PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
(As extended by S. Con. Res. 49, 79th Congress)
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 7
JANUARY 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28 AND 29, 1946

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
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JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman
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HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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2 | 401-982 | 1059-2586 | Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3 | 983-1583 | 2587-4194 | Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
6 | 2493-2920 | 6647-7888 | Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
8 | 3379-3927 | 9108-10517 | Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9 | 3929-4599 | 10518-12277 | Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10 | 4601-5151 | 12278-13708 | Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11 | 5153-5560 | 13709-14765 | Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

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XIV

CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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1 Pages referred to relate to sworn answers submitted by the witness to written interrogatories.
2 Sworn statement presented to committee.
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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

TUESDAY, JANUARY 22, 1946

Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[7890] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

General, will you hold up your hand?

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER C. SHORT, UNITED STATES ARMY, RETIRED

(Having been first duly sworn by the Chairman.)

The CHAIRMAN. General, the Chair understands that you have a statement here which you desire to read, or to have read, due to the fact that you have been somewhat indisposed.

If you would like to have someone else read it, it would be entirely agreeable to the committee, or if you wish to read it yourself, why, you may proceed.

General SHORT. Mr. Chairman, I have been in the hospital with pneumonia, and have not entirely recovered my strength, but I shall make every effort to go through my testimony before this committee without interruption.

I prefer to read it myself.

The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed.

General SHORT. Mr. Chairman; I want to thank you and the members of the committee for giving me, after 4 long years, the opportunity to tell my story of Pearl Harbor to the American public. I appeared before the Roberts commission but was not permitted to hear the other witnesses nor given the privilege of cross-examination. I was not [7891] given the opportunity to read the evidence taken before the Roberts commission until August 1944. I appeared before the Army Pearl Harbor board, but again was not permitted to hear the other witnesses nor given the privilege of cross-examination; however, I was furnished a copy of the hearings except for the

1 Italic figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript of testimony.
2 Subtitles and consecutively numbered footnotes in General Short’s testimony were supplied by him; footnotes indicated by * were supplied by the staff of the committee.
part considered top secret. The Army board labeled certain evidence top secret and I was never permitted to see that until this committee was about to meet. Both boards took testimony off the record which has not been made available to me.

Before taking up my statement in detail, there are a few points that I would like to mention for emphasis. These will be elaborated upon later.

1. On Pearl Harbor day I was carrying out orders from the War Department as I understood them.

2. At no time since June 17, 1940, had the War Department indicated the probability of an attack on Hawaii. In none of the estimates prepared by G-2 War Department was Hawaii mentioned as a point of attack, but the Philippines was mentioned repeatedly.

3. There was in the War Department an abundance of information which was vital to me but which was not furnished to me. This information was absolutely essential to a correct estimate of the situation and correct decision. My estimate of the situation and my decision were made without the benefit of this vital information. Had this information been furnished to me, I am sure that I would have arrived at the conclusion that Hawaii would be attacked and would have gone on an all-out alert.

4. When I made the decision, based on the information available to me, to go on alert to prevent sabotage (No. 1), I reported measures taken as follows:

Reurad 472 27th Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy.

The War Department had 9 days in which to tell me that my action was not what they wanted. I accepted their silence as a full agreement with the action taken. I am convinced that all who read the report thought that my action was correct or I would have received instructions to modify my orders.

I would like to pass out at this time a chart. Copies of these charts, in colors, will be placed on the bulletin board. They are not large enough to be very readily seen from there.

I have had several charts prepared that may be of assistance to this committee in the course of my testimony.

Chart No. 1 is a chronological summary. It shows my appointment to Hawaii in December 1940, my conversations in Washington in January 1941, and the period of my correspondence and testimony which have been considered. I have met with the War Department and with the Navy Department, and since February 7, 1941, until December 17, 1941.

It traces my 10 months of effort to strengthen Hawaiian Defense. As I mention these efforts in the course of my testimony, a glance at this chart will show how the particular matter fitted into the chronological picture.

At the foot of the chart are listed the various requests and requisitions I made of the War Department, most of which were disapproved. An “X” on the chart indicates the date of disapproval of my request. The committee may see at a glance that by December 7, the picture clearly showed that the War Department was not favorably considering my efforts to strengthen the great Hawaiian outpost.

The chronological summary also shows the “alert” messages and the replies, beginning July 8, 1941. It shows the step-up in traffic from the 24th to the 28th of November. And it portrays graphically the 9 days
of silence which the War Department maintained after I sent my second sabotage-alert report.

It shows, also, the December 4 sabotage report, which was sent by General Martin from Hawaii on December 4, but for some reason never reached the War Department until December 10. (The chart referred to is included in "Exhibit No. 134").

General Short. Introduction:

1. Appointment to Hawaii

The Chief of Staff selected me as the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department. I was first notified in December 1940. I held conferences in Washington, D.C., with General Marshall the first week in January 1941. I also conferred with General Gerow in the War Plans Division. I talked with some officer about the equipment of the Hawaiian Department. I talked with Colonel (now General) Spaatz about the Air Corps problem.

2. Assumption of command

At the time I assumed command on February 7, 1941, the Hawaiian Department was amply prepared for defense against the submarine danger and against sabotage and espionage, but was not adequately prepared for defense against an air raid, either by bomber or by torpedo planes or both. On February 7, 1941, the Chief of Staff sent me a letter, detailing his policies regarding the Army mission in Hawaii and stressing his interest in strengthening our air power and antiaircraft defense. In that letter he deplored the fact that all defenses would be inadequately equipped because of the over-all shortage of aircraft and anti-aircraft equipment.

EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN DEFENSES

3. 10 months' efforts.

During the 10 months immediately following my assumption of command, in full cooperation with the Navy, I made strenuous efforts to improve the defense system of the Hawaiian Islands.

4. Agreements with Navy

A joint agreement with reference to the employment of the air forces was concluded with the Navy, and has heretofore been called to the attention of this committee. Pertinent extracts have been selected by the counsel for the committee and introduced here as exhibit 44. Committee exhibit 13, the air study dated August 20, 1941, is also before the committee. These agreements specifically placed the responsibility for distant reconnaissance upon the Navy and provided that the Army, when called upon, should furnish to the Navy any available aircraft for assisting in this reconnaissance. It specified also that when Army planes were detailed to assist in the distant reconnaissance they would act directly under the orders of the Navy and report to the Navy the results obtained in carrying out the mission.

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1 See letter, Secretary of Navy to Secretary of War, dated January 24, 1941, and reply by the Secretary of War, Joint Committee, Daily Record, vol. 5, pp. 720–728.

5. Statement to Roberts commission

At the time that I was called before the Roberts commission, I prepared and submitted to them a large document marked as their "Exhibit No. 7." I am submitting a copy of this long document to this joint congressional committee, in order that you may have it available in your own records and in order that I may refer to it in this statement.

6. Statement to Roberts commission

At this time I want to call attention to pages 28 to 48, inclusive, of exhibit 7 of the Roberts commission and to the exhibits lettered "V" through "Z," and "IA" through "IR," as annexed to that exhibit 7. On those pages and in those exhibits, I developed at some length and in considerable detail, the nature of my effort to improve Hawaiian defense.

The Vice Chairman. General, pardon an interruption.

Do we have before us this exhibit from the Roberts testimony that the General is referring to?

Mr. Kaufman. Yes, sir. Reference was made to it the other day, Mr. Chairman, and indication was made by Mr. Masten that there were only five copies available.

The Vice Chairman. That is the one, is it?

Mr. Kaufman. That is the one.

The Vice Chairman. All right.


General Short (continuing):

7. Statement to Roberts commission

I think it unnecessary at this time to read all the factual data that I previously collected for the Roberts commission. Those who wish to check the details are referred to the statement which I made to the Roberts commission. I believe that it will be sufficient if I summarize briefly my efforts to increase the defenses of Hawaii.

8. Letter to General Marshall 19 February 1941

My initial study of the problem was incorporated in a letter to General Marshall on February 19, 1941, and is copied on pages 4 to 9, committee exhibit No. 53, "Correspondence between General Marshall and General Short."

9. Airfield bunkers

On February 19, 1941, a letter was sent to the War Department recommending that $1,565,600 be allotted for the purpose of providing protective bunkers and the necessary taxiways and hard standings for our aircraft. On September 12, 1941, the War Department promised $1,358,000, but these funds were not to become available until January 1, 1942, nearly 30 days after the attack. As a result of the delay of this project, on December 7, 1941, it was impracticable to disperse the planes adequately at Hickam Field or to protect them from an air raid. Bunkers at Wheeler Field [7899] had been constructed with soldier labor.3

3 See exhibit "W" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission.
10. **Military roads and trails**

On February 19, 1941, I requested $1,370,000 for construction of military roads and trails. Up to December 7, 1941, only $350,000 had been allotted to us.⁴

11. **Coast artillery**

On February 18, 1941, I requested two regiments of mobile coast artillery. As a result, the War Department, in May 1941, authorized certain increases in the coast artillery garrison, to be gradually furnished us between June 1941 and March 1942. The War Department, however, disapproved our request of February 25, 1941, for an increase in enlisted men of the 251st Coast Artillery Regiment from 1,181 to 1,450.⁵ This was an intial aircraft regiment.

12. **Kaneohe Naval Air Station**

In February 1941, the Army assumed responsibility for the defense of the naval air station at Kaneohe Bay. General Marshall concurred with this change in the defense plan. On April 14, 1941, a letter was sent to the adjutant general recommending procurement of a 12-inch gun battery for the Kaneohe Bay area. I requested an increase of the war strength [⁷⁹⁰⁰] garrison to 71,500 to provide appropriate defenses for Kaneohe Bay and for station complements. This request, as well as our subsequent letters, did not receive favorable consideration from the War Department.⁶

13. **The Infantry**

As early as April 25, 1941, I requested the organization of two triangular divisions in place of the Hawaiian division (square), the formation of station complements at Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter, and the activation of an air-defense command. At this time the square division was outmoded and no longer in use in the mainland units. On May 29, 1941, the War Department reduced our initial war garrison to 58,000. I immediately protested and asked that the allotment be increased to 71,500 and repeated my request for station complements. These requests met with disapproval, except that authority was granted in July for the organization of the two triangular divisions,⁷ with a reduced over-all strength remaining at 58,000 instead of 71,500 as requested by me.

14. **Additional airfields**

Proper air defense and training urgently required the construction of additional airfields. Numerous letters were 7901] dispatched between April 5, 1941, and May 14, 1941, with specific recommendations for 10 airports. Up until the time of the attack, no funds had been specifically allotted by the War Department, although plans had been approved. By directing that an air field be constructed at Kahuku, delay was occasioned by protracted negotiations. In an effort to start fields without waiting for the receipt of funds, I directed the use of soldier labor at Molokai, Burns, Morse, and Barking

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⁴ Exhibit "1A" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission.
⁵ Exhibit "13" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission.
⁶ Exhibit "1C" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission; letter, March 13, 1941, General Marshall to General Short, p. 13, committee exhibit No. 53.
⁷ Exhibit "1L" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission.
Sands. I considered the immediate improvement of Bellows Field vital for the protection of Oahu and so informed the War Department. The War Department approved plans for the project but did not immediately allocate funds. However, the district engineer was directed to take all possible steps until such time as the specific funds were made available. By this makeshift means gasoline storage tanks were completed and a 5,000-foot runway was half completed on December 7, 1941.  

15. Landing strips

On June 21, 1941, the War Department's attention was directed to the necessity for landing strips at Wheeler Field. In spite of a prolonged exchange of communications on this subject, no funds were allotted or received for this purpose. Limited improvements were made by soldier labor.

16. Radar

The aircraft warning service was regarded as probably the most important single defense project. The priorities granted to us, however, made it impossible to complete the permanent radar stations prior to the time of the attack.

17. Priorities

The priorities situation also rendered it impossible to obtain supplies except from the mainland, with delivery delayed 6 to 8 weeks even under the most favorable conditions. We made repeated efforts to correct this situation, but no success had been made up to the time of the attack. In this respect, as well as all others, the War Department reserved to itself full control of the determination of the strategic importance of the various defense projects and in the case of aircraft warning material did not favorably consider my request that a higher priority be granted to us.

18. Camouflage of airfields

On July 15, 1941, we requested funds for camouflage treatment of airfields. The War Department, apparently acting upon their estimate that air attack was improbable, had furnished us no funds for this purpose prior to December 7, 1941. The effectiveness of camouflaging which we were able to do was limited by our inability to buy the necessary materials.

19. Field fortifications

Along the same line, our request for funds for field fortifications and camouflage was also denied by the War Department. No funds were given us for this purpose.

20. Advance procurement funds

In July 28, 1941, we requested a revolving fund allotment of $1,000,000 to permit advance procurement of essential materials. In September the Deputy Chief of Staff allotted $500,000 for this fund, but before any materials could be secured the War Department di-

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8 Exhibit "1B" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission.
9 See p. 33 and exhibit "1D" of exhibit 7, Roberts commission.
10 Exhibit "1E" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission.
11 Exhibit "1F" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission.
12 Exhibit "Z" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission.
13 Exhibit "Y" to exhibit 7, Roberts commission.
verted the money for housing at Kaneohe Bay. As a result, no reserve supplies, except lumber, had been accumulated.\textsuperscript{14}

21. Air depot

Our air depot at Hickam Field was extremely vulnerable to attack. Therefore on September 10, 1941, I recommended that bombproof facilities for aircraft repair be constructed, costing $3,480,650. On October 27, the War Department informed me that:

\* \* \* it is a policy that such facilities will not be provided.\textsuperscript{15}

\[7904\] During the attack, this air depot was a main target and suffered tremendous damage. Immediately after the attack, funds were provided, and underground, bombproof facilities were begun.

22. May 1941 maneuvers

During our May 1941 maneuvers, it was found that our then existent defensive field orders were too cumbersome. On July 14, 1941, a tentative Standing Operating Procedure was issued. In letters dated October 10 and 28, General Marshall suggested certain changes in this defense plan, relative to the Air Corps mission, which suggestions we adopted in the final draft of the S. O. P., dated 5 November 1941.\textsuperscript{16} Due to this plan and the familiarization of all units with it, all personnel down to the last man were able to act promptly in the execution of their missions when the raid took place. This they did in a most creditable manner.

23. Standing operating procedure

The Standing Operating Procedure of November 5, 1941, was issued to comply with paragraph 159, FM 100-5, issued by the War Department on May 22, 1941, which states:

In every unit, standing operating procedure is prescribed by the commander whenever practicable.

\[7905\] This procedure covers those features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness. The adoption of such procedures will save time in the preparation and issuance of orders, minimize the chances for confusion, and errors when under stress of combat, and greatly simplify and expedite the execution of operations in the field.

the value of having a standing operating procedure was fully demonstrated at the time of the attack.

I wish to pass out chart No. 2 at this time.

The Vice Chairman. This [indicating] is the chart you refer to, General?

General Short. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. I believe all members of the committee have it.

General Short. This chart will summarize for the committee the requests I made of the War Department and the amount I was granted.

It shows that I requested a total of some $22,953,697 for projects which the responsible officers in Hawaii considered vital for national defense.
It shows that the War Department granted us only $350,000—for roads and trails.

The grants totaled about 1½ percent of the requests. That situation speaks for itself.

I want to add that beginning December 7, 1941, right after [7905] the attack, I was given a blank check for everything I needed.

(Chart No. 2 appears in "Exhibit No. 134.")


24. Civilian defense program

From page 43 through page 48 of the statement which I submitted to the Roberts commission, I discussed the civilian defense program of the islands. The committee may examine that statement for an outline of this phase. The defensive measures to enable the civilian population to meet any emergency which might arise where covered under the following headings:

(1) Production and storage of food.
(2) Organization of doctors and nurses for care of injured and wounded.
(3) An agreement with the Red Cross for it to purchase and store in Honolulu $200,000 worth of medicines and surgical supplies and equipment for use in any possible emergency.
(4) Organization of an auxiliary to the police force to guard utilities and prevent sabotage.
(5) Preparation of plans and provision for evacuation of women and children and preparation of shelters for workers in the vicinity of central industries.

[7908] Governor Poindexter’s letter. I think the best summary of my work in preparing the civilian population to meet any emergency is found in the letter of Gov. Joseph B. Poindexter, dated December 23, 1941, which I should like to quote in full: 17

SEAL OF THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII

EXECUTIVE CHAMBERS,
Honolulu, 23 December 1941.

Lieutenant General Walter C. Short,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

MY DEAR GENERAL SHORT: Having noted in the public press that an investigation is being made as to the military preparedness of the Army and Navy in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, I believe it appropriate that I make to you a statement as to the state of preparedness of the civil communities of these Islands for war when they were so insidiously and treacherously attacked on December 7, 1941.

The citizens of the Hawaiian Islands have always appreciated that these Islands were important to National De—[7909] fense from a military standpoint, but it has only been since your arrival in these Islands on February 5, 1941 that it has been brought home to the civil population the importance of the part it would play in the event of a war in the Pacific. On December 7th, the citizens of these Islands met the hour of their test in such a manner as to make me proud to be the Chief Executive of these Islands. Your foresight in urging the population to prepare to meet the possible vicissitudes of war and the joint efforts of the Army and civil population in planning and preparing for this emergency was magnificently rewarded.

17 See exhibit 7, Roberts commission, pp. 47a to 47c.
It may be of interest to point out in detail some of the plans and preparations which bore fruit on December 7, 1941:

1) The enactment of the Hawaiian Defense Act by a special session of the Legislature called for that purpose. This legislation permits a mobilization of the entire civil economy of the Islands in the interest of National Defense or in the event of disaster. By virtue of this Act, civilian defense was planned and many of its phases were brought to such a point of preparation that they were able to go into action immediately and to function effectively on December 7, 1941.

2) The production and conservation of food:

Householders were persistently urged to stock their shelves in canned food. It is estimated that this resulted in increasing the available food supply of the Hawaiian Islands by more than twenty percent. Federal appropriation was requested for procurement and storage for food reserve. This appropriation has, since December 7, 1941, been authorized. By agreement with plantation owners, plans were made for the procurement and storage of seed and the planting of certain large areas with quick growing food crops. Agreements were also made for the growing, in normal times, of these crops not usually grown in marketable quantities. In furtherance of this plan, the War Department was induced to permit the purchase of Island-grown potatoes for the use of the Army although the price was above that of mainland potatoes. In anticipation of the receipt of reserve supplies of food asked for in the emergency, the Army supported a certificate of necessity for building an adequate warehouse to meet these needs. This warehouse is now available for the storage of food supply when it arrives.

3) The medical facilities for the care of the injured and wounded during any disaster was one of the first things accomplished by the civilians of these Islands for an emergency. This resulted in mobilizing the entire medical profession of the Islands with all its medical facilities. Approximately three thousand persons were given training and instruction in First-Aid as required by the Red Cross. The persons thus trained assisted in carrying out the arduous tasks of evacuation. Twenty First-Aid units were organized, each unit consisting of personnel of about one hundred and twenty. An ambulance corps of one hundred and forty improvised ambulances were organized. The performance of their tasks by these groups was one of the highlights of the civil defense efforts on December 7, 1941.

4) Plans for the evacuation of women and children and the preparation of shelters for workers inessential industries had reached a high state of perfection on December 7, 1941, and the evacuation of women and children from areas attacked was accomplished in a most admirable manner.

5) An auxiliary police force to guard utilities and to prevent sabotage was organized at an early date in our preparation and it was able to function instantly when called upon to do so on the morning of December 7th. The work of this force was exceptional and excellent.

6) Legislation authorizing a home guard was enacted at the special session of the Territorial Legislature. It was well planned and so organized that 1400 of such home guardsmen could be and were placed on duty thereby relieving members of the Army for other military duty.

7) There were many other matters too numerous to detail here which were planned and accomplished at your instigation. Important among these was the bringing home to the public the urgent necessity for cooperation and public service in times of emergency.

All of the foregoing required tremendous effort on the part of the local authorities, the citizenry and military authorities. All such efforts have been rewarded since December 7, 1941, in that Territorial and City Governments and all phases of the public welfare have overcome all obstacles and have operated smoothly as a direct result of prior planning and training.

It is my belief that the public has confidence in the military and civil authorities. The fact that the Japanese Government has seen fit to inflict a treacherous attack has not in any way diminished the faith of this community in your demonstrated abilities. I wish to state that the magnificent way in which the Territory of Hawaii met its problem in its crucial hour was in a large measure due to your foresight. I am deeply grateful for your efforts on behalf of the Territory.

You are at liberty to use this letter in any way which you see fit.

Very sincerely yours,

J. B. Poindexter,  
Governor of Hawaii.

Prior to the time that I assumed command in Hawaii, General Marshall had definitely indicated his intention to direct personally any genuine prewar alert. As commanding general and as a matter of training I was, of course, fully authorized to conduct drills, maneuvers, and practice alerts. Numerous maneuvers, general and special practice alerts were, in fact, held. However, as a part of my orientation, on the day before I assumed command, General Herron, my predecessor, acquainted me with the relation which had existed between himself and General Marshall during the all-out alert which began June 17, 1940. In that alert, General Marshall had directed the alert and had closely supervised its continuance, as disclosed in committee exhibit No. 52, Communications Between War Department and General Herron Concerning 1940 Alert. The following message began the alert:

June 17, 1940. No. 428. Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with possible trans-Pacific raid, to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communication direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly. Acknowledge.

27. Supervision by Chief of Staff

The record is clear that at the time of the 1940 alert the Chief of Staff had sufficient time and sense of personal responsibility toward the Hawaiian Department to order and to supervise the Hawaiian alert. In addition, he had information which caused him to state that—

* * * In any event it would have been foolhardy not to take special precautions.

28. Expected action of Chief of Staff

In was my expectation that if the Chief of Staff once again had information causing him to expect a “trans-Pacific raid” against Oahu, he would follow the course he had previously set as an example. I felt that a Chief of Staff who had personally supervised the long-continued 1940 alert would certainly have the time and interest not only to read and to understand my succinct report “Reurad four seven two 27th Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy”, but to send further word in the event that he disagreed in any way with the measures I had taken in obedience to his November 27 directive. At the time that the previous alert had been modified, on July 16, 1940, the Chief of Staff had thought that the sabotage menace continued, even though the air raid danger had subsided. He had said that he wanted the Air Corps training resumed in such manner that the “aerial patrol measures” could be reestablished on short notice.
29. **Rainbow Five.**

The basic war plan was called Rainbow Five by the Army and WPL-46 by the Navy. This plan could be put into effect only by the War and Navy Departments.\(^{21}\)

30. **Local defense plan.**

The joint coastal frontier defense plan for Hawaii was approved by Admiral Bloch and me on 11 April 1941, based, of course, on the Rainbow Plan. Under this plan, the Navy undertook responsibility for "distant reconnaissance." \(^{22}\) No part of this joint plan would take effect until the War Department ordered M-day under the Rainbow Plan, unless it was ordered in effect from Washington or by mutual agreement of the Army and Navy in Hawaii. \(^{23}\) Due to my knowledge of the attitude of the War Department, I would never have ordered any part of the plan into effect \([7916]\) without consulting it, as long as communications were open and time permitted. Under the circumstances preceding the attack, the War Department, with far more intimate knowledge of the nature of the Japanese situation, had not ordered M-day, had not put the Rainbow Plan into effect, in whole or in part, and had expressed no dissatisfaction with my report of a sabotage alert. The only conclusion I could draw was that it did not want the war plans implemented because of the possible alarm to the public or the danger of provoking the Japanese. Their silence I took as concurrence with the degree of alert I had adopted.

**INFORMATION FURNISHED HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT**

31. **Information in general.**

I want to outline for the committee the information which the War Department furnished me during the critical 10-day period preceding the attack.

Pass out chart No. 6, please.

(Chart No. 6 is included in "Exhibit No. 134.")

\([7918]\) General Short. Chart No. 6 is an attempt to show on the map the important factors which entered into my estimate of the situation—the things which led me to think that the Japanese were not going to attack Hawaii.

1. The last official prediction of an imminent trans-Pacific raid on Oahu was the Marshall-Herron alert of 1940 (shown by a broken line on the map from Japan to Honolulu.)

2. The current information in November 1941 from Washington pointed to a Jap attack on Russia, Siam, Kra, the Philippines, or Borneo—shown by heavy dark arrows stemming from Japan.

3. The current information also indicated that the probable danger in Hawaii, Guam, and Samoa was "internal attack"; that is, hostile action in the form of sabotage and subversive activities.

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\(^{21}\) Sec. IX, par. 53, Rainbow Five; sec. VIII, par. 40a, Rainbow Five.

\(^{22}\) Par. 18, 1, Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, April 18, 1941.

\(^{23}\) Par. 15, 6, (2), Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, April 18, 1941.
4. Meantime, Hawaii was a focal point in transporting troops, B-17's and air crews to the Philippines. The planes were always sent to Hawaii unarmed, but when sending them out to the more dangerous area of the Philippines, we were instructed to arm them.

5. Discussion was going on about Army troops moving out to Christmas and Canton to relieves the Marines—shown by a dotted line on the map.

6. The Marshalls were the nearest Jap territory.

[7919] With such a picture, the committee can get a better idea of the considerations which weighed on my mind.

32. Background since 1940 alert

As a matter of brief background, the committee should recall the precedent set by the Marshall-Herron alert of 1940. They should also bear in mind the message from The Adjutant General on July 25, 1941 which is shown in committee exhibit No. 32 (reading):

WASHINGTON, D. C., 152A July 8, 1941.

Nine two four seventh AGMC for your information deduction from information from numerous sources is that Japanese govt has determined upon its future policy which is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups period. This policy is at present one of watchful waiting involving probable aggressive action against maritime provinces of Russia if and when Siberian garrison has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia period. Opinion is that Jap activity in the south will be for the present confined to seizure and development of naval army and air bases in Indo China although an advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out period. Neutrality [7920] pact with Russia may be abrogated period. They have ordered all Jap vessels in US Atlantic ports to be west of Panama Canal by first August period. Movement of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are being requisitioned.

This is the only message sent direct by the War Department to me which indicates that “magic” sources were being used by the information center. It also is the only message received from the War Department that made a definite estimate as to probable Japanese action.

I should like also to read the message of July 25, 1941 received through Naval Intelligence, shown in committee Exhibit No. 32. This is addressed to Admiral Kimmel from Admiral Stark. [Reading]:

This is a joint dispatch from the CNO and the chief of staff US Army x. Appropriate adees deliver copies to commanding generals Hawaii Philippines and Caribbean defense command and to General Chaney in London xx. You are advised that at 1400 GCT July twenty sixth United States will impose economic sanctions against Japan x. It is expected these sanctions will embargo all trade between Japan and the United States subject to modification through a licensing system for certain [7921] material x. It is anticipated that export licenses will be granted for certain grades of petroleum products cotton and possibly some other materials and that import licenses may be granted for raw silk x. Japanese assets and funds in the United States will be frozen except that they may be moved if licenses are granted for such movement x. It is not repeat not expected that Japanese merchant vessels in United States ports will be seized at this time x. United States flag merchant vessels will not at present be ordered to depart from or to enter ports controlled by Japan x. CNO and COS do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by Japan through the use of military means but you are furnished this information in order that you may take appropriate precautionary measures against possible eventualities x. Action being initiated by the United States army to call the Philippine army into active service at an early date xx. This despatch is to be kept secret except from immediate and
army subordinates x Spenavo CinCPac CinCLant CinCAF Com Fifteen Spenavo London xx.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. General, would you pardon an interruption there? What is the page of that which you just read?
General SHORT. That is on page 2 of Exhibit No. 32.
The VICE CHAIRMAN. And what was the page of the other [7922] one you read?
General SHORT. The other was page 1.
The VICE CHAIRMAN. Page 1?
General SHORT. Yes, sir.
The VICE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. May I have the page number which you are reading from now?
General SHORT. Page 2 of Exhibit 32.
Mr. Gearhart. No, I mean of your statement.
General SHORT. Page 16 of my statement.
Also, on October 20, 1941, the Army had informed me that they expected "no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy" 25 in spite of the fact that the Navy Department had predicted possible hostilities on October 16, 1941. 26 These two messages are so diametrically opposed in their views that I should like to read them.
The VICE CHAIRMAN. Will you please give the page every time you read one?
General SHORT. Yes, sir. On page 3 of Exhibit 32 a message sent by Ingersoll to Admiral Kimmel dated October 16, 1941.

[7923] The resignation of the Japanese Cabinet has created a grave situation X If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti-American X If the Konoye cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the US X In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility X Since the US and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers X In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan X Second and third adees inform appropriate Army and Naval district authorities X Acknowledge XX.

That was a quite definite prediction of hostile action on the part of Japan.

Now, the Army message reads as follows; page No. 4, exhibit 32:

WASHN, D. C., 1234P Oct. 20, 1941.

20th Following War Dept. estimate of Japanese situation for your information Stop Tension between United States and Japan remains strained but no repeat [7924] no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent.

ADAMS.

33. Sabotage versus air danger

General Marshall's testimony made a strong point of the fact that in the correspondence between him and the Hawaiiaan Department, sabotage was not mentioned but that the letters were confined largely to aircraft and antiaircraft defense. He stated that he did not understand the reason why sabotage then should later be emphasized.

25 Radiogram, 20 October 1941, Adjutant General to Short, p. 4, committee exhibit 32.
26 Radiogram, 16 October 1941, CNO to CINCPAC; p. 3, committee exhibit 32; p. 20-B, exhibit 37.
The reason that sabotage was never discussed in my letters to General Marshall was the fact that we had in Hawaii all of the equipment necessary to prevent sabotage. Our letters were written to emphasize the need of aircraft and antiaircraft defense. The Secretary of the Navy had stated in his letter to the Secretary of War on January 24, 1941, that defense against sabotage had been provided for satisfactorily. I agreed fully with this statement. There was therefore no reason to make requests upon the Chief of Staff with reference to equipment or material for antisabotage measures.

34. Nov. 24 message to Kimmel

On November 24, 1941, Admiral Kimmel received the following message from the Chief of Naval Operations, concurred in by the Chief of Staff:

There are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan. This situation, coupled with statements of Nippon Government and movements of their naval and military force, indicate, in our opinion, that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility. The Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch and concurs and requests action. Inform senior Army officers in respective areas. Utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate the already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action.27

This message indicated possible movement in the direction of the Philippines or Guam and called for secrecy.

35. Nov. 27 message to Kimmel

On November 27th the Chief of Naval Operations sent to the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet the following message which was made known to me:

Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned to WPL 46. Guam, Samoa, and Continental Districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Inform naval district and army authorities. British to be informed by Spenavo.28

You will notice that whereas the message of the 24th indicated a possible attack on Guam, by this time they had decided that the movement was entirely to the south and they indicated only sabotage arrangements on the island of Oahu.

While this message is headed "War Warning," it should be noted that Navy War Plan 46 was not placed in effect by the Navy Department, but a defensive deployment was ordered in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned under Navy War Plans 46. This indicated that later directions would be received if it became necessary to carry out this plan. Japanese action toward the south was indicated. I want to emphasize the following sentence from the message:

You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46.

27 Message November 24, Navy to Kimmel, p. 28–B, exhibit 37.
28 Message November 27, Navy to Kimmel, p. 31–B, exhibit 37.
Such defensive deployment would necessarily include distant reconnaissance.

36. Do-Don’t message

On November 27 I received the following radiogram from the Chief of Staff which, on account of its conflicting instructions, the Army Pearl Harbor Board called the “Do-or-Don’t message”: 29

No. 472. Negotiations with the Japanese appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they [7928] pertain to Japan. Limit the dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.” 30

The impression conveyed to me by this message was that the avoidance of war was paramount and the greatest fear of the War Department was that some international incident might occur in Hawaii and be regarded by Japan as an overt act. That this opinion was in accordance with the views of General Marshall is shown by the following quotation from his testimony:

So far as public opinion was concerned, I think the Japanese were capitalizing on the belief that it would be very difficult to bring our people into a willingness to enter the war. That, incidentally, was somewhat confirmed by the governmental policy on our part of making certain that the overt act should not be attributed to the United States, because of the state of the public mind at the time. Of course, no one anticipated that that overt act would be the crippling of the Pacific Fleet. 31

No mention was made of a probable attack on Hawaii since the alert message of June 17, 1940. An examination of the various Military Intelligence estimates prepared by G-2 WD, shows that in no estimate did G-2 ever indicate the probability of an attack on Hawaii. 32 There was nothing in the message directing me to be prepared to meet an air raid or an all-out attack. “Hostile action at any moment” meant to me that as far as Hawaii was concerned the War Department was predicting sabotage. Sabotage is a form of hostile action.

37. Sabotage emphasis

The only additional information received from the War Department after the receipt of message No. 472 (November 27) was contained in three messages on sabotage and subversive measures. The first from G-2 War Department to G-2 Hawaiian Department received November 27 read as follows:

Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate. Hostilities may ensue. Subversive activities may be expected. Inform Commanding General and Chief of Staff only. 33

32 Exhibit 33.
This message was erroneously paraphrased in the Army Pearl Harbor Board report, page 133, to indicate that hostilities were "probable."

38. Report by General Short

I replied as follows to the radiogram from the Chief of Staff November 27:

[7930] CHIEF OF STAFF, WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington D. C.

Reurad four seven two 27th Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy.

SHORT.34

I wish to point out that this message reporting measures taken referred by number to the message which I had received from the War Department. If the War Department had checked the message carefully, there could have been no possible mistake that it was in reply to War Department message No. 472 which directed a report of the measures taken. War Department message No. 472, November 27, was the only message addressed to the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, signed "Marshall." The message of November 27, No. 473, signed "Miles," was addressed to G-2, Hawaiian Department, and did not call for a report. My message No. 959, November 27, was addressed to the Chief of Staff, referred by number to No. 472, and stated that I was reporting measures taken. It is difficult to see how there could have been any possible confusion as to the message which was being answered. Failure to check my message No. 959 to determine to which War Department message it was a reply probably came about only because all who read the message believed the action [7931] was correct. General Marshall, in his testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, stated:

We anticipated, beyond a doubt, a Japanese movement in Indochina and the Gulf of Siam, and against the Malay Peninsula. We anticipate also an assault on the Philippines. We did not, so far as I recall, anticipate an attack on Hawaii; the reason being that we thought, with the addition of more modern planes, that the defense there would be sufficient to make it extremely hazardous for the Japanese to attempt such an attack.35

39. November 28 Sabotage message and report

On November 28 the following message, relating entirely to sabotage and subversive measures, was received from the War Department:

HAWN DEPT Ft SHAFTER TH

482 23dth Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities within field of investigatory responsibility of War Department (see paragraph three MID SC 30-45). Also desired that you initiate forth all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishment, property, and equipment against sabotage, protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage. This does not, repeat not, mean that any illegal measures are authorized. Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security, avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm. To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not, repeat not, affect your responsibility under existing instructions. ADAMS.36

When this message was received from the War Department I felt that it had been prepared after consideration had been given to my message reporting measures taken pursuant to War Department mes-

34 P. 12, exhibit 32.
36 November 28, message No. 482 from The Adjutant General; p. 13, exhibit 32.
sage No. 472. I sent the following message in reply and was careful to refer directly to the War Department number, "482":

**The Adjutant General,**

**War Department, Washington, D. C.**

Re your secret radio 482 28th, full precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of War Department (paragraph 3 MID SC 30–45) and military establishments including personnel and equipment. As regards protection of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power plants, telephone exchanges and highway bridges, this headquarters by confidential letter dated June 19, 1941, requested the Governor of the Territory to use the broad powers vested in him by Section 67 of the Organic Act which provides, in effect, that the Governor may call upon the commanders of military and naval forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, etc. Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June 20th confidentially made a formal written demand on this headquarters to furnish and continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage, and lawless violence in connection therewith, being committed against vital installations and structures in the Territory. Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is now being afforded vital civilian installations. In this connection, at the instigation of this headquarters the City and County of Honolulu on June 30th, 1941, enacted an ordinance which permits the Commanding General Hawaiian Department to close, or restrict the use of and travel upon, any highway within the City and County of Honolulu, whenever the Commanding General deems such action necessary in the interest of national defense. The authority thus given has not yet been exercised. Relations with FBI and all other Federal and Territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters.

**Short.**

40. General Arnold’s radiogram

On November 28 General Arnold, Chief of the Air Corps, sent to the commanding general, Hawaiian Air Forces, a message relating entirely to sabotage and subversive activities, similar in tone to War Department message No. 482, signed “Adams.” General Martin, replying to this message on December 4, gave a detailed report of measures taken by him against sabotage and subversive activities and added:

This entire department is now operating and will continue to operate under an alert for prevention of sabotage.

We received no reply disagreeing in any way with the action reported.

41. November 28 to December 7, 1941

From November 28, 1941, until the war began, I received only one more message from the War Department, that of November 29, 1941, regarding preparations to move two Army pursuit squadrons on short notice, and informing me that the Army would take over the defense of advance Pacific bases, except for furnishing antiaircraft equipment. This message stated that Christmas and Canton Islands would be garrisoned from Hawaii, and replacements would be sent from the United States. This was the last information from the War Department until the final message from the Chief of Staff of December 7, which arrived 7 hours after the attack.

I do not believe that message has been placed in evidence.

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37 P. 17, exhibit 32.
34 P. 14, exhibit 37.
36 Message, December 4, No. 1033, General Martin to General Arnold; p. 19, exhibit 32.
40 No footnote supplied in official transcript.
79716—46—pt. 7—3
Mr. Kaufman. Counsel for General Short has suggested that we offer in evidence at this point a telegram from the War Department to General Short dated November 29, 1941. The request was made by counsel for General Short.

The Vice Chairman. Do we have copies for the committee?

Mr. Kaufman. We have photostats; and I think they have been handed around to the members of the committee this morning.

The Vice Chairman. Does counsel desire that the message be read at this time?

Mr. Kaufman. Either read into the record, or marked as an exhibit. I suggest it be read into the record.

The Vice Chairman. Suppose you read it into the record.

Mr. Kaufman (reading):

Approved by the President
March 10, 1926.
Telegram.
Official Business—Government Rates
Cablegram
Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department, Fort Klafter, T. H.
Consult C in C Pacific Fleet reference his dispatch number two eight zero six two seven to Chief of Naval Operations period. In view of information contained in above dispatch comma the movement of the two Army pursuit squadrons as indicated in War Department cable number four six six comma November two six comma one nine four one comma will be suspended period. These squadrons should however be prepared to move on short notice period. Paragraph War Department has offered to take over defense of Pacific advance bases from the Navy except for furnishing antiaircraft equipment period. Consult C in C Pacific Fleet reference requirements and areas to be defended period. War Department has also assumed responsibility for defense of Christmas and Canton period. It is contemplated that you will form base defense units from the Hawaiian garrison. [7938] specially organized as task forces for particular areas period. If these units are moved from Oahu comma necessary replacements from the United States will be furnished period. Report your conclusions and recommendations to the War Department at the earliest practicable date.

Green cy w/d & destroyed by burning. Signature illegible
12/30/41, CDM—1705.
[Stamped] Secret.

Senator Ferguson. What is the name of that man at the bottom of the telegram?

Mr. Kaufman. The notation here is "signature illegible."

General Short. I think it was General Wall.

The Vice Chairman. It does not look like "Wall" on my copy. It looks more like "Williams."

Mr. Murphy. Does the record now show there is a notation that the signature is illegible?

Mr. Kaufman. There is a notation on the mimeographed copy. On the photostatic copy there is a signature, but I cannot make it out.

General Short believes that it is the signature of General Wall.

General Short. I may be wrong, but it looks like "Wall," the last four letters.

Senator Brewster. What are his initials?
General Short. I do not know.

Senator Brewster. Isn't there somebody that can clarify that? I think there is somebody in the War Department that can tell whose signature it is.

Mr. Kaufman. Somebody suggested "Sullivan." We will make an effort to find out whose signature it is.

Mr. Murphy. I was wondering, Mr. Chairman, what difference it makes who signed it, as long as it came from the adjutant general.

The Vice Chairman. That is what I was going to ask. General Adams was the man who sent it?

General Short. General Adams was the man who sent it.

The Vice Chairman. Adams' name on it means to you that the adjutant general of the Army sent it to you?

General Short. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. And this other signature did not mean anything to you at the time, did it?

General Short. That is correct.

Senator Brewster. I think in view of the fact that it has appeared at some times that the chiefs in the [7940] offices did not always know what their subordinates were doing, we certainly ought to establish, at any rate, who signed this. It does not seem that would be beyond the possibility of determination.

The Vice Chairman. The counsel has stated he will endeavor to secure that information. You may continue, General.

Senator Ferguson. May I make one inquiry of counsel? In the lower left-hand corner of the telegram, the "green cy W/D and destroyed by burning 12/30/41 cdm-1705," what is that?

Mr. Kaufman. I do not know, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Is there any character that that refers to?

Mr. Kaufman. I am told the "green cy" refers to green copy.

Senator Ferguson. Will you ascertain what that means?

Mr. Kaufman. Yes.*

The Vice Chairman. All right; proceed, General. Give us the page where you will resume.

General Short. I am resuming on page 24 of my statement. The message sent by the Chief of Staff of December 7, which arrived 7 hours after the attack, was as follows:

**Hawn Dept Ft Shafter, TH**

529 7th Japanese are presenting at 1:00 P. M. Eastern Standard Time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly. Inform naval authorities of this communication.

**MARSHALL**

42. Delay of December 7 Message

The message was filed at 12:18 p. m., December 7, eastern time (6:48 a. m., December 7, Honolulu time). It was received by the R.C.A. in Honolulu at 7:33 a. m., December 7, and delivered to the Signal Office, Fort Shafter, at 11:45 a. m. (Delivery was undoubtedly delayed by the Japanese attack.) The deciphered message was delivered to the adjutant general, Hawaiian Department, at 2:58 p. m., December 7.

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*See memorandum from the War Department in clarification of this document in Hearings, Part 11, p. 5296.
Delay in deciphering due to not being marked "Priority" in Washington. Thus, this vital message was received 7 hours after the attack. [7943] If this message had been sent by scrambler telephone there would have been time to warm up the planes and put them in the air, thus, at least, avoiding a large loss of planes in the initial attack at 8 a.m. This would not necessarily have lessened the naval losses. The fact that the War Department sent this message by radio in code instead of telephoning it in the clear and putting it through in the minimum amount of time indicates that the War Department, even as late as 6:48 a.m., December 7th, Honolulu time, did not consider an attack on Honolulu as likely enough to warrant drastic action to prepare the islands for the sneak attack.

Senator Lucas. Pardon me, General Short. There is one statement you made there with respect to the word "Priority" that I do not find in my copy.

General Short. That is not there. Since writing the statement I have seen the photostatic copy of the message as it was received in Hawaii and there is no indication of any mark of priority or urgency, or anything.

Senator Lucas. Will you kindly refer to page 24 and read that statement again, in order that I may correct my copy here?

General Short. The deciphered message was delivered to the adjutant general, Hawaiian Department, at 2:58 p.m., [7943] December 7. Delay in deciphering due to not being marked "Priority" in Washington.

Senator Lucas. Thank you, sir.

General Short. I might say that General Powell, who is one of the witnesses and who was the signal officer in Honolulu, will have a photostatic copy of the message as received. I believe also that it is shown in the Clausen report in that condition.

43. Staff procedure re communications

It is standard staff procedure and doctrine that all important or emergency messages should be sent by all available means of communication, which in this case would have included the scrambler telephones which had been frequently used between the War Department and Fort Shafter. Colonel Phillips and General Marshall did confer by scrambler phone later in the day on December 7, 1941. If security would be violated by sending the information by phone, then the War Department should have issued the necessary alert orders which they would have known that I would have issued at once if I had the information which they possessed. In support of this position, I quote from the War Department Field Manual on signal communication:

* * * Choice of the means employed in each instance depends on the situation. Exclusive reliance upon [7944] any one means is unwise because special and unforeseen circumstances may render that means inoperative when most needed. Plans of all commanders will make advance provision for prompt employment of effective and reliable alternate means; and the simultaneous operation of several means will minimize the ill effects of complete interruption in any one. * * * 42

42 Italics supplied; par. 8b, FM 24–5, p. 4.
44. Alert plans

The standing operating procedure, headquarters, Hawaiian Department, 5 November 1941, provided for the following alerts:

SECTION II—ALERTS

13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3) Alerts as indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a Department order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack. * * *

14. Alert No. 1.—a. This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands, with no threat from without. * * *

I want to make clear that under alert No. 1, we had skeleton crews at all antiaircraft guns, capable of conducting fire on the enemy, and that .30 cal., .50 [7945] cal., and pistol ammunition was immediately at hand for rifles, pistols, automatic rifles, and machine guns. Three-inch ammunition was readily accessible to all but four batteries. This ammunition was in casemates from 20 to 75 yards from the batteries. As part of alert No. 1, the interceptor command and the aircraft warning service functioned from 4 a.m. to 7 a.m., the most dangerous hours for an air raid.

15. Alert No. 2.—a. This alert is applicable to a more serious condition than Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile subsurface, surface, and aircraft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided. * * *

16. Alert No. 3.—a. This alert requires the occupation of all field positions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of Oahu and the Army installations on outlying islands. * * *

45. Conferences November 27

When I received the November 27, 1941, message signed “Marshall,” I immediately talked it over with my chief of staff, Colonel Phillips, and then made my decision to order alert No. 1. This decision was then communicated to G-2 and to the echelon commanders. On that same afternoon, I conferred on the matter with General Martin and with General Burgin. [7946] The general contents of the radiogram were also made known to the two division commanders through staff officers. In view of the restrictive orders against wide dissemination of the information, I withheld it from the other Army personnel. At the same time that I ordered alert No. 1 into effect, I directed that the interceptor command, including the aircraft warning service and information center, should operate from 4 a.m. until 7 a.m. daily. In addition, the six mobile stations operated daily, except Sunday, from 7 a.m. to 11 a.m. for routine training and daily, except Saturday and Sunday, from 12 noon until 4 p.m. for training and maintenance work.

46. Alert No. 1: Consideration

In making the decision for alert No. 1, I considered several matters. (a) Navy conversations.—From repeated conversations with the Navy, I knew that the Japanese naval vessels were supposed to be either in their home ports or proceeding south. I had no information suggesting that some ships might have been detached to proceed eastward. Our information also indicated that Japan had no land-based bombers capable of proceeding from their nearest island, some 2,100 miles away.
(b) Task force reconnaissance.—It was known that the Navy usually had two or three task forces at sea. The carriers [7947] with the task forces normally scouted 300 miles at each side, a total width of 600 miles. Two task forces would thus cover 1,200 miles of ocean in the vicinity of Oahu. The Navy also had reconnaissance from Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston Islands. I thus felt that air attack was highly improbable. On the morning of November 27, I conferred with Admiral Kimmel concerning the messages we had each received from Washington with reference to Wake and Midway. Admiral Kimmel and I discussed reinforcement of the Wake and Midway garrisons by Army planes. Such reinforcement would have weakened the Oahu defense. The Admiral asked his war-plans officer, Captain McMorris, what he thought were the chances of a surprise attack at Honolulu. The captain answered, "None." General Martin and Colonel Mollison were present with me at this conference. Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch, who were present, expressed no difference of opinion with Captain McMorris. Reconnaisance, as directed in message No. 472, November 27, was a function of the Navy under the joint agreement approved March 28 by Admiral Bloch and me. That the Chief of Staff recognized that this was the case is shown by the following quotations from his testimony:

[7948]  General Marshall. Distant reconnaissance—was a naval function, and the Army Commander was liable to furnish them such of the planes suitable for that purpose that could be provided.

General Marshall. ** ** As I recall the matter, the only way the Army would have been involved in the deep reconnaissance would have been in attaching units to serve under the Navy. ** **

General Russell. Well, is it your view that both having seen the message of November 27, without more ado the Navy should have started their distant reconnaissance?

General Marshall. That is right. That is my view.

(c) Training mission.—The factor of training was also considered. Use of Alerts 2 or 3 would have seriously interfered with our training mission. The soldiers and officers of my command were in large part relatively new to the Army and to their specialized tasks. Regular training was essential. The War Department message had not indicated in any way that our training mission was modified, suspended, or abolished, or that all troops were to go immediately into tactical status. [7949] The Hawaiian air force in particular had the mission of training combat crews and of ferrying B-17's to the Philippine Islands. On September 8, 1941, we sent 9 trained combat teams to General MacArthur. Before November 27, we had sent 18 trained teams to the mainland and we had 17 more teams ready to go to the mainland for ferrying purposes. Twelve more combat crews had to be trained for planes expected to arrive at an early date. Only 6 of our 12 flying fortresses were in condition and available for this important training. It was thus imperative that General Martin be allowed to make maximum use of these planes for training. If war were momentarily expected in the Hawaiian coastal frontier, these considerations would give way. But every indication was that the War Department expected the war to break out, if at all, only in the

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far Pacific and not at Hawaii. In fact, on November 26, 1941, a radiogram from the War Department had ordered me to equip two B-24 airplanes for a special photographic reconnaissance mission over Truk and Jaluit in the Caroline Islands, with particular attention to the location of naval vessels, submarines, airfields, airplanes, barracks, and camps. If attacked, the crews were directed to use all means in their power for self preservation. These planes were to be sent to Honolulu unarmed, but I was directed to insure that both were "fully equipped with gun [7980] ammunition upon departure." 47 The first of these two planes did not arrive in Hawaii until December 5, 1941. Presumably, had the War Department in the meantime decided that Hawaii was a zone of danger, they would have armed the plane before sending it to me. General Martin wired back a request that the second B-24 bring necessary equipment other than the guns and ammunition which we could supply. 48

I would like now to pass out chart No. 4. I want this committee to see graphically the picture as I had it in my mind and as all of us in Hawaii saw it at the time.

There was a large number of Japanese aliens and of citizens of Japanese extraction. There were thousands of these people all around us and near to every military and naval installation.

Most of these Japanese were loyal. Many were disloyal. Sabotage was "first to be expected in point of time", as General Marshall put it.

Chart 4 shows the major installations. Each black square represents an important camp, airfield, or naval yard. Each round black dot represents 1,000 persons of Japanese extraction. Each grey dot represents 1,000 other residents.

My figures are taken from a 1943 census study based on the population figures of 1940.

(Chart No. 4 is included in "Exhibit No. 134."

General Short, (continuing):

(d) Sabotage danger.—The danger of sabotage was paramount in my mind and seemed to me to be the chief danger which the War Department feared. Sabotage had long been considered our primary danger in Hawaii, because of the large Japanese population, many of whom were under suspicion of disloyalty. 49 Thirty-seven percent of the population was of Japanese descent, or probably 161,000. Of these about 40,000 were Japanese aliens. Many of the Japanese lived in very close proximity to air fields and other defense installations. Sabotage might reasonably be expected for several months prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Antisabotage defense is best carried out where there is little dispersion of the command. Planes must be grouped on landing mats and on the apron. The fact that man-proof fences and searchlights had not been installed around the air-fields made the protection of the planes from sabotage much more difficult when the planes were dispersed in bunkers. Funds for fencing air-fields had been finally allotted by the War Department but too late for installation of fences prior to attack. That the War Department

47 Message, 26 Nov. 1941, No. 465 (RCA No. 831 US Govt), quoted on pages 304-305, Vol. 4, Army Pearl Harbor Board Tr.; page 6, Ex. 32.
48 Message December 5, 1941, to General Arnold.
49 Compare, Hawaiian Defense Project Revision 1940, committee daily record, vol. 6, pp. 966, 967; also exhibit 44.
was equally conscious of the danger of sabotage is shown by the following quotations:

In the aide memoire handed to the President by the Chief of Staff May 3, 1941, was the statement—

** * * * In point of sequence, sabotage is first to be expected and may, within a very limited time, cause great damage. On this account, and in order to assure strong control, it would be highly desirable to set up a military control of the islands prior to the likelihood of our involvement in the Far East.**

General Marshall in his letter to me of February 7, 1941, stated:

** * * * The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation ** * * * **

(e) Herron alert precedent.—The precedent of the Herron alert of 1940, to which I have already alluded, and the general War Department policy of centralization were important factors in my mind. I felt and I still feel that if the Chief of Staff wanted an all-out alert in Hawaii, he would have ordered it himself and not expected me to make the decision, knowing as he did how relatively limited was my information as com- pared to that available to him. Questioned by Mr. Keefe, General Marshall gave the following testimony before this committee:

Mr. Keefe. Well, when you issued the alert on the 17th of June 1940, you used the language, “To deal with possible trans-Pacific raid.”

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Yes. Well, now, then, let us put it this way without splitting words: General Marshall, on the morning of the 28th of November you had tremendously more information as to the possibility of an attack by the Japanese than you had in June 1940?

General Marshall. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. If you had information in June 1940 as to the possibilities of a trans-Pacific raid, you had a mountain of evidence on the 27th of November, did you not, to the same effect?

General Marshall. That is correct.

Message No. 472, November 27, was referred to so frequently by General Marshall as a command directive that I feel there should be a comparison of this message with the Herron message and with the Navy message of November 27.

[7956] I have prepared a chart for comparison of these three messages and have attached it as annex A to this prepared statement. An inspection of the chart comparing the three alert messages makes it readily apparent by the Army Pearl Harbor board designed message No. 472 of November 27 as the “Do—Don’t Message.”

I would like you to turn to that chart. I would like to make some remarks in reference to it.

Taking up the comparison of the three alerts——

The Vice Chairman. Will you give us the page, General?

General Short. It is the very last thing in the statement, annex A.

At the time of the Herron alert, there were no negotiations going on between Japan and the United States, so no information was given on that subject. The Navy message stated, “Negotiations have ceased. Aggressive move by Japan expected within next few days.” That was a very positive and definite statement. The Army message stated:

Negotiations appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibility will be resumed.

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29 Exhibit 59; daily record, vol. 17, p. 2888.
30 Exhibit 53, pp. 1 to 3.
Now, the papers indicated that they had been resumed on December 1, 2, and 5. However, I had no information from the War Department. The War Department knew that [7957] while they had outwardly been resumed, they were defacto ruptured, and the Japanese emissaries had been told to keep up the illusion that the negotiations were going on, so that we would be misguided. That information was not in my hands.

The alert message of June 17 made an estimate of Japanese action as a possible trans-Pacific raid. That is what they probably thought the danger was. The Navy message of November 27 stated:

Amphibious expedition against Philippines, Thai, Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo indicated by known Jap task forces.

This message also made a direct estimate of the probable Japanese action.

The Army message stated:

Japanese future action unpredictable, but hostile action possible at any moment.

Now, this was not in any sense an accurate statement as to the probable Japanese action, considering the information that was known in Washington. Mr. Hull stated that he considered the document from the Japanese of November 20 as an absolute ultimatum, and from then on it was just a question of putting it off. They knew that that meant war.

[7958] General Stark stated before this committee that he made up his mind in the fall that war was inevitable. The “future action unpredictable” in this message did not reflect those two opinions in any way.

Now, I will take up the question of missions and orders as given in the three messages. The alert of June 17, 1940, stated:

Immediately alert complete defensive organization to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or projecting undue curiosity of newspapers and agents.

Maintain alert until further orders.

It stated exactly the type of alert that was desired, which were defensive missions.

The Navy message stated:

Consider dispatch a war warning. Execute appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out tasks assigned in WPL–46.

Again, a definite directive.

Take a look at the Army message. It states:

US desires Japan commit first overt act. This should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Take such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures carried out so as not to alarm civil popula... [7959] tion or disclose intent. Should hostilities occur, carry out tasks Rainbow Five.

Everything is qualified. No definite directive without qualification.

All messages contain certain miscellaneous instructions.

The Herron message stated:

Instructions for secret communications with Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly. Acknowledge.

The Navy message stated:

Inform District and Army authorities. Guam, Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage.
The Army message of November 27 stated:
Report measures taken. Limit dissemination to minimum essential officers.
Those are the only two unqualified statements in the message. The "report measures taken," when that report was made, no attention was paid to it.
Now, analyze the last:
Limit dissemination to minimum essential officers.
It does not say to limit to minimum essential officers and men. It says "to minimum essential officers."
Now, if you took up alert No. 2 or No. 3, under No. 2 you could not send a plane in the air to shoot down Japanese planes without telling the crew that they were to shoot [7960] down Japanese planes, and telling them why. You could not put your antiaircraft in position and tell them to shoot down Japanese planes without giving them a definite order, and telling them why.
Alert No. 3 would have sent every man to his battle position. You do not send soldiers into battle without telling them why they are there. So that instruction alone literally interpreted would have prevented the use of alert No. 2, or alert No. 3.
We come now to the follow-up of these messages, which is a very important factor. The Herron alert of June 17, 1940, states:
Frequent instructions and request for information from War Department for several weeks.
The committee Exhibit No. 52 shows those in detail.
The Navy message of November 27:
On December 3 two messages with reference to Japanese instructions to destroy codes were sent. On December 6 authority was granted for outlying islands to destroy all secret and confidential documents.
Now, as to the Army message of November 27, no checkup was made to even find out what my report of measures taken meant. No additional instructions were given from the 28th of November under after the attack.

[7961] The Vice Chairman. General Short, it has been suggested that we might recess until 2 o'clock. You might possibly get a little tired.

General Short. Thank you very much.
The Vice Chairman. We will recess at this point to 2 o'clock this afternoon.

General Short. Thank you very much.
(Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the committee recessed to reconvene at 2 p.m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION—2:00 P.M.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Congressman Keefe.
Mr. Keefe. Yesterday, at the beginning of my examination of Admiral Kimmel, I made the statement, which I quote from the record:
In your testimony you have acquitted yourself magnificently.
My attention has been called to the city edition of the New York Times which reports that incident as follows:

The Admiral was applauded by spectators when Representative Keefe, Republican of Wisconsin, told him, "In your testimony you have acquitted yourself insignificantly."

I want the record to show that I have discussed this matter with Mr. White, who wrote the article, and I am certain that he sent the quote correctly, and either in transmission or in composition some error was made which completely changes the statement to such an extent that I feel it is necessary to have the matter corrected. I hope that in the later editions of the New York Times that very serious error will be noted, and that it would not be sent out to their readers as indicating that I have accused Admiral Kimmel of acquitting himself insignificantly, which caused the audience in the room to voice their approval by spontaneous applause. The whole thing just does not make sense, and I know the New York Times will see that it is properly corrected.

The Chairman. The committee can correct its own mistakes but it cannot correct those made outside. However, I am sure that the great newspaper, New York Times, will make the necessary correction in this case.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, at that point, I am wondering what the committee is doing about protecting itself, because there are a great many misquotations in the record itself. I know there are a great many in my own questions. I am wondering if we have anybody proofreading the record, and what steps we will take to correct the misquotes in the record, because there are a lot of misquotes in the record.

Senator Ferguson. I have noted some misquotes in the record.

The Chairman. It might be advisable for members of the committee to read over their own questions in the daily record and call the attention of the reporters to any mistakes that may be made.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, in the Ways and Means Committee of the House of Representatives each member is furnished a copy of the daily record with the pages marked on the back where his name appears, or his corrections. He can turn through the pages under his name and very readily take out his own without having to read everything that is in the whole record. I do not know whether anything like that is practical here or not, but that is the practice that is followed there.

The Chairman. It would not be difficult for each member of the committee to find his own interrogation, and if there are any mistakes to call the attention of the reporter to them.

The Chair is advised that General Short wishes to be excused for the remainder of the day after he finishes his written statement, because of his recent illness. That is entirely agreeable.

The Chair wishes also to announce that immediately following that there will be an executive session of the committee, at which he hopes all members will be present.

Go ahead, General.
TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER C. SHORT, UNITED STATES
ARMY (RETIRED)—Resumed

General Short. Proceeding on page 33:

[7965] 47. Confirmation of sabotage alert

After making my decision for the anti-sabotage alert, several other
things occurred which confirmed my opinion that I was complying
exactly with the wishes of the War Department.

(a) Report to and acquiescence by War Department.—As directed,
I reported that I had alerted the Department to prevent sabotage
and had established liaison with the Navy.53 No reply disagreeing
with my report was sent to me. If the War Department felt upon
receipt of my report that my alert against sabotage was not sufficient
to meet the situation, it should have immediately ordered me to
provide against an air raid or against an all-out attack. No steps of
this kind were taken by the War Department, and I had every reason
to believe that they approved fully of the measures I had taken, in-
asmuch as they had 9 days before the attack in which to give me
additional instructions or direct that an all-out alert against an air
raid or an all-out alert be put into effect. General Marshall, when
asked by Mr. Keefe, if it wasn’t his responsibility to check up on
the measures taken by General Short as reported in reply to message
No. 472 of November 27, stated:

occurred, there is no question about that, there is no question in regard to my
responsibility as Chief of Staff. I am not attempting to evade that at all, but I
do not think it is quite characterized in the manner that you have expressed
yourself.54

When questioned further by Mr. Keefe with regard to General
Gerow’s responsibility in the matter, General Marshall stated:

He had a direct responsibility and I had the full responsibility.55

As shown in the following quotation, General Marshall admitted
that since no objection was being raised by the War Department, I
had the right to assume that my action was approved:

Senator Ferguson. Well, would this be true from an Army viewpoint, that
when an overseas commander is ordered to take measures as he deems neces-
sary and to report measures taken to you, is he correct in assuming that if
his report is not the kind of action that you had in mind that you would there-
after inform him specifically of the difference?

General Marshall. I would assume so.56

[7967] With reference to my report that the Department was
alerted to prevent sabotage, General Marshall testified:

It did not register on Colonel Bundy, it did not register on General Gerow, it
did not register on me and it carries Mr. Stimson’s initials also.57

For 9 days from November 27 to December 7 this reply apparently
did not register on any of the responsible officers.

54 Daily record, vol. 22, p. 3726.
I want to emphasize also that my report was clear and concise, as required by War Department rules:

General Gerow (reading): "The merit of a report is not measured by its length. A concise presentation of important points usually is all that is required."

Senator Ferguson. Would General Short's reply comply with that regulation?  

General Gerow. Yes, sir."

In spite of General Gerow's confession that this report of mine was in conformity with directives, he still contended that somehow he had misunderstood it. When asked how it should have read in order to be clear to him and his staff, he answered:

Well, I think, sir, if the message had read simply, [7968] "alerted against sabotage only," it would have been perfectly clear."

The only little word "only" seems to have been the missing link in General Gerow's mind. He was unwilling to read my message and admit it meant what it said, no more and no less.

(b) Further sabotage messages.—The three messages on sabotage and subversive activity convinced me that the War Department was cognizant of the measures I had taken, approved of the action, and wanted to be sure that my measures against sabotage and subversive acts were complete but that no illegal acts were committed in carrying them out. I believed, and I had good reason to believe, that since the War Department specifically mentioned subversive activities as a threat to Hawaii, they would also mention a "trans-Pacific raid" if they had thought it to be one of our immediate dangers. The fact that the War Department sent to the Hawaiian department three separate and distinct messages on November 27 and 28 with reference to sabotage is conclusive evidence that the War Department considered it as a very serious threat.

[7969]  (c) Ferrying unarmed planes.—As late as December 6, 1941, the War Department was ferrying planes to Hawaii, unarmed and unprepared to fight. In fact, 12 B–17 airplanes under orders from the War Department left Hamilton Field, Calif., in two squadrons at 9:30 p. m., December 6, Pacific time (12:30 a. m. December 7, eastern time), and at 10:30 p. m., December 6, Pacific time (1:30 a. m., December 7, eastern time). None of these planes was equipped with ammunition or defensive armament. The machine guns were cosmoline and had not been bore-sighted. Ferry crews were skeletonized, consisting of pilot, copilot, navigator, engineer, and radio operator. Such crews were incapable of manning the machine guns, even if the guns had been properly prepared for combat and supplied with ammunition. It cannot be imagined that the War Department wished to send these planes to Honolulu unarmed when they already had information of a pending Japanese attack. The only inference that can be drawn is that while the War Department had information of a pending attack, General Arnold, the Chief of Air Corps, who ordered these planes to Honolulu, and who, I understand, was present at Hamilton Field at the time of their departure, did not know of the critical situation in the relations between the United States and Japan. [7970] These planes actually arrived at Hickam Field in the midst of the first attack. Four of the 12 planes were destroyed or damaged without being able to fight.

(d) Conferences with Navy.—In my conferences with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch between November 27, 1941, and December 7, 1941, nothing further developed to indicate that an attack might be expected in our coastal frontier sector. The Navy war warning message of November 27, shown to me by Admiral Kimmel, indicated that in the continental districts and at Guam and Samoa the Navy Department feared chiefly the sabotage danger. On December 1, 1941, we conferred for a long while regarding the suggestion from Washington that Army troops relieve the Wake and Midway Marine garrisons, to make them available for landing operations. On December 2, Admiral Kimmel came to my quarters with an 8-page letter he had prepared on this Wake and Midway problems. On December 3, we conferred at Admiral Kimmel’s headquarters on a radiogram I was sending to the War Department with reference to the relief of Wake and Midway. During this period, November 27 to December 7, the Navy made no request for Army planes to help conduct long-distance reconnaissance. [7971] At that time I was convinced that the Navy either knew the location of the Japanese carriers or had enough information so that they were not uneasy. I felt that they could handle the situation. My liaison officer to the Navy, Major Fleming, held another conference with Colonel Pfeiffer of the Marine Corps on December 4, 1941.55

Will you pass out chart No. 5, please. (Chart No. 5 is included in “Exhibit No. 134.”)

[7973] General Short. This chart collects the time data on a 24-hour clock. It shows the December 7 “1 p. m.” message which was received in the War Department about 9 a. m. Washington time, which was 3:30 a. m. Hawaiian time.

The events of the submarine sinking, the radar misinterpretation, and the action at the time of the attack are charted.

After the third attack, the “1 p. m.” message arrived. It had been delayed by the coding, by the commercial transmission, by the attack, and by the fact that it was not marked “urgent” or “priority.” Other priority messages were first decoded by my message center. [7974] This time element was so important that I would like to run over this chart in some detail.

We notice first on the chart the fact that the War Department had in its possession at 3:30 a. m. Honolulu time, the 1 p. m. message stating that the other matter was to be delivered at that hour. It was 3 hours and 15 minutes from that time before anything happened in Honolulu.

Then we had the destruction of the two-man submarine.

About this same time, at 6:48 a. m. General Marshall wrote a message which was not delivered until after the attack.

7:20 a.m., planes reported. The Opana radar station picked up the planes from the north, and it was misinterpreted by the control officer.

7:55 a.m., the first attack in Hickam Field and other installations.

8 a.m., the first of the unarmed B-17’s from Hancock Field, Calif., arrived at Hickam Field.

51 Exhibit 27, p. 31B.
52 Compare p. 301, vol. 4, Army Pearl Harbor board transcript.
54 Compare p. 303, vol. 4, Army Pearl Harbor board transcript.
Incidentally, the first plane to land, the pilot was killed by the Japanese.

At 8:03 a.m. my chief of Staff, Colonel Phillips, reported the attack.

At 8:05 a.m. the first enemy plane was shot down.

[7975] At 8:10 a.m. the alert by that time had been transmitted to all of the major echelons, and Schofield Barracks had been attacked, and a plane was shot down there.

By 8:30 a.m. the infantry divisions were proceeding to their battle positions.

At 8:50 a.m. the first of the pursuit planes took the air to combat the Japanese.

At 9 a.m. the second attack struck. At the same time the civilian surgical teams started reporting at a hospital for work.

By 10:30 a.m. the third attack took place.

When this was over, at noon, the civilian ambulance teams started evacuating women and children from the threatened-attack places, and it was not then until 2:50 p.m. that Marshall's warning message was received, practically 11½ hours after the War Department had its information, the information in its possession when we received this vital information.

48. Events early on December 7, 1941

Two events occurred early on the morning of December 7, which, if interpreted differently at the time, might have had a very decided effect upon the action that followed.

49. Submarine in Pearl Harbor

About 6:45 a.m. a two-man submarine entering Pearl Harbor [7976] was destroyed by ships on duty. Had the naval authorities foreseen this as a possible forerunner of an air attack or notified the Army, time would have been available for the dispersion of the planes. However, the naval authorities did not connect this submarine attack with a possible general attack. The Army was not notified until after the attack.

50. Radar schedule

After the aircraft warning service information was closed at 7 a.m., December 7, the Opana station remained in operation. On Saturday, December 6, 1941, Second Lt. Grove C. White, Jr., O396182, Signal Corps, had obtained permission of the control officer to have all stations operate from 4 a.m. to 7 a.m. only on Sunday, December 7, 1941.

51. Misinterpretation of radar

At 7:20 a.m., December 7, 1941, the telephone operator at the information center received a call from the Opana radar station stating that a large number of planes were heading toward Oahu from North 3 points East. Lt. Kermit A. Tyler then talked on the telephone with Private Lockard of the Opana station and said that it was not anything of teams. At 0700 all the men at the information center except the telephone operator had folded up their equipment and left. When the Opana operator phoned [7977] at 0720, Lieutenant Tyler thought the flight indicated was either a naval patrol, a flight of Hickam bombers, or possibly some B-17's from the United States.
52. Misinterpretation of radar

If Lieutenant Tyler had realized that the incoming flight was Japanese, there would have been time to disperse the planes but not to warm up the engines and get them into the air. Lieutenant Tyler made no report of this matter to me and as far as I know did not report the incident to the control officer, Major Tyndall, after the information center was manned about 8:30 a.m. This matter was not brought to my attention until the next day when it was too late to be of value. Had this incident been reported to the control officer at 8:30 a.m. on the 7th, he would have informed the Navy and it might have enabled them to locate the carriers.

I might say at this point, at that time there was no device in existence for determining whether a plane picked up by the radar was friend or foe. A few months later such a device was put on the planes.

ACTION AT THE TIME OF ATTACK

53. Beginning of attack

At 7:55 a.m., December 7, the enemy planes attacked Hickam Field, Pearl Harbor, and Wheeler Field. At 9 a.m. a second attack was made, and a third about 10:30 a.m., each lasting approximately 15 minutes. At 8:03 a.m. the chief of staff reported the attack, and by 8:10 a.m. an order had been given to all units (major echelons) by telephone to put alert No. 3 into effect.

54. Antiaircraft artillery

All antiaircraft batteries had skeleton crews guarding them. These crews were able to conduct antiaircraft fire. All units had in their possession ammunition for rifles, pistols, automatic rifles, and machine guns. Three-inch ammunition had been placed in positions accessible to all batteries except four batteries of the 64th C. A. C. (AA).

55. Automatic weapon batteries

The automatic weapon batteries at Fort Kamehameha, Pearl Harbor, and Cape Malakole fired on the enemy planes during the 8 o'clock raid. The first enemy plane was shot down at 8:05 a.m.

56. Hawaiian air forces

During the first attack men started pulling planes out of the fire, and at 8:50 the serviceable pursuit planes took off.

57. Twenty-fourth Division

Troops of the Twenty-fourth Division at Schofield were attacked at 8:10 a.m. The troops of this division promptly returned the fire and with success—one plane being shot down with a rifle. At 8:30 a.m., the division started moving to its battle positions to repel a possible landing attack.

58. Twenty-fifth Division

The Twenty-fifth Division opened antiaircraft fire almost immediately. It also moved into battle positions at 8:30 a.m.
69. Value of prior training

All movement and action of troops was carried out as prescribed in the standing operating procedure, with precision and with remarkable speed. The value of our prior planning and training, which had made everyone familiar with the plans, was brought out very clearly.

60. Civilian surgical teams

At 9 a.m., the first civilian surgical teams began reporting at Tripler General Hospital.

61. Civilian relief committee

At 12 noon the civilian relief committee began the evacuation of Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, and Schofield, and continued throughout the afternoon and part of the evening. Most of the women and children were moved to school buildings, although a few from these posts and all of the women and children from Shafter, Tripler, Ordnance Depot, and Signal Depot were sheltered in the incompletely underground Interceptor Command Post.

62. Seizure of foreign agents

During December 7 the foreign agents previously listed by F. B. I. and G-2 were arrested and confined at the immigration and quarantine stations as follows:

- Japanese 370
- Germans 98
- Italians 14

Total 482

Incidentally, there were only four of the listed agents that were not picked up on this first day.

62. Clearing airfields

The 804th Engineers began clearing the runways at Hickam Field and Wheeler Field just as soon as the first attack diminished.

64. Creditable action of command

Every officer and man under my command performed his duty in a most creditable manner. The deeds of courage on the part of both the military and civil population is a matter which I hope that history will eventually disclose.

INFORMATION NOT SENT BY WAR DEPARTMENT

65. Policy to withhold information

As this joint committee’s investigation has already revealed, there was a vast amount of highly significant information available in the War Department which no responsible military man could exclude from consideration in forming an estimate of the situation. The War Department was aware of the fact that I did not have this information and had already decided that I should not get this information. It was therefore their duty not only to make the estimate of the situation but to make the decision as to what military action it required, and to give me orders to go on an all-out alert instead of permitting my sabotage alert to stand. This was in line with their centralized peace-

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time control system. It is my firm conviction that they did estimate
the situation, that they expected only sabotage and subversive activi-
ties in Hawaii, and that on reading my report, "Department alerted
to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy," they dismissed the
matter from their minds because I had done exactly what they desired.

[7982] 66. No magic to Hawaii

A definite decision had been made by the War Department that
neither the Japanese intercepts nor the substance of them should be
given to the commanding general in Hawaii. The following testimony
of General Miles makes such decision clear:

Mr. Gesell. What steps were taken to distribute the intercepted messages to
the Commanding Officer at Hawaii?

General Miles. There were no steps taken to distribute these messages to that
General.

Mr. Gesell. Do I understand from your answer that these messages as inter-
cpted and translated were not sent to Hawaii by the Army?

General Miles. They were not. In some cases the substance, of some messages,
were sent to Hawaii, and almost always in naval code, I think always in naval
code, because the naval code was considered to be more secure than the Army
code.

Mr. Gesell. Who made the decision that these messages should not be sent
to Hawaii as they were intercepted and translated as far as the Army is
cconcerned?

General Miles. That followed from the general policy laid down by the Chief
of Staff that these messages and the fact of the existence of these messages or our
ability to [7983] decode them should be confined to the least possible num-
ber of persons; no distribution should be made outside of Washington.

Mr. Gesell. Was that determination by the Chief of Staff in writing or simply
an expression of policy?

General Miles. As far as my recollection goes, it was simply an expression
of policy.

Mr. Gesell. Were you consulted in connection with the formulation of that
policy?

General Miles. I do not now remember but I imagine that I was.67

67. Hindsight evaluation

I do not want to attempt to summarize or even to list all the informa-
tion here which the War Department had but which I did not have.
I want to refrain from hindsight evaluation of this information. But
I also want to call the committee's attention to some very obvious items
which had they been given to me, would have necessarily changed the
picture which I then had of the crisis between the United States and
Japan.

68. Military commitments in Far East

I did not know that United States Army officers at Singapore had
made tentative [7984] military commitments, not approved by
the President, that the United States would fight, along with the Neth-
erlands and the British, to defend the Dutch East Indies and Sing-
apore.68

69. Japanese knowledge of United States policy

I did not know that the War Department knew that the Japanese
suspected or had somehow learned of this joint military program.
Intercept No. 1243, dated 3 December 1941, published in joint com-


68 See Marshall-Stark report to Roosevelt, 27 November 1941; Army Pearl Harbor board
449-450.
mittee Exhibit No. 1, page 227, disclosed to the War and Navy Departments, at least by December 5, that the Japanese did realize that such joint military action would occur. As early as November 12, the people in Washington had in their hands intercept No. 1066, printed on page 111 of committee exhibit No. 1, which disclosed that Japan had been semiofficially told that—

If Japan invades again, the United States will fight with Japan—

[7985] and that the American Government had, and believed, reports that—

* * * Japan will be on the move soon. The American Government does not believe that your visit on Monday to the President or the coming of Mr. Kurusu will have any effect on the general situation.

If this information is connected up with the knowledge gained of the definite Japanese intention to expand southward, it is clear that the War and Navy Departments must have known that war was a certainty, and that they, with this exclusive intelligence, wanted to make the estimate and decision as to American military defensive action. This explains their care in ordering me not to disclose intent, alarm the population, or do anything which Japan could use as propaganda that the United States had provoked war.

70. November 20 ultimatum

I had not been told, but Washington knew, that the Secretary of State regarded the November 20, 1941, Japanese proposal as an ultimatum 69 and that from then on it was merely a question of trying to stall off the final break as long as possible and, quoting Secretary Hull: in the hope that somewhere even then something might develop suddenly and out of the sky.70

71. Deadlines

I did not know, but the War Department knew [7986] that the Japanese had set a deadline after which their armed forces would move. On November 26 a translation of intercept No. 188, on page 174 of Exhibit No. 1, disclosed that—

* * * our forces shall be able to move within the day—
in the event that the United States-Japanese negotiations were not successfully terminated by 25 November 1941. The first Navy translation which told of the November 25 deadline was made as early as 5 November 1941.71

On 17 November, an intercept was deciphered which included this sentence:

I set the deadline for the solution of these negotiations in my #736, and there will be no change.72

On 22 November, a translation of a 19 November intercept showed that Kurusu and Nomura still regarded the 25 November deadline as "an absolutely unalterable one."73 This message also contained considerable discussion about evacuation of Government officials and their

69 Testimony of Mr. Hull, joint committee daily record, November 23, 1945, vol. 7, pp. 1186, 1188.
70 Testimony of Mr. Hull, joint committee daily record, November 23, 1945, vol. 7, p. 1195.
71 See No. 736, committee exhibit No. 1, p. 100.
72 Intercept 16 November 1941, pp. 137-138, committee exhibit No. 1.
73 Intercept No. 1140, 19 November, p. 159, committee exhibit No. 1.
wives. The 25 November deadline was then extended to 29 November, by an intercept of 22 November, translated the same day. But the Tokyo Government [7987] became more emphatic, saying:

This time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. After that things are automatically going to happen.74

On the 28th of November it was learned in Washington that in 2 or 3 days a report would be sent from Tokyo in answer to the "humiliating" American proposal after which—

* * * the negotiations will be de facto ruptured.75

This same intercept, moreover, showed a design to hide the fact that negotiations were broken off.

72. Code destruction

Another thing I did not know is the fact that the Japanese were under orders to destroy their codes and code machines. The War Department knew of this code destruction as early as 1 December 1941 and knew specifically of the orders to destroy the codes in the United States on 3 December 1941.76 I should certainly have been told of this intelligence. The following testimony of General Miles makes it plain why the Japanese messages ordering the destruction of their codes did not reach the commanding general in Hawaii:

[7988] Mr. Gesell. The Army did not send any messages to General Short in respect of code destruction, did it?

General Miles. No, sir.

Mr. Gesell. What is the explanation of that?

General Miles. The main reason was that the code experts apparently agreed, at least the Navy was particularly strong on the point that their code was much more secure than ours. It was obviously, of course, of great importance in security that a message be sent in only one code and not two and we had every reason to believe, or thought we did, that a Navy message to Hawaii would be promptly transmitted to the Army authorities there.

Mr. Gesell. It is a fact, is it not, General Miles, that none of these messages contained any instructions for the Navy authorities to show the information to the Army representative at Hawaii?

General Miles. That is true, sir.

Mr. Gesell. And that was the practice where joint messages were sent sometimes as we have seen, was it not?

General Miles. That happened on one or two occasions, yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell. Did you give any instructions or directions to the Navy that action should be taken to see that these messages were made available to the Army authorities [7989] at Pearl Harbor?

General Miles. Any instruction to the Navy?

Mr. Gesell. To the Navy here that they should so transmit the messages that the Army would be certain to receive them?

General Miles. No, sir; that was not considered necessary.77

73. Ships in harbor report

While the War Department G-2 may not have felt bound to let me know about the routine operations of the Japanese in keeping track of our naval ships, they should certainly have let me know that the Japanese were getting reports of the exact location of the ships in Pearl Harbor, which might indicate more than just keeping track, because such details would be useful only for sabotage, or for air or submarine attack in Hawaii. As early as October 9, 1941, G-2 in Washington

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74 Intercept No. 812, 22 November, p. 165, committee exhibit No. 1.
75 Intercept No. 844, 28 November, p. 195, committee exhibit No. 1.
76 Intercepts Nos. 2438, 2444, 2443, 867, pp. 208, 209, 215, committee exhibit No. 1.
knew of this Japanese espionage.\textsuperscript{78} This message, analyzed critically, is really a bombing plan for Pearl Harbor.\textsuperscript{79}

\textsuperscript{[7990]} 74. Winds code

I was not informed, but the War Department knew, of the so-called "winds" code or of the fact that the so-called implementing message had been received, definitely confirming the fact that diplomatic relations would be severed between Japan and the United States.\textsuperscript{80}

75. Hull's "ultimatum" to Japan

I was not informed of Secretary Hull's note of November 26, proposing a 10-point plan which the Japanese considered an ultimatum.\textsuperscript{81}

76. War considered inevitable

I did not know that sometime in the fall of 1941 the Chief of Staff had come to the conclusion that war with Japan was inevitable.\textsuperscript{82}

77. Jap reply—13 parts

Critical information (the first 13 parts of the long Japanese memorandum) finally terminating relations with the United States was received in the War Department by 9 p.m. on December 6. The so-called "pilot" message from Tokyo to Washington December 6, 1941, No. 901,\textsuperscript{83} had been received in the War Department sometime during the \textsuperscript{[7991]} afternoon of December 6. This message stated definitely that the long Japanese memorandum would be sent as message No. 902 and would be presented to the Americans as soon as instructions were sent.

78. Part 14, Jap reply

The fourteenth part of the long memorandum and the short message of the Japanese directing the Ambassador to deliver the long memorandum at 1 p.m. on the 7th were in the hands of the War Department between 8:30 and 9 a.m. December 7.\textsuperscript{84} This message indicated a definite break of relations at 1 p.m., and pointed directly to an attack on Hawaii at dawn. Had this vital information been communicated to Hawaii by the fastest possible means, we would have had more than 4 hours to make preparations to meet the attack which was more than enough for completing Army preparations. The Navy might have had time to get all ships out of the harbor.

79. Delay of December 7 message

Not until 7 hours after the attack was I informed that the Japanese Ambassador had been directed to deliver the 14-part memorandum to the Secretary of State at 1 p.m., December 7. This message was received in the War Department from a naval courier between \textsuperscript{[7992]} 8:30 a.m. and 9 a.m., December 7 (3 a.m. to 3:30 a.m. Honolulu time). This message definitely pointed to an attack on Pearl Harbor at 1 p.m., Washington time. If this message had been

\textsuperscript{78} Army intercept No. 23260, 24 September 1941, p. 12, committee exhibit No. 2.
\textsuperscript{79} Daily record, vol. 12, p. 2191.
\textsuperscript{81} Hull's note, 26 November 1941, joint committee exhibit No. 1, Intercept No. 1189, pp. 181–182.
\textsuperscript{82} See Army Pearl Harbor board, vol. A, p. 40.
\textsuperscript{83} Exhibit 1, p. 238.
\textsuperscript{84} Exhibit 1, No. 902, p. 245, and No. 907, p. 248; Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, vol. A, pp. 16–17.
delivered to me by the most rapid possible means of communication 
I would have had 4 hours, more than enough time, to fully alert the 
Army forces against an air raid.

80. Delay translation December 6 Pearl Harbor message

A more prompt decoding and translation of one of the December 6 
intercepts would have pointed out clearly to the War and Navy De- 
partments that a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was planned. 
After discussing the lack of barrage balloon defense, the consul at 
Honolulu reported as follows to Tokyo:

* * * However, even though they have actually made preparations, because 
they must control the air over the water and land runways of the airports in 
the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford and Ewa, there are limits to the 
balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all probability there is 
considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against 
these places. 85

I would like to set up my conclusions. There will be a certain 
amount of repetition, but I think it is desirable.

CONCLUSIONS

81. Obeyed instructions

On December 7, 1941, I was obeying [7993] my instructions 
from Washington as I understood them, and as the War Department 
had every reason to know that I understood them, and was acting 
in accordance with the information which was available to me at 
that time. Little information was available to me. The little that 
was given to me in the War Department message of November 27 did 
not give an accurate picture of the prospects of war. The War De-
partment knew definitely by 9 p. m., December 6, that the hour had 
struck and that war was at hand. By 9 a. m., December 7, the War 
Department knew the hour of attack. None of this information was 
given to me.

82. War Department responsibility

If for any possible reason the War Department felt that it could 
not give me the information, then it was the responsibility of the 
War Department to direct me to go on an all-out alert particularly 
since it well knew that we were on an antisabotage alert. The 
Hawaiian Department was not provided with agencies for obtaining 
Japanese information outside of Hawaii, and was dependent on the 
War Department for such information.

83. War Department estimate

When the War Department was informed that the Hawaiian De-
partment was alerted against sabotage, it not only did not indicate 
that the command should be alerted against a hostile surface, subsur-
face, ground or air attack, but replied emphasizing the necessity for pro- 
tection against sabotage and subversive measures. This action on the part of the War Department definitely indicated 
to me that it approved of my alert against sabotage. The War De-
partment had 9 more days in which to express its disapproval. The 
action of the War Department in sending unarmed B-17's from
Hamilton Field, Calif., on the night of December 6, to Honolulu confirmed me in my belief that an air raid was not probable.

84. Reasonable reliance on report

Confirmation of my view that the War Department’s silence and failure to reply to my report of November 27 constituted reasonable grounds for my belief that my action was exactly what the War Department desired, is contained in General Marshall’s testimony before this joint committee on December 11, 1945:

Senator Ferguson. Well, would this be true from an Army viewpoint, that when an oversea commander is ordered to take “such measures as he deems necessary and to report measures taken to you”, is he correct in assuming that if his report is not the kind of action that you had in mind that you would thereafter inform him specifically of this difference?

General Marshall. I would assume so.66

[7995] 85. Distant reconnaissance plan

The joint coastal frontier defense plan, Hawaiian coastal frontier places upon the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District the responsibility for distant reconnaissance. Annex No. 7 to the joint coastal frontier defense plan provides that when naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations and army aircraft are made available, these will be under the tactical control of the naval command during search operations. That means that the Army planes receive their missions and all instructions from the naval commander and carry out the search as he deems necessary in order to carry out his responsibility for distant reconnaissance. During the period November 27 to December 6 the Navy made no request for Army planes to participate in distant reconnaissance. To me this meant that they had definite information of the locations of the Japanese carriers or that the number unaccounted for was such that naval ships and planes could make the necessary reconnaissance without the assistance from the Army. It is noted that the Navy Department, both on October 16 and on November 27, directed Admiral Kimmel to make preparatory defensive deployments, and that Admiral Kimmel had several task forces at sea and was conducting considerable reconnaissance.67 He did not have sufficient equipment to conduct complete reconnaissance. General Marshall has testified here that even during the war the Hawaiian Islands had never had sufficient equipment for complete perimeter reconnaissance.

86. Army-Navy cooperation

During this period I held frequent conferences with the commander in chief of the United States Fleet and the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and at no time was anything said to indicate that they feared the probability of an air attack by the Japanese. In fact, the sentiment was expressed by a naval staff officer that there was no probability of such an attack. With a large part of the United States Navy in Hawaiian waters and with their sources of information, I was convinced that the Navy would be able either to intercept any carrier attempting to approach Oahu or at least to obtain such information from task forces or by reconnaissance as to make them

67 Exhibit 37, pp. 20B and 31B.
aware of the presence of carriers in the Hawaiian waters and of the probability of an air attack.

87. Expectations from War Department

I felt that I had a right to expect the War Department to inform me by the most rapid means possible if a real crisis arose in Japanese relations. I did not expect that when the crisis arose the message would remain in the hands of General Miles and Colonel Bratton without action from 9 a.m. till 11:25 a.m. and [7997] that when action was finally taken the desire for secrecy would be considered more important than the element of time. Had the message in regard to the Japanese ultimatum and the burning of their code machines been given me by telephone as an urgent message in the clear without loss of time for encoding and decoding, delivery, etc., or if I had been directed by telephone to go on an all-out alert for a dawn trans-Pacific raid, without being told the reason, I would have had approximately 4 hours in which to make detailed preparations to meet an immediate attack.

88. Follow-up of orders

When any department of the Army has issued an order on any matter of importance, it has performed only one-half of its function. The follow-up to see that the order has been carried out as desired is at least as important as issuing the order. The War Department had 9 days in which to check up on the alert status in Hawaii and to make sure that the measures taken by me were what was desired, which it did not do. The check-up would have required no more than a reading of my report of measures taken.

89. Supervision by Chief of Staff

Repeatedly, from the time I took command in Hawaii in February 1941, the Chief of Staff had written me at length advising me on policies and details of operation. However, after October 28, 1941, with the War Department receiving information almost daily which [7998] indicated that war was imminent, he communicated to me none of those personal messages containing the inside information.

90. Erroneous estimate of situation

My decision to put the Hawaiian Department on an alert to prevent sabotage was based upon a belief that sabotage was our gravest danger and that air attack was not imminent. I realize that my decision was wrong. 88 I had every reason to believe, however, that my estimate of the situation coincided with that of the War Department General Staff, which had the signal advantage of superior sources of intelligence as to enemy intentions.

91. Hindsight value of information withheld

I know it is hindsight, but if I had been furnished the information which the War Department had, I do not believe that I would have made a mistaken estimate of the situation. To make my meaning clear, I want to add that I do not believe that my estimate of the situation was due to any carelessness on my part or on the part of the senior Army and Navy officers with whom I consulted. Nor do I believe that my error was a substantial factor in causing the damage which our Pacific Fleet suffered during the attack.

92. Intelligence complacency

I have been more than astounded to learn the complacency of the War Department General Staff with regard to so-called magic intelligence. The War Department could have devised a method to paraphrase the information obtained and send it by courier to me, without, if they chose, disclosing to me that it resulted from an ability to decipher Japanese messages. I want to quote for the committee the following pertinent paragraph from the Operations Manual then current:

From adequate and timely military intelligence the commander is able to draw logical conclusions concerning enemy lines of action. Military intelligence is thus an essential factor in the estimate of the situation and in the conduct of operations.\[99\]

General Marshall and Admiral Wilkinson have pointed out that the security of our cryptanalytic ability was risked for the slight, temporary exultation of shooting down Yamamoto’s plane. Surely, then, supplying the data to me and to Admiral Kimmel would not have been inconceivably risky.

93. Opinion of Judge Advocate General

I want to quote for the committee one paragraph from the opinion of the Judge Advocate General of the Army concerning this intercept intelligence:

\[8000\] But since we know in retrospect that Short was not, apparently, fully alive to an imminent outside threat and since the War Plans Division had received substantial information from the Intelligence Section, G-2, the Board argues that had this additional information been transmitted to Short it might have convinced him not only that war was imminent but that there was a real possibility of a surprise air attack on Hawaii. In retrospect it is difficult to perceive any substantial reason for not sending Short this additional information or, in the alternative, checking to see whether Short was sufficiently alive to the danger. General Gerow did neither. In my opinion General Gerow showed a lack of imagination in failing to realize that had the Top Secret information been sent to Short it could not have had any other than a beneficial effect. General Gerow also showed lack of imagination in failing to make the proper deductions from the Japanese intercepts. For instance the message of 24 September from Tokyo to Honolulu requesting reports on vessels in Pearl Harbor and dividing Pearl Harbor into various subdivisions for that purpose coupled with the message of 15 November to Honolulu to make “the ships in harbor report” irregular and the further message of 29 November to Honolulu asking for reports even when there were no ship movements (Top Secret Ex. “B”) might readily have suggested to an imaginative person a possible Jap design on Pearl Harbor. Failure to appreciate the significance of such messages shows a lack of the type of skill in anticipating and preparing against eventualities which we have a right to expect in an officer at the head of the War Plans Division. If this criticism seems harsh, it only illustrates the advisability of General Gerow transmitting the Top Secret information to Short.\[100\]

94. Adequate sabotage defense

I had been furnished adequate means to prevent sabotage. I used those means with complete success, as the testimony has shown. No one can say to what extent sabotage would have occurred if the Army had not taken such measures to prevent it.

95. Inadequate means for air defense

I had not been furnished adequate means to defend against a surprise air raid. The War Department was aware of the inadequacy of

\[99\] Italics supplied; par. 194, FM 100-5; dated May 22, 1941, p. 40.
\[100\] Opinion of the Judge Advocate General, 25 November 1944, committee exhibit 63, p. 45.
our aircraft and antiaircraft defense establishment. The following table will show at a glance how inadequate our air defense was at the time.\(^{81}\)

\[8002\] I would like to offer at this time a table showing the type of equipment that was actually available on December 7, the number that we required to complete our plans and the amount of equipment that was actually on hand in December 1942.

The Vice Chairman. General, is that information you are seeking to offer now different from the table that is in your statement?

General Short. It is, in that it has the additional equipment that was present at Hawaii in December 1942.

The Vice Chairman. And that table, is that different from the one appearing in your statement?

General Short. Just the third which it adds.

The Vice Chairman. It adds another column?

General Short. It adds another column.

Mr. Murphy. May I ask at this time, Mr. Chairman, if this statement given here is a correct statement about there being no bombers in Hawaii on December 7?

General Short. No; no torpedo bombers.

Mr. Murphy. No torpedo bombers?

General Short. We had no torpedo bombers.

\[8003\] Mr. Murphy. It shows no bombers at all. My impression is there were 37.

General Short. The B-17's were bombers.

Mr. Murphy. Are those the only ones then?

General Short. Those were the only bombers. We had B-18's that were 7 years old, that were distinctly out-of-date, with a maximum speed of 150 miles per hour and I did not include those because the air people did not feel that those were proper equipment to fight with.

Mr. Murphy. We will go into that later with you as to what I had in mind.

Senator Lucas. General, you said "December 1942."

General Short. I am making a comparison of what they had provided at the end of another year.

The Vice Chairman. Well, do you have copies of this new table that you want to refer to now?

General Short. I have only one.

The Vice Chairman. Or can you give us this third column?

General Short. I will give you the third column.

The Vice Chairman. If you can give us the third column slowly so that we can insert it on here, that might serve the purpose.

General Short. All right, sir. I would like to call attention to the fact also—

\[8004\] The Vice Chairman. How is the third column to be headed?

General Short. "On hand December 1942."

I would like also to call attention to the fact that in December 1942 the Japanese had several months before been decisively defeated at Midway and that the danger of an attack was far less than it had been on December 7, 1941.
The Vice Chairman. Well, now, it would be helpful, I think, if you would give us the third column just exactly as it appears here. For instance, "B-17D Planes."

General Short. I will give each one in turn if that will be satisfactory.

The Vice Chairman. All right.

General Short. B-17 planes: Available on December 7, 6, required 180; in December 1942 there was only one B-17 plane but there were 40 B-24 planes, which was a very comparable plane.

The Vice Chairman. One B-17 and——

General Short. 40 B-24's which would accomplish the same purpose.

Interceptor and fighters: There were 105 available on December 7; required according to our plans 185; and in December 1942 they had 200.

Torpedo bombers: There were none available on December 7, 36 were required according to our plans and there were [8005] still none on hand in December 1942.

The Vice Chairman. None?

General Short. None; yes, sir.

3-inch antiaircraft guns: There were 82 available on December 7, 98 required by the plan. In December 1942 there were only 40 3-inch antiaircraft guns but there were 44 90-millimeter guns, which was a much more powerful gun, able to accomplish much more.

37-millimeter antiaircraft guns: On December 7 there were 20 available. There were required under our plans 135. In December 1942 there were actually 276.

50-caliber machine guns: Available December 7, 109; required according to our plan 345; actually available in December 1942, 793.

I wish to point out that the 50-caliber machine gun was the most effective weapon against planes coming in very low over the water, and that the number that they had in December 1942 was more than seven times the number that we had on December 7.

I am presenting this table because there has been a statement before the committee that we had all that was necessary to defeat the Japanese attack.

The seriousness of this shortage of equipment is best borne out by recalling that our equipment was inadequate to [8006] protect the Pacific Fleet, even had we been on an all-out alert such as that which the Chief of Staff had ordered in June 1940. I want to quote General Herron's testimony on this point.

General Frank. * * * Let us assume that in 1940, when the Army was in that alert, that there was a real menace and that an attack had come similar to the one that came on December 7th with the Army on the alert and the Navy not. What do you think would have happened?

General Herron. Well, approximately what happened on December 7th. The dive bombers would have come in. The Army could not have stopped them with its three-inch guns posted up on the hills. They necessarily would bring more planes than we had. If we had 50 combat planes they would bring 150, surely. 

96. Army failure—Heroism of troops

Due to the fact that the War Department did not make available to Hawaii the information in its possession, the Army forces in Hawaii were unable to prevent the terrific destruction caused by the Japanese.

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attack. However, the fine action of the Hawaiian troops when struck by the surprise attack should not be overlooked. Every officer and man did his full duty with promptness, precision and efficiency. All organizations moved quickly to their battle positions and took up their prescribed duties. Acts of heroism were the rule, not the exception.

97. General Staff reorganization

I trust that the reorganization of the War Department General Staff will lead in the future to prompt evaluation and use of all items of intelligence concerning possible aggressive movements by foreign military powers.

98. Unjust War Department treatment

I do not feel that I have been treated fairly or with justice by the War Department. I was singled out as an example, as the scapegoat for the disaster. My relatively small part in the transaction was not explained to the American people until this joint congressional committee forced the revelation of the facts. I fully appreciate the desire of the War Department to preserve the secrecy of the source of the so-called "magic," but I am sure that could have been done without any attempt to deceive the public by a false pretense that my judgment had been the sole factor causing the failure of the Army to fulfill its mission of defending the Navy at Pearl Harbor. I am sure that an honest confession by the War Department General Staff of their failure to anticipate the surprise raid would have been understood by the public, in the long run, and even at the time. Instead, they "passed the buck" to me, and I have kept my silence until the opportunity of this public forum was presented to me.

99. War Department's 4-year silence

The War Department had 4 years to admit that a follow-up should have been made on the November 27 message and on my report of the same date, but no such admission of responsibility was made public until General Gerow and General Marshall testified before this committee.

100. First opportunity to present story

I want to thank all the members of this committee for the thorough manner in which you have tried to bring out the facts and particularly for the opportunity to present my story to you and through you to the American public.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will excuse you at this time, General, until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

General SHORT. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee desires to have an executive session and the spectators will depart as rapidly as possible.

(Whereupon, at 3:15 p.m., January 22, 1946, an adjournment was taken until 10 a.m., Wednesday, January 23, 1946.)
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 23, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 o'clock a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.
Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[8010] The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order. General Short, do you have anything to add before counsel begins to question you?

General Short. No, sir. I have not had an opportunity to see if there are any clerical errors in the transcript. I would like later on if I find any to submit those.

The Vice Chairman. Then counsel may proceed.

Mr. Kaufman. Before proceeding with the examination of General Short I would like to have certain documents marked in evidence.

Yesterday General Short in his statement offered as an exhibit the batch of papers that he had used before the Roberts examination. It was agreed that with respect to this exhibit it need not be duplicated but I would like to have it given a number. The next number is 133.

The Vice Chairman. Counsel desires to offer that as Exhibit 133?

Mr. Kaufman. As Exhibit 133.

The Vice Chairman. It will be so ordered.

[8011] (The charts referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 134.")

Mr. Kaufman. I ask that there be marked as "Exhibit 135" a compilation made by counsel as to the details of the time of sending and the receipt of the messages commencing on November 27. Copies of this have already been distributed to members of the committee. That is Exhibit 135.

The Vice Chairman. It will be received as Exhibit 135.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 135."
Mr. Kaufman. I ask that there be marked as Exhibit 136 the report of Eugene V. Elder, Lieutenant Colonel, Signal Corps, relating to the operation of the radio sets and radar equipment. I ask that that be marked Exhibit 136.

The Vice Chairman. It will be received as Exhibit 136.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 136.")

Mr. Kaufman. I ask that there be marked as Exhibit 137 the reports from the War Department as to the operation of the radar station in Hawaii and the alert of the radar station commencing November 27, 1941. This has been requested by Congressman Gearhart at pages 259 and 260 of this record. Copies of this have already been distributed to the members of the committee.

The Vice Chairman. What is the number?

Mr. Kaufman. Exhibit 137.

The Vice Chairman. It will be received as Exhibit 137.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 137.")

Mr. Kaufman. Now may I proceed with the examination of General Short?

The Vice Chairman. Counsel may proceed with the examination of General Short.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER C. SHORT, UNITED STATES ARMY (RETIRED)—Resumed

Mr. Kaufman. General, will you please state for the record your experience in the Army?

General Short. Yes, sir.

I was commissioned a second lieutenant of Infantry, March 13, 1902. My appointment was made upon the recommendation of the president of the University of Illinois, from which university I had graduated in 1901.

I was assigned to the Twenty-fifth Infantry and to duty in the continental United States. I served in the Philippines from August to December 1907. I was assigned to the Sixteenth Infantry in December 1907 and returned to the United States.

I served in Alaska from 1910 to 1912. I was secretary of the School of Musketry from November 1912 to March 1916. I served with the Pershing expedition in Mexico from March 1916 to February 1917.

I served in France and Germany from June 1917 to June 1919. I went to France as a captain of the Sixteenth Infantry in the First Division. I was in the first group of officers sent to the British and French fronts and to the British and French schools.

I participated in the organization of the corps schools and of the Army Machine-Gun School in France. I was promoted to major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel during my service in France. I served on the general staff at GHQ, General Headquarters of the A. E. F., having charge of the training and front-line inspections of machine-gun units. I was made assistant chief of staff, G-5, Third Army, when it was organized and sent into Germany.

I was an instructor at the Command and General Staff School from July 1919 to February 1921 at Fort Leavenworth, Kans. I was placed on the initial General Staff eligible list and detailed on the General

1 Part 1, p. 109.
Staff in February 1921. I served on the General Staff with troops from February to June 1921. I served on the War Department General Staff from July 1921 to August 1924.

I attended the Army War College from September 1924 to July 1925. I served in Puerto Rico as a lieutenant colonel, Sixty-fifth Infantry, from July 1925 to July 1928. I was in charge of the G-3 section, Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, from August 1928 to September 1930. I served in the Bureau of Insular Affairs as financial officer and later as executive officer from October 1930 to June 1934. I commanded the Sixth Infantry at Jefferson Barracks from July 1934 to June 1936. During 2 months of this period I acted as executive officer of the national matches in 1935.

I was assistant commandant of the Infantry School at Fort Benning from July 1936 to January 1937; promoted to the grade of brigadier general on December 1, 1936. Commanded the First Brigade from March to December 1937. Commanded the First Division from January 1938 to September 1940, except during periods of maneuvers when I was commanding a corps.

I was promoted to major general March 1, 1940. I organized and commanded the Fourth Corps in maneuvers at Fort Benning, Ga., marched the corps to Louisiana and participated in maneuvers from March 1940 to May 1940. I commanded a provisional corps of National Guard and participated in maneuvers from August 1940 to September 1940. I organized and commanded the First Corps at Columbia, S. C., from October 1940 to December 1940. I commanded the Hawaiian Department from February 7, 1941, to December 17, 1941; was promoted to the grade of lieutenant general February the 8th upon taking command of the Department. I retired as a major general February the 28th, 1942.

Mr. Kaufman. General, when were you informed that you had been selected to command the Hawaiian Department?

General Short. In December 1940.

Mr. Kaufman. And who so informed you?

General Short. I had a personal letter from the Chief of Staff.

Mr. Kaufman. And after the receipt of that letter did you come to Washington to confer with the Chief of Staff?

General Short. Not immediately.

Mr. Kaufman. When did you do so?

General Short. I came to Washington the first week in January to confer with the Chief of Staff.

Mr. Kaufman. And at that time were you told by the Chief of Staff as to the probable dangers in the Hawaiian Department?

General Short. My conference with the Chief of Staff was rather brief and he did not go into my mission to any considerable extent at that time but he wrote me a long letter on the day that I assumed command detailing his idea of my mission.

Mr. Kaufman. Were you informed before you took command of the Hawaiian Department that there would be a change in the command of the Pacific Fleet?

General Short. I was not.

Mr. Kaufman. When were you informed about that for the first time?
General Short. After I reached Honolulu, probably 2 days—I think that I knew it 2 days before I took command.

Mr. Kaufman. The letter that you referred to is the letter by General Marshall to you dated February 7, 1941, and is part of exhibit 53?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Kaufman. And it was in that letter that the Chief of Staff told you about the probable developments and probable dangers of the Hawaiian Department?

General Short. Yes, sir; not pointing at any particular time, but as I got the idea, if hostilities did eventuate that those were the probabilities.

Mr. Kaufman. And the next to the last paragraph of the Chief of Staff's letter of February 7 is as follows:

My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved [8017] in a surprise raid by air and by submarine constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority.

It was in that letter that the Chief of Staff made those statements?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. So that your first instructions, written instructions from the Chief of Staff was that the main hazard was a surprise air attack and a probable submarine attack?

General Short. He mentioned in order there—he did not say what he considered the order of priority, but he mentioned sabotage first.

Mr. Kaufman. Sabotage and the risks involved in a surprise raid by air and submarine?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. That is all in the one sentence.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. And he winds that sentence up by stating:

This constitutes the real perils of the situation.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. And in addition you knew at that time of the deterioration of the relations as between the United States and Japan?


Mr. Kaufman. And you regarded and the Hawaiian Department was regarded as one of the most important outposts of the United States?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Kaufman. You recognized that?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. Then there followed between you and the Chief of Staff a series of communications commencing on February 7, 1941, and ending on October 28, 1941, all of which correspondence is included in exhibit No. 53.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. And the purport of that correspondence was constant advice and direction to you from the Chief of Staff in connection with preparation of the Department for a surprise attack by air?
General Short. I would say in preparation for any kind of an attack by air.

Mr. Kaufman. And particularly a surprise attack by air?

General Short. Yes. He only emphasized that, as I remember, once, that it was a question of getting the necessary things to meet any air attack.

Mr. Kaufman. You will not say that the purport of the correspondence between you and the Chief of Staff laid particular emphasis on the possibility of a surprise attack by air?

General Short. In that one paragraph he did.

Mr. Kaufman. I am talking about the rest of the correspondence commencing in February of 1941 and ending in October of 1941, whether or not the emphasis in all of those communications was not with respect to the possibility of an attack, of a surprise attack by air?

General Short. I would say it was with reference to the possibility of any attack by air, surprise or otherwise.

Mr. Kaufman. By air?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. And you recognized, as the result of that correspondence, the probability of the attack by air in the event of hostilities with the Japanese?

General Short. At least the possibility.

Mr. Kaufman. Now what were the conditions in the Hawaiian Department at the time that you took over the command?

General Short. There was still much to be done to prepare the defenses against an air attack. My letter of February 19 set forth these conditions very briefly to General Marshall.

Now I would like to add, I am not reflecting on any previous commander that may have made efforts to get all of these things, but the fact is those things existed.

Mr. Kaufman. The fact is after you took command, and in recognition of the possibilities of an attack by air, it was part of your problem to make the department ready against such possibility of attack?

General Short. Very definitely.

Mr. Kaufman. And you made efforts in that direction?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. And you made requests of the War Department for additional material and equipment and men for the purpose of strengthening that department?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. And some of your requests were granted and some were not granted?

General Short. Very few were granted; most were not granted.

Mr. Kaufman. The requests for pursuit planes were granted, were they not?

General Short. We got a considerable increase in pursuit planes.

Mr. Kaufman. And your request for radar equipment was granted?

General Short. Not completely. I asked for a higher priority, which would have advanced the date of receipt, and that was not given to me.

Mr. Kaufman. The fact is, however, you did get three mobile sets?

General Short. I got six mobile sets.
Mr. Kaufman. Six mobile sets and three stationary sets?

General Short. I do not believe the stationary sets were complete. I think certain parts were still missing.

Mr. Kaufman. At least one of the stationary sets was in operation at one time or another prior to December 7?

General Short. All six of them were in operation at one time or another.

Mr. Kaufman. All six were in operation at one time or another?

[8022] General Short. Of the mobile sets.

Mr. Kaufman. All six of the mobile sets were in operation and at least one of the stationary sets was in operation?

General Short. No, sir; no stationary set was in operation, to my knowledge.

Mr. Kaufman. Now on page 3 of your statement, and thereafter, you lay particular stress on the efforts that you made for the procurement of additional material and equipment for the Hawaiian Department?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Kaufman. And those efforts were the expected efforts of a commander in the field to strengthen his Department?

General Short. That is right.

Mr. Kaufman. Against the possibility of air attack?

General Short. That is right.

Mr. Kaufman. You were doing what was expected of you to be done?

General Short. And what I thought was essential.

Mr. Kaufman. And most of the material that you made a demand for was so as to better protect the Department against a possible air attack?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. Now, as a matter of fact, you know, don’t you, that the Hawaiian Department got priority in material [8023] and men in 1941?

General Short. Up to a certain point, and then they started sending all the B-17’s to the Philippine Islands, and they even took them away from us to send there. I might add also, that as late as about December 2 they asked me if I could afford to send 48 75-millimeter guns and 120 30-caliber machine guns, and that they would replace them.

Mr. Kaufman. Well, as a practical matter, General, if you had had the additional material there on December 7 it would not have made any difference, because the material that you did have was not used on December 7?

General Short. It would have made a great deal of difference if I had had additional material, and if I also had the information that the War Department had.

Mr. Kaufman. Now will you tell us, General, what was the principal duty of the Army in the Hawaiian Department?

General Short. It was to defend the Island of Oahu from surface attacks, air attacks, sabotage, internal disorders such as uprisings, with particular attention to the defense of Pearl Harbor and of the fleet when in the harbor, and always supported by the Navy.
Mr. Kaufman. One of the principal duties of the Hawaiian Department was the protection of the fleet when the fleet was in the harbor?

[8024] General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Kaufman. And we might summarize the duties of the Hawaiian Department as follows: To protect the island from invasion of any kind, or an attack of any kind?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. And to protect the fleet when it was in the harbor?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Kaufman. And the installations of the fleet while it was in the harbor?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. And that particularly including the fuel supply around the harbor?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Kaufman. The fuel supply was in large tanks without any protection of any kind?

General Short. That is right.

Mr. Kaufman. Which created an additional problem for the commander of the Hawaiian Department, isn’t that correct?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Kaufman. Because of the recognition by the commander that a destruction of the fuel supply would render the fleet impotent?

General Short. Yes, sir.

[8025] Mr. Kaufman. Now as commanding general in that field you received broad directives from the War Department?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. And it was your duty to determine the manner of performance?

General Short. In the main things the War Department also required the opportunity to approve my plans. They were sent to Washington for approval.

Mr. Kaufman. But with respect to a directive, the commander in the field had the responsibility of determining the manner of performing the directive issued to him?

General Short. Yes, sir; and the War Department also had the responsibility of furnishing him with the information available.

Mr. Kaufman. We are talking about different things, General. We are talking fundamentally about the duties of a commander in the field. He gets his directives from the War Department?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. And the responsibility as to the manner of performance is his?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. He reports to Washington as to the method of performance, and sometimes he gets instructions and sometimes he does not?

General Short. I may also add that the manner of the performance of his duties necessarily will be influenced by the essential information provided him. It necessarily must be so.

Mr. Kaufman. Now on pages 14 and 26 of your statement you state, in substance, that if any general alert was to be invoked in the
Hawaiian Department you assumed that General Marshall was going to supervise such alert; is that right?

General Short. He had very definitely done that in the June 17, 1940, message.

Mr. Kaufman. The fact is, as you state on pages 14 and 26 of your statement, that you expected that if a general alert was going to be invoked for the Hawaiian Department General Marshall was going to supervise it!

General Short. I expected him to do one of two things: Either to order the general alert or to give me sufficient information to justify me in ordering it.

Mr. Kaufman. And you assumed that because he ordered the general alert in 1940; is that right?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Kaufman. And you also assumed it because in 1940 he, to some extent, supervised the alert that was invoked there?

General Short. He followed it up there directly, to know what was going on.

Mr. Kaufman. Did you make inquiry from the Chief of Staff as to whether or not he would supervise an alert?

General Short. I did not.

Mr. Kaufman. Did you make inquiry from the Chief of Staff as to whether or not he would directly order an alert?

General Short. I did not.

Mr. Kaufman. You recognized, of course, that conditions had changed very materially from the summer of 1940 to the summer of 1941?

General Short. But I also recognized that a thing that would be dangerous in 1940, would be dangerous in 1941.

Mr. Kaufman. You did recognize, however, that conditions did materially change?

General Short. Very materially.

Mr. Kaufman. From the summer of 1940 to the summer of 1941?

Mr. Kaufman. And that the Chief of Staff and the War Department in Washington had many problems in 1941 that they did not have in 1940?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Kaufman. And that that required a greater reliance by them on their field commanders in 1941?

General Short. It also required a greater reliance and more exact requirement of performance of duty by the general staff.

Mr. Kaufman. Now, coming back to the question of the recognition of the possibility or probability of an air attack on the island, are you familiar with the correspondence between Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson?

General Short. I am.

Mr. Kaufman. Which is exhibit 10 in this proceeding?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. When did those communications first come to your attention?

General Short. Probably within the first few days after my arrival at Honolulu.
Mr. Kaufman. And you recognized the concern of the Secretary of the Navy that everything be done to protect Pearl Harbor, and the fleet against an air attack on the island?

General Short. I did.

Mr. Kaufman. And you are familiar with the directive made by the Secretary of War in his communication of February 7, 1941, directing that a study be made, and that all preparations be made against such a possible attack?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Kaufman. It was as the result of the communications of the Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of War that the joint coastal frontier defense plan was worked out?

General Short. The modifications of it.

Mr. Kaufman. The modifications of it?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. And the modification of the coastal frontier defense plan is annex 7 as part of exhibit 44 in this proceeding. Did I adequately describe it, General?

General Short. That is right.

Mr. Kaufman. Will you turn to that plan? Under item 1, General, it says:

In order to coordinate joint defensive measurements for the security of the Fleet and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war, and before a general mobilization, the following agreement is made.

Do you have that language in mind?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. So that one of the first things after you took command of the Hawaiian Department was to work out this agreement with General Bloch, the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Kaufman. And it contemplated the preparation of this plan of defense before a declaration of war, and before general mobilization.

General Short. It made provisions for it.

Mr. Kaufman. It made provisions for it?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. And it was something you had in mind in connection with the working out of this agreement?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. So that the plan was good even though the performance may not have been good?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. Not that agreement between yourself and Admiral Bloch clearly contemplated specific things to be done 1, by the Army, and 2, by the Navy?

General Short. I do not know whether you would say that was the order. The order probably would be reversed.

Mr. Kaufman. What is that?

General Short. The order perhaps would be reversed on account of the things that the Navy was expected to do.

Mr. Kaufman. Well, the fact is, irrespective of the order, that the agreement contemplated well-defined activities?
General Short. Very definitely.
Mr. Kaufman. For the Navy and the Army?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Kaufman. And those activities were to be put into effect by joint agreement whenever the occasion arose?
General Short. The first provision would be from Washington, if they put the basic war plan into effect, or any part of it. That would be the normal procedure.
Mr. Kaufman. Well, it would not be put into effect by Washington, would it?
General Short. It would be ordered into effect, the basic plan would be ordered into effect, which would direct us to put this into effect.
Mr. Kaufman. Or else that particular part of the agreement could be put into effect as a result of joint action by you and Admiral Bloch?
General Short. That is true, but when you consider the instructions we had from Washington, indicating that they were very anxious not to provoke Japan, I do not believe they wanted us to put into effect any part of the war plan that had not been indicated from Washington.
Mr. Kaufman. The plan contemplated activities even before a declaration of war, or general mobilization?
General Short. Well, at least before a declaration of war.
Mr. Kaufman. And it also says, "and before general mobilization."
General Short. They were at liberty to put any part of their plan into effect.
Mr. Kaufman. And you and Admiral Bloch could yourselves have put into effect if you determined that it was necessary?
General Short. But we would have had to keep in mind that desire of Washington not to provoke Japan.
Mr. Kaufman. Well, with respect to this agreement that was made between you and Admiral Bloch for joint activities, did you report that plan to Washington?
General Short. We did, and it was approved.
Mr. Kaufman. So that Washington knew that so far as the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District and the Commander of the Hawaiian Department was concerned, they had worked out a plan for joint activities to be effective before war was declared, or before there was a general mobilization?
General Short. That is correct; possibly to be effective before it could be made effective.
Mr. Kaufman. To be effective before it could be made effective?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. And they knew that your plans with the Navy were completed?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. And in order to be put into effect, it could be put into effect as the result of an agreement between yourself and Admiral Bloch?
General Short. Yes, sir; and I believe certain portions were actually directed to be effective from Washington. In the Navy message of October 16, and the Navy message of October 27, the Navy directed the commander of the fleet to take defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out war plans 46, which necessarily would have included, and did include very considerable reconnaissance.
Mr. Kaufman. I think we will come to that, General. What I am concerned with is as to whether or not with respect to this agreement, it contemplated that it could be put into effect by you and Admiral Bloch, if you determined to do so.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. And that would have require agreement between yourself and Admiral Bloch to put it into effect?

General Short. Or a directive from Washington that required it.

Mr. Kaufman. Or, Washington could direct one of you to put it into effect?

General Short. Or certain parts of it.

Mr. Kaufman. Or certain parts of it, and if Washington did direct you to put it into effect, it would have again contemplated agreement between yourself and Admiral Bloch that each of you was doing the part provided for in the plan?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Kaufman. Now, coming down to the summer of 1941, you read in the paper, of course, about the deterioration of relations as between the Japanese and the United States?

General Short. I did.

Mr. Kaufman. And you knew of the freezing of Japanese funds in the United States?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. And you knew of the oil embargo against Japan?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. And the embargo against scrap and ammunition?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. Did that create in you a consciousness that trouble might come with Japan?

General Short. Yes, sir; but I was also told by the War Department that they did not expect a reaction causing the use of military forces on account of these acts. In their message of July 25, they stated definitely they did not expect a military reaction.

Mr. Kaufman. They said that in July 1941?

General Short. Yes, sir; on July 25.

Mr. Kaufman. And did you get any further advice from Washington that they did not expect military action?

General Short. No, sir. The only further advice that might be construed to that effect was on the 20th of October after the joint message had been sent on the 16th predicting certain attacks by the Japanese.

The War Department sent me a message on the 20th stating, while the situation continued to be tense, that they did not expect any abrupt change in the relations between the United States and Japan.

Mr. Kaufman. Now, after this message from the War Department on the 26th of July—is that correct?

General Short. The 25th.

Mr. Kaufman. The 25th of July 1941, there was nevertheless, great concern about the air defenses at Hawaii?

General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. As a result of which, General Martin made a report in August of 1941, which is Exhibit 13 in this proceeding. Are you familiar with that report?

General Short. I am very familiar with it.

Mr. Kaufman. And in that report he made many suggestions for the improvement of the air defenses in Hawaii?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Kaufman. And you approved that report, did you not?

General Short. I went over that report very carefully, and personally added the 36 torpedo bombers to what we required.

After talking it over with General Martin, he agreed with my suggestion. I reviewed that report very carefully before it went to Washington.

Mr. Kaufman. You approved that report, and this is a photostatic copy of your approval of that report [handing document to General Short]?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Kaufman. I will ask that that be marked as an exhibit. A copy of it has been handed to the members of the committee.

The Vice Chairman. It will be so received. What exhibit number will that be?

Mr. Kaufman. Exhibit 138.

(The document referred to was marked “Exhibit No. 138.”)

Mr. Kaufman. General, on the basis of the report of General Martin, another agreement was made between the Army and Navy with respect to the use of planes for reconnaissance and other things, and that is known as the Martin-Bellinger agreement, is it not?

General Short. I do not think that was made as the result of the study. That was just a natural follow-up on the agreement that Admiral Bloch and I had made.

Mr. Kaufman. That is correct.

So that we have it, General, in connection with your appointment, you recognized the importance of the Hawaiian Department; you recognized the deterioration of relations between Japan and the United States throughout the summer of 1941, you had in mind the letter from the War Department of July 25, that they did not anticipate any action by Japan, and we come now to the telegram that you received from the War Department, the one of November 27. Have you got it before you?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. Before you received this telegram, did you see a telegram sent to the Navy Department dated November 24?

General Short. Yes, sir. I was a little uncertain whether I had actually received it, or just had it read to me, but a naval officer before the Roberts board stated that he definitely gave me a copy, which he undoubtedly did.

Mr. Kaufman. In the hearings before the Roberts Commission your recollection was that you had not seen the telegram of November 24?

General Short. I believe I stated that I remembered seeing it, but I had been unable to find it in my headquarters, and I thought perhaps I had not actually received it.

But in view of what the naval officer stated, I am sure I must have actually received it.
Mr. KAUFMAN. Captain Layton testified that he had actually given it to you.

General SHORT. Actually delivered it to me, and talked to me about it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You saw it and you did receive it, according to the testimony of Captain Layton, prior to the receipt of the telegram of November 27?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. From the War Department?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. So that on the 24th you received information from the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, as follows:

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful.

That was a definite statement, was it not?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. It goes on to say:

This situation, coupled with statements of Japanese Government, and movement their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive move in any direction including attack on the Philippines or Guam, is a possibility.

Now, I take it from your statement, General, that you said that language excluded Hawaii, because of the mention of the Philippines or Guam.

General SHORT. What I intended to say was that I felt certain that if the Navy Department believed an attack on Hawaii was probable, they would have mentioned it, the same as they did the Philippines.

"In any direction——"

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, they said——

Senator Brewster. Let him finish.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I am sorry.

General SHORT. "In any direction" might mean anywhere in the world, but they specifically stated that they did expect an attack toward the Philippines or Guam. I believe if they had been convinced of the same thing in Hawaii, they would very definitely have included Hawaii specifically, and not leave it to be included in the "in any direction."

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, do you mean to say, General, that with information of that kind, you were justified in not going on an all-out alert?

General SHORT. I think very definitely that I was. The fact that the War Department did not even inquire or give me any direct information to justify it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. This was directed to be sent to you for your information?

General SHORT. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. A specific direction to you?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. So that when the Navy Department said "aggressive movement in any direction," did it not mean in the direction in which they directed this message to go for information?

General SHORT. I would not say so. If you take it literally, I feel absolutely confident, if they had any idea that Hawaii was to be directly included, if there was a direct probability that they would have said so. There would be no purpose in leaving me to guess.
Mr. Kaufman. Did you expect the War Department to be able to tell you the exact place of an attack?

General Short. I believe the War Department actually had the information 4 hours before the attack, so they could have told me the exact place.

Mr. Kaufman. Now, we are 2 1/2 weeks before the 4 hours of the attack. We are on the 24th of November, General.

General Short. The War Department could at least give me their best estimate, and I would like, when you get to November 29, to read to you what the man who wrote the estimate had to say about it.

Mr. Kaufman. Coming back again, General, to the 24th, [8042] you said that the failure in this dispatch to name Hawaii as the place of possible attack, the same as the Philippines of Guam excluded from your consideration Hawaii as a probable point of attack.

General Short. It indicated to me that they did not feel that Hawaii was definitely a point of probable attack. It was a possible place of attack, of course, but I am 100 percent confident, if they had believed it was a probable place of attack, they would have so stated it.

Mr. Kaufman. Did it prompt you to ask for any instructions from the War Department?

General Short. It did not.

Mr. Kaufman. We go now to the telegram of November 27. That was a direct telegram to you?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. It states.

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes, with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue.

That is a very definite statement, is it not?

General Short. It is a very indefinite statement. It says that they are to all practical purposes, but there is a possibility that they may come back. And they did [8043] come back. I knew it only from the papers. I knew that the negotiations were continuing.

The War Department knew definitely there was a de facto rupture, and the Japanese were just stalling. They intercepted a message that told them that very positively.

Mr. Kaufman. You regard that as an indefinite statement?

General Short. A very indefinite statement.

Mr. Kaufman. Then it follows, with the statement: "Action unpredictable."

It says:

Japanese future action unpredictable, but hostile action possible at any moment.

Was that an indefinite or definite statement?

General Short. Certainly, when you say a thing is unpredictable, it is not a definite statement. You say that something is possible, and they did not indicate the type of hostile action, they just said "hostile action," and I would say again that is a very indefinite statement.

Mr. Kaufman. You did not believe that that was sufficient to put you on notice to go on an all-out alert?
General Short. I did not. I thought the War Department was perfectly capable of writing a positive and definite instruction if they wanted to give one.

[8044] Mr. Kaufman. You did not make any inquiry from the War Department?

General Short. I did not.

Mr. Kaufman. Well, you did get a definite instruction in this dispatch, did you not?

General Short. I got certain missions assigned, as will appear later in the message.

[8045] Mr. Kaufman. It says:

If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. That is a definite statement?

General Short. That is a definite statement if they didn’t go ahead and modify it by the next sentence. Then you change it into an indefinite statement.

Mr. Kaufman. But that statement, you agree, is definite?

General Short. If you stop there I agree that is definite.

Mr. Kaufman. Then it says:

This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.

General Short. You immediately have qualified it and it is no longer a definite statement. It is an indefinite statement.

Mr. Kaufman. You have one definite statement and one indefinite statement?

General Short. They are joined together.

Mr. Kaufman. Did what you claim to be inconsistencies in that statement prompt you to make any inquiry from Washington?


Mr. Kaufman. And you didn’t do so?

General Short. No, sir. I was satisfied of one thing, that their prime desire was to avoid war, and to not let any international incident happen in Hawaii that might bring on war.

Mr. Kaufman. It says:

You are directed to take such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. But these measures should be carried out so as not to alarm the civilian population.

So that you did have a broad directive?

General Short. Always qualified.

Mr. Kaufman. We will come to that. You did have a broad directive to take such action as you deemed necessary?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. But to do it in such a way as would not alarm the civilian population?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. That was a complete and concise directive to you, was it not?
General Short. The first part was a very concise directive. When you qualify it, then there was always a question about whether the manner I was going to do it in would alarm the public.

Mr. Kaufman. The second part referred to the manner?

General Short. The manner; yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. That, again, did not prompt you to make any inquiry from the War Department?

General Short. It did not.

Mr. Kaufman. And you didn’t make any?

General Short. I did not.

Mr. Kaufman. The record shows, General, that this dispatch was decoded in your signal center at 2:22 Hawaiian time.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. And that Colonel Phillips took that message to you at 2:30 on that day.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. On the morning of that day you had had a meeting with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. And that meeting was before you had received this telegram?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Kaufman. And you received this telegram according to the testimony of Colonel Phillips at 2:30 and according to the record the only person with whom you conferred about this telegram and the order that you gave was with Colonel Phillips, your chief of staff?

General Short. But almost immediately afterwards I conferred with my G-2 and with my air force commander and my antiaircraft commander, within, I would say, the next hour to an hour and a half, all three of them.

Mr. Kaufman. You put in the alert No. 1 within 30 minutes after the receipt—

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. Of the dispatch and before conference with anybody except Colonel Phillips?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Kaufman. And you replied to the War Department before you had had any conference with anybody other than Colonel Phillips?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Kaufman. And you replied to that before you had conferred with Admiral Kimmel or Admiral Bloch?

General Short. I had conferred very fully with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch and at the time we conferred we all knew exactly what was in the message of November 24 and there was not one additional bit of information of the enemy in this message that was not included in the message of November 24. We knew nothing more than we had known from the message of November 24.

Mr. Kaufman. At any rate, you replied to this telegram to the War Department before you had conferred with Admiral Kimmel or Admiral Bloch or any part of your staff other than Colonel Phillips?

General Short. I did.

Mr. Kaufman. And in that telegram your report of action taken was—
Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. General, having discussed these telegrams and having characterized some of them as being indefinite or unresponsive, do you think that the War Department was justified in taking from the words "liaison with the Navy" the meaning that you had put into effect the joint coastal frontier defense plan?

General Short. They very definitely were not.

Mr. Kaufman. Why not?

General Short. Because, in the first place, it was primarily their function to order it into effect. They knew, I think, that I would have consulted them before I would have considered ordering any part of it into effect if the communications were open. I am sure they would have expected me to phone them and tell them that I contemplated doing so.

[8050] Mr. Kaufman. What did you mean by the words "liaison with the Navy"?

General Short. I meant that I was keeping in touch with the Navy. I had actually discussed the dangers of the situation over a period of about 3 hours that morning with Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel and there had been no change since that discussion.

Mr. Kaufman. Well, keeping in touch with the Navy was part of your normal function, was it not?

General Short. Yes, sir; and I was performing it.

Mr. Kaufman. It was a part of your normal function that you had been undertaking and doing ever since you had taken charge of the Hawaiian Department?

General Short. Also "liaison" is a term that is thoroughly understood throughout the Army and there was no doubt in my mind it was thoroughly understood by the War Department.

Mr. Kaufman. General, will you state for the record what your understanding of the word "liaison" means in military and naval circles?

General Short. We use "liaison" in two different ways. In the way in which I was using it there, where you keep in touch and keep generally informed. The other way was where you have a liaison officer detailed to a headquarters who has the sole mission of keeping his own headquarters informed [8051] as to what is going on.

Mr. Kaufman. That, you say, is the well-defined meaning?

General Short. That is right.

Mr. Kaufman. Of the two uses of the word "liaison"?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. One is to indicate that you were keeping yourself informed by the Navy.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. As to what they were doing?

General Short. The general situation. We were keeping each other informed, you might say, as to what we were doing.

Mr. Kaufman. Well, did you keep yourself informed as to what the Navy was doing?

General Short. I think at that particular point I was extremely well-informed because we had discussed for a period of approximately 3 hours the whole situation in the Pacific, looking toward Midway and
Wake, and the dangers that were involved in sending carriers out there for relief. We discussed every phase of it.

Mr. Kaufman. The telegram of November 27 says:

You are directed to take such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Kaufman. Let us go to the first directive. You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance—

General Short. As I deem necessary.

Mr. Kaufman. As you deem necessary.

Did you take any reconnaissance at that time?

General Short. I did not deem any was necessary because it was the Navy's function, definitely agreed upon in the plan, to conduct the long-distance reconnaissance.

Mr. Kaufman. Did you make inquiry from the Navy as to whether they were at that time making reconnaissance?

General Short. I knew they were sending out three task forces. I discussed it fully with them that morning. They were sending a task force to Wake to send out additional Marine planes. They were sending out to Midway to send out additional Marine planes. They were going to send one to Johnston Island. And I actually got permission to send a staff officer along because they were going to conduct a landing exercise which I wished my G-2 section to understand. I knew they were making perimeter reconnaissance from Johnston and Wake to Midway. I did not know the details of that reconnaissance but I knew it would take place.

Mr. Kaufman. You knew that the task force to Johnston Island did not leave until December 5?

General Short. It was later, but the other two were leaving early.

Mr. Kaufman. Admiral Halsey left on the 29th?

General Short. The 28th or 29th.

Mr. Kaufman. 28th or 29th.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. Those were the only two task forces that were out?

General Short. The only two task forces going out right at that time.

Mr. Kaufman. Now, the joint agreement between yourself and Admiral Bloch contemplated long-range reconnaissance from the islands, did it not?

General Short. It contemplated it not just from the island. Whatever long-range reconnaissance was necessary. And, as I understand Admiral Kimmel's attitude, it was that with the perimeter reconnaissance from Johnston, Wake, and Midway, there was a very great saving in planes, that he could accomplish more than he could with the same number of planes from Oahu. And it was a logical thing to do, not to send them all out from Oahu.

Mr. Kaufman. General, let us come back to the 27th of November. You were directed to take reconnaissance?

General Short. As I deemed necessary.

Mr. Kaufman. As you deemed necessary?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. In other words, in order to have reconnaissance, effective reconnaissance, radar stations have to be in operation, do they not?
General Short. The radar did not make distant reconnaissance. We thought at that time it was limited to 75 or a hundred miles. We discovered that under very exceptional circumstances we actually got 132 miles. It was not an instrument for distant reconnaissance.

Mr. Kaufman. That was not put into alert, was it?

General Short. That was put into alert during what I considered the most dangerous hours of the day for an air attack, from 4 o'clock to 7 o'clock a.m. daily.

Mr. Kaufman. And did you report that to the——

General Short. I did not.

Mr. Kaufman. Just putting the radar station into operation is not effective unless there is the information center that works with it?

General Short. The information center was working with it.

Mr. Kaufman. Was working with it?

General Short. Was working with it; yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. Now, General, did you later on that day see the dispatch that Admiral Kimmel received from the Navy Department?

[8055] General Short. Yes, sir. I think Lieutenant Burr testified that he actually brought it to me personally.

Mr. Kaufman. That was after you had replied to the War Department?

General Short. Probably sometime in the next hour or two.

Mr. Kaufman. And when you saw the words "war warning" did that create any impression on your mind?

General Short. No more so than the fact that they had said before that the Japs would probably attack.

Mr. Kaufman. Had you ever in your experience seen a message to a field commander using the words "This is a war warning"?

General Short. No, sir; but I knew that the Navy messages were habitually rather more aggressive than the Army. On October 16 we had a message in which they said Japan would attack. On October 20 I had one from the War Department saying they didn't expect any. My message said nothing about a war warning and his did. I think the Navy messages were inclined to be more positive, possibly you might say more alarming, in the context.

Mr. Kaufman. So that the war warning, you just regarded it as aggressiveness of the Navy, and paid no particular attention to it?

General Short. No particular attention to those words.

[8056] Mr. Kaufman. I direct your attention to the telegram to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet which says:

The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo.

That is for information, is it not?

General Short. Yes, sir; and indicated definitely to me they were attacking toward the Western Pacific.

Mr. Kaufman. Then it goes on with a directive to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. To——

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46.
General Short. Yes, sir. I thought sure that that included distant reconnaissance and as I remember Admiral Kimmel told me that he had tightened up all along the line, as I think he expressed it.

Mr. Kaufman. Now, you had occasion to see Admiral Kimmel within a few days after the receipt of the dispatches of November 27? General Short. I had a conference with Admiral Kimmel on December 1. I had another conference with Admiral Kimmel on December 2. I had another conference with him on December 3.

Mr. Kaufman. Did you—— Senator Brewster. Let him finish.

Mr. Kaufman. General, did you at any time tell Admiral Kimmel that you had alerted only against sabotage?

General Short. I don't know that I said that specifically. However, there was never any doubt in my mind that he knew exactly the status. Lieutenant Burr was detailed as a liaison from the Navy to the G-3 section. He sat in with our G-3 section, which was our operations section, which controlled all the alerts, all the war plans, everything of that kind. He knew everything that my staff knew. He had just one duty and that was to keep his headquarters informed of exactly what we were doing.

Mr. Kaufman. Now, can you account, General, for the testimony given by Admiral Kimmel before this committee to the effect that he did not know that you had alerted only against sabotage? He testified further that he thought you had gone on an all-out alert and that he didn't know that you had anything else but an all-out alert.

General Short. The only way I can account for that would be poor staff work on the part of the staff of the Fourteenth Naval District. As I say, their liaison officer must have known exactly. We had furnished them with 10 copies of our staff operating procedure, which somebody in that naval staff certainly must have dug into and known what it meant. Why it did not get to Admiral Kimmel I do not know.

Senator Lucas. General Short, will you give the committee the name of that liaison officer?

General Short. Lieutenant Burr. I don't know his initials. B-u-r-r.

Senator Lucas. Thank you.

Mr. Kaufman. Now, General——

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest, in the interest of saving time, that counsel ask General Short at this time what an all-out alert would mean to an observer who knew nothing about it. What would they have to do so that someone in Hawaii would know that they were on an all-out alert if one was ordered and they went on such an alert.

Mr. Kaufman. What would be an all-out alert, General?

General Short. An all-out alert would cause every officer and every enlisted man in every organization to move to battle positions. Men would be moving all over the islands, in helmets, full
field equipment, by motor, and otherwise. There would be men on every road.

Mr. Kaufman. And do you feel that was contrary to the instructions of the War Department not to alarm the civilian population?

General Short. I would say that it would mean to the civilian population and any Japanese agents that we were taking up our definite battle positions. There couldn't be any mistake about it.

Mr. Kaufman. Even though it was done under the name of war games, or whatever you wanted to call it?

General Short. If we had had time to make a previous announcement, which we usually did if we were going into maneuvers, and a little build-up, we probably could have deceived the average citizen. We probably could not have deceived a Japanese agent who had the message.

Mr. Kaufman. So you want the committee to understand that you had that problem in mind, so as not to circumvent or go contrary to the decision of the War Department?

General Short. I did.

Mr. Murphy. Counsel, as long as you are going into that, I suggest that we might complete the picture and ask the witness why he didn't go into alert No. 2, which provided [8060] protection against a submarine and an air attack. Alert No. 2.

Mr. Kaufman. General, will you first describe what alert No. 2 was. We have No. 1, against sabotage, and No. 3, an all-out alert. What was alert No. 2?

General Short. Alert No. 2 was a defense against sabotage and uprisings and, in addition, a defense against an air attack or against an attack by surface and subsurface vessels.

Mr. Kaufman. Will you tell me why you didn't put that into effect?

General Short. All of the coast artillery, all of the antiaircraft artillery, and all of the air would have immediately taken up their duties as described in that alert. Part of the coast artillery was right in the middle of the town. Fort de Russy was within two or three blocks of the Royal Hawaiian Hotel. The public couldn't help seeing that they were manning their seacoast guns. Placing live ammunition. Some of the guns were practically in the middle of the park. The bombers would have all gone to outlying islands, except the B-17's which could not, because the landing gear was not along. So there would have been a considerable amount of activity. Again perhaps the average citizens wouldn't have understood fully but if there was a Japanese agent, who knew what he was looking for, he would have known perfectly.

[8061] Mr. Kaufman. Congressman Clark has a question.

Mr. Clark. That answers what was in my mind, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. And there were plenty of Jap agents in Hawaii?

General Short. We knew there had been a total list of 239 consular agents. We had their names very definitely. We had the names of probably 70 or 80 more that we were confident were Japanese agents. I might add in addition to that opportunity of alarming the public if we placed men at seacoast guns and at antiaircraft batteries with an explanation that they were to be prepared to fire immediately upon notice against Japanese, if we told our airplanes to be warmed up to

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be ready to go up and attack Japanese planes it is inconceivable that in some way the Japanese agents would not have picked up the information.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You knew that there was certainly no need for two-hundred-odd consular agents of the Japanese there, that their function was other than what their names indicated? General SHOFT. There function may have been twofold. Some of them may not have been espionage agents. The Japanese, as we knew, were very much interested in keeping the Japanese-Americans as Japanese and I think, to a considerable extent, these agents were propaganda agents for Japan; some of [8062] them espionage; all of them propaganda.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You did not think, General, that it might have been very well to indicate that the men were taking battle stations as the means of probably heading off an attack, did you?

General SHOFT. I did not think it would comply with the War Department message. It might have been very desirable but they had indicated that they did not want that kind of thing done.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, as commander in the field you certainly had the power to inquire from Washington and to make known your plans, didn't you, if you wanted to do so?

General SHOFT. They had indicated very definitely that they did not want to alarm the public and that they did not want to provoke Japan.

Mr. KAUFMAN. So that you did not feel that you should have even made that suggestion to the War Department?

General SHOFT. I felt definitely that they did not want it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, on the following day——

General SHOFT. May I add something before you leave that message?

Mr. KAUFMAN. By all means, sir.

General SHOFT. There were two things in that message [8063] that you did not mention. One was "report measures taken." Now, that told me, said to me that if I reported the measures taken and they were not what the War Department thought they should be that I would unquestionably get additional instructions.

The other was, "Limit this highly essential information" or "highly secret information to the minimum officers"; not officers and men but officers. You could not possibly go into alert No. 2 or alert No. 3 without directly violating that.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Well, in connection with that, General, in your statement you state in paragraph 90 that your decision on the 27th of November in the light of hindsight was wrong.

General SHOFT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And the purport of your argument in your statement is that although you made an error you complain that Washington did not correct your error; isn't that the purport of your argument?

General SHOFT. Yes, sir; if you are not furnished information you in all probability will make an erroneous estimate.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And your argument throughout your statement is that although in the first instance the error was yours Washington should be partly responsible for not having [8064] corrected your error?
General Short. I would say wholly responsible.
Mr. Kaufman. All right. It does not relieve you of the responsibility, however, does it, General?
General Short. Yes, sir; I told them exactly what I was doing. I had no reason in the world to believe that they did not approve of it. The Chief of Staff has himself stated before this committee that I had a right to assume that he would tell me if the action were not what he wanted.
Mr. Kaufman. You say that you made a full report as to the action taken by you?
General Short. Yes, sir; I said I made a report.
Mr. Kaufman. You made a report?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. And in that report you intended to make it a complete report, did you not?
General Short. I intended for it to be complete enough for them to understand without question.
Mr. Kaufman. And in that you told them that you had alerted against sabotage. Now, the radar warning system had nothing to do with sabotage, the sabotage alert, did it?
General Short. No, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. That is an action that you took that you did not report to Washington.
Mr. Kaufman. And you did not report the fact that it was only running on a partial time basis?
General Short. I did not report it at all.
Mr. Kaufman. You did not report it at all. You did not think it was material for Washington to know that you were only carrying your radar station for 3 hours a day?
General Short. My basic report was of an alert against sabotage, which indicated to them that I was not alerted against an air attack or against a landing; all-out attack.
Mr. Kaufman. Then why was the radar alerted on the 27th of November?
General Short. There were two very good reasons. The first reason is the Martin study had decided that the 3 hours, 2 hours immediately preceding dawn and 1 hour after were the dangerous hours. The radar was very new, the men were just beginning to be trained. If there was any possibility, it was a factor of sabotage, and it also was an opportunity to train the men at the most important time and to make them train a little harder because it was tied in with another alert.
Mr. Kaufman. Have you anything further to say about the November 27 message before I leave it, sir?
General Short. No, sir. There is one thing that I think [8066] it would be appropriate to take up at this time to indicate that the officers——
Senator Lucas. What was the question?
(The question was read by the reporter.)
General Short. The question is all tied in with this message as to why I did not assume or estimate that Japan was about to attack Hawaii.
I have here a mimeographed copy from volume 2 of the Clarke report. Before I read this I would like to explain that General Kroner, who was then Colonel Kroner, was the head of the military branch of G–2. He was the officer who was responsible for maintaining information and for the preparation of estimates as to probable action.

Hawaii was not mentioned as a place of probable attack in the current information and intelligence sent me in November and early December 1941.

In this connection I want to quote for the committee the testimony of Gen. Hayes A. Kroner, the chief of the intelligence branch in War Department G–2 from July 1941 up to the time of the Japanese attack. The testimony I quote was given on September 13, 1944, before Col. Carter W. Clarke. It is found in the so-called Clarke investigation. I recently borrowed the War Department copy. I am informed that the committee has the only other [8067] copy of the Clarke report. I quote from page 5 and pages 9 and 10 of General Kroner's testimony:

Col. Clarke. Did you have access to a source of information which we know as Top Secret or the British know as Most Secret?
Gen. Kroner. Meaning communications information?
Col. Clarke. You mean you didn't get it or your Branch didn't get it?
Gen. Kroner. I personally as Chief of the Branch did not get it. I was aware that something, which later I found out to be of this nature, existed, but I was given to understand, particularly by Col. Bratton and Col. Pettigrew, who sometimes handled the matter for Col. Bratton, that he received information from Col. Minkler, whom I knew to be in the Signal Corps, which perhaps had to do with Japanese troop movements, which he by long custom and by General Miles' special desire, was to handle himself directly with Gen. Miles.

Col. Clarke. I would like to ask one more question. In any estimate from the time you took over the Intelligence Group up to and including Pearl Harbor, was there ever any prediction or forecast made of a possible [8068] attack on Pearl Harbor?
Gen. Kroner. None to my knowledge. I have in mind the last estimate that was made before Pearl Harbor, which was an estimate covering a future period from December 1 to sometime in 1942.
Lt. Col. Ginspon. Did you consider it a capability of the Japanese to successfully attack Pearl Harbor with bombers?
Gen. Kroner. No. The matter was discussed——
Col. Clarke. Did you identify this document?
Gen. Kroner. Yes. I identified it—this is the document to which I referred—IB 150, November 29, 1941.

That is in Exhibit 33 under estimates dated November 29, 1941. [Reading:]

This particular estimate was considered by the whole division, not only the Intelligence Group but by General Miles himself, as perhaps the most important we had ever gotten out. That importance lay not in so much the danger that we saw from Japan, although danger in that field was pretty thoroughly discussed, but primarily because Gen. Miles wishes to focus War Department thought on the defeat that could be administered to the Nazi powers. In the preparation of the estimate [8069] each geographic section in the Intelligence Branch prepared its part. Colonel—now Brigadier General—Thomas J. Betts put the several estimates together and did what we called "polish them up," He and I discussed the lines of action and capabilities of all the warring powers and especially of each potential enemy to the U. S. A., and I took them to Gen. Miles where they were finally altered to suit him or approved. This particular estimate does not include in the lines of action open to Japan an attack on Pearl Harbor, and I remember that so distinctly because when the
word came through the radio on that fateful Sunday, December 7, that Japan had attacked Pearl Harbor, I was sitting in my office in the Munitions Building reading from this paper the Japanese capabilities. Therefore from my point of view, I feel that Japan's potential capability against Pearl Harbor was left from this estimate because neither Col. Betts nor I had any information which would lead us to believe that they were capable of or planned to do so.

Col. Clarke. I would like to ask one final question again just to reiterate the fact that you personally had no knowledge of what Col. Bratton did with this most secret material or to whom he showed it.

Gen. Kroner. That is correct, except to Gen. Miles.

[8070] I want to call attention to the fact that these two officers who were responsible for the preparation of this estimate, General Kroner and Colonel Betts, in spite of the fact that General Kroner was the head of the Military Intelligence Branch, were denied access to the "magic" and for that reason he did not consider Japan capable of making an attack and did not believe that they were going to do so.

I was in the same position with reference to "magic." I had no access to "magic." I had access to even less information than General Kroner did and General Kroner has made it perfectly plain that the absence of access to "magic" had caused him to draw the conclusion and to write to the estimate that way and the reason it was left out of the estimate was not, as General Miles said before this committee, because it was too obvious to be put in, but because they did not believe Japan was capable of making the attack considering the information they had.

Mr. Murphy. May I inquire at this point whether or not General Kroner was a subordinate of General Miles?

General Short. He was. He was in charge of the intelligence branch directly under General Miles and he took this estimate to General Miles and General Miles accepted it.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, we distinguish between chief of the intelligence branch and head of the intelligence branch?

[8071] General Short. No, sir. The G-2 was divided into several branches.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate General Miles was head of Intelligence?

General Short. He was head of all G-2.

Mr. Murphy. All Intelligence?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. And this man was called Chief of the Intelligence?

General Short. Of the Military Intelligence Branch.

Here is another short radiogram that I would like to introduce at this time because it shows the attitude of G-2 and what they thought between the time of the sending of this message and December 7. This message was dated December 5, 1941, No. 512, addressed to G-2 Panama Department:

U. S.-Japanese relations strained STOP Will inform you if and when severance of diplomatic relations imminent.

Signed "Miles."

Now, that was only 2 days before the attack and apparently Miles, who was head of G-2 at that time, did not consider that the rupture of Japanese relations was imminent.

Mr. Kaufman. I am told that this has never come before the committee before.

Senator Ferguson. Read it.
Mr. Kaufman. It has been read into the record by General Short and is dated December 5, 1941.

To Panama Canal Department:
U. S.-JAPANESE RELATIONS STRAINED: STOP WILL INFORM YOU IF AND WHEN SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IMMINENT.

MILES.

That was not sent to you, was it, General?

General Short. That was not sent to me but I read it to show that at that time Miles did not believe the severance was imminent, 2 days before the attack.

Mr. Kaufman. And is something that you have found that supports your contention—

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Kaufman (continuing). That other people came to the same erroneous estimate as you did?

General Short. And people who had much more information than I had even.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, can Mr. Masten, who was here earlier with us, can he explain on this record why the War Department, why the Intelligence branch, did not deliver that to the committee and why it was not called to the attention of the committee before Miles took the witness stand and before General Marshall and others were on the witness stand?

Can he explain why we get this information after witnesses have been here instead of before? I think here is an appropriate place to place their information now in the record as to this incident.

Mr. Masten. Senator, I have no personal knowledge to answer the question that you asked. I understand from Colonel Duncombe, the Army liaison officer, that it is his impression that that was delivered, that they had delivered it to us, but we will have to look and see. I understand that the exhibit which I think is—

Senator Ferguson. As I understood it we were to have all messages.

Mr. Masten. Excuse me, Senator. Exhibit 32, which is the only exhibit containing Army messages from Washington, states specifically that it is restricted to messages between the War Department and Hawaii. Now, to my knowledge, there has not been any effort made to compile an exhibit of the messages from the War Department to Panama or to any of the other places.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand then that we do not have all the messages to Panama and we do not have all the messages to the Philippines? This is very material as I see it, that this committee has all messages sent out in relation to this war or anticipated war.

Mr. Masten. Well, as I say, Senator, I have no personal knowledge of the precise answer to your question. There are a number of other photostats in the office and I will have to check them up.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. Well, then, we will ask you to check it. It is now 12 o'clock and the committee will recess until 2 o'clock, General.

General Short. Thank you.

The Vice Chairman. And the members of the committee are requested to meet in the Finance Committee room in executive session at 1:30.
(Whereupon at 12 noon a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[8075]  

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The Chairman. The committee will be in order.

Before the examination of General Short is resumed, the Chair wishes to announce that in the interest of expedition in the hearings that instead of calling personally the members of the staff of General Short and of Admiral Kimmel, consisting of some 15 or 20 witnesses in all, who have heretofore testified on numerous occasions in regard to this inquiry, that a complete record of their testimony heretofore taken will be filed as an exhibit as a part of the record of this hearing with the right of any member of the committee who wishes to inquire of any particular witness who has heretofore testified concerning his testimony heretofore given, shall have the right to bring it to the attention of the committee and have the right to have the committee act favorably upon that request, with the further understanding that any previous witness whose testimony is filed as an exhibit, who is called before the committee and orally examined by any member of the committee will then be subject to general examination by the committee.

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, there was a further understanding.

The Chairman. And, also, the Chair omitted to say that counsel for Admiral Kimmel and counsel for General Short were consulted by the committee and agreed to that procedure.

[8076]  

Mr. Keefe. So that there may be no mistake in the record, Mr. Chairman, I think the further qualification should be added, that the resolution adopted by the committee does not include the record of the Clausen investigation and affidavits.

The Chairman. Clausen, as the Chair understands it and as the committee understand it, was not a member of the staff of either Admiral Kimmel or General Short and therefore this resolution would not apply to him.

Mr. Keefe. All right.

The Chairman. All right. We will now proceed.

Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, at the conclusion of the morning's session a question was asked regarding a telegram dated December 5, 1941, from General Miles to the G-2 of the Panama Canal Department, as to when that telegram had been made available to counsel for the committee.

During the noon hour we have looked into this matter and have received this memorandum from the Army liaison officer. It reads as follows:

With reference to the message from G-2, War Department, to G-2, Panama, dated 5 December, referred to at the close of this morning's session, the paraphrased text of that message is set forth on Page 285 of Volume D of the top-secret transcript of Proceedings Before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. That transcript [8077] was delivered to the committee on 9 October 1945. Also, a photostatic copy of the same message was delivered by the War Department to the committee on or about 1 December and at the same time a copy was delivered to Captain Ford, General Short's counsel.

HARMON DUNCOMBE,  
Lieutenant Colonel.
I have checked the files of counsel and find that one of the two sets of these volumes has at all times remained in counsel's office available to the members of the committee. The other set was delivered on October 11 to Senator Brewster and is still in his possession.

The CHAIRMAN. That is all. You may proceed, Counsel.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER C. SHORT, UNITED STATES ARMY (RETIRED)—Resumed

Mr. KAUFMAN. General, coming back——

General Short. May I add just one thing in regard to that message in regard to General Miles?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes.

General Short. I would like to state that I have no information as to whether General Miles followed up the December 5 message by any warning before December 7, even though he had all the magic intelligence.

I do not know why Miles sent this message to the Panama Canal but not to Hawaii, but it shows that his interpretation of the alert messages was the same as mine, that relations were only strained with no threat of attack on Hawaii.

Mr. KAUFMAN. General, as I understand it, you have testified that after the message of November 27 that you did not invoke the joint defense plan.

General Short. That is correct. I would like to add though, however, that I considered that the naval message of October 16 and of November 27 did invoke part of it where they told him to take a defensive deployment preparatory to WPL-46.

Mr. KAUFMAN. But so far as you are concerned you do not want to be understood as having taken any action under that war plan?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, I direct your attention to the testimony that you gave at page 380 of the Pearl Harbor board hearings. You were asked by General Grunert——

General Short. May I see it?

The Vice CHAIRMAN. You are referring to the witness' testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor board?

Mr. KAUFMAN. That is correct, sir.

The Vice CHAIRMAN. All right.

[8078] Mr. KAUFMAN. Page 380. Have you got page 380?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. I direct your attention to this question by General Grunert:

In your message of November 27th you say "Liaison with the Navy." Just what did you mean by that? How did that cover anything required by that particular message?

To which you are reported to have answered:

To my mind it meant I was definitely keeping in touch with the Navy, what information they had and what they were doing.

QUESTION. Did it indicate in any way that you expected the Navy to carry out its part of that agreement for long-distance reconnaissance?

ANSWER. Yes, without any question, whether I had sent that or not, it would have effected it because they signed a very definite agreement which was approved by the Navy as well as by our Chief of Staff.
In the light of the testimony that you gave at page 380 do you want to change any of the testimony that you gave this morning?

General Short. No, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. You do not. I asked you this morning whether the interceptor command had been activated at the time of the activation of the radar station on November 28 and you told us this morning that it had been.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. Will you please account, if you can, for the testimony given by General Davidson at pages 170, 178, 179, and 196 of the Roberts Commission and the testimony of Colonel Phillips at page 232—

General Short. May I see that testimony?

Lieutenant Colonel Karr. We do not have copies of it.

Mr. Kaufman. You do not have a copy of that?


Senator Lucas. May I suggest to counsel that you take one of those pages at a time and show them to General Short? He is asking about a number of pages there. It seems to me it may be a little more convenient.

The Vice Chairman. It might be in that same volume there.

General Short. No, that volume is my testimony only.

Mr. Kaufman. I can change my question with regard to that.

General Davidson and General Phillips testified before the Roberts Commission that the interceptor command was not activated until the 17th of December, 10 days after the attack. Can you explain their testimony?

General Short. Yes. General Davidson and Colonel Powell and Colonel Meehan had been sent to the mainland to learn what was the method of operation in this country. It was entirely new. We had just two officers in the Army and one naval officer who had any conception of what a communication center and an interceptor command consisted of. They were the only two, as far as I know, who had ever seen it. That was Major Bergquist and Major Tindall of the Army and Commander Taylor of the Navy, who had had considerable work with the British and had been loaned by the Navy to work with us.

What we were doing was operating under verbal orders and they had full authority to make changes, they were trying to work the thing out to what they thought was being done in the States because they had been back and seen it a little previously, the two of them, with full authority to change it from day to day and we had purposely waited the return of General Davidson and Colonel Powell before putting it in a written order as we did not want to issue a written order one day and have to modify it materially the next day.

They came back I think on the 3d or 4th of December, got their reports in on—I know General Davidson got his report in on the afternoon of the 6th, so that there had been no time to have them go over the procedure and put it down in writing. They went ahead and operated for the next 10 days on the same verbal orders and at the end of that period they felt positive enough as to what they wanted to do that we put it in written form. It was
entirely experimental and we were trying to arrive at what we thought was the correct thing with the limited information we had.

Mr. Murphy. Now, Mr. Chairman, for the sake of accuracy, as I understand it the question was directed to page 380 of the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearings. Is that right?

Mr. Kaufman. No, sir.

Mr. Murphy. What page?

Mr. Kaufman. General Davidson's testimony at pages 170 and 178 of the Roberts record.

The question, General, is as to whether or not the interceptor command was in operation prior to the 17th of December?

General Short. It was definitely in operation but it was operating on verbal orders in an informal way, but that Major Bergquist and Major Tindall had full authority to make changes because they were the only two in the Army that really knew anything about it.

[8083] Mr. Kaufman. Then how do you explain the testimony of Colonel Phillips that it was not activated and did not start operating until the 17th day of December?

General Short. I think he must have meant that the formal order had not been issued.

Mr. Kaufman. And the same thing for General Davidson?

General Short. The same thing. I know from talking with General Davidson, there was no doubt in his mind that it was operating just the same before as after.

Mr. Murphy. I think, Mr. Chairman, you will find in the testimony of General Short it was being operated on a volunteer basis.

General Short. I believe not. I would like, if Mr. Murphy has any such reference to my testimony, to have it quoted exactly, because I do not believe I ever made such a statement.

Mr. Murphy. When I come to the examination I will do it.

Mr. Kaufman. Then your answer is now that it was being operated on an experimental basis?

General Short. Experimental, informal basis, under verbal orders to make changes from day to day as it proved necessary.

[8084] Mr. Kaufman. Can you explain the testimony that Admiral Kimmel gave here the other day to the effect that he understood the interceptor command was working fully and complete?

General Short. I will say again, if he understood that, it must have been due to poor staff work on the part of the staff of the Fourteenth Naval District, because their liaison officer, Lieutenant Burr, sitting in G-3, must have known exactly what we were doing.

Mr. Kaufman. Between November 27, and December 7, did you activate your fighter planes?

General Short. The fighter planes were always activated.

Mr. Kaufman. Under whose direction was that, General?

General Short. The fighter planes were under the command of General Davidson when he was there. I am not sure who was the next senior to him, and was in command while he was away. It was possibly Colonel Flood, but I am not positive.

Mr. Kaufman. General, were not the fighter planes bunched on the field for more easy protection against sabotage?

General Short. They were grouped for protection against sabotage. They were not armed, and warmed up and immediately available to take the air.
Mr. KAUFMAN. They were not available at any time between the 27th of November and December 7?
General Short. All day long, they were functioning in training. Probably most of the time during the training hours some one squadron would have been able to take the air immediately, but not fully armed.

Mr. KAUFMAN. General, will you explain this, that if your radar was alert, what good it would have done if your pursuit planes were not ready to take off during the time when the radar was in operation?

General Short. If the information had gone to them when it was first picked up, they would have had 35 minutes, which would have been plenty of time to disperse the planes.

It would not have been time to get them in the air, but we would have had time to disperse the planes and the loss would have been much less.

Mr. KAUFMAN. General, I am not now talking only about the 7th of December; I am talking about the period between November 27 and December 7.

General Short. I am saying at any time that the radar picked it up, and I would have been notified, I would have had 30 minutes and the same would have been true. We could have dispersed the planes.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Only 30 minutes?
General Short. 20 or 35 minutes.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, you know that the radar equipment is not complete without the pursuit planes having the ability to take off.

General Short. That has nothing to do with radar equipment. The interceptor command would not be functioning completely without that, that is true.

Mr. KAUFMAN. So your interceptor command was not working between November 27 and the 7th of December?

General Short. It was working, but not prepared to take the air immediately.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you do anything between November 27 and December 7 to inform yourself precisely as to what Admiral Kimmel was doing?

General Short. I talked with Admiral Kimmel on 3 days when we were talking about a more dangerous part of the Pacific, as we regarded it, than Honolulu, and I knew where his task forces were going out; I knew certain reconnaissances he was making on the perimeter, and as I said, he had made the statement to me that he had tightened up all along the line.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You knew he had to rely on you for long-range planes?

General Short. No; I did not.

Mr. KAUFMAN. You did not?

General Short. I had 6 planes and he had approximately 50. I knew if he wanted my planes for long-range reconnaissances that he would have asked for them, and I would give them to him, but I did not know that he relied on that 6 rather than his 50.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, did anything happen between the 27th of November and the 7th of December to require you to change your estimate?

General Short. Nothing. In fact, the things that happened tended to confirm my estimate.
Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, on the 27th of November, after the receipt of this message from the chief of staff, you got a message from General Miles, did you not?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Page 10 of Exhibit 32.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That was a definite statement, was it not, that negotiations had come to a practical stalemate?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And it was a definite statement to you that hostilities may ensue?

General SHORT. May ensue; yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. After giving you the information, then, he talks about "subversive activities may be expected."

General SHORT. Yes, sir. I might add that that apparently was the form of hostilities that he expected me to be interested in there. That would be the inference.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Your inference was that the hostilities that he said might ensue pointed only to subversive activities?

General SHORT. Pointed to subversive activities. If he wanted to point out anything else that would have taken place I would expect him to say so.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did not he say two things; "Hostilities may ensue," and "Subversive activities may be expected"?

General SHORT. Subversive activities are a form of hostilities. It is the form of hostilities apparently that he was worried about there.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That was your interpretation?

General SHORT. That was my interpretation.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, did you have in mind, on November 27 and following that date, the Navy reply that all shipping was to be routed through the Torres Straits?

General SHORT. I think that ships were turned to the south. I do not think that I knew exactly Torres Strait, but I knew they were going to the south from Honolulu.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And did you have in mind the fact that those ships were being escorted by naval ships of Admiral Kimmel's fleet?

General SHORT. I think I knew that there were some escorts; yes.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Did you have in mind that on November 26 you were ordered to equip two B-24 bombers for photographic reconnaissance through Truk and the Jaluit Islands?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; and I remember very definitely that they sent them unarmed to Honolulu and directed me to arm them after they got there.

Mr. KAUFMAN. That was an unusual mission for you?

General SHORT. It was.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Although you had that in mind, you did not connect it with any of the telegrams you received?

General SHORT. I figured if they would send them to Honolulu unarmed and they directed them to be armed from there on, that they would not consider that Honolulu was in the same dangerous area as the Pacific to the west.

Mr. KAUFMAN. When were you first advised, General, that the Japanese consuls in Hawaii were burning their papers?
General Short. I did not remember the incident until the day after the attack, but in view of the testimony of two members of my staff I probably did hear that they were burning papers on Saturday morning. It seems that at the staff meeting an assistant G-2 did report that they had been burning papers. However, my G-2, in his testimony before the Roberts Commission, stated that he thought nothing of it, because we habitually burned papers every day to keep anything from being left around about our codes, and he said he reported it to me. It probably made the same impression on me that it had made on him. There was no question of codes in connection with it—simply papers.

[8091] Mr. Kaufman. Did you receive any information from the Navy that they had been advised that the Japanese consular posts at Hong Kong and Singapore, and other places, were ordered to destroy their codes?

General Short. I did not.

Mr. Kaufman. You received no such information from the Navy at all?

General Short. No, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. Do you recall a telegram directing you on your G-2 to communicate with Commander Rochefort respecting the so-called winds code?

General Short. I never saw such a radiogram and never heard anything about it until 2 or 3 years afterward.

Mr. Kaufman. And your G-2 did not report that incident to you?

General Short. He did not.

Mr. Kaufman. Do you remember on the evening of December 5 Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell called on you and Colonel Fielder and gave you a report on the tapping of the so-called Mori message?

General Short. It was not on the 5th. It was on the evening of December 6, sometime along 6:30 or 7 o'clock in the evening.

Mr. Kaufman. And what did he report to you at that time?

[8092] General Short. He brought a message, or, rather, a translation of a telephone conversation that had been picked up by the FBI. I read the message carefully, and Colonel Fielder read the message carefully. I asked Bicknell if he had any idea as to the interpretation of it, the meaning of it, and he said he had not, but that he knew Mori, that he suspected Mori and for that reason he was rather positive that it meant something.

But no one of us could figure out what it possibly meant, and I do not believe anybody up to this day has been able to draw any definite conclusion.

Mr. Kaufman. Did not Colonel Bicknell tell you that he regarded that as being very significant?

General Short. But he could not tell me what the significance was. He thought it was significant only because he did not have any confidence in this Dr. Mori.

Mr. Kaufman. Did you tell Colonel Bicknell a few days after the attack that he was right about the message and you were wrong about it?

General Short. I have seen that statement of his, but I do not remember it. If I said it I would have had only one point, that it had to be significant, but he was never, as far as I know—and I talked
to him about it several times—able to indicate to me, or to anybody else, what the significance [8993] of the message was.

Mr. Kaufman. General, on the morning of December 7, who first reported the attack to you?

General Short. I heard the first bomb and thought it was perhaps a naval exercise that I had forgotten about. Then when the second one dropped I ran out on an upstairs porch of my quarters where I could see Pearl Harbor and I could see some smoke. About that time my chief of staff, who lived next door, ran in to my quarters and called to me that it was the real thing, that he just had a phone message from Hickam and Weaver Field. That was anywhere from 1 minute to 3 minutes after 8 o'clock.

The Chairman. After what?

General Short. After 8 o'clock.

Mr. Kaufman. On that morning you had 32 antiaircraft batteries stationed around Pearl Harbor?

General Short. I have forgotten the exact number.

Mr. Kaufman. Is it a fact that only 4 of the 32 antiaircraft batteries got into action prior to the time of the third attack?

General Short. That is not true.

Mr. Murphy. Section VIII, page 11.

Mr. Kaufman. General, have you seen Section VII of exhibit 5 of this proceeding, being reports made from your [8094] headquarters, showing that 4 of the 32 anti-aircraft batteries fired at any time during the three attacks?

General Short. That is not signed. I do not know who made it. But I have here an exhibit, exhibit No. 7 signed by C. K. Wing, Colonel, Fifty-third Coast Artillery Brigade, who commanded all of the anti-aircraft batteries. He gives in detail when the battery was alerted, when it was ready to fire, when it opened fire, and when it brought down any enemy planes.

Mr. Kaufman. Have you a copy of that?

General Short. It is in exhibit 133. I believe it is 1-s or 1-t, if you look into the table of contents. It is in the Wing report.

Mr. Kaufman. In the record submitted to you in the Roberts commission?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. It has been marked in evidence here this morning?

General Short. Yes, sir. It was made out December 20, and gives great detail, and I think Colonel Wing is in a better position to give that information than anybody else, because it was his immediate command.

Mr. Kaufman. And you say that the paper that I have just referred you to, being section VII of exhibit 5 of this [8095] hearing, is not true?

General Short. I have not looked it over in detail, but if it states that only four batteries fired is not correct. This, I am sure, is the most accurate statement that is to be found of what took place, the one I have in my hand. It is annex S.

Mr. Kaufman. General, does that set out your staff as it existed between November 27 and December 7?

Senator Lucas. Counsel, before you leave that last point, I wonder if we are going to put that into the record and make it a part of the transcript?
Mr. Kaufman. It is in the record as an exhibit, sir.

General Short. I have a signed copy here, if you wish to put it in the transcript, sir.

Senator Lucas. I would like to have it.

General, just give me briefly, without reading it, what the document says, in view of the question asked by counsel.

General Short. I will just take up a few batteries. Here is the way it gives it: At Fort Weaver, headquarters, Second Battalion, Ninety-seventh Coast Artillery, Antiaircraft, alerted 8:10, ready to fire 8:13, engaged enemy at 8:14. Ammunition fired: .30 caliber ball 407 rounds; .30 caliber armor piercing, 117; .30 caliber tracer, 53; pistol, 12.

Now it goes through every battery.

[8096] Senator Lucas. How many batteries were there fired?

General Short. I am not sure. The 32 is probably correct. I can count them here. I am not sure without counting them up.

Senator Lucas. I think it is important, in view of the previous statement that only four were in operation. It seems to me the committee at this time ought to know how many actually were fired at that time.

Mr. Kaufman. Well, now, let us take the statement, General, that you give us here.

General Short. All right, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. The Second Battalion, according to your report, was alerted at 8:10, was ready to fire at 8:15.

General Short. 8:13, I think it is.

Mr. Kaufman. That is one battery?

General Short. That is four batteries.

Mr. Kaufman. Four batteries. Battery G of the Ninety-seventh was alerted at 8:10?

General Short. Ready to fire at 8:30, and engaged the enemy at 8:30.

Mr. Kaufman. That was one battery?

General Short. That was one battery.

Mr. Kaufman. Battery F of the Ninety-seventh was alerted at 7:55 and was ready to fire at 8:55, an hour later, is that correct?

[8097] General Short. Apparently that is right.

Mr. Kaufman. And that is one battery. Battery G of the Sixty-fourth was alerted at 8:15 and was ready to fire at 10:30.

General Short. They had to move, apparently, to some distance.

Mr. Kaufman. They were ready to fire at 10:30, according to this report.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. And Battery H of the Sixty-fourth was alerted at 8:30 and was ready to fire at 11:45. That was after the third attack, was it?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. Well, the preceding one was after the third attack?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. The marine detachment—

General Short. You say the marine detachment?

Mr. Kaufman. Yes. The marine detachment was alerted at 8 o'clock and ready to fire at 8:10.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, was that an Army responsibility, the marines?

General Short. They worked under the Army.

Mr. Kaufman. The general says they worked under the Army.

Mr. Murphy. They are not on this exhibit, then, are they, [8098] the Army exhibit? We have only the Sixty-fourth, the Ninety-seventh, Ninety-eighth, and Two Hundred and Fifty-first and the AA batteries.

Mr. Kaufman. That is right.

Mr. Murphy. The marines are under the Navy ordinarily.

Mr. Kaufman. Probably, according to the general, they were under his jurisdiction at that time.

General Short. The antiaircraft fire was coordinated so that the Marine Corps guns on shore operated under our command.

Mr. Kaufman. Then we have the Ninety-eighth Coast Artillery at Schofield that was alerted at 8 o'clock and was ready to fire at 8:55.

Mr. Murphy. What battery would that be?

Mr. Kaufman. They were alerted at 8 o'clock and ready to fire with their automobile rifles—I assume that means automatic rifles, does it not?

General Short. I haven't got just where you mean. It probably does. Where do you mean?

Mr. Kaufman. The Ninety-eighth Coast Artillery, Schofield Barracks.

General Short. Yes. Certain of them were equipped with automatic rifles.

Mr. Kaufman. Then the First Battalion of the Ninety-eighth Coast Artillery, Battery B, was ready to fire at 9:55. That [8099] was after the second attack?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. And Battery D of the First Battalion, Ninety-eighth Coast Artillery, was ready to fire at 10 o'clock.

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Kaufman. And Battery C was not ready to fire until 10:30.

On the next page, Battery M of the Sixty-fourth was alerted at 8:15 and was ready to fire at 11:55. That was after the third attack?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. And the Second Battalion of the Ninety-eighth Coast Artillery, Battery F, was not alerted at all but was in position and ready for action at 1315. That is 1:15?

General Short. That is 1:15.

Mr. Kaufman. And Battery G at 1:15, and Battery H at 1:30.

And the First Battalion of the Two Hundred and Fifty-first Coast Artillery, Battery B——

General Short. You are overlooking the fact that from their camp there they did open fire at 8:04 and brought down a plane. They were not at their assigned positions, but they entered into the combat. All the units were alerted and they all fired and brought down planes. [8100] Mr. Kaufman. That fire was with small arms, rifles?

General Short. It was with machine guns undoubtedly.

Mr. Kaufman. We are talking about anti-aircraft batteries.

General Short. Those are batteries of anti-aircraft guns.
Mr. Kaufman. That would mean that the First Battalion of the Two Hundred and Fifty-first Coast Artillery was not ready to fire until 11:45?

General Short. It had fired its guns and then moved on to assigned positions.

Mr. Kaufman. It does not say that here, does it?

General Short. It says in the first paragraph that all units opened fire at 8:05 and brought down planes. They were apparently all in their positions.

Mr. Kaufman. All it says is that the units were alerted at 8:05 when fired upon by single enemy planes.

General Short. Better read the next sentence.

Mr. Kaufman (reading).

All units returned the fire with small arms and the plane was shot down.

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Kaufman. That makes no reference to the anti-aircraft batteries.

General Short. I am sure it means with the automatic rifles and machine guns.

Mr. Kaufman. With respect, however, to the batteries of the First Battalion of the Two Hundred and Fifty-first Coast Artillery, none of those batteries were ready for firing until 11:45?

General Short. That is right, after they moved.

Mr. Kaufman. After the attack was over. What time was the third attack over, General?

General Short. Oh, there is a variation in estimates. Sometime around 11 o'clock.

Mr. Murphy. May I suggest that the tank farm was ready at 11 o'clock?

Mr. Kaufman. What is that, sir?

Mr. Murphy. The tank farm at Schofield Barracks. The tank farm is the only one before 11:45. That is at 11. You notice it is the second to the last one. That would be Battery G of the Two Hundred and Fifty-first.

Mr. Kaufman. Battery G?

Mr. Murphy. It is Battery G of the Two Hundred and Fifty-first Coast Artillery on this exhibit.

Mr. Kaufman. The tank farm?

Mr. Murphy. Yes, tank farm, Schofield Barracks, 11 a.m. That is the only one before 11:45. I just wanted that corrected.

Mr. Kaufman. Now Battery A of the Ninety-seventh Coast Artillery fired 130 rounds of .30 caliber at one enemy plane at 8:35. Was that by machine gun or rifle or what?

General Short. What is this you are reading from now?

Mr. Kaufman. The next paragraph after the second battery of the Two Hundred and Fifty-first Coast Artillery.

General Short. 1,500 rounds.

Mr. Kaufman. 1,500 rounds of .30 caliber?

General Short. Yes.

Mr. Kaufman. At one enemy plane off-shore at 8:35?

General Short. Yes.

Mr. Kaufman. Was that rifle or machine guns?
General Short. That was undoubtedly machine guns. They would not fire rifles at that distance.

Mr. Kaufman. Sand Island. The anti-aircraft detachment of Battery F, Fifty-fifth Coast Artillery, present at Sand Island when the attack started, was ready for action at 8:15. The battery fired 89 rounds of 3-inch antiaircraft and shot down two enemy planes at 8:15.

Let us go back to the first item on this memorandum. Fort Weaver, Headquarters Second Battalion, was that one battery or four batteries, as you indicated? Was it not only one?

General Short. It may possibly have been only one. I read it the Second Battalion, and it apparently was the headquarters of the Second Battalion.

Mr. Kaufman. So that going through this list, as we have just gone through the list, would you state that it is \([8103]\) accurate?

General Short. This, I think, is absolutely accurate.

Mr. Kaufman. Is it not accurate as stated in section VII of exhibit 5?

General Short. I do not believe that it is.

Mr. Kaufman. That only four of the batteries were ready to fire prior to the end of the attack?

General Short. I am sure that that is not an accurate statement.

Mr. Kaufman. Now I counted them through here and I do not find any more than four or five prior to the time of the completion of the attack. General, I will try to check that after the hearing.

General Short. I think if you will check it carefully you will find that there were more than that. More planes were brought down by those outfits.

Mr. Kaufman. More than four out of the 32 batteries?

General Short. I think so; yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. How many more would you say?

General Short. I have not checked it carefully enough to be able to tell.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I request that the exhibit of the General be spread on the record at this point, and that immediately afterward we have spread section VII of exhibit \([8104]\) 5 on the record, that was prepared by the Army as the Army exhibit.

Mr. Kaufman. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Without objection that will be done.

(The matter referred to follows:)

HEADQUARTERS 53RD COAST ARTILLERY BRIGADE (AA),
OFFICE OF THE BRIGADE COMMANDER,
FORT SHAFTER, T. H., 20 DECEMBER 1941.

Subject: Report on action by 53d C. A. Brigade (AA) from 0755 to 2400, 7 December 1941.

To: General Short.

1. At the beginning of the attack on Oahu 7 December 1941, the 53d Coast Artillery Brigade (AA) was operating under the conditions of Alert No. 1 S. O. P., H. C. A. C., 26 November 1941. The 97th C. A. and the AA Detachments of the East Group had anti-sabotage guards at their fixed 3-inch gun batteries. All anti-aircraft equipment was being guarded.

2. a. FORT WEAVER. Headquarters 2nd Battalion 97th C. A. (AA).

Alerted 0810
Ready to fire 0813
Engaged enemy at 0814
Amm. fired
407—30 Cal. ball.
Point. South Group Command Post detail at stations at 0810. NO repeat NO interruption in communications in South Group during this period. There was rifle and automatic rifle fire on low flying enemy planes by officers and men.

BATTERY G 97th, were in camp at Fort Weaver. Its battle position is at fixed battery at Fort Weaver.

Alerted at 0810
Ready to fire 0830
Engaged enemy 0830
Fired 30 rds—3" A.A. Shrapnel. Approximately 200 rds of .30 Cal. ball Amm. One .50 Cal. Machine Gun was in action at approximately 8:50 A.M. During this firing Private YORK gunner was wounded while engaging the enemy, he stayed at his post although ordered to take cover. Lieutenant KING states that the battery fire broke up and definitely turned back one formation of 15 enemy planes. Casualties—One (1) Officer dead—Killed while proceeding through Hickam Field to his battle position. Four (4) enlisted men wounded.

BATTERY F 97th, was camped at Fort Weaver. Its battle position at Fixed Battery Closson, Fort Hamehameha, T. H.

Alerted 0755, and moved to Battery position across Pearl Harbor Entrance.

Ready to fire 0855
Engaged Enemy 0900 to 0920
Amm. fired
Approximately 400 rds .30 Cal. ball.
Approximately 130 rds .30 Cal. A. P.

BATTERY G 64th, was in barracks at Fort Shafter, battle position at Ahua Point.

Alerted approximately 0815, and moved to battery position at Fort Kamehameha.

Ready to fire 1030
Engaged Enemy with .30 Cal. M. G. at 1030
Amm. Fired
Approximately 50 rds of .30 Cal. ball.

BATTERY H 64th, was in barracks at Fort Shafter. Its battle position is at Fort Weaver.

Alerted 0830
Ready to fire 11:45
Engaged Enemy 2100
Amm. fired
40 rds .50 Cal. ball.
40 rds .50 Cal. A. P.
30 rds .50 Cal. Tracer.

MARINE DETACHMENT: The Fleet Machine Gun School at Fort Weaver. Operations were in cooperation with South Group although not tactically assigned.

Alerted 0800
Ready to fire 0810
Engaged Enemy 0810
Amm. fired
Approximately 5000 rds. of .50 Cal. A. P. ball and tracer.
Approximately 450 rds. of 20 mm A. A.

This Detachment shot down 4 enemy planes and saved a 4-engined bomber by causing enemy plane firing on its tail to pull out and cease its attack. Much shrapnel and some small arms bullets fell about Fleet M. G. School. There was excellent cooperation from Fort Weaver personnel in the liaison, phone, etc.

b. 98th COAST ARTILLERY, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

Alerted at 0800
The communications section at the Command Post, Wahiawa, shot down one enemy plane flying at less than 100 feet, with their automatic rifles at 0855.
1st Battalion 98th C. A. (AA), was in position and ready for action at the following time:
B-98 0635
D-98 1000
C-98 1030

[B108] Battery M 64th, stationed at Fort Shafter, was alerted at 0815, moved to Wheeler Field, and was ready for action at 1155.

2nd Battalion 98th C. A. (AA).—This Battalion has two batteries at Kaneohe and one at Waipahu School. They were in position and ready for action at the following times:
F-98 1315
G-98 1315
H-98 1330

C. CAMP MALAKOLE 251st C. A. (AA).—All units were alerted at 0805 when fired upon by a single enemy plane. All units returned the fire with small arms and the plane was shot down.

1st BATTALION 251st C. A. (AA), was in position and ready for action as follows:
B-251 at West Loch 1145
C-251 Ewa Beach 1145
D-251 South of Ewa 1145

2nd BATTALION 251st C. A. (AA), was in position as follows:
E-251 Navy Yard
F-251 Navy Recreation Area
G-251 Tank Farm
H-251 Navy Yard

[B109] At 1120 and again at 1122, E, 251st fired on enemy planes, shooting down one plane. 100 rds. of .50 Cal. were fired on the first plane and 200 rds. of .50 Cal. were fired on the second plane.

d. FORT KANEHAMEHA.—Battery A, 97th C. A. (AA) fired 1500 rds. of .30 Cal. at one enemy plane offshore at 0835.

c. SAND ISLAND.—The AA Detachment of Battery F, 55th C. A., present at Sand Island when the attack started was ready for action at 0815. This battery fired 90 rds of 3" AA and shot down two (2) enemy planes at 0815.

f. FORT SHAFTER.

(1) Three (3) enemy dive bombers were fired on by the Headquarters Battery and the Intelligence Battery of this Brigade and by Battery E, 64th C. A. (AA). Ammunition Expended—3000—30 Cal.

(2) Enemy planes were fired on at 0700 and 1000 by Battery A, 64th C. A. (AA). Ammunition Expended 1000—30 Cal.

(3) All 3" gun batteries and Automatic Weapons Batteries of the 64th C. A. (AA) were alerted at 0815 and were in position as follows:
B-64 at Aiea 1000
C-64 at Aliamanu 1030
D-64 south of Aliamanu 1100

[B110] F-64 at Pearl City 1105
G-64 See Par. 2 a. above
H-64 See Par. 2 a. above.
I-64 at Aliamanu
K-64 at Hickam Field.
L-64 at Hickam Field
M-64 See Par. 2 b. above.

All of these units except M, 64th fired during the second attack from 1000 to 1145. Ammunition expended as follows:
3", 23 rds.
.50 Cal, 2361 rds.
.30 Cal, 2821 rds.

g. FORT BARRETTE.—Battery H, 97th C. A. (AA), was stationered at Fort Weaver. The battery was alerted at 0735, moved out of Fort Weaver at 0830, and arrived at Fort Barrette at 0810. Enemy planes were engaged by small arms fire at Fort Weaver, while enroute, and at Fort Barrette. The detachment on guard at Fort Barrette shot down one enemy plane at 0810 by small arms fire.

3. Three (3) Marine AA Batteries were attached to the Brigade at 2245.
4. AMMUNITION.

Status at 0730, 7 December 1941. All units of the [8111] Brigade had in their possession, the initial issue of small arms ammunition. This included ammunition for rifles, pistols, automatic rifles and machine guns. In addition, the 3-inch ammunition was so positioned that it was readily accessible to all units of the Brigade except four (4) batteries for which ammunition was at Aliamanu Crater. These batteries completed drawing their initial allowance, 1200 rounds per battery, by 1015.

(Sgd) C. E. Wing
C. E. WING,
Colonel, 53d C. A. Brigade (AA),
Commanding.

[8112] ACTION AND DISPOSITION OF 53RD CA BRIGADE (ANTI-AIRCRAFT)

ON 7 DECEMBER 1941

64th CA (AA) Regiment

All 3-inch gun batteries and automatic weapons batteries of the 64th CA (AA) were alerted at Fort Shafter at 8:15 a.m. and were in position as follows:

Battery
“A” (Searchlight) at Honolulu---------------- 10:00 a.m.
“B” (3-inch) at Aiea-------------------------- 10:00 a.m.
“C” (3-inch) at Aliamanu--------------------- 10:30 a.m.
“D” (3-inch) south of Aliamanu----------------- 11:00 a.m.
“E” (Searchlight) at Ewa-Pearl Harbor----------------- Time not known
“F” (3-inch) at Pearl City---------------------- 11:05 a.m.
“G” (3-inch) at Ahua Point--------------------- 10:30 a.m.
“H” (3-inch) at Ft. Weaver--------------------- 11:45 a.m.
“I” (37 mm.) at Aliamanu---------------------- Known only that batters were in position before 11:45 a.m.
“K” (37 mm.) at Hickam Field------------------ 11:55 a.m.
“L” (37 mm.) at Hickam Field------------------
“M” (37 mm.) at Wheeler Field------------------

97th CA (AA) Regiment

Batteries of the 97th CA (AA), except Battery “A” at Fort Kamehameha, were stationed at Ft. Weaver. They were alerted between 7:55 and 8:10 a.m. and were in position ready to fire as follows:

[8113] Battery
“A” (Searchlight) at Ft. Kamehameha---------------- 8:34 a.m. (Engaged enemy with small arms at 8:34 a.m.)
“F” (3-inch) at Ft. Kamehameha------------------ 8:55 a.m. (Engaged enemy at 9:00 a.m.)
“G” (3-inch) at Ft. Weaver---------------------- 8:30 a.m. (Engaged enemy at 8:30 a.m.)
“H” (3-inch) at Ft. Barrett---------------------- 10:20 a.m.

98th CA (AA) Regiment

Batteries of the 98th CA (AA) Regiment were stationed at Schofield Barracks with the exception of Battery “D” which was stationed at Camp Malakole. They were in position ready to fire as follows:

Battery
“A” (Searchlight) at Schofield Barracks---------------- Time not known
“B” (3-inch) at Schofield Barracks----------------- 9:55 a.m.
“C” (3-inch) at Schofield Barracks----------------- 10:30 a.m.
“D” (3-inch) at Puulea Dump, South of Ewa---------------- 11:45 a.m.
“E” not yet organized.
“F” and “G” (3-inch) at Kaneohe Naval Air
Station----------------- 1:15 p.m.
“H” (3-inch) at Waipu High School----------------- 1:30 p.m.
3rd Bn 98th CA (AA) not yet organized.
All units of the 251st at Camp Malakole were alerted at 8:05 a.m. Batteries of the 1st Battalion were in position and ready for action as follows:

**Battery**
- "A" (Searchlight) at Ewa
- "B" (3-inch) at West Loch
- "C" (3-inch) at Ewa Beach
- "D" (3-inch) at South of Ewa
- "E" (50 cal.) at Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor
- "F" (37 mm.) at Navy Recreation Area
- "G" (37 mm.) at Tank Farm, Schofield Barracks

**AA Det Battery "F" 55th CA**

This detachment was at Sand Island when the attack started and engaged the enemy with 3-inch guns at 8:15 a.m., shooting down two enemy planes at that time.

**[8115]** Mr. Kaufman. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

General Short. You asked a question about this [indicating].

Mr. Kaufman. Yes; I want to finish that.

With the permission of the chairman, may I suggest that this be made an exhibit? I would like to ascertain something about that chart. Does that state your staff of officers and is it correct?

General Short. I think that chart is correct.

Mr. Kaufman. May we have that marked as an exhibit?

The Chairman. You want that made an exhibit?

Mr. Kaufman. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. What number will it be?

Mr. Kaufman. May we have it spread in the record at this point instead of having it marked as an exhibit?

The Chairman. That will be done.

(The chart referred to faces this page.)

**[8117]** Mr. Kaufman. I also offer in evidence at this time two reports made to General Short. It has been distributed to the members of the committee today.

The Chairman. Do you want that made a part of the testimony?

Mr. Kaufman. No, sir. Just as an exhibit. That will be exhibit 139.

The Chairman. That will be done.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 139.")

The Chairman. Are you through?

Mr. Kaufman. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. General Short, I wish to ask you a few questions. You were commander of the Army in Hawaii prior to the arrival of Admiral Kimmel to take charge of the fleet?

General Short. No, sir; he took charge of the fleet, I think, a week before I arrived.

The Chairman. You followed him?

General Short. By about a week.

The Chairman. In command of the Army forces?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. And you were assigned there during the whole time up to the attack?

**[8118]** General Short. That is correct.
ORGANIZATION OF THE HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR

HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

CHIEF OF STAFF
COL. W. C. PHILLIPS

G-1
Lt. Col. R. C. Throckmorton

G-2
Lt. Col. K. J. Fielder

G-3
Lt. Col. W. E. Donegan

G-4
Lt. Col. M. W. Marston

ADJUTANT GENERAL
Col. R. H. Ounlop

CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE
Lt. Col. G. F. Unmacht

ENGINEER
Col. A. K. B. Lyman

FINANCE
Col. E. S. Ely

INSPECTOR GENERAL
Col. L. B. Row

JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
Col. T. H. Green

ORDNANCE
Col. W. A. Capron

 Provost Marshal
Lt. Col. M. L. Craig

SIGNAL CORPS
Lt. Col. C. A. Powell

QUARTERMASTER
Col. W. R. White

SURGEON GENERAL
Col. E. King

XX
24th Infantry Division
(Brig. Gen. D. S. Wilson)

XX
25th Infantry Division
(Maj. Gen. M. Murray)

XX
Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command
(Maj. Gen. H. T. Buring)

XX
Hawaiian Air Force
(Maj. Gen. F. L. Martin)
The **Chairman.** Did your duties require you to remain on the island constantly?

**General Short.** I was never out of the Hawaiian group. I made visits of inspection on the outlying islands.

The **Chairman.** You were going from place to place within the territory under your jurisdiction?

**General Short.** That is correct.

The **Chairman.** During the entire time?

**General Short.** That is correct.

The **Chairman.** What proportion—I am asking you this question because I was unavoidably absent when Admiral Kimmel's testimony was concluded, and did not get an opportunity to ask him any questions at all—what proportion of the time you were at Pearl Harbor—Pearl Harbor was your headquarters?

**General Short.** Fort Shafter.

The **Chairman.** Fort Shafter; on the island of Oahu?

**General Short.** Yes, sir.

The **Chairman.** How much of the time during your presence at Fort Shafter, or on the island of Oahu, was Admiral Kimmel in the harbor at his headquarters?

**General Short.** I think he was in almost constantly. He was undoubtedly out at sea for a few days at a time, [8119] but I do not remember specifically. I think the greater part of his time he was in his headquarters.

The **Chairman.** He spent most of his time there on the island, at Pearl Harbor?

**General Short.** I think so.

The **Chairman.** And was only out at sea when his flagship went out?

**General Short.** Yes, sir.

The **Chairman.** Was there any time during that nearly a year from the time you took over in the Army and Admiral Kimmel took over in the Navy, when Pearl Harbor was completely empty of naval vessels?

**General Short.** I do not know, sir. Naturally you could see the vessels in Pearl Harbor every time you drove along the road, but I could not say definitely.

The **Chairman.** During this year, from February on up until the 7th of December, you and Admiral Kimmel conversed in a general way about the situation?

**General Short.** We talked about the situation, I think from every angle, more or less. We talked many, many times about it.

The **Chairman.** How many times would you say a week during that year?

**General Short.** I probably saw him officially at least [8120] once a week, and I usually played golf with him every other Sunday, and we talked of all kinds of things around the course at that time.

[8121] The **Chairman.** You talked over the international situation on the fairway?

**General Short.** Over everything, in effect; yes, sir.

The **Chairman.** Now, as time went on toward the 7th of December, did he and you both recognize that the situation was becoming more tense?
General Short. I think from July 25 on, when the sanctions were put into effect, that we both felt it was tense, from then on.

The Chairman. You didn't have to have any message from Washington in order to know that?

General Short. No. We read the papers.

The Chairman. Yes. And you got general information from Washington, sizing up the situation as did the admiral?

General Short. Not very often. The number of messages were very limited, but we did get them.

The Chairman. Did you get letters as well as cablegrams?

General Short. I didn't get letters on the international situation. I got letters from General Marshall, but usually pertaining to measures that were being taken to strengthen our defenses.

The Chairman. There is voluminous correspondence between Admiral Stark and Admiral Kimmel. It fills a [8122] volume as thick as Blackstone's Commentary. Did you have any such correspondence as that?

General Short. The correspondence between General Marshall and me, I think, is all in this exhibit here, exhibit No. 53.

The Chairman. When does that start?

General Short. That correspondence started on, the first letter was written by General Marshall on the 7th of February, and the last letter written by him was on October 28.

The Chairman. Now, was there any touchiness between Admiral Kimmel and you——

General Short. We were extremely friendly.

The Chairman. Let me finish the question before you answer, please.

General Short. I am sorry.

The Chairman. Was there any feeling of touchiness between Admiral Kimmel and you that might have prevented either of you from making a too detailed inquiry into what the other was doing, lest he be offended?

General Short. I don't think there was at all. I think that maybe either one of us wouldn't have wanted the other prying into business he thought didn't concern him in any way, but our relations were extremely friendly. [8123] I think I could have asked Admiral Kimmel anything that really concerned me and——

The Chairman. Well, of course, the national defense concerned both of you, did it not?

General Short. Oh, yes; no question about it.

The Chairman. Concerned you both.

General Short. Yes.

The Chairman. And as the situation grew worse, presumably would concern both of you more and therefore any inquiry from either as to what the other was doing would not necessarily be prying into his business, would it?

General Short. I was thinking, Senator, more in the way of asking him as to details, how they performed certain things, that he might possibly have figured wasn't my business.

The Chairman. In his testimony before the Grunert committee, I believe it was, Admiral Kimmel made the statement, or testified in effect that he hesitated sometimes to ask you in too much detail for fear he might be regarded as trying to pry, although I don't think he used that language.
General Short. I think he probably meant the same thing that I am trying to say, that if I would have asked him how often he opened the hatches, for instance, of his ships and made an inspection, he would have thought that it was not any business of mine.

The Chairman. But as to how many ships he might have in the harbor—

General Short. Yes; I think anything of that kind there would be no question about it.

The Chairman. Why was it necessary to allude to that subject in the former investigation?

General Short. Well, I don’t know. If you will remember, in General Marshall’s first letter to me, he talked considerably about Admiral Kimmel, the type of man he was. He wanted to be sure, apparently, that I did get an understanding to begin with, and get off, so to speak, on the right foot.

The Chairman. Yes.

General Short. And I think I took that into consideration.

The Chairman. He sort of warned you against the Admiral’s bluntness?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. And he wanted you to take note of that in making the proper approach?

General Short. Yes, sir; and I think I tried to carry that out; and I think our terms were excellent.

[8125] The Chairman. Did you have any such characteristics as might have embarrassed the admiral in approaching you?

General Short. Well, I might have, but he wasn’t told about it.

The Chairman. He wasn’t warned against you?

General Short. I don’t believe he was.

The Chairman. I note in your statement that you have followed the pattern rather closely, in a sense, adopted by Admiral Kimmel in his statement, that if he had had all of the information that was available in Washington, he might have acted differently; you take the same position, that if you had had all of the information that was in Washington, you might have acted differently?

General Short. I am sure that we have taken that position absolutely independently, because, if you will take my statement, the statement I made before the Roberts commission, the first 50 pages I dictated, I had never talked with Admiral Kimmel during that period, and you will find the same claims that you will find in my statement here.

The Chairman. Did you and Admiral Kimmel consult or confer about this hearing?

General Short. Oh, I have talked to him frequently about this, but at the time of the Roberts hearing we were both so busy—I think I had 3 days, and spent most of the nights preparing that large volume that I have turned in to you, so you can see I had very little time to consult with anybody.

The Chairman. Is it customary, or is it required, or is it military or naval practice that the commanders in the field shall be given copies of diplomatic messages sent back and forth between their Governments and other governments?

General Short. I wouldn’t say that it was, but they at least, if it is anything that is going to affect them, it seems to me they would always
be given the substance, even if they were not told where it came from.

The Chairman. Have you read all of the intercepts that Admiral Kimmel recited in his statement that he thinks he should have been entitled to see?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Outside of the message carving up Pearl Harbor into the five divisions in which ships were located, is there anything in any of those messages which pointed to an attack upon Pearl Harbor any more than upon any other place?

General Short. That was the most definite thing, and then the fact that the delivery of the message was at 1 p.m., Washington time, which would be shortly after dawn in Honolulu, which I think was an indication—

The Chairman. Well, you couldn’t have gotten that one any sooner than you got it, could you?

General Short. Yes; we could have gotten that, we could have gotten it—they had it all decoded in the War Department between 8:30 and 9 o’clock in the morning.

The Chairman. That was decoded in the Navy Department?

General Short. Yes, sir; but it was received in the War Department between 8:30 and 9 a.m.

The Chairman. General Marshall testified as to the time when he received it.

General Short. That is correct, but General Miles and Colonel Bratton had it in their possession from at least 9 o’clock to 11:25 a.m., and did nothing.

The Chairman. Well, General Miles testified as to what he did, and Colonel Bratton will, I suppose.

At any rate, there were none of these messages that are complained of because of their nondelivery in Hawaii, these intercepts, that gave any indication of an attack on Pearl Harbor, except the one dividing up Pearl Harbor?

General Short. No.

The Chairman. They all indicated, most of them, an attack somewhere.

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. But I am talking about Pearl Harbor.

General Short. I think those two things are the really definite things that pointed to Pearl Harbor.

The Chairman. And the other intercepts related to the more tense situation as it developed?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. But did not give indication as to where or when any attack would be made.

General Short. Well, I think you could get an indication possibly of when. You knew when they set deadlines that something was going to happen.

The Chairman. That was a conclusion that might have been drawn, that when they set a deadline of the 25th and then moved it up to the 29th, you could draw the conclusion that something was going to happen?

General Short. Anybody who was familiar with the weather conditions in Alaska and the Aleutian Islands and happened to think
along that line, I think would have drawn a direct conclusion, because about that time of the year the weather gets very bad out in the Aleu-
tian Islands. I happen to have spent 2 years in Alaska, and know that. And to a Navy man that might well mean that the condition
[8129] was getting to the point where the fueling of ships at sea would be hazardous.

The CHAIRMAN. The weather in Alaska wouldn't necessarily indi-
cate whether the Japanese were going to make an air attack or
whether they would make it at Hawaii or the Panama Canal or Puget Sound.

General Short. It would only indicate the difficulty of proceeding
by that northern route.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, if anybody familiar with the
weather in Alaska had sat down to speculate on it, he would have
speculated they wouldn't send the six ships through that route?

General Short. Not later than that. It was getting about the limit
on where it would be bad after that.

The CHAIRMAN. But even that speculation wouldn't have told you
anything if they were coming to Pearl Harbor?

General Short. If they went by the northern route, they would be
probably going to either Seattle or Hawaii.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, this message that the Navy Department sent
to Admiral Kimmel on the 24th was shown to you?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Of course, while it was shown to you for informa-
tion, it was also shown to you for your guidance?

General Short. Yes, sir.

[8130] The CHAIRMAN. Under the mutual arrangement that you
were supposed to have our there either one of you who got an important
message or a directive from Washington was supposed to show it to
the other?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. To keep one another advised?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you got this message of the 24th of November,
which has been read time and time again into the record, but which
states:

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This
situation coupled with the statements of Japanese Government and movements
their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive
movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is possibility.
Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests action. Addressee to
inform senior army officers their areas. Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to
complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action.

and so forth.

Now, this is a message saying that an aggressive attack may be ex-
pected in any direction, including two places; it doesn't exclude any
other place, does it?


The CHAIRMAN. It emphasizes—

General Short. It emphasizes those two places, and when some
other place is equally important, I feel that if they intended to in-
clude the other place they would mention it.
The Chairman. Wouldn't a careful interpretation of that message mean that the Japanese were calculated to make an aggressive movement in any direction, and that "any direction" means the Philippines or Guam, as well as every other place, but that they emphasized those two places?

General Short. I would say that it was possible in any direction, but probable toward the Philippines and Guam because they were singled out.

The Chairman. Well, that is a matter of interpretation.

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. The word "including" means, for instance, if I want to sell some stock, I advertise I have a lot of stock for sale, including a horse and a mule; that wouldn't mean that all the rest that I had for sale wouldn't be sold?

General Short. That is true; but that would definitely emphasize the horse and the mule.

[8132] The Chairman. Yes; I wouldn't want to overlook selling them.

General Short. No, sir.

The Chairman. In this message of the 27th—which was shown to you also, was it not?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. And for the same purpose?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. It was a little stronger:

This is to be considered as a war warning.

General Short. There is one very significant thing there, though. You notice that Guam was included in the probable attack, or possible attack on the 24th, and in that message they talk about Guam only in terms of sabotage.

The Chairman. Yes.

General Short. It would indicate that they were dwelling even more on the Southwest Pacific.

Guam, which was very close to Japan, had been eliminated.

The Chairman. Let me ask you this. Everybody in Washington, all the high officers in Washington—Navy, Army, Intelligence, War Plans, General Staff—all saw these intercepted messages, but as to which Admiral Kimmel [8133] complains and you complain not having been transmitted to you?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. They all have testified that, notwithstanding those messages, they did not really expect an attack at Pearl Harbor and were surprised when it came.

Do you think that if you had gotten all of those, or if the admiral had gotten them, or both of you together had gotten them, you would have reached any different conclusion from that reached by everybody in Washington?

General Short. I think there was a possibility because Pearl Harbor meant a little more to us. We were a little closer to the situation, and I believe we would have been inclined to look at that Pearl Harbor information a little more closely.
We might not have made the correct decision, but I believe there was more chance that either we or someone on our staffs would have had the idea.

The Chairman. You say that Pearl Harbor meant more to the admiral and to you and that therefore you were more concerned about it.

If that is true, why did you rely for the action you took upon some definite instruction from Washington instead of exercising greater judgment and discretion in doing what you could do with what you had?

General Short. Because they were my only sources of information. I had no source of information outside Hawaii, except the War Department.

The Chairman. In other words, you mean to say that with your general information and sizing up the situation during the whole year that you would take no action that meant anything in the way of preparation until you got meticulous detailed instructions from Washington to do it?

General Short. I mean that I knew that the War Department had many sources of information. They had military attachés. They got reports from the State Department and the Commerce Department.

They had a certain number of agents scattered around in the Far East. If they were in a position to get information that I had no access to at all, I had every reason to believe that their judgment would be better than my just arriving at a conclusion from reading the newspapers.

The Chairman. Well, we had military attachés and ambassadors in Tokyo, but due to the secretiveness of the Japanese Government, we didn't get much information.

General Short. That is true. I didn't know whether they were getting much or getting little.

The Chairman. Yes.

Now, let me get down to the message that you got yourself from General Marshall, which you call in your statement, the "do-don't" message.

General Short. The Army Pearl Harbor Board was the one that designated it that.

The Chairman. Do you mean by that description to rather ridicule the message that Marshall sent to you, by calling it the "do-don't" message?

General Short. The Army Pearl Harbor Board gave it that term, because of conflicting ideas presented, because of the fact that practically everything they gave was qualified, except two things. It was not my terminology. I adopted it. I adopted it from the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

The Chairman. It is not original with you, then?

General Short. No, sir.

The Chairman. Now, this message to you, No. 472——

General Short. Yes, sir.
The Chairman [reading]:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese might come back and offer to continue.

That was the day following the delivery of the 10-point note to the Japanese Ambassador by Secretary Hull?

The Chairman. Which he delivered on the 26th?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Chairman [reading]:

Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.

That was our policy in all departments. All of you understood that if war had to come that our own country desired that Japan precipitate it instead of our country precipitating it; that is correct, isn't it?

General Short. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. You understood that?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. And that is what the Secretary of State, the President, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy, and all of the high officers understood that if there had to be hostilities, we didn't want to start them; isn't that true?

General Short. I very strongly got that impression from that message.
The Chairman [reading]:

If hostilities cannot be avoided the United States [8137] desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy could not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures—

As might be necessary under the circumstances.

General Short. It made, however, a rather difficult situation. If we discovered a carrier 800 or a thousand miles out at sea, it would have been a very fine point whether under that we should attack.

The Chairman. Well, you didn't have to pass on that fine point, because you were just in charge of the Army?

General Short. Yes, I might have had to furnish bombers to do the bombing.
The Chairman. Yes.
General Short. Admiral Kimmel would be the one.
The Chairman. That was a naval decision.
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Chairman [reading]:

Prior to hostile Japanese action—

This is not a request. It is not an intimation. It is a direction:

you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance—

[8138] In general broad terms, that doesn't mean to look out after sabotage, does it?

General Short. No, sir; but long distant reconnaissance, by the agreement with the Navy, was definitely a Navy problem, and General
Marshall agreed that under that construction all I had to do was to turn over my planes to the Navy if they were called for.

The Chairman. When did he agree to that?

General Short. I have the quotation. He was asked, I think, before the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

The Chairman. He hadn't agreed to that before this took place?

General Short. No, but he said that was his interpretation, the same as it was mine.

The Chairman (reading):

Undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken.

In reply to that message—then it goes on to say:

Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in rainbow five.

And so forth.

[8139] In reply to that message—which I believe was the next day, was it?

General Short. No, sir; it was the same day.

The Chairman. The same day?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. You cabled him that you had taken steps against sabotage and had created liaison with the Navy?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Did you regard that reply as responsive to General Marshall's dispatch?

General Short. I did. There was one very important part of that message you didn't read.

The Chairman. I tried to read it all. What part did I omit?

General Short (reading):

Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

The Chairman. Oh, yes. That was a direction for you not to spread it around in the vicinity.

General Short. You couldn't possibly take up alert No. 2 or alert No. 3 without telling all of the enlisted men what they were out there for, who they were to shoot at.

The Chairman. You had Army practices from time to [8140] time that involved these alerts, did you not?

General Short. But we didn't give them live ammunition and tell them to shoot at a Jap plane, if one came over.

The Chairman. The population, hearing these guns firing, wouldn't know whether they had live ammunition.

General Short. This limited information wouldn't have allowed me to disclose that to an enlisted man—merely to "minimum essential officers."

The Chairman. If General Marshall knew, as you say he knew, that you had no responsibility as far as reconnaissance was concerned, why do you suppose he directed you to institute reconnaissance and take every step you thought necessary to protect yourself?
General Short. Because he did not write that message. I would like to read what he said in regard to that. This is a quotation from General Marshall:

Distant reconnaissance. —was a naval function, and the Army Commander was liable to furnish them such of the planes suitable for that purpose that could be provided.

That is one quotation. There is another quotation from before the Army Board.

[814] The CHAIRMAN. Well, now, if it is true that you could understand this message and you knew what it meant when it said for you to institute reconnaissance—

General Short. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. The words are simple, there is no ambiguity about it. If you knew and you knew he knew that all you could do about that was to make your planes available to the Navy—

General Short. That was exactly it.

The CHAIRMAN (continuing). Why didn't you in your reply to him say either that you had made the planes available to the Navy or you had not done so and why you had not done it, instead of just saying that you had taken steps against sabotage? Sabotage can be carried on where there are no actual hostilities between two nations. That is something that all the spies in Hawaii could indulge in, blowing up an installation on the ground or things of that sort without war being actually declared.

Why in your reply to General Marshall did you limit this to sabotage instead of saying something about reconnaissance, which is the only specific thing he mentioned in his direction to you?

General Short. I was directly obligated by the agreement with the Navy to furnish these planes. It had been approved [814½] by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations and it did not seem to me that it was necessary to reiterate that because without they told me that—there was also a provision in that agreement that if the agreement were to be abrogated it would be in writing.

The CHAIRMAN. Was that a written agreement?

General Short. That was a written agreement signed by Admiral Bloch and me, approved by General Marshall and by Admiral Stark and it had a provision that any abrogation must be in writing.

The CHAIRMAN. I cannot understand then why if General Marshall knew that you had no duty in regard to reconnaissance that he put this in this instruction to you and that if you knew he knew that why you did not call his attention to it in your reply to him so that he would not be under any misapprehension?

General Short. Yes, I think I can possibly explain that. In the first place, General Marshall was out of town when the message was drawn. In the second place, this message was written basically for General MacArthur in the Philippines and then adopted to the rest of us, and in the Philippines they had no such agreement. The Army was responsible for reconnaissance and they got together with the Navy and agreed upon what sectors that each would cover.

[814¾] Mr. Murphy. Will the chairman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. Would you regard it as the duty of a high commanding officer in the field—a man of your rank and you obtained that rank after long, distinguished service, as the admirals in the Navy
do—if there was any possibility of misunderstanding a direct instruction given by the Chief of Staff or the Chief of Naval Operations to the high-ranking commanding officer in the field, that it is the duty of that ranking officer in the field to call that to the attention of the originating officer and clarify it instead of just sitting around waiting for further instructions?

It seems to me there ought to be some liaison between the two respective offices; if there is any misunderstanding or misapprehension or any lack of comprehension that ought to be brought to the attention of the other office so as to clarify it immediately. Now, it seems that after you received this message on the 27th you made no further effort, and so far as the naval end of it is concerned, they made no further effort to ascertain just what it was that Washington had in mind when they gave these instructions about reconnaissance and defensive deployments and all that language that has been used here in this hearing.

What have you to say about that? That bothers me, General.

General Short. I believe that Admiral Kimmel felt full responsibility for the reconnaissance; I think he realized that it was his full duty.

The Chairman. Well, inasmuch as this message had come to you about reconnaissance didn’t it ever occur to you that you ought to advise General Marshall that under the agreement the naval end of it had assumed full responsibility for reconnaissance and that it was not a part of your responsibility, so that he would not be expecting you to do it?

General Short. Frankly, I believed General Marshall would have known it.

The Chairman. You believed he would have known it?

General Short. I believed he would have known it because he personally approved that.

The Chairman. Well, if that is true this language in here, this direct instruction to you to institute reconnaissance, was just idle words, it didn’t mean anything so far as he was concerned, you think?

General Short. You will notice it says:

Such reconnaissance as you may deem necessary.

The Chairman. No; that is not what it says:

You are to take such reconnaissance and other measures.

General Short. I think the “deem necessary” applies to all. I don’t think there is any question of it in reference to any part of it.

[8145] Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield at that point?

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. I think I have something precisely in point. I would like to read from page 380 of the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearing, General Grunert to General Short:

In your message of November 27th you say “liaison with the Navy,” Just what did you mean by that? How did that cover anything required by that particular message?

Answer. To my mind it meant I was definitely keeping in touch with the Navy, what information they had and what they were doing.

Question. Did it indicate in any way that you expected the Navy to carry out its part of that agreement for long distance reconnaissance?
Answer. Yes, without any question whether I had sent that or not it would have effected it because they signed a very definite agreement which was approved by the Navy as well as by our Chief of Staff.

The CHAIRMAN. What do you say about that answer to that question?

General SHORT. Well, I want to finish the quotation that I started to read from General Marshall because it was taken before the Army Pearl Harbor Board also.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, go ahead.

[1846] General SHORT. This is from the testimony of General Marshall. This is the testimony on distance reconnaissance.

As I recall the matter, the only way the Army would have been involved in the deep reconnaissance would have been in detaching units to serve under the Navy.

General RUSSELL. Well, is it your view that both having seen the message of November 27, without more ado the Navy should have started their distant reconnaissance?

General MARSHALL. That is right. That is my view.

In other words, I think he had the same view of the responsibility that I had there.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know why, General, and can you tell the committee why it was that there was no reconnaissance on the 6th of December, the day before the attack?

General SHORT. I believe, it is my impression that Admiral Kimmel was making a considerable reconnaissance.

The CHAIRMAN. He said that there were some Navy planes flying to the south.

Senator LUCAS. No; patrol planes.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not talking about patrol planes. I am talking about reconnaissance, long-distance reconnaissance.

General SHORT. I think all of his reconnaissance from Johnston Island to Wake Island to Midway was very definitely distance-reconnaissance. He was doing it on the perimeter in [1847] place of flying them out and back from Oahu. He could accomplish more with the same number of planes.

The CHAIRMAN. He could accomplish more with the same number of planes if he had had them at the right place at the right time.

General SHORT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. But he could not accomplish more with them down to the south if the attack was coming down from the north. It seems to me there was no reconnaissance from that direction.

General SHORT. It is apparent the Navy had not considered that because you will recall Admiral Richardson stated before this committee that his reconnaissance extended from 10 degrees west of north down to the south. He did not think his reconnaissance ever went to the east or north.

Mr. MURPHY. Will the Chairman yield?

The CHAIRMAN. I am through. Congressman Cooper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I suppose as usual we do not want to detain General Short too long and we will quit at 4 o'clock as we have been doing?

The CHAIRMAN. Unless General Short is willing to go on further. General SHORT. Just at the pleasure of the committee.
The Chairman. Unless there is some reason for the members on the House side wanting to quit at 4 there is no reason that I know of why the Senators would want to quit in view of the situation in the Senate.

The Vice Chairman. Well, while General Short is on the stand we have suspended heretofore at 4 o'clock and I think we ought to do that.

The Chairman. All right.

The Vice Chairman. Are you through?

The Chairman. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. Pardon me. Do you have something further you want to look at, General?

General Short. That is all right.

The Vice Chairman. I would like to inquire of you to get some additional information, if I may, please. You had served about 40 years in the Army, hadn't you?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. I believe you stated that you went in the military service from the State of Illinois?

General Short. Yes; that is correct.

The Vice Chairman. You did not attend the Military Academy at West Point?

General Short. No, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And I understood you to say you were recommended by the president of the University of Illinois for a commission.

[8149] General Short. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. And commissioned in 1902?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Now, at the time you were in command of the Hawaiian Department you were one of the senior officers of the Army, weren't you?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. You at that time held the rank of Lieutenant General?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. At that time there were very few holding the rank of lieutenant general, weren't there?

General Short. I think there were nine, two of whom were air officers. I am not sure.

The Vice Chairman. Certainly there were not near as many as later developed during the war?

General Short. No; by no means.

The Vice Chairman. The rank of lieutenant general back at that time was really pretty high in the Army, wasn't it?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Now, on December 7, 1941, General, you held one of the most important commands in the Army, didn't you?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Our fortress at Hawaii was one of the greatest possessions for national defense that this country had?

General Short. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. And it was your responsibility to protect that?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Now, you received considerable information in the form of correspondence between you and the Chief of Staff, as you have indicated in the booklet that you have up there, during the period that you were in command at Hawaii?

General Short. A great deal of information on the defenses, and so forth.

The Vice Chairman. Yes.

General Short. A very limited amount on the international situation.

The Vice Chairman. Well, you kept informed on the international situation from every source that you could inform yourself, did you not?

General Short. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. And it was a matter of rather general knowledge that the situation was growing exceedingly tense between the United States and Japan, wasn't it?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And the situation was growing more [8151] critical all the time. You knew that as you very frankly stated here.

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Did you consider that war between the United States and Japan was inevitable?

General Short. I would not go that far. I think I would say that I considered it probable but I thought that Washington, from the message I had, was making every possible effort to avoid war and to avoid an international incident in Hawaii that they must, therefore, still have some hopes of averting it.

The Vice Chairman. Well, that was your very clear and definite impression of the efforts being exerted at Washington?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. But you also knew what Japan was doing, too, didn't you, General?

General Short. I knew that she was pressing down into China and getting on toward the south and that sooner or later might cause a conflict.

The Vice Chairman. And you knew that every indication pointed to Japan's further conquests, didn't you?

General Short. Without we were able through negotiations to arrive at something that would stop them.

[8152] The Vice Chairman. But every move Japan was making gave clear indications that she was bent on further conquest, didn't it?

General Short. It looked that way.

The Vice Chairman. It looked that way and you understood that?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Now, did you ever consider that Japan would attack Pearl Harbor?

General Short. I frankly felt with the fleet—as large a fleet as we had in the Hawaiian waters—that they would be able to either keep the carriers up there from the vicinity of Hawaii or at least get the information of their approach in time for us to be prepared for the attack.
The Vice Chairman. I did not understand the last part.

General Short. I say if they were not able to intercept them that they would at least get information in time to give us sufficient time to prepare for the attack.

The Vice Chairman. You thought the fleet would be able to do that?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Now, it was true that the fleet had certain units out at sea most of the time?

General Short. Always, I think.

[8153] The Vice Chairman. And certain task forces were operating between Hawaii and other islands such as Midway and Wake and Johnston and through that area?

General Short. Yes, sir. They also had forces stationed at those islands and they had a certain amount of reconnaissance constantly from those islands.

The Vice Chairman. So then you assumed that the Navy would become aware if any hostile act became apparent and you would receive the information through the Navy?

General Short. I expected to; yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. I believe on page 3 of your statement, General and subsequent pages—you need not refer to it; I am just going to ask a general question.

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. On page 3 and subsequent pages of your statement you referred to certain requests made by you to the War Department for additional equipment, material, and so forth.

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. But the fact that you were not furnished everything you asked for did not relieve you of the duty and responsibility to use what you did have to the best advantage in the defense of your department, did it?

General Short. In no way.

[8154] The Vice Chairman. I believe General Marshall made one statement here that I think you will agree with at least. He said that no commander was ever quite satisfied with what he got.

General Short. That is unquestionably right.

The Vice Chairman. They all ask for more than they are able to get and he said it only indicates he was a good officer because he was asking for more than he could get all the time.

Now, I believe on page 15 of your statement, General, under the heading of "War Plan," among other things in that paragraph there you say:

That no part of this joint plan would take effect until the War Department ordered M-day under the Rainbow plan.

Well, now, M-day was war with Japan, wasn't it?

General Short. Not necessarily war with Japan but it would be the mobilization toward the preparation for war with Japan.

The Vice Chairman. I see. Well, anyhow, M-day was mobilization for war?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And you say that no part of the joint plan had to be put into effect until the War Department ordered that on M-day?
General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Well, this did not prevent you from using every possible means for a proper defense of your command, did it?

General Short. Not if the situation I would say was just definitely so that there was no time to communicate with Washington, but if you take their policy I think they expected in all cases to indicate when the plan was to go into effect, and also if you couple that with that express desire not to create any international incidents, not to provoke Japan, I think you naturally would hesitate very seriously as long as there was time to communicate with Washington and the communications were open, to put anything into effect without first communicating with them. That was my attitude.

The Vice Chairman. Well, naturally, that would generally be true, but at the same time the responsibility rested upon you to defend your Department?

General Short. Yes, sir; but likewise an equal responsibility rested upon the War Department to provide me with all the information that I needed.

The Vice Chairman. I am not arguing with you about the responsibility of the War Department. I am just inquiring briefly about your responsibility as a lieutenant general of the United States Army in command of the most valuable post for the national defense of this country.

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Now, it was your duty——

General Short. It was mine.

The Vice Chairman (continuing). To defend it?

General Short. But my estimate was bound to be made upon the information I had.

The Vice Chairman. Yes; but it was your duty to defend that post that had been assigned to you?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Whether any M-day had arrived or whether any instructions had been received from Washington or anywhere else if the occasion arose, it was your duty to defend that command?

General Short. And when the definite occasion did arise it never occurred to me to communicate with Washington then.

The Vice Chairman. That is right.

General Short. Because the situation was definitely there. We went into action immediately.

The Vice Chairman. Well, there wasn’t any declaration of war at the time it happened?

General Short. No, sir.

The Vice Chairman. There wasn’t any M-day put into effect?

General Short. No, sir.

The Vice Chairman. There wasn’t any order to that effect form the War Department?

General Short. No, sir.

The Vice Chairman. But when the Japanese attack came you went into action?

General Short. Within a minute or two.

The Vice Chairman. Yes. Now, you have been asked a number of questions about these particular messages that were received and
the chairman has just inquired some about the message of November 24 to Admiral Kimmel. You say you saw that and conferred with him about it?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And, of course, you saw in that message that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction is stated there, isn't it?

General Short. Yes, sir; but it also points out particular places.

The Vice Chairman. It also mentions other things but those words are in there?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. All right. Now, you say there a little below the middle of the page:

This message indicated possible movements in the direction of the Philippines or Guam and called for secrecy.

[8158] but this is not all that it indicated, was it?

General Short. I would say that that was what it indicated—probable. The other was possible. When you say "attack in any direction," that is so indefinite that you cannot point it out as a probable thing.

The Vice Chairman. Well, your statement here is:

This message indicated possible movements in the direction of the Philippines or Guam and called for secrecy.

General Short. I believe that if the Department had considered Hawaii in the same way, classing it with the probable as the Philippines or Guam, it would have included it.

The Vice Chairman. But at least the message said also what is said about the Philippines and Guam?

General Short. But in a very general way.

The Vice Chairman. At least you did not accept it as meaning anything but the Philippines and Guam?

General Short. That was all that it meant to me.

The Vice Chairman. That was all that it meant to you?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. All right.

General Short. I think that is all it meant to Admiral Kimmel.

The Vice Chairman. It referred to the Philippines and Guam and that is all it meant to you and you did not accept it as [8159] meaning anything else?

General Short. No, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Or as being worth anything else to you?

General Short. I realized that any time that there was any Japanese action against the United States that sabotage and subversive action might start in Hawaii even ahead of the action to get the jump on us.

The Vice Chairman. But you did not think there was anything in this message—

General Short. I did not expect an attack.

The Vice Chairman. Well, you did not think there was anything in this message that should have meant anything to you except the Philippines and Guam?
General Short. And possibly internal disorders in Hawaii.
The Vice Chairman. In Hawaii?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. That is all?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And so far as all these other words that we used here they were just surplusage as far as conveying any meaning to you?
General Short. They were so general and so indefinite that it was pretty hard to say that they conveyed any specific meaning.

[Page 8160]
The Vice Chairman. Well, it did not mean anything to you?
General Short. No, sir.
The Vice Chairman. All right.
The Chairman. The Chair thinks we will suspend with you until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4:03 p. m., January 23, 1946, an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m., Thursday, January 24, 1946.)
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a.m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building; Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Congressman Cooper will resume his examination.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you ready, General?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER C. SHORT, UNITED STATES ARMY (RETIRED)—Resumed

The Vice CHAIRMAN. General Short, when we adjourned yesterday we had been discussing the Navy message of November 24, with which you said you were familiar.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

The Vice CHAIRMAN. And you had given your explanation of what you thought it meant and your ideas about that message. I would now like to consider with you for a little while the messages of November 27. The Chief of Naval Operations also sent a message of November 27 to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet.

General SHORT. May I correct my very last statement to you before we take that up?

The Vice CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir.

General SHORT. On page 8159 of the transcript you asked me:

Well, you did not think there was anything in this message that should have meant anything to you except the Philippines and Guam?

I added there.

You said then, "In Hawaii?"

And I said:

Yes, sir. And so far as all these other words that we used here they were just surplusage as far as conveying any meaning to you?

General SHORT. They were so general and so indefinite that it was pretty hard to say that they conveyed any specific meaning.
Then you said:

Well, it did not mean anything to you?

General Short. No, sir.

I think I should like to correct that that it did mean to me that they definitely expected hostilities but that it did not point to Hawaii. I don't think my answer "It did not mean anything" was a correct answer.

The Vice Chairman. As full and complete?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. It did mean to you then that hostilities—

General Short. That hostilities, yes, sir, but not an attack at Hawaii.

The Vice Chairman. All right. Now, then, the Navy message of November 27, the so-called war warning message, you are thoroughly familiar with that?


The Vice Chairman. And you saw it at the time Admiral Kimmel received it?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And you conferred with him about it?

General Short. I am sure that I talked pretty thoroughly about that on the 1st and the 3d—well, the 1st, 2d, and 3d of December.

The Vice Chairman. Well, that was received—

General Short. Oh, no. On the 24th you are talking about?

The Vice Chairman. No.

General Short. The one on November 27?

The Vice Chairman. I am talking about the one on November 27.

General Short. I talked pretty thoroughly with him about that.

We had talked immediately previously on that morning about the situation and the message of the 24th and there was really no additional information of an enemy in the message on the 27th that was not in the 24th.

The Vice Chairman. Well, it was received in Hawaii on the 27th, the day it was sent?

General Short. That is correct, the afternoon of the 27th.

[8165] The Vice Chairman. And you were familiar with it on that day?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And the opening words there:

Consider this dispatch a war warning—

you say it did not mean anything special to you?

General Short. It meant no more than saying that Japan was going to attack some place. It is the same thing.

The Vice Chairman. I see. And I believe you stated yesterday that you never had seen those words used in any dispatch before?

General Short. I did not remember that I had; no, sir.

The Vice Chairman. I recall that Admiral Kimmel stated that he had never seen those words used before.

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And I was just wondering why it was that those words that you had never seen in a dispatch before did not mean something more to you than you here indicate?
General Short. Well, if you analyze them they really are not nearly as definite, they mean not nearly as much as to say that Japan is going to attack the Philippines or Borneo because you are saying there that war is imminent and you are saying where it is imminent.

[8166] The Vice Chairman. Well, this says:

Consider this dispatch a war warning.

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. That is a pretty definite statement, General.

General Short. Well, I think if they tell you that the Philippines are going to be attacked that is equivalent to a war warning.

The Vice Chairman. Well, that would be definite, too.

General Short. I think probably that was the reason that it did not have any particular effect on me, because the one on the 24th had stated that they expected Japanese action in any direction, including the Philippines and Guam.

The Vice Chairman. Well, you had the impression in your mind at the time from the information contained in the Navy message of November 24th that hostilities were indicated?

General Short. That the Navy definitely believed they were indicated.

The Vice Chairman. All right. Then 3 days later on the 27th, you saw this message, "Consider this dispatch a war warning."

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. With the knowledge in your mind that you had already been notified that hostilities were imminent?


The Vice Chairman. And then here comes a message:

Consider this dispatch a war warning.

You did not give any special meaning to that?

General Short. I thought it was just a reiteration of what had been said.

The Vice Chairman. I see. Now, that was with respect to the Navy message of the 27th.

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Now, then, on page 18 of your statement you enter into a discussion of the Army message of November 27, which you quote there on page 18 of your statement.

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. This was a message from the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, to you.

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And you received it on the 27th?

General Short. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. You had the information contained in this message in addition to the information contained in the Navy message of the same date with which you were familiar?

General Short. That is correct.

[8168] The Vice Chairman. Now, I do not want to go into too lengthy a discussion of this message, because it has been covered so many times in the hearing, and you set it forth here in your prepared statement, but I would like to invite your attention, to get some infor-
motion as to your views about it, to certain words appearing right about the middle of the message, and I will quote them to you:

Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance, and other measures as you deem necessary.

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. That was a direct order from the Chief of Staff to you?

General Short. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. And then the words “Report measures taken.”

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Now, in your reply to General Marshall, you reported only that you had alerted your department against sabotage, and liaison with the Navy.

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Whether they are the exact words or not, that is what you meant and that is what you said?


The Vice Chairman. Now, do you find the word “sabotage” used anywhere in this message of November 27 to you?

General Short. No, sir; but I did in the next 3 messages that I got.

The Vice Chairman. Well, you promptly replied to General Marshall upon the receipt of this message?

General Short. That is correct. I also do not find anywhere in there that he said there was a probable attack on Hawaii. That is what caused me to——

The Vice Chairman. All right, we will get to that in a moment, but right at this point, you say the word “sabotage” is not used anywhere in this message of November 27 to you from the Chief of Staff?

General Short. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. And you say you promptly replied to that message without consultation with any members of your staff or anybody else, except, I believe, you talked with Colonel Phillips; is that right?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Now, with this message before you, and you had not at that time received these other messages, you promptly replied to General Marshall, you alerted your department against sabotage, and “liaison with the Navy.”

[8770] General Short. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. From this message of General Marshall to you, which does not contain the word “sabotage” anywhere in it, where did you get the idea that all he wanted to know about was sabotage?

General Short. The Navy message of November 24 pointed directly to an attack on the Philippines or Guam. It did not point to an attack on Hawaii. That was in my mind. That was received just 3 days before.

There was nothing in this message amending that. The information on the enemy given there “unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment.” I felt the information contained in the message of November 24 still stood, that the probable action was toward the Philippines and Guam.

[8771] The Vice Chairman. I know, General, but as an experienced officer with long and distinguished service of 40 years in
the United States Army, you had right in front of you a dispatch from the head of the United States Army, the Chief of Staff, and you replied to this dispatch.

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. You did not reply to the Navy message of November 24.

General Short. Nor, sir; but I also knew—

The Vice Chairman. It was this dispatch that you replied to?

General Short. I also knew from 40 years' experience that if the Chief of Staff believed there was going to be an air attack or an all-out attack on Hawaii he would have said so.

The Vice Chairman. What I am trying to find, General—and I am just trying to get the facts about this thing the best I can, the same as I questioned the other witnesses, my only purpose in serving on this committee is to try to find the facts about the question that is presented to us here—with this message of the Chief of Staff before you, without the word "sabotage" mentioned in it at all, I am just wondering how you got the impression that your reply of "an alert against sabotage" was responsive to this message.

General Short. Because there was no information that indicated anything in Hawaii other than internal disorders. And the man who wrote the estimate on November 20, the two men, Colonel Betts and Colonel Kroner, did not have access to magic, and they drew exactly the same conclusion, that there was not a possibility of an attack on Hawaii, there was no possibility of an air attack on Hawaii, and the only thing of importance was an alert against sabotage and internal disorder.

The Vice Chairman. But certainly, General, at the time you replied to General Marshall's message you did not know what Betts and Kroner knew, or whether they knew anything about that.

General Short. I did not, and I did not have as much information as he had. I am simply saying my conclusion had been absolutely logical. These two men, the heads of military branches of the United States, drew exactly the same conclusions for the same reasons, and anybody else would if they were not given the magic information.

The Vice Chairman. One difficulty with all of us is to separate hindsight or present knowledge from what occurred at the time back there. I realize your difficulty, and we all have that difficulty, but this Kroner and Betts information was not before you then, you knew nothing about it.

General Short. It had nothing to do with my decision.

The Vice Chairman. All right.

General Short. But there was nothing else before me that caused me to expect an attack on Hawaii.

The Vice Chairman. Although the words definitely appeared in this message:

Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary?

General Short. And I did. "Hostile action" to me, taking everything that I had had before and everything in that message into consideration, meant the form of hostile action in Hawaii would be internal disorders, that the War Department thought it would be internal disorders.
The Vice Chairman. Did you undertake such reconnaissance as you deemed necessary?

General Short. I did not deem anything necessary in the way of long-distance reconnaissance, because it was a Navy job, and I was ever ready to give them the planes any time they requested, and that was my only function.

The Vice Chairman. All right. With this directive from the Chief of Staff to you to undertake such reconnaissance, and indicating that the Navy was supposed to furnish long-distance reconnaissance, did you then promptly confer with Admiral Kimmel so you would know whether he was doing it?

General Short. I knew that morning what reconnaissance [817\%] in general he was taking; I talked with him 3 hours that morning.

The Vice Chairman. But not after you received the order from the Chief of Staff?

General Short. No, sir; but I knew what he was doing.

The Vice Chairman. Now this same message was sent to certain other commanding generals; was it not?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. The commanding general at Panama, among others; was it not?

General Short. I think you will find—I am not positive, but I think probably some of the “don’ts” were left out. I know the message to the Philippines omitted the don’ts.

The Vice Chairman. We will get to that in a minute. If you will try to stay with me as we go along, it will help me a great deal.

At the bottom of this message appearing on page 7 of exhibit 32, after the name “Marshall,” which appeared on the message to you, it says here:

War Department Message Center: Please send same radiogram to: Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command.

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. That was the Panama command?

General Short. That is correct.

[8175] The Vice Chairman. And the General in command there replied to the message in quite different form to what you replied?

General Short. In all probability he did not have the definite written approved agreement with the Navy that they would be responsible for long-distance reconnaissance. I know that was the case in the Philippines. I do not know that that was the case in Panama.

The Vice Chairman. There was quite a difference between that general’s reply and yours.

General Short. There would be necessarily a great difference if I had been responsible for the long-distance reconnaissance, but I was not.

The Vice Chairman. But the fact remains there was considerable difference in the replies.

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. All right. Now, then, on the same day a message was sent to General MacArthur in the Philippines. That is not identical with the message received by you, but quite similar to it; isn’t it?
General Short. Except all the don'ts were left out.
The Vice Chairman. It is quite similar to it. The same words appear in it, General:

Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to take such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.

Those identical words appear in the message to MacArthur and to you; do they not?

General Short. Yes, sir; and I happen to know that there was no agreement in the Philippines Islands whereby the Navy assumed the responsibility for long-distance reconnaissance.

The Vice Chairman. But those same words appear in your message and in MacArthur's message?

General Short. Yes, sir; but the condition in the two places was entirely different.

The Vice Chairman. And MacArthur's reply to General Marshall is quite different from yours?

General Short. Necessarily so.

The Vice Chairman. He says:

Pursuant to instructions contained in your radio six two four air reconnaissance has been extended and intensified in conjunction with the Navy stop Ground security measures have been taken stop Within the limitations imposed by present state of development of this theatre of operations everything is in readiness for the conduct of a successful defense stop intimate liaison and cooperation and cordial relations exist between Army and Navy.

You replied that your department was alerted against sabotage, and liaison with the Navy.

General Short. I think you ought to also take into consideration that he had a great deal—not all, but a large part of magic, that he had received a radiogram, that he had held a conference with Commissioner Sayre and Admiral Stark, and that this message was from the President, that repeated estimates had pointed to the probable attack on the Philippine Islands. The situation as painted to him was entirely different from that which was painted to me.

The Vice Chairman. Back again, General, the same words conveying a definite directive to him, were contained in the message to you?

General Short. But the action required would be governed by the situation that existed, which was entirely different.

The Vice Chairman. I see. In just reading MacArthur's message it would seem that he replied directly to these words contained in both messages.

General Short. I think he replied to meet his situation as it existed.

The Vice Chairman. All right. Now, General, on page 20 of your statement you refer to the message of November 27 from G-2 of the War Department to G-2 of your department.

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. That was the same day that General Marshall's message was sent to you?

General Short. Received probably within an hour or less.

[8?78] The Vice Chairman. An hour or less?

General Short. Almost the same time.

The Vice Chairman. But after you had replied to General Marshall's message?

General Short. I think so.
The Vice Chairman. All right. Now then this message from General Miles, G-2 of the War Department, to your G-2 relates only to sabotage and subversive activities, does it not?

General Short. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. Then why did you think General Miles sent you this special message relating only to sabotage if it meant only the same thing as the message General Marshall had sent to you?

General Short. General Miles was responsible for giving us information not only about sabotage but information of any probable hostile action. The fact that the information he gave us related only to sabotage indicated that he did not expect other hostile action or he would have pointed it out the same as they did the subversive action.

The Vice Chairman. But the message from General Miles to your G-2 meant the same thing to you as General Marshall's message to you?

General Short. It predicted to me the same type of hostile action. [8179] The Vice Chairman. I see. And you see no difference between the Marshall message to you and the Miles message to your G-2?

General Short. I did. To me the Marshall message indicated that there was paramount in the idea of the War Department that they must avoid war if possible with Japan and that no international incident must take place in Hawaii that would provoke the Japanese or give them an excuse. There was nothing of that kind in Miles' message.

The Vice Chairman. Well, if you even had not received General Marshall's message, why, you would not have taken any such action, would you?

General Short. If I had not received General Marshall's message and only had Miles' message, you mean?

The Vice Chairman. If you had not received either one of them you would not have done anything to create a Japanese incident, would you?

General Short. I would have been very careful not to, because for months there had been an indication that they were particularly anxious not to provoke the Japanese.

The Vice Chairman. You did not need any message from General Marshall or General Miles, or anybody else, for you to take that definite course yourself, did you?

General Short. I would say that that made it clear; it was necessary to reiterate their position, because they were very anxious about it. Uppermost in their minds was that they did not want to be responsible for starting a war.

The Vice Chairman. And you were not going to do anything to start a war even if you had not heard anything from them, were you?

General Short. Not intentionally.

The Vice Chairman. How is that?

General Short. Not intentionally.

The Vice Chairman. All right. Now, General, I believe you have stated that the operation of radar was your responsibility?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And I think you stated, in response to questions by counsel, that you had six mobile radar sets and three stationary sets.
General Short. No, sir; there were no stationary sets in operation.
The Vice Chairman. You had been furnished three, had you not?
General Short. Not complete.
The Vice Chairman. But you had six mobile sets?
General Short. We had six mobile sets.
The Vice Chairman. In operation?

[8181] General Short. Yes, sir. And I might state also that
the plans for the erection of the antenna, the towers for the sets were
not received until—I think they show an endorsement of December
10, so they were not there.

At this time, if I may, I would like to read a telegram that I
received here in the room yesterday from a former signal officer.
I did not even remember the man——

The Vice Chairman. Just one second before you get to that. I
just want to try to be clear on one point. I certainly will give you
an opportunity to read your telegram. There were six mobile radar
sets in operation at the time?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And although three stationary sets had been
furnished, they were not complete and not in operation?

General Short. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. I understood you to state yesterday, in re-
sponse to a question by counsel, that you did not know whether the
three stationary sets were in operation at that time or not.

General Short. I did not mean to convey that. I knew definitely
they were not; I knew they were robbing those sets for parts to keep the
mobile sets working.

The Vice Chairman. Now if you desire to read the telegram you
may do so.

[8182] General Short. As it happens, I do not even remember this
officer. No inquiry had been made of him. I would just like to
read the wire that came to me yesterday morning.

It is dated January 22, at Waterloo, Iowa:

Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short,
Care Senate House Investigating Committee, Washington, D. C.:

On Dec 10, 1941 I was transferred to Oakland California as assistant signal
officer SFP of E Stop Lying on the Oakland pier for a long time were three 100
ft. radar towers No SCR 271 Stop Several weeks later I received a phone inquiry
from Wash DC and instructions for the Transportation Corps to ship same to
Honolulu on the next boat Stop It was necessary to use a floating crane to hoist
these heavy towers Stop Approximately twenty SCR 271 have since been installed
in the Hawaiian Islands Stop In my opinion if these radar towers had not been
delayed on the Oakland docks you could have used them to good advantage Dec
7 1941 End

George D. Leask,
O-122826 Ex-Major, Signal Corps.

I want to introduce that just to show that those sets were not com-
plete, that the towers had not been received.

[8183] The Vice Chairman. That was three additional sets,
wasn't it?

General Short. I don't know from his wire whether it was three
additional sets. You see, we originally were authorized three sets.
It was changed to six. I think the situation was that the three towers
were there but that the plans for the erection of the towers and for the
footings to be installed by the engineers had not been received and
were not forwarded to Hawaii until sometime about December 10 or 12. I am not sure of the exact date.

The Vice Chairman. Well, let's be clear in our understanding. You had six mobile sets in operation?

General Short. I definitely had six mobile sets.

The Vice Chairman. You had three stationary sets that had not been put in operation?

General Short. That is correct; and were not complete in all ways.

The Vice Chairman. But did those three stationary sets have the towers there?

General Short. I don't know. This [referring to wire] raises a doubt in my mind. I thought that the towers were there, but the plans were not. This wire here that I just got, raises a little doubt in my mind as to whether my information was exactly correct, but I am sure that the plans for the erection of the towers had not been received.

The Vice Chairman. Well, you don't know whether the three towers for the three stationary sets were there in Hawaii at the time, or not?

General Short. I am not positive.

The Vice Chairman. You are not positive?

General Short. I had thought that they were.

The Vice Chairman. And you don't know whether that telegram just read relates to the towers for the three stationary sets already in Hawaii or the three sets that were to be sent there?

General Short. I do not, because there is no statement made.

The Vice Chairman. All right. Thank you. With all six of the mobile sets, radar sets that you did have there—were they in operation on the 7th of December?

General Short. I am of the opinion they were. I imagine sometime during the day certain sets were temporarily out of commission because that happened right along. But I don't know.

The Vice Chairman. You don't know?

General Short. Don't know.

The Vice Chairman. Now, on page 38 of your statement, General, you refer to radar schedule under No. 50. You state:

Radar schedule.

After the aircraft warning service information was closed at 7 a.m. December 7, the Opana Station remained in operation. On Saturday, December 6, 1941, Second Lieutenant Grover C. White, Jr., Signal Corps, had obtained permission of the Control Officer to have all stations operate from 4 a.m. to 7 a.m. only on Sunday, December 7, 1941.

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Did you know that permission had been granted to Lieutenant White?

General Short. No, sir; I did not. I had ordered, as part of the interceptor command and aircraft warning service, the operation only from 4 to 7. The additional hours were part of the training program, and for some time they had been exceeding the prescribed hours. They were very keen on making progress, and they had worked well beyond the prescribed hours. There was no training as training prescribed on Sunday, but they had been doing it.

I think the control officer was entirely within his province in permitting this training to be discontinued. I think that Major Berquist, who was the head control officer, felt that the men had been
using their eyes so many hours, that some of them were having eye trouble.

He testified to that fact before the Army Board.

I think that perhaps was the reason they agreed to cutting out the training on December 7.

The Vice Chairman. Who was having eye trouble?

General Short. The men who were operating the oscilloscopes; the radar sets.

The Vice Chairman. Who was this major, who was the control officer?

General Short. Major Berquist was the senior man. He and Major Tindall were the only two officers we had that knew anything about it.

The Vice Chairman. Did that major have authority to issue orders for radar stations not to operate without consulting you, or even notifying you?

General Short. He did where the hours were over and above the hours prescribed by me. There was no training prescribed Sunday. They had been doing it on Sunday on their own. I had not issued an order that they would have the training and maintenance work on Sunday. I considered [8187] that he was within his province in calling that off.

The Vice Chairman. Then it was purely voluntary on their part?

General Short. On Sunday, not the 4 to 7. That was a definite order, but the training on Sunday was voluntary.

The Vice Chairman. And you didn’t know that this permission had been granted by Major Berquist to Second Lieutenant White?

General Short. I did not.

The Vice Chairman. Now you also tell about the incident there in which Lieutenant Tyler was involved.

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Where he received this message from the man who was voluntarily on duty?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And practicing. That he had observed this flight of planes coming in.

General Short. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. And Tyler made the decision to do nothing about it?

General Short. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. Was anything done about Tyler’s action in that respect?

General Short. No, sir. As soon as I heard it, [8188] which was the next day, I told my chief of staff that I wanted affidavits taken to find out the exact status, but at that time there was no device by which we could differentiate between friendly planes and enemy planes, nobody could have told whether it was an enemy plane or a friendly plane. Tyler was inexperienced. I did not feel there was anything to justify disciplinary action against Tyler, because he had made what he thought was a correct decision.

The Vice Chairman. You knew he was inexperienced?

General Short. Yes, sir. There were only two experienced men on the island until the return of General Davidson and Colonel Meehan.
The Vice Chairman. Whether they were technically experienced and trained on that, General, you did have plenty of men with mature judgment and discretion?

General Short. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. That could have been discharging these duties that this inexperienced officer was then discharging?

General Short. Major Berquist selected certain men he was training as control officers. I think that he selected these men with instructions to call him in case there was any doubt about anything.

[8180] The Vice Chairman. You think he expected them to do that?

General Short. To call him personally; yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. What did you know was supposed to be done there in the case of receipt of information that might convey vital information to you?

General Short. If there had been any doubt in the mind of whoever was acting as control officer, the pursuit planes at Wheeler Field should have been alerted immediately.

If that lieutenant had phoned to Wheeler Field, General Davidson would have turned out the planes without question. It would have been looked into later if it were wrong, but there wouldn't have been any hesitation on his part.

The Vice Chairman. Certainly there was a serious error in judgment there. This inexperienced officer that you referred to——

General Short. He should have phoned to Major Berquist because his experience, I think, was probably insufficient for him to make the decision.

The Vice Chairman. And you knew he was inexperienced?

General Short. I did not know, as a matter of fact, that he was on the board that morning.

The Vice Chairman. You didn't know who was?

[8190] General Short. I didn't know who was on there. The list of officers being trained as control officers was operated by Major Berquist. If he found that a man didn't show aptitude, he was at liberty to throw him off, and call for another officer.

The Vice Chairman. Did you personally know that any of the radar stations were operating that morning?

General Short. I didn't visit them that morning, but I had visited the radar stations, at least three of them, personally out in the field. I had gone through the aircraft warning service several times, the information center, and my orders were ordinarily carried out. When I gave orders, I fully expected them to be carried out.

The Vice Chairman. I think that is natural, and I think every Army officer expects that, but one of your main complaints here is that although General Marshall issued you a direct order, he didn't do anything to see if you carried it out.

General Short. When you come to the follow-up it depends on how far down you are going. I don't think I could be expected to check on every officer detailed there any more than I would see if the corporal of the guard received his instructions correctly when he went on duty. [8190-4] My follow-up was expected to go far enough, certainly, for me to talk with the commander of the Air Force, and the chief signal officer, which I did. And to know that
they had the picture, and trying to develop the thing in harmony as graphically as possible.

The Vice Chairman. Wasn't your responsibility such that required you to go far enough to see that the job was properly done?

General Short. I would say to know in general that it was being properly done, which I did know that they were conducting this every morning. I don't think that my responsibility extended to the point of inspecting every man that went on there as a control officer. It would have been a physical impossibility for me to take not just this, but every other line of activity on the island, and I was responsible for all of them, not just this, it would be physically impossible for me to inspect every detail in every one of them every day; it couldn't be done.

The Vice Chairman. But weren't you required to assume sufficient responsibility to get the job done?

General Short. I thought that I was getting it done.

The Vice Chairman. You thought you had done that?

General Short. I had the only two men who had ever [8191] seen an installation of this kind supervising it.

The Vice Chairman. It was your responsibility to see that the job was properly done?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And you thought you had taken sufficient steps to do that?

General Short. I thought I had.

The Vice Chairman. And you found that you had not?

General Short. I am not sure, in view of the impossibility of determining the difference between friend and foe that you could have logically said that anybody, no matter how experienced could say that those were hostile planes.

The Vice Chairman. But you stated a few moments ago, General, that if this inexperienced second lieutenant had reported to General Davidson this information that came to him, General Davidson would have had his planes in the air immediately.

General Short. That is not quite what I stated.

The Vice Chairman. That is the way I understood it.

General Short. What I meant was he had the full authority, in spite of the fact that he was a lieutenant, as control officer, had full authority to alert the planes at Wheeler Field. He would just turn them out for [8192] hostile planes approaching. If they had received that report, no matter whether it had any value or not, they would have turned out immediately.

The Vice Chairman. But that was not done?

General Short. That was not done.

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?

The Vice Chairman. Just one more question on that, if I may.

If the Navy had had out proper long-distance reconnaissance planes——

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. They could have been in a position to have found whether they were friendly or enemy planes, couldn't they?

General Short. If the Navy had told me that carriers were in Hawaiian waters, then we would have been instantly on the alert and we would have been suspecting everybody.
The Vice Chairman. So it was the fault of the Navy in not conducting proper long-distant reconnaissance so as to be able to supply you the information?

General Short. Well, I think, if you are going back to fault, you can go back and say, if they had received the message of the delivery of the ultimatum, at 1 p.m., I think they would have turned out everything for the reconnaissance. I don't think you can take one point and stop there.

[8193] The Vice Chairman. But the fact remains that if the Navy had been conducting long-range reconnaissance, you thought they were, they would have been in position to supply you the information as to whether these were hostile or friendly planes?

General Short. I would not say that, because I knew that the Navy did not have sufficient planes to conduct, for any period of time, a 360-degree reconnaissance. If they had information pinning down probable hostile action to a certain time then they had enough planes that they could have searched practically the whole area for a few hours. As it was, they were searching what they considered was the probable line of approach of the enemy.

The Vice Chairman. If you had had proper liaison with the Navy, you could probably have known whether these were hostile or friendly planes?

General Short. No, sir; I do not think I could.

The Vice Chairman. Did you want to say something?

Mr. Murphy. I was wondering how that lieutenant could be held responsible for knowing anything when he never heard of these war warnings, never had been apprised of any change in the situation, and had the information that the man on the street had, even though he was the key man in the control station.

[8194] General Short. The information of the war warning was given to General Martin. It was talked over thoroughly with him. Probably spent 30 minutes. The Interceptor Command was under him. Whether or not he read the message he saw the "Dessemination to the few essential officers." I don't know whether he gave the information to Major Berquist or Major Tindall or whether he decided that it was limited in that.

The Vice Chairman. Now, General, you state on the top of page 38 of your statement, the very page that I have been asking you some questions about:

At that time I was convinced that the Navy either knew the location of the Japanese carriers or had enough information so that they were not uneasy. I felt that they could handle the situation.

General Short. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. That is correct.

General Short. There was nothing from them of an alarming nature. Nothing to show that they were alarmed about the situation.

The Vice Chairman. So you thought the Navy was taking proper care of the long-range reconnaissance matter and when they didn't notify you to the contrary you rested on that assumption?

General Short. I thought they were doing everything they [8195] were capable of doing. They found nothing to alarm them. They had transmitted nothing to me. And I accepted it on that basis.
The Vice Chairman. You didn't check on the matter, did you, didn't do anything further?

General Short. I knew generally what they were doing but I didn't know specifically what hours they were sending out planes and things of that kind.

The Vice Chairman. You don't think it was incumbent upon you to find out when they were making reconnaissance and definitely what they were doing?

General Short. It was Admiral Kimmel's definite responsibility. I thought he was an officer of sufficient experience. He knew more about reconnaissance with surface ships and submarines than I did. I felt that he could be counted on to do his job.

The Vice Chairman. You just assumed that was being done?

General Short. Yes, sir; as far as he could do it.

The Vice Chairman. You state also on page 38:

About 6:45 a.m., a two-man submarine entering Pearl Harbor was destroyed by ships on duty. Had the Naval authorities foreseen this as a possible forerunner of an air attack or notified the Army, time would have been available for the dispersion of the planes. However the Naval authorities did not connect this submarine attack with a possible general attack. The Army was not notified until after the attack.

General Short. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. You received no information from the Navy at all about this submarine incident?

General Short. Until after the attack.

The Vice Chairman. Yes.

General Short. Mr. Congressman, I would like before we leave the radar to add one thing, if I may.

The Vice Chairman. Be glad for you to.

General Short. The radar system in New York City and in Seattle and in San Francisco had been completely installed some time before we received any equipment and, as I understand it, in New York City in order to expedite it they hired experts from the American Telephone & Telegraph Co.—or RCA, rather—who were familiar with this type of equipment, to assist in the installation.

Now, when it came to Hawaii, it was just a question of the officers digging out the thing the best they could from the pamphlets they had on the subject and instructing the men the best they could, which undoubtedly took more time. It looked like the War Department was more interested in developing radar on the mainland than in Hawaii.

[8197] The Vice Chairman. You think that is a proper reason, then, for you not being more careful about the operation of radar in Hawaii?

General Short. No, sir. I think that is the reason why our radar was still in the experimental stage. If we had been furnished it as early as New York and Seattle, we probably would have had it much better developed.

The Vice Chairman. The fact is a man voluntarily practicing on the radar that you did have found these planes coming in.

General Short. That is correct; but he didn't know what they were. The Vice Chairman. All right.
General Short. As a matter of fact we know that planes were coming in from San Francisco. They came in 5 minutes later. Just a difference in direction of 3 degrees.

The Vice Chairman. What was done about Lieutenant Tyler?

General Short. I did not. I believe, I am quite sure that General Emmons, who succeeded me, did not, because I think he [Lieutenant Tyler] has gone ahead throughout the war and received and been promoted.

The Vice Chairman. What is his present rank?

General Short. I believe he is a lieutenant colonel.

[8198] The Vice Chairman. Been promoted from lieutenant to lieutenant colonel?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. All right.

Now, then, on page 47 of your statement you quote questions and answers there between counsel and General Miles while Miles was a witness before the committee.

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. One of the quotations there is:

Mr. Gesell. What is the explanation of that?

General Miles. The main reason was that the code experts apparently agreed, at least the Navy was particularly strong on the point that their code was much more secure than ours. It was obviously, of course, of great importance in security that a message be sent in only one code and not two and we had every reason to believe, or thought we did, that a Navy message to Hawaii would be promptly transmitted to the Army authorities there.

You quote that part of the testimony.

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Did you and Admiral Kimmel keep each other thoroughly informed as to all information you received?

General Short. I will tell you what the practice was.

[8199] Whenever he received a message that directed the message be transmitted to me or that the Chief of Staff concurred in this message he furnished me with a copy. He did not furnish me with copies of other messages. He frequently, when we were together, told me of some other information but the only thing that I got from the Navy were the messages that he was told to deliver to me.

The Vice Chairman. All you got from Admiral Kimmel were the messages that he was told to deliver to you?

General Short. As far as messages were concerned. As I say, there were times when he picked up items of interest that he told me of.

The Vice Chairman. That was more or less accidental?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. How about the messages received by you, did you promptly inform Admiral Kimmel of what they contained?

General Short. I don't think I received any message that I didn't send to him, because I didn't have more than a half-dozen. I think every message that I got either showed that it was going to him or I sent him a copy.

The Vice Chairman. You feel sure then that you kept him fully informed as to all information received by you through messages but he did not do the same thing to you?
[8200] General Short. Well, I would say there was this difference. I got such a limited number of messages and only the very important messages. I got a message on July 8, on July 25, and on October 20, and November 27, and then one on the 7th, that came after the attack. I think those five were the only messages from July on that I received pertaining to the situation, the international situation, and I am quite sure that they were all furnished to him, to the Navy. They, on the other hand got, I think, much more information and lots of it, apparently, that they didn’t feel I had any interest in or that they assumed I had received.

The Vice Chairman. How about these code messages, about burning the codes, was that conveyed to you?

General Short. That was not.

The Vice Chairman. It was not conveyed to you?

General Short. Not conveyed to me.

The Vice Chairman. The Navy had it?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And did not tell you anything about it?

General Short. No, sir; and there was no direction in those messages that they should.

The Vice Chairman. So unless there was a definite direction in the Navy message to tell you about it, why, you were not told?

[8201] General Short. I think that is absolutely correct.

The Vice Chairman. All right.

Now, General, I would just like to ask you this question, with all deference and proper respect but if the messages sent, that is, if the messages not sent to you from Washington which you think should have been sent had made no more impression than the messages that were sent to you from Washington, what difference do you think it would have made?

General Short. I don’t think that is a correct statement at all. There was never a message received by me that didn’t make an impression. It may not have made the impression on me that you get from it or you think it should have made, but I never received a message from Washington that I didn’t analyze carefully and make up my mind what the message meant.

The Vice Chairman. And you think these messages that were not sent to you from Washington would have been more important to you than those that were sent?

General Short. There were two that could hardly fail. The intercept which was the bombing plan of Pearl Harbor and the message stating that the ultimatum would be delivered at 1 p.m., which could have been sent to me 4 hours before the attack, and reached me 7 hours after the attack. Those two messages would definitely have meant something to me.

The Vice Chairman. Now, on page 53 of your statement, [8202] General, there is this sentence, and I will read it to you:

During the period November 27 to December 6 the Navy made no requests for Army planes to participate in distant reconnaissance.

That is true, is it?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And that also led you to believe that the Navy had sufficient planes and was conducting distant reconnaissance as it should have been?
General Short. As they deemed desirable and necessary.

The Vice Chairman. All right.

On page 54, you state, under the No. 86, "Army-Navy Cooperation," your last sentence in that paragraph:

With a large part of the United States Navy in Hawaiian waters and with their sources of information, I was convinced that the Navy would be able either to intercept any carrier attempting to approach Oahu or at least to obtain such information from task forces or by reconnaissance as to make them aware of the presence of carriers in the Hawaiian waters and the probability of an air attack.

General Short. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. And you have stated several times that you relied upon the Navy entirely in this respect?

General Short. Yes, sir; I had no source of information \[8203\] of my own.

The Vice Chairman. And they never at any time called on you for any assistance so far as reconnaissance was concerned?

General Short. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. Now, General, I believe you stated here, and it also appears rather clearly in your statement, that you did not have any conference with Admiral Kimmel from December 3 to December 7?

General Short. That is correct; no personal conference.

The Vice Chairman. No personal conference.

General Short. The liaison officer, Major Fleming, who did a great deal of my business with the Navy, and Colonel Pfeiffer, who was the gunnery officer of the fleet, had conferences about the equipment for Kanton and Christmas.

The Vice Chairman. And the last conference between the Army and Navy was December 4?

General Short. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. There was no conference between the Army and Navy in Hawaii between December 4 and December 7?

General Short. Well, that would not be true of the ONI and G-2, because the ONI and our contact officer had offices next door to each other, had a teletype system, and on subversive measures particularly they, I think, were usually in touch several times a day on practically all of the subversive activities.

\[8204\] The Vice Chairman. But you didn't have any conference with Admiral Kimmel after December 3?

General Short. No, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And no staff officer or responsible officer with you conferred with the Navy after December 4, you say?

General Short. No, sir. I will say, however, that Lieutenant Burr, the liaison officer, was in the G-3 section, and knew everything that was taking place, I am sure.

The Vice Chairman. I mean December 3. December 3 was the last conference you had?

General Short. That is what I understood you said.

The Vice Chairman. Somebody suggested that I said December 30.

General Short. I understood the 3d.

The Vice Chairman. December 3 was the last conference you had with Admiral Kimmel?
General Short. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. And December 4 was the last conference that your Colonel Pfeifer—

General Short. Major Fleming and Colonel Pfeifer.

The Vice Chairman. Had with the Navy?

General Short. Yes, sir.

[8205] The Vice Chairman. Now, just this question in conclusion, General:

When Admiral Kimmel tells this committee he did not know you had gone on a sabotage alert only, and thought you had gone on full alert, and you tell us you thought the Navy was conducting long-range reconnaissance when they were not, does that look like proper liaison between the Army and Navy?

General Short. I still believe they were conducting long-range reconnaissance. Maybe not all you think they should have, but I am sure they were. As to the other, my only answer to that is that they had a staff man in our operating section who was familiar with everything, had no duty, no function, except to keep the staff of the Fourteenth Naval District informed of what was going on, and I am sure that somebody on that staff was informed.

The Vice Chairman. The point is, General, do you know about it.

General Short. Yes, I have Lieutenant Burr's testimony as to what—

The Vice Chairman. I mean, did you know then it was being done?

General Short. I know that he was sitting there with no other duty, had no other purpose in being there except [8206] to tell them what we were doing, and I knew there was nothing being held out from him.

The Vice Chairman. Who was the Army man to find out for the Army?

General Short. The Army man?

The Vice Chairman. Yes.

General Short. With the Navy?

The Vice Chairman. Yes.

General Short. In the Harbor Patrol we had an officer 8 hours a day, Lieutenant Dingle.

The Vice Chairman. Eight hours of the 24?

General Short. Yes. Major Fleming was in constant touch. He wasn't sitting in the office, but he was in direct touch with them, and got a great deal of information.

I think that they had a great deal of confidence in him. That was one.

The Vice Chairman. He was the equivalent of Lieutenant Burr?

General Short. No; because Lieutenant Burr—

The Vice Chairman. Who was the Army equivalent of Lieutenant Burr?

General Short. We did not have, except at the Harbor Patrol Post, any man who sat in—

The Vice Chairman. You did not have any Army man who [8207] was the equivalent or opposite of Lieutenant Burr?

General Short. We did not.

The Vice Chairman. All right. Now then, was there anything that could have been more important than the very things that you and the Navy did not know about with respect to each other?
General Short. I think that I knew in regard to their reconnaissance really practically all that I could be expected to know; that they were using their combination of ships, submarines, and planes, to reconnoiter the waters that they considered most dangerous. They were the ones to make the decision.

Now, as to what they didn't know about my operations, I think it must have been faulty staff work, because they should have known. At least one Navy man was fully informed. Lieutenant Burr unquestionably knew. And, as I say, it was his sole function, sole duty, to get it to them. Now, I don't know inside their staff how they operated.

The Vice Chairman. How about inside your staff, General. You didn't have any opposite to Lieutenant Burr?

General Short. I did not have any opposite to Lieutenant Burr but I did have, as I say, Major Fleming who operated at irregular intervals, and I did too; and I had conferences at that particular period, frequent enough that I think anything of importance would have been given to me personally.

[3205] The Vice Chairman. Well, you know now that the Navy was not conducting long-range reconnaissance in the direction from which the Japanese attack came?

General Short. I grant you that.

The Vice Chairman. But you didn't know back at that time it was not being done, did you?

General Short. No; and I don't know any more than the Navy knew that that was the direction they were coming. They had made the decision. I don't know whether it was on account of weather conditions that that was thought the most dangerous direction.

The Vice Chairman. You didn't know at that time that that decision had been made?

General Short. No, sir.

The Vice Chairman. All right. Thank you.

The Chairman. Senator George.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, before Senator George proceeds I would like to make one request, in the interest, I hope, of expediting. I have made a request for the documents from the War and Navy Departments with particular reference to the Judge Advocate General reports on discussions in connection with the Roberts Commission.1 I have a very full memorandum from the office of our counsel enclosing five items from the War Department, who, apparently, gave a considerably broader construction to my request than the Navy did.

It seems to me that they are documents of very considerable importance in connection with the historical record dealing with the contemplated action of The Adjutant General as recommended to them. I don't know whether this has ever come to the attention of General Short or not.

Have you ever seen the possible charges that were contemplated in connection with your case?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. How long since you have had those?

General Short. I think in the last 2 or 3 days.

Senator Brewster. Well, I would like to request that these, there are five items, be made an exhibit in this case, in order that they may

1 See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5495 et seq.
be formally a part of the record, and then at any appropriate time General Short may make any comment that he desires regarding some of the comments, some of which are favorable, some of which are un-
favorable.

[8210] The CHAIRMAN. Does the Chair understand the Senator to want to make as an exhibit here some informal memoranda in the War Department upon which charges might have been based but were not?

Senator Brewster. Well, I would not call it informal. It is a formal report of the Judge Advocate General discussing the whole case at length and giving a very comprehensive review of it, analyzing all of it, and it seems to me that this will inevitably in the future be a thing that will be one of the things that will be considered and it seemed to me that it ought properly to be a part of our record. If there is some question about it I would be glad to defer it for discussion.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, my only question was your request is to put it all in as an exhibit?

Senator Brewster. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Well, I was not clear on that. You said there were four or five things.

Senator Brewster. Four or five items which are submitted here, which have been submitted.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. But you are not desiring to pick out part of it?

Senator Brewster. Oh, no.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You want to put it all in?

[8211] Senator Brewster. That is right, including the letter from the War Department transmitting it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. As an exhibit?

Senator Brewster. That is right.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. I just wanted to be clear.

Mr. Murphy. May I ask the Senator how long that material that he has there has been available?

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel has a suggestion.

Mr. Richardson. Well, with reference to the situation as to the Navy, I will get the representative of the Navy to make a search to see whether the Adjutant General's office participated to any extent whatever—

Senator Brewster. The Judge Advocate.

Mr. Richardson. The Judge Advocate's office participated to any extent whatever in relation to the Roberts report or a report on the Roberts report and investigation and he says that he will make a further investigation and report to me. When I get that I will turn it over to Senator Brewster.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire how long this material that is now being made an exhibit has been available?

Senator Brewster. I should say perhaps 50 pages.

Mr. Murphy. No, I am asking how long it has been available to the committee.

Senator Brewster. I have seen it about 10 minutes. I [8212] received it about 10 minutes ago.

Mr. Murphy. No other member of the committee has seen it or knows what is in it.
The Chairman. Well, the Chair suggests that the Senator withhold his request until other members have had a chance to look at it. I don't know that there will be any objection to it.

Senator Brewster. That is quite all right. I just brought up the point to be sure that General Short had ample opportunity to examine it before he was cross-examined on it, because naturally you could not give this to him and expect that he would make any comment within a short time, that is all I had in mind. Perhaps it can be adjusted this afternoon.

The Chairman. It would be obviously impossible, if no member of the committee ever has seen it, to examine it.

Senator Brewster. As an exhibit, I assume it will be available to everybody, but I have no desire to press the request, Mr. Chairman, immediately.

The Chairman. All right, we will pass on it later.

General Short. Mr. Chairman, may I make a statement at this point?

The Chairman. Yes, sir.

General Short. If that is material, if this material is being put in it seems to me appropriate that the letters preceding this and which caused the Judge Advocate General to prepare the opinion he did be put in.

Senator Brewster. I would think so; I agree with you and that is what I expected. I am not certain whether all of the correspondence is included here or not but I would certainly say that it should be.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, does the General have that correspondence?

General Short. I have it, I think.

Senator Ferguson. Could we see it?

General Short. I will state that there is one item of the correspondence that I have not been able to get from the official files. I asked Colonel Duncombe for it and it has not yet been located. It was a personal letter to the Chief of Staff forwarding an application to the Adjutant General, and I have a copy of that letter that I can put in.

Senator Brewster. What was the date of that?

General Short. That was January 25.

Senator Brewster. 26th?

General Short. 25th, a personal letter from me to the Chief of Staff and I have not been provided with that official letter by the War Department but I do have a copy of it.

The Vice Chairman. The year, General?


Senator Ferguson. Might we see what you have then?

Senator Brewster. Well, I have here a letter of January 25, 1942, from Oklahoma City, Okla. “Subject: Time.” Is that the letter?

General Short. That probably is it. May I see it?

Senator Brewster. Yes.

General Short. That probably is it. That to which I am referring is one that I did not succeed in getting. No, sir; this is the letter that I enclosed with the personal letter.

Senator Brewster. All right.

The Chairman. Well, any additional documents or letters that might be well made a part of the exhibit should be passed upon when the committee passes on the exhibit later on.
General Short. Shall these just be turned in or read?

The Chairman. Well, I think probably you might turn them in, General. It will be acted upon when the other matter is reached.

The Vice Chairman. Just as a suggestion, Senator, why don't you turn the thing over to Mr. Masten and let him get it all together and bring it to our attention this afternoon and then we will know what you want to offer?

Senator Brewster. That is precisely what I was going to [8215] suggest. I think that would be the orderly way to handle it and make sure that General Short's counsel can cover the case as completely as they wish.

The Chairman. All right. Senator George.

Senator George. General Short, I have not heard all of your direct testimony and very little, practically none, of the cross examination by counsel and at this time, at least, I wish to ask you about only one matter.

I believe it is agreed, so far as your direct statement goes, that the function of the Navy under the joint agreement approved March the 28th by Admiral Bloch and yourself was to provide distant reconnaissance.

General Short. That is correct.

Senator George. Or deep reconnaissance.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator George. Was there ever any dispute about the function of the Navy?

General Short. Never. I am sure that they agreed fully. I think Admiral Kimmel's testimony stated specifically that it was his responsibility.

Senator George. That was my recollection but I wish to know if there was any dispute or doubt about it. General Marshall also seems to have agreed that distant reconnaissance was a naval function and the Army commander was liable to [8216] furnish them such planes suitable for that purpose as could be provided.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator George. In his examination before the Army board General Marshall made this direct statement also:

As I recall the matter, the only way the Army would have been involved in the deep reconnaissance would have been in detaching units to serve in the Navy.

General Short. That is correct.

Senator George. You say you only had actually about six planes that were suitable for this type of service or kind of service?

General Short. That is correct. I had 12 B-17's but 6 of them had been stripped of parts to keep the planes going to the Philippines going, so we had only 6 that could operate.

Senator George. Only six?

General Short. Yes.

Senator George. Admiral Kimmel was aware of that condition with respect to these planes?

General Short. We had an arrangement whereby every day General Martin, commanding the Hawaiian Air Force, and Admiral Bellinger exchanged information as to what planes were actually in condition to operate that day, and I think they [8217] knew every day the exact number.
Senator George. Now, General, I wish to ask you, because I am not able to quite interpret it, in view of the fact that it was the function of the Navy to provide at least distant reconnaissance, and that fact was known to General Marshall, because he has testified to it not only in this but in prior hearings, what did he mean precisely by his message of November 27, which probably was not received by you until the 28th or maybe later—

The Vice Chairman. No; he said he received it the same day.

Senator George. Later on the 27th. According to General Marshall's testimony, as I recollect it, it was reported to have left very late on the day of the 27th, but that is immaterial.

What did he mean by this statement to you, this direct directive:

You are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.

What did he mean by "such reconnaissance" in that message?

General Short. I think that got into that message due to the fact that General Marshall did not write the message. He had approved the arrangement with the Navy, and I am sure that if he had personally written the message or had seen it [8278] before it went out that he would have known that it was the Navy function. I think that is the complete answer as to why that expression was used in there.

Senator George. Well, were you charged with the duty or responsibility of carrying on any type or kind of reconnaissance?

General Short. We were supposed to carry reconnaissance up to 20 miles from the shore. We actually, on account of the planes that we were using, usually sent them not beyond 10 miles, and it depended on the visual ability of the pilot for the other 10. The only value that that had was in connection with submarines because the time element was such that if they had seen an enemy plane it would have been in there before they could have made a report.

Senator George. It would have been of no service so far as it contemplated—

General Short. So far as an air attack went; no, sir.

Senator George. So far as an air attack went. General, now I would like to ask you this direct question: It just troubles me very greatly.

General Marshall, with the knowledge that you were not charged with the responsibility of carrying on any distant reconnaissance, or deep reconnaissance, nevertheless directed you to undertake "such reconnaissance and other measures as [8219] you deem necessary." Your immediate reply to that message was that you had alerted against sabotage as you have described.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator George. There is nothing in the suggestion "and undertake such reconnaissance," is there, that would bring to your mind the suggestion, rather, that you should simply alert against sabotage? In other words, isn't it inconsistent with the response which you immediately made that you had alerted against sabotage when his direction to you was to take some type of reconnaissance?

General Short. Such as I deemed necessary and in view of the fact that it was the Navy's responsibility, fully admitted by them, approved by the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations and with a definite provision in that agreement that that would only be abrogated
upon written notice, so it was my best judgment that there was not any reconnaissance necessary for me to take.

Senator George. Well, I could understand that but what I do not understand is how you could have consistently interpreted this directive here to you to mean an alert against sabotage when the use of the word “reconnaissance” here certainly would indicate something beyond an alert against sabotage as I understand it. I am a mere layman and trying to understand that situation as it actually existed.

General Short. Since I was not—since the Army was not taking any reconnaissance I did not report it because it was a naval function, they were the ones that would make a reconnaissance.

Senator George. I think that seems to be rather clear, yet General Marshall did approve this message that went to you and in it he refers to “reconnaissance.”

General Short. As I understand it he did not see that message till the day after it was sent. His name was signed to it. While his name was signed to it it was prepared by General Gerow and the Secretary of War.

Senator George. General, I do not recall the exact testimony of General Marshall but my recollection was that he did say that he had approved the message although he was absent from Washington until late in the day that the message was dated, down in North Carolina on some sort of inspection trip.

The Vice Chairman. He said he went over it on the 26th.

Senator George. Yes, but I think it is clear that the function of the Navy was to provide any distant reconnaissance that might become necessary or that might be ordered and I think it is clear that General Marshall himself knew of that understanding and that agreement and I am just curious to know why he should have directed you to take such reconnaissance as you thought necessary under those circumstances?

General Short. Well, I believe he read that message; he said that he thought he saw the message on the 28th after he returned from maneuvers and apparently, if it struck him at all, he did not think it was significant enough to send me a message correcting it because he did not know it before it was sent.

Senator George. There is no dispute here in this record that you did advise precisely what you had done.

General Short. Just exactly.

Senator George. And that that was in response to a request in that message.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator George. And that thereafter you had no advice that your alert against sabotage was insufficient or inadequate.

General Short. That is correct.

Senator George. You had known of the warning messages—code messages about destruction of codes or important paper messages sent to you prior to the attack?

General Short. That is correct.

Senator George. Mr. Chairman, that is all that I have to ask General Short, at least at this time.

The Chairman. Congressman Clark.
Mr. CLARK. General, I wish to ask you only a very few questions.

At or about the time you took command at Pearl Harbor it was suggested, I think, by General Marshall that the chief danger to our establishment at Hawaii was an attack by air. Did you agree with that?

General SHORT. I think that I took his suggestion that if an attack came—I stated that there were three things that were of primary importance that would cause the danger and the first thing he mentioned was sabotage; the second was attack by air or submarine.

Mr. CLARK. Well, I have the impression from this record that he listed attack by air as the chief danger.

General SHORT. May I read exactly what he said in that letter? In the next to the last paragraph he states:

Risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air or by submarine constitute the real perils of the situation.

Mr. CLARK. And he goes on to eliminate much danger from a landing attack.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. Now, you agreed with that estimate?

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. And subsequent events proved it to be correct.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

Mr. CLARK. You did not on or about the 7th of December anticipate any surprise attack by air, did you?

General SHORT. I did not.

Mr. CLARK. You had something to say in your statement about requests made for additional equipment. Do you think that the combined equipment and manpower of the Army and Navy as it existed on the 7th of December was sufficient to have discovered and broken up or greatly lessened the damage if it had been fully employed?

General SHORT. That is very difficult to say, whether we would necessarily have discovered the carriers. If we had been told 4 hours, which was possible, before the attack of the time set for the delivery of the ultimatum we might have been lucky and picked up the carriers.

Mr. CLARK. Well, I don't think you quite get my question, General, if you will pardon me. I am asking you whether from, say, the 27th of November until the 7th of December if full use had been made of all the equipment and manpower available under the joint agreement between the Army and Navy, do you think that the attack might have been discovered or broken up or its effect greatly lessened with just what you had?

General SHORT. I think to have made the maximum use of that and felt justified in making the maximum use of it we would have had to have something pointing to Hawaii. Admiral Kimmel had orders to make a deployment preparatory to placing War Plan 46 into operation, which was an offensive against the Mandate Islands.

Now, if we had had something that indicated an attack at Pearl Harbor he undoubtedly would have discarded that part and would have devoted everything he had toward the reconnaissance. He apparently did not feel that he could use up all of his planes and maybe
having nothing at the critical time when he got an order to take an
offensive action in the Carolines. I think a more positive indication
as to an attack on Hawaii would have made him use the types of planes
that he had very definitely for reconnaissance and would have given
a suitable opportunity of locating the Japanese carriers.

Mr. Clark. Well, did I understand you to consider the use of the
ships in the manner that they were used as constituting a deployment?

General Short. Undoubtedly he was using his ships—I don’t know
just exactly in what way, but he was told to use them as a defensive
deployment preparatory to going forward.

Mr. Clark. There were some ships out, that he had sent to these
islands, one of which was on the way back in.


Mr. Clark. And if I have your testimony correctly you have pre-
presented that here as constituting a deployment to that extent in that
area.

General Short. No; I presented that as constituting a reconna-
sance.

Mr. Clark. Well, I meant reconnaissance when I said deployment.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. Now, with those particular ships aside was there not
sufficient equipment still on the island to have conducted a considerable
reconnaissance?

General Short. A considerable reconnaissance but not 360°, and it
still would have been a matter of his judgment as to what was the
dangerous sector of that 360°.

Mr. Clark. But the fact that you could not cover the entire 360°
would not constitute any reason, would it, for not employing that
equipment to the full extent possible?

General Short. No, sir. I think probably what influenced him in
that was that he felt his job was going to be to take offensive action,
that he did not want to get his planes and his crews into such shape
that they would not be able to take that when they got the order.

Mr. Clark. Now, you think that was the reason, or was it
[8226] the reason, really, that he was not dreaming of a surprise
attack on Pearl Harbor.

General Short. He did not expect a surprise attack on Pearl
Harbor.

Mr. Clark. And neither did you.

General Short. Neither did I.

Mr. Clark. And, consequently, this material and equipment and
men were not used at the site where there might be a surprise attack,
isn’t that correct?

General Short. I believe that Admiral Kimmel is a more logical
person to ask as to why he did not employ his ships and planes.

Mr. Clark. Yes.

General Short. But I feel that unquestionably that the fact that
we had had nothing pointing to an attack on Hawaii very definitely
entered into his use of his ships and planes.

Mr. Clark. Just why did you go into an antisabotage?

General Short. Because there never had been at any time anything
since June 1940 indicating that the War Department believed that
an attack on Hawaii was probable, so that left it if hostilities oc-
curred and did not include an attack, then it left nothing but sabo-
tage and internal disorders.

[8227] Mr. Clark. Would you mind stating what difference in routine or daily action you invoked upon going on an antisabotage alert?

General Short. When you went into an antisabotage alert, the men who were placed as guards over all the vital installations like bridges, telephone exchanges, gasoline tanks, everything of that kind, naturally were not continuing in their training, in instruction.

There were also two battalions that remained on a 24-hour alert, with every man required to be present, with the motor transportation there so that they could be moved to any part of the island to put down any possible uprising or disorder.

All of the rest of the men in the Department continued their training.

Now, that was sabotage alert No. 1. When you went to No. 2 you had this same provision against sabotage, but in addition to that you had arrangements to meet a surface, or subsurface, or an air attack. That meant every plane and every man in the Air Corps was devoting his attention to being ready to meet an air attack. You would probably have a squadron of pursuit planes in the air all the time. You would have certain other squadrons warmed up, and they would all be so alerted that they could get in the air [8228] in a certain number of minutes. The planes that would not be in the air would be in the bunkers. The men belonging to the crew would be in the bunkers, would sleep in the bunkers. They had their gasoline there, had ammunition there.

The harbor defense troops would be fully manned, ready to fire upon any approaching Japanese ships. The antiaircraft guns would be all at the prescribed positions and with full crews and ammunition immediately at hand and ready to fire.

I would like to explain, if I may at this point, that some may have gotten the wrong idea yesterday in presenting that table signed by Colonel Wing. A considerable number of those batteries had to move maybe 20 miles, so that accounted for the length of time from the time they were alerted until they were ready to fire.

That is not part of your question, but I wanted to point that out because that naturally came in with alert No. 1.

Now, you see, in that case the only people who could continue to train would be the infantry divisions. Everything else practically would be alerted.

The infantry divisions could go ahead with their training, because they are not part of alert No. 2.

[8229] When you come to alert No. 3, that is an all-out alert, where every man goes to his battle position, every company and pla-
toon, battalion, of infantry go to their positions, take up their posi-
tions, ready to meet an attack, and if their positions have not been developed and improved they would start continuing the develop-
ment, doing more digging, if they need to, putting out barbed wire in front of them, doing everything to meet a landing attack.

Does that answer your question?

Mr. Clark. Yes, sir.

Getting back to the alert you did take, the antisabotage alert, about the only difference there as against what you were doing before would
be to put these particular men on a 24-hour basis rather than regular hours?

General Short. I would like to explain that rather fully.

Mr. Clark. I would like to get clear as to just what difference it made.

General Short. Between that and ordinary times?

Mr. Clark. That is right.

General Short. If there had been no alarming condition we would not have had any of those men out over bridges and civilian installations and things of that kind. If [8230] it was just normal peacetimes, I would not have any of that on.

Now, as a matter of fact, beginning July 8, the situation was such that we put considerable number of men out.

When we got this message of November 27, I had the sentinels checked. That was especially true along the water front because we had a very serious situation, that all the gasoline that was available commercially in Hawaii, which meant a great amount, was open to easy sabotage.

I had General Murray, who commanded the Twenty-first Division, occupy the positions on the south side of the island, and Colonel Fielder, who was the G-2, personally go over the whole situation with respect to sentinels, to recommend changes, and we made a very decided overhaul, and put on a great many additional sentinels. We did a most thorough job, and particularly around the water front where there was danger from fire from gasoline, and so forth.

Mr. Clark. But that was all precautions against what might take place by people located on the island.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. It did not make any great change in that situation?

General Short. Well, it required a considerable number [8231] of more men. There were more men who were not able to go on with their training. We felt it made a very considerable change in that we were much safer as far as any internal action went than we were before, because we spent the whole time in going into that extremely carefully.

Mr. Clark. That was the extent of the action that you, as the commanding officer, felt that you could take in response to the message you received on the 27th?

General Short. With the information I had that was all the enemy action I anticipated, or expected.

Mr. Clark. Just what was there in this message that caused you to feel there might be more danger of injury from people on the island?

General Short. I thought there was more danger of imminent action.

Mr. Clark. Beg pardon?

General Short. I thought there was great danger of imminent hostilities. Since they had never at any time pointed toward Hawaii as a place of attack, and the officers who wrote their estimate on November 29 said they definitely eliminated it, as I saw the thing, our problem was to meet internal disorders.

Mr. Clark. Could you give the committee an illustration of any internal disorder, you had had before [8232] that?

General Short. I had tried to state that we had tightened the ring so that there would not be any. We had succeeded; there never was.
Mr. Clark. From the time you got there until the 7th of December, there was no internal disorder?

General Short. No, sir; but there had been for almost 2 years a considerable number of sentinels on duty watching. There had hardly been a time in 2 years that they had not had considerable guards out against sabotage.

Mr. Clark. Had there been any sabotage?

General Short. No sir; but that is no indication that there would not be. We all knew the possibilities, with the large Japanese population, and I think most of us remembered the sabotage that had taken place in the United States in 1917, and we were determined to prevent that, if possible.

Mr. Clark. Now, although there had been no sabotage, the only action you took pursuant to this message was to further guard against it?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Clark. Now, if you had gone on an all-out alert, according to your testimony, as I got it, it would have [8233] attracted a great deal of attention on the island?

General Short. Unquestionably. We would have troops move under full field equipment over practically every road on the island.

Mr. Clark. Practically everybody on the island would have known what was taking place?

General Short. I think they would. I think we had hundreds of Japanese-Americans actually in the service at that time, in the National Guard regiments. Some of those may have been Japanese agents. We didn’t know.

Mr. Clark. Now, was there anything to keep Admiral Kimmel from noticing that you were not on that kind of an alert?

General Short. I think if he had been ashore, he would have noticed it, if we had gone on the all-out alert, because he could not have helped seeing the movement of troops.

Mr. Clark. But he was ashore, wasn’t he?

General Short. From his headquarters at Pearl Harbor, I do not know that he could see any traffic.

Mr. Clark. Well, you mean to tell the committee everybody on the island would have known you were on an all-out alert, except Admiral Kimmel?

General Short. Undoubtedly some of the Navy people [8234] would have known.

Mr. Clark. He says he did not know that you were not on an all-out alert.

General Short. I still insist it was faulty staff work on the part of the Fourteenth Naval District if he did not know.

Mr. Clark. And you did not know that he was making a long-distance reconnaissance?

General Short. I knew he was making considerable long-distance reconnaissance. I did not know the exact time the planes were going out, or the exact location of the ships, but I knew he was making considerable long-distance reconnaissance. He told me he had tightened up all along the line. That was the expression he used.

Mr. Clark. Did you consider that important, General?

General Short. I did.
Mr. Clark. You knew he had not called on you for the use of the long-distance reconnaissance planes under your control?

General Short. Yes, sir, and there might have been a very good reason. In the first place, I had only six, and those six planes were the only planes in Honolulu, either Army or Navy, that could go and bomb a carrier that had plane protection, and had any chance to get away [8235] with it, that could fight as well as carry bombs. The Navy patrol planes were too cumbersome. If the carrier were protected with planes in the air in the vicinity they probably would be shot down if they tried to bomb.

The B-17’s were the only planes in the whole islands suitable for bombing missions. That might have been his reason for not calling on them for a patrol mission, because if they located a carrier, and he wanted to bomb, they were the only planes that could fight their way through and have a reasonable chance of getting home.

Mr. Clark. At any rate, you knew he did not call on you?

General Short. He did not call on me.

Mr. Clark. You knew he was hard pressed for planes with which to make long-distance reconnaissance?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Clark. And even with the Army planes, he did not have enough to cover the whole 360°, you say?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Clark. Because of that circumstance, did it occur to you to inquire particularly as to whether this reconnaissance could be made?

General Short. Well, as I say, I knew that a considerable reconnaissance was being made.

[8236] Mr. Clark. I am asking you whether or not the fact he did not call for your reconnaissance planes, did not raise the question in your mind as to whether it was being made to the fullest extent possible with the equipment available?

General Short. As I said, I had so few—six—and they were so much the best planes for a bombing mission, if such mission became necessary, that I think it would have been very sound judgment for him not to use those as long as he could avoid it, because they were the ones he would want to drive home the bombing attack.

Mr. Clark. The fact he did not call on those planes did not raise that particular question in your mind?

General Short. No, sir.

If he had felt the need of them badly probably his air men would have asked for every one of my air men, as to whether to send them out or hold them for a bombing mission.

Mr. Clark. I think Mr. Cooper has already touched on what is in my mind, therefore I will not take the liberty of repeating the question.

Was there anything more important to the proper protection of this establishment in Hawaii than the state of alert the Army was on at the time the long distance reconnaissance would be conducted?

General Short. Certainly the reconnaissance was perfectly important. The state of alert was undoubtedly limited, if I carried out specifically the last sentence in my order, which said:

Disseminate this vitally secret information to the minimum essential officers.
Now, it did not say "officers and men."

The minute you ordered either alert No. 2 or alert No. 3 you had to
tell every enlisted man that was put in position why he was there,
and what he was to shoot at.

Mr. Clark. Yes; I understand your position about that because
I listened to your testimony. But may it not be that the information
not to be given out, that was limited to the officers, was the general
information? That does not refer exclusively to the alert. It does
not say "alert."

General Short. The only information it gave was general infor-
mation that there was a big chance of hostilities with Japan.

Mr. Clark. Your position was that you could not have gone on an
all out-alert without having gone contrary to this message of the
27th?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Clark. Did it occur to you, if that was your [8238]
opinion, that you might ask for a clarification on that?

General Short. I thought that the War Department should under-
stand perfectly. They told me to report measures taken. They knew
exactly what I was doing. They had 9 days in which to tell me I
was wrong, that I should do something more or something less, and
they took no action whatever.

Mr. Clark. In that 9 days, did it occur to you that you might ask
them to clarify this apparent contradiction in the message?

General Short. I did not think so because it struck me the things
that they were primarily interested in were, first, avoiding war; sec-
ond, avoiding any possible international incident that would give
Japan an excuse for going to war, or for using propaganda that we
had started the war.

[8239] Mr. Clark. And notwithstanding the fact that that
message, I think you said, was not to jeopardize the safety of the
establishment down there?

General Short. That was in regard to the first overt act. They did
not say that in regard to the dissemination of information.

Mr. Clark. What I was asking you about was the comparative im-
portance of the kind of alert you were on and the long-distance re-
connaissance that was not being made. Was there anything there more
important than that, in your judgment?

General Short. The long-distance reconnaissance, if it obtained
positive information I could have changed my type of alert in a very
few minutes. I actually had completed the change in 7 minutes when
the attack took place. Our plans were so drawn that everybody
understood them to the last man. We had moved into position with
those plans so the time required, if we got any information from
Washington or from the Navy that indicated an attack on Hawaii, it
was simply a question of minutes in going into the correct alert.

Mr. Clark. In view of the fact that you did not know that the
Navy was conducting long-distance reconnaissance, or whether it was
conducting a long-distance reconnaissance, and in view of Admiral
Kimmel's testimony that he did not know you had not gone on an
all-out alert, just what did you [8240] mean in the reply to
the message of the 27th by saying, "Liaison with the Navy"?
General Short. That I was keeping in touch with the Navy, and I thought I knew what they were doing. I still think I knew. Not in exact detail, but I knew generally what they were doing. Frankly, it had not occurred to me that he did not know the type of alert we were on.

Mr. Clark. But in view of the fact that you did not know precisely what the Navy was doing about long-distance reconnaissance, and that Admiral Kimmel did not know you had not gone on an all-out alert, do you think your statement to the War Department "Liaison with the Navy" would have been justified?

General Short. When I made that statement I had no reason to believe he would not know exactly what my alert was, because, as I say, he had an officer there who knew exactly what we were doing, who had no other function except to report it, and I knew from a 3-hour conference that morning exactly what he was doing in the way of reconnaissance. Not in detail, but I mean the general picture. I thought he was covering from east of Midway around west and south to Palmyra.

Mr. Clark. General Short. I do not know whether it might be an argument for or against unity of command, or anything of that sort, but as a member of this committee I am rather seriously impressed by the fact that you, as the commander in chief of the Army, and Admiral Kimmel, as the commander in chief of the Navy, in fact did not know what the other was doing about some very vital matters on Pearl Harbor.

If you can clarify my mind any further in that respect I would appreciate it.

General Short. I would like to answer that rather fully.

Command by cooperation necessarily depends, to a considerable extent, on the personality of the two commanders. I believe if Admiral Kimmel and I had full information from Washington that our relations were such that we could have made cooperation work. However, I will state, on general principles, in the average situation, that I believe unity of command is a much stronger, much safer proposition.

Does that answer your question?

Mr. Clark. Yes, sir; except I do not quite see the unity in actual operation at Hawaii.

General Short. Unity of command did not exist in Hawaii until after the attack.

Mr. Clark. Even in view of the contract that was executed between the Army and the Navy?

General Short. There was only one place where we had provision for unity of command and that was when planes were turned over by the Army to the Navy or by the Navy to the Army. That was the only unity of command that was provided. There was no other unity of command. That was cooperation.

Mr. Clark. Just one thing further I would like to ask you. Why did you not operate the radar for longer hours than from 4 to 7?

General Short. Well, there were three reasons. In the first place, the information I had did not cause me to expect an air attack. I really did not expect it, but I decided to operate during the most dangerous hours anyway.
We had a very limited number of trained men. When you operated the information center and the interceptor command you needed your best crew on, because there was no use wasting the time of the people at the information center by putting men on the radar who did not know how to operate it. We needed time during the day for training purposes.

In the third place, we had no spare parts except what we took from the permanent sets that were not in use. If we operated 24 hours a day there was a very considerable chance that by the end of a few days we would not have more than one or two stations that would be capable of operating.

Mr. Clark. I want to say before I desist entirely, sir, that I have great respect for you and your honorable record as an officer in the Army. I have some sympathy for you for having gotten into a situation of the kind you encountered at Pearl Harbor. It has been a hard experience for you, sir, and I appreciate the very clear statement you have made to the committee.

General Short. I thank you very much. I tried to be perfectly frank with the committee, and I hope I have succeeded.

The Vice Chairman. The committee at this point will recess until 2 o'clock, at which time Senator Lucas, of Illinois, will inquire, General.

(Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the committee recessed until 2 p.m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION—2:00 P.M.

The Vice Chairman. The committee will be in order. Does counsel have anything at this point?

Mr. Kaufman. No, sir.

The Vice Chairman. General, do you have anything before your examination is resumed?

General Short. No, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas, of Illinois, will inquire, General.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER C. SHORT, UNITED STATES ARMY (RETIRED)—Resumed

Senator Lucas. General Short, I have listened with a great deal of attention to the memorandum that you furnished the committee in which you set forth your views concerning this Pearl Harbor disaster. The language that you use in paragraph 98 of your statement expresses in rather terse and forceful terms your views, and I just want to ask you one question on that. [Reading:]

Unjust War Department Treatment: I do not feel that I have been treated fairly or with justice by the War Department. I was singled out as an example, as the scapegoat for the disaster.

Following that statement I should like to ask you whether or not you bear any ill will against the former President of the United States, Mr. Roosevelt, as a result of your retirement in December 1941?

General Short. I do not.
Senator Lucas. General Short, I desire to call your attention to the November 27 message and even though there may be some repetition there I believe that I should like to ask you a question or two in order to satisfy my own mind.

That message was sent by General Marshall on November the 27th and in that message General Marshall states, among other things, that you are to "undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary."

Now, you have been examined with much care upon that one line in the message. I should like to ask you what you understand that "deep reconnaissance" means?

General Short. Exactly the same thing as distant reconnaissance. It would be reconnaissance—I would say according to the Martin study it should go to the extent of a thousand and fifty miles. That is what the Martin study determined should be made to be safe.

Senator Lucas. Now, did you have any planes at your command at that time which would carry out a distance reconnaissance?

General Short. I had six planes.

Senator Lucas. And as I understand it the Navy had 39 planes.

General Short. I believe it was 49. I am not positive.

Senator Lucas. I think you are correct. At least the Navy had the bulk of the planes to carry out any long distance reconnaissance?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. And, of course, as we know, through the joint agreement it was the duty of the Navy to carry out any reconnaissance under any orders that you as commander or Admiral Kimmel as commander of the fleet might have received?

General Short. That is correct.

Senator Lucas. When you received this message did this statement asking you to undertake such reconnaissance signify anything of unusual importance with respect to our danger from Japan?

General Short. It would simply indicate to me that while they had not pointed in any way toward us that they wanted to be a little surer than they would normally be that the Japs were not sending anything in there.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I have that answer read?

General Short. It was maybe poorly put in.

Senator Lucas. Will you read the answer, Mr. Reporter, please?

(The answer was read by the reporter.)

Senator Lucas. Do you want to clarify that answer in any way, General?

General Short. Is that clear to you?

Senator Lucas. It is clear to me.

Senator Ferguson. I do not know as I understand what you mean by "a little clearer."

General Short. Did I say "a little clearer"?

Senator Ferguson. Or "a little surer."

General Short. A little surer.

Senator Ferguson. What do you mean by "a little surer"?

General Short. They were just inclined to take a few more precautions than they would normally take because they felt that hostilities were imminent.
Senator Lucas. Well, isn't it a fact, General, that when General Herron was there in 1940 long-range reconnaissance was held for some weeks?

General Short. It was held, I think, from June 17 through July 16 and then the sabotage part of the alert was continued on for probably another month.

Senator Lucas. And in that long-range reconnaissance, as I recall, the evidence discloses that both the Army and the Navy participated in that operation but it was under the jurisdiction of the Navy.

General Short. At that time there was not a written agreement putting the responsibility upon the Navy. Actually, through a personal agreement at the time they did it the same way but it had not been laid down in written form and had the approval of the War and the Navy Departments.

Senator Lucas. In the summer of 1940 is the only time that any long-range reconnaissance was ever carried on?

General Short. I could not be sure of that. It may be that Admiral Kimmel, when he got a message like the one of October 16, he carried on some. He was carrying on some habitually on the perimeter, which was over a thousand miles out from Oahu. He was sending planes from Johnston Island to Wake Island to Midway, which was well—and part of it well over a thousand miles, so he was conducting habitually some long-range reconnaissance.

Senator Lucas. Is there any difference in what a patrol plane can do and what a long-range reconnaissance plane does?

General Short. I would say exactly the same thing.

Senator Lucas. The same thing?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Did you understand that Admiral Kimmel if he were carrying out long-range reconnaissance was doing that as a result of this message or had he been doing that before?

[8249] General Short. Well, he had been doing some before. I think from what he told me that he had tightened up all along the line and that he was doing more.

Senator Lucas. Then this word or, rather, this statement, as I understand it, given to you by General Marshall in his message of November the 27th, did not mean very much to you?

General Short. There was one thing that I was responsible for but it was not of much value, and that was the in-shore reconnaissance that went out only 20 miles and was really of value only against submarines. As far as an air attack, it was absolutely valueless. That was our responsibility and we did that in two ways: We had one reconnaissance squadron that did nothing but train in reconnaissance and fly around the perimeter of Oahu and then all of our fighters that were training over the island of Oahu normally were taught reconnaissance at the same time.

Senator Lucas. Did you ever at any time before receive a message signed by General Marshall while you were in command of Hawaii?

General Short. I believe that is the only message. I received a good many letters but I believe that was the only message. I am not sure about that.

Senator Lucas. Well, this is a command message, is it not?

General Short. Yes, sir.
[8250] Senator Lucas. And there is a distinct difference in Army circles and Navy circles between a command message and one that is merely sent for information?

General Short. Yes; but a command message may be sent by the adjutant general as well as the chief of staff, either one.

Senator Lucas. Did the fact that General Marshall was sending you, for the first time in your career as commander of the Hawaiian Department, a message, make any unusual impression upon you as to the danger that might exist?

General Short. I, practically, got from that message that they considered hostilities imminent and that they were particularly anxious to avoid war, if it was possible to do so, and that they did not want any international incident in Hawaii that would either provoke Japan or enable her to say that we were starting the war. I think probably if I thought about the fact that it was signed by Marshall I might have thought that that was his personal angle on the thing, to be sure we were careful to not produce a state of war, not producing the effect that we had started the war.

Senator Lucas. The mere fact that General Marshall, who was chief of staff of the Army at that time, had his hands in the fire in many different places throughout the world, and of course you knew that it would take time and effort to send you a message of this kind, seems to me it should have probably fired your imagination immediately on the dangers existing.

General Short. Well, that indicated at least his specific interest, and I thought from the message that his first interest of all was to be sure that we were doing nothing to precipitate a war; that it looked like hostilities were imminent and what he was particularly cautioning us against—and I took it it was possibly a very personal desire of his—that we do nothing to precipitate a war.

Senator Lucas. General Short, what time did you receive this message of November 27?

General Short. I think it was sometime after 2 o'clock. I am not sure of the exact time.

Senator Lucas. In the afternoon?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. And where were you at the time when the message came?

General Short. I was in my office, in my headquarters.

Senator Lucas. As I understand the record, you replied to General Marshall within 30 minutes' time after receiving the message.

General Short. I made my decision within that time. The message I do not think got out of the Signal Office that fast, but I made my decision in that time.

Senator Lucas. And before making your decision you conferred with no member of your staff as to the meaning or the significance of this message?

General Short. I conferred with the chief of staff and General Fielder, G-2, yes, sir. I conferred with him before the message went, but I was rather of the opinion that I made my decision before the conference. I am not sure.

Senator Lucas. Well, if I am in error in that statement of course I apologize to you, sir.
General Short. I conferred with the chief of staff definitely, and it is possible—the time was so close together that I am not sure that I talked with G-2 immediately before or immediately after.

Senator Lucas. In that reply message of yours you stated “Alerted to sabotage; liaison with the Navy.” How did you alert your command to sabotage within that short space of time?

General Short. We had the standing operating procedure that laid down definitely what every unit would do, and we issued the order as an oral order, and it went out over the telephone in a very few minutes; it was not take over 10 minutes at the outset to put it into effect, because everybody knew what was required. We had that standing operating procedure. You did not have to tell anybody what his business was.

Senator Lucas. Well, your standing operating procedure at that particular time was with respect to sabotage, was it not?

General Short. No; it was with respect to the three alerts. All we had to do, when the phone message went out, was to go into alert No. 1.

Senator Lucas. And what alert were you operating under previous to the time you received the message?

General Short. We were not operating under an alert, but we had out a very considerable number of guards over vital installations. We were not fully under alert No. 1; we were, you might say, halfway, because there were certain installations that were so important that they had been really guarded for months.

Senator Lucas. Then you took sole responsibility for alerting your command to sabotage immediately after receiving this message of November 27?

General Short. That is correct. I sent for two officers who would be most intimately concerned, General Martin and General Burgin, and I conferred with them some time within the next hour or hour and a half.

Senator Lucas. And that is true notwithstanding the fact that there is not a single word in that message which talks about sabotage?

[8254] General Short. That is correct.

Senator Lucas. It has always been just a little difficult for me to understand why your message was not a little more responsive to the message that was sent by General Marshall.

General Short. It is just an interpretation of what the message means to you. I think I was influenced almost wholly by the fact that no War Department message or estimate since June 17, 1940, had ever pointed to the probability of an air attack or a raid.

Senator Lucas. That is probably true; but the record is rather complete here that everybody in Hawaii, both in the Army and Navy, were talking about the possibility of an air attack, that is from February on at least until October, and they were also having air drills, contemplating; I presume, an air attack, were they not?

General Short. We had lots of drills. We talked about the possibility.

Senator Lucas. Yes.

General Short. But everything that we got from the War Department in the nature of a probability indicating where the attack would come pointed toward the Philippines, Borneo, the Kra Peninsula.
down in that part of the world, and at Guam in one instance, and then in the next wire they took Guam [8255] out so as to give them sabotage orders. I think we should make a big distinction between the "possibility" orders and "probability" on account of the information we had from the War Department.

[8256] Senator Lucas. I think that is a sound conclusion. Now, following this message that you got from General Marshall, you also received a message from General Miles?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. And that was wholly in regard to sabotage?

General Short. Yes, sir, and it was Miles' function if he had any information indicating anything beyond sabotage, an all-out attack, a landing attack, or air attack, that he should also have mentioned that.

Senator Lucas. Who was your G-2 in Hawaii at that time?

General Short. Colonel Fielder, now General Fielder, who is still G-2 in the Hawaiian Department.

Senator Lucas. What were his duties in Hawaii under your command there in the Hawaiian Department?

General Short. His duties were naturally to assemble and evaluate all possible enemy information, and the sources of enemy information were purely local. What he was able to get on his own pertained to subversive action. He was dependent on the War Department or the Navy Department for any other type of information. He had no agents outside of Honolulu.

Senator Lucas. Did he have liaison with the Intelligence man in the Navy in Hawaii?

General Short. He had very close liaison with the man who had charge of the subversive action measures altogether. They had offices side by side in town; they had a teletype that connected the FBI and ONI and G-2, so they could talk back and forth.

Senator Lucas. Do I understand you to say to the committee, General, that all of the information that you received as to the situation existing between Japan and this country in the months preceding the attack came from Washington, D.C.?

General Short. Or some from the Navy Department. None on our own. I will amend that slightly. Our contact officer made it a habit to meet the boats from the Orient so he could get in touch with the people who had been living out in China or Japan who were coming through, and pick up anything he could.

Of course the value of that information varied with the individual he talked to. We were never sure how valuable it was, but we carried it on all the time, getting what we could out of these passengers going through.

Senator Lucas. Do I understand your only means of obtaining intelligence information was through the Army and Navy Intelligence Department here in Washington, D.C.?

[8258] General Short. No, we got some from the Navy in Hawaii.

Senator Lucas. In Hawaii?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. I was going to ask you where Admiral Bloch figured in in that picture, as far as obtaining any intelligence was concerned?

General Short. Admiral Bloch had a service, a radio intercept serv-
ice on the location of ships, Japanese ships, and his office kept track of them pretty thoroughly, and on a good many occasions I have seen the map showing the various locations of the Japanese ships as they thought they had been.

I also talked with both Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel as to where the Japanese Fleet was.

Senator LUCAS. There was an interchange then of information with respect to the communications that were received?

General SHORT. Yes, sir. I think it was more directly with me than it was with G-2. My liaison with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch was a little closer than his liaison with the man who handled that type of information.

Senator LUCAS. One of the reasons that I have asked these questions is because of what I find in exhibit 33.

[8259] In exhibit 33, on November 26, 1941, I note a memorandum for the Chief of Staff: Subject: Japanese Naval Task Force.

The following information was received from the Commandant 14th Naval District through the Office of Naval Intelligence at 12:45 a.m. this date.

In that memorandum they set forth at some length where they believe the Japanese Fleet might be on that particular day. I was just wondering whether you had ever seen that memorandum before it left Hawaii for the Naval Intelligence Department here.

General SHORT. I did not see the memorandum as such. I might have had the information from conversations with Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel, or I might have seen the same thing on the map in Admiral Bloch's headquarters.

Senator LUCAS. The only reason that I mention that is to me it is apparent that Admiral Bloch, or someone out at Hawaii had a considerable amount of information that they had obtained, and thought it valuable enough to send to Washington in order that they might have the advantage of making any evaluation of it that they saw fit.

General SHORT. Yes, sir, they had a regular intercept service. As I understand the thing, Washington took their [8260] estimates and the estimates of the intercept station at Manila. If there was no difference in the information, or if there was no difference of opinion, they accepted it, and if there was a difference of opinion they gave more credence to Manila, because it was closer and they thought it would be more accurate.

Senator LUCAS. Now in that memorandum to the Chief of Staff, which came from the Naval Intelligence of the 14th Naval District, you conclude by saying:

The evaluation put upon the above information by the Commandant 14th Naval District is that a strong force may be preparing to operate in southeastern Asia, while component parts thereof may be expected to operate from Palao and the Marshall Islands.

Is not that a strong indication that those in Hawaii at the time believed that Japan was going to move toward the Marshall Islands?

General SHORT. That would indicate that they thought some ships were going toward the Marshall Islands. Of course Palao is well down toward the Philippines.

Senator LUCAS. Yes, I know.

General SHORT. The Marshalls would have been of decided interest. I don't remember having that piece of information, and I believe I
have seen since in docu- [8261] ments here that Manila disagreed, and within 12 hours they knew from the War Department that Manila had disagreed from that finding, and that may be one reason I never did know about it.

Senator Lucas. That may be true. I am not certain about whether Manila disagreed with this finding. I am only pointing out the Marshall Islands, because under the Orange war plans, that was where the American fleet was going to strike also.

General Short. That was of very great interest.

Senator Lucas. So if the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, on November 26, 1941, had any information that he believed that the Japanese Fleet, or a part of it might go into the Marshall Islands, you were getting pretty close to where America expected to start her offensive in the event of a declaration of war?

General Short. That is correct. It would have been of interest to me, and, as I say, it is possible I did not get it because of the disagreement between the two stations.

Senator Lucas. I do not think that Admiral Kimmel was interrogated upon that message. I overlooked it. It seems to me it would be rather important as showing definite information on the 26th of November as to what Admiral Bloch [8262] at least, believed with respect to the offensive toward the Marshall Islands.

General Short. I believed, incidentally, that that would turn out to be, and it turned out to be false information.

Senator Lucas. They did not come by way of the Marshalls, but they came north of the Marshalls?

General Short. They came way north of the Marshalls.

Senator Lucas. Yes; that is true.

General Short. It could not have been the same force.

Senator Lucas. I am only using it to point to the information which they believed at that time, that there was a possibility of some sort of a force coming in to the Marshalls which would bring them at least closer to Hawaii, and therefore it should have been, it seems to me, of tremendous significance to the folks in Hawaii with regard to the danger they were facing, whether it was right or wrong.

General Short. It would have been of very great interest to me, but I did not get it at the time.

Senator Lucas. I have been just a little puzzled, General, with respect to your reply to this message of November 27, and the reply of General DeWitt, who was at that time, as I recall, commanding the command on the [8263] west coast.

The message that was sent by General Marshall to you and the message that was sent by General Marshall to General DeWitt on the west coast are almost identical are they not?

General Short. That is correct.

Senator Lucas. I have been puzzled at your reply when I compare it with the reply of General DeWitt, and here is what he says:

Report following measures taken as per your radio November 27: Your radio paraphrased to Commanding Generals ADC Second Air Force, Fourth Air Force, Ninth CAD, Pacific Coastal Frontier Sectors, Ninth Corps Area, and Commandants Eleventh, Twelfth and Fifteenth Naval Districts. All harbor entrance control posts continuously manned. One gun battery each harbor defense continuously alerted. Protection against sabotage and other subversive activities intensified. Sixth Infantry battalions and necessary motor transportation
alerted so as to be instantly available to CG NTA to carry out his missions under Rainbow Five. Constant contact being maintained with corps area and naval district commanders and full cooperation assured. PCE, sector, and sub sector plans Rainbow Five practically completed and necessary reconnaissance being made to carry [8264] out defense of critical areas. Two rifle companies furnishing CG SF F of E for guard duty and one company furnished to CG NCA for internment aliens at Angel Island, and in connection with radio to CG GHQ November 25 which recommended that WPL five two be extended to include Pacific coast and Japanese vessels and which outlined steps to be taken by me in preparation therefore. As air forces as well as other Army forces will be involved in the execution of WPL five two or the preparatory stage of Rainbow Five it is strongly urged that I be authorized to direct operation of Air forces in defense of the PCE or that instructions be issued specifying air action and that I be furnished copy of such directive. Should hostilities occur this command now ready to carry out tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan except for woeful shortage of ammunition and pursuit and bombardment planes which should be made available without delay.

I presume that there are reasons for the difference in the answers that were made by yourself and the one who was in command of the west coast.

Can you tell why General DeWitt would take the position that he did in replying to the same kind of a message?

General Short. I can only make a guess at it. My [8265] guess would be that he did not having a standing operating procedure, and therefore it was necessary for him to go more into detail.

Our standing operating procedure showed that we had two battalions with full motor transportation ready to go any place on the islands.

We didn't mention that because that was part of the standing operating procedure. The reconnaissance apparently had no agreement with the Navy so he had to show the reconnaissance. The air force that he speaks about wanting placed under his command, I think was part of GHQ Air Force that operated directly under Washington, and he was asking to have it put under him for operation.

That is largely an estimate, but I think it is probably a fair one.

Senator Lucas. His danger was not as much as yours, was it, General?

General Short. Well, he had the much longer front, and he had some very vital installations, like all of the factories at Los Angeles, and so it was difficult to say, because he had less, far less personnel to defend with than we had. Our area was a concentrated area where we could take up our positions in a relatively short time. His were hundreds of miles long, and he had a very limited force.

[8266] Senator Lucas. Well, the thing that struck me as being rather strange was to find a reply of this kind to the same kind of a message and the reply of yours from Hawaii which always seemed to me to be the most dangerous spot perhaps of our outlying possessions or our coastal positions.

General Short. I believe it would indicate that our preparation for occupying our positions and everything of that kind were much more complete.

Senator Lucas. It may be, but he went on an all-out alert; DeWitt went on the all-out alert?

General Short. No; I don't think so. He alerted certain infantry battalions. We had certain infantry battalions alerted. If you notice, on his seacoast guns, he alerted, I believe, one gun at the entrance of each harbor.
Senator **Lucas** (reading):

All harbor entrance control posts continuously manned. One gun battery each harbor defense continuously alerted.

**General Short**. He only had 1 battery alerted. Around San Francisco he probably had at least 12 and at Puget Sound he had a very considerable number. So you can see his was a partial alert. It was not a complete alert at all.

**Senator Lucas**. Let me ask you about the civilian population in Hawaii. You alerted for sabotage. You were not there in 1940 when they had the previous alert?

[8267] **General Short**. No, sir.

**Senator Lucas**. Well, did you learn about any uprisings or any undue sabotage being committed at that time by the people of Hawaii was the result of that alert?

**General Short**. No; you wouldn't get sabotage as a result of an alert. You might get it because you didn't go into an alert.

**Senator Lucas**. He went on an all-out alert in 1940?

**General Short**. That is right, on a direct order from the War Department.

**Senator Lucas**. I know.

**General Short**. Then he cut it back on July 16.

**Senator Lucas**. What I am trying to find out is whether as a result of the alert the population of Hawaii was in any way disturbed.

**General Short**. If you will read the letters between General Marshall and General Herron there is one letter in there where General Herron says that a lot of people were considerably disturbed for the first few days and he says that even some of the younger officers sent their families to the hills.

**Senator Lucas**. Well, the War Department in Washington and you fellows out in Hawaii were both wrong on that, too, weren't you, on the question of sabotage?

[8268] **General Short**. It is very difficult to say. We can't tell what would have happened if we hadn't held a tight rein over them. I think the feeling was, with everybody who had made a careful study, that if there had ever been any real success to the Japanese plans, that most anything might have happened.

**Senator Lucas**. What do you call a success if December 7, 1941, wasn't a pretty fair test of success?

**General Short**. A landing on the island of Oahu. They immediately would have had perhaps an army of thousands, a fifth column of thousands, ready to support them.

**Senator Lucas**. Were you alerted against sabotage because you feared a landing of the Japanese?

**General Short**. No, sir. We were alerted because we felt they might try to destroy all the vital installations; and, as a matter of fact, without an alert against sabotage, the way the gasoline and oil was placed along the waterfront in Honolulu a very small group of men could have destroyed the city of Honolulu; and the same thing with 4 million gallons of oil in Pearl Harbor. They could have done much more damage than was done because they could have destroyed all the oil. They could have destroyed the repair facilities. And probably the fire would have destroyed a good many of the ships in the harbor.

[8269] **Senator Lucas**. I don't doubt but that is true, General Short, that you had every reason to take every precaution possible
against sabotage, but I come back to my original question, whether or not anybody from Japan really used the sabotage methods on December 7 or immediately thereafter insofar as you know?

General Short. Whether they used it?

Senator Lucas. Whether they did carry out these acts of sabotage that you people in Hawaii and the people in Washington were constantly afraid of.

General Short. There was none, but whether there would have been if we had been lax I don’t think anybody will ever know.

Senator Lucas. Perhaps not. That is one of those things that will go unsolved.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. I think it is in the record, but do you recall how many planes you lost that morning in the air raid that were on Hickam Field?

General Short. I think I have it here.

Senator Lucas. It may not be material but I am leading up to another question.

General Short. It is in that exhibit No. 7 of the Roberts commission. I don’t know whether I am going to find it right here or not. I have the statement of planes here as of December 7 and then as of December 20. I don’t have the statement right here on that.

Senator Lucas. You don’t recall how many planes you lost at that particular time?

General Short. No, sir; I do not. This shows the different types. Some of them may have been repaired, don’t you see, between December 7 and December 20 and be back in use.

Senator Lucas. You may have received some more by that time.

General Short. Beg pardon?

Senator Lucas. You may have received some more from the mainland.

General Short. We received 29 more B-17’s and that was all.

Senator Lucas. How many planes got in the air before the last attack was completed?

General Short. I think there were a total of 14.

Senator Lucas. Did they shoot down any Jap planes?

General Short. They shot down 10 enemy planes.

Senator Lucas. They shot down 10 enemy planes.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. So it is a pretty safe assumption that if the planes had been warmed up and ready to go that, considering what you did with the 14 planes, that the damage would have been minimized considerably?

General Short. No question about that. I think our pilots showed that they were superior to the Japanese pilots in individual combat that day.

Senator Lucas. Do you recall seeing that two-man submarine?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Do you remember seeing the prisoner that they took?

General Short. I did not. I recall the incident but I didn’t actually see him.
Senator Lucas. Do you recall now, from the conversations that you had with anyone there, as to just how far out that two-man submarine was before it started operating at sea?

General Short. Well, I can give you a rather interesting report of just what happened at the time of the capture. It was off a reef opposite Bellows Field and the commanding officer or G-2 of Bellows Field phoned me that it was there and that the Navy were getting ready to bomb it. I said if they wanted to destroy it, I didn't think it ought to be destroyed, but if the Navy wanted to destroy it we could bring up a piece of field artillery and do it very quickly, because it was on the reef. But before that message, apparently, could get to the Navy, they dropped a bomb, which fortunately [8272] missed it and picked it up and set it on the inside of the reef, and we sent a man out to put a rope around the conning-tower and towed it in. Some fellow from Texas, probably, lassoed it.

Senator Lucas. Was there ever any conclusive evidence as to how and where that submarine took to sea, how far out it was and what brought it there?

General Short. I would hesitate to say. I am afraid my information would not be exact.

Senator Lucas. Well, was it possible that a surface ship, a war-ship of some kind, belonging to the enemy, could have come within 200 miles and dropped it off, or do you think it came in by submarine?

General Short. I think the feeling was at the time that there was a mother ship that had brought them at least a considerable part of the way. I don't believe they were capable of going more than 150 to 200 miles under their own power.

Senator Lucas. Now, what kind of a ship—that was the point I was making—what kind of a ship did you people conclude brought this midget submarine to 150 miles of the Hawaiian Islands?

General Short. Well, I am really a little uncertain on that. I think the Navy would be a much better source.

[8273] Senator Lucas. Could a Jap submarine carry one of these small two-man submarines?

General Short. I think the largest type probably could but again I am not sure.

Senator Lucas. There is more than a possibility that some large surface Japanese ship sailed within 150 or 200 miles of the Hawaiian coast that morning and dropped that submarine off?

General Short. I believe the feeling was that they must have been in the vicinity of Hawaiian waters, maybe for several days, and had not been picked up.

By the way, I have the report here, Senator, of the planes damaged. Senator Lucas. Please read that.

General Short. I will take up first what we had.

We had at the beginning of the attack: Planes in commission, 80. That is pursuit planes. Pursuit planes out of commission, 69. A total of 149. Of those 80 were damaged.

We had reconnaissance planes: In commission, 6. Out of commission, 7. Out of those 13, 6 were damaged. We had bombers: In commission, 39. That included the old B-17's. Bombers out of commission, 38. And 34 of those bombers were damaged.
Now, a considerable number of those planes we were able to repair locally. So in the report of December 20 we had almost as many planes in commission as we had the morning of the 7th, because our repair facilities were working 24 hours a day.

Senator Lucas. Under the sabotage order these planes were lined up wing tip to wing tip?

General Short. Very close together on the landing mat.

Senator Lucas. Now, you have given to the committee in your statement what you consider the term “appropriate defensive deployment” means.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. In that statement you take almost direct issue with Admiral Kimmel.

General Short. I did not intend to give the impression that I was making an out and out statement of what a defensive deployment meant, but I couldn’t conceive of any defense not including reconnaissance. I think that that, I said, must necessarily include reconnaissance. Isn’t that the statement to which you refer?

Senator Lucas. That is right.

General Short. I still cannot conceive of any defense that would not include reconnaissance.

Senator Lucas. Admiral Kimmel didn’t so interpret the order.

General Short. I don’t know what the technical term in the Navy would include. In the Army any defense in the world we would take up would include reconnaissance.

Senator Lucas. I want to call your attention to the report of the Army board that made an investigation into this Pearl Harbor affair. I direct your attention to the last page. The board says:

Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, failed in his duties in the following particulars:

(a) To place his command in a state of readiness for war in the face of a war warning by adopting an alert against sabotage only.

You have gone into that thoroughly and have made your explanation.

General Short. I have.

Senator Lucas. I presume you did the same thing before the Army board?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Notwithstanding its finding?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. And I presume your evidence before the Army board was practically what is before this committee?

General Short. That is correct. I know some things now, like magic, which I had never heard of at the time I was before the Army board.

Senator Lucas. They further state:

The information which he had was incomplete and confusing but it was sufficient to warn him of the tense relations between our Government and the Japanese Empire and that hostilities might be momentarily expected.

Do you agree with that?

General Short. Yes, sir; but that wouldn’t necessarily mean an attack. I doubt very much if that board knew of the conclusions of General Grunnert and General Betts, which agreed 100 percent with
mine, and why they made them. They made them because they didn't have access to magic.

Senator Lucas. Assuming, General Short, that you had never received any message from the War Department, either on November 27 from Marshall or on the 28th from Miles, or on the 29th from Arnold—

General Short. Or had any previous information?

Senator Lucas. No. From the 27th on you only received three messages?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. But you saw some of the Navy messages?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Would your position have been any different on December 7 than it was previous to the message on November 27?

General Short. I think the three messages that followed up the 27th all pointing directly to sabotage did a great deal to confirm me in my opinion that I had done what the War Department wanted.

Senator Lucas. I can well appreciate that.

General Short. I could have gone into any other alert in a few minutes if I had anything to indicate but what I got from the War Department pointed, all of it, 100 percent, very definitely to sabotage.

Senator Lucas. That is, the second and third messages pointed definitely to sabotage.

General Short. Second and third and fourth.

Senator Lucas. Which tended to confirm your message to General Marshall?

General Short. That is correct.

Senator Lucas. That is the way you took it?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. The question I am asking you is this: Assuming you received no messages at all from the War Department your position on December 7, 1941, would have been no different than if there was an attack on November 24?

General Short. I would not have had the message of the 27th.

Senator Lucas. That is right.

General Short. I hadn't been told to report any measures taken?

Senator Lucas. That is right.

General Short. I would have been in the same position I was on November 24.

Senator Lucas. In other words, these messages didn't enlighten you whatsoever as far as going on an all-out alert or going on the second alert which was near an all-out alert?

General Short. There was absolutely no additional enemy information. And there was one thing that cut down the probability. If you remember in the Navy message of the 24th they said: "Including action toward the Philippines and Guam." In the message of the 27th they told me to be prepared for sabotage at Guam.

In other words, it looked like they had eliminated even Guam, which was right alongside Japan, from possible attack.

Senator Lucas. Yes; but the message of the 27th to you didn't have anything to do with sabotage.
General Short. No. That was the naval message.

Senator Lucas. That is true, but you relied primarily upon General Marshall's message, more than any Navy message?

General Short. So far as information pointing to an attack I had to rely on the Navy messages because at no time [8279] after July 8 did I ever have an Army message that indicated any probable line of action by the Japanese.

Senator Lucas. You did rely upon both messages, of course?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. But I recall in this testimony that you stated that the message of November 24, I think it was, that was sent to the Navy, which was the war warning message of the 27th——

General Short. The 27th was the war warning.

Senator Lucas. In previous testimony you were not sure whether or not you ever saw that war warning message.

General Short. I think I said that I knew the substance of it. I was under the impression that Admiral Kimmel had just read it out loud at a conference. But in reading over the testimony, Captain Layton says that he personally brought it to me, and I have no doubt he did, and that he discussed it with me. I was perfectly aware of the contents. But I couldn't find in my headquarters, when I assembled the material for the Roberts commission, I couldn't find the message of either the 24th or the naval message of the 27th, and so I was doubtful whether I had been advised orally or whether I had received copies.

Senator Lucas. Do you believe that in the future, should [8280] something of this kind occur, that someone in Hawaii should assume all responsibility for the proper interpretation and analysis of such a message as was sent by Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel?

General Short. I would say, in view of all of the discussion and publicity were reference to Pearl Harbor, that anybody in command would take no chances whatever. To illustrate what I mean, in March of 1942 I visited a good-sized post in the interior of the country and found around the parade ground antiaircraft guns manned 24 hours of the day, when the possibility of an attack at that particular place was practically nil. But the commanding officer was taking no chances.

I believe that would be the condition that you will have for some years.

Senator Lucas. You realize that Americans forget pretty fast?

General Short. Well, in a generation they might forget some. I don't believe they would forget much faster. The ones in the Army wouldn't forget.

Now, along that same line, this was hardly over until the War Department had called on the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth to prepare changes in their manual to provide for just that kind of a thing, and I would like to [8281] read what they inserted. This was inserted as an entirely new paragraph. It was not in the old manual. This is Field Manual 100-15, Field Regulations, Larger Units, June 29, 1942, paragraph 23:

In times of strained relations the War Department must exhaust every possible source of information to keep its commanders of field forces advised——
Not only keep itself but—
keep the commanders advised of air, military, and naval dispositions and movements of potential enemies and of the trend of diplomatic relations. Commanders of the field forces must keep themselves informed of the possibility of a surprise attack being made both from without and within previous to a declaration of war. During this period commanders must dispose of their forces so that a sudden attack will be defeated.

[8282] In other words, the War Department took very decisive action and prescribed very definitely for themselves that they would keep the commanders completely informed of the information and of the relations.

Senator Lucas. Of course, that comes about through the Pearl Harbor disaster.

General Short. It comes about definitely through the Pearl Harbor disaster.

Senator Lucas. What I am talking about is: Assuming that in 50 years a similar situation occurs, where there is no unity of command, it is still under a joint control system. You told the committee this morning that whether or not they had that complete unity of thought and action that was so necessary for the protection of the fleet and islands, that personalities were involved. That is, two men might get along all right, and two men who followed might not get along all right.

If you had one man in command, where you could place all of the responsibility over the Hawaiian Islands and the fleet, would that eliminate what I am talking about here, eliminate the possibility of any confusion or conflicting interests in the future which might be responsible for a similar disaster?

General Short. I believe it would be decidedly helpful. [8283] When you put it at 50 years, it is hard to say whether everybody would forget.

Senator Lucas. Suit your own time on that. Most of us won't be around.

The Chairman. You don't mean that, Senator.

Senator Lucas. Yes; I do. [Laughter.]

Senator Lucas. One further question. There can't be any question but what under the evidence submitted before this committee they were as much confused in Washington in the Intelligence Branch of the service as they were in Hawaii with respect to what was going on between the two departments.

Do you agree that if you had one man in Washington responsible solely for all of the information, the evaluation of all of the intelligence, both from the Army and Navy, that that would be conducive to better administration, and possibly reduce the danger throughout?

General Short. I think it would tend to. At the same time, one department would have to analyze critically which I don't believe was done.

Senator Lucas. At any rate if you had one man, you wouldn't have a general like General Miles coming before the committee and when you ask him about the important [8284] message that was sent from Tokyo to Honolulu carving the island into five districts, you wouldn't have him saying that that was a Navy responsibility, and not his, to properly interpret that?
General Short. He would know definitely it was his responsibility.

Senator Lucas. That is where I think we are going to have to lodge some of these things, definite responsibility in someone so there can't be any buck-passing when a serious thing happens.

General Short. I agree fully that you should have a much more competent Intelligence service that is combined.

[8365] Senator Lucas. Now this report further says, reading again from the Army board report:

This required that he guard against surprise to the extent possible and make ready his command so that it might be employed to the maximum and in time against the worst form of attack that the enemy might launch.

I take it you do not agree with that, and you have covered that in your testimony.

General Short. I do not agree.

Senator Lucas. Further:

(b) To reach or attempt to reach an agreement with the Admiral commanding the Pacific Fleet and the Admiral commanding the Fourteenth Naval District for implementing the joint Army and Navy plans and agreements then in existence which provided for joint action by the two services. One of the methods by which they might have become operative was through the joint agreement of the responsible commanders.

You could not agree with that in view of the position that you took with respect to the interpretation of these messages?

General Short. I believe that the War Department fully expected to declare when the situation had arrived to put the war plans into effect and that they would have expected us to get their permission before we thought of doing it.

[8366] Senator Lucas. They further state:

(c) To inform himself of the effectiveness of the long-distance reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy.

As I understand you took that for granted, that they were doing the job?

General Short. I knew that Admiral Kimmel was doing a great deal. I didn't know the exact details. But I considered that he was more capable of fitting the ships, surface ships and the submarines and the planes, into a complete picture than I was.

Senator Lucas. Under a unity of command no board could have made that charge?

General Short. That is correct.

Senator Lucas. Do you know why the air drills were stopped on November 12, 1941?

General Short. I am of the opinion that they probably were not all stopped. The ones that had to do with the B-17's I think were stopped because we needed all the time we had for training the crews.

Senator Lucas. What was the nature of one of those air drills, what did you do?

General Short. They were of various natures. We would have a report, or the Navy would make an estimate, that possibly some Japanese ships were in a certain direction. [8367] A squadron or group would be given the mission of going out and finding this carrier. If they were successful then a bombing squadron would be sent out to bomb them.
Then you might, by the next phase, assume that the carrier got in without being picked up and the fighter planes were coming in. You would get that information just in time possibly to send up your own pursuit planes to try to intercept the enemy bombers and fighters before they reached the islands.

They varied.

Senator Lucas. That was an actual drill?

General Short. Oh, yes. We had one a week on the average from about March on and I think probably about one a month where the B-17's were excluded because we didn't think we could spare the time.

Senator Lucas. Why did you have those drills?

General Short. To try to get the Army-Navy Air Corps so they could work together.

Senator Lucas. Did you have any potential enemy in mind?

General Short. We always, any time we maneuvered in Hawaii, the potential enemy was Japan. There wasn't any doubt in our minds about that. We didn't mention it but we thought—we thought of it as Orange—but it was Japan.

Senator Lucas. That was the real reason for the air drills, was it not?

General Short. That is correct.

Senator Lucas. There was no point in having any air drills over the islands unless it was for the defense of those islands and the defense of the fleet in case of an attack by the common enemy?

General Short. Yes, sir. Those air drills were held, as I recall, from sometime in February up to November 12. I think it was probably about the first of March before we really got them under way.

Senator Lucas. And all of a sudden they ceased.

General Short. I don't know definitely but I am inclined to think that they had one on the 20th of November that did not include the B-17's.

Senator Lucas. Well, it is difficult for me to understand why you had all of these air drills all summer long and yet when the tension became more strained and everybody in Hawaii knew, as well as here, that the conditions with Japan were deteriorating day by day, all of a sudden you quit the air drills and went to sabotage.

General Short. I can tell you why no air drill was scheduled for the morning of the 7th. They had a good many of these exercises on Sunday morning when the carriers would come in and the planes would be sent ashore on Ford Island. They would come in Saturday afternoon and then there would be an air drill scheduled for Sunday morning in which the Navy fighter planes would participate. On this particular Sunday morning the carriers were all out at sea. One was returning from Wake. One was going to Midway. One was on the west coast being overhauled. So there were no naval planes to participate. That I know was one reason why nothing was scheduled that Sunday morning.

Senator Lucas. General Short, where were you on the morning of December 7 when the attack came?

General Short. I was in my quarters.

Senator Lucas. How far were your quarters from the quarters of Admiral Kimmel?
General Short. I would say probably about a mile and a half, maybe just a little more than that.

Senator Lucas. And you immediately, of course, took command and gave the orders to your men on the island there as soon as the first flight of planes came through?

General Short. The chief of staff came into my quarters somewhere around 8:03 and I gave him directions to immediately put No. 3 alert into effect. I went over to my headquarters. He was there by the time I got there and probably about 8:12, and he said that by 8:10 he had them all alerted. I remained there just long enough to [8290] make sure my G-3 section had reached the field command posts. I left Colonel Phillips in charge of the regular headquarters that had communication with Washington, and I went to the field command post where I could be in touch with all of them.

[8291] Senator Lucas. Admiral Kimmel told the committee that he was not only alerted to sabotage but a good many other things, as I recall, but was not clear whether he knew that you were alerted to sabotage only.

General Short. I believe that we have some of his testimony before this board that states that he did know.

Senator Lucas. That he did know that you were alerted to sabotage?

Mr. Kaufman. He testified both ways.

General Short. On page 6985 of the transcript:

I conferred with General Short on November 28 about the messages each of us had received on the 27th. We discussed these dispatches in all aspects. We considered, as we did frequently before and did later, the probabilities and possibilities of an air attack on Pearl Harbor. In this connection there was discussion of the effect of the suggestion from Washington that fifty Army pursuit planes be sent by aircraft carriers to Wake and Midway. I understood the Army was on an alert and that the alert was against sabotage among other things, although I do not now recall General Short specifically mentioning the details of his alert.

Senator Lucas. Did you talk to Admiral Kimmel on December the 6th in the afternoon or the evening?


Senator Lucas. You did not expect on December the 6th any surprise attack on the following day?

General Short. No, sir; I did not.

Senator Lucas. Was there anybody in Hawaii that you knew that expected a surprise attack?

General Short. If they did they never told me before or after. Ordinarily, afterward, there is someone who does expect it.

Senator Lucas. Well, everybody in Washington and everybody in Hawaii sent messages from February on up to almost the day of the attack about the possibility of a surprise attack. They had air drills for it, they had the Martin-Bellinger report that detailed exactly how this thing might happen, which it did, and everybody was surprised when the attack came.

General Short. Yes, sir. I think you must differentiate between possibilities and probability.

Senator Lucas. I presume that is correct.

General Short. We had probabilities pointing to attacks at other places and nothing probable pointing to an attack on Hawaii.

Senator Lucas. Well, the truth of the matter is that everyone thought that this war was going to start over around [8293] the
Malayan States, down the China Sea, and everybody just went to sleep on watching Hawaii.

General Short. I think the universal opinion was that that is where the war was going to start.

Senator Lucas. You stated in your statement before the committee that you alerted your command and your troops took the battle positions against what you thought was the possibility of a landing attack.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Was that a serious possibility?

General Short. Here was the way I felt about it: I felt that if that many carriers could elude the Navy and get in there as a complete surprise that there was an outside possibility that there would be a landing force attack here and that I would take no chances.

Senator Lucas. Then if there was that possibility I would like to ask you this hypothetical question:

Assuming that the fleet had been withdrawn to the western coast and conditions at Pearl Harbor were the same other than that, do you believe that it would have been possible under those conditions or probable that the Japs could have made a landing with the striking air forces that they had and brought the planes down as they did?

General Short. It would have been thoroughly possible. [8294] If they had sent as large a force as they sent against the Philippines they could have made the landing. I doubt very much if they could have made the landing with a hundred thousand, but I believe they sent 224,000 against the Philippines and a force of that size, willing to take its losses, could undoubtedly have made the landing.

Senator Lucas. And that would have been a possibility——

General Short. That would have been a possibility.

Senator Lucas (continuing). If the fleet had not been in Pearl Harbor?

General Short. I would have been much more worried if there had been no fleet in Hawaiian waters; I don't mean in Pearl Harbor but in the waters of Hawaii.

Senator Lucas. In the Hawaiian waters.

General Short. I wish to make the distinction.

Senator Lucas. Yes; in the Hawaiian waters. If that should have happened, that possibility should have happened—and it was a possibility—and the Japs had taken the island of Oahu, it would have taken us a long time to have thrown them out of there, wouldn't it?

General Short. It would have been very serious.

Senator Lucas. Very costly.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Referring again to the question of [8295] Admiral Kimmel's statement on sabotage I call your attention to page 6989 of the present transcript where this question was asked by Mr. Richardson, counsel for the committee:

Mr. Richardson. Did you know, Admiral, what General Short's first alert was?

Admiral Kimmel. You mean No. 1 alert, as you call it?

Mr. Richardson. That is it.

Admiral Kimmel. I did not know he had but one kind of an alert.

Mr. Richardson. What kind of alert did you think he had?

Admiral Kimmel. I thought he had an alert where he put his people on the alert.
Mr. Richardson. Did you know at the time you talked with General Short that his No. 1 alert was simply against sabotage?

Admiral Kimmel. I did not know he had a No. 1 alert. I think I have found out since, however, that this No. 1, 2, and 3 alert business was put into effect on the 5th of November of 1941. Prior to that they had an alert and a nonalert status.

So that seems to place his testimony just a little different.

[8296] General Short. That is a little contradiction from the other.

Senator Lucas. Yes.

General Short. I would like to say, however, that we had furnished Admiral Bloch's headquarters with 10 copies of our alert system, so someone in the staff should have known exactly what the different alerts meant.

Senator Lucas. I want to ask one final question, General Short. Notwithstanding this far-reaching sea disaster and the damage that was done to the property on the island and the loss of life is it your contention now that with all the information available at that time you did all that any prudent commander could do to prevent or minimize such a surprise attack?

General Short. I believe I did all that a prudent commander could be expected to do; yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Do you believe under all the circumstances you exercised that high degree of care and caution that was automatically imposed upon you when you took over the command of that base?

General Short. I believe the people in the—all the people in the Army there and the civilians know that I worked very seriously and very conscientiously constantly from the time I got there until the date of the attack to improve [8297] conditions to get ready for an attack.

Senator Lucas. And you feel that you exercised that superior judgment necessary for one of your rank and position when you knew that war was on its way?

General Short. I believe I did.

Senator Lucas. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I am not sure that I shall be here when my turn comes and I only have one question. I do not want it answered now.

I will put the question in connection with this material which the counsel has now given me and which he has gone over with General Short. I can reoffer it again as an exhibit, although I won't press the offer at this time, but before General Short concludes his testimony I should like to have him make whatever comment he may think is warranted on certain of the items in here which indicate certain conflicts in his prior testimony and I will only read one sentence from the exhibit here that bears on it. It is not of a critical character.

The Chairman. Not of what?

Senator Brewster. This is not of a critical character but other portions of the exhibit are. [Reading:]

General Short's non-feasance or omission were based on an estimate of a situation which although proved faulty [8298] by subsequent events was, insofar as I am able to ascertain from the report of the Roberts Commission, made or concurred in by all of those officers in Hawaii best qualified to form an exact military opinion. That estimate was that an attack by air was in the highest degree improbable.
Now, whether you want to accept it now or whether you want other members of the committee to look it over before it is offered is immaterial to me.

The Chairman. The Chair has stated that other members would like to see them and look them over before it is made an exhibit and I see no delay in that procedure that would be disadvantageous.

Senator Brewster. That is quite all right.

The Chairman. And inasmuch as it is obvious that the committee will not conclude with General Short's testimony today that might go over until tomorrow.

Senator Brewster. I think he should certainly have a full opportunity to prepare any statement he desires on it and that is why I think it ought to be gone over.

The Chairman. Well, the general is familiar with this, with the interrogatory of the Senator from Maine.

General Short. I am not familiar with the particular things he is bringing up there.

[8299] The Chairman. Would you like to have an opportunity to familiarize yourself with it before you answer it?

Senator Brewster. Well, I am not asking for it now.

The Chairman. Well, even the suggestion.

General Short. I think it would be an advantage.

The Chairman. Yes, all right. Well, we will determine that later.

Congressman Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. General Short, you were an infantry officer for some years, were you not?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Did you ever have any training or work with the Air Force at all prior to going to Pearl Harbor?

General Short. Yes. In maneuvers we had Air Corps units attached.

Mr. Murphy. Outside of maneuvers you never did deal directly with the Air as such, did you?

General Short. In the Command Staff School and in the Army War College we had a great deal of instruction.

Mr. Murphy. How many years before Pearl Harbor were you at the Staff School and had any instruction about the Air?

General Short. I graduated from the Army War College in 1925.

Mr. Murphy. Had you been there between 1925 and 1941?

General Short. No, sir.

[8300] Mr. Murphy. Admiral Kimmel was a ship man primarily, wasn't he?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. He had not had anything to do particularly with the Air either then, so far as you know?

General Short. I do not know, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, both Admiral Kimmel and yourself, as I recollect it, say that you were largely influenced by the newspaper at Honolulu as to your estimate of the situation subsequent to November the 27th. Is that right in your case?

General Short. No, sir. I would say the only thing I remember getting from the newspaper that had a direct bearing on this message was the fact that the negotiations in Washington with the Japanese had been resumed. That is the only thing——
Mr. Murphy. Now, I would like to direct your attention to the headlines of the papers in Manila. I am now reading—

The Chairman. In Manila?

Mr. Murphy. In Honolulu. I beg your pardon.

I am now reading from page 11 of the United States News which contains the Army Pearl Harbor Board report. The newspaper headlines in question, referring to the Honolulu Advertiser and the Honolulu Star Bulletin—the newspaper headlines in question read as follows:


That was the Honolulu Star-Bulletin of November 29.

Japanese May Strike Over Weekend; Kurusu Bluntly Warned Nation Ready for Battle.

That was the Honolulu Advertiser of November 30, although it is recorded here as the 20th, which is a typographical error because the piece is already in the record. That is in the Honolulu Advertiser.

Hull, Kurusu in Critical Meeting Today.

That is the 1st of December in the Honolulu Advertiser.

U. S. Army Alerted in Manila, Singapore Mobilizing as War Tension Grows; Japanese Envoys Resume Talks Amid Tension; War Fears Grow in Philippines.

That was the 1st of December in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin.


That was December 2 in the Honolulu Advertiser.

Huge Pincher Attack on U. S. By Japan, France Predicted.

That was the 3d of December in the Honolulu Advertiser.

Japan Spurns U. S. Program.

That was on the 4th of December in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin.

Pacific Zero Hour Near; Japan Answers U. S. Today.

That is the 4th of December 1941 in the Honolulu Advertiser.

[8302] Singapore on War Footing; New Peace Effort Urged in Tokyo; Civilians Urged to Leave Manila.

That is the 6th of December in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin.

America Expected to Reject Japan's Reply on Indo-China; Japanese Navy Moving South; Detailed Plans Completed for M-Day Setup.

That is the 6th of December 1941 in the Honolulu Advertiser.

F. D. R. Will Send Message to Emperor on War Crisis.

That is the 7th of December 1941 in the Honolulu Advertiser.

Do you thing there is anything in those headlines that would justify you in feeling that there was a lessening of the tension that existed?

General Short. Only one thing, the fact that the negotiations were expected to continue for 2 weeks.

Mr. Murphy. In other words, with about 14 you eliminate 13 and you stand on that 1 that says they might go 2 weeks?

General Short. But practically all of them pointed towards the South Pacific. In addition——
Mr. Murphy. Let us stick to the papers, General. Out of the 14
the only one that impressed you was the one that they might go on
for 2 weeks?
General Short. No.
Mr. Murphy. Notwithstanding the fact that the subsequent
[8303] one says that the zero hour may be on the 4th, or the Pacific
zero hour is near; is that right?
General Short. I was willing to accept the information in the mes-
 sage of the 27th that hostilities might break out.
Mr. Murphy. Well, I understand you. You said that the November
27 message made you feel that war was imminent.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Do you think then that Admiral Kimmel or yourself
would be justified, in view of these headlines in December, that the
newspaper headlines would make you feel there was a lessening in the
tense situation that existed on the 27th of November?
General Short. The only thing there would be the statement of De-
 cember 1 on account of the fact that the message had said there was
a bare possibility that the Japanese Government would come back
and would resume operations and it shows that they had resumed op-
erations and then the message indicating that the negotiations would
probably continue for 2 weeks might well have led us to believe that
there was less likelihood of hostilities until the expiration of the 2
weeks.
Mr. Murphy. At any rate, that was the only paper that influenced
you, was it, that one about the 2 weeks?
[8304] General Short. That one and the one about the resump-
tion of the negotiations.
Mr. Murphy. And the others you dismissed?
General Short. No. I thought the others were in line with what—
Mr. Murphy. With the 27th message?
General Short. With the information we had been given and also
the direction of the attack was in line with the information we had
been given.
Mr. Murphy. General, you felt and apparently Admiral Kimmel
felt that there was going to be an attack on the Philippines. You both
agreed on that, didn't you?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Why, if there were going to be an attack on a United
States possession and at the Philippines, wouldn't you feel that there
was grave danger of some kind of an attack on Hawaii?
General Short. Frankly, I felt that there would certainly be in-
ternal disorders but that in all probability if the Japanese were going
to make a real out and out attack on the Philippines, on the Philippine
Islands, that they would employ practically all of their equipment and
available means for that purpose to make it as strong as possible.
Mr. Murphy. Now, the thing that puzzles the writers and [8305]
 a lot of people in the country is if they were going to go all out on the
Philippines why wouldn't any military man expect that there was
danger of an attack from the fleet then on their flank and why wouldn't
they seek to eliminate that possibility?
General Short. To make that attack they took six out of the eight airplane carriers they had. In other words, they took three-fourths of their air power that might have been used to support the Philippine attack and sent it to Hawaii. It weakened their attack in the Philippines very much and ordinarily when any country is making a very serious effort like that they try not to drive their forces.

Mr. Murphy. Couldn't an attack on the Philippines, General, be made and wasn't it made by land-based bombers?

General Short. They could by a certain amount.

Mr. Murphy. Well, didn't they attack it? Isn't that what they used?

General Short. They did.

Mr. Murphy. And didn't you know that, that they could?

General Short. Yes; but also we knew that the addition of the carrier planes would make that attack much heavier and much more serious.

Mr. Murphy. Well, they did a pretty thorough job with land-based planes, didn't they?

[8306] General Short. They did, yes; but we have used both all through the war whenever we have made a serious attack.

Mr. Murphy. Now I would like to review with you, General, if you will, exhibit 53.

General Short. 53?

Mr. Murphy. I think it is important that somewhere in the record there should be a résumé of the correspondence between you and General Marshall. And before I go into that, General, on May 1, 1941, you had an all-out alert in Honolulu, did you not, where you had fortifications being built, you had everything out you could have in the way of equipment, didn't you, for the whole day?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Did you have some plans for a maneuver on the 10th of December?

General Short. No, sir; we had no definite plans for a maneuver.

Mr. Murphy. Had you discussed it?

General Short. We were counting on having a maneuver. There were two things that we were waiting for for a complete maneuver. We were building an underground interceptor-command post and we were completing our own field-command post. We were waiting until they were completed and got into communication so that our next maneuver would be controlled by the [8307] communications which we expected to have already to follow.

Mr. Murphy. I will take that up with you later. Let me go to Marshall's correspondence with you. I refer first to the letter of February 7, 1941. At that time General Marshall gave you his impression and appraisal of Admiral Kimmel; that he was brusque and undiplomatic in his approach to problems and that he appeared rather rough in his methods of doing business and that he felt that he was entirely responsive to plain speaking on the part of the other fellow if there is frankness and logic in the presentation. You remember that?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. And then you answered him, did you not, by saying that you had told Kimmel and Bloch that there would be no hair-splitting between you, on February 19?
General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, to come back to the letter of February 7, General Marshall told you that Hawaii was on a far better basis than any other command in the Army, did he not?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. He told you at that time that at Cavite and Corregidor they had only two antiaircraft guns?

General Short. Yes, sir.

[8308] Mr. Murphy. He also told you, and I think this is significant:

Please keep clearly in mind in all of your negotiations that our mission is to protect the base and the Naval concentrations at Hawaii.

That was your mission there; wasn’t it?

General Short. Yes, sir.

[8309] Mr. Murphy. Then he also told you about the Army and Navy feuds “which still persist in confusing issues of national defense,” and “we must be completely impersonal in these matters”?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, in your letter of the 10th of February, you told him that you were taking up the question of dispersion of pursuit aviation upon the island of Oahu in order that you might be able to meet an attack from any direction; did you not?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. Then on page 7 of your letter, you make reference, General, to a letter on maximum readiness of aircraft in the Hawaiian area. Do you have a copy of that letter? I am speaking now of page 7 of the exhibit, General.

General Short. What paragraph is that?

Mr. Murphy. The third paragraph from the bottom of the page:

Letter HHD to Major Echelon Commanders, 17 February 1941, subject: Maximum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area.

I would like to see a copy of that letter, if I may.

General Short. I have not a copy here. I will ask Colonel Duncombe if he can obtain a copy.

[8310] Mr. Murphy. Will you make a notation of that, counsel, please? That is the third last paragraph on page 7.

On page 8 you spoke to General Marshall about the necessity of bomb-proofing the vital installations; did you not?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. On March 5, 1941, General Marshall wrote you a letter in which he said:

I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first priority.

Do you recall that?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. On March 6, 1941, you wrote General Marshall:

One of the first projects which I investigated in this Department was the aircraft warning service which I believe is vital to the defense of these islands.

Then again you said:

With the present international situation, it seems to me that if this equipment is to be used at all, the need for it is now here.
That was back in March; was it not?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Then you also stated in the next paragraph that the equipment would arrive in June and the stations would be operating shortly thereafter, did you not?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. You assured General Marshall that the personnel would be trained and the stations in operation within 30 days after the receipt of the equipment mentioned in your letter?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, on March 13, 1941, General Marshall wrote to you and said:

The progress that you are making in reaching close coordination with local naval authorities, and so insuring a maximum degree of readiness in your Department, is most gratifying.

On March 15, 1941, you received a letter from General Bryden, in the absence of General Marshall, saying:

The War Department appreciates fully the necessity for the early establishment of the aircraft warning service station in the Hawaiian Department.

Then, the third paragraph:

I have given these matters my personal attention.

The last paragraph:

We are as anxious as you to work out a solution for these problems with the least practicable delay, and I know that I can count upon you for fullest cooperation.

General Short. May I interrupt you a moment?

Mr. Murphy. All right, General.

General Short. That particular thing he is discussing is the question of getting the permission of the Park Service.

Mr. Murphy. That is right.

General Short. That request was started in June 1940.

Mr. Murphy. That is right.

General Short. And we did not get the authority until April 1941.

Mr. Murphy. That is right. You had great difficulty in getting permission to have the fixed stations operate. The fixed stations were not operating, and therefore they could not help you on December 7?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. Just put that one on one side, and let us go to the next one.

Now, on March 15, 1941, you stated to General Marshall:

On all fields the planes have been kept lined up on the field where they would suffer terrific loss.

So apparently you meant to change that situation, did you not?

General Short. In case of an air attack; yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. But you did not, did you?

General Short. We were not alerted against air attack. We were alerted against sabotage.

Mr. Murphy. I see.
Now, then, on page 16, you said:

In general, we have no serious shortage in three-inch anti-aircraft artillery, only 16 guns being required to complete our complement—

did you not?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. Then in the paragraph on the bottom of the page:

After the installation of our new detectors, we shall have some warning from the different islands and almost continuous service in the most dangerous direction for approximately 75 miles.

What was the most dangerous direction you were speaking of there?

It was from the north, wasn't it?

General Short. The north is what we ordinarily figured, although the Navy felt that there was quite a possibility of an attack coming in from the southwest, on account of the Mandated Islands.

[8314] Mr. Murphy. As a matter of fact, an expert on Hawaii, and Admiral Kimmel on several occasions, and some other witnesses in these records, have said the most dangerous area was from the north. Are you familiar with that?

General Short. I am familiar with that particular thing. Also the Navy thought there was considerable danger from the southwest.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, throughout the testimony, for hundreds and hundreds of pages, the north was pointed to as the most dangerous place. Then, at a subsequent hearing, after the Roberts board had completed, there was a statement that the most dangerous place was from the north, and in this hearing there is a reference by Admiral Richardson to what he thought. The fact is you thought the north was the most dangerous section, did you not?

General Short. Not necessarily directly north, but northwest to north. That was the most probable.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, you said there:

The pursuit aviation, however, will have to be prepared to take the air in the minimum amount of time.

That is what you told General Marshall, is it not?

General Short. That would be true no matter what direction they came from.

[8315] Mr. Murphy. At any rate, that is what you told General Marshall, that pursuit aviation would have to be prepared to take the air in the minimum amount of time?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, on the last page, page 17 of that letter, the letter of March 15, you told General Marshall:

I feel that the question of anti-aircraft defense against air attack is the most serious problem that we have to face—

did you not?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, on March 28, 1941, General Marshall wrote you, and at that time he said in the second to the last paragraph, he said:

I am hopeful of arranging for the early augmentation of your anti-aircraft garrison so as to provide full strength unit for the armament available within your department.
Then, again, in the last paragraph:

I approved your proposal to send General Martin and General Gardner, or their executives, to the west coast defense exercise.

That was an air exercise, wasn't it?

General SHOXT. Yes, sir.

[8316] Mr. MurPhy. On April 14, 1941, you wrote General Marshall, and in the second to the last paragraph on page 19, you said:

Knowing that you are very much interested in the progress that we are making in cooperating with the Navy, I am enclosing the following agreement made with them—

And one of them was the joint coastal frontier defense plan.

Then in paragraph 3, on page 20, or the one numbered 3, you state:

putting into effect for the Army the provisions of the Joint Agreement.

The next paragraph:

I have found both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch very cooperative, and we all feel steps have been taken which make it possible for the Army and the Navy Air Forces to act together and with the unity of command as the situation requires.

We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the Air Force and the anti-aircraft defense. I hope we shall arrive at something on that in the near future. The more I go into the details, the more I am becoming convinced that it will be necessary for us to set up an air defense command.

[8317] Then, in the last paragraph, you told General Marshall:

The Navy has felt very much encouraged by the increase in our air and anti-aircraft defense.

Now, I go over to the letter of May 5, that General Marshall wrote to you:

Thank you for your letter of the 14th enclosing the joint plans and the estimate concerning possible air action. It is evident that you have been on the job, and I know that the Navy is delighted to have such generous cooperation.

And in the last paragraph—and this is significant—

It is most gratifying to hear you say that everything is going along extremely well, and do not hesitate to write at any time.

Do you remember that?

General SHOXT. Yes, sir.

Mr. MurPHY. Now, on May 29, 1941, you wrote General Marshall, and you were describing the recent maneuvers. In paragraph 2, you said this:

The maneuver was divided into three phases. The first phase consisted of the air action and the actual issue of one day's fire and of engineer supplies for field fortifications and of engineer tools. During the air [8318] phase, our bombers acted under Navy Command in cooperation with the Naval Patrol Squadrons and actually located and bombed airplane carriers 250 miles out at sea. The movement of the carrier was entirely free so that the Navy Patrol planes had the mission of locating the ship and notifying our bombers and they then made the attack. Pursuit attacked enemy bombers represented by naval planes and our own bombers, when they came in to attack ground defenses.

Upon receipt of the warning for this phase, our bombers were sent to fields on outlying islands and pursuit planes were dispersed. The Navy cooperated very fully during this phase, and I believe we learned more about the coordination of Army Air Force, Navy Air Force, and anti-aircraft, than we had during any previous exercise.

Ammunition and engineer supplies had never been actually issued before, and we got complete data in regard to the time and the transportation required to complete the issue.
If you had done just that after the war warning, it would have been a different result, would it not?

General Short. Not just that alone, no.

Mr. Murphy. If you had done just what you did on May 29, issued live ammunition and had your planes ready, and have your pursuits ready?

General Short. We had live ammunition at all antiaircraft batteries but four, or immediately accessible to them.

Mr. Murphy. You said you had that ready, and you also said you could go into alert 2 from alert 1 in 7 minutes, but the fact is, it took 5 to 6 hours for them to get to their guns, didn't it?

General Short. No, it did not. It took time to move the guns and troops to prescribed positions. There were some batteries that had to move probably 20 miles.

Mr. Murphy. You mean to go from alert 1 to alert 2 you would make a phone call and say, "Go to alert 2"; is that it?

General Short. They were prepared for that anyway.

Mr. Murphy. You would just give the order, but it might take six hours to get to where you could shoot?

General Short. For a few of the batteries that is true.

Mr. Murphy. It took a few batteries some time to get into their positions?

General Short. They had to move their troops.

Mr. Murphy. You mean your ammunition was at the crater?

General Short. The ammunition was at the crater for four batteries.

Mr. Murphy. In the Sixty-fourth Coast Artillery, Antiaircraft B, C, D, and F, just those four batteries?

General Short. Those four batteries. The others were placed close to the prescribed positions, within, I think 20 to 75 yards.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, when you had this maneuver on May 29, and when you had the alert on May 1 for 12 days—or would that be the same one, General?

General Short. The same one, yes.

Mr. Murphy. At that time, did the public get hysterical?

General Short. I do not think you understood that ammunition business. What we were attempting there, was to find out, from a logistics point of view, how long it would take to move a day's fire. That ammunition was not issued out to the men. That ammunition was transported from the various places of storage to the troops. The boxes were not opened. It was a question of transportation, as to how long it would take to load up the ammunition and to deliver it to the organization concerned. It was a logistics problem entirely, and it had never been tried out before in Hawaii.

Mr. Murphy. The fact is that on May 1, you say now that you did not take the ammunition out and did not use live ammunition?

General Short. We did not use any of it.

Mr. Murphy. Did not fire any shots at all?

General Short. No, we fired none. It was a logistics proposition.

Mr. Murphy. Now, you also say that the ammunition up in the crater only affected four antiaircraft batteries. Is that correct?
General Short. That is correct. Now, do not misunderstand me. There were lots of other ammunition in the crater. We had ammunition immediately accessible to the gun positions of all but those four batteries. There were many days of fire in the crater.

Mr. Murphy. Did not you issue one full day's supply of ammunition to each gun in the maneuvers in May?

General Short. We delivered it to the batteries, yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. You had it right there ready for use?

General Short. It was not ready for use. It was a purely transportation proposition.

Mr. Murphy. It was in the boxes and the boxes were not opened?

General Short. It was testing the time that it took [3322] to draw the ammunition at the storage, and to move it to the battery.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, you said in the last paragraph of that letter, on page 36:

Some time later we expected to have a maneuver without any warning whatever to the troops. But will wait until after the organization of our air defense command.

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. Is that the one you were still waiting for in December?

General Short. That is the one we were waiting for.

Mr. Murphy. On October 10, you said to Senator Lucas you had no word from Washington about the air subsequent to July, as I understood you, and here is a letter from General Marshall to you, dated October 10, which said:

The mimeographed standard operating procedure for the Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, has just come to my attention, and I am particularily concerned with missions assigned to air units.

Then again, in the second paragraph:

This seems inconsistent with the emphasis we are placing on air strength in Hawaii.

General Short. That has no relation whatever to a probable attack.

Mr. Murphy. Well, that was a discussion between you and General Marshall as to how much the air forces should be trained for using guns and the like; and in your letter you told him, did you not, that you had a surplus of some 3,000 men?

General Short. Right at that time.

Mr. Murphy. That you had around 7,000-some-odd-hundred men, and if you used around 3,000 of them, that would take care of all of your needs for the airplanes, and you had 3,000 left over, and you wanted some to take care of themselves in the event there was an invasion; is that right?

General Short. That is correct, at that particular day.

Mr. Murphy. But you were still talking about air, and the importance of air?

General Short. Yes, but nobody was pointing to the probability of an air attack today or tomorrow, next week or next month.

Mr. Murphy. I expect you had those airplanes there to stop an air attack, did you not?

General Short. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. You had your air fields, your antiaircraft guns, your pursuit planes, and the only reason for them being there was to stop an air attack, was it not?
[8324] General Short. Yes, but that did not mean at all that an air attack was going to take place in the immediate future.

Mr. Murphy. You were told that war was imminent?

General Short. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. You thought they should tell you where the stroke would come?

General Short. If they had the information, I thought so, and I still think so today, and I think they had it.

Mr. Murphy. Then, on October 14, you wrote to General Marshall:

I have your letter of October 10 with reference to the use of men of the air force on other than strictly air duties. At the time our tentative standing operating procedure was put out the Air Corps had 7,229 men. Full combat details and all overhead required only 3,885 men for the planes and organizations actually on hand. This left a surplus of 3,344 men with no assigned duties during maneuvers. One of the main reasons for the assignment was to give these men something to do during the maneuvers. Another reason was the belief that any serious threat of an enemy ground attack of Oahu could come only after destruction of our Air Forces.

[8325] So that there would not be any need of an all-out alert particularly unless the Air Force was destroyed?

General Short. That was my estimate of the situation.

Mr. Murphy. You say then near the end of the second to the last paragraph:

As regards their use as military police that was not correct. The plan was to use them for guarding certain essential utilities, which did not require team training. However, this will be unnecessary as the Legislature has just passed the Home Guard Bill, which will go into effect very soon. They will be able to take over guarding of all essential utilities, highway bridges, railroad bridges, etc.

So that on October 14, at any rate, you were discussing the air forces as such with General Marshall?

General Short. We were always discussing air forces.

Mr. Murphy. Now, General, I would like to ask you this: In the alert you put out what did you do about your fire control stations? Did you alert them?

General Short. The fire control for the coast artillery?

Mr. Murphy. All of your fire-control stations under the command of the Army.

General Short. We did not do anything about the fire control stations because we were not on that kind of an alert.

[8326] Mr. Murphy. Right. The fact is that a great amount of the damage was done to the hangars. I see here a picture of the hangar burning. What hangar would that be, General, do you remember?

General Short. I rather suspect it may have been the Hawaiian Air Depot. I am not sure.

Mr. Murphy. I show you another picture of what appears to be another hangar, or it may be the same one. Will you examine this, if you please?

General Short. I would not know which particular hangar it was because they all look alike.

Mr. Murphy. Will you pass these two to him, please?

(The photographs were handed to General Short.)

General Short. I would not be able to say what particular hangars those were.
Mr. Murphy. The fact is that a great deal of damage occurred from fire there that day, did it not?

General Short. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. If you had your fire-control stations alerted would that have cut down the damage?

General Short. When you are talking about fire control I assume you mean those stations for controlling the fire of the harbor defense guns. We had a fire department on every post.

[8327] Mr. Murphy. I misunderstood you. I do not know anything about those things. I see Admiral Richardson laughing back there. However, I am only a layman and you are an expert.

What special provisions did you take to stop fire after November 27?

General Short. We always had provisions to stop fires.

Mr. Murphy. What special provisions after November 27?

General Short. Our fire department was always fully alerted. We did not take any special provisions.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, you say that the Navy had reconnaissance, General, and therefore the Navy had reconnaissance because of an expected air attack. Why did you have your pursuit planes on 4 hours' notice?

General Short. I did not say that the Navy had reconnaissance because of an expected air attack, because I do not think they did expect an air attack. They had reconnaissance to make sure that there were no Japanese vessels in the coastal zone.

Mr. Murphy. Is that the understanding you gave to the Roberts board that I read yesterday, that the reconnaissance that was had was the kind of reconnaissance that was expected in the joint air mission? Is that what you referred to, the responsibility of reconnaissance in the event of an air [8328] attack?

General Short. That does not pertain only to air attack. That responsibility would be for any kind of reconnaissance.

Mr. Murphy. You have said, General, you expected the Navy was carrying out their full duty in having reconnaissance and the Navy expected you to be doing your full duty on radar. Now if the Navy was having reconnaissance why did you have your pursuit planes on 4 hours' notice?

General Short. You are making statements that I have not made. I said I expected them to do their full duty as far as they were able to do it with the equipment they had.

Mr. Murphy. I understand you to say, sir, you expected the Navy to do complete reconnaissance.

General Short. I did not say that.

Mr. Murphy. Let me find your answer and let me give your exact words in the statement you gave before the Army Pearl Harbor board.

General Short. Will you please quote the page?

Mr. Murphy. I will, General. I have it here.

The Chairman. I might say we have reached the hour of 4 o'clock.

Mr. Murphy. All right.

[8329] The Chairman. Do you want to recess now or go into this?

Mr. Murphy. No; I will go into it in the morning.

The Chairman. The committee will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Whereupon, at 4 p.m., January 24, 1946, the committee recessed until 10 a.m., Friday, January 25, 1946.)
PEACHT HOUSE ATTACK

FRIDAY, JANUARY 25, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washitngton, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a.m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, the other day a request was made for any further information that might be available regarding the message of December 7 to General Short signed by General Marshall.

We have received the following memorandum from Colonel Duncombe that I would like to read into the record.

The Vice Chairman. Of the War Department?

Mr. Masten. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. You may proceed.

Mr. Masten (reading):

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Memorandum to Mr. Richardson:

The following inclosures relate to General Marshall's message to General Short, dated 7 December 1941:

(1) Copies of papers which show that, at the time of the Army Pearl Harbor board hearings, a search was made for General Marshall's handwritten draft of the message and that the draft was not found.

(2) A photostat of a copy of the encoded message sent from the War Department. On the photostat, to avoid disclosure of U. S. codes, the encoded text of the body of the message has been blocked out.

(3) A copy of Committee Exhibit 61, which is a photostat of General Gerow's memorandum to The Adjutant General concerning the message. This memorandum, as indicated by General Gerow's memorandum in Committee Exhibit 39, "was typed later during the day (7 December) and formally made of record."


(5) A photostat of the message as decoded in Hawaii.

/s/ HARMON DUNCOMBE,
Lt. Colonel, GSC.

5 Incls.
We suggest that the memorandum I have just read, together with enclosures 1, 2, 4, and 5, be spread on the record at this point.

The Vice Chairman. It will be so ordered.

Mr. Masten. I omit enclosure 3 since it is already Exhibit No. 61.

The Vice Chairman. It may be so ordered.

(The matter referred to follows:)

8 September 1944.

[8333]

Note for record:

1. On 8 September, Mr. Schneider, Secretary to Mr. Justice Roberts and Secretary to the Roberts Committee, informed General North that
   a. he had no recollection of having seen General Marshall's handwritten draft of the 7 December 1941 message,
   b. all documents received by the Committee from the War Department were returned to the Secretary of War by Colonel Brown who acted as liaison officer,
   c. Mr. Schneider has no signature indicating receipt by an official of the War Department.

2. On 8 September 1944 Lt. Col. William M. Connor Jr., reports that General Weir of the Judge Advocate General's Office stated that he does not have the handwritten draft in his possession.

Thomas North,

Brigadier General, G. S. C.,
Chief, Current Group, OPD.

Col. Brown, who returned the papers to the War Department, and Col. Bratton, who carried the manuscript message in question to the Message Center, have both been questioned, and both disclaim any knowledge of what became of the [8334] manuscript draft.

C. G. J.

Priority

18 Sept 44
Washington, D. C.

Secret

A War 181916Z WTJ

War 82425 18th. Desire to locate handwritten original of warning message dispatched on seven December nineteen forty one period. This draft was used in testimony before Roberts commission and it would appear that it was submitted to that commission paren for Richardson for Colonel Charles W. West from North signed Marshall paren Colonel Lee How Brown comma USMC comma now believed station with HQ Fifth Marine Division or comma was law officer for the commission period. Request you contact him to determine what disposition was made of this draft and radio your findings.

[Copy]

Secret

20 September 1944.

Grunert

President, Army Pearl Harbor Board,
Bldg #36, Presidio of San Francisco.

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, War Department, Washington, D. C.

[8335] Read September Eighteenth from General North inquiry Colonel Brown Marine Corps reveals he does not recall what disposition was made handwritten original mentioned message period. He suggested that Albert J. Schneider now secretary to Justice Roberts then clerk of commission may be able furnish information leading to discovery its whereabouts end

Lt. Gen. George Grunert,
U. S. Army,
President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Official:

R. G. Hurt,
Major AGD,
Aide-de-Camp.
Signal Corps, United States Army

[8336]

Memorandum:
Checked on the history of this radio of Dec. 7, 1941 with Lt. Col. John R. Deane, G. S. C., who states that a pencil draft of it was taken directly to the Message Center by Col. Bratton for immediate dispatch which was done. T. A. G. did not enter the picture at that time in any way except as custodian of the record message.

1-29-42
File

[8337]

Signal Corps, United States Army

Secret
1549WS Washington DC 74/73 RCA Etat 7 1218P
C G,

Hawaiian Dept, Ft Shafter, T. H.

529 7th Japanese are presenting at one PM eastern standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform naval authorities of this communication

(Marshall.

(Time and date stamp—Received at 3—7 Dec. 1941 Hq. Haw. Dept. AGO SRS) (Decoded by Lt. J. H. Babcock, 251P Dec 7 1941. Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 529 7th 70E."

[8338] TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER C. SHORT, UNITED STATES ARMY (RETIRED)—Resumed

The Vice Chairman. General Short, do you have anything further that you want to bring to the attention of the committee before your examination is resumed?

General Short. Yes, sir.

First, I would like to have an opportunity for me and my counsel to look over this material that has now been introduced, because we have not seen it.

The Vice Chairman. You have that right.

General Short. I have a statement here. I do not know whether I should read it now.

Senator Lucas asked me a question that I was unable to answer at the time. I have the answer out of the testimony of Admiral Inglis. I can read it now.

The Vice Chairman. Would you permit a suggestion, General?
Since Senator Lucas asked you about that, don’t you think it might be desirable to wait a little longer until he comes in? He is detained a few moments now.

General Short. I think it would be.

The Vice Chairman. Since he is the man that wanted to know about it, I just offer that suggestion for your consideration.

General Short. All right, sir; we will put it to one side.

[8339] The Vice Chairman. With respect to the memorandum from Colonel Duncombe and the attached data which has been spread upon the record, I assume, General, you are familiar with General Marshall’s testimony?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. That he wrote out in his own handwriting that message of December 7, and you know about that?

General Short. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. All right.

Colonel Karr. We have no objection to the introduction of that exhibit.

The Vice Chairman. Counsel states that he has no objection to that being put in the record, which has been done.

Mr. Murphy, of Pennsylvania, will continue his inquiry.

Mr. Murphy. General Short, the reference I made yesterday afternoon and was about to read was from page 46 of volume entitled “Previous Testimony of General Short.”

Colonel Karr. That is the Roberts Commission hearing?

Mr. Murphy. The Roberts Commission hearing. And, apparently, a quotation from the prepared statement which you presented to the Roberts Commission. It reads as follows:

The question of just how the total reconnaissance was carried out was never known by me.

General Short. About where is that on the page?

[8340] Mr. Murphy. Page 46, General, six lines from the bottom.

General Short. Yes, sir, I have it.

Mr. Murphy (reading):

The question of just how the total reconnaissance was carried out was never known by me. If they called on us for a squadron of planes they would assign it to a certain sector, say, maybe from zero to 70 degrees, to search out 600 miles, or whatever it was. I assumed that the Navy planes were searching all the other critical areas, and they probably were. I say, that was a matter that was not under my control.

My only reason for referring to that is that I get the impression from that that you thought the Navy were doing a pretty good job on reconnaissance.

General Short. On the critical areas. The best they could do with the material they had.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, my other question is, If you thought they were having reconnaissance in the critical areas, why did you have your pursuit planes on 4 hours’ notice?

General Short. Because, on my information from Washington, I had nothing to indicate that we were going to have an air attack.

Mr. Murphy. Did you think the reconnaissance was being made as a result of the message of November 27?
[8341] General Short. I thought the reconnaissance was being made on account of both that and the message of October 16. They were giving exactly the same instructions on October 16 as they were in the message of November 27.

Mr. Murphy. Is it your impression that there was no change in the situation from November 27 on than that which existed from October 16?

General Short. As far as the deployment of the Navy, because both messages stated that the Navy would take a defensive deployment preparatory to carry out——

Mr. Murphy. But you did say, General, many times in the record, that you felt after the 27th the Navy tightened up?

General Short. That is correct. They said they did.

Mr. Murphy. Right. At any rate, you did not have your pursuit planes on other than a 4-hour preparatory state; isn't that right?

General Short. However, I may state that when the situation arose they were actually in the air in 55 minutes.

Mr. Murphy. Some of them were.

General Short. All that were in condition to get in the air.

Mr. Murphy. General, do you have any report made by you to Washington immediately after Pearl Harbor on that situation?

[8342] General Short. On the planes in the air?

Mr. Murphy. On exactly what happened. We have a report before us, a letter, which Admiral Kimmel wrote to Washington, and which I am going to discuss with you. Do you have a report that you made as to what planes were ready, how your antiaircraft was situated, and so forth?

General Short. I think we made a written report. I haven't got it immediately available.

Mr. Murphy. I think it is important that we have it. I will ask the Army liaison to produce a copy of it if they will.1

General Short. May I say one word to Colonel Duncombe if he is here.

I think Colonel Phillips, who is in the audience, can tell you definitely whether we did put in a written report.

The Vice Chairman. The question was about a written report made by General Short to the War Department following the attack on December 7, 1941.

General Short (addressing Colonel Duncombe). They want that and I think Colonel Phillips can tell you definitely whether it was put in and when.

Mr. Murphy. Don't you know, General, whether you made a report to Washington or not?

General Short. I think I did. I was just referring to my chief of staff who would be responsible for assembling the details of the report. We made several reports by telephone. I think we put in a written report.

Here is a report put in by radiogram on December 7.

Mr. Murphy. No, I want a report from the commanding general to Washington of the over-all picture.

General Short. This was a previous report on the over-all picture.

Mr. Murphy. Signed by whom?

General Short. Signed by me.

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1 The document was subsequently admitted to the record as "Exhibit No. 104."
Mr. Murphy. All right.

General Short. Do you wish me to read it?

Mr. Murphy. No, I would like to examine it, if I may. It probably is quite lengthy.

Captain Ford. It is about seven lines.

Mr. Murphy. Oh, then read it, General. I thought perhaps it was six or seven pages.

General Short. This was dated the 7th of December and was addressed to the Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D.C.

Japanese enemy dive bombers estimated number sixty attacked Hickam Field Wheeler Field Pearl Harbor at eight am Stop Extensive damage to at least three hangars Wheeler Field three hangars Hickam Field and to planes caught on the ground Stop Details not yet known Stop Raid lasted over [8344] one hour Stop Unconfirmed report that the ships in Pearl Harbor badly damaged Stop Marine air field EWA also badly damaged Stop Details later

Mr. Murphy. It is the details that I am interested in.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. I would like to have a report, if there is one, by you giving your explanation as to what happened and your impression of why it happened.

General Short. I think Colonel Duncombe will be able to find that.

Mr. Murphy. I have reference in that regard to a letter dated December 12——

General Short. There are other radiograms making additional reports. The photostats are very dim and very difficult to read.

Mr. Murphy. I will ask the Army to get us the detailed report which the General made explaining what happened on December 7.

In that connection I refer to a letter dated December 12, 1941, sent by Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark in which he said the Army anti-aircraft guns were not manned. Did you know that Admiral Kimmel said that?

General Short. No, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Was that a fair statement?

[8345] General Short. It was not. They were partly manned.

Mr. Murphy. There was only a skeleton antisabotage crew, wasn't there?

General Short. That is correct; but they were able to fire, and brought down a considerable number of planes in that first raid.

Mr. Murphy. You do not agree with that statement of the Admiral.

General Short. Not entirely. I don't know how he meant it. He may have meant that the full crews were not there. If that is what he meant that is correct.

Mr. Murphy. He also said:

Ships in harbor opened fire very promptly but the first attack was practically unopposed.

Do you agree?

General Short. We knocked down a number of planes in the first attack wave.

Mr. Murphy. You don't agree then with the admiral's statement that the first wave was practically unopposed?

General Short. If he means the dive bombers that came in a distance above the water estimated to have been anywhere from 10 to 200 feet, the torpedo planes, that is probably correct, because nobody fired on them until they were close enough to identify.
Mr. Murphy. Now, General—

General Short. I have, Mr. Murphy, a radio report here by General Martin, commanding the Air Corps, on the 7th, which was a little more detailed than the one I read.

Mr. Murphy. I will ask counsel and the liaison officer if they will assemble a report, the reports from Hawaii from the Army on what happened on December 7.

General Short. Yes, sir.

May I interject one other thing?

Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir.

General Short. Colonel Phillips, who is in the audience, the chief of staff, says that a detailed report was made about the 10th or 11th in written form.

Mr. Murphy. You say that Colonel Phillips made a detailed report?

General Short. I signed the report but he remembers more of the details.

Mr. Murphy. But did Colonel Phillips know what went on between you and Admiral Kimmel?

General Short. I think he knew anything of importance.

Mr. Murphy. He testified that he didn’t, didn’t he?

General Short. No, no; I wouldn’t say that. I would like to have you read that testimony.

Mr. Murphy. Well, let’s get down to that exactly. The [8347] fact is that one Phil Hayes—was he a general or colonel?

General Short. He was a colonel.

Mr. Murphy. Colonel Phil Hayes was your chief of staff up to November 1 of 1941; isn’t that correct?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. And every time you had a meeting with the Navy you took your chief of staff with you?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. Then on November 6 you got Colonel Phillips as your chief of staff and you never brought him to the Navy meetings with you; isn’t that correct?

General Short. Yes, sir. Do you wish me to make an explanation on that?

Mr. Murphy. Yes, why you wouldn’t have your chief of staff in your conferences with the other branch.

General Short. Colonel Hayes had been there for 3 or 4 years. He knew all the Navy people and had been present at all these conferences. I took him because I thought he had considerable background of what had gone on before. At the same time that Colonel Hayes had been attending conferences with me Major Fleming had been carrying on a great deal of the liaison work with the Navy and I thought he had more of a background than my new chief of staff.

For that reason, the fact that he was an unusually keen [8348] able officer, with a remarkable memory, I thought he would know a great deal about the things that Colonel Hayes had participated in.

Mr. Murphy. In other words, Major Fleming, who was in daily contact with the District Engineer in Honolulu and in contact with the civilian engineer and in contact with the engineer at San Francisco and was one of your—

General Short. May I add, his contact with the engineer in San Francisco was through the District Engineer in Honolulu.
Mr. Murphy. At any rate, he was one of your engineers, in contact daily with the civilian authorities in Honolulu, and with the District Engineer, and when you were discussing matters subsequent to November 27 instead of having your own chief of staff with you you took one of the members of G-4, your engineer, with you?

General Short. Because I thought he had more background. He had a background over a considerable period. He knew probably most everything that Colonel Hayes had known for the last year.

Mr. Murphy. How was your chief of staff ever to learn or ever to know or ever to understand if you were taking the engineer to the conferences instead of your chief of staff?

General Short. I explained to the chief of staff anything of importance.

[8349] Mr. Murphy. But the chief of staff never saw these messages of the Navy, did he?

General Short. Yes, I am sure that the important ones were delivered to him; copies of the important ones he did see.

Mr. Murphy. Did he at any time engage in conversation where you had Admiral Kimmel in conversation?

General Short. After November 27, in those few conferences, he was not present.

Mr. Murphy. He was not present at any conference after the war warning. Was he ever present at any conference between you and the Navy from the time he became your chief of staff on November 6?

General Short. He was not present at formal conferences. He was present at a considerable number of informal conferences where Admiral Kimmel and I talked.

Mr. Murphy. And the chief of staff, who was never present at any formal conference between you and the Navy, was the only person you talked to before you decided on alert No. 1?

General Short. Yes, sir; because I considered him the best informed man on the staff.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, you considered him the best informed man, but yet you never took him to the conferences.

General Short. May I put in here, that when you consider [8350] a chief of staff you must not consider him on only one phase. I would like to compare slightly Colonel Hayes and Colonel Phillips. Colonel Hayes was an excellent administrative man. He had had dealings with the Navy over considerable periods of time. Colonel Phillips was a far more competent man on field work and training. A far more competent man.

Mr. Murphy. Isn't it so—excuse me, go ahead.

General Short. This November 27, if anything was going to come of it, it was going to come of it as field work.

Mr. Murphy. That is the trouble. It was going to come of it as field work.

General Short. If anything came he was the more competent.

Mr. Murphy. In other words, you were field-work conscious. weren't you?

General Short. I am talking fighting.

Mr. Murphy. Are you talking about the air, though? I don't mean about the infantry.

General Short. He knew more than any staff officer I had of the fighting, the combined army.
Mr. Murphy. How could he when he is presiding as chief of staff over a staff conference of your organization intelligently discuss with your staff what was going on if he wasn't in conferences where the two services got together?

[8351] General Short. I think I had better explain how those conferences were conducted.

Mr. Murphy. I wish you would, and will you—

Senator Ferguson. I don't think the witness had completed his answer.

The Vice Chairman. Let him finish his question first.

Mr. Murphy. I wish you would discuss that. General, I don't want to interrupt. But in that connection I wish you would tell us what staff conference, if any, was had by the Army between November 27 and the date of the attack.

[8352] General Short. The conferences were habitually held on Saturday morning.

Mr. Murphy. Was there one held on December the 6th?

General Short. There was.

Mr. Murphy. All right. Now go ahead.

General Short. And the chief of staff conducted these conferences but he did not do all the talking. Each staff officer, the head of each section was called upon in turn. If he had anything of interest or importance he discussed it. If the Chief of Staff had anything to add to it, or if some other section of the general staff was interested in the thing and had some additional information it was brought in.

Mr. Murphy. You say there was a conference—

The Vice Chairman. Does that complete our answer, General?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. All right.

Mr. Murphy. Now, there was a staff conference on December 6, 1941?

General Short. There was.

Mr. Murphy. And who were present at it, General?

General Short. I think—I was not present at it but I am sure that all of the general staff and probably the special staff were present at it.

Mr. Murphy. Well, you were not present, at any rate, to give them the benefit of what you knew about what the Navy knew, isn't that right?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. And there was no one else in your organization who discussed anything from a staff standpoint with Admiral Kimmel, was there?

General Short. I am sure that Phillips knew anything of importance that I knew.

Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate, you said there was no one—

General Short. He was present.

Mr. Murphy. You said before he was not.

General Short. Oh, yes. He conducted the conference.

Mr. Murphy. Oh, no; I beg your pardon, we are misunderstanding each other. Phillips, your chief of staff, was not at the formal conferences with the Navy?

General Short. No, sir; he was not.
Mr. Murphy. That is right. Now, then, he is the one presiding over the staff conference and yet he had not been present at the conferences with the other service, isn’t that correct?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

General Short. That is correct, but he knew what had taken place.

Mr. Murphy. He knew only what you told him, isn’t that right?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. And he never saw the reports as such or what went on or did not have the benefit of looking over these people as they discussed things and sizing them up. He took what you told him about what went on; isn’t that correct?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, do you know whether the man from the engineers was requested by the staff conference to give his impressions as to what went on at the conference?

General Short. I don’t know whether he gave his impression or not. He was there and if he thought there was anything that needed to be added I am sure that he would have added it.

Senator Lucas. Will the Congressman yield right on that point for one question?

Mr. Murphy. Yes; surely.

Senator Lucas. General Short, did Colonel Phillips know about the war-warning message that came from the Navy?

General Short. Oh, I am sure he did because that message—it happens that that particular message was not delivered to me personally. I think, but delivered to the G-3 section and unquestionably he brought it to me from the G-3 section.

Senator Lucas. It is your opinion that he saw that message?

General Short. I am confident that he knew exactly what was in the message.

Mr. Murphy. I thought, General, that Layton testified—oh, that was the 24th. I beg your pardon—no; I thought it was Layton who testified that he delivered that war-warning message to you personally.

General Short. I may be confused but I think the message of the 24th was delivered to me personally but that the message of the 27th was delivered to Colonel or Major Donnegan in charge of the G-3 section. It might have been the other way around, but I do not think so.

Mr. Murphy. Now I wish you would turn to page 534 of the Army Pearl Harbor board hearings. I would like to read question 838:

General Grunert. One question, here. Somewhere in my notes, here, I have something to the effect that your Chief of Staff, Colonel Phillips, stated that he was not informed as to what took place at your conferences with the Admiral. Did you keep him informed, or did you discuss with him what happened?

General Short. Anything of any importance, I am sure I discussed with him. We were on a very friendly personal basis—

you are meaning there that you were on a very friendly basis with your own chief of staff?

General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Murphy. Yes. [Reading:]

—and I am sure that if I picked up any piece of information that I thought was of any importance—and I know that I talked to him about certain task forces, because when it came to sending an officer along, why, he would be the one that would get out the order.

Now, that was a very accurate statement as far as what Phillips knew as to what the Navy was doing?

General Short. That is a correct statement.

Mr. Murphy. Then you told him whatever you thought was of importance?

General Short. That is a correct statement.

Mr. Murphy. And you then attended meetings with the Navy on November the 27th and December the 1st and December the 2d and December the 3d, and then a meeting between Major Fleming and Colonel Pfeiffer on December the 4th where there were many Navy men present, at least at some of the meetings and not your own chief of staff; isn't that right?

General Short. I don't know who was present between Major Fleming and Colonel Pfeiffer. On December 2 there was nobody but Admiral Kimmel and me. On December 3 in all probability Admiral Bloch was there; I don't remember definitely and I do not know what additional naval officers were there. I think in all probability that Major Fleming was with me, although General Martin may have been.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, I would like to ask you to turn to page 522 of the same record, question 790:

General Grunert. The notes on the testimony before the Roberts Commission indicates that General Wilson, commanding the 24th Division, was never called in conference or consulted regarding the warning message of November 27th.

Was that a correct statement?

General Short. I sent a staff officer the afternoon I received the message to General Wilson to explain exactly what was in the message. I did not scatter copies around on account of limiting the strictly secret information as I had been directed.

General Wilson had the north sector, which was much less populated than the south sector and where we feared much less subversive measures or sabotage. There were practically no changes made in the alert, in the sabotage alert as prescribed in our standing operating procedure in General Wilson's sector.

On the other hand, in General Murray's sector, the south sector, as a result of inspections by General Murray and by Colonel Fielder we very largely revamped the guard system in that sector, which was the more dangerous of the two sectors.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, General, General Wilson said he was never consulted about the war warning, and that is a correct statement.

General Short. But he does not say that he did not have the message, intelligence on the message of November 27. A staff officer was personally sent to him to explain.

Mr. Murphy. Well, do you know that.

General Short. I do know it; yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Who did explain it to him?
General Short. I do not know the name of the staff officer. I directed that the staff officers be sent and I know they were sent.

Mr. Murphy. Well, let me read you a little bit more.

General Short. Did he say he got it from the Division Officer?

[8359] General Grunert. He said he was never consulted.

General Short. He had the north sector where the antisabotage work was not nearly as serious. While I had repeated conferences with Murray, I may not have had any with Wilson.

General Grunert. Wilson thought the Navy had an inshore and offshore patrol. Why was he not instructed and informed?

General Short. His job was quite different from that of the other divisions. While I had repeated conferences with Murray, and I had Murray personally inspect every post and he came back to me with recommendations and made a lot of changes—

General Grunert (interposing). That was in connection with your alert 1?

General Short. Yes.

General Grunert. But in connection with the possibility of his giving advice as to any other alert, he, Wilson, did not have any information?

General Short. I did not have any conference with him as to whether he wanted to advise me as to something different.

Now, at any rate, General, Wilson was not at that meeting on Saturday morning, December 6, was he?


Mr. Murphy. Now, then, let us come to Colonel Fielder, at the bottom of page 522, question 795. Colonel Fielder. he was your G-2, wasn’t he?

General Short. Yes, sir.

General Grunert. Colonel Fielder says he discussed the possibility of an attack with the Commanding General in a purely academic way. I do not quite understand how there is anything academic about discussing the possibility of an attack.

General Short. I do not. We discussed the possibility, probably because he was G-2 and was supposed to have some information.

Do you know whether or not G-2—what he meant by “a purely academic way”?

General Short. I do not know why he used that terminology, but he had more information on sabotage than anybody in the department. He had a very thorough understanding of it.

Mr. Murphy. About sabotage?

General Short. And any internal disorders and was supposed to know more about what the Japanese population in Hawaii were doing and thinking than anybody in the department.

Mr. Murphy. That was covered very well by everybody, but what about the air warning and the messages of the Navy? [8361] Why didn’t he see that or why was he left out of that conference with the Navy?

General Short. Because we had no message of an air warning.

Mr. Murphy. Well, the Navy had McMorris there, didn’t they, their war plans man? He was their war plans man, wasn’t he, McMorris?

General Short. He was the war plans man.

Mr. Murphy. Yes. Why didn’t you have your war plans man there if you were going to have a conference?

General Short. It was entirely up to me whom to bring. McMorris I do not think was—I am not sure but I do not think he was in on the conference all the time. He was immediately available where Admiral
Kimmel could call him in. That was true of all of Admiral Kimmel's staff. I took with me to that conference General Martin, who was the head of my air force, and Colonel Mollison, who was his chief of staff. This was an air conference. They were the two best men, the two best informed men in the department on the situation. It was perfectly logical to take them.

Mr. Murphy. General, you say it was an air conference but it had nothing to do with the message of November the 27th, did it?

General Short. Not directly because we had not received the message.

Mr. Murphy. That is right; you did not get that message until some time around 2 o'clock in the afternoon and this meeting in the morning for about 3 hours was about something else entirely, wasn't it?

General Short. But it necessarily covered all the elements of danger because the conference was about the reinforcement of Midway and Wake by Army planes, but we had discussed the danger connected with the reinforcement and the danger connected with lessening the air equipment at Oahu.

Mr. Murphy. Did you ever at any time between November the 27th and December the 7th have your staff and the naval staff together to discuss the war warning?

General Short. There never was any time that I know of, and I have not heard of any time in the past, where the complete Army and Navy staff were assembled. If any previous commander ever did so I never heard of it.

Mr. Murphy. Now, your key officers, did you assemble them, I mean your G-3 and your G-2?

General Short. We did not.

Mr. Murphy. Now, I direct your attention to page 525, question 803. Do you have that General, at the bottom of the page?

General Short. Yes, sir.

[8363] General Grunert. "Lt. Col. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, informed the staff at a meeting on December 6 that the Japs were burning papers on December 5. Says it meant that war was imminent, to him." Did he so inform his Chief of Staff or his Commanding General? If so, what conclusions were reached with regard to it?

General Short. I am sure he didn't inform me.

Mr. Murphy. As a matter of fact, General, you did not see him about that until the next day, did you?

General Short. Well, I think that I did not but both my G-2, Colonel Fielder, and my chief of staff, Colonel Phillips, stated in their testimony before the Roberts commission that they did inform me that they were burning papers. Colonel Fielder also stated to the Roberts commission that he attached no importance to it because we did the same every day and he thought it was a routine burning of papers.

Mr. Murphy. Well, the fact is, General, that you did testify here and again in these hearings that you did not know about that until the next day.

General Short. All right, will you give me the quotations?

Mr. Murphy. All right. Now, you say that you did not testify on several occasions—

General Short. I am asking you to give me the quotations where I did testify.  

[8364]
Mr. Murphy. I will.

Mr. Keefe. Why not do it now? You said you were going to do it half a dozen times and you haven't done it. I would like to get it while the General is being interrogated on the subject.

Mr. Murphy. Be calm; I have the references here and I have a thousand pages here. I promise you I will.

General Short. I would like to have the references so that I can judge which one it was.

Mr. Murphy. I cannot turn to it right now, but I will later.

Now, your assistant G-2 said he thought that the burning of papers meant that war was imminent. You were not at the staff conference. Did anybody tell you; did your assistant G-2 tell you on December the 6th that he thought war was imminent and about that being discussed at the conference?

General Short. Not the assistant G-2; he did not tell me that. G-2 says he told me that they had been burning papers and he apparently—he had heard the talk and the report of the assistant G-2. He apparently did not consider it a matter of importance, and I wish to invite your attention to one thing further.

Bicknell said he got this information on the 5th. \[8365\] If he had considered it so terrifically important he would not wait till the morning of the 6th to report it.

Mr. Murphy. All I know, General, is that here is one of your staff saying under oath that he thought that war was imminent and that he discussed it at a staff meeting and you do not go to the staff meeting and apparently nobody tells you that in that staff meeting there was a feeling that war was imminent on the part of at least one person there, isn't that right?

General Short. And he also stated that he received the information on December 5 and apparently he did not tell Colonel Fielder and he did not tell me, which would not indicate that he attached such great importance to see that we got it.

Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate he was right, wasn't he?

General Short. He was right in that respect. He was a much less experienced man than the G-2.

Mr. Murphy. Now, may I ask counsel, do you have handy exhibit 37; the basic exhibit?

Mr. Masten. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. Now I direct your attention to exhibit No. 37—the last paper. I think I can make it clear to the general; it is just a one-sentence dispatch.

General, on December 6, 1941, there was sent from \[8366\] COM Fourteen, "ACTION: OpNav," Information for the Navy:

Believe local Consul has destroyed all but one system although presumably not included your eighteen double five of third.

Did you have any information from the Navy that they had sent word to Washington that the Japs at Honolulu were destroying their systems?

General Short. I did not.

Mr. Murphy. Now, did you have any information from the Navy that on December the 6th a message was sent to Admiral Kimmel:

In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific Islands you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and con-
Did the Navy tell you about that?
General Short. They did not.
Mr. Murphy. You were not in any conference on any day from the third on, were you, with the Navy?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Murphy. Right. Did you know from the Navy that they had a dispatch on the 4th of December about destroying confidential publications and other matters at Guam?
General Short. I did not.
Mr. Murphy. Did you know from the Navy that on the 4th of December—I beg your pardon. On the 4th of December—rather, the 3d of December that there was a message sent to them—and this is important in view of your testimony, General:

Circular Twenty Four Forty Four from Tokyo One December ordered London Hong Kong Singapore and Manila to destroy Machine XX Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo XX December second Washington also directed destroy X All but one copy of other systems X and all secret documents XX British Admiralty London today reports Embassy London has complied.

The Navy did not tell you about that either, did they?
General Short. They did not.
Mr. Murphy. Did you know from the Navy that on the 3d of December they had a message:

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

Did you get that either, General?
General Short. I did not.
Mr. Murphy. Now, General, as I read your testimony in the other hearings you testified that if you had received the one p.m. message that there were two matters in the message, one the ultimatum, the date, the 1 o'clock hour, and the other about the destruction of the codes and you said that that would have much more importance to you than the 1 o'clock business, is that right?

General Short. Will you restate that, because I do not believe you made your meaning clear.
Mr. Murphy. All right. Will you read the question?
(The question was read by the reporter.)
Mr. Murphy. Do you understand that?
General Short. The 1 o'clock business included both; that is the reason I did not understand your question.
Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate did you attach great importance to the information about the destruction of the codes or to the fact that there was a 1 o'clock hour set?
General Short. It would have been a combination of both.
Mr. Murphy. Did you testify before the Navy—excuse me, I don’t mean to interrupt.

[8369] General Short. I think you are misquoting me again.
Mr. Murphy. Again I am misquoting you?
General Short. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. Well, then, General, I guess I had better quote you exactly so that I won't be accused of that after this hearing.

General Short. All right, sir.

Mr. Murphy. I want to be eminently fair with you, but I want the facts. When did I misquote you before, General?

General Short. When you have read from the—I cannot say exactly when but a number of times you have made a statement that I think did not coincide exactly with my testimony.

Mr. Murphy. You think I misquoted you?

General Short. I don't mean intentional at all, but when we quote without reading it is pretty hard to state definitely what has been said.

Mr. Murphy. Well, I will quote you exactly, General. I now refer to page 256 of your testimony before the Navy Court of Inquiry.

General Short. 256?

Mr. Murphy. 256, General; question 179.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Question mark. Period.

General, would you have made a very quick re- [8370] estimate of the situation and have ordered such an alert had you had that scrambled telephone conversation with General Marshall?

A. I think I would because one thing struck me forcibly in there, about the destruction of the code machines. The other matter wouldn't have made an impression on me. But when you destroy your codes or code machines, you are going into an entirely new phase. I would have had this advantage also: I could have asked him the significance to him. But leaving that out, the code machine would have been very significant, the destruction of the code machine would have been very significant to me. I would have been very much more alarmed about that than the other matter.

General, would that be misquoting you by what I said about that message?

General Short. You may have drawn the wrong inference from my answer.

Mr. Murphy. What did you mean by that?

General Short. I meant by that just the delivery of the ultimatum, because at previous times they had stated that the negotiations were practically terminated. I was not talking about the 1 p. m. I was talking about the ultimatum.

Mr. Murphy. General, you say you were not talking about [8371] the 1 o'clock message?

General Short. Not the hour. In my statement there I was comparing the importance in my own mind of the statement that the code machines were ordered destroyed and the statement that the ultimatum—that an ultimatum was to be delivered, not the hour of the ultimatum but that an ultimatum was to be delivered; that is what I had in mind.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, General, you were saying that the code-machine business was very significant to you; isn't that right?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. Right. And the fact is that the Navy on the 3d and the 6th had several messages about code destruction and then this from your own Honolulu to Washington on the 6th sent a message to Washington; isn't that so?

General Short. Let me get your last statement.

Mr. Murphy. On the 6th they sent a message to Washington about the destruction of the system?
General Short. Who did?
Mr. Murphy. The Navy.
General Short. I believe that that is correct, but I knew nothing about any one of them.
Mr. Murphy. Well, let me quote it correctly so that we won't have any charges against me that I am misquoting. [\text{8372}] I do not want to misquote you.
General Short. Yes, sir; I have the message that they sent on the 6th.
Mr. Murphy. Well, I will read it exactly:

Believe local Consul has destroyed all but one system although presumably not included your eighteen double five of third.

Do you see that, General?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. And the fact is that you time and again in this hearing have stated that Admiral Kimmel gave you everything of importance; isn't that right?
General Short. No, sir; I said he gave—I was pretty sure that he gave me everything that he considered of importance to me that I should know.
Mr. Murphy. At any rate, you considered these messages important?
General Short. Very important; yes.
Mr. Murphy. And the fact is that they were very important, as you have testified.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. And you and Admiral Kimmel had no conference about the air messages and you say you had no conference with him after the 3d?

[\text{8373}] General Short. The message on the third came in after the conference.
Mr. Murphy. Well, you had no conference?
General Short. We had no conference and I did not get the message.
Mr. Murphy. And it was your understanding that Admiral Kimmel was not to give it to you unless Washington told him to give it to you, is that right?
General Short. I think his practice was definitely to transmit messages, as I said, only when he received instructions from Washington to do so. He might mention the thing to me informally, but he did not transmit the message to me.
Mr. Murphy. Did you know, General, that Admiral Kimmel was getting a lot of information over the months from Manila?
General Short. I think that I knew that he was getting something on location of Japanese intercepts, perhaps, but I did not know of anything else that I remember.
Mr. Murphy. Well, did you know that he got a message from Manila about the winds code?
General Short. No, sir.
Mr. Murphy. He did not pass that on to you either, did he?
General Short. No, sir; I never heard of the winds code for many months afterward.
Mr. Murphy. Well, let me quote exactly. Did you know that there had been sent on the 28th of November from "\text{CINCAF, ACTION OPNAV, INFO: COM SIXTEEN CINCPAC COM FOURTEEN}" a message on the winds code which I believe is already in the record?
General Short. I did not.

Mr. Murphy. Did you know that there was a message on the 1st of December from "COM SIXTEEN, ACTION: CINCAF, INFO: CINCPAC, OPNAV, COM FOURTEEN, 011422", as follows:

J-V-J press tonight in closing seventeen hundred schedule stated quote "All listeners be sure and listen in at zero seven zero zero and zero seven thirty tomorrow morning, since there may be important news" unquote XX Suggest frequencies seven three two seven X Nine four three zero X And one two seven five X Times Tokyo LCT.

Did the Navy ever tell you about that message?

General Short. They did not.

Mr. Murphy. Did you know that Admiral Kimmel subsequent to the 27th of November instituted a 24-hour war plan?

General Short. I don't know what you mean by a "24-hour war plan."

[8375] Mr. Murphy. Well, let me quote exactly. I am referring to exhibit 118 in this record:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., 1200, 30 November, 1941.

Steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese War within the next Twenty-four Hours.

And then subsequently a revision of that on December 5, 1941. Did you know that the Navy had taken those steps?

General Short. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. Murphy. Don't you think if you had had conferences with the Navy where these problems were discussed from November 27 on that you most certainly would have been told about a 24-hour plan that the Navy had?

General Short. That was a later date, I believe, than any of our conferences.

Mr. Murphy. Well, one was the 30th of November.

General Short. The 30th of November.

Mr. Murphy. That is when it was constituted and you had a conference on the first, on the second, on the third and Major Fleming with Colonel Pfeiffer on the fourth.

General Short. That is correct, but I was not told about that.

Mr. Murphy. Well, don't you think you should have been?

[8376] General Short. I have not read the thing. I could not make a statement.

Mr. Murphy. Well, I ask you to look it over now, if you will, General, please. It has been an exhibit for some days [hanging document to the witness].

Have you examined it, General?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Had you any word of that plan?

General Short. I had not.

Mr. Murphy. General, a while ago—oh, I don't want to go off this subject yet. Don't you think you should have been told about the fact that they after the 27th had a 24-hour plan and that on the very 5th of December they had a revision of it?

General Short. I think if you read it carefully that they had two things in there: First, the details of what he was doing to carry out his instructions for a defensive deployment and the next the naval de-
tails of what he expected to do in case that he put war plans—was directed to put War Plans 46 into effect.

I do not believe that he would have thought it necessary to tell me what he expected to do on details of that kind. He possibly would have—he probably would have told me if he had ever—when he put the thing into effect. You see, among other things they are to include the bringing back from the west coast another carrier and he undoubtedly did not think that that was a matter—he had not ordered it back, he just contemplated doing it if the war came on. I can see why he did not tell me.

Mr. Murphy. The fact is that he did have 3 or 4 days ahead—may I have it so that I will quote it exactly, please?

General Short. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. He did have a plan called, “Steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese War within the next 24-hours.”

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. And do you or do you not think you should have been told about the creation of that plan on the 30th of November 1941 and the revision on December 5, 1941?

General Short. Looking it over it is practically all details of ship movements, and so forth and I can readily understand why he did not think it directly concerned me.

Mr. Murphy. General, war within 24 hours would very much concern you, wouldn’t it, as the General in Hawaii?

General Short. Yes, sir; but the location of a particular ship might not concern me.

Mr. Murphy. General Marshall did tell you your mission was to protect the base and the naval communications and your first concern was to protect the fleet, didn’t he?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. And wouldn’t you be concerned then if there were going to be war involving the fleet within 24 hours?

General Short. If there was going to be?

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

General Short. Definitely; but I would not necessarily be concerned whether cruiser A was here and B over here, or vice versa.

Mr. Murphy. Would you be concerned whether the fleet was in or out of the harbor?

General Short. Very decidedly.

Mr. Murphy. Wouldn’t the 24-hour plan affect that very decidedly?

General Short. I do not believe as I looked over that paper that there is any provision for the fleet coming in from outside the harbor except to come in long enough to refuel and go out. That provision was there.

Mr. Murphy. Now, General, I wish you would come back to page 525 of the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearings.

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. General Martin was your air officer; isn’t that right?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. Now, will you turn to question 807?

General Grunert. And General Martin did not seem to know that the interceptor command was not activated until December 17.
General Short. Well, the fact was it was actually operating, and there was such a technical difference there that apparently Bergin and Martin, neither one realized it hadn't gone out as an order. It was actually operating daily.

Was there some confusion in Martin's and Bergin's minds about the status of the air warning service?

General Short. I think it was more likely confusion in reference to terms used because I think they both knew that it was actually in operation. The printed order or typed order putting it into operation did not go out until the 17th.

Mr. Murphy. In other words, prior to December the 17th the air warning service was under the control of the Signal Corps and had not yet been turned over to the Air Corps, isn't that right?

General Short. That is not correct.

Mr. Murphy. It is not correct?

General Short. No, sir. They were operating on a basis of cooperation. The control officer in every case was an Air officer. We had not put the whole thing directly under the Air people. The Signal Corps were responsible for the training of the operators and for the training of the men at the information center, but whenever they operated they had an Air officer in control, the control officer was always an Air officer.

Mr. Murphy. Well, the Signal Corps—under the order of the 17th it went under the Air Corps, did it not?

General Short. Even for training, yes, and they were not under it for training previous to that time.

Mr. Murphy. But after the 17th it would be under the exclusive control of General Davidson?

General Short. For training and everything else.

Mr. Murphy. For training and everything else?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Then before the 17th, the Signal Corps was doing the training?

General Short. They were responsible for the training when they operated as part of an interceptor command. The Air control officer actually controlled the whole operation.

Mr. Murphy. Then on page 1103—

General Short. 1163?

Mr. Murphy. No, you do not have this, General. I am now referring to Transcript of Proceedings Before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, pages 973 to 1105, in which I find the following—I do not think there is another copy of this available, General. Will you come up and check me as I am reading it, so I will have it correctly?


Mr. Murphy (reading):

General Russell. You were not to go into action as a pursuit officer until these other people who evaluated the information, had evaluated it, and told you that hostile aircraft was enroute to the Island? That is the situation, isn't it?

Colonel Tyler. That is right, sir.

General Russell. I think it was not your job to evaluate this information?

Colonel Tyler. No, sir; it was not.

Do you know whether or not that is true?

General Short. I will tell you how the thing functioned.
We had an officer from the pursuit squadron right there in the information center. If he looked on the board when this report came in, he should have known exactly where our own planes were, and when a plane was reported at a certain place, and he knew that that was our own plane, then he would not alert pursuit planes.

You see, there was no way at that time for the men operating the oscilloscope saying "This is an enemy plane," or "This is a friendly plane." All he could say is "There is a plane at such and such a place," and it was up to the officer representing the pursuit people to try to determine whether there was any possibility of a friendly plane there before we opened fire, or before we sent someone out to shoot it down.

Mr. Murphy. General, on the floor of Congress, time [8383] after time after time, there have been castigations at this gentleman. I do not know who he is, except his name is Tyler.

As I understand it from reading this record, he was there and his duty was to order these pursuit planes where to go, after he had been told by somebody else that there was a problem that called for that being done.

Is that your understanding?

General Short. If the interceptor command had been operating at 7:20, which it was not, before he had the bomber squadron at Wheeler Field, there would have been a check-up by the pursuit officer to be sure we would not go up and knock down our own planes.

There was nobody at the station at 7:20, as I understand, but a man named McDonald, who was a telephone operator, and Lieutenant Tyler, because the station as such had been closed about 7 o'clock.

[8384] Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate, wasn't it his job to direct the planes from the ground after someone said there was a reason for them to leave the ground?

General Short. Under the circumstances, I will tell you what I think he should have done. He should have called the Pursuit Command at Wheeler Field and they would have made the check then whether they had planes in that vicinity, before they sent anyone up to fire upon them.

Mr. Murphy. As a matter of fact, would not they then have to call you, or somebody else, to reverse alert 1 and put into some other order so that they could take them off the ground?

General Short. No, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Who had the authority to alter alert 1?

General Short. There was a provision in the standing operating procedure that in case of a surprise attack the alert would go automatically into effect. They would notify me after they would put it into effect.

Mr. Murphy. What was he then? A lieutenant? Could a lieutenant do anything about that?

General Short. I beg pardon?

Mr. Murphy. I say he was only a lieutenant. It was Lieutenant Tyler, wasn't it?

General Short. Yes, sir.

[8385] Mr. Murphy. He says at page 1101:

General Russell and you knew the only thing you had to do was to get in touch with the people who could put those planes up, isn't that true?

Colonel Tyler. That is not exactly true, sir, because we had nothing on the alert. We had no planes.
Would he be in error in that respect?

General Short. He would be in error. I have checked that statement of his with General Davidson, who was the pursuit commander at Wheeler Field, and he said there would have been no question, that if he had received a message from Tyler to alert the command he would have turned out everything. He would have immediately checked afterward to find out whether there was justification for it, but the first thing he would have done was to alert the command.

Mr. Murphy. In other words, the second lieutenant would identify the planes as being enemy planes?

General Short. He would not, because he did not have the information there. The station was closed. In normal times there would be a pursuit officer there whose business would be to identify them.

May I call your attention to paragraph 13? I think that will answer you. The last two lines, or part of the last three lines.

[8386] Mr. Murphy (reading):
—will be initiated by Department Order except in the case of a surprise hostile attack.

General Short. In case of a surprise hostile attack it went into effect automatically; it did not have to be put into effect by the Department.

Mr. Murphy. In other words, if this lieutenant knew there were any planes—

General Short (interposing). He could put it into effect by simply calling the Pursuit Command, and they would start operations and then notify me. The first thing they would have done would be to start operations.

Mr. Murphy. Now I direct your attention to page 517, General, of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Question 764:

General Frank. It strikes me that right within the Army itself you had a situation between the Air Force and the Signal Corps where this A. W. S. was operating on a cooperative basis rather than on a positive command basis.

General Short. Because it had not reached a state of training where we thought it could work to the best advantage.

General Frank. But if the vast proportion of the people concerned with its operation were Air Force people—

General Short (interposing). Not the technical operation. The operation of the communications and the radar [8387] system is definitely for the Signal Corps.

That is a correct statement?

General Short. That is absolutely correct. There probably may have been 10 times as many men of the Signal Corps working as of the Air Corps.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, General, we have a letter placed in the record from Admiral Kimmel ordering the Navy not to bunch the planes but to disperse them, and then, as I remember it, the testimony was that the ones that were dispersed and anchored in the bay were destroyed and the ones that were together were not destroyed.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, your planes were bunched, based upon a survey of General Burwell, isn't that correct?

General Short. That is correct. It was a very extensive survey.

Mr. Murphy. I now direct your attention to page 526—by the way,
I will get through in 10 minutes—page 526, question 808:

General GRUNNERT. General Rudolph, the Commanding General of the bombers, stated that had he had any intimation of preceding trouble his planes would not have been bunched or concentrated but would have been ready for the air. Then, in parenthesis, "especially on a Sunday morning" parenthesis.

[8388] Was he not informed by the Commanding General, or the Commanding General of the Air Forces, of the warnings of the immediate past?

General SHORT. I went over the thing very fully with General Martin, talked over with him at as great length as anybody. I would imagine that he talked with his subordinate commanders.

Would that be a proper subject for discussion at that meeting on Saturday morning?

General SHORT. No, sir; I mean General Rudolph was not present at that meeting.

Mr. MURPHY. At any rate, General Martin, if General Rudolph was telling the truth, should have passed on the message to him, is that right?

General SHORT. He should have passed on the message to him. I do not know whether he did or not. I would like to read General Martin's report, what he says about that in his report to the War Department.

Mr. MURPHY. I wish you would.

General SHORT. I would also say, in view of General Burwell's extensive study—in the first place, General Rudolph could not have dispersed those B-17's because you did not dare take them off the runways, the ground was so soft that you would have never gotten them into the air if [8389] you had.

I would like to read this: 8 December 1941.

CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES,

Washington, D. C.:

More specific information on questions asked by General Arnold: Command alerted prevention sabotage required concentration rather than dispersion Stop All planes now dispersed comma pursuit in bunkers Stop Bombers cannot be bunkered on account of soft ground off runways Stop Local joint agreement places responsibility for search on Navy who may call on Army for help when thought necessary Stop Planes in ferry flight all land Oahu two landed small fields and were badly damaged comma one destroyed by gunfire and one badly damaged Stop Attack so perfectly executed surprise attack in strict accord with our prescribed tactics Stop Dive bomber was highly accurate Stop Every effort made with the bombers left to locate carriers without success Stop Casualties dead six officers two hundred seven enlisted men comma wounded some seriously three hundred and sixty-seven enlisted men Stop Morale high.

MARTIN.

Mr. MURPHY. Now, General, will you kindly go to page 524 of the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearing, question 800:

General GRUNNERT. You had a conference once a week. [8390] What did you confer on if it were not what the condition of things was and what should or should not be done, and so forth? I do not know whether this is the truth, but that is what is in the record, and we will question about it.

General SHORT. Undoubtedly that is correct. Burgin was not in on the weekly conferences. I did confer with the staff.

General GRUNNERT. Then the weekly conference was a staff conference and not a conference with subordinate commanders?

General SHORT. No. We had a conference with subordinate commanders on irregular occasions, whenever there was something we thought we should take up with them.

Do you know whether there was a staff conference with the subordinate commanders between November 27 and December 7?

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General Short. I had a conference with General Martin and General Burgin within an hour or an hour and a half after the receipt of the November 27 message. I had probably at least four or five conferences with General Murray, who was commanding the division in the south sector. I do not believe I had a conference with General Wilson in the north sector, because there was nothing in particular that I felt I needed to confer with him about.

Mr. Murphy. General, if you had had all of the radar that you had ordered present, would you have had any different [8391] schedule on Sunday morning, December 7, in view of the situation as it then confronted you?

General Short. In view of the parts situation and in view of the fact that we had to train men, I doubt if I would.

I would like to read you, in that connection, a reference to this spare parts. This is a memorandum made out on yesterday.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
ARMY SERVICE FORCES,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER,
WASHINGTON, 24 JANUARY 1946.

Memorandum:

I have examined the budget estimate for the FY's 1941 and 1942 and, in addition, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the first appropriated funds for the maintenance and operation of Radar sets SCR 270 were in the Third Supplemental Estimate, Fiscal Year 1942, page 35, submitted 13 November 1941, which was approved by the Congress on 17 December 1941. The original planning for these funds was made 10 October 1941 (preliminary estimate, F. Y. 1942).

These appropriated funds were for the operation of this type of set for a period of two hours per day, five days a week, and 50 weeks a year to provide training of [8392] personnel in the operation of this equipment.

That was signed by K. C. Lawton, colonel, Signal Corps.

That shows what the War Department planned their estimate of funds on, and that was 2 hours operation a day 5 days a week.

Mr. Murphy. Now, General, I would like to ask you, if you will—

General Short (interposing). In connection with that, there is a statement here from Major Berquist, now Colonel Berquist, who was our chief control officer and who was one of the two officers who had some training prior to the return of General Davidson and Colonel Powell. This is from volume 10, pages 1197 and 1198 of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. This is a paraphrase and not a direct quotation:

The design of the gasoline engines was defective and we had very serious trouble. We had very serious trouble with electric power failures.

He also said in connection with this number of hours, on page 1197, and again I paraphrase:

Colonel Berquist pointed out that some of the enlisted men had been ruining their eyes because we had to keep them on the radar work too long.

Now he was the man who was actively in charge of the operation of the radar and interceptor command, the man that [8393] we thought had the most knowledge.

Mr. Murphy. Berquist?

General Short. Berquist.

Mr. Murphy. Now in that connection I direct your attention to page 1088 of the hearing before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. You do not have that.

General Gunnett. But if somebody came down there and said "we have got to get this thing going, anything is liable to pop any minute" you might have shortened up the time?
This is General Grunnert questioning Commander Taylor.

General Short. Yes.

Mr. Murphy (reading):

Commander Taylor. I think both Berquist and Taylor had that attitude, but unfortunately we could not get that much information out of the people we dealt with.

General Grunnert. Could not Berquist or Powell, or you, as far as the Navy was concerned, have had access to the Chief of Staff and said, "The most important thing is lacking. We have got to get it in"?

Commander Taylor. We saw the Chief of Staff, but we found that somebody else was always responsible.

General Grunnert. So they were not sufficiently impressed to make this their business or push it in comparison with all the other things they had to do?

[8394] Commander Taylor. No, sir; they lacked the power packs to get it going.

General Grunnert. General Short expressed himself as most concerned about getting this in. It seems to me if you had approached him he would have been able to do something about it. Do you know whether or not permanent radar equipment had been on the island awaiting construction projects such as roads, cables, and so forth?

Commander Taylor. It could be, sir; but not according to the Signal Corps. My information is from the Signal Corps Officers on the station.

Do you know whether or not that is a correct statement?

General Short. Commander Taylor was a naval officer and probably did not know as much about the details of what was required and what had not been received as Colonel Powell would have known. There was one thing that we had definitely not received. I think it was sent from the States about December 10 or 12. That was the plans for the erection of the radar towers. The engineer could not go ahead and erect those towers until he got the plans of the footings that had been provided for in the specifications in the States, and those were not received until after the attack.

Mr. Murphy. I understand he is talking here, General, about the air warning service that was operating.

[8395] General Short. As far as that is concerned, as I pointed out yesterday, on the station at Haleakula, in the park, the negotiations with the park people lasted from June 1940 to April 1941, and I personally had a conference with the head of the park system before we got that straightened out. So we were not asleep at the switch.

Mr. Murphy. I am thoroughly familiar with that. You made every effort, and you had your difficulties, but, as I understand it, Commander Taylor is talking about the mobile sets. He may be talking about the permanent sets, but I am not sure.

General Short. I am talking about the permanent sets.

Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir. He says this:

General Grunnert. There was one remark that set me back when I saw it in your testimony. You said you never saw Short. Was he not the commanding general and was he not around there?

Commander Taylor. I saw his Chief of Staff. I saw his Operations Officer. We were very closely tied in with his staff and the Air Force staff.

General Short. May I state there that Commander Taylor being a naval officer, a junior naval officer, may not have felt that he could come to me, but I am sure Colonel Powell, my signal officer, told him he could come to me any time, and he was the man who was responsible, although Taylor was helping him out.
Mr. Murphy. Now I want to conclude, General, by asking you to go to the supplemental part of the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearing.

General Short. We have it here. Is it part of the Roberts commission?

Mr. Murphy. Yes. Now, the bottom of page 1619, the fifth paragraph up, beginning, "Now, General."

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy (reading):

The Chairman. Now, General, have you in mind the contents of General Marshall's message of the morning of December 7? You have in mind its content, have you?

General Short. You mean the one—

The Chairman. That never reached you.

General Short. That didn't come until 2:58; yes, sir. I know exactly what it was.

The Chairman. If that message had reached you, let us say, three hours before the attack, would that have changed your dispositions?

General Short. Yes. Oh, yes. I would have gone immediately to either—to at least an alert against an air attack, and I probably would have gone against a complete attack, because it looked so significant.

[8397] The Chairman. Well, can you tell me what was in that message that would have stirred you up?

General Short. The thing that would have affected me more than the other matter was the fact that they had ordered their code machines destroyed, because to us that means just one thing; that they are going into an entirely new phase, and that they want to be perfectly sure that the code will not be broken for a minimum time, say of 3 or 4 days. That would have been extremely significant to me, the code machine, much more significant than just the ultimatum.

That was what I was referring to a while ago.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, if the Navy had given you that information on any of those days about the codes, you probably would have gone into a more serious alert; is that right?

General Short. Yes, sir. It would have been very significant. I would like to call your attention to the fact that when I made this statement about the ultimatum that I had no conception of what that ultimatum consisted of as magic as shown us. Here I found out how serious it was. At that time I had no idea what it was.

Mr. Murphy. But, General, all we are interested in [8398] is what you knew on December 7. Not hindsight.

General Short. Yes, sir. That is the reason for my making the statement. I did not know the seriousness of what the War Department had received.

Mr. Murphy. Now, you will recall that I said I would show you in the transcript where you said you hadn't seen the information until the next day.

Will you come to the next question?

General McCoy. Didn't you have on the night of the 6th a bit of information from your intelligence officer that they were burning the consular records?

General Short. No, sir, I did not know anything about that until probably the afternoon of the 7th, that they had. I think that he did get some information that they had burned something.

General McCoy. It was not given to you?

General Short. It was not given to me.

Isn't that what I said before?
General Short. As I have explained, I may have, in the first part, thought that he meant the information given me the following day about burning codes, and at that time I did not remember, as I have stated, about the burning of papers, but after reading the testimony of Colonel Fielder and Colonel Phillips, I am sure the report was made to me of the burning of the papers on Saturday morning of the 6th.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, you did say at page 1620:

As a matter of fact, I didn’t know that they had really burned anything until the time that the FBI arrested them on the 7th; they interrupted the burning. I wasn’t cognizant of the fact that they had burned the previous day.

You did say that?

General Short. I believed that at the time. When I later saw the chief of staff, I knew that my memory was at fault. I am perfectly willing to accept your statement.

Mr. Murphy. General McCoy did say:

And you would consider that a serious slip on the part of your intelligence officer, then?

General Short. Well, that is a little questionable, General, because we burn every day. Any secret stuff that we are destroying, we burn to be sure that there is no chance of helping somebody break the code, and I wouldn’t have been surprised if the Japanese consul’s office was burning every day. It wouldn’t have surprised me at all to learn that they habitually burned everything in their waste-baskets every day. I don’t know that I would have gotten terribly excited about just the burning of the stuff in the waste baskets. I would expect it.

General McCoy. But the fact is that that did not come to you.

General Short. That did not come to me, no, sir. I learned the next day that when they arrested the consul and the assistant consul, they interrupted the burning of a file.

Now, General, I am asking you this question simply because it was passed on to me. Did somebody from the FBI call you on the night of December 6th and ask to see you before you went to a social affair at Schofield Barracks?

General Short. No, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Did you talk to anybody in the FBI that night?

General Short. No, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Did you on the night of the 6th tell anybody that they were “too security minded” anybody in the FBI?

General Short. No, sir; I talked to no one. I did talk to Colonel Bicknell, who had information from the FBI.

Mr. Murphy. That was to Bicknell and Fielder at your house?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. You were at a social affair at Schofield Barracks, some kind of a relief proposition, on the night of the 6th?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. And the Air Corps had a party that evening but not in this building?

General Short. On an entirely different post.

Mr. Murphy. At a different post?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now I come to page 1622, the third paragraph:

General McCoy. And, as I remember it, you had in mind, however, not any fear of an attack at that time, and that you were trying to get warning of that, but that you were trying to get the personnel accustomed to the worst time, the most dangerous time?
General Short. Frankly, that is more nearly correct, that I was more serious about the training, rather than expecting something to happen at that time.

That would be about the radar?
General Short. About all material.
Mr. Murphy. About everything.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Right.

[8402] Now, then, General, I come down to page 1622, the bottom of the page. The other day I made some statement about the radar being on a volunteer basis, and at that time you felt that wasn't correct. I believe you said yesterday that it was on a more or less voluntary basis?

General Short. It was, as far as Sunday was concerned.
Mr. Murphy. That is what I meant.
General Short. And over hours. They were working more than the prescribed hours.
Mr. Murphy. I think this will answer it squarely. I direct your attention to the question at the bottom of the page.

Admiral Standley. In one of the affidavits made by your officers, the affidavit of Grover C. White, the Second Lieutenant, Signal Corps, he says, "On Saturday, December 6, 1941, I contacted the Control Officer to request authority to have all stations operate from 4 a.m. to 7 a.m. only, December 7, 1941."

General Short. Yes, sir.
Admiral Standley. "This was agreed to by the Control Officer." Have you any information as to why that request was made that way on that Saturday?

General Short. I haven't any information except I had ordered these stations to work only from four until 7 o'clock, seven, and then they were supposed to carry on routine training for the rest of the day. In agreement, they had gotten together and decided that if they carried on until 11 o'clock in the morning as a body, they would get more out of it than they would if they went on their own after 7 o'clock, and they had agreed among themselves that they would carry on the training three teams at a time until 11 o'clock and from there on to four they would be on their own and making repairs, and things of that kind. So that since I had not ordered that, and they were doing it by agreement, they apparently thought that they could eliminate it on Sunday, by agreement. That's the only way I can account for it.

The Chairman. In other words, they were not going to do the training after 7 o'clock on Sunday?
General Short. On Sunday. They had agreed that just on Sunday alone, in place of working right straight through, they would stop at 7 o'clock on Sunday.
Admiral Standley. We have a great many coincidences in this incident here on the 7th.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Admiral Standley. And this is one of them. I was trying to see if there was any reason why that request was made on that Saturday, not to work after 7 o'clock in the morning on Sunday.
General Short. I think it was only because it was Sunday, and they were working every day practically from 4 o'clock in the morning until four o'clock in the afternoon, making a good long training day, and then they decided that on Sunday they would chop off Sunday hours, the only way I can figure it. They were working 12 hours a day the other days.

Then, the next question:
Admiral Standley. General, under the date of 5 November, 1941, you issued a Standing Operating Procedure. That was signed by Adjutant General Colonel Robert H. Dunlop, and you stated that copies of this were furnished the Navy.

In that connection. General, the Army have testified that they did not get a copy of your standing operating procedure of November 5 until sometime in early 1942.
Do you know whether or not that is correct?
General Short. I have no way of knowing. The Army regulations at that time had a prescribed distribution of every order that we issued, every paper of any kind the Adjutant General was supposed to mail to Washington without letter of transmittal, these various things, to meet the Army regulations. The only record that was made of the mailing of these things was when the document was secret and this was not a secret document. I have talked with General Dunlop, who is here in town, and was Adjutant General, and he says the fact that it was distributed by the Adjutant General to all of the units in the department would make him sure that he must have sent it to Washington, but there would be no record of that, because it wasn't secret.

Now I have a copy of the Army regulations in effect at that time, and it mentions only corps areas, but the department that worked on the same basis as corps areas, applied it to them, and we habitually mailed these prescribed copies of whatever we got out.

Mr. Murphy. I don't think it particularly material anyhow. I was just going into it to clear up the record.

General Short. I would be glad to put this in the record as an exhibit.

Mr. Murphy. What I say is this: Alert No. 1 could not be confusing because you didn't say that; you said sabotage.

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. The fact is the Army, and I am just trying to clear the record, said they didn't get it until 1942, but I don't think it would make any difference one way or the other, whether they had it or not.

General Short. Hawaii cannot prove whether they did or not, because there are no records.

Mr. Murphy. Now, as to the AWS, I agree the record says it is by cooperation, but I refer you to page 1628, and I was only quoting you when I made the statement I did:

General Short. I hadn't definitely—we hadn't given it a definite organization. It was working, but we waited to bring out the orders until General Davidson got back from the mainland, so we would not have to revise that. We were working informally.

Admiral Standley. But is was still working under the Signal Corps at that time?

General Short. Yes, sir.

That is what I had reference to.

General Short. My answer there was not—as far as aircraft warning service, not the interceptor command, but specifically the aircraft warning service, that was entirely a Signal function, and I may have made the answer on that account.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, I was quoting a pretty good witness.

General Short. The combined thing was a combination worked by cooperation.

Mr. Murphy. Then I want to come to page 1633, the third last paragraph from the bottom of the page:

General Short. Frankly, I do not know how much search the Navy made, as that whole business of search was tied in between the ships and the planes, and it was their responsibility, and I do not know when their task forces—as I say, they have two task forces out at the time. I don't know what instructions their
task forces had as to search. I assume that whenever their task force went out, if it located Japanese ships, it would report them.

Admiral Standley. But as for the search from Oahu itself, which in wartime was to be an all-around search, did you know that that was not being carried out daily?

General Short. I didn't know just what the Navy were doing, frankly. I knew they had task forces out and I assumed any searching they did was tied in with the task forces.

You made that statement?

General Short. May I say Admiral Standley's statement where he says that they were supposed to make a complete all-around search from Oahu would never be correct, because they would use the perimeter from Wake to Johnston-Wake to Midway so as to get the most economical use of their planes.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, the war plan called for a 360-degree search, but they couldn't do it?

General Short. No, sir. If the Navy had been gone, and the Army had to do this, if we hadn't occupied the outlying islands, we would have had to do it from Oahu.

Mr. Murphy. Now, page 1634:

Admiral Reeves. It seems to me, General, that the reconnaissance search and the radar search are absolutely parallel in locating possible ships at sea. One was a longer range affair than the other, but otherwise there was no difference whatever.

General Short. Oh, there should be—they would be tied in.

Admiral Reeves. It seems to me that prior to any hostile or air—or declaration of war, that neither of these procedures was being operated regularly day after day.

General Short. They were being operated as a training matter, Admiral, rather than as a real intelligence service just combing the ocean.

Admiral Reeves. Yes.

[8409] General Short. Now, I say I do not know just exactly what the Naval instructions were, but I know that was true from our point of view, that we were operating as a training proposition.

Admiral Reeves. Your failure to operate the radar after 7 a.m., was that in any way dependent on the fact that you thought the Navy reconnaissance planes were operating?

General Short. It frankly was that we didn't think—from all the information that we had, we did not think the situation demanded it.

Admiral Reeves. Yes.

General Short. We would have been working 24 hours a day, if we had had anything to indicate that the situation demanded it.

Now, again at page 1636, at the bottom of the page, referring to the carriers, General, five paragraphs up from the bottom:

General McCoy. Did any information come to you that day from your own sources of information or from the Navy that indicated the carriers were to the north of Oahu?

General Short. The only thing that indicated that to me was the fact that they picked up this group of planes at 7:20 132 miles 3 degrees east of north. That would indicate one carrier was in there, was in that direction.

I will ask that that be stricken. That is not the part I wanted.

Go to the bottom of page 1638, General, the third last paragraph:

General Short. I think the system is all right. I think that we made a very serious mistake when we didn't go to an alert against an all-out attack. I think that our system was perfectly all right. Our estimate of the situation was not.

General McCoy. Do you think there would have been any change in your attitude, possibly, or a more complete meeting of the situation, if there had been unity of command?

General Short. I don't believe it would have had any particular effect without the commander in that instance had decided that there was the danger of an air
attack. You could have had the same degree of alertness under unity of command that you had under cooperation.

Did you make that statement, General?

General Short. I believe that is a perfectly correct statement, that we made our estimate of the situation based on the information we had from Washington, that one man [8411] would have made the same estimate if he had been in full command, if he had the same information, because Admiral Kimmel and I absolutely independently arrived at the same conclusion.

Mr. Murphy. Now, General, will you go to page 1639, again, at the bottom of the page. You are referring there to the conferences you had about Wake and Midway.

* * * —in the whole discussion the fear was submarines, because Wake is close to some of the Japanese bases, and not a question of air, although they would be close enough that land-based planes could have operated against them when they were executing the relief of Wake. I don't think that that was given very serious consideration, but there was a lot of discussion at that time, owing to, the fact that we were going so far out to make this relief, going practically into the Mandate Islands.

That was a discussion, was it not, about Wake and Midway, General?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Is that a fair statement?

General Short. Yes, sir. But I think that that statement may not be absolutely correct, inasmuch as I remember that the Navy was not willing to send the carriers closer than 200 miles to Wake, and I think for both reasons [8412] and we even went to the point where Admiral Halsey took a carrier, we had never flown P-40 planes off a carrier, and he took his carrier out and two planes and made the experiment to determine that afternoon whether we could do it, and we succeeded in doing it. That was before the decision had been definitely made not to replace them.

Mr. Murphy. General, it is getting close to the adjourning hour, and I want to say that I am sorry that I have to ask you some questions here where we talk about radar going 122 miles, when we have passed from that time to reaching the moon by radar.

General Short. I hope I did not give you the idea that I thought you were purposely misquoting, but it is hard to quote from memory.

Mr. Murphy. No. Life is too short for me to misquote anybody.

The Vice Chairman. You are not quite through?

Mr. Murphy. I will want about 5 minutes.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas, General Short wants to present some material that you inquired about.

General Short. On page 8272 of the record, Senator Lucas asked me how the midget submarines got in the vicinity of Hawaiian waters, and Admiral Inglis in his [8413] statement in exhibit 8, page 16, makes an explanation of why he thought they got there, and I would like to read that.

Senator Lucas. Let me say, General, I had forgotten the testimony that the Admiral had placed before the committee, but since I have to read his testimony. I thank the General for calling my attention to it again.

General Short. It is just eight or ten lines, if you wish me to read it.
The Vice Chairman. Do you want it read, Senator?
Senator Lucas. That is perfectly all right.

General Short [reading]:

Between 50 and 100 miles off Pearl Harbor, five midget submarines were launched from specifically fitted fleet submarines as a "special attacking force" to conduct an offensive attack against American ships within the harbor, and to prevent the escape of the American Fleet through the harbor entrance during the scheduled air strike. Available data indicates that only one of the five midget submarines penetrated into the harbor. It inflicted no damage on American units, and none of the five rejoined the Japanese force."

The Vice Chairman. Is that all, general?
General Short. That is all.

[8414] The Vice Chairman. We will stand adjourned until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 12 o'clock noon, the committee recessed until 2 o'clock p.m., of the same day.)

[8415] afternoon session—2 p.m.

Mr. Clark. The committee will be in order.

Testimony of Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, United States Army (Retired)—Resumed

Mr. Murphy. General Short, I direct your attention to page 1641 of the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearing, the fourth last paragraph from the bottom of the page:

General McCoy. If you had been furnished with all of the things that you felt necessary, would that have made any difference in this particular action?
General Short. I do not believe it would.

Was that a correct answer?
General Short. What I intended to imply by that, that in the absence of information from the War Department we would not have been in a proper alert and that we would not have been much more effective.

Mr. Murphy. Even though you had all the planes, all the radar, and all the things you required?
General Short. It would have made some difference in the antiaircraft fire; that is all.

Mr. Murphy. In the antiaircraft fire you still would not have the men at the guns?
General Short. Only the skeleton crews.
Mr. Murphy. Just to guard the guns from the islanders?
[8416] General Short. And they could fire them.
Mr. Murphy. Now, continuing:

Admiral Standley. Right there: In case the patrol planes that were necessary to make the effective off-shore patrol were here in sufficient numbers, do you still think that no change would have been made in the plans?
General Short. None whatever, because you couldn't tell when some of them might have been ordered away. If they had been left they just simply would not have called upon us. As a matter of fact, as I said, in most of our exercises the assumption was that they had enough to make the patrol, so they made the patrols and called upon us to execute the bombing mission, because they considered that our B-17's were more effective as bombers than their own planes.
Admiral Standley. Yes, but in this estimate they stated definitely that there were not sufficient forces to make a continuous air patrol as required in war.

General Short. Yes, sir. Well, there wouldn't be—

Admiral Standley. Now, if you had had that force here do you think under the circumstances you would have been making that patrol every morning? Not you. I mean, but the Navy?

General Short. But the Navy.

[8417] Admiral Standley. The combined effort; yes.

General Short. Well, I think that would be a fair question to ask the Navy. I don't hardly think under the conditions that they would; I think that they would have been doing it as an exercise now and then in connection with us. I do not believe that they would have been doing it habitually if they had had them, but I don't know. It would be a fair question to ask them.

Were those questions asked you, and did you make those answers before the Roberts board?

General Short. I think that is perfectly O. K.; yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, General, one more question near the bottom of the page:

Admiral Reeves. Before you go to that, General, let me ask General Short this:

On the other hand, if you had had material and fully equipped radar stations, would you have been operating them throughout the day or would you have operated them as you did on the morning of the 7th?

General Short. I probably would have operated them just as I did.

Is that a correct question and a correct answer, as reported there?

General Short. That is assuming that I had just the same information from Washington that I did have.

Mr. Murphy. Now I direct your attention to this question by the Chairman of the Roberts Board, at page 630 of Admiral Kimmel's previous testimony. Do you have that?

General Short. Page 630?

Mr. Murphy. Page 630.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. The very top of the page:

The Chairman (Justice Roberts). In the picture of it as drawn by Admiral Standley's question and your answer, if that is correct as I understand it, the Army knew that it was not going to get any warning from your distant reconnaissance?

Admiral Kimmel. No, sir.

Do you think Admiral Kimmel was justified in making that statement?

General Short. I do not know that he intended to answer that we knew we would not get any, but with all the reconnaissance that I know he had out I could not count on getting them. put it that way.

Mr. Murphy. Now I direct your attention to page 109 of the Roberts board hearing of the Army, General, and I will only ask a few more questions.

General Short. Yes.

[8418] Mr. Murphy. Page 109. I see, down about 12 lines:

Anybody who has lived here in the last year would know he could hardly ever step out of his house without hearing planes.

Do you see that?

General Short. Page 109?

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

General Short. Yes, sir; I have it.
Mr. Murphy (reading):

Anybody who has lived here in the last year would know he could hardly ever step out of his house without hearing planes. * * *

You made that statement, did you not, before the board?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. I go to page 127, General, the middle of the page:

General Short. Yes, habitually there were planes in the air from 4 o’clock on. There were planes in the air almost all the time except from about 11 o’clock at night until 4 o’clock in the morning. As I said before, you couldn’t step out of your house and look in the air without seeing planes.

Then at the bottom of the page General McCoy said:

Well, they were apparently not up on that Sunday morning. That Sunday morning they were not up, most unusual. Each Sunday morning you are likely to——
General McCoy. How do you explain that?
General Short. I wouldn’t be able to explain it without asking General Davidson just why; but if they had been up and training they wouldn’t have had ammunition, for normally in the training they did not carry ammunition.

In that connection, General, I direct your attention——
Will you give me the number of this exhibit, Kimmel exhibit 5 to report of action, dated December 19, 1941.
Mr. Masten. Exhibit No. 120.
Mr. Murphy. Exhibit No. 120. Do you have that?
Lieutenant Karr. We don’t have it.
Mr. Murphy. I will read it to the general. There is what is called the Kimmel exhibit 5 to report of action, and it is dated December 19, 1941, and on page 2, under paragraph 4, it says:

All planes, except those under repair, were armed with machine guns and a full allowance of machine gun ammunition.

I was wondering why the Navy planes would have machine guns and ammunition and not the Army?

General Short. Our planes were grouped for sabotage alert. If you put machine-gun ammunition in the planes and a grenade was exploded you would probably set off the ammunition and start a lot more trouble. We deliberately kept out ammunition when we grouped them for sabotage.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, I ask you, General, if you would outline where you were on the 6th of December. That question has been asked of each of the important witnesses so far.

General Short. I was, as I remember, in my office until probably sometime around 5 o’clock, or a little after. I then went to my quarters. Around about 6:30 Colonel Bicknell arrived with the so-called Mori message. Colonel Bicknell and General Fielder and I discussed that for some time.

Mr. Keefe. What message was that?
General Short. The Dr. Mori message.
Mr. Keefe. Yes.
General Short. We discussed that for some time.
Mr. Keefe. The poinsettia message.
Mr. Murphy. The Hibiscus and poinsettia.
Mr. Keefe. Yes.

General Short. Yes. After that discussion we, my wife and I, drove with Colonel and Mrs. Fielder to Schofield Barracks where
we attended a dinner for some type of local relief. I left the club sometime between 10 and 10:15, arrived at home at about 10:45, and retired.

Mr. Murphy. Now, General, you were speaking about so many planes in the air on other mornings. There is testimony of Private Elliott that on other mornings besides this Sunday morning they would have about 25 different targets on the radar station.

General Short. That confirms my statement, because they would pick up everything.

Mr. Murphy. Other mornings but not this particular morning.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, Admiral Kimmel received from Washington a several page report of a message or memorandum by General Short and Admiral Stark to the President outlining the Pacific situation rather in detail. Did he ever give you the benefit of showing you that?

The Vice Chairman. You mean General Marshall and Admiral Stark.

Mr. Murphy. Strike the question.

Admiral Kimmel received from Admiral Stark a copy of a memorandum to the President from Admiral Stark and General Marshall outlining the Pacific situation in quite some detail. Did he let you see that?

General Short. No, sir; he did not.

Mr. Murphy. Did he ever tell you that he received it?

General Short. I don't think so.

Mr. Murphy. When you talked to Secretary Knox on his arrival at Pearl Harbor, there was some conversation between you in which he asked you if you had received a message and, as I recall it, he said something about it being sent from Washington at midnight. Will you tell us about that?

General Short. My feeling is that he must have been confused in the time or some way we didn't arrive at an understanding because the only message that I got and he could have been referring to was the one sent by General Marshall about noon on the 7th.

Mr. Murphy. Now, I do find in exhibit 123 on the sixth page, something that I think should be shown in the record, and I will read it to you, General.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Of course, Admiral Kimmel had before him the whole Pacific area. You had before you the defense of Pearl Harbor. So that his problem was a broader problem than yours, ordinarily?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. I read this paragraph:

[8423] The conditions likely to exist on Oahu, in the event of war are definitely different from those prevailing in Europe, and which dictated the establishment of the combined headquarters and operating centers in Great Britain. Sustained attack of any kind is unlikely. The mission of the Army and the Fleet are considerably different—the operation of one being defensive and local, while the operations of the other are offensive and far flung. Strategic, rather than tactical cooperation, is indicated, and therefore the necessity for rapid receipt and exchange of information and arrival at quick decisions is of less importance.
That, General, was a statement by Admiral Kimmel to the Chief of Naval Operations on November 3, 1941.

Now, there was a letter written by Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Stark on June 4, 1941, General, where he said this:

The liaison between the Army and Navy Air Corps in Hawaii is very satisfactory and weekly drills in air-raid alarms with the two services acting in unison are held.

Then there was the "Memorandum for General Marshall."

Enclosed is the arrangement of Kimmel and General Short with regard to joint air operations. You will recall our talking about it, and it looks to me extremely good.

Signed by "Stark."

Would there be a possibility that if General Marshall read your reply to his telegram that he might have understood liaison with the Navy to mean just that?

General Short. Undoubtedly he would have taken that whole thing as referring to that annex No. 7. I don't think there is any question but what that would have been the feeling.

Mr. Murphy. I will ask you this question: As I understand it, there was provision at Hawaii for a joint committee of which your chief of staff, Colonel Phillips, was head, and that committee never met from November 27 until after December 7, and as I understand it, your reason for their not meeting was they would only meet in the case of an over-all change and there was nothing here to indicate the need of any such meeting?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. You also had 100 artillery lookouts that were not utilized because you didn't consider the situation called for it?

General Short. They would only be used if we expected a surface attack.

Mr. Murphy. Now, you also had sound detectors that were not manned and that was to give some indication of something coming toward the island?

General Short. They were good for only about 4 miles.

Mr. Murphy. They were not manned because of the situation?

General Short. Because we were not in this type of alert.

Mr. Murphy. You also had civilian squadrons or lookouts, and they were not used because of the situation?

General Short. Civilian aircraft squadrons?

Mr. Murphy. No.

General Short. I don't believe we had any.

Mr. Murphy. There was no provision for civilian aircraft squadrons or lock-outs?

General Short. There was one poor lone civilian flyer that practically flew into the Japanese and got fired at when he didn't know anything was on.

Mr. Murphy. Your harbor-control post was working 8 hours a day before December 7, and 24 hours after?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Murphy. One other question, General. The martial law, how long had you made provision for that?

General Short. That probably had been in every war plan for the last 20 years.
[8427] Mr. Murphy. At any rate, when you took over immediately after the raid, was it your intention at that time that martial law would be continued indefinitely, or only for the immediate emergency?

General Short. I would say as long as it was necessary. Once put into effect it could only be called off upon the order of the President.

Mr. Murphy. No other questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Brewster.

Senator Brewster. In the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor board, at page 49, there is the following colloquy between General Grunert and General Marshall to which I invite your attention:

General Grunert. Just to have it in the record for our future consideration, I want to put a query to be answered or not, as you see fit, or whether or not the question is such as to really demand an answer. That is this: Here, the same message, or three messages go to at least four prominent commanders, or three of them, overseas—Panama, Hawaii, and the Philippines, and one, on a presumably exposed West Coast. Three of them apparently interpret those messages in one way, and the fourth one does not. So the three of them report all of the measures they have taken, or show by their reports that they considered this as quite a critical and dangerous situation; so they take greater measures than the fourth does.

Now, is there anything in the case of that fourth which happens to be Hawaiian Department—are there any peculiar circumstances there that it should be interpreted in a different way for that command than it was in Panama, the Philippines, or on the West Coast?

Now, this is what I would like your consideration of:

General Marshall. All I can say to that is this—and my answer does not explain the contrast between the very, very urgent attitude of the Naval and Army Commanders in Hawaii in the spring and early summer with relation to air and anti-aircraft and radar requirements. All I can say is that Hawaii had always 130,000 Japanese in a very congested district there, and no commander could ever forget that, and the others did not have them. That did not exist in Panama. You had Panamanians over the border, but certainly you had no feeling of fears regarding them. In the Philippines you had no Japanese population, certainly of any moment. It actually developed later there was a Fifth Column, very well organized, out there; but you had always present in your mind in Hawaii the large Japanese population of unpredictable activities.

Now, I think that covers the answer to the question [8428] General Grunert asked as to why there was a different interpretation on the messages, if that was a fair statement of their purport.

General Short. Yes, sir; and I would like to add also that the very difference in the answers from the various departments should have caused the people in the War Plans Division who read my answer to look at it critically, and know what it said. It was sufficiently different that it should have called their attention to it, in place of their saying they never realized what it said.

Senator Brewster. It was true in the Philippines they did have these intercepts?

General Short. They had a great deal more information.

Senator Brewster. So that was another reason.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. But reverting to the point you make, which I think is referred to here, reading from page 52:

General Frank. Now, General Marshall, a reading of the Roberts commission testimony leads one to the conclusion that there was a general feeling in both the Army and the Navy and in Hawaii that there would not be an air attack. In other words, there was a state of mind of security against an air attack. Do you believe such a state of mind [830] existed?
General Marshall. I was unaware of it. The previous communications we had had, notably those of the spring and up to June, 1941, related very specifically to the urgency of measures protective against an air attack.

General Short. General Marshall specifically made the statement himself, and I quoted it in my statement that he did not expect a surprise attack in Hawaii.

Senator Brewster. Where was that? You mean before this committee?

General Short. Yes, sir. It is in my statement. He made the statement before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and I quoted it here. It is quoted in my statement. I haven't found it yet, but he said he expected an attack toward Siam, he expected an attack in Indochina, he expected an attack in the Philippines, and possibly Borneo, but that is as far as he knew, nobody expected an attack in Hawaii. So he was in the same position.

I have it right here. Don you wish me to read it?

Senator Brewster. I think it should go in here.

General Short (reading):

We anticipated beyond a doubt a Japanese movement in Indochina and the Gulf of Siam and against the Malay Peninsula. We also anticipated an assault on the Philip [3/31] pines. We did not, so far as I recall, anticipate an attack on Hawaii, the reason being that we thought the addition of more modern planes at the defenses would be sufficient to make it extremely hazardous for the Japanese to attempt such an attack.

Now, that is Army Pearl Harbor board transcript, volume 1, page 9.

Senator Brewster. I will see if that is in the one I have here. Yes; I have that here before me, and this part which I have been reading is subsequent thereto.

So that it would appear that although I presume there may have been intermittent appearances, that before that very board subsequently General Marshall denied his knowledge of the existence of a state of mind as to security from air attack, which he apparently had earlier testified he understood existed.

General Short. Definitely. I would like to add, in respect to your previous question, if I may, that there was a very considerable difference in the message that I received and the message that was received in the Philippines, which would account for that, because the message in the Philippines didn't have the "don'ts," my message:

Don't alarm the public, don't do anything to disclose your intent, limit the dissemination of [8/82] this information to the minimum essential officers.

Those words did not appear in the message to the Philippines.

[8/83] Senator Brewster. Well, I think the point is very proper, but recurring to this matter of General Marshall, if my interpretation of his language is correct then it would indicate that even Jupiter occasionally nods. I speak of that because I think they have criticized you somewhat because of giving different impressions as to the state of mind that existed at various times.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. And this would apparently indicate a somewhat different impression as to the fear of an air attack in General Marshall's own mind at various times.

General Short. I think also the aide memoir that he gave to the President on May the 3rd, 1941, with reference to Hawaii where he
said in points of view or in sequence that the thing that would probably occur first would be sabotage and that it might be necessary to establish strict military control for several months in Hawaii before we had difficulty in the Far East.

Senator Brewster. Going further, General Frank on page 52 further asked General Marshall:

General Frank. At that time, December 1941, what in your opinion was the general feeling in military and naval circles relative to the effectiveness of the air attack with bombs and torpedoes?

[8434] General Marshall said:

As I recall, we considered it as very effective, in view of what had occurred in the European theater.

Were you given to understand that that was the military opinion at that time?

General Short. I believe in general I was. I think, however, that the Navy had a slightly different idea in regard to the torpedoes; that they thought if the water was shallow enough that the torpedo attack would not be effective.

Senator Brewster. I think that is what Admiral Kimmel has testified.

General Short. I think that was his opinion. I had no decided opinion because I did not know enough about the action of torpedoes.

Senator Brewster. This is the next question:

General Frank. Was any consideration ever given—

this is on page 52 and 3—

Was any consideration ever given in the War Department to the possibility of a feeling of apathy that might ensue as a result of "crying wolf; wolf; too often"?

General Marshall answered:

Very much so.

Do I understand that that is your position, General?

General Short. I knew that for a year there had been some status of alarm and I suppose in the long run that that [8435] would make everybody slightly less alert or less likely to believe in any warning that came.

Senator Brewster. Now, going on with General Frank's question on page 53 of this same report:

With respect to the messages on sabotage sent to General Short from Washington, do not the provisions of his war plan and his standing operating procedure provide for full defense against sabotage?

General Marshall said:

I think it does.

General Frank. Were not the provisions of these plans known in the War Department?

General Marshall. They must have been.

General Frank. Then why was sabotage specifically singled out?

General Marshall. By whom?

General Frank. By messages that were sent to him. Between November 16 and 28 there were six messages sent to him, four of them told him to be careful not to disturb the Japanese, and three of them cautioned him about sabotage.

General Marshall. Two of those on sabotage that are related to air were just coincidences, and those not to disturb the Japanese related to air, and the extreme anxiety not to have anything happen which would [8436] provoke a break, which would enable the Japanese to say that we were taking action, to
give them an excuse for action; and that was to enable Mr. Hull to stall this thing off as long as possible. All measures against sabotage are very difficult of set-up, because they indicate their purpose so plainly when you have to deploy your people around the key points and have them stay there in tents or otherwise, so they always provoke a difficult situation, and one that we were fearful would give the Japanese some handle to place the accusation against us that we were taking action of a hostile character directed towards them. That is as nearly as I can recall the reason for the three messages that you refer to, I think, though I have to look at the messages to familiarize myself with what they say. I don't recall them.

General Short. In that connection, I would like to say that when I arrived there, there were a considerable number of men on guard over vital installations to prevent sabotage, there had been for a year or so. So far as the guard for sabotage purposes, the community had become so accustomed to them that it did not alarm them in any way.

From July the 8th, or July the 25th, when we got the sanction message, we had had about a half alert against sabotage [8437] constantly because the community was extremely uneasy at that time; it affected their pocketbooks, it closed up businesses operated by Japanese, so that they were at that time accustomed to having our guard over vital installations.

Senator Brewster. Then the next question:

General Frank. In accordance with that, you feel that it was a responsibility for the War Department to caution about sabotage?

General Marshall. In relation to what I have just said. We were trying to be very certain that we did not take measures which the Japanese could put their fingers on and say that we were doing something that was hostile; and most of your sabotage defense has to be right out in the open, a great portion of it. Now, in that respect we were doing something. We had to talk about it, too, because that was related to the meetings with Mr. Hull, where we were trying to do anything possible that could be done to stall off a break in the Pacific.

That is the whole of the quotation. Was this attitude of General Marshall, to which he here refers, as to the very great concern in Washington against anything of a provocative character communicated to you?

General Short. I definitely got that idea that their chief purpose, the chief aim was to avoid war if possible [8438] and by all means to avoid an international incident that might lead to war or might give the Japanese the chance to use it as propaganda that we provoked war, but at no time did I get the other idea presented that a guard over a vital installation was something that the population would not understand and would think was provocative.

Senator Brewster. And the thought was that there must, so far as practicable, be nothing done which the Japanese could by any strained construction interpret as a hostile act directed against them?

General Short. Very definitely.

Senator Brewster. Or an indication that you expected an attack from them?

General Short. Very definitely.

Senator Brewster. That seems to run through the thread of General Marshall's testimony and the thing which I thought was important was to know as to whether or not that attitude which he expresses here was communicated to you. I gather it was.

General Short. The November 27 message meant to me beyond everything else that what they were interested in was the avoidance
of war and the avoidance of giving Japan any excuse to start a war or to use propaganda that we had provoked a war.

[8439] Senator Brewster. Now, in connection with the material which I presented yesterday, as I have examined it—I do not know whether other members of the committee have had the opportunity as yet—it appears that it consists almost exclusively of excerpts from the testimony before the Roberts commission and I have come to the conclusion that in justice to all concerned, if the testimony before the Roberts commission is ultimately to be made a part of our record as an exhibit, it would be more fair to handle it in that way.

Has there been any conclusion reached on that matter of the Roberts evidence as yet?

The Chairman. There has not been any consultation among the committee on it at all since you brought it up the other day.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire with regard to that? I would like to suggest in answer to that. Mr. Chairman, that the testimony of General Short before the Roberts commission, to which frequent references have been made, be made an exhibit in this proceeding the same as we did with the Navy testimony of Admiral Kimmel.

The Chairman. The Chair sees no objection to that.

Senator Brewster. May we hear from counsel?

Mr. Richardson. Well, I suggest this, Mr. Chairman, that until you determine the question of all of the testimony [8440] I see no point in picking out a particular bit of testimony and making it an exhibit, if all of that testimony is ultimately to be in your record here.

The Chairman. The Chair would like to inquire of the members of the committee if they have had an opportunity to examine the document Senator Brewster referred to, I think, day before yesterday, copies of which were supposed to be distributed.

Mr. Richardson. Well, they are available. We have had it mimeographed.

Mr. Kaufman. Yes; but it has not been distributed.

Senator Brewster. Well, as I have looked it over it does consist almost entirely of quotations from the Roberts committee testimony and I think rather than taking excerpts it would be fairer all around if either the Short testimony or all of it—I would favor having all the Roberts testimony as an exhibit in connection with our case in order to comprehend the evidence of the whole situation.

Mr. Murphy. The only trouble, Mr. Chairman, is that what I have asked for is a compilation of General Short's testimony on three different occasions for the convenience of those who were sufficiently interested to read and study it. The suggestion of counsel would have people going through three separate records to find what General Short said or did [8441] not say.

General Short. You mean this volume here, Mr. Murphy?

Mr. Murphy. I mean that very volume, General, which contains your testimony on all three occasions and I think in fairness to you and to the others who are interested they ought to be able to find it as the committee had it and make use of it.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman. Wasn’t that done with Admiral Kimmel?
Mr. Murphy. That was done with Admiral Kimmel.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that if we put this testimony in, which I think should be, that it should be sorted by counsel so that the testimony of the witness will always appear at one place in the record instead of going back days and looking for it, just as we would do later with this, but I believe that the time will come, and I favor that, that all of the testimony be put in.

Mr. Kaufman. Mr. Chairman, I assume the Senator means that with respect to the several records that a compilation job be done.

Senator Ferguson. That is right.

Mr. Kaufman. So that the testimony of a witness in all proceedings be put together with appropriate notations as to which proceeding the particular testimony comes from.

[8442] Senator Ferguson. That is right; and that it be marked as an exhibit so that we can have it.

The Chairman. If that is done, of course, it would comprise all the testimony in all the proceedings and it would be marked as an appropriate exhibit and, therefore, would include Admiral Kimmel's previous testimony as well as General Short's.

Senator Ferguson. That is correct.

The Chairman. And, therefore, would obviate the necessity of making them separate exhibits now.

Mr. Kaufman. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Richardson. That is the point I made a moment ago.

The Chairman. It seems to the chair that that is a logical way to handle it. It all goes in anyway, but it goes in together under an exhibit and with the connotation in the record of each one of these testimonies as they have come all put together so that the members of the committee could refer to them conveniently. That would be a better way to handle it.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I concur in Senator Ferguson's views there, I think that would be helpful to us and to others who examine the record, but on this question Mr. Murphy raises we have accorded Admiral Kimmel the privilege of having his testimony in other hearings included as [8443] an exhibit. I think General Short should be entitled to that same privilege.

The Chairman. Well, couldn't we do it this way? Of course, we will be glad to accord to General Short the same privilege accorded to Admiral Kimmel, but if the committee should have it all published, that would obviate the necessity of having these two particular testimonies as exhibit something and then put it in again as exhibit something else.

The Vice Chairman. That is correct.

The Chairman. So that with the understanding that if the committee should order it all done and made an exhibit, then it shall not be filed as an exhibit separately from that collection of testimony which has been put in.

Senator Ferguson. That is what I had in mind, to do it all at the same time.

Mr. Kaufman. And it would result, Mr. Chairman, that the exhibit of Admiral Kimmel would be stricken out for practical purposes and all put in at once.

Senator Ferguson. That is right.

The Chairman. And the same could apply to General Short.
Mr. Murphy. I want the record to show that it be stricken out only on the condition that it comes in in some other exhibit.

Senator Brewster. I don’t understand that. He refers to [8444] a record. Is this to be an exhibit or a record?

The Chairman. An exhibit. The record you referred to is to be an exhibit.

If there is any reason—let us get it clear—the committee should not orders all this testimony presented as an exhibit together, with the understanding that counsel will arrange it so that each witness’ testimony will appear consecutively or appear at one place, to which it can be referred, in the event we do that then the testimony of Admiral Kimmel and also of General Short will not be filed as separate exhibits.

If we should not do that, then both of them go in as an appropriate exhibit now.

The Vice Chairman. Can’t we decide that now?

The Chairman. Why can’t we now act on that? Without objection, then, the Chair will order that all this previous testimony be so arranged by counsel as to appear appropriately as we have discussed it and that that include the testimony of Admiral Kimmel referred to and made an exhibit the other day, as well as the testimony of General Short, and it will all be made an exhibit and include all of that instead of having it separate.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, Mr. Chairman, with the understanding, then, that that includes all witnesses called by the com-mittee or not called, who testified in these previous hearings.

The Chairman. Yes, I think so. That includes, of course, the testimony also upon which we agreed the other day.

Mr. Richardson. And it includes all of the hearings.

The Chairman. All of the hearings.

Senator Ferguson. That is right; all except the Clausen because that was nothing but affidavits.

Senator Brewster. That is right.

The Chairman. That is right.

Mr. Murphy. I want to say something about the Clausen report later.

Senator Brewster. I think that covers this question that I raised, because I think it is better to have the whole thing in than to have just the excerpts.

The Chairman. Yes.

Senator Brewster. So that will dispose of my request, I think.

The Chairman. Yes.

Senator Brewster. Now, one other matter that I would like to inquire of you about, General, and that is the matter of the circumstances of your retirement.

General Short. I would like, in order to be very exact, to read a page that states the circumstances very succinctly:

[8446] When I read the findings of the Roberts Commission on the morning of January 25th, 1942 I was completely dumbfounded. To be accused of dereliction of duty after almost forty years of loyal and competent service was beyond my comprehension. I immediately called General Marshall on the telephone. He was an old and trusted friend of thirty-nine years standing. He said he had been in New York and had not seen the report until that minute. I asked him what I should do, having the country and the war in mind, should I retire? He replied, “Stand pat but if it becomes necessary I will use this conversation as authority.”
I told him I would place myself entirely in his hands, having faith in his judgment and loyalty. After I hung up I decided it wasn't quite fair to him to have to use the conversation as authority, so I wrote out a formal application which I inclosed in a personal letter to him. I asked the War Department for a copy of this letter but they have not been able to locate it.

I have a copy that I had written of the letter to him and I should like to read that.

Senator Lucas. Do we have a copy of this?
Senator Ferguson. It was just handed to you.
General Short. It is this letter, the mimeograph.
Senator Brewster. That does not appear to have a date, General.

General Short. I beg your pardon?
Senator Brewster. It does not appear to have a date on it, General.

General Short. That was dated January 25. That was made from a copy that I had made in my own handwriting at that day and it was sent from 610 Northwest Fifteenth Street, Oklahoma City, Okla. That does not appear on here.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, there is one thing I would like to inquire about. The preliminary statement, General Short, that you read previous to the statement you are about to read, is that your own or is that some other statement?

General Short. That is mine and was not mimeographed but I wrote it in order to be sure and say exactly what I meant.

Senator Lucas. All right, sir.
The Chairman. That is not included in this?
General Short. That is not included in this.

The Chairman. All right.

General Short. This is the letter that I wrote to General Marshall on January 25.

Senator Ferguson. Just one moment that I may understand that correctly. Do I understand that what you stated first from that statement was a telephone conversation with General Marshall?

General Short. That is correct, about 1 p. m. on January 25.

Senator Brewster. From Oklahoma City?
General Short. From Oklahoma City.
The Chairman. Did you call him or did he call you?
General Short. I called him.
Senator Ferguson. Thank you for the explanation.

General Short (reading):

Dear General Marshall: I appreciate very much your advice not to submit my request for retirement at the present time. Naturally, under existing conditions, I very much prefer to remain on the active list and take whatever assignment you think it necessary to give me. However, I am inclosing application so that you may use it should you consider it desirable to submit it at any time in the future.

Since you asked me to call your attention to anything I consider important, I want to call your attention to the fact that the report of the Board did not mention the fact that 12 B-17's arrived from the mainland in the midst of the attack without ammunition, with guns cosmonaled, and with skeleton crews, resulting in the destruction of four of these planes. You will find this set forth fully in my statement accompanying the Board report. From my point of view this is a strong argument that the War Department agreed with me that sabotage was the most dangerous thing to the Hawaiian Department and for that reason did not direct me to take action against an air
I considered my dealing with General Marshall a purely personal matter between two old friends.

I did not receive a reply to this letter. I have seen General Marshall only one time prior to his appearance before this committee. In June 1942 I went to West Point to witness the graduation of my son and attended a garden party given by the superintendent of the academy. At this party General Marshall came across the lawn to speak to Mrs. Short and me. He spent about 5 minutes with us. He did not mention [8450] Pearl Harbor but talked of our early service together.

In this connection there are certain paragraphs in volume 23 of the transcript of this committee, page 4049, which I would like to read. [Reading:]

Senator Ferguison. What did the Secretary of War's order that you spoke about do?

General Marshall. The Secretary of War's order that I spoke about brought General Short back from Hawaii, relieved him from all responsibility of command in Hawaii, directed him to report to some point in the United States, we will have to look at the order to see just what it was. Thereafter the question was whether he would be given another assignment, or, as actually developed, his retirement, which I believe was at his request; I do not recall that.

Senator Ferguson. Were you consulted on that, as to whether or not he would be given another assignment?

General Marshall. I do not recall that, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Will the gentleman yield, Mr. Chairman?


Senator Ferguson. Yes, I will yield.

Mr. Keeffe. Yesterday when I examined General Marshall I requested counsel to present the order with reference to General Short and I wonder whether that is [8551] here today, whether we have received it.

Mr. Mitchell. It has not been handed to us yet by the War Department.

General Marshall. The procedure in General Short's case was handled by the Secretary of War.

Now, the enclosure in my personal letter to General Marshall was as follows:

610 N. W. 15th St.,
Oklahoma City, Okla., Jan. 25, 1942.

Subject: Retirement
To: Adjutant General, U. S. Army.

1. I hereby submit my request for retirement after more than thirty-nine years service, effective upon a date to be determined by the War Department.

2. If practicable, I request that the effective date be such as to permit me to take advantage of all accrued leave of absence (approximately four months). However, if this request for leave should militate against granting of retirement, I wish the request for leave to be disregarded.

(Sgd) WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General, U. S. A.
Now, this letter that I have just read was enclosed with [8453] my personal letter to General Marshall to be used by him if he considered necessary.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, so that the record might be clear, has our counsel requested this previous letter and has the War Department reported that it cannot be found, the one in the enclosure that includes the one of January 25? I just want to know whether that is a missing paper from the files of the War Department, whether we have made a sufficient search to ascertain that fact.

Mr. Richardson. I do not think we have ever requested that letter.

Senator Ferguson. What are the facts?

Mr. Kaufman. The fact is, from Colonel Duncombe, that when it was ascertained that General Short had a copy of that letter no search was made then for the original letter.

Senator Ferguson. Well, could we now have a search made and ascertain the facts as to why that letter was not with the letter that was enclosed in the same envelope? As I understand General Short’s testimony, they were enclosed in the same envelope.

General Short. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. And he made an inquiry and could not locate in the War Department this top letter that he has just been reading.

[8453] General Short. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Is that correct?

General Short. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. May we have General Short’s statement?

The Chairman. The Chair might ask General Short whether the fact, as you stated, that it was a personal letter to General Marshall and not an official letter would have any bearing upon whether it would be part of the files of the War Department.

General Short. It was a purely personal letter and he could retain it or file it as he saw fit.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I make this inquiry, as to whether or not we are not getting, this committee is not getting personal letters between our respective officers and are only getting those letters that the officers consider are official letters or communications?

The Chairman. Well, of course, the Chair does not know how many personal letters pass between officers in Washington and elsewhere and therefore cannot answer that question. I don’t know whether anybody can or not.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, let me ask General Short.

Is the letter that you have read here addressed to General Marshall, and you supplied the date January 25, 1942, is this a correct copy of the letter you sent to General Marshall?

[8454] General Short. That is a correct copy. The copy was made in my own handwriting. I did not have a typewriter and carbon paper when I wrote it, and I made a copy in my own handwriting and this is a correct copy.

The Vice Chairman. So the committee now has before it, supplied by you, the letter that is being discussed here?

General Short. That is correct.

The Chairman. Did you write that letter to General Marshall in your own handwriting?
General Short. I did.
The Chairman. Did you mark it "Personal"?
General Short. I did.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I should like to make this observation on this point. I do not think there has been any question but what every department downtown has furnished us letters from their files of a personal nature if the letters were in the files. Obviously many personal letters went from one individual to another that never found its way into the State, War, or Navy files. Certainly there would be no way that counsel or the liaison man of the Navy or the Army could find out all of the personal letters that went from one individual to another.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, this is what I have in mind: When the official letter dated January 25, "Subject: [8455] Retirement" appears before us, it is in a way a conditional, or at least there was another condition attached to it, because there was a letter and a telephone conversation that preceded it and it does not exactly speak the facts alone and, therefore, without the others we do not have all of the facts.

The Chairman. Well, General, I do not suppose that you or any other officer who wrote a personal letter to one of your superiors always expected that that personal letter should become a part of the official files of the Department. It was discretionary, I presume, with the recipient of the letter.

General Short. Absolutely.
The Chairman. As to whether he should regard it as purely personal and if you marked it as "Personal" he probably would not put it in the files.

General Short. I regarded it as personal myself and apparently he did, too.

The Chairman. And no implication is to be drawn from the fact that General Marshall did not make it a part of the official files of the War Department of any sort that would be derogatory to the effort to keep the record. Your official letter was the one addressed to the Adjutant General, isn't that true?

General Short. Yes, sir; and I have a photostat copy of [8456] it there.

The Chairman. And that is a part of the files in the War Department.

General Short. Now, may I explain that this letter and all of the following letters were taken from my 201 file in the War Department. That was a personal file of the officer concerned. My counsel, Colonel Karr, had the copies prepared and compared them and all the remaining letters that I will read came out of my personal file. I did not see them till yesterday but——

The Chairman. In other words, all this correspondence except that personal letter to General Marshall is part of the file and was taken from the file?

General Short. That was part of my personal 201 file.

The Vice Chairman. And the letter to General Marshall was taken from your individual file and is here?

General Short. That is correct.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, might I make a suggestion?
The Chairman. Mr. Richardson.
Mr. Richardson. So far as I know—and I am supported in that by my associates—there has never been, so far as we know, any attempt on the part of any government agency to pick out what may be called official letters from [8457] personal letters. We have been given all the correspondence, so far as we know, that are in the files that were examined.

Exhibit 53 now in the record contains the personal letters between Short and Marshall, 106 between Kimmel and Stark, and we know of no personal letters that are not there and I would like to inquire from General Short whether he knows of any additional personal letters that are germane here that are not included in the exhibit 53?

General Short. I believe the exhibit marked "Letters from General Marshall to General Short" contains all of our personal correspondence.

Senator Ferguson. The other way, from Short to Marshall, does it contain all?
General Short. Both ways, I think, during the period that I was in Honolulu.

Senator Brewster. Well, I very much appreciate this assistance in my examination. I hope it does not indicate any inconsiderateness if I may now ask a question.

The Vice Chairman. General Short is not through.

Senator Brewster. I am all through with it. I said I appreciate the help of the committee in the examination. It was a cooperative proceeding.

The Vice Chairman. I thought you were fixing to ask another question.

[8458] Senator Brewster. I am when I get a chance.

The Vice Chairman. He is not through reading yet.

Senator Brewster. As everybody else has taken the privilege of interrupting him I would like to exercise that privilege likewise. I have a question which I think is really germane.

The Chairman. Proceed.

Senator Brewster. The point that I wanted to clarify, and my question contains no implication as to whether or not this letter should have been in the file. I just want to establish the point, which I think you said you had asked the War Department, as to whether they had a copy of this personal letter and what was the reply that you received from them?

General Short. I had asked Colonel Duncombe and up to the present he has not located it.

Senator Brewster. And when did you make that request?
General Short. Do you remember, Captain Ford?
Senator Brewster. Well, recently I mean?
General Short. Probably in the last week or 10 days.

Senator Brewster. Well, that is all right, that clears that up. I think now you may resume.

General Short. All right, sir. The next is a memorandum. [Reading:]
Memorandum for the Secretary of War.
Subject: Retirement of General Short.

As I told you this morning, General Short telephoned me at 1 p. m. yesterday (Sunday), to say that he was ready to submit his application for retirement if that was desired. I told him to take no action at the present time, that we had not yet had an opportunity to read the proceedings, let alone arrive at any conclusions.

I am now of the opinion that we should accept General Short's application for retirement today and to do this quietly without any publicity at the moment.

Admiral Stark has requested me to advise him if we do this, as he proposes to communicate this fact to Admiral Kimmel in the hope that Kimmel will likewise apply for retirement.

I have talked briefly with the Judge Advocate General, who sees no objections to the foregoing procedure. He is looking over the proceedings of the Roberts' Board and preparing to advise us as to the matter of a Court of Inquiry or Court-martial. Quite informally he stated that his idea in the matter, without careful consideration, was identical with ours, that the Roberts' Board was on a plane above that of a Court of Inquiry and, therefore, rendered the latter unnecessary and to be refused if requested, and that a court-martial would not be in the public interest at this time.

(S) G. C. MARSHALL, 
Chief of Staff.

This next is a memorandum. [Reading:]

Memorandum for The Adjutant General.

Attached is a written application for retirement from Major General Walter C. Short.

Please hold this without action awaiting instructions from the Secretary of War.

(Sgd.) G. C. MARSHALL, 
Chief of Staff.

Senator BREWSTER. Now, General, could General Marshall have received your letter on the 26th when he sent this memorandum to the Secretary of War?

General SHORT. He undoubtedly had received it on the 28th.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes.

General SHORT. I don’t remember whether I sent the letter airmail. I probably did. It might have been possible for him to receive it on the morning of the 26th.

Senator BREWSTER. But the memorandum of the 26th does, at any rate, indicate a radically different position than he had taken the day before?

General SHORT. Yes, sir; and it also by implication indicates that he had not received my written application, if you read it carefully.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes. But whether or not he had then had an opportunity to read the proceedings and to arrive at any conclusion, that he was on the 26th of the opinion that the application should be accepted.

General SHORT. Yes, sir; and the day before he had told me to stand pat.

Senator BREWSTER. Yes. Now, did he call you at any time again regarding this?

General SHORT. He did not and he did not answer the letter. Here is another memorandum—
Senator Brewster. Well, now, in the 28th memorandum, evidently then a written application was in and he turned it over to the Adjutant General with instructions to await action from the Secretary of War? General Short. Yes, sir. [Reading:]

[Hand-written note:]
[8462] To G-1
Check on opinion of JA to See War.

Senator Brewster. Isn't that, "See what must be done"?
General Short. It should be: "See what must be done. (Sgd. GCM." [Reading:]

Memorandum to the Chief of Staff:
I took up with Knox after Cabinet meeting today the retirement of Kimmel and Short. He assured me that Kimmel would get no leave with full pay. I told Marshall of the opinion of the Attorney General indicating that notice to the effect that the time must not be considered a condonation of offenses, if any, on the part of the War Department or a bar to a future court martial. The language of the President roughly, as given by Knox, was as follows: "provided it is agreed by you that this is no bar to be used legally or otherwise to subsequent court martial proceedings".

Knox told me that the Navy thought that it was only fair that Kimmel and Short should have the right to ask for a court martial if they desired it.

Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of War.

[8463]

Memorandum for the President:
I took up with Secretary Knox, after Cabinet meeting yesterday, the retirement of Admiral Kimmel and General Short. It is my suggestion that the requests for retirement of General Short and Admiral Kimmel should be now accepted:
In order that the acceptance of these requests for retirement may not be considered as a condonation of the offenses, it is recommended that the following language be used in the acceptance of such requests:
"Is accepted, effective ______________, without prejudice to future action in the interest of the Government."
Secretary Knox concurs in this recommendation.

Secretary of War.

It does not show "signed Henry L. Stimson."

[Handwritten notes:]
Secretary of War's proposed wording
without condonation of any offense or prejudice
to future action on behalf of the Gov't
without condonation of any offense or prejudice
to any future disciplinary action.

[8464] This approved as safe by Atty. Genl. by telephone Feb. 16.

It has a notation that—

Green copy never on file.

Memorandum for the Attorney General:
1. At the Cabinet meeting yesterday, the question of the acceptance of requests for retirement of Admiral Kimmel and General Short was discussed. Several suggestions have been made as to the language that should be used in the action on the requests. In order that the acceptance of these requests for retirement may not be considered as a condonation of the offenses, the following language has been recommended:
a. The language of the President, roughly, as given to Secretary Stimson by Secretary Knox:
"Provided it is agreed by you that this is no bar to be used legally or otherwise to subsequent court martial proceedings."
b. The staff of the War Department, believing that the language suggested above might provoke the officers concerned to request court martials at once, and believing such action to be inadvisable at this time, submitted the following language, in which The Judge Advocate General concurred:

[8465] "is accepted, effective -----------------, without prejudice to future action in the interest of the Government."

c. The Secretary of War proposes the following wording:

"without condonation of any offense or prejudice to future action on behalf of the Government."

The President has requested that you express your judgment as to which of the suggestions offered is preferable, and whether or not the preferable wording serves the legal purpose for which intended.

2. The Secretary of War has directed me to request that before reaching a final decision with respect to the President's request, that you read the complete file relating to proposals attached, and also the two opinions of The Judge Advocate General of the Army, one to the Secretary of War dated January 31, 1942, and the other to the Chief of Staff dated January 27, 1942, and the informal memorandum from the Secretary of War to The Judge Advocate General appended to these opinions.

3. In view of the fact that the President desires to reach a decision in regard to this matter on Monday morning, the Secretary of War has directed me to request that you [8466] make available to him your decision before the end of this week end. In view of the urgency of this matter, Colonel Walsh is delivering these papers to you, and is available for what assistance he may be to you in this matter.

For the Secretary of War:

J. H. Hilldring,
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

And a memorandum to the Secretary of War. At the top it says:

If the Secretary returns to Washington tonight—Sunday—have this at his house then.

G. C. M.

[Note attached:] Clause agreed upon by Sec. War, Sec. Navy and the Attorney General:

"without condonation of any offense or prejudice to any further disciplinary action"

To Secretary of War:

For Monday a. m. decision
Opinion of Attorney General re Short and Kimmel.

G. M. C.

[8467]

Office of the Attorney General,
Washington, D. C., February 14, 1942.

Memorandum for the Secretary of War:

I have given consideration to the suggestions contained in your memorandum of today concerning language to be used in connection with the acceptance of the requests for retirement which have been made by Admiral Kimmel and General Short. In this connection I have read the opinions and other documents which accompanied the memorandum.

It seems to me that the objection which may be raised as to suggestion a (using the words "subsequent court martial proceedings") may be found with respect to the words in suggestion c "without condonation of any offense". It has been felt that the reference to court martial would indicate to the officers concerned that such action was definitely planned for a future date, and would move one or both of them to insist that such proceedings be had immediately. Similarly the reference to an offense may suggest to these officers that we felt that an offense had been committed, and thus might lead them to an insistence that the question of whether or not they were guilty of an offense be immediately determined by appropriate proceedings.

Suggestion b, while somewhat more remotely susceptible to the same difficulty, leaves the matter open for further action on the part of the government.
without stating that a particular course is planned or that any special interpretation has been placed upon the acts committed. I believe it would be preferable to use the language contained in recommendation b which, I understand, to be that of the Judge Advocate General and the War Department staff.

(Sgd) FRANCIS BIDDLE,
Attorney General.

That completes the correspondence.

Senator Brewster. Well, now, that opinion of the Attorney General seems to recommend b, while the notation on the prior page recommends c. Do you know whether there is any reconciliation of those two statements?

General Short. You mean General Marshall’s memorandum to the Secretary?

Senator Brewster. Yes. It says:

The clause agreed upon by the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy and Attorney General—

which is clause c, while the opinion of the Attorney General recommends clause b.

General Short. Maybe this order directing the retirement would explain that fully:

FEBRUARY 17, 1942.

Subject: Retirement.
Major General WALTER C. SHORT (O-1621), U. S. Army,
610 N. W. 13th Street, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma:

By direction of the President, Major General Walter C. Short (O-1621), United States Army, upon his own application, is retired from active service to take effect February 28, 1942, under the provisions of Section 1243, Revised Statutes, after more than 39 years’ service and without condonation of any offense or prejudice to future disciplinary action. He is relieved from his present status of awaiting orders at Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and at the proper time will proceed to his home. The travel directed is necessary in the military service. FD-1401 F 1-06 15-06 A 0110-2

By order of the Secretary—Major General—Adjutant General,
and the name has not been copied here, so I do not know what particular adjutant general signed it.

Senator Brewster. Was the matter taken up by anyone, either the Chief of the General Staff, or any other one, before this action?

General Short. About the same time that that letter was written it was transmitted to me in Oklahoma City by an officer sent by plane by the Chief of Staff, who delivered it to me.

Senator Brewster. There was no further discussion [8470] regarding any construction to be placed on this language, or the phraseology which was used?

General Short. No, sir; because I would have welcomed a court martial in open court, although I did not want any more star-chamber proceedings that had everything secret and off the record, as had been the case in the Roberts report.

Senator Brewster. I think that is all that I have.

Senator Lucas. Will the Senator yield for just a moment?

Senator Brewster. Yes.

Senator Lucas. Is the opinion of the Judge Advocate General of the Army to the Secretary of War on January 31, 1942, available for the committee?
Mr. Kaufman. Yes, sir; that is available. The entire file has been duplicated, sir.

Senator Lucas. What do you mean by the "entire file," if I may ask?

Mr. Kaufman. The entire file that leads up to the Advocate General’s opinion.

Senator Lucas. Do I understand that this is not all of the file, that General Short has read, but only a part of it? Are there more documents and correspondence that is involved in this question?

[8471] Mr. Kaufman. There are more documents involved in this question; yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. That is in the letter, the reference to the opinion of the Judge Advocate General to the Secretary of War, dated January 31, 1942, and the other to the Chief of Staff dated January 27, 1942, and the informal memorandum of the Secretary of War, they are all appended to these opinions. Those are these two documents here [indicating].

Lieutenant Colonel Karr. We have photostats of them but did not have time to reproduce them. We will be very glad to present them with all the documents that have gone in.

Senator Lucas. My inquiry was whether or not this is all the information we are going to get on this question or whether there is additional information that throws more light on this subject.

Mr. Kaufman. Senator Brewster or Senator Ferguson has the files.

Senator Ferguson. Senator Brewster.

Senator Brewster. This is the file of which I was speaking [indicating]. These are items 1 and 2. The one to which I have particular reference is the one here [indicating]. That is the larger document that deals with the brief and résumé of the records in the Roberts Commission on General [8472] Short’s case. That is the one to which I had reference and it simply summarizes many points of evidence in the Roberts record.

These others are references to the opinions of the Judge Advocate General, of which I quoted two sentences yesterday.

[8473] Senator Lucas. In view of the fact that General Marshall’s name has been used in these letters that have been read by General Short, I am wondering whether or not there is any more information in connection with this problem that is now before us, where General Marshall is involved anywhere.

General Short. Senator Lucas, I have two additional ones that we got later. We did not have time to duplicate them. I am not sure whether General Marshall’s name appears on them or not. I will be glad to read them.

Senator Brewster. You referred to the memorandum of January 27, which was a memorandum for the Chief of Staff. Is that the one you refer to?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. By Maj. Gen. Myron C. Cramer, the Judge Advocate General?

Senator Lucas. That is the one I referred to in the beginning, yes; because I thought that was important. I should like to see what the Judge Advocate General said on that occasion. Then I followed it
with asking for any additional information that is in the file that
deals with General Marshall on this subject.

Mr. KAUFMAN. The rest of the file is right in front of Senator
Brewster.

[8474] Senator LUCAS. I should like to have counsel, if he will,
examinate that file overnight and see if there is anything pertinent in
it that ought to go in this record following what the general has
stated.

Senator Brewster. They are the ones that presented it to me, and
they have examined it, so they are familiar with what it contains.

I had discussed this with them before I took the course I did.

General Short. May I make a statement to you, Senator Lucas?

Senator LUCAS. Certainly, General.

General Short. These two documents here [indicating] were fur-
nished us by the War Department, by Colonel Duncombe. The others
that I read they did not furnish us, but we went to my 201 file, and
dug them out, but these were furnished by Colonel Duncombe.

Senator LUCAS. I shall conclude by requesting counsel to make a
further study of that file with a view of determining whether or not
they believe this is pertinent and material, to place the additional
information before the committee.

General Short. I believe, Senator, that this memorandum, signed
particularly by the Judge Advocate General [8475] would be
of interest, and I would like to have the counsel read it, if there is no
objection.

Senator Brewster. Would it be possible to have it placed in the
record?

Senator LUCAS. I would just as soon have it spread on the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be spread on the record without reading.
(The matter referred to follows:)

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

Memorandum

To the J. A. G.

Will you kindly give me your opinion on a further question—in addition to
those embodied in this opinion—viz:

If Genl. Short’s proposed application for voluntary retirement were accepted,
with the announced understanding that such action would not preclude a future
court martial for the alleged offenses in re Pearl Harbor, would that be valid—
could a subsequent court martial be validly brought, should it be found advisable?

H. L. S.

[8476]

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF

Washington

To Secretary of War:

Judge Advocate General’s recommendations reference Major General Walter C.
Short.

G. C. M.
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff
Subject: Course of action with respect to General Walter Campbell Short.

1. Pursuant to your instructions I submit the following comments with respect to possible courses of action against the above-named officer on account of the derelictions disclosed in the report of the President's Commission to investigate the Japanese attack on Hawaii on December 7, 1941. These comments are based solely upon the text of the report of the Commission. I have not seen or examined the 1857 typewritten pages of testimony taken [8477] by the Commission nor the 3000 printed pages of records and documents examined by it.

2. General Short may be tried by a general court-martial or he may be summarily discharged from the Army by the President pursuant to the provisions of Article of War 118.

3. With reference to trial by general court-martial, it is assumed that the evidence taken by the Commission sustains its findings of fact and conclusions and would warrant such procedure should it be deemed advisable. However, it is impossible to predict with certainty the result of any trial or the sentence which the court might impose. In this case should a court acquit or impose a sentence less than dismissal I can see no advantage resulting from such a trial. It will be noted that the offenses charged against General Short are offenses of omission or nonfeasance which require a much stronger showing to justify a trial than those involving misfeasance or malfeasance. General Short's nonfeasance or omissions were based on an estimate of the situation which, although proved faulty by subsequent events, was, insofar as I am able to ascertain from the report of the Commission, made or concurred in by all those officers in Hawaii best qualified to form a sound military opinion. That estimate was that [8478] an attack by air was in the highest degree improbable.

4. There are, in my opinion, serious questions of policy which should be considered in connection with a possible trial of this officer by general court-martial.

a. If a court should find him guilty and sentence him to anything less than dismissal, the Army would be accused of white-washing General Short. This accusation would be much more strongly made should the trial result in his acquittal.

b. Such trial would have to be in open court, otherwise the War Department would be subject to criticism of whitewashing General Short if acquitted, or of persecuting him if convicted.

c. The ramifications of this case are such that in a trial by court-martial it would be necessary to introduce in evidence numerous secret plans, orders and other papers which do not appear in the Commission's report. Both the prosecution and the defense would need these documents in order properly to present their cases. It certainly would be against the public interest to disclose some, at least, of these various war plans and documents. Such being the case, it would be impossible to prevent the publication of these plans and documents except by closing the court during those sessions in which these secret papers were read and [8479] discussed. The result of a trial by a court partly in open session and partly in secret session might be that the War Department would be subject to the same charges of whitewashing or persecution as referred to in the subparagraph a above.

d. A general court-martial would require the time and energy of a considerable period of a large number of generals and other officers of high rank as members of the court-martial, and for personnel of the prosecution and defense. It would consume much time and effort of the numerous officers of the Army and Navy whose services would be required in order properly to present the case for trial, or whose attendance would be required as witnesses. The ramifications of such a trial would be so great and it would require the time of so many officers from the lowest to the highest rank that it would interfere seriously in the main job now before the War Department, namely the prosecution of the war.
e. The career of General Short as an active Army officer is finished and closed. Because of the lack of confidence which the public now has in him, which lack of confidence would no doubt be shared by his future subordinates, it is unthinkable that any command should again be entrusted to him. General Short knows this. That in itself is a very severe punishment. Furthermore, General [8480] Short has been relieved of his command which reduces him from a lieutenant general to a major general. The addition to that punishment of any punishment other than dismissal, such as a reprimand, loss of files, forfeiture of pay or suspension from a command, would be inappropriate.

5. For the President to discharge General Short summarily under the provisions of Article of War 118 would tend even more strongly than a dismissal by a sentence of a general court-martial to enable him afterward to claim persecution. Revised Statutes, section 1244, provides that when an officer is 62 years old he may be retired from active service at the discretion of the President. General Short will be 62 years old on March 30, 1942. However, it is unnecessary to discuss this source of action for the reason that you have informed me that General Short has offered to apply for retirement at any time you may desire to accept it. He may lawfully be retired upon such application.

6. General Short entered the Army as a second lieutenant of Infantry on February 2, 1901, and had, up to December 7, 1941, nearly 41 years of honorable and most creditable service. He reached the next to the highest rank that an Army officer can reach, namely that of a lieutenant general.

7. I realize that the question of what ought to be [8481] done in this matter has been the subject of heated discussions in the press and elsewhere and whatever may be done will probably subject the War Department to criticism. However, in view of all the considerations hereinabove discussed, I respectfully suggest the advisability and the desirability of accepting the application of General Short for retirement. However, in this connection I would further suggest that it would be both politic and just to coordinate the action taken by the War Department with that taken by the Navy Department in the case of Admiral Kimmel.

/s/ MYRON C. CRANER,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.

[8482]

CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL,
Washington, January 31, 1942.

Memorandum for the Secretary of War.
Subject: Course of action with respect to Major General Walter Campbell Short.

1. After considering my memorandum for the Chief of Staff of January 27, 1942, on the above subject, you have asked me a further question, as follows:

"If General Short's proposed application for voluntary retirement were accepted, with the announced understanding that such action would not preclude a future court martial for the alleged offenses in re Pearl Harbor, would that be valid—Could a subsequent court martial be validly brought, should it be found advisable?"

2. A retired officer is as a matter of law still an officer of the Army and still subject to court-martial as much as though he were still on the active list (A. W. 2a; Nat'l Defense Act, sec. 2; 10 U. S. C. 4). Neither does his retirement amount to a break in the continuity of his service which would prevent his trial after retirement for [8483] an offense committed before retirement (Dig. Op. JAG 1912, p. 992, par. I G 2b). The real question involved is whether the retirement of an officer on his own application constitutes a condonation of his offense, barring trial for it.

3. There are opinions of this office to the effect that under certain circumstances release from arrest or confinement or promotion may constitute such a condonation. I find no precedent holding either way with respect to retirement. Retirement after thirty years' service upon the officer's own application under section 1243, Revised Statutes (10 U. S. C. 943; Mil. Laws, sec. 326), is "in the discretion of the President." The foregoing is one of the two statutes under which General Short may be retired at once on his own application. If he be retired under the statutes, there may be some plausibility in a contention that the President's exercise of discretion in terminating the officer's active service on his own applica-
tion constitutes a bargain between him and the officer to the effect that he will not further be prosecuted for known offenses occurring prior to retirement. There is no statutory or judicial authority for such a view, and I regard it as unsound as a strict matter of law. Therefore I answer your inquiry by saying that as a matter of law [8484] the retirement of General Short under the above statute upon his own application in the discretion of the President does not involve the passing of judgment by the President upon the officer’s past services or a condonation by him of prior offenses which would prevent subsequent trial by court-martial.

4. Nevertheless, as a matter of fairness rather than law, there is force in the supposed contention above stated. General Short has volunteered to submit an application for retirement. He may reasonably suppose that a request to him from an official source, in answer to his voluntary suggestion, to submit his application for retirement, involves a tacit agreement that the issue of his official conduct of the defense of Hawaii prior to and on December 7 will be closed by his retirement, and that no charges will be preferred against him growing out of such conduct.

5. Another statute under which General Short might be retired immediately upon his own application, is the second proviso of section 3 of the act of June 18, 1940 (54 Stat. 380), reading:

“Provided further, That any officer on the active list of the Regular Army or Philippine Scouts who serve in any capacity as a member of the military or naval forces of the United States prior to [8485] November 12, 1918, shall upon his own application be retired with annual pay equal to 75 per centum of his active-duty annual pay at the time of his retirement unless entitled to retired pay of a higher grade as hereinafter provided, except that officers with less than twenty years’ service and officers who are under investigation or who are awaiting trial by courts martial or the result of such trial, or whose cases are pending before courts of inquiry shall be retired only when the application for retirement in each case has been approved by the Secretary of War; * * *”

It is manifest that War Department approval of an application of General Short for retirement under the above statute, would amount in effect to a finding that he is not under investigation or awaiting trial by court martial and would thus tend even more strongly to support a contention that any offenses chargeable against him were condoned by the action.

6. If General Short should be retired on his own application under the above circumstances and if afterward he should be brought to trial for his conduct of the defense of Hawaii, it may be anticipated that charges of bad faith would be made against the War Department by him [8486] or by others in his behalf. I think it is most desirable that no opportunity be afforded for such accusations. I assume that General Short’s offer of retirement as made was not subject to any conditions. Therefore, I suggest that before his offer be accepted he be given to understand, preferably in writing, for the purpose of the record, that such retirement will not constitute a condonation of his offenses, if any, on the part of the War Department, or be considered a bar to any future trial by general court martial in case such trial should be deemed advisable.

7. Should General Short refuse to submit his application for voluntary retirement with such a condition attached, the President may, without any application by General Short, retire him upon his reaching the age of 62 years on March 30, 1942, pursuant to the provisions of Revised Statutes, section 1244 (10 U. S. C. 944; Mil. Laws sec. 323), and may make announcement to that effect at the present time.

/s/ Myron C. Cramer, Major General, The Judge Advocate General.

1. Incl.
   Let. to C. of S.
   1/27/42.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Lucas. Yes.

[8487] Mr. Murphy. General, will you state now as to whether or not you feel it would be in the interest of national defense and national security to have had a court martial of either you or Admiral Kimmel during the war, and in view of the fact it would show the
situation at Hawaii, as well as other things, and require the presence of admirals in Admiral Kimmel's case, of admirals who were scattered over the seven seas, and in your case, generals and other officers who were scattered over the different parts of the world?

General Short. I will say that there may have been some justification in that point of view, but I do not think there was any justification in concealing the many things that were concealed; that the public had a right to know that, and that certainly I had the right to consider that the public should know it.

Mr. Murphy. In other words, you feel that there should have been a more fair statement by the War Department, but you do not feel that there should have been a complete, [8488] open court martial exposing the matter on the record, is that right?

General Short. There might possibly have been some question about magic.

The Chairman. General, in that connection, is it not ordinarily the practice—whether it is the wisest or best practice, it has nearly always been the practice of the War Department and Navy Department, in making investigations of any sort under a board of inquiry, to make them secret? They do not usually do that out in the open, like we are holding this hearing, do they?

General Short. I will say this: Through the press propaganda, or otherwise, the public had been so acquainted with this case that any court of inquiry, or any courts martial was practically a trial before the American public, and I do not think there would have been any justification for any more secret, top secret, or off-the-record testimony.

The Chairman. Well, you have not answered my question. I asked you whether it was not the practice, over the years, in both the Navy and War Department, to hold secret investigations?

General Short. That has been done frequently. Now I will say also usually it is not a matter of the same public interest. [8489] The Chairman. No; and we were not previously engaged in an inquiry where the revelation of military secrets might have been as universal as in this case.

General Short. But even granting that, I do not believe there ever was any possible justification for off-the-record testimony that nobody could examine in the future.

The Chairman. Do you think that the interest, or the welfare, or the result that might follow to any individual officer in the case of yourself and Admiral Kimmel could compare to the public interest that might be served or affected to a disadvantage by the revelation of things that would have come out in a public courts martial in both cases?

General Short. The top secret evidence was kept secret until after the war was over, and then has been made available. The off-record testimony was not recorded, and I do not know to this day, and the public does not know to this day, and I do not think the committee knows to this day what that off-the-record testimony consisted of, and yet there was a final decision arrived at on the basis of that testimony.

The Chairman. That is a matter about which I think the committee need not spend any more time.

Congressman Gearhart.
[8490] Senator Brewster. Just a minute. I would like to pursue that.

So it is your impression, General, that the public impressions which were formed as the result of releases here in Washington and the action taken convicted you before the American public on what you term off-the-record testimony?

General Short. It is.

Senator Brewster. Without an opportunity for you to have a hearing of any proper kind?

General Short. That is correct. It might be of interest if I could read the waiver that I signed to the Secretary of War in regard to the courts martial.

First, I received a letter from the Secretary of War—

The Chairman. General, before you do that, may I ask you this question, to clear it up.

In the newspapers from time to time it has been stated, and elsewhere, maybe on the floor of Congress, that in either the Navy or the War Department a demand could be made for a courts martial, and it was stated that was not true of both Departments. Is it not true that you had the right to demand a courts martial, and Admiral Kimmel had a right to demand it in the Navy?

General Short. I think either one of us could demand it, but whether it was granted in either Department depended [8491] on the Department.

Now there was a difference. I think you may possibly be confusing the court of inquiry in the Navy with the Army board. Under the regulations in the Navy, with the court of inquiry, the accused officer is permitted to hear all of the evidence given, to have an attorney, and is accorded the privilege of cross-examination.

When Admiral Kimmel appeared before the Navy board he sat in, he heard all of the testimony, he had the privilege of cross-examination so if things were not brought out he could bring them out.

Before the Army board I was not permitted to hear the other witnesses. I was not given the privilege of cross-examination, and neither was I permitted to be represented by an attorney during that period. That was the difference in the two Departments.

I believe, as far as a courts martial is concerned, that both Departments had the legal right to refuse us a courts martial, if they saw fit to do so.

The Chairman. I got the impression that one Department was compelled by law to grant a courts martial if the person involved requested or demanded it.

General Short. That is true of a court of inquiry. I think the point of view expressed by the Judge Advocate [8492] General and Chief of Staff was that the action of the Roberts report was on a plane above a court of inquiry and therefore denied us the right to demand a court of inquiry. That is plainly said in one of these memoranda.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question?

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. Do I understand, General, that before the Army Pearl Harbor board you were not afforded the right of counsel?
General Short. I had the right of counsel only when I was testifying. My counsel could not sit in when the others were testifying, and neither he nor I heard the other witnesses, nor had any privilege of cross-examination.

Mr. Murphy. But you did have Brig. Gen. Thomas Green as counsel?

General Short. Yes, sir; and he was present during the time I was testifying only.

Mr. Murphy. You were furnished a copy of the testimony over the protest of the board, weren't you, by the Secretary?

General Short. I was furnished with a copy of the testimony, except for the top secret and off-the-record testimony, so what I got did not explain the situation at all.

The Chairman. The off-the-record testimony was, in the main, testimony that might involve some result or effect upon the military operations during the war, was it not?

General Short. There is no way for me to know what was involved.

The Chairman. Of course, there was no record made of the off-the-record testimony.

General Short. There was no record made and there was nothing to indicate the nature of it.

The Chairman. All right, go ahead.

[8494] General Short. This is the letter I received from the Secretary of War——

Senator Brewster. General Short, do I understand that before the Army board there was off-the-record testimony?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. And there is no record as far as you know of that?

General Short. I am sure there is no record of it.

Senator Brewster. That appears at various points in the testimony?

General Short. It just shows the testimony was taken of a certain witness off the record.

The Chairman. Have you been told or have you gotten information to the effect that it related largely if not altogether to magic?

General Short. I have had no word of what it consisted of. It was just the blank page.

The Chairman. Go ahead.

Mr. Keefe. Will the gentleman yield?

My recollection is that in the report of the Army board right at the beginning of the session there is a notation that General Marshall testified off the record, with the time the off-the-record discussion started, and [8495] when his testimony was again placed on the record. It is about an hour and 20 minutes, as I recall, that he testified off the record. No one knows what that testimony was, of course.

Senator Brewster. Except the men who listened to it.

Mr. Keefe. Yes; except the men who listened to it.

Senator Brewster. And were affected, apparently, by it.

The Chairman. You couldn't say that without knowing what it was.

General Short. Shall I proceed?

The Chairman. Go ahead.
General Short (reading): 

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Washington, D. C., 18 September 1943.  

Major General Walter C. Short,  
United States Army, Retired.  

My Dear General Short: In connection with your possible trial by general court-martial, the two-year statute of limitations prescribed by Article of War 39 will, unless action is taken to prevent it, bar your trial by general court-martial 7 December 1943. The tolling of the statute of limitations would be stopped by either a present waiver by you or your arraignment before a general court martial, which, probably, would adjourn the case until later.  

So long as the war continues it will be impracticable to have a number of important witnesses appear before the Board on account of their war duties. In this situation it has occurred to me that the practical thing to do is to postpone any possible trial until later and that you may desire for this purpose to execute a waiver of the statute of limitations. In the event that you see fit to do this, I give you my personal assurance that any trial determined upon will be held at the earliest practicable date. 

If you should agree with the foregoing your prompt return of the enclosed form of waiver, duly executed by you, is requested. 

Sincerely,  

(Signed) Henry L. Stimson.  

1. incl. 

Waiver. 

This is the waiver that I signed: 

**Waiver**  

September 20, 1943.  

I, Walter C. Short, Major General, United States Army, Retired, hereby agree on my honor as an officer and a gentleman that I will not plead, nor permit my attorney or other person on my behalf to plead the statute of limitations in bar of my trial by General Court Martial in open court for any alleged offenses with which I may be charged relating to the period on or before December 7, 1941, should my trial be held during the present war or within six (6) months thereafter. 

I take this action voluntarily, believing it to be in the public interest. 

Walter C. Short.  
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.  

Senator Ferguson. Will the gentleman yield? 

Senator Brewster. Yes.  

Senator Ferguson. I would like to inquire, General, whether or not you ever saw the Roberts report and when. I mean the testimony before the Roberts Commission.  

General Short. I saw it in August 1944. Now, it is possible that my attorney had it the last part of July. I made a request for it in July and I saw it when I came on to Washington for the Army board.  

Senator Ferguson. July of what year?  

General Short. 1944. 

Senator Ferguson. When these letters were written, which you have read here today, this report had not been furnished to you?  

General Short. It had not.  

Senator Ferguson. I mean, the testimony.  

General Short. No, sir. Here is the letter I wrote requesting the Roberts report. July 4, 1944—

Senator Ferguson. That brings up this question: At the time you were relieved from command and later retired you didn’t have the Roberts report and know what the testimony was?
General Short. I had no idea what the testimony was. I had simply the printed document that appeared in the newspapers.

Senator Ferguson. Later you demanded it in writing and you are going to read us that latter?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. When you called General Marshall and wrote him your personal letter enclosing your letter to the Adjutant General, the Roberts report hadn’t been made at that time?

General Short. It was published in the Sunday morning paper of January 25.

The Chairman. And you were not in Washington at that time?

General Short. I was in Oklahoma City.

[8499] The Chairman. You phoned him on seeing the publication of the Roberts report?

General Short. That is correct.

The Chairman. So the action on your part upon seeing in the newspapers an account of that report was purely voluntary?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I was talking about the record upon which that report was made. I am talking about the testimony.

General Short. I understood perfectly.

The Chairman. I understood it, too.

Let me ask in that connection, in your letter waiving any right to plead the statute of limitations, you said you made that waiver on condition that it was a public court martial. Did you mean to intimate that if it was not to be a public court martial that you would insist on the statute of limitations?

General Short. Very definitely. I would raise the point. If they tried to try me in a closed court I would plead the statute of limitation. If it were in open court I would comply with my waiver.

The Chairman. That was the implication I got from your letter, your waiver was based on the understanding that you had an open court martial.


Mr. Murphy. In order to have an open court hearing you would insist, during the war on a public disclosure of the war plans we had drawn for the prosecution of the war?

General Short. If they insisted on court martiaizing me during the war I wanted the public to know exactly what I was being tried upon.

Mr. Murphy. You wanted a public disclosure of all of our war plans for winning the war?

General Short. That would have been up to the War Department. If they thought the court martial was important enough they would have to agree to it.

Mr. Murphy. In this hearing we have had the war plan in the Atlantic, we have had the war plan in the Pacific, we have had the hemispheric defense plan, and according to your theory there should have been a complete spreading on the record and in the newspapers and over the radio all of our war plans in the war in which we were then engaged?

General Short. That was a decision for the War Department. If the War Department decided my trial was so important that it was worth putting that in the papers that was their decision, not mine.
The Chairman. Was anybody in the War Department insisting upon a court martial of you?

General Short. I don't think so.

The Chairman. Finally, as a result of the board of inquiry, the War Department recommended that no action be taken.

General Short. That is correct. I just wanted to be sure when I signed the waiver that I would never be subject to a star chamber proceeding.

Senator Brewster. It should be clear in the record also that your waiver gave the War Department 6 months after the conclusion of the war to determine, so that there would be no necessity of the exposure of plans even if they did determine you should be court martialed.

General Short. Not without they deciding it was so important they wanted to do it this minute and they would gamble everything else.

Senator Brewster. If they decided to wait, the stipulation was that it should be after the war, and an open trial?

General Short. Yes.

Senator Brewster. So there was no necessity on the part of the War Department to expose their plans in the face of the enemy.

General Short. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You wanted to read something, General?

General Short. Yes, sir. My letter doesn't appear here but the memorandum of the Secretary of War in answer to it does appear, which is the important thing.

This is dated July 4, 1944:

Memorandum for the President:

Major General Walter C. Short has requested that he be furnished a copy of the full proceedings of the Roberts Commission. A copy of General Short's letter is attached.

But it is not attached.

I am informed that the Navy Department, presumably with your approval, has furnished Admiral Kimmel with a photostatic copy of the report. I believe that General Short is also entitled to a copy, in order to prepare his own defense, and request your approval of his request.

(Signed) Robert P. Patterson,

Acting Secretary of War.

OK FDR

That is in the President's handwriting.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

[8503] Senator Ferguson. What are you reading from?

General Short. From a memorandum for the President.

Senator Ferguson. What file?

General Short. In my own 201 file.

The Chairman. That is the number of your file in the War Department?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. That is what you call the personal file of every officer; it is a 201 file.

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. 201 is the personnel number.

General Short. It is all my file; yes.

Mr. Murphy. May I ask one question, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. I ask you, General, whether or not on page 541 of the Army Pearl Harbor board hearing there will be found the following:

General Short. I thank the Board for its very courteous treatment.

General Short. The Army board.

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Now, the Chair would like to get to a little left of center and reach Congressman Gearhart for [8504] interrogation.

Senator Lucas. Will the Congressman yield for just one question?

Mr. Gearhart. I will gladly yield to the distinguished Senator.

General Short. May I, Mr. Chairman—may I introduce one more letter, that bears on this same question of testimony, before we go ahead?

Mr. Gearhart, Mr. Chairman, I yield to the witness.

General Short (reading):

Confidential.

War Department,
Washington, October 20, 1944.

Dear General Short: I have your letter of October 18, 1944, requesting that your counsel be authorized to inform you of the information he obtains from an examination of the records made available to him in response to your letter of September 29, 1944.

Much of this information is classified and involves highly important material affecting military security. It must not be transmitted in writing, or by a third party, or by telephone or telegraph.

[8505] Should you feel that your interest justifies your personally meeting with your counsel, he may orally communicate the information to you upon your written undertaking to me that you will not disclose any of this classified information to any person except with the prior approval of the Secretary of War.

Sincerely yours,

(S) Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of War.

Naturally, I refused to sign any such written undertaking, because it would bar me from using it before this committee or any place without the personal approval of the Secretary of War. So I had never seen any of this material until more recently.

The Chairman. At that time this committee hadn't been created.

General Short. It wouldn't have made any difference. He didn't limit this. I couldn't use it for any purpose without his personal approval.

Mr. Murphy. Isn't there a letter at page 4450 of the Army Pearl Harbor board in which General Ulio said that you are "to be furnished with a copy of the testimony taken to date by the Army Pearl Harbor board less exhibits and that hereafter he be furnished with a copy of the [8506] remainder of the testimony from day to day as it is taken as approved by order of the Secretary of War"?

General Short. But that did not approve the top secret and the top secret was never furnished me. I had never seen any of the top secret until probably a day or two before this board convened on November 15, when they had released it for printing. And the first time I ever saw the magic was when it was passed out here; this printed information.

Mr. Murphy. At the time you were demanding the top secret information, the war was in progress, was it not?
General Short. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. All right, Congressman Gearhart.
Senator Lucas. I won't ask my question. I will wait.
Mr. Gearhart. We will not detain you for long, General.

General, I understood that when you asked to have an attorney appear with you on the Roberts hearings, that you were denied the right to have an attorney, but were allowed to have a person in the room with you to assist you with your documents; is that correct?

General Short. That is not correct. I did not make a request for an attorney. I took them at their word that this was not a trial in any sense. I didn't know they were [8507] going to arrive at a finding that practically amounted to a finding of court martial. I felt that I was absolutely not guilty in any sense, and I could handle my own case, and I went before the Roberts commission with no one assisting me in even handling documents.

Mr. Gearhart. Didn't General Green accompany you in the hearing room?

General Short. He did not.
Mr. Gearhart. You were alone?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. You handled your own papers?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, what was your reference to him a moment ago?

General Short. General Green was my counsel before the Army Pearl Harbor board, not before the Roberts Commission.

Mr. Gearhart. Later on?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Did he appear in the room as your attorney at that time, or did they object to him appearing as your attorney?

General Short. He appeared as my attorney, but when he read one document and made one slight comment on it, [8508] they did object to his comment. He could read the papers for me, to save me the trouble of reading them, but he could not comment.

I haven't that reference immediately at hand, but that actually happened.

Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact, his function as an attorney was limited by the court of inquiry—rather the Army board?
General Short. Chiefly to advising me.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, I just want to ask one or two questions about the radar.

On the day in question, December 7, 1941, the radar was on from 4 in the morning until 7 in the morning?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Gearhart. How were those hours fixed?

General Short. I issued a general order at the time that we got the message of November 27 to my chief of staff and he transmitted the verbal order. I am not sure whether he transmitted it orally, or whether he put out a written order, but my order was an oral order to the chief of staff.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, was the radar on the same time schedule on week days as on Sundays?

General Short. The schedule for routine training was from 7 until 11 on week-days and from 12 to 4 for [8509] routine training
and maintenance. They could do in the afternoon all of the main-
tenance they required, and the man who was responsible for the training could vary the thing and do whatever he thought was most needed.

Now, on Sunday there was no required training. There were a good many Sundays they trained voluntarily. Saturday afternoon there was no required training, but again because it was new, they did voluntarily quite a good deal of maintenance work.

Mr. Gearhart. Lieutenant Lockhart gave some testimony in Washing-
ton on the 30th day of October of 1944 at the Pentagon Building
where he was examined by a Mr. Fraser. He testified, in substance:

Answer. That is right. There were approximately six men per unit. We had six in ours. We operated from 7 to 9 o'clock.

Question. Nobody operated at nighttime so far as you know?

Answer. If there was any alert, or if maneuvers were going on, or something like that kind, there was a night operation.

Question. From 7 to 5 except for lunch periods, you were on daily?

Answer. Yes, sir, during the week.

[8510] Question. Sunday was a day off normally?

Answer. We had to operate Sundays from 4 in the morning until 7 in the morning. We took turns. That happened to be my Sunday.

General Short. This statement might have applied before November 27. It would not be correct for the period after November 27. And you notice he shows specifically that they did operate from 4 to 7 on Sunday, and that was required for every day.

Mr. Gearhart. From the 28th of November on?

General Short. From November 27 on.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, that matter was never touched on further, so the record is silent except for what I have read to you on that point.

Now, was there any change in your verbal orders to stay on from 4 to 7 after you gave those orders?

General Short. No, sir. There was a considerable number of changes in the way they actually worked for training and routine, because they were interested in doing all they could possibly do, and they tried it out, worked until 6 o'clock, from 4 o'clock in the morning until 6 in the afternoon. They decided very soon that they couldn't work the men that hard, and when they were working beyond the hours, that was something they could agree to, and they [8511] made quite a number of changes before it settled down to 7 to 11 and 12 to 4.

Mr. Gearhart. How many of those radars did you have?

General Short. We had six.

Mr. Gearhart. Where were they placed? One was at the very north of the island?

General Short. I think I can give you the locations of most of them. The Opana station, which was 2 or 3 miles southwest of Kahuku. There was one station then almost directly north of Kawaiola. That was several miles to the west of the Opana station. There was one station at Koko Head, which was a short distance to the south of Diamond Head, which I think is familiar to most of you. There was one station above Fort Shafter, a very short distance on a high point. There was one station near Hawaii Island on the west side of the island, I believe that covers them all.

Mr. Gearhart. The arrangement of those stations was so that you could cover the sea in every direction?
General Short. Yes, sir. They were placed to get the best coverage possible with that number. Of course, there probably would have been some movement of them as soon as we got our fixed stations into place. We probably would [8512] have moved some of them then.

Mr. Gearhart. I notice from the testimony that appeared in the statement that I have just read from that the range of these portable radar stations was 132 miles.

General Short. We thought the range was 75 to 100 miles. That was the normal range. That was what the people on the mainland thought. Apparently, our atmospheric conditions were more favorable, and we actually got 132 miles on the morning of December 7. I understand that the expert radar people that came out from the mainland later were appalled to think we could get any such distance.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, I heard some talk about two of the fixed stations already being in place on December 7. That was news to me. Is that correct?

General Short. That is not correct. I think on one station all of the construction work was about 97 percent completed. That was over on Haleakala. I am quite sure that the blueprints for the installation of the radar antenna hadn't been received so they couldn't complete that part of the work.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, the one that was 97 percent complete, was it usable at all?

[8513] General Short. No, sir; because they couldn't set up the antenna, because they didn't have the approved plan for putting in the foundations and setting up the antenna.

Mr. Gearhart. What was to be the range of these permanent fixed stations?

General Short. It was a little uncertain. We thought with these greater elevations that we would get between 150 and 200 miles.

Now, we had one at 10,000 feet. As a matter of fact, I believe that they did later get almost the 200 miles from Haleakala, but for some reason the expert radar people from Washington recommended that it be discontinued on account of dead space. There apparently was certain dead space. However, that was after my time, and I have no personal knowledge of that.

Mr. Gearhart. When was the material for the construction of the fixed radar stations in Hawaii?

General Short. Most of the material was in Hawaii previous to December 7, and we were actually robbing those units for spare parts to keep the others in operation?

Mr. Gearhart. To keep the portables in operation?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Gearhart. But the original contract for the [8514] construction of the fixed radars was for their completion at a time prior to December 7, was it not?

General Short. I would hardly put it as a contract. I would say the estimate of the time that they would be completed was put—we were told that we would have the parts by June 30. I mean all of the sets. We didn't get them. And we hoped to have all of the construction work done before they arrived.

However, there were a number of things that held that up, and they were not there.
Mr. Gearhart. One of those things was the old question of priority?

General Short. Priorities and the difficulty of getting permission from, taking 10 months to get permission from the Department of Interior for the park system. Also the difficulty of getting construction materials. There were all kinds of difficulties.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, the question of priority was determined in Washington, was it not?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. The priorities which determined when you were going to get material for the construction of your fixed radars was determined in Washington, you had nothing to do with that?

General Short. No, sir. I did all I could do. We were working under the same priority as military construction in the States, which was A-1C. When I heard from the Division Engineer in San Francisco, about June 10, that he did not believe we would get our material by June 30, I sent a wire to the Adjutant General on the 19th of June and requested that the priority be attached to A-1A, which was the priority the Navy had for the outlying bases. They came back and they said they would advance it to A-1B, and that the chief engineer would take care of the rest of it.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, did they?

General Short. They got there considerably later than June 30. They got there, most of them, in August.

Mr. Gearhart. Then the construction work began?

General Short. The construction work had been going on where it could before they were received. You see, we had to build roads up steep mountains to get up there and that had been going on for some time before the sets were received.

Mr. Gearhart. If you had been able to get a first priority for the material and had been able to get promptly your permit to build this fixed station in the national park from the Department of Interior, you would have had your 200-mile radius radar on December 7, would you not?

General Short. We probably would have had. Now, there was an additional difficulty that I have not mentioned. Procuring first-class expert workmen had become a terrific problem in Hawaii. They had taken everybody locally. The Navy got started about a year before the Army on construction. They were constructing bases on Johnston Island, Palmyra, and one or two other places. They had combed the local market. And apparently the market for labor in the States was a good deal in the same situation. They put in a request to the engineer in San Francisco for 300 workmen and when they got there they would not be 300 of the type that was expected but probably the best that could be had because good labor was scarce all over. It was an added difficulty.

Mr. Gearhart. But with these interferences and delays incident to priorities and permits to occupy the national-park area, you got one of those permanent fixed stations 93 percent——

General Short. 97 percent.

Mr. Gearhart. 97 percent completed?

General Short. That is my memory, but I think that is correct.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, on the 28th day of November you alerted against sabotage?
General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. How long did you remain alerted against sabotage? General Short. We remained alerted against sabotage until the time the attack struck and by 8:10 that morning I had ordered the No. 3 alert, which was the alert against an all-out attack.

Mr. Gearhart. There was no suspension of the alert against sabotage between the day you ordered it and the day of the attack?

General Short. No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. That is all.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, before you adjourn—

The Chairman. We will adjourn, but before we do so, inasmuch as Mr. Tyler’s name has been mentioned here, Lieutenant Tyler, who I believe you say is now a colonel?

General Short. I believe he is a lieutenant colonel. I don’t know.

The Chairman. The newspapers carried several stories to the effect of drawing some implication out of the promotion of Lieutenant Tyler to a lieutenant colonelcy and keeping of Sergeant Lockhart in the ranks where he was at the time, the inference being that Lieutenant Tyler, who ignored this warning, that Lieutenant Tyler was promoted, whereas Lockhart was not.

Do you know anything about that?

[8519] General Short. Lockhart was a private.

The Chairman. A private?

General Short. He was a private and he was promoted from a private. I think he became a lieutenant; so they were both promoted.

The Chairman. They were both promoted. So there was no justification in drawing a comparison as to what happened to the two of them?

General Short. I don’t think so. And, incidentally, I will say I had nothing to do with the promotion of either one of them.

Mr. Gearhart. In addition to that, Mr. Chairman, I think Lockhart was given a decoration at the end for his alertness.

General Short. I believe he was.

Senator Ferguson. In March of 1942.

The Chairman. That has been bandied about in public publications and I am glad to get it straightened out.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, before we adjourn, the understanding was that everything that was in this file about General Marshall had been offered.

I have here a letter dated June 12, 1942, and then under it a memorandum of July 21, 1943:

Took up this matter with General Marshall.

That is in regard to this court martial.

[8520] Took up this matter with General Marshall. He told me that he would have to wait for Secretary Stimson’s return for it was a matter for his decision.

Now, Senator Ferguson was the one who requested this file.

Senator Ferguson. Senator Brewster.

Mr. Murphy. Senator Brewster, and I do not want to offer something that was brought to him as an exhibit, but I do want the record to show that if Senator Brewster does not renew his offer of this file
in the morning I will ask unanimous consent to have it go in the record because I think it ought to be straightened out on the record.

The Chairman. Yes, that is the time to take action on it.

Senator Lucas. Let me ask one question of General Short on this point before we suspend. You don't object if I ask another question, General Short?

General Short. No, sir.

Senator Lucas. I was somewhat intrigued with the condition that you placed in the waiver with respect to court martial. I was just wondering what the custom is in the Army with respect to having courts martial in open before the public.

General Short. The normal court martial is open but I think there are some cases on record where the order for the court martial has been—where they have directed sessions in [8521] closed quarters.

Senator Lucas. If I understand you correctly, then, either in time of war or in time of peace the ordinary court martial is open to the public?

General Short. Wide open.

Senator Lucas. I was not sure on that. I was under the impression it was just the other way.

General Short. No, sir; but I think—my attorney says by act of Congress that it must be open.

Senator Lucas. It must be. Being a member of Congress I should know that and I plead guilty. One other question.

The Chairman. Guilty of what?

Senator Lucas. Of not knowing or anything that the committee wants to find me guilty of, that is all right.

One other question—well, I will not ask you that. I will just withhold it. Thank you, sir.

The Chairman. All right, the committee will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 4:15 p. m., January 25, 1946, an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m., Saturday, January 26, 1946.)
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SATURDAY, JANUARY 26, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D.C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a.m., in
the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster,
and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark,
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H.
Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P.
Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

The Vice CHAIRMAN. The committee will please be in order.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER C. SHORT, UNITED STATES
ARMY (Retired)—Resumed

The Vice CHAIRMAN. Does counsel have anything at this time to
present before examination of the witness is resumed?

Mr. RICHARDSON. No, sir.

The Vice CHAIRMAN. General Short, do you have anything you
want to present to the committee before your examination is resumed?

General SHORT. No, sir.

The Vice CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson of Michigan will inquire.

Senator FERGUSON. General Short, you brought in the other day a
telegram dated December 5, 1941, to the Panama Department. Had
you seen the reply to the message of the 27th by General Andrews—
it is in exhibit 32.

General SHORT. I have it here. It is dated November 29, 1941.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, it would appear that that was mailed air
mail and there was a telegram sent prior to that indicating he would
send the report by air mail.

General SHORT. Yes, sir.

[8523] Senator FERGUSON. He says:

Reurad four six one November twenty seven signed Marshall report requested
being forwarded air mail. CDC six eight seven.

Signed "Andrews."

Then we have the memorandum showing in detail just exactly what
he was doing.
Now, apparently that was received prior to the 5th. And then General Miles sends this wire:

U. S.-Japanese relations strained. Will inform you if and when severance of diplomatic relations imminent.

Did you take that wire as a modification of the message of the 27th so that they really didn’t want Andrews to be alerted to the full extent that he had notified them?

General Short. No, sir, I took it that he was given to understand that he could expect additional and probably last-minute information as to exactly what was taking place diplomatically.

Senator Ferguson. And that Miles’ construction of the message of the 27th was that diplomatic relations weren’t as bad as the message of the 27th indicated or that severance of diplomatic relations being imminent that they would be notified of that?

General Short. Yes, sir.

[8525] Senator Ferguson. Well, now, I note on this telegram this language “send number five twelve”—that is apparently the number of the telegram—“twelve seven.” In other words, it was drawn up on the 5th. Severance of diplomatic relations was not imminent at this time and it wasn’t sent until the 7th. Sent on the very day—even after we had the 14-part message?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So that as far as General Miles was concerned he didn’t even consider that the 1 o’clock and the 14-part message indicated that a severance of diplomatic relations was imminent.

General Short. Is it possible that he failed to mark the message “urgent” or “priority” and that it was held here in Washington for 2 days?

Senator Ferguson. That was going to be my next question. This message is not marked “priority,” the same as General Marshall’s message to you of the 7th, it wasn’t marked priority.

General Short. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. So that it didn’t receive the same attention that a priority message would receive. Now, was it the understanding as far as you were concerned that when messages were not marked “priority” that they were not considered important messages?

General Short. If the lines were not loaded, they would be sent through, but if the lines were loaded all of the priority or urgent messages would be sent ahead of those not so marked.

Senator Ferguson. And if at the other end there was any translating or interpreting of codes the ones that were marked “priority” would all go through first and these nonpriority messages would be taken up after those?

General Short. That is correct.

[8527] Senator Ferguson. Is that the system?

General Short. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator Ferguson. So that you account for this message to Panama that while it was drawn on the 5th, they did not get it until the 7th because it was not marked “Priority” and it is not marked “Priority.” I have gone over it carefully. It is a photostatic copy and I cannot find where it was sent “Priority.”
Do you want to look at it and see whether or not you can find anything on it indicating "Priority"? [Handing document to witness.]

General Short. I see nothing to indicate either "Priority" or "Urgent."

Senator Ferguson. I have before me—and I received it from your counsel when going over the papers that were put in yesterday morning on the question of priority of the message of General Marshall to you.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And that it was not a priority message. I think it is clear now from what was put in yesterday that it was not a priority message but I think this should be in to make the record complete. Do you have a copy of it before you?

General Short. I think so.

Senator Ferguson. Would you read it into the record?

General Short. You mean the message itself or the—

Senator Ferguson. No.

General Short. The inquiry?

Senator Ferguson. The inquiry.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What was told you or what was told one of your officials when they made an inquiry.

General Short (reading):

Paragraph 3 WAR L 541 extra urgent

WASHINGTON, D. C., 219 p. m., December 9, 1941.

C G

Hawaiian Department, Ft. Shafter, T. H.

Five four nine ninth please advise immediately exact time of receipt of our number five two nine.

Senator Ferguson. That "529" was the Marshall message of the 7th?

General Short. Yes, sir [reading]:

Repent five two nine December seven at Honolulu exact time deciphered message transmitted by Signal Corps to staff and by what staff office received.

Colton, Acting.

Now, there is a pencilled note on that:

529 delivered to C/s 300 pm 7 Dec—receipted for by Capt. Trueman delivered by Mr. Hough.

[8529] And then out to one side there is a notation that apparently places it at "2:58 p. m., Colonel Dunfey."

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what that "2:58 p. m." is?

General Short. I beg your pardon?

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what that "2:58 p. m." is?

General Short. I beg your pardon?

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what this "2:58 p. m." is?

General Short. I think what that means is that that was delivered to Colonel Dunlop, the adjutant general, at 2:58 p. m. and he turned it over to my aide, Captain Trueman, at 3 o'clock, 2 minutes later, because it would take about that length of time to walk from his office to mine.

Senator Ferguson. Do you have this memo before you?

General Short. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ask someone there to get this information for you so that you could wire it back to the War Department?

General Short. I probably did not personally but unquestionably a member of my staff did.

Senator Ferguson. And this is a memorandum?

General Short. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Would you read that into the record?

General Short (reading):

Radio War Department 529 Received. Filed at Washington, D. C. 12:18 PM Washington time (or 6:48 A. Haw. time) (as RCA 1549 WS),

I think it is.

[8530] Received by RCA at Honolulu 7:33 A. M. Delivered to Signal Office at 11:45 A. M. Not marked priority. Other priority messages handled first. Delivered to decoding officer 2:40 P. M. Decoded and delivered to Col. Dunlop 2:50 P. M. Delivered to Capt. Trueman in office of Chief of Staff HHD at 3:00 P. M.

And then this was the message, using that information, that was sent to the War Department:

Re your five four nine. Radio five two nine delivered Honolulu via RCA seven thirty three morning of seventh received Signal Office Fort Shafter eleven forty five morning (this time approximate but within five minutes) seventh Stop Deciphered message received by Adjutant General Hq. Haw Dept two fifty eight afternoon seventh (Received by Chief of Staff Hq Haw Dept three o’clock afternoon seventh All Hawaiian).

Short.

That “All Hawaiian” indicates all Hawaiian time.

Senator Ferguson. Now, all of the other messages that you read, the foundation for the message that you sent, “Not marked priority, other priority messages handled first,” do you know what they were?

General Short. No, sir; I do not. There may have been a considerable number.

[8531] Senator Ferguson. Would counsel look in and see whether they can find out what messages were sent in there that same day?

Mr. Masten. I did not hear that, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. On the same day there is a memorandum here on the 7th that this message was not marked priority, “other priority messages handled first.” Would you try and ascertain what those other priority messages were on the 7th going into Hawaii that were translated first?

Mr. Masten. Yes.¹

Senator Ferguson. Then I take these messages to indicate this, that on the 9th of December, that is the Tuesday following the disaster, the War Department here undertook to investigate at least to the extent of ascertaining when you had received their message of the 7th. Is that correct?

General Short. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know anything about the General Bundy mission that was coming out to Hawaii to investigate as to the disaster?

General Short. Not for 2 or 3 years afterward, I think.

Senator Ferguson. Well, was there any mission that came out for the War Department other than the Roberts commission?

General Short. No, sir. Secretary Knox came out ahead of the Roberts commission.

Senator Ferguson. I understand that he went more into the details of the Navy than he did of the War Department.

General Short. He went completely through my field headquarters and spent, I would say, probably 2 hours, in which we had officers detailed from every section to explain everything that had happened. He got a very complete picture not only of our headquarters but how we were functioning and exactly what happened, and at the end of the time he was so impressed with our headquarters that he directed the Navy to make arrangements to move over into an underground headquarters right alongside of us.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did he indicate in any way that he was not satisfied with what you had done?

General Short. He did not.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I may be repeating on this; I do not want to repeat but I want to try and find out whether or not you were present when Colonel Knox, Secretary of the Navy, said something to Admiral Kimmel about a message being sent on the 6th, the afternoon or the evening of the 6th?

General Short. I do not remember it. I talked with Colonel Knox at Admiral Kimmel’s headquarters soon after he arrived, but I do not remember the conversation. It may have taken place.

[8533] Senator Ferguson. Well, did he mention in any way to you a message being sent on the 6th, a warning message?

General Short. I do not remember that. I think that in some way that we must have misunderstood each other as to the time, because I explained to him about the Chief of Staff’s message on the 7th and it was the only message I received, and I think that there must have been a misunderstanding somewhere between us.

Senator Ferguson. Now, on the message of the 27th, were you familiar with exhibit 45? I wish you would look at exhibit 45. Does counsel have exhibit 45 there?

Mr. Masten. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Pass it to General Short, please.

Mr. Masten. All right [handing document to witness].

Senator Ferguson. That is an explanation or partial explanation as to the message of the 27th [reading]:

The Secretary of War sent for me about 9:30 A.M.”—

This is a memorandum for the Chief of Staff.

General Bryden was present. The Secretary wanted to know what warning messages have been sent to General MacArthur and what were proposed.

Now, you will note there that there was nothing said about Hawaii. It is only what had been sent to General MacArthur and what was proposed.

[8534] I gave him a copy of the Joint Army and Navy message sent November 24. I then showed him a copy of the draft message you discussed at the Joint Board meeting. He told me he had telephoned both Mr. Hull and the President this morning. Mr. Hull stated the conversations had been terminated with the barest possibility of resumption. The President wanted a warning message sent to the Philippines.
And you will note there that nothing is said about the President wanting a message sent to you. Then going on and reading:

I told him I would consult Admiral Stark and prepare an appropriate cablegram.

Now, when did you first learn about that exhibit?

General Sifton. I think that I learned the substance of that exhibit when I read the testimony of Secretary Stimson and General Gerow before the Army Pearl Harbor Board in 1944. I do not know whether I had actually seen the memorandum but I did learn the substance.

Senator Ferguson. Now I would like to go to several answers in the top secret. Admiral Ingersoll on page 423 of the Hart record. Now, you were asked and others were asked about that preparatory deployment. Here is question No. 38:

Admiral, do you recall what the CNO meant by its [8535] directive to make a preparatory deployment as contained in this dispatch of October the 16th?

That is the first they used that “preparatory deployment”, in that message also. Now, here is what he answers:

I think the preparatory deployment that would not constitute provocative action or disclose strategic intentions against Japan referred more to the withdrawal of certain units of the Asiatic Fleet from the China Sea area toward the Southern Philippines rather than any particular deployment of the Pacific Fleet, with the possible exception of sending out submarines for observation. It will be noted that the dispatch is addressed to both the Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet and Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet. I wish to state here in connection with this dispatch and others which followed that they were released by me. In all cases such dispatches were drafted in the War Plans Division and were presented to Admiral Stark for consideration before being sent. In many cases I am quite certain that he may have notified both the State Department and the President of his intention to send dispatches of this character. The fact that it bears my release simply means that after the original draft was presented and corrected by Admiral Stark, in order to save time and not to bother him further [8536] I released these dispatches in the form which he had approved.

Now, on page 426, questions Nos. 49 and 50. Let me read both of them.

Question: In drafting the dispatch of the 27th of November was consideration given to the thought that mention of western Pacific objectives only might tend to reduce the vigilance of the Pacific Fleet in the Hawaiian area?

Answer: I am sure that the drafting of the dispatch was not meant to give such an impression. The impression it was intended to give was that the events were moving in such a fashion in the Far East that the United States would become involved in war in a few days and consequently that the United States forces elsewhere in the Pacific and also in the Atlantic would find themselves at war with the Axis when the clash actually took place in the Asiatic waters.

Question No. 50: What action on the part of the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet was expected incident to the directive concerning a deployment as given in the dispatch of the 27th of November?

Again—

This is his answer—

Again this dispatch is dispatched both to the Commander in Chief of [8537] the Asiatic Fleet and the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. The deployment referred more to the movements which were contemplated in the Asiatic Fleet regarding withdrawal of forces from the Manila Bay area for operations contemplated elsewhere and the movements in the Hawaiian area were those regarding observations, the establishment of a patrol and the reinforcement of outlying positions in our own islands. It will be remembered that an early dispatch in October had warned both Commanders in Chief against taking action which would provoke war.
Now, did you ever hear of that testimony or that interpretation of this word "deployment" in these messages?

General Short. I know at the time that it did not strike me that it was intended to be only the Asiatic Fleet. I do not believe I have had access to the Hart report; at least I do not remember those particular passages. I would like to ask my counsel if we have ever had a copy of the Hart report?

Captain Ford. No; we have not.

General Short. We have never had a copy of the Hart report.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, you have never seen the Hart report?

General Short. That is correct.

[8538] Senator Ferguson. Even to the time you are testifying here?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, is this the kind of difficulty we find in messages that are given to two or more outposts where certain words are intended for one outpost and not for another?

General Short. Unquestionably in this case it was of great difficulty because it never occurred to me when I read those two messages that they applied just to the Asiatic Fleet. I think they directly applied to Admiral Kimmel.

Senator Ferguson. But the man who drafted the messages or sent them out gives this interpretation, that they were intended more for the Asiatic Fleet because they had certain missions which were outlined in the war plans. Now, were you familiar with the War Plan No. WPL 46?

General Short. I knew in general terms what it provided for. It was an offensive into the mandated islands.

[8539] Senator Ferguson. Well, now, General, in this message it said that you were not to commit an overt act against Japan.

General Short. What is that?

Senator Ferguson. You were not to commit the first overt act against Japan.

I want to ask you how, as the head of the Army in Hawaii, it was possible for you to commit an overt act of war against Japan?

General Short. Only by sending out my long-range bombers, which would have been acting under the orders of the Navy, not under my own orders.

Senator Ferguson. Then do I understand there was only one way in which you could have committed an overt act against Japan, and that would have been to send out the long-range bomber and that bomber had done something in relation to a ship or submarine, or something of Japan?

General Short. I might add, something that I might have done to the Japanese national that the Japanese might have construed it that way. They were apparently looking for excuses. For instance, if I had arrested one of the consular agents that we knew the names of, they might have considered that an overt act. It would have been possible for me to do that.

[8540] Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, the Navy did not get this message and they were in a position to commit many overt acts?
General Short. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for that?

General Short. I cannot account for it.

Senator Ferguson. Do you think that the arrest by the military police of one of the consular agents would have been an overt act in war?

General Short. I do not, but I do not know what the Japs might have tried to make it appear, or how they might have tried to make it appear.

Senator Ferguson. Well, how did you read the overt act part of your message? What did it mean to you?

General Short. It meant to me simply that the War Department was extremely anxious to avoid war, and they did not want any international incident to happen in Hawaii that might provoke war or might give the Japanese an opportunity to claim that we had started the war.

Senator Ferguson. Now, let us look at it this way. We had put the fleet in Hawaii in order that we might show Japan our strength, and we were backing up our diplomacy by the fleet being out there.

Now, why would the exhibition of a strong army in Hawaii have a greater tendency to prevent war than by showing we were weak and afraid and we were not doing anything?

General Short. It would look like it would be a similar action that they were using to impress Japan.

Senator Ferguson. With the Navy?

General Short. A strong army would have been the same means of impressing the Japanese.

Senator Ferguson. But in one case, we put the Navy in there as a symbol of strength, and in the other case, in your case, we tried to conceal the fact that you had a strong army and you were ready for anything that might happen.

General Short. That would be true.

Senator Ferguson. Now, would it have been possible, in your opinion as an expert—laying aside this question of the first overt act as far as the Army was concerned, that if we had a full mobilization of the Army—some 40,000 was it in Hawaii?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. If we had shown a full mobilization of that army, if we had shown that we were on the alert for everything that might come that we would have never had an attack at Pearl Harbor?

General Short. I think it quite probable that if that had been reported to the Japanese, they would have turned back the attacking force.

Senator Ferguson. That would have meant that we would have had no attack at Pearl Harbor?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. These two phrases, one, don't commit the first overt act, and the other one, don't do anything—what is the language in the message of the 27th?

General Short. Alarm the public or disclose intent.

Senator Ferguson. Now, if you had not had those, and you were fully alerted, where the soldiers were wearing regalia, full arms, your machine guns were manned, your radar was working 24 hours a day, then you would come to the conclusion, would you not that in your opinion as an Army General, they would have turned back?
General Short. There would have been a very excellent chance that they would have turned back. That would have been the tendency, because they would have felt, or they would be sure that they would take heavy losses. Surprise was the only opportunity that they had to succeed.

Senator Ferguson. Now, in your prepared statement, you use this language, on page 60, paragraph 98:

I do not feel that I have been treated fairly, or [8543] with justice by the War Department. I was singled out as an example, as the scapegoat for the disaster.

Now, you are covering very broad ground when you use the word "War Department." I wish you would be specific and tell me whom you had in mind was the War Department?

General Short. I had in mind the General Staff in particular, because they were primarily responsible for the policies pursued by the War Department.

Senator Ferguson. And the General Staff was headed by whom?


Senator Ferguson. And who else would be in there? I would like for you to be specific instead of covering the whole ground.

General Short. General Gerow as head of the War Plans Division had the direct responsibility for keeping me informed. General Miles, the head of G-2, had a very direct responsibility.

[8544] Senator Ferguson. What about the Secretary of War? Is he included in the words there "War Department"?

General Short. As far as technical things went, I would not have expected him to be as fully aware of the significance of technical things. I would expect him to be fully aware of any policy.

Senator Ferguson. So as far as the policy was concerned, he would be included in that?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now when you use the word "scapegoat", will you give us the meaning that you want to convey to us in that word?

General Short. It seems to me that may be a slang expression, but it is a word in very common usage, and I meant just exactly what the common usage meant, that it was someone that they saddled the blame on to get it off of themselves.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, they were in this position, in your opinion, and that is what you wanted to convey, that someone had to take some blame for what happened at Pearl Harbor, that certain people in Washington that you had named in your opinion were to blame, that they shifted that blame over to you as the commanding general at Hawaii and therefore made you, in the common language, a [8545] scapegoat?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Is that what you want to convey to this committee?

General Short. That is exactly what I want to convey.

Senator Ferguson. Now yesterday you read to us some letters about your retirement, and you read part of General Marshall's testimony where I had examined him. What is it that you wanted to convey by the reading of General Marshall's testimony? Were
you of the opinion that it was in conflict with what you were about to read from the messages?

General Short. I thought his testimony conveyed the idea that the matter of my retirement had been handled entirely by the Secretary of War and that he had had nothing to do with it, in fact he was not cognizant of what was being done, and the correspondence I had did not agree with that.

Senator Ferguson. Therefore you were of the opinion that his testimony was not in line with what the letters showed that you were about to put in? Is that what you wanted to convey to the committee?

General Short. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Did you consider, in a way, that your retirement request was a conditional one, that is that [8546] you would be consulted later by General Marshall before it would be turned in?

General Short. When I sent that to General Marshall I had very great confidence in both his judgment and his loyalty to me. I felt that he would use it only if his best judgment indicated that he should use it, but I did expect—not necessarily before he used it if there was not time, but he would communicate with me before he used it, or he would communicate with me immediately afterward and explain why it was necessary to use it. I had given him full authority to use it.

Senator Ferguson. It would indicate, from the fact that you had talked to him at 1 o'clock on the 25th, that is Sunday, when the Roberts report came out, and it was used on the 26th, that he would not have had time to read all of the testimony in the Roberts report to find out the facts, would he?

General Short. He would have had time, of course, to read all of the findings published in the newspaper, but he would not have had time to read all of the testimony.

Senator Ferguson. When you use a report, as a rule, you want to know on what facts it is based, do you not?

General Short. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. When those facts are in existence?

[8547] General Short. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Were you consulted by Justice Roberts as to whether or not you had magic? You know what I mean by "magic," the intercepted codes, either the codes themselves or the means of getting the codes?

General Short. You mean the intercepts?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Short. I do not think that at any place any inquiry was made of me as to whether I had received them. I am rather sure no inquiry was made. I think they understood that I had not.

Senator Ferguson. Well, at least you were not asked the specific questions as to whether or not you had or did not have magic?

General Short. I am sure that is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether the Roberts report is based upon the fact that you and Admiral Kimmel did have magic and had the means of getting the magic?

General Short. I have seen no testimony from the War Department that indicated that they were told that I did have magic. I
believe that there has been testimony here that the Roberts Board was informed by someone in the Navy Department—

Senator Ferguson. By Turner and Stark?

[8548] General Short. Yes, sir; that Admiral Kimmel did have magic.

Senator Ferguson. And that would have meant if Kimmel had it you would have it?

General Short. If he had been told to give it to me.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. General, do have a clipping as to what appeared in the press about your retirement?

General Short. I do. I have one here that I do not know whether it actually appeared, but I have a statement by the Secretary of War that was mimeographed, and it is presumed that it appeared in the press. My memory is not definite now to say whether it actually appeared.

Senator Ferguson. By the way, where did you get the copy?

General Short. Colonel Dumcombe gave it to me this morning.

Senator Ferguson. You received it when?

General Short. This morning.

Senator Ferguson. Will you read it?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. It was in the War Department file?

General Short. Yes, sir. [Reading:]

[8549]

WAR DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF PUBLIC RELATIONS
Press Branch
Tel.—Re 6700 Brs. 3425 and 3438

FEBRUARY 28, 1942.

Immediate release

RETIREMENT OF GENERAL SHORT APPROVED

The Secretary of War announced today the acceptance, effective February 28, 1942, of the application for retirement of Major General Walter C. Short “without condonation of any offense or prejudice to any future disciplinary action.”

The Secretary of War announced at the same time that, based upon the findings of the report of the Roberts Commission, he had directed the preparation of charges for the trial by court-martial of General Short, alleging dereliction of duty. The Secretary of War made it clear, however, that the trial upon these charges would not be held until such time as the public interest and safety would permit.

[End]

Distribution: A, D, M, N.
1:00 P.M.

Senator Ferguson. I understand then from that that the Secretary of War indicated that upon the basis of the Roberts report you would be court-martialed at some time?

General Short. He at least stated that he had directed this to be drawn.

Senator Ferguson. That is right. That would be the same as if you would be court-martialed?
General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now did you ever do anything in any way to prevent that court-martial, the charges being filed?

General Short. I did not. In fact, I signed a waiver that I would agree to a court-martial within 6 months after the termination of hostilities.

[8551] Senator Ferguson. Now, who came to you about that waiver?

General Short. General Woodruff, retired, was sent from the War Department to Dallas, to see me.

Senator Ferguson. What was the conversation about the waiver? About when was it?

General Short. I have forgotten the date. I believe it was sometime before December 7, 1943, because they wanted the waiver before the time was up. Perhaps along in September or October of 1943.

He explained to me that Admiral Kimmel had signed such a waiver and gave me the letter of the Secretary of War requesting me to sign the waiver, and also a copy of the correspondence that Admiral Kimmel had had with the Secretary of the Navy.

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, they had used your request for retirement in getting Admiral Kimmel’s request for retirement.

Now, do I understand that they used what Admiral Kimmel had done to waive the statute of limitations when they came to you?

General Short. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Did they explain that Admiral Kimmel had waived the statute of limitations?

[8552] General Short. They furnished me with a copy of his letter and a copy of the waiver signed by him.

Senator Ferguson. Did they ask you to sign such a waiver?

General Short. Yes, sir; by the Secretary of War in a written letter delivered by General Woodruff.

Senator Ferguson. Do you happen to have that written letter?

General Short. I have it. I think we have it here probably. The waiver and letter were both read into the record yesterday, on page 8495. Do you wish to have it?

Senator Ferguson. No, no; just let it go.

General Short. The date of that letter was the 18th of September 1943.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know whether or not any department of the Government ever made any request of Congress to pass a statute extending the statute of limitations?

General Short. I do not.

Senator Ferguson. But you were requested by the Secretary of War to sign a waiver of the statute of limitations, and you did so?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, have you ever made any direct [8553] request for a courts martial trial?

General Short. I have not.

Senator Ferguson. And you have done nothing, as I understand it, to prevent such a trial?

General Short. I have not.

Senator Ferguson. You are prepared, then, to defend any trial that the Government may start? Is that the way it stands?
General Short. That is the way it stands.

Senator Ferguson. A trial that the Government may start?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you consider that this is a fair hearing for you?

General Short. I consider that this hearing has been extremely fair, very thorough, and that I have been accorded very great courtesy by the chairman and by every member of the committee.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I want to go to another subject.

On October 17, 1941, George W. Bicknell, lieutenant colonel, G. S. C., assistant A. C. of S., G-2, contact officer—he was in your department?

General Short. Yes, sir.

[8554] Senator Ferguson. He was what?

General Short. He was one of my intelligence officers. He was the assistant to the G-2, Colonel Fielder.

Senator Ferguson. Now were you familiar with what he drew up? It is here in evidence as exhibit 139, dated the 17th of October 1941. Will you look at that and tell us when you first saw that?

General Short. I probably saw that the day it was prepared, or maybe the day after it was prepared.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I will take you to paragraph 3, on page 3, and ask you to read that. It is headed “Attack on British Possession in the Far East.”

General Short. You want me to read from there on?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I want you to read from there on to the bottom of the page.

General Short (reading):

4. Defend against an American attack in support of the British.
5. Attack simultaneously—

Senator Ferguson. No, no, I guess you did not understand my question. I mean on page 3, the paragraph numbered 3, “Attack on British Possessions in the Far East.” Then I would like to have you read from there down to the bottom [8555] of the page.

General Short. I was on page 2. I am sorry.

Following the principle of defeating one opponent at a time—famous with her Axis partner, Hitler—it is believed that Japan, if faced with certain British military resistance to her plans, will unhesitatingly attack the British; and do so without a simultaneous attack on American possessions, because of no known binding agreement between the British and Americans for joint military action against Japan, and that the American public is not yet fully prepared to support such action. However, it must be evident to the Japanese that in case of such an attack on the British, they would most certainly have to fight the United States within a relatively short time.

You want me to read on from there?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Short (reading):

While a simultaneous attack on the ABCD powers would violate the principle mentioned above, it cannot be ruled out as a possibility for the reason that if Japan considers war with the United States to be inevitable as a result of her actions against Russia, it is reasonable to believe that she may decide to strike before our Naval [8556] program is completed.

An attack on the United States could not be undertaken without almost certain involvement of the entire ABCD block. Hence there remains the possibility that Japan may strike at the most opportune time, and at whatever
point might gain for her the most strategic, tactical, or economical advantages over her opponents.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Now, General, prior to that, what was your information in relation to any agreement we may have had, whether legally binding or not, with the British and Dutch?

General Short. I had no information whatever about an agreement between the British and Dutch.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any information about any understanding that we had with them?

General Short. I did not.

Senator Ferguson. You notice that your G–2 officer uses this language:

it is believed that Japan, if faced with certain British military resistance to her plans, will unhesitatingly attack the British, and do so without a simultaneous attack on American possessions, because of no known binding agreement between the British and Americans for joint military action against Japan, and that the American public is not yet fully prepared to support such action.

Now, he uses the language "no known binding agreement." What do you understand by "binding agreement"? Do you mean by treaty?

General Short. To be binding, it should be approved by the Congress, as I understand it.

Senator Ferguson. Is that what he was talking about there? He was telling you that we had no treaty, we had no agreement that was approved by Congress?

General Short. It is difficult to say. He might have meant simply any agreement that had been made and approved by the President, and not made public, something that the President expected to set forth in the Senate. I do not know.

Senator Ferguson. What was your understanding about that part of it that "the American public is not yet fully prepared to support such action"?

General Short. I felt at that time that the American public would not have been willing to have an agreement ratified that we would go to war to defend the Netherlands East Indies or Singapore.

Senator Ferguson. Now, were you familiar at that time with the message from Tokyo to Berlin, where we openly intercepted—-I will not put it that way. We can only locate, in the War Department, two parts of three parts of a message sent from Tokyo to Berlin on this question.

General Short. I was not familiar with it.

Senator Ferguson. You had no knowledge as to that?

General Short. None whatever.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that we had met with the British and Dutch and had talked over this question?

General Short. I did not.

Senator Ferguson. You had no knowledge at all on that?

General Short. No knowledge whatever.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that this plan, which we now have in evidence, this WPL–46, talked about certain agreements? Whether or not they were binding agreements is another question; but at least talked about it.
General Short. I knew when we received Rainbow 5 at the same time that it was drawn up with the idea apparently that when it went into effect we would be allied with Britain and the Dutch, but I had had no basis for the writing of that plan.

[8550] Senator Ferguson. Did you know that we had received word from the British on the morning of the 6th, sent to the State Department, that the Japanese ships were going into the Kra Peninsula?

General Short. I did not.

Senator Ferguson. Would that have meant anything to you, what you knew about our understanding?

General Short. It meant certainly war against the British.

Senator Ferguson. Have you ever tried to find out personally what it would mean if Japan and Britain would go to war with no attack on America?

General Short. No, sir; I have not asked the War Department.

Senator Ferguson. You heard Admiral Kimmel testify here, did you?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you have read his testimony?

General Short. I did not hear him; I read his testimony.

Senator Ferguson. You read his testimony?

General Short. I read his testimony.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know, prior to the time that you read his testimony, that there was certain correspondence by Admiral Kimmel on this question of attack on the British and Dutch alone?

General Short. I did not.

Senator Ferguson. The exhibit that I have just referred to, the WPL-46, is exhibit No. 129, so that the record will show it.

Now have you gone over this war plan?

General Short. I think I had gone over it some time ago. Not the WPL-46, but the Rainbow 5, which would have the same provisions, probably, in regard to fighting with the Allies.

Senator Ferguson. That is true. This is the “Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5.”

CHAPTER I. ORIGIN, BASIS, AND SCOPE OF THIS PLAN

This Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5, was prepared under the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations.

It is based upon the report of the United States-British Staff Conversations (Short Title ABC-1), the Joint Canada-United States Defense Plan (Short Title ABC-22), and the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5.

The United States-British Staff Conversations (ABC-1) and the Joint Canada-United States Defense Plan (ABC-22) will be given only a limited distribution to holders of this plan.

Now, you did not know anything about these negotiations?

[8561] General Short. I knew nothing about the negotiations, but I think I had a copy of the plan, about what you have read there, a short time before the attack. That was a modification of our existing war plans, and I think we received that.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know when Singapore was alerted?
General Short. I do not exactly. I think probably a short time before December 7, maybe a week or 10 days before, but it would be just guess work.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that the Dutch, on December 1, sent this dispatch by the Netherlands Minister, Dr. A. Loudon, to Mr. Hornbeck—

The Netherlands Minister informed me by telephone this morning that the Governor of the Netherlands East Indies had ordered a comprehensive mobilization of his armed forces?

General Short. I did not.
Senator Ferguson. You did not know that?
General Short. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now under the knowledge that you had would that have meant anything to you?

General Short. With the information that I had had from the War Department always pointing to an attack to the Southwest Pacific, and including the Netherlands East Indies, I would have thought that was what was going to take place.

[8562] Senator Ferguson. Would that have meant anything to you?

General Short. It would have meant that they considered war very imminent out there naturally.

Senator Ferguson. Would it have meant that war was imminent on the Hawaiian Islands?

General Short. Not necessarily, because there had never been an estimate since June 17, 1940, of an attack on Hawaii. It would have meant possible hostilities on Hawaii, but not necessarily an attack.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that the President had delivered to Japan, on August 17, a message in relation to the entire Pacific?

General Short. I did not.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have the copy or copies of information from any diplomatic notes between Japan and the United States?

General Short. I did not.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, if they had brought to your attention the alerting of Singapore, the fact that the Singapore troops were alerted, what would that have meant to you?

General Short. With the information I had from the War Department it was just a confirmation that the Japanese action was going to come in that part of the world and not [8563] in Hawaii.

Senator Ferguson. So it meant just the opposite to you than an alert in Hawaii? It indicated to you that there was going to be war many thousands of miles way from you with another country?

General Short. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Is that what the information meant to you?

General Short. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Now I am not clear on the radar. I would like to get some information about it.

There isn't any doubt that the radar machine will catch a plane going out as well as coming in?

General Short. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. And there isn't any doubt that early on that morning, about 7 o'clock, our radar machine saw planes 132 miles, I believe it was, 130 or 132 miles, coming in from the north, and that
those very planes bombed American fortifications and sunk our ships?
Is there any doubt about that?

General Short. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And as shown by the map, that same radar machine, or other radar machines saw the planes going out in the same direction, is there any doubt about that? This [8564] map shows them coming in from the north one hundred and thirty-some miles, and we had contact with them going out, one hundred and thirty-some miles out even further north. At 7:02 we catch them first going out.

General Short. Major Berquist, who was the chief control officer, stated that there was so much confusion—I suppose he meant because they were going in every direction—that he was not able to draw any logical conclusion from what he had.

Senator Ferguson. There wasn’t any confusion about the fact that they were coming in at that distance?

General Short. Absolutely, because that is a definite direction.

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for the fact that the ships in these task forces were notified to go south and look for them, when our only information was that they came from the north, and they even had the degree, or the line on which they had come, and we saw them coming in at 132 miles and we saw some of them, at least, going out the same way, so why did we go to the south to look for them?

General Short. Lieutenant Tyler states he did not make a report on that until some days later, when he reported to General Davidson the coming in. I personally did not hear that day that the Opana Station had picked them up. [8565] It seems when Major Tindall came back, when they re-manned the station about 8:30, that they took off all of the old information on the board in the information center. So apparently Lieutenant Tyler was not experienced enough to have this mean anything, and it not having been reported to Major Tindall when the station opened he did not know it, and the result was that it was not reported.

Senator Ferguson. But, as I understand it, it was brought out definitely yesterday that Lieutenant Tyler has been promoted at least twice.

General Short. Yes, sir.

[8566] Senator Ferguson. There was no disciplinary action against him for not reporting this matter?

General Short. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. And that may have meant the difference between bombing and not bombing this Jap Fleet?

General Short. I think unquestionably if the Navy had had that information, they would have tried to locate the carriers.

Now, there is one other thing I did not mention. I believe that they picked up radio information, an intercept that indicated a Japanese ship sending radio messages from the southwest. Now, that may have been a small ship that was sent out there purposely by the Japanese, and I think that that influenced the Navy to send to the southwest first.

Senator Ferguson. That was not as definite information, was it?

General Short. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. As that the ships had come in from the north and had gone out to the north?
General Short. No, sir; but they did not have that and I did not have it.

Senator Ferguson. I take it from your testimony, you knew nothing about them coming in from the north on the day [8567] of the 7th?

General Short. Beg pardon?

Senator Ferguson. On the day of the 7th you had no knowledge of these planes coming in from the north?

General Short. That is correct. I did know that our flying fortresses from California came in from the north. I knew that definitely.

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand now that you had no information on the 7th about the radar chart showing planes coming in from the north?

General Short. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Anyone could see these planes coming in at various times from the north, could they not?

General Short. They came in from every direction, Senator. They had different tasks assigned them. Some came in from the east of the island to actually make the attack, and others came in from the west, so apparently they had diverted from their original direction so as to approach certain targets in certain ways.

Senator Ferguson. I would assume that after they got near the island they would take a position so they could approach a target from a certain direction.

General Short. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. But prior to that did not everything [8568] indicate that they were coming from the north?

General Short. All we had was what Lieutenant Tyler knew. If he had reported, it would have been a definite indication, but we did not have it at that time.

[8569] Senator Ferguson. General, how can you account for the fact that there was no disciplinary action against an Army officer for not reporting a thing like that that was so vital to America's defense?

General Short. There was no device at that time by which he could differentiate between friend and foe.

Senator Ferguson. But it turned out in a few minutes that everyone on the island knew that these ships were foe.

General Short. But coming in about 3° difference in direction, and 5 minutes difference in time. He just made a false assumption that the ships picked up were the American planes.

Senator Ferguson. There isn't any evidence in the record that Tyler knew that the B-17's were coming in, other than that the music played all night on the Hawaiian radio, and therefore he assumed that our planes must be coming in on that beam.

General Short. You see, they had no beam at that time, and I think it was common knowledge with the air people that that music was used as a beam to guide our planes in.

Senator Ferguson. Were our planes all equipped with radio?


Senator Ferguson. Then why couldn't our radio stations contact the planes and ask them whether they were enemy or friend?

General Short. If the report had been made by Lieutenant Tyler, it could have been done.
Senator Ferguson. I come back—

General Short. Even if they had gotten the report, they might have been misled because they were so close to the same position at the same time.

Senator Ferguson. Couldn't we have asked the B-17's "Are you friend or foe?" Didn't we have any codes at that time?

General Short. We could have asked them; yes.

Senator Ferguson. Did we ask them?

General Short. We did not.

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for that? I realize you personally were not in charge of it, but I am trying to find out why there wasn't some discipline as far as men down in the ranks were concerned in relation to these fatal errors. I consider that you considered them fatal.

General Short. Apparently Lieutenant Tyler felt so sure they were friendly planes, that he made no inquiry.

[8571] Senator Ferguson. But within a few minutes after he gets this message, raining down on the American possessions and our men were bombs from an enemy. How could this same man then keep the conclusion in his mind that they were friends?

General Short. I don't think he did.

Senator Ferguson. Then why couldn't he at that moment, at the dropping of the first bomb, even, if necessary, by foot, give the alarm and tell where these planes were coming from so that we could go out and get the carriers, so at least they would never do it again?

General Short. He did alert the command, but he gave nobody the information he had as to what direction they were coming.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, he alerted the command, enemy planes came in, and he never even told them what direction the planes were coming from?

General Short. Apparently not.

Senator Ferguson. And that man was promoted?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did anybody ask him from what direction they were coming? Didn't somebody think to ask him? I realize you were taken away from there about the 16th.

[8572] General Short. What I did as soon as I heard it was this—it was too late to accomplish anything, but as soon as I heard of the incident, I sent an officer to take affidavits of Lieutenant Tyler and Lieutenant White, and I believe they got one from the operator, Private McDonald.

Senator Ferguson. General, did you know that we even went out and bombed one of Admiral Newton's ships, one of the ships of his fleet?

General Short. I didn't know that we ever actually bombed one. I knew at one time that we had mistaken information, but fortunately our pilots recognized the ship as an American ship and did not bomb it. I never heard that we actually bombed a ship.

Senator Ferguson. If you will bear with me a moment—

Mr. Murphy. You will find something on it, Senator, in the naval narrative. I don't have the page, but it is in the naval narrative.

Mr. Masten, do you have volume 2 of the navy narrative here?

Mr. Masten. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. Here it is. It was the Portland.

None, except we carried on air patrol looking for any enemy forces in our area. We fueled cruisers and [8573] destroyers from a tanker, and we had several scares due to erroneous reports of enemy forces which turned out to be false.

The Portland was bombed by one of our own planes from Pearl Harbor, but, fortunately, the bombs hit well astern. This plane reported the Portland as an enemy carrier and the Porter, who was guarding her while she recovered one of her planes was reported as an accompanying cruiser.

Did you ever hear about that?

General Short. I don’t remember. If I did, I have forgotten about it.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, this fleet of ours went south to look for this task force instead of north, with a good prospect of finding it to the north, as I understand the testimony, and that we bombed our own ship, the Portland.

General Short. The search was in control of the Navy. They gave our people the information on which they wanted the search. I think we made one search that was not directed by the Navy. There were persistent reports that there were Japanese planes off Pearl Harbor, 25 or 50 miles to the southwest off Barber’s Point, and I believe that General Martin went out on his own and investigated that when he [8574] had no mission from the Navy, and found it was false.

Senator Ferguson. General, I realize that we were at peace for something like 25 years, and that we had put our heads in the corner and didn’t look for any war. That is, some people did, but I wonder whether the Army and the Navy were doing the same thing. Here it was said that our people weren’t ready to enter into an understanding that in case there was an attack down there we would go to bat. But we weren’t consulted on the question of the shooting orders in the Atlantic, as I recall. Congress didn’t say anything about that.

Now, were the Army and the Navy, and I use this expression because it is one that is well-known, were they asleep at the switch up to December 7?

General Short. I think we had worked very seriously in Hawaii to make preparations against any type of attack, but all of the information that we had from Washington indicated to us not an attack on Hawaii, but toward the Philippines and South Pacific, and definitely gave us the opinion that hostile action in Hawaii would be in the nature of sabotage and internal disorder, and that was what we were immediately alerted for, that is what we immediately expected.

Senator Ferguson. Did the Army and the Navy ever come [8575] to use “possible” and “probable” as they are commonly understood? This word “possible” is so weak that if you tell a man a thing is possible you can hardly blame him for not paying attention to it.

General Short. I think the message of July 8, when they were pointing out action of the Japanese against Russia, was a rather definite prediction, and was the only prediction that the War Department ever made direct to me.

Some of the naval messages pointed directly toward the Philippines and toward the Kra Peninsula. No message of the Army after July 8 ever pointed anywhere.
Senator Ferguson. Now, General, I know that you had your own forces and your own job out there, but did you know about where Newton's course was? Newton's force was about 300-odd miles from Midway when he learned of the attack. You know where Midway is as you see it on that map [indicating]?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. About 300 miles. He said that he thought he would receive orders to intercept the enemy, who, he felt must be to the northwest, northward of Oahu. Therefore he signaled the Lexington that the flight to Midway was canceled, because presumably Midway had also [8576] been attacked.

Now, if he had received the message to go north, wouldn't there be good prospects, where you see this red line, this lower red line on that chart, to have intercepted that force?

General Short. He might have intercepted it after they had lost their planes and were withdrawing. He would have had to go east, I think, to intercept it beforehand.

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, the Lexington had a full deployment of airplanes on her. Notwithstanding those that they had taken to Midway or were taking to Midway.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So they would have had the capacity with planes at least to attempt to do something to the Jap fleet, which it turned out nothing was ever done to, it was never intercepted, never seen, and it gave the Japs a great stimulant, I would assume, to know that they had made an attack and were not intercepted by the American forces. Wouldn't that indicate to the Japanese that we were asleep at the switch?

General Short. It would indicate that they had succeeded in putting over a complete surprise on us.

[8577] Senator Ferguson. Now, coming back to this "asleep at the switch," do you think that we were, as a War Department and a Navy Department, our Intelligence, and the whole thing, really asleep at the switch as to war coming to America on the 7th?

General Short. I think that our Intelligence definitely failed to draw the conclusions that should have been drawn from the intercepts and that they failed to transmit anything to us that would be helpful.

Senator Ferguson. Was it true in the Army that we treated Intelligence somewhat, to use the old saying, as a stepchild, that that is about the way we treated Intelligence?

General Short. I had not been in Washington on duty with the General Staff since 1924. It would be hard for me to say what the attitude toward Intelligence was in 1941.

Senator Ferguson. What was the reputation of the Intelligence Branch in the Army? Did good officers try to avoid it?

General Short. I don't believe they did. When I was in the War Department General Staff from 1921 to 1924, that was soon after the First World War, Gen. Stuart Heintzeleman, whom the Army considered one of the really top-notch men in the Army, was placed in charge of the Military Intelligence Division.

[8578] Senator Ferguson. Well, now, you said yesterday that it took almost a year to get permission from the Interior Department
to put up radar equipment, permanent radar equipment in the Hawaiian Islands.

General Short. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Would you say that we really had an alert Army when it took a year to place radar in position, which was one of the new things to protect Hawaii, would you say that if it took a year that we were really alert and going as an army?

General Short. I don't believe you could place that on G-2 because I wrote to the Chief of Staff personally about that and had a reply signed by the Deputy Chief of Staff, General Bryden, as to the reasons why they did not feel they could do it. I don't believe it stopped at G-2.

Senator Ferguson. But the Commander in Chief of the United States Army, the President of the United States, was at least over both those branches?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for it taking almost a year to get the right to put up permanent equipment, and we didn't even have it up on the 7th of December, when we had a war message, a warning in June, on June 17, 1940. How do you account for the fact that we, having that [8579] kind of a warning that we were going to have an attack on Hawaii, either ships or planes, and radar would catch both, that it took a year after that to get the right to build radar equipment on those islands?

General Short. I would say that the Department of Interior at least did not have any proper appreciation of the international situation.

Senator Ferguson. But who was over the Department of the Interior? Wasn't the President of the United States?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And he was the Commander in Chief of our Army?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand you said yesterday we had fine radar equipment in New York City?

General Short. That is my understanding.

Senator Ferguson. Where else—on the west coast?

General Short. The west coast, Seattle and San Francisco. I sent these officers to attend an exercise meeting conducted at Seattle. When they finished there they went to New York City to look over the establishment. They reported to me that those establishments were all set up.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know whether or not they were working 24 hours a day?


Senator Ferguson. On the 6th and the 7th?

General Short. I do not.

Senator Ferguson. I will ask counsel if he will ascertain from those radar stations what they were doing and whether or not those radar station were alerted on the 6th and the 7th.1

General, as an Army officer, would you consider that our possessions, the Hawaiian Islands, were in more danger than New York City on the 7th?

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1 See memorandum dated February 21, 1946, and attachments, from War Department in Hearings, Part 11, p. 5302 et seq.
General Short. Very much so.
Senator Ferguson. From what you know now?
General Short. Very much more.
Senator Ferguson. From what you know now?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Would you consider also that it was in more danger than Seattle or San Francisco?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. From what you know now?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, coming back, and I know this is a hypothetical matter because we didn't get those radars established, but if those radars had been established under priority—and I understand the priority was solely [8581] in Washington—is that correct?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. It wasn't in your hands?
General Short. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you try to get high priority, the best priority to get the equipment in?
General Short. On June 10 I radioed the War Department and asked that the priority be advanced to A-1A, which was the highest priority.
Senator Ferguson. Were you a believer in radar?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you feel that it was good equipment and new equipment such as would help the Army of the United States?
General Short. I stated in the telegram that it was probably the most important thing that we were trying to do at that time. I think I can find that and read it if you wish.
Mr. Murphy. I think you will also find it, once or twice, in your correspondence with General Marshall, that very same statement.
General Short. I was looking for the definite wire. I know I covered it in the wire to General Marshall.
I have the telegram:

[8582] To the Adjutant General,
Washington, D. C.

Division engineer, San Francisco, has informed me that the priority covering contract W-four one four Engr. seven eight four with Interstate Equipment Corporation, Elizabeth, N. J., is now dash one dash G Stop. This contract is the one for furnishing all materials for cableway to Kaala Aircraft Warning Station Stop Motors and all electrical equipment and subcontract to General Electric Stop. Division engineer states that with this priority there is strong probability that delivery this electrical material to contractors will be delayed about fifteen weeks Stop. This Kaala station is the most important in aircraft warning system and early completion of this cableway is essential Stop. I consider this aircraft warning service as the most important single project in this department Stop. Strongly recommend that the War Department give all possible assistance to Chief of Engineers to have priority on this contract changed to dash one dash B Stop.

I thought I requested that it be A-1A. This copy states 1-B.

[8583] Senator Ferguson. On March 6 you wrote to General Marshall:

Defense of these islands and adequate warning for the United States Fleet is so dependent upon the early completion of this Aircraft Warning Service that I believe all quibbling over details should be stopped at once. This project was very thoroughly studied by a Board of Officers in this Department who made
several personal investigations of each one of the sites. Now that basic decisions as to locations, types of stations and general plans have been approved by the War Department, I strongly recommend that this project be decentralized, and that I be authorized to give final approval to designs, layouts and other details to expedite its completion.

Signed "Walter C. Short."

What were you talking about there when you said "I believe all quibbling over details should be stopped at once." This was back in March.

General Short. Because we had to get the design of the buildings going into the national parks approved by the Department of Interior.

From an architectural standpoint, it had to fit in with their ideas of the scenery.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, we were talking about beauty rather than efficiency, as far as war was concerned?

General Short. It might appear that way.

Senator Ferguson. Well, how does it appear to you?

General Short. It appears to me that the Department of Interior considered their routine requirements of more importance than preparations for war.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, what was more important to the United States when we knew war was coming, to get prepared, or to determine upon the beauty of the structure that was to prepare us?

General Short. Unquestionably it was important, and I think I made my letter to the Chief of Staff about as strong as I could afford to make it.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, you say "afford." There are certain things you do not say—

General Short. To a superior officer. I told him I thought it was time to stop quibbling.

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, there are certain things that in the Army you do not say to your superior; is that it?

General Short. You say it in a tactful way.

Senator Ferguson. I see. You stop just a little short, or you say it in a tactful way. That is what you tried to do here?

General Short. That is what I tried to do.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether the same rule applies to Cabinet officers?

General Short. I do not.

Senator Ferguson. You haven't been a Cabinet officer?

General Short. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I am sure it does not apply to Members of the House or the Senate.

Well, now, General Short, the Intelligence Department of the Army was to be used for two purposes if I am right, and if I am wrong you correct me: One was to determine when war might come. The other one was to determine where war might come. Is that correct?

General Short. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. That is really the duty of an Intelligence Department?

General Short. Yes, sir. I might add another thing, and also the strength that the prospective enemy might have to pursue this.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. And do you consider them of equal importance?
General Short. I would say you might say they were of equal importance because one without the other does not give you the information.

Senator Ferguson. Now, in your opinion did these messages that reached you—and you have listed five, I think there were five—tell you when war was coming?

General Short. They indicated in that message of the 27th that war should be coming reasonably soon, although it left a possible chance of avoiding it.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did they tell you when war was coming?

General Short. I mean when, not where.

Senator Ferguson. Did they tell you where war was coming?

General Short. At no time after July the 8th did a War Department message directed to me ever point in any [8587] direction.

Senator Ferguson. Would you say that the message of June 17, 1940, the alert, told General Herron where war was coming?

General Short. It told him definitely that they were afraid of a trans-Pacific raid on the Island of Oahu.

Senator Ferguson. And that was definite information?

General Short. Absolutely.

Senator Ferguson. Not the date but definite information as to where?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any such warning?

General Short. I did not.

Senator Ferguson. Were you kept advised as to what we were doing as far as our Army was concerned in the proposed attack on the Azores, the sending of the Army up to Iceland and whether or not we had contemplated a force going into Ireland?

General Short. General Marshall in one of his personal letters to me indicated confidentially that there was a possibility of attack on the Azores. That was some months before.

Senator Ferguson. Did you put that letter in here?

General Short. Yes, sir.

[8588] Senator Ferguson. It is in?

Mr. Murphy. It is in the record.

Senator Ferguson. It is in the record?

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. So that we have then before us all the so-called personal mail between you and General Marshall?

General Short. I believe that you have everything.

Senator Ferguson. There has been no determination that the thing was personal or departmental. You have put them all in.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

General Short. The War Department selected it. I do not have any other letters.

Mr. Murphy. When I say it is in the record I mean it is in the exhibit which has been offered.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I understand.

Well, now, did you know of any investigations, outside of the Roberts investigation, made by the War Department up until the Army board was created under the statute of Congress?

General Short. No, sir; I do not.
Senator Ferguson. You did not have information on the Bundy investigation, where they were lost in the plane?

General Short. I did not.

Senator Ferguson. And afterward you were not informed [3589] of any investigation. Did you know that the President had asked or requested that a compilation, at least, of messages, and so forth, be prepared and it was sent to General Marshall and that he made certain alterations in it?

General Short. I did not.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know what preparation was made by the Army by investigation that they might court martial you?

General Short. I do not.

Senator Ferguson. You were never advised of any of those investigations?

General Short. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, you knew about the statute that was passed asking that there be an investigation?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And such action taken as was required?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you ever know about the Clausen investigation?

General Short. I think there was something in the newspapers indicating that it was taking place but I was never advised by the War Department that it was being made.

Senator Ferguson. Did Clausen ever come to you and try to get an affidavit?

[8590] General Short. He did not.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know now why the Clausen investigation was undertaken?

General Short. I think that there is an explanation of that. You have to read between the lines.

Senator Ferguson. Well, will you read between the lines for us and give us that explanation? What are you looking for?

General Short. It is Exhibit 63. I am looking for the recommendation. Here it is.

This is a memorandum from the Judge Advocate General, General Cramer, dated November 25, 1944, for the Secretary of War. "Subject: Army Pearl Harbor board."

Senator Ferguson. Will you read what you have in mind? Read the lines and read between them.

General Short. On page 48, the first paragraph. [Reading:]

Unexplored Leads:

In the course of my examination of the report and record certain further inquiries have suggested themselves to me which, in my opinion, might advantageously be pursued. The answers to these inquiries would not, in all probability, in my opinion, affect the result; at the same time in order to complete the picture and in fairness to certain personnel these leads should be further explored. I do not mean to suggest that the Board should be reconvened for this purpose; the work could be done by an individual officer familiar with the matter.

Now, I would like to state there——

Senator Ferguson. Now you are going to read between the lines?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right.
General Short. General Marshall testified before this committee that in all his service he had never heard of a reviewing officer, if he were dissatisfied with the findings of a court martial or a board, taking such action; that the normal action was to refer the proceedings back to the board and direct that additional evidence be taken if that were desired, or direct that a review of their findings be made by the board, and they would then be returned to the reviewing officer with a further explanation.

In this case the Judge Advocate General goes out of his way to state he does not want it referred back to the board but suggests an officer who has been on duty with the board.

Now, there were only three officers who could have met that qualification.

Senator Ferguson. Who were they?

General Short. They were Colonel Toulmin, who was the executive of the board, Colonel West, who was the recorder of the board and Lieutenant Colonel Clausen, who was a Major at the time, who was assistant recorder of the board. Unquestionably General Cramer had in his mind the recommending of Colonel Clausen at the time that he made that recommendation, which would have taken the further investigation out of the hands of the Army board and placed it in the hands of a selected individual.

Senator Ferguson. He placed it in the hands of a Major, who was an assistant?

General Short. Yes, sir, assistant recorder, who was promoted to Lieutenant Colonel since.

Senator Ferguson. Now, in your experience in the Army did you ever know of that?

General Short. I have never known of it. I have seen cases repeatedly where the reviewing officer might return the proceedings to the board and direct that additional evidence be taken and return it to the board, stating that he did not agree with their findings and asking them to review their findings, but I have never heard of a case of this kind.

Senator Ferguson. Now, as I understand it, before a real review of these findings was made they sent Major Clausen out?

General Short. I think the review had been made but it was not what they wanted.

Senator Ferguson. Oh. Now, that is what you are reading between the lines, that when they read this report they were not satisfied and they used the words "certain personnel" in there?

General Short. And they apparently did not believe there they could get what they wanted out of the Army board, so reading between the lines—

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I will yield.

Mr. Murphy. I ask at this point in the record that the complete file of the Adjutant General, in view of what is now going on here, be placed in the record.

Senator Ferguson. I have no objection.

Mr. Murphy. I understand that there is a transcript or mimeograph, a complete mimeograph of that prepared, which we have.

The Vice Chairman. It will be so ordered.
Senator Ferguson. Do you have it?

General Short. I will look at it.

Mr. Murphy. I understand the file is in Senator Brewster's hands and it has been prepared for the committee.

Senator Ferguson. Oh, that is the one.

[8594] Mr. Murphy. I mean the Judge Advocate General's, that is the one I am talking about.

Lieutenant Colonel Kerr. This is a different one.

Mr. Murphy. It is the one in which the charges in this case are contained.

Lieutenant Colonel Kerr. That may be. I have looked at the file that you have reference to and this is not the complete file.

Mr. Murphy. Well, I ask that we have the complete file then of everything. And in that connection, Senator, may I also request—I understand that the Army has made available all the papers concerning General Marshall in this transaction and I ask that they be made available and spread on the record and I also ask that Secretary Stimson's diary insofar as it pertains in any way to the retirement of General Short, that that also be brought in here and spread on the record.

I ask that everything the Army has in regard to this question of General Short's retirement and the preparation of charges be brought in here and placed in the record.

The Vice Chairman. Spread on the record or as an exhibit?

Mr. Murphy. As an exhibit.

Senator Ferguson. I not only approve of what the Congressman is saying, but I would like to say I have been endeavoring here for weeks to get all of the evidence.

Mr. Murphy. I agree the Senator has and I am not trying to steal a march or anything like that. I want to be cooperative.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I will say this: I not only want Mr. Stimson's diary as it relates to this particular question, but I want it as it relates to the whole Far East. I think that we will find in that diary an explanation of many things that we have been searching for here days and days and weeks and that we have hundreds, if not thousands, of pages in this record that could have been boiled down to a few lines out of the Secretary of War's diary. I think that we ought to get it immediately.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield for just 1 minute?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. I also again call the attention of the committee to the exhibit which has just been offered, which should be made available to all of us.

Senator Ferguson. May I look at it to see what you are putting in?

The Vice Chairman. Without objection Mr. Murphy's request is granted, but do you want it as an exhibit or spread on the transcript?

Mr. Murphy. I think an exhibit is enough.

The Vice Chairman. What is the next exhibit number?

Mr. Kaufman. 140.

[8596] The Vice Chairman. It will be received as Exhibit 140.

That is this document here?

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. Will you furnish the reporter a copy of it?

1 See Exhibit 170 in Exhibits, Part 19, and Exhibit 140 in Exhibits, Part 18.
Mr. Kaufman. Yes. (The document above referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 140.")

Mr. Murphy. I would like to call the attention of the committee to the fact that yesterday there were certain letters read into the record and, as I recall it, it was a series of letters in connection with the general's retirement.

There were present here some photostatic copies and I, at least, listening to them intently, thought they did not get into the record but I would like everybody to know that they are in the record and there is among them a notation in the handwriting of General Marshall, where he turns over to the Secretary of War the Judge Advocate General's recommendations in reference to—I don't know what these words are—"retirement of General Walter C. Short", and the initials of General Marshall.

And then there is a letter dated the 27th of January 1942 from the Judge Advocate General to General Marshall explaining the problem before him and there is a letter of January the 31st from the Judge Advocate General to the Secretary of War, in which he encloses the letter which he had sent to General Marshall, and I suggest a reading of those letters in connection with the evidence that went in yesterday.

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Richardson.

Mr. Richardson. It probably would be appropriate to say that with reference to the Stimson diary, that diary was referred to by the Secretary of War in a hearing before the Army board.

An effort was made by Mr. Mitchell before the hearing commenced with reference to this diary and he ran into a situation of illness on the part of Mr. Stimson under which his doctor refused even to permit the question of the diary to be referred to him.

Our information as to Secretary Stimson's present physical condition is not very accurate. I will be very glad to contact him again and ascertain, first, whether he can present himself as a witness with his diary; or, second, whether he would be willing to submit his diary to the committee. When I get that information I will report it to the chairman.

The Vice Chairman. Well, we will let it rest on that for the present.

Mr. Murphy. I will say, Senator, in connection with this business of the Judge Advocate General, in all fairness to General Short, that it is in effect a complaint, with General Short not, in fact, being given a chance to answer it. I do not want to have any one-sided partisan proposition, but in view of his referring to what the Judge Advocate General had in mind and why he did certain things I think we ought to have everything.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest that this volume is rather large, I haven't seen a copy of it yet; it has been here among my papers and it is quite large and I assume that General Short will want some time to go over it. I would like to question him on it. I wonder whether or not after I am through with these other matters that I have and counsel and all the rest of the members ask their questions, if we can bring him back and I can quest-
tion him Monday morning, which will give him plenty of time to go over this and also give me plenty of time to go over it.

General Short. Senator, I would like to make a statement right now. I have been over it.

Senator Ferguson. Oh, you have been over it?

General Short. And I have a statement, since Mr. Murphy says I should be given an opportunity, that I would like to make.

Senator Ferguson. I ask you now to make it if you desire to.

General Short. This relates to Exhibit 140.

Regarding the memorandum of specifications drawn up against me by Colonel Munson, I want to point out that the Judge Advocate General reviewed all the evidence of the Roberts commission, of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and of the Clausen affidavits, and came to the conclusion that he could not prove any offense.

The Judge Advocate General's letter dated January 27, 1942, reads in part as follows:

General Short's non-feasance or omissions were based on an estimate of the situation which although proved faulty by subsequent events was insofar as I am able to ascertain from the report of the commission made or concurred in by all those officers in Hawaii best qualified to form a sound military opinion. That estimate was that an attack by air was in the highest degree improbable.

In the Judge Advocate General's opinion dated 25 November 1944, page 50, the last paragraph, General Cramer said:

I suggest, therefore, that a public statement be made by you giving a brief review of the Board's proceedings and pointing out that General Short was guilty of errors of judgment for which he was properly removed from command, and that this constitutes a sufficient disposition of the matter at this time. In the event further investigation should disclose a different situation the matter could later be re-examined in the light of such additional evidence.

I have looked over the specifications that were drawn up by Colonel Munson and shown in this Exhibit and I will say very definitely that if these charges had been preferred and I had been arraigned my plea in every case would have been "Not guilty."

The Vice Chairman. Does that complete your statement on that, General?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. It is now 12 o'clock. We will recess until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon a recess was taken until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[8601]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The Chairman. The committee will be in order. Senator Ferguson will resume his examination of General Short.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER C. SHORT, UNITED STATES ARMY (Retired)—Resumed

Senator Ferguson. General, there has been offered and received in evidence this paper—

The Vice Chairman. Senator, I think it is Exhibit 140.

Senator Ferguson. Exhibit 140.

The Vice Chairman. Yes.
Senator Ferguson. In that exhibit there is a memorandum for Mr. Bundy, November 27, 1944, subject: "Secretary's Press Release of 28 February 1942 re General Short."

Then it says:

1. Attached hereto are two copies of the Secretary's press release of 28 February 1942.

And then:

2. Pursuant to his direction the Judge Advocate General's office on 4 March undertook preparation of charges against General Short, utilizing all available data including the Roberts Report and transcript. This work was completed 20 April 1942 and resulted in preparation of charges alleging violation of the 96th Article of War, with 11 specifications [8602] as follows:

Before I go to those specifications, the end of that letter says:

3. The above charges were merely tentative and possible charges and were never approved by The Judge Advocate General or transmitted to the Secretary of War. Of course, they were never made public.

It is signed "William J. Hughes, Jr., Colonel, JAGD."

Now, I would like to ask you about those specific charges. They are in the record and I would like to have your opinion on them.

1. Failure to provide an adequate inshore aerial patrol.

You made the statement that you plead not guilty to all of them, but I think that we should have an explanation on the record of these charges and what your answers to them are rather than the conclusion of "not guilty."

General Short. Do you wish me to indicate my answer on each one?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Give us what you consider is your complete answer on it.

General Short. Not guilty.

Senator Ferguson. Now, is there anything you want to say more than that on number 1?

[8603] General Short. On the inshore aerial patrol?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Short. I did have an adequate patrol. The air people were satisfied and had full control. If the purpose was antisubmarine defense it was not designed for air defense.

Senator Ferguson. Were you using all the equipment that you had?

General Short. We had one observation squadron, six planes, in commission, and we were operating them several hours a day. I couldn't say exactly what the hours were.

Senator Ferguson. Were you using them as much as possible?

General Short. I would say we were using them all we should use them. In addition to that there was a lot of observation that accomplished the same thing because our pursuit training was all over Oahu, pretty much around the perimeter, and they were all given to understand that they should learn to observe for submarines.

Senator Ferguson. Now, is that all you want to say on number 1?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Number 2.

Failure to provide adequate anti-aircraft defense.

[8604] General Short. Not guilty. We would have had an adequate antiaircraft defense if the War Department had given us the
equipment, and had given us the information which indicated imminent attack. Or, if they had replied to my report and indicated any desired modification.

Senator Ferguson. Were you using all the antiaircraft guns and facilities that were provided from Washington for you?

General Short. We were not alerted for an antiaircraft defense because we had not received any information indicating a probable air attack.

Senator Ferguson. The next:

Failure to set up anInterceptor Command.

General Short. Not guilty. We were training personnel as fast as we could to operate an effective interceptor command, and it was set up and operating as effectively as it could.

Senator Ferguson. No. 4:

Failure to provide a proper aircraft warning service.

General Short. Not guilty. We were training our personnel as fast as we could to set up an effective aircraft-warning service. It was in operation.

Senator Ferguson. Now, No. 5:

Failure to provide for the transmission of appropriate [8605] warnings to interested agencies.

General Short. Not guilty. We were restricted by direct order from Marshall, from transmitting the November 27 warning to any other than the minimum essential officers.

Senator Ferguson. And that would exclude giving it to what was called interested agencies; is that your opinion?

General Short. Yes, sir. If I had set up an aircraft-warning service and gotten it to everybody we would have had to give it to all the enlisted men.

Senator Ferguson. No. 6:

Failure to establish a proper system of defense by cooperation and coordination with the Navy.

General Short. Not guilty. We had full, complete plans for defense by cooperation with the Navy, which had been approved by General Marshall and Admiral Stark.

Senator Ferguson. And in your opinion was that being carried out; was it being carried out?

General Short. It would have been carried out 100 percent if they would have given us the information they had.

Senator Ferguson. No. 7:

Failure to issue adequate orders to his subordinates as to their duties in case of sudden attack.

General Short. Not guilty. I could not tell "subordinates" [8606] to expect a sudden attack which neither I nor the War Department nor anyone else expected. Our information regarding impending hostile action was, by direction of the chief of staff, limited to the minimum essential officers. Our standard operating procedure of 5 November 1941 prescribed fully the duties of all personnel in event of any sudden attack.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I understand from some evidence that the people in Honolulu were given no information as to what to do in case of an air raid. Can you explain why that was true?
General Short. The civilians?
Senator Ferguson. Yes; the civilian population was not instructed.

General Short. We had had a number of alerts and blackouts. We had had definite training of the surgical teams and of the first-aid people and of the ambulance corps. They had turned out and set up these several times. And I think that the civilian agencies that had to act not only knew but they performed their duties extremely well on December 7.

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that your claim is that you had given intimation previously to civilian agencies what to do in case of raids?

[8607] General Short. The ones who had positive things to do.

Senator Ferguson. Now, if you had called in the civilian authorities and explained to them that you anticipated an attack as of after November 27, would you have been violating the instructions given to you in the message of the 27th?

General Short. I certainly would, because in all probability a considerable part of the population would have moved to the hills, notifying every Jap agent that we expected an attack practically immediately.

Senator Ferguson. Well, from what you know now, didn't the Japanese agents know all about the defense and all about the various activities there?

General Short. They knew quite largely, probably most all about it, but they would have known definitely then that we were expecting an attack. I doubt if they knew that because we didn't know it ourselves.

Senator Ferguson. But if you had been alerted as they were in 1940 would you then have alerted the civilian population?

General Short. I think that we would have encouraged them, except the ones in the very congested areas, to remain definitely where they were. We had plans completely drawn for the evacuation of certain areas where they thought there [8608] was danger of bombing or sabotage of the gasoline supply and we had asked for money to build those evacuation camps and we had not succeeded in getting it. The Delegate, Sam King, and the Governor, had also made strenuous efforts to get that money.

Senator Ferguson. Had the responsible authorities in Washington been notified of the M-day plan that you had under the legislature of Hawaii?

General Short. Yes, sir; they knew that that legislation was being passed, I am sure, because we had made requests for these funds and when we didn't get it through the War Department then the Governor and the Delegate had tried through their channels.

Senator Ferguson. Now, had you any notice to put that into effect, to declare M-day?

General Short. We had not.

Senator Ferguson. Would that have helped the situation?

General Short. We had things worked out so that the Governor was able to put that in effect in a very few hours. He put it into effect sometime before 7 o'clock in the afternoon of December 7 so that it turned out the home guard.

Senator Ferguson. How many civilians were killed in the attack?
General Short. I couldn't answer that question. Not a great many. There were a few.

Senator Ferguson. Our casualty lists, I understand, only include the Army and Navy, the military casualties. Can you give us an idea?

General Short. We lost in the Army 9 officers and 223 men. My guess would be that there were perhaps 10 civilians killed, but that might be off.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether that has ever been listed authoritatively?

General Short. I think it has. And one rather unusual part of it is that I think a very considerable proportion of them were Japanese.

Senator Ferguson. Number 8:

Failure to take adequate measures to protect the Fleet and Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.

General Short. Not guilty. I took every measure I thought necessary to protect the fleet and naval base against sabotage. I so reported to the War Department. Marshall testified that I was reasonable in assuming that I was doing exactly what he wanted, because otherwise he would have notified me that he wanted more measures taken.

Senator Ferguson. Number 9:

Failure to have his airplanes dispersed in anticipation of a hostile attack, after having been warned of the danger thereof.

General Short. Not guilty. I was never warned of any imminent danger of an air attack. The planes were therefore grouped for more adequate protection against hostile action in the form of sabotage.

Senator Ferguson. Therefore, when you wrote on the 28th, or sent a message back that you were alerted for sabotage, that would indicate, would it, that the planes were grouped?

General Short. Yes, sir. That was laid down in our standard operating procedure.

Senator Ferguson. No. 10:

Failure to have his airplanes in a state of readiness for an attack.

General Short. Not guilty. My aircraft were not in a state of readiness for a surprise attack, but were protected against sabotage as directed by the War Department in the sabotage-alert messages of 27th, of 28th November 1941, and as reported to the War Department by me.

If they had been equipped with ammunition, grouped as they were, and a sabotage attack had been made, there would have been much more damage by exploding ammunition.

We never permitted, when alerted for sabotage, we never permitted them to be armed or to have ammunition in the planes.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, the sabotage alert was one that wouldn't permit ammunition to be in the planes when they were grouped for sabotage?

General Short. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. No. 11:

Failure to provide for the protection of military personnel, their families, etc., and of civilian employees on various reservations.

General Short. We made a quite elaborate plan for evacuating the families of civilians on the military reservation. We asked the
War Department for money to establish a camp some 4 miles east of Schofield. I wrote a personal letter to the Chief of Staff and told him that we were asking for the money to establish these camps on the basis of recreation camps and the different units, different families would be assigned to different locations, but our real purpose was to get ready for a possible attack and this would give us a chance to acquaint everybody with the details without advertising what we were doing.

He answered my letter and stated that guns were needed worse for other purposes.

[8613] Senator Ferguson. I notice that you left out the words "not guilty" to this last one. Is there any reason?

General Short. No, sir. I plead not guilty.

Now, I might say when we failed to get our concentration camp plans approved, get the money, we then made an alternate plan for taking care of the women and children in school buildings that we thought would be out of the range of an attack.

We had blankets placed in those school buildings, we had all arrangements set up for the establishment of cafeterias and they were moved in there on the afternoon of the 7th and everybody was taken care of.

Senator Ferguson. In this evidence that was put in this morning, this exhibit, Myron C. Cramer, major general, judge advocate general, gives a report. I wish you would look on page 50 of that report; I don’t know what page it is in the record.

General Short. I think it is the paragraph I read into the record this morning.

Senator Ferguson. Oh, it is in Exhibit 63 that I had in mind.

General Short. Exhibit 63, top secret, yes.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; top secret.

Now, I notice at the bottom of page 49 this remark by the [8614]

Judge Advocate General:

As to whether General Short should be tried at any time, a factor to be considered is what sentence, in the event of conviction, the court would adjudge.

Why would the Judge Advocate be concerned in advance and before he had filed the charges as to what the court would give as a penalty?

General Short. It would look like that he was thinking of the possible effect on public opinion. If I were tried and found not guilty, or given a very mild sentence, that the public would tend to feel that there had been no justification, that is the only conclusion I can draw.

Senator Ferguson. And then he goes on:

As I have already indicated, upon any charge of neglect of duty, or of his various duties, General Short would have the formidable defense that he responded to the request to report measures he had taken with a message, incomplete and ambiguous it may be, but which should have prompted doubt as to the sufficiency of the action taken.

Now, was he talking about your reply to General Marshall’s message?

General Short. He undoubtedly was, in spite of his statement about it being ambiguous and incomplete.

[8615] Senator Ferguson. Now, in your opinion was it an ambiguous message that you had taken an alert against sabotage?
General Short. I don't see how it could have been briefer or more concise or clearer.

Senator Ferguson. The next sentence:

My experience with courts martial leads me to the belief that a court would be reluctant to adjudge a severe sentence in a case of this kind where the general picture would be clouded by a claim that others were contributory causes. (Cf., Roberts Report, Conclusion 18, p. 21.)

General Short. I do not have a copy of the Roberts report here.

Senator Ferguson. Would you see that he gets a copy?

Mr. Masten. Yes. [Handing document to witness.]

Senator Ferguson. I want to ask you this question in relation to that: Couldn't that have been cured by trying all that were guilty of contributory causes?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not the War Department has ever considered the question of trying all that were guilty of contributory causes or causes of the disaster at Pearl Harbor?

General Short. I am quite sure they have never made a [8616] public statement to that effect. I do not know whether any consideration has been given to it or not.

Senator Ferguson. Now, you have before you the Roberts report, do you?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you want to look at those conclusions 18 on page 21 and see what he was talking about?

General Short. I have looked at it.

Senator Ferguson. Do you want to make any answer in relation to them?

General Short. I would say in regard to 18 that it was a complete surprise, because we had not been furnished the information that was definitely available in Washington and that should have been furnished to us.

In regard to 19, the things that he mentioned are largely beyond our control:

Disregard of international law by the Japanese.

There was nothing that we could do about that.

The restrictions they prepared on counter-espionage.

That was a question of our own laws. The Hawaiian Department could do nothing about that.

Emphasis in the warning messages of the probability of aggressive action in the Far East and on anti-sabotage measures.

That was wholly on the shoulders of the War Department. That could not apply to the Hawaiian Department.

[8617] Failure of the War Department to reply to the message relating to the anti-sabotage measures instituted by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

That was entirely a War Department failure.

Information received by the interested parties prior to the attack of warning message of December 7th.

That was entirely the failure of the War Department.

Senator Ferguson. The War Department is defined there as you defined it this morning?
General Short. I beg your pardon?

Senator Ferguson. Is it defined as you defined it this morning?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Is there anything more that you want to add?

General Short. I would like to call attention to the fact that he admits in paragraph 20 that when the attack came that the command did act efficiently. He said that they were present and that certain things had not interfered in any way with their efficiency and that subordinate commanders executed their orders without question. They were not responsible for the state of readiness.

I would like to say there that I have never at any time tried to pass the buck to any single subordinate. My decision was made on the information that the War Department had furnished me and I had no desire and absolutely never took any steps to pass the buck to some individual man below me.

Senator Ferguson. Is there such a thing as a joint trial in courts martial, where men can be tried jointly?

General Short. There is, yes, sir. It is rather unusual but it is possible. I think I am correct in that, am I not?

Lieutenant Colonel Karr. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Then reading on:

There is also in cases like this the historic precedent of President Lincoln's refusal to rebuke Secretary of War Simon Cameron for a gross error of judgment. (Life of Abraham Lincoln by Nicolay & Hay, Vol. 5, p. 125-130.) I am therefore forced to conclude that if General Short is tried and if such trial should result in his conviction there is considerable likelihood the court would adjudge a sentence less than dismissal and might well adjudge nothing beyond a reprimand.

Would that lead us to believe, then, that he was of the opinion that he was concerned with the sentence and they were concerned with that alone?

General Short. I would say they were very greatly concerned with the effect on public opinion and that they wanted to be very careful and not try me on something where they would fail and the effect would bounce back on them.

Senator Ferguson. Now, coming to the Clausen report. When did you see the Clausen affidavits?

General Short. About 2 or 3 days before this committee convened we got a copy of them.

Senator Ferguson. In the first part of the Clausen report, the 23d of November 1944—have you got the Clausen report before you?

Lieutenant Colonel Karr. No, sir; we do not have that here.

Senator Ferguson. It is the letter by the Secretary of War to Major Clausen and on the next page is this memorandum:

Memorandum for Major Henry C. Clausen: Subject: Unexplored Leads in Pearl Harbor investigations.

You had those before you this morning, did you not?

General Short. I think so.

Senator Ferguson. The unexplored leads.

General Short. I do not believe I did.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to put in evidence those two papers, the letter of the 23d creating the Clausen power and unexplored leads.
Mr. Murphy. I wonder, Mr. Chairman, why the public are not entitled to the whole thing? I move that we put it all in, the whole volume.

[8620] The Chairman. Make them an exhibit or consider it as being spread on the record?

Senator Ferguson. I would like to spread those pages at least on the record because I have questioned General Short and he gave some answers in relation to these unexplored leads and that is what I desire to have in the record at the present time.

Mr. Murphy. You mean you object, Senator, to the whole thing going in?

Senator Ferguson. Well, I think we should wait. The only thing is I think we should wait until Clausen came to get the other papers in, to know how the other papers were obtained before they go in.

Mr. Murphy. Well, I propose later on to ask that they all go in. I would like to have it all go in now. I will ask that again.

The Chairman. Well, the chair does not want to exclude anything that ought to go in here, but if it is all going in when Clausen comes in I do not see any need of putting it all in here.

Mr. Murphy. I have no objection to those two going in but I move that they all go in so that we will have everything.

The Chairman. Let them go in.

[8621] Senator Ferguson. I will read them in, General, so that you will have them before you.

General Short. Yes.

Senator Ferguson (reading). "November 23, 1944." Now, that date is after the board had rendered its opinion?

General Short. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. But the board, all the members were living and in good health so that they could have carried on, couldn't they?

General Short. So far as I know they were.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2:

Subject: Pearl Harbor Investigation.

In connection with the recent report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, a number of unexplored leads have suggested themselves which require investigation. I have directed that this investigation be undertaken by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD.

You are directed to give Major Clausen access to all records, documents, and information in your Division, whether of secret or top secret nature and to advise all officers of your Division to afford Major Clausen the fullest possible cooperation. Inquiries made by Major Clausen should be answered fully and the persons interrogated should volunteer any information of which they have knowledge concerning the subject of Major Clausen's inquiries.

In addition, copies of any papers required by Major Clausen, whether secret or top secret should be furnished him, any present directives to the contrary notwithstanding.

Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of War.

Henry C. Clausen,
Lt. Colonel, JAGD.

A true copy.

Now, the next page is:

Memorandum for Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD:

Subject: Unexplored Leads in Pearl Harbor Investigation.

1. In order to assist you in the investigation you are now making, I am suggesting herewith certain unexplored leads which, in my opinion, might
advantageously be followed up in order to complete the general picture in this matter. The present memorandum merely contains suggestions and will not be construed as a directive or as in any way fixing the scope of your investigation.

2. In the War and Navy Departments in Washington, the following matters can be investigated:
   a. Whether Kimmel notified the Navy Department and the Navy Department notified the War Department of the order to sink Jap subs, of the reasons for the order.
   b. What was the naval condition of readiness at Pearl Harbor.
   c. Whether Short or Kimmel sent any reconnaissance reports to Washington.
   d. Whether Kimmel had any orders from Washington requiring a large part of the fleet to remain in harbor.
   e. Whether Kimmel understood the term "defensive deployments" or wired back for its meaning.
   f. Whether Kimmel replied to the 24 November, 27 November, and other Navy Department messages and if so, was the War Department furnished copies thereof.
   g. Whether the June 1940 alert message to Herron was specific and indicative of an established War Department policy of being specific when war alerts were believed required by the situation.
   h. Whether the War Department manuals and war plans, current in 1941, authorized a Commanding General of an overseas Department to revise the estimate of the situation, without consulting with or reporting to the War Department.

[8623] 1. Whether Short answered the Secretary of War's letter of February 1941.

j. The number of troops in Hawaii in late 1941, the state of their training and the possibility of continuing training under Alert 2 or 3.
   k. The terms and origin of the Joint Action Agreement, if any, with Britain and the Netherlands, and whether Japan was officially advised of this agreement or discovered its existence.

1. Whether Short was sent official notice of the Joint Action Agreement or of the Roosevelt-Churchill July 1941 compact for a Joint warning to Japan. (Rep. 41)

3. Concerning the "magic" intercepts we should ascertain:
   a. The exact date and time of first translation.
   b. The reason for the apparent delay in translating or deciphering of some of the most vital messages.
   c. Who got each message, when and in what form.
   d. The evaluation made of them at the time and the degree of reliance placed thereon by the General Staff and by the Navy.
   e. The origin of the "Budapest" intercept.

4. Significant details regarding the "Winds" intercept might be explored:
   a. The original of the Navy Department message and translation, now probably part of the original Roberts Report records, or at least, questioning of Mr. Justice Roberts would possibly disclose how that Commission disposed of it.
   b. The Navy's alleged delivery of two copies of the translation to the Army (Tr., Safford C. 133-135), as to just what procedure there was for delivery, as to who was responsible therefor, and who had a duty to check up on whether the translation was received.
   c. Whether General Miles, Admiral Noyes, Colonel Bratton, or Captain Safford knew about the Anglo-Dutch-U.S. Joint Action Agreement, in which case they would have known that a "War with Britain" message would necessarily have involved the United States in war.

Did you ever hear about that one before?

General Short. I learned that in respect to the report, as I say, 2 or 3 days before the committee met. I had never heard about it before that time.

Senator Ferguson. Well, do you know whether or not Miles did know about that Anglo-Dutch-U.S. joint action agreement, in which case they would have known that the War with Britain message would necessarily have involved the United States in war?
[8626] General Short. I don't remember whether that question was specifically asked him or what his answer was.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

d. Whether the partial implementation “War with Britain” was brought to Admiral Stark’s or General Marshall’s attention, it being clear that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff did know of the Joint Action Policy.

e. Did the Navy in any way notify Admiral Kimmel or Commander Rochefort of the implementation intercept?

f. Did the Honolulu intercept stations independently receive the activating “Winds” message?

g. What was the significance of the other Japanese intercepts which the Board failed to examine?

[8627] Did you know that the Army board had failed to examine certain intercept messages?

General Short. I did not know what they had examined. I was never permitted to see or know anything about magic.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

h. Whether General (then Colonel) Fielder actually received the message directing him to contact Commander Rochefort, whether he did so, and whether there is substance to the hypothesis that he and Short were relying upon the warning they would expect to receive when the second or implementing “winds” message would be intercepted, thus giving advance notice of hostilities.

General Short. I never heard of the winds code until I read the Roberts report here sometime in August 1944. That was the first time I knew there was such a thing.

Senator Ferguson. You never knew then that Rochefort, admiral or commander, whatever he was—it was Commander Rochefort—had known that there was intercepted a winds or implementing message?

General Short. No, sir; I had never heard of it.

Senator Ferguson. So then you were not waiting, as a matter of fact, on an implementing winds message in order that you may be given advance notice of hostilities?

General Short. I was not.

[8628] Senator Ferguson. This is signed Myron C. Cramer, major general, United States, Judge Advocate General.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; I will yield.

Mr. Murphy. As you remember, we were first going to put in the first 18 pages, and I then stated in the record it was unfair to have the 18 in without the explanatory part but to have incorporated in the judge advocate general’s opinion the report of Major Clausen.

There is also in the record the cross-examination from the Clausen report of General Gerow. I do not see how you can intelligently understand a report if you have only three parts of it in and not the whole.

I request, in view of the matters that have been read, that the entire report go in as an exhibit.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I am putting in here just what the judge advocate general was asking Clausen to look into. I haven’t time this afternoon to examine him on the whole matter here that is contained in this volume.

I want to ask you, General Short, if you read this paper that I read and that I have before me, these affidavits of Clausen, or in the Clausen report?
General Short. I have read the complete report.

[8629] Senator Ferguson. You have read the complete report?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. The papers have never had the Clausen report. I think they are entitled to them.

The Vice Chairman. Without objection, then—

Mr. Keefe (interposing). Just hold it, Mr. Chairman. I have at least on one or two other occasions registered objection to the introduction of the so-called Clausen statement at this time, until after we have had an opportunity to go into that situation in connection with the examination of Colonel Bratton and others who expect to be witnesses.

When the full facts with reference to it are developed it can then be disclosed as to whether it is material and pertinent to this inquiry. I do not care to be a party to consenting to the introduction in evidence of matter which may or may not be pertinent.

The Vice Chairman. Does the gentleman of Wisconsin object to the request of the gentleman of Pennsylvania?

Mr. Murphy. May I say on this point, the Navy had a special examination after the naval court of inquiry concluded, by Admiral Hart, and they had a subsequent examination by Admiral Hewitt, and in each of those cases it was conducted by an individual going about the world to [8630] take testimony. The Clausen examination, as I understand it, covered 57,000 miles to the war fronts of the world.

I am simply making my request so that everything about Pearl Harbor shall be known, for whatever it is worth. Maybe it will not be worth much in the view of individual members, but so that all the facts will be before the papers of the country I think it should be made an exhibit.

Mr. Keefe. In view of that statement, it is perfectly obvious why the statement is made; I do not want any misinterpretation of the purpose of my objection.

There is quite a difference between the Hewitt report and the Hart report and the manner in which the two were prepared, quite a difference between the questions and answers of witnesses recorded under oath than the mere statement that is made in the taking of affidavits.

Now I have some knowledge as to the manner and method in which affidavits are obtained, and so far as I am concerned, it will all be brought out at the proper time. I do not think they should be introduced in evidence at this time but should await the time when the individuals become witnesses on the stand and it gives us an opportunity to examine those witnesses in reference to how those affidavits were obtained.

Mr. Murphy. According to the papers the gentleman said [8631] he wants to conclude by February 15, and I want to be sure the Clausen report is in by then, and I think this is as good a time as any.

The Vice Chairman. Permit me to remind the gentleman from Wisconsin, as I recall the only witness who has appeared before the committee so far and who had appeared before the Army board of inquiry and later gave an affidavit to Major Clausen was General Gerow.

Mr. Keefe. That is correct.
The Vice Chairman. General Gerow was questioned by members of the committee about his affidavit that he gave to Major Clausen. Mr. Keeffe. I certainly would not have any objection to having General Gerow's affidavit, which he gave to Clausen, introduced in evidence.

Senator Ferguson. It is already in evidence.
Mr. Keeffe. It is already in evidence. Now all I ask is that the same situation with respect to the affidavit, perhaps, of Colonel Bratton and others be indulged in. I have no objection to the public and the world knowing just exactly what is in every one of those affidavits, but I would like to introduce them at a time when I have the right to cross-examine the witness who gave those affidavits.

Mr. Murphy. As I understand it, Mr. Chairman, Major [8632] Clausen, I believe, questioned 135 witnesses. I do not believe we are going to have them all here. Ordinarily, if you put any part of an instrument in you ought to put all of it in, for whatever it is worth. The Vice Chairman. The objection has been heard. That settles the matter for the present.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, in view of what has been said I think it should be made clear that we do not take the affidavits of 135 witnesses. If Colonel Clausen appears here and we can examine him about it, we can review that whole question at that time. In the meantime it is a little premature.

Mr. Murphy. I understand, sir, we have already agreed to take the statements of the staffs at Hawaii.

Senator Brewster. As the gentleman well knows, those who are in the category of these witnesses we agreed to let go in evidence.

Mr. Keeffe. That matter has heretofore been determined by this committee, as the Chairman will know, when we agreed to put in sworn testimony in the place of calling certain witnesses, and the Clausen matter was specifically eliminated by unanimous action of the committee at that time.

[8633] The Vice Chairman. That is true, of course. It was determined by the committee in executive session that the Clausen material would not be included with this other material, but it does not follow that any member of the committee is deprived of the right to ask unanimous consent to include it at any time he may desire.

Mr. Murphy. I ask it particularly in view of the fact that those members of the armed forces of the United States were fighting in the battlefronts of the world, and swore before God under oath that what they said was true, and it was presented to us by an officer of the United States Army

Senator Brewster. You produce the officer, and we will listen to him.

The Vice Chairman. Proceed.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar, General, with the planes that were passing through Hawaii to other fronts for other places in the Pacific?

General Short. To the Philippines in particular?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Short. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Were these planes up until the 7th [8634] the same as those that came in then? They were not armed?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. No ammunition in them?

General Short. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. You were to arm them there and then send them on?

General Short. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Had that ever been done before?

General Short. All the planes that had gone to the Philippines came in in that condition up to December 7.

Senator Ferguson. Came in that condition?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So there was no alteration at that time?

General Short. You mean the ones coming in on the 7th?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

General Short. No, sir; that had been the normal procedure.

Senator Ferguson. Was your force being reinforced or were these planes, from a certain day, all going through to the Philippines?

General Short. We had actually lost planes. We had 21 B-17’s at one time, and 9 of those were sent to the [8635] Philippines and we were down to 12, and had to rob 6 of those of parts to keep the others going through.

Senator Ferguson. Did that impress you with the fact that there was more thought of an attack in the Philippines than there was in your territory?

General Short. No question about it. They were ferrying in the last few months everything to the Philippines they could.

Senator Ferguson. Can we get what planes went through Hawaii from, say, July, or something like that, Mr. Richardson?

Mr. Richardson. We will try.

Senator Ferguson. Try and get that, and what planes stopped and how they completed their journey.

General Short. May I interject there, also, there were other types of planes that were not flown through, that were shipped through on transports.

Senator Ferguson. You knew about that?

General Short. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Had you been reinforced in such a way by shipping planes in after, say, September?

General Short. I think we got most of our planes before July 1. I could not state definitely, but I think we did.

[8636] Senator Ferguson. After that, had you requested any more planes for your defense?

General Short. We had in August put in that study showing that we should have a total of 180 B-17’s.

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever received any word of any kind that after the 27th of November the Secretary of State had made a statement to the Secretary of War that the matter, in effect—I do not undertake to quote him in exact words—was then being turned over to the Army and Navy?

General Short. I had not.
Senator Ferguson. You indicated yesterday that you were of the opinion that General Marshall had never seen the message of the 27th as it was sent, prior to the time it was sent to you.

General Short. Yes, sir; I believe that is correct.

Senator Ferguson. And where do you get that knowledge?

General Short. Because General Marshall was not in Washington. He was, according to his testimony, and that of others, in the Carolinas for maneuvers. He stated, as I remember in his testimony that when he returned to his office on the 28th, he thought he found his message on his desk.

Senator Ferguson. And he saw it afterward? [8637] He saw it after the maneuvers?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you want to add anything to or subtract anything from any of your answers that I may have asked you questions on?

General Short. I might bring out the fact that in addition to planes, a few days before December 7, I had a wire from the War Department asking me if I would be willing to ship forty-eight 75-millimeter guns and 120 30-caliber machine guns to the Philippines, and that they would replace them very soon. I agreed to that.

The transport was held at the time long enough to get them aboard, and they were shipped to the Philippines. That, of course, was another indication that they considered the situation in the Philippines much more critical than in Hawaii.

Senator Ferguson. And had you had the understanding before that that we knew our authorities knew that in case of a war with Japan, we could not hope to hold the Philippines?

General Short. I think that for years it had always been considered that we probably would lose the Philippines and have to retake them. I think in playing our war games at the War College, that had been the usual assumption.

[8638] Senator Ferguson. Were you familiar with the letter from Admiral Stark to Admiral Kimmel wherein he quoted the President as saying that it would be very embarrassing to us if the Philippines were attacked?

General Short. I am not. I don’t remember.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know, as a military man, how it could have been embarrassing, using that word; is that the word you use in military circles, or is that a diplomatic word?

General Short. I think it would always be embarrassing from a military point of view, to lose anything of that kind, but it was something we had expected would happen.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. And if an attack came, it would come against the Philippines?

General Short. It would come against the Philippines and we probably would not be able to hold them. We did not have enough out there.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment.

Had you ever asked the question as to what our policy was in case of an attack on the Philippines?
General Short. No, sir. I thought I knew, because I had seen the war plans when I was here in Washington.

[8639] I had played war games, commanded one side of the war game in actual maneuvering at the War College. I think I at that time knew it very thoroughly.

Senator Ferguson. What was our policy in case of an attack? Would we go into action, into war?

General Short. We would hold them as long as we could and then expect to take them back.

Senator Ferguson. Did it mean a general war? Was that our policy?

General Short. I think so.

Senator Ferguson. So then in your opinion, it meant war if they attacked the Philippines, and the British and Dutch?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Just as much as if they attacked Hawaii or the Marshalls, or Guam, or any other possessions?

General Short. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Or even our Coast?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. I just want to say that you made an error when you said that was quoting the President about the embarrassing situation.

[8640] Senator Ferguson. I want to get the exact language. I would not under any circumstances leave a quote in here which is not a correct quote. Can I get the last letter, counsel, in the Stark-Kimmel letters?

Mr. Murphy. I think he quotes the President in some matters, but I do not think that was the quotation.

Senator Ferguson. Under no circumstances do I want to allow even a thought that I am misquoting.

Were you here the day that the MacArthur affidavit was read into evidence?

General Short. I am sorry. I did not get the question.

Senator Ferguson. Were you here on the day that the Clausen-MacArthur letter was read in evidence?

General Short. I think I was. At least I have read it.

Senator Ferguson. Well, the substance of it, as I recall it, was that General MacArthur claimed that he had enough information and was not embarrassed by any lack of information. Did you know at that time that he had magic?

General Short. No, sir; I did not.

Senator Ferguson. That would indicate that if he had sufficient information then you had sufficient information, would it not?

General Short. If you read that alone, you could readily [8641] draw that inference, if you did not know anything about the situation.

Senator Ferguson. But if you know about magic, do you think that changes the situation?

General Short. There were two things that would give him much more information. One was magic and the other, which I did not know about, the message from the President to Commissioner Sayre, that Commissioner Sayre, General MacArthur, and Admiral Hart
were to get together at a conference. There was a considerable amount of information there.

Senator Ferguson. And the fact that he had magic and access to that?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So that there will be no doubt about my quotation, I am going to ask to strike my previous question. I will quote directly from the letter.

This is the letter of the 25th of November 1941, in exhibit 106.

The Vice Chairman. Whom is the letter from?

Senator Ferguson. The original letter is signed “Betty.”

The Vice Chairman. From whom to whom?


Now, I will read the postscript:

I held this up pending a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull today. I have been in constant touch with Mr. Hull, and it was only after a long talk with him that I sent the message to you a day or two ago showing the gravity of the situation. He confirmed it all in today’s meeting, as did the President. Neither would be surprised over a Japanese surprise attack. From many angles, an attack on the Philippines would be the most embarrassing thing that could happen to us. There are some here who think it likely to occur. I do not give it the weight others do, but I included it because of the strong feeling among some people.

You know I have generally held that it was not time for the Japanese to proceed against Russia. I still do. Also I still rather look for an advance into Thailand, Indo-China, Burma Road area as the most likely.

[8643] I won’t go into the pros and cons of what the United States may do. I will be damned if I know. I wish I did. The only thing I do know is that we may do most anything and that’s the only thing I know to be prepared for; or we may do nothing—I think it is more likely to be “anything.”

It is initialed “H. R. S.”

Have you seen that? It was written on November 25, and he indicates that he is holding it up because of a meeting with the President and Mr. Hull and then he adds this postscript.

General Short. I have never seen it.

Senator Ferguson. Before December 7?

General Short. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. When is about the first that you heard of it?

General Short. I heard it discussed here.

Senator Ferguson. In one of our joint committee hearings?

General Short. Yes; the first I ever heard of it.

Senator Ferguson. So you did not know what they were talking about in there, about it being embarrassing if an attack was made on the Philippines?

General Short. I did not know specifically what was intended.

[8644] Senator Ferguson. That is all.

The Chairman. Congressman Keefe.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, before Congressman Keefe proceeds, there is a matter that I would like to bring to the attention of the committee that just came to my attention in connection with the introduction of this record called the brief and résumé of records of the Roberts commission. I brought this originally to the attention of the committee and asked its consideration, and it was deferred. Copies were made available for examination.

Subsequently I stated that an examination of this indicated to me clearly it was excerpts from a much longer report of the Roberts com-
mission and I asked that a complete record be put in this record and be made an exhibit, in justice to all concerned, and that was agreed to.

Subsequent thereto, there were certain letters that were discussed in connection with this, which went into the record yesterday. Last night, just before adjournment, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Murphy, stated:

I do not want to offer something that was brought to him as an exhibit, but I do want the record to show that if Senator Brewster does not renew his offer of this file in the morning I will ask unanimous consent to have it go into the record because I think it ought to be straightened out on the record.

That being brought to my attention I came here this morning and spoke to the chairman, Mr. Cooper, in charge, and I told him I had to go to a meeting of conferences on the Ship Sales Act, and if it were to be offered I wanted to be heard. He suggested I talk to Mr. Murphy, which I did. I asked Mr. Murphy if he wanted to put this in and he said no, that he had no intention at this time to put it in. I went back to Mr. Cooper and told him the matter was adjusted. I find subsequently in the morning Mr. Murphy did offer it. I am ready to consider the further factors which led Mr. Murphy to change his mind in the course of the morning.

Mr. Murphy. I would like to speak for myself.

Senator Brewster. I certainly shall be happy to hear you.

The Chairman. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. I talked to the Senator from Maine this morning and told him it was my understanding that exhibits 1 and 2 attached to the file he had were not in evidence. I was informed by counsel that they were, the counsel for General Short. Thereafter, after the Senator from Maine—

Senator Brewster. Just a moment. You said that was all our conversation?

Mr. Murphy. I told you I did not intend to put the file in right then.

Now, with the understanding that the general was not going to be a witness after today, the general then made a statement to the effect, as I recollect it, that the Judge Advocate General did not want anyone on the Army board, but rather, one individual to go out to make a survey of certain additional facts.

Then there is one other thing. Yesterday the gentleman said, as I remember it, that there were certain parts of that record in this exhibit.

Senator Brewster. The Roberts commission.

Mr. Murphy. Yes. In this exhibit there is a letter which states that they are referring only to things on the record. When the gentleman saw fit to refer to The Adjutant General of the United States Army, and apparently to the Secretary of War, with the inference, as I got it, that there was some impropriety in sending out Major Clausen to make this survey, I then asked that not only this exhibit but all of the files of the War Department, including these and everything else, go into the record, so we would have the entire picture.

I also stated on the record that this, in effect, was a complaint that it was a one-sided ex parte proceeding. I used that word before the noon hour, an ex parte proceeding. I said in fairness to the general, he ought to be able to give his answer here.
Whereupon the general said, "I have a paper prepared here. I have examined the exhibit." He then read his answer.

I do think, inasmuch as the gentleman from Maine has brought it up, that he should be the one to offer it. Apparently he thought it was significant, because he brought it up twice. I certainly do not want to offend the general's feelings, but I am interested in the whole truth. My only purpose in introducing it is if there was any wrong committed by The Adjutant General, or anyone else on the staff, as to the procedure, we ought to know it. That is the only reason why it should be in this record.

Senator Brewster. I appreciate the gentleman's statement that he wants the whole truth, and so do I want the whole truth, but having examined this document I have found it does not even purport to be anything but a very partial summary of certain portions of the evidence. I asked for the entire evidence before the Roberts commission to be put in as an exhibit, so that we would have the whole truth, and that was agreed to.

I do not think we need to, or want, perhaps, to take the time of the committee at this time. In the light of the circumstances as stated by Mr. Murphy and myself, I would ask that the decision of the committee be reconsidered and that we have an opportunity over the week end to consider the situation, with a view to whether or not this should be incorporated in the record as an exhibit.

I think there were some serious questions about this which I should like to consider and perhaps discuss with Mr. Murphy and the committee.

Mr. Murphy. I would like to say that inasmuch as the good faith of The Adjutant General of the United States Army appears to be challenged, or the Judge Advocate General, I think this committee and everybody should want to know the whole story, and for that reason I think it should remain in the record.

Senator Brewster. I simply ask the matter be reconsidered.

The Chairman. That matter can be pending and the committee can consider it.

The Vice Chairman. As the record stands now, it is in the record. The Senator is asking to reconsider it and the question of reconsideration is carried over.

The Chairman. It is in the record as an exhibit, not as a part of the transcript, I understand, so the question of reconsidering that, as to whether it should be filed as an exhibit, will be pending.

[8649] Mr. Murphy. May I just say, Mr. Chairman, that there are additional papers, and, as I understand it, counsel have a great volume of them, and I hope there will be a study made over the weekend. There is particularly one paper that is a memorandum dated February 17, 1942, which refers to the original retirement paper, or proposed retirement paper of the general, and it refers to a memorandum from General Marshall, and I would like to see that memorandum.

I have asked to have it here.

Senator Brewster. I think we should have all the records bearing on this which were asked for some days ago by me. It was as the result of that that these various records were produced.
Mr. Murphy. I want to give the Senator full credit for it.

Senator Brewster. I want to say that I cannot conceive that similar records to this do not exist in the Kimmel case in the Navy Department, and I should like to have the matter thoroughly explored in order that entire justice may be done to all concerned, if it is finally decided that particularly documents of this character are to be included in this record as exhibits.

The Chairman. All those matters can be straightened out by the committee. The Chair would like to see if we cannot finish with General Short today. We cannot do it [8050] if we argue back and forth on these matters, which I think can be disposed of in the committee itself.

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment. I do not want the record to show that I feel that I was in a position to really examine General Short on this because we dropped the subject and I did not cover it as carefully as I would want to. I did the best I could.

The Chairman. You made a pretty good stab at it.

Congressman Keefe.

Mr. Keefe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. You are welcome.

Mr. Keefe. It is always a great pleasure to find myself at the end of this whip cracking and get thrown off into the last minute of the last hour of Saturday afternoon with witnesses, so that I am under the urge, of necessity, of not consuming any time in trying to complete with the witnesses.

I assure you, General Short, that I shall not utilize any of these bulky minutes in my examination. I will try to get through by 4 o'clock.

Now, General, I sat here during your entire examination and listened as attentively as I knew how to this mass of detail that has been submitted to this committee.

The Chairman. Will you permit me to say that counsel [8051] wishes to have a brief executive session at the conclusion of today's session, so the members who are here will remain.

I beg your pardon for interrupting.

Mr. Keefe. I wonder if I have arrived at a wrong conclusion, or whether I am correct when I assume that the evidence up to date, and the cross-examination of yourself, has tended to meet the issues with respect to your conduct as the commander at Pearl Harbor prior to December 7, when in the public's mind for a long time after December 7, it was apparent that you and Admiral Kimmel were charged with the failure of your responsibilities as commanders at Pearl Harbor.

You specifically had training to alert your command to meet this air attack, with all that is involved in that matter of alerting your command.

In other words, the statement has repeatedly been made that had Kimmel and Short been on the alert they would have been able to meet this Jap attack and either repel it or to have minimized the results of that attack, and therefore Pearl Harbor was the result of the failure to be on a suitable and proper alert.

You felt the impact of that sentiment in the last 4 years, did you not?
General Short. Yes, sir.

[8653] Mr. Keefe. I understand your position to be, General Short, that as commander at Pearl Harbor prior to December 7, 1941, and subsequent to your appointment to that important position you did everything within your power to provide the physical things necessary to provide for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands.

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. And it is your contention that as to many items of physical property, such as guns, installations, radar equipment, air strips, buildings, and so on, you did not get but a small part of the material that you had requested prior to December 7, 1941.

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. General Marshall has testified, as I recall, that in his opinion the material which you did have at Pearl Harbor on December 7, if alerted and effectively used, would have given a good account of itself and perhaps enabled you to repel the attack, or to severely minimize the damage that was caused. Do you agree with that?

General Short. I could have given a better account of myself, but to see how inadequate it was we need to only compare two items. The best antiaircraft defense against low-flying planes, which did the most damage there, is the .50-caliber machine gun. We had 109. Our program at [8653] that time called for 345, but by December 1, 1942, they had actually increased the number of .50 caliber machine guns on Hawaii to 793, showing how much more the War Department thought was necessary, and keep in mind that that date is after the Japanese had been seriously defeated at Midway.

Mr. Keefe. Now, General, I do not want to indulge in the realm of hindsight or speculation. I know how easy it is to judge when you have the benefit of hindsight and I do not feel I should call upon you to indulge in a matter of speculation. The fact of the matter is, is it not, that except for the possibility of getting a few more guns into action and possibly minimizing, to a small extent, the damage that was done, regardless of what you had out there on December 7, this attack would have come in by surprise, isn't that true?

[8653] General Short. With the information.

Mr. Keefe. With the information that you had?

General Short. The information we had from Washington, it was bound to be a surprise.

Mr. Keefe. Yes. Now, then, I think it is quite clear from this evidence, and anybody can correct me if they think I am in error, but as I recall the evidence up to date, every witness that has testified concluded that there was no probability of an attack by air on Hawaii, except, as I recall, the testimony of Admiral Turner. He is the only witness that testified to the probability, in his opinion, that an attack by air would be made upon Pearl Harbor.

General Short. Except that General Miles said that the attack was so obvious that they couldn’t take the trouble to mention it.

The Chairman. What was that?

General Short. So obvious that they didn’t mention it in any of his estimates.

Mr. Keefe. Well, General Miles said that?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Very well. But it impresses me that everybody that had access to the diplomatic changes and all of the information with
respect to the Japanese inten-

[8655] tions concluded that the attack, if it came at all, would be in the far west Pacific.

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. That is what you thought?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. That is what Stark thought?

General Short. I think so.

Mr. Keefe. That is what General Marshall thought.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Everybody that I know of that had access to anything thought that is where the attack would come.

Now, as evidence of that, you have brought before the committee a long series of situations. Admiral Kimmel has done likewise. That is, that that was the intention.

You have pointed out the fact that B-17’s were sent out there unarmed, with their guns cosmolined, that they arrived at the very time that the attack was going on, as evidence that the Air Corps or nobody else would have sent those B-17’s into that fray unarmed had they expected an attack.

You have indicated that they were ordering you to ship your supplies to the Philippines, material that you had on hand. That is correct, is it not?

General Short. Yes, sir.

[8656] Mr. Keefe. As indicating that that is where the attack would take place?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Some place in the record there is evidence of a plan by which the Army was to garrison our outlying islands. Do you remember that?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You would garrison the islands of Samoa, Canton, Christmas, Palmyra, and Johnston; is that right?

General Short. I think that Palmyra and Johnston were not specifically mentioned. They stated that we would at some future time take over the outlying islands and we would garrison Christmas and Canton at once.

Mr. Keefe. And when was that supposed to take place?

General Short. The message was received, I believe, November 29.

Mr. Keefe. Then the idea was, after the war warning message of the 27th, plans were invoked by which you were to deplete your garrison at Honolulu and to send Army replacements to garrison Canton, Samoa, Christmas; is that right?

General Short. I am doubtful whether Samoa was included, but Christmas and Canton definitely.

Mr. Keefe. Canton and Christmas.


Mr. Keefe. And they proposed to replace the troops thus removed from Oahu with fresh troops to be brought from the mainland?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. That is correct?

General Short. Yes, sir. You took all of those things into consideration, along with a lot of other facts that I will not burden the record with at this time, that indicated to you that if there was any
intent on the part of the Japs to attack Hawaii, that that information would be available to Washington, and would be forwarded to you?

Mr. Keefe. And you got no information that would indicate a specific attack on Hawaii?

General Short. No, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, it appears in accordance with the record that is before the committee that this November 27 warning message, page 7 of exhibit 32, was received in the Hawaii signal center at 6:46 p.m. Washington time, 1:16 Hawaiian time, having been dispatched from Washington to Hawaii at 6 o'clock p.m., Washington time on the 27th day of November, and that you replied as shown by your message on page 12 of exhibit 32, which was encoded in Hawaii at 11:10 p.m. Washington time, or 5:40 p.m. Hawaii [8658] time, and it was received in the War Department code room at Washington at 5:57 a.m. on the 28th of November, or 12:27 a.m. the 28 of November, Hawaiian time.

Now, there we had the war warning message to General Short and General Short’s reply to General Marshall in which you stated that you were alerted against sabotage, and had liaison with the Navy.

Now, after that message of Marshall’s you received a message from G–2, that has been referred to, sent to you by General Miles, a short message, on November 27, which reads:

Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate stop Hostilities may ensue stop Subversive activities may be expected stop Inform Commanding General and Chief of Staff only.

Signed Miles.

That message went from G–2 in Washington to G–2 Hawaii?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And advises the G–2 in Hawaii to inform you and your chief of staff only, and refers to nothing but sabotage?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You saw that message, did you?


Mr. Keefe. Then on the 28th day of November you received a message signed “Adams.” Who was Adams?

General Short. He was the adjutant general.

Mr. Keefe. He had authority to send you messages?

General Short. His message meant that it was authorized by the Chief of Staff.

Mr. Keefe. He would not send you a message unless it was authorized by the Chief of Staff, would he?

General Short. I am sure he wouldn’t.

Mr. Keefe. He had the authority to give you a command?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And in this message which he sent you on the 28th day of November he states:

Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of War Department. Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures to provide for protection of your establishments comma property comma and equipment against sabotage comma protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage stop This does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop [8660] Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding unneces-
sary publicity and alarm stop To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat nor affect your possibility under existing instructions.

Now, when you received that telegram on the 28th after Washington had receive your message in which you stated that you were alerted against sabotage, did that tend to influence you in your thinking that the alert which you had was the proper alert, the alert that Washington wanted?

General Short. It did. I thought it was an answer to my radiogram and wanted to emphasize the question of legality.

Mr. Keeffe. Now, there was also sent to the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, on the 28th a message signed “Carl Robinson, adjutant general.” Did you receive that one?

General Short. Robinson?

Mr. Keeffe. That is what is looks like to me.

General Short. What page is that?

Mr. Keeffe. Well, I don’t know——

Mr. Murphy. He is reading from different exhibits.

Mr. Keeffe. Here it is. This one here. Wouldn’t you say that is “Robinson”?

Senator Ferguson. I have one by Sullivan. Is this the one you want?

Senator Lucas. “Williams” isn’t it?

Mr. Murphy. The record shows that somebody thought it was Wall, somebody thought it was Sullivan, and now you say it is Robinson.

Mr. Keeffe. Here is the photostatic copy.

Mr. Murphy. I have seen it. I can’t make it out.

Mr. Keeffe. Robinson, R-o-b-i-n-s-o-n, as plain as anything.

General Short. It is the Arnold message you are reading, from the Chief of Air Corps?

Mr. Keeffe. Yes; that is the one.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, is it Robinson, Arnold, Williams, or Sullivan?

Mr. Keeffe. This is signed Carl Robinson, adjutant general. My eyes aren’t too good, but I can certainly see that.

That came out to you on the 28th of November, did it not?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. And that reads:

[8663] Attention Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force Period That instructions substantially as follows be issued to all establishments and units under your control and command is desired Colon Against those subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of the War Department Paren See paragraph three MID SR three zero dash four five Paren——

Whatever that means. That is what you were worried about, Mr. Chairman, the other day.

The Chairman. I am still worrying about it.

Mr. Keeffe. So am I.

Then it says:

The present critical situation demands that all precautions be taken at once Period It is desired also that all additional measures necessary be initiated by you immediately to provide the following Colon Protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda Comma Protection of all activities against espionage Comma and protection against sabotage of your equipment Comma property and establishments Period This does not repeat not authorize any illegal measures
Period. Avoiding unnecessary alarm and publicity protective measures should be confined to those essentially to secure Period. Para It is also desired [8663] that on or before December five this year reports be submitted to the Chief Army Air Forces of all steps initiated by you to comply with these instructions Period

(Signed) Arnold.

[8664] Now, you got that on the 28th of November?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. Another message which refers specifically and only to sabotage and espionage; that is true?
General Short. That is true.
Mr. Keeffe. The message speaks for itself.
Now, you replied to those two messages, the one from the adjutant general and the one from the air, the Arnold message, you replied separately, did you not?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. And you replied at considerable length?
General Short. Very great detail.
Mr. Keeffe. And those replies, your reply was addressed to the Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.?
General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Keeffe. And in this reply, which I shall not attempt to read, I take it this message is in the record and I won't burden the record with reading it again, you give them a full and complete description of everything you have done?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. Now, General——
The Chairman. What is the date of that?
Mr. Keeffe. The date is the 29th of November 1941.

[8665] Perhaps I had better read it into the record right at this spot:

Re your secret radio four eight two twenty eighth comma full precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of War Department paren paragraph three mid sc thirty dash forty five end paren and military establishments including personnel and equipment stop As regards protection of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power plants comma telephone exchanges and highway bridges comma his headquarters by confidential letter dated June nineteen nineteen forty one requested the governor of the territory to use the broad powers vested in him by section sixty seven of the organic act which provides comma in effect comma that the governor may call upon the commanders of military and naval forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence comma invasion comma insurrection etc stop Pursuant to the authority stated the governor on June twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand on this headquarters to furnish and continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage comma and lawless violence in connection therewith comma being committed against vital installations and structures [8666] in the territory stop Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is now being afforded vital civilian installations stop In this connection comma at the instigation of this headquarters the city and county of Honolulu on June thirteenth nineteen forty one enacted an ordinance which permits the Commanding General Hawaiian Department comma to close comma or restrict the use of and travel upon comma any highway within the city and county of Honolulu comma whenever the commanding general deems such action necessary in the interest of national defense stop The authority thus given has not yet been exercised stop Relations with FBI and all other Federal and Territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters

Signed, "Short."
Did you consider that there was full and complete and ample notice to the War Department at Washington as to what you were doing out there in Hawaii?

General Short. It seems to me I thought it was very definitely a full explanation.

Mr. Keeffe. So if your message of the 27th in response to the Marshall message in which you used the language “alerted against sabotage—liaison with the Navy,” might be contended by some people to be too short and too brief and not full enough, this message which went to the Adjutant General is full and complete as stating everything that you were doing?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Then also on the next day, November 30, 1941, originating at Fort Shafter at 12:57 a.m., the message being dated November 29, you replied to the message from General Marshall?

General Short. That was on December 4. On page 19. I think the one you have is a Panama message.

Mr. Keeffe. No. Did you send a reply to the message from Arnold?

General Short. General Martin sent the reply after my O.K., and it is shown on page No. 19, 19 and 20, sent over both General Martin’s name and mine.

Mr. Keeffe. Oh yes. That is pages 19 and 20 of Exhibit 32. General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. That gives a full and complete response to the wire received by you from General Arnold?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Keeffe. And this was prepared by General Martin of the Air Corps in Hawaii but bears your signature?

[8668] General Short. Yes, sir; and bears his also.

Mr. Keeffe. So that there again was a full and complete statement to Washington addressed to the Chief of the Air Corps setting forth completely just what you were doing out there at Hawaii?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Now, I understand that from the time you sent your reply on the 27th of November right down to December 7, the time of the attack, you never received a single word from Washington that would indicate that these replies which you gave to these messages, and which are now in the record, did not indicate that you were carrying out the instructions from Washington?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Keeffe. Now, you assumed during all this period, having replied to the Marshall message, having replied at great length to the Adjutant General’s message, having replied at great length to the message sent you by the Chief of the Air Corps, you felt full assurance that had any other alert been expected by Washington they certainly had all the information as to what you were doing and would have given you the order; is that your position?

General Short. I did; I felt that.

Mr. Keeffe. Now, as a matter of fact, your war plans, [8669] you were familiar with Rainbow 5, were you not?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. And WPL–46?
General Short. Less familiar with it than Rainbow 5 but familiar with it.

Mr. Keefe. It is a fact, is it not, General Short, that the war plans, the joint war plans of the Army and the Navy for war in the Pacific with Orange, which was Japan, contemplated an offensive war in the event of outbreak of hostilities?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. And that commencement of hostilities was to be announced by radiogram to all theaters announcing in plain English just what ways to put that plan into effect—M-day?

General Short. M-day, that is right.

Mr. Keefe. Then everybody knew, all over the Pacific, just exactly what to do; isn’t that true?

General Short. That is true.

Mr. Keefe. In accordance with the plans already worked out?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. That contemplated, so far as the fleet was concerned at Pearl Harbor, an offensive action against the [8670] Marshalls and the Carolines, did it not?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. So that in the event of an outbreak of hostilities, according to the recorded plan which is here in evidence, that fleet was supposed to go on the offensive immediately?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. That meant air cover, did it not?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And when Pearl Harbor happened the plans had to be completely revised and instead of an offensive war it became a defensive war; isn’t that true?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. Did any of the war plans, so far as you know, contemplate an attack on Pearl Harbor?

General Short. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. Keefe. Of course, I assume, General Short, that you were training personnel out there at Honolulu all the while you were there in various games of one kind or another designed to protect that island?

General Short. That is correct.

[8671] Mr. Keefe. You knew that Pearl Harbor and the Island of Oahu was a vital thing in our war games and plans as far as the Pacific area was concerned?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. Now, radar has been mentioned here repeatedly. You were pretty young and pretty new in the radar field at the time of the 7th of December, weren’t you?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. The fact of the matter is you only had about two people out there that knew much of anything about it, isn’t that true?

General Short. We had had two and three more arrived and became available the day before the attack.

Mr. Keefe. In fact, you had sent a couple of men to the mainland to sort of get some instructions a short time before December 7, hadn’t you?

General Short. That is right. They had just gotten back.
Mr. Keefe. They had gone there with the full knowledge of Washington and practically on instructions from Washington to get some knowledge about this radar business?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And what you were trying to do was to train as many men as you could in the use of such facilities as you had?


Mr. Keefe. Isn’t that true?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Well, the utilization of the radar then, as I understand it, in view of the attitude that no one expected any attack out there at Pearl Harbor, was more largely based upon the desire for training than it was the expectation that they would intercept Jap planes coming into an attack that nobody expected would ever occur out there, am I correct in that assumption?

General Short. You are correct.

Mr. Keefe. Admiral Kimmel has testified that he was compelled to indulge in large-scale training activities because his fleet was being depleted constantly of trained personnel for transfers to other theaters. Did you know that that was taking place?

General Short. I think I did.

Mr. Keefe. Did you transfer any troops from your command in the fall of 1941 to other theaters?

General Short. Trained crews for the B-17’s.

Mr. Keefe. Yes. Now, you were training those crews out there, were you not?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You couldn’t ship B-17’s out to the Philippines without trained operating and ground crews, could you?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. And you were busy training those crews as fast as the B-17’s would come in, to take them on and ferry them out to the Philippines?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. And that is where the emphasis was being placed, to get those bombers out to the Philippines?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, General Short, how in the world could you have put your command on a No. 3 alert without disclosing your intent?

General Short. It was impossible.

Mr. Keefe. Well, I agree with you.

The military installations on Oahu, which is a very small island, some of them are right next door to the biggest hotel there, isn’t that true?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. Right near the public parks?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, if you went on an all-out alert it would mean more than just having a few people running around with steel helmets and a little field equipment, would it not?

General Short. It would.
Mr. Keefe. It would mean putting up barbed wire entanglements, it would mean stretching signal wires around and putting up emergency signal equipment, would it not?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. It would mean the complete control of the life of that island so far as black-outs and all that sort of thing was concerned.

General Short. I could not have exercised complete control over the civil population until martial law was put into effect, but it would have been control so far as the Governor could have complied with my wishes.

Mr. Keefe. Now, I am wondering if I am correct in my thinking that here is some 135,000 Japanese with a tremendous number of loyal Japanese but an unknown number of disloyal Japanese. You had that problem before you constantly, did you not?

General Short. We did.

Mr. Keefe. And you could not tell what would happen in the event of a rupture of diplomatic relations between this country and Japan so far as that overwhelming Japanese population out there was concerned?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. Now, that was well known to the War Department at all times here and everybody connected with it, wasn't [8675] it?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. So this question of sabotage and espionage became a highly important thing so far as Oahu was concerned?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, when they sent you this message that said you should take a reconnaissance and such other defensive measures as you deem necessary, you explained the failure of reconnaissance by reason of the fact that you had a written contract with the Navy which was approved by the War and Navy Departments, and you say that General Marshall thoroughly understood that, in your opinion?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And that whoever wrote that message in his absence apparently had overlooked the fact that that was a Navy responsibility, is that your answer?

General Short. That is my answer.

Mr. Keefe. And that when it says "other defensive measures," measures against sabotage and espionage would be those other defensive measures, would they not?

General Short. To me they appeared the most important.

Mr. Keefe. Now, you had a chief of staff. Was it Colonel Phillips?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Was he a colonel or a major?

General Short. He was a colonel.

Mr. Keefe. You requested that he be assigned to you as your chief of staff, did you not?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. You made that request of General Marshall when you were appointed?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. When did he get out there?
General Short. About March 1.
Mr. Keeffe. Who was the chief of staff prior to the time that Colonel Phillips arrived?
Mr. Keeffe. When did Colonel Hayes retire as chief of staff?
General Short. I believe it was effective November 5, but I think he had been on leave of absence for a few days before that.
Mr. Keeffe. Well, I do not quite understand that, General. You say that Colonel Phillips was sent out there to be your chief of staff in March, but Colonel Hayes continued out there until about the 5th of November.
General Short. I was understood that Phillips was to become chief of staff upon the expiration of the tour of Colonel Hayes and the time, the interim was used to put Colonel Phillips through all the sections of the general staff to familiarize him with conditions.
Mr. Keeffe. So that he would have full knowledge when he actually assumed the responsibilities of chief of staff?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. So that he actually did not perform as chief of staff until some time, you think, in—
General Short. The last part of October, the last few days of October.
Mr. Keeffe. When the commission came through ordering Hayes back?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. He was an experienced man, was he not?
General Short. He was an unusually experienced man on field work and training.
Mr. Keeffe. Did he talk Chinese?
General Short. I think so. He has been since that time the senior liaison officer with the Sixth Chinese Army, with 300 officers under him, one down to each battalion and I believe that the rating of that Sixth Army, from talking with American officers, was extremely high, perhaps the best of the Chinese armies.
Mr. Keeffe. Well, your chief of staff continued on after this debacle at Pearl Harbor?
General Short. Yes, sir; he continued. The War Department had ordered Colonel Collins over there to become chief of staff and General Emmons asked him to stay as deputy chief of staff. He remained on for almost a year and at his own request was relieved as he desired to get more active service.
Mr. Keeffe. Now, in this line of command you had a staff?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. Kimmel had a staff?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. You each had your chief of staff?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. And you had your chiefs of various departments of your layout out there?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. Now in the line of command it was the responsibility of the commanding general to issue an order to his chief of staff and
it went on from him down through to the various other elements that
would be affected by that order?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Is that correct?

[8679] General Short. That is the normal way.

Mr. Keefe. That is a normal method of doing business, is it not?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And in connection with your determinations, they were
your determinations and your orders when issued, but on vital matters
were they the result of the combined action of your staff?

General Short. I could go to them for advice but the responsibility
was definitely mine no matter under what circumstances I made the
decision. I could not pass the responsibility to them because they
participated.

Mr. Keefe. Oh, I understand that thoroughly, but the point is you
are the president of this corporation out there and you have got a
board of directors as your staff and you sit in staff meetings and talk
these things over, isn't that true?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. And you as the president have to make the ultimate
decision.

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. Did you ever have a situation where you and your staff
disagreed on anything of great importance?

General Short. I don't think we did.

[8680] Mr. Keefe. Did you have a telephone out there that you
could call Washington?

General Short. I had what we called a scrambler phone and Gen-
eral Marshall had one in his office.

Mr. Keefe. Did you ever use it?

General Short. I did.

Mr. Keefe. How long did it take to get a message through normally
from Honolulu to Washington here using that scrambler telephone
business?

General Short. The times I used it I would say 10 or 15 minutes.
On the morning of the attack, along about 8:15 I directed Colonel
Phillips to call General Marshall because I was going to my field
command post and I believe that he got the connection at 8:22. I
think it took 7 minutes.

Mr. Keefe. In other words, do I understand that that morning
right while the attack was going on Colonel Phillips called General
Marshall on the scrambler telephone and got a connection in about
7 minutes?

General Short. And told him if he would listen he could hear the
bombs. The attack was still going on.

Mr. Keefe. I might also say in that connection that I was advised
by Mr. Hoover when Mr. Gearhart and I talked with him that Mr.
Shivers, his agent out there, called him when he was up in New York
and got a direct telephone connection [8681] in just a few
minutes right while the attack was going on and he heard the bombs
dropping over the telephone.

Well, if you could get the telephone message while this attack was
going on in just a few minutes there wouldn't be any reason why the
line was not clear so a message could come from the other way, from Washington to Honolulu, is there?

General Short. There wouldn't appear to be.

Mr. Keefe. Now I would like to get some idea about the use of this other means of communication out there. Wasn't there radio communication?

General Short. The Army had a 10-kilowatt station and the Navy had a 25-kilowatt station; the FBI had a station, I think it was quite a good deal more powerful than the Army. I am not sure whether it was 25 or what. And there was also a commercial radiogram and commercial cable.

Mr. Keefe. These radiograms back and forth, did you use the Army set-up frequently?

General Short. I think they always used it when it was not overloaded and when the atmospheric conditions were such that the 10-watt system would go through.

Mr. Keefe. Well, do you know whether any investigation has ever been made to see what the atmospheric conditions were that morning as to whether or not they could use this radio as a means of communication?

[8682] General Short. I have heard— I did not know it at the time— I have heard since that they did have some trouble getting through with that 10-kilowatt system that morning.

Mr. Keefe. Well, do you know about the Navy or the FBI?

General Short. I am sure that they could have gotten through.

Mr. Keefe. I recall the testimony here that at the time they were considering the question of sending this message on the morning of December 7 in General Marshall's office, I think I recall that somebody suggested that Admiral Stark offered the use of the Navy radio.

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. And it was not used. Well, now, supposing you had been called on the telephone, or supposing a telephone call had been put in here that morning by somebody when the Japanese fourteenth part message and the short message of instruction was received, decoded and translated and in clean form some time between 7 and 8 o'clock that morning, would you have been aroused from your slumbers that morning or somebody out there to answer a telephone if one had come through?

General Short. We had an officer on the general staff on duty all night along right by the phone and there would have been no difficulty in getting anyone. He could have [8682] gotten me within a minute or two.

Mr. Keefe. Well, the story has gone around the country that you were all drunk out there that night; that you were drunk and that Kimmel was drunk and everybody else was drunk and that everybody was asleep out there at Pearl Harbor sleeping off a jag. That is the way it has been told out around the country. Now, is there any truth in that, General Short?

General Short. There is absolutely no truth in it. If I may add one thing——

Mr. Keefe. Go ahead.

General Short. To show that the War Department, if they were not conscious at that time that more than one means of communication
could be used, they became fully conscious at the time they issued the order to relieve me. I got that order three different ways within 30 to 40 minutes. I received a radiogram first. Ten or fifteen minutes later General Enmons got off a plane with a printed order. Fifteen or twenty minutes later the secretary of the general staff called Colonel Philips to ask if I had received the order.

Mr. Keefe. So you got it in—
General Short. In three different ways.
Mr. Keefe (continuing). In three different ways?
Mr. Keefe. To make sure that you got it?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Well, now, General Short, to be perfectly frank and candid, you have told us where you were that night?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. You were not expecting an attack at all?
General Short. No, sir.
Mr. Keefe. You had your various members of your establishment at their respective duties that night the same as they had been?
General Short. Yes, sir, and my chief of staff at midnight, owing to the fact that we were expecting the B-17's in from Hamilton Field, went over to headquarters and checked up to find out whether any additional information had been received in regard to them. I know my chief of staff was at our headquarters as late as midnight the night before.

Mr. Keefe. You had no notice whatsoever of this intercept of the first thirteen parts of the fourteen part message and no knowledge whatsoever until after the attack of the receipts of the short message or anything else?
General Short. Seven hours after the attack.
Mr. Keefe. As evidence of the fact, if I understand your statement correctly, General Short, when the attack did take [8685] place and your all-out alert was ordered the men did do a remarkably splendid job of defense?
General Short. They did it with great rapidity and precision. Every man knew exactly his job and it went into effect extremely rapidly.
Mr. Keefe. It was too late.
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. I was a little intrigued by the questions that were asked this morning by Senator Ferguson with respect to the difficulties which were encountered out there due to not only duplication of or, rather, separation of command but also the intervention of a third governmental unit in the picture, namely, the Interior Department, which had to be dealt with in the matter of securing permission to erect military installations out there and I think you testified that it took nearly a year to get permission to erect some installations for radar equipment on Government-owned land, part of the parks system, under the supervision of the Interior Department.
General Short. About 10 months.
Mr. Keefe. About 10 months. In the face of possibilities of an attack in Hawaii?
General Short. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Now, General Short, there has been a tremendous amount of information given to the American people with [8686] respect to a Colonel Clausen and a Hans Wilhelm Rohl, who were in charge of Army construction out there in Hawaii. Now, I do not want to go into that because that would take all next week.

The Vice Chairman. You mean Colonel Wyman.

Mr. Keefe. Wyman, that is right. I don't mean Clausen. I mean Colonel Wyman.

And the inference has been that due to certain failures of the Army engineers in making installations out there at Pearl Harbor the installations were delayed and, thus, as a result Pearl Harbor happened and all the damage was done.

Now I would like to ask you the flat, plain, square question: If you had had all the installations that were contemplated and that you had asked for and the operators of those installations were not alerted to use them, the best that you could have hoped for was to have minimized this attack rather than to have stopped it or prevented the damage which did actually occur; isn't that right?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. In other words, it doesn't make any difference how many guns you have if there is nobody to use them and if there is no ammunition in them; isn't that right?

General Short. That is true.

Mr. Keefe. It doesn't make any difference how many radar [8687] stations you have if there is nobody to use them or know how to use them, isn't that right?

General Short. That is true.

Mr. Keefe. So that all this question about the failure of installation or failure of installations, while it may be a very important subject for some further investigation, so far as its effect upon whether or not it contributed to bring about Pearl Harbor do you see any connection?

General Short. If we had had the information, if we had picked it up at 200 miles instead of 132 it would not have been time enough to do any more than disperse the planes. What we needed was information from Washington giving us time to go into an alert.

Mr. Keefe. Well, you could have done a pretty good job with the stuff you had out there if you had been on the alert and had been expecting an attack.

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You had some bombers and you had some planes that could have been in the air and the few that did get into the air did a pretty good job, didn't they?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And these slow torpedo planes that came in there and did most of the damage to the battleships in the harbor were pretty easy targets for your fast fighters, were [8688] they not?

General Short. If you knew where they were coming from they would have been very easy.

Mr. Keefe. Now, all during this war the element of surprise has been a thing that has been involved in almost everything that has been done on both sides out there in the Pacific, isn't that true?
General Short. All over the world. It is always the most important element.

Mr. Keefe. It is always the attempt on the part of a commander to involve his adversary in surprise, isn't that true?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. And as far as an air attack itself is concerned our experience has been that regardless of the fact whether an attack is known or not a lot of these planes—some of them, at least, get through and cause damage, isn't that true?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. That was true at Okinawa, is it not?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, when we think of the exploits at Midway and the magnificent job that our Navy did in sinking the Jap Navy, it was possible because of intelligence, was it not and the fact that our Navy was informed and had the facts and knew what to do?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. And when they shot down this Admiral Yamamoto that was possible because they got an intercept which put them on notice and gave them some information?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. I refer to those two incidents because it correctly illustrates the idea that intelligence is necessary and fundamental, is it not?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And when Intelligence fails you are liable to have serious results?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, your position in this case is that Intelligence, so far as Washington was concerned, failed?

General Short. A hundred percent.

Mr. Keefe. And thus Pearl Harbor occurred. Is that your defense?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. That is all.

The Chairman. Does counsel for General Short wish to ask any questions?

Lieutenant Colonel Karr. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

[8690] The Chairman. Counsel for the committee?

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. There are several questions I would like to ask.

Senator Lucas. I would like to ask a couple, too.

Senator Ferguson. Now, counsel, give me the ship movements exhibit, the intercepts on the ship movements. It is on page 22. On page 22 of that exhibit there is an intercept; I want to ask you about that. It is in Exhibit 2.

Lieutenant Colonel Karr. I am sorry. We do not have that.

Senator Ferguson. Exhibit 2, page 22. It has been referred to at times as the “light in the window” message. Are you familiar with that?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. It may have been a Paul Revere, it has been suggested here, but nobody was riding?

Are you familiar with that?
General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, if it appears in the testimony and from the evidence that that was translated in the rough by 1 o'clock on Saturday, the 6th, and that information had come to you, would that have made any difference to you? It is dated the third, from Honolulu (Kita) to Tokyo.

[3591] General Short. Unquestionably that would have given us some very definite information if we had had the message and knew how to read it.

Senator Ferguson. What I mean is if you could have had that information it would have indicated an attack on Hawaii, would it not?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. No doubt about that.

General Short. It shows a definite desire for detailed information of just exactly what our fleet is doing and is preparing to do.

Senator Ferguson. Now, there is another message on page 27. It is dated the 6th, from Honolulu to Tokyo, on page 27. That is the one that says:

No barrage balloons.

And then it says at the end:

I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage by a surprise attack against these places.

If that had been decoded and sent to you, or the information from it, would that have meant anything to you?

General Short. That would practically have meant a surprise attack was in store for us or was a certainty.

Senator Ferguson. There isn’t any doubt whatever that such [3692] a message, while not decoded, as shown by the instrument itself at the bottom, because it shows that it was decoded December 8 but it was sent on the 6th and therefore was intercepted on the 6th—if that information had come to you that would have, uncontradicted, have indicated a surprise attack on Oahu?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And would that alone have alerted you?

General Short. Very decidedly.

Senator Ferguson. Now, there was one other thing that I wanted to inquire about. Did you know about the General Carter Clarke report or investigation?

General Short. I never heard of it till some time after this committee met. I have since then read it. I think it probably was a month after this committee started meeting before I knew of the existence of this report.

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for that investigation by Carter Clarke after Clansen got through and we find a new investigation by Carter Clarke, Gen. Carter Clarke?

General Short. It is pretty difficult to say just what they were attempting to do. They were apparently wanting to find out exactly what every man holding an important position in G-2 would say about their so-called top secret material, magic and about their estimates, and so forth, and it was a [3693] very difficult report to get a hold of.

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Senator Ferguson. And do you know whether or not it indicated in any way that there had been an investigation by G–2 for the President and that there had been some changes made in it by General Marshall?

General Short. Somewhere—I have forgotten whether it was in that report or not, but somewhere I have run across something of that kind.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Isn't it fair to say that after reading it that there is a man named Friedman and several other witnesses and a General Spaulding and others who had some kind of a rumor going about that Marshall was supposed to have destroyed papers, and that was unequivocally, absolutely and positively contradicted?

Senator Ferguson. But there is also more in it. I think at some time Carter Clarke or General Clarke should appear and give us the reason for it, if there was a reason, but I am just asking you, General, what you know about it.

General Short. I know nothing except what the report states.

Senator Ferguson. That is all.

[8694] Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I want to ask just one question, if I may.

The Chairman. All right.

Mr. Keefe. Stories have gone about, been bandied about that you had your planes lined up on the apron wing-tip to wing-tip without any gasoline in them, without any ammunition, making a perfect target and a perfect set-up for the Japs to come in to spray with incendiary, bullets that demolished the whole works at one time, and that set-up there was likened to the story of the ships in the harbor like a lot of sitting ducks for the Japs to come in and shoot up.

That is the story.

Now, I would like to know whether or not under your provisions against sabotage, there were specific provisions made and orders given as to how the airplanes were to be fixed?

General Short. That is correct. General Burwell—Colonel Burwell then—

Mr. Keefe. Colonel who?

General Short. Burwell.

Mr. Keefe. Who is he?

General Short. He was a colonel in the Air Corps detached to make a study in connection with sabotage. He [8695] made a very extensive study and was absolutely insistent that the way to protect them was to place them close together where they could be guarded absolutely safely leaving the ammunition out of them, so if one was hit the ammunition would not explode.

I am quite sure that the gasoline was not removed. It was an element of danger to have gasoline in them, but the gasoline was in them, so the planes could be moved.

Mr. Keefe. In other words, then, the placing of the planes wing-tip to wing-tip on the aprons of the bunkers was in accordance with the practice that had been developed by the Air Corps representative out there, this Colonel Burwell?

General Short. That is correct.
Mr. Keefe. In his report?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. And that was considered after a long investigation and study to be the most effective manner of protecting those planes against the possibility incident to sabotage?

General Short. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. And you referred to the fact that some of the Navy planes, I believe over at Kaneohe were not so placed, and that they were the ones that really got damaged.

General Short. It just happened that the planes that were dispersed in the water were sunk, and a considerable number on the apron were saved.

Mr. Keefe. Those that were anchored were all shot and sunk?

General Short. They were all sunk.

Mr. Richardson. May I ask a question, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Richardson. General Short, the only difference there, so far as you are concerned, as to guarding the planes against sabotage, would have been whether you used a couple of hundred men if they were concentrated or 400 or 500 to guard them, if they were dispersed?

General Short. That is not correct. The bunkers for the planes at Wheeler Field, a very large percentage of them, were right along the highway where a man could have driven a truck along the highway and simply hurled a grenade into each bunker.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas. I desire to ask a question or two.

Following the thought that has just been discussed, I should like to ask you this question, General Short:

[8697] Your planes were lined up, most of them wing-tip to wing-tip under the sabotage-alert order, under which you were operating; is that correct?

General Short. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Now, I do not think the record is clear as to what position the Navy planes were in that were on the ground at that time.

General Short. At Kaneohe Bay the seaplanes were well dispersed, but they had on the apron a bunch of planes, or a group of planes that were bunched.

Now, I do not know the exact arrangement of their planes at Ford Island. I do happen to know it at Kaneohe Bay, but I do not know at Ford Island.

Senator Lucas. The record discloses that the Navy lost 102 planes and the Army lost 96 planes, and I have been at a loss to understand why the Navy lost more planes than the Army unless the Navy was also alerted to sabotage.

General Short. Their planes were dispersed. There is probably one reason. A plane that was anchored in the bay at Kaneohe was hit, sunk, and was a complete loss. Where they were hit on the runways, on the aprons, the men got in and pulled them out, even while the attack was going on, and a great many were saved that way.

Senator Lucas. Do you know whether or not any of [8698] the Navy planes were lined up wing-tip to wing-tip similar to the planes that you had?
General Short. I think that was true of Kaneohe Bay, and as to the other places, I do not know.

Senator Lucas. You made no inquiry about that afterwards?

General Short. If I had known, I have forgotten it. I do not know now.

Senator Lucas. I do not believe Admiral Kimmel was interrogated along that line. It does seem to me in view of his testimony, that that is somewhat important.

One other question. It is not clear in this record whether or not Admiral Kimmel knew that you were operating on the sabotage alert. What would you say about that?

General Short. I believe you will find in his testimony one place that he does make the statement that he did understand that I was on the sabotage alert, and I think he said some other things.

Mr. Keefe. That is in the record, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Lucas. I was under the impression that he said in one place that he did not know that he was on the sabotage alert, and in another part of the testimony that he thought he was on the sabotage alert.

General Short. I believe he made slight variations in his testimony. I would say that the Navy, the Navy staff, the staff of the Fourteenth Naval District definitely should have known, on account of their liaison officer, Lieutenant Burr, who knew exactly what was going on.

Senator Lucas. In other words, if Admiral Kimmel didn’t know you were on the sabotage alert, it was no fault of yours, because you gave that information definitely to his liaison man?

[8700] General Short. Yes, sir; I have the quotation here. Page 6985 of the transcript. Witness Kimmel:

I conferred with General Short on November 28 about the messages each of us had received on the 27th. We discussed these dispatches in all aspects. We considered, as we did frequently before and did later, the probabilities and possibilities of an air attack on Pearl Harbor. In this connection there was discussion of the effect of the suggestion from Washington that 50 Army pursuit planes be sent by aircraft carriers to Wake and Midway. I understood the Army was on an alert and that the alert was against sabotage, among other things, although I do not now recall General Short specifically mentioning the details of his alert.

Senator Lucas. Well, the morning you received the message from General Marshall and you alerted your command for sabotage, a short while thereafter, as I understand you did not directly tell Admiral Kimmel?

General Short. I sent a copy of the message to him.

Senator Lucas. You sent a copy of the message that you had alerted for sabotage through your Navy liaison man?

General Short. Yes, sir; I sent a copy of my message from the Chief of Staff.

Senator Lucas. One other question. On yesterday [8701] there was considerable controversy here between yourself and the committee with respect to court martials and Army and Navy inquiries and Army and Navy boards.

In order to clear up a cloud in my mind as to how they operate, I want to ask you whether or not there is any difference in the way an Army board operates and the way a Navy board operates insofar as it being a public affair?
General Short. The Navy board in this particular case was a court of inquiry. Now, I do not know under their regulations whether they can have a board that would operate just as the Army board did. They were both closed sessions—secret—but in the Navy court of inquiry the accused, so to speak, had the right to be present all the way through, hear all the witnesses and have counsel with him, and had the right of cross-examination.

Before the Army board I was not permitted to hear the evidence given by the other witnesses or to have counsel, except when I was personally giving my testimony.

Senator Lucas. The point I raise is whether or not there is a difference between the regulations of the Army and the Navy in an investigation of a question of this character.

General Short. I would rather an officer of the Judge Advocate General's Department answer that.

Senator Lucas. My conclusion upon it is that if the Navy has one set of regulations on an important matter of this kind, which permits an accused to come before that Board of inquiry with counsel and have the right to cross-examine witnesses, and the Army has a different system, which denies that very thing, it certainly is a question for consideration by the Congress, because I cannot see why you should be denied the right and Admiral Kimmel have the right. That is the point I make.

General Short. Yes, sir. It actually worked out that way. I don't know all the details of the law.

Senator Lucas. Now, General Short, the Congressman from Wisconsin and the Senator from Michigan have raised some questions about stories that have originated from time to time about what happened at Pearl Harbor, about the laxity here and the laxity there. I want to state that those are not the only stories that have originated about Pearl Harbor from time to time.

It has been alleged and reported by certain individuals as well as a segment of the press that members of this committee have sought to suppress certain evidence and in so doing have attempted to whitewash the real reason for this investigation. In answer specifically to a question [8703] submitted by Senator Ferguson you stated that this committee had given you every consideration and, as I understand it, you are perfectly satisfied with the fair and impartial treatment that you have received at the hands of this committee; is that correct?

General Short. That is correct, absolutely.

Senator Lucas. Do you know of any evidence that has been covered up, that has been suppressed, by any member of this committee, or by counsel for the committee, that would have in any wise affected your interest, or any other individual who is interested in this hearing?

General Short. I do not.

Senator Lucas. There have been a lot of investigations. I suppose you hope this is the last one?

General Short. As far as I am concerned.

The Chairman. Is that all?

Senator Lucas. Yes.

The Chairman. The Chair would like to ask this one question, General. I am not thoroughly familiar now with what your answer
was as to whether between the 3d of December and the 7th of December 1941 you had any conferences with Admiral Kimmel.

General Short. I did not.

The Chairman. That is the way I remembered it.


The Chairman. Now, this has nothing to do with what actually happened at Pearl Harbor, but the matter of your retirement and the communications between General Marshall and you. I am in doubt there, too.

I want to see if I can clear up something because it may affect your personal relations with General Marshall.

You had been relieved of your command at Pearl Harbor prior to the Roberts report?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. And you had returned to this country and were in Oklahoma City?

General Short. That is correct.

The Chairman. You saw in the morning paper accounts of the Roberts report and then you called General Marshall over the telephone?

General Short. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Did he tell you in that conversation that he had read the report?

General Short. He told me he had not read it.

The Chairman. You, seeing the report in the newspapers, probably thought over in your mind whether your continued active status in the Army would be embarrassing to the War Department and therefore you called up to inquire whether they desired you to ask for retirement: did that happen?

General Short. I thought both the country and my personal interest required a rather careful consideration, I had great confidence in General Marshall's judgment and his loyalty as an old friend, and that was the reason I called him and put the thing entirely in his own hands.

The Chairman. You told him in your conversation with him that you were going to write him and you would enclose a letter to the Adjutant General requesting retirement?

General Short. I do not believe that I told him in that conversation. I think probably after I hung up I decided it was fair to him to send it to him.

The Chairman. Throughout the conversation between General Marshall and you then he did not know and was not told that you were going to actually send your request for retirement to the Adjutant General?

General Short. He told me that he would take that conversation as an application for retirement if they got to the point where it looked like it was the thing to do.

The Chairman. And after you hung up you decided to put it in writing and make it formal?

General Short. Yes, sir; and I sent it to him personally.

The Chairman. Now, is there any other statement not brought out by any questions by counsel or members of the committee that you wish to make with reference to any further pertinent facts in regard to the Pearl Harbor attack?
General Short. I would like to make a very brief statement.

The Chairman. All right.

General Short. As a matter of the interests of the country and as a loyal soldier, I maintained a steadfast silence for 4 years and I bore the load of public censure during this time and I would have continued to bear it so long as I thought the question of national security was involved. However, the war is now ended and I have been very appreciative of the opportunity that has been given me here to make a full and frank statement of my point of view.

I want to thank all the members of the committee for the attitude that they have taken and I want to assure them that I have tried to give them fully and frankly all the information that I have on the subject.

The Chairman. The Chair might state that regardless of any conclusions that may be reached by the committee when the evidence is all in, in any report that it makes to the Congress, the Chair feels that one of the outstanding benefits of this hearing has been that the evidence has been brought forth in public and everybody has been given an opportunity to give to the committee and to the country whatever information they had. In all likelihood, regardless of what report the committee makes, the country will very probably have made up its own mind, and maybe before we do.

But there has been that benefit that has accrued by reason of this public hearing.

The committee thanks you, General, for your courtesy and patience in cooperating with us in attempting to bring out all the evidence. I hope you will soon completely recover your health.

General Short. Thank you very much.

The Chairman. You are excused.

(Witness excused.)

The Chairman. The committee will now go into executive session and the spectators will retire as promptly as possible.

(Whereupon, at 4:30 p.m., the committee recessed and went into executive session.)
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

President: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

I might state that Senator Barkley had to go to the White House this morning to attend the usual Monday morning conference. He will be in a little later. We will proceed.

Does counsel have anything before the next witness is called?

Mr. Richardson. No.

The Vice Chairman. The counsel will then call the next witness.

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, I desire to present to you for examination, Captain Zacharias.

The Vice Chairman. Will you please come forward, Captain Zacharias. Will you please be sworn.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ELLIS M. ZACHARIAS, UNITED STATES NAVY

(Captain Zacharias was duly sworn by the Vice Chairman.)

Mr. Richardson. Captain, how old are you?

Captain Zacharias. I am 56 years old.

Mr. Richardson. How long have you been in the Navy?

Captain Zacharias. I have completed over 37 years in the naval service.

Mr. Richardson. Were you a graduate of Annapolis?

Captain Zacharias. I was.

Mr. Richardson. What class?

Captain Zacharias. Class of 1912.

Mr. Richardson. Now, will you detail to the committee in a general way, what your Naval experience has been since?

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1 See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5511 et seq., for corrections in his testimony submitted by Capt. Zacharias.
Captain Zacharias. As I have said, I have completed over 37 years in the naval service. I served in or operated with all types of ships. I served aboard ship in all departments as head of the department.

I commanded destroyers, a heavy cruiser, and a battleship.

All of my shore duty with the exception of 1 year as instructor at the Naval Academy, and 1 year taking the senior course at the Naval War College, all of my work has been in intelligence on shore duty. That included 3½ years in Japan studying the language and the people; one tour in crypt-analytic work; two tours of about 2½ years each as head of the Far Eastern Division of Naval Intelligence; one tour of about 2½ years as District Intelligence Officer of the Eleventh Naval District with headquarters at San Diego, Calif.; and between my two war cruises, I have served 1 year as Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence. That gives a total of about 12 years actually in intelligence work on shore.

[8711] At sea, my spare time was devoted to study and matters relating to intelligence, and while at sea I actually participated in certain counter-espionage activities, and this gave me a direct and indirect connection with intelligence over a period of 25 years.

During the war, I had the good fortune to command two capital ships.

Mr. Richardson. Which war?

Captain Zacharias. The recent war. One of those was the heavy cruiser Salt Lake City, and the other was the battleship New Mexico. Both of these ships participated in many of the operations successfully in the Pacific and both of them are still afloat.

My most recent duty was that of conducting a psychological warfare campaign against the Japanese high command, which had for its objective the unconditional surrender of the Japanese without the necessity of a forced invasion of the Japanese main islands.

Mr. Richardson. Now, just before you go into that, did this intelligence work of yours, Captain, and your life in Japan, give you a Japanese acquaintance?

Captain Zacharias. It gave me an opportunity to make a very wide acquaintance in Japan, and I was fortunate in knowing intimately, many of the Japanese who in the last [8712] war became the Japanese high command.

Mr. Richardson. Did you learn the language?

Captain Zacharias. I did.

Mr. Richardson. Do you speak it fluently?

Captain Zacharias. I speak it very fluently.

Mr. Richardson. And it was that fact, plus your Intelligence experience that brought the assignment to you that you were about to relate when I interrupted you?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct.

[8713] Mr. Richardson. Now will you proceed.

Captain Zacharias. I think that just about concluded my work, except I was about to say that this objective, which was the unconditional surrender of Japan without the necessity of a forced invasion of the Japanese main islands, there was an indication of completion of that on the 25th of July, 1945, in a broadcast by an official spokesman of the Japanese Government direct to me, and, as we know, the situation eventuated on the 15th of August 1945.
Mr. Richardson. Now did your experience with the Navy take you into Hawaiian waters?

Captain Zacharias. It did quite often.

Mr. Richardson. And were you familiar with Hawaii and the general conditions and set-up in Hawaii?

Captain Zacharias. I was.

Mr. Richardson. With the character of the people there and the Japanese element involved in the population?

Captain Zacharias. I was, both the second generation Japanese, that is Americans of Japanese extraction, and also the first generation of Japanese who were enemy aliens after the war began.

Mr. Richardson. During 1941 were you in service in the Pacific?

Captain Zacharias. I was in command of the heavy cruiser [8714] Salt Lake City.

Mr. Richardson. And was that a part of the Pacific Fleet?

Captain Zacharias. It was.

Mr. Richardson. Then you were stationed, a portion of the time at least, at Pearl Harbor?

Captain Zacharias. I was.

Mr. Richardson. Are you acquainted with Admiral Kimmel?

Captain Zacharias. I am, sir.

Mr. Richardson. And with his Chief of Staff, Admiral Smith?

Captain Zacharias. I am.

Mr. Richardson. It was brought to the attention of the committee, Captain, that a conversation occurred between you and Admiral Kimmel during 1941 in which it is reported reference was made to the probability, possibility, likelihood of a Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

Now I would like to ask you whether any such conversation occurred, where it occurred, when it occurred, and who was present.

Captain Zacharias. I think it will add something to the conversation by indicating the reasons for the conversation.

Mr. Richardson. Was there such a conversation?

Captain Zacharias. There was such a conversation.

[8715] Mr. Richardson. When did it take place about?

Captain Zacharias. It took place between March 26 and March 31, 1941.

Mr. Richardson. Where was it?

Captain Zacharias. In the office of the commander in chief, United States Fleet, Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. Richardson. At Pearl Harbor?

Captain Zacharias. At Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Richardson. Who was present at the conversation?

Captain Zacharias. Admiral Kimmel and his chief of staff, then Capt. W. W. Smith, now Vice Admiral Smith.

Mr. Richardson. They were old acquaintances of yours?

Captain Zacharias. I had known them both previously.

Mr. Richardson. Now if you will proceed.

Captain Zacharias. As I indicated, it will have some bearing to tell the reasons why I went over to see Admiral Kimmel on this occasion. On the 8th of February 1941, I had a long conversation with Admiral Nomura in San Francisco. He was then enroute to Washington, D. C., as Ambassador.
The Vice Chairman. From Japan?

Captain Zacharias. From Japan.

Mr. Richardson. Was he one of the ambassadors who thereafter conducted, in part, the negotiations that took place with Secretary Hull?

[8716] Captain Zacharias. He was.

Mr. Richardson. Proceed.

Captain Zacharias. I had indicated previously to Admiral Richardson that I proposed to have such a conversation with Admiral Nomura when he came through San Francisco, and Admiral Richardson expressed a desire to have a copy of the report which he knew I would submit after such a conversation, and for that reason, after Admiral Richardson was relieved on the first of February 1941 by Admiral Kimmel, I sent to Admiral Kimmel on the 11th of February 1941, in a letter to Admiral Kimmel, a copy of the report on this conference with Admiral Nomura that I had sent to Admiral Stark.

When I arrived in Pearl Harbor with my ship after an overhaul period on the west coast I took the first opportunity to see Admiral Kimmel, and it occurred between the dates that I gave.

Mr. Richardson. Now, why did you want to see Admiral Kimmel?

Captain Zacharias. I wanted to see Admiral Kimmel to find out if he had received the report, or whether or not this report of the conversation with Admiral Nomura had come to his attention. In addition to that I wanted to tell Admiral Kimmel of an incident which occurred on the [8717] 16th of October 1940, which had a bearing on future events as I saw them approaching.

Incidentally, I think what I am about to relate was referred to as having caused Admiral Richardson to take his fleet out on a wild goose chase. I would like to clarify that point now by saying that this incident had no effect, as far as I could see, on influencing Admiral Richardson in any decision that he was to make as a result of it, which you will see from the incident itself.

On October 16, 1940, as district intelligence officer at San Diego, I received a report from an intelligence reserve officer at the border, Tia Juana, or at San Jacinto opposite Tia Juana in Mexico, that he had something of the most vital importance and if I could not come down myself he requested that I send one of my best investigators. I could not go myself at that time, therefore I did select my most competent investigator to go down and find out what this was.

When he arrived this reserve officer related to him information that had just come from an informant in Mexico which stated that a certain Japanese—who, incidentally, was on our No. 1 suspect list—had stated that on the following day, the 17th of October 1940, the Japanese were going to bomb four battleships. He had all the details, that it would be done by a force of 12 planes divided into [8718] four groups, one of whom in each group was to be a suicide plane and dive down the stack of each ship, and the other two would drop their bombs and get away, if possible.

When this report came to me I took it in to the commandant of the district, and simultaneously I learned that Admiral Richardson had arrived on the west coast, at San Pedro, with three battleships and a heavy cruiser, indicating the four ships in this picture.

Mr. Richardson. Where is San Pedro?
Captain Zacharias. San Pedro is the seaport of Los Angeles.

We notified Admiral Richardson that there was something of importance and requested that he remain on board while I came up by plane, which I did. I went aboard, related the story to Admiral Richardson, and he said, "Are there any planes in this vicinity which might carry out such an attack?" I informed him that we could not assure him that there were not planes in Mexico, and further that there had been surreptitious activities along the coast by the Japanese vessels that we knew of, but we were not certain that there were not planes in Mexico with which the Japanese could carry out such an attack.

Admiral Richardson considered that and then said, "We cannot ignore this." And I said, "Admiral, I think you are [8719] quite right." He said, "I will alert my antiaircraft batteries, and when you return to San Diego you get in touch with Captain McCain," who was then the commanding officer at the naval air station at San Diego—"and tell him to be on the alert." I did that. I understand that the following morning Admiral Richardson sailed from San Pedro for San Francisco, where he was going anyhow, and possibly left a little before the time of his scheduled departure.

I told Admiral Kimmel that full situation.

[8720] Mr. Richardson. Did you see Admiral Kimmel then at the place you mentioned earlier in your testimony?

Captain Zacharias. I did. As indicated, Admiral Kimmel then called in Captain Smith, and I proceeded to relate the circumstances of my interview with Admiral Nomura. He informed me he had received a copy of my report sent to Admiral Stark, and then I proceeded to tell him of this incident on the 16th of October 1940. From that he went into a discussion of the general Japanese situation, the possibilities of what might occur in the future, Japanese attitudes, and the prospects of this situation being liquidated.

Mr. Richardson. What do you mean by that, "liquidated"?

Captain Zacharias. The situation which then existed between Japan and the United States, for which Admiral Nomura had come over to this country to handle if possible.

Mr. Richardson. By the word "liquidated" you mean settled?

Captain Zacharias. Settled; right.

Mr. Richardson. Go ahead.

Captain Zacharias. In the course of our discussions, Admiral Kimmel asked me if the situation became extreme what I thought would occur. And this point is very important, because I think of a misunderstanding that has been created [8727] by something which has been said here about the date December 7 having been the date which I predicted.

First I would like to say that December 7 is a synonym for Pearl Harbor particularly in the memorandum which I later submitted to Admiral Draemel for Admiral Nimitz.

This conversation with Admiral Kimmel was 9 months before Pearl Harbor, and I don’t think there is any profession which would attempt to predict 9 months ahead the exact day that something would occur. I told Admiral Kimmel in this conversation that if the situation became such that Japan decided that they must go to war with us, that it would begin with an air attack on our fleet on a week-end and probably a Sunday morning; that attack would be for the purpose of disabling four battleships.
Mr. Richardson. Why did you mention four battleships rather than three or five or seven?

Captain Zacharias. Four battleships was a number that I had determined in my own mind as the number that the Japanese felt they would have to reduce our fleet in order to prevent effective interference with any southern movement that they might want to make after declaring war with us. I will go into more detail on that later.

Admiral Kimmel then asked me how I thought they would effect such an attack. I said there are two methods, the least likely of which would be to bring in seaplanes, surreptitiously aboard merchant vessels, and land them in the lee of some of our islands that were sparsely populated and then on a selected day, weather permitting, they could make such an attack.

He asked how that could be prevented. I said that could be prevented effectively by declaring a defensive sea area around the Hawaiian Islands, in which case you notify all nations of the world and require all merchant vessels coming into that area to proceed through a specified point at which place we could conduct inspections. That would preclude any surreptitious entrance and prevent such a contingency of an attack by that method.

However, I emphasized that the most probable method of attack would be by aircraft carriers supported by appropriate ships; that such an attack would come in undoubtedly from the northern because that was the prevailing winds in the Hawaiian Islands; they would come in and launch their attack downwind, because of their concern over the possible loss of a single capital ship and for that reason after launching their planes, the ships and the force which brought the planes to launch them would retreat as quickly as possible directly upwind in order to escape any damage which they felt might come.

Mr. Richardson. Was there discussion as to where this supposed expedition would start from?

Captain Zacharias. There was not. I would like to indicate at this point that although this conversation was 9 months prior to the actual attack on Pearl Harbor, it lasted for about an hour and a half, and concerned something in which the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet would be vitally interested. However, I realize that Admiral Kimmel was a very busy man, that I was only one of hundreds to whom he talked, and it was quite possible that he could not remember the details of my conversation.

However, his chief of staff, then Captain Smith, was present throughout the entire conversation, and I am sure that he remembers the details of that conversation, because he has discussed those details subsequent to the event, and for a considerable period after Pearl Harbor occurred.

Mr. Richardson. Why did you think the attack would come on Sunday morning?

Captain Zacharias. I think it has been clearly indicated that the Japanese knew of our every movement in and out of Pearl Harbor, the situation existing in Hawaii prior to the attack on December 7. They well knew that on Sunday morning everyone took advantage of the lack of drills to be excused from reporting in on Sunday morning. We call it being excused from Sunday morning quarters.
So that they would not have to report on that day. That applies to officers and men, and particularly to those who have families in Hawaii, in Honolulu.

Mr. Richardson. Well—

Captain Zacharias. I might add there that Sunday morning is a time when everyone is enjoying their leisure and it is significant that 8 o'clock in the morning, which was approximately the time of the attack, at 8 o'clock. That is the time when the watches change, when men are relieving others who have been on watch, and there is a certain amount of confusion existing at that time in the turn-overs which take place.

Mr. Richardson. You spoke of Japanese knowledge in Hawaii. Was it a matter, Captain, of common knowledge in the Navy that there was present in Hawaii a large number of Japanese agents?

Captain Zacharias. It was. In my conversations, and I must say that I kept in constant touch with not only the fleet intelligence officer, but also with the district intelligence officers, because I had a hand in setting up that organization beginning with my arrival there November 13, 1940. Therefore, I had a direct interest in that organization and what they were accomplishing. It was believed that there existed in Hawaii at least a thousand enemy agents.

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, do you know of anywhere that you have served, where the operations of a military force of either the Army or the Navy was subject to as concentrated an espionage as our establishment in Hawaii?

Captain Zacharias. I do not, and there is no other place comparable except in Panama where there was an unusually large group of Japanese barber shops before Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Richardson. Now, in this conversation, Captain, that you had with Admiral Kimmel, were the details of the reasons why you thought there would be an attack discussed between you?

Captain Zacharias. Only in a general way, but I think the reasons why I thought there would be an attack on the fleet if the situation became such that war between Japan and the United States was imminent, I think that those reasons have a great bearing on everything that is before this committee.

Mr. Richardson. Was there any discussion on the part of Admiral Kimmel in agreement with or opposition to your views?

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir. After outlining to him the probabilities and the methods by which the Japanese would make their attacks, in the second instance that of an attack by aircraft carriers, Admiral Kimmel asked me how I thought it could be prevented, and I stated that the only possible way of doing it would be to have a daily patrol out to cover the approach of the Japanese, and this patrol must go out at least 500 miles.

To that Admiral Kimmel replied, "Well, we have neither the personnel nor the matériel with which to carry out such a patrol," and I replied to him, "Well, Admiral, you better get them because that is what is coming."

Mr. Richardson. Do you, as a naval man know of any other way in which such an attack could be effectively guarded against than through distant patrol and discovery of the attacking planes either in carriers, or in the air, and an attack on those planes by fighter planes?
Chairman. Only by learning of the approach of such a force and intercepting it with the fleet.

Mr. Richardson. Where were you at the time of the attack?

Captain Zacharias. I was in command of the Salt Lake City which was then 200 miles west of Oahu returning to [8727] Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Richardson. Now—go ahead.

Captain Zacharias. I was with Admiral Halsey’s force which had been to Wake Island to deliver the planes to the marines.

Mr. Richardson. Between the time of this conversation with Admiral Kimmel, and the attack, were there any other discussions between you and any of the staff officers, or task commanders with respect to the probability of an attack on Hawaii from the air?

Captain Zacharias. There was.

Mr. Richardson. I want to know whether it was a matter of general conversation, or simply a vague possibility?

Captain Zacharias. There was. As I indicated while on sea duty, I devoted myself to reading and study of intelligence matters. For that reason I frequented the fleet intelligence office. The fleet intelligence officer, then Commander Layton, I knew well, and I had recommended him to Admiral Richardson for that job which he did in an excellent manner.

[8728] In my visits to the fleet intelligence office and the public relations office I was enabled to keep track on the situation as it was developing and there came a period when I was somewhat concerned over the prospects. That is what prompted me to say at one time to a group of the staff assembled, I can’t recall just who was present at the time——

Mr. Richardson. Where was it?

Captain Zacharias. In the office of the commander in chief Pacific Fleet, the flag office.

I was prompted to say, as recorded in this memorandum which has been presented to the committee, that “I think it is time to stop these surprise inspections and get ready for a surprise attack.” These surprise inspections were methods by which the matériel conditions of the ships were ascertained without giving previous notice of visits by either division commanders or others.

Mr. Richardson. Was there any rejoinder to that remark on your part from those present?

Captain Zacharias. There was not. In the course of those conversations I asked the fleet intelligence officer if he had presented to the war plans officer of the commander in chief a certain extract from a Japanese book which considered the pros and cons of success of an attack on Pearl [8729] Harbor. That is included in one of the papers that were presented to the committee by the Navy Department and I would like to refer to that later on. It is page 47 of the papers.

Senator Lucas. What is the date of that conversation, sir?

Captain Zacharias. That was in October 1941. I will bring that in when I discuss the reasons for my belief that an attack on Pearl Harbor would occur.

Mr. Richardson. Between the time you had your first talk with Admiral Kimmel and the time you had this talk in the fall of 1941
was the subject of a possible air attack on Pearl Harbor a matter of common or unusual discussion among the Navy people that you met in Hawaii?

Captain Zacharias. Because of my—

Mr. Richardson. Was it or not?

Captain Zacharias. There was general discussion of what would occur if we went to war with Japan.

Mr. Richardson. Was there any general feeling that an attack, an air attack, surprise air attack was possible or probable or likely or improbable?

Captain Zacharias. There was not much expression of opinion. It was rather an acceptance of my opinion because of my background knowledge and any discussion was for the purpose of ascertaining what I thought in the premises, and [8730] I cannot recall any objections to them or any attempt to belittle the possibilities.

Mr. Richardson. Was there any discussion at any time prior to the attack between you and the other commanders of the task forces about the probability of an attack by air on Hawaii in the case of hostilities?

Captain Zacharias. There was not. I was a little reluctant to impose my views here and there. I think most of the officers present knew of my background and if the task force commanders wanted any opinion from me they could ask for it.

I discussed with Admiral Spruance, who was my division commander when I was in command of the Salt Lake City, the possibilities of the success of Admiral Nomura in preventing hostilities developing between Japan and the United States.

Mr. Richardson. Did you believe he would be successful?

Senator Brewster. I don’t believe he had finished his answer.

Mr. Richardson. Pardon me. Proceed.

Captain Zacharias. In these conversations with Admiral Spruance there was nothing very definite. There was nothing definite regarding what would happen if we went to war. It was more with regard to the possible success of preventing war. Outside of that I did not talk to any task force commanders.

[8732] I might say that I did at one time, or on several occasions, endeavor to engage in conversation the war plans officer of the commander in chief regarding the situation. On three separate occasions I endeavored to do so, but he was always preoccupied and I was never able to do so. It seemed rather strange to me at the time that he did not want to discuss it, so much so that I went to the fleet intelligence officer and questioned him about the attitude of this individual.

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, may I ask at this point: Who was the war plans officer, by name?

Captain Zacharias. That was then Capt. C. H. McMorris, United States Navy, now Vice Admiral McMorris.

As a result of what I took to be in the colloquial a “brush-off,” I never discussed the situation with him although he was the war plans officer for the commander in chief.

The next time I discussed this with someone whom I considered of importance was with Mr. Munson. I had—

Mr. Richardson. Just a minute. He was a civilian?

Captain Zacharias. He was a civilian, and who had come to Hawaii with a letter signed by Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations,
which he showed to me, Munson showed to me, stating that he was there to investigate certain matters and everything was to be opened up to him.

Munson told me that he had been advised to get in touch with me because of my background knowledge of the Japanese. I had several conferences with him during the period of October 20 to 26, 1941, and during those conversations I related to him every aspect of a possible attack. He was principally interested in whether or not there would be an armed uprising in Hawaii or on the west coast in case of a war between Japan and the United States.

After relating to him everything that I had told to Admiral Kimmel I told him that he could forget about an armed uprising or sabotage of any kind, that was categorical, because it would begin with an air attack on our fleet, and for that reason it would have to be conducted with the greatest secrecy and therefore no Japanese, regardless of their position in the United States or in Hawaii, would be aware of the fact that such an attack was coming.

That being so, and knowing the great preparations that you have to make in an armed uprising or for the commission of sabotage, those contingencies were an impossibility, and I told him that I was convinced that hostilities would begin with an air attack on the fleet.

Mr. Richardson. Now, Captain, during the period immediately before the attack, do you know what distant reconnaissance was being carried on of your own knowledge?

Captain Zacharias. I do not.

Mr. Richardson. You were with Halsey's task force?

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. And your task force was ready for battle from the time you started up to the time of the attack, was it not?

Captain Zacharias. You mean from the date we left Pearl Harbor on the 28th of November 1941?

Mr. Richardson. That is right.

Captain Zacharias. We received no direct orders from Admiral Halsey, but the fleet went out ostensibly on routine training on that morning. About noon we changed course to the westward and headed for Wake Island. That was not the direction of the operating area and we knew that we were going on a different mission.

As I recall, Admiral Halsey did not send out any specific orders to the ships of his course, at least to the cruisers, because there was no necessity. He had full knowledge undoubtedly of what might be impending and I assume that he was in a position to make any dispositions necessary to meet any threat that we might encounter en route or returning from Wake Island. I knew that something unusual was occurring but was not quite certain. We did learn en route [8734] that, through signal, that we were going to Wake Island to deliver planes to the Marines which the Enterprise had on board, that we would launch them about 100 miles east of Wake Island and then return to Pearl Harbor. We were originally scheduled to arrive back in Pearl Harbor on the 5th of December 1941, but we were delayed by fueling and weather, and, now I know because of certain orders, which did not speed us up, and we felt that was where our luck began because we were just 200 miles to the westward instead of being inside on December 7.
Mr. Richardson. Do you regard that as good luck or bad luck?

Captain Zacharias. I regard that as good luck because as a commanding officer of a ship I prefer to take my chances in the open sea rather than in an enclosed harbor.

Mr. Richardson. Now, can you give us a little more information on certain orders that you later discovered had been transmitted, who transmitted them and what they were, generally?

Captain Zacharias. What orders?

Mr. Richardson. You just said that you learned afterward of certain orders which delayed you. I am wondering what those orders were.

Captain Zacharias. Oh, that is only hearsay and what I have heard of the testimony before this committee.

Mr. Richardson. I see. When knowledge of the attack came to you in fact the direction in which you were directed to search was to the south, was it not?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Did that surprise you?

Captain Zacharias. It did. I might qualify that by saying that in the numerous reports that we were receiving subsequent to the attack it was indicated that there was a Japanese force down to the southward, but still I could not reconcile them being there.

Mr. Richardson. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Captain Zacharias. If I may, I indicated that I felt it important to present the reasons why I thought an attack on Pearl Harbor or the fleet would occur.

Mr. Richardson. Very well. Let me ask you preparatory to that, Captain, did you consider that the tension of the situation with the probability of war with Japan constantly increased during 1941?

Captain Zacharias. It did.

Mr. Richardson. And was there any time that it was as tense as it was during the week before the attack?

Captain Zacharias. I had, the week before the attack, having sailed on the 28th of November, which seems to have been the really turning point in the situation, I received very little news en route to Wake Island except through radio press, which indicated that there had been some difficulty in the progress of the negotiations taking place in Washington.

However, I had become somewhat concerned over certain events which had transpired in the interim or during 1941, such as the embargo and other things which were matters of policy.

Mr. Richardson. Now, as the tenseness grew in your mind and with your experience did the danger of an air attack become greater and greater, as the tenseness continued?

Captain Zacharias. No, because I was always convinced that if the situation ever became such that hostilities between Japan and the United States were imminent that the Japanese would begin their campaign with an air attack on our fleet wherever it was.

Mr. Richardson. What I am suggesting is that the condition of affairs, the information you had, growing tenseness of the situation, constantly made that danger greater?

Captain Zacharias. It did not make the danger of an air attack any greater. It made the danger of hostilities become more imminent.
Mr. Richardson. As hostilities became more imminent the danger of an air attack increased?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. No further questions.

Captain Zacharias. Now may I go ahead with the reasons why I thought that there would be an air attack?

Senator Lucas. Will you move closer to the microphone, please.

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.

There were four very good reasons why I felt that in case of hostilities between the United States and Japan it would begin with an air attack on our fleet.

First of all, the Japanese could be counted upon not to commit the grave strategical blunder of making a movement to the southward without disabling a part of our fleet and that is in spite of the fact that we had in Pearl Harbor at the time a force considerably inferior to the Japanese Fleet, namely, about 180 ships in the Japanese Fleet to 102 of ours.

That was because the Japanese well knew if they made a movement to the southward that before we would be able to assemble an expeditionary force with which to take the offensive against them we would be able to bring around from the Atlantic coast the rest of our fleet which would have then made us superior to the Japanese, even if that fleet had to go around the Horn.

The Japanese are great students. They know everything that has been written about the fundamentals of warfare. They know all of the lessons of history, and they could be counted upon to utilize everything that has been written about it.

They realized the value of surprise as one of the fundamental principles of warfare. They used it at Port Arthur with tremendous success. Therefore, it could be certain that they would use it again at Pearl Harbor if they could do it with fair safety.

I have already indicated that the Japanese weighed in their minds the probability of success of such an attack on Pearl Harbor. They have written several books and those books, I might say, are always released under the auspices of the military in Japan, because of the complete government control and censorship.

In those books they have discussed the probability of success in war with the United States. In this particular book, which is entitled "When Japan Fights," written ostensibly by a civilian named Hirata, he discussed the pros and cons, and I think it might be well to read that. It is very short, and is included at page 47, I think, of the papers which were given to the committee.

He says:

The American Commander-in-Chief has been occupied by various secret plans, but the three points about which he is the most concerned are:

1. Will a Japanese fast striking force made up of cruisers and aircraft carriers come on a scouting or striking mission?

2. Will Japanese submarines hover near the islands to attack or harass the Fleet?

3. Will a Japanese expeditionary force be sent overseas?

The first of these is the most fearsome. Suppose Japan were to form a fast striking force composed of such speedy battleships (whose speed America cannot match) as the Haruna, Kongo, and Kirishima, the aircraft carriers Akagi and Rinjo and the Nachi class of heavy cruisers? This would be a fast-stepping force that would be truly matchless and invincible.
Were they opposed to even the large guns of American battleships, they could utilize their superior speeds, thus leaving their slow adversaries behind. If opposed to a cruiser force, they could close in with telling blows, crush the opposition. Truly this would be a peerless force; able to close to battle, or open out, if outgunned. If this fast striking force should meet misfortune, losing one or two fast battleships or aircraft carriers, they would surely be a severe blow to Japan, and we would have to grit our teeth, smothering our rage until the day of a decisive main engagement to obtain our revenge.

Maybe such a bold venture would be too great a risk, who can say? On the other hand, warfare is a risk, and he who hesitates, or fears the risks of bold venture, cannot wage war.

Moreover, an attack off Hawaii would be the first battle of the Pacific war, and if in the very first engagement one can wrest the courage away from the enemy by one's own daring, it would put him in a funk or give him the jitters.

Mr. Richardson. Was that book at all widely read among naval men?

Captain Zacharias. It was read by our officers who knew the Japanese language. In fact, this translation was made in the fleet intelligence office at Hawaii and, as I have indicated, a copy of this extract was given to the war plans officer about October 1941. That was the third indication.

The fourth indication that they would attack, open the war by an attack on our fleet was somewhat strengthened by this incident which occurred in Mexico on October 16, 1940.

We had always known through discussions of the 5-5-3 ratio that Japan was anxious to have the number of capital ships reduced because they felt that with a 5-5-3 ratio it was possible for us to arrive in the theater of operations in Asia with more than parity. That is what crystallized in my mind the fact that they would make an attack on our fleet for the purpose of betting 4 battleships. Four battleships out of our number, which were then 15, excluding the 2 new ones which we had not yet commissioned, would have reduced us to 11. One battleship they knew was always in the navy yard under overhaul, bringing us down to 10. Under the treaty they were allowed 9 battleships, but, as expected, they had rearmed the Hiyei, which brought them up to 10, or what they considered a parity with us.

As we know, the intensity of their attack was directed toward the battleships and I think my impressions were confirmed. Those were the four reasons why I felt certain that hostilities with Japan would begin with an air attack on our fleet.

Now, I would like to jump back to my conversation with Admiral Kimmel, to say that in the precautions that I felt we should take I indicated that there would be earliest indications of hostilities and unmistakable signs of hostilities.

Among the earliest indications I told him would be the withdrawal of their merchant ships to Japan. We had long realized that and had kept a complete track of the location of every Japanese merchant vessel throughout the world. I started that system myself in 1935 in the Office of Naval Intelligence.

The other early indication would be preparations or, rather, deceptive measures in which they would engage, some of which developed. The unmistakable signs, as I pointed out to Admiral Kimmel, would be the appearance of submarines in the Hawaiian area, in which case he could well realized that the Japanese were then ready to strike.

In my conversations with Mr. Munson there was one additional
indication which I gave to him and that was that we already had two Japanese envoys in Washington, Admiral Nomura and Mr. Kurusu; that when the third envoy arrived they could definitely look for things to break one way or the other.

I learned over the radio on the 3d of December that the Japanese Ambassador to Peru, Mr. Sakamoto, had arrived in Washington and that made me feel that the situation was coming to a head.

Mr. Richardson. I have no further questions.

The Chairman. I did not have the privilege of hearing your testimony up to now because I was unavoidably absent and I may ask a question or two that has already been covered.

You just spoke of the Peruvian Japanese Minister arriving in Washington on the 3d of December.

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Where were you at that time?

Captain Zacharias. I was in command of the Salt Lake City. We were then en route to Pearl Harbor from Wake Island.

The Chairman. From Wake?

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. When did you arrive at Pearl Harbor?

Captain Zacharias. On the morning of—at noon on the 8th of December.

The Chairman. On the 8th. After the attack?

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. You got this information about the Peruvian Minister or Ambassador on the 3d by radio you say?

[8745] Captain Zacharias. By radio; yes, sir.

The Chairman. You had a radio receiving set on board the ship?

Captain Zacharias. We had many sets; yes, sir.

The Chairman. And you got it through a radio?

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Do you know whether the officers in charge of the Pearl Harbor installations in the fleet and particularly Admiral Kimmel, Admiral Bloch or General Short, had that information about the Peruvian Minister coming here on the third?

Captain Zacharias. It is possible they had the information regarding his arrival but I had not indicated to them that that would have any bearing on the subsequent events because I did not know in my conversations with Admiral Kimmel that there would be even a second ambassador arriving.

The Chairman. You don't know what his reaction to that would have been if he had known it?

Captain Zacharias. I do not know, sir.

The Chairman. Were you stationed at Pearl Harbor or in the Hawaiian Islands when you had this conversation in March with Admiral Kimmel?

Captain Zacharias. I was in command of the heavy cruiser Salt Lake City and I have already indicated in my testimony why I sought this conference with Admiral Kimmel and that was to discuss, to make certain he had received the report of my conference with Admiral Nomura which I had given in detail to Admiral Stark in a letter to Admiral Stark.

The Chairman. Maybe you have already stated it. What was Admiral Kimmel's reaction to that prediction?
Captain Zacharias. What he stated? I did state, sir.
The Chairman. All right. State it again, please.
Captain Zacharias. He said to me, "Well, we have neither the personnel nor the matériel with which to carry out this patrol." I had indicated to him that the only way to prevent this air attack which would come down wind from the northward because that was the prevailing wind in Hawaii, was to have out patrols at least 500 miles then, and he stated that he had neither the personnel nor matériel with which to carry out such patrols and I said to him, "Well, Admiral, you better get them because that is what is coming."
The Chairman. You formed your conclusion as to what was coming from your general knowledge of the situation, together with your experience, your long experience in the Intelligence Division?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
The Chairman. You did not have the benefit of any magic or intercepted messages at the time you formed your conclusion and at the time you transmitted your conclusion to Admiral Kimmel?
Captain Zacharias. No, sir; I did not. I did have some knowledge of certain messages which dealt with the Far Eastern situation in general but I would not say that I had access to any which really bore upon the events which followed.
The Chairman. Have you read those intercepted messages as they have been filed with the committee?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Have you read the messages about which Admiral Kimmel and General Short have testified as being messages to which they were entitled and which might have changed their course of action if they had had them?
Captain Zacharias. Those which were not decoded, I think, until after Pearl Harbor.
The Chairman. No, some of them were decoded.
Senator Brewster. But not communicated.
The Chairman. But not communicated. They were decoded but not communicated to them.
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir; I now recall them.
The Chairman. As an Intelligence Officer I would like to ask your opinion as to whether those messages if transmitted would have given any additional information as to the immediate likelihood of an attack on Pearl Harbor?
[8748] Captain Zacharias. I can state the effect that they would have had on me but I cannot state what effect they would have had on Admiral Kimmel or General Short.
The Chairman. Well, I realize that but just for my own—not curiosity exactly—but for my own information, I would like to get an opinion as to what reaction they would have had on you.
Captain Zacharias. What opinion I would have had?
The Chairman. Yes.
Captain Zacharias. Why, I can state positively if I had had access to those messages it would have further confirmed my opinion as to what took place.
The Chairman. Those messages, outside of the one carving up the Pearl Harbor region or area into five different sections for the ships to be parked—that is not the naval word.
Mr. Murphy. Docked.
The Chairman. Docked or berthed pertain to the——

Captain Zacharys. The five different what, sir?

The Chairman. One of those messages was an intercept of a message between the Hawaiian Islands and Tokyo indicating the dividing up of the harbor into five sections and the berthing of the ships there, which might have indicated they had some particular interest in that in Pearl Harbor, but outside of that, as I recall, the other messages were dealing with the general situation between Japan and the United States and the growing tension of it. Would those messages outside of that one, would those messages have indicated any additional likelihood of an attack upon Pearl Harbor?

Captain Zacharys. Yes, I think I can say categorically that those messages would have had a very distinct effect on my opinion.

The Chairman. Now, this book from which you have quoted here, you say that the part you read was translated and distributed among the naval officers?

Captain Zacharys. I do not know the distribution but this copy was given to me by the fleet intelligence officer because it was translated in that office and I picked it up in the course of my conversations with them and my interest in the situation.

The Chairman. That was in October?

Captain Zacharys. About October.

The Chairman. 1941?

Captain Zacharys. 1941, yes, sir.

The Chairman. Well, that is all I will ask at the moment. I am at a disadvantage because I did not hear the rest of the testimony.

Congressman Cooper.

The Vice Chairman. That fleet intelligence officer you referred to, Captain, was the fleet intelligence officer of the Pacific Fleet under the command of Admiral Kimmel?

Captain Zacharys. He was the first fleet intelligence officer of the Pacific Fleet and later, as the name was changed—first he was fleet intelligence officer of the United States Fleet and when it was changed later to the Pacific Fleet he became fleet intelligence officer of the Pacific Fleet. He had been there for quite a considerable time before Pearl Harbor.

The Vice Chairman. Well, at the time you received this copy that you have read to the committee he was then Admiral Kimmel’s intelligence officer?

Captain Zacharys. That is correct.

The Chairman. Would you allow me to ask one question that I have overlooked?

The Vice Chairman. Yes.

The Chairman. What, from your experience, your long experience in the Intelligence Division of the Navy, what is the practice of naval officers in the Navy Department in transmitting diplomatic messages to naval officers in the field or in the waters where they are in command?

Captain Zacharys. I think the general policy is to give such messages only to those who need to know their existence.

The Chairman. There is a general policy that from such messages as are received initially anywhere an estimate of the situation is drawn and that is transmitted to the commanding officers both in the Navy and War Departments, is it?
Captain Zacharias. I did not get that.

The Chairman. Instead of sending each individual diplomatic message that is picked up in general for any reason or from any source to the commanding officers in the field or in the waters in which the Navy may be operating, is it the practice to send them an estimate, a general estimate of the situation drawn from those messages that are received in the Department as a whole?

Captain Zacharias. Either or both of those methods are employed. The Chairman. Either or both?

Captain Zacharias. Yes.

The Chairman. All right.

The Vice Chairman. Captain, would you give us a little more information as to why you considered the arrival of the third Japanese envoy so important?

Captain Zacharias. The reasons as to why I felt that the arrival of a third envoy in Washington would precipitate a decision, that came through experience in intelligence work and our observation of the many Japanese missions which came over to this country on inspection trips or purchasing missions. We noticed that almost invariably when they went to a certain industrial activity they were interested in one particular thing in that plant. Depending on its importance, a second mission would come and go to that same plant and showed an interest only in that particular piece of machinery or whatever it was. They would be followed by a third group, who would go through the same procedure and after the visit of the third group all interest in that plant and that particular item would disappear.

In my mind I formulated the opinion that the Japanese would not accept the view of a single individual; that two individuals usually resulted in a controversy. Therefore, it was necessary to have the opinion of a third one before they would reach their decision. That is typical and in line with everything Japanese.

The Vice Chairman. It is part of their way of operating, to do everything three times before they reach a decision?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir, and that is possibly the reason why even in their most important operations they have in the past taken away the initiative from the commander in chief and required him to get his detailed instructions from Tokyo before he would make any move.

I feel that that every condition was responsible for in some degree our success at Midway. Ordinarily when a force is coming in to make a surprise attack, as they were doing again at Midway, a commander in chief would know that he had been discovered when they spotted a patrol plane of ours 2 days before and would then retire to a sector and come in at a later date. The commander in chief was not empowered to make any such decision and by the time, I assume, that he was able to contact Tokyo and get permission to change his plan it was too late.

I give that as an indication that decisions by the Japanese are never confined to a single individual or even two.

The Chairman. And you cite that instance as something that actually happened that contributed to our success in the Battle of Midway?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir; that was known; that information had been furnished to Mr. Munson and, as I indicated in the memorandum, I talked with a third party, went over the details of this thing completely the night before I sailed for Wake Island. The night before was November 27, 1941; and that was with Mr. Lorrin Thurston, the head of the Honolulu Advertiser and the head of Station KGU in Honolulu, who was a Military Intelligence Reserve officer, a captain.

The Vice Chairman. He was a captain in the United States Army? Captain Zacharias. Yes, Military Intelligence Reserve and, as I indicated in that memorandum, he expressed surprise that he had not been informed as to what to send out over his radio when the air attack came.

The Vice Chairman. Well, now, I want to try to understand you a little more clearly, Captain, about this—what was his name, Thurston?

Captain Zacharias. L-o-r-r-i-n T-h-u-r-s-t-o-n; Lorrin Thurston.

The Vice Chairman. Well, was he at that time a captain in the United States Army?

Captain Zacharias. He was a captain in the Military Intelligence Reserve of the United States Army, not on active duty.

The Vice Chairman. Not on active duty?

Captain Zacharias. Right.

The Vice Chairman. Well, was that a civilian radio station that he had or was it a military radio station?

Captain Zacharias. That was one of the two civilian radio stations on the Island of Oahu.

The Vice Chairman. And just what was it you told him?

Captain Zacharias. I related to him the entire probability of events as I have already testified and that is [8755], what caused him to say to me with an expression of surprise, "Why, I am here and a Reserve intelligence officer in G-2 and I have not been given any indication of what I should send out over the radio in the event of an air attack."

I said to him, "Well," I said, "if you say, 'We are having a sporadic air attack; there is no reason for alarm. Everyone should keep indoors because if you go on the streets you will interfere with the military going to their posts. Just stay at home and keep calm."

And I might say that on the morning of December 7 when the communications officer brought me the word around 8 o'clock that Oahu had been attacked. I turned on my radio and almost those exact words were going out over KGU.

The Vice Chairman. Well, now, I cannot say that I understand this. I am sure it is my fault but I am sorry. I still do not quite understand just the status of that officer. You say he was not on active duty?

Captain Zacharias. He was not on active duty.

The Vice Chairman. Then you say he was working with the Army intelligence office. Now, what does that mean?

Captain Zacharias. I did not say he was working with the intelligence office. I said that he was an intelligence officer in the Military Reserve not on active duty but I happened to know that he was consulted from time to time by the [8756] Army because he was a very prominent citizen in Hawaii by reason of those two positions
he occupied, but I inject that only to indicate that up to the very last moment these ideas that I had were being passed along as freely as possible.

The **Vice Chairman.** Well, the reason I got the impression that he was connected with the Army intelligence office there in Hawaii was your statement that you said he was surprised that he had not been told about that because he was connected with the Army intelligence office.

Captain Zacharias. Well, if I conveyed the impression that that was being critical of the Army for not advising him I ask to correct that because it was not. That was only incidental and the surprise was on his part.

[8757] There were no implications in that. I only brought that in to further substantiate the fact that I was carrying all these things along in my own mind.

The **Vice Chairman.** Well, you told us about your conversation with Admiral Kimmel in which you gave him the information that you here related, and then you state that you conveyed substantially the same opinion, or expressed the same views to Captain Layton.

Captain Zacharias. No, sir; I did not say that I had expressed those same views to Captain Layton. Undoubtedly in our many conversations, possibilities and probabilities were discussed, but I did not say that I had given Layton specifically an outline of what I had expected. I assume that he would arrive at similar conclusions because of his experience in intelligence, and knowledge of the Japanese. He was also a Japanese language officer.

The **Vice Chairman.** And you had served with him, and it was on your recommendation that he was appointed in the positions he was then holding?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct.

The **Vice Chairman.** Now, who else, if anybody, besides Admiral Kimmel, did you tell substantially this same thing to?

Captain Zacharias. I think those were all. As I said [8758] before, I was on duty there in the Hawaiian area. I already expressed myself to Admiral Kimmel and his chief of staff. I felt if there was anything further that they wanted from me, they knew where I was, and they could get it.

The **Vice Chairman.** You were not at that time in the intelligence service of the Navy?

Captain Zacharias. I was not, except indirectly, because I had been admonished by a former director of naval intelligence when I completed a certain tour of duty in naval intelligence, when he said to me "Although you are now leaving this office to go to sea, you must consider yourself as continuing your active intelligence work. I hope you will feel that way and continue to do so, because of your background and the value that it will have to the Navy, and generally in the future."

In other words, he gave me a commission to continue intelligence work even while I was afloat, and I proceeded to do so, even to the extent of engaging in certain counter-espionage activities, while I was aboard ship.

The **Vice Chairman.** I believe you stated you had directly, or in an indirect way, about 25 years' experience in naval intelligence work?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
[8759] The Vice Chairman. Then the greater part of your 37 years' service in the Navy has been devoted to that line of work?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir; although the portions afloat, as I have indicated, were during my spare time, because all Japanese language officers well realized that in order to have the possibility of promotion by selection in addition to their specialty, they had to be good naval officers.

The Vice Chairman. Now, one other inquiry, if I may, please, Captain.

This information that you say you conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, was that based upon your general knowledge of the Japanese, and the relations existing between Japan and the United States, or was any part of that directly the result of your conversation with Admiral Nomura?

Captain Zacharias. I think I can say categorically that it was principally my background experience, and not the result of the conversation with Admiral Nomura. I had hoped that he might be able to arrive at a successful solution to the situation between Japan and the United States. I might say after my conversation with him, I was not too hopeful, but I felt—I knew that—I will stick to my original expression, I felt that he was quite anxious [8760] to prevent a war between Japan and the United States, because he had always said to me that if Japan and the United States went to war, it would mean the finish of the Japanese Empire and a great loss to the United States. He reiterated that in my conversation with him in San Francisco on February 8, 1941.

The Vice Chairman. Well, you sought this conference with Admiral Nomura in San Francisco, then, did you?

Captain Zacharias. I did, and when I had previously notified the commander in chief of the United States Fleet, Admiral Richardson, that I proposed to do so, he liked the idea and asked me to send him a copy of the report of that conversation immediately after it was completed.

The Vice Chairman. And you were then serving as naval intelligence officer at San Francisco?

Captain Zacharias. No, sir; I was then in command of the heavy cruiser, Salt Lake City, which had recently come into Mare Island to be overhauled, and an implementation of her armament.

The Vice Chairman. Had you been ordered, directed, or had a suggestion come to you that you have such a conversation with Admiral Nomura?

Captain Zacharias. Only through the attitude of Admiral Richardson when I indicated to him that I had known [8761] Admiral Nomura intimately in Japan, and on subsequent occasions of his visit to the United States, that I had found him the one Japanese who was willing and never embarrassed by discussing situations, and I felt if anybody could get from him an expression of opinion as to the real mission for which he was sent over, that I could do it. I felt there was only one other person in the United States with whom he would talk as frankly, and that was Admiral W. V. Pratt, retired.

The Vice Chairman. You had known Admiral Nomura in Japan?

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. How long were you stationed in Japan, Captain?
Captain Zacharias. The first time about 3 years.

The Vice Chairman. Were you naval attaché at our Embassy there?

Captain Zacharias. I was an attaché at the Embassy for the purpose of learning the language and studying the people. It was during that period that I first met Admiral Nomura. He was then director of naval intelligence in Japan.

The Vice Chairman. All told, how much time have you spent in Japan?

[8763] Captain Zacharias. About 4 years. I went back to the Asiatic Fleet in 1926 for a specific purpose, and on my way back from the Asiatic Fleet I was in Japan for a period of something over 6 months, to refresh my knowledge of both the language, the people, and the situation.

The Vice Chairman. Well, after your conversation with Admiral Richardson, in which he indicated at least to you that he thought it might be well for you to talk to Admiral Nomura, you then did have the conversation with him?

Captain Zacharias. I did, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And you reported by way of a memorandum on that conversation to Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations?

Captain Zacharias. I wrote a personal and very lengthy letter to Admiral Stark, a copy of which you have in the papers that were furnished by the Navy Department to the committee, and I received a reply from Admiral Stark, a copy of which also has been furnished to you, in which he indicated that my letter to him was very interesting and illuminating, and he had sent the original over to the President and had made copies for the Secretary of the Navy, and Secretary of State.

[8763] The Vice Chairman. I believe you state that copies were sent to Admiral Kimmel and in your conversation with him he told you he had received it.

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Now what was the occasion for your writing the memorandum to the other Admiral; Admiral Draemel?

Captain Zacharias. That memorandum, as you recall, was written on March 17, 1942. The specific purpose of that memorandum was to advise Admiral Nimitz, then commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, of the situation existing in Hawaii as I saw it, and to indicate to him that if certain steps were not taken to change the situation existing there that he could expect something even more disastrous than what took place at Pearl Harbor.

As you know, that situation eventuated less than 3 months later and precipitated the battle of Midway. At that time, as you know, the Japanese were approaching Hawaii with an overpowering force for the purpose of capturing Hawaii after Midway.

I must say that I felt that we were very fortunate in the conclusion of that campaign. I know that Admiral Nimitz felt that way after the battle of Midway had finished.

Now, as I say, this memorandum was prepared for Vice Admiral Nimitz of the situation then existing. I was very much concerned in what had not been done regarding Japanese agents in Hawaii subsequent to Pearl Harbor, the inspections of various localities and everything else as is outlined in this memorandum.
I was still the commanding officer of a ship and it took a good deal of deliberation on my part to decide to go over to the commander in chief and present my views to him. However, because of my background in intelligence and knowing that I was the senior, the one officer in the United States Navy who had such a background of knowledge regarding the Japanese, and in intelligence work, I felt it my duty to advise him of the situation as I saw it, and I proceeded to have a conversation with Admiral Draemel, his chief of staff, to see what he might suggest.

After going over all these details with him, which included a complete analysis of the situation prior to Pearl Harbor, and that was given to Admiral Draemel for the sole purpose of letting him know my background and to let him know, or, rather, to convince him that I knew what I was talking about, that was the sole purpose of giving him this pre-Pearl Harbor background.

After my conversation, and the relation of it was given to him, he said, "Well, now, I agree with you practically 99 percent and I wish you would write that out for me in the form of a memorandum so I can give it to Admiral Nimitz to read, and then if he wants to discuss it with you further he can do so."

I told him I would be very glad to do that. I returned to my ship and wrote out the memorandum as exactly as possible as our conversation had taken place and gave it to him.

The Vice Chairman. Then on March 17, 1942, when you wrote this memorandum to Admiral Nimitz, you were then in the Pacific Fleet?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir. I was a subordinate.

The Vice Chairman. And in command of the cruiser Salt Lake City?

Captain Zacharias. In command of the cruiser Salt Lake City.

The Vice Chairman. I believe you stated, Captain, that you were graduated from the Naval Academy in 1912.

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

The Vice Chairman. From what State were you appointed?

Captain Zacharias. Florida.

The Vice Chairman. And you have been in the Navy continuously since then?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. That is all. Thank you.

[8766] The Chairman. Senator George had to leave to go to the floor. Congressman Clark is not here. Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas. Captain, you told the committee a few moments ago that in October 1941, you attempted, on three different occasions, to discuss the Japanese situation from the standpoint of a surprise attack with Captain Layton. Is that right?

Captain Zacharias. No, sir. This was with Captain McMorris—and it was not to discuss the possibilities of an air attack, it was to discuss the current situation of our relations with Japan.

Senator Lucas. Well, why did you want to see Captain McMorris at that time?

Captain Zacharias. Because he was the war plans officer and I knew that he would be drawing up any procedures for eventualities.

Senator Lucas. What did you have in mind discussing with Captain McMorris?
Captain Zacharias. I would have discussed with him the probabilities.

Senator Lucas. Of an air attack?

Captain Zacharias. Of what might eventuate. I think I would have related to him then everything I had told Admiral [3767] Kimmel, because it was just at that same period that I had the conversations with Mr. Munson.

Senator Lucas. Why were you so free with Munson with respect to the possibility of an air attack and yet you did not pass it on in October 1941 to the proper authorities in Hawaii?

Captain Zacharias. I had already passed it along to Admiral Kimmel.

Senator Lucas. Yes; you had done that back in March 1941.

Captain Zacharias. Yes.

Senator Lucas. Did it ever occur to you, as the tense situation developed between this country and Japan, to again repeat that to Admiral Kimmel?

Captain Zacharias. I have already indicated that Admiral Kimmel and his chief of staff knew that I was a commanding officer in his fleet, and I felt that if he wanted any further information from me he knew where he could find me. I did not again go over to bring myself to his attention, because I long since learned that when you are persistent in these things you arouse certain feelings which nullify the effect which you desire to produce.

Senator Lucas. Did you feel that they considered you a sort of a nuisance for interfering with their own decisions [3768] when you made suggestions of this kind?

Captain Zacharias. No, sir; there was no indication of that. Why Captain McMorris did not want to discuss it I do not know, but it so impressed me after the third attempt that I went in to Commander Layton and said, "What is the matter with Captain McMorris? I tried to engage him in a conversation about this situation but he does not feel like talking about it." And the intelligence officer indicated to me he did not know any reason why he should not want to discuss it.

Senator Lucas. You were a very good friend of Captain Layton?

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. I understand you recommended him.

Captain Zacharias. I did.

Senator Lucas. Was it Layton you recommended for the position he held in the fleet at that time?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct. I might add that I was also a good friend of Captain McMorris and he is a classmate of mine.

Senator Lucas. Now did you discuss with Layton at any time in October 1941 the possibilities of an air attack and give to him the substance of the conversation that you gave to Munson?

Captain Zacharias. No; only I think I discussed with him [3769] the fact that Munson had sought me out, and what I had gone over with him I cannot recall.

Senator Lucas. Why did you consider Munson more important than Layton?

Captain Zacharias. Because Munson had come out with a letter signed "H. R. Stark," to open up everything to him. That letter
was to the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet. So I tried to get from Munson some indication as to whom he was representing, but he consistently declined to tell me, in a very friendly manner, so I did not pursue it further, but I reached my own conclusions.

Senator Lucas. Did Munson talk to Captain Layton while he was there?

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Did you confer with Layton after Munson left and discuss with him the conversation that you might have had?

Captain Zacharias. Now, only incidentally, possibly. In one of my visits to the fleet intelligence officer I said I had some conversations with Munson and had given him my idea of what would occur.

Senator Lucas. As I recall, Admiral Kimmel does not remember the conversation you had with him in March 1941.

Captain Zacharias. I have indicated that I was possibly one of hundreds with whom he talked, and although the subject of our conversation was one which I felt, and still feel, was most vital to his position as commander in chief of the fleet, I have said that I can realize that he might not remember the details of that conversation.

Senator Lucas. Have you talked to Captain Smith, the other officer who was present at the time you engaged Admiral Kimmel in a conversation about this important matter?

Captain Zacharias. Not about the matters I discussed there. I probably have spoken to him in greetings.

The Vice Chairman. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Lucas. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. I understood the Senator to state Admiral Kimmel testified he did not have the conversation with him.

Senator Lucas. If I said that I am wrong. Admiral Kimmel did not recall the substance of the conversation that he had with you, Captain?

The Vice Chairman. If the Senator will permit, I interrogated Admiral Kimmel about that. He stated that he did have a conversation with Captain Zacharias in March of 1941. Then I read to him this statement from your memorandum and asked him whether Captain Zacharias told him there would be an air attack on Pearl Harbor, and he answered that he did not believe that.

Senator Lucas. Yes; I think that is right.

Captain Zacharias. I think I can clarify that.

Senator Lucas. Clarify it, if you will, sir.

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir. The question asked of Admiral Kimmel was whether this was going to take place, or whether I had told him that this would take place on December 7, and he said I did not.

The Vice Chairman. I will read the quotation, if the Senator will indulge me a moment.

Senator Lucas. I yield for that purpose.

The Vice Chairman. I first asked Admiral Kimmel:

Now, you were asked some questions about some conversations between you and Captain Zacharias.

Senator Brewster. What page is that?

The Vice Chairman. Page 7133 of our transcript.

Admiral Kimmel answered: "Yes, sir."
Then I asked:
He was an officer under your command at the time?  
Admiral Kimmel. Yes.

Then I asked:
And you stated that you did have a conversation with him in March of 1941, and you did not recall that he said anything to you about expecting an air attack on Pearl Harbor, is that correct?  
Admiral Kimmel. That is right. I made such a statement as that.

Then I asked:
Did you have any conversation with him at any other time other than March 1941?  
Admiral Kimmel. Not that I now recall.

Then I asked:
You had no other conversation with him at all, that you remember?  
[8773] Admiral Kimmel. Well, I cannot recall every conversation I had with every officer in Pearl Harbor, but so far as I know, Captain Zacharias never expressed any idea that an attack on Pearl Harbor was imminent at any time to me. He may have expressed such sentiments, I do not know.

Then I said:
Now, then, Admiral, you say that when you received the message of November 24, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations—
then I inquired about the message of November 24.  
Then shortly after that we recessed for noon.  
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. In the meantime I had looked at these papers that had been filed before we resumed the afternoon session, or that you had filed with the Navy Department. There was only one copy, and I had not read it up to that time, but during the noon recess I looked through it. Then, when we resumed the hearing after noon, I questioned Admiral Kimmel further on that point, as appears on page 7140 of our transcript.

Senator Brewster. Would not you take page 7137, where you started your question on that? That is where you began in the afternoon about the conversation.  
[8774] The Vice Chairman. That was during the morning. I had not thought that was important, but this should precede what I read.

Senator Brewster. That was the afternoon session, page 7137, when we resumed the inquiry, and introduced the exhibit.  
The Vice Chairman. Oh, yes; I see now. Page 7137.  
Captain Zacharias. I think I know the point.  
The Vice Chairman. Anyhow, on page 7137 I asked Admiral Kimmel this question:

Admiral Kimmel, this morning I asked you a few questions about your conversation with Captain Zacharias. At that time I did not have before me the photostatic copies of certain documents that have been presented here to the committee with respect to Captain Zacharias, and at the conclusion of the morning's session, counsel handed me this copy which is the only one before the committee. It is headed "Notes, Correspondence, and Reports Relating to Pearl Harbor and Events Leading Up To It." And quite a number of items are listed on the front page, but I will pass on down to an item appearing about the middle of this page, which I will read to you:

"March, 1941: Conversation with Admiral Kimmel CINCPAC—
that was you—

“and his Chief of Staff, Captain,” it [8775] looks like “W. W. Smith, U. S. N."

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Then I continued reading:

“Regarding Nomura, notifying of surprise attack on our Fleet by Japanese in case hostilities eventuate. Details of this conversation are covered in a personal and confidential memo to Chief of Staff, to CINCPAC, Rear Admiral Milo Draemel, U. S. N., for presentation to CINCPAC (Admiral Nimitz) and dated March 17, 1942, copy attached.”

Then I turn over to this copy to which he refers in that note. I will not take time to read all of it, but in the fourth paragraph of this headed “Personal and Confidential Memorandum for Admiral Draemel, March 17, 1942” I read you as follows:

“Only a few people know that I had cautioned Admiral Kimmel and Captain Smith during the course of an hour and a half conversation with them of the exact event to take place on 7 December, not only as to what would happen, but also how and when. My only error was that the Japanese were after four battleships, and they got five.”

Do you recall any such statement as that, or any information of that nature given you by Captain Zacharias?

Admiral KIMMEL. I think there is very little I can add to my previous testimony on that subject. In the past [8776] few days I heard of this memorandum, and I had read that memorandum before I testified before this committee and if you want me to clarify any of my previous statements, I will be pleased to do so, but I am willing to let it stand as it is.

Then I asked:

Well, in questions asked you by counsel and those which I asked you, you stated that you did not remember——

Admiral KIMMEL. That is correct.

Then I asked:

Any conversation with Captain Zacharias along this line.

Admiral KIMMEL. I remembered a conversation with Captain Zacharias.

Then I asked:

But I have now tried to refresh your memory.

Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Then I state:

If it is worth anything in that respect.

Admiral KIMMEL. Yes.

Then I state:

By reading you what appears in this memorandum prepared by him, which has been presented to this committee for whatever it may be worth.

[8777] Admiral KIMMEL. That is right.

Then I asked:

And I am now asking you whether he said to you what he states there, or anything like that.

Admiral KIMMEL. He did not, and furthermore, I would have paid very little attention to any man who told me in March of 1941 that an attack was going to occur on the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

I think that covers the pertinent point. I assume you are familiar with it.

The CHAIRMAN. I think it is time to adjourn.

Captain ZACHARIAHS. I can reply very quickly to that.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, if you will. We will have to recess in a moment.
Captain Zacharias. Included in that memorandum was the date December 7. I have already indicated that December 7 is synonymous with Pearl Harbor. When you realize that this memorandum was prepared after Pearl Harbor, it was referring back to an event for the benefit of Admiral Draemel and Admiral Nimitz, and Admiral Kimmel is quite correct in saying that in March 1941, I did not predict something was going to happen on December 7. And he is also correct in saying that I did not indicate that there was any imminence of Japanese hostilities. Everything I said to him [8778] was contingent upon the development of a situation which made hostilities between Japan and the United States imminent. I did not predict when that would occur, but I indicated to him clearly as to what would happen if that situation evolved.

The Chairman. The committee will recess until 2:00 o'clock, and the Chair understands that Justice Roberts will be here.

You may come back here also, Captain.

Captain Zacharias. I will be here, sir.¹

(Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the committee recessed to 2 p.m., of the same day.)

[8779]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The Chairman. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Justice Roberts, will you be sworn?

(Justice Roberts was sworn by the chairman.)

Mr. Richardson. I have before me, Mr. Chairman, some correspondence which it might be well to have extended in the record in connection with the testimony of the Justice.

The first is a letter of December 16, 1941, to the President from the Secretary of War in connection with the individuals who were selected to form the Commission of which the Justice was the chairman.

That is followed by a letter of January 27, 1942, being a letter to Justice Roberts from the Secretary of War with reference to the report which had been prior thereto filed.

The third is a letter under date of January 31, 1942, from the Justice to the Secretary of War in acknowledgment of the letters.

I think probably it would be sufficient if the letters were extended in the record by the stenographer without reading them.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I have had the privilege of counsel showing them to me and I think that they are of sufficient consequence to have them read.

The Chairman. Oh, well, they ought to be spread on the record at this point before Justice Roberts testifies.

Senator Brewster. I think they should be read so the committee will be familiar with them.

The Chairman. If there is no objection, counsel may read them.

Mr. Murphy. I have a suggestion to make. They were read about two weeks ago at the time Senator Ferguson asked a question about them. I think these were among those read.

Senator Brewster. These were not read.

The Chairman. The Chair does not understand that they were read.

Mr. Murphy. Oh, I see, these letters were not read.

¹ Captain Zacharias’ testimony is resumed on p. 2303, infra.
The Chairman. Without objection the counsel will read the letters into the record at this point in sequence.

Mr. Richardson. (reading):

Personal and Confidential December 16, 1941.

Dear Mr. President: Knox tells me that you would like our suggestions as to the investigating board this morning——

The Chairman. Let me ask counsel this question: Prior to that letter is there any official document appointing the Commission by the President which might well go in ahead of these letters?

[8781] Mr. Richardson. This would come ahead of that, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Brewster. Yes.

The Chairman. Go ahead.

Mr. Richardson (reading):

Knox tells me that you would like our suggestions as to the investigating board this morning.

1. My suggestion for the civilian head is Justice Roberts. No less a man in my opinion should be asked and Roberts, by his action in investigating and prosecuting the Teapot Dome scandal and in deciding the Black Tom case more recently, has an outstanding reputation among our people for getting down to the bottom of a factual situation. I think his appointment would command the confidence of the whole country. I believe Knox agrees with me.

2. For the War Department representatives I suggest Major General Frank R. McCoy, Retired, and Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney of the Air Corps.

a. McCoy you know personally. He has the most outstanding record of any man in the Army for such an appointment, requiring as it does breadth of view, superlative character, and wide similar experience. As a member of the Lytton Commission which investigated the [8782] Japanese in Manchuria, he won a very high reputation among all nations involved for his balance and tact. It was due to him more than any other member that the report of that Commission was unanimous.

b. McNarney I recommend as the best air man we have for that purpose. I think there must be an air man on the board because the duties and alleged derelictions were in air protection. The fight was an air fight. We have had retired officers of the Air Corps fit for this assignment, but McNarney has a reputation which commands the respect of everybody. As you know, he was Chief of Staff for Chaney in London, was on the recent Staff conferences with the British, went to Moscow, and is familiar with British technique in respect to air defense. Marshall and I think he is the most competent man we have at the present time on air and ground joint requirements.

Marshall and I united on all the foregoing suggestions after very careful consideration by each of us.

Most confidentially we are sending to Hawaii two men to relieve Short and Martin, the present Army Commander and Air Commander. Lieutenant General Emmons, our present Air Combat Commander, will relieve Short. Brigadier General Tinker will relieve Martin. They are starting at once and I think nothing should be said about [8783] it until they arrive to take command. As you know, we have had a bad and serious blow in this matter. Major General Dargue and Colonel Bundy, who have been missing since the storm of last Friday night, were on their way out to Hawaii. They were two of the best men we had and we had expected to use Dargue to relieve one of the men out there.

Faithfully yours,

Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of War.

This is addressed to:

The President,
The White House.

My opinion is that the housecleaning which I describe in the last paragraph should be synchronized with a similar housecleaning in the Navy Command, and all announced at the same time.
This was followed by a letter of January 27, 1942, from the Secretary of War to Justice Roberts. [Reading:]

My dear Justice Roberts:
This is just a hasty line to tell you what an admirable job I think that you and your colleagues have done in your difficult task of drawing the report on the disaster at Pearl Harbor.

[8784] I think it is a masterpiece of candid and accurate statement based upon most careful study and analysis of a difficult factual situation. One of the best features of it has been your treatment of certain underlying elements which could not be fully embodied in the report without giving assistance to the enemy.

Your full opinion on some of these latter points seems to me so important that I hope it will be given to the President and others of us who are concerned in the defense of the country, in a manner which can be used without going to the enemy. These are the type of things that I intended to suggest to you in my preliminary talk with you before you left for Pearl Harbor.

Faithfully yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON,

And addressed to: “Honorable Owen J. Roberts, United States Supreme Court, Washington, D. C.”

That is followed by a letter of January 31, 1942, from Justice Roberts to the Secretary of War. [Reading:]

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I am greatly indebted to you for your letter of January 27 with respect to the Pearl Harbor report. It was good of you to take the time from your manifold duties to write me about it.

Yours sincerely,

OWEN J. ROBERTS.

Addressed to “Hon. Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, Munitions Building, Washington, D. C.”

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, does the record show the date of the first two letters?

Mr. Richardson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. It does? All right.

The Chairman. Proceed with the examination of Justice Roberts.

[8786] Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I wish those would remain or be gotten back.

The Reporter. They will be back in a half-hour.

The Chairman. Proceed, Mr. Richardson.

TESTIMONY OF HON. OWEN J. ROBERTS, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE, UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (RETIRED)

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Justice, you were the Chairman of what is known as the Roberts Commission in connection with the investigation of Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. When was that Commission sworn in?

Mr. Justice Roberts. I should think the 18th or 19th of December. I can give you the exact date from the minutes. We swore the recorder and then he swore the members of the Commission.

Mr. Richardson. How soon after that before the Commission began to function?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Immediately. The very morning that it was organized.

Mr. Richardson. Will you give us a running résumé of the time the Commission did function here and then later upon your arrival at Hawaii?

Mr. Justice Roberts. We called in the higher command of the Army and Navy and ask them to produce the war plans, maps, orders, and
every document that could have a bearing on the situation at Pearl Harbor. We examined those and had the officers explain them and their bearing to us.

I might say at that time we had not decided how we would take testimony, and we had no stenographer. We had a secretary who was a stenographer who made notes on the topics on which these people spoke, and we each made notes for ourselves of things which we thought important and that we desired to investigate.

General Marshall and Admiral Stark were present and gave us an outline of the whole transaction from their points of view. We asked whether we should retain certain code telegrams, and what not, and they told us that copies of them would be found at Pearl Harbor, and we decided not to take those into our possession at that time but to get them when we had stenographic service at Pearl Harbor.

As the result of the conference and testimony of these gentlemen, who were not under oath but were upon honor to give us all they had, we then formed a plan of going to Pearl Harbor where copies of practically every document they produced would be found and we could proceed more formally with the stenographer.

We made arrangements immediately for stenographic service by stenographers known in Washington, and known to me personally to be reputable, because we did not know what kind of stenographic service we could depend on in Pearl Harbor, and we took those gentlemen with us. I think they arrived on Oahu on the 22d—I may be wrong about the date—about 6 o'clock in the morning, and we started our session at 9:30 on that morning at Fort Shafter with a stenographer present, and we called for our first witness, after we called for the production of a lot of documents, General Short.

Mr. Richardson. From that time on, when the Commission functioned, it was by question and answer to witnesses who had first been duly sworn?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes. I might say that Congress passed an act giving us the right to subpoena witnesses and swear them, and that was at our request.

Mr. Richardson. Was any witness proposed who was not given an opportunity to be heard?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Certainly not.

Mr. Richardson. How were your proceedings conducted with respect to their being open or otherwise?

Mr. Justice Roberts. They were closed. Every witness was asked to observe secrecy, that is to say, not to disclose what went on in the room.

Of course the reason for that was what this committee now knows, that there were questions of broken codes. We were informed that the Army and Navy were getting invaluable information every day; that the Japanese did not realize that their codes were broken, and indeed the Navy was rather chary about even telling us about the thing for fear there might be some leak from our commission.

Of course if we held open hearings there was a chance we might do a great damage to our forces, our military program.

Mr. Richardson. When did you complete your duties there, approximately?

Mr. Justice Roberts. I have got it all in the minutes, and you have the minutes, I think, so when I speak I do not speak against the minutes. It was around the 18th of January, I suppose.
Mr. Richardson. Then you returned to Washington?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes; we came to San Francisco, and in order not to lose any time we came back by Pullman from San Francisco, and we had a drawing room in which we could discuss the facts, and as to facts which were of record and as to which there was no doubt we could start to prepare findings, which we did on the train.

Mr. Richardson. Approximately how long after you returned were your findings completed?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Again I do not speak by the record. It is all here. You can get it day by day. But I should think something over a week.

The Chairman. The report shows that they held meetings on the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 21st, 22d, and 23d.

Mr. Justice Roberts. That is right.

The Chairman. And the report is dated the 23d of January.

Mr. Justice Roberts. That is right.

Mr. Richardson. Then upon your return to Washington you took no more testimony?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes; we did. We took some testimony on some matters that were still doubtful in our minds, and we did not attempt to make findings on those particular points until we had taken testimony from General Marshall, Admiral Stark, and several others.

Mr. Richardson. I note, Mr. Justice, in the report that your commission eventually made, there are 19 in number of what are referred to as the findings of fact.

I also note in the minutes of your commission, under date of January 21, 1942, the following language:

At 3:00 o'clock p.m. the Secretary of the Navy, having been shown certain proposed findings of fact, stated that he suggested no changes for the safeguarding of the national interest in any of the statements except one, in Finding No. 20. This was then differently phrased. At 4:30 p.m. Brigadier General Gerow, designated by the Chief of Staff, after examining the same findings for the same purpose stated to the recorder that he found no changes to suggest, and the recorder so informed the Commission.

I would be obliged if you would give us some explanation with respect to the elimination of what must have been originally finding No. 20 in connection with your report.

Mr. Justice Roberts. There wasn't any elimination. When we started to make findings, every member of the commission was drawing findings to represent his view of certain facts. Then we took the different drafts of the members and compared them, and corrected them, and agreed on a statement.

In order to have that done accurately, I asked the Commissioners in making findings, to make a short finding for each specific fact. When we had finally agreed on the findings there were over 70 of them, numbered from 1 to 70. They were agreed upon. Those were the ones that were shown to the Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of War.

When we came to draft our report for submission to the President, every one of the Commission but myself said that it was a disjointed sort of thing, because it had 70 short paragraphs in it, cut apart, and they said it would be a great deal better to put the findings in longer paragraphs together.
We did that, and we finally condensed those 70 paragraphs into 19, without changing a word in them. If you will look at the findings, you will see that No. 1 consists of two paragraphs. Those were originally numbered separately.

The next one consists of two paragraphs which were originally numbered separately. The third one does not. The fourth consists of three paragraphs that had separate numbers, and so on.

We took the findings that dealt with a particular situation and put them under one caption with paragraphs instead of having them numbered straight through.

As to finding No. 20, I think I know what it was. It is at the bottom of page 6 of the printed report. That finding is now in a paragraph starting “November 24, 1941.” It dealt with a message from the Navy. In making up a statement on these messages we garbled them. We were told if we had translated them accurately, that either the Germans or the Japanese, who had taken off the code messages, might take the translation and break our code, and we should paraphrase them, and Secretary Knox thought our paraphrase perhaps was not plain enough to deceive the Japanese, and he suggested a slight change in verbiage, and we made it.

Mr. Richardson. Then, as a matter of fact, Mr. Justice, nothing in your findings was deleted, or eliminated because of the objection of anyone outside of the Commission?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Certainly not, except, as I say, Secretary Knox called attention to one finding, and said that might give some information, that we ought to phrase it somewhat differently, and we did.

Mr. Richardson. But the factual result of the rephrasing was the same as the original phrasing?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Absolutely.

Mr. Richardson. Now was your commission unanimous in approving each of the findings which you reported?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Certainly.

Mr. Richardson. And was your commission unanimous in the report which you filed on those findings?

Mr. Justice Roberts. It was.

Mr. Richardson. Now, when that report was made, how was it signed?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Signed by all the commission in duplicate.

Mr. Richardson. And each commissioner had a signed copy of the report?

Mr. Justice Roberts. No, sir. When we decided to make this change in the findings of fact, to put them in long paragraphs, that was pretty late. I think it might have been Thursday afternoon or Friday morning, and our secretary told us that he could get the report finished quicker, if he did not have to make seven copies, with six carbons, so he made the first and two carbons; that made it less difficult to put into the machine for each page, and we signed two duplicates. This is one, the ribbon copy, and one carbon.

I kept this one copy [indicating] as my copy, the third carbon. If you will look at the minutes, you will see the commissioner instructing the secretary to make one copy from this for each of the
other commissioners, that is to make four from this. So far as I know, the four were made, and so far as I know, each commissioner has a copy. I do not believe there was any shuffling around. I think that is the copy that the minutes said I was to have.

Mr. Richardson. And that copy was an exact copy of the report as signed?

[8795] Mr. Justice Roberts. Absolutely. It is a carbon copy of the ribbon copy.

Mr. Richardson. Now, following the signing of your report, did you have some conference with the President with reference to that report?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes. I covered that in my letter.

Mr. Richardson. Would you mind going over it again, so your testimony can be complete here on that point?

Mr. Justice Roberts. I do not know whether I can state what is in the letter with accuracy or not. I think I can.

That report was finished around 2:30 on Friday afternoon, December 23. In the presence of the commissioners, I called the White House, got Miss Tully on the phone, told her the report would be ready late that afternoon, was practically ready, and would be ready within an hour or so, and I should like to know whether the President wished it sent by the recorder under cover or whether he wished the commission to wait on him in a body and present it, or whether he wanted myself, as the chairman, to present it.

Miss Tully told me that the President was in a Cabinet meeting and could not reach him, but when he came out she would communicate with me.

The commission waited until Miss Tully came back and [8796] said the President had come out of the Cabinet meeting, that he was very tired, and he did not want the report presented that afternoon; that he wanted it presented by me as chairman of the commission in person, and he would see me for that purpose at 11 o'clock the next morning.

Mr. Richardson. What date or what month was the 24th?

Mr. Justice Roberts. January 24, Saturday.

Mr. Richardson. Your earlier remark was December 23. That should have been January?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Should have been January; certainly.

So I called at the White House on the morning of January 24 at 11 o'clock, saw the President in his study on the second floor. He was at his desk. I handed him an envelope containing these two duplicate reports. He opened it, and then started to read it.

I sat there and he read it line by line, and so far as I could make out he read every word of it, carried his finger on the pages.

I was there over 2 hours.

When he concluded reading it, he turned to me and said, "Is there anything in this report that might give our enemies information they ought not to have?" Or words to that effect. I said "No, sir; I cleared that with the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy, [8797] because we didn't want to put anything in here that might endanger the national defense."

Then he said, "I do not see why I should not give this report to the public in full."
I said, "It would be a great satisfaction to the commission if you did that, sir," or "it would please the commission if you did that," or words to that effect.

He rang the bell, and Mr. McIntyre came in. He threw this whole thing across the table, as I remember it, both copies, and envelope, and said, "Mac, give that to the Sunday papers in full," and Mr. McIntyre said, "Well I will have to put it in the mimeographing room, in the press room."

You see, it was then 1 o'clock and he took it and started to go away, and then he turned around and said, "Don't you want to say something about the work of the commission, Mr. President?"

The President said, "Oh, yes," and then he said something about he was greatly indebted to the commission for their prompt report, something of that kind, and Mr. McIntyre turned and went away. I have never seen the report from that day to this.

Mr. Richardson. You have had a copy, this carbon copy?
Mr. Justice Roberts. That has been in my files.
[8798] Mr. Richardson. That has also been compared, has it, with this Senate Document No. 159?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes.
Mr. Richardson. And that also is a correct copy of the report?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Well, I found one typographical error in the Senate Report, in finding 15, where it should read "distant air raid reconnaissance," it reads "distinct air raid reconnaissance." There can be no mistake as to what is meant, because the word "distant" appears twice again in the same paragraph. That is at the top of page 12. That is evidently a printer's error. That is the only thing I can find.

Mr. Richardson. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I do not care to inquire of the Justice.
Congressman Cooper.
Mr. Justice Roberts. I would like to say this: When we made these findings into larger paragraphs, we made two or three changes. You will note up at the top of page 8, at the end of the paragraph there, "Referred to in the next succeeding paragraph."

Well, as that paragraph had been put into a finding we had to change the words "next succeeding finding" to [8799] "paragraph," because they were all separate.

The same thing occurs in one or two other places wherever we speak of the "next succeeding paragraph." That originally read "finding?", but when we put them in one finding, we changed it.

The Chairman. I will ask just one question.
I gather from your statement there was never any finding 20 that was in any way eliminated, but you consolidated some seventy-odd findings into 19 findings; is that correct?
Mr. Justice Roberts. That is correct.
The Chairman. At no time during your consideration was there any finding No. 20 that was subsequently eliminated?
Mr. Justice Roberts. No, sir. There is one other thing.
At the very last moment, and after we had heard from the Secretaries of War and Navy, we made a slight change in finding 16, what is now the fourth paragraph of that finding.

In reading over the thing when it was finally in type, there was a word or two in there which I thought indicated that the Navy might
have broken the Japanese Navy code after December 7, and I eliminated, with the consent of the other two commissioners, two or three words, that I thought might indicate that the Navy had broken the Japanese code. That was the Japanese naval code, and not this other code that has been talked about.

The CHAIRMAN. That elimination was made with the approval of all of the commissioners?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. As a matter of fact, the whole report was a tentative draft which was subsequently reduced in form to the 19 findings which appear here in this official document?

Mr. Justice Roberts. That is correct.

[8801] The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Cooper.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Mr. Justice, there never was any intention of conducting any kind of court proceeding or trial, or anything of that kind?

Mr. Justice Roberts. No, sir.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. You were just making an investigation, were you?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes, sir. This seemed to me a preliminary investigation, like a grand jury investigation, and I did not think, for our report, that was to be taken as precluding every one of the men mentioned in it from a defense before his peers.

In other words, you could not conduct a proceeding without cross-examination and without publicity and call it a trial. It was not a trial.

[8802] The VICE CHAIRMAN. It was just an investigation?

Mr. Justice Roberts. It was an investigation and it was the formation of a judgment to be handed to the President. We didn't know whether the President would publish it or what he would do with it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator George.

Senator George. No questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Clark is not here. Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Justice, after the President gave the two copies to Secretary McIntyre with instructions to give it to the press, do you recall seeing that report in the press the following Sunday?

Mr. Justice Roberts. At that time I was on the Supreme Court and the following Monday mimeographed copies of this press release were sent up to the press room of the Supreme Court and Mr. Potter brought me up one. I didn’t compare it line for line with our report but I had the report fully in mind. I read it through and it was obviously complete.

Senator Lucas. After you read the report through you saw no changes or there was nothing in the report that called to your attention any changes from what you had presented to the President on the Saturday before?

Mr. Justice Roberts. That is correct, sir. I also saw the full report published in the New York Times on Sunday and read it with some care to see if it was complete and to my eye it was complete. There again I did not compare it line for line with my typewritten copy. Of course, with this [indicating printed copy] I took the trouble to compare it paragraph by paragraph—not line by line—and it was complete.
Senator Lucas. That is all.

The Chairman. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Justice, when Admiral Kimmel was testifying before us he made some reference to the type of stenographic work done at Pearl Harbor. As I read the record that has been given to us there was first several pages reporting the questions and answers as between the Commission and the witness. Thereafter there were corrections suggested and as we have been given it they are interlined following each particular page that would be corrected.

Then after that was done, as I understand it, Admiral Kimmel presented his version of the testimony. I mean, something that was prepared by him and which he wanted the commission to substitute for that which the stenographer had actually reported. As I understand it, then the commission [8804] said “No, but we will take it as reported to us and the corrections as supplied by you, we will also take what you consider the correct version, and include both in our record, and we will have before us what we actually got from the stenographer, the corrections that were suggested, plus the completed copy.”

At any time was there ever any intention on the part of the commission to be unfair to Admiral Kimmel and not reflect entirely what occurred during the course of the entire investigation?

Mr. Justice Roberts. No, Mr. Murphy.

Let me say that Admiral Kimmel was in a state, to my mind, of shock after this situation. He was dreadfully down, at which I was not at all surprised. These stenographers that I have spoken of served first to my knowledge in the Teapot Dome case. They are official court stenographers in Washington of the highest type. There was no criticism of their work in any respect.

Now, the transcript of Admiral Kimmel’s testimony to our knowledge was a correct transcript of what he said. Then he came back and said that wasn’t what he said and he wanted to substitute various things—and you have got his proposed substitutions. The commission considered that matter and they said “The stenographic transcript to our mind [8805] is correct as to what you said, Admiral, and we can’t let you interlard things that you did not say.”

So we didn’t allow him to do that. Then he went off with one of his assistants and prepared a draft of what he said he really meant by his testimony or had really intended to say and we said—he wanted what he had said deleted from the record and this thing substituted—and we said “We can’t do that, Admiral Kimmel, but in fairness to you we will include in the transcript this new paper that you have drawn up which you say is really what you want to say on the subject.”

So we put them all in the record so there would be no question of unfairness to him.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Justice, do you have any recollection of any paper ever having been given to your commission which was in effect an intercept of the so-called winds code?

Mr. Justice Roberts. No, sir.

Mr. Murphy. I believe the Army Pearl Harbor Board makes reference to the fact that such a paper was presented to your commission and lost.

Mr. Justice Roberts. Was not.

Mr. Murphy. Did you ever have any such paper?
Mr. Justice Roberts. It was not. When Senator Ferguson wrote me some time ago and asked me what I knew about the [8806] winds message I sent him a letter about a winds message that I did know about and when I read the testimony before this Commission I found that I was talking about something entirely different. There was a commercial message over the radio from Tokyo on the 5th or 6th of December by a merchant in Honolulu to a merchant in Tokyo.

Mr. Murphy. Would that be the Mori message?

Mr. Justice Roberts. I think so. It talked about the poinsettias being in bloom and the winds blowing from the east, and so forth. I thought that was the thing referred to. But I know of no other.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate that was the only so-called winds message that you had any knowledge of during the course of your entire proceeding?

Mr. Justice Roberts. That is true.

Mr. Murphy. I have no other questions.

The Chairman. Senator Brewster.

Senator Brewster. On page 9 of the report, the Senate document, there is a statement:

Every effort was made to have the message reach Hawaii in the briefest possible time, but due to conditions beyond the control of anyone concerned the delivery of this urgent message was delayed until after the attack.

That relates to the warning message of the morning of [8807] December 7.

That would require some qualification under the evidence we have received. How fully was that explored by you?

Mr. Justice Roberts. As fully as we knew how, and that was our judgment after hearing all the story. You may have evidence that we didn't have.

Senator Brewster. What was your understanding as to how that message was sent?

Mr. Justice Roberts. I haven't seen the testimony, since it was sealed, but I will give you my recollection of it after 4 years.

General Marshall told us before we went to Pearl Harbor the circumstances of that. When he had gotten to his office on the morning of December 7 and learned of this decode of the Japanese message he thought he ought to send one more urgent message to Pearl Harbor, and he told Admiral Stark he would like him to join it, and Admiral Stark in effect said, "Well, I have sent so many warning messages to them that I think it will only confuse them to send another; I think they have all the warning they need, and I won't join."

Marshall sat down and, to hurry, he scribbled off the message in lead pencil. Then Stark reconsidered, phoned him, and said, "You may join me in that message," which Marshall [8808] did. He then sent for his communications officer. It may have been Colonel French. He said, "How quickly can you get that to Pearl Harbor?" The man said, "In about a half an hour." I think he had warned French beforehand that he wanted to get a message through, and French had tried to open communications on the Army radio to Pearl Harbor but they couldn't get them. This communications officer explained to us in his testimony their practice in that case, where they couldn't raise the station on the radio, was to open the Western Union wire. He said the Army had a standing arrangement that when they wanted a wire open they could get it opened immediately and have it
had open. He called the Western Union and asked them to open a wire to San Francisco. That was done. The message was coded and sent. That then required the Western Union in San Francisco to carry the message across the street to the cable office to be resent.

Mr. Richardson. RCA, I think.

Mr. Justice Roberts. RCA, whatever it was. The cable office. I guess there is no cable to Hawaii. But to a communications company that would send it to Hawaii.

Now, we asked General Marshall whether he couldn't have used the telephone. He had, as we understood it, what might be called a private telephone from his office to [8809] General Short's office. General Marshall said that first of all the man having told him that he could get the message there in about a half an hour it didn't occur to him to use it but in any event he would have been hesitant to use that telephone while it had a scrambler on it. He knew that our enemy, and I don't know whether it was Germany or Japan, had been able to take off some messages from those scrambler telephones. They weren't very safe.

I think that is the whole of it.

Senator Brewster. Well, I think my question had reference to the—

Mr. Justice Roberts. Oh, let me add one thing more.

If the teletype in Pearl Harbor had been working Sunday morning that message would have been delivered within 2 or 3 minutes of its receipt. It was not the practice to run the teletype Sunday morning and the teletype was not running this Sunday morning. When the RCA operator found he couldn't get to General Short on the teletype he gave a little boy the message to take on a bicycle. The boy started out and went some distance when the first bomb dropped and then he went into the bushes and stayed there until about 2 o'clock when he delivered the message.

The Chairman. Can't blame him for that.

Senator Brewster. The qualification which I had in mind, [8810] which I gather is now indicated by your testimony, is that every effort was made to have the message reach Hawaii in the briefest possible time consistent with security. That qualification I take it is implied in connection with the scrambler telephone.

Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. As we have had testimony that within the next hour after the attack they reached Washington on the phone in 7 minutes; so that apparently there was very ready communication by the scrambler telephone between Washington and—between Hawaii and the east coast of the United States. There was the question of security raised which, of course, was a factor to be taken into account.

Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes. Those are all the facts I know on which we formed our judgment. It may have been quite a wrong one.

Senator Brewster. So you would agree that that qualification would be necessary to make your statement in the report strictly accurate?

Mr. Justice Roberts. No; I don't think so. The way I got it was that General Marshall thought that it would go through in code in about a half hour.
Senator Brewster. Did he tell you how long it took on the scrambler telephone?

[8811] Mr. Justice Roberts. No, but I supposed only a minute or two.

Senator Brewster. So that the statement:

Every effort was made to have the message reach Hawaii in the briefest possible time, * * *

without a qualification would not be correct?

Mr. Justice Roberts. That is probably true.

Senator Brewster. Now, another statement, on page 18:

Both commanders were handicapped by lack of information as to Japanese dispositions and intent. The lack of such knowledge rendered more urgent the initiation of a state of readiness for defense.

On this question of lack of information, were you informed in your hearings in Washington that Admiral Kimmel and General Short had the same information which was available in the War and Navy Departments here in Washington?

Mr. Justice Roberts. I don't think so.

Senator Brewster. In particular relation to the magic messages?

Mr. Justice Roberts. I don't think so. I think we set forth in our report what information we thought they were given by these warning messages. They were in doubt about the disposition of the Japanese fleet. The monitoring, the Navy monitoring system in Pearl Harbor, had been keeping [8812] very careful tabs on radio messages from the Japanese fleet. They had gotten a lot of indication that there was a tremendously fleet going down the Kra Peninsula. They had also noted that there was complete silence by the carriers.

Now, they assumed that the carriers being silent they were in port, because when they were in port they used a low frequency radio that couldn't be heard over the ocean. Of course, the carriers were coming across under silence from the northeast but the Navy Department seemed to think the carriers were in port. I presume Admiral Kimmel was told that from time to time by the monitors.

The reason for our statement there was that after the warnings that any lack of information ought to have made the commanders even more alert because they had warnings that war was liable to break out and go in any direction any moment.

Senator Brewster. That, of course, would be a matter of opinion.

Mr. Justice Roberts. That is a matter of our conclusion and our findings and I do not assume you are examining the Roberts Commission to find its faults.

Senator Brewster. Not at all. I was examining the Roberts commission to find out what——

Mr. Justice Roberts. What it had before it.

[8813] Senator Brewster. That is right.

I call attention again to:

Both commanders were handicapped by lack of information as to Japanese dispositions and intent.

It is my understanding that you were given more or less information about the magic, but all reference to that was very properly eliminated from both your investigation and your report?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Certainly.
Senator Brewster. This is now all a matter of public knowledge. The point which I think is of importance to determine is whether or not when you were given the information regarding the magic you were given any information as to whether or not Kimmel and Short had been given any report regarding that or its contents.

Mr. Justice Roberts. The commission's information was, I think, quite to the contrary. In other words, that no commander anywhere was told anything about that. Perhaps a half a dozen people in Washington were all the people that knew anything about it.

Senator Brewster. That was explained, so far as you recall now, to you fully at that time?

Mr. Justice Roberts. We knew the commanders weren't given what was taken off the breaking of the code; yes, indeed.

[8814] Senator Brewster. Was there evidence before you as to the responsibility of General Marshall and General Gerow in checking on General Short's report, which you quote:

Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy.

Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes.

Senator Brewster. And you understood that that was their responsibility, to check on that?

Mr. Justice Roberts. I understood, yes, and you will notice that in our report we say one of the subsidiary causes of the disaster was the failure of the War Department to reply to the message relating to the anti-sabotage messages instituted by the commanding general, Hawaiian Department.

Senator Brewster. Did the matter of the winds message come before you?

Mr. Justice Roberts. I don't know anything about this winds message except the winds message that I wrote Senator Ferguson about, that commercial message a day or two before the attack.

Senator Brewster. So, so far as you now recall, there was no mention about either the original or implementing winds message, as it is called?

Mr. Justice Roberts. I have no recollection of any such thing. And I think you will search the testimony in [8815] vain for any reference to it.

Senator Brewster. Well, we understood there were important gaps in that as the result of representations as to security.

Mr. Justice Roberts. Oh, No. The stenographic testimony is complete. There is nothing eliminated from the stenographic testimony. Oh, now and again General McNarney would want to know where General X or General Y was, and would say off the record "By the way, where is General X or Y." There were questions of that type, but there was nothing suppressed from the testimony whatever. All that about the magic, and all that, was given us in confidence at the War Department when we were taking the statements and not put on the typewritten record, not having a stenographer present.

Senator Brewster. That is what I am addressing myself to. I supposed that was material which was not a formal part of the record?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. For reasons which you have indicated.

Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes.
Senator Brewster. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. I have already questioned the Justice.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Gearhart. Pardon me.

[8816] Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Justice, how much time intervened after the attack before the Roberts commission had its first meeting?

Mr. Justice Roberts. The attack was on December 7. We had our—I was called to the White House and told that the President desired me to act as chairman of the commission on the 16th or 17th, 16th, I think. Admiral Standley was on his way to Washington. General McNarney had come in by air that morning. There was an informal meeting of four of us with the Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy on the morning I would say of the 17th and we formally organized on the morning of the 18th. That would have been 11 days after the attack.

Mr. Gearhart. Then on the 16th day, were Admiral Stark and General Marshall present?

Mr. Justice Roberts. The White House sent me a request to call there in the afternoon by 5 o'clock. I called at the White House and went to the President's Executive Office. Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary of Navy Knox, Admiral Leahy, Admiral King, Admiral Stark and General Marshall, at least, were there when the President asked me to assume this duty. I think there were no others present. I told him I could not assume the duty without the consent of the Chief Justice and he asked me to get that consent and phone [8817] him and I did that evening.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you take any testimony in the United States, that is, in the States here?

Mr. Justice Roberts. I would say so, Mr. Gearhart. I would say that all these statements and all this documentary proof that was produced from the Navy and the Army—I imagine you have had it all before you, war plans, submarine plans, copies of messages, orders, letters, all of that was in a sense testimony, and General Marshall told us what its bearing was and which hitched to which.

Admiral Turner was there to explain the war plans. General Gerow was there to explain the war plans. I would call that all testimony. It was not taken formally.

Mr. Gearhart. It was not stenographically reported?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Not at that time. We had no stenographers at that time and we had been warned that nobody outside of the Commission was to be there because the Army and Navy were so worried about anybody getting this story about the broken code, which, of course, they had to tell us, to tell us why they got frightened on December 7.

Mr. Gearhart. Admiral Stark and General Marshall both told you about the 1 o'clock directive message?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Which do you mean, the 1 o'clock? The one that was sent off at noon on December 7?

[8818] Mr. Gearhart. That contained a reference to it. I am referring to the Japanese intercepted message directing that the reply to Secretary Hull's message be delivered at 1 o'clock on Sunday, the 7th of December 1941.

Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes, they told us about that. That was the secret thing that they didn't want disclosed anywhere.
Mr. Gearhart. Yes.
Mr. Justice Roberts. You see, we had to cover that up in our report. I saw where we said something about it was “believed”, “that it was believed that relations would be broken off”, or something of that kind. “Believed”, by Secretary Hull.

The Chairman. You said in effect that information was received “from various sources”?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Something of that kind.
The Chairman. Without identifying it.
Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Did General Marshall and Admiral Stark tell you when they first received that information?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes. It was on the morning of December 7. General Marshall was out horseback riding. I think he got it about, I won’t be certain, 10:30. Something like that—10 or 10:30. He came right to the War Department. I don’t remember when Admiral Stark said he got it but it was that morning, maybe 9 o’clock or 9:30. I won’t be certain.

Mr. Gearhart. Did either of them tell when it was received and when it was decoded?
Mr. Justice Roberts. No, sir. I got the impression that it was received on the morning of December 7 sometime. Now, they weren’t definite about when the State Department or the Navy Department got it and they were very chary about telling us which agency was taking this stuff off. I never got it clear whether it was the Navy that broke that thing or the Army or the Department of State or whose agency was doing it. I know that they got the final word sometime on the morning of December 7 and from whom they got it I don’t know.

Mr. Gearhart. Did they, or either one of them, tell you about the 14-part message which the 1 o’clock directive referred to?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Not in that way. They said they didn’t know the final news until that morning. They didn’t tell us that the 14 parts came one day and one part the next day or overnight, but that the final directive, whatever it was, came that morning. And I believe that is right. I don’t know.

Mr. Gearhart. I think that is right. Was anything said by either of them about the 13 parts that came the afternoon before?
Mr. Justice Roberts. No. It was spoken of as their getting the knowledge that the thing was going to break that morning.

Mr. Gearhart. Did they or either one of them tell you where they were on Saturday night preceding?
Mr. Justice Roberts. No, sir, I don’t think we asked them.

Mr. Gearhart. You didn’t ask them that question?

Mr. Justice Roberts. I don’t think so.

Mr. Gearhart. Did they volunteer any information as to where they might have been?

Mr. Justice Roberts. No, sir, I think not.

Mr. Gearhart. Did they tell you where they were the previous Saturday during the daytime?

Mr. Justice Roberts. No, I think not. I don’t think we asked them.

Mr. Gearhart. That is all.
The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Justice, were you interviewed by Colonel Clausen? The reason I ask is that someone advised him, as shown in the record at page 8625:

[8821] The original of the Navy Department message and translation, now probably part of the original Roberts Report records, or at least, questioning of Mr. Justice Roberts would possibly disclose how that Commission disposed of it.

Mr. Justice Roberts. I am sure I don't know what he is talking about.

Senator Ferguson. This was sometime in 1944. He is talking about the winds message.

Mr. Justice Roberts. No; I never heard of it.

Senator Ferguson. At another place in the record, page 134 of Safford's testimony before the Pearl Harbor Board—

Mr. Justice Roberts. Whose testimony?

Senator Ferguson. Safford, Captain Safford. Do you recall him?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

The last time I saw that message after the attack on Pearl Harbor about the 15th of December, Admiral Noyes called for the assembling of all important messages into one file, to show as evidence to the Roberts Commission; and Kramer assembled them, and I checked them over for completeness and to see that we straitened out the unimportant ones; and that "winds" translation, the "winds execute," was included. [8822] In those, I do not recall whether that ever came back or not. So far as I know, it may even be with the original papers of the Roberts Commission. It never came back that I know of, and we have never seen it since, and that is the last I have seen of it.

Mr. Justice Roberts. It couldn't be with the original papers of the Roberts Commission. We did not take any of these original messages. Not one. They were looked at. The Navy and the Army said they would rather keep them in their secret files. They were available. We made memorandums of them. When we got to Pearl Harbor we took the same course. If there was any message that was shown to us we made a memorandum as to what it was and gave it back to the custodian. We did not have the original, the file originals of anything of this kind in our custody at any time.

Senator Ferguson. When you made a copy of a message, at the end, when you got through, what happened to your papers?

Mr. Justice Roberts. It was returned to the man who produced it for us.

Senator Ferguson. I mean the copies. When you finally completed and had your testimony and your notes.

Mr. Justice Roberts. We destroyed them. When we took [8823] a copy of a message, if the message said, "This is a war warning," we would make a copy; in conjunction with the Navy or the Army, "This is to be considered a war warning," so as to stick in a couple of words so that if we ever published it the Japs couldn't translate from the English back to the code. We would make our transcript of the purport of the message and return the message to the man who produced it.

That is true of the messages that were produced for us in Pearl Harbor. We didn't take them out of the Army Pearl Harbor files. They ought to be there today.

Senator Ferguson. In volume 3 of the testimony before your commission, referring to page 290, this is a photostatic copy, you are examining Colonel Fielder. He was——
Mr. Justice Roberts. He was on General Short's staff.

Senator Ferguson. As an intelligence officer?

Mr. Justice Roberts. That is right.

Senator Ferguson. You were the chairman and this is your language:

The Chairman. It has been reported to me that about 10 days before the attack a code was intercepted which could not be broken, but it was forwarded to Washington to the War Department to be broken, and the War Department found out it could be broken and did break it, and found it contained three important signal words which would direct the attack on Pearl Harbor, and that the War Department subsequently intercepted over the radio those three signal words and forwarded them to the military authorities here as an indication that the code had been followed and that the attack was planned.

I wish you would look at that.

Mr. Justice Roberts. You don't need to show it to me.

Senator Ferguson. What were you talking about?

Mr. Justice Roberts. I was talking about some information that had been given to me somewhere around Pearl Harbor. People were coming to me all the time telling me that there was such and such a rumor. You see I say "It has been reported to me."

Senator Ferguson. Wouldn't this describe the winds code message?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Very likely it would; very likely so.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, do you know of anyone in Hawaii that knew about this code coming in here and that we translated and got it?

Mr. Justice Roberts. I couldn't know. I got numerous letters and telephone messages from people who thought they had information and I gathered reports from all around. And you will see that I say in this report that the commission has had all sorts of rumors and tried to run them down. And that is no doubt some report that came to me out in Pearl Harbor.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Justice, this last part—and that the War Department subsequently intercepted over the radio those three signal words and forwarded them to the military authorities here—you were in Hawaii then?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. As an indication that the code had been followed and that the attack was planned.

Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes; that is what I say.

Senator Ferguson. Wouldn't that indicate that the winds execute message had been received and that you had some information on that point?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Surely. Somebody had told me that or I wouldn't have asked the question.

Senator Ferguson. Now, on page 319—

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. Don't you think we ought to have the answer of Colonel Fielder?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Colonel Fielder said:

I have no knowledge of that whatever.

[8826] The Chairman. You know nothing about it?

Colonel Fielder. No.
The CHAIRMAN. You had no communication from the War Department as of December 5th forwarding to you the meaning of the three code words which would be the signal for the attack?

I was coming back to that.

Now, that would indicate that there were three code words showing there was going to be an attack as far as the United States was concerned, at least someone told you about it?

Mr. Justice Roberts. That is right.

Senator Ferguson. And then Colonel Fielder says:

No, sir, it never came to my attention.

The CHAIRMAN. After the Japanese Consul had burned his papers, the code message here was discovered?

Colonel Fielder. Yes, the code book was.

They are talking about a different thing.

Now, I refer to exhibit 32 and on December 5, 1941, there was a message sent by General Miles:

Assistant Chief of Staff, Headquarters, G-2, Hawaiian Department, Honolulu Territory, Hawaii.

Contact Commander Rochefort immediately through Commandant Fourteenth Naval District regarding broadcast from Tokyo with reference weather.

[3827] signed “Miles”.

Did you have that message before you, do you recall?

Mr. Justice Roberts. I think so.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that they were talking there about the original code message?

Mr. Justice Roberts. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I mean the original winds message.

Mr. Justice Roberts. No, sir; I don’t know it now.

Senator Ferguson. Now, going on:

The CHAIRMAN. I refer to something else which you may or may not know anything about. I refer to the fact that some ten days before December it is supposed that a Japanese code message was intercepted and was broken down by the Department in Washington, one of the military departments, which gave certain key words which would be flashed over the radio directing the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Colonel Bicknell. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. And that, having broken that down, one of the military establishment in Washington caught over the radio the three key words and relayed them here to you. When I say “you”, to the Islands.

Colonel Bicknell. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know of any such story?

Colonel Bicknell. I never heard of such a thing, no, sir.

[3828] The CHAIRMAN. Never heard of it?

Colonel Bicknell. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no other questions. Are there any other questions?

Mr. Justice Roberts. I was talking about the same rumors that had come to me from somewhere.

Senator Ferguson. As you were there with Bicknell?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you follow that up? I have looked over the testimony and I haven’t been able to find it but I want to know now, from your recollection, do you know whether you ever tried to follow that up here in Washington after you failed on Bicknell and Fielder?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes, sir. We asked for all the messages there were about any broken codes and we were told we had had all they had except this magic thing.

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that you did not get the magic?
Mr. Justice Roberts. No; we were never shown one of the magic messages.

Senator Ferguson. Not one?
Mr. Justice Roberts. Not one.

Senator Ferguson. Were you ever shown the substance of the magic messages?

[8829] Mr. Justice Roberts. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So that when you made this report you never had any information out of the magic messages?

Mr. Justice Roberts. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know there were such messages?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Well, I knew that the Army or Navy or State Department had been cracking a super code of the Japanese for weeks or months and that they had been taking off all kinds of information. We asked the War Department and the Navy Department to tell us what they got from that and they told us. They did not show us the messages, any of them, and I didn’t ask them to.

Senator Ferguson. That being true how was this finding possible, on page 19:

The Secretary of State—

Mr. Justice Roberts. Now, Senator, is this an investigation of the Roberts commission or an investigation of what happened at Pearl Harbor?

Senator Ferguson. I am trying to get the facts.

Mr. Justice Roberts. When you ask “How is this finding possible?” I don’t find you criticizing me a bit.

Senator Ferguson. I am not criticizing. I want to know on the facts you had before you—

[8830] Mr. Justice Roberts. How we could make a certain finding.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Justice Roberts. I think that is criticism.

Senator Ferguson. You think that is criticism?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Go ahead. I will be glad to answer your question.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

The Secretary of State fulfilled his obligations by keeping the War and Navy Departments in close touch with the international situation and fully advising them respecting the course and probable termination of negotiations with Japan.

Now, I merely mean if you didn’t have any of these messages, for instance, the message setting the dead line as the 25th, which he had, another dead line of the 29th, the pilot message, the 1 o’clock message, the 13-part message up until midnight or 9 o’clock, and the 14th part and 1 o’clock message on Sunday morning, how could the commission make a finding, if they didn’t have the facts?

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

The Chairman. Let him answer the question first.

Mr. Justice Roberts. I spent an entire day in Secretary Hull’s office. Secretary Hull showed me, as a Commissioner sent over by the
commission, because we wanted to do him the courtesy of sending someone there to take his evidence instead of dragging him over to the Navy Department. Secretary Hull showed me his personal memorandum where he had noted that on a certain day he had told the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy this, that and the other thing, and where he got that information I didn't ask him, but I was perfectly convinced, and our commission was convinced from my report to them of the testimony he brought to me, that Secretary Hull had been warning the War and Navy Departments day by day and day by day that something might happen this day or that day, that the situation was degenerating, and so on.

[8832] Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, Justice, that part of the testimony is not in the testimony furnished to us, is it?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Certainly not. They had a stack of memoranda of the State Department that high, or Secretary Hull's personal memoranda and in order to recap it I asked him to write the letter which is in our record.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever have the message of the 16th and the 17th—no, it was in Exhibits 16 and 17 here and I will describe it because you wouldn't know those exhibit numbers, about the two deadlines. Did you ever know there was a dead line set?

Mr. Justice Roberts. I won't say that I knew there was a dead line set in so many words. What our commission was interested in was this, if General Marshall and Admiral Stark had not been given sufficient warnings the Secretary of State would have been at fault. We did not want to pass on the policy that the Secretary of State had or was pursuing, it was not within our function at all. We were to look into any military defaults.

Now, all we had to satisfy ourselves was that General Marshall and Admiral Stark had had ample warning and they told us so themselves. They said that they had had ample warning.

[8833] Mr. Murphy. That is all the report says, by the way, the Army and Navy Departments—

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment.

The Chairman. The Senator does not yield.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand you did not go into any question of policy of the Secretary of State or the President of the United States?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Certainly not. It was not within our commission. Here is the commission.

Senator Ferguson. Your commission was limited solely to the Army?

Mr. Justice Roberts. And the Navy.

Senator Ferguson. And the Navy?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Then we come to the next finding in your conclusions:

The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy fulfilled their obligations by conferring frequently with the Secretary of State and with each other and by keeping the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations informed of the course of the negotiations with Japan and the significant implications thereof.

Now, without having the intercepted magic messages, did you make this finding? I will put it that way.
Mr. Justice Roberts. Why, certainly. The Chief of Staff and Admiral Stark told us and the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy told us that every time Hull gave them a warning they would go and repeat it to the Chief of Staff and to the Admiral. I did not need to look at any messages to find out whether Marshall and Stark had been sufficiently warned. That is all I was interested in.

Senator Ferguson. Now, Justice, the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, the President, and the Secretary of State were each being furnished this magic. Did you not know that they were all being furnished the magic?

Mr. Justice Roberts. I did not know it and I would not have been interested in it.

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, as to whether or not——

Mr. Justice Roberts. Now, let's go ahead.

Senator Ferguson. Do you have something to say?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Let's investigate the Roberts commission. I would not have been interested in it, Senator. I wanted to know whether the military men were put on full warning and put on their toes by the men who did have the information. I got a unanimous statement that they were.

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, Justice, if your commission was not furnished all the data that we had here in Washington how could you make a finding on whether or not they were on their toes out in Hawaii and knew all the facts?

Mr. Justice Roberts. We had the messages that were sent to them.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you know that there was more information that could have been sent to them?

Mr. Justice Roberts. I suppose there never was a situation where there was not more information that could be sent to somebody.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I show you Exhibit 2 and show you a message on page——

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Not at this moment.

(Continuing.) Page 14 and ask you whether or not that message was ever furnished to you? [Handing document to witness.]

Mr. Justice Roberts. I think we saw that message; I think so.

Senator Ferguson. Now, on page 18 of your report you say this: [Reading:]

Both commanders were handicapped by lack of information as to Japanese dispositions and intent. The lack of such knowledge rendered more urgent the initiation of a state of readiness for defense.

Now, have you ever gone over all of the intercepted messages, diplomatic and otherwise, like the one I just showed you, to determine whether or not that was a fact or not, or did you find this upon what you had before you and that did not include the magic?

Mr. Justice Roberts. It certainly did not include the magic. The magic was not shown to us. I would not have bothered to read it if it had been shown to us. All I wanted to know was whether the commanders had been advised of the criticalness of this situation. I found from the messages sent them—I say "I found"—the commission found that they had had ample warning and that they had orders from headquarters. Now, they could have been sent more, of course. They could have been sent a message every 2 hours.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, wait. If there was a message coming in every 2 hours and that information would have given them more warning wouldn't there then have been neglect on those here who did not send it?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Now, do you want me to make your report?

Senator Ferguson. No.

Mr. Justice Roberts. Well, I have made my conclusions. My commissioners joined me in making the conclusions. If you [8837] reach a different conclusion, certainly that is your privilege but don't ask me to check your conclusions.

Senator Ferguson. On page 2 I see this:

The oral evidence received amounts to 1,887 typewritten pages, and the records and documents examined exceed 3,000 printed pages in number.

Now, the photostatic copy of the transcript has only 1862 pages, 25 less, and there is—would you look at the page?

Mr. Justice Roberts. I do not need to, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Can you answer it if you do not need to look at it?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes; I can answer it. I do not know why the discrepancy.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether there is any evidence that we do not have?

Mr. Justice Roberts. I know there is none you do not have.

Senator Ferguson. Well, do you know what evidence we have as far as the Roberts report is concerned?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Well, I thought you meant whether there was any evidence before us that you do not have. We turned over everything that was before us that was in the shape of evidence.

[8838] Senator Ferguson. And to whom did you turn it over?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Well, our minutes show it; you have the minutes before you. Documents received from the Army were returned to the Army. Documents received from the Navy were returned to the Navy. Documents received neither from the Army nor the Navy were sealed in a Navy bundle, the testimony was sealed in a bundle, a copy of our minutes were sealed in a bundle and one bundle delivered to the Army and one bundle delivered to the Navy and in each one of them we had a list of the documents delivered to the Army and to the Navy.

Senator Ferguson. No copy of the findings and the exhibits was furnished to the White House?

Mr. Justice Roberts. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. On the day that you spent some 2 hours with the President the day you made your report did you have a discussion of the facts?

Mr. Justice Roberts. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. There was no discussion of the facts?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Well, it depends on what you mean by a "discussion of the facts."

Senator Ferguson. Well, will you try and give us what took place there and that will answer the question.

Mr. Justice Roberts. Well, I think it a highly improper thing but if you ask it I suppose I am bound to answer it.

[8839] The President, as I said, read this report with his fingers on the lines, and I remember when he came to a statement——

Mr. Justice Roberts. Certainly. I think it is improper; the report speaks for itself.

The President, I remember, when he saw our report said that the attack had done great damage and caused a great loss of life. He said, "Did you report on the nature of the damage?" I said, "No, Mr. President, I thought the administration would give that out when it thought the country was prepared for it. It is not really our province." He said, "I think you are right." And I remember when he got to something about what happened at Pearl Harbor he said, "Frank Knox told me that." Knox had been over there before us and had come back. And several times he would say "Frank Knox reported on that." Two or three times he would shake his head and say, "Tsk, Tsk," something of that sort.

I remember when he got to the finding about the FBI establishing an office in Pearl Harbor he said, "I ordered the FBI to establish an office there." He said, "I thought they could do the civilian espionage better than the Army or the Navy."

And then he turned to me and he said, "Was there any evidence that the Army and the Navy and the FBI did not cooperate fully?" I said, "We could find none, Mr. President." And I think there was some report went to Washington on it and he said something about, "I understand the airways there are going to be usable very soon in there," and I said, "I heard the Army and Navy men discussing it with some of the witnesses but it didn't interest me, it had nothing to do with our inquiry."

I remember that—of course, it has been 4 years ago and it was a sort of a running commentary. I think he asked me what reason these officers out there seemed to have for thinking that there never would be an air attack on Oahu? And I told him that as nearly as I could gather it was because they thought that the Japanese would never risk three or four carriers in such an attack, it was too big a risk. And he said something about our lack of carriers, that our carrier force, he hoped, would be very much augmented and very fast and I think he said that he was thinking about converting other types of vessels into carriers, merchant vessels into small carriers.

Well, there was that sort of comment; it was a comment and a question here and there.

Senator Ferguson. Was there anything said about the safety of the fleet at Pearl Harbor, whether that question had been raised before?

Mr. Justice Roberts. No. Our report referred to that and he did not say anything about that.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, Justice, what was wrong with the question I asked you, to tell me what the President had said?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Well, now Senator, I am not going to indicate whether Senator Ferguson is wrong. We have been inquiring about how wrong Roberts is. Don't let us get clear off that line.

Senator Ferguson. I was wondering why we shouldn't have the facts as a committee.

Mr. Justice Roberts. Well, I am not going to argue it with you, Senator. I said I was going to try to answer your questions.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, there is in your letter—rather, in the letter from Mr. Stimson I read this language:

Your full opinion on some of these latter points seem to me so important that I hope it will be given to the President and others, possibly, who are concerned with the defense of the country in a manner which we can use without getting to the enemy.

What did he have in mind, do you know?

MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS. Well, I think I know. I told you that on the morning after I was notified of my appointment and the others were we met informally in the Secretary of War’s office at his request. Secretary Knox was there and Mr. Stimson very characteristically said that the Army and Navy wanted to cooperate fully with us and furnish us every facility they could and he added that he felt really that it was not a question of Army versus the Navy or Navy versus the Army and he turned to Knox and said, “How about that, Frank?” And Secretary Knox said, “That is absolutely right; it is not a question of Army against the Navy or the Navy against the Army. Let them find the full facts.”

And Stimson said, “I have asked you to stop in here because there is another thing in my mind.” He said, “While I understand it has nothing to do with your functions as an investigative body, some of these men are competent military and naval men. It has just occurred to me that as a result of your investigation you may think of something that is for the betterment of the service, some lines that we can take in the future and make some recommendations,” and we listened to him and we went out.

You see, he wrote in that sense to me afterward. I thought it was not my province to make recommendations to the Army and Navy and you will see by my reply I acknowledge his letter and say nothing about making any recommendations.

Whether Admiral Standley or Admiral Reeves saw something about a better type of airplane and mentioned it to the Secretary afterward or better antiaircraft or better organization, I do not know, but I did not think I would volunteer any military advice to the Secretary of War and I did not.

Senator Ferguson. So you had not given him any opinion, so that he wanted you to elaborate on the report?

MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS. Certainly not. I gave him what is in our report and I have never given him anything else.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have information in Hawaii that there had been wire tapping?

MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS. It depends on when you mean.

Senator Ferguson. Well, at any time.

MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS. We were so informed and the testimony was that the military services, intelligence services, including the FBI, had been instructed by the Attorney General that it was unlawful to tap commercial messages, private messages. We were informed that that view was changed just before Pearl Harbor, I cannot say how many days, and that arrangements had been made with one or two of the commercial radio companies for taps. As a result of those taps they got this poinsettia called message that I told you about, where a Honolulu merchant talked to a Tokyo merchant for something like $50 about winds and poinsettias and so on.
They took that tap to General Short and he said, "Well, what does it mean?" They said, "We don't know." He said "I don't know what I can do about it." They took it to Admiral Kimmel and the same think took place.

I think they also—that is the only commercial message that I remember that they got as a result of those 2 or 3 days of taps. They did take off a message that I am not sure whether it was a commercial message or not, in code which contained signals that if a fire was burning on a mountain on Mani on a certain night that would mean something and if a light was shown in a certain house on a certain night—on the night of December 6, that would mean something.

Now—

Senator Ferguson. Just on that, if I may.

Mr. Justice Roberts. And in addition—let me finish.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Justice Roberts. The Navy Intelligence Service could not make that message out. They never got it broken until, I think, December 8 or 9; they finally broke it.

Senator Ferguson. You mean at Hawaii they had not broken it?

Mr. Justice Roberts. That is right.

[8845] Senator Ferguson. We have some testimony here before us that it was broken in the rough and on Commander Kramer's desk by 1 or 2 o'clock on Saturday. Did you go into the question of the attack on the Kra Peninsula; what it meant?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Well, we went into the fact that the navy intelligence was indicating a tremendous fleet going down the Kra Peninsula and that the likelihood was that an attack would come there very likely.

Senator Ferguson. Did you go into the question as to whether or not we had any obligations if there was an attack upon the Kra Peninsula and not upon America, as to what our obligations would be?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Certainly not.

Senator Ferguson. You would have considered that part of the policy which you were not to go into?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Why, certainly.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. So that was not covered.

Mr. Justice Roberts. Certainly not.

Senator Ferguson. That is all.

The Chairman. Congressman Keefe.

Mr. Keefe. I just want to ask one or two questions to see if I can understand the testimony of Justice Roberts.

The scope of your inquiry or, rather, the inquiry made by [8846] the Roberts Commission, was limited to the Army and Navy and specifically limited to the facts surrounding Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Quite so, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, do I correctly understand your testimony that in connection with the determination of what you conceived to be the issue submitted to the commission you were not shown by either the Army or the Navy the magic messages?

Mr. Justice Roberts. That is correct; we were not shown one of them.

Mr. Keefe. You were shown the messages that were sent from Washington to Kimmel and Short?
Mr. Justice Roberts. That is right.
Mr. Keeffe. And the reply that Short and Kimmel gave to Washington?
Mr. Justice Roberts. That is right.
Mr. Keeffe. So that the determination of the Roberts Commission was based upon that type of message and that type of intelligence and in no way considered the magic which was in the possession of the officers here in Washington.
Mr. Justice Roberts. Well, we considered it in this sense, that evidently the magic had given information to all in the high command here that something was going to break very soon. Now they had a duty as soon as they got that information. That duty was that they sufficiently advise the commanders at the front that that was the situation and put them on warning.
Mr. Keeffe. So that as far as you and your commission were concerned you had general knowledge that they must have received information from some source—
Mr. Justice Roberts. Oh, certainly.
Mr. Keeffe (continuing). Which prompted them to send the messages.
Mr. Justice Roberts. They told us they had this magic that gave that distinct information.
Mr. Keeffe. Yes.
Mr. Justice Roberts. Yes.
Mr. Keeffe. That is all.
Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, before—
Mr. Justice Roberts. Mr. Chairman, is it desired that my copy of the report go in? There still seems to be some suspicion that the President did not get all we had, or expressions of that sort.
The Chairman. Well, regardless of any suspicion or lack of suspicion, in order that the record may be complete the Chair thinks that such copy should be printed at this time as a part of your testimony.
Mr. Justice Roberts. And that it may be returned to me, if the stenographer will mark it as my property. This is the only copy I have.
[8848] The Chairman. We will undertake to do that.
Mr. Justice Roberts. Thank you, sir.
(The report referred to follows:)

[8849] The President,
The White House.

Sir: The undersigned were appointed by Executive Order of December 18, 1941, which defined our duties as a commission thus:
"to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941. "The purposes of the required inquiry and report are to provide bases for sound decisions whether any derelictions of duty or errors of judgment on the part of United States Army or Navy personnel contributed to such successes as were achieved by the enemy on the occasion mentioned, and if so, what these derelictions or errors were, and who were responsible therefor."
The Congress speedily supplemented the Executive Order by granting the Commission power to summon witnesses and examine them under oath.
The Commission held three meetings in Washington December 18, 19 and 20, and on the latter day proceeded to Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii, where the Commission arrived December 22 and held meetings December 22, 23, 24, and 26 at the Headquarters of the Hawaiian Department, Fort
Shafer, and December 27, 29, 30, and 31, 1941, and January 2, and 3, 1942 at the Submarine Base, Pearl Harbor, and January 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel, Honolulu. January 10 the Commission left Honolulu for Washington, D. C., held meetings January 12, 13, and 14, arrived at Washington January 15th, and held further meetings January 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23.

The Commission examined 127 witnesses and received a large number of documents. All members of the military and naval establishments, and civil officers and citizens who were thought to have knowledge of facts pertinent to the inquiry were summoned and examined under oath. All persons in the Island of Oahu, who believed they had knowledge of such facts, were publicly requested to appear, and a number responded to the invitation, and gave evidence.

Various rumors and hearsay statements have been communicated to the Commission. The Commission has sought to find and examine witnesses who might be expected to have knowledge respecting them. We believe that our findings of fact sufficiently dispose of most of them.

The evidence touches subjects which in the national interest should remain secret. We have, therefore, refrained [8851] from quotation of testimony or documentary proof. Our findings, however, have been made with the purpose fully and accurately to reflect the testimony, which as respects matters of fact is substantially without contradiction.

It is true, as we have found, that due to the enormous demand on the nation's capacity to produce munitions and war supplies, there was a deficiency in the provision of matériel for the Hawaiian area. This was but natural, in the circumstances, and was well known to the government departments and local commanders. We have made no detailed findings on the subject, since as will appear from our report, we find that this deficiency did not affect the critical fact of failure to take the appropriate measures with the means available.

At our hearings reference was made to what has long been a matter of common knowledge—that there are, and have been, diverse views of national policy respecting the basing of the entire United States Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, T. H. We feel that the national policy in this matter is one that has been, settled by those responsible for such decisions and that it is not within our province—that of finding the facts respecting the attack of December 7, and the responsibility for the resulting damage to the United States,—to discuss any such topic.

Regrettable loss of life and extensive damage [8852] resulted from the air raid. The nature of that damage and the details of the measures taken to repair it have no direct bearing on the execution of the mandate appointing this Commission, and the subject is dealt with in our report only to the extent that it bears on questions of responsibility for the disaster.

The evidence taken covered a wide scope. The Commission intentionally invited such latitude of testimony and inquiry in the belief that thereby incidental light might be thrown upon the main issues involved. As an example, the Commission heard evidence to show what had been done at Pearl Harbor and on the Island of Oahu by naval and military commands subsequent to December 7, 1941, in the view that this might throw some light upon the matters submitted for our consideration. Again, the Commission heard much testimony as to the population of Hawaii, its composition, and the attitude and disposition of the persons composing it, in the belief that the facts disclosed might aid in appraising the results of investigative, counter-espionage, and anti-sabotage work done antecedent to the attack of December 7, 1941.

The Commission visited the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor and air fields of the military and naval establishments, as well as the Army posts and forts and certain of the coast fortifications on the Island of Oahu.

[8853] The minutes of each meeting of the Commission are on record. The statements of witnesses received in the meetings previous to that of December 22 have been recorded in summaries. All testimony received at the meeting of December 22 and the subsequent meetings was stenographically reported and transcribed.

The oral evidence received amounts to 1887 typewritten pages, and the records and documents examined exceed 3000 printed pages in number.

Appended hereto is a map of the Island of Oahu showing the location of the principal naval and military establishments.

All the testimony and evidence received have been considered, and as the result of its deliberations, the Commission submits the following.
About 7:55 A. M. Honolulu time (1:25 P. M. E. S. T.) on Sunday, December 7, 1941, Japanese forces attacked Army and Navy installations and ships of the Pacific Fleet in Oahu, Territory of Hawaii.

Although the United States and Japan were at peace on that morning, Japan planned to announce to the Secretary of State of the United States at 1:00 P. M. of that day E. S. T. (7:30 A. M. Honolulu time) the severance of diplomatic relations and simultaneously to attack the Island of Oahu and Pearl Harbor. The military preparations for this breach of international faith and honor were put in train and the forces for its consummation had been dispatched weeks prior to any intimation of the planned severance of relations.

The Territory of Hawaii comprises the group of islands known as "The Hawaiian Islands." This group consists of the larger islands—Hawaii, Maui, Molokai, Oahu, and Kauai—a number of smaller islands. They extend from Hawaii in the south some three hundred miles in a northwesterly direction, including Kauai in the north. For purposes of certain developments and protection, the Islands of Midway, Wake, Johnston, Palmyra, Christmas, and Canton, had been placed under the responsible naval and military heads in the Hawaiian area.

The importance of the Territory of Hawaii from a national defense standpoint is the fact that Pearl Harbor, the main outlying naval base in the Pacific, is located in the Island of Oahu, one of the Hawaiian group. For this reason all measures for the protection and defense of the Territory have centered in and around Oahu, the other islands being garrisoned by minor forces only. A main outlying naval base, such as Pearl Harbor, is intended for the use of the fleet for taking on fuel and supplies, for recreation and rest of the fleet personnel, and for the repair and refitting of ships.

It has been well known that the policy of the United States as to affairs in the Pacific was in conflict with the policies of other Governments. It was realized by the State, War and Navy Departments of the United States that unless these policies were reconciled war in the Pacific was inevitable.

Plans and preparations against the contingency of war was the joint responsibility of the military and naval authorities, and within the limits of funds and authorizations provided by the Congress were being ceaselessly carried out. Under these plans the general function of the Army is to conduct military operations in direct defense of United States territory. The general function of the Navy is to conduct naval operations to gain and maintain control of vital sea areas, thereby contributing to the defense of the coastal frontiers.

Specific plans for the protection of the Hawaiian area against every contingency had been prepared. There included Joint Army and Navy War Plans and War Department and Navy Department plans subsidiary thereto which establish the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, assign tasks and forces to both Army and Navy for its joint defense, and prescribe that the system of coordination between the responsible Army and Navy commanders shall be by mutual cooperation.

The responsibility for the joint defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier rested upon the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant 14th Naval District, the latter acting as a subordinate of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet. The Commander in Chief of the Fleet, in addition, was assigned the task of protecting the territory within the Hawaiian Naval Coastal Frontier by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions within that frontier, and the further task of covering the operations of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier forces. The Commanding General, Hawaiian De-
partment, could properly deal respecting defense measures and dispositions with either the commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet or the Commandant of the 14th Naval District.

The Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet from February 1, 1941 to December 17, 1941, was Admiral Husband E. Kimmel. The Commandant, 14th Naval District from April 11, 1940 to date is Rear Admiral Claude E. Bloch. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, from February 7, 1941 to December 17, 1941, was Lieutenant General Walter C. Short.

A local joint defense plan entitled "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier", was prepared by General Short and Rear Admiral Bloch, the latter acting under the direction of Admiral Kimmel. Each commander adopted a standing operating procedure, or standing orders, to carry out his obligation under the joint agreement. This Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was intended to become operative under order of the War and Navy Departments or as agreed upon by the local commanders in the case of an emergency, a threat of hostile action, or the occurrence of war.

VI

The means available to the Army, for the fulfillment of this mission, consist of coast defense and antiaircraft artillery, mobile ground forces, the Hawaiian Air Force, and an aircraft warning service. The supporting elements of the Navy consist of local naval defense forces comprising light surface craft and shore-based aircraft not assigned to the fleet. The fleet as such was not charged with the defense of Pearl Harbor, except that certain aircraft attached to the fleet, when present, and the antiaircraft weapons of such units of the fleet as were in port, were available.

It was recognized that, prior to furnishing the full war strength garrison, insufficient forces were available to maintain all the defenses on a war footing for extended periods of time. The responsible commanders made numerous recommendations to the War and Navy Departments for additional forces, equipment, and funds which they deemed necessary to insure the defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier under any eventuality. The national situation permitted only a partial filling of these requirements. However, presupposing timely dispositions by the Army and Navy Commands in Hawaii, the forces available to them were adequate to frustrate a surprise air attack or greatly to mitigate its effectiveness.

VII

In a letter of January 24, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy advised the Secretary of War that the increased gravity of the Japanese situation had prompted a restudy of the problem of the security of the Pacific fleet while in Pearl Harbor. The writer stated: "If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor." The writer stated that the "inherent possibilities of a major disaster" warranted further speedy action to "increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned.

The letter proceeded: "The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be: (1) air bombing attack (2) air torpedo plane attack (3) sabotage (4) submarine attack (5) mining (6) bombardment by gun fire." It stated the defenses against all but the first two were then satisfactory, described the probable character of an air attack and urged consideration by the Army of dispositions to discover and meet such attack and provision of additional equipment therefor. It concluded with recommendations for the revision of joint defense plans with special emphasis on the coordination of Army and Navy operations against surprise aircraft raids. It also urged the conduct of joint exercises to train the forces to meet such raids.

The Secretary of War replied February 7, 1941, giving the present and prospective status of the Hawaiian Department in respect to airplanes and antiaircraft artillery, and stating with respect to the other proposals of the Secretary of the Navy that a copy of the letter was being forwarded to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, with direction to him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making the suggested measures effective.

Admiral Kimmel and General Short received copies of these letters at about the time they assumed the commands which they held December 7, 1941. Rear Admiral Bloch also received copies.
The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan and plans subsidiary thereto envisaged the possibility of an air attack and estimated that, if made, it would most likely occur at dawn. An agreement between the Hawaiian Air Force and the Commander, Navy Patrol Wing Two, established the responsibilities for the joint use and operation of the available air forces of the Army and Navy. The Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, and standing orders of the U. S. Pacific Fleet and the 14th Naval District also prescribed measures for protection against air attack. Frequent joint drills and exercises were conducted during the year 1941 to insure such measures would be effective.

VIII

For months prior to December 7, 1941, the Secretary of State was repeatedly in contact with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, not only in Cabinet meetings, but in meetings of the War Council; and on the occasions of those contacts and in conference with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy discussed negotiations with Japan and the growing tenacity of the relations of the United States with Japan. At meetings [8861] of the War Council the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations were also present. The Secretary of State constantly kept the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy informed of the progress of the negotiations, and all three of these officials were cognizant of the growing threat of hostilities and of the military and naval needs and measures consequent thereupon. The Secretaries of War and Navy were in constant touch with the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, and imparted to them the information received from the Secretary of State and the results of their conferences with him. The latter officers in turn advised the responsible commanders in the field of the progress of events and of the growing threat of hostilities. The responsible commanders in the Hawaiian area were aware that previous Japanese actions and demonstrated Axis methods indicated that hostile action might be expected prior to a declaration of war.

IX

October 16, 1941, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commander in Chief of the Fleet, were advised by the War and Navy Departments of the changes in the Japanese cabinet, of the probability of hostilities between Japan and Russia, and of the possibility of an attack by Japan on Great Britain and the United States. [8862] Both commanders were warned to take precautions and to make preparatory dispositions which would not disclose their strategic intentions or constitute provocation as against Japan. Admiral Kimmel made certain dispositions of units of the fleet, and placed additional security measures in effect in the operating areas outside Pearl Harbor. At that time various task forces of the Navy were engaged in training operations and maneuvers which were deemed highly important to the training of the fleet personnel, and the Army was also conducting intensive training, particularly of its air arm. The responsible commanders testified that to undertake increased defense measures respecting Pearl Harbor and the Hawaiian area would necessitate curtailment of training, if not its virtual suspension, and they thought the situation was not such as to require that.

November 24, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a message to Admiral Kimmel in which he stated that in the opinion of the Navy Department a surprise aggressive movement in any direction by the Japanese, including an attack on the Philippines or Guam, was a possibility; that the doubt as to favorable outcome of pending negotiations, the statements of the Japanese government, and the movements of its army and naval forces, support this opinion. The communication enjoined secrecy to prevent complication of the tense existing situation. The message advised that the [8863] Chief of Staff of the Army requested that the local senior Army officers be advised that he concurred in the despatch. This message was seen by both the Commander in Chief of the Fleet and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department.

The responsible commanders in Hawaii knew that negotiations had been continued through October and November, and were awaiting further developments. November 27, 1941, the Chief of Staff of the Army informed the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, that the negotiations with Japan seemed to be ended, with little likelihood of their resumption; that Japanese action was unpredictable; that hostilities on the part of Japan were momentarily possible; that
in the event of hostilities could not be avoided the United States desired that this nation should not commit the first overt act; that the Department Commander was not to be restricted to any course which would jeopardize his defense. The message directed him, even prior to hostile action, to undertake such reconnoissance and other measures as he deemed necessary, but to carry them out in such a way as not to alarm the civil population or disclose his intent. He was directed to restrict the information contained in the message to the minimum of essential officers, and to report to the Chief of Staff the measures taken. The purport of this message was communicated by the Department Commander to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

[8864] On the same day (November 27, 1941) The Chief of Military Intelligence sent a message to the Intelligence Officer on the Staff of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, directing him to inform the Commanding General and his Chief of Staff that negotiations with Japan had practically ceased; that hostilities might ensue; and that subversive activity might be expected.

On the same day (November 27, 1941) the Chief of Naval Operations sent a message to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, which stated in substance that the dispatch was to be considered a war warning; that the negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific had ended; that Japan was expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days; that an amphibious expedition against the Philippines, Thai, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo, was indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. It directed the execution of a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out war tasks. It stated that Guam, Samoa and Continental Districts had been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage, and that a similar warning was being sent by the War Department. It ordered that the addressee inform naval district and army authorities. The Commander in Chief of the Fleet communicated the purpose of this message to the General commanding [8865] the Hawaiian Department of the Army.

At the time of our hearing General Short had no independent recollection of the last mentioned message, although he felt that it must have been shown to him. November 27, 1941, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, in response to the direction of the Chief of Staff that he report measures taken, informed the Chief of Staff that he had alerted his command against sabotage and that he was maintaining liaison with the Navy. No reply referring to this message was sent by the War Department; but General Short testified that he considered the Adjutant General's message referred to in the next succeeding paragraph a reply.

November 28, 1941, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, received from the Adjutant General of the Army a message stating that the critical situation required every precaution to be taken at once against subversive activities, within the scope of the Army's responsibility; that all necessary measures to be taken to protect military establishments, property and equipment against sabotage, against propaganda affecting Army personnel, and against all espionage. The message disclaimed ordering any illegal measures, and warned that protective measures should be confined to those essential to security, so as to avoid unnecessary publicity and alarm. The message stated that [8866] Identical communications were being sent to all air stations, and on November 28 the Chief of the Army Air Forces sent such an identical message to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force.

November 29, 1941, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, replied to the last mentioned message outlining at length and in detail the measures taken to prevent sabotage of military establishments and property and essential industrial and public utility installations. No reply was sent by the War Department to this message. General Short testified that he considered this series of messages a tacit agreement that the measures taken were all that were intended by the Department.

November 29, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a message to the Commander in Chief of the Fleet, which was in substance a quotation of the Chief of Staff's despatch of November 27 to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; and in addition directed the addressee to take no offensive action until Japan had committed an overt act, and ordered certain action in case hostilities should occur.

November 30, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a despatch to the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, and also forwarded the message to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet for his information, in which it was
stated the indications were that Japan was about to launch an attack on the Kra Isthmus, directing the Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet to do certain scouting, but to avoid the appearance of attacking. Admiral Kimmel testified that he had viewed this message as indicating that the Navy Department was not expecting a Japanese attack on Hawaii.

The Navy Department sent three messages to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet; the first of December 3, 1941, stated that it was believed certain Japanese consulates were destroying their codes and burning secret documents; the second of December 4, 1941, instructed the addressee to destroy confidential documents and means of confidential communication, retaining only such as were necessary, the latter to be destroyed in event of emergency (this was sent to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet for information only); and the third of December 6, 1941, directing that in view of the tense situation the naval commands on the outlying Pacific Islands might be authorized to destroy confidential papers then or later, under conditions of greater emergency, and that those essential to continued operations should be retained until the last moment.

The foregoing messages did not create in the minds of the responsible officers in the Hawaiian area apprehension as to probable imminence ofaid raids. On the contrary they only served to emphasize in their minds the danger from sabotage and surprise submarine attack. The necessity for taking a state of war readiness which would have been required to avert or meet an air raid attack was not considered.

December 1, 1941, the Director of Naval Intelligence issued a bulletin which, under the caption "Japanese Naval Situation", stated:

"Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that extensive preparations are under way for hostilities. At the same time troop transports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan and northern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and Formosan ports. Present movements to the south appear to be carried out by small individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, now definitely indicated, will probably take sharper form in the next few days. To date this task force, under the command of the Commander in Chief Second Fleet, appears to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the combined air force, destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one division of battleships also may be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers."

The naval intelligence service in Hawaii, due to lack of information indicating that the bulk of Japanese carriers were at sea, concluded they were in home ports.

At about noon E. S. T. (6:30 A. M. Honolulu time) December 7, an additional warning message indicating an almost immediate break in relations between the United States and Japan, was despatched by the Chief of Staff after conference with the Chief of Naval Operations, for the information of responsible Army and Navy commanders. Every effort was made to have the message reach Hawaii in the briefest possible time, but due to conditions beyond the control of anyone concerned the delivery of this urgent message was delayed until after the attack.

The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, the Commander in Chief of the Fleet, and the Commandant 14th Naval District, their senior subordinates, of their principal staff officers, considered the possibility of air raids. Without exception they believed that the chances of such a raid while the Pacific Fleet was based upon Pearl Harbor were practically nil. The attack of Sunday, December 7, 1941, was therefore a complete surprise to each of them.

While General Short and Admiral Kimmel conferred frequently with respect to joint Army-Navy plans and procedures, they did not, on or subsequent to November 27, 1941, hold any conference specifically directed to the meaning of the messages received from the War and Navy Departments or concerning action required to be taken pursuant to those messages.
For some time prior to November 27, 1941, the War Department and the Navy Department had under consideration the possibility of sending Army airplanes to Wake and Midway and withdrawing marine planes then on those islands; of relieving marines stationed there by the substitution of units of the Army. General Short, Admiral Kimmel, and Rear Admiral Bloch had been in conference concerning this proposal.

At the time of the receipt of the messages of November 27 by Admiral Kimmel and General Short, respectively, this proposal was a subject of discussion. General Short held discussions with Admiral Kimmel on November 27, December 1, 2, and 3, concerning this matter in an effort to compose certain differences of view. At one of these conferences Admiral Kimmel inquired of his War Plans Officer, Captain McMorris, who was present, concerning the probability of a surprise air attack on Oahu. According to General Short, Captain McMorris replied there was no probability of such an attack; and, according to Captain McMorris, his reply was that the Japanese would never so attack. According to the testimony Admiral Kimmel and General Short did not discuss means or measures for Hawaiian defense to be adopted in the light of the messages.

On and after November 27, 1941, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, independently took such action as each deemed appropriate to the existing situation. Neither informed the other specifically of the action he was taking, and neither inquired of the other whether or not any action had been taken, nor did they consult as to the appropriateness of the actions taken by them respectively.

After receipt of the messages of November 27 the following action was taken:

The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, ordered Alert No. 1 (see next succeeding paragraph) into effect on November 27, and it was maintained in effect until December 7. At the same time he ordered that the aircraft warning system operate daily from 4:00 A.M. to 7:00 A.M. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District, in his capacity as base defense officer, called a conference of all the destroyer commanders of the inshore patrol, advised them that something might happen, and that they should be on the alert. The Commander in Chief of the Fleet made certain dispositions of units of the Fleet for the purpose of strengthening his outposts to the south and west of the Islands [8875]. Hawaiian Islands, and also issued an order that any Japanese submarines found in the operating areas around the Island of Oahu should be attacked. This order went beyond the authority given him by the Navy Department.

In the Hawaiian Department’s standing operating procedure governing the defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, three states of readiness were prescribed, known as Alert No. 1, Alert No. 2, and Alert No. 3. Alert No. 1 was thus defined:

“This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and risings within the Islands, with no threat from without.”

Alert No. 2 was thus defined:

“This alert is applicable to a condition more serious than Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile subsurface, surface, and air craft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and risings, is provided.”

Alert No. 3 was thus defined:

“This alert requires occupation of all field positions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of Oahu and the Army installations on outlying islands.”

[8874]

The responsibilities of the Army included the installation and operation of an aircraft warning system for the detection of water-borne and air-borne craft at a distance from the coast. Throughout the late spring and summer of 1941 the Army was engaged in the installation of permanent facilities for this purpose on the Hawaiian Islands. Permanent installations had not, on December 7, 1941, been completed. By November 27, 1941, certain mobile equipment had been installed at temporary locations, and was being operated intermittently throughout the day for the purpose of training personnel in its operation. On November 27, 1941, in connection with the order for Alert No. 1, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, ordered that this system be operated each day during the period from 4:00 A. M. until 7:00 A. M. It was intended that in the near future the Navy should have officer personnel in the information center, but up to December 7 such officers had not been designated. In accordance with the order in effect, the system closed at 7:00 A. M. Sunday, December 7. A noncommissioned officer who had been receiving training requested that he be allowed
to remain at one of the stations, and was granted leave so to do. At about 7.02 A. M. he discovered what he thought was a large flight of planes slightly east of north of Oahu, at a dis-

stance of about 130 miles. He reported this fact at 7.20 A. M. to a lieutenant of the Army who was at the central information center, having been detailed there to familiarize himself with the operation of the system. This inexperienced lieutenant, having information that certain United States planes might be in the vicinity at the time, assumed that the planes in question were friendly planes, and took no action with respect to them. The recording of the observation made indicated that these airplanes were tracked towards the Island and then lost.

On November 27, 1941, there was sufficient partially trained personnel available to operate the aircraft warning system throughout twenty-four hours of the day, as installed in its temporary locations. An arc of nearly 360 degrees around Oahu could have been covered.

Admiral Kimmel, on and prior to December 7, 1941, assumed that the aircraft warning system was being fully operated by the Army, but made no inquiry after reading any of the messages of October and November from the War and Navy Departments as to what the fact was with respect to its operation.

xiv

The Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan provided that, when it became effective, the Army should conduct an inshore airplane patrol, covering the circum-

ference of the Island of Oahu to a distance of about twenty miles. Prior to December 7, 1941, no inshore patrol was conducted, except during drills and maneuvers. Pilots were being trained on weekdays, and the training involved flying around the confines of Oahu from about eight o'clock in the morning throughout the day. On Sunday morning no inshore airplane patrol was conducted.

xv

Under the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, when the Plan became effective the Navy was to conduct distant air reconnaissance, radiating from Oahu to a distance of from seven to eight hundred miles. Prior to December 7, 1941, no distant reconnaissances were conducted, except during drills and maneuvers. The Fleet from time to time had task forces operating in various areas off the Island of Oahu, and in connection with such operations carrier and patrol planes conducted reconnaissances of the operating areas. The sectors searched, however, constituted but small arcs of the total arc of 360 degrees, and rarely extended to a radius of seven hundred miles.

Means were available for distance reconnaissance which would have afforded a measure of security against a surprise air attack.

General Short assumed that the Navy was conducting distant reconnaissance, but after seeing the warning messages of October and November from the War and Navy Departments he made no inquiry with respect to the distant reconnaissance, if any, being conducted by the Navy.

xvi

There were, prior to December 7, 1941, Japanese spies on the Island of Oahu. Some were Japanese consular agents and others were persons having no open relations with the Japanese foreign service. These spies collected, and through various channels transmitted, information to the Japanese Empire respecting the military and naval establishments and dispositions on the Island.

In Hawaii the local Army Intelligence Service has always devoted itself to matters pertaining to Army personnel and property; and the local Naval Intelligence Service to matters pertaining to Navy personnel and property. In addition, prior to the establishment of an office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Hawaii, Naval Intelligence investigated enemy activities amongst the civil population. When the Bureau's office was established it was agreed by the three governmental agencies that the Bureau should take over and become primarily responsible for investigation of matters connected with the civil population, and that the three services should cooperate with each other. Efforts were made by the Bureau to uncover espionage activities in Hawaii. The United States being at peace with Japan, restrictions imposed prevented resort to certain methods of obtaining the content of messages transmitted by telephone or
radio telegraph over the commercial lines operating between Oahu and Japan. The Bureau and the local intelligence staffs were unable, prior to December 7, to obtain and make available significant information respecting Japanese plans and fleet movements in the direction of Hawaii.

In the summer of 1941 there were more than 200 consular agents acting under the Japanese Consul who was stationed in Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii. The Naval District Intelligence Office raised a question with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and with the Intelligence Officer of the Hawaiian Department of the Army, whether these agents should not be arrested for failing to register as agents of a foreign principal as required by statutes of the United States. In conferences respecting this question the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, objected to the arrest of any such persons at least until they had been given notice and an opportunity to register, asserting that their arrest would tend to thwart the efforts which the Army had made to create friendly sentiment towards the United States on the part of Japanese aliens resident in Hawaii and American citizens of Japanese descent resident in Hawaii and create unnecessary bad feeling. No action was taken against the agents.

It was believed that the center of Japanese espionage \[8879\] in Hawaii was the Japanese consulate at Honolulu. It has been discovered that the Japanese consul sent to and received from Tokyo in his own and other names many messages on commercial radio circuits. This activity greatly increased toward December 7, 1941. The contents of these messages, if it could have been learned, might have furnished valuable information. In view of the peaceful relations with Japan and the consequent restrictions on the activities of the investigating agencies they were unable prior to December 7th to examine messages transmitted through commercial channels by the Japanese consul, or by persons acting for him.

It is now apparent that through their intelligence service the Japanese had complete intelligence. They evidently knew that no task force of the United States Navy was anywhere in the sector northeast, north, and northwest of the Hawaiian Islands. They evidently knew that no distant airplane reconnaissance was maintained in any sector. They evidently knew that up to December 6 no inshore airplane patrol was being maintained around the periphery of Oahu. They knew from maps which they had obtained, the exact location of vital air fields, hangars, and other structures. They also knew accurately where certain important naval vessels would be berthed. Their fliers had the most detailed maps, courses, and bearings, so that each could attack a given vessel or field. Each \[8880\] seems to have been given a specified mission.

The passes and liberty granted the personnel of the Army and Navy in Hawaii on Saturday, December 6th, were normal for a period when the forces were not upon a war footing, with the following exceptions: the normal Army guard had been increased by approximately 100 per cent; two battalions of infantry were held in reserve for anti-sabotage defense; anti-aircraft gun crews were maintained on ships in harbor for instant defense; all Navy personnel, with the exception of those authorized to be absent, were required to be in their quarters at midnight; all places of amusement in Honolulu and all entertainments at the Army posts were closed at midnight; all saloons and drinking places in Honolulu were closed at midnight.

On the night of December 6 numerous officers of the Army and Navy attended social functions at various points on the island of Oahu, principally the usual Saturday functions at the various posts and naval establishments. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, were both guests at dinners away from their posts of command on that evening, but returned to their quarters at an early hour. \[8881\] The percentages of strength in the Army present for duty on the Island of Oahu at 8:00 A.M. December 7, 1941, reported by all major echelons and posts, were: 24th Infantry Division, 90%; 25th Infantry Division, 85.6%; Coast Artillery Corps, 87.5%; Air Force, 88.9%; miscellaneous, including Department Headquarters, Ordnance, Quartermaster, and Medical, 92%. Estimated general percentage 88.8%. Reports from large ships and destroyers that were in Pearl Harbor during the attack, show 60% of officers on board, and 96% of the men. Of seventy-five vessels of the Fleet, of all kinds, 49 commanding officers were aboard during the attack, and 22 were enroute to their ships, one was on another ship, and one was on authorized leave, which leaves two for whom we are unable to account.
Intoxicating liquor is sold on the Island of Oahu, and men on pass or on liberty have the opportunity to buy and consume it. Following the established procedure, at home and abroad, the Army exercises disciplinary control of men on pass through its military police, and the Navy of men on liberty by the use of shore patrols. These organizations take into custody any person showing evidence of intoxication. On the night of December 6-7, 1941, from 6.00 P. M. to 6.00 A. M., arrests of soldiers by the military police, for intoxication, were 38, and arrests of sailors by the Navy shore patrol, for intoxication, were 4. By comparison the arrests of civilians for drunkenness on that night were 30. Thorough inquiry disclosed there is no evidence of excessive drinking by any officer of either service on that night. The evidence shows that as respects the use of intoxicating liquor and intoxication, the conditions amongst the men of the Army and of the Navy on the night of December 6 compare closely with similar conditions for the several preceding months. On Saturday, December 6, 1941, the usual percentage of enlisted strength entitled to pass or liberty took advantage of such privilege to spend the afternoon or evening in the city of Honolulu. Application of this ratio to total numbers of all the services then on the Island of Oahu and in Pearl Harbor, amounting to about seventy-five thousand men, indicates that no less than eleven thousand soldiers, sailors and marines visited Honolulu that afternoon and evening.

In normal times more enlisted men of both services are absent from duty by permission on Saturday nights than on other nights; and on Saturday nights more officers are customarily absent than on week-day nights.

On the morning of Sunday, December 7, Army posts and Naval vessels and stations were adequately manned, for the readiness and alert then in effect, by men fit for duty.

XVIII

The attack on the morning of December 7, 1941, was a combined air raid and submarine attack on the Island of Oahu, a bombardment of Midway and a continuous air attack and bombarding on Wake Island. Available information indicates that the force attacking Oahu consisted of either three or four Japanese carriers, with supporting surface craft and a few small submarines, and that this force had maintained radio silence during its approach, which, except for the submarines, was from the northward of Oahu.

In the attack on Oahu a suspicious object was sighted in the prohibited area off Pearl Harbor at 6.30 A. M., by the U. S. S. Antares. Between 6.33 and 6.45 this object, which was a small submarine, was attacked and sunk by the concerted action of a naval patrol plane and the U. S. S. Ward. A report of this action by the Ward reached the Naval Base watch officer at 7.12 A. M., who notified his Chief of Staff. The ready destroyer was despatched to investigate, but no alert warnings were issued based upon this report. Another small submarine was fired upon, depth charged, rammed and sunk inside the harbor between 8.35 and 8.45 A. M. A third small submarine grounded in Kaneohe Bay and was captured. There is no evidence of any damage by torpedoes fired by these submarines.

Pearl Harbor was provided with an anti-torpedo net which would have prevented the entrance of torpedoes into the harbor, and would have revealed the entrance of a submarine. The procedure prior to December 7, 1941, was to keep the net closed during the hours of darkness, opening it only when necessary for a vessel to pass through. It was kept open during daylight hours, on the theory that, during daylight, the channel entrance destroyer, the net vessel, and other vessels in the vicinity, would detect a submerged or partially submerged submarine. December 7 the net was opened at 4.58 A. M. for the entrance of two mine sweepers. It was kept open until 8.40 A. M., when it was closed by orders. The net was not damaged. The submarine was first sighted in the harbor at 7.45 A. M. The time of its entrance is not known, but probably it passed in about 7.00 A. M.

An estimated force of from 150 to 200 fighting, bombing and torpedo planes simultaneously attacked Pearl Harbor and all air bases on Oahu at about 7.55 A. M. All attacking planes had withdrawn before 11.00 A. M. As a result of the attack serious loss of life was caused and serious damage was inflicted on ships in the harbor, and planes, hangars, and other facilities at Hickam Field, Ewa Field, Fort Island, Wheeler Field, Bellows Field, and Kaneohe.

The major part of the damage to ships in Pearl Harbor resulted from torpedoes launched from planes. The torpedoes were of an obsolete type, altered to increase
their explosive load, to decrease their radius, and fitted with side vanes to insure functioning in shallow water. [8885] A weapon peculiarly adapted to an attack such as the one delivered upon ships in Pearl Harbor. Many of the bombs had extra heavy cases, and appeared to be modified armor-piercing shell.

December 7, 1941, at 9:30 P. M. Midway time (11:30 P. M. Honolulu time), a force believed to consist of two cruisers and two destroyers, approaching from the southward, opened fire and shelled Midway Island for about thirty minutes. About noon December 8, 1941 (2:50 P. M. December 7, Honolulu time), some twenty-seven land planes made a strafing and bombing attack on Wake Island. Some loss of life and damage to material resulted on each island. Attacks on Wake continued until its capture on December 22, 1941 (December 21, Honolulu time).

Immediately upon realizing that the Japanese were attacking, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, ordered Alert No. 3. The alert was executed with reasonable promptness. At the same time the Commander in Chief placed the Fleet on a full war basis and issued a series of orders in an effort to intercept and destroy the attacking force.

Officers and enlisted men, in defending against the attack, demonstrated excellent training and high morale. Anti-aircraft weapons aboard ship, which were not already manned, and anti-aircraft weapons ashore, which were in position, were promptly manned. Junior officers and enlisted men on their own initiative procured from storage every possible automatic weapon. These weapons continued in action during and in spite of low level strafing and dive bombing which had been known to demoralize even seasoned troops. At least three fighter pilots, in total disregard of their own safety, attempted to take off in the face of greatly superior forces then attacking their airdrome, but lost their lives in the attempt. A few fighter planes parked on an outlying gunnery training field, which was not attacked, took the air. This combined anti-aircraft and fighter action resulted in the destruction of approximately thirty enemy aircraft; and a number of others were lost at sea because they were unable to rejoin their carriers.

**XIX**

The state of readiness prescribed for Army aircraft prior to the attack required them to be ready for flight only after four hours' notice. The type of alert in effect required all Army aircraft to be concentrated in order more effectively to guard against possible sabotage, instead of being dispersed in order to afford greater security against air attack, and greater facility in taking the air. This state of readiness, this concentration of airplanes, and the element of surprise, all [8887] contributed to the effectiveness of the Japanese attack, and resulted in such permanent or temporary disablement of airplanes that very few fighter planes were able to take the air during the course of the action. For the same reasons it was impossible to get airplanes into the air in time to trail the Japanese airplanes back to their carriers.

The aircraft warning system, which was renamed by about 8:30 A. M. December 7, 1941, failed during the balance of that day to furnish any reliable information of enemy aircraft returning to their carriers. Such information as it afforded indicated enemy forces to the southward and southwestward of Oahu. A report of an actual contact with an enemy carrier, which later proved to be erroneous, gave credence to numerous reports from other sources indicating enemy carriers might be to the southward and southwestward thus causing futile searches in those areas.

On December 7, naval Task Force 8 was about 200 miles west of Oahu proceeding towards Oahu. Another was about 700 miles west of Oahu. A third Task Force 11 was in the vicinity of Johnston Island, about 700 miles southwest of Oahu. These task forces were engaged in operations connected with strengthening the defenses of the outlying islands.

On the morning of December 7, 1941, prior to the attack, the following searches of sea areas were being made. [8888] Six patrol planes were searching south and southeastwardly from Midway. Three patrol planes were in the air engaged in a joint exercise with submarines south of Oahu. Eighteen scouting planes from Task Force 8 had been despatched to scout in advance of the force which was on its way to Oahu. These scouted to the southwestward of Oahu. After the attack the following searches were made; The three planes in the air south of Oahu, according to their standing orders, searched to the northwest of Oahu a distance of about 375 miles. Nine planes were despatched by Task Force 8 and searched to the south and southwest of Oahu. Carrier
planes of Task Force 11 searched in an area about 500 miles southwestward of Oahu. About 11:27 A.M. two heavy Army bombers and four light bombers took off to attack a carrier reported about 25 miles off Barber’s Point. After failure to make contact the two heavy bombers searched first to the southwestward and then in areas to the northwest of Oahu. The other four searched to the southwestward. At 11:50 A.M. six Navy VS planes searched southward of Oahu. Thereafter nine planes searched the sector southwest to northwest of Oahu. Two utility planes searched northward of Oahu to a distance of 300 miles; and nine planes which had arrived from carriers and refueled searched some two hundred miles to the northward. No contacts were made with the enemy aircraft or carriers, except that one Navy airplane was attacked by a Japanese airplane some 300 miles north of Oahu. This incident was not reported until the next day.

SUMMARY OF THE MORE IMPORTANT FACTS

Pearl Harbor is an important outlying naval base, and its security is vital to both offensive and defensive operations. It is the Army’s function to insure the security of Pearl Harbor against hostile attack, and the Navy’s function to support the Army indirectly by operations at sea and directly by making available therefor such instrumentalities of the Navy as are on the vessels of the fleet when in harbor and are located or based on shore either temporarily or permanently.

Effective utilization of the military power of the nation is essential to success in war and requires that the operations of the Army and the Navy be coordinated. Under the then existing plans the joint defense of the Hawaiian Frontier was to be coordinated by mutual cooperation between the commanders concerned. Plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier were prepared by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, the latter acting as a subordinate of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet. Adherence to such a plan prepared in advance of hostilities does not suffice to relieve commanders of their responsibility to apply and adapt the plan to the situation as it develops.

Where as here the defense of an area is the joint responsibility of two commanders who are to coordinate their activities by mutual cooperation, the first duty of such commanders in the case of an emergency is conference and consultation with respect to the measures to be taken under the existing plans and the adaption of those plans in whole or in part to the situation.

At about the time that Admiral Kimmel and General Short assumed their respective commands, the War and Navy Departments were in correspondence with respect to adequate defense against air raids on Oahu and the naval base. The correspondence between the Departments exhibits a deep concern respecting the probability of this form of attack. These commanders were acquainted with this correspondence. Nevertheless, there has been amongst the responsible commanders and their subordinates, without exception, a conviction, which persisted up to December 7, 1941, that Japan had no intention of making any such raid. Consequently this form of attack was a complete surprise to all of the superior officers of Army and Navy stationed in the Hawaiian area. This conviction persisted notwithstanding messages containing warnings and orders, brought to the attention of both commanders over a period of weeks prior to the attack. As early as October 16 the commanders were warned of the possibility of an attack by Japan on the United States and were directed to take precautions and make preparatory dispositions in the light of this information. A significant warning message was communicated to both the local commanders on November 24th. On November 27 each responsible commander was warned that hostilities were momentarily possible. The warnings indicated war, and war only.

Both of these messages contained orders. The Commanding General was ordered to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as he deemed necessary. The Commander in Chief of the Fleet was ordered to execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out war tasks. Other significant messages followed on succeeding days. These emphasized the impending danger and the need for war readiness.

In this situation, during a period of ten days preceding the Japanese attack, the responsible commanders held no conference directed to a discussion of the meaning of the warnings and orders sent them, and failed to collaborate and to
coordinate defensive measures which should be taken pursuant to the orders received. Dispositions as a result of the messages were independently made by each commander. Neither of them informed himself of the measures and dispositions taken by the other.

The dispositions so made were inadequate to meet a surprise air attack.

Both commanders were handicapped by lack of information as to Japanese dispositions and intent. The lack of such knowledge rendered more urgent the initiation of a state of readiness for defense.

The personnel, matériel, and equipment were insufficient to place the forces on a war footing and maintain them on that footing for an extended period. These deficiencies did not preclude measures which would have to a great extent frustrated the attack or mitigated its severity.

A considerable number of the Army and Navy personnel were on pass or liberty December 6th, for the reason that the state of alert or of readiness demanded by the emergency had not been put into effect. With immaterial exceptions Army and Navy personnel had returned from leave and liberty hours before the attack ensued, fit for duty.

Both officers and men responded immediately in the emergency and exhibited initiative, efficiency and bravery in meeting the raid.

Based upon its findings of fact, the Commission reaches the following

CONCLUSIONS

1. Effective utilization of the military power of the nation is essential to success in war and requires: first, the coordination of the foreign and military policies of the nation; and, second, the coordination of the operations of the Army and Navy.

2. The Secretary of State fulfilled his obligations by keeping the War and Navy Departments in close touch with the international situation and fully advising them respecting the course and probable termination of negotiations with Japan.

3. The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy fulfilled their obligations by conferring frequently with the Secretary of State and with each other and by keeping the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations informed of the course of the negotiations with Japan and the significant implications thereof.

4. The Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations fulfilled their obligations by consulting and cooperating with each other, and with their superiors, respecting the joint defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier; and each knew of and concurred in the warnings and orders sent by the other to the responsible commanders with respect to such defense.

5. The Chief of Staff of the Army fulfilled his command responsibility by issuing a direct order in connection with his warning of probable hostilities, in the following words: "Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary."

6. The Chief of Naval Operations fulfilled his command responsibility by issuing a warning and by giving a direct order to the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, in the following words: "This despatch is to be considered a war warning"; and "Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned."

7. The responsible commanders in the Hawaiian Area, in fulfillment of their obligation so to do, prepared plans which, if adapted to and used for the existing emergency would have been adequate.

8. In the circumstances the responsibility of these commanders was to confer upon the question of putting into effect and adapting their joint defense plans.

9. These commanders failed to confer with respect to the warnings and orders issued on and after November 27, and to adapt and use existing plans to meet the emergency.

10. The order for Alert No. 1 of the Army command in Hawaii was not adequate to meet the emergency envisaged in the warning messages.

11. The state of readiness of the naval forces on the morning of December 7 was not such as was required to meet the emergency envisaged in the warning message.

12. Had orders issued by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations November 27, 1941, been complied with, the aircraft warning system of the Army should have been operating; the distant reconnaissance of the Navy, and the
inshore air patrol of the Army, should have been maintained; the anti-aircraft batteries of the Army and similar shore batteries of the Navy, as well as additional anti-aircraft artillery located on vessels of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, should have been manned and supplied with ammunition; and a high state of readiness of aircraft should have been in effect. None of these conditions was in fact inaugurated or maintained for the reason that the responsible commanders failed to consult and cooperate as to necessary action based upon the warnings and to adopt measures enjoined by the orders given them by the chiefs of the Army and Navy commands in Washington.

13. There were deficiencies in personnel, weapons, [8896] equipment and facilities to maintain all the defenses on a war footing for extended periods of time, but these deficiencies should not have affected the decision of the responsible commanders as to the state of readiness to be prescribed.

14. The warning message of December 7, intended to reach both commanders in the field at about 7:00 A. M. Hawaiian time, December 7, 1941, was but an added precaution, in view of the warnings and orders previously issued. If the message had reached its destination at the time intended, it would still have been too late to be of substantial use, in view of the fact that the commanders had failed to take measures and make dispositions prior to the time of its anticipated receipt which would have been effective to warn of the attack or to meet it.

15. The failure of the officers in the War Department to observe that General Short, neither in his reply of November 27 to the Chief of Staff's message of that date, nor otherwise, had reported the measures taken by him, and the transmission of two messages concerned chiefly with sabotage which warned him not to resort to illegal methods against sabotage or espionage, and not to take measures which would alarm the civil population, and the failure to reply to his message of November 29 outlining in full all the actions he had taken against sabotage only, and referring to nothing [8897] else, tended to lead General Short to believe that what he had done met the requirements of the warnings and orders received by him.

16. The failure of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, to confer and cooperate with respect to the meaning of the warnings received and the measures necessary to comply with the orders given them under date of November 27, 1941, resulted largely from a sense of security due to the opinion prevalent in diplomatic, military and naval circles, and in the public press, that any immediate attack by Japan would be in the far East. The existence of such a view, however prevalent, did not relieve the commanders of the responsibility for the security of the Pacific Fleet and our most important outpost.

17. In the light of the warnings and directions to take appropriate action, transmitted to both commanders between November 27 and December 7, and the obligation under the system of coordination then in effect for joint cooperative action on their part, it was a dereliction of duty on the part of each of them not to consult and confer with the other respecting the meaning and intent of the warnings, and the appropriate measures of defense required by the imminence of hostilities. The attitude of each, that he was not required to inform himself of, and his lack of interest in, the measures undertaken by the other to carry [8898] out the responsibility assigned to such other under the provisions of the plans then in effect, demonstrated on the part of each a lack of appreciation of the responsibilities vested in them and inherent in their positions as Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, and Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

18. The Japanese attack was a complete surprise to the commanders, and they failed to make suitable dispositions to meet such an attack. Each failed properly to evaluate the seriousness of the situation. These errors of judgment were the effective causes for the success of the Japanese attack:

19. Causes contributory to the success of the Japanese attack were:
   Disregard of international law and custom relating to declaration of war by the Japanese and the adherence by the United States to such laws and customs.
   Restrictions which prevented effective counter-espionage.
   Emphasis in the warning messages on the probability of aggressive Japanese action in the Far East, and on anti-sabotage measures.
   Failure of the War Department to reply to the message relating to the anti-sabotage measures instituted by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
Non-receipt by the interested parties, prior to the attack, of the warning message of December 7, 1941.

20. When the attack developed on the morning of December 7, 1941, the officers and enlisted men of both services were present in sufficient number and were in fit condition to perform any duty. Except for a negligible number, the use of intoxicating liquor on the preceding evening did not affect their efficiency.

21. Subordinate commanders executed their superiors' orders without question. They were not responsible for the state of readiness prescribed.

Respectfully submitted.

[8900] The Chairman. I have a recollection that Admiral Kimmel was asked here by one of the members of the committee whether there were a couple of distinguished admirals who were members of the Commission of which you were chairman and his reply was "There were a couple of admirals."

I would like to ask if you are acquainted with the records of Admiral Standley and Admiral Reeves, as to what positions they had held in the Navy?

Mr. Justice Roberts. Well, Admiral Reeves was originally the assistant engineer on the Oregon. When Captain Clark was ordered to bring the Oregon around to fight in Cuba in the Spanish-American war Admiral Reeves was responsible largely for the physical condition of her machinery and so on. She came around, as you know, to Cuba and fought.

Admiral Reeves after the Spanish-American War determined that air was the great, coming thing in the Navy. He asked to be transferred from the engineering to the line. He was transferred to the line. He went to Florida and went into one of the Navy's flying schools and handled the sticks, although he was a middle-aged man.

He is the outstanding original airman in the Navy. He was promoted finally to Admiral of the Pacific Fleet and he was Admiral of the United States Fleet more years than any other man in your life or mine. He has been in command of the United States Fleet.

When the war broke out he was called back to take care of the Navy's end of the lend-lease with Britain and has held that responsible position up to recently at any rate; I do not know how long. He was an officer who wherever he appeared in Honolulu or anywhere else Navy men just flocked to him, as if to a father, and with respect to many of the witnesses who were admirals who came before us, Reeves would turn to me and say, "He is one of my boys."

Admiral Standley has had almost a parallel career. Admiral Standley has had very high commands in the Navy and was Chief of Naval Operations, as you know, sir, for a long time and a very outstanding Chief of Naval Operations, one of the keenest and ablest men I have ever known and one of the fairest.
The Chairman. I think it is valuable to have that testimony as to their record in view of the question asked by a member of the committee.

Mr. Justice Roberts. You are correct, sir.

The Chairman. The Senator from Maine would like to inquire.

Senator Brewster. I would like to take up one further matter, Justice, and I think you will understand that it is very rare for us to have an opportunity to examine a former Justice of the Supreme Court.

[8902] Mr. Justice Roberts. Well, I hope they are having as much fun as I am.

Senator Brewster. It is rarely we can suggest that a witness may be unduly sensitive, although without positive—

Mr. Justice Roberts. Oh, no; I am just plain Mr. John Citizen now; you know that. I haven't the high exalted position that you hold now.

The Chairman. Well, you can be recalled to the service, but if we are retired, we cannot be.

Mr. Justice Roberts. No, I cannot be. I have resigned, Senator. I am a pensioner, sir, on your good will only.

Senator Brewster. Well, I am sure you will appreciate somewhat the difficulty of our situation and I do think that this should be clarified in the record, in justice to everyone concerned. I think probably it is susceptible of clarification, but on page 3173 of our record General Marshall, answering Senator Ferguson—Senator Ferguson, referring to the Roberts report, said:

Before that report was issued, there were certain things taken out of it?

General Marshall. Before that report was made public there were certain things withdrawn. * * *

Senator Ferguson. We are clear on that, that certain parts were taken out before it was made public?


Then on page 3175 the question appears there, with the Chairman also participating as to clarification of this statement, and Senator Ferguson says:

May we have from the witness what his understanding was?

General Marshall. My understanding was, and I am speaking on hearsay because I had no control over the matter, that the complete report went to the President but that the portions that referred to magic were withdrawn from the portion of the report which was released to the public.

Senator Ferguson. Have I misquoted you, General?

General Marshall. There has been so much conversation I am a little confused, but the complete report, as I understand it, and I am not an authority on that, went to the President, and the portions that were considered top secret, which were magic, were pulled out of that before a general release to the public. That is my understanding, but I am not the best authority on that. That is my understanding and it was on that that this part of the letter was based.

I quote all of this, Mr. Justice, in justice to Senator [8904] Ferguson who, I think, had reason to feel that the situation invited clarification and I assume that it is susceptible of clarification and I gather from what you have said that General Marshall was wrong in his understanding, but I do think we ought to have that as a matter of record.

[8905] Mr. Justice Roberts. Well, I have testified to the facts. Now if you want me to say, which I think is a very improper thing, that General Marshall was wrong, I will say General Marshall was
teetotally wrong. I have given you facts. The facts are all typed, they are not my word against General Marshall's word.

Sometime ago the President of the United States was asked why portions of the Roberts report were suppressed and he said, "For military reasons."

Senator Brewster. What President?

Mr. Justice Roberts. President Truman. The papers from time to time said that portions of it were suppressed. I was not accused of suppressing it, so I did not jump to conclusions.

Senator Brewster. You made your first reputation as an investigator and prosecutor, Mr. Justice, and I cannot believe that in your broad experience you failed to call the attention of witnesses to contradictions of testimony in order to give them an opportunity to clarify it, if it was possible.

I do not think it is questioning the integrity of General Marshall or criticizing you when your attention is called to the testimony of General Marshall before this committee, and it was called to your attention for any comment you desired to make, and I do feel very confident, in examining your distinguished record both as investigator and justice of the highest court in this country for many years, that you have found that this could be duplicated many times.

Mr. Justice Roberts. Thank you for those kind words.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to interrupt and raise the point of order, but Justice Roberts has taken care of it.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one remark.

The Chairman. Senator Lucas wishes to ask another question.

Senator Lucas. I want to make one observation with respect to the winds message, the so-called pilot message and so-called execute message.

There has probably been more misinterpretation about that message than any other message in this hearing.

Mr. Justice Roberts. I haven't any information about it.

Senator Lucas. On the question that the Senator from Michigan asked you, and also calling attention to a question that you asked a witness while you were in Hawaii, in order to make the record complete at this point I want to direct your attention and call the attention of the committee to the fact that on November 28 Admiral Hart sent to Admiral Kimmel for his information a copy of the pilot message that is known as the original winds message.

The pilot message, and Admiral Kimmel had that message when you gentlemen were in Hawaii making this investigation.

Mr. Justice Roberts. I did not know it.

Senator Lucas. So it is very reasonable to suppose that, as the result of those high in command in Hawaii having this original message, that some information leaked out and got to you along that line.

The Chairman. Mr. Justice, just this one question:

Regardless of General Marshall's answer to any questions based upon the assumption that something in the Roberts Report was suppressed or withheld and that it was done for military reasons, and regardless of the impression of the present President of the United States, who was not at that time familiar with your report or the
existence of it, that if anything was withheld it was for military reasons, the fact is that nothing was suppressed or withheld for military or other reasons, is it not?

Mr. Justice Roberts. That is correct, sir. We tried not to disclose any military secrets in what we wrote, but what we wrote was published line for line.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I want the record also to show that General Marshall said he could only give hearsay. There had been a protest by certain members of this committee theretofore about hearsay evidence, but he was asked to pursue a line which necessarily would be hearsay. So it is not a question of contradiction necessarily, it is a question of one knowing the fact and the other giving hearsay evidence.

The Chairman. Any further questions by the committee?

(No response.)

The Chairman. By counsel?

(No response.)

The Chairman. Mr. Justice, the committee thanks you for your cooperation. It regrets the necessity of bringing you from what Horace in his “Odes” said is a Sabine farm.

Mr. Justice Roberts. I cannot get back in time to milk, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. I would like to have a photograph of you in that operation.

Mr. Justice Roberts. I think that is the most irrelevant of anything that the committee has asked me for [Laughter].

The Chairman. Thank you very much.

(Justice Roberts was excused.)

Captain Zacharias, will you resume the witness stand.

[8909] TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN ELLIS M. ZACHARIAS, UNITED STATES NAVY—(Resumed)

The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order.

Senator George was unavoidably detained when he was reached this morning and he will inquire at this time, Captain.

Senator George. I think my very brief questioning should follow Senator Lucas since he had already commenced.

The Vice Chairman. Without objection, the questions of Senator George and answers of Captain Zacharias will appear in the record following the conclusion of Senator Lucas' inquiry.

Senator Lucas. Developing the thought that was just placed before you by the distinguished Senator from Georgia, I again call your attention to page 7137 which carries a copy of the statement that you had given to the committee which you prepared sometime, as I recall, after the Pearl Harbor disaster.

At page 7138 you make this statement:

Only a few people know that I had cautioned Admiral Kimmel and Captain Smith during the course of the hour and a half conversation with them of the exact events to take place on 7 December, not only as to what would happen but also how and when.
Now reading that without any clarification, would not I be justified in concluding that you had predicted to Admiral Kimmel that this would happen on December 7?

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir; without knowing that I had given him this 9 months before, and I doubt that anyone would assume that I would make a prediction as to an exact date 9 months hence. I explained at the conclusion of this morning's testimony that the two words "7 December" were synonymous with Pearl Harbor and were injected in that sentence for the purpose of conveying to Admiral Draemel and Admiral Nimitz what I was talking about prior to a certain period.

Senator Lucas. I accept your interpretation and clarification, but what I am asking you is, without any clarification and verification, would I have the right to reach the conclusion that you had given Admiral Kimmel definite information that this attack would happen on the date of December 7?

Captain Zacharias. You would have to assume that I had some very occult powers.

Senator Lucas. I am not assuming anything, whether you have occult powers or just ordinary powers; I am asking you whether that would not be a fair interpretation and whether that is the way he interpreted it on the following page, on page 7140, where he said:

The Vice Chairman. And I am now asking you whether he said to you what he states there, or anything like that.

Admiral Kimmel. He did not. And furthermore, I would have paid very little attention to any man who told me in March of 1941 that an attack was going to occur on the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir; I would agree with him that such a statement was made.

Senator Lucas. In other words, Admiral Kimmel, after reading your statement, took the position that you had told him that this would happen on December 7, 1941, and answered accordingly. You have clarified that and qualified it by your statement to the committee this morning.

Captain Zacharias. Well, it is hard for me to say, with a careful reading of that sentence and having in mind that this was a statement prepared for Admiral Draemel subsequent to Pearl Harbor, that he could read any other meaning into it.

Senator Lucas. I will read it again.

Only a few people know that I had cautioned Admiral Kimmel and Captain Smith during the course of an hour and a half conversation with them of the exact events to take place on 7 December not only as to what would happen but also how and when.

If I understood the construction of the English language—and I have been practicing law for a good many years—it seems to me—

Captain Zacharias (interposing). The reference to December 7 was made over 3 months after the date, and as I said, it was synonymous with the words "Pearl Harbor." So I suppose it is possible that Admiral Kimmel would read something else into it. I will grant him that.

Senator Lucas. I read something else into it too.

Captain Zacharias. That is all right, sir.
[8915] Senator Lucas. I am just wondering if I am not fair in making that kind of interpretation by the way you have it stated here.

Captain Zacharias. I do not think that would be a fair interpretation.

Senator Lucas. I caution you if you have a case in court at any time you better not use that type of language. It may get you into trouble. Especially with a man like Justice Roberts.

The Chairman. Or Lawyer Lucas. [Laughter.]

Senator Lucas. Now, one other question or two, sir: When you were out with Admiral Halsey, with his task force on the mission to Wake Island, which, I understand you to tell the committee went on a regular routine trip without being armed, or without knowing that war might be imminent at any time—

Captain Zacharias (interposing). We were to leave that morning on a routine training schedule. Our task force was due to go out that day, which we did, but after we were outside the harbor, Admiral Halsey changed the course to the westward, and we proceeded toward Wake.

Subsequent to that time we were advised by signal that we were heading for Wake to deliver planes to the [8916] Marines at that place.

Senator Lucas. What orders did you get from Admiral Halsey with respect to having your ship ready for anything that might happen?

Captain Zacharias. No additional orders. We were in condition of readiness 3, which is half of the antiaircraft battery manned.

Senator Lucas. Is that the way you sailed?

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. To Wake and also upon your return?

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator Lucas. When did you finally change over to an all-out alert on that ship?

Captain Zacharias. About 11 o'clock in the morning of December 7 a report was received that an enemy plane was sighted to the southward, and we went into condition 2, in which half of the main battery are manned in addition to the antiaircraft battery being manned.

Senator Lucas. When did you first learn of the attack?

Captain Zacharias. About 8 o'clock when my communications officer came into my cabin and informed me that a message had been received that—

Oahu is being attacked. This is no drill.

[8917] Senator Lucas. Then you went on the all-out alert?

Captain Zacharias. No, sir. We immediately received a signal from Admiral Halsey to change our disposition a slight degree. We reduced the distance of the cruisers from the carrier, which we were escorting, by one-half.

We closed into 1,000 yards from the carrier, whereas we were out a mile from the carrier before.

The destroyers which were screening us closed in proportionately.
Senator Lucas. And you were due back in Pearl Harbor on the evening of December 5?

Captain Zacharias. As far as the schedule provided.

Senator Lucas. Why was it again that you did not get there then?

Captain Zacharias. We were delayed by the fueling of the ships, the destroyers particularly, and also some little rough weather that we had coming back.

Senator Lucas. Did you ever have a conversation with Admiral Halsey with respect to the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor?

Captain Zacharias. Not during that trip, sir. There was nothing to justify me in doing that.

Senator Lucas. At any time, did you ever talk to him about it? [8918] Captain Zacharias. During the trip?

Senator Lucas. At any time previous to Pearl Harbor did you ever discuss with Admiral Halsey what you discussed with Captain Layton—or do you know about that?

Captain Zacharias. Only my conversation. No exact details.

Senator Lucas. I think that is all.

Senator George. Captain, this forenoon you detailed a statement that you made to Admiral Kimmel and the discussion that you had with Admiral Kimmel. I should like to ask whether or not your statements made to Admiral Kimmel regarding the air attack on Oahu, or the Hawaiian Islands, was based on any specific information that you had received or was it based upon your general knowledge and your general estimate of the situation?

Captain Zacharias. It was based upon my general knowledge and general estimate of the situation.

Senator George. You received no specific information that there was to be at any particular time an overseas air attack on the Fleet at Oahu?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

Senator George. You never gave any information to General Short?

Captain Zacharias. I did not, sir.

Senator George. That, of course, was not your responsibility. But you did have this conversation with Admiral Kimmel.

Captain Zacharias. Yes.

Senator George. I also understood from your testimony that you did not indicate that an air attack would be made on any particular Sunday or week-end.

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

Senator George. And whether it would be on December 1, December 7, December 21, or any other particular day?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

Senator George. Your statement was general, not based upon any specific information whatever but upon your general evaluation and general knowledge of the Japanese and their methods of warfare, and so forth?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir; and it was contingent upon a situation which might result in hostilities between the United States and Japan.

Senator George. Yes, I understand that. That is, if hostilities actually did become imminent, that is, immediate, why, this was your conclusion of what would happen, is that correct?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

Senator George. That is all the questions I have.

The Chairman. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. Captain, as I understand it, your conversation with Admiral Kimmel was sometime toward the end of March of 1941, in which you outlined your idea as to the possible attack on Pearl Harbor, that is right, isn’t it?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Had you, prior to your conversation with Admiral Kimmel, been familiar with the message which had been sent to Hawaii from Washington about the possible attack on Pearl Harbor, or the origin of that being from the Ambassador to Japan, Mr. Grew?

Captain Zacharias. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. Murphy. Well, you now know, do you not, that there was such a message in the month of February?

Captain Zacharias. I have heard that there was something.

[8919] Mr. Murphy. Had you known at the time you talked to Admiral Kimmel about the letter of the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of War’s answer, the Secretary of the Navy outlining pretty much in detail the dangers and Pearl Harbor?

Captain Zacharias. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. Murphy. Had you known that just about at the very same time as you were talking to Admiral Kimmel, that there was prepared, I believe on March 21, 1941, a plan which in effect, outlined the steps that you outlined to the Admiral?

Captain Zacharias. I did not know that, sir.

Mr. Murphy. There has been a great deal of talk here about a bomb plot from the Japanese in the month of September and decoded in the month of October, but the Martin-Bellinger plan was practically a bomb plot of what would happen at Pearl Harbor; did you know about that?

Captain Zacharias. No, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Did you know that the Secretary of War had given a direction to the general at Pearl Harbor to be prepared to meet a situation such as a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, an air raid attack?

Captain Zacharias. I did not, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, Mr. Chairman, so that there will be a complete account of the message sent by Captain Zacharias to Admiral Draemel, I ask that the letter of March 17, 1942, be spread on the record at this point in its entirety.

The Chairman. Without objection, it will be so ordered.

(The memorandum referred to follows:)

Personal and confidential
Memorandum for Admiral Draemel

March 17, 1942.

In accordance with your request after our conversation this morning, the following memo is submitted—

My conversation with you is impelled from a sense of duty because of what I consider a serious situation existing in Hawaii. Once before, in such a situation, I gave concrete opinions and advice which apparently could not break through preconceived ideas. History was about to repeat itself and no one would believe it. I have no personal ambitions or desires regarding the subject matter other than assuring that we have a safe and well protected base for our fleet, which
is the sole reason for the existence of Hawaii. It has been my attitude that it makes no difference who does a job as long as it is done efficiently and thoroughly.

Any criticism direct or implied is offered solely from a constructive viewpoint and is for the purpose of preventing in the future a recurrence of a disaster such as that of 7 December.

[8921] Only a few people know that I had cautioned Admiral Kimmel and Captain Smith, during the course of an hour and a half conversation with them, of the exact events to take place on 7 December, not only as to what would happen, but also how and when. My only error was that the Japanese were after four battleships and they got five. I also gave them the reasons for my conclusion and advised them of the steps necessary to prevent such an attack. From time to time, in contact with the Staff, I would voice possibilities and only two months before the attack amazed at unrealistic attitude I said, “When are we going to stop these surprise inspections and prepare for surprise attack.” About that same time Mr. Munson, a representative from Washington (believed to be a Presidential agent) carrying a letter from Opanv to “open everything to him,” sought me for an expression of views on probabilities and my opinion as to what action should be taken with the Japanese here and on the West Coast. After outlining to him my firm conviction that if Japan decided to go to war with us it would open by an air attack on Pearl Harbor, on a weekend and probably Sunday morning, with all the reasons therefore, and I then stated, “You now have two envoys in Washington. When the third one arrives you can look for it to break immediately, one way or the other.” This envoy arrived [8922] in Washington about 2 December 1941.

On the night of 27 November, after dinner with Lorrin Thurston, Head of the Honolulu Advertiser and KGU, I related the impending possibilities as above and he said, “Here I am a G-2 Officer and I haven’t even been advised what to send out over the radio in case of an attack.” I advised him precisely to say, “We are having a sporadic air attack, everyone should keep calm and remain indoors. Do not go on the streets, as it will prevent the military from getting to their stations. There is nothing to worry about.” On 28 November I sailed with Task Force 8 for Wake Island. Upon receipt of CincPac’s despatch on 7 December, “The Islands are being attacked this is no drill,” I turned on my radio and KGU was sending out my exact words. At least someone believed it. This was probably made certain by the press announcement about 3 December that the Ambassador to Peru had arrived in Washington as a third envoy. Seeing this, Mrs. Thurston reminded her husband; and they were alerted.

On Friday, 5 December, having received a report of a submarine off Oahu—one of the things I gave Admiral Kimmel as a positive indication of intention to attack—I listened all evening on short wave for Japanese conversation. All was garbled conversation but the intensity of the [8923] acknowledgments (typically Japanese) indicated to me that something was imminent. I tried to obtain a single word which would justify me in requesting ComTaskFor 8 to advise CincPac, but nothing could be made out. I knew what the reaction would be to a recommendation from thin air and I assumed that proper warnings would be coming from Washington.

I have made it a point when afloat to give my advice to Intelligence activities both ashore and afloat and when necessary even to the point of “butting in”. I had tried for years to have detailed a Fleet Intelligence Officer who was not tied up as Flag Secretary or on other jobs. Finally two years ago Commander Dyer advised me that Circus was going to have a Fleet Intelligence Officer. I recommended Lieutenant Commander Layton, who has consistently done a splendid job in an office where there should have been 20 officers instead of two. Early in November I was about to see Captain Smith and advise that he get some help for Layton and Hudson as they were both worn down and appeared ready to crack up. But I hesitate, wondering why should I have to advise Circus on the adequacy of his force. It should have been obvious to any Commander that Intelligence at such a time was his most vital issue. I decided not to approach Smith, because I found that Intelligence was not receiving its proper recognition.

[8924] One of the contributing factors to 7 December was the reluctance of Admiral Kimmel to assume his prerogatives and tell the Commandant to carry out directives or someone else would be obtained to do the job. The possibilities of an unpleasant situation should have been readily apparent to the Department when a former Commander-in-Chief is put under a younger man. Petty jealousies are bound to be present and these grow into opposition.
A typical indication was one incident which I observed closely. When I arrived in Honolulu in November 1940 to take command of the Salt Lake City I was asked to assist in a survey of the District Intelligence Office which was initiated by the Commander-in-Chief. It was learned then that recommendations had been blocked and that the office was of little value.

This survey included immediate and extensive recommendations, including trained personnel to be taken from my old 11th District to build up the 14th as quickly as possible.

The next day, after telling Admiral Bloch the security we enjoyed in the 11th and indicating the complete lack here he approved all steps to remedy the situation. Accordingly, the personnel arrived and expansion, planning, and training were rapid. During the course of a subsequent survey to outline faults in the District, the report or digest was brought to the attention of Admiral Bloch. This survey was made by an officer who was working for the Commander-in-Chief and also helping the [8925] District. At the sight of this critical survey coming from the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Bloch gave vent to his wrath and Intelligence activities suffered for quite a time.

The skepticism of the Commandant regarding necessity for security was also typical from a remark once made during security efforts, "Bring me a Japanese spy. I've never seen one and would like to see one". His yard was full of them.

On 16 September, 1941, in a letter to Admiral Stark, I stated, "It is gratifying to see that there is a possibility of resolving the Japanese situation, but we must not relax until they have given concrete demonstrations of sincerity".

All of the foregoing is simply to indicate the possibility of qualified personnel accurately estimating the situation, and the distressing fact that nothing was done about it.

I am now concerned because of another situation which is growing in seriousness and proportions. Rumors are increasing and I find not only the morale of civilians falling lower and lower but also that of Naval Officers. This is a typical fifth column technique and it must be stopped. It not only softens up our own people but it is throwing the second generation Japanese into the laps of enemy agents, many of whom are still not in custody. I used to be most optimistic about the Japanese never returning here for another raid, but that persistence of the present situation, which they will learn about soon enough, will be an invitation to them to return. [8926] This situation can be corrected somewhat by strong "offensive" pronouncements but not by "defensive" ones, and by punitive action against rumor mongers. I found one woman frantically engaging passage because an Army man told her how terrible the gas attack would be when it came. Someone is spreading a rumor that there is to be a Japanese Fleet attack on April 14th. I am now trying to trace the source of some rumors. Rumors are sometimes started to enhance the position of an individual or organization.

Apparently, on the West Coast they are undecided how to handle the Japanese situation. Here, where it is much more difficult, I find that little or nothing is being done. Make no mistake about it, the proper handling of this situation requires two qualifications: first, highly professional Intelligence activities, and second, a thorough knowledge of the Japanese people. The Army in Hawaii has no one qualified to handle either. I know what they have and what they are capable of doing. It makes no difference who does the job as long as it is done efficiently and thoroughly. But I venture to make the flat statement that little or no results have been received on cases turned over to them by the 14th Naval District. I find that the numerous Japanese amateur operators have only been admonished by letter only not to operate. Adequate searches have not been made. Known suspects have not been taken into custody. Strategic locations are still endangered by the [8927] presence of enemy aliens. The problem can be solved in forty-five days by qualified personnel and Intelligence Action.

In my long interview with General Emmons, I was impressed with his incompetence. He appeared to have no thoughts of his own. He gave as the reason for continuing the Japanese newspapers that they were necessary for the morale of the enemy aliens. At the same time, the Army has assembled all the second generation Japanese into one battalion of the Territorial Guard and have disbanded it. The selectees have been disarmed and put into labor battalions. This action will have the effect of sending these boys slinking home and into the laps of enemy agents. It is most serious. There are sensible solutions to all these problems which certain of us have worked out, but it is inadvisable to let incompetent hands take on pre-prejudiced solutions.
After my interview with General Emmons, I searched for the reasons for what seemed like an undue influence upon him. Yesterday I think I discovered the answer. I was told that one of his principal advisors on Island and Japanese matters is General Wells, a highly paid official, of one of the large local industries whose objectives are still "maintenance of the status quo".

At the present time the Army is endeavoring to take over control of the Intelligence Organization in Hawaii. Under those conditions the Commander-in-Chief would be tying his own hands voluntarily. Their past and present training and performances in no way qualifies them for the work. I know their capabilities and what they have because it was I who for many years tried to have them implemented on the West Coast, but the War Department invariably replied, "No action will be taken until M day". As a result they "had not a single trained Intelligence man with which to start an organization". The quotations are from General Miles, the head of G-2.

The Naval Intelligence Organization of the 14th District has been built up and trained through the intensive effort of two excellent officers with years of experience behind them. Through their knowledge, excellent personnel have been enrolled and trained and I am safe in saying that in spite of obstructions which should have been help, this organization is so far superior to the Army and F. B. I. for Intelligence work that there is no comparison.

CONCLUSION

Hawaii, as a defense outpost of the United States, is of value solely as a safe base for the Fleet. The protection of it provides the only excuse for the existence of the Army. An offensive attitude is a requisite to that defense. This offensive attitude does not exist. Under the present state of administration, the influences at work, and the degenerating morale, I cannot escape the feeling that unless firm action is taken we are approaching a situation which might result in some thing worse than that of 7 December. (It has always been my considered opinion for a long time that because of the racial situation the Hawaiian Islands will eventually require a military government. Its purposes dictate that it should be a Naval military government, therefore now is the time to start it.)

RECOMMENDATION

That the Commander-in-Chief, as Military Commander, exercise his function as Military Governor and take command of all activities that the administration of martial law be delegated to a Deputy, as at present, if such administration has been satisfactory, and that the Intelligence Organization be centered under the Commander-in-Chief, in order to insure the security of the Fleet and the Fleet Base.

That power of arrest be extended to special agents of the Naval Intelligence Organization. (The most vitally interested agency but the only government agency not having the power.)

That the security of the Naval District and the Navy Yard be incorporated under a competent head (The present security officer, Victor Houston, was recently removed from the Police Commission and it is inconceivable that he should be in a position to hamper Naval security).

E. M. Zacharias.

[8930] Mr. Murphy. Now, Captain, I would like to take you to the memorandum which you sent to Admiral Stark on February 9, 1941, in which you outlined your conversation with Ambassador Nomura.

Did you at any place in that letter to Admiral Stark, a copy of which was apparently sent to Admiral Kimmel, refer to the details which you have outlined as to Pearl Harbor?

Captain Zacharias. I did not, sir.

Mr. Murphy. That letter which you sent to Admiral Stark, and which Admiral Kimmel got a copy of, was, in effect your appraisal of the situation, of the relations between Japan and the United States, as the result of the Nomura talk; isn't that right?

Captain Zacharias. I would say it was more in relation to the details of the conversation than the reactions of Admiral Nomura.

Senator Brewster. Will the Congressman yield?
Mr. Murphy. Yes, surely.
Senator Brewster. Do you contemplate putting this entire matter in? It seems to me it might be a valuable thing as an exhibit in the case, and I was going to suggest that at the proper time.
Mr. Murphy. I ask that the letter of February 9, [8931] 1941, be spread in the record at this point, and that all of the letters be marked as an exhibit.
Senator Brewster. Do you have what I have here, labeled “Notes, Correspondence, and Reports Relating to Pearl Harbor and Events Leading Up to It”? I think that should be in as an exhibit.
Mr. Masten. That will be Exhibit 141,
The Vice Chairman. It will be received as Exhibit 141, and the request of Mr. Murphy to spread the letter he described on the record will be granted without objection.
(The document referred to was marked “Exhibit No. 141.”)
(The letter referred to follows:)

U. S. S. SALT LAKE CITY,
Marc Island, California, February 9, 1941.

My Dear Admiral: I think that you will be interested in a conversation that I had with Admiral Nomura yesterday. It lasted for more than an hour and we were alone the entire time in his room at the hotel. Having known him intimately and favorably over a long period we were in a position to speak frankly. I decided to arrange for such a conversation in order to determine if possible the purpose for which he was [8932] sent over here and to explore, if possible, the latitude which might be in his hands. As a result of the conversation I have formed the following impressions:

(1) That Japan regrets her partnership in the Axis and is greatly concerned over the China venture, therefore Admiral Nomura was sent here to determine the best bargain to be obtained. (A previous thought that he might be coming to “Rock us to sleep” while Japan proceeded to the Southward, has been eliminated definitely).

(2) He will try to prevent an embargo on oil and other essentials now being obtained here, and will request reconsideration on those now under embargo.

(3) Japan definitely has decided that they cannot “conquer” China or exert sufficient control while Chiang Kai-Shek maintains his present position and strength. They realize that their best way out is a peace. This will be attempted first by trying to dissuade us from further aid to China, thereby allowing the Wang Chin-wei group to gain control under Japanese direction. If this is impossible he will then explore the other possible means of bringing about peace in China.

(4) That hostilities between Japan and the U. S. can be avoided if he is given sufficient basis for an approach to the Leaders in Japan. (I indicated to him that an [8933] immediate definite indication of sincerity by Japan would have to be forthcoming if our Government opened such an approach. When he asked “What for example,” I replied, “If I were asked, I would say ‘Immediate cessation of all Japanese activities in Siam and French Indo-China’.” He made no comment on this.

In the course of the conversation he made the following positive statements:

(1) That his mission was to prevent a resort to force between Japan and the U. S. in settling present disagreements.

(2) That Japan has completely changed her views with regard to China, and that peace is essential to both countries.

(3) That if the U. S. is patient until Europe is settled then the Far Eastern situation will take care of itself. (This statement I took to be a feeler, therefore I resisted an impulse to ask him if impatience meant probability of force by us in the Far East.) My reply was optimism over British prospects which prompted the question from him “Do you think it will be a long war?” My answer was negative and reason given was the effect upon the German people when they finally hear of U. S. aid to Britain.

(4) That the signing of the Axis pact was done only after a sharp division of opinion and with only a slight [8934] balance of influence in its favor.
Now, the mistake is realized but as it is a "Fait accompli" nothing can be done towards cancelling it. It must die a natural death. (The previous day a leading Japanese business representative in San Francisco referred to the signing of the pact by Japan as a grave mistake. When asked what could have brought this about he stated without hesitation and authoritatively that it was accomplished by bribery of officials with tremendous sums of money from Germany.)

DETAILS OF CONVERSATION

After the usual exchange of pleasantries I opened the conversation by indicating to the Admiral that I thought he had been given a most difficult task and asked him how he expected to handle it.

He said "My hope is to prevent a resort to force in settling the difficulties existing between our two countries. I replied, "Of course you know that at least 65 percent of the American people are reconciled to any action as far as the Far East is concerned, and you yourself have often said that such a conflict would be disastrous for Japan and entail great loss for the U. S."

"We have no desire to see Japan defeated and destroyed. We saved her in 1904, you will agree?" He answered in the affirmative, and I continued, "Well, we would like to [8935] save her again because the very same reasons exist today. The American people have long since learned that a strong Russia or a strong China means the end of Japan, in which case problems for us will come from other sources. I have always told the Japanese that we would go to war if our commerce was blocked off, because that has been the cause of every war in which we have engaged. Now see what has happened to all Foreign trade in Manchuria. What would happen in the rest of Asia?" At this he apologized for their extremists and I reminded him that they are the ones who bring on wars. I then said, "Admiral, one thing which the American people can't reconcile is why Japan, a country which has called continually for 'Equal Opportunity' could sign a pact with Germany which has done away with all opportunity and has the utmost contempt for all other nations?" He replied that there was a sharp division of opinion in Japan as to the advisability of signing the pact and that only a very slight balance of influence made it possible. Now, they realize the mistake but it is a "fait accompli" and it is practically impossible to cancel it. Therefore it will have to die a natural death.

[8936] "Admiral, I would like to know why you think you can pick a man like Wang Ch'in-wel, set him up and count upon him working for Japan?"

He replied that Wang was for peace in China and that this was very necessary now to combat the growing menace of Communism which has spread Russian influence as far South as Peping. "In this case", I said, "it seems to me that you want a man like Chiang Kai-shek to combat it, as he has done so successfully for over ten years. That is where you ought to make your agreement if you really want the peace of Asia, and here is where the U. S. might act as Mediator and again save Japan. With communications as now exist in China you will never be able to conquer or control it. Peace in China will bring prosperity to all three of our countries. Your objective of markets and raw materials will be realized. Our complementary trade will thrive again and there remains only the problem of taking care of Japan's expanding population. Let's explore the realms of possibility. Do you think that if Chiang Kai-shek should be willing to cede Manchuria to Japan in return for the protection it would afford Asia from the inroads of Communism, would you then be able to go to the Japanese people and say 'Japan has at last reached her original objective, we can now stop this war in China and settle down to prosperity', do you think it would be accepted?"

This question was evidently unexpected for after much hesitation the Admiral laughing and then seriously said, "It would have to be handled [8937] very carefully, you know how excited the extremists become in such matters and the steps they take." I replied that I remember well the affair of resumption of normal affairs under the careful direction of Chiang Kai-shek and the long desired development would eventuate, China would disappear." The Admiral again indicated the difficulty of approach to such problems in Japan at this time, but I said that the more difficult they were the more important they became. And I added, "Of course, you understand that if Japan really wants the U. S. to assist in solving this serious situation without resort to force, which you say is your mission, then there would have to be an immediate definite indication of sincerity by Japan." I would say Immediate cessation of all Japanese activities in Siam and French Indo-China. He made no comment on this and remained thoughtful for an appreciable interval.
During this conversation I made two references to my watch and the fact that he must have many callers, in order to give him the opportunity to indicate a desire to break off, but each time he stressed that he had no engagements and wanted to continue talking.

Other parts of the conversation were devoted to the general cause of ill feeling between the two countries which I indicated has been due solely to the vilification of the U. S. by the controlled press of Japan. Starting with the unjustified raging over the Portsmouth Treaty after the U. S. had saved Japan from defeat, it continued with every incident. Typical was that after the immigration bill, a purely economic expedient occasioned by the failure of immigrant farmers to adhere to the existing standards thereby endangering the California farmers, Japan does not admit farmers.

I indicated that the Public is now well aware of the vast difference between the Monroe Doctrine and the Asiatic Monroe Doctrine. Also that the public does understand Japan's needs and the difficult situations with which she has been confronted in the past, however they do not understand and will not tolerate either in Europe or Asia any impositions on our commerce which restricts their freedom to go where and when they will.

In conclusion I told the Admiral that he had been quoted in the Press as having accepted this mission on the conditions that while he was here the Japanese Government would not take any steps in the Far East which might embarrass him. He neither confirmed nor denied this. I then said that I hoped that it was true because it had put him in a very favorable light with the American public and they would wish him every success as I do.

Admiral Nomura is accompanied by Mr. Wakasugi, as advisor. Wakasugi was formerly Consul-General at San Francisco, and was not looked upon as a good mixer. Having had some occasion to observe him in 1931 I was not impressed with his ability. For a diplomat he was unusually unapproachable, which gave the impression of assumed reticence to hide inferior qualities. It is believed that he will be only a general guide for Admiral Nomura, whose activities or conclusions will not be influenced by Mr. Wakasugi.

Admiral Nomura was very appreciative of the attentions which he received from Admiral Richardson while in Honolulu, and I am sure these will have a profound effect in Japan, in raising his prestige.

Admiral Richardson, who knew of my proposed conversation with Admiral Nomura, had expressed a desire to have any details I could give him on it. I am therefore sending a copy of this letter to Admiral Kimmel.

With kindest regards and best wishes, I am

Sincerely,

E. M. Zacharias.

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. N.,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Mr. Murphy. Captain, my understanding of the reason for you having been listed as a witness was that early in the executive session one of the members of the committee said you had given two talks at Annapolis relative to the Pearl Harbor situation.

Did you give talks at Annapolis to the student body?

Captain Zacharias. I had given talks at Annapolis to the student body, but I do not recall that they referred specifically to the Pearl Harbor situation.

Mr. Murphy. You do not recall any such talks there?

Captain Zacharias. I always talked about Japan and the possibilities of war, but I do not believe I referred to what might occur specifically at Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Murphy. Now you gave testimony this morning to the effect that, in your judgment, the north of the island was the most dangerous. Were atmospheric conditions any different on the north of the island usually than they were on the other parts of the island of Oahu? Was it clearer there ordinarily?

Captain Zacharias. There is quite frequently a difference in the atmospheric conditions to the northward from those to the southward because of the configuration of the land areas.
Mr. Murphy. You also said something about the north being a more dangerous area for an attack because of the wind conditions. What degree of the are would you say, or what degree of area, would be covered by that particular wind condition?

Captain Zacharias. The prevailing winds in the Hawaiian area are from the northward, because of the trade winds. The trade winds are from the northeastward, but in the Hawaiian area they are—I do not know just what the prevalence is, but they are from the northern sector.

[8942] Mr. Murphy. Now is it your judgment—while I agree that this was marked as an exhibit—is it your judgment that all of this material is pertinent to this inquiry? They are your notes, are they not?

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir. Of course there are letters there which bring out what I felt were organizational deficiencies regarding the improper indoctrination in the Navy and the naval officers regarding security.

Mr. Murphy. You have seen fit to criticize the conduct of officers even after Pearl Harbor. Was that part of your function? You remember that, don’t you? You made some very caustic remarks and uncomplimentary remarks about General Emmons.

Captain Zacharias. Well, you will note these reports were marked “personal and confidential,” made up for a superior officer of the Navy, for his use, on which to base an estimate of the situation. As an Intelligence officer and as an officer of 37 years in the Navy I felt that I had reached the stage where I could present facts to a superior officer without mincing any words.

Mr. Murphy. Did you think it was part of the Navy function to be criticizing Army generals? That is what I am wondering about.

Captain Zacharias. That report was not for the purpose [8943] of criticizing Army generals but was for the purpose of emphasizing to the commander in chief what I considered the danger in allowing Japanese newspapers, under the control of alien enemies, to be republished in Hawaii after Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, the report was written for the admiral in charge after there was unity of command and after the Army, in effect, was under the command of the Navy; is that right?

Captain Zacharias. Well, I understood by the joint agreement of the Army and Navy that the senior officer present in an outlying station, such as Pearl Harbor, the senior officer was, in fact, in a position to exercise unity of command.

Mr. Murphy. I think there is considerable disagreement about that. The fact is, however, after December 7 there was unity of command and it was in charge of a Navy man and your letter was written while the Navy was, in effect, in command and the Army under the Navy command; is that right? Do you understand me?

Captain Zacharias. I would like to have that again.

Mr. Murphy. Read it please, Mr. Reporter.

(The question was read by the reporter.)

[8944] Captain Zacharias. That is correct. I would like to add that the report that I made up after my conference with General Emmons regarding allowing these Japanese newspapers to resume publication, I went to see him upon the direction of Admiral
Nimitz and the report was made out in an official manner for Admiral Nimitz. I took along with me, now that you have mentioned the criticism, I took along with me the district Intelligence officer, Capt. I. H. Mayfield, now Rear Adm. I. H. Mayfield, who upon the termination of our conference with General Emmons, or my interconversation with General Emmons, as we left him turned to me and he said, "Now you see what we are up against."

A year later I was advised by an Army officer who was then the head of the Joint Intelligence activity that he had read this report that I had submitted to Admiral Nimitz and he wanted to say that he and Admiral Richardson agreed with everything I had to say in it and steps would be taken to remedy the situation immediately.

Mr. Murphy. I have just one more question.

Captain, you have been asked about the particular alert condition of the ship you were on after it departed from Pearl Harbor immediately prior to December 7, 1941. There is an article—and I do not like to go to the Saturday Evening Post for my authority, but it has been mentioned here [8945] at different times—there is an article by Lt. J. Bryan 3d, USNR, of January 1, 1944, in which he said that on November 28, 1 day out at sea, battle order No. 1 was put into effect and that that provided the following:

1. The Enterprise is now operating under war conditions.
2. At any time day or night we must be ready for instant action.
3. Hostile submarines may be encountered.

The writer says further:

Further he ordered all planes armed with torpedoes, bombs and ammunition and told the pilots "sink anything you sight."

Do you know of anything like that ever having existed?

Captain Zacharias. No order of that nature was transmitted to us but it is quite possible that it was in effect on the Enterprise because of their duties of scouting and other matters.

Mr. Murphy. I have no other questions.

The Chairman. Senator Brewster.

The Chair might say, in view of the fact the members of the House have some duties at the other end, we have decided not to go later than 4:15.

Senator Brewster. I don't think I will take more than 3 minutes.

The Chairman. All right.

Senator Brewster. I have asked that this entire record be placed in evidence as an exhibit because I think there is some very valuable material in there on Intelligence and it is to the broader questions that I shall address myself.

With regard to the December 7 date concerning which you were examined by Mr. Lucas, I think it may be pertinent to call attention to what appears in the subsequent portion of the same paragraph where the statement is made:

About that same time Mr. Munson, a representative from Washington (believed to be a Presidential agent) carrying a letter from OPNAV to "open everything to him", sought me for an expression of views on probabilities and my opinion as to what action should be taken with the Japanese here and on the West Coast. After outlining to him my firm conviction that if Japan decided to go to war with us it would open by an air attack on Pearl Harbor, on a
weekend, and probably Sunday morning, with all reasons therefor, and I then stated, "you now have two envoys in Washington. When the third one arrives you can look for it to break immediately, one way or the other."

So that in the same paragraph to which Admiral Kimmel's attention had been called in reference to the letter it did appear that while [§247] on March 17 you apparently had predicted December 7, if it is read very literally in October when Mr. Munson arrived you did not defend the date but indicated you were referring to the attack and the time?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct.

Senator Brewster. So it lends some confirmation to the interpretation which you placed on the communication, you gather?

Captain Zacharias. It does, sir.

Senator Brewster. Now, on the broader question of the intelligence, Admiral Stark in his testimony, on page 6280 said, in response to a question about intelligence, and, as I understand, there were three officers in charge of intelligence in the year preceding Pearl Harbor; is that correct?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct.

Senator Brewster. Admiral Kirk, Admiral Anderson, and Admiral Wilkinson, three in the year preceding?

Captain Zacharias. Yes.

Senator Brewster. Admiral Stark in response to a question about the officer desiring to go to sea and be taken out of Intelligence said:

Generally speaking that is true in the Navy. An officer in wartime, or if the occasion demanded, I think at [§984] any time might sacrifice his career, * * *

Now, in a letter which you have written I find that same language, that you indicated in one of your exhibits your readiness to sacrifice your career for Intelligence. What does that mean?

Captain Zacharias. I was asked one day by Admiral Anderson, when he was Director of Naval Intelligence, whether I would sacrifice my career for Intelligence. I was rather puzzled at the question and I said to him:

Admiral, I think that the situation is such that if some of us don't think about sacrificing our careers there aren't going to be any to sacrifice.

I later in my letter to Admiral Stark reiterated to him that, something along that same line that I had told to Admiral Anderson. That was for the purpose of emphasizing that regardless of the prejudice against ourselves which we wrought by engaging in too much intelligence work, because we thought it was vitally necessary for the security of the Nation, I was ready to accept that if necessary.

Senator Brewster. As it would mean that your promotion might be seriously affected by failure to have the well-rounded activities of the Navy?

Captain Zacharias. That would be correct; but I felt that I did have a well-rounded activity throughout the Navy [§949] as my record at sea will show.

Senator Brewster. One other thing and I am through.

In your letter of November 16, 1941, you emphasize this in your communication to Admiral Stark:

Of course I look forward to the day when I will be in the position to continue to work out the many ideas which I know to be vital to our intelligence organization. As you know, the Commander in Chief has expressed himself as to
the lack of sufficient and thoroughly effective Intelligence organization. In the past it has been a difficult "selling" job, but I hope eventually to make our people, particularly the higher ranks, realize the important elements. Last June, while in Washington, Admiral Anderson asked me one day if I would be willing to sacrifice my career for Intelligence—

Was he then in charge of intelligence?

Captain Zacharias. Yes; I am quite sure.

Senator Brewster (reading):

"asked me one day if I would be willing to sacrifice my career for Intelligence." I replied, "Admiral, the time has come when if we don't think about sacrificing our careers, there won't be any to sacrifice." Of course, I am delighted with my ship and will soon have in half of my two years in grade, but if and when the situation demands my statement above still stands.

In other words, is it your impression that the important of competently directed intelligence had not been sufficiently appreciated in what you term the higher ranks of the Navy prior to Pearl Harbor?

Captain Zacharias. If I may say so, I think that is one of the greatest contributing factors for Pearl Harbor.

Senator Brewster. That is all.

The Chairman. If I may interject there, what you mean is that the average naval officer making a choice between gluing himself to a desk or a station for intelligence work or going to sea in command of a vessel would choose the sea and that in order to have a properly directed intelligence service men must give up the chances of promotion that would be involved in command at sea and remain, if necessary, glued to their desks in the intelligence service?

Captain Zacharias. That is one phase of it, sir, but what I was driving at in the two letters which I wrote on January 27, 1942, which are included in there, one regarding the lack of security indoctrination in the Navy and the other the faulty selection of officers for intelligence duty, those were based upon a belief on my part that the officers of the Navy were not sufficiently cognizant of the scope and importance of intelligence as such and I urged that training facilities be installed to remedy that situation.

I felt that once a general knowledge on the part of all officers of the Navy became a fact, a general knowledge regarding the scope and importance of intelligence, that the future would be safeguarded against such a thing as occurred at Pearl Harbor.

I would like to invite attention to one page in one of those letters, I think it is page 40 in the documents listed, which outlines my opinion of what constituted a good intelligence officer.

Among the things which are given there in addition to the qualifications, I say that an officer must not only be able to receive the information and evaluate it properly, he must have the courage to present it to his superior officer, and that is where in the past that has been one of the greatest drawbacks and that is the reason I said that this situation was one of the greatest contributing factors to Pearl Harbor.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one question?

The Chairman. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. I understood Admiral Stark to say—and I won't say that I am correct about it and I hope you can tell me—I understood Admiral Stark to say that as a matter of law by act of Congress naval officers had to have a certain amount of sea duty.
Captain Zacharias. I think it is custom rather than law.

The Vice Chairman. Well, the custom is then that they have to have a certain amount of sea duty.

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir; in order to be eligible to have a good chance of selection and be promoted.

The Vice Chairman. And that does have some bearing on promotions?

Captain Zacharias. It does; yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And that, he thought, affects an officer's career.

[8953] Captain Zacharias. It affects those who might otherwise choose intelligence as a field.

The Vice Chairman. Well, are there any intelligence officers at sea?

Captain Zacharias. Each ship has an intelligence officer designated as such but—

The Vice Chairman. That is what I thought.

Captain Zacharias (continuing). Very few have any intelligence background or experience.

The Vice Chairman. Well, I thought they had intelligence officers at sea.

Captain Zacharias. They now have people with experience because during the 1 year which I had as Deputy Director of Navy Intelligence between my two war cruises I installed an entirely new system of training which gave basic and advanced intelligence training and provided for the fleet the officers which they now have to interpret what we call operational intelligence.

The Vice Chairman. Well, these officers who have intelligence duties at sea, does that count in their favor the same as if they were serving intelligence work on shore?

Captain Zacharias. In the past that duty at sea has been a collateral duty. They had regular ship's duties in addition to having intelligence duties.

[8954] The Vice Chairman. Well, does the fact that they do intelligence work at sea militate against their interest?

Captain Zacharias. No, sir; it does not.

The Vice Chairman. All right.

The Chairman. Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas. As I recall, Captain, there are some special duty stations in the Navy where the officers are never changed; am I correct about that?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct; yes sir. They all have the status of engineering duty only, although they might not be in engineering.

Senator Lucas. Their promotion is not affected as a result of being placed in that special-duty work?

Captain Zacharias. The general feeling has been that an officer in specialist duty is prejudiced to some extent.

Senator Lucas. But there are some spots where they make no change. Once they get a good man in that place they keep him there.

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

Senator Lucas. There were a few instances of that kind, as I recall, testified to before the Naval Affairs Committee some time ago and I would like to ask you whether or not in view of what has happened here in the development of a lack of proper intelligence, perhaps, or
lack of proper evalu-
ation, whether or not if you found
the right type of a man that really could do the job it wouldn’t be more
advantageous to the national defense to keep that man in Intelligence
rather than move him out every year and a half or two years all over
the globe?

Captain Zacharias. I think that goes without saying, sir.

Senator Lucas. You would advocate that, wouldn’t you—

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas (continuing). As one who has had a lot of experi-
ence in that kind of work?

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir, that is quite true. Of course, then—

Senator Lucas. In other words, take a fellow like Edgar Hoover
here, who is the head of crime detection in this country and of intelli-
gence. We don’t take him out every so often and put a new man in be-
cause he has done and is doing a whale of a job, and it seems to me that
in Army and Navy as a result of this Pearl Harbor investigation
we must have something on the same order and it does seem to me
that that has to come about.

Captain Zacharias. I am now convinced that we will have to come
to something of that nature, and this lack of the knowledge and scope
of the work of intelligence ordinarily has tended to create another
organization unit. I think it has brought out in these
hearings that the war plans officers have taken over the functions of
evaluation, which are primarily the functions of the Chiefs of Intelli-
gence, and I feel certain that if the Chiefs of Intelligence had been
allowed to retain that function and had the responsibility, that a great
many things which did occur would not occur and I certainly ad-
vocate that for the future.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I wanted to just say that I did
not go into detail in this exhibit just introduced, which gives Captain
Zacharias’ views at considerable length, on account of the time ele-
ment. I think they are highly important. I do want to read this
additional sentence that I found there in the letter of the 27th of
January:

The orthodox and conservative type of naval officer is designed by training
and indoctrination not to be an intelligence officer.

Captain Zacharias. I think that is correct.

Senator Brewster. I think that is a considered conclusion. I might
say in conclusion, Captain, that in November 1940 when you were
going to Pearl Harbor, if you need additional corroboration as to your con-
cern, you stated it very fully to me in the course of a trip out
there, as to your very great anxiety over the Pearl Harbor situation,
to which you then pointed.

Were you then a captain?

Captain Zacharias. I was then a captain. I was en route to take
command of the Salt Lake City.

Senator Brewster. And you have not been promoted since that
time?

Captain Zacharias. No, sir.

The Chairman. Well, the committee will suspend until 10 o’clock
tomorrow, when the captain will resume.

(Whereupon, at 4:30 p. m., January 28, 1946, an adjournment
was taken until 10 a. m., Tuesday, January 29, 1946.)
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a.m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster and Ferguson, and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[8959] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ELLIS M. ZACHARIAS, UNITED STATES NAVY (Resumed)

Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, we have one item that we would like to take up first.

The CHAIRMAN. The counsel has something to take up before you resume, Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, some time ago we compiled a group of documents which relate to certain transfers of information and inquiry between the United States and other Governments. The file I hold in my hand contains the photostats of those documents.

There has been suggestion from individual members of the committee that they would like to have us advise the State Department that these various documents should be called to the attention of the foreign governments, and their permission obtained, as is required, for the publication of these documents.

We brought the matter, you recall, to the attention of the committee at one time, suggesting that we felt we should have the direction of the committee before we formally advise the State Department to formally request the foreign governments to release the documents.

[8960] Now, I say just for what it may be worth, which is probably nothing, as we go through these documents there are only one or two that we can, by any particular stretch of the imagination, feel are germane.

I have this suggestion:

If the committee is amenable to a direction to us to secure the consent of the foreign governments to the publication of all of these documents, that then some method be devised whereby any indi-
individual committee members who are interested might examine this group and delete from the number of documents those that are not relevant to this proceeding, so that the number that we have to ask the foreign governments to O. K. and free, can be reduced as much as possible.

But I would like now to have the committee give us some direction as to what is to be done with reference to communicating with the State Department to get the release of these documents.

The Vice Chairman. Let me inquire there, Mr. Richardson. You have examined all of these documents?

Mr. Richardson. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And it is your opinion that only a few of them could, by any stretch of the imagination, be relevant or material to this inquiry?

[8961] Mr. Richardson. That was my feeling, as I read them.

The Vice Chairman. It would look to me like the committee would want very carefully to consider that before we go to all the trouble of having the State Department get the clearances of the foreign governments on something that may not be even material or relevant to this inquiry.

I would think that the members who have indicated an interest in this material, would assist the committee to the extent of examining these things carefully, and conferring with you and seeing if they can reach a decision to comply with the suggestion that you here made.

Mr. Richardson. Well, Mr. Chairman, there is no need of any further conference with us. I am perfectly willing to turn this file over to any committeeman who wants to examine it, and then it is up to the committee to tell us which ones ought to be taken out.

The Vice Chairman. My point in that suggestion is that a member interested may take this whole file and examine it carefully himself, and then confer with you as to your opinion as to which of those documents might be material, and you can point out to the member your reason for thinking that others are not. In other words, try to get together with the committee member and if the committee member feels that he still wants to urge that all of it be brought in here, why, then the matter can be submitted to the committee again for action on it.

[8962] Senator Lucas. May I inquire just that this is?

Mr. Richardson. Senator, it is a series of documents that have to do with the troubled relations existing between the United States and Japan and England and China.

The Vice Chairman. I might say personally what I am afraid of is that we are getting such a mass of material in here, much of it that is so remotely, if at all, related to the subject under consideration, we are going to get our record so terribly large that it will be difficult for people interested in the matter to find the things that are really material and important.

Mr. Richardson. Suppose, Mr. Chairman, that I turn this over to Senator Ferguson, who I think is more familiar with them than anyone else.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I will say that I have gone over this and I have marked certain ones that I think are material. I wanted them released prior to a witness we had last week leaving the stand, but I will go over them again.
The Vice Chairman. I am sure we will all appreciate that.

Senator Ferguson. There were, I think, three places that I marked for counsel that I was greatly interested in, but the witness has gone from the stand and I couldn't use [8963] it for cross-examination.

Mr. Richardson. Then we may depend upon having further information from Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. All right.

Mr. Richardson. Now I think Mr. Masten has a document he wants to offer in evidence.

Mr. Masten. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Masten may proceed.

Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, we have distributed to the committee this morning a folder of documents, mimeographed copies of documents, which is entitled "Material Relating to 'Winds' Code."

The Vice Chairman. That is this document here?

Mr. Masten. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. All right.

Mr. Masten. If you will look at the first two pages you will find a table of contents of the documents that are included in this compilation. Many of the documents included have been previously introduced, either in the transcript or as exhibits, but it was thought for the convenience of the committee it would be well to bring them all together in one place.

If I may take a minute I would like to run down the [8964] index to show you just how it was compiled.

The Vice Chairman. Go right ahead.

Mr. Masten. Section No. 1, entitled "Data received concerning establishment and nature of winds code," lists dispatches, all of which, except item d, have been previously placed in the record or made an exhibit.

Under Section 2, "Dispatches and data relating to monitoring for Winds 'Execute,'" there are listed three dispatches, all of which are either exhibits or have been read into the record previously.

Section 3, entitled "Certification of Secretary FCC, dated 8/18/44, with attachments as follows," is not now in the record and is new material.

The Vice Chairman. All four of those messages?

Mr. Masten. All four of those items under No. 3.

The same is true of all of the items of Section 4 entitled "Material relating to weather Winds 'Execute' message sent or received." Items a and b under that number include all of the communications which have been received from General MacArthur in this connection.

Items c, d, and e include communications from the State Department to the British, the Australians, and the Dutch regarding the monitoring for the Winds "Execute" message that was carried on by those respective governments.

[8965] Items c, d, and e may have to be supplemented by further reports from the State Department, but we have given you here everything that we have received to date in that connection.

Section 5, entitled "List of messages appearing in Committee Exhibit 1 dealing with instructions to Japanese representatives to de-
stroy codes, sent through ordinary channels of communications," is simply a list that was compiled on the basis of the material in Exhibit 1, and I think is self-explanatory.

Section 6 consists of new material which has to do with the question of file number JD–1 7001 in the Navy Department, and I think will be found self-explanatory upon examination.

In this latter connection, I would like to read into the record a memorandum dated January 26, 1946, from Lt. Col. Harmon Duncombe, the Army liaison officer, which is as follows:

Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

Pursuant to the request of former counsel to the committee, a comparison was made of the intercepted messages in the Army Signal Intelligence Service file which had been translated on 2, 3, and 4 December 1941 and those in the Navy file translated on the same dates. The purpose of the comparison was to ascertain whether the Army file contained a message not in the Navy file. The comparison, which was jointly made by the Army and the Navy, showed that each message in the Army file was also in the Navy file.

The results of the comparison were reported orally to the former counsel to the committee at the time the comparison was completed.

As you will see that memorandum also has to do with the question of file number 7001.

Now, there may be additional material later in connection with the winds matter, in fact, there are some dispatches referred to in the statement by Captain Safford which has been circulated to the committee which the Navy Department is now endeavoring to find and deliver to us, and we will make them available to you just as soon as they are received.

We would like to offer this compilation as Exhibit No. 142.

The Vice Chairman. It will be received as Exhibit No. 142.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 142."")

Mr. Masten. We would also like to offer two additional documents from the Federal Communications Commission file, the first of which is the page dated at the top December 5, 1941, and is a memorandum to Mr. Sterling. We would like to offer that as Exhibit 142–A.

The Vice Chairman. Exhibit 142–A?

Mr. Masten. Yes; in other words, we would like to have Exhibit 142 as the basic exhibit for all this new material.

The Vice Chairman. It will be so received.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 142–A.")

The Vice Chairman. What is next?

Mr. Masten. That is all we have.

The Vice Chairman. All this is one exhibit, then?

Mr. Masten. Yes; Mr. Richardson suggests that we mention at this time that the material included in Exhibit 142, item 3, and this additional material which we have now marked as Exhibit 142–A, is only a part of the total material we have received from the FCC but is the part that we felt was most relevant, and if any of the other material becomes relevant we will add it to the exhibit.

The Vice Chairman. All of this material in Exhibit 142–A relates to the FCC?

Mr. Masten. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I inquire from counsel, have you got in this new data you gave us this [8968] Tokyo to Washington serial 8430, November 27, 1941?

Mr. Masten. If that is one of the dispatches referred to in Captain Safford's statement as not being in the record, it is not yet included in this as we have not yet received it from the Navy Department.

Senator Ferguson. You have not yet got that from the Navy Department.

Mr. Masten. They are working on it, but it has not yet been received.

Senator Ferguson. Another one is OPNAV 282301. That is not in either?

Mr. Masten. That is not in this compilation.

Senator Ferguson. Then on page 16 of the Safford statement, 1, 2, 3, 4 OPNAV messages are marked priority, two of them referred to priority, you don't have those in the memorandum?

Mr. Masten. If those are dispatches referred to as not having been introduced, then they are not in this compilation but all of them are being sought by the Navy and we will let you have them as soon as we get them.

Senator Ferguson. But you haven't them now?

Mr. Masten. No, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Is there anything further?

Mr. Richardson. No.

[8969] The Vice Chairman. Captain Zacharias, do you have anything you want to present to the committee before your examination is resumed?

[8970] Captain Zacharias. I think I would like to clarify one of my statements yesterday regarding the word "when" about which I was questioned by Senator Lucas.

I couldn't quite make his point and since thinking it over, I feel that he wanted an explanation of what I meant by "when."

If so, the word "when" applied to two things; one a Sunday morning, and the other a time when submarines were discovered in the Hawaiian area. That would cover the meaning of the word "when" in my statement that I advised Admiral Kimmel as to where, how, and when such an attack would take place.

Senator Lucas. That still does not satisfy the Senator from Illinois.

The Vice Chairman. Is there anything further, Captain?

Captain Zacharias. Nothing further.

The Vice Chairman. I believe it is Mr. Gearhart's time to inquire. Mr. Gearhart of California will inquire, Captain.

Mr. Gearhart. Captain, as I understand your testimony, the substance of your conversation with Admiral Kimmel and the purpose of your going to his office or headquarters to discuss anything with him, was to point out that in your opinion, as an experienced Intelligence officer, and also [8971] as an experienced line officer in the Navy, that the Japanese, if they chose to attack us, would commence hostilities by an attack upon our fleet; is that not correct?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir. Of course, that discussion evolved from my discussions with Admiral Kimmel regarding the report that I had sent in to Admiral Stark regarding my conversations with Admiral Nomura and then the discussion of the incident of October 16, 1940, which I described in detail yesterday.
From there we went into a discussion of the general situation which might arise, and the things that would be inherent in it.

Mr. Gearhart. After you pointed out to him that in your opinion, they would commence hostilities by an attack upon our fleet, the next topic of conversation naturally was, "Well, assuming that to be true, what should we do about it," and you suggested that we install or inaugurate patrols?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct.

Mr. Gearhart. Which caused the admiral to say that he didn’t have the equipment or the men to maintain extended patrols for any length of time?

Captain Zacharias. He didn’t qualify it. He said:

[8972] Well, we have neither the personnel nor the matériel with which to make such a patrol.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, the maintenance of a patrol which is adequate as a defense against surprise attack, you could expect a tremendous attrition upon the planes that are used, could you not?

Captain Zacharias. The patrol planes?

Mr. Gearhart. Yes.

Captain Zacharias. Yes, you could. However, it is to be expected that an alert patrol would be able to get in a report by radio before it is shot down.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, I don’t mean attrition by warfare especially, but attrition from the mechanical standpoint.

Captain Zacharias. That is correct.

Mr. Gearhart. A certain number of planes will always have to be under repair, a certain amount of parts will become worn, and have to be replaced, so unless you have a large number of planes, as a reservoir, any patrol undertaken with 50 or 60 planes available would necessarily be a limited operation, limited as to time, would it not?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir, but although limited in forces available for that work, they nevertheless could be used and restricted to the most probable area [8972] or sector.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, was there a most probable area?

Captain Zacharias. In my opinion, as I stated, I expected, fully expected, that an air attack would be launched down-wind, and as the prevailing wind in Hawaii is from the northward sector, it would come from that direction.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, you knew that if any Japanese fleet should sail into that area, that it would have to travel several thousand miles, didn’t you?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. You also knew that the Japanese were already installed in the Marshall Islands, and in other Pacific islands, from which they could make a quicker movement toward the Hawaiian Islands?

Captain Zacharias. But they would suspect that that would be the locality in which we would be most interested.

Mr. Gearhart. In other words, it being more probable that they would come from the Marshalls or from some other islands in that area, therefore they would reduce, by coming from that area, the element of surprise?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. And if they came from the north, the element of surprise would be emphasized rather than detracted from?

[8974] Captain Zacharias. Well, it wasn't the unexpected area in my mind.

Mr. Gearhart. In other words, you selected that point as a probable initiation of attack because it was the improbable one?

Captain Zacharias. From the standpoint of what the Japanese would estimate us to do.

Mr. Gearhart. In other words, you were trying to think as a Jap would think.

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, Admiral Kimmel explained to you that he only had a limited number of planes available for this purpose of reconnaissance, and you urged him to do everything he could to get the Washington authorities to supply him with more planes, didn't you?

Captain Zacharias. He didn't explain that he had a limited number. He said "We have neither the material nor the personnel with which to carry out such a patrol," and as I indicated, I replied, "Well, Admiral, I feel you better get them because that is what is coming."

Mr. Gearhart. You knew that both Admiral Kimmel and General Short were asking for more and more planes at all times?

Captain Zacharias. I did not, sir.

[8975] Mr. Gearhart. You didn't know that Harry Hopkins was sending them across the Atlantic rather than sending them to the Pacific?

Captain Zacharias. No, sir.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I object to that statement.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, the Senator from Illinois has a perfect right to object, but I would like to know.

Senator Lucas. What is the basis for the assumption, and why bring Harry Hopkins into this program at this late date?

[8976] Mr. Gearhart. Why, certainly the Senator from Illinois is not so uninformed as not to know that Harry Hopkins was doing the allocating of those materials at that time.

Senator Lucas. Well, is there any proof in this record to that effect?

Mr. Gearhart. Yes; there is in this record as well as in the record of the American people.

Senator Lucas. Well, I challenge the statement.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Gearhart will proceed in order.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, do I understand then that the ruling of the Chair was that the Congressman was not in order?

The Vice Chairman. I ruled that the gentleman from California may proceed in order, which is a proper parliamentary expression to use.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. And is used all the time in the Senate and in the House.

Mr. Gearhart. Yes; that was a very adroit one because nobody knows when they hear that ruling whether the objection is sustained or is not sustained. However, we will proceed in order.
The Vice Chairman. The gentleman from California will proceed in order.

[8977] Mr. Gearhart. You were informed that there was a munitions assignment board, weren't you?

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir; I was aware of that.

Mr. Gearhart. And you were also aware of the fact that Harry Hopkins was a member of that board, weren't you?

Captain Zacharias. I do not recall that I did, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, he was, and if there is any doubt in the mind of the Senator from Illinois now, it is now in evidence by my assertion.

Senator Lucas. Of course, that makes it so.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, I am giving the Senator from Illinois an opportunity now to say it is not true if it is not true, and I will accept his word for it.

Senator Lucas. I am not going to argue with the Congressman. He has testified all the way through in these hearings.

Mr. Gearhart. You knew that under lend-lease we were supplying the British and other people who were fighting Hitlerism with planes?

Captain Zacharias. I knew we were furnishing a great many supplies and including planes, too.

Mr. Gearhart. And you naturally knew as an American citizen that which the Senator from Illinois pretends is not in evidence, that some agency of the Government had to allocate to the different theaters of operations and to the different countries that were involved all the munitions that we produced of various kinds, including airplanes, didn't you?

Captain Zacharias. That was a matter of policy to which I gave no question at all.

Mr. Gearhart. Then as a naval expert, one who has had a great deal of experience in intelligence work, which involves a further study of the question of what is an appropriate supply, do you think that the number of planes that Admiral Kimmel had and General Short had was a sufficient amount to defend that island in the likelihood of an attack from the Japanese?

Captain Zacharias. Both Admiral Kimmel and General Short have stated that the number of planes was insufficient. I prefer to take their opinion on that point.

Mr. Gearhart. Because they were closer to the problem.

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, when did you first reduce to writing the substance of your conversation with Admiral Kimmel?

Captain Zacharias. The first time was when I presented the memorandum to Admiral Draemel on March the 17, 1942, just about a year after I had the conversation with Admiral Kimmel.

[8979] Mr. Gearhart. Was there anything in that conversation that you had with Admiral Kimmel which marked it in your memory so that you can say now that your memorandum prepared a year later was accurate in every detail?

Captain Zacharias. I would like to say that this whole question was something that was uppermost in my mind. There were no important duties to becloud it in any way. It was something that had been of interest to me for the past 20 years. Therefore, there is every reason
why I should have remembered every detail of that conversation with Admiral Kimmel and I might say, on the other hand, that he had many other matters which were his concern, and I grant the possibility for that reason for his not having remembered the details of that conversation.

However, I do want to emphasize that this whole question was one to which I was giving full attention all my spare time in contacts with the fleet intelligence office at Pearl Harbor and the district intelligence office in the city of Honolulu.

Mr. Gearhart. To whom did you say you prepared that memorandum? For whom did you prepare it?

Captain Zacharias. It was prepared as a result of a conversation which I had with Admiral Draemel, then the chief of staff to Admiral Nimitz, and it was made up upon his recommendation when he said:

I agree with ninety-nine per cent of what you have said and I wish you would write this up for me as a memorandum so I can present it to Admiral Nimitz and let him go over it at his leisure.

That was the sole purpose of the preparation of that memorandum, and I would like to emphasize at this time that there was no inclination on my part to air my views regarding this previous conversation that I had had with Admiral Kimmel in March of 1941.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you take any steps after your conversation with Admiral Kimmel, when he told you he did not have sufficient equipment to undertake a patrol of the type that you recommended, did you take any steps to communicate your views to Washington authorities?

Captain Zacharias. Not regarding the lack of planes. I think I furnished a copy of that memorandum to Admiral King.

Mr. Gearhart. After the conversation, a year after the conversation with Admiral Kimmel.

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, at the time you talked with Admiral Kimmel and at the time he told you he could not undertake such a reconnaissance, you did not carry your ideas to any other source, but remained silent on the subject for a year?

Captain Zacharias. In replying to that, sir, I would like to emphasize that I was a commanding officer of a ship of the Pacific Fleet, which were my primary duties and having once given Admiral Kimmel my views as a student of Japan I knew that—I felt that—he knew that I was in the vicinity, available at any time should he desire any further advice on the subject.

Mr. Gearhart. But if Admiral Kimmel told you he did not have sufficient equipment to undertake such a reconnaissance, you knew that equipment could be secured from higher authority. Did you thereafter take the matter up with any authority—

Captain Zacharias. No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart (continuing). By letter or by conversation?

Captain Zacharias. No, sir; I did not. That was not a part of my function.

Mr. Gearhart. Was your original conversation with Admiral Kimmel a part of your function?

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir. As I stated yesterday, I was the senior officer on active duty who had studied the Japanese language
and Japan. I was the one who had interviewed Admiral Nomura and had made a semiofficial report to Admiral Stark, in which I knew Admiral Kimmel would be interested. I was the one who participated in that event of October 16, 1940, which I knew would be of interest to Admiral Kimmel. Therefore, it was from a sense of duty that I took it upon myself to go over and have a talk with him.

Mr. Gearhart. At that time you were the commander, were you not, of the U.S.S. Salt Lake City?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. And as such you were not detailed to intelligence work at that time, were you?

Captain Zacharias. Only insofar as I had been previously impo- rtuned by a former Director of Naval Intelligence that because of my past experience and interest, although I was going to sea duty, it was hoped and desired that I would continue active as an Intelligence officer no matter where I was or what duty I was performing. I merely followed that recommendation.

Mr. Gearhart. At the time that you held this conversation with Admiral Nomura were you an Intelligence officer or were you just a naval officer, a friend of his?

Captain Zacharias. I was commanding officer of the Salt Lake City at that time in the San Francisco area. I had previously discussed the proposed visit of Admiral Nomura with Admiral Richardson and told him that I expected to talk to him because of my intimate acquaintance with Admiral Nomura, and Admiral Richardson expressed a desire for a copy of the report which I told him I would make out after the conversa- tion and send in to the Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, as an expert in naval strategy, and as an Intelligence officer and informed with respect to such things, you knew what the Japanese problem was in the event they undertook hostilities against the United States?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. That problem was to immobilize our fleet until they could consolidate their conquests and install themselves into position, is that not correct?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir, and specifically, too. I felt that they had as their objective seriously disabling at least four battleships.

Mr. Gearhart. It would have been a rather dangerous operation for the Japanese to attempt conquests in the southwestern Pacific if the American fleet was on its flank and in fighting trim?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir. As I explained yesterday, that although we had in the Pacific 102 ships as against the Japanese 180, they would certainly feel that by the time we had assembled an expeditionary force with which to make an offensive movement across the Pacific we could have the rest of our fleet around in the Pacific even if it had to go around the Horn.

Mr. Gearhart. And even though the Japanese did have far more ships, numerically speaking, in the Pacific than we had, they had their responsibilities, other responsibilities than facing an American fleet alone, and would have further responsibilities in
the event they were to move through finally in the Pacific, is that not correct?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir; and I might add that in all our fleet problems at War College and the general consideration, it was taken for granted that in the event of hostilities between the United States and Japan they would most certainly capture Guam and attempt to capture the Philippines regardless of whatever else they did.

Mr. Gearhart. And whatever they did do, each operation required ships?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Therefore, they did not have 160 vessels of different kinds to direct against our approximately a hundred vessels of different kinds at Hawaii?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. And assuming that we would immediately reinforce our fleet by transfers from the Atlantic—and they had to assume the worst, of course—it became apparent from their standpoint, did it not, that they had to immobilize a considerable number of our ships before they undertook any operations in the southwestern Pacific?

[8985] Captain Zacharias. That is correct, and as I have indicated previously.

Mr. Gearhart. And when they undertook this attack upon Hawaii they undertook a very risky operation, did they not? As it turned out, it worked all right for them, but I mean as they contemplated it and looked forward to the operation.

Captain Zacharias. All things being equal it may be considered a very dangerous operation, as was indicated by the extract that I read into the record yesterday, which is page 47 of the papers furnished to the committee, but we felt that they knew the exact situation existing in Hawaii and could to some extent discount the danger that they might encounter.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, as a matter of fact whether it was very, very dangerous, or whether it was less dangerous, or not dangerous at all, it was absolutely necessary for Japan to commence this war that way, as you pointed out.

Captain Zacharias. In order to have a chance of victory, that is correct.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, the Hawaiian Islands are very small, and the harbors are very limited, and the fleet based on Hawaii was necessarily concentrated, with the ships very close together under all circumstances, is that not correct?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. And the fleet at Hawaii proper would be a [8986] far better opportunity for immobilization by a successful attack than they would have been if the fleet had been scattered between San Francisco, Monterey Bay, Los Angeles Harbor, Long Beach and San Diego?

Captain Zacharias. I think the important point in their was that that gave the Japanese a better opportunity to destroy the aircraft which would be a menace to the force that was bringing the planes over and thereby reduce the danger to the Japanese force, than would have existed if they would have had to attack another area. As it turned out they did immobilize practically every aircraft in Hawaii.
Mr. Gearhart. And by knocking out our battleships they immobilized our fleet and compelled it to immediately drop its offensive plans as set forth in WPL-46 and the Rainbow, and go on a defensive operation, didn't they?

Captain Zacharias. Of course, I felt immediately after Pearl Harbor that the Japanese had not destroyed any vessels which we would use in the operations that would be needed in the immediate future, such as the raids which we began. Those battleships, of course, would be vitally necessary at a later date, when we began the expeditionary forces.

Mr. Gearhart. That being true how do you account for the fact that the Japanese pilots went right after the battleships and their damage to the cruisers was slight in comparison?

[8987] Captain Zacharias. Because the Japanese had in mind disabling all the battleships because they would represent the ultimate force that would be brought to bear against the Japanese in the Western Pacific.

Mr. Gearhart. But they were not considering about ultimate forces as much as they were considering the immediate result, were they not? Is that not true?

Captain Zacharias. The immediate result was to disable the battleships; yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. The immediate result they were after was to immobilize the American fleet for a considerable length of time.

Captain Zacharias. That is correct.

Mr. Gearhart. To give them time sufficiently long for them to consolidate their conquests in the Southwest Pacific.

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, they immobilized our fleet, as they set out to, by immobilizing our battleships, didn't they?

Captain Zacharias. I was differentiating between the offensive and defensive actions on our part, but I agree to what you say, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. In other words, if their attack had been unsuccessful against Hawaii, the very temper of the American people, I think, would have been such as to require an immediate attempt by the American fleet to go to the relief of the Philippines; is that not correct?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. And if we went to the relief of the Philippines it would have to be by an American armada undertaking the task, wouldn't it?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. That would have to include battleships, would it not?

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. And therefore, by immobilizing our battleships, they immobilized the American fleet right then, not eventually; is that not correct?

Captain Zacharias. As far as early movements were concerned, that is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. Now, by concentrating our fleet in this limited area around the Hawaiian Islands and in that one harbor that they have over there that is at all important, did we not offer the Japs a temptation to come there and with one fell swoop to immobilize our
whole fleet and accomplish something which would have been difficult to accomplish if the fleet had been scattered along the Pacific coast as advocated by others and naval strategists?

Captain Zacharias. Well, that is a matter of policy, undoubtedly, based on information which was not at my disposal. I prefer not to comment on that.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, I don't want you to take sides between one set of officers and another set of strategists, but, in passing on it, the Japs could not have hit the Pacific coast and knocked out and immobilized our full fleet if our fleet was scattered, with only four carriers, could they?

Captain Zacharias. I think the important consideration is this: If the fleet had been at some point on the west coast, the Japanese would not have been in a position to immobilize the aircraft at our disposal, which would have resulted in a very sizable aircraft force being sent out against the forces which had to come in to make this attack, and would have created a very dangerous situation for the Japanese fleet which had come over. In addition to that they would have had to travel 2,500 miles further than Hawaii, which would put them in a position strategically vulnerable because of the location of the air forces at Hawaii and Dutch Harbor to the northward.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, now, we have defined the problem that the Japanese had with our fleet based at Hawaii. Can you define the problem that would have been theirs if they were contemplating hostilities against the United States if our fleet were scattered between San Francisco and San Diego?

[8990] Captain Zacharias. We did contemplate that in our fleet problem No. 14 in 1932, in which I participated as commanding officer of a destroyer and was required to make up an estimate of the situation and a decision. At that time I arrived at the conclusion that the Japanese would begin hostilities with an air attack on our fleet wherever it was and also disable by an air attack, if possible, the facilities at Hawaii on their way home.

At that time, 1932, we did not have dispersed along the west coast or in close proximity the air bases which we had in 1941 and which I have indicated would have created a much more dangerous situation for the Japanese at that time than it would have in 1932. However, I give you that to indicate that we have thought in terms of this air attack for a long time.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, if our fleet was scattered along the Pacific coast the air defense problem would be reduced to one-half, in that they would only have to patrol 180°, whereas around the islands they have to patrol 360°, is that not correct?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir, provided we did not take into consideration a favorable sector from which they might approach.

Mr. Gearhart. And in the event that they set upon the [8991] idea of immobilizing our fleet scattered as I described along the Pacific coast, they would have to send at least four naval contingents to cover each one of the ports where the American fleet might be at that moment in harbor?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. And, furthermore, is it not a fact that we had permanent installations of radar along the Pacific coast?
Captain Zacharias. I do not recall the state of the radar installations at that time.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, there is one other thing that I would like to conclude by asking you about: In the course of your remarks you used the phrase "surprise inspections."

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. I think you were discussing some operation that was being used frequently in the Hawaiian area, were you not?

Captain Zacharias. Those surprise inspections were inspections made by division commanders of ships, or higher authority, by sudden visits to the ships they wished to inspect, with an announcement only late the night before that they were coming the following morning. This, of course, was for the purpose of keeping up matériel conditions of the ships. What prompted my remark this afternoon when I was visiting [8992] with some of the staff at fleet headquarters, was the changing situation which made me feel that a little more attention should be directed toward the surprise attacks rather than these matériel conditions at that time.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, you were coming into Hawaii on December 7, weren’t you, as commander of the U. S. S. Salt Lake City?

Captain Zacharias. We were originally scheduled to return on the 5th of December, but that was on the regular training schedule which we were to take up when we left port, but which was changed when we found that we were going to Wake Island, so our delay was due principally to the necessities of refueling on that trip, a little bad weather that we encountered, and the duty that we were performing, so that we did not arrive until the morning of the 8th of December.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, naturally as a naval officer you were tremendously interested in what had transpired at Pearl Harbor on the 7?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Everybody was talking about that and nothing else. Did you make a visit to Pearl Harbor on the 8th?

Captain Zacharias. I did, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. You saw the results of their attack?

Captain Zacharias. I did, sir.

[8993] Mr. Gearhart. I wonder if you heard discussed at that time anything about inspections having been ordered or having been in process on any of the ships that were in the harbor at the time of the attack?

Captain Zacharias. I did, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. What did you learn as to what was the fact with respect to inspections of various kinds that were being engaged in at the time of the attack?

Captain Zacharias. Well, this is only hearsay and I have no basis for expressing it other than that there was much discussion about one or more ships being opened for a surprise inspection on Monday morning.

Mr. Gearhart. Monday morning? You mean after the attack they were still opened?

Captain Zacharias. They were opened on Saturday or Sunday—or Saturday, or before the attack on Sunday morning, so that they
would be ready for the inspecting party when they arrived on Monday morning. As I say, I have no knowledge of the facts regarding this.

Mr. Gearhart. When you use the phrase, "opened for inspection" are you referring to the voids of the larger ships?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Battleships have voids?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

[8994] Mr. Gearhart. Cruisers have voids?

Captain Zacharias. Some; yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. But destroyers do not, is that correct?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct.

Mr. Gearhart. And when the voids are opened the battle efficiency of a battleship and a cruiser is reduced somewhat, is it not?

Captain Zacharias. Those voids are for the purpose of giving additional stability to the ship. Therefore, when water is allowed to enter them the stability of the ship is greatly reduced and enhances the chances of capsizing.

Mr. Gearhart. But if water enters into any one void and is properly sealed, the water is confined to that particular void, is that not true?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. And the ship therefore will not sink as a result of having been pierced by a torpedo in a single or one or two voids?

Captain Zacharias. That is true, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, did you hear in the discussion that the voids on some of the battleships were opened for inspection at the time the torpedo attack occurred?

Captain Zacharias. Those were the rumors.

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. Well, wasn't it a well-substantiated [8995] rumor in view of what happened to the Oklahoma?

Captain Zacharias. So it would appear, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. In fact, it capsized because of the torpedoes and the letting of water in unequally in the ship, is that correct?

Captain Zacharias. I don't know about the Oklahoma, but I think it has been brought out that the Bureau of Ships made a study of the situation pertaining to those ships and found that only one ship was affected by that condition. I cannot remark on the correctness of that statement.

Mr. Gearhart. The report was a little bit unsatisfactory to me when it said that the fighting efficiency of one ship was reduced because of the condition of the inspection. I do not know how to interpret that, and the ship they referred to was the California.

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. But the fighting efficiency of one ship can be improved by having its voids open when a battle is on?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, I had a letter from one of the Annapolis students who heard you speak down in Annapolis and ever since you said something about that yesterday I have been trying to find that letter and I haven't been able to find it, but it compels me to ask you were your addresses that you delivered [8996] down there at that time written? Were they prepared addresses in writing?

Captain Zacharias. They were delivered from notes, and after the question yesterday I found my notes last night and discovered that the statement was with regard to the importance of Intelligence, if
I may refer to the notes, which I have. This was a lecture delivered to the midshipmen on the 20th of November 1942 in which I stated, in the course of emphasizing the importance of Intelligence, that—

Full appreciation of Intelligence would have prevented the surprise at Pearl Harbor. Intelligence knew what would happen, where and when, and more will be heard later about the failure to grasp the basic psychology of the Japanese which was largely responsible for the success of the Japanese attack.

I think that is the substance of the point in question.

Mr. Gearhart. I believe that is all. Thank you very much, Captain. The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson, of Michigan, will inquire, Captain.

Captain Zacharias. Sir?

The Vice Chairman. I said Senator Ferguson of Michigan will inquire now.

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Captain Zacharias, were you familiar with our policy as far as our diplomatic relations with Japan were concerned?

Captain Zacharias. I think so, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Were you one of the men who saw the intercepts of the Japanese code as far as it related to our international or our relations with Japan?

Captain Zacharias. I had seen many of them at times previously but none at the time near the Pearl Harbor attack.

Senator Ferguson. When did you leave the Intelligence Branch here in Washington?

Captain Zacharias. I left Washington the last time in 1936, when I went to 2 years sea duty. My next Intelligence duty was as district Intelligence officer in San Diego from June 1938 until November 1940. During that period I made one trip back to Washington on duty, for a period of about 3 or 4 weeks to discuss the situation and details with Admiral Anderson, then the Director of Naval Intelligence.

Senator Ferguson. Now, if I understood you correctly then, you knew that we were intercepting Jap diplomatic messages?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you knew that how early, what year?

Captain Zacharias. Well, of course, I indicated that I [8997] was engaged in cryptanalytic work, particularly of the Japanese, as far back as 1924.

Senator Ferguson. Now, were you familiar with the actual messages at any time? Did you know that we had received a dead-line message on the 29th?

Captain Zacharias. No, sir; I did not have knowledge of those.

Senator Ferguson. You did not have any knowledge of that?

Captain Zacharias. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have the so-called ship movements knowledge that is in Exhibit 2? I want to show you several messages.

Captain Zacharias. Well, they had continually been interested in movements of ships, all of our ships.

Senator Ferguson. But if you will look on page 12, the one I think that was referred to yesterday. Now, that is dated September 24, 1941, and according to our information on the bottom of it it was
translated on October the 9th. Are you familiar with that message?

Captain Zacharias. I had not seen it before; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Would that indicate that Japan was plotting our harbor for an air attack?

Captain Zacharias. I think that would have reinforced my views regarding the preparation.

[9999] Senator Ferguson. Isn’t that the thing that such a message would indicate? Isn’t that the only thing that such a message could indicate?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for the fact that it would not be translated from September 24 to October the 9th when our diplomatic intercepts were being decoded the day, many times, that they were received? In fact, I know of no case when they were not translated the same day.

Captain Zacharias. I think that is one—I look upon that as one of the organizational deficiencies.

Senator Ferguson. I want to ask you about the organizational deficiencies. Will you explain that to us?

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. What you mean by the “organizational deficiencies”?

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield on one thing that is in the record? You said the diplomatic messages were translated on the same day. That is not quite so. In fact, the winds code was not translated for a period of about 2 weeks after, the original winds code itself.

Senator Ferguson. I want to ask the witness whether or not the winds code was considered diplomatic. It was not in purple code, as I understand it.

[9999] Mr. Murphy. It is in the intercepts, in the diplomatic intercepts. It is in Exhibit 1, it is in that book there on page 154. You will find a period of 10 days.

Senator Ferguson. It tells exactly when they were received here and many of them were translated on the same day. It was one known as the code J-19, not the purple code.

Were you familiar with the difference between J-19 and purple?

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir. I think that at this time there was a limited number of personnel available to do such work as you have here, and the allocation of it was a result of an agreement between the Army and the Navy, and the delay which is indicated here is undoubtedly due to one or two things: Either insufficient personnel with which to cover all of the traffic or improper selectivity.

[9999] Senator Ferguson. Now, in that same Exhibit will you look at page 22?

Captain Zacharias (after reading document). Yes.

Senator Ferguson. If that had been decoded and on the desk of one of the naval officers by noon, or by 2 o’clock Saturday, the 6th, would that message have been significant as to an attack on Pearl Harbor? Particularly page 23?

Captain Zacharias. Only as something leading up to it. It does indicate a little further concentration of espionage activities, but there is nothing there beyond what we already knew, that they were trying to keep in the closest possible touch with our ship movements.
Senator Ferguson. Did not that also indicate that they were following up the message that you saw on page 12?

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir. It is an intensification of the espionage activities which would have had a significance.

Senator Ferguson. Now, that was received by our communications on the 3d of December 1941.

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, look at page 27, the one on the 6th from Honolulu to Tokyo, where they talk about, in [3002] the first sentence:

Furthermore, there is no indication that any training for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there are no signs of barrage balloon equipment.

Then the last sentence:

I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.

What does that indicate?

Captain Zacharias. That would have been extremely significant that an attack was in preparation.

Senator Ferguson. Well, that was in our possession, as shown by the message itself on the 6th.

Now, I want to ask you, how the selectivity of these messages could have been exercised, so we could have pulled out a message like that, and have seen that they intended to attack Pearl Harbor, and even do it by a surprise attack. What method is there in the Department for selecting such a message to get a translation of it quickly, particularly since on the morning of the 6th we had a pilot message that we were going to get an answer to our declaration of the 26th, and it would be in 14 parts, and there would be a time of delivery? Are you familiar with those messages?

Captain Zacharias. Not the contents of the messages, but in general.

[3003] Senator Ferguson. Now, that being true, and expecting on Saturday that there was, as they had expressed before, "something automatically would take place," wouldn't it be significant that on the day we were anticipating an answer that we were not decoding immediately all messages sent on that day, because that could be a fatal day? Do you see what I have in mind?

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir; that is correct, but it is possible that there were personnel limitations there. That point, I think, can be better covered by the officers actually engaged at the time in this work.

Senator Ferguson. Well, would there be anything unusual on that kind of a day to work all personnel around the clock?

Captain Zacharias. Considering the situation existing at the time, I would say that that is correct, sir.

[3004] Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not we were alerted here in Washington on that day?

Captain Zacharias. I do not know, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You say that the message on page 27 is a very significant message that they would attack Pearl Harbor. I wish you would look at the whole message.

Captain Zacharias. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Give us your opinion on it.
Captain Zacharias. That would lead to the conclusion that there
had been previous discussions by the Japanese of the feasibility
of an air attack and that this did presage something.

Senator Ferguson. Now were you familiar with the fact that Japan
was about to attack the Kra Peninsula on Sunday or Saturday?

Captain Zacharias. I was not aware of that.

Senator Ferguson. You were not aware of that?

Captain Zacharias. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Would that fact have been significant, that on
Saturday we had received the message from the British Admiralty,
through Winant who was our Ambassador there, to the Secretary of
State, which went to our Navy, and to others, that some sixty-odd
ships were moving on the Kra Peninsula about 14 hours away?

[9005] Captain Zacharias. That would depend upon other in-
formation available at the time. The Kra Peninsula, while being a
direct menace to Singapore, I cannot say at this time and would not
have been able to say whether or not that in itself would involve Japan
in a war with the United States.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any knowledge as to what was the
arrangement between the United States and Britain and the Nether-
lands in relation to an attack on one being considered an attack on all?

Captain Zacharias. No, sir; I did not.

Senator Ferguson. You had no such knowledge?

Captain Zacharias. None whatever.

Senator Ferguson. It would have depended upon that situation,
would it, as to what appraisal or evaluation you would have given the
movement on the British possessions?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you anticipate that if they attacked one
that they would attack both, or did you have no facts upon which you
could base that?

Captain Zacharias. I had no facts, but I always felt that the
Japanese, being the opportunists that they were, and the fact that
they had always made their advance prepared to retreat a little to
 placate anyone who might dislike it. [9006] I could only specu-
late as to the probable effect that that would have on my opinion at
that time.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that the Japanese maps showed
that there were supposed to be carriers where some of our battleships
were, and that that may have made a difference on the concentration
on the battleships? You indicated before that you thought they were
equally alert to getting our aircraft as they were to getting the battle-
ships.

Captain Zacharias. The aircraft on shore, I meant. I did not mean
the naval aircraft.

Senator Ferguson. You did not mean the naval aircraft?

Captain Zacharias. No, sir. That was the aircraft on shore, because
they would be the only one available to go out against the Japanese
forces, or to intercept the attacking planes. It would be impossible
to launch the aircraft from the carriers in the harbor.

Senator Ferguson. That is true.

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What about the carriers themselves?
Captain Zacharias. Well, they would look upon the carriers as probably just as important as the battleships. But knowing that they were cognizant of the movements of our ships I think they well knew that no carriers were in [9007] there on the morning of December 7.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know anything in relation to a downwind sector? Does that mean anything to you?

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Where was that sector?

Captain Zacharias. I do not know about a message——

Senator Ferguson (interposing). Not a message but a certain territory around Hawaii.

Captain Zacharias. Well, the down-wind sector, of course, is a small sector on either side of the direction of the wind. That is the sector within which we might expect an attack to come, because of the necessity of the attacking forces to have the best chance of getting away.

It was felt that they would launch their planes from up-wind in that comparatively small sector in order to let them come in with a greater speed, and when the forces retreated up-wind, that is away from Hawaii, it would slow down any planes, it would slow down to the greatest extent any planes that might come out to attack those forces.

Therefore it could be expected that an attack would be launched from this down-wind sector, so-called, in order to get the best results in the shortest possible time, and to give the greatest protection to the attacking forces.

Senator Ferguson. You said you had a conversation with [9008] Admiral Nomura before he came over here, in fact before he arrived here in Washington.

Captain Zacharias. I did, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Was there anything in that conversation that indicated to you that war was imminent?

Captain Zacharias. There was not, sir. I was convinced that he would do his utmost to prevent it.

Senator Ferguson. At that time you trusted him?

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir; because of his statement in 1921, and which he reiterated at that time on February 8, 1941, that he felt that if Japan and the United States went to war it would mean the finish of the Japanese Empire and a great loss to the United States.

Senator Ferguson. Did he say anything on the day that you talked to him in 1941 about that?

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir; he did. I asked him if he still felt that way and he said he did.

Senator Ferguson. Then there was nothing in that conversation that was significant, as far as Pearl Harbor was concerned, or an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Captain Zacharias. No, sir; there was not.

Senator Ferguson. In fact I take it, from your statement there, that it would be all negative, that it would indicate that war would not be imminent?

[9009] Captain Zacharias. That he would do his best to prevent it.
Senator Ferguson. And in your opinion was he a strong man in government in Japan, that his views would mean a lot on the question of war?

Captain Zacharias. He was. He was a very unusual Japanese in many ways, and I might say that he was the only Japanese extant who had expressed himself regarding the potential power of the United States, because that was something they never wanted to hear, or disliked to hear.

It so happens that when other Japanese, who had been over here in official capacities, ventured the opinion that the war potential of the United States might make it impossible for them to win a war against the United States, it always brought them into disfavor.

Admiral Nomura was the only one who seemed to be able to keep his position even after stating such things.

Senator Ferguson. Would that bring you to the conclusion that it would have been a good thing for us to be bold with our forces on Hawaii, that we should have indicated that we anticipated an attack, that we were alerted to full strength both in Washington and in Hawaii, rather than to say that we were to do nothing that would arouse the population?

[9010] Captain Zacharias. Well, that was a matter of policy which was probably based on more information that I had available.

Senator Ferguson. But with what you knew, what would your answer be?

Captain Zacharias. My knowledge of the Japanese makes me feel that they respond better to certain things than they do to others, and one of them would be a situation that would not invite an attack by them. That was why I was concerned about the situation in March 1942 which caused me to prepare, or to initiate the conversation with Admiral Draemel and prepare the memorandum for Admiral Nimitz, because of the local situation and the defensive attitude that we were taking at that time which, to my mind, invited the Japanese to come back. That, of course, eventuated in less than 3 months when the battle of Midway took place.

The attitude to which I refer was expressed in the press in such terms as “We can defend the Islands.” Anyone knowing the Japanese would realize that that would immediately create in their minds a doubt on our part as to whether or not we could defend them. I would have preferred to say “We wish the Japanese would come back. We will hit them with everything we have.” That would have had an entirely different effect upon them than a pronouncement that [9011] we can defend the Hawaiian Islands.

Senator Ferguson. Was your ship, the Salt Lake City, alerted fully to war on the 6th, your particular ship? In other words, you were the captain of that ship.

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Were you alerted to war?

Captain Zacharias. I was alert myself on December 5, when I received a report that a submarine had been sighted in the Hawaiian area. As you recall, that was one of the contingencies, the unmistakable signs that I indicated to Admiral Kimmel, that the Japanese would be ready to strike. Therefore—
Senator Ferguson (interposing). As I understand it, you were alert because you knew there was a sub around, not that somebody alerted you?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Go ahead. You started to say "therefore."

Captain Zacharias. That evening, from 6 o'clock to midnight—this was the 5th of December, Friday night—I sat at my radio listening to the short wave transmissions from Japan, hoping to pick up something which would give me further indications of what they intended, but all I could hear was scrambled conversation. We were then en route to [9012] Pearl Harbor. I did nothing, other than the condition of readiness 3 in which we were placed at the time, to alert the ship any further.

Of course, under way the captain is in his emergency cabin all the time, which is really a part of the navigating bridge, where the officer on deck can have him on the bridge within 2 seconds.

Senator Ferguson. But there was no specific alert given to your ship?

Captain Zacharias. There was not, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now we have evidence before us that Gen. Hayes A. Kroner, the Chief of the Intelligence Branch, War Department, G-2, from July 1941 up to the time of the Japanese attack, had not personally received the intercepts of the Jap codes either in Exhibit 2 or Exhibit 1, or the others. Could you explain what the set-up would be that would keep him from having that information? You were familiar with the set-up here, were you not?

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir. I did not know about that specific instance, but it might be an indication of one of the organizational deficiencies which I had in mind and which had been considered over a great number of years and on which effort had been made to bring about a change. That is the allocation of the cryptographic work to a [9013] purely technical bureau such as the Office of Naval Communications and Signal Intelligence Service of the Army. Those are purely technical organizations which have the facilities and personnel for picking messages out of the air. After that their function would seem to cease, and therefore, the decrypting, translating, evaluating, and dissemination, of information in such dispatches is a purely Intelligence function.

For that reason I had made consistent efforts over many years to have that function placed directly under the Office of Naval Intelligence, but without results.

Senator Ferguson. Well, why would they place evaluation under Communications rather than under Intelligence?

Captain Zacharias. That is one of the things that I could never understand, because Intelligence is the receptacle of all information and would be the only organization in either the Army or Navy where all information was available, and particularly background information such as on the Japanese. That appears to have contributed largely to some of the things that took place, because the evaluations were made by certain war-plans officers without a background knowledge of Japan and the Japanese, and they could not possibly have at their disposal all the information available.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know how often they would [9014] change the heads of Intelligence in the Navy?
Captain Zacharias. That is another organizational deficiency that I would like to defer. I might say that in the past 5 years we have had seven Directors of Naval Intelligence.

Senator Ferguson. If you knew that, how is it possible for the Director to get the background information and really intelligently operate as an Intelligence officer?

Captain Zacharias. It is not possible.

Senator Ferguson. Before December 7, 1941, we had a change, as I remember here in the evidence, in March, and one on October 15, which was the day before the change in the Jap Cabinet.

Captain Zacharias. That was when Admiral Kirk was relieved by Admiral Wilkinson.

Senator Ferguson. Kirk took the place of Anderson and Anderson had been relieved by an acting man, so we really had three in that year.

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. How would it be possible, from your experience in Intelligence, for an officer as Director of Naval Intelligence to get the background and to be able to intelligently evaluate intelligence under those circumstances and under those changes?

[9015] Captain Zacharias. As I said before, it is not possible. That is one of the points that I would like to emphasize, regarding the training of officers for Intelligence work. There has been a general misconception that because an officer is intelligent he is a good Intelligence officer. That is not correct. As indicated by Senator Brewster yesterday in reading from one of the papers, I wish to emphasize that naval officers are trained fundamentally not to be Intelligence officers, because of the qualifications that are attached thereto. That does not detract one bit from the capabilities of these officers as naval officers, but it is a misconception to believe that because an officer is intelligent he will make a good Intelligence officer.

[9016] Senator Ferguson. Why shouldn't a man, if he makes a good Intelligence officer, receive his promotions and receive high rank? Why do we treat Intelligence, which is, as I understand, to tell you the strength of the enemy, when you may go to war, or when you may not, and where you may go to war—are those all very, very important questions?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir. It is actually a specialty of the same comparable importance as the Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery.

Senator Ferguson. But what have been the conditions in our Navy?

Captain Zacharias. I might say that there has been entire disregard of the fundamental requirement for Intelligence, but that is not a reflection on those who made the decisions, because they were not in a position to judge properly.

If you will examine that letter of mine written on January 27, 1942, which is a part of the exhibit which I sent into the Chief of Naval Operations, via the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet at that time, I have indicated clearly why we must have better selectivity and training for officers doing Intelligence work, and unless we do that I think we will never change the situation with [9017] which we have been confronted in the past.
Senator Ferguson. You mentioned yesterday, in relation to, let's call it the boldness of an officer, or the capacity of an officer to evaluate something for a superior officer, that some men just do not have the capacity to evaluate and actually tell the superior officer the meaning of what he has.

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir, and that is what I tried to do for Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Nimitz.

Senator Ferguson. Could that, prior to the 7th, have been one of the cases that we didn't really get out of what we intercepted and what we had the real significance, and permitted an attack without our knowledge that it was coming?

Captain Zacharias. That is quite true, sir. The improper selection of officers for Intelligence duty is one, I look upon it as one, organization deficiency. The allocation of evaluation functions to the communications officer and Signal Intelligence Service is the other, and a third one—well, I won't bring that in at this time.

Senator Ferguson. Does it have anything to do with this?

Captain Zacharias. We have mentioned it already. The War Plans officers undertaking the functions of evaluation and dissemination instead of the Chiefs of Intelligence taking over.

Senator Ferguson. Now, that brings me to this point, that sometime during 1941, it was decided that certain people would get the information, that is, it would be given to the War Plans, it would be given to the Chief of Naval Operations, it would be given to the Secretary of the Navy, it would be given to the President of the United States, it would be given to the Secretary of State, in the raw, you might call it, so that evaluations would not go to them from the men who had been trained and who had the history of the situation.

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did not that fact alone place the responsibility for the evaluation of our intelligence in those who got it in the raw, and who did not take the evaluation of those who had the history and who were trained to give evaluation?

Captain Zacharias. I would say that it would tend to take away the functions of the Chiefs of Intelligence who should have been the sole, should have had the sole, responsibility for the evaluation and presentation to the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, and at Pearl Harbor, the fleet Intelligence officer instead of the War Plans officer.

I would like to point specifically to that because, as has been reported, it was the War Plans officer on the staff of the commander in chief who stated in a conference between General Short and Admiral Kimmel, when asked whether there was any probability of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, he stated there was none.

Now, he was an officer, an excellent officer, but he did not have any background knowledge of Japan or the Japanese, or their psychology. In other words, he did not have full information at his disposal on which to make such a decision, and unconsciously that would be bound to effect the decision of the commander in chief, and I feel that he is entitled to better information and advice than he received there, all of which was inadvertent and due solely to the organizational deficiency, and I feel confident that if the fleet intelligence officer had had the sole responsibility for stating his evaluation to the commander in chief
and had been allowed to do so, we would have had an entirely different picture.

Senator Ferguson. Now, you stated this morning that the attack of the Japanese on Pearl Harbor was a hazardous attack. Of course, all attacks in war are hazardous, isn't that true?

[9020] Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir; and they discuss that fully in this extract from the book that I read yesterday.

Senator Ferguson. Now if the Japanese knew that we were fully alerted—and as I understand it their intelligence was rather superior on Hawaii, they had intelligence officers all over the island?

Captain Zacharias. They knew everything that was going on.

Senator Ferguson. They knew everything that was going on. Therefore we should have assumed that they knew everything that was going on, isn't that correct?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Now, if they knew everything that was going on, the next thing they would have to find out would be whether we knew that they knew what was going on; isn't that correct?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. If we did know what was going on and were fully alerted, it would be an extraordinarily hazardous thing, would it not?

Captain Zacharias. That is true.

Senator Ferguson. If they knew that we just passed it over and didn't do anything, for instance, stopped our radar at 7 in the morning, and had our ships coming in from the coast unarmed, at the same time that we were not alerted, they had these messages, as I have shown you, what hazard were they taking?

Captain Zacharias. I would say they were confident that they were taking none, and that they knew every detail of information as to the operation of the radars, the times at which they were under operation, and other things that were of importance to them.

Senator Ferguson. In your opinion, how could the fact that on the morning of the 7th we fully alerted Hawaii, Pearl Harbor, to a full alert for an attack, how could that have in any way been a detriment to the United States? That would be 4 or 5 hours before they left their ships.

Suppose they found out we were then fully alerted, wouldn't that be a great benefit to the United States, that they would get that knowledge?

Captain Zacharias. It would have, sir. It might have served the purpose of preventing—of calling off the attack.

Senator Ferguson. If they knew we were fully alerted?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I showed you the ad in a newspaper this morning.

[9022] Senator Ferguson. You obtained from your file another ad in a newspaper. I want to show you these ads.

First, I want to show you the cloud above, with the white spot on it, and the bottom part of the "J" in "Jashion," and some of the words. Have you got an extra copy of that?

Captain Zacharias. I have a small one.
Senator Ferguson. What does the bottom of that "J" indicate in the Japanese or Chinese characters?

Captain Zacharias. The bottom part would be the numeral 1.

Senator Ferguson. Not 7? Captain Zacharias. No, sir. The bottom part is simply that straight line.

Senator Ferguson. I don't mean the bottom, I mean the entire—will you take this interpretation. This is an advertisement published by the Honolulu Star Bulletin, December 3, 1941. That is before the Pearl Harbor attack.

Take the other sheet that I hand you. The reason I ask you is that you are familiar with the language, and we have indications here from some of these messages that they were using the want ads and other ads to get certain signals or certain information.

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir; but I don't think I would attach much importance to it.


Senator Ferguson. Now, look down over the sheet that has been interpreted there, and see whether or not there is any truth—or whether they are false—those interpretations.

Captain Zacharias. I checked on—

Senator Ferguson. You must have checked on that ad.

Captain Zacharias. I did, sir. In Hawaii, this was brought to my attention, and we checked first to see if these were the names of silks, and I was told that there was a silk for each one of these names. That led to the—

Senator Ferguson. Take the "Yippee."

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir. In consideration of those—

Senator Ferguson. What kind of silk is that?

Captain Zacharias. In consideration of those various unusual silks, it led to the investigation of who had inserted the ad in the paper, particularly because in another paper, in the Honolulu Star Bulletin on six different days, November 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, and 26, there appeared in the personal column, a phrase, "Yippee," which also appears in this silk ad, "Please call me on phone, urgent."

On checking with the newspaper office, it was found that this ad was registered in the name of a man named Tmayer, giving a certain address.

Further investigation disclosed that no such person was at the address given, or in any directory in Hawaii. But the Intelligence officer was unable to run down anything further regarding these advertisements, but it did leave the impression that it was very suspicious, particularly because the ad was made up in Hawaiian Importing Co., which was a Japanese house, and turned over to the newspaper for publication.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether there was a silk known as Tip-Hi? That is the second one.

Captain Zacharias. Only through inquiries that there was such a silk. I don't know now whether that is true.

Senator Ferguson. What does the word "Juno" mean; what is the interpretation of that? What is the interpretation given on the ad I gave you? Will you look and see on the one I gave you?

Senator Ferguson. That is not correct?

Captain Zacharias. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What is the word for Sunday?


Senator Lucas. What is Monday in Japanese?

Captain Zacharias. Monday?

Senator Lucas. Yes.

Captain Zacharias. Getsuyobi.

Senator Ferguson. The reason I am asking you about these ads, you thought they were significant and had looked them up and our Intelligence officers had looked them up; isn’t that true?

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you find that their intelligence was such that they were using certain ads to convey certain messages?

Captain Zacharias. It was my impression that they were, particularly in Japanese newspapers. The reason for insertion in the English-language newspapers was in order to reach agents who were not Japanese and who we knew were operating in Hawaii at the time. That is, Germans and Italians.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, they were reaching them by ads in American newspapers, and this could have been one of those ads?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. You thought at one time that it was such an ad?

Captain Zacharias. I did, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you get anything from it?

Captain Zacharias. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Would the interpretations put on the one which I gave you, give you any more knowledge on it?

Captain Zacharias. No, sir. These have been analyzed very thoroughly, and the conclusion was that there was nothing we could understand from them. That still did not remove the possibility of their being an instrument for conveying information.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, unless you had the code words, you couldn’t determine that they were significant?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

Now, in order that there might not be any doubt about this translation “Juno” meaning Sunday, the word “Nichiyobi” is composed of two characters, “Nichi,” meaning Sunday, and “yobi”—“day.” Likewise Monday is composed of “Getsu,” which is Monday, and “yobi,” which is “day.”

Mr. Murphy. May I suggest that somebody reading this record is going to have to read all this to get down to what they are looking for.

Senator Ferguson. Was this part of the Intelligence system that you were looking at—were any of our other officers looking at these ads?

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir; very much so. I was in frequent consultation with the officer in charge of investigation in the Fourteenth Naval District located in Honolulu.

Senator Ferguson. That was now Commander W. B. Stevenson. Had you any other advertisements that you looked over?
Captain Zacharias. No, sir. These are the only ones.

Senator Ferguson. Now, there is one more question. Why did you get a certificate from Munson that you had made a statement to him in October—it is the last page of your sheet. That was in July of 1942. There is a certificate, as I read it, that you did tell Munson this story about, this item about an attack on Sunday morning, and he was making an investigation for someone here in Washington and had credentials to see everything and hear everything?

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Why did you get the certificate?

Captain Zacharias. That was done upon the advice of my wife, who, through womanly instinct, felt that at some future date the subject might come up for discussion and there might be some short memories.

Senator Ferguson. Is your wife an Intelligence officer, also?

Captain Zacharias. She is my adviser on strategy.

Senator Lucas. I don’t know why you would need that. Your memory is not short.

Senator Ferguson. That is all.

The Vice Chairman. It is now 12 o’clock. We will recess until 2 o’clock this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 12 noon, the committee recessed until 2 p. m. of the same day.)

[9029]

AFTERNOON SESSION—2 P. M.

The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order.

Mr. Keefe of Wisconsin will now inquire, Captain.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ELLIS M. ZACHARIAS, UNITED STATES NAVY (Resumed)

Mr. Keefe. Captain Zacharias, did you ever at any time tell Admiral Kimmel that a Jap air attack would be made on Pearl Harbor on the 7th of December, 1941?

Captain Zacharias. I did not, sir.

Mr. Keefe. In your conversations with Admiral Kimmel did you state anything more than your opinion based upon your study and your experience in Intelligence?

Captain Zacharias. I did not, sir.

Mr. Keefe. That in the event of a breakdown of diplomatic relations Japan would attack the fleet wherever it might be and, in your opinion, the attack would come from the north and would take place probably on a Sunday morning?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Is that all that you ever told Admiral Kimmel?

Captain Zacharias. That is the substance of it, with the addition of the earliest indications and the unmistakable signs.

[9030] Mr. Keefe. Of the submarines?

Captain Zacharias. Of the submarine appearing in the operating area.

Mr. Keefe. Now you had a discussion with Mr. Munson?

Captain Zacharias. I did, sir.

Mr. Keefe. A civilian?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. In October 1941?
Captain Zacharias. I did, sir?
Mr. Keeffe. You understood Mr. Munson had been sent to Hawaii to make an investigation of conditions there by someone in authority at Washington?
Captain Zacharias. I did, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. Did you learn under what authority he was acting?
Captain Zacharias. I endeavored to ascertain that but he consistently refused to disclose it, other than to produce the letter signed by Admiral Stark as Chief of Naval Operations to open up everything to him.
Mr. Keeffe. Because of the letter which he carried representing his credentials, signed by Admiral Stark, you advised him of whatever information you had in the interviews which he had with you?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
[9031] Mr. Keeffe. When you had this conversation with Mr. Munson did you relate to him the same information that you had given to Admiral Kimmel back in March of 1941?
Captain Zacharias. I did, sir, and in addition I indicated to him the circumstance about the arrival of the third envoy in Washington, as to what would take place, and I learned over the radio while at sea that the Ambassador to Peru, the Japanese Ambassador to Peru had arrived in Washington on the 2d of December, 1941.
Mr. Keeffe. Did you prophesy or predict or state to Mr. Munson that, in your opinion, the Japs would attack on Sunday, December 7, 1941, at Pearl Harbor?
Captain Zacharias. I did not, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. Did you tell him any more than you had previously told Admiral Kimmel, with the addition of the information to which you have just alluded?
Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir; I did. He was interested in the question of whether or not there would be an armed uprising in Hawaii or on the west coast in the event of hostilities. As I have previously testified, I told him that because of my belief that the hostilities would commence by an air attack on the fleet, because of the necessity of secrecy on the part of the Japanese, they would not have been able to disseminate the necessary information on which [9032] to base an uprising or extensive sabotage, and therefore he could forget about those two items.
Mr. Keeffe. I have read the report which appears in the record of these proceedings, of January 17, in which is set out the report of Mr. Munson, and the reason for asking you these questions is because I do not find in his report any reference or suggestion of a proposed air attack upon Pearl Harbor.
You have read that report, haven't you?
Captain Zacharias. I have seen his report, but I do not know why he did not include it.
Mr. Keeffe. The fact is, as far as my question is concerned, he did not include it, did he, in his report?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir. However, he did authenticate, in July 1942, for me the fact that I had given him those details.
Mr. Keeffe. All right. Now you graduated from the Naval Academy in 1912?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Did they have an organization at the Academy at that time known as the Green Bowlers?

Captain Zacharias. I did not know of any such organization and heard of it only recently.

[9033] Mr. Keeffe. How did you happen to hear of it recently?

Captain Zacharias. It came up in a discussion of a group of naval officers, and later I saw an account of it in a recent publication of the Army and Navy Bulletin in which the editorial of that paper concluded that it was an organization of not much importance or influence.

Mr. Keeffe. How long have you been a captain in the United States Navy?

Captain Zacharias. Since July 1939.

Mr. Keeffe. Have you been up for promotion since then?

Captain Zacharias. Not under a regular selection board of the Navy. I might add that these selection boards as such were discontinued during wartime.

Mr. Keeffe. The thought just occurred to me, in all frankness, Captain Zacharias, that here is a graduate of the Naval Academy of the class of 1912; he has been a captain since 1939, who has rendered distinguished service both in the line and in Intelligence, and he is still a captain when others have been carried on to considerably higher rank; is there any reason for that, that you know of, or are conscious of, today?

Captain Zacharias. I appreciate the thought, and I might add that that never has been a consideration with me and will so remain. Why I was not promoted is something [9034] within the knowledge of the former Chief of the Bureau of Personnel and the former Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. Keeffe. Thank you. That is all.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I ask two questions?

The Vice Chairman. May I ask a question first?

Mr. Murphy. Surely.

The Vice Chairman. Wouldn't any other officers, Captain, have anything to do with promotions besides the Chief of the Bureau of Naval Personnel and the Chief of Naval Operations?

Captain Zacharias. I am not entirely familiar with the methods by which promotions were made during wartime. It was something different from the process of selection for promotion as established by the Congress.

The Vice Chairman. Do not the commanding officers under whom officers serve have some power of recommending, and so on?

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir. They make out periodic reports of fitness of the officers concerned. My reports for service at sea have been uniformly excellent, as can be noted in the record.

The Vice Chairman. One reason that prompted me to ask that question—I recall Admiral Richardson testified here that he included Admiral Kimmel on his list for Commander of [9035] the Pacific Fleet. Admiral Stark stated that he had included Admiral Kimmel on his for that. And that carried a promotion. So I was just wonder-
ing whether commanding officers did make recommendations that had something to do with the question of promotions.

Captain Zacharias. I think that he was referring to his position as a member of the selection board which passed upon the record of all officers coming up for consideration for promotion.

The Vice Chairman. Of course, I don't know about the Navy, and you do; but I got the impression that Admiral Richardson had submitted a list of names for the position of commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, and Admiral Kimmel was included on that list; and Admiral Stark—I got the impression with regard to him, that he had a list that he had made up which included Admiral Kimmel for the position of commander of the Pacific Fleet.

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir. I think that was probably a special list of those eligible for commander in chief and not in the general run of selection for promotion.

The Vice Chairman. Well, I had also understood that in the Army probably a list of names was submitted for special assignment which carried with it a promotion and the appointing authority selected one of those names on that list.

Captain Zacharias. That is quite true.

The Vice Chairman. So I had assumed that commanding officers had some function to perform in the preparation of those lists and had something to do with the question of promotion. I am just asking for information.

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir. The only part the commanding officer plays is to submit the periodic reports of fitness which go into the record of that officer and are kept in the Bureau of Personnel, which are later considered by the board when they meet regularly for considerations of that kind.

The Vice Chairman. Well, in fairness to you as a witness before us here, I will ask you: Do you want to give the committee any further information with respect to the question asked you by Mr. Keefe about your promotion?

Captain Zacharias. Why, no, sir. I would not inject that into the question at all.

The Vice Chairman. All right. Mr. Murphy, of Pennsylvania, will inquire.

Mr. Murphy. I have two questions, Captain.

You testified this morning, Captain, that you talked at Annapolis to the student body on the question of intelligence, and I assume from your past experience plus the fact that you were selected to address the student body that you can answer this question quite satisfactorily: What is the significance of the destruction of codes by an expected enemy at a time when international relations are tense between our Nation and the supposed enemy?

Captain Zacharias. It means that that nation intends to resort to hostilities in the country in which the codes are destroyed.

Mr. Murphy. Do you know of any teaching anywhere in the Naval Academy, or anywhere in the United States Navy, that would justify an admiral in charge of the fleet in saying that the destruction of codes was a matter of little importance, or not of vital importance? Do you know of any books, any pamphlet, or any ad-
dress anywhere in your lifetime where you ever heard that until this case?

Captain Zacharias. There is nothing of that nature on which he could base it, unless he had information that was specially available to him.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, all of the textbooks and the authorities are to the effect, are they not, that the destruction of codes by an expected enemy at a time when relations are tense is a very good indication of the probability of war?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Murphy. That is all.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman—

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson, of Michigan, will inquire.

Senator Ferguson. Captain, what is your present assignment with the Navy?

Captain Zacharias. I am still attached to the office of the Secretary of the Navy, the administrative office of the Navy Department, where I was attached at the time I was engaged in the project of conducting a psychological warfare campaign against the Japanese high command. That has not been changed as yet.

Senator Ferguson. Is that considered an assignment in the Intelligence Branch?

Captain Zacharias. It is not, sir.

Senator Ferguson. It is a special branch in that section of the Navy office?

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir. It is more in the light of ability, being attached to the administrative office, and that assignment was simply to facilitate the handling of my records while I was on this other special duty.

I might add that the last word I had from the Secretary was to wait further word from him.

Senator Ferguson. On your new assignment, if there is to be one?

Captain Zacharias. I don’t know as there is a new assignment yet in prospect, but I am waiting, and covering the situations and occasionally making out estimates and memorandums for him.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you want to add to or subtract anything from your testimony, or do you want to change it in any way?


Senator Ferguson. Is there anything that you think of that you could tell this committee that would help us in the solution of the problem now before us as to how this surprise attack could have taken place in Pearl Harbor in December, on December 7, 1941?

Captain Zacharias. There is nothing that I can add to what I termed as organizational deficiencies, which had some effect and which I feel should be remedied in the future in order to add better security to the Nation.

Senator Ferguson. Have you an opinion on the unification of the Intelligence in all the services?

Captain Zacharias. I have long advocated a joint intelligence agency for the purpose of handling all intelligence.

I made a plan, made up a plan, in 1942 which contemplated such an organization and would have incorporated in time of war all intelligence agencies under a joint committee, and directly under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
In peacetime such an organization would have to be a little differently constituted, but there should be something, in my opinion, to coordinate all of the efforts, eliminate duplication, and assure us that all information is available to those who might require it.

[9041] Senator Ferguson. Isn't it important that in peacetime the Navy has all of the intelligence the Army has and that the Army all that the Navy has, and the Marines, including all of the services, so that evaluation will include the evaluation of all pertinent facts?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Can you get that under a system such as we had in the two services prior to the 7th of December 1941?

Captain Zacharias. The likelihood is that some information would not reach those who should be using it.

Senator Ferguson. Now, wasn't it true that Mr. Munson represented some other agency outside of the Army and Navy when he came out working on intelligence?

Captain Zacharias. I don't know, sir. I was never able to establish the source of his representation.

Senator Ferguson. Well, you have in the last sheet of your report—do you have it before you there?

Captain Zacharias. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. The word that he was—well, did you say "possibly" or "presumably"?

Captain Zacharias. I presumed that he was a representative of the President. I did not know.

Senator Ferguson. Why did you presume it? Was there any facts?

Captain Zacharias. No, sir. His refusal to tell me, and his—quite properly so—and his coming out as a civilian with a letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to have things opened up to him. That did not bear—have any bearing on the information that I gave to him or the expression of my opinion to him.

Senator Ferguson. Have you ever talked to him as to why he left out of his report to the Secretary of State the facts of what you told him about the attack on Sunday?

Captain Zacharias. No, sir; I have not. At the time I saw him in 1942 I had not seen his report, and I haven't seen him since then, as I recall.

Senator Ferguson. So you have no knowledge on it?

Captain Zacharias. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. That is all.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, one other question.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. Captain, do you know of any rule in the Intelligence field or any authority or any reason after an admiral of the fleet gets a war warning, and thereafter from December 3 on, gets several messages in regard to code destruction, do you know of any reason for his not making that information available to the Commanding General at Hawaii?

Captain Zacharias. I am not in a position to answer that, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Well, are there any rules that prohibit the handing over of code-destruction messages to your counterpart in the other service, when you are expecting a war?

Captain Zacharias. I am not aware of any.
Mr. Murphy. All right; that is all.
Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question?
The Vice Chairman. Counsel will inquire.
Mr. Richardson. Captain, following out the inquiry of Congressman Murphy briefly, you regard information with reference to code burning as being of the first importance?
Captain Zacharias. Of the highest importance.
Mr. Richardson. And you would regard it as the duty of any competent Intelligence service to place that information in the hands of people in the field from whom action was expected?
Captain Zacharias. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Richardson. And you would expect those people in the field to extend that information to all persons with whom they were associated, who could be helpful in defending the interests of the United States?
Captain Zacharias. I would sir.
[9044] Mr. Richardson. That is all.
The Vice Chairman. Are there any further questions?
(No response.)
The Vice Chairman. I believe you have already been asked, Captain, if you have any further information or knowledge you desire to give to the committee.
Captain Zacharias. I have nothing else.
The Vice Chairman. On behalf of the committee, I thank you for your appearance, the information you have given to the committee, and your apparent desire to be helpful in bringing to the attention of the committee all information you have on the question here under consideration.
You may now be excused, sir.
Captain Zacharias. Thank you very much.
(The witness was excused.)
The Vice Chairman. Counsel may proceed.
Mr. Richardson. I would like, Mr. Chairman, to present to the committee Admiral Smith.
The Vice Chairman. Admiral Smith will please come forward.
Admiral, will you please be sworn?

[9045] TESTIMONY OF VICE ADM. WILLIAM WARD SMITH, UNITED STATES NAVY

(Having been first duly sworn by the Vice Chairman.)
Mr. Richardson. Admiral Smith, what is your full name?
Mr. Richardson. How long have you been connected with the Navy?
Admiral Smith. It would be 41 years next June.
Mr. Richardson. You are a graduate of Annapolis?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; class of 1909.
Mr. Richardson. Are you still in active service?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
[9046] Mr. Richardson. You are the Admiral Smith who was chief of staff for Admiral Kimmel for the Pacific Fleet in the summer and fall and winter of 1941?
Admiral Smith. I am.
Mr. Richardson. You are the Admiral Smith referred to here in the testimony of the previous witness, Captain Zacharias?

Admiral Smith. I am.

Mr. Richardson. Were you present at any conversation between Captain Zacharias and Admiral Kimmel during 1941?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; I was.

Mr. Richardson. And was the time and place of that conversation that which was named by Captain Zacharias?

Admiral Smith. The exact date I do not know but it was after Admiral Kimmel transferred his headquarters from the Pennsylvania to shore; I should say approximately April 1, possibly at the time given by the last witness.

Mr. Richardson. How long had you known Captain Zacharias?

Admiral Smith. I knew him slightly at the Naval Academy. I was a first classman when he was a plebe. I have seen him from time to time since but have never served in the same organization with him.

Mr. Richardson. Your relations with him have always been friendly?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. And how long had you known Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral Smith. I first served with Admiral Kimmel in the summer of 1939 and from then on until after Pearl Harbor. I had known him, had met him on one or two occasions previously, but had never been with him, never had served with him.

Mr. Richardson. Now, Admiral, will you advise the committee of what your recollection is of this conversation at which you were present and referred to by Captain Zacharias as having taken place in Honolulu on or about April 1, 1941?

Admiral Smith. I remember the meeting very well, but Captain Zacharias is in error when he says that Kimmel sent for me. Zacharias came to my office and I took him down to the War Plans office where I knew Kimmel to be at the time. So far as I recollect, no one else was present. Kimmel was studying war plans.

I introduced Captain Zacharias and had the impression at that time that they had never met before. The meeting, to my recollection, did not last an hour and a half but I believe more likely 15 minutes, and during this meeting Admiral Kimmel did most of the talking.

After the first few minutes of the conversation, which concerned the Jap situation as it existed at the time, Admiral Kimmel questioned Zacharias on the characteristics of some of the Japanese leaders, naval leaders. He had already had from Admiral Hart very good reports of these leaders and Admiral Hart’s information turned out to be correct.

Admiral Kimmel then asked about the efficiency of operations of the Japanese Fleet, and, as I recall, Captain Zacharias could give him no information on that. We already knew that he probably could not, since none of our Intelligence officers or students, language students, had ever been able to get about in Japan to see the things they would have to see to learn something of the operations efficiency and gunnery of the Japanese Fleet.

The conversation was brief and, as I recall it, when Zacharias left, Admiral Kimmel was disappointed and said to the effect that he had gained no new information.
Now, to cover this meeting more thoroughly, I would like to refer to a few items mentioned by Captain Zacharias.

Mr. Richardson. Before you do that might I ask you, Admiral, to state how the meeting came about?

Admiral Smith. Captain Zacharias came to my office and asked to see Admiral Kimmel and tell him that he had had a great deal of Intelligence duty and I believe he just came from Naval Intelligence and had brought the Salt Lake City and had [9049] just joined up, as I remember.

Mr. Richardson. Go ahead.

Admiral Smith. I listened to that testimony, I might say, with astonishment. It struck me as the testimony of clairvoyance operating in reverse. I am absolutely positive that at this meeting there was never mentioned the question of an air attack on Pearl Harbor, a submarine attack, or the question of seaplanes arriving in merchant ships and taking off from the nearby islands.

There are two statements in this testimony, one where Zacharias is alleged to have told Kimmel that an air attack was certain and Kimmel replied, "How can I prevent this?"

Now, those words do not sound like Kimmel to me as I know him. This was a subordinate officer just joining up and I believe that Kimmel knew very little about him.

The next statement, that when he informed Admiral Kimmel about an air attack—about a reconnaissance to 500 miles—and when Kimmel replied that he had neither men nor materials to carry out such reconnaissance and that Captain Zacharias states that he replied, "You had better get them, Admiral, for that is what is coming."

Had any officer of any rank ever made a statement like that to Kimmel it would have been so impressed upon my memory that I would never have forgotten it, and I do not recollect [9050] that statement.

Now, Captain Zacharias states also that Captain Smith has since discussed—since Pearl Harbor has discussed this meeting, this air attack with others on several occasions. I would like to know with whom I held these discussions and where. I am certain that the matter passes out of my mind.

Never since that meeting was Captain Zacharias in my office, I never saw him with Admiral Kimmel, he was never at a meeting of the staff though he probably did have meetings with the fleet Intelligence officer, Captain Layton. I have never heard his name mentioned in staff meetings.

Now, as for this Sunday business, that was not questioned. A Sunday attack had been discussed as far back as 1935 when I was fleet operations officer to Admiral Reeves and the fleet was in San Pedro. Admiral Reeves feared a Sunday attack, but we were lying in an open harbor with no protection whatever. Officers and men had their families there, so that on Sunday morning probably half of the officers and half of the men would be on shore. There was no protection against submarines.

At Pearl Harbor it was different, after we left Lahaina Roads. Very few had their families in Honolulu. There was a net at the gate; there was no danger from torpedo attacks from submarines.
As for the attitude of McMorris—that he was preoccupied. I can believe that he was often preoccupied. It may be that this reflects the fact that Kimmel had more confidence in his own Intelligence officer, Captain Layton, than he had in Captain Zacharias or in anyone else, and I think this is confirmed by the fact that after Admiral Nimitz took over the fleet he kept Captain Layton on as his fleet Intelligence officer throughout the war.

As for Mr. Munson, I never heard of him until a few days ago. I doubt that he represented the Chief of Naval Operations because it was customary and a matter of courtesy when a special agent was arriving at Pearl Harbor for the Chief of Naval Operations to notify the commander in chief in advance of his coming. No such notice was received to the best of my knowledge and I did not know that Mr. Munson had ever been in the Pearl Harbor area.

As for the statement to Mr. Munson that he can forget sabotage and consider only an air attack, I do not see how sabotage could be overlooked. We all knew that the islands had many Japanese spies in them, some as consular agents and some as priests. I know the Army was afraid of sabotage. I talked to many civilians who spent their lives in the Islands and it was their opinion that the most dangerous Jap was the one born in Honolulu and taken at a very early age to Japan, educated there and brought back to the islands in early manhood. They said that that type of Jap could never be converted to the American system.

If I may touch upon a few other statements it may clear up questions in the minds of the committee.

Halsey was not delayed in his return to Pearl Harbor. There was no haste in his return to Pearl Harbor. It was natural for him to return at an economic speed so as not to consume too much fuel. He had to fuel his destroyers from his heavy ships regardless of weather conditions and there was no need for him to be back in Pearl Harbor on the 5th of December, no necessity for his arriving at that time. The balance of his force, including his three battleships, did return on the 5th of December as they were scheduled.

As for the reason for the search to the south: It is true that the weather in the north after you get a few hundred miles north of Midway is likely to be very thick. I had 6 months in the Aleutians and believe I understand that weather; it also may be very rough, but the Japanese Fleet had to fuel en route and fueling in the water is not always easy, but it must be remembered that two carriers had been reported in the Marshalls, not very far away. That was an Intelligence report.

Our best Intelligence, except for the absence of radio interception, was that the Japanese main carrier strength was in Empire waters.

On the morning of the attack and shortly after the attack a report was received by radio that a Jap carrier had been sighted to the south. This later proved incorrect. It was the cruiser Minneapolis operating under Admiral Brown. Shortly after that report was received and while we were still uncertain, the fleet Intelligence officer ran over to the plotting board with radio bearings and stated, “Here they are” and he cut them into the southward. Present at the plotting board were Admiral Kimmel, Captain McMorris, the war plans officer, Captain
Delaney, the operations officer, and myself. For that reason the search was ordered to the south.

The fleet Intelligence officer's explanation of that later is, as we knew at the time, radio bearings from a single station were then and may still be subject to only one error, that is an error of 180 degrees. That was Layton's explanation the last time I talked to him and shortly after Pearl Harbor.

The statement is made that the Japs knew all the fundamentals of naval warfare. I think this war has proved that they did not.

As for Mr. Thurston and the station KGU: It is true that KGU did send out this warning to keep the streets clear, to permit freedom for the military, to keep cool, summoning [9054] the Red Cross, and so on, but when the attack struck, the telephone system of Honolulu was blocked because the Honolulu Advertiser had not been delivered that morning and everyone was calling for his paper. The radio was carrying on as usual with morning music. I left the house and was informed later by my wife that the music was interrupted and KGU announced "Pearl Harbor under attack," then went on with the music for something like one hour before it gave the instructions what to do. Where it got those instructions I do not know.

As for the appointment of Captain Layton, I do not know anything of that except that when Admiral Reeves had the fleet in 1935 and 1936 and Admiral J. O. Richardson was his chief of staff, Layton was on the Pennsylvania, was known to be a Japanese language student, was the officer usually sent to board an incoming Japanese naval vessel. He had the high respect of Admiral Richardson.

About surprise inspections: Surprise inspections were never held on Mondays. Surprise inspections referred to the captain's inspection on Saturday morning, which was always held, unless the ship were fueling or taking on board ammunition; it was held from 9:30 until 11:30 in the morning. All that it involved was the inspection of the crew and of the living quarters and of a few other compartments. It did not involve the inspection of double bottoms.

[9055] The system was that a division commander just before morning quarters at 9:30 would send a signal to a ship stating "You will receive a surprise inspection this morning," and then accompanied by the captain of another ship of the division and of an inspection crew of many officers the admiral would go to that ship under inspection and while he inspected the crew and the living quarters the younger officers would go to the engine room and to various parts of the machinery spaces and storerooms.

The inspection was brief. A very brief report was put in on it. The captains liked this inspection because it gave them an opportunity to exchange ideas with other ships and they would come back and make improvements in their own and, consequently, get less reprimand perhaps from the admiral on his next inspection.

A question has been asked this morning whether carrier planes could take off from the carriers while in Pearl Harbor. Planes were never on the carrier decks in Pearl Harbor. They were flown off, sometimes as much as 200 miles, but always before entry and were dispersed into air fields at Ewa and other places where they could continue their training in case the carrier were to remain for a long time.
When the carrier sortied from Pearl Harbor the planes joined her at sea. This practice had been going on long before Pearl Harbor.

The *Utah* may have been mistaken by the Japanese for a carrier. Her deck was flat and covered by 12 by 12 lumber because she was used for bombing purposes, bombing from the air. To them from the mountains she may have appeared to be a carrier. She was occupying the berth of the *Enterprise* and I believe that she received the torpedoes intended for the *Enterprise*.

The question was asked this morning whether a ship had been alerted at sea. Ships at sea were always alerted and the moment the *Salt Lake City* sortied from Pearl Harbor she was automatically alerted by Admiral Kimmel's order 2 CL-41, which is an exhibit before this committee. She then went to condition 3, and I would like to explain that condition 3 is ample on a ship at sea. It is quite different from a shore establishment.

At condition 3 the aircraft battery of the ship is manned, ammunition is at the guns, lookouts are stationed. There is an air patrol of some kind in the air from the ship's own planes if from no other source, so that a surface enemy could be sighted when many miles out of range. It is only a very few minutes to go from condition 3 to a full alert manning all guns. It is obviously unnecessary to man turret guns when there is no possible enemy within range.

In confirmation of what Captain Zacharias has said, he never arrived before a board of nine admirals in accordance with the old, regular Navy selection system. The last officer selected by that system was the top man in 1911, so that his failure of promotion cannot be blamed upon the Navy promotion system, as it exists except in time of war.

The fleet Intelligence officer did evaluate all of the information he had and bring it to the commander in chief every day, and when other task force commanders or type commanders were in port and came to the admiral's morning conferences the fleet Intelligence officer invariably, on a chart which covered one whole wall of the room, explained the information received by Intelligence and his evaluation of where the enemy was and what he was doing.

Mr. Richardson. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Having been unavoidably absent during the Admiral's testimony I am not advised of his testimony. Therefore, I cannot at this time make any inquiries and therefore I will not do so at the moment. Congressman Cooper?

The Vice Chairman. No questions now.

The Chairman. Senator George?

Senator George. I have no questions on the points covered by Admiral Smith. If there are any questions asked on any other matters, I may have a few questions later.

The Chairman. Congressman Clark?

Mr. Clark. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Lucas?

Senator Lucas. I have no questions.

The Chairman. Mr. Murphy?

The Vice Chairman. He just stepped out.
The Chairmain. Senator Brewster?
(No response.)
The Chairmain. Congressman Gearhart.
Mr. Gearhart. The Admiral’s testimony was very clear. I do not have any questions at this time.
The Chairmain. Senator Ferguson?
Senator Ferguson. Admiral Kimmel when he was on the stand related a conversation that he had with Secretary Knox in relation to a message being sent on the 6th. Were you present at that conference or conversation?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; I was.
Senator Ferguson. Will you explain that?
Admiral Smith. I remember that, I believe, word for word because it impressed me so at the time.
Admiral Kimmel, General Short, Admiral Bloch, and Admiral Pye had been in conference all morning and I had been invited to join up at 12 o’clock and be there for lunch. I joined them in a small room. Present, in addition to those mentioned, were the Secretary of the Navy and his aide, Captain Beattie.
[9059] Secretary Knox made a statement—I don’t know what had been discussed before my arrival—but Secretary Knox made a statement:

I don’t believe anyone in the War Department or in the Navy Department expected an air attack on Pearl Harbor, not even Kelly Turner.

He then said:
But did you not receive on the Saturday preceding Pearl Harbor a warning message that we had learned surreptitiously that Kurusu and Nomura had been directed by their home government to deliver their final message to Mr. Hull at one o’clock on Sunday, December 7th?

Everyone in the room said “No.”
Whereupon Secretary Knox stated:

That is strange. I know that such a message was sent to Hart and I thought it was sent to you.

Senator Ferguson. Did he say when it was sent, Saturday or Sunday?
Admiral Smith. I understood him to say Saturday, the night before.
Senator Ferguson. The night before.
Admiral Smith. But I checked it later on with Admiral Hart and found he had never received it either.
Senator Ferguson. Did you see all the messages that came to Admiral Kimmel?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether they were considered [9060] and did you pass judgment on the war warning message?
Admiral Smith. I was at the conference when it was discussed; yes, sir. I saw all of his messages, I saw every letter that he wrote or received to or from Admiral Stark.

Senator Ferguson. Can you tell us the impression that the war warning message had on you, what it meant to you as a war warning?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Would you do that?
Admiral Smith. We had had many warnings but this warning as analyzed, if written in letter form by the War College System and the system in use in the fleet, would have been in two paragraphs.

Paragraph 1, Information:

Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days. The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, That or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo.

Paragraph 2: Which is always the action paragraph:

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46. Inform [9061] District and Army authorities.

That meant to me, since all previous warnings had been to the effect that the attack was bound to the southward, toward the Kra Peninsula and a previous message about an attack, an aggressive attack in any direction, including the Philippines, in my mind confined the possible attack to that area and this message warned us to take a defensive deployment so that we could carry out our tasks in the war plan, the first of which would have been a raid on the Marshalls. It did not convey to me that we were likely to be attacked.

Senator Ferguson. Was there an opinion of the group that were studying this message expressed at that time?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us what that opinion was?

Admiral Smith. There was general discussion. Always in a case of that kind Admiral Pye, if in port, and always Admiral Bloch as previous commander in chief, with the members of the staff who were concerned, and they reached the same agreement that I have told you of, and there was no opposition that I recall.

Senator Ferguson. Did the staff have daily staff conferences?

Admiral Smith. Not every day; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did they have them prior to the 7th?


Senator Ferguson. And if so, what date?

Admiral Smith. They had them practically every morning; Admiral Kimmel had certain members of his staff, not the entire staff, in his office. It is my recollection there was a staff meeting on the morning of the 27th before this message was received.

The message was received some time in the afternoon and Admiral Bloch was sent for and did not come. I believe it was the only conference he missed. He had been to the hospital to see his wife. He was represented by Captain Earle. I believe Admiral Halsey was there but am not certain. The message was sent by courier, by Captain Layton to General Short and on the following morning, to the best of my recollection, there was a full conference between Admiral Kimmel and General Short and the principal members of their staffs and that this conference lasted all morning.

Senator Ferguson. Did you see the message that went to General Short in relation to that on the 27th?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. That was brought over by Captain Earle.
Senator Ferguson. Did that change your opinion in any way as to your opinion on this?

Admiral Smith. No, sir.

[9063] Senator Ferguson. Did you have the same opinion about that instrument?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Was the relationship good between the officers and Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Smith. Very good; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What were the relations between your organization, the Navy, and the Army? Was it good or was it not cooperative?

Admiral Smith. It was good and Admiral Kimmel and General Short were together very frequently. Sometimes Admiral Kimmel would go over to see him. There was liaison between the fleet gunnery officer and the Army, the fleet aviation officer and the Army Air Force. The two staffs did not get together very frequently except in the presence of the commanding general and Admiral Kimmel.

Senator Ferguson. Were these liaison officers competent to do the job between the two, to have coordination between the two services?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. I believe every member of Admiral Kimmel's staff has since been promoted. They had to be competent to serve with him.

Senator Ferguson. And I take it that included your own promotion?

[9064] Admiral Smith. Well, I hope so. I don't know.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I mean you were on his staff.

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You were speaking of those on his staff. You have been promoted after that?

Admiral Smith. I had been promoted before that. I had been selected by the Navy Board of Selection in September 1941, some time after I became Chief of Staff, but I had not yet made my number when Pearl Harbor struck, and when I was promoted it was dated back to November 1941.

Senator Ferguson. Just the one promotion, that is the only one you have had since Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Smith. Well, I have been made Vice Admiral since. That was March 1945.

Senator Ferguson. So there were really two promotions after Pearl Harbor as far as you are concerned?

Admiral Smith. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Now, were you familiar with the demands for more material and more men by Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Were there such demands?

Admiral Smith. There were very many of them. In fact, we sometimes thought he was sending in too many. He was demanding radar, all kinds of late materials, more planes, anti-

[9065] aircraft guns, more men, and stability of officers.

Of course, we realized that men trained in the fleet had to be sent to new construction and his principal demand was that they send men out for training to overcomplement ships so that taking expe-
rienced men out and sending them home to new construction would not handicap the efficiency of the ship. In the last message I remem-
ber he asked for something like 20,000 men, I think it was, or perhaps 19,000, 9,000 to fill up the fleet and 10,000 additional for training. He did not get them.

Senator Ferguson. Prior to Pearl Harbor were you in on the con-
versations in relation to taking ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic?

Admiral Smith. Moving ships from the Pacific to the Atlantic, that movement was made after I was Chief of Staff. There was no conference on the subject. We simply received orders to do so.

Senator Ferguson. Were there some ships returned after Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Smith. After Pearl Harbor I believe everything we sent was returned with the exception of two light cruisers, the Brooklyn and the Philadelphia. The carrier Yorktown—in fact two cruisers of that type, the three battleships New Mexico, Idaho, and Mississippi and the destroyers were promptly [9066] returned to the Pacific after Pearl Harbor.

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Smith, do you know of anything that you could give this committee to help us in deciding the question before it as to how this surprise attack could happen at Pearl Harbor and we not be prepared for it?

Admiral Smith. I might say for one thing, not as an explanation of Pearl Harbor but in the interests of the future. I believe there was entirely too much secrecy in all branches of the Government connected with national defense. I see no use in breaking a cipher unless you use its contents.

I can think of one incident to explain what I mean by “too much secrecy.”

Senator Ferguson. Will you do that?

Admiral Smith. In about May 1941, while we were at sea in exer-
cises, the commander in chief was in my cabin when we received from the Chief of Naval Operations a dispatch directing us to send two divisions of cruisers and two squadrons of destroyers to Samoa to stand by for distant reconnaissance and to occupy the torpedoes of these destroyers with the mark VI exploder. The commander in chief was no informed where these ships were going and did not know until they received their direct orders from Washington after their arrival in Samoa.

[9067] The commander in chief asked if I knew the meaning of the term “Mark VI exploder” because he did not, and I told him that I had a suspicion that it was an exploder for the magnetic head of a torpedo. I gave as my reason for this the fact that 15 years previously I had been in charge of torpedo manufacture at Newport and we then had an order for a new type of torpedo to use a magnetic head. The torpedo was very successful. The magnetic exploder which had been tested proved an absolute failure.

Captain Hart, now Senator and Admiral Hart, was the inspector in charge at Newport. He promptly called in the engineers of the Westinghouse Co. to design a magnetic head that would work, and their engineers were there frequently and would return to their laboratories, all at no expense to the Government, to attempt to develop this device.
I left Newport in 1929 and was never able to learn whether that torpedo head had proved successful.

Senator Ferguson. And you were captain at that time?

Admiral Smith. I was a commander when I had the torpedo desk, the torpedo I manufactured. In 1939 I asked an officer who was in a position to know what results had been obtained and he said that the head was successful but was so secret that it could not even be talked about.

[9063] Admiral Kimmel then sent for the fleet gunnery officer, Captain Kitts.

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand this was an order from Washington that you received?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You were trying to interpret it?

Admiral Smith. We were trying to fulfill the contract for 250 torpedoes equipped with that head, and I dare say many contracts followed.

On the receipt of this message on the Pennsylvania, Admiral Kimmel sent for the fleet gunnery officer and asked if he knew the meaning of the words "Mark VI exploder." Captain Kitts had spent most of his career in gunnery. He is now Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance. He admitted to me that he had never heard of a magnetically exploded head.

Admiral Draemel, then in command of the destroyers of the Pacific Fleet, was sent for, and he stated that he had never heard of such a device. The exploders we found on our return to port were in the storehouse on the submarine base, and certain submarine officers had been given instruction on how to use them. There was a test stand of some sort to indicate whether they were active or inactive, and all were tested out before being issued.

[9069] Now, shortly before Pearl Harbor, a squadron of submarines was moved from Pearl to Cavite and these were equipped with this new magnetic device. I am informed that early in the war the heart of many a submarine captain was broken when he fired these torpedoes and they passed under the ships without exploding, when they were designed to explode under the ship and blow her belly through the smokestack. They all ran deeper than they were supposed to run.

Now, in my opinion, had we not been so secret about that device and had taken some of them out and tested them, we would, of course, have had a much more effective weapon.

I believe that this matter of secrecy has some bearing also on Pearl Harbor. All of these magic messages—none of which I ever heard of until I arrived here before this committee and listened to the testimony—these messages should certainly have been sent to the commander in the field, and to permit him and his staff to evaluate the information they received. I think it is admitted that all the naval brains are not concentrated in Washington.

[9070] Admiral Kimmel had a staff and many good advisers in the Pacific Fleet. He had no chance to evaluate this information which I learned was available in Washington.

I believe there was a state of mind in Washington that the war is in the Atlantic. In fact, one letter received after Pearl Harbor but
written before, stated something to the effect, "I know you need more men, and would be glad to give them to you, but they are not available; and remember the war is in the Pacific and we here in the Atlantic think that you are sitting pretty."

The Chairman. You do not quite mean that. You mean the war is in the Atlantic, don't you?

Admiral Smith. "The war is in the Atlantic, and you in the Pacific are sitting pretty," yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Have you since then read over the diplomatic messages in exhibit 1, and the messages in exhibit 2, the so-called ship-movement messages?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; I have heard them read before this committee.

Senator Ferguson. And that is what you are now referring to?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; particularly the bomb plot message of October 10, and the two deadline messages of November 25 and November 29, and the 1 o'clock message.

[9071] Senator Ferguson. And the 13-part message, or whatever it is.

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well now, do you have a judgment that if you had seen those messages, you would have had a different idea about what was going to happen at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Smith. The dead-line messages would have indicated war, but not necessarily Pearl Harbor. The message dividing Pearl Harbor into five sectors, and demanding information even to the detail of reporting at least twice per week, when two large ships were tied up abreast, would certainly have indicated to us that Pearl Harbor was a dangerous place for our fleet to remain. I believe had that message been received, the fleet would have spent most of its time at sea, with small detachments in port.

The message about the delivery at 1 o'clock, meaning, 7:30 at Pearl Harbor, and about midnight in the Philippines would have been a matter for grave discussion. I cannot say now that we would have known that to mean an air attack on Pearl Harbor, but I think it very likely that someone in the conference would have advanced that idea, and the matter could have been discussed and evaluated, and I think most certainly any land radar would have been [9072] manned at that time, and I believe that planes would have been ready for take-off, or might have been in the air rather than grouped.

Senator Ferguson. That is all I have.

The Chairman. Congressman Keefe.

Mr. Keefe. I have just one question, Admiral. In all the discussions relative to the construction or interpretation of these messages which were received by the Navy at Pearl Harbor, the staff of Admiral Kimmel was advised, and discussed what the meaning of those messages was?

Admiral Smith. Invariably; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And any determination which was made by the commander in chief, while that determination was his fundamental responsibility, necessarily arose as the result of those discussions had with his staff members?
Admiral Smith. Always, and at the end of the conference, the war plans officer, or the operations officer would be directed to draw up the paper or plan, and that paper or plan, when drawn up, would be brought to me, slight changes might be made in discussion among the war plans officer, the operations officer, and me, and then the paper would be taken in to Admiral Kimmel for signature.

To my knowledge, he never issued any plan entirely on his own. The staff was always in on the discussion.

[9073] Mr. Keefe. Well, of course, the reason for my asking that question is perfectly obvious I think. The responsibility for Pearl Harbor has heretofore been placed largely upon General Short and Admiral Kimmel, and no responsibility in any of these findings that I have read has been placed upon the distinguished members of the staff of Admiral Kimmel.

Admiral Smith. That is right, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, while it is true that the determination of war plans for any orders to be issued, was the function and responsibility of the commander in chief, whatever he did resulted from the joint conference with his staff officers?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; that is true.

Mr. Keefe. That also is true of the Army, in its operations there, is it not?

Admiral Smith. I would expect it to be so; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. That is all.

The Chairman. The Chair would like to ask a question or two, prompted by Admiral Smith’s comments here.

I do not know just what prompted your comment upon Captain Zacharias’ failure to be promoted. Evidently that was prompted by a question that was asked before I came in.

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

[9074] The Chairman. You said that he had no complaint at his failure to be promoted according to the rules that prevail in time of peace.

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. And I gather from that there may have been a different situation in time of war. My impression is that both in the Navy and Army, nearly everybody has been promoted on account of the war, because of their services. Lieutenants in the Army, second lieutenants, have become majors, and lieutenant colonels, and some of them colonels, and men low down in rank in the Navy have become vice admirals, and so on.

I do not know that there is any reason for that, and I do not know as it is pertinent to what had happened at Pearl Harbor, but I am wondering whether, in view of that general course during the war of promoting the men in the Army and Navy time and time again, that Captain Zacharias’ precocity, or disposition to give to his superior officers, or even go over the heads of some superiors to give his opinions to others, had anything to do with his failure to be promoted during the war.

Do you know anything about that?

Admiral Smith. I do not. I would have to see his record. I know he is very smart and he is a very brilliant [9075] Japanese student, and has been studying naval intelligence during most of his
career. I know that he has had the necessary sea duty for promotion, but I have never served with him at sea and don't know what his record in that respect is.

If I might say so, in the peacetime system, the board looking over the officers for promotion has available their entire record, the entire possible for them to see the written record. The time of officers re-
nNaval Academy. Under the wartime system of promotion—and I do not know what it is—these records cannot be available because the opinions are asked of officers at sea in both oceans and it is not possible for them to see the written record. The time of officers re-
quired to look over the many records would take too many officers away from their jobs. It is true that promotion in wartime has been very rapid in both the Army and Navy, but there has been a great deal of selectivity in the Navy from captain to flag rank. There are many good officers who have not been promoted to flag rank.

[9076] The CHAIRMAN. I make no point of it, I do not know anything about it, but in view of the fact that this man graduated from the Naval Academy in 1912, has given 37 years in the Navy and he was a captain, I believe, at the time he says that he gave this infor-
mation or his views back in 1941—he was made a captain in 1939—that he is still a captain when practically everybody else who has been in the Navy that long has been promoted, and I am just wondering whether something failed to click there, whether it is his fault or the fault of those who are responsible for promotion? I still insist that it has nothing to do with what happened prior to Pearl Harbor, but inasmuch as you mentioned it a while ago, evidently in response to a question that I did not hear, I am wondering whether there is some sort of penalty that has been assessed because he took it upon himself to communicate his views to some of his superiors?

 Admiral Smith. That conversation referred to the last few ques-
tions asked of Captain Zacharias when some of the members of the committee asked for his opinion why he had not been promoted and he stated that he had not come before a Regular Navy selection board. I merely confirm that. I am not qualified to express an opinion on why he was not promoted.

[9077] The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate that. Were you present during the entire conference between Captain Zacharias and Admiral Kimmel?

 Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; I was.

The CHAIRMAN. My recollection is that Admiral Kimmel stated that that conversation lasted an hour and a half and that Captain Zacharias also stated it lasted an hour and a half, whereas you say it only lasted about 15 minutes.

 Admiral Smith. I am positive of that.

The CHAIRMAN. How do you reconcile that?

 Admiral Smith. I did not know that Admiral Kimmel did state an hour and a half.

The CHAIRMAN. My recollection is he said he thought he recalled it lasted about that long. It may have just seemed that long to him, but my recollection is he said that he recalled it lasted about that long, and I understand Captain Zacharias fixed the same length of time. That is a pretty wide difference as to the length of the conversation.
It may not be material, but I am wondering whether you were there all the time?

Admiral Smith. There were so many administrative details to my job that I never spent an hour and a half out of that office without growling, unless in one of Admiral Kimmel’s conferences, and I do recall that I stayed through this conference because I remained and talked to him afterward.

The Chairman. After Captain Zacharias left?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Well, now, one other question. It has been testified here by Admiral Stark and Admirals Wilkinson and Turner, and also the Chief of Staff of the Army and his assistants, in regard to these magic messages, that one of the reasons why they did not transmit them to Hawaii was their fear that the Japanese might discover that they were being intercepted, and in the interest of safety they did not transmit them.

Your position is, as I understand it, and that of Admiral Kimmel, that they should have been sent regardless of that; that that risk should have been taken and they should have been transmitted to Hawaii.

Now if that had been done, or if in a similar circumstance, an evaluation made in Washington through messages received by the high-ranking officers in the Army and Navy had fixed an evaluation on this situation and that had gone out, as it is claimed in this case they did send out their evaluation of the situation based upon these messages, if the messages actually had gone and Admiral Kimmel and General Short had assessed a different evaluation on them so that there would have been a conflict between Washington and the field, which evaluation would have taken precedence?

Admiral Smith. The one in the field.

The Chairman. The one in the field?

Admiral Smith. Yes; because the field commander was carrying the responsibility.

The Chairman. Would that precedence go to the extent of the action in the field countermanding the directions of the high-ranking officers in the War and Navy Departments?

Admiral Smith. Throughout the war the evaluations were made and the operations executed by orders in the field, and I never heard of any conflict with Washington.

The Chairman. I am wondering if there had been a conflict based upon the same information, whose orders and directions would have been entitled to precedence or priority in controlling what happened in the field. I can understand that where an officer is in the field he has a wide discretion to exercise his own judgment under circumstances that may arise, but where in the office of the Chief of Staff, or the Chief of Naval Operations, based upon information received, an evaluation is made and that is sent out in the field with instructions as to what to do, that same information had been sent in the field and the commanding officer there had reached a different conclusion to what ought to be done, without any further communication between Washington and the field, which would have taken precedence? Which would have been carried out?

Admiral Smith. Well, Senator, I do not know in what legal posi-
tion that commander in chief would have found himself, but I do know that every commander in chief with whom I have served would take action on his own evaluation if he thought he was in danger, just as a ship’s captain will drop out of formation if he thinks the formation is in danger; he is then on his own, and I have never heard of anyone being hanged for it.

The CHAIRMAN. Being what?
Admiral SMITH. Being hanged for it, or punished for it.

The CHAIRMAN. I am not talking about being hanged; I am trying to determine, from the information available at both ends of the line, whose commands, whose directives were to be obeyed in the event there is a different assessment or evaluation. I believe there is nothing that succeeds like success, and even if the commander in the field violated instructions from Washington and gets away with it and succeeds in it nobody raises any question, but suppose he acts on his own judgment and violates the direction [9081] from Washington and it turns out to be bad judgment, then what would happen? It might be an academic question, but it is entirely possible that that might arise, and it might have arisen here.

Admiral SMITH. I do not know that that is laid down. Of course, the general plan is issued from headquarters in the Navy Department and the details of carrying it out are the responsibility of the officer in the field. That is one reason I believe that our fleet has been so successful.

If an operation is planned and something comes up that the enemy changes his plan, the task-force commander at sea is entirely free to depart from the plan laid down for him and to get the enemy where he can find him.

[9082] The CHAIRMAN. Yes, I agree, but even in that case I suppose it would be the duty of the commanding officer in the field to advise the Department in Washington what it was doing.

Admiral SMITH. Immediately.
The CHAIRMAN. That is all.

Senator LUCAS. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question or two?
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator LUCAS. Admiral, how many meetings did the staff officers of General Short and the staff officers of Admiral Kimmel have from February on? I am talking about the combination of the two, joint meetings.

Admiral SMITH. I should say an average of once in 2 weeks.
Senator LUCAS. There wasn’t any specific time.

Admiral SMITH. No, sir.
Senator LUCAS. For these meetings?
Admiral SMITH. No, sir. They would be called, but the meetings between General Short and Admiral Kimmel were much more frequent than that.

Senator LUCAS. I understand that.
Now you said in your testimony, in answer to questions by Senator Ferguson, that you had certain joint-staff [9083] meetings from time to time, as I recall.

Admiral SMITH. Not regular meetings; no, sir.

Senator LUCAS. Not regular meetings?

Admiral SMITH. Not regular.

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Senator Lucas. This message of November 27, which was the war-warning message, as I understand it, didn't mean very much to you as Chief of Admiral Kimmel's staff?

Admiral Smith. Frankly, not much more than the others had, no, sir.

Senator Lucas. What would it indicate to a reasonably prudent commander when it starts out by saying "This is a war-warning message"?

Admiral Smith. Well, I have heard others testify here that they never heard the expression used before in an official message. It is quite true. But when you look back through the messages that preceded it, they were war warnings also.

Senator Lucas. I have read all of these messages, and I heard Admiral Kimmel's testimony along that line and I heard him quote from different messages, but there isn't a single one of those messages that Admiral Kimmel quoted which directly states in such terms, it seems to me, as given to the command at that time.

It starts out by saying "This is a war-warning message."

[9084] Now, I don't know what construction you, as chief of staff, would place upon those words.

Admiral Smith. Then it told us what to do.

Senator Lucas. That is right.

Admiral Smith. We were already prepared to do that.

Senator Lucas. Yes.

Admiral Smith. But we couldn't go ahead with it. Had we received a message "Mobilize," or "Execute WPL-46," that would have meant something. WPL-46 would have meant war.

"Mobilize" wouldn't have meant war.

Senator Lucas. That message caused you to have a meeting of two staffs, the following morning, did it not?

Admiral Smith. Yes. We had a meeting not only on that but at the same conference discussed the replacement or reinforcement of the marines on the outlying islands by Army troops. That is one reason the conference was so large, that we had the head of the Army Air Force there, because planes were also considered.

Senator Lucas. That was discussed at the same conference?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. That was one of the reasons for calling it? [9085]

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. I believe that same matter had been discussed on the 27th.

Senator Lucas. It has been disclosed, Admiral, that the Navy lost 105 planes in the raid and the Army I think lost something like 95. Can you tell the committee, how those planes, the naval planes were dispersed at the time?

Admiral Smith. I cannot in detail, but I believe that that may be explained by the fact that Ford Island has such a limited field, it is impossible to put large numbers of planes on it without having them very, very closely bunched. There is no place to disperse them.

I believe that is one reason. And of course the Japs concentrated on Ford Island.

Senator Lucas. Well, I understand Admiral Bellinger will be here, and he can tell us about that.
Admiral Smith. It may be possible also that the Navy had more planes than the Army.

Senator Lucas. One other question before you retire, sir. Did you know that General Short was alerted to sabotage?

Admiral Smith. No, sir. I knew he was alerted.

Senator Lucas. Why didn’t you know that, as chief of staff?

[9086] Admiral Smith. I have inquired since I have been here. I find there was an order issued called Operation Procedure, or something of that sort, and it was issued only very shortly before Pearl Harbor; I believe it was in the month of November, possibly on the 5th, in which the Army prescribed these three types of alerts. That letter went to Admiral Bloch because in the defense of the island Admiral Bloch was the naval base defense officer and his control post and his patrols had to work with the Army.

I have checked up with several members of the staff now on duty in this vicinity and none of them recall having seen that letter or that procedure. I doubt if it ever reached the commander in chief’s office.

Senator Lucas. Well, would that be of some interest to you had you known that General Short was alerted only to sabotage in view of the fact that it was General Short’s duty to protect the fleet while it was in the harbor?

Admiral Smith. It might have; yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. It might not have?

Admiral Smith. Of course, I did know that what the Army seemed to fear most was sabotage.

Senator Lucas. Was that what the Navy feared, also?

Admiral Smith. No, sir. The Navy was—Admiral [9087] Kimmel was offensive-minded, and he was thinking of what he could do in attacking when the time came. The Navy did not fear sabotage because the saboteurs could not get near the Navy.

Senator Lucas. Do you know why it was, if the Navy didn’t fear sabotage, that General Short’s No. 1 order was sabotage?

Admiral Smith. Well, his problem was much different.

Senator Lucas. His problem was different, but his main problem, as I understand it was the defense of the fleet when it was in harbor. That was his main duty, was it not?

Admiral Smith. That is correct.

Senator Lucas. As I understand, you say that the question of sabotage was not important from the standpoint of the fleet, even while it was in the harbor?

Admiral Smith. No, sir; it was not.

Senator Lucas. Then it is still difficult for me to understand why the Navy didn’t know exactly what General Short was doing with respect to sabotage, or with respect to his alerts, in view of the fact that General Short’s great responsibility was to protect that fleet while it was in the harbor.

Admiral Smith. I saw the Army go on the alert on the late afternoon of the 27th, the streets were full of them, [9088] going in all directions, manning the bridges, public utilities, but I did not know how far their alert went.

Senator Lucas. And you never inquired, as chief of Admiral Kimmel’s staff?

Admiral Smith. No, sir; I did not.
Senator Lucas. Did you assume that General Short's movement of troops at that time was in response to the message of the 27th he had received?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir. I returned the next morning and reported to Admiral Kimmel that the Army was on the alert?

Senator Lucas. Did you see the message that General Short received, that was sent by General Marshall on November 27?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Did you have a chance to analyze that?

Admiral Smith. Yes, I did.

Senator Lucas. Was there anything in that message which would have caused you as chief of staff to have gone on a sabotage alert and that alone?

Admiral Smith. I don't recall the wording of that message, but I do recall that he was cautioned not to disclose intent and not to alarm the civilian population.

[9089] Senator Lucas. That is right. That is one of the many things that was in there.

Also, to take a defensive deployment. That was Kimmel, as I recall it.

Admiral Smith. That was the Navy message.

Senator Lucas. That is right.

Well, the morning that you saw the troops of General Short moving around in the streets, did you report that to Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; I did.

Senator Lucas. What did you tell him?

Admiral Smith. I said the Army went on the alert last night, I saw them do it.

Senator Lucas. You believed as a result of what you saw that they were really on an all-out alert?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; I thought they only had one kind.

Senator Lucas. I think that is all.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a few questions.

The Chairman. Congressman Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. Admiral, how many times have you testified before today about Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Smith. I testified before the Hart Board, [9090] the Naval Court of Inquiry, and the Hewitt Board. I was not called before the Roberts Commission.

Mr. Murphy. Are you the Admiral Smith who described Admiral Kimmel saying that the situation in the outlying islands would be a certain way over his dead body?

Admiral Smith. That wasn't exactly as it happened.

[9092] Mr. Murphy. Will counsel produce that testimony.

Where was that expression used, "over his dead body"?

Admiral Smith. That was in a conference between Admiral Kimmel and General Short.

Mr. Murphy. Where did you give the testimony?

Admiral Smith. In Admiral Kimmel's office.

Mr. Murphy. Before what board and in what inquiry?

Admiral Smith. I think it is in the Hart inquiry. I remember the testimony. I can give it to you.

Mr. Murphy. I would like to have it exactly so there will be no mistake and no misquoting.
Does counsel have it? Do you know where it is, Mr. Masten? Admiral, while I am looking for that, you say the Navy didn't fear sabotage?

Admiral Smith. No, sir; not so far as the fleet was concerned.

Mr. Murphy. Isn't it a fact that you were on a sabotage warning at Hawaii on an order issued on it for two solid year before Pearl Harbor and the reason you didn't go on sabotage was that you were sabotage-minded for two solid years and were guarding against it? Is that a fact or not?

Admiral Smith. What would sabotage be, a ship in the fleet? It would be something from the inside, would it not? We have always been alerted against that.

Mr. Murphy. I am saying that there is testimony in one of these hearings that the reason why you didn't go on a special sabotage alert is that you were alerted to it for two solid years. Is that not a fact?

Admiral Smith. I should say for more than two solid years if you have in mind the kind of alert, sabotage alert, that I mean. We had had cases in the past where a ship prepared to leave a navy yard would find emery in her bearings or when a ship was overhauled. We were always alerted against sabotage.

Mr. Murphy. Is it or is it not a fact that there had been sabotage precautions taken for two solid years by the Navy at Pearl Harbor before December 1941?

Admiral Smith. I don't doubt it.

Mr. Murphy. Isn't that the reason why you didn't have to take any special precautions, you already were taking them?

Admiral Smith. No; that is not. I hope the ships are still alerted against sabotage.

Mr. Murphy. Let me take the next proposition. You said you saw the Army guarding the public utilities; that was your testimony?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

[9093] Mr. Murphy. Didn't you know that the Army had been guarding public utilities for 2 months before, that they were guarding the public utilities ever since the freezing of the assets?

Admiral Smith. It was not in evidence to the man in the street.

Mr. Murphy. What is that?

Admiral Smith. It was not in evidence to the man on the street.

Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate, you were the chief of staff, do you now know whether or not the Army at Pearl Harbor was guarding the public utilities ever since the freezing of the assets?

Admiral Smith. I do not.

Mr. Murphy. Did you have any conference at all with the chief of staff of the Army from the day of his appointment until after the attack, and if so, when?

Admiral Smith. I had several conferences with his predecessor, Colonel Hayes.

Mr. Murphy. No. I am talking about Colonel Phillips. From the day of his appointment to the day of the attack, did you have a single conference with Colonel Phillips?

Admiral Smith. No, not in person; no.

The Vice Chairman. May I inquire while you are looking through your papers?

Mr. Murphy. Yes.
The Vice Chairman. Admiral, I was interested in the statement you made about what you thought would be of value for future consideration.

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And you stated you thought that there had been too much secrecy.

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. In the Navy.

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Now, you wouldn't apply that to these intercepted Japanese messages, would you?

Admiral Smith. Oh, no; but I have never heard that the Japanese, or that any other nation, ever broke our most secret codes. To my mind there was no danger in transmitting those messages from Washington to Pearl Harbor over our system.

The Vice Chairman. You think there was no danger at all involved?

Admiral Smith. Absolutely.

The Vice Chairman. In transmitting those highly secret Japanese messages from Washington to Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Smith. I am positive there was no danger. Our [9095] own most secret messages were sent by the same system.

The Vice Chairman. Was it known at that time that there was no danger in transmitting these highly secret Japanese messages from Washington to Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Smith. Well, it was believed, certainly—I was once a cryptanalyst, in my early career, and the character of our secret devices is such that it was certainly my opinion, and I believe the opinion of all other naval officers, that our system was safe. If not safe, then it was unsafe to send our own messages back and forth between Washington and Pearl Harbor, messages which had to be sent.

The Vice Chairman. I can understand that, Admiral, but the fact is that Japan did not know that we had broken her code, did not know that we were intercepting, decoding, and translating these highly important messages; that is a fact, isn't it?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Well, now, wasn't it highly important that every effort be made to continue the situation that prevented Japan from knowing that?

Admiral Smith. Most important; yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And every precaution should be taken?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

[9096] The Vice Chairman. And in the opinion of those in charge of this highly important work that there was some element of danger involved, that certainly was an important aspect of it, wasn't it?

Admiral Smith. The only expression I have heard of danger of imparting leakage is over the scrambler telephone. I agree with that. But there was no danger of leakage in passing on the secret Japanese messages unless a leak was expected in the headquarters of Admiral Kimmel, and I am certain there was no more danger of a leak there than there was in the Navy Department in Washington.

The Vice Chairman. Well, the fact that we had broken the Japanese code and the fact that they had not broken our code always involved some element of danger that they might break our code, didn't it?
Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And that was something that should have been carefully guarded at all times, wasn't it?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir; but we had messages in the air every day. They had plenty of material of our own upon which to practice. Passing on these magic messages in our code would only have added to the quantity of material. I don't see that it would have increased the danger.

The Vice Chairman. Well, if we had transmitted every one [9097] of these Japanese messages that we intercepted it would certainly have increased the possibility of Japan finding out that we had broken their code, wouldn't it?

Admiral Smith. Not unless they knew that we were passing those messages out; but that same message when placed into a naval cipher is so disguised that there is nothing that a cryptanalyst could use to recognize the Japanese message as a Japanese message, after placed in the American cipher.

The Vice Chairman. Well, it was highly important?

Admiral Smith. It was highly important; yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. To our success in the war and the security of our armed forces that Japan not find out that we had broken their code?

Admiral Smith. Most important; yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And every precaution should have been used to try to prevent them from finding that out?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. It would naturally follow if they had ever found that out they would have changed their code?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And it might have been very disastrous to us, couldn't it?

Admiral Smith. It would have been disastrous to us possibly and certainly would have been advantageous to the Japanese because had they known we were breaking their code the great ambush at Midway might not have taken place.

The Vice Chairman. That is the question I was going to ask you next. Isn't it true that some of our greatest successes in battle during this last war were due to the fact that we were breaking their code and had the information?

Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Now, then, I assume, Admiral, that you would not take the position that your general statement as to too much secrecy in the Navy would apply to a matter of this type?

Admiral Smith. No, sir.

The Vice Chairman. All right. That is all.

Mr. Murphy. Now, Admiral, did I understand you to say that there was a discussion at a meeting between the Army and the Navy staff about the possibility of an air raid after the receipt of this war warning?

Admiral Smith. No, sir.

Mr. Murphy. It was never even discussed, was it, the possibility of an air raid, at that conference?
Admiral Smith. I do not recollect it having been discussed: no.

Mr. Murphy. Let me refer you to your testimony in the Hart investigation on page 50, question 130:

Q. Were any decisions arrived at as to coordinated action to be taken with respect to the security or defense of Pearl Harbor, in the light of this warning? A. I think the question of the defense of Pearl Harbor, in the light of that warning, was never raised except the danger of sabotage by the large Japanese population in the islands. That's to the best of my recollection.

Question 131:

Q. Did the question of possible attack arise? A. No.

Does that refresh your recollection?

Admiral Smith. I think that is correct.

Mr. Murphy. Do you now think there was a discussion about sabotage at that meeting on the 28th? Who would be talking about sabotage at the time you were discussing sending planes to Wake and Midway?

Admiral Smith. If the question of sabotage was discussed it was raised by the Army.

Mr. Murphy. My question is, Was it? Admiral Smith. I do not recollect.

Mr. Murphy. Now, when Admiral Kimmel was on the stand he said that he got these code-destruction messages and he said he didn't show them to the Army nor did he order them to be shown. Did you, as chief of staff, order them to be shown, or did you, as chief of staff, show them to the Army?

Admiral Smith. It was my impression then, and is now, that the Army had the same information.

Mr. Murphy. But the Army, according to General Short, if they had had it even on December 7, it would have been of great significance to them, highly important and he never received them. Why didn't you, as chief of staff confer with somebody, your counterpart in the Army, to find out if the people who were to protect your ships knew those things and why they didn't?

Admiral Smith. I was under the impression that they got news.

Mr. Murphy. Don't you think that as chief of staff your interest in the security of the fleet should have been such that you would make inquiry instead of resting on an assumption?

Admiral Smith. I probably should have. There are many things for a chief of staff to do.

We have an Intelligence officer and a district Intelligence officer. They are in close liaison with the Army.

Mr. Murphy. The responsibility of the Army was to protect the fleet in order for it to carry out the offense and if the fleet wasn't protected, you had no fleet, and here is a code-destruction message—and, by the way, what significance did the destruction of the codes have to you as a naval officer of vast experience?

Admiral Smith. These were diplomatic codes in various parts of the world, not in all. To my recollection, the code-destruction message did not include Honolulu. But if the situation had been reversed, if we feared that Japan intended to attack us, we might very well have told our diplomatic officials in Japan, or Japanese-occupied territory, to destroy their codes.

Mr. Murphy. But, Admiral, the Navy at Honolulu sent a code-destruction message to Washington. What significance did that have
to you? The Navy, the U. S. Navy at Honolulu, sent a message to Washington that the Japanese at Honolulu were destroying their machines, their systems.

By the way, let me quote that exactly.
Do you have exhibit No. 37, Counsel, please?
(Counsel hands document to Mr. Murphy.)

[9102] Mr. Murphy. Admiral, on the 6th of December, there is a message from COMFORTEN to OPNAV:

Believe local consul has destroyed all but one system although presumably not included your eighteen double five of third.

The “eighteen double five of third” was another message.
There is the U. S. Navy informing Washington about the destruction of systems at Honolulu. Wouldn’t that be highly significant to you?

Admiral Smith. There is a very good point to be raised. That is the commander of the Fourteenth Naval District, the naval base defense officer.

If the fleet is in port, it helps him support the Army. If the fleet has one ship in port, that one ship helps him.
If the fleet is not in port, he does it himself. But that is his duty, to keep the Army informed. He is working for and with the Army in this respect. That is not the function of the commander in chief.

Mr. Murphy. I will come to that.
First of all, what conferences did you have with the chief of staff of Admiral Bloch in this critical period?

Admiral Smith. I had none.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, you say it was Admiral Bloch’s [9103] responsibility to protect the fleet.
Isn’t it a fact that all Admiral Bloch had was four old destroyers, one or two small ships, and nothing else?

Admiral Smith. Quite true, but this message refers to something else. This refers to his Intelligence. He had plenty of that.

Mr. Murphy. But if there was a conference between the chiefs of staff, don’t you think that you would call on your Intelligence to give each of the chiefs of staff a report on Intelligence, and then have the combined judgment of the three chiefs of staff as to how best to meet the danger?

Admiral Smith. No; I would say that was rather a matter between the two Intelligence officers.

[9104] Mr. Murphy. But if the Intelligence officer does not do his work, who is over the Intelligence officer and who is responsible for him? Isn’t it the chief of staff?

Admiral Smith. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. Let me come, if you will, to page 48 of this report. I see question 114:
Q. Did these discussions include coordinated efforts to resist any attempt by the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor?
A. Frankly, I do not believe that the Commanding General or Admiral Bloch or Admiral Kimmel expected an attack upon Pearl Harbor, except by submarine.

But the question is, Admiral, did the discussions include a possible attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Smith. I do not recollect that.

Mr. Murphy. All right. I will now take you to page 42 of the Hart inquiry, question 67:
Was it your belief that the Army and the Navy, operating through the local
defense forces, were capable of furnishing complete defense of the Pearl Harbor base against air attack?
    A. We thought so at the time. I realize now we were not.
    Did you so think, Admiral?
    [9105] Admiral Smith. I did. I also thought that Oahu could not be taken. I know now that it could have been.
    Mr. Murphy. Oahu?
    Admiral Smith. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Murphy. You say it was taken?
    Admiral Smith. It could have been at the time, had the Japanese brought with them an amphibious force such as we now know in our own Navy, today.
    Mr. Murphy. Now, in the Naval narrative there is a report and I hope counsel can locate it. I have it, but I cannot put my finger on it, where you spoke about Admiral Kimmel saying "Not over my dead body."
    I refer you, however, in the Hart inquiry to page 40, question 57:
    Was Admiral Kimmel familiar with the state of personnel and material readiness of the Army to carry out its commitments as to the defense of Pearl Harbor, just prior to the Japanese attack?
    A. Yes. He had a shock, though, in the week preceding Pearl Harbor, when we had orders from the Navy Department, and General Short had orders from the War Department, to prepare a plan immediately for bringing all the Marines off of the outlying islands, and all the Marine and Navy planes in the outlying islands, and replacing [9106] them with soldiers and with Army planes, and, as I remember it, practically the entire week before Pearl Harbor was spent with the two Staffs together. The Army was undecided whether to put P-39’s or P-40’s on these islands. We told them that any planes they put on Wake would remain there for the duration, in case of war, because they would have to take off from a carrier and could not come back, and we had no means of putting a ship in there to bring them off, and during the discussion of this, with General Short and his staff, the Commanding General of the Army Air Force (General Martin) and Admiral Pye were present, and also Admiral Wilson Brown, the War Plans Officer, the Operations Officers, and I believe Admiral Bloch. Admiral Kimmel said, "What can I expect of Army fighters on Wake?" And General Martin replied, "We do not allow them to go more than fifteen miles off shore." That was a shock to all of us, and Admiral Kimmel's reply was, "Then they will be no damn good to me." The exchange was never made because the war broke beforehand. The only dispute between the Army and Navy over that exchange was that General Short said, "If I have to man these islands, I shall have to command them." Admiral Kimmel replied, "No, that won’t do. If the Army commanded one of the islands I wouldn’t be able to get a ship into one of the ports,” or [9107] words to that effect, and General Short said, "Mind you, I do not want to man these islands, I think they are better manned by Marines, but if I man them, I must command them." That was as near to a dispute between General Short and Admiral Kimmel as I ever saw, but the plan as made and submitted but never carried out.
    Now, then, in the naval narrative, Admiral, they quote you in different fashion. Are you aware of how they quote you about this "dead body" business?
    Admiral Smith. I have been told about that naval narrative. I don’t know who prepared it but someone did it in great haste and I understand that it is full of errors.1
    The Chairman. We will recess at this time until 10 o’clock tomorrow morning.
    (Whereupon, at 4:15 p. m., January 29, 1946, an adjournment was taken until 10 a. m., Wednesday, January 30, 1946.)
    Part 8—January 30 and 31 and February 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946—follows.

1 Admiral Smith's testimony is resumed in Hearings, Part 8, p. 3521.