PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
Pursuant to
S. Con. Res. 27
(As extended by S. Con. Res. 49, 79th Congress)
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 9
FEBRUARY 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, AND 14, 1946

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
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OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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PURSUANT TO
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UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1946
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EDWARD P. MORGAN, Assistant Counsel
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### NAMES OF WITNESSES IN ALL PROCEEDINGS REGARDING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK—Continued

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1 Pages referred to relate to sworn answers submitted by the witness to written interrogatories.
2 Sworn statement presented to committee.
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PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 1946

Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in
the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building; Senator Alben
W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster,
and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark,
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H.
Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P.
Morgan and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[10519] The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
The Chair understands that counsel concluded last evening.

Mr. Richardson. Yes, I had, but I have some other matters, Mr.
Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, inasmuch as the committee has indicated that it
proposes to make the evidence and proceedings contained in the earlier
investigations a part of the record of the committee here, I would like
to ask the committee to reserve Exhibit Nos. 143 to 149, inclusive, to
cover the seven reports, the Roberts, the Hart, the Navy, the Army,
the Hewitt, the Clarke, and possibly the Clausen, if the Clausen should
come in—reserve those exhibit numbers for those reports so that those
exhibits might run in a list of exhibits in consecutive numbers.²

The Chairman. Without objection that will be done.

Mr. Richardson. Now, next: Some time ago, the committee, or
members of the committee, asked that the prior testimony of Admiral
Bloch and Admiral Stark and General Marshall be collated and mime-
ographed copies of it made up, the same as had been done for General
Short and Admiral Kimmel.

Now, we have done that and we will have during the day available
for distribution to the committee the compiled testimony of Bloch
and Stark and Marshall if the committee wants [10520] us to
deliver it to the members of the committee in view of the later deter-
mination of the committee that all of the earlier reports, which would
include all of the testimony, is to be put in the record generally and
printed copies of all of this will, in due course, be laid before each
member of the committee in the page proof sheets that are now being
delivered to us. We have the mimeographed copies if members of the
committee want us to furnish them.

¹ Italics figures in brackets throughout refer to page numbers of the official transcript
of testimony.
² See Index of Exhibits in Part 12.
79716—46—pt. 9—2
The Chairman. Thank you, counsel.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I inquired yesterday something about the progress that was being made with regard to printing, and I understood from Mr. Masten—is he here now?
Mr. Richardson. He was here just a minute ago.
Mr. Masten. We have solved that problem.
The Vice Chairman. You have taken care of that all right?
Mr. Masten. Yes.
The Chairman. The Chair might state—this is off the record.
(Discussion off the record.)

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ALWIN D. KRAMER, UNITED STATES NAVY
(Resumed)\(^{1}\)

The Chairman. Captain, I only have a few questions. I have to go and preside over another committee at 10:30, so I will have to be brief, and I would be, anyhow.

\(^{1}\) Capt. Kramer's testimony begins in Hearings, Part 8, p. 3893.

[10521] You are familiar, of course, with the Japanese intercepts setting forth the conditions under which a winds execute message might be expected. That is, if communications were cut off, or diplomatic relations broken so that the ordinary methods of communication could not be utilized, if this broadcast about the weather should appear, that would mean certain things.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. With respect to the United States and Great Britain and Russia.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. That was the basis upon which you were looking for, and as far as you know, and I believe you testified, that everybody in the Department was looking for, or expecting, an execute based upon that?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. As a matter of fact, the conditions under which such a message should come through were never fulfilled. That is, there was never any breaking in communications or in diplomatic relations prior to the 7th of December, is that true?

Captain Kramer. Precisely, sir.
The Chairman. Now, the message that you referred to as the one having been brought by your door on the 5th of December and taken to Captain Safford—I want to clear up in my own mind whether you regarded that message as an execute based upon the previous messages with regard to the winds situation?

Captain Kramer. I did so regard it; yes, sir.
The Chairman. You did?

Captain Kramer. However, if I may interject at this point, Mr. Chairman, in the last few minutes here I have been making some notes regarding this winds message which I consider part of the answers to some of the questions of the counselor yesterday afternoon which, however, were not included in my answer due to interspersed questions about points that came up in the part of the answer that I gave. If I may do so, I would like to cover these loose points at this point.

The Chairman. Yes, go ahead.

Captain Kramer. I mentioned the fact regarding this so-called skipped file number, that there are a number of reasons why such a
file number should be canceled or skipped in the JD file by section GZ. I specifically covered two of the points, the two primary reasons why such file numbers were skipped.

There are two others which I meant to include in that and explain them. I would like to do so now.

One reason is the fact that occasionally the numbering machine which we used skipped a number in changing from one number to the next. I previously indicated that there were 14 copies to number. There was no automatic shift on the machine at the end of 14 numberings, it had to be done by hand.

The notation in the particular blank we are talking about, 7001, in the file indicates it was canceled. It may have been canceled rather than skipped. However, earlier in the year file No. 2074 has a notation in Lieutenant Harrison’s handwriting that the number was skipped in error.

I should like to mention at this point that for the first time since 1941 I have had access to these files or, rather, I might put it I have examined these files this Monday. In the course of this examination I looked back into the 1940 files and found similar canceled numbers. In fact, there is one block of numbers from, as I recollect, No. 4100 through 4499 that is skipped in that file: in other words, a block of approximately 400 numbers skipped in that file. At the time it was noted, a day or two later, as I recollect it, I said not to bother going back to fill in those numbers.

Regarding another possibility of a canceled number, it will be noted in this Exhibit 142 that there is a notation under file No. 4647 by Lieutenant Harrison in his handwriting—he customarily used handwriting because he was not a typist—that that number was canceled by Army after being numbered by Navy.

In other words, apparently, a dispatch, a decryption was sent over to us by Army and subsequently canceled. My guess at this time as to the reason for the cancellation is that it was Army practice not to include in these numbered series messages bearing on the text of this decryption work. They customarily left that out of the file. That was not, however, the Navy practice. We left them in the files.

That covers the points I wanted to bring out about the canceled number. Regarding the interception of the message—

The Chairman. May I ask you, then, if you are through with that part just this question: If I understand your testimony, there was nothing particularly unusual about this 7001 being a blank sheet?

Captain Kramer. That is precisely the point I am trying to emphasize, sir.

The Chairman. So that whatever should have been on it, or might have been on it if it had been filled out, was somewhere else in the files, is that true?

Captain Kramer. It would not necessarily be anywhere else in the files. It might, of course, be because of a duplication of the file number message.

The Chairman. Yesterday you talked about changing the file numbers or switching it from one file number to another and I got the impression that it might be located on some other file number. Maybe I was wrong about that.
Captain Kramer. No, sir; that was purely a question of the number they gave to a particular message. That number might be canceled for the various reasons I have given.

The Chairman. Well, if that number were canceled, though, would it appear on some other file?

Captain Kramer. Oftentimes it was reallocated if it occurred the same day, particularly to fill out the solid block, but particularly during the latter part of 1941 that was rare because of the fact that with the earlier episodes of that kind I had cautioned the men doing that particular work on the point and there are none apparently in the latter part of 1941 of that kind of error, skipping or allocating numbers erroneously. By that I mean, as I explained yesterday, the two primary reasons for the cancellation of numbers would be allocating a number to a part of a multipart message the first parts of which we had previously received. In other words, it was purely a clerical matter of making a proper check of our files to see whether or not we had those previous parts of that multipart message before allocating a number to the current part that had come in.

[10526] The Chairman. Are we to understand, then, your testimony to mean that there is no particular significance to be attached to the fact that this 7001 is a blank sheet?

Captain Kramer. That is precisely what I mean to indicate, sir.

The Chairman. All right. Now you were about to interpret the message.

Mr. Richardson. I think he has one thing further he wants to say.

The Chairman. Proceed in any way you wish.

Captain Kramer. I am going off this subject of the canceled number now, but it is on the general subject of this winds message. I have been under the impression during the past 4 years, purely as a matter of memory, that in that piece of teletype that was shown me by the GY watch officer only one country was involved. I so indicated the first time I had occasion to testify on that point before the court of Admiral Murfin.

The Chairman. You referred to that as a court of Admiral Murfin.

It was the Naval Court of Inquiry?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Yes.

Captain Kramer. I am still under that impression. I, however, am not positive and have never been positive on the [10527] precise wording of that message since I first attempted to recollect what the wording was.

In that connection, too, I should like to emphasize this point. I heard Captain Safford in the last few days indicate that in that piece of teletype Russia was also included but in the negative form. I can categorically state that if any of that phraseology had appeared in the negative form in my mind it would have thrown the whole thing out, because there was no provision whatsoever for a negative form of any of these phrases.

Regarding the question of my memory, I would like to comment to this effect: My contact with that piece of teletype totaled only a few seconds in duration. I probably saw it not over 10 or 15 seconds. I did not see it while Captain Safford was examining it. He was standing—he was holding it, and standing in front of me. At no
occasion from December of 1941 until the question was asked me before Admiral Murfin's court of inquiry, was the question of what country was involved brought up in conversion or on any other occasion. That question took me, you might term it, cold.

In that connection, too, I would like to comment on my testimony before Admiral Murfin's court of inquiry, that my testimony was given without any preparation whatsoever. I had been detached 2 days before from the South Pacific, ordered north under priority one transportation by air. I had been traveling 2 days and arrived in Pearl Harbor around midnight.

I phoned Captain Layton, whose number as Fleet Intelligence officer I readily found, to find out what my assignment was to be. It was then that I first learned that the purpose of ordering me up on fast transportation was to testify before this court of inquiry. I was not aware even that it was meeting there.

I called Captain Layton from the airport. It was not until the following morning at 8:30 that I first learned that I was free to disclose to this court of inquiry anything having to do with radio intelligence. In other words, I was still strongly impressed by all the security indoctrination connected with this work. I was not at all certain that it was proper in the interest of national security to disclose any matters concerning radio intelligence or cryptanalysis before this court of inquiry. For that reason I stopped at Captain Layton's office before proceeding to where the court was meeting and asked him about that specific point and was first assured at that time, one-half hour before I commenced testifying, that this court had full authority to delve into all aspects of cryptanalysis as far as the Navy was concerned, that such testimony would be made a top secret supplement to their record of proceedings.

That is what I mean by being caught cold on what my recollections were in testifying before that court.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all you wanted to say about that?

Captain KRAMER. In further amplification of the question of my memory I should like to make this brief comment also:

Every other—perhaps not other—but every message that was typed up and disseminated by section GZ of Naval Communications was seen by me at least six or eight and sometimes as many as a dozen times. I invariably examined the file of current traffic quite closely; in fact, early in the year I studied it closely enough to write a gist of each message; the last month or so before December 1941, when we had ceased the practice of gisting the day's traffic because of the urgency of getting the material out promptly, I studied these things particularly closely because I did not have a gist before me while the recipients to whom I normally delivered this material were examining it. I felt that it was a part of my job to be thoroughly familiar with what they were looking at, so that in case questions were asked, references given, personalities whose names appeared therein were asked about, that I would be familiar with what they were talking about and could elucidate.

By contrast this particular winds message that I have described I saw only once and for not more than 15 seconds or so.

One further point in connection with this winds message. Captain Safford has testified that the translation of the set-up of these winds
messages is incorrect. I agree to that to this extent. The version on the work sheet from which the translation was made in the Navy Department was garbled, appreciably garbled.

Mr. Richardson. You are speaking now, Captain, of the original winds code message?

Captain Kramer. Original set-up of this message; yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. All right.

Captain Kramer. I think it is Circular 2343.

The Chairman. Fifty-three.

Captain Kramer. I have had occasion in the last few days to examine that work sheet again and confirm my memory on that point. Without changing those garbles the translation as it appears in Exhibit 1 is still correct, but by modifying the garbles or clearing these garbles it can be made to fit fairly precisely the British translation submitted by Singapore to commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet.

Senator Lucas. Just a moment.

[10531] Captain Kramer. One final point in connection with this thing—

Senator Lucas. Will you kindly go into that just a little more, that last statement you made about fitting the parts?

Captain Kramer. That is what I am going to do now, sir.

Senator Lucas. But you are starting with another subject.

[10532] Captain Kramer. No, sir. That version furnished by the British to the commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, which was put on the Kopek channel, was put on that circuit and came into the Navy Department, as I recollect, the same date that we had our translation in that winds set-up.

It was for that reason that no message was drafted by the Navy Department covering this winds set-up. We felt it was fully and adequately covered by the translation of the circuit already. It was in more emphatic form.

From current examination, it was in more precise form than the version we had in the Navy Department.

That is all I have to state.

The Chairman. I am sorry, Captain, I have to go to another committee, and I will not be able to finish my examination.

Will it be agreeable to the committee if I reserve the right to resume my examination later, unless some other member covers the points I have in mind? I am sorry I have to leave, but I have to go to another committee.

Thank you very much.

The Vice Chairman. Captain, do you now have, or have you ever at any time had any interest in the prosecution or the defense of Admiral Kimmel, or anybody else connected with this Pearl Harbor attack?

Captain Kramer. Most emphatically no, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Have you ever at any time exercised yourself in helping to prepare any type or form of prosecution or defense of Admiral Kimmel, or anybody else connected with the Pearl Harbor attack?

Captain Kramer. None whatsoever, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Have you ever at any time, or do you now feel that the officers of the General Staff of the Army or the Navy,
in effect, are crooks or would indulge in framing Admiral Kimmel or anybody else connected with this Pearl Harbor attack, or that they are not to be trusted?

Captain Kramer. Such phenomena are inconceivable to my mind, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Now, with respect to the so-called winds execute message, Captain, just a few questions in connection with that.

I have before me page 12 of the statement read to this committee by Captain Safford. I assume counsel can supply you a copy of it, if you do not have it.

Captain Kramer. I have one.

The Vice Chairman. I ask you to please turn to page 12 of Captain Safford's prepared statement, which he read to this committee about the middle of the page, and I invite your attention to the paragraph beginning:

When I first saw the winds message, it had already been translated by Lieutenant Commander Kramer, in charge of the Translation Section of the Navy Department Communications Intelligence Unit. Kramer had underscored all three "code phrases" on the original incoming teletype sheet. Below the printed message was written in pencil or colored crayon in Kramer's handwriting the following three translations:

"War with England (including NEI, etc)
"War with the U. S.
"Peace with Russia."

I am not sure of the order; but it was the same in the broadcast, and I think England appeared first. I think Kramer used "U. S." rather than "United States." It is possible that the words "No war" instead of "Peace" were used to describe Japan's intentions with regard to Russia.

Now, having read that part of Captain Safford's testimony, Captain, are you prepared to give this committee information bearing on that?

Captain Kramer. I think the testimony I have given already covers most of this point. I can only reiterate those statements. Anything appearing in one of these winds broadcasts indicating a negative form, in other words, as interpreted on this page, peace with someone would have immediately discarded it in my mind as being a signal in this winds system.

I might further comment along that line that I think it would be a very strange sort of disguising on the part of the Japanese to have said "No north wind."

The winds set-up was to be ostensibly an authentic weather broadcast.

I would like to comment further, that there were at least six or eight false alarms on this weather broadcast.

From the time we were set up at the end of November, I was called down, I definitely recollect one time, I believe three times at night to check with the GY watch officers on some of the reams, yards, of teletype paper covering the plain language broadcasts of the Japanese.

In every case that I have just described, what I examined was on long lengths of teletype with solid blocks of Japanese news appearing on the teletype as well.

In each case a careful examination of this plain language broadcast of weather made me reach the conclusion that it was nothing more than ordinary weather broadcasts.
The specific piece of teletype that was shown me and which I accompanied the watch officer with to Captain Safford's office, was a short piece of teletype paper torn off the teletype machine. My presumption at the time was that the GY watch officer had determined that it fitted the general conditions required by this weather broadcast, namely that it appeared in its proper location in the text of a news broadcast, either at the beginning or at the end or both, and that it had been repeated the required number of times.

That was part of the function of the GY watch officer, not only on this particular weather system but on all systems. They were the break-down people, they identified systems; they turned into my section only the final Japanese text.

That applies to everything except incompletely recovered codes in which the coded Japanese text would be turned into my section.

I therefore personally, in the case of this Friday morning so-called winds message, had no occasion to check on these points the question of whether it appeared in its proper context of a news broadcast or whether it was repeated the proper number of times. It may have been repeated the proper number of times on the piece of teletype paper. I am not positive as to the precise wording of that.

[10537] In the last few weeks. I have had occasion to see some interrogations conducted by General MacArthur's headquarters in Japan of high Japanese officials who were concerned with these broadcasts.

In view of their statements that no such weather signal was made, it is my present belief, in the light of my recollections on this matter, as well, that what I saw Friday morning in December before Pearl Harbor was also a false alarm on this winds system. It was, nevertheless, definitely my conception at the time that it was an authentic broadcast of that nature. I am still of that opinion, that it used that precise wording, keeping in mind, as I indicated this morning, that my recollections on that are that only one country was involved.

The Vice Chairman. What country was that?

Captain Kramer. To the best of my recollection, it was England.

I would like to point out one other item in connection therewith.

I have already indicated that the first time the question of what country appeared on that winds broadcast came up in conversation, or anything that we had in connection with this matter, was when that one question was asked me by the court of inquiry at Pearl Harbor.

[10538] My first reaction was, without having thought about it since December 1941, that it was the United States, because of the fact we were at war with Japan, so of course, it must have been the United States.

[10539] I would like, however, to invite the committee's attention to the fact that later on, in the course of questioning me at Pearl Harbor, on page 187 of the transcript of that court of inquiry, I made the statement that through the latter part of that week and until the attack on Pearl Harbor there was still nothing whatsoever in this traffic to indicate any overt intentions of the Japanese directed at the United States. That I believe appreciably modifies my first hasty reactions to the first time the question was propounded to me.
The Vice Chairman. Then, Captain, returning to the testimony here of Captain Safford which I have read, it states there:

When I first saw the winds message, it had already been translated by Lieutenant Commander Kramer.

Is that true?

Captain Kramer. I am fairly definite on the point that I did not make the original translation. I may have corrected a hand-written translation already made by the GY watch officer who had all these three Japanese phrases, the translation on hand in pursuance of instructions from Captain Safford and Admiral Noyes, to be able to take care of this matter during the night promptly by the Navy Department communications officers.

[10540] The Vice Chairman. Well, if you and the watch officer went to Captain Safford’s office and simply handed him the paper he could not have known who translated it, could he?

Captain Kramer. Unless he recognized the handwriting, I do not see how he could.

The Vice Chairman. All right. Was not the thing supposed to be typewritten?

Captain Kramer. It was a piece of teletype paper, which of course is typewritten.

The Vice Chairman. All right. Then he goes on to say:

Kramer had underscored all three “code phrases” on the original incoming teletype sheet.

Had you done that?

Captain Kramer. I do not recall that, sir.

The Vice Chairman. “Below the printed message was written in pencil or colored crayon in Kramer’s handwriting, the following free translations:” which I have read.

Did you write in colored pencil or crayon in your handwriting these phrases that are mentioned here in Captain Safford’s statement?

Captain Kramer. I have no recollection that I used my colored pencil or that I made the original translation. I can most emphatically state that any translation I might have made would most emphatically not have used the expression “war.” That was entirely outside the provisions of the winds set-up called for by the message appearing in Exhibit 1, which refers only to disruption of communications.

The Vice Chairman. Well, you are confident, Captain, that there was no use of the word “war” in this so-called winds message on that occasion?

Captain Kramer. Certainly not by me, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Did you see or hear anything to indicate that anybody at that time saw or thought they saw the word “war” in the message.

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

The Vice Chairman. I understand then, Captain, that these messages, including the number 7001, were in your custody.

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And were kept in your safe in your office?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Now, were any of those files ever stolen, filched, or removed from the file there in your custody?

Captain Kramer. In my period of duty in that section there was never such an occasion, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And all of the files were in their proper order and in their proper place and kept there in your safe?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

I might further amplify that answer, sir, to this effect, that the so-called numerical file, after a series of messages were numbered for dissemination, a copy was invariably and immediately inserted in that numerical file. Messages were never removed from that numerical file for reference or for any other purpose. That numerical file had two primary purposes, one to have a solid file of what had been translated and disseminated and, two, the primary purpose was to have something to which the translators could turn in case of references to back traffic when future messages were received.

We had a very complete and involved cross-index system on 3 by 5 cards, covering every originator in the Japanese diplomatic service. By that I mean every consulate, every embassy, every legation that originated messages had their own serial numbers for their series of messages. In addition there was a series of circulars by each originating major diplomatic post. All that was very carefully cross-indexed by my chief yeoman. That was the primary file to which we turned for determining the duplication of incoming traffic. Sometimes we received as many as six or seven copies of a particular message. Later copies were as a rule simply filed without any further work on them if it had been received earlier and translated and disseminated. On occasion, if the earlier copy were appreciably garbled a corrected translation would be made from one of these later copies if it were in better or less-garbled form.

From this exhaustive cross-index I have described and which included references to the numerical file of translations, the translator would determine whether we had a previous translation and could refer then to the previous translation for interpretation of the reference. That numerical file, as I have indicated, was never touched for the purpose of inserting in subsequent folders these back references in disseminating later traffic to the normal recipients of this later traffic. The extra copies that had previously been disseminated and returned were normally retained for a period varying from a few days to a few weeks for that purpose.

In fact, there were two or three other files that we normally kept on other subjects, namely, the war in Europe and the United States negotiations. We had a subfile for that covering particular phases of the negotiations and on the file arranging all the Washington and Tokyo serial numbers in order.

The Vice Chairman. Captain, you were constantly using these messages and these files, as I understand it?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Now, were any of them ever destroyed or removed or done away with during your tour of duty in that office?

Captain Kramer. From this basic numerical file there was no occasion that I know of where anything was removed or destroyed.
from that file with the exception of the fact that if it was determined later, probably a few days or a week later, that we had two identical messages, one of which was a duplication of another, when that was discovered the latest numerical file number would be canceled as a duplication of the earlier one.

Examples of that appear in this Exhibit 142.

The Vice Chairman. Well, the point I am getting at, Captain, is this, if anybody had wilfully taken out of those files all messages relating to this winds execute message you would have known about it, wouldn't you?

Captain Kramer. I most certainly think I would have, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And you say nothing of that kind ever happened during your tour of duty there?

Captain Kramer. To my best knowledge and belief most categorically no, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Well, could anybody have gone in there and filched or stolen all of the messages relating to the winds execute message and you have known nothing about it?

Captain Kramer. I don't see how that would be possible, sir, with this possible exception, that the combination of the safe in which these were kept, there was a copy of that combination in a double-sealed envelope in some of the front offices. If that envelope had been opened someone else would, of course, be able to open my safe. Otherwise, the only people who knew the combination of the safe in which that particular file was kept were three people, Lieutenant Harrison, the then Chief Yeoman Bryant, and myself.

The Vice Chairman. Do you feel confident that nobody in the so-called front office who had the combination in the sealed envelope never removed any of those files?

Captain Kramer. I am thoroughly confident of that point, sir.

The Vice Chairman. All those files were in a locked safe there in your office?

Captain Kramer. At all times, yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Are you positive, Captain, that 7001 had no relation whatever to the so-called winds execute message?

Captain Kramer. From an examination of the files last Saturday in the Navy Department and this study, Exhibit 142, of about a week or so ago, I am almost positive, I am as positive as I can be that that file number 7001 could not possibly have been any winds message. That is in addition to the fact that I have absolutely no matter of any kind, no recollection, no knowledge that a winds message was ever written up by my section.

The Vice Chairman. Now, then, one more question, if I may, Captain.

Captain Safford says he received orders to destroy notes, memo-
randa, and so forth. Did you ever hear of any such order as that?

Captain Kramer. I first heard of that a few days ago when Captai
n Safford testified.

The Vice Chairman. And heard it from him?

Captain Kramer. From him on this witness stand.

The Vice Chairman. That is the only time you ever heard of anything like that?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. May I have that question?
The Vice Chairman. Captain Safford says he received orders to
destroy notes, memoranda, and so forth.
Mr. Keefe. All right.

[10547] The Vice Chairman. You recall that?
Mr. Keefe. Yes, I remember.

Captain Kramer. I might further amplify that reply in this re-
spect: I have appeared as a spectator in these hearings only four or
five times before last Friday, initially while General Marshall was
testifying, again while Admiral Wilkinson was testifying, and while
Captain McCollum was testifying. I have had at least a half dozen
conversations during the past year with Captain Safford going over
a number of points connected with Pearl Harbor. Last Saturday
I had intended with my wife to go out of town for the day. I was so
astonished by some of the statements made on Friday afternoon I
felt that I better remain here Saturday, which I did.

The Vice Chairman. You mean statements made by Captain Saf-
ford?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.
The Vice Chairman. All right. Go ahead.

Captain Kramer. That is all I have to say.
The Vice Chairman. Could you indicate——

Senator Ferguson. May I inquire what question the witness was
answering by that last remark?

Captain Kramer. I was amplifying my earlier reply.
Senator Ferguson. To what question?

[10548] The Vice Chairman. I asked him the question, Senator,
I stated that Captain Safford had testified——

Senator Ferguson. I wanted it from the witness, what question he
was answering, if I can get it.
The Vice Chairman. Do you want the reporter to read it?

Senator Ferguson. If the Chairman would allow me I would like
to ask the witness what question he thought he was answering when
he gave that answer.
The Vice Chairman. Well, I don’t see that that is especially ma-
terial, but if the Captain——

Senator Ferguson. I will question him about it later.
The Vice Chairman. All right.

Senator George would be next in line for recognition. He is not
here. Mr. Clark, of North Carolina, will inquire, Captain.

Mr. Clark. Captain, was this piece of paper that you did see at
your office door ever distributed as magic?

Captain Kramer. I didn’t understand.

Mr. Clark. The piece of paper that you saw at your office door and
which went to Captain Safford’s office, was that ever distributed as
magic?

Captain Kramer. It never came into my office, was never written
up, was never disseminated by me.

Mr. Clark. You mean it was never distributed as magic,

[10549] was not distributed by you?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Clark. Who determined what portion of this radio traffic, as
I believe you call it, would be distributed as magic?
Captain Kramer. That was done by my office, sir.

In amplification of that point and your previous question I might state that nothing was ever disseminated by my office until we had a piece of paper in my office to work from. No piece of paper, either this—specifically this piece of paper—that was taken to Captain Safford’s office ever came back to my office.

Mr. Clark. Well, you were the judge of what should be disseminated, as you call it, of magic. Why didn’t this paper come to your office in the first instance?

Captain Kramer. The things that came to my office were determined in the first instance by the GY watch officers. There were many systems in various states of analysis. After an attack on a new system the traffic in that new system might be held for periods varying from weeks to years before any of that material ever came to my office. When a system was sufficiently broken down to pull any intelligible text out of it, however, it then came to my office. The determination of what was of sufficient importance to write up was the function of my office and that is what I referred to.

[10550] Mr. Clark. But if someone else determined what should come to your office, then you didn’t really have the determination of what should be distributed as magic, did you?

Suppose something came in that was magic and wasn’t sent to your office?

Captain Kramer. Then I would have nothing to do with its dissemination; no, sir. However, there was no provision for any other means of dissemination that I am aware of except the special provision set up by Admiral Noyes for handling anything that came in this particular winds system.

That was an unprecedented set-up and was the only instance of that kind that I am aware of.

Mr. Clark. Now, did I understand you that anything that came in in the nature of a winds execute would go to Admiral Noyes and not to you?

Captain Kramer. It was not very clear-cut how that particular message would be handled during the daytime. The provisions set up by Admiral Noyes and Captain Safford were primarily intended to promptly take care of that at night.

In carrying out the provisions of those instructions, however, apparently the GY watch officer was proceeding [10551] to Captain Safford’s office and then to Admiral Noyes.

My only possible explanation at this time of why that did not come back to my office for normal dissemination, translating and dissemination—this is merely presumptuous, I might interpolate—is that whoever saw it after I saw it, which I have already indicated was a matter of only a few seconds, must have determined that it was only another instance of a false weather broadcast, of which we had had numerous examples during the previous week or ten days.

Mr. Clark. Just exactly who would that be?

Captain Kramer. I don’t know just who it would have been because I don’t know who that piece of teletype paper was passed on to.

Mr. Clark. Well, who could it have been passed on to.

Captain Kramer. My presumption was and still is that Captain Safford was heading for Admiral Noyes’ office with it.
Mr. Clark. Did all the magic that was disseminated as such have to come through your office?
 Captain Kramer. So far as I am aware, that is precisely correct, sir, so far as the Navy Department is concerned and responsibilities outside of the Navy Department that the Navy had.
 Mr. Clark. I am speaking only about the Navy Depart-

[10552] ment.
 Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
 Mr. Clark. Can you advise the committee with certainty as to whether all messages disseminated as magic had to come through your office?
 Captain Kramer. I know of no instance when any dissemination was made not through my office.
 Mr. Clark. Who set up this plan for disseminating magic? Who established it?
 Captain Kramer. I do not know, sir. It had been in effect for at least 15 or 20 years when I took charge of that office.
 Mr. Clark. I see.
 You say this particular piece of paper never came back to your office, and was never disseminated as magic?
 Captain Kramer. Precisely, sir.
 Mr. Clark. I understood you to answer Senator Barkley’s question on one point that you considered this some kind of a winds message?
 Captain Kramer. I did at the time, sir, because of the fact that it used the phraseology called for by the set-up of that winds message.
 Mr. Clark. I am under the impression from the testimony that has been given here, that all of you were very particularly interested in any winds execute message that might come in; is that correct?
 Captain Kramer. Very particularly what, sir?
 Mr. Clark. Interested.
 Captain Kramer. Precisely.
 Mr. Clark. And on the lookout for it?
 Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
 Mr. Clark. Do you consider that this slip of paper that you saw was a winds execute message?
 Captain Kramer. I did at the time; yes, sir.
 Mr. Clark. And you interpreted it to mean what?
 Captain Kramer. That the provisions called for by Tokyo’s Circular 2353 were in effect regarding the country mentioned in that particular winds message.
 The provisions referring purely and simply to the cutting off of communications with supplementary instructions to burn certain papers.
 Mr. Clark. Well, broken down in language which I can understand, you interpreted it to mean that it was war with England?
 Captain Kramer. Not war with England; no, sir.
 Mr. Clark. Well, what?
 Mr. Clark. And referred to diplomatic relations, rather than war?
 Captain Kramer. Perhaps better would be a diplomatic crisis; yes, sir.
Mr. Clark. Did you make any effort to ascertain where this piece of paper went, or what became of it?

Captain Kramer. Never.

Mr. Clark. Did you discuss it or mention it to any of the people to whom you had been distributing magic?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Mr. Clark. Did you consider—

Captain Kramer. I would like to modify that, however, by saying that I may have mentioned it in the course of distribution of the other traffic on Friday to the usual recipients.

I am uncertain of that point.

Mr. Clark. Now, did you consider this a winds execute message insofar as the United States was concerned?

Captain Kramer. My best recollection now is, and I believe has been throughout the period since 1941, that it did not apply to the United States.

Mr. Clark. And consequently it was of much less importance than if it had referred to the United States?

Captain Kramer. It was not only of much less importance than if it had applied to the United States, but it was nothing new in its reference to England. It was more emphatic in nature than any such winds message might have been. Was the scheme being cooked up between the Japanese Ambassador in Bangkok and the Thai Chief of State for an occupation of Thailand and forcing of the Thai premier’s hand to throw in Thailand in Japan? We knew about that in appreciable detail.

In fact, on 1 December, the subject of the dispatches relating to that were drafted by me, sent. I believe, initially, as was usual, to Captain Safford’s office, and released by Admiral Noyes. It appears, I believe, as an exhibit in this hearing as Opnav Dispatch 011926, dated December 1941.

Senator Ferguson. December what?

Captain Kramer. 01 01 indicates the first day.

Senator Ferguson. The 1st of December?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. Captain Kramer, I must confess to some little confusion. As I understand the winds code set-up, it was arranged so that if an execute message came in, it would indicate. or certain words would be taken to indicate war with the United States?

Captain Kramer. I have never had that conception, sir.

Mr. Clark. Well, will you, if you don’t mind—well, I think Senator Lucas is going into that. I will not pursue it.

Senator Lucas. Go ahead.

Mr. Clark. No.

It merely related to the severance of diplomatic relations, and not war?

Captain Kramer. Not necessarily the severance of diplomatic relations. Fundamentally and primarily severance of communications which, of course, normally accompanies severance of diplomatic relations also.

Mr. Clark. Then they would use this weather broadcast, too, as a means of communication.

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Clark. And certain words used, however, were to indicate certain things, were they not?

Captain Kramer. Were to indicate certain countries, sir.

Mr. Clark. Yes.

Well, anyway, I may be a little confused on the technicalities of that, but what is in my mind is that whenever a winds execute message should come in, it was considered by all of the people who had access to magic to be very important and significant, and you were on the alert in looking for it?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. Still, you now say that a message came in which you regarded as a winds execute message but which doesn’t seem to have been of any importance. There is where my confusion is.

Now, if this was a winds execute message why did it not have the significance and the importance that the people in the Department had attached to it?

Captain Kramer. It had importance, yes, sir. No more importance, however, than many other things that we were getting. As regards England in my mind, at least, it had less importance because of its very unspecific character than this contemplated invasion or demonstration before Kota Bharu, which was something specific. Important, yes, sir, in that it would be another straw in the wind indicating a further reaching of a climax in diplomatic relations.

Mr. Clark. Well, now, what kind of a winds execute message would have qualified in importance and significance with what was expected here in such a message?

I mean to say this, stating the question this way: It is in evidence, and I have already referred to it, that everyone here who was familiar with magic was particularly interested in a winds execute message.

Now, what kind of a message, a winds execute message, would have met that interest and expectation? What would it have had to say to be of that importance and interest?

Captain Kramer. I believe the primary interest of all of the high officials in Washington receiving these intercepts was the United States. We were still conducting negotiations with Japan, even though those negotiations had been de facto terminated.

One of the principal things that we were still interested in would be the nature and character of Japan’s reply to Mr. Hull’s note of 26 November which we had not yet received.

There were many indications of Japanese intentions directed at England, specifically, this Kota Bharu affair. There still was no intention of an overt nature anywhere in this traffic directed at the United States, with the possible exception of the dispatch late in November from Tokyo to Berlin, disclosing for the first time to the Germans, their Tri-Partite partners, the nature and terms of negotiations that were being conducted through 1941 with the United States.

Up to that time Japan had been consistently and continually putting off Ribbentrop and Hitler in their direct inquiries on this subject.

The Japanese ambassador in Berlin was not cognizant of the nature and character of these negotiations.
Mr. Clark. Then the lack of interest and importance of the particular message to which you refer, that was on this yellow teletype paper, was, that it did not refer to the United States?

Captain Kramer. That is the best of my present recollection; yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. Well, do you know about that?

Captain Kramer. I am not positive of the wording appearing on that piece of teletype paper. My connection with it was so fleeting that I do not believe it is strange that I do not recollect it.

Mr. Clark. Well, Captain, I do not mean to suggest anything strange about it, but here you were performing a very long faithful service as you were——

Captain Kramer. I would like to state further, sir, that if it had referred to the United States, I am quite positive that it would have impressed itself on my memory.

The fact that it does not impress itself at this time, and without reference prior to 4 days ago to any of this material—I remember some details of all this traffic—is a further indication that I did not consider it, as I do not now, as referring to the United States.

The fact that it did not impress itself on my memory is a further indication to me now that it in most probability referred to England, which, of course, would not have impressed it on my memory because of the fact that we knew so much more in detail Japanese intentions directed to England.

Mr. Clark. That is about what I was fixing to call to your attention, but it still strikes me as strange that with everyone here who knew anything about magic interested in this particular winds execute message, and with tension high on that subject, it is hard for me to understand how an accomplished officer like yourself in this line could have read a message that did refer to the United States, and therefore qualified as a winds execute message, without being immediately impressed by that fact.

Captain Kramer. I am sure it would have been impressed on my memory if it had referred to the United States.

Mr. Clark. And still you can’t tell this committee positively whether it did or whether it didn’t?

Captain Kramer. The reason I have not categorically stated what the wording of that is, is the fact that I have no positive, had no positive recollection of that, and that any statement I would make now as to its precise wording would be reconstruction in my mind of what it might have said.

Mr. Clark. But I am not asking you, Captain, to repeat the wording. I am suggesting to you that if under those tense conditions, this paper had qualified as a winds execute message, you certainly would have known it?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir, I would.

Mr. Clark. Then don’t you know whether it did or not?

Captain Kramer. To the best of my current belief, it did not.

Mr. Clark. And you are not in a position to make a positive statement on that particular point to the committee?

Captain Kramer. Not purely from memory. I could make a positive statement on reconstruction as I have outlined.
Mr. CLARK. But you would have to proceed by reconstruction on that most vital and important point in the situation that then existed?

Captain KRAMER. I am sure, sir, that if the United States had been mentioned, that a dissemination of that piece of paper would have been made.

I am further of the belief, sir, that whoever saw that piece of paper after it left Captain Safford's office came to the conclusion that it was only one of many of these other apparent winds messages.

This particular piece of paper apparently impressed itself on my memory not appreciably more than these other false winds messages for which I was called to the office several times during the night of the week or ten days preceding Pearl Harbor, and which at the time we determined to be false winds messages.

[10563] Mr. CLARK. Well, that all looks reasonable to me and still we are left more or less in the realm of speculation?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir, speculation insofar as my precise memory of the wording of that piece of teletype paper is concerned.

Mr. CLARK. Speculation insofar as you cannot tell this committee positively that you never saw a message that completely qualifies as a winds execute message?

Captain KRAMER. With reference to the United States I cannot make that categorical statement purely from memory.

Mr. CLARK. That is all.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas, of Illinois, will inquire, Captain.

Senator Lucas. Captain, in the statement presented to this committee by Captain Safford, the Captain said that when you and the watch officer came to his office you made the statement, "This is it," as you handed him the winds message, and he has underscored the word "it."

Do you care to elaborate upon your previous statement?

Captain KRAMER. The "it" which I may have used referred to the fact that this was the first determination of anything appearing with the phraseology called for by this winds system.

Senator Lucas. Do I understand you to tell the committee [10564] that when you made that statement to Captain Safford that you did not mean that it referred to the United States?

Captain KRAMER. I did not, sir.

Senator Lucas. Captain, as I understand this is the only message in traffic, if there was such a message of this kind, that was not actually translated and delivered to the proper recipients in the days of November and December 1941?

Captain KRAMER. That is not an accurate statement, Senator.

Senator Lucas. Well, you correct me, Captain. You may have to do that frequently.

Captain KRAMER. I should say that the translations disseminated not only during this period but prior and subsequent periods were only a small percentage of all traffic received by this section of the Navy Department. I previously indicated that a percentage of that traffic was in various states of analysis by the crypt-analysts. Other parts of this traffic were in various states of code recovery by my section,
Other parts of this traffic were in minor systems which were given only a partial translation to determine their character. If they were purely of an administrative nature they were frequently not translated if we were pressed by more important traffic. By "administrative [10565] nature" I mean that some office, diplomatic post of the Japanese, might be asking for more funds for a certain purpose, and elaborating in some detail the purpose for which they wanted their funds, and so forth.

Senator Lucas. I understand.

Now, did Captain Safford talk with you about this message at any time between December 3 or 4 and the date of the attack on December 7 after you met in his office?

Captain Kramer. I have no recollection of discussing this piece of teletype with Captain Safford between the time I took it to his office and the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Senator Lucas. Did you ever talk to him about this particular message thereafter?

Captain Kramer. To my best recollection and belief the first time it was discussed subsequent to the attack on Pearl Harbor was this past spring.

Senator Lucas. And how did that happen?

Captain Kramer. Captain Safford is an acquaintance of mine for some years back. He had written me a letter concerning certain phases of this subject in late December 1943 and early 1944. Shortly after I returned to Washington last spring I had occasion to be in the branch building of the Navy Department where his office was and looked him up, more in the nature of a greeting of him after a couple of [10566] years absence. During the course of that and subsequent conversations we discussed some of the points concerning this matter.

Senator Lucas. Did you ever agree with him in these discussions that this particular message in controversy was a genuine implementing winds message?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; I did not. I tried to disillusion him of that idea since it was so diametrically contrary to the conception of it that I had.

Senator Lucas. Did you ever talk to him again about this same winds message following that conversation?

Captain Kramer. I have met him, I think, about half a dozen times during this past year prior to seeing him during these hearings in the last few days where I have had further conversations with him.

Senator Lucas. And I presume you two reached the same conclusion about the type of a message this was?

Captain Kramer. We did not on that point as well as on a number of other points concerning this. I, however, expressed my opinions to him on a number of points. In fact, he showed me the courtesy of permitting me to examine some of the files that he had been preparing. I looked through some of those files partly with the idea of refreshing my memory on some points that he had material on. That, [10567] incidentally, was the first occasion since 1941 that I had seen any pieces of paper connected with this matter with the exception of the exhibits shown to me during previous hearings I appeared at.
Senator Lucas. Well, if you never saw this so-called execute message after your conversation with Safford on either December 4th or 5th where, in the course of natural events, or in the course of understanding, would that message go after it left Safford's office?

Captain Kramer. I have already indicated, Senator, that that particular message came in as a part of a news broadcast coverage which we had not been customarily covering during the course of 1941, except occasional sampling of that coverage, primarily because of the fact the FCC then had that function of monitoring foreign broadcasts. That coverage was instituted only after we were aware of the Japanese setting up this particular winds system of signals. It was an added burden not only to my section, with limited translating talent, but, of course, to Captain Safford's whole organization, including the monitoring stations and his watch officers in the decrypting section, to examine this plain language coverage.

Senator Lucas. Did that come through in Morse code?

Captain Kramer. I believe it did, sir. However, [10563] cannot be certain of that from first-hand knowledge because of the fact that material coming in in teletype would normally be transcribed onto a teletype ribbon for rapid transmission and such transcription would not clearly indicate whether it was Romaji, in other words, Arabic letter transmission or Kana Morse, Japanese Morse transmission.

Senator Lucas. That is, by an examination of the teletype itself you could not tell whether it was Morse code or not?

Captain Kramer. You could not tell whether it was international Morse or Japanese Kana Morse.

Senator Lucas. There is quite a difference, as I understand it, between the two.

Captain Kramer. There is a difference when picked out of the air, yes, sir, but not when transcribed on a teletype.

Senator Lucas. I mean as far as the interception is concerned, there is quite a difference?

Captain Kramer. As far as the interception, but not when it is transcribed to English letters.

[10569] Senator Lucas. Well, this message, according to the evidence that is before this committee at the present time, could only go to one place after it left Stafford's office and that would be to Admiral Noyes' offices, isn't that correct?

Captain Kramer. That was my understanding at the time, and still is.

Senator Lucas. Well, it is my understanding that Safford has told the committee that he directed one of the men in his office to take this message to Admiral Noyes, but he does not remember who it was. Now, do you recall the watch officer that came to your door that morning?

Captain Kramer. I am not positive of his name. It, however, does impress itself on my memory that he was approximately my height. I recall that because we walked for approximately 150 yards. My belief has been and still is, that it was a Lieutenant Murray, one of the watch officers.

Senator Lucas. If Admiral Noyes received this so-called execute winds message, or this false weather message, whatever it was, what would be his duties, Captain, with respect to that message?
Captain Kramer. This is purely presumption on my part based on his instruction to me to prepare certain cards concerning this winds message. I presumed if he received such a [10570] winds message that he would at once telephone the sense of that message to these usual recipients of this decrypted traffic.

Senator Lucas. Well, would he follow the telephone communication with the delivery to these proper recipients of that type message?

Captain Kramer. Would he what?

Senator Lucas. Would he follow the telephone communication with an actual delivery of this type of a message to these various recipients? That is the custom you followed, as I recall.

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Senator Lucas. And I presumed he would follow the same course, would he not? Of course, you are speculating now.

Captain Kramer. I do not know about that point, sir.

Senator Lucas. All right. In Captain Safford's statement on page 14 he says:

It is my recollection that Kramer and I knew at the time that Admiral Noyes had telephoned the substance of the Winds Message to the War Department, to the "Magic" distribution list in the Navy Department, and to the Naval Aide to the President. For that reason, no immediate distribution of the smooth translation of the Winds Message was made in the Navy Department. The six or [10571] seven copies for the Army were rushed over to the War Department as rapidly as possible; here the Navy's responsibility ended. The individual smooth translations for authorized Navy Department officials and the White House were distributed at noon on December 4, 1941, in accordance with standard operating procedure.

Now, who delivered those smooth copies, who delivered the smooth translations around noon of December 4, 1941, if you know? Whose responsibility would that be? Assuming now that it is in Noyes' office and assuming that the statement of Captain Safford is correct, who would have the responsibility for ultimately making the distribution of the smooth translations as is stated here?

Captain Kramer. With the exception of certain deliveries made on my instructions by Lieutenant Harrison, I know of no one else who ever made a dissemination in the Navy Department of the final translations except myself.

Senator Lucas. That was my understanding. In other words, if Admiral Noyes had considered this message as a winds message, then it would have been your duty, under the previous arrangement that you had, to have delivered these smooth translations to the proper recipients?

Captain Kramer. That is precisely correct, sir.

Senator Lucas. In other words, Admiral Noyes would not [10572] have detailed some other officer who was not familiar with magic and familiar with the recipients to have made the delivery in this particular and special case?

Captain Kramer. It would have been unprecedented and I cannot conceive of his so doing.

Senator Lucas. Well, now, it is a fact, and I think you stated it categorically, that you, as the one individual who had delivered all these magic messages, never received from Admiral Noyes any instructions of any kind to deliver to the proper recipients this so-called execute winds message?

Captain Kramer. None whatsoever, sir.
Senator Lucas. And you know of no one who did make this delivery?

Captain Kramer. I do not, sir.

Senator Lucas. Do you agree with me that if this winds execute message was the type and kind as was outlined in circular 2353, that it would have been absolutely the thing to do, to make such a delivery?

Captain Kramer. It would have been if it had come into my section for translation and dissemination. However, as has been repeatedly pointed out, there were special provisions made to handle this particular winds system messages.

Senator Lucas. Yes, I understand that, but even though this particular provision was made whereby Admiral Noyes was [10573] to receive this kind of a winds execute, as I understood you to say it would still have been your duty, if the delivery of the smooth translation had been requested, it would have been your duty to do it?

Captain Kramer. It certainly would, yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. And if Admiral Noyes, who will testify later about this, if Admiral Noyes selected any other officer, then he broke a precedent up to that time as far as delivering this magic?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. I might state further, sir, in connection with this whole subject that it was my presumption that this particular message would not come into my section because of the special provisions made by Admiral Noyes and Captain Safford for dissemination. However, if it came into my section, it would have been disseminated through the usual channels, via myself. I have not had this particular winds message impressed on my memory during the intervening years partly for that reason, partly for other reasons I have already given and partly because what is apparently a considerable issue on this particular winds message apparently came to a head not before at least two years or so after Pearl Harbor.

Senator Lucas. Two years after Pearl Harbor, about the time when Captain Safford started writing you asking you [10574] while you were serving in the Pacific whether or not you knew anything about this particular message?

Captain Kramer. That is just about the time, sir, that I was first aware that there were any questions or issues concerning this subject.

Senator Lucas. And he asked you in question 18 of that letter as to whether or not you knew anything about this particular message and your reply was wholly on another message at that time?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. In other words, your memory two years afterwards did not coincide with Stafford's memory about that message the first time that it was ever brought to your attention?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Senator Lucas. And as far as you know that is the first time that the so-called winds execute message was ever called to the attention of anyone in connection with the Pearl Harbor controversy?

Captain Kramer. Precisely, sir.

Senator Lucas. Now, in this same statement Captain Safford said that it was his recollection that "Kramer and I knew that Admiral Noyes had telephoned the substance of the winds message."

[10575] Do you recall that Admiral Noyes told you at any time that he had telephoned the substance of this so-called winds execute message to the proper recipients?
Captain Kramer. I was never aware of what phone calls Admiral Noyes made, if he made any. In fact, I have no knowledge of what happened to this particular piece of paper, this so-called winds message, after I left Captain Safford's office.

Senator Lucas. All right. Now, returning for a moment, Captain, to circular 2858: Are you the individual who originally translated that message when it was intercepted?

Captain Kramer. My section translated it, sir—one of my translators did. The "Y" at the bottom before the expression, "Navy translation," indicated that it was a Mr. Cory.

Senator Lucas. Who?

Captain Kramer. Cory; C-o-r-y, who about 8 months later was killed on Guadalcanal as a young officer in the Marines, into which he was commissioned in the spring of 1942.

Senator Lucas. Well, you were familiar, of course, with this particular message after it came in and was translated?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. You were the one who made the delivery of this message—

Captain Kramer. I did, sir.

[10576] Senator Lucas (continuing). To the proper people here in Washington who were on the "in," so to speak, on magic?

Captain Kramer. I think that probably the first delivery was made to Captain Safford because it was my customary practice to bring at once to his attention anything bearing on the technicalities of his section.

Senator Lucas. Now, the first part of that message is as follows:

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

That was thoroughly understood by you?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Was there ever anyone who translated those words from the intercepted message in different language than what we find now in this circular?

Captain Kramer. At no time, sir. There was only one translation made of this in the Navy Department. About the same date as this translation we received a translation from the Far East of this same circular.

Senator Lucas. Is that the one Captain Safford gives to the committee in his statement which is found on—

[10577] Captain Kramer. A dispatch originated by commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, as a translation furnished by Singapore.

Senator Lucas. Yes. That is the one that Captain Safford—

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. That translation from the Asiatic Fleet was essentially the same as ours, disagreed only in certain parenthetical points with reference to the southwest Pacific. My recollections now of my reaction at the time were that the Asiatic Fleet version of it differed from ours; it further made it—was probably made more emphatic than ours because of the closer proximity of those people to danger; that for that reason alone I would not question their translation. I recall at no time going back to the original decryption of ours to determine why the two translations were dif-
ferent—I first saw, since those days, the work sheet of this message a few days ago—and that there would be no necessity of our briefing and drafting the subject of this message to send to the usual recipients, the Asiatic Fleet specifically, and commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, because it was already on that channel, they already had it.

Senator Lucas. Well, I notice in Captain Safford’s statement that he says:

[10578] Consul-General Foote, our Senior Diplomatic Representative in the Netherlands East Indies, on December 4, 1941 (Java time), which is December 3, 1941 (Washington time), sent a similar message to the Secretary of State, from which I quote:

“When crisis leading to worst arises following will be broadcast at end weather reports: One east wind rain war with United States. Two north wind cloudy war with Russia. Three west wind clear war with Britain including attack on Thailand or Malaya and Dutch Indies.”

Now, do you consider that message any different than the one which you received in circular 2353?

Captain Kramer. I do not believe I saw until some time later that particular message. I may have. I know that I was told about it, however, because my reactions at the time I was told about it, about 3 or 4 December, were that that particular subject was getting a pretty wide dissemination.

I was concerned purely from the security angle. I was concerned that if too many people became cognizant of it, inasmuch as this thing was set up in a secret Japanese code, that the Japanese might get wind of the fact that that code was broken.

Senator Lucas. Well, did Admiral Noyes know about this [10579] particular message which was sent in by Consul-General Foote?

Captain Kramer. Very probably he did.

Senator Lucas. Could it be that this so-called winds execute message that we have been talking about was following the pattern as laid down here in this message that I have just read?

Captain Kramer. So far as I am aware, sir, those messages from Java were never used by Captain Safford’s organization in connection with interception or attempted interception of anything on this winds system. We had our own translation, which was the primary and initial translation, and we had the Asiatic Fleet version of the translation furnished by the British, which in most essentials were identical. Those two versions of it were the basis on which instructions, in my understanding, were sent to our intercept stations and provisions made, all the provisions made to handle this particular winds system.

Senator Lucas. Well, do I understand you to say, then, from your last answer, that Captain Safford and yourself and all other individuals who were intercepting and decoding and translating these messages from Japan were following the pattern as laid down in circular 2353 or circular 2354 and you were eliminating any message that you might have received from Java?

Captain Kramer. My only reaction to those messages from [10580] Java, was that, as I have indicated, it was getting a very wide dissemination. Incidentally, I might interpolate that to my best recollection this is the first instance that I was aware that the Dutch were working on this traffic.
Senator Lucas. So you had good reasons to discount, I presume, in view of the fact that you fellows had been working on it a long, long time, and thought that your system of analysis of these intercepts was as good as any, or better?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. I might amplify my previous answer by stating that although it was obvious that the Dutch had differences on the subject, my first reaction was that very likely the British at Singapore had furnished it to them.

Senator Lucas. Well, if Captain Safford was not using these reports that came in from Java, why does he use it here; can you tell that?

Captain Kramer. I cannot presume to diagnose the thought processes of Captain Safford.

Senator Lucas. Getting back to circulars 2353 and 2354, the one which all responsible people in the Army and Navy had, there is nothing in that message which speaks about war with the United States or Russia or Britain?

Captain Kramer. Nothing whatsoever in the text of the message. The war angle could be only personal inference and [10581] deductions of what a diplomatic crisis involving severance of communications might lead up to.

Senator Lucas. That is right. So in the event that any winds implement message had come in on the basis of what is laid down in circular 2353 it could only mean, if this message is correct, that diplomatic relations were cut off or international communications had ceased, isn't that right?

Captain Kramer. Precisely correct, sir.

Senator Lucas. And at the time, either on December 4 or 5, we were carrying on diplomatic relations with Japan?

Captain Kramer. We were, sir.

Senator Lucas. And the communications between Tokyo and her people in this country and all over the world were continuing, were they not?

Captain Kramer. So far as the United States is concerned, they continued in full effect; yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Well, negotiation and communications both continued right up almost until the bomb fell?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. The first bomb fell at Pearl Harbor?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. So if this message is correct there was never any reason for Japan ever sending out an implementing [10582] winds message because no communications ceased and no diplomatic relations ceased between the two countries?

Captain Kramer. So far as the United States was concerned, it appears to me to have been an extremely illogical thing for Japan to have sent such a message with reference to the United States since they took such stringent precautions to safeguard the fact that they contemplated not only a break but actually an overt act directed toward the United States.

[10583] Senator Lucas. All right, now, Captain, one more question.

I have always considered circulars 2353 and 2354 of tremendous importance, and I always thought any implementing winds message following the plan laid down, was also of tremendous importance.
Do you agree with me that if an implementing message had come with the instructions as set forth in these circulars, it would have been followed distinctly and carefully?

Captain Kramer. What instructions do you refer to, Senator?

Senator Lucas. I am speaking now of the latter part of the circular which says, “This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast, and each sentence will be repeated twice.”

Now, that is clear, isn’t it?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. If the words “Higashi—” you pronounce them for me please.

Captain Kramer. Higashi no kaze ame.

Senator Lucas. If they had appeared only in the middle of the winds execute message, would that, standing alone have been sufficient for you to reach the conclusion that that was an implementation of the winds message, or false message?

Captain Kramer. In my examination of these earlier false alarms where I saw the full teletype paper, sometimes running to 12 and 15 yards in length, in analyzing those weather reports, that was one of the points I looked for, to see whether it appeared in the middle and at the end.

Senator Lucas. Yes.

Captain Kramer. If it did not appear at the end, it would have tended to discount anything appearing in the middle.

However, its omission from the end would very likely be accompanied by an omission of part of the end of the weather broadcast due to interference or atmospherics, and therefore incomplete reception of that news broadcast.

Senator Lucas. That could happen?

Captain Kramer. It might possibly happen; yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. It might possibly happen?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Well, you would have to consider under those circumstances then, if you received any one of these danger signals, either in the middle or the end of the message, I take it, you would have to give that some weight, and consideration so far as beings a winds execute message is concerned?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; and I did in those earlier things I mentioned.

The Vice Chairman. Would it disturb you to suspend at this point?

Senator Lucas. No.

The Vice Chairman. There is a very important roll call in the House, and as soon as the House convenes, the House Members will have to be present for that.

Without objection, the committee will now stand in recess until 1:30.

(Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m. the committee recessed until 1:30 p.m. of the same day.)

[10586] Afternoon session—1:30 p.m.

The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order.
TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ALWIN D. KRAMER, UNITED STATES NAVY
(Resumed)

The Vice Chairman. Does counsel have anything at this time?
Mr. Richardson. No.
The Vice Chairman. Captain, do you have anything you desire
 to submit before your examination is resumed?
Captain Kramer. Mr. Chairman, in the past few minutes I have
examined a document presented to me this morning as I commenced
to testify. There is a notation on here that it is exhibit 41. I have
never seen it before, however. It is information from documentary
evidence on messages 901, 2, 7, and 10. The first one of those, 901,
is what has been termed in this hearing the "pilot" message.
Yesterday I testified concerning the time of receipt of the transla-
tion of that message in the Navy Department. I was unpositive as
to the exact time. My impressions were purely from memory after
over 4 years that it was received late in the afternoon, after the first of
the parts of the Japanese note were coming in.
An examination of this document would tend to confirm [10587]
such testimony inasmuch as in the fourth paragraph under 901 it
states:

Teletype sheet containing Japanese code received by Army SIS from Navy
(A) 12:05 P. M. 6 December.

In the normal course of processing this material it took several
hours. It is therefore extremely unlikely that that message was
processed, translated, and disseminated prior to late Saturday
afternoon.
That is the only thing I wanted to bring up at this time, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas of Illinois will continue his
inquiry.
Senator Lucas. Do you recall, Captain, what we were talking about
just before lunch? There were a number of things but I am trying
to think of the last one.
Captain Kramer. I have forgotten just the line of the questioning,
sir.
Senator Lucas. We were discussing the circular 2353 with respect
to whether or not it was necessary in order to complete the cycle that
the word, for instance, which means "East wind-rain" should appear
in the center and at the end of the message.
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. And then there was another warning in [10588]
there which said that each sentence will be repeated twice.
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Now, would atmospheric conditions interfere with
that last instruction with respect to each sentence being repeated
twice?
Captain Kramer. On that point, Senator, I was somewhat confused
at the time and still am confused because it disagrees with the sub-
sequent directive on this subject, 2354.
Senator Lucas. Yes. In a subsequent directive it says:
The above will be repeated five times.
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas (reading):

And included at the beginning and end.

Captain Kramer. That is correct. We expected, certainly, that that would be repeated. Just which of those would apply, we were still uncertain what the Japanese intended.

Senator Lucas. That is right. In other words, if they followed either one of these circulars, which they would be compelled to do in the implementing wind message, it would be necessary that they either repeat twice or five times?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. I might comment further on that to this effect, that in 2354 it says it will be included at the beginning and the end; 2353 says in the middle and at the end.

I have previously indicated that it was only a few days ago that I saw the original work sheets since 1941 of these two messages. There is still doubt in the minds of any person in the United States as to the precise meaning as to what the Japanese intended. Those discrepancies are undoubtedly due to only tentative or erroneous recoveries by my code recovery section. As a matter of fact, that beginning in 2354 from a personal examination of the work sheet appears to be a tentative and erroneous recovery which could very well be better recovered, more precisely and accurately recovered as "the middle."

The expression actually appearing on the work sheet now in the files of the Navy Department is "Boto," meaning "beginning." It was a tentative recovery. In contexts in which that code group have previously appeared it seemed to be a logical recovery. With subsequent appearances of those code groups we very likely would have made a more accurate recovery. That is just another indication of doubt with reference to the precise meaning intended by the Japanese in these two messages.

Senator Lucas. Well, I can understand that from an examination of the two Circulars and your explanation of it, too. What I want to know, Captain, is whether or not if this implementing wind message had been a genuine one if it [10590] would have been necessary for them to repeat the message twice or at least five times?

Captain Kramer. We certainly expected that it would be repeated; yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. From what you saw in these three lines that came into your office was that message repeated more than once?

Captain Kramer. My recollection is that there was repetition.

Senator Lucas. There was repetition in there?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. In that particular message?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. And you do not recall, now, how many times, I take it?

Captain Kramer. I am not certain on the number of times; no, sir. I have previously commented on that particular point, that it was the function of the Gy section of cryptanalysis to determine the authenticity of codes. They for the most part examined these various other weather reports that had been coming in, threw many of them out themselves as not fitting the precise phraseology or the repetition called for, and did not call on me.
Senator Lucas. Well, now, in this same message it further states:

When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Now, as I understand it there was a message went out from Tokyo to Washington on December the 4th telling them:

Before you burn the codes brought you by KOSAKA, have him teach all your telegraphic staff how to use them—

and so forth.

Are you familiar with that one in Exhibit 1 on page 231?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; I am familiar with that.

Senator Lucas. Well, now, that message could have nothing to do with the winds execute message.

Captain Kramer. Nothing whatsoever, sir. That would, in that connection, tend to prove that there was no winds execute message up to that time.

Senator Lucas. That is exactly the point I wanted to raise. In other words, in view of the fact that they said here in Circular 2353:

When this is heard please destroy all code papers—in other words, on December the 4th, 1941, if a winds execute message had been sent from Tokyo there wouldn't have been any reason for them on December the 4th to send out that kind of a message, would there?

Captain Kramer. No, sir. Also, there would be no point to addressing such a winds system message to Washington in view of the precise instructions that they had sent Washington on the third to retain certain systems and codes.

Senator Lucas. Yes. There is another message here about burning of codes some place that I want to call your attention to. It is on page 236 of Exhibit 1, Captain, from Washington to Tokyo, December the 5th, 1941:

We have completed destruction of codes, but since the U. S.-Japanese negotiations are still continuing I request your approval of our desire to delay for a while yet the destruction of the one code machine.

Now, do you agree with me that that message from Washington to Tokyo, when it talks about negotiations still continuing, is in line with what they were talking about in Circular 2353 about negotiations there?

Captain Kramer. There is no connection whatsoever, sir.

Senator Lucas. It has none?

Captain Kramer. None, sir.

Senator Lucas. Well, now, will you explain that and get me straight on that, please?

Captain Kramer. On page 215 is a directive from Tokyo to Washington.

Senator Lucas. In Exhibit 1?

Captain Kramer. In Exhibit 1.

Senator Lucas. All right.

Captain Kramer. The translation reads, of a message dated 2 December:

Among the telegraphic codes with which your office is equipped burn all but those now used with the machine and one copy each of "O" code—
a character Japan intended as "Oite"—

and abbreviating code (L)—

which we knew as "L. A."

(Burn also the various other codes which you have in your custody.)

That is presumably for distribution.

Stop at once using one code machine unit and destroy it completely.

That, incidentally, is the first time we knew that Washington had more than one code machine. We were curious about that point.

When you have finished this, wire me back the one word "haruna."

At the time and in the manner you deem most proper dispose of all files of messages coming and going and all other secret documents.

Burn all the codes which Telegraphic Official KOSAKA brought you.

That is the one you referred to initially, sir. In view of that and the fact that Washington's dispatch of 5 December [10594] refers back to that, it is quite evident, it appears to me, that Washington's destruction of part of their codes was the direct result of that dispatch from Tokyo of 2 December and had no connection whatsoever with any winds system message.

Senator Lucas. Well, I refer you, Captain, to the language in there, "We have completed destruction of codes," and I agree with you that is in line with the message that you have read into the record here dated December the 2nd.

Captain Kramer. The one of December 5, Senator, says, "Re your 867."

Senator Lucas. Yes.

Captain Kramer. Which is the one of December 2?

Senator Lucas. But isn't it a fact when they state:

But since the U. S.-Japanese negotiations are still continuing I request your approval of our desire to delay for a while yet the destruction of the one code machine—

in other words, this is Circular 2353—no, I am wrong on that. You are right and I am wrong.

Anyhow, this message of December the 5th definitely indicates that no additional winds execute message had been received or there would not have been any necessity for that.

Captain Kramer. It certainly indicates that the Japanese embassy in Washington was not talking about, and presumably had received nothing, concerning any winds message.

[10595] Senator Lucas. Well, if this had been a genuine winds execute message and had followed the advice given in Circular 2353 when it says, "When this is heard please destroy all code papers," there wouldn't be any necessity for them sending this message of December the 5th.

Captain Kramer. I do not see that it would, sir.

Senator Lucas. Well, now, Captain, we have spent a good long time about this so-called winds execute message and assuming that this winds execute message had been a genuine one, what would that have added to what you already had as far as the tenses of the situation is concerned between Japan and this country?

Captain Kramer. It would have added considerable to the already tense situation between Washington and this country because it would
have indicated a contemplated break with this country. To date and up until December 7, the time of the attack, there was still no indication that the Japanese definitely contemplated a complete break in relations with this country, to say nothing about the slightest indication of any intention to attack this country.

Senator Lucas. Well, is the so-called execute winds message, if it had been a genuine one and if it had been understood, more important than the 14-point message?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; it is not.

[10596] Senator Lucas. In other words, the so-called winds execute message did not say when war was going to break out?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Lucas. It did not say where war was going to break out?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Lucas. Assuming Captain Safford's theory of this thing or his explanation is correct, all it said was, "War with United States," that is correct, isn't it?

Captain Kramer. Not necessarily war, sir.

Senator Lucas. Well, I am assuming that his theory of this is correct, all that it said on that message was, "War with United States, war with England and peace with Russia." That is what he had on there.

Now, everybody knew at that time that has testified here, practically, that war was coming sooner or later with Japan, didn't they?

Captain Kramer. From the general situation, yes, sir; that is true.

Senator Lucas. Nobody knew when that message came in?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Lucas. And nobody knew where the attacks were going to—where the Japs were going to attack the United States if they attacked us at all?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; or that they would attack the United States. In fact, I am speaking from my own personal recollections, but I believe that it was the consensus of the opinion of my associates and many of the high officials in Washington, that it was very illogical and foolish on the part of Japan to undertake open warfare with the United States, that it was almost inconceivable that they would in view of the fact that it was very likely that they could get everything that they wanted and as they had got in French Indochina and what they wanted in the south of French Indochina, without any action being taken by the United States.

Senator Lucas. Well, Captain Safford in his statement to the committee said this:

The Japanese were going to start the war on Saturday, December 6, 1941, or Sunday, December 7, 1941. The War and Navy Departments had been given 72 hours' advance notification of the attack on England and the United States by the Japanese themselves.

Assuming, sir, that Captain Safford's statement is absolutely correct, that there was this execute winds message and it said on it just what he contends that it says, is there any reason to deduce a statement of that kind, in your opinion, from that message?

[10598] Captain Kramer. None whatsoever, sir.

Senator Lucas. There is one other question. You prepared a file for Secretary Forrestal?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. You have said that you did not discuss with Safford at that time about the preparation of that file.
Captain Kramer. In reply to that, Senator, I would like to refer to page 15 of Captain Safford's statement.
I do not believe that Captain Safford knew until some years after Pearl Harbor that I had prepared any such folder for Secretary Forrestal. When I returned to this country last spring and had some of my conversations with Captain Safford I told him specifically that only one folder had been prepared; no material from my section in the Navy Department had ever been presented before the Roberts hearing.

I testified, I believe, yesterday that during the course of the Roberts hearing I was curious on that point myself. I had no knowledge of whether these encryptions were being presented as evidence in that hearing. I asked my immediate superior, Captain McCollum, about that point. That was the first time I knew that they were being presented.

I was very curious about what safeguards were being maintained on the handling of that in that hearing. Captain McCollum was uncertain.  

[10599] As regards the statement made in the bottom of page 15 of Captain Safford's statement, he says:  

I had no responsibility in the matter after forwarding the original message to Admiral Noyes—  
and this is the point particularly—  

and after checking Kramer's "folder" to see that the messages were presented in a logical and understandable order.

At no time during all my duty in that section of Naval Operations do I have any recollection of my presenting a folder to Captain Safford for his checking my manner of presentation or being shown anything except what I showed him.

Senator Lucas. That was your responsibility?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Not Safford's responsibility.
Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.
Senator Lucas. Well, now, when you talked to Secretary Forrestal, according to Safford you told him that you discussed this message along with others with Forrestal for about 2 hours. Now, in that conversation was there anything ever said about this so-called controversial execute winds message?

Captain Kramer. Captain Stafford's statement in that regard is apparently a garbled recollection of our conversations of this past spring. I told him that I was in Secretary Forrestal's office not more than 15 or 20 minutes ex-  

[10600] plaining the general nature of the material in that folder. He read some of the things in my presence; Captain McCollum was also there. The folder was then left with him to study further since he had not customarily been seeing any of this traffic. On a few occasions he did see it.

One specifically I recall was when I was at Secretary Knox's desk while he was examining a folder and Mr. Forrestal came into the office. Secretary Knox called Mr. Forrestal over to point it out to
him; he let him read one of the particularly interesting items in the folder he was reading.

There was no winds message in that at all. There was the one referred to as the hidden-word message, which I specifically took pains to point out was an error in that it omitted the United States. That was one that appeared Sunday morning, 7 December 1941.

Senator Lucas. But insofar as this message is concerned that is in controversy here and the one that Captain Safford claims that he saw and delivered to Noyes, that was not in the file and that was not discussed with Forrestal?

Captain Kramer. No winds message of any nature or kind whatsoever was discussed with Mr. Forrestal. In fact, not even the nature or system by which that hidden-word message came was discussed with Mr. Forrestal, only the text of the messages themselves.

[10601] Senator Lucas. I think that is all, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania will inquire, Captain.

Mr. Murphy. Captain, when I was questioning Captain Safford on the stand I asked him to give the names of those officers who might corroborate him as to the winds execute and in giving me those names he listed your name and then he also listed Colonel Bratton of the Army; he also listed Colonel Sadtler of the Army and while he was on the stand I read to him what Colonel Bratton had to say about it.

According to the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board in Top Secret Report at page 7 Colonel Bratton testified that no information reached him as to the break in relations shown by the winds message prior to the Pearl Harbor disaster December 7, 1941, and he does not believe anybody else in G–2 received such information. So much for Colonel Bratton.

I now go to the Army Pearl Harbor Board report dated October 6, 1944, at page 251. This is the testimony of the second witness, Colonel Sadtler, claimed by Captain Safford. [Reading:]

General Frank. Go ahead.

Colonel Sadtler. We paid a great deal of attention to that message, and then when the directive came from Tokyo regarding the destruction of codes, that message [10602] began to assume some importance, or a great deal of importance.

General Frank. That is, in the estimation of the people who were handling it?

Colonel Sadtler. That was in the estimation of General Miles, Colonel Bratton, and myself; others, maybe; I don’t know.

On the morning of the 5th of December, Admiral Noyes, who was Chief of Naval Communications at that time, called me, about 9:30, with words to the effect, “Sadtler, the message is in.” I asked him which one it was and he said he didn’t know, but he thought it was the one that meant war between Japan and Great Britain. I asked him for the Japanese word, and he said he didn’t know it, but to please tell G–2.

I went immediately to General Miles’ office and told him that the word was in. He said, “Wait a minute, I will call Colonel Bratton,” and in a very short while Colonel Bratton came into the office, and we sat down at General Miles’ desk. There were General Miles, Colonel Bratton; some officer, I don’t know who it was. I think he has since been identified as General Roderick, who is now dead; and myself.

I then reported what General Noyes had told me, [10603] and Colonel Bratton took out his little notebook, and he said, “Which one of these three words is it?” And I said, “I don’t know, but Admiral Noyes says it is the one meaning war between Japan and Great Britain.” “Well,” he said, “do you think you can verify that word? This may be a false alarm.” I says, “I will go back and call Admiral Noyes on the secret phone.”
I got Admiral Noyes, and he said, "I don't know," and I said, "can you verify it?" He said, "I can't do it right now, as I have to attend a meeting in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations," or some place, I don't know where; but he was unable to verify that at the time, "and," he says, "I will do it later." I says, "I think later will be too late." I went back to General Miles' office and told them that Admiral Noyes was unable to verify the word at that time, that he had to go to a meeting, but he was positive that it was the word meaning Japan and Great Britain, and it was the implementation of that "Winds" message. I would like to add here that my memory is a little bit faulty as to whether it was not Japan and Great Britain. It may have been Japan and Russia, but I am positive it was not Japan and the United States.

I went back to my office. Rather, General Miles [10604] said, "Well, I don't know what we will do. You keep on the lookout for anything that comes in and let us know just as soon as possible."

I went back to the office, and then I went down to see General Gerow, who was head of the War Plans, told him the effect of what Admiral Noyes had said, and didn't he think we should send a message to Hawaii. I don't mean Hawaii—to Panama, the Philippines, and Hawaii. He says, "I think they have had plenty of notification." And the matter dropped.

So much for Colonel Sadtler.

Captain, you have talked, as I understand it, to Captain Safford on a great many occasions. Do you know of any feeling between Captain Safford and Redman of the Navy? Was it Admiral Redman or Captain Redman?

Captain Kramer. It was Captain Redman in 1941 and in 1942.

Mr. Murphy. Well, now, Captain Safford has talked about orders from Redman in the week of December 14 and 15. He has spoken of Redman wanting publicity in connection with the trial in Chicago, with apparently some feeling as to Chicago, about his loving publicity. Do you know of any feeling between those two men or any reason for any ill feeling between them?

[10605] Captain Kramer. Well, sir, in answer to that question I attended some conferences in late January of 1942 and in early February of 1942 aimed at splitting up the three primary functions of the Communications Security Group, then under Captain Safford, into three subsections. Captain Safford was in charge of Section 20-G, known as the Communications Security Group.

One of its primary functions was the development, the preparation, and the dissemination of all United States Navy codes and ciphers. That function occupied a large part of the time of Captain Safford from my general understanding at that time because of the rapid expansion of the Navy at that time, particularly in view of the way developments were taking place in Europe. Among the things being developed were new U. S. Navy machines, cipher machines.

There were many conferences that I became aware of between Captain Safford and various manufacturers who were contracted to make parts of these machines. Without digressing into that function of Captain Safford's office any more, there was another function which was carried on on only a minor scale, namely, the policing function on our own use of Navy systems. It was a function that I first became aware of in 1935, when I went to sea after returning from Japan, although it had been carried on for years before that. It, among other things, required that every ship originating a code or ciphering message had to send a copy of that message to the flagship of the fleet for checking as to violations of security measures.

As part of the function and competition in vogue in those days certain demerits were assigned in the Communications competition for
such violations. That function, that manner of activity, was still going on and was intensified—in 1941 and was intensified after the war between Japan and the United States broke out. That was another reason, I believe from these conferences, we had for splitting up Captain Safford's three functions.

A third reason was a desire on the part of the director to further intensify our efforts in the cryptanalytical field. Apparently the Director of Naval Communications felt that in view of the contemplated intensified efforts in these three functions the job now became too big for one individual, regardless of how remarkable his talents might be, to handle. Therefore, these conferences aimed a splitting up these functions into three subsections.

During the course of these conferences Captain Safford presented some papers giving his views on how to split up, on how the split-up should take place, and what officers should be in charge of the respective contemplated three subsections. He suggested himself to head the Communication Intelligence [10607] subsection engaged in cryptanalysis.

After these several conferences the final conclusion, whether by Captain Redman or by higher officers in naval operations, I do not know; in any case the decision was to put a Commander John Redman and a Commander Wenger in charge of that cryptanalytical section, to leave with Captain Safford as his primary function full charge of the continued development of our own naval codes and ciphers, which function I believe he continued to exercise at least during the early part of the war.

Mr. Murphy. In other words, the recommendation of Captain Safford as to his particular assignment was not given to Captain Safford as requested or recommended, but given to Commander Redmond?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Murphy. The son of Captain Redman?

Captain Kramer. The younger brother of Captain Redman.

Mr. Murphy. A younger brother?

Captain Kramer. Who had had long communications experience.

Mr. Murphy. Did he ever express any particular peeve to you over that?

Captain Kramer. I do not recall any particular expression along that line before my return from the Pacific last year [10608] There may have been; certainly there was during the course of these conferences an expression of his desire to head that section.

Mr. Murphy. Well, did he say in his letter to you in the Pacific that both Redmans, both brothers, the Admiral and the Commander, both loved publicity, didn't he, that they were after publicity in Chicago?

Captain Kramer. He said that, yes sir.

Mr. Murphy. But did he ever use any stronger words or other words to indicate any feeling as to the Redmans, either one of them?

Captain Kramer. No conversations along that line stand out in my mind although there may have been before my departure from Washington for the Pacific.

Mr. Murphy. Do you know if he had any grievances against—well, I withdraw that.
Who would be responsible for making that decision that he did not get the assignment that he desired? In the last analysis who would make the final decision? Would that be Admiral Stark?

Captain Kramer. Normally such allocations as to duty in the Division of Naval Operations is made by the Director of that Division. I believe it is customary on occasion, however, to confer with the Assistant Chief of Naval Opera- [10609] tions on those issues, on those assignments.

Mr. Murphy. Well, would Admiral Stark's office have the right to say "Yes" or "No" as to that?

Captain Kramer. They most certainly would, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Did he ever express any feeling to you about Admiral Stark subsequent to his failure to get that assignment?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; he did not.

Mr. Murphy. Now, did you have any information as to his—he said that for a long time he had a certain attitude toward what happened at Pearl Harbor and then he made a change. Did he ever tell you why he made the change?

Captain Kramer. The first indication I had of what I might term bitterness on the part of Captain Safford toward any other officers in the Navy Department was Captain Safford's second letter to me.

Mr. Murphy. That was the one I read in detail on the record?

Captain Kramer. Dated, I believe, January 22, 1944.

Mr. Murphy. Right. Now, then, you went to the hospital at Bethesda on the 25th of September 1945, did you not?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. And you had a visit from Captain Safford on October the 3rd, that is right, isn't it?

Captain Kramer. Approximately that date, yes, sir.

[10610] Mr. Murphy. What was the purpose of that visit?

Captain Kramer. Quite frankly, Mr. Murphy, I was somewhat surprised at that visit. My relations with Captain Safford have been, I believe, cordial; I believe they still are. They have never been intimate to the extent of myself or my wife making social calls on Captain Safford and his wife. It was purely office and official contacts. That is part of the reason at my surprise at his visit to me at the hospital. It was not too surprising, however, inasmuch as he was a long-time acquaintance of mine.

We discussed a few things, not bearing on Pearl Harbor. We played a game of chess that evening. He brought me a box of chocolates, for which I thanked him, naturally.

He called again about 3 or 4 days later and picked up a book which he had left with me, a book of cartoons, on his first visit. Our conversations then were of the same character. We may have played a game of chess then, too. He was one of probably six or eight visitors I had during that first few weeks there.

Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate did you ever discuss Pearl Harbor with him while you were at the hospital?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; we did not because all our contact was in the company of other patients in the hospital.


Captain Kramer. I was made aware of that headline, yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, can you tell us where you were on that particular day? This is a headline of the New York Journal-American of Friday, November the 9th, 1945. Where were you that day? Or at least it had reference to your vanishing. Did you leave the hospital?

Captain Kramer. The day before, Mr. Murphy, my wife arrived in Washington from Florida. After one or two discussions with my doctors, and I believe on my request, I was permitted to what is termed "subsist" out of the hospital.

My wife contacted that afternoon the Red Cross in the hospital about locating a room near the hospital. We got such a room and stayed there that night. The following day, since it was several days before I had any appointment for further treatments, my wife and I went to Washington shopping. I got permission from the doctor before I left the hospital.

I learned on returning to the hospital the following morning from the nurse that on the previous afternoon there had been another visitor trying to see me. The visitor was described to me as a woman. From the description I could not determine who it might have been. It was that morning about 9:15 in the company of my wife at the hospital that I was preparing [10612] to leave the hospital again, having gotten the doctor's permission to do so, to go into town, when the medical officer in charge, Dr. Duncan, informed me that he had a phone call just then from the Navy Department to the effect that a Mr. Gearhart and Mr. Keefe were on their way out there to interview me. It was not until Mr. Keefe, I believe, explained to me that it was his secretary or someone from his office that had come out the day before that I first had any clue as to who my previous day's visitor was.

Mr. Murphy. Now, there have been statements in the press—and I am reading now from the New York Times of November the 12th, the byline of C. P. Trussel, a very able and distinguished writer for that great paper—there is a statement there that—

Navy Captain issues a denial that he had been beset and beleaguered; asserted that he was feeling very well and would appear before the committee prepared to state fully "anything I know that they may want to know."

Now, were you ever beset or beleaguered by anybody in regard to this case? And, if so, I think the committee are entitled to every detail.

Captain Kramer. At no time have I been what is termed beset and beleaguered, sir.

Mr. Murphy. There is a statement further in this article that—

Captain Kramer had been badgered and beset by an effort [10613] to breakdown his testimony.

Now, do you know of anybody and if you do I think we ought to have the details.

Captain Kramer. That statement, sir, is false.

Senator Lucas. Did Trussel make those statements?

Mr. Murphy. No; Mr. Trussel is not making them himself but quoting a very distinguished gentleman, not the writer.

Mr. Gearhart. Name him. Don't hold it back.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, I come to the Washington Times-Herald, the United Press.

Senator Lucas. What is the date of that?

Mr. Murphy. I don't know the date of this but it is current or about the same time as the New York Times. This is the Washington Times-
Herald and the only reason I think is pertinent to go into these matters is that the composite mind of America is influenced by everything they hear on this case and I think we ought to go into the whole story. I see here a statement:

I stand exactly on my statement that Kramer is being badgered and beset. Here is the most important witness in the investigation. He entered the Naval Hospital under orders. They took away his uniform, gave him pajamas, bath-robe and slippers. His meals were served in a ward from September 28 to the morning of [10614] November 7. I know that Kramer is chafing under this restraint.

Were you chafing under any restraint at the hospital?

Captain Kramer. I was getting restless in the hospital because that was the longest hospitalization I had ever had. My previous hospitalizations in the Navy had never been of more than a few days duration.

In that respect I might refer back to about 15 years ago when I was operated on for tonsillectomy in the Navy Hospital in Boston. The normal period in such operations, I was informed, was to keep the patient in the hospital not less than a week. After 3 days following my operation I walked out of the hospital and returned to my ship. I again was “chafing,” if you want to use that term, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Well, I am just quoting from the paper, sir.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. I now quote from the Washington Post, something by the Associated Press, that you were being—quoting a distinguished gentleman—that you were being badgered to—change his original testimony, meaning he was being badgered to change his original testimony.

Had anybody asked you to change your original testimony?

Captain Kramer. At no time during my hospitalization at Bethesda Naval Hospital has anything in connection with decryption or testimony been brought up in any conversation in which I engaged.

Mr. Murphy. There is also a statement in this same piece from the Washington Post by the Associated Press, not that of the Associated Press writer, but that of a distinguished gentleman, that the Navy was holding you incommunicado.

Captain Kramer. That statement is incorrect, sir.

I have previously indicated that I had a number of visitors, and I made some phone calls as well.

Mr. Murphy. I am referring now to another story from another issue of the Washington Times Herald, an article by an able writer, Ted Lewis, in which he quotes another distinguished gentleman, other than the one who had made the previous statement, to the effect that there was a missing winds message of December 6, 1941, which purportedly showed that the Japs were committed to immediate attack.

You do not know anything about any message of December 6, do you?

Captain Kramer. I do not, sir.

Mr. Murphy. I now quote from the Scranton Times of Scranton, Pa., United Press dispatch of November 7:

The Navy today denied Republican charges that a potential witness in the Pearl Harbor inquiry had been “broken in mind and body” and was being held incommunicado [10616] in a hospital psychopathic ward.
Were you broken in mind or body?
Captain Kramer. I do not believe so, sir.
Mr. Murphy. You were in this room for several days were you not?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. And under questioning by members of this committee yesterday morning and yesterday afternoon, this morning and this afternoon?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, when you were at the hospital, you were interviewed, were you?
Captain Kramer. By Mr. Keefe and Mr. Gearhart, yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Did you tell what you know about this inquiry, and what facts you knew?
Captain Kramer. Our discussions lasted approximately 4½ hours, interrupted in the early part of those discussions by some members of the press. I believe we covered most of my story that I had given in previous hearings and have given in this hearing in those conversations.
Mr. Murphy. Do you feel you told them the truth at that time?
[10617] Captain Kramer. I did, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Is what you are telling today and told yesterday under oath different in any respect from what you told them at that time?
Captain Kramer. In no respect whatsoever, sir.
Mr. Murphy. My reason for going into this is, if there is one single individual who has approached you in any way, low or high, no matter who he is, in any way to attempt to influence your testimony, I think in fairness to yourself, and the members of this committee, we ought to know about it.
Was there ever any such person?
Captain Kramer. There was never any such person, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, sir: I would like to review with you your testimony before the Hewitt inquiry. You stated at page 128:
The evaluation was normally done by Commander McColllum, the head of the Far Eastern Section, or Admiral Wilkinson, but I gave them the benefit of my opinion about it too.
Is that so?
Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Murphy. You stated on page 129, that you had seen those two dispatches set forth on pages 154 and 155 of Exhibit 1. That would be Circular 2353 and Circular [10618] 2354, would it not?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Then you were asked if you had seen the dispatch marked "exhibit No. 3" from Alusna, Batavia, and you said:
I do not recall having seen that.
Which one was that? Would that be the one sent to the Pacific, or would that be the so-called Foote dispatch?
Captain Kramer. No, sir; it would be the dispatch from the United States Naval Liaison Officer stationed in Batavia.
Mr. Murphy. And distinct from either 2353, 2354, and the so-called dispatch that we received by way of Admiral Hart?
Captain Kramer. That is right, sir.
Mr. Murphy. At page 130, you stated:

We were very interested in seeing any of this traffic after the thing was set up, which was about the end of November, but traffic did not appear in this system until the 7th of December and the latter part of December, 1941.

I take it at that time you were talking about the hidden word dispatches.

Captain Kramer. Mr. Murphy, until I was shown a photostat of the hidden word message during Admiral Hewitt’s hearing, I was still under the impression that the dispatch received [10619] Sunday morning was a winds message.

Mr. Murphy. Is it not a fact that from December 7, 1941, down to the time you testified before Admiral Hewitt, you thought the December 7 dispatch was an execute of the winds code?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. Murphy. Now, I take you to the bottom of page 130:

Captain Kramer. That is correct. That refreshes my memory now. I remember now that you remind me of it, that these reams of plain language traffic that we were getting in, several weeks before Pearl Harbor, were searched for that indicator. That, however, I didn’t recall specifically, because I didn’t do the searching. It was done by the GY watch officers.

Admiral Hewitt. I believe that about the middle of the first week of December, there was a teletype message which, to the best of your recollection, one of the watch officers had in his possession and which was subsequently delivered to Admiral Noyes. Will you tell me about that to the best of your recollection?

Captain Kramer. I previously testified on that matter at Pearl Harbor, Admiral. I would like to go over that previous testimony again in the light of thinking it over since [10620] that time.

I had no recollection of that message at the time it was first mentioned to me in the spring of 1944. However, after being given some of the details of the circumstances surrounding it, I did recall a message some days before 7 December 1941, I believe about the middle of the week 1–7 December, and I do recall definitely being shown such a message by the GY watch officer and walking down with him to Captain Safford’s office, and being present while the GY watch officer turned it over to him.

A brief conversation ensued, and Captain Safford then took it, I assumed, to Admiral Noyes, since that message we had all been on the qui vive about for a week or ten days.

That is the last I saw of such a message.

Admiral Hewitt. Can you recall what the general subject of the message was?

Now this is important. You speak up above about the one on December 7 and here, as I understand it, you are describing the one you saw with Safford.

Admiral Hewitt. Can you recall what the general subject of the message was?

Captain Kramer. It was, as I recall it, a “winds” code message. The wording of it I do not recall. It may have been, “Higashi no kaze ame”, specifically referring to the United States, as I have previously testified at Pearl Harbor, but I am less positive of that now than I believe I was at that time. The reason for revision in my view on that is the fact that in thinking it over, I have a rather sharp recollection in the latter part of that week of feeling there was still no overt mention or specific mention of the United States in any of this traffic, which I was seeing all of and which also was the only source in general of my information since I did not see, as a rule, the dispatches from the Fleet Commanders or going out to them from Operations.

Is your memory more clear now than it was then on that subject, or do you still feel the same way?

Captain Kramer. I still feel the same way regarding the precise wording of that piece of teletype. I, however, [10622] am thoroughly convinced from my study of the papers in the last few days, in the last few weeks, that the United States did not appear on that thing. That is my current conviction.
At the time I was testifying in previous hearings I had not thought particularly about this. In fact, the first time that there was occasion to think about it at all was in preparing my reply to Captain Safford's first letter, in which there is no mention or reference to what country was involved.

Mr. Murphy. Well, Admiral Hewitt then said to you:

Then it is still your belief, the best you can recall in view of that, there was no indication—.

Captain Kramer. I would like to continue that statement, Admiral, by saying: For that reason I am now at least under the impression that the message referred to England and possibly the Dutch rather than the United States, although it may have referred to the United States, too.

Captain Kramer. That is simply because I was unpositive, and still am unpositive, of the precise wording.

Mr. Murphy. Then Admiral Hewitt says:

Or possibly it may have referred to Russia?

Captain Kramer. I just don't recall.

Now Admiral Hewitt said:

[10623] Reference to one or more of the messages supplied by the FCC is in Exhibit 65. Can you recall whether any of those may have been seen by you?

Is it your recollection that you did or did not see any of those?

Captain Kramer. I believe I saw some of those; yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. You said then:

Captain Kramer. This document 1 is not a message and document 4 is the one of the 5th of December about midnight GMT. I may have seen these specific messages. I cannot be certain, however, because we saw a great many messages of this kind in looking for this particular type of "winds" code message. When we started monitoring all Japanese plain language some weeks before Pearl Harbor, the volume of material coming in was simply tremendous, swamping. We had only three linguists at the time for translation purposes, with a pretty heavy volume of coded traffic concerning the negotiations. Consequently, we felt the extra burden of having to scan all this Japanese plain language stuff and there were many instances of weather occurring in that, but because of the fact that the particular code thing we were looking for, we felt it was incumbent on us to examine it all. The reason I cannot state specifically that these particular ones were ones I had seen, but they were of the [10624] same nature as many I did see.

Then at the bottom of the page Admiral Hewitt said:

My understanding is that when that was first decoded, the word "minami," which related to the United States, was overlooked, so that the translation merely referred to England. Is that your recollection?

Captain Kramer. Last summer when that question of the late morning of 7 December had come up at Pearl Harbor, my recollection had been that it was a "winds" message. It wasn't until I saw these exhibits yesterday afternoon—and that would be sometime between May and July of 1945, would it not?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Your testimony was on Tuesday, May 22, 1945, so I take it that you saw the message on May 21, the day before.

Captain Kramer. I believe that is correct, sir.

Mr. Murphy. You said:

It wasn't until I saw these exhibits yesterday afternoon that my recollection was refreshed to the extent that I thought it was one of these hidden word messages rather than the "winds." I do recall on that that after my return from the
State Department near 10:30 the morning of 7 December, we had just had translated a message specifying the time of delivery of the 14-part note from the Japanese Government to the United States. That item, together with several other minor messages, one thanking the Ambassador for his services and another to the Embassy Staff and another directing final destruction of codes, all added up in my mind to a crisis to take place at 1 o'clock. Consequently, I was in very much of a hurry to get the word out. The books were made up in the course of a couple of minutes and as I was leaving the office, I looked at another short plain language message that had just come in, had just been brought in, and I recognized, as I recall it now, the first word in there as being a code word in this plain language text.

Now at that point, do we have here, or is it available, the plain language text of the Japanese message before translation?

Captain Kramer. Here it is [indicating].
Mr. Murphy. Now will you look at that just a minute please? The first word was “Koyanagi,” was it not?
Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Murphy. And if you will look at page 186 of Exhibit 1, “Koyanagi” was England, wasn’t it?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Then there are several other words, “rijivori seirinotugoo, arunituki,” and then “hattori,” and “hattori” meant “relations between Japan and (blank country) are not in accordance with expectation,” is that not right?
Captain Kramer. That is precisely what it means, sir. If the committee is interested they, of course, may call a Japanese expert other than presumably myself, and refer to a dictionary which I have in front of me.
Mr. Murphy. At any rate, the way it was set up for the Navy on page 187 was precisely “relations between Japan and (blank country) are not in accordance with expectation,” is that not so?
Captain Kramer. That is precisely an exact translation, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, after “hattori,” which was the general part, the next word is “minami,” which means the U. S. A., is that right?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, at that time you said you dictated a translation of this particular message. Is that true?
Captain Kramer. That is true, sir.
Mr. Murphy. And then you apparently, in your hurry, left with the translation as you thought it was at the time, having overlooked “minami” or the U. S. A. word.
Captain Kramer. I did not overlook it exactly. I [10627] overlooked it to the extent of not identifying it as a code word. The plain text message, which this is, should be translated:

Please have director Koyanagi send a wire stating the sum which has been decided to be spent on the hattori minami memorial library in order that this business may be wound up—

and then the code indicated a stop.

Now in translating this message—the word “minami” I might explain is a very common word in the Japanese language. It simply means “south”. In a hasty scanning of this message, without referring to the Japanese code list on this hidden word set-up, that message could be translated in the same way I have just read, except
that it could also mean, if it was not immediately apparent that "minami" was a code word:

Please have director Koyanagi send a wire stating the sum which has been decided to be spent on the hattori southern memorial library in order that this business may be wound up.

It was for that reason, the fact that that word "minami" fitted very well into a normal translation, did not stand out at the moment as a code word, that it was overlooked. The words "Koyanagi" and "hattori" are proper names in the Japanese language, which can readily immediately be distinguished from any ordinary Japanese word.

Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate, upon examination of [10628] part 4 of the hidden word code set-up on page 187 you found that "minami" was a code word meaning "U. S. A."

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, you did add in pencil on that particular paper that correction, did you not?

Captain Kramer. On one copy of that particular write-up, yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. And that copy, did it have any more than just the word "minami," or did it have some of your writings?

Captain Kramer. Just an insertion with the word "United States", and it was done with a view to sending around a corrected translation, which was not at all an infrequent occurrence, on the next dissemination of this material.

Mr. Murphy. I was wondering if Captain Safford saw that message with your handwriting in it "United States."

Captain Kramer. I doubt if he did, sir.

Mr. Murphy. I think you will find from the evidence that he did or at least he examined it later.

Captain Kramer. Normally the copies of this traffic—

Mr. Murphy (interposing). I do not mean on December 7, but at a subsequent time he saw the message.

Captain Kramer. That is what I am referring to. [Continuing:]—were destroyed, except the numerical file copy for reference, and occasionally one, and at one [10629] time during 1941, two other copies which we retained for cross-references by subjects.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, when you translated this message which would then say that relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations on the 7th of December, you immediately put that into the pouch and took that to the addressees, did you not, the receivers of the pouch?

Captain Kramer. That first version; yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Then subsequently you made a phone call saying there would be a correction adding the translation of the word "minami"?

Captain Kramer. My memory on that point is not very clear. That, too, was not an unusual thing to do. I made frequent phone calls, and in fact every time I started delivery prior to leaving the office I made a number of phone calls to locate recipients. There were a number of times that I specifically recall during 1941 when I made calls indicating corrections, whether major or minor.

My recollection on this thing is that when I first noted it I did make two or three phone calls indicating that the United States should be included in that.
Mr. Murphy. At any rate, the force and effect of it had been considerably lessened by the delivery of the 1 o'clock message to the recipients of the pouch before you [10630] had discovered that "minami" was a code word?

Captain Kramer. I believe that was my impression at the time, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now what puzzles me is, that here is a message that is a hidden word message on the 7th, and it immediately comes to you and it immediately is distributed to all of the receivers of the pouches, and I am wondering why the difference was made between that one of the 7th and why there was this treatment of this other one of the 5th which would go direct to Noyes.

Captain Kramer. When this so-called hidden word system was set up, the first knowledge of which we had, I believe, in early December, it was so involved by comparison with the winds system, which was extremely simple in nature and character, there were so many code words involved, that no special provision was made to handle it. It would have required, in view of the complicated character of this by comparison with the winds thing, processing like our other coded traffic.

Mr. Murphy. Is it not a fact, Captain, that the cards that were distributed to Noyes and the others had the code words from the messages of 2353 and 2354?

Captain Kramer. That is precisely correct, sir.

Mr. Murphy. They did not, however, have the code words [10637] of—

Captain Kramer (interposing). They had the translations of those code words.

Mr. Murphy. The translations. They did not have the word "minami," which meant "U. S. A." or the word "kodama", which meant "Japan", or the word "Koyanagi", which meant England, or the word "hattori", which meant "relations between Japan and (blank country) are not in accordance with expectation"?

Captain Kramer. Absolutely not, sir.

Mr. Murphy. So then, if they got a message which purported to be an intercept and it was under the hidden word code, and they were to make any comparisons at all they would not know whether it was a real execute under that code because they did not have that translated?

Captain Kramer. I do not see how they could possibly have gotten anything under this hidden word system in other than the pouch I delivered to recipients.

Mr. Murphy. I do not know that they did. I am just talking about Noyes.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now the message that was delivered to Noyes, is it your recollection that the Japanese words as such were delivered to him or an English translation of the words? [10632]

Captain Kramer. My recollection and understanding is that the piece of teletype which I saw was taken by Captain Safford to Admiral Noyes' office.

Mr. Murphy. Do you recall my reading from Sadtler's testimony, that he wanted to know what word was used?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. And I take it from that that he apparently had certain Jap words such as "kita" and the other words from the winds code. Do you know whether they were furnished the Japanese or English?

Captain Kramer. I do not know, sir, what Admiral Noyes phoned to him.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, so far as your testimony goes, you state that it is your best recollection that you did not see a message, which was a winds intercept, referring to the United States?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; I never did.

Mr. Murphy. And are you able to state "yes" or "no" to the question as to whether or not, on December 4, 5—let me change that—on December 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 you delivered any message in any pouch which would be a winds intercept to the White House and the other recipients showing a break in relations, negotiations, either one of those two, between Japan and the United States?

[10633] Captain Kramer. I can categorically state, sir, that no message in the winds system was delivered in any pouch which I brought to the recipients of this material.

Mr. Murphy. Now, let me ask you just one final question. If you will refer, Captain, to Exhibit 1, at page 226—do you have a copy of Exhibit 1?

Captain Kramer. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. There is a message from Tokyo to (Circular) 3 December 1941, "Please keep the code list (INGO HIKAE)—which means "hidden words," and "INGO DENPO," which means "hidden words," too, doesn’t it?

Captain Kramer. "DENPO" means "telegram."

Mr. Murphy. That is important, for this reason, that in setting up the hidden word code on page 156 of Exhibit 1 they refer to "INGO DENPO" as "hidden word" and that would be the hidden telegram, is that it?

Captain Kramer. "IN" means "hidden," "GO" means "word," and "DENPO" means telegram.

Mr. Murphy. Now, on page 226 they speak of "INGO HIKAE." Would that mean one would be by telegram and the other would be by voice?

Captain Kramer. There is no distinction of that kind that I am aware of, sir. I am uncertain offhand as to the reason for the discrepancy between those two. "HIKAE" might [10634] be an inaccurate recovery of the code group applying to that, and this circular may have been sent in a quite different system from the earlier one.

Mr. Murphy. Now these two messages then on page 226:

Please keep the code list (INGO HIKAE) (including those in connection with broadcasts) until the last moment—

and then the next one from Tokyo to Vancouver:

Please retain the "hidden meaning" codes and the codes to be used in conjunction with radio broadcasts until the last moment—

would that indicate to you the possibility, and the ability of Tokyo to broadcast to London by the PA-K2 code any message they wanted to about relations between the two countries not being in accordance with expectations?
Captain Kramer. These two dispatches do not refer to the so-called PA-K2. That was still another system which the Japanese referred to. I believe, by the name “O” or “Oite”.

Mr. Murphy. Will you get the original, Mr. Masten, and have it here?

You think it is “O”, is that right? You think it would be the code “O”, or “Oite”?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. In that connection, if it is “Oite” I would like to refer you to page 216, a dispatch from Bern [10,635] to Ankara. In that case it says:

Orders have been issued to our diplomatic officials in North America (including Manila), Canada, Panama, Cuba, the South Seas (including Timor), Singora, Chienmai, and to all our officials in British (including our Embassy in London) and Netherlands territory to inform me immediately upon the burning of all their telegraphic codes except one copy of Oite “L”.

So if it is “Oite” they could still get the broadcast about the break in relations, could they not, on the code referred to on page 226?

Captain Kramer. There are three codes involved, Mr. Murphy: The Oite, the L, which we knew as LA, and the hidden word code, which had been set up only a few days previously.

Mr. Murphy. Right. Well, do you know of any reason why, on December 3, 4, and 5, Tokyo could not broadcast to England, as well as to all other places, a message to the effect, by international Morse or by what you call Kani Morse, or by any other system of communication generally used, the fact that relations were in danger?

Captain Kramer. I do not have any first-hand knowledge of what systems were actually held or burned by the Japanese Embassy in London. From this dispatch which you have read on page 216, however, it is apparent to me that Japan [10,636] could have sent via either of these code systems or via the hidden words system indications of any disruption in relations to England.

Mr. Murphy. The fact is that on the 7th of December Japan did send such a message, did it not, referring to England? I refer you now to page 251, from Tokyo to (Circular Telegram), 7 December 1941:

(plain Japanese language using code names) Circular #2494, Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.

Captain Kramer. That was a circular telegram which could very well have included England; yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. You mean as a recipient?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; as a recipient.

Mr. Murphy. But it did refer to relations between Japan and England on the 7th of December?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. I have no other questions.

The Chairman. Senator Brewster being absent, Congressman Gearhart is recognized.

Mr. Gearhart. Captain, there are certain respects in which your testimony coincides completely with that of Captain Safford, is that not correct?

Captain Kramer. I believe that is the case, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Captain Safford testified that on the 4th [10637] of December 1941 you appeared before him at his office with a yellow teletype paper in your hands and said to him "This is it." To that extent your testimony is in agreement, is it not?

Captain Kramer. Except for the date in my present conviction on the matter; yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. What is your present conviction?

Captain Kramer. That incident occurred on the morning of 5 December.

Mr. Gearhart. Not the 4th?

Captain Kramer. No, sir. I explained, I believe, yesterday afternoon the reason for the confirmation of my conviction on that is that was an examination of our directives to our outposts in the western Pacific and Asia on destruction of codes. That showed the dispatches were drafted, as indicated by the date time group on the dispatch on the afternoon of 4 December. I specifically have had my memory refreshed by these things on that point, because I do have a definite recollection of the fact that those dispatches were drafted, the first two, I think, by Admiral Noyes in his office in my presence while he was examining a folder which included the directive from Japan to the Western Hemisphere to burn and destroy certain systems.

There was nothings "winds" whatsoever connected therewith.

[10638] Mr. Gearhart. Is that the only reason why you think that the date was the 5th instead of the 4th, the fact that Admiral Noyes was writing these messages directly to our outlying positions to destroy their codes, code machines and particular papers, and you do not remember that contemporaneously with the preparation of those orders there had been any discussion of a winds message, is that it?

Captain Kramer. Until I saw those dispatches quite recently and read parts of the so-called Navy Narrative prepared by Lieutenant Commander Baecher, in which there is quoted some of the Army testimony bearing on this point of the date, I was still uncertain as to the precise date that this incident occurred.

Mr. Gearhart. But you did not indicate in any of your previous testimony that there was any uncertainty in your mind until you came here to testify?

Captain Kramer. I invariably indicated that there was uncertainty as regarding the date that incident occurred. My mind was only refreshed on that point when I saw this series of our directives, and—

Mr. Gearhart (interposing). Then the only basis—

The Chairman. Let the witness finish his answer, please.

Mr. Gearhart. Is there anything further you wanted to say, Captain?

[10639] Captain Kramer. I do not think it is material. I have given what I was about to say already, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Now is the only basis for your saying that it was the 5th, instead of the 4th, that you remember distinctly the sending out of the code destruction method, and you remember distinctly that preceding that there was no discussion of a winds message, is that it?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. That is the only basis for it?
Captain Kramer. That is the only basis. That was testimony taken from the Army inquiries that fixed positively the date in my mind; yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Then you want us to understand that your memory 5 years later is better than it was shortly after the event, is that correct?

Captain Kramer. I do not want to create that impression, sir, I never have created, or intended to create, that impression.

Mr. Gearhart. Your attention has been called to the fact that a certain message was sent out by direction of Admiral Noyes to destroy codes, which had been prepared by Captain Safford.

Captain Kramer. They were prepared in final form, I believe, by Captain Safford; yes, sir.

[10640] Mr. Gearhart. Yes. Now for the first time you remember that those messages were sent out at a date different from the date upon which there was discussion of the winds message?

Captain Kramer. I recall no discussion of any winds message, sir, except the few words exchanged with Captain Safford and the GY watch officer, and a few remarks I may have made on the date the winds message was received in the process of disseminating the folders of other decrypted traffic.

Mr. Gearhart. And now, after 5 years, you are positive that those two subjects were on different days. Now will you tell me why it was on the 5th that the winds message was discussed rather than on the 4th?

Captain Kramer. I have never been positive of the date, sir. I stated—

Mr. Gearhart (interposing). Well, you mean—

The Chairman. Let the witness finish his answer.

Mr. Gearhart. Go ahead.

Captain Kramer. I stated that my memory was refreshed only in the last few days as to the date, and that is my current conviction, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. And are you positive today?

Captain Kramer. I am positive only to the extent that these things I have mentioned refreshed my memory, sir.

[10641] Mr. Gearhart. Well, there is nothing to refresh your memory in respect to the date when the winds message was received. There is no record you have been able to look at. You simply say it was the 5th because it was not the 4th, is that it?

Captain Kramer. That is not quite it, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. All right, name one paper that refreshes your memory in respect to the discussion of the winds message. Upon what do you base your conviction of today?

Captain Kramer. On the relative times of occurrence of this incident in Admiral Noyes' office when he drafted these dispatches and I received this piece of teletype paper containing the words which might have been the winds message.

Mr. Gearhart. All right. I know that you have the evidence of the messages that were sent forth to destroy the codes and code machines and secret papers, you have refreshed your memory on that occurrence, but tell me from what record do you refresh your memory in respect of the day when the winds code message was received.
Captain Kramer. On the basis of no record whatsoever, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Then you want us to understand that that is purely memory besieirred after five years of discussion to the contrary, is that correct?

Captain Kramer. My first recollection of this incident [10642] in Admiral Noyes’ office was only after I saw those four dispatches which we sent out directing our destruction of codes. At that time my memory was refreshed to that extent.

I might remark in that regard, sir, that my memory has been refreshed on a number of other details connected with this hearing—

Mr. Gearhart. (interposing). I am only asking about one thing now.

The Chairman. Let the witness finish his answer.

Captain Kramer (continuing). Concerning events taking place about the time of Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Gearhart. Has anybody pointed out to you that it might be in corroboraton of Captain Safford’s testimony that when they received the winds code they immediately prepared the code destruction notices and that, therefore, you better put it on a subsequent day?

Captain Kramer. Will you repeat that question?

Mr. Gearhart. Has anybody suggested that to you recently?

The Chairman. What was that question?

Mr. Gearhart. Read it, Mr. Reporter.

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Captain Kramer. Mr. Gearhart, no one has pointed out anything to me at any time concerning the matter you just [10643] mentioned. My current conviction, based on refreshing due to examination of these dispatches, was my own personal conviction, not due to pointing out or discussions with anyone, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Now the winds message was being watched for, wasn’t it?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Everybody having to do with the interception of the messages was on his toes, very alert, looking for the winds message?

Captain Kramer. I believe that was the case, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. And you received a message which related to the possibility that it was a winds message that came on the teletype paper and you went in and said to Captain Safford, “This is it”?

Captain Kramer. It was far more than a possibility in my mind, sir. The fact is it was a conviction in my mind at that time, that the words appearing on that piece of teletype paper coincided precisely with what was called for by this winds system. That could very well be, since it was very simple Japanese language, which might well be used in any normal weather broadcast.

[10644] Mr. Gearhart. When you were on your toes, alert, looking for this message, and were at the time convinced that it was the message, convinced at the time that it contained the words directly pointing to the United States, how do you explain the fact after 5 years your conviction today is to the contrary?

Captain Kramer. Mr. Gearhart, I have never been of the positive conviction that that piece of teletype paper referred to the United States. My statement as to the wording of that is hazy. It has always
been hazy. My contact with that was only for a few seconds duration. If it had referred to the United States, I am fairly certain that it would have impressed itself on my memory.

Mr. Gearhart. Captain, you had been looking for this paper for a long time. You had it in your own hands. You looked at it, and you said after reading it, "This is it." Do you mean to say that you weren't convinced at that moment that it was it?

Captain Kramer. I certainly was convinced that it was it to the extent of being the first thing that we had seen which was believed by me and by the GY watch officer was something in that hidden word—rather in that winds system. That, purely, and simply, is what I meant by this expression which I apparently used. I have no positive [10645] recollection of using that expression, incidentally.

Mr. Gearhart. You have no positive recollection of having said, "This is it"?

Captain Kramer. I have repeatedly so testified.

Mr. Gearhart. You have testified in this hearing that it was the expression you used, haven't you?

Captain Kramer. I have stated I may well have said that. I have no positive recollection of having said it.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, will you tell us why, when you had been waiting for this paper for a long time, when you read it, and you felt it was a winds message, why you didn't make out any file for it?

Captain Kramer. Of this approximately quarter of a mile of plain language traffic that we had been receiving for a week or 10 days past, there is no record that I am aware of that was ever maintained on all that traffic.

The only record I kept in my section, section GZ, was of broken-down messages by the decrypters, or in the case of plain language papers that were sent in to my section for translation, every one of those papers were filed.

I am fairly certain every one of those papers will now be found in the files of the Navy Department.

Mr. Gearhart. The paper you had been waiting for, the paper you thought was the paper you had been waiting for, [10646] the one you took to Captain Safford, you made no file out for it?

Captain Kramer. Made no file of anything, sir, except what came in to my section. That did not come in to my section. There were specific provisions made why it should not have come in to my section. I do not believe, sir, that any record was kept by the GY section of any of that plain language traffic coming in either.

Mr. Gearhart. Who was this watch officer that brought it to you?

Captain Kramer. To the best of my recollection it was a Lieutenant Murray, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Was he in your section?

Captain Kramer. He was in the adjacent section, GY.

Mr. Gearhart. The missing file 7001 is a file that might have been filled by paper that came in during the first week in December; is that right?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. What was the last you saw of this teletype yellow sheet of paper?

Captain Kramer. The last I saw of that piece of teletype paper was when I left Captain Safford's office.
Mr. Gearhart. It was then in his possession?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

[10647] Mr. Gearhart. At the time, as you have testified, you considered that message to be the winds execute?

Captain Kramer. I did, sir.

I might amplify that remark, as I believe I have previously testified, that that is the first occasion I know of where I left my office and accompanied a GY watch officer to Captain Safford's office. It was primarily for the purpose of confirming with Captain Safford the language appearing on that piece of teletype paper.

The watch officer himself had instructions on how to handle anything coming in in that particular winds system.

Mr. Gearhart. Why did he bring it to you?

Captain Kramer. He did not bring it to me, sir. As he was passing the door of my office, he noted that I was in and he called me to the door to confirm his interpretation of what appeared on that piece of teletype.

Mr. Gearhart. Then you read it carefully to confirm his interpretation, and you don't remember anything about it now?

Captain Kramer. I do not, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, you weren't too much help to him in reading it, were you, then?

Captain Kramer. I believe I was of some help at the time, sir. I saw that paper for only a few seconds. All these other things which my section handled, I saw from six or eight to two or three dozen times. I read and studied them carefully in order to be familiar with what the recipients were reading when I was present while they were reading.

Mr. Gearhart. He asked you for the purpose of checking himself, asked you to read it with care and to see if he interpreted it correctly.

In the days gone by, you remembered that it contained words referring to the United States, and now you are uncertain because the paper was in your hands so fleetingly?

Captain Kramer. In days gone by, sir, I have never definitely remembered that piece of teletype as referring to the United States. I have never recalled, and still do not recall, the precise wording of that piece of teletype.

Mr. Gearhart. And upon that you are sure and you are willing to say that you never testified that it did refer to the United States?

Captain Kramer. My first reaction when that question was first propounded to me during the course of Admiral Murfin's court of inquiry was having in mind very well the expressions involved and in view of the fact that we had been engaged in a serious war for 2 years with Japan, that, of course, it was the United States.

[10649] Later on in that hearing, however, I indicated in reply to another question that the only thing involving the United States in all this decrypted traffic was the disclosure at the end of November to Berlin wherein they used the expression "Anglo-Saxon," which included the United States, presumably.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, a question has been raised as to whether or not there was any reason behind the winds message being sent by directional broadcast to London 2 or 3 days before the actual breaking out of hostilities.
Can you think of any reasons why the Japanese would want London advised in advance of the event and would take great chances possibly of exposing their hand to advise London?

Captain Kramer. I believe, sir, that it would have been an illogical thing to do.

Mr. Gearhart. A what?

Captain Kramer. An illogical thing to do.

Mr. Gearhart. You can't think of any reason why London, that is, the Japanese Embassy in London, would want to know in advance?

Captain Kramer. In view, Mr. Gearhart, of the stringent security measures imposed by the Japanese military on all their moves connected with the outbreak of war between Japan and England and the United States, I very much doubt it.

Mr. Gearhart. I direct your attention to intercept No. 1410, which appears on page 234 of Exhibit 1, the message from Berlin to Tokyo, December 4, 1941, translated December 5, 1941:

In case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy in London—

That would seem to indicate that Berlin was expecting evacuation and war, wouldn't it?

Captain Kramer. Not necessarily war, sir. We ourselves had evacuated all of our language officers from Tokyo in August of 1941.

Mr. Gearhart. That is probably another explanation, isn't it?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. War is still another possibility, isn't it?

Captain Kramer. That would be a matter of personal deduction, if you wanted to stretch this thing to that meaning, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. That is no more of a stretch than the other, is it?

Captain Kramer. By that token, you could stretch our evacuation of our language officers from Tokyo as meaning we intended to go to war with Japan.

[10651] Mr. Gearhart. It says:

Evacuation by the members of our Embassy.

That means all, doesn't it?

Captain Kramer. I don't see that it does, sir. We evacuated members of our Embassy, namely, the language officers.

Mr. Gearhart. This doesn't say anything about part of the members, but it says "the members." A fair interpretation of that, even to an Intelligence officer, is that it would mean all, wouldn't it?

Captain Kramer. You could put that extreme interpretation on it; yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, let's go on:

In the case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy in London, I would like to arrange to have Secretary Matsui of that office and three others—

And they are named in the message.

—stay here. Please do your best to this end.

That is from Berlin.

Now, there is a possible direct reason, is there not, why London should know before the breaking out of hostilities, because after the breaking out of hostilities there would be no chance to evacuate any members of the Japanese Embassy in London, would there?

[10652] Captain Kramer. Presumably not.
Mr. Gearhart. They would be immediately interned, would they not?

Captain Kramer. That is correct.

Mr. Gearhart. So there is a reason given right here, given in the intercept, why London should be advised in order to accomplish a purpose before it was too late; is that not true?

Captain Kramer. I would invite your attention, Mr. Gearhart, to the following message.

Mr. Gearhart. That is right; but we are talking about this one first.

In that message we have been discussing, the one I have just read, is contained a possible reason why London should be advised before the outbreak of hostilities, isn’t there?

Captain Kramer. Not necessarily hostilities. It might be the breaking of diplomatic relations, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Diplomatic relations does not mean internment, does it?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, then, they could go on and evacuate their men if it was just a breach of diplomatic relations?

Captain Kramer. Not necessarily. They would be dependent then, presumably, on special arrangements for shipping.

[10653] Mr. Gearhart. That is right, unless they had arranged to take their people off the island by the German submarines?

Captain Kramer. That is possible, of course, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Then, in all fairness—now, I am not asking you to strain your conclusions—in all fairness, if the Japanese wanted to get some people off the British Isles, and over to Berlin before the outbreak of hostilities, that would be a reason for a directional broadcast of a winds message 3 days before the attack on Pearl Harbor, is that correct?

Captain Kramer. You could put such a construction on that, yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, it has been testified that any directional broadcast from Tokyo to London could be heard on the East Coast of the United States; is that not so?

Captain Kramer. I am not familiar with the technicalities of what could be heard or not heard in various parts of the world.

Mr. Gearhart. You were present in this room when testimony was given that because of atmospheric conditions, natural phenomena, scientific consequences, that a directional broadcast from Tokyo to London could be and would be heard on the Atlantic Coast of the United States?

[10654] Captain Kramer. I heard that testimony, sir, and I am in general familiar with the subject of communications as a line officer in the Navy, and also with the difficulties which we had at various times with our own intercept set and the reallocation of certain monitoring stations to cover certain circuits, yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. If that were the consequence of that kind of a directional broadcast, the Japanese would know it, their scientists would know it there, just as ours here?

Captain Kramer. Presumably; yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. It seems, by the next message, that Tokyo wanted to get some people out of the United States before hostilities broke out.

The next message reads:

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
5 December, 1941.
Re your #1245
Will you please have Terasaki, Takagi, Ando, Yamamoto and others leave by plane within the next couple of days.

In that message you see a possible reason why Tokyo wanted the United States to know that relations with the United States were failing and were about to end; isn't that correct? Isn't that a fair conclusion?

[10655] Captain Kramer. That is a possible conclusion, sir.

However, there are many movements of diplomatic officials disclosed by this traffic to us. In fact, every transfer of a Japanese diplomatic official was as a result of instructions of this kind. Referring back to page 227 of this exhibit, in a message from Washington to Tokyo dated 3 December, Washington apparently objects to detaching Secretary Terasaki.

The message is incomplete. Apparently badly garbled. Presumably there had been prior discussion in this traffic which we had not read because of its not being picked up, or other reasons, concerning the movement of Secretary Terasaki.

This one that you have just read, of 5 December, apparently is a later message bearing on the subject of evacuation—not evacuation—but the transfer or movement of Terasaki and certain other people, and the officials.

Mr. Gearhart. I was merely asking you the possibility. I don't care to pursue it any further.

The Chairman. Is that all?

Mr. Gearhart. Yes.

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. Captain, I am not going to speak to you about the winds message for a while. We will take a [10656] rest on that message.

Captain Kramer. Thank you, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I want to show you a message in Exhibit 1, No. 904, page 243. Are you familiar with that message?

Captain Kramer. I am, sir.

Senator Ferguson. When did you first see that message?

Captain Kramer. I believe on Saturday evening, 6 December 1941, sir. It was translated, as indicated at the bottom, on the 6th of December.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Now, was that message delivered to the Secretary of the Navy and the President on the evening of the 6th?

Captain Kramer. I am quite certain, sir, that that was included in the folder delivered that night.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, just read that message, will you?

I want to ask you some questions about it.

The Vice Chairman. Read it aloud for the record, Captain.
Captain Kramer (reading):

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
December 6, 1941

Re My #902
There is really no need to tell you this, but in the preparation of the aide memoire be absolutely sure not to use a typist or other person.

Be most extremely cautious in preserving secrecy.

Senator Ferguson. Now, that message, "In re my #902" referred to the long diplomatic reply to Secretary Hull's message of the 26th?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What interpretation did you give this message that they were to use no typist on it, they were to do it personally, themselves, and to "be most extremely cautious in preserving secrecy"?

I want you to consider that at the same time you had a pilot message indicating that this 902 was to be delivered when a certain time was given to them here in Washington.

How do you interpret this message?

Captain Kramer. I do not recollect precisely my reaction to this thing, sir. It was included, however, as I told you in the folders delivered that night with the first 13 parts of the note. I believe my reaction at the time was that the note itself was of a much more serious nature than previous notes forwarded to this country.

Senator Ferguson. You had read the 13 parts, had you?

Captain Kramer. I believe I had read part of the 13 parts at the time this came in. I believe this came in while we were still writing up the 13 parts.

Senator Ferguson. Before they went to the White House had you read the 13 parts?

Captain Kramer. Before I went to the White House I had; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you come to the conclusion that the end had come as far as relations between the United States and Japan were concerned?

Captain Kramer. There was certainly a strong possibility of that; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Just a possibility?

Captain Kramer. Well, perhaps a probability.

Senator Ferguson. Didn't this message, that they were to be sure and not use a typist or any other person on it, together with the pilot message, indicate to you that the time had come when negotiations were ended?

Captain Kramer. I believe my reaction at the time was, particularly after reading most of the note, that negotiations which had been going on were ended, yes, sir; but as regards the interpretation or construction to be put on this cautionary message, 904, the Japanese Embassy in Washington had previously in very strong language been cautioned on security, particularly in the spring of 1941 when quite categorical orders were sent from Tokyo to the Japanese ambassador in Washington that no one except himself and his Counsellor of Embassy was to handle a certain code.

Senator Ferguson. Well, at one time the messages indicated that they knew that we were breaking their code; isn't that true?
Captain Kramer. As a result of their investigation in the spring of 1941, they concluded that we were reading something. We did not know, and do not know to this date, what they found out at that time.

Senator Ferguson. I appreciate that, but you had indications that they knew that you were breaking the code and reading messages; isn't that true?

Captain Kramer. Breaking some code, yes, sir, because one of their messages so stated.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Now, their method then, to keep you from, or to slow you down on reading their code, was to change the cipher, was it not?

Captain Kramer. Was to change a cipher they suspected our reading.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

[10660] Captain Kramer. In that connection, sir, there were a number of incidents, not only during 1941, but during 1940, when they cancelled codes arbitrarily as soon as they had the first inkling or suspicion that we were reading their code.

A code which we designated as AJ-12, in my recollection, I have not seen the message since those days, I remember Japan cancelling arbitrarily, because as I recall that message, they suspected that the British and the Dutch, I believe, were reading that system.

In, I think it was May of 1941, one of their systems, a naval system in this case, was compromised by a search of narcotic agents in San Francisco. Within 24 hours of the time that search was made, a report had been made to Tokyo about this search and Tokyo had issued instructions to cancel it at once.

Senator Ferguson. There is nothing unusual about the changing of ciphers so that someone can't read your code, is there?

Captain Kramer. Not at all, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And that saves you at times changing your code book, isn't that true, by changing your cipher?

Captain Kramer. That was the usual practice.

Senator Ferguson. Then it takes some time to get back [10661] into stride, as it were, to get the cipher, and then you can decode again, but if they change again on you, you have the same trouble? Isn't that true?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I notice in reading your testimony of yesterday that you didn't mention this 904 as being taken to the White House and the Secretary of the Navy the night before.

Captain Kramer. I was not questioned on that point, sir. That night, however, there were probably five or six messages in the folders distributed.

Senator Lucas. Will you tell us what five or six messages were in the folders the night you left the 13 parts at the White House?

Captain Kramer. This is the first time that question has been propounded, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I am not going to repeat, if I can help it. Captain Kramer. I would presume, without having made a study of this traffic to determine that point, that you ask, that my file numbers 7142 through 7149 were distributed that night.

Senator Ferguson. What book have you got? You are reading from another book?
Captain Kramer. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Four one what?
Captain Kramer. I will correct that 7143, which was the note.
Senator Ferguson. That was the 13 parts?
Mr. Murphy. The JG number is at the bottom of the page.
Senator Ferguson. What other numbers—7144?
Captain Kramer. Presumably numbers 7143 through 7149, sir. I recall distinctly that one of the messages in that folder was on the Tokyo-Berlin circuit, or vice versa. I have made no study of this file to determine the particular point you are bringing up, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, did you have a conversation with the aide at the White House?
Captain Kramer. A brief one; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. What was said?
Captain Kramer. The general tenor of our conversation was to the effect that there was something of high importance, in that pouch, which the President should see as soon as possible.
Senator Ferguson. Do you recall who the aide was?
Captain Kramer. I do not recall his name, sir, but it was one of the junior officers which Captain Beardall [10663] had on duty in that office he set up.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether it was Schmidt?
Captain Kramer. I cannot be sure, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know a man named Schmidt?
Captain Kramer. I do not recall him now, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Was he the same man as you delivered the 14th part and the 1 o'clock message to the following morning?
Captain Kramer. I again do not know who the man was. The delivery, however, was made to the Situation Room in the White House where these men were on watch.
Senator Ferguson. The Situation Room was merely a map room was it not?
Captain Kramer. A map room and a file of considerable classified material including dispatches from the Navy Department.
Senator Ferguson. Wasn't this true, that that was one of the few times that you left a message there? As a rule you waited until it was read, did you not?
Captain Kramer. There were only two occasions, sir, one subsequent to Pearl Harbor, but one occasion prior to Pearl Harbor, when I took material directly into the President, and that occurred in the late summer or early fall of 1941. At other times delivery was made to the naval [10664] aide.
There was a short period during the summer when there was no naval aide, and Admiral McIntyre, the Surgeon General of the Navy, acted in that capacity.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, what was the occasion that you took it in to the President personally?
Captain Kramer. I do not recall just what was in the dispatches, sir, but it was something bearing on these negotiations which I might characterize as "hot" and I felt the President should see at once, and Admiral McIntyre was not available to take charge of this particular pouch and I did not entrust it to Mr. Roosevelt's private secretary to take.
Senator Ferguson. Being that "hot" you can't recall it? As you say, it was so "hot" you wanted to take it in personally?

Captain Kramer. My principal purpose, Senator, was to see that the President got it promptly, and it was of sufficient importance to see that he did get it promptly. It probably concerned some negotiations to take place the following morning. That may have been the "hot" aspect of it.

Senator Ferguson. You didn't consider this 13th part as "hot" then, because you left that with an assistant; is that true?

Captain Kramer. I believe I left that with an assistant, yes, sir, but I further stated during this brief conversation that I had learned in phoning to Admiral Wilkinson's home, that Admiral Beardall was there, and I stated that undoubtedly Admiral Beardall would check up later in the evening to see whether the President had yet received it, presuming that if he had not, Admiral Beardall himself would then come down to the White House to see that he did see it.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you tell the aide that?

Captain Kramer. I did.

Senator Ferguson. So the aide was instructed that if he didn't get it to the President, that Admiral Beardall would check up later in the evening?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Have you ever learned as to whether or not Admiral Beardall did check up with the President as to whether or not he got that 13th part, and this 904?

Captain Kramer. I know, sir, only that I informed Admiral Beardall when I arrived at Admiral Wilkinson's home of the instructions I left with his assistant in the White House. I do not know what further action Admiral Beardall took.

Senator Ferguson. You never learned later?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, there wasn't any doubt that Admiral Beardall was not the appraiser or the evaluator of these messages, the President received these messages and he evaluated them personally, so far as you know.

Captain Kramer. Presumably Admiral Beardall did do evaluating, but undoubtedly the President had evaluations from many other high officials too.

Senator Ferguson. Now, were these delivered to Beardall for the President, or to Beardall for Beardall? Who was getting these messages?

Captain Kramer. They were intended for the President, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Wasn't it your understanding that the President was personally receiving these raw messages to place his own evaluation on?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And that was why you told the aide in charge on Saturday night, that he was to give it to him, and it was important and that you would speak to Beardall later about it?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, before you went to the White House, did you telephone the White House?
Captain Kramer. No, sir; I did not. I had prior to setting up of that Situation Room. After that was set up, I knew it was manned 24 hours, there was no need to phone.

Senator Ferguson. So you went to the White House knowing that there would be someone in the map room, or Situation Room, and would see him without calling.

Now, who did you call before you left the Navy Department?

Captain Kramer. I attempted to call Admiral Stark's home, Admiral Turner's home. I didn't succeed in reaching either of those people. I called my own home, requested my wife to bring the car down to expedite delivery that night.

I called Captain McCollum at his home in Alexandria.

I called Secretary Knox's apartment at the Wardman Park hotel. And after making all these calls, I then called Admiral Wilkinson to inform him of whom I had been able to contact and what I proposed to do in the way of delivery.

Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral Stark, next to the President, was in charge in the Navy?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. The Commander in Chief, and then [10668] Admiral Stark?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. In the line of orders, the Secretary of the Navy came in between—

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. In a certain way.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. But the highest ranking officer was Admiral Stark; is that correct?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you know that the evaluation of these messages had been turned over to Admiral Turner's office and taken away from the Intelligence Branch? Did you know that?

Captain Kramer. I was unfamiliar with that, sir, until these hearings commenced.

Senator Ferguson. You didn't know it then, when you called Admiral Turner; is that correct?

Captain Kramer. On that particular point, yes, sir; that was my understanding.

Senator Ferguson. So, as I understand it, your office was fully alerted to war on the evening of the 6th of December 1941?

Captain Kramer. I believe it was, sir. It was no [10669] differently alerted, however, than it had been during a large part of the year of 1941.

Senator Ferguson. Well, when did the change in the kind of alert come in your office?

Captain Kramer. When the volume of this traffic, particularly with reference to the war in Europe and the negotiations of the United States—

Senator Ferguson. Do you include in the war in Europe the war in the Atlantic that we have heard here from the witness stand, about the undeclared war that started in August? Is that what you have reference to?
Captain Kramer. By the war in Europe, I refer specifically to the Tokyo-Berlin circuit and anything bearing on hostile action of the Germans and the Italians. That would include, of course, the war in the Atlantic, if anything came up in this traffic.

Senator Ferguson. If it came in on this same traffic?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, from the testimony we have here now, that Admiral Turner's office had taken over the evaluation of these messages, his office was apparently not alerted for war on the night of the 6th, because you couldn't reach him; is that correct?

Captain Kramer. I am unfamiliar with that point, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, you couldn't reach him?

Captain Kramer. I could not reach him; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Where did you call?

Captain Kramer. His home.

Senator Ferguson. You had that telephone number?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And Admiral Stark, apparently his office was not alerted, because you couldn't reach him; is that correct?

Captain Kramer. I was unable to reach him, sir; that is all I can say.

Senator Ferguson. You personally tried to call his home and your couldn't reach him?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did the telephone not answer or he was not there, which?

Captain Kramer. My recollection is that the telephone did not answer.

Senator Ferguson. The telephone did not answer. Did it answer at Admiral Turner's?

Captain Kramer. I believe the same thing in the case of Admiral Turner.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you try the Deputy, Ingersoll?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know any reason why you didn't call him? Hadn't it been your custom to deliver to Ingersoll if you couldn't reach Stark?

Captain Kramer. It had not, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever delivered to Ingersoll?

Captain Kramer. On a few occasions when Admiral Stark was absent from his office and his flag secretary, Commander Wellborn, indicated that Admiral Ingersoll would probably want to see that right then, and because the flag secretary was busy at the moment with other paper work. Normally deliveries to Admiral Stark's office were made to Admiral [10672] Stark's private secretary, his flag secretary, rather, Commander Wellborn, who got them to Admiral Stark, as well as the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ingersoll, as well as many of them to then Captain Schuermann, head of the Central Division.

Senator Ferguson. Did you try Admiral Stark's office that night?

Captain Kramer. I did, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did it answer?
Captain Kramer. I do not believe it did, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you try Turner's office that night?
Captain Kramer. I tried those first before I tried their homes.
Senator Ferguson. And it didn't answer?
Captain Kramer. It did not, sir.
Senator Ferguson. So there were two offices and their homes that were not alerted to warn that evening as far as telephone communications were concerned?
Captain Kramer. On that interpretation of the alerting for war, sir, I know nothing about it. What provisions Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner had made in that regard I am not familiar with, only in a general way in that there were certain senior captains on duty at night in the Navy [10673] Department to take care of getting dispatches that might come into those officers.
Senator Ferguson. Did you find any of these officers in charge to get these dispatches to that night?
Captain Kramer. Those officers, sir, on the watch list that I referred to included many captains, I believe certain admirals as well, who never had access to this decrypted material, and they were, therefore, never shown it, and would not be shown it that night.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Then as I understand it now, Opnav, Admiral Stark’s office, could not be reached. His home couldn’t be reached. The next in line, the War Plans, which was Operations at the time, couldn’t be reached, and his home couldn’t be reached, and there were no other officers assigned to which these important messages could be delivered?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir, there were.
Senator Ferguson. Who were the officers?
Captain Kramer. Admiral Wilkinson, the Director of Naval Intelligence, whose prime responsibility it was to see that these things were delivered.
Senator Ferguson. All right.
Now, do I understand that you were not the man to deliver these messages, but Wilkinson’s duty was to make [10674] deliveries?
Captain Kramer. It was my responsibility as a subordinate of Admiral Wilkinson to make such deliveries as I was instructed to make.
Senator Ferguson. Then do I understand you conferred with Wilkinson and that it didn’t reach anyone out of his office—and he didn’t have the authority; we have learned here, to evaluate these messages, they were to be delivered to War Plans for evaluation as far as the Navy was concerned, were they not?
Captain Kramer. I have stated I am unaware of what arrangements were made regarding evaluation. My position on that was that in carrying out the general instructions in effect to deliver this traffic to the normal recipients, in case I was unable to reach Admiral Wilkinson first, which was the normal procedure, that that particular night when I informed Admiral Wilkinson of who I had been able to reach and what I proposed to do, and further that later that night when I showed these things to Admiral Wilkinson, that if he decided further efforts should be made in reaching the Chief of Naval Operations that he would so instruct me.
His instructions to me were to have this material ready to deliver promptly early the following morning as soon as the Admiral reached his office.

[10675] Senator Ferguson. I understand then that you called Wilkinson before you called Stark and Turner?

Captain Kramer. I called Admiral Wilkinson last, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Last. Did you call him and tell him that you couldn't reach these two men or reach anyone in their offices?

Captain Kramer. I did, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And did he tell you to bring it out to his home?

Captain Kramer. He approved my proposed distribution first to the White House and then to Mr. Knox and then to his home.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did he say then that you were not to deliver to Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner that night? You didn't try them again after that one call, did you?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And what time would you say you called their homes?

Captain Kramer. It was within a few minutes of 9 o'clock.

Senator Ferguson. Now, let's go to Mr. Knox. Did you call him on the phone and offer to deliver these messages, which included the one not to use any typist or any other person?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. I did call his home.

[10676] Senator Ferguson. When you went there you found Mr. Knox there?

Captain Kramer. I did, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did he read all of the information that was in your folder?

Captain Kramer. He did, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did he remark anything, did he make any remarks to you?

Captain Kramer. There were some brief remarks and conversation, none that stands out in my mind, however.

Senator Ferguson. Was there anything said about evaluating these messages? That is, as far as Knox was concerned?

Captain Kramer. My recollection is that he agreed with the construction I had placed on it, that it aimed towards a conclusion of negotiations.

Senator Ferguson. Did you tell him that there was a 14th part yet to come?

Captain Kramer. I did, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And what other conversation had you on this 14th part?

Captain Kramer. After he made his phone calls, apparently to Mr. Hull and Mr. Stimson, he instructed me to appear at the State Department the following morning by 10 o'clock, [10677] when there would be a conference of the three Secretaries and to bring at that time the material I had just shown him, as well as the 14th part, and any other thing of that type which might have come in during the night up to the time that delivery was made at 10 o'clock.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have any discussion with him that prior to the 14th part, or did you remind him that there had been a message which indicated it was to be delivered to the American Gov-
ernment at a certain time and that that time would come later, did you explain that to Mr. Knox?

Captain Kramer. I believe that message was also in the folder, sir.

Senator Ferguson. The pilot message then was in the folder that you were delivering to the White House and to Knox?

Captain Kramer. I am quite certain it was, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, Admiral Stark didn't have this pilot message on Saturday at all, or he didn't have any of the 13 parts, or this message about the typing; is that true?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You say it is not true?

Captain Kramer. That is true, sir; he did not have it.

Senator Ferguson. And Turner had none of those messages?

[10678] Captain Kramer. So far as I am aware, no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Because they hadn't been delivered, and you were the only one that had the pouches?

Captain Kramer. That was normally the case. However, it is possible that they would get delivery or at least see these things by other means, namely, the Director of Intelligence or Captain McCollum or possibly some officers, senior officers in the War Department.

Senator Ferguson. But as far as delivery was concerned they had not seen them?

Captain Kramer. So far as my delivery was concerned they had not.

Senator Ferguson. And you had no knowledge that they had seen them or had copies or you wouldn't have taken the trouble to deliver to them?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I will take up later when these messages were received but I want to go along on this.

Did you hear Secretary Knox telephone?

Captain Kramer. I did not hear his phone conversation; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That I assume was in another room?

Captain Kramer. I believe it was in an adjacent room.

Senator Ferguson. In an adjacent room. When he came back he told you that he had arranged a conference with the Secretary of war and the Secretary of the Navy at the State Department with the Secretary of State at 10 o'clock on the following morning; is that correct?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did he tell you to bring the 13-part message, the pilot message, and this typist message to the State Department at 10 o'clock?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; he told me to bring all the messages in that folder.

Senator Ferguson. And whatever came in that night?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, then, I assume that you drove—is that all the conversation you had with Secretary Knox?

Captain Kramer. That was approximately the sum total of the sense of our conversations in private. There was a subsequent conversation for about 10 minutes in which Mrs. Knox and the business associate of Mr. Knox engaged.
Senator Ferguson. Did he ask you what your evaluation—by the way, you were in the Intelligence Branch of the Government?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And part of your job was to know all of the Intelligence and therefore have an over-all view of it to evaluate these things?

Captain Kramer. At that time I had a comparatively limited view sir. Approximately 2 years before, when I was in charge of the Japanese desk in the Far East Branch of Naval Intelligence I had a much more comprehensive picture than I did at that time.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Who was the man in that department or the Intelligence Branch that had the comprehensive view and the over-all view?

Captain Kramer. Captain McCollum, Admiral Wilkinson, and presumably their seniors.

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Wilkinson had only been there, had never been in Intelligence before, he only came there October 15; isn’t that true?

Captain Kramer. That is true as far as his arrival is concerned, sir. Just what his intelligence background was, I was and am unfamiliar with.

Senator Ferguson. Are you just assuming that he had the over-all view of this?

Captain Kramer. It is my presumption that a director of Naval Intelligence would have a much more comprehensive view than I had.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, even though he had only been there a month and a half?

[10687] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, you went down to Wilkinson’s home, did you not?

Captain Kramer. Admiral Wilkinson’s home, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you found there what officers?

Captain Kramer. The naval aide to the President, Beardall, Admiral Wilkinson, and, as my memory has been recently refreshed, General Miles, the head of Military Intelligence.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, you really had Intelligence in one office, didn’t you?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; one room.

Senator Ferguson. One room. You had the top man in the Army, you had the top man in the Navy, and you had the top man in the White House, as far as Intelligence was concerned; isn’t that true?

Captain Kramer. I can say that is approximately true.

Senator Ferguson. That Army and Navy Intelligence for one time in one room; isn’t that correct?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you had in a bag, in a brief case, a pilot message for delivery of a 14-part message, and you knew of the message between Tokyo and Berlin telling us that there was going to be war sooner than they would think between the Anglo-Saxons, meaning America and Britain, you had the 13th part of this message, and you have described what you thought of it, and you had this typist part and these other messages; is that correct?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You gentlemen took them out there and read them; is that correct?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you now, what was the conclusion of the Army and the Navy Intelligence after they read these various messages?

Captain Kramer. I cannot state what their conclusions were, what the conclusions they reached in their minds were, sir. There was some conversation—

Senator Ferguson. That is what I want, the conversation, and that will tell me what the attitude of mind was.

Captain Kramer. There were some conversations during that period in Admiral Wilkinson's home that I took part in. The general tenor of the conversations in which I took part was approximately as I have described in the case of Secretary Knox. There were other conversations at the side of the room one or two times, while I left that room to go out to my car where my wife was waiting, that I did not engage in.

Senator Ferguson. Well, let's keep to the part that you were in. How long were you in this room with these gentlemen?

Captain Kramer. I should say approximately one-half hour before we all left that room and went to another room where a number of Admiral Wilkinson's dinner guests were.

Senator Ferguson. I assume that nothing was discussed there in relation to the message?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Now, I assume, and is it correct, that you told them that the Secretary of the Navy was the only man in the Navy outside of the President that you had been able to reach on these messages?

Captain Kramer. Except for the fact that I informed Admiral Wilkinson that I had phoned Captain McCollum about them.

Senator Ferguson. I will come back to get Captain McCollum's conversation with you later.

Now, did you tell them that Secretary Knox had arranged a meeting for the following morning at 10 o'clock with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of State?

Captain Kramer. I did, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And what was their reply and who replied to it?

Captain Kramer. I do not recall the precise wording of their reply. Admiral Wilkinson, I believe, told me to be sure to be there on time, or something to that effect.

Senator Ferguson. Did he tell you that it would not be necessary for you to try later to get Stark?

Captain Kramer. My recollection is that I asked him about that point and I was not so instructed.

Senator Ferguson. What did he tell you?

Captain Kramer. He told me specifically to be sure to have those things ready for delivery to Admiral Stark as soon as he arrived in the office the following morning.

Senator Ferguson. Did he tell you not to bother him that night, it was late, and therefore you could give it to him the next morning?
Captain Kramer. I don’t recall that he put it in so many words, sir, but that was the general effect of what he told me.

Senator Ferguson. Prior to that time did you know that Admiral Stark had not visited his office on Sunday?

Captain Kramer. I am uncertain of what Sundays Admiral Stark visited his office. He was there on some Sundays during 1941. Other Sundays I know he was not because I made delivery to him at his home.

Senator Ferguson. What I am getting at is, you couldn’t reach him on the phone at night, and you had no knowledge that Wilkinson had reached him on the phone?

Captain Kramer. I was under the impression that Admiral Wilkinson phoned Admiral Stark that night, but that was only an impression.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Now, he phoned him, and when he came back he said:

Deliver him the information tomorrow morning, he will come down to the office to get it.

Captain Kramer. Admiral Wilkinson left that room on several occasions during the approximately half-hour while these officers were reading this material. I simply presumed that he may have made phone calls similarly to those made by Secretary Knox.

In any case, he instructed me to be sure that Admiral Stark saw them the first thing in the morning.

Senator Ferguson. Somehow Wilkinson knew that night and told you to deliver this to Admiral Stark the next morning at his office?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And that is the reason that you paid no more attention to delivering it that night, and didn’t try to deliver it that night?

Captain Kramer. That is not quite accurate, sir, in that the impression I had from the instructions and the conversations with Admiral Wilkinson were that no efforts to reach those officers that night were called for.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Then we come to the conclusion that one of the intelligence officers, the top—you told us Wilkinson was the top of the evaluation section because you didn’t know that that had been taken away by Admiral Turner?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. He told you that these messages were not so important that they should receive attention that night? That was the substance of what he told you. It would be perfectly all right the next morning.

Captain Kramer. This is the substance; yes, sir. There was no evaluation or construction of that kind put on. I am referring in what I am saying simply to when I was instructed to get them to Admiral Stark.

Senator Ferguson. You drew that conclusion from what he said after he read them?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. By the way, how did they read them? You had enough copies for all, and they sat there and read them, or did one read it aloud?
Captain Kramer. I believe I had two copies with me. I may have had three when I went to Admiral Wilkinson's home. I am sure I had two, and those three officers read them between them.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did each one sit and read them, or did someone read them aloud so they could all hear?

Captain Kramer. There was no reading aloud.

Senator Ferguson. So it was necessary that each one take them and read them?

Captain Kramer. I believe two of those individuals were reading one copy at certain parts of that half hour.

Senator Ferguson. Well, do I understand now that that wasn't of such importance that a man would sit and really read it, but that he would just look over the other man's shoulder and read part of it?

Captain Kramer. I believe all three of those officers [10688] read every word appearing in that folder.

Senator Ferguson. All of the words in the folder?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did General Miles tell you anything about or comment in any way about these messages?

Captain Kramer. I have no recollection of anything General Miles may have stated. I could very well have informed Admiral Wilkinson at that time—I believe I did inform him that all this traffic, specifically the note which we had been writing up, had been sent to the Army by 9 o'clock.

I believe that Colonel Bratton knew about it. I presume that as he always did in the past, that he was making his usual prompt deliveries of that material.

Senator Ferguson. And therefore you would assume that Colonel Bratton had delivered them the same as you were delivering them?

Captain Kramer. That was my presumption; yes, sir.

I have a distinct impression that Colonel Bratton knew about it that night. In fact, I even may have called him as I did on a number of occasions in the past to make sure that he had gotten something.

Senator Ferguson. Your best recollection is that you didn't want to scoop him on this delivery, that you called [10689] him?

Captain Kramer. There was no question of scooping, sir. Normally delivery was made about the same time by both Colonel Bratton and myself.

Senator Ferguson. And you wanted that to continue so that they would be able to be delivered at the same time?

Captain Kramer. Colonel Bratton had responsibility for delivering to different officials than I did; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. But you wanted to see that he could deliver them at the same time so there would be no change in time, one wouldn't get it before the other?

Captain Kramer. I intended to make no reference or presumption to the time of delivery. My reference is simply to the fact that it is my distinct impression and was at that time that Colonel Bratton knew about it that night, and my presumption merely is that he was making his usual delivery.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you tell him that you were going to deliver that night?

Captain Kramer. I may have said that if I phoned him; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson: Now, I take it, because you were delivering at night, you were quite concerned with the importance of these messages?

Captain Kramer: Of course I was concerned; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: But that concern was not present with these three men at Wilkinson’s home, because they then said:

Well, deliver them tomorrow morning. Be sure and be at the State Department at ten o’clock and see that Admiral Stark gets his in the morning—

is that correct?

Captain Kramer: I have another impression on that point.

Senator Ferguson: Give it to us.

Captain Kramer: Concerning Admiral Wilkinson’s reaction when I first phoned him, he was concerned that the President and Secretary Knox got it promptly.

Senator Ferguson: He was concerned that those two gentlemen got it promptly, but he wasn’t so concerned about Admiral Stark, or Admiral Turner getting it promptly?

Captain Kramer: What his concern was in that respect, I don’t know, except as I can deduce.

Senator Ferguson: Would your deduction be along that same line?

Captain Kramer: It would be that Admiral Wilkinson did not feel sufficiently concerned to instruct me to attempt further delivery to Admiral Stark that night; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: What did Admiral Wilkinson say to you about delivery to Admiral Turner?

Captain Kramer: The same thing applies to Admiral Turner as to Admiral Stark.

Senator Ferguson: He told you that?

Captain Kramer: That is my distinct recollection of the impression I had.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether he tried to call Admiral Turner that night?

Captain Kramer: I do not know that he did, sir. It was my impression at the time that he did make some phone calls.

I presume that a phone call would be made to Admiral Turner.

Senator Ferguson: The next morning did you deliver to Admiral Turner?

Captain Kramer: I don’t believe that Admiral Turner first saw the material when I delivered it. I think Captain McCollum got it to him that morning.

Senator Ferguson: Well, then, you didn’t follow out the instructions of Admiral Wilkinson to deliver to Admiral Turner immediately?

Captain Kramer: I was not instructed regarding Admiral Turner.

Senator Ferguson: I misunderstood you then.

Captain Kramer: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Then, as I understand it, that night Admiral Wilkinson did not tell you to deliver to Admiral Turner the next morning?

Captain Kramer: I have no recollection of any such instructions; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Then the only one you were to deliver to was Admiral Stark?
Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. However, I, of course, would continue efforts as soon as I arrived at the office the following morning to make delivery to Admiral Turner.

Senator Ferguson. Now, the next morning, as I understand it, you arrived at 7:30 in the morning?

Captain Kramer. Thereabouts, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And immediately, I assume, you got in touch with Admiral Stark’s office?

Captain Kramer. I believe I phoned it shortly after that; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Who did you reach?

Captain Kramer. I don’t recall reaching anyone, although I may have. In any case, Admiral Stark was not there on my first phone call, nor his Flag Secretary, with whom I could leave a pouch for Admiral Stark.

[10693] Senator Ferguson. When were you first able to alert or to get an answer from OpNav that you could deliver to Admiral Stark’s office?

Captain Kramer. I—

Senator Ferguson. I assume you kept trying all the time after 7:30?

Captain Kramer. I did not keep trying; no, sir. It was, I believe, around 8 o’clock or shortly after, it may have been shortly before, that those folders were brought to Captain McCollum in the Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence.

Senator Ferguson. The ones that you had?

Captain Kramer. The folders I had; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Captain Kramer. Captain McCollum had not seen the material the night before. He was my next senior responsible for these deliveries; he indicated that he would also keep in touch with Admiral Stark’s office and get it to him as soon as he arrived.

I believe I left an extra folder; I may have left two extra folders with Captain McCollum at that time.

Senator Ferguson. Then you are of the opinion that Captain McCollum delivered to Admiral Stark?

Captain Kramer. I believe that is the case, sir.

[10694] Senator Ferguson. And you therefore do not know the hour it was actually delivered?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. But it would include all of these messages, pilot and the other 13 parts and the typist and the other messages?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then did you leave a copy for Admiral Turner?

Captain Kramer. I do not recollect that particular point, sir. I don’t believe I left a copy for Admiral Turner with Captain McCollum. However, he could make use of one of the copies I did leave.

Senator Ferguson. Now, as I understand it, the so-called 1 o’clock message came in at 5 o’clock in the morning.

That is on page 248. I wish you would refer to that.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, when we get a message from Tokyo to Washington and there is a date, is that the Tokyo date?
Captain McCollum. That is the Tokyo date, presumably, of its drafting, but certainly the date of the cipher used to encode or en-
cipher the message.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

[10695] Now, look at that message at the top of the page.

It says:

To be handled in Government code.

It is No. 907.

Re my #902.

So you could tell immediately it was in relation to the 14-part message?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

[10696] Senator Ferguson (reading):

Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if pos-
sible to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 p.m. on
the 7th, your time.

So that made it so that there was to be a delivery to the United
States, to the Secretary of State, on a Sunday at 1 o’clock.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. There wasn’t any doubt about that.

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now I want you to look at page 249, the top
message, from Tokyo to Washington, December the 7, 1941, “Ex-
tremely urgent.” The other one was listed, 907, “Urgent, very im-
portant,” but this is “Extremely urgent” and I will read it:

After deciphering part 14 of my #902 and also #907, 908 and 909, please
destroy at once the remaining cipher machine—

You will notice it says:

the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes. Dispose in like manner
also secret documents.

Now, I will ask you when that message was received and decoded.

[10697] Captain Kramer. I cannot state, sir, from first-hand
knowledge when it was received and when it was decoded. I do know
that it was not received, or at least seen by me, until about the middle
of Sunday morning.

Senator Ferguson. Now, what hour would that be?

Captain Kramer. I believe that this particular one, 910, which you
read, was seen by me first when I returned from my appointment at
the State Department.

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that it was seen at the same
time as the 1 o’clock message?

Captain Kramer. That is my recollection, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, I have information here that a 910
and 907—907—there are two short messages I have just read—was
filed in Tokyo on 4:18 a.m. on the 7th of December. That is Exhibit
41. It is page 248 of Exhibit 1. And it was intercepted in Japanese
code by the Navy station at Bainbridge Island, Washington, at
4:35 a.m.

Captain Kramer. It says “4:37”.

Senator Ferguson. And it appears in the testimony that it was in your possession at 5 o'clock in the morning. Now, going over to the next page:

Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy— blank.
Decoded by Navy— blank.
Sent by Navy to Army SIS— blank.

[10698] Translated and typed by Army SIS on basis of Navy decode— December 7th.

How do you account for the fact that that very vital message that had an investigation by the Roberts Commission immediately following, that you could not get the time when that message was decoded so that it would be part of the files of the Navy Department?

Captain Kramer. I know nothing about the records kept on those times, sir. It was entirely outside the province of my section. Certain files in that regard were kept by the GY watch officers with which I have only a general acquaintance; certain other times I believe that time stamps were used by the Signal Intelligence section which I have no first-hand knowledge of.

Senator Ferguson. Whose duty was it to get that information and see that the time stamps were used on this kind of material?

Captain Kramer. I am not sure that the Navy ever used a time stamp. I know that the SIS did on certain things. The question of the keeping of a log on these incoming messages was, I presume, on Captain Safford's office orders or instructions, the duty of Section GY and its watch officers.

Senator Ferguson. It was their duty to get that information and put it there?

[10699] Captain Kramer. I am unfamiliar with what instructions were in effect in that regard.

Senator Ferguson. You don't know; all right.

Now, let us get to 910, this message about:

Please destroy at once—After deciphering part 14 of my #902 and also #907, #908 and #909, please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes— and so forth.

Then after that is code destruction. That describes that message, doesn't it, on page 249 of Exhibit 1?

Filed by the Japanese 6:44 p.m. 7 December Tokyo time (N & A).

What does that stand for?

Captain Kramer. What page are you on now?

Senator Ferguson. I am looking at—I don't know whether you have got a copy of it. This has been furnished by the Navy.

Captain Kramer (reading):

Filed by the Japanese 6:44 p.m.

That is under No. 910, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, No. 910.
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What is the "N & A"?

Mr. Kaufman. "N" is Navy files and "A" is Army files.

Senator Ferguson. Now, the next is 4:47 on the 7th. In [10700] other words, it came in at 4:44 and the 1 o'clock message came in at 4:18. [Reading:]

Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S (Bainbridge)— that is the same one that intercepted 907—

at 5:07 A.M. 7 December—

and the other one was 4:37, so it is just 30 minutes apart.

Then it says:

Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (A)—

blank.

Decoded by Navy (A)—

blank.

Sent by Navy to Army SIS—

blank.

Translated and typewritten by Army SIS on basis of Navy decode (A) 7 December.

Now, your answer would be the same in relation to that?

Captain Kramer. Precisely, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, you had a teletype to Bainbridge?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Therefore, these two messages— and I assume that you alerted Bainbridge; that you were looking for valuable information, because you were looking for the fourteenth part; you were looking for the time of delivery; you had alerted them to that effect, had you not?

Captain Kramer. Any alerting that might have been done I am entirely unfamiliar with, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And we have information here that it [10701] was in the office at 5 o'clock. How do you account for the fact, if this office was alerted to war or near war, that those two messages were not immediately decoded and translated in the morning at 5 o'clock?

Captain Kramer. I cannot account for anything in that connection, sir. I would like to state, however, that these messages in general were handled far more promptly than was the normal course throughout early months and years. In the usual routine of handling messages for which we already had broken the cipher or code it was quite normal for a period of anywhere from 4 to 6 hours to several days to elapse before such message was processed, translated, and disseminated. These particular messages were handled, in my opinion, extremely promptly by all hands. As regarding a precise time schedule on which piece of paper moved where, I am unfamiliar with that aspect of it.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what code those two messages were in? Were they in the same code?

Captain Kramer. I believe all these were in the so-called purple machine, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, it has been testified here that you found the key immediately, or at least you found the key on the 6th
for this particular fourteenth part message, and this code had a different key to it as far as [10702] ciphering was concerned, and you had the code. Now, how long would it take you, the department, to decode those messages that contained three lines?

Captain Kramer. It probably would not take very long, but there are a number of reasons why it might not be decoded promptly. The machines we were using were constructed from a variety of manufactured parts. Our own machine in the Navy Department—we had only one in the Navy—broke down at various times and—

Senator Ferguson. Was it broken down this morning?

[10703] Captain Kramer. Not that I am aware of, sir. There were occasions when a particular key which we presumed we had recovered was inaccurate in some respects, maybe three or four letters in the whole key were inaccurate, and therefore throughout the text of a message coming out of that machine there would be what appeared to be garbles appearing every three or four or six or eight letters, or oftener.

All of those aspects of it were purely within the province of GY.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Now, did you translate these two messages?

Captain Kramer. I am certain I did not, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You are certain that you did not?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Can you give us any information as to how long it would take to translate those messages after they were decoded?

Captain Kramer. Messages of this length in Japanese text, provided there were no bad garbles in them, should not take more than a very few minutes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Fifteen minutes apiece?

Captain Kramer. Less than that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Less than that.

[10704] Now, if you were trying to find out in that department in connection with the receipt of these messages, if you wanted to find out just when they were received, how long it took to decode them, what the delay was, if any, and the time for reciphering them and translating them, whom would you call to this witness stand, if you wanted to get that information?

Captain Kramer. On those technicalities, sir?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. They are not technicalities. It is information I am asking about.

Captain Kramer. I think Captain Safford would be fully competent on that point.

Senator Ferguson. And if he was not there that morning whom would you call?

Captain Kramer. I think further that any of the GY watch officers would be fully competent to give you full information in that respect, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I understand also that the watch officers that were on at that time—that record is not in existence. Do you know anything about that?

Captain Kramer. I am entirely unfamiliar with that record, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know who was on that morning, whom we can call? That is what I am trying to get at.
[10705] Captain Kramer. I cannot recall the names of the watch officers that were on that Sunday morning. My impression is there was not only the regular one on, but there was another one.

Senator Ferguson. Who was the regular one?

Captain Kramer. I do not recollect who the particular one who was on that morning. Evidence has been presented here that Brotherhood was there. I have no first-hand recollection on that point.

Senator Ferguson. Is he a decoder or translator?

Captain Kramer. He was one of the watch officers, and was primarily a cryptanalyst or decoder. He, however, had some familiarity with simple Japanese, particularly the Japanese appearing in these dispatches.

Senator Ferguson. Then he may have translated these two?

Captain Kramer. That is extremely doubtful, sir. His knowledge of Japanese would not have extended that far.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. I think you will find in the record he said around 5 in the morning he knew what was in it, but he was not positive. Then it waited in the Navy from [10706] then until morning, then it was sent from the Navy to the Army and then translated by the Army and then sent back to the Navy.

Senator Ferguson. It is possible, if we would get a sergeant in the Army or a yeoman in the Navy, we would get answers to some of these questions.

Captain Kramer. Senator, may I further possibly enlighten you on certain aspects of that? I do not know whether it has been brought out fully in previous testimony, at least I am unfamiliar with it.

I have indicated already, I believe, the translator situation in effect that particular night, and the following morning, in the Navy.

I would like to make further this point, however, that on the evening of December 6 the Army Signal Intelligence Section instituted an overnight watch for the first time of translators. My distinct impression is that there were no Army translators there from the end of working hours shortly after Saturday noon until around 6 that evening, when that watch was to start. I am uncertain of the time, but, in any case, there were translators on duty in the Army Signal Intelligence Section that night, a newly instituted watch. I was aware of that point, sir.

I left instructions as I had frequently done, so in [10707] the past with my watch officers to call me down if anything important came in which required the efforts of a translator.

Apparently—this is purely my presumption—the GY watch officer exercised some discretion on Sunday morning in not calling me, as he was instructed to, but sent certain of these dispatches over to the Army to be translated rather than calling me up, probably in view of the fact that I had been up quite late the night before and he knew I would be in quite early the following morning.

Senator Ferguson. I did not want this to be intended in any way as criticism of your actions.

Captain Kramer. No, sir. I was intending by my last statement to amplify some point that may not have been brought out here.
Senator Ferguson. You were one man that was apparently alert, as you worked until after midnight and you were in the next morning at 7:30.

Captain Kramer. I do not wish to create the impression I was any more alert than any other officers in those departments.

Senator Ferguson. But you tell us this, that the Army was closed from noon until 6 o’clock on this important [10708] day of Saturday, the 6th of December 1941, as far as interceptors, decoders, or translators were concerned.

Captain Kramer. That is not correct, sir. I was referring purely to translators.

Senator Ferguson. Then I got the wrong impression.

Captain Kramer. That is simply my impression.

Senator Ferguson. The translators went home at noon?

Captain Kramer. I am not certain on that point, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You stated that, did you not?

Captain Kramer. That was my impression.

Senator Ferguson. How many translators had they in the Army?

Captain Kramer. I do not know, sir. I think they had at least as many as we did.

Senator Ferguson. How many did you have?

Captain Kramer. I had six, three of which were highly competent, and three others of which were much less competent as regards the work of our office.

One was a top notch expert in Japanese, but was in training as far as the work of our office was concerned.

The other two were what I might term our weakest translators.

Senator Ferguson. We had 12 translators between the Army and Navy. How many decrypters and decoders were there [10709] in your department in the Navy?

Captain Kramer. I have only a general knowledge of that, sir; nothing first hand. There are other officers who can give you precise information in that respect.

Senator Ferguson. Haven’t you any idea how many we had?

Captain Kramer. My impression is that we had probably a dozen quite competent cryptanalysts on duty, and several dozen others of various degrees of competency, and in various states of training.

Senator Ferguson. And how many had the Army, if you know?

Captain Kramer. My general impression is that the Army establishment was approximately our size.

Senator Ferguson. That would be 24 or 25 decrypters, and so forth?

Captain Kramer. Cryptanalysts, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And a dozen translators. I want you to tell me why they were not all on duty that night when you had these 13 parts and these other messages coming in, so that they would get them early in the morning.

Captain Kramer. Senator, the reason I did not specifically order any of my translators—in that connection I might point out too, that these translators were all [10710] civil-service personnel. There was no overtime pay in those days. Any extended hours which they worked was in effect a gift to the Government. Those translators,
particular certain ones, worked a great many hours overtime on some occasions quite late into the night. I wanted to be certain that on Sunday we had competent translators available who had not worked all night the night before. That is the reason that I did not institute an overnight watch that night myself.

However, I, as I had frequently done in the past, left instructions I was to be called. I considered myself as an available translator who could arrive at the Navy Department within not over 10 minutes, probably less than that, of the time I received a phone call.

Senator Ferguson. Now, that is the explanation of not having people work that night on this important occasion?

Captain Kramer. That is the explanation of why I had no Navy translator in my office all night that night, yes, sir.

In that connection, too, I might point out, Senator, there is one other aspect of that.

An institution of a 24-hour watch, with only three highly competent translators, meant that the talents of these highly competent individuals would be wasted for many hours during periods of time when no traffic was coming in.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did you know this, that on Saturday evening, when you had the 13 parts, and the 14th part did not come in in the same intervals as the other parts, that they were greatly concerned about it? Did you know that?

Captain Kramer. I believe all recipients I delivered it to that night were greatly concerned, at least greatly interested in seeing that 14th part; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So the President of the United States, the Secretary of the Navy, the top of the Army and Navy being together, Wilkinson and Miles, were all greatly concerned about this 14-part message coming in and getting it immediately.

Now, we find that it came in intercepted in Japanese code by the Navy station S—and, by the way, station S had a teletype in it, and the teletype works in minutes, doesn't it?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. It takes time, however, to cut the ribbon for transmission.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. It came in from 3:05 to 3:10 a.m. on December 7?

Captain Kramer. Which one?

Senator Ferguson. That important message came in to the Navy. It was intercepted at that time, and again we come to the point that the time that it was teletyped from Japanese code in the Navy was blank. How do you account for that?

Captain Kramer. I cannot account for that. I have no first-hand knowledge whatsoever of the details of filing and traffic logs kept by those GY and Signal Intelligence sections.

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it now, we had no one in the Navy Department as a translator from 12 o'clock at night until 7:30 when you got there?

Captain Kramer. Not actually present; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Not actually present.

Do you know of any decoders or decryptors present from 12 o'clock until you got there Sunday morning?

Captain Kramer. I know there was a 24-hour watch on, as there had been for many months in the Navy; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Then it could have been decrypted but not decoded?

Captain Kramer. Decrypted.

Senator Ferguson. And not translated?

Captain Kramer. And decoded if it were in code, but not translated.

[10713] Senator Ferguson. All right.

Now, as I understand it, this message was in English.

Captain Kramer. Which message do you refer to?

Senator Ferguson. The 14 parts I am talking about, 902.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; that is correct.

Senator Ferguson. But it did have to be decoded, did it not?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And decrypted?

Captain Kramer. I do not believe there was any coding. It was purely a cipher; in other words, decrypted.

Senator Ferguson. When you broke the cipher, you had the English words, and they were in order?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So that took less time, and you had the machine set up, as I understand it, so you had the key to these 13 parts, so you could get immediately the fourteenth part, isn't that right?

Captain Kramer. I believe they had those keys predicted; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Now, there was no one there to translate, and in fact you did not need a translator for the 14th part, isn't [10714] that correct?

Captain Kramer. Not quite correct, sir.

There were introductory instructions. Probably the first three lines would have instructions in Japanese, but the main text of the 14th part of the note was in English, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Was in English.

So the minute it was deciphered, it could be sent off to the White House and to the various departments; isn't that correct?

Captain Kramer. Not quite correct, sir.

[10715] Senator Ferguson. Well, will you tell me what is correct?

Captain Kramer. There were throughout the text of this decrypted version of it frequent three-letter code groups which, of course, were in the hands of the GY section, concerning punctuation, capitalization, and so forth, quotations, parentheses, spacing, indentation, and what not, that had to be transcribed to a finished version. A multiple set of copies of these would have had to be prepared before dissemination could be made.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, and it is about one-third of a page, isn't it?

Captain Kramer. The length of the message, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now what you told me about is done by the translator or the decrypter?

Captain Kramer. This thing could have been done, I think, by a translator. I am unfamiliar with how much Japanese text there was in that thing. Probably very little, except the introductory instructions I referred to.

Senator Ferguson. Now the first thing, the note, "In the forwarding instructions to the radio station handling this part, appeared the plain English phrase 'Very important,'" who put that in?
Captain Kramer. I believe I inserted that note at 10:16 the time it was written up.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. So in English to the broadcasting station were the words “Very important,” isn’t that correct?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So there you had the flag that you had the 14th part, because it said “#902 part 14 of 14” and “VERY IMPORTANT”.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now when did that reach you? When is the first that you saw that in the rough on Sunday morning?

Captain Kramer. I am uncertain of the precise time. Probably very shortly after I arrived at the office.

Senator Ferguson. At 7:30, or within the next half-hour?

Captain Kramer. I should say so, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Was it in the rough then, and how long did it take you to smooth it out?

Captain Kramer. I do not believe it took as much as a half hour, sir.

Senator Ferguson. A half hour. So you would say sometime between 8:00 and 8:30 on Sunday morning you had the 14th part?

Captain Kramer. I believe that is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now will you tell us—you being the deliverer, as it were—why you did not awaken these people if there were any of them asleep and deliver this 14th part, to show them what they had all told you they were waiting for? Now why did not you get it to them at 8:30?

Captain Kramer. As soon as this 14th part was typed up, which I believe was shortly after 8:00 o’clock, delivery was made to Captain McCollum along with the other 13 parts and the other traffic.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, as I understand it then, about 8:15 Captain McCollum had the full 14 parts message.

Captain Kramer. I believe that is the case, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And that is the message that Secretary Hull has described in the Foreign Relations book, and Peace and War?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now can you tell me why it was not delivered immediately? Why you did not deliver it? It was your duty, as I understand it, to deliver these messages.

Captain Kramer. It was my duty subject to modification by my two seniors, namely, Captain McCollum and Admiral Wilkinson, to make deliveries on their instructions. Captain McCollum did not direct me to deliver that at once to the White House. I indicated, I believe, at that time other messages were coming in which I was in the process of preparing. I returned to my office to complete those other messages.

I believe that a first delivery was made to Admiral Stark’s office by me about 9:30 of these supplementary messages, on my way initially to the White House and then to the State Department.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, I understand that you said you did not get to the White House with this 14th part until close to 10:00 o’clock.

Captain Kramer. I went there first before going to the State Department, sir; and I arrived at the State Department on foot by 10 minutes of 10.
Senator Ferguson. And you went from the White House across the street to the State Department?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So you would say you delivered it to the White House at what time?

Captain Kramer. I should say it was between twenty and a quarter of 10.

Senator Ferguson. Twenty and a quarter of 10. But McCollum had it, and you had it by 8:15 that morning, is that right?

Captain Kramer. That is my recollection now; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now do you know why McCollum held this 14th part message from 8:15 until 9:30, because that would be about the time you left the Navy Department to go to the White House?

Captain Kramer. I do not know; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Has it ever been explained to you?

Captain Kramer. The subject has been brought up for the first time now, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. This is the first time you heard about it?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now the only message that you had then, when you went over there at 9:30, 20 minutes to 10, or a quarter to 10, was this 14th part?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; that is not the only message.

Senator Ferguson. All right, tell me what other messages you had.

Captain Kramer. I have not made a study of this traffic to see precisely what other ones there were.

Senator Ferguson. Apparently I am not going to finish with you tonight and therefore you will have over the night to think about it.

Captain Kramer. There are three or four others, however, in this series. Japanese series 902 through 910.

The Chairman. Without objection, we will recess until 10 o'clock in the morning.

(Whereupon, at 5 p.m., February 7, 1946, the committee recessed until 10 a.m. of the following day, Friday, February 8, 1946.)
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[10722] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

Senator Ferguson, I believe you were examining the witness.

Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, we have something for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Counsel, I believe, have something to put in the record.

Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, during Mr. Murphy’s examination of Captain Safford, he requested Captain Safford to produce the correspondence with Captain G. W. Welker.

Captain Safford has delivered to us the following letter, dated January 15, 1946, which was written to him by Captain Welker. With your permission I would like to read it into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir; go ahead.

Mr. Masten (reading):

DEAR CAPTAIN SAFFORD: I was glad to receive your letter of 27 December. I was in Washington during the latter half of December, but never got near the Navy Department. I’m sorry that I never received your letter of last fall. I missed a full month’s mail from home and think it was destroyed in the Okinawa typhoon of late September. Your letter must have [10723] been in that.

I recalled having heard of the “winds message” when I saw it mentioned in the papers, but I never did know anything of it at first hand. Kramer evidently had other sources of information and contact than 20-GX, for no order ever went out to stations controlled by us to listen for that, insofar as I know. No information of that kind ever came through my office to Kramer. Of course I know nothing of the stations that were watching for it, how the orders went out to them, or how the information came back. Nor do I know what the FCC was doing at the time or was supposed to be doing. Neither do I know when it came in or what was done with it in or by 20-G.

I’m sorry that I can’t be of help in this. I believe if you will get in touch with Daniels, you will find his memory the same as mine, i. e., that that was part of a lot of stuff going on in 20-GY that GX was never in on at all.

When I get up to Washington again I will look you up. It will be good to see you again.

Sincerely yours,

GEORGE W. WELKER.

15 JAN. 1946.

79716—46—pt. 9—7
Senator Ferguson. Who is he?
Mr. Masten. Captain Welker, as I understand it, was under Captain Safford in Captain Safford's section.
Senator Ferguson. What was the other name mentioned at the end? Danford?
The Chairman. Daniels.
Mr. Masten. Daniels. I do not know who he is.
Senator Ferguson. You do not know who he is?
Mr. Masten. No.
We have three other memoranda regarding the watches maintained in the War and Navy Departments on December 6 and 7, 1941. The first is a memorandum dated January 14, 1946, from Lt. Harmon Duncombe, addressed to Mr. Richardson, and is as follows:

Reference is made to Mr. Mitchell's memorandum of 31 December 1945 forwarding Senator Ferguson's request for any records showing who was in charge of the offices of the Chief of Staff and of General Gerow on the night of 6 December 1941.

General Gerow indicated to the committee that as of 6 December 1941 War Plans Division had an arrangement whereby a duty officer was designated for the 24-hour period and, though not required to remain at the office throughout the night, was required to stay within calling distance of a telephone (Tr. 4320–1). The Office of the Secretary [10725] General Staff maintained a similar duty officer arrangement for the Chief of Staff. A thorough search has been made for the duty rosters of War Plans Division and of the Office of the Secretary General Staff for the period including 6–7 December 1941. Those rosters have not been located and apparently it was not the practice to preserve such rosters.

We also have a memorandum dated 31 January 1946 from Lt Comdr. John Ford Baecher, which reads as follows:

1. With reference to the request made on 21 January 1946 by Senator Ferguson for further information as to the working hours in Admiral Turner's office, the following information is submitted.
2. There is no record of the actual working hours which prevailed in Admiral Turner's office (War Plans Division) on 6–7 December 1941, outside of the regular Navy Department working hours which were as indicated on the enclosure.
3. From the recollection of officers who were on duty in the War Plans Division at that time, there were officers who were present for duty until late Saturday afternoon, 6 December, and on Sunday morning, 7 December 1941. All available personnel reported for duty after [10726] news of the Pearl Harbor attack was received.

John Ford Baecher,
Lieutenant Commander, USNR.

The enclosure to this memorandum is a circular letter dated November 10, 1941, from the Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, to Chiefs of Bureaus, Offices and Boards, Navy Department; Major General Commandant, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, and prescribed the hours of duty.

With the committee's permission, we will have that spread in the record at this point, but I will not read it.
(The circular letter referred to follows:)
Address reply to The Secretary of the Navy and refer to initials— and No.—
PS&M-1-NGL

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Washington

CIRCULAR LETTER

From: Secretary of the Navy.
To: Chiefs of Bureaus, Offices and Boards, Navy Department, Major General Commandant, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps.
Subject: Hours of Duty.

References:
(a) Act of June 28, 1940 (Public No. 671–76th Congress).
(b) Dept's. cir. ltr. NN/P18–2 (410226), February 26, 1941.

1. Effective November 24, 1941, the regular hours of duty of all employees of the Navy Department and Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, except employees of the Professional and Subprofessional Services and blueprinters, photostat and rotaprint operations, inspectors and supervisory planners and estimators of the Clerical, Administrative and Fiscal Service, shall be as follows:

First Shift
Monday to Friday, inclusive—From 8 a. m. to 4:30 p. m.
Saturday—From 8 a. m. to 12 m.

Second Shift
Monday to Thursday, inclusive—From 4:15 p. m. to 12 p. m.
Friday—From 4:15 p. m. to 11:45 p. m.
Saturday—From 11:45 a. m. to 3:45 p. m.

There shall be an intermission of one-half hour for luncheon on the above-mentioned days, except on Saturdays, for each shift.

2. Where regular routine requires the staggering of work hours, the hours of duty for employees shall be adjusted as necessary.

3. Where second shifts are deemed necessary and directed by Chiefs of Bureaus, Officers and Boards and Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, as the case may be, the schedule of working hours for the second shift provides a fifteen-minute overlap in order that the incoming shift may have contact with the outgoing shift for the purpose of receiving any instructions which may be necessary in preserving the continuity of the work being prosecuted.

4. Reference (b) is amended accordingly.

FRANK KNOX.

MR. MASTEN. Finally we have a memorandum dated 30 January 1946, from Lt. Comdr. John Ford Baecher to Mr. Richardson which reads as follows:

In compliance with the request of Senator Ferguson on 21 January 1946 for the names of the officers in charge of the office of Naval Intelligence on 6–7 December 1941, the following information is submitted:

Officers in Charge of Watch. ONI Duty Officers

Lieutenant (now Commander) Paul L. Hopper, USNR (70836), from 2000 on 6 December to 1400 7 December 1941.
Lieutenant Commander (now Commander) Brockholst Livingston, USNR, (60646) from 1400 on 7 December to 0800 on 8 December 1941.
Special Watch in the Far Eastern Section of ONI

Lieutenant Commander (now Captain) Ethelbert Watts, USN, (58753) from 1200 on 6 December to 0800 on 7 December 1941.

Commander (now Captain) Arthur H. McCollum, USN, (57105) from 0800 on 7 December 1941 to 0800 on 8 December 1941.

Mr. Masten. That is all we have.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ALWIN D. KRAMER, UNITED STATES NAVY
(Resumed)

Senator Ferguson. Captain Kramer, do you have anything you want to add to the record this morning before we start, other than to answer the two questions that you were to look up?

Captain Kramer. I have a number of statements or comments that I should like to make at this time; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Would you proceed then, with those?

Captain Kramer. My first statement is as follows:

Mr. Chairman, I have always been an admirer of Mr. Fulton Lewis, Jr., and in past years have frequently listened to his news broadcasts. I have always considered him an objective, unbiased, and accurate reporter and commentator.

Last night I had occasion to listen to Mr. Lewis’ broadcast, one of the very few opportunities I have had to do so since returning to Washington several weeks ago from sick leave in Miami, because of the fact that I had no personal radio with me here in Washington.

In the course of reporting the Pearl Harbor hearings of yesterday, Mr. Lewis applied the terms “irate,” “antagonistic,” and “reluctant” to testimony I gave.

It may well be that he is accurate in this regard, inasmuch as I left this witness chair at 5 p.m. yesterday afternoon, after testifying for approximately 6 hours, with a slight headache, undoubtedly due to the fact that I am somewhat out of condition physically.

Mr. Chairman, my effort has been to be as objective and cooperative with this committee as I possibly could. In pursuance of this purpose I have been as truthful as I could. I have endeavored to be as precise as possible in distinguishing between what I know to be true, what I don’t positively know but believe to be true, as well as what I don’t know and what I merely surmise or presume.

If I have created any impression of irrationalism, antagonism or reluctance, I feel I am under obligation to apologize to this committee and assure the members that my only intention in tone of voice or manner was emphasis on points I was making. I will endeavor to amend my tone and manner during further inquiry.

That is the end of my first statement.

Senator Ferguson. Was that all you wanted to state?

Captain Kramer. That is the end of my first statement.

Senator Lucas. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Senator Lucas. Captain, I heard that same broadcast last night. I want to say that in my opinion Fulton Lewis definitely misrepresented you in your testimony on yesterday.

Captain Kramer. Thank you, Senator.
My second statement, which will be chiefly extemporaneous, is along the following lines: Yesterday afternoon in reply [10732] to a question from Mr. Murphy I made the following answer, which I will quote from the record which has only been made available to me within the last few minutes. I stated:

It was not until Mr. Keefe, I believe, explained to me that it was his secretary, or someone from his office, that had come out the day before, that I first had any clue as to who my previous day's visitor was.

After the close of the hearing yesterday afternoon my wife indicated to me that she thought I was in error in attributing to Mr. Keefe my information as to the identity of the visitor I had at the Naval Hospital the day prior to our conversations with Mr. Keefe and Mr. Gearhart. She further stated as her recollection that she made that remark to me a few minutes before the arrival of Mr. Keefe and Mr. Gearhart in Dr. Duncan's office where we were waiting and that the tenor of her remarks had been that the previous afternoon's visitor very likely was someone from Mr. Keefe's office which was reported in that effect in the press that morning.

Mr. Keefe, it is my belief it is almost exactly 3 months since that episode. At no occasion after leaving Washington a few days after that episode has that thing been discussed by me or recalled in any manner to my memory. If I have attributed, as I unquestionably have, erroneously [10733] to you statements to that effect, I wish to apologize to you and request the Chair that my testimony of yesterday be amended in that respect.

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman. I don't understand you are making any apology to me, Captain Kramer, are you? Did I so understand, you are addressing your remarks to me?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Well, I was not impressed by that statement as calling for an apology.

Captain Kramer. Thank you, sir.

The Chairman. The testimony will go in as of yesterday and as of today.

Mr. Keefe. I think when I get to examining you myself, if I ever do, I think we can very easily clear that matter up, and quite a few other things.

Captain Kramer. I am sure we could, sir.

My third comment is an item that occurred to me last night during a study of certain files in the Navy Department in compliance with a request of Senator Ferguson. It concerns the question of this blank file number 7001.

I have previously outlined in my testimony four reasons why there should be such a blank file number. Without going into detail I should briefly cover them by mentioning that it might have been:

[10734] (1) A duplication of a previous translation;

(2) A part of a multipart message given a new file number by mistake, and later canceled when given the file number of the first part of the multipart message;

(3) That it might have been a mechanical slip or personnel error in shifting the numbering machine; and,
(4) That it might have been the cancellation of an Army translation. The fifth possibility is this: We had a number of categories of translations which we filed. One category was the JD file, many translations of which appear in Exhibit 1, Exhibit 2, and in various parts of the record.

In addition to this JD file, which meant Japanese diplomatic file, there were five or six other files referring to Japan. They were JM, meaning Japanese military traffic; JN, meaning Japanese naval traffic; JO, meaning Japanese official traffic, other than the three above categories; JP, Japanese personal traffic, meaning private communications of various kinds; JQ, meaning Japanese commercial traffic; and JZ, meaning traffic whose classification could not clearly be determined.

In the clerical process of numbering this traffic in my section, the stack of papers sometimes was as much as a foot high, referring by that remark to the fact that there were 14 pieces of paper to be given the same number of each translation. There is a possibility, it occurs to me, and occurred to me last night, that there were a number of incidents of this kind previously, that a translation was erroneously grouped in the JD file, given a number and only after numbering the whole stack was in discovered that it should have been in another category.

If this happens to be the case in the instance of File No. JD-7001, there is a possibility that such translation might appear in another category file of the Navy Department with the JD file number crossed out and another category file number now appearing on it.

If the committee so desires, a search for this possibility might be instituted, although it may already have been made since I have no knowledge whatsoever of what searches have been made in this connection. If such a new search is unsuccessful, however, there is not the slightest question in my mind that one or another of the four previous reasons I have given account for this canceled file number.

I have two additional brief comments, one concerning a question by Senator Ferguson on the interpretation or construction to be placed on a dispatch from Tokyo to London concerning evacuation of personnel. It occurred to me last night while I was making the studies referred to that in the course of my duty in the Pacific during the war and in interrogation of prisoners and study of captured documents, both originals and translations thereof, we were fortunate from the intelligence point of view on Saipan to capture a Japanese chief petty officer who had been a secretary of what corresponds to our Joint Chiefs of Staff in Japan in the months preceding Pearl Harbor.

This chief yeoman gave us much valuable information concerning the events leading up to Pearl Harbor. The impression I gained from reading the interrogations of this prisoner were that the Japanese military had an extremely tight rein on all events controlled by the Japanese Government, including control of anything the diplomats did or might send out from Tokyo which might, by any possibility, compromise or even disclose to the officials in the Foreign Office or other high Japanese officials not directly concerned anything concerning their contemplated surprise of the United States Fleet in their attack on Pearl Harbor.
I mention this simply in connection, as I have stated, with the con-
struction or interpretation to be placed on that directive to London.

My last comment concerns Mr. Gearhart's questions regarding four
dispatches sent out by Naval Operations to the Western Pacific which
refreshed my memory concerning the [10737] date of the
winds message. I would like to comment in that connection that there
is at least the implication in Mr. Gearhart's question that something
in this connection had been pointed out to me. I rather categorically,
I believe, denied that implication.

I would like to state further that these dispatches were made available to me last fall—not only these, but records of prior inquiries into
the Pearl Harbor affair and many other documents—but I never undertook a study of them until about 2 weeks ago. Attention was again directed to these four dispatches by Captain Safford's state-
ment of about a week ago.

Last Saturday while Captain Safford was still on the stand I did not come to this hearing but took time out to go to the Navy Building
where these Japanese diplomatic files were held in order to make a
study of them for the first time since 1941. It was while studying
the files that I first recalled the episode in Admiral Noyes office con-
cerning the drafting of these dispatches. That is in essence pri-
marily the basis for the refreshing of my memory.

The last thing that I should like to bring up now is two pieces of
paper I have before me summarizing the study I undertook last night,
which was fairly exhaustive, in connection with the question that
Senator Ferguson asked me [10738] at the close of the hear-
ing yesterday afternoon. I believe I can answer his question now with
some exactitude.

I would like to state, however, that giving this information verbally
will undoubtedly appear rather complicated. I have, a few minutes
ago, suggested to counsel that it might be better, more readily assimili-
ated, if a smooth copy of this study were prepared and possibly made
an exhibit in this hearing.¹

Senator Ferguson. My only reason for wanting it now is that I
would like to ask you some questions on this.

Captain Kramer. I can read this thing; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you can later file it as a clear copy.

The Vice Chairman. Without objection, Captain, you may pro-
ceed with it as you have it and later prepare a smooth copy and sub-
m it to counsel for inclusion as an exhibit.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Yesterday afternoon when being questioned concerning this so-
called pilot message I made the statement that I believed that the pilot
message had arrived sometime late Saturday afternoon, 6 December
1941, or Saturday evening, and that I believed it was distributed Sat-
ury evening with the Japanese note and other papers. I find as a result of [10739] my study last night that the pilot message
was not disseminated, at least in the Navy, until Sunday morning sub-
sequent to 10 o'clock, at the time when the so-called hidden word
message and a number of other short messages, including the 1 o'clock
message, were disseminated.

¹ The document appears in Hearings, Part 11, p. 5481.
The messages disseminated Saturday evening were JD File No. 7138, 39, 40, 41, 42, and 43, the last one being the Japanese note.

Senator Ferguson. May I just ask the reporter—

Captain Kramer. These messages, with the exception of two, appear in exhibit 1, on the following pages.

Senator Ferguson. May I just have the reporter read me the last answer? I missed one of those numbers.

(The answer was read by the reporter.)

Senator Ferguson. The Japanese note?

Captain Kramer. The 14-part note.

The Vice Chairman. Pardon me there. That was the first 13 parts.

Captain Kramer. The first 13 parts.

The Vice Chairman. Of the 14-part note.

Captain Kramer. Of the 14-part note, that is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, that was what was distributed on Saturday evening?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you give us the pages of Exhibit 1 that they are at?

Captain Kramer. The first one, 7138, does not appear in Exhibit 1. I do not know whether it appears elsewhere in this record or not. The subject is a dispatch from Berlin to Tokyo concerning an interview with Herr Ribbentrop. 7139 appears on page 235 of exhibit 1.

Senator Ferguson. Page 235; just a moment. That is the long dispatch from Washington to Tokyo?

Captain Kramer. Concerning an interview on 5 December.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Captain Kramer. 7140 appears on page 234 of Exhibit 1.

Senator Ferguson. Which one of those messages? "In case of evacuation by the members of our Embassy"?

Captain Kramer. It is Tokyo to Washington, serial No. 896.

Senator Ferguson. Oh, yes, the one at the bottom of the page.

Captain Kramer. Concerning Terasaki going out of this country.

Senator Ferguson. And Ando?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. They were to go out the next couple of days?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. All right.

Captain Kramer. 7141 does not appear in Exhibit 1 but its subject is a dispatch from Washington to Tokyo dated 5 December 1941 to the effect that Ambassador Nomura wanted to keep Terasaki for the moment because of work in hand. 7142 appears on page 237 of Exhibit 1.

Senator Ferguson. What one of those messages?

Captain Kramer. It is Tokyo to Washington, serial 897, sir.

Senator Ferguson. It is the one at the bottom of the page.

[Reading:]

What I meant in paragraph 2 of my #867 was that of the two sets of "B" code machines with which your office is equipped, you are to burn one set and for the time being to continue the use of the other.
Captain Kramer. Exactly, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Captain Kramer. 7143 is the Japanese first thirteen parts of the Japanese note.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, that was the Saturday night deliveries?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Well, does that complete the statement you desired to make before examination is resumed, Captain?

Captain Kramer. The Senator, I understood, desired to determine what was delivered when on Sunday morning. I am coming to that now.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. The first delivery, take Sunday morning first.

Captain Kramer. I find as a result of my study last night that I have been under a slightly erroneous impression during the past four years as to precisely what was delivered when on Sunday morning. I will further elucidate that now.

Prior to the deliveries made by me commencing about 10:30 Sunday morning the only additional material disseminated earlier that Sunday morning, that is, additional to the material of the previous evening, was the fourteenth part Japanese note.

On Sunday morning at 10:30 the following file numbers were delivered: 7144—

Senator Ferguson. 7144; and where do we find that in Exhibit 1?

Captain Kramer. I will give all those in a moment, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right, thank you.

Captain Kramer. Through 7151, inclusive.

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us where 7144 is in exhibit 1?

Captain Kramer. It is on page 245 of Exhibit 1, the one concerning a typist in the Japanese embassy.

Senator Ferguson. That is the typist, all right.

[10744] Captain Kramer. 7145 is on page 248 of Exhibit 1, Tokyo to Washington, serial 907.

Senator Ferguson. That is the top of the page; that is the one o'clock message?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Captain Kramer. 7146 is on page 248 also.

Senator Ferguson. Is that the next message?

Captain Kramer. That is Tokyo serial 908.

Senator Ferguson. That is “Thank you to the two Ambassadors”? Captain Kramer. To the two Ambassadors, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Captain Kramer. 7147 is on page 249 of Exhibit 1.

Senator Ferguson. Which one is that?

Captain Kramer. That is the one, namely, Tokyo serial 910, concerning the final destruction of cryptographic and other classified material.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Captain Kramer. 7148 is the so-called hidden word message appearing on page 251.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Captain Kramer. 7149 is the so-called pilot message appearing on page 238 of Exhibit 1.


Captain Kramer. 7150 does not appear in Exhibit 1 or elsewhere in this testimony so far as I am aware.

Senator Ferguson. Have you seen it?

Captain Kramer. The subject of it is a very short dispatch Tokyo to Washington, serial 905, concerning U. P. and A. P. reports regarding a message from Mr. Roosevelt to the Japanese Emperor.

Senator Ferguson. What does it say about it?

Captain Kramer. It makes inquiries as to its subject and when it was sent.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. How about 7151?

Captain Kramer. That one is on page 248, Tokyo serial 909, subject, "Thanks to the commercial attaché and members of the embassy staff."

Senator Ferguson. I thought you gave us that one before under 46?

Captain Kramer. That was "thanks to the two Ambassadors."

Senator Ferguson. Oh, I see, yes.

Captain Kramer. Those were the dispatches delivered at 10:30 on Sunday morning, sir. I would like to point out, sir, additional material I have on this paper and refer also to previous testimony I have given concerning the chronological arrangement of these dispatches.

[10746] File No. 7138 through 7143, inclusive, are chronologically dated 3 December, 5 December, 5 December, 5 December, 6 December, 6 December.

The group 7144 through 7151 are chronologically dated 6 December, 7 December, 7 December, 7 December, 7 December, and then 6 December, 6 December, 7 December.

Those last three which commenced with the pilot message and end with the "thanks to the commercial attaché" I now recall specifically for the first time. The first five of these, up to the hidden word message, but not including the hidden word message—I must amend that.

The first four of these were in folders which I was about to leave the office to distribute when the hidden word message came in. At about the same time, to my present recollection, the three messages 7149 through 7151 were delivered to my office by Army. Since, in order to insert the hidden word message which I was dictating to my chief yeoman into the folders I was about to disseminate, the folders had to be broken apart, I directed at that time that the three newly arriving messages from Army also be inserted in those folders. That is the reason for the slight discrepancy in the chronological arrangement of all these dispatches in this folder, which was our invariable practice.

I hope that answers your question, sir.

[10747] Senator Ferguson. It answers it but I don't know as it makes it any clearer.

Captain Kramer. I realize that that pilot message apparently complicates previous testimony given here but, nevertheless, that is my present conviction on the time that that pilot message was delivered based on my refreshing of memory of last night.

Senator Ferguson. I don't want the answer that I made that I said it doesn't make it any clearer to indicate that I am commenting on
the evidence at all, but now I do want to get something about this pilot message.

If you did not know what this pilot message was until 10:30 in the morning on Sunday morning how did you know there was going to be a fourteenth part?

Captain Kramer. Because, sir, when the first part of this 14-part message was broken down after decryption of the first few lines there appears, as there appeared in every Japanese dispatch, an indication of how many parts were in that dispatch and which part that was. My recollection is that the first part broken down was the eighth part of a 14-part message. The time when that occurred, to my best recollection, was about 3 p.m. Saturday afternoon. That made it immediately apparent that 14 parts were due to come in.

[10748] Senator Ferguson. How did you know without the pilot message that you were going to get an answer to the 26th note and that is what you were all standing by for and working on?

Captain Kramer. I did not, at least, know positively but certainly at the time and now presumed from the context of the parts we were breaking down that that must be the reply to Mr. Hull’s note of 26 November.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know whether message 900 came in on the same teletype as 901, the pilot message?

Captain Kramer. I have no record of Tokyo serial 900 in the study I made last night, sir. I might add that—

Senator Ferguson. Were you in the Navy Department—pardon me, I don’t want to cut you off.

Captain Kramer. And I believe Tokyo serials 903 and 906 do not appear as a part of this record. My recollection of a phone call made last night is that we have 906 but never intercepted or received 903.

Senator Ferguson. That was not my question. Did you work in the Navy Department last night?

Captain Kramer. I did, sir.

Senator Ferguson. With whom did you work?

Captain Kramer. Commander Boone, the custodian of the file I referred to.

Senator Ferguson. And it was then that you made up the [10749] information that you gave us that morning?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now I will ask you what time 901 came in and what message was on the same teletype?

Captain Kramer. I have no knowledge concerning that, sir; since I had no direct contact at any time with the incoming teletype traffic except on the rare occasions when I examined it, chiefly during the period of ten days preceding Pearl Harbor, examining plain language traffic.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, what is in that file specifically to show that you did not get 901, which is the pilot message, until after 10 or 10:30 on Sunday morning? What was there in the file?

Captain Kramer. I am speaking, Senator, in my comments from this study only of the time it was received in the Navy Department.

Senator Ferguson. All right. What is in the file of the Navy Department to show what time 901, the pilot message, was received in the Navy?
Captain Kramer. We used no time stamp in my section of the Navy Department, sir, at any time. However, every time a delivery was made by me, and they were frequent, between Saturday noon and Sunday noon, all messages on hand completely translated, either by Navy or Army, were disseminated [10750] at once.

Senator Ferguson. That did not answer my question at all.

Captain Kramer. I am sorry, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I asked you what there was in the Navy Department to show the time of the delivery, or the receipt of 901, the pilot message, in the Navy Department?

Captain Kramer. I thought I was answering your question directly in my previous comments. I should like to further elucidate by extending my answer.

Senator Ferguson. Don't elucidate. Just answer that question and then we will let you elucidate.

Captain Kramer. If that pilot message had been in my section when I left the office at 9:30 I would very definitely have made delivery at that time.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, what—

Captain Kramer. It was not in my office at that time, namely, 9:30, I am thoroughly convinced now, but arrived not during the intervening period between the time I left my office and returned to my office, but at about the time I was leaving my office for the second time. If it had been in my office when the folders were first made up for my departure on my second trip it would have been included chronologically with the group file Nos. 7144 through 7148 in num— [10751] bering that group of messages.

Senator Ferguson. What is in your office now to show when the pilot message was received? Now, watch the question. I want to know what I can look at in your office in the Navy Department to show what time 901, the pilot message, was received?

Captain Kramer. You can look at nothing which will positively indicate when the pilot message was received that I am aware of, sir; except the file which I studied last night, which I am attempting to interpret to you, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, I want that file brought here that we may see how you made that study. Have you got the file here?

Captain Kramer. I do not have it, sir. I understood that Commander Boone would be here this morning with it. I am not familiar with whether he is here or not.

Senator Ferguson. Will counsel get in touch with Commander Boone so that we can get this file? 1

Now, what was there in that file? Tell me from your memory what was in that file to show that the pilot message was not translated prior to your delivery at 9 o'clock Saturday evening?

Captain Kramer. There is nothing whatsoever in the file, Senator, to show definitely one way or another that point. [10752] I am only trying to indicate that that point is my present recollection and conviction as the result of studying that group of messages.

Senator Ferguson. But yesterday you had no doubt in your mind that the pilot message was with the 13 parts because you described it and you discussed it with these various men.

1 See Hearings, Part 8, p. 3800.
Captain Kramer. I am sorry, sir; if I created that impression. I believe the first time, or the first few minutes that question was propounded to me I was rather doubtful and so expressed myself, as to the time the pilot message was received in the Navy Department.

Senator Ferguson. Well, will you be able to get in this Navy file teletype serial Nos. 347 and 348, the initial "S" before it, Tokyo serial 900 and 901, and see whether or not these two messages, one of them being the pilot message, came in on the same teletype and were logged by Davis on the third and fourth messages on his watch?

Captain Kramer. I will undertake that, sir. I have previously indicated, I believe, that I had no direct connection with such teletype receipts, however, so I have no first-hand knowledge concerning the technicalities of that matter.

Senator Ferguson. All right. And that that message was [10755] received in the Navy Department about 8 o'clock local time on the 6th day of December 1941 and whether it was not sent to the Army and whether it was not decoded by them and delivered on Saturday afternoon.

"General Miles"—this is on page 3590.

The Vice Chairman. Of what, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. Of our record. General Miles says, "Senator"—I had better go back and read something. I am examining; the Senator from Michigan is examining Miles. [Reading:]

Senator Ferguson. I am trying to get an answer to this question: If your department was alerted as you expected Hawaii to be alerted by the same message, how do you account personally for the pilot message not being delivered to General Marshall, the Chief of Staff, who was the only man under his testimony that could act, or he or the President or the Secretary of War, as I understand his testimony? Now, how do you account for that pilot message that came in separately, not part of the fourteen parts, that that was not delivered on the day it was translated?

Miles says:

Senator, my answer is, first, that I had every reason to believe that General Marshall did receive the [10764] locked pouch which contained this message. I heard this testimony this morning. I think he is mistaken in saying that he did not receive that message on the afternoon of the 6th.

Captain Kramer. I cannot presume to state anything regarding the Army dissemination of that pilot message, Senator. I was commenting only concerning my dissemination of that pilot message in the Navy Department and to the White House.

Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, you haven't any idea, the way you testify this morning, that this pilot message which is numbered prior and received at some time early on the morning of the 6th you had no knowledge of that before you had the thirteen parts and even the fourteenth part?

Captain Kramer. That is my present conviction. That was my conviction at the time I first commented on that point, sir, that at the time we were getting the first parts of that Japanese note we still had no knowledge of a Japanese note coming to us.

Senator Ferguson. Now, let us take 901 from the information that we get.

Filed by the Japanese 8:56 P. M. on the 6th, Tokyo time: Washington time 6:56 A. M., December the 6th.
[10755] That is Saturday morning, 6:56.

Intercepted in Japanese code by Navy Station S (Bainbridge Island, Washington) at 7:15 to 7:20 A. M., December the 6th.

Teletyped in Japanese code to Navy (N & A)—

blank time.

Teletype sheet containing Japanese code received by Army SIS from Navy (A) 12:05 P. M. December the 6th.

Decoded, translated and typed at Army SIS (A) on the 6th of December.

Now, that is before midnight?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, how do you account for this important pilot message not getting to the Navy before 10:30 on Sunday morning and after the fourteenth part was translated by you?

Captain Kramer. Senator, in my reading a few minutes ago from this study of mine I indicated that as a result of a refreshed memory from the study last night that the only additional material disseminated in my first trips on Sunday morning was the fourteenth part of the note from Japan which I finished translating about 8 o'clock Sunday morning.

It is apparent to me now that no deliveries of translations was made to my section by Army until my return from the [10756] State Department after my 10 o'clock appointment there. Six—rather, seven of the translations appearing under these file numbers 7144 through 7151 are Army translations. The only translation in that block is one Navy translation, the so-called hidden word message. If any Army translations had been delivered to my section prior to my return from Mr. Hull's office or, rather, perhaps prior to my departure for Mr. Hull's office I would most definitely have made delivery at that time.

Senator Ferguson. Now I will come back to this question: What is there in the file that the committee can look at. This has been furnished to us by the services, this information that I told you about, 12:05 on December the 6th, "Decoded, translated and typed at Army SIS on December the 6th." Now, what is there in the Navy file that this committee can look at to show that this message did not get to you until 10:30, which was after the time you had already delivered the fourteenth part message? I want to know what is there in the file that we can look at?

Captain Kramer. Nothing, sir, except what I have already outlined.

Senator Ferguson. What is it? Now, tell us, what can we look at?

Captain Kramer. The file itself, Senator.

[10757] Senator Ferguson. What is in there that will show us this that you are telling us, that it did not get to you on the sixth?

Captain Kramer. Nothing more than the translations themselves bearing the various file numbers.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Is the man here with that file now?

Commander Baecher. You mean 901, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. 901. It shows what he examined last night in the Navy. There is the difficulty we find here, that the Navy—they can examine things down in the Navy and this committee cannot receive them here so that we know what these men are talking about.

Commander Baecher. Senator, the man has brought the file up here. He is in the phone booth now. We can find out whether it is that one or not.
Senator Ferguson. See if it is that particular one. I want to know what the witness saw in the Navy Department last night. You saw a file?

Captain Kramer. A file; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And I want that file brought into the committee room, and then we can find out what you saw instead of you just telling us.

Mr. Richardson. Well, now, Mr. Chairman, there was no reference to this file up until 4 or 5 minutes ago; we have never seen it. We are not clairvoyants, and I don’t think the Navy Department is either. It seems to me that if the Senator wants it, and I think he is entitled to it, and I would like to see it myself, that we should possess ourselves in patience until the Navy can get it here. I rather gathered from the Senator’s remarks that he was criticizing the Navy in some respect.

Senator Ferguson. No.

Mr. Richardson. Of course, as far as we are concerned, we don’t care.

Senator Ferguson. But if a man goes in and examines a file in the evening and comes up here and testifies about it in the morning—and, as I understand, there is some conflict between what he said yesterday and now—it would be well for the committee to see what is in the file to ascertain what he saw last night to change his opinion this morning.

Mr. Richardson. Well, I agree entirely, and 7001—

Senator Ferguson. 7001 is what is necessary.

Mr. Richardson. 7001 is here for examination and has been here for a couple of days now.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Mr. Richardson. Now, the other one is number what?

Senator Ferguson. I don’t know the number. He did not state a number.

Captain Kramer. There is simply one file involved, Mr. Counsellor.

Mr. Richardson. Well, we will have that here very, very shortly for you, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. I asked earlier this morning for message 900. I will pass that part for the time being.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; I will yield.

Mr. Murphy. At one time before Admiral Hewitt there were as many as three witnesses present. Why wouldn’t it be a good idea to have the Army, or whoever prepared exhibit 41, present so that we would have the Army witness on those times and the Navy witness and then get the whole picture cleared up?

The Vice Chairman. Well, it looks like we do well enough if we proceed with one witness at a time. Go ahead, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. I won’t take any more time than I have to on this, but I would like to get it cleared up. It is a matter that ought to be at least clear on the record.

Now, you appeared before the Navy court, did you?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; I did.

Senator Ferguson. And they say in question No. 85:

I show you exhibit 38 of exhibit 63 and ask you if you had this about the 6th of December 1941 and, if so, at what time? This is the dispatch informing the Japanese legation that a long dispatch will be transmitted shortly and setting
forth that a definite time would be given later as to the delivery of the long dispatch.
A. I believe that that was received and delivered the evening of the 6th, along with the first thirteen parts.
Q. Was that one of the dispatches that was referred to in your previous testimony as being some of the other material?
A. Yes, sir, that is correct.

Now, that was back when you testified before the Navy Court of Inquiry.

Captain Kramer. In that respect, Senator, it is obvious to me now that my memory was faulty after 2 years intervening since I had had contact with that material.

Senator Ferguson. Now, Captain, there was a Commission appointed by the President within a few days after Pearl Harbor, isn't that true?

Captain Kramer. If you refer to the Roberts Commission; [10761] yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. That Presidential Commission was to make an inquiry, isn't that correct?

Captain Kramer. I believe so; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And at that time I assume that you thought you would be called as a witness.

Captain Kramer. I was uncertain about that point. The fact is, I never was called.

Senator Ferguson. I realize you were not called but I am just trying to get at that time that at least you expected you would be called because you were one of the men who delivered messages.

Captain Kramer. I was at no time under the impression that I was likely to be called, although there was the possibility I might be called.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you understand then that the Roberts Commission was not to investigate Washington, that you would not be called because they were not going to investigate Washington?

Captain Kramer. My only knowledge, Senator, of what took place before the Roberts hearing was and still is the result of a few conversations I had with Captain McCollum who was a witness and the report subsequently published concerning that hearing.

[20762] Senator Ferguson. What I am trying to get at, Captain, is when you knew that this Commission was meeting and that you were one of the interested parties, why you did not review in your own mind this situation and see whether or not anything had happened in your office or in your deliveries that went wrong. Did you do that?

Captain Kramer. Senator, at no time subsequent to the attack on Pearl Harbor did I attempt to refresh my memory in that respect until the arrival of Captain Safford's first letter to me.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, here is the proposition: You had delivered the 14 parts?

Senator Ferguson. Thirteen and the fourteenth the next morning?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You knew that a message had been sent by General Marshall?

Captain Kramer. I was not aware of that until after the Roberts hearings were finished, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You then did not go over this in your own mind in any way to know what you had delivered? You were not concerned with it?

Captain Kramer. I recollect no attempt to refresh my memory in that respect. My feeling now is that my memory would have been quite clear in the possibility I was called before this hearing.

Senator Ferguson. You mean before the Roberts hearing?

Captain Kramer. The Roberts hearing; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I am going to just briefly, if I can, review whom you delivered the 13-part message to and these others that you say you delivered at the same time on Saturday evening.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you give McCollum a copy?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; I did not. I phoned him, however, about 9 o'clock concerning the note. I would like to comment further—Mr. Richardson. Just suppose you answer his questions, sir, and then later on do the commenting.

Captain Kramer. Omit that comment.

Senator Ferguson. You did not give a copy to McCollum. You telephoned to him about it. Now, you next say that the next place of your delivery or telephone to anyone that you reached was the White House, the map room.

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You delivered a copy there and left a copy there? Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. There isn't any doubt now in your mind about that?

Captain Kramer. None whatsoever and there never has been, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right. You went out to Secretary Knox, the next delivery?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Isn't that correct?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you made a delivery at Secretary Knox of all this material and he read it all?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you leave any copies of the 13 parts with Secretary Knox?

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then you went to Wilkinson's home and you found there three men that were entitled to see this, Admiral Beardall, Admiral Wilkinson, and General Miles?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. They read all of this material, each of them?

Captain Kramer. They did, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And the comments were as you have said, isn't that correct?

Captain Kramer. In that tenor; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, did you leave any copy with them?

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, you went home?

Captain Kramer. I went to the Navy Department.
Senator Ferguson. You went to the Navy Department and you had in your possession then every one of the copies of the 13 parts, except the one you left at the White House?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir, with the exception that by 9 o'clock 7 copies of all this material, so far as Navy translations are concerned, had been or were delivered to the Army Signal Intelligence section.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. In other words, the Navy deliveries had all been made that you could make, and you had delivered them to the Army at 9 o'clock that night, all these messages?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And to whom were they delivered in the Army?

Captain Kramer. I have no first-hand knowledge of that, [10766] sir. My presumption is that they were delivered to the same section of the Signal Intelligence that all this material was always delivered to.

Senator Ferguson. And that would be to Colonel Bratton's section?

Captain Kramer. No, sir. Colonel Bratton was in the Far East section, the head of the Far East section of Military Intelligence. All this material was delivered initially to the Army Signal Intelligence section, which then delivered to Colonel Bratton.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, the Army Intelligence. Now, as I understand it, you brought this file back, as far as the Navy copies were concerned, and put them in your safe?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you telephone Ingersoll and—you know who I mean by Admiral Ingersoll?

Captain Kramer. I do, sir; and I did not telephone Admiral Ingersoll and I can recollect now no occasion during 1940 or 1941 that I did phone Admiral Ingersoll or attempt to make deliveries directly or initially to him except on the few occasions when he was in his office during working hours and Admiral Stark was absent.

Senator Ferguson. And you did not deliver to Ingersoll that night any of these copies?

[10767] Captain Kramer. No, sir; I did not.

Senator Ferguson. Not the next morning?

Captain Kramer. Not directly to Admiral Ingersoll; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. He was not at Wilkinson's?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; not to my present recollection.

Senator Ferguson. And he was not at the Secretary of the Navy's?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. He was not at the map room in the White House?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I am now going to ask you if you can explain his testimony on page 59 of the Navy inquiry. This is extracted testimony of Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, U. S. Navy, pages 824 to 842, inclusive, this is on page 829.

Now, Royal E. Ingersoll was the Chief—what do you call him—to Admiral Stark?

Captain Kramer. That post was at that time, as I recollect it, termed the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.
Senator Ferguson. All right. And you told me yesterday that you had not delivered him a copy. You knew who I was talking about yesterday?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

[10768] Senator Ferguson. And no one had a copy except the White House, as far as the Navy was concerned?

Captain Kramer. That night; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And do you know of any reason why the Army would go out of its way to deliver to Ingersoll a copy of this message?

Captain Kramer. I cannot comment directly on that, Senator. It is possible, however, that Admiral Ingersoll may have seen a copy of that message pursuant to any deliveries Colonel Bratton may have made that night, in the same manner that General Miles saw the file I was delivering that night.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, he may have been at a place where Bratton had delivered a copy that night?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You did not have any assistants that night delivering these messages on the thirteen parts, did you?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; except that of my wife, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And she remained in the car?

Captain Kramer. Most of the time except the latter part of my stay at Admiral Wilkinson's home.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Well, you know that she did not deliver any copy to Admiral Ingersoll?

Captain Kramer. My wife at no time was ever cognizant [10769] of the precise nature of these messages.

Senator Ferguson. All right. [Reading:]

56. Q. You have testified that you did see a rather long dispatch. Did you say it was on the night of December 6?
   A. It was some time during the night of December 6 or 7. I don't know whether it was before or after midnight.

57. Q. You do not mean the night of December 7?
   A. It was some time during the very late evening of December 6 or the early morning of December 7. Whether or not it was before or after midnight, I don't recall.

58. Q. You have also testified that, as you remember, the latter portion of this rather long message was missing?
   A. As I remember, the officer who brought the dispatch to the house stated that there was a part of the message missing. I think he told me it was the latter part.

59. Q. Did the tone of this rather long message which you say you received on the night of 6th-7th of December 1941 indicate a friendly or conciliatory spirit on the part of the Japanese?
   [10770] A. No; because it merely confirmed the whole course of negotiations from the very beginning. This message was nothing but a smoke screen, eye wash, and window dressing for the record.

60. Q. Did you have any opinion at the time you saw this dispatch that diplomatic negotiations were then broken off officially?
   A. So far as the Navy Department was concerned, negotiations with the Japanese had stopped about the 27th of November.

Now, will you account for Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll's testimony in that record, sworn to?

Captain Kramer. I cannot account for that, sir. I can only presume that it must be attributed to faulty memory.

Senator Ferguson. Will you read that answer, please?

(The answer was read by the reporter.)
Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, as I understand your testimony, you telephoned to the department where Admiral Turner was, who was the superior officer to Admiral Ingersoll? You telephoned to that office, the War Plans, the Navy Plans, or what is the name of it?

Captain Kramer. Admiral Turner was not Ingersoll's superior but his junior, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Oh, that is right; yes, he was his [10777] junior. But you telephoned Admiral Turner and did not get him?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right. And you did not get his home. He did not answer the phone?

Captain Kramer. That is my present recollection; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, how do you account for Turner saying that he got a copy if you did not give it to him as you say here?

Captain Kramer. The remarks I made concerning Admiral Ingersoll would apply in the case of Admiral Turner.

[10772] Senator Ferguson. Now I want to read to you——

Mr. Keeffe. May I get that answer?

Senator Ferguson. Will you read it, please?

(The answer was read by the reporter.)

Mr. Keeffe. Do I understand that to mean that the remarks you refer to that Kramer made, that he can only explain it by faulty memory?

Captain Kramer. Or the other possibility that he may have seen some copy delivered by the Army.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand that you want to say now that it is faulty memory, that you did not deliver to Ingersoll? Is that faulty memory?

Captain Kramer. I made no delivery to Admiral Ingersoll.

Senator Ferguson. And you are positive about that?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. There is no faulty memory about that?

Captain Kramer. None whatsoever, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you made none to Turner, and you have no faulty memory about that?

Captain Kramer. I am quite clear on that point, too, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Turner says, on page 5219 of the testimony, while he is being examined by Mr. Mitchell [reading]:

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir.

[10773] Now this is on page 5219:

Mr. Mitchell. Now, turning now to the messages that were intercepted between Japan and her Ambassadors here in Washington on the day of the 6th and 7th of December 1941, what are known as the pilot message, the 14-part message and the 1:00 p. m. message, when did you first have called to your attention or see any part or all of those messages? You know what I am talking about?

Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. I think I testified that my recollection is that sometime just preceding the 7th, some night, and I now believe it to have been the night of December 6th, about 11:30 p. m. an officer came to my house and I was in bed and went down and read a long dispatch in several parts. I believe that that was the dispatch in question. I asked the officer to whom he had shown these, and he said, "Admiral Wilkinson, Admiral Ingersoll, and Secretary Knox," and I did nothing more about it.

Captain Kramer. Senator, in that connection I should like to remark that I believe, in my present recollection, that approximately a
week, it may have been more than that, preceding Pearl Harbor. I did make a delivery to Admiral Turner's home late one evening. It is possible that Admiral Turner is confusing that incident with this subject.

Senator Ferguson. I want to read on:

[10774] Mr. Mitchell. Well, when you say that was the dispatch in question, my question was probably too broad.
Admiral Turner. The first 13 parts.
Mr. Mitchell. Yes.
Admiral Turner. The first 13 parts, I believe.
The Vice Chairman. What time did he say he saw it?
Admiral Turner. 11:30 p.m.
Mr. Mitchell. 11:30 in the evening at his house.
Admiral Turner. About 11:30 at night.
The Vice Chairman. Of the 6th?
Admiral Turner. Of the 6th; yes, sir.
Mr. Mitchell. Where had you been at about that time?
Admiral Turner. I had been home.
Mr. Mitchell. All evening?
Admiral Turner. Yes, sir. That is confirmed by a telegram which I just received from my wife as to where we were that night. She said we were home and that is my recollection.
Mr. Mitchell. Well, now, the next day what was the first hour you say at which you saw the 14th part and the 1 p.m.?
Admiral Turner. I do not recall seeing the 14th part until after the attack I did see the 1 p.m. part.

I had stayed at home Sunday morning and about 10:30, as I recall it, Admiral Stark called up and said there was [10,775] a dispatch from Admiral Hart or a letter, rather, and he wanted me to come down to the office. I went down to the office, arriving there sometime, I believe, about 11:15, it may have been a little ahead of that, and it was quite urgent that a letter be written to Admiral Hart and he gave me the necessary information. I went to my office and started writing the reply and had just about finished and looked over my dispatches for the day and Admiral Stark called me on the interphone and told me to come to his office. That, as I recall, was about 12 or 12:15.

Now there isn't any doubt that Admiral Turner knew what he was talking about, the 13-part message, and that he saw it that night, is there, in your mind, from his testimony?
Captain Kramer. That appears obvious from his testimony.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Captain Kramer. It further, however, obviously differs from my recollections.
Senator Ferguson. There isn't any doubt now that you say it differs from your recollection?
Captain Kramer. There is no doubt about that; no, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Isn't it very important in this case, if this committee is ever going to solve these problems, that we can get some kind of reconciliation between this testimony, so we know actually what happened and who had this knowledge [10,776] in Washington? Isn't that your opinion?
Captain Kramer. That would be my personal opinion, yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know how this committee is going to get the testimony?
Captain Kramer. I am afraid I can offer no further suggestions.
Senator Ferguson. You haven't any suggestions?
Captain Kramer. In that connection to this committee; no, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you think it is important as to whether Ingersoll or Turner knew about this on the night of the 6th?
Captain Kramer. I believe so; yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Now do you know, or do you have any information that Admiral Ingersoll or Admiral Turner were in touch with the Secretary of the Navy that night, and that somehow they got copies from there, or that the one out of the White House was circulated to anybody after you left it there that night?

Captain Kramer. Not that I am aware of; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Have you ever heard about it?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

[10,777] Senator Ferguson. So the only one, so far as the Navy was concerned, that was outside of your safe—and these were secret documents?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson (continuing). Was in the White House, in the Map Room?

Captain Kramer. So far as I am aware; yes.

Senator Ferguson. And here were two men who testified under oath, one before this committee and one before the Navy Board, that they were delivered copies on Saturday night. Have you any way that you can reconcile that? You are the only man that can reconcile that, are you not?

Captain Kramer. I cannot reconcile that conflict; no, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Mr. Murphy. I just wanted to point out that at page 962 of the Naval Court of Inquiry Captain Kramer says that he had not delivered that to Admiral Turner on that evening. The same conflict existed there as it does here.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now we are back—and I am sorry this takes so much time, but I do not know of any other way to get it than to get it from witnesses, if there is even that way. As far as my ability is concerned, I seem to be unable to understand it.

[10778] Now let us get to the morning of the 7th. I do not suppose that there was any time more important in the history of this Nation than the morning of the 7th of December 1941. Will you agree with me on that?

Captain Kramer. Certainly during my lifetime, I believe that is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So we agree on the importance of this morning. Now you told us that the 14th part message was translated by you and ready for delivery at 8 o'clock on the morning of the 7th.

Captain Kramer. About that time, or a very few minutes after; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right. We will then speak of it as 8 o'clock, and you delivered that to the head of the Far Eastern Section, which was McCollum?

Captain Kramer. I have a quite definite recollection that the first time Captain McCollum saw any part of this note, the 14th part was included. I had informed him the previous night about the 13 parts and he had told me in words to the effect that he would be down early the following morning and would look at it then.

Senator Ferguson. Now how early did you see him Sunday morning?
Captain Kramer. My present recollection on that is that it was between 8 and 8:15.

Senator Ferguson. And therefore you delivered to him this 14th part and the 13 parts at that time?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; together with other traffic.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; with this other traffic that you have mentioned.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Was that in your office or his office?

Captain Kramer. In Captain McCollum's office, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And how far was his office from yours?

Captain Kramer. Up two decks and two corridors away in the Navy Department.

Senator Ferguson. Two corridors and up two decks. You went to his office. I assume, with this message?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And did you leave the 14 parts with him?

Captain Kramer. I did, sir. Invariably, a copy of all this traffic was left in the Far East Section for periods varying from a few days to, more normally, several weeks.

Senator Ferguson. And did you leave more than one copy there?

Captain Kramer. My present recollection is that I left several copies with him, so that he could make delivery as soon as he learned that Admiral Stark or Admiral Wilkinson arrived at the Navy Department.

Senator Ferguson. Then between 8 and 8:15 he had copies for Stark and Wilkinson?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right. That was Stark and Wilkinson.

Captain Kramer. Presumably for Admiral Turner, too, who could be shown one of those copies.

Senator Ferguson. You left two copies with him?

Captain Kramer. That is my present recollection, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is your present recollection?

Captain Kramer. Yes; that is, two copies in addition to the one for the Far East Section.

Senator Ferguson. That would make three copies that you left?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; that is my present recollection.

Senator Ferguson. Three out of seven, one being at the White House, that left three in your possession, is that correct?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now did he say that he had an appointment with Admiral Stark that morning?

Captain Kramer. I recollect no comment of that nature; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. But you had been told by Wilkinson that Stark would be down at the office?

Captain Kramer. It was not quite as categorical as that, sir. It was to the effect that Admiral Stark would almost certainly, or very likely, some words to that effect, be at the Navy Department early the next morning and I was to get it to him as soon as he arrived there.

Senator Ferguson. Now, as far as McCollum was concerned, he did not mention what time Stark would be down, or
whether Stark would be down—and when I use "Stark" I would like to have the stenographer always put the word "Admiral" before it, because this is no disrespect—

Captain Kramer. No mention whatsoever that I recall, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So that you left the copy there and then you went out of the office. You left the three copies and you left the office?

Captain Kramer. Returning to my office; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Now, wasn't it your duty at that time to deliver at 8:15 or 8 o'clock a copy of this fourteenth part to the Secretary of the Navy, to the President of the United States, wasn't it your duty to do that? Why did you go to the office and keep your copies there, and not make your deliveries?

Captain Kramer. Senator, in all my activities concerned with the dissemination or delivery of this traffic, I was acting as a subordinate of Captain McCollum, and Director of Naval Intelligence. Frequent diversions on their direction, were made from routine. I, as a rule, attempted to get all traffic to Captain McCollum, or Admiral Wilkinson, or both, prior to deliveries to any other recipient. If they had instructions concerning a particular folder, they would give them to me at that time.

Senator Ferguson. That is what I am going to get at now. Did they have instructions, did they give you any instructions in relation to that folder, that you did not make a delivery to the White House and one to the Secretary of the Navy?

Captain Kramer. None that I recall, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then, do I understand that you made no deliveries unless you had specific directions or instructions from McCollum?

Captain Kramer. That is not correct, sir. Frequently, when unable to contact Captain McCollum, in fact, normally when I was unable to contact Captain McCollum, or Admiral Wilkinson, I made deliveries, as far as possible, to all other recipients, and informed those two officers, as soon as practicable, of who had these copies.

Senator Ferguson. You had then specific instructions to deliver to the President of the United States the 13 parts on Saturday night, did you?

Captain Kramer. I had no specific instructions. I made that in pursuance of what I have just outlined.

[10784] Senator Ferguson. Then I will ask you why the same rule did not apply the next morning at 8 o'clock when you had a copy, and you knew how important the fourteenth part was, because it had at the top of it "Very Important," even by the Japanese, why you did not immediately take that to the President of the United States.

Captain Kramer. I informed Captain McCollum of my 1 o'clock appointment—rather my 10 o'clock appointment at the State Department; outlined to him at that time in more detail just what deliveries had been made the night before; indicated to him that I had work in hand in my office, and at least gained the impression that my contemplated departure from the Navy Department a half or three-quarters or perhaps an hour later would be sufficiently rapid delivery of this material, which, I should like to further comment on, was
far more expeditious than had been the case on any other day during 1941, prior to this time.

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you what deliveries you had ever made to the Secretary of the Navy at his home at night before; I mean you personally?

Captain Kramer. I can recollect no previous occasion when I delivered personally to Secretary Knox at his home. In elucidation of that point, I should like to mention, [10785] however, that my initial attempt in deliveries to the Secretary of the Navy was always to get his Naval Aide, then Captain and now Admiral Beatty, who customarily took any copies for the Secretary's perusal.

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever delivered personally to the President a message at 9 o'clock, or any time at night, other than on this, December 6?

Captain Kramer. Not at night, personally, to the President, sir. The only occasion when I did make personal delivery in the late summer or early fall of 1941, was late in the afternoon, as I recollect, 5 or 5:30 p.m.

On another occasion, in fact two other occasions, on the direction of Admiral Stark, I made late evening deliveries to Mr. Hopkins in the Naval Hospital, then located at the west end of Constitution Avenue.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, do I understand Mr. Harry Hopkins was on the list to get these secret code messages? Is that what you are telling me?

Captain Kramer. He was not on any list; no, sir; but I was given to understand by Admiral Stark that he customarily saw the copy left for the President.

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you tell me what messages [10786] you delivered to Harry Hopkins on the instructions of Admiral Stark?

Captain Kramer. I do not recall specifically what messages, sir. I might be able to reconstruct that by an examination of the files, although I doubt it. However, it could be determined within limits, by determining the dates during which Mr. Hopkins was in the hospital. My recollection is, in connection with those deliveries to Mr. Hopkins that Admiral Stark indicated, or told me, or asked me rather, whether I had any instructions from the White House to show these copies to Mr. Hopkins during his hospitalization.

On my reply in the negative, he directed me to make such delivery.

Senator Ferguson. Now, over how long a period did this delivery to Harry Hopkins, or Mr. Hopkins, continue?

Captain Kramer. My present recollection is, sir, that it occurred twice, about 4 or 5 days apart, during one period of Mr. Hopkins' hospitalization.

Senator Ferguson. To whom did you deliver that? Mr. Hopkins personally?

Captain Kramer. I sat with Mr. Hopkins while he perused them; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You were in the room, you delivered [10787] them personally, and you waited until he went over the messages? They were magic, no doubt about that?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Purple?
Captain Kramer. Purple and other systems, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you evaluate them for Mr. Hopkins, or did he evaluate them for you, or did you discuss them?

Captain Kramer. I commented on them, yes, sir; elucidated references, names, and some background in connection therewith, if that may be termed evaluation; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is some evaluation, is it not?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And did Mr. Hopkins discuss these secret messages with you?

Captain Kramer. There was a rather extended discussion, not only concerning these messages, but various security aspects of this work during my first visit to Mr. Hopkins.

Senator Ferguson. And what month was this in, that you delivered these secret codes to Mr. Hopkins?

Captain Kramer. I am not certain of the month, sir. My recollection is it was the late summer or early fall of 1941.

[1078] Senator Ferguson. Now, was this a delivery over and above what you took to the White House, or did you not deliver those to the White House when you took them to Mr. Hopkins?

Captain Kramer. This was a delivery over and above the delivery to the White House. It was the first occasion I had made such delivery to Mr. Hopkins.

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, Admiral Stark told you Mr. Hopkins was evaluating these and therefore you should make these deliveries?

Captain Kramer. I recollect no comment to the effect that Mr. Hopkins was evaluating this traffic, but that Mr. Hopkins customarily saw this traffic in the White House.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, will you tell me, after you remember this conversation about the messages, and so forth, what the messages were?

Captain Kramer. I cannot recall precisely. My guess at this time is that they chiefly concerned the United States-Japanese negotiations.

Senator Ferguson. Well, that, of course, is what this purple system was, wasn’t it, concerning the negotiations between Japan and the United States?

Captain Kramer. In the purple system, Senator, there were not only messages concerning our negotiations by messages directed to approximately one dozen other Japanese major diplomatic posts which held this purple machine.

Senator Ferguson. So this is between the United States and Japan, these messages, on that diplomatic phase of it?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did Mr. Hopkins at that time comment on these two messages?

Captain Kramer. There were not two messages, sir. I did not mean to imply that. There were two folders involved.

Senator Ferguson. Two folders. Did he comment on the folders, on what was in the folders at different times?

Captain Kramer. There was conversation, as I have outlined, concerning the various messages in these two folders, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did not this rather impress you, delivering this outside the White House and to Mr. Hopkins, so you can re-
member what the conversation was? He was the only civilian outside of the Navy that had ever seen or heard of this magic, isn't that true?

Captain Kramer. The State Department officials saw it, sir, and they were civilians.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Captain Kramer. Mr. Knox was a civilian and Mr. Stimson was a civilian.

Senator Ferguson. Was there anybody else besides Hopkins, the Secretary of State's office, and the Secretary of the Navy? Was there anybody else?

Captain Kramer. I am familiar only in a general way with what civilians in the State Department or in the White House, might possibly have seen this traffic.

In the case of the White House I have no first-hand knowledge other than that I knew that the naval aide, or during the period when there was none, Surgeon General McIntire, was seeing this.

The first definite information to me that Mr. Hopkins was seeing this was Admiral Stark's comment to me.

In the case of the State Department, I knew that Mr. Welles, that Mr. Hornbeck, the political adviser on Far Eastern affairs, and that Mr. Hamilton, the head of the Far East Division of the State Department, were regularly seeing this. I am under the impression that there may have been one or two or more others who were seeing this.

Senator Ferguson. In the State Department?

Captain Kramer. In the State Department, although when this material was first introduced to the State Depart- [10791] ment on a regular basis, it was only after a conference attended by Admiral Anderson, then director of Naval Intelligence, his opposite number in Army Intelligence, Colonel Bratton, Captain McCollum, and myself in Mr. Hull's office, during which conference, chiefly Admiral Anderson, as I now recollect it, commented at some length on the security features absolutely essential to handling this material.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did I understand that when you delivered these to Mr. Hopkins, it was only when you had specific instructions from Admiral Stark and that is why you only did it twice?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you think of delivering the 13 parts on the night of the 6th to Mr. Hopkins? Was there anything said about that?

Captain Kramer. I made no deliveries, or I recollect no contact with Mr. Harry Hopkins other than what I mentioned.

Senator Ferguson. Those were the two occasions, and they were on specific instructions?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you have given us, as well as you can, all of the instructions that you had about Mr. [10792] Hopkins?

Captain Kramer. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Now, no one else outside of the ones you have spoken about has ever received magic, that is these intercepts?

Captain Kramer. Not that I am presently aware of; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, you think you would recall deliveries to anyone else?
Captain Kramer. I can recall no one else; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. When you went to the White House on Sunday morning with the 14th part—no; I want to go back to the Navy for a while. We got off on another course.

Now, you left at 8 o'clock or a few minutes after—you gave McCollum the reason that you were busy, as I understand it—or am I correct on that—that you did not feel you ought to go to the White House and the Secretary of the Navy that morning, because you were going to make another delivery at 10:30 to the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of State?

Captain Kramer. At 10 o'clock; yes, sir.

[10793] Senator Ferguson. Is that right?

Captain Kramer. That is in general correct, sir; yes sir.

Senator Ferguson. But we have 2 hours until 10 o'clock, and we have the 14th part which is the summary of the whole thing, and the 13 parts were important enough that you went to the Secretary of the Navy's home at 9 or 9:30, you went to the President and had a message delivered to him of these 13 parts, and then you personally the next morning gave the excuse that you had something else to do and no delivery of the 14th part, which was in a way the key to the whole situation, was delayed for 2 hours in going from the Secretary of the Navy to the President of the United States; is that what you tell us? Is that what you want this committee to understand?

Captain Kramer. In reply to those remarks and that question, Senator, I should like to state that I had two primary functions in connection with the duties of my office. One was technical. The other was purely a messenger boy function. There, of course, must at times be a conflict between priority to be given those two functions.

In order to be at the State Department to meet my appointment with Mr. Knox I would have to leave the Navy Department at about the time I did so that if Mr. Knox arrived [10794] there a few minutes before 10 o'clock I could get it to him. If at that time, speaking now of approximately 9:15, when I went to Captain McCollum's office, I had taken time to make phone calls to Mr. Knox or to other recipients, which sometimes involved 15 or 20 minutes phoning to various possible locations of these individuals, taken further time to dig up transportation to reach these individuals; my present recollection of the thought processes of that time is that time might be wasted.

My only explanation in answer to your question is that at the moment it was considered sufficiently early for me to leave when I contemplated to make these deliveries.

Senator Ferguson. You told us yesterday, if I recall, that Admiral Wilkinson made certain that you had made a delivery of the thirteenth part to the President and one to the Secretary of Navy?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And, therefore, you knew the importance of the President getting this and the Secretary of the Navy getting it?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Didn't it occur to you that morning, and to Captain McCollum, that there was more than two persons in the Navy, and that there might be someone else that could [10795] be a delivery man, as you say you were, in this one case, that he could
run it, if necessary, yes, run it to the Wardman Park and run it to the White House to deliver this most important message, the fourteenth part, so that if there was going to be trouble the high, the tops in this Government could act in an emergency, and isn't it true that you felt there was an emergency or you wouldn't have taken the 13 parts at night?

Captain Kramer. Certainly a crisis; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. A crisis. Now, didn't it occur to you or didn't Captain McCollum say something, such as "This fourteenth part must get to the President and the Secretary of Navy and to Admiral Stark?" You had read it. You had interpreted it. You had translated it. You knew how important it was; isn't that correct?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. It was more important, wasn't it, than an ultimatum? An ultimatum is usually "You do or else." This was the "else," was it not? It was no ultimatum. It was over.

Captain Kramer. It was certainly emphatic; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And now you tell us that the reason you didn't deliver it was that you wanted to go back to your office for an hour and a half or an hour and three-quarters [10796] so you could deliver it on the same trip that you went to the Secretary of the Navy; is that correct?

Captain Kramer. That is not quite accurate, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Will you get it accurate?

Captain Kramer. The times involved, as I have stated, was three quarters of an hour to perhaps an hour. At the time the initial delivery was made to Captain McCollum, probably around 8:15, no folders had been prepared with the 14th part inserted yet. There would be time involved in doing that clerical chore. There on the point of making an immediate delivery to Mr. Knox or other high officials I believe occurred to us the possibility that we might pass them on their way to the State Department or to the Navy Department.

Senator Ferguson. Now, as I understand this, this all describes the attitude of your Department and the Navy when they were alerted to war on the Sunday morning?

Captain Kramer. That is my present recollection of what we thought then.

Senator Ferguson. That is what you were describing as being alerted to war; is that correct?

Captain Kramer. I believe, Senator, that even in the light of hindsight a present perusal of the 14th part cannot be categorically interpreted as a Japanese intention to declare [10797] war on the United States.

Senator Ferguson. So then you don't agree with Mr. Hull as to what he thought about that message?

Captain Kramer. I am unaware, except in a general way from newspapers, of what Mr. Hull thought.

Senator Ferguson. You haven't read his testimony?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; I have not.

Senator Ferguson. So then you were undertaking to evaluate this 14th part but you had previously evaluated the 13 parts as being of such importance that you went at night and delivered it?
Captain Kramer. I should like to state on that point, Senator, that at no time did I presume to evaluate this traffic. I did, however, offer such comments or opinions at various times as I might have had on this traffic if it were called for or appeared to be called for.

Senator Ferguson. Now, at 9:15 was Admiral Stark in his office?

Captain Kramer. Not to my present recollection; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what time he got down there? First, of your own knowledge, and if you don’t know that, from hearsay, and who told you?

Captain Kramer. I am still unpositive of the precise time he arrived, sir. My recollection is that he was there at about 9:30. I should like to further point out that I have previously testified and it is still my recollection that Captain McCollum indicated to me that he would get this traffic to the Admiral as soon as he arrived at the Navy Department.

Senator Ferguson. So that he wasn’t going out for him, but he was going to wait until he arrived Sunday morning, and now you went back to your office and, I assume, started to work?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And what did you do for the next hour or hour and a half?

Captain Kramer. I cannot recall specifically, sir, except that I unquestionably was engaged in going over traffic; its precise nature I do not recall.

Senator Ferguson. Well, at least, the pilot message didn’t come to you in that hour and a half, did it?

Captain Kramer. There would be no necessity of my going over a pilot message since it was a complete translation and the only function I would then have would be immediate dissemination.

Senator Ferguson. It didn’t come to your attention during that hour and a half?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; not to my present recollection and conviction.

Senator Ferguson. All right. I am going to take that period of an hour and a half, about the time, until the time that you put it in the folder and proceeded to the White House and the Secretary of State. You know what time I am referring to, do you not?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. The 1 o’clock message didn’t come to your attention during that period?

Captain Kramer. It did not, sir.

Senator Ferguson. The message in relation to the destruction of the last code machine—you know the one I am talking about?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; I do.

Senator Ferguson. That didn’t come to your attention?

Captain Kramer. Not to my present recollection and belief, sir.

Senator Ferguson. The other messages, the 908—I wish you would read 908 and 909 into the record, from Exhibit 1, because they have been referred to so much and they are not in the record, as I understand it.

Captain Kramer. They are both, Senator, part of Exhibit 1, on page 248 of that exhibit.
The Vice Chairman. They are in Exhibit 1. Does the Senator desire them read into the record?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I think they are very significant here because they convey an idea of how serious they think it is, because, as I read the two letters, they indicate at least that they are going to be interned here in the United States, that the end has come.

Captain Kramer (reading):

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 7, 1941.
Urgent.
#908 (to be handled in Government code).
All concerned regret very much that due to failure in adjusting Japanese-American relations, matters have come to what they are now, despite all efforts you two Ambassadors have been making. I wish to take this opportunity to offer my deepest thanks to you both for your endeavors and hard work as well as for what all the members of the Embassy have done.

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington.
December 7, 1941.
(Urgent).
#909.
[10801] From Bureau Chief Yamamoto to Commercial Attaché IGUCHI and his staff as well as to Secretary YUKI

I, together with the members of the Bureau, deeply appreciate and heartily thank you for your great effort which you have been making for many months in behalf of our country despite all difficulties in coping with the unprecedented crisis. We pray that you will continue to be in good health.

Senator Ferguson. Take the last line. Does that mean anything to you? Did that indicate that they were going to be interned?

Captain Kramer. That is not an unusual expression on the part of a Japanese, Senator. In fact, expressions of that nature appear in most correspondence, personal letters, and so forth.

Senator Ferguson. I haven’t found it in any of these other messages. So you didn’t interpret it as meaning anything?

Captain Kramer. This particular message, which is in the character of a personal nature, would not be unusual in that respect; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, what time did you have the file completed to deliver the fourteenth part? As I understand it, this is a special delivery of one part, the fourteenth part; is that correct?

[10802] Captain Kramer. Special delivery was not made of that one part. It was included with the traffic of the night before.

Senator Ferguson. Can you give me a description of what was with the fourteenth part?

Captain Kramer. In some detail; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. The whole message was with it?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So it was 14 parts of the message, the entire message?

Captain Kramer. The entire message; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Were there any other messages with it?

Captain Kramer. The messages I have described as being delivered on Saturday evening; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You included what you had in the file of Saturday evening?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So that you duplicated the 13 parts and those other messages and the fourteenth part. The only new material was the fourteenth part?

Captain Kramer. Such duplication was frequent, Senator, and my answer, of course, is yes.

Senator Ferguson. I am not criticizing. If I get a little insistent it is because I am just trying to get the [10803] facts.

Captain Kramer. I do not interpret that as a criticism, Senator; I simply wanted to bring to your attention again that frequently earlier traffic references and background were included in these folders.

Senator Ferguson. The only new material then was the 14th part?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, what time of the day did you get that ready for delivery—and I am going to talk about—when I ask you questions now, when I say the 14th part it will include all the others, but I will specifically apply it to that 14th part.

Captain Kramer. It would be sometime between the time I returned to my office from Captain McCollum’s office and my departure from my office approximately 9:30. I do not recall precisely.

Senator Ferguson. When you were told by Secretary Knox to be at the State Department with the Secretary of War and the Secretary of State on Sunday morning that looked to you like a very important assignment, did it not?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And he instructed you what to bring with you?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What was that instruction? Did he tell you to bring the 14th part if it came in?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did he tell you anything else?

Captain Kramer. To bring the material that was shown him the night before, and any new material that came in including, of course, the 14th part if it had arrived.

Senator Ferguson. Now, didn’t you convey that to the people who were in the decoding section, so that if anything came in during the night, or up until the time you were getting this, that you wanted it to be in that file so you could take it to this most important meeting of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy?

Captain Kramer. I do not believe that my instructions to the GY watch officers on departure from the Navy Department that night included any details of whom I had made deliveries to.

It was, however, as I now recollect, the specific instructions that anything further coming in on the Tokyo-to-Washington circuit should be, I should be informed about, should be called to the Navy Department, as I frequently had been on other occasions. I was not so called to the Navy Department.

I indicated, I believe, yesterday, that apparently— [10805] this is purely my present presumption—the GY watch officer exercised his own judgment about calling me, and in view of the fact that that night the Army had translators on duty, sent it over to them rather than calling me down.
Senator Ferguson. Did you have all the translators and all of the decipherers, and decoders at work that night because of the fact that you were to meet with the three important Secretaries of this Government the next morning at 10 o'clock and they told you to bring, one of them, Secretary of the Navy, had told you to bring with you all of the messages that came in that night?

Captain Kramer. That is not my understanding at all, Senator.

My understanding then as I now recollect it, and my present understanding is that no additional watches were put on that Saturday night with the exception of the translator watch in the War Department instituted for he first time that evening.

Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, the alert, so-called, in your department was not changed, the regular procedure took place on Saturday night and Sunday morning that had taken place on previous Saturdays and Sundays?

Captain Kramer. That is correct; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So this message, this information that you got from the Secretary of the Navy, really didn't change things at all; it went on the same as in the usual way; isn't that correct?

Captain Kramer. The usual way, yes, Senator; but I should like to point out that we were working then at capacity trying strenuously at the same time to train additional experts in cryptanalysis and translation to amplify the scope of our efforts.

If any additional watch—and this is again purely my present presumption—

Senator Ferguson. I don't want presumptions.

Captain Kramer (continuing). Had been instituted that night, it would undoubtedly, unquestionably in my opinion, have disrupted the work of these sections in following hours or days when something extremely important might also have occurred.

There was no clue to the precise date of the culmination of what appeared to be a crisis with the United States. There had been many crises during the course of 1941. I recall now specifically a number concerned during the summer of 1941 with the movements of Japanese forces, military and naval, into French Indochina. There were many other crises of a diplomatic nature during the latter part of 1941.

Senator Ferguson. Is this true, that there wasn't really a crisis as far as the Intelligence Branch of the Navy of the United States was concerned on that day and previous days?

Captain Kramer. The crisis, so far as the United States was concerned, could only be deduced as being perhaps more acute than it had been earlier that year, from a reading of the 13 parts of the 14-part note.

Senator Ferguson. Had you read the note from Tokyo to Berlin where the two parts came in indicating there was going to be war? Had you read the previous messages that things would happen automatically? Had you read this traffic, or is this true: That the Intelligence Branch was relegated to doing nothing, that the raw material was being delivered to superior officers and that, therefore, the Intelligence Branch of the Navy of the United States was, in effect, functioning on the 6th and the 7th of December 1941; is that a fair statement?

Captain Kramer. I do not think that is quite a fair statement.
Senator Ferguson. Will you correct it?

Captain Kramer. I may have given the wrong impression in my reply to your previous question that our idea of the increasing acuteness of the crisis with the United States was based purely on this 13 parts of the 14-part note.

There were many other clues to that, including the things you have mentioned, namely, the note to Berlin, [10809] but also the movements of the Japanese convoy which was sighted during the week 1–7 December, and on which we had frequent reports from Admiral Hart and in order to keep contact with, special search planes had been ordered into the South China Sea.

There was also, of course, the information we had concerning contemplated Japanese action against British Malaya and Thailand. Those were a number of many clues pointing toward an increasing crisis in diplomatic relations.

There was still, however, in my present recollection of my reaction at that time, no positive clue of a definite Japanese intention to attack the United States.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand, then, that the Intelligence Branch of the Nation only deals in positive things?

Captain Kramer. That is not correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, why did you say that there wasn't any information which was positive that there would be any conflict with the United States if they don't deal with other things than positive information?

Captain Kramer. I should say, Senator, in that regard, from my background on Intelligence duties, that at least three-quarters of the information with which Intelligence, at least Naval Intelligence, deals, perhaps 90 percent is [10810] of anything but a positive nature.

Senator Ferguson. Now, is this one of the troubles, that your department and you thought that Japan was going to war with the British and not with the United States; was that one of the troubles? Talking about Sunday morning.

Captain Kramer. There was certainly a possibility, and perhaps even a probability that the Japanese contemplated hostilities with the United States. It was much more specific and definite in the case of England. The date when such hostilities would take place, however, was not known in the case of the United States.

Senator Ferguson. Was it known as to the British?

Captain Kramer. It was known within closer limits because of the fact that this convoy we were sighting during the latter part of that week was in a position to effect the scheme we first learned about directed toward the British and Thailand.

Senator Ferguson. On Sunday morning did you have any doubt the Japanese were going to strike in the Kra Peninsula, and it meant war with Great Britain?

Captain Kramer. None in my mind, no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Because you knew that the Admiralty through Ambassador Winant, had sent at 10:40 the day before, [10811] on the 6th, this message:

British Admiralty reports that at 3 a.m. London time this morning two parties seen off Cambodia Point, sailing slowly westward toward Kra 14 hours distant in time. First party 25 transports, 6 cruisers, 10 destroyers. Second party 10 transports, 2 cruisers, 10 destroyers.
Signed "Winant".
Then he goes on in the next telegram that he sends in at 3:05 that Saturday afternoon which we got, that they were 14 hours out. You knew about those telegrams?

Captain *Kramer*. I believe, Senator, this is the first time I have ever heard of those telegrams or heard them read to me.

Senator *Ferguson*. So you didn't know about these telegrams?

Captain *Kramer*. I customarily did not see State Department dispatches, or for that matter, Naval Department dispatches, except occasionally some that Captain McCollum might have shown me.

Senator *Ferguson*. As I understand it, you knew from other information that Great Britain and Japan were going to war, and it was usual that war broke out on Sunday? As far as the Kra Peninsula was concerned?

[10812] Captain *Kramer*. It was not positive that the Japanese contemplated an actual attack on the Kra Peninsula Sunday morning. It was, however, from an evaluation of the information we had, apparent that it was a very strong probability that they would, in view of the position of that convoy, and its capabilities of carrying out an attack Sunday morning.

The *Vice Chairman*. It is now 12:30.

If it is convenient, Senator, the committee will recess until 1:30.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee recessed until 1:30 p.m. of the same day.)

[10813] Afternoon Session—1:30 P. M.

The *Vice Chairman*. The committee will be in order.

Senator Ferguson will resume his inquiry.

**TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ALWIN D. KRAMER, UNITED STATES NAVY**

(Resumed)

Senator *Ferguson*. I am just going on with the Navy Department now, the fourteenth part message, which was at about 9:30 or a quarter to 10.

Captain *Kramer*. It was about 9:30, sir.

Senator *Ferguson*. How far was it from your office to the map room in the White House?

Captain *Kramer*. Between 8 and 10 blocks, I should say, sir.

Senator *Ferguson*. Did you drive or walk?

Captain *Kramer*. I walked, sir. It was partly almost on the double, I should say.

Senator *Ferguson*. Almost a dog trot?

Captain *Kramer*. Something of that nature, sir. I at least trotted part of the way.

Senator *Ferguson*. At least we have got somebody running on Sunday morning now. Is that right?

Captain *Kramer*. Yes, sir.

Senator *Ferguson*. To deliver a message.

Captain *Kramer*. I believe so, sir.

[10814] Senator *Ferguson*. All right.

Now, before you went there, you went up to see McCollum again with the fourteenth part?
Captain Kramer. No, sir. I thought I stated fairly clearly that the fourteenth part was delivered to McCollum along with the 13 parts.

Senator Ferguson. That is very clear, as to what you stated, but I understood the other day you said you went up and saw McCollum and drew some kind of a time circle.

Captain Kramer. No, sir; that did not take place until my return from the State Department, the 10 o'clock appointment.

Senator Ferguson. That is the second time that you got messages that morning, that you drew the time circle?

Captain Kramer. The occasion for drawing that time circle— Senator Ferguson. Please answer my question, and we will get along a little faster.

Captain Kramer. At the arrival of the 1 o'clock message, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Captain Kramer. My first sighting of that.

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you this: You made up a file down in your office, you had the fourteenth part, the 13 parts and the other parts at 8:15.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you kept them on your desk until the time came for you to leave and go over to the White House?

Captain Kramer. That is my present recollection, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So that was satisfactory to at least McCollum?

Captain Kramer. I think that is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. When you got to the White House, it was about what time?

Captain Kramer. I should say about a quarter of 10 sir, because my recollection is I was at the State Department after leaving the White House at 10 minutes to 10.

Senator Ferguson. A quarter to 10.

Now, who was there to receive the pouch?

Captain Kramer. I do not know his name, sir. It was left, however, in the situation room.

Senator Ferguson. Was it a Naval or Military attaché or aide?

Captain Kramer. It may have been either one or both, I do not recall, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I will ask counsel—and I think we have a letter here stating that it is impossible to find out who was the aide on Sunday morning. We know the name of the aide on Saturday night, but we cannot find the name of the aide on Sunday morning.

Now, can you help us?

Captain Kramer. I am afraid my memory fails me in that respect, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, there wasn't any doubt that Admiral Beardall knew that you were to go to the Secretary of the Navy at 10 o'clock the next morning?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir, he mentioned that in Admiral Wilkinson's home.

Senator Ferguson. Now did he say he would get in touch with the President sometime that night?

Captain Kramer. I do not recall precisely what he said in that regard. My present impression is that he did phone probably the
situation room at the White House. At least my present impression is, and I think was at the time, that I was given to understand, when I left Admiral Wilkinson's home, that the President had seen it.

Senator Ferguson. So you assumed then, that Admiral Beardall had talked to the White House, and learned that he had seen it, and you learned that that night from Admiral Beardall?

[10817] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you ever hear that there was a meeting that night and the 13 parts that you left at the White House had been delivered by other officers, or by another officer to Admiral Turner and Admiral Ingersoll? They do not say in their testimony that you delivered it.

Captain Kramer. I know of no such possible delivery, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You never heard of such a delivery?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then, when you delivered this message, this 14th part on Sunday morning, a quarter to 10 to the map room, what did you say to the man who were in charge, the military and/or naval aide, or both?

Captain Kramer. This is the first time I have had occasion to recollect exactly what I said at that time. Senator. I believe it was in the same tenor as my instructions had been the night before.

Senator Ferguson. That it was very urgent, and that the President was to see it immediately?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for the fact that Admiral Beardall was not down that morning on this important assignment?

[10818] Captain Kramer. I cannot, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You cannot account for that?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. But you are certain he was not there?

Captain Kramer. I am not even certain of that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then do you think Admiral Beardall was there to get that message that morning?

Captain Kramer. He may have been there. In any case it has not impressed itself on my memory so that I now recollect exactly who received it at the White House that morning.

Senator Ferguson. Whoever it was, was in uniform, either the Army or the Navy?

Captain Kramer. In those days, sir, the military officers stationed in duty in Washington, except on certain occasions, were in civilian clothes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. How did you know that these men were authorized to receive this for the President Sunday morning?

Captain Kramer. They were introduced to me in the first instance by then Captain Beardall as his assistants, and the purpose for his setting up the situation room with these watch officers.

[10819] Senator Ferguson. Then they were watch officers that you had met before through Admiral Beardall?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And therefore you had authority to deliver to them?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, how many times did you go to the State Department that morning on the 7th?

Captain Kramer. Twice, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. You went there twice?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. The first time you had just this 14th part message and you arrived there 10 minutes to?

Captain Kramer. 10 minutes to 10, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Whom did you have a conversation with, and what was it?

Captain Kramer. There was one I know of, and possibly two or three of Mr. Hull's private secretaries there, all of whom had been indoctrinated on the security features involved in this traffic, and customarily received these folders for Mr. Hull. The Army courier was there at about the same time.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Who was he?

Captain Kramer. I have been under the impression through the past years that it was Colonel Bratton. I am still of that impression, although he states that it is his belief he spent most or all of that morning in the War Department. If it were not Colonel Bratton then it was very likely one of his senior officer assistants, all of whom I knew.

Senator Ferguson. So you remember the Army officer being there. Was he in uniform?

Captain Kramer. We were not wearing a uniform in those days.

Senator Ferguson. Not wearing a uniform?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. But you know he was an Army officer?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Because you had seen him in connection with this magic before the delivery of it?

Captain Kramer. Frequently in the past, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now was he there the second time you went over?

Captain Kramer. The Army courier was there within almost a minute or two of the time I arrived at the State Department on my second trip.

Senator Ferguson. On your second trip as well as your first trip?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And on the first trip you had just the new material, the 14th part now, you are certain of that?

Captain Kramer. That is my present conviction; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you see Mr. Hull at all that morning?

Captain Kramer. I think I saw him, but whether it was in his office or passing through his outer office going in. I am not at present certain. In the case of Mr. Knox I can be specific, because I arrived there before he did and pointed out the 14th part in the folder which I handed him.

Senator Ferguson. So you showed Mr. Knox personally the 14th part?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And how long did you remain there? Did you see Secretary of War Stimson?
Captain Kramer. I think I did, sir.

Senator Ferguson. How long did you remain at the State Department that morning?

Captain Kramer. I do not believe I spent more than a minute after Mr. Knox’ arrival in Mr. Hull’s outer officer before returning to the Navy Department.

Senator Ferguson. All right. You were not over 10 minutes there?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now I will ask you whether or not you left these papers there, the 14 parts and the other data?

Captain Kramer. I left one folder there for Mr. Knox, the only one of the three Secretaries for which I was responsible; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You left it there for him?

[10822] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. The other courier was there in relation to Mr. Stimson?

Captain Kramer. Mr. Stimson and Mr. Hull, for which the Army then had responsibility.

Senator Ferguson. Both of those. Do you know whether or not he left the 14 parts, the two folders?

Captain Kramer. That is my definite impression; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now you came back to the office, is that correct?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What time did you get back?

Captain Kramer. My current estimate is about 9:20, sir.

Senator Ferguson. About 10:20. Then what did you do?

Captain Kramer. For the first time I saw a few messages, Army translations, which apparently had arrived in my office between the time I left it and the time I returned. As a result of seeing the 1 o’clock message I directed immediate preparations of another set of folders, with a view to departing again for delivery as early as possible.

Senator Ferguson. And in that folder—and you have told us what was in it, it was the 1 o’clock message, the pilot message, the burning of the last code message—

[10823] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Is that correct?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And the two so-called “thank you” messages?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What time did you have that folder completed?

Captain Kramer. I believe the total time I was in my office was not over 10 minutes. It was probably less than that.

Senator Ferguson. That let you go out at what time?

Captain Kramer. About 10:30, sir.

Senator Ferguson. About 10:30. And you then went to see McCollum?

Captain Kramer. I went first to Admiral Stark’s office, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Captain Kramer. And McCollum came to the door of Admiral Stark’s office, at which time I pointed out the new material I had in the folder, specifically the 1 o’clock delivery message, and explained
very briefly and hurriedly its possible and probable tie-up with the
movement of the Japanese convoy and contemplated Japanese action
against the British and [10824] Thailand. My distinct recol-
lection is that McCollum grasped that point almost instantaneously,
and I then departed from the State Department, after not more than
probably one-half minute's conversation.

Senator FERGUSON. Now you said you drew a time circle.

Captain KRAMER. That was in my office while the folders were
being prepared, sir.

[10825] Senator FERGUSON. Just explain that.

You took a piece of paper and put a circle on indicating the earth?

Captain KRAMER. A navigator's time circle.

Senator FERGUSON. A navigator's time circle. And you put on a
circle down around, or down through the Pacific Coast?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir. Greenwich, Washington—

Senator FERGUSON. Where?

Captain KRAMER. Greenwich, England.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Captain KRAMER. Washington—

Senator FERGUSON. Washington?

Captain KRAMER. The South China Sea area. I did not take the
time to determine the precise time zone involved. And Pearl Harbor,
that is the Hawaiian Island time zone, 10½.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now what you did you put on the Greenwich time, whatever it was,
and you put on the Washington time, which was 1 o'clock, is that
right, and you put on 7:30 at Hawaii?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. And you put on what time in the [10826]
South Sea area?

Captain KRAMER. I simply estimated that point, sir, and it appeared
to be, from my estimation, my hasty estimation, probably 2 or 3 hours
before dawn. I did not check the time of sunrise out there.

Senator FERGUSON. Two or three hours before dawn?

Captain KRAMER. Yes; which, incidentally, is the normal time to
institute amphibious operations.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you told us this morning that you did not
see the Winant note that said they were 14 hours out on the previous
day, but you had other information that they were going to attack
on the Kra Peninsula, or in that area.

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. What was your other information?

Captain KRAMER. I am not positive on just where I got it from.
My present recollection is that I was told about those dispatches, of
sightings of this convoy, by Captain McCollum during the several
previous days.

Senator FERGUSON. So you knew about that. Did you know about
the incident of sending the three little men-of-war with the second
rate Filipinos on them over into that area to watch? Do you remem-
ber that?

Captain KRAMER. I am not familiar with that episode, [10827]
no, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You are not familiar with that?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That was sent out on the 3d. You did not know about that?

Captain Kramer. I may be able to refresh my memory. I do not recall at the moment, sir.

Senator Ferguson. We will get to it in a moment. I will let you see the message. I want you to look at page 39 in Exhibit 37.

(The document was handed to Captain Kramer.)

Captain Kramer. I believe this is the first time I have read that dispatch, sir.

Senator Ferguson. The first time you ever knew about that?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever had any information as to what this country would do in case of a Japanese attack on the British?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; I did not.

Senator Ferguson. No information whatever?

Captain Kramer. None whatsoever; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then, it would not have meant to you at all, about war with Britain, as far as Japan was concerned, it would not have meant anything to this country?

[10828] Captain Kramer. Not so far as I was concerned; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Have you ever seen WPL-46, the war plan?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; I have not.

Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, you had no information, and you did not interpret this message that you got Sunday morning about the strained relations with Britain as meaning anything at all?

Captain Kramer. Which message do you refer to, sir?

Senator Ferguson. That is the one on page 251, the one that you misread and corrected before you gave it to Secretary Forrestal, on top of page 251:

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations.

That did not mean anything? How does it come then, that you put it in the file and delivered?

Captain Kramer. Because that was just another confirmatory item of what appeared to be definite Japanese hostile intentions towards England.

Senator Ferguson. Why were you concerned with that? You had never heard anything about it.

Captain Kramer. I do not know that we were more concerned with contemplated hostile action towards England [10829] than towards us. I should say we would have been far more concerned about any contemplated hostile action towards us.

Senator Ferguson. Then as far as you are concerned, prior to the shells, the bombs dropping on Pearl Harbor, you did not have the least idea or expectation of war between the United States and Japan?

Captain Kramer. That is putting it in rather superlative language, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. You put it in your language.

Captain Kramer. I certainly knew a crisis was developing and developing rapidly. Whether it would culminate in actual outbreak of war, I did not know.

Senator Ferguson. Well, what is the purpose of an Intelligence Branch? What is the purpose? Isn't it to do three things—-
Captain Kramer (interposing). To evaluate information received, and pass it to higher authority, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Evaluate it to ascertain first if there is going to be a war, and, second, where that war would break out?

Captain Kramer. If possible; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Sure, if possible. And third, the strength of the enemy?

[10830] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, where did you stand on the proposition as to whether or not there was going to be a war? What evaluation was there? You had to, as I understand, tell these men, that you delivered the messages to in effect what they meant.

Captain Kramer. I, on occasion, expressed an opinion when it appeared to be called for, or was invited, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Now, what was your opinion on that morning, as to whether or not there was going to be war—and that is all the United States was concerned in, as I understand it—as you thought, between the United States and Japan?

Captain Kramer. Senator, the only distinct recollection I have of expressions of my opinion during those two days was one remark I made during the course of my visit at Secretary Knox's apartment, to the effect that I certainly saw no possibility of reconciliation of the differences between the United States and Japan. Other remarks I made during the course of those two days, I believe were of like tenor.

[10831] Senator Ferguson. Then you anticipated war?

Captain Kramer. That does not necessarily mean war, sir. It could mean a disruption in negotiations, a break in relations; but, of course, could mean war, too. That would be the extreme view to take.

Senator Ferguson. Now, during this morning you read this message when you put it in the folder:

After deciphering part 14 of my #902 and also #907, #908 and #909, please destroy at once the remaining cipher machine and all machine codes. Dispose in like manner also secret documents.

What did that message mean to an Intelligence Officer, together with the 1:00 o'clock delivery message?

Captain Kramer. Both of them struck me as forcibly indicating an acute crisis. Just what its nature was I was uncertain, but certainly a crisis in which the Japanese visualized the possibility of our seizure of their diplomatic establishments in this country.

Senator Ferguson. And that could only occur under one condition; that was war?

Captain Kramer. I am not sure that that is the only condition, sir. That is certainly one condition.

Senator Ferguson. That is at least one condition?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

[10832] Senator Ferguson. So if they destroyed their last cipher machine they were through as far as receiving cipher code messages in this country?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And they were cut off from Japan?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; as far as those kinds of messages; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And you say that you didn’t come to the conclusion that that message, together with the 1 o’clock delivery message, meant war with the United States?

Captain Kramer. Not to my mind, sir. It did not positively mean war. It indicated an extreme likelihood of war.

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, you used the word “positively” this morning, that you need positive information to make up your mind on a thing like that?

Captain Kramer. I would like to indicate to the Senator again that at no time in my handling of this traffic was I considered responsible for its evaluation.

Senator Ferguson. But you had to give advice on it and did on occasions give advice?

Captain Kramer. My advice chiefly and primarily and almost solely concerned references and explanation of the texts of this traffic.

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, it was a secret [10833] as far as you were concerned, that the Intelligence Branch of our Navy was not evaluating this evidence, but that the War Plans was evaluating it, they were the evaluator, Admiral Turner’s department?

Captain Kramer. My present recollection is that I had no knowledge of such an understanding.

Senator Ferguson. That is right.

Captain Kramer. Of method of procedure.

Senator Ferguson. Now, the people who had a right to evaluate were not in the office as far as you were concerned, you didn’t get a copy of it that night or the next morning, the fourteenth part, you left it with Captain McCollum, and Admiral Turner you didn’t reach?

Captain Kramer. I did not reach Admiral Turner; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. When you came back to the office did you feel certain they were going to attack Britain that morning?

Captain Kramer. I felt reasonably certain in my own mind; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Before 1 o’clock our time, that Britain would be attacked?

Captain Kramer. Probably about 1 o’clock; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, when you drew this so-called time circle you had Pearl Harbor on it, 7:30?

[10834] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Meaning 1 o’clock here, 7:30 there?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then for the British at Singapore you had a time?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; South China Sea area.

Senator Ferguson. Two or three hours; you didn’t put the Philippines on it?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, you had a conversation with Captain McCollum outside of Admiral Stark’s office about this 1 o’clock, that it meant 7:30 at Pearl Harbor, because you showed him that map?

Captain Kramer. I showed him no map, sir. It was purely verbal of a few seconds’ duration.

Senator Ferguson. Well, you had a piece of paper with you?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You didn't carry that with you?
Captain Kramer. I did not; no, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you tell him you had drawn one?
Captain Kramer. No, sir. That is normally to determine, unless you have it readily in mind, the time zones involved. It was to determine such relative time zones.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, what did you tell Captain [10835] McCollum about the 1 o'clock in Washington? Just give us it as near as you can.
Captain Kramer. My recollection of my remarks to Captain McCollum is that it involved only the South China Sea. I do not believe I took the time, since I was in very much of a hurry, to mention or refer in any way to Pearl Harbor.
Senator Ferguson. Well, you told Mr. Richardson that 7:30 at Hawaii would be breakfast time and that certain watches would be at breakfast. What did you tell him that for?
Captain Kramer. I commented on that because I had had before coming to Washington 2 years' duty in a ship based at Pearl Harbor.
Senator Ferguson. Was this just something in your mind at that time and not expressed to any one?
Captain Kramer. It was expressed, as I recollect it, only in Mr. Hull's outer office. It was, of course, in my mind when I drew the time circle.
Senator Ferguson. It was in your mind when you drew the time circle. You didn't tell it to Captain McCollum. You only told him about the one down through the China Sea. Then you went over to Secretary Knox's office?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And you met Colonel Bratton?
Captain Kramer. Either he or one of his senior assistants.
[10836] Senator Ferguson. And some aides to Secretary Knox?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Was it——
Captain Kramer. Secretary Hull.
Senator Ferguson. Secretary Hull? Was the meeting over then?
Captain Kramer. No, sir. My purpose in hurrying so rapidly from Admiral Stark's office was to get to the State Department before that meeting broke up.
Senator Ferguson. What time did you get there?
Captain Kramer. I am less specific on the time I arrived there, but I should say it would be about a quarter of 11.
Senator Ferguson. Did you walk?
Captain Kramer. I walked again as I had on the earlier trip.
Senator Ferguson. So you got there about a quarter to 11, you think?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. It may have been nearer 11 o'clock.
Senator Ferguson. And then is when you told this Military Aide and Secretary of State Hull's aide that 1 o'clock meant 7:30 at Pearl Harbor, and that the watches would be eating breakfast there and there would be less men on the ships?
[10837] Captain Kramer. I made no such comment, sir. The reference which I made to Pearl Harbor there was not emphatic in any way. As I recollect it, it was only a passing remark after these
folders had been delivered and in the few minutes I remained there, as I recollect it—I would like to amend that, sir.

It was part of my remarks when I was explaining to Mr. Hull's secretary the significance, the likely significance of this 1 o'clock time in Washington and its tie-up with the movement of the sun. In other words, time of day in the South China Sea. My recollection is that I mentioned something about the time of day at Pearl Harbor and that point in the conversation. In the few minutes following that my recollection is that I referred again to that purely in passing and I believe primarily for the benefit of the Army officer and these civilian State Department officers who might not be familiar with the ships' routine or Fleet routine on a Sunday morning.

Senator Ferguson. And you then, as I understand it, mentioned about eating breakfast?

Captain Kramer. I don't recall referring to that, no, sir. It was a general remark to the effect that 7:30 on a Sunday morning in the Fleet was probably the quietest time of the week. Something along that line. I cannot be specific.

Senator Ferguson. I am trying to get the substance.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You told Mr. Richardson something about this messing at 7:30 and that some of the officers would be there rather than on their actual watch. I was trying to get whether or not you made that same statement or a similar statement to these officers or these people in the outer office of Secretary Hull's office.

Captain Kramer. That is what I am trying to say, sir; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You did?

Captain Kramer. I did, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And now you say that it was only in passing, that Pearl Harbor being attacked never entered your mind?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And it was only in a passing way that you said that to these officers?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Were you in any way connected with ONI?

Captain Kramer. I was attached to the Far East section of ONI; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. It appears that on December 6 there was a memorandum for Colonel Holbrook. Do you know him?

Captain Kramer. I may have. I don't recollect him now, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know James F. Perry?

Captain Kramer. The same applies to him, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is the memorandum that went from the War Department General Staff, Military Division, G-2, memorandum for Colonel Holbrook, as follows:

Word has just been received from ONI by telephone to the effect that the Japanese Embassy in Washington, D.C., was reliably reported to have burned a code book and ciphers last night.

Signed "James F. Perry."

Did you have any information in ONI that that had taken place?

Captain Kramer. Not that I am aware of; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Would that have meant anything to you?
Captain Kramer. We knew that the Embassy had burned many of their systems, because I have seen the directive from Tokyo to that effect. The fact that traffic was still coming to that embassy on the morning of 7 December indicated to me they still had some systems in hand.

Senator Ferguson. Did it indicate they had at least one machine?

Captain Kramer. At least some systems, yes, sir; one code machine among others.

Senator Ferguson. Now, Captain, do you reconcile your testimony before the Pearl Harbor Navy Board, the Hewitt committee, and this committee, as far as the winds message is concerned? You know what I speak of when I say wind message. This is the one implementing the wind messages.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you claim that they are consistent?

[10841] Captain Kramer. I would state in that respect that they are not consistent, that until a few days ago I was testifying purely from memory after several years, that only in the last few days has my memory been refreshed from an examination of these documents in that respect, sir.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, you don't claim now, and I am going to ask you later exactly what documents you had to refresh your memory, but you don't claim now that your testimony in relation to the winds message is consistent?

Captain Kramer. It is not inconsistent in any respect except as to the date involved.

Senator Ferguson. Now, you say that your testimony is the same except as to date?

Captain Kramer. I believe that is the case, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I just want to take a short time, if I may, on this testimony. This I am taking from the Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry of 1944.

Mr. Murphy. Page?

Senator Ferguson. On the bottom of page 956:

Because of that special arrangement for this particular plain language message, when such a message came through, I believe either the third or the fourth of December—

[10842] You were not certain. You are not really contradicting the date there.

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

—I was shown such a message by the GY watch officer, recognized it as being of this nature, walked with him to Captain Safford's office, and from that point Captain Safford took the ball. I believe Captain Safford went directly to Admiral Noyes' office at that time. Again, because of the fact that this was a plain language message, and because of the fact that special arrangements had been made to handle this Japanese plain language message which had special meaning, I did not handle the distribution of this particular message, the one of the 3rd or 4th.

Now, that is perfectly consistent with your present testimony, is it not?

Captain Kramer. I believe it is, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Because you used the two dates.

Captain Kramer. What was that last remark, Senator?
Senator Ferguson. You used the two dates there, the 3d or 4th.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. My impression was a few days before Pearl Harbor, probably about the middle of the week.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

[10843] Q. You say it is your recollection that you received some Japanese plain language words which corresponded with the language set out in Document 15; is that correct?
A. My statement was, not that I received it, but I was shown it.
Q. Can you recall from looking at Document 15, which Japanese language words you received?

That is question 34.

A. Higashi no kazeame, I am quite certain. The literal meaning of higashi no kazeame is east wind rain. That is plain Japanese language. The sense of that, however, meant strained relations or a break in relations, possibly even implying war with a nation to the eastward, the United States.

Now, it was not suggested in the question any Japanese words. Nothing was suggested in the question. It says:

Can you recall from looking at Document 15 which Japanese language words you received.

And you answered in that language.

Now, is that consistent with your present testimony?

Captain Kramer. I believe it is, sir, in the light of what I stated yesterday afternoon in that regard, that until I testified before that hearing I had had no occasion [10844] whatsoever to recall or refresh my memory. I do not believe it was ever discussed as to what country was involved in that wind message which I saw. My reaction at the time when that question was first propounded was that in view of the fact we were in the midst of a serious war with Japan, it of course must have been the United States.

I had well in mind the Japanese expressions referring to the United States.

Senator Ferguson. But wouldn't it stand to reason that a spontaneous answer made by you at that time, and after you had received Captain Safford's memorandum and had answered him on the 28th or sometime about that time, the 22d of December 1943, your answer that you had been thinking about this, wouldn't a spontaneous answer be correct? Do you now dispute that answer?

Captain Kramer. I was faulty in my recollection at that time, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you want to now dispute that answer?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. I think I have clearly indicated that fact already in this hearing.

Senator Ferguson. Well, you told me you thought your testimony was correct, that you didn't want to change it except as to date?

[10846] Captain Kramer. On that point, Senator, I pointed out yesterday, I think, that later on in that hearing I testified to the effect that in all this traffic, which was my primary source of information at the time of Pearl Harbor, there was still nothing to indicate Japanese overt intentions toward the United States, except the message from Tokyo to Berlin at about the end of November.

Senator Ferguson. Well, that was an overt act, was it not; that was a proposition that they were going to war?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, do you swear, as you did swear, as you did swear before the Pearl Harbor Board, before three of your own admirals, that that statement is false, that I read to you?

Captain Kramer. That is my present belief; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Is it any more than your belief? Are you certain about it?

Captain Kramer. It is conviction, too, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So, then, you contradict your testimony in its entirety as far as that answer is concerned?

Captain Kramer. So far as that point is concerned; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

[10846] Q. Do you remember in what form this communication was that you saw which contained the words about which you have testified, higashi no kazeume?

A. I am almost certain it was typewritten. I believe it was on teletype paper.

Is that true or false?

Captain Kramer. That is still my recollection on that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Is that correct?

Captain Kramer. I believe it is; yes, sir.

[10847] Senator Ferguson. Then you saw those words on the typewritten paper?

Captain Kramer. I saw certain words on this typewritten paper which I have repeatedly emphasized I do not precisely recall. It was, and this is the only thing on which I am certain of in that respect, of the winds code characters.

Senator Ferguson. I read you another question, question number 143:

Q. Were you the officer who went to the Communications Officer and said, “Here it is”?

A. I believe I used that expression when I accompanied the watch officer to Commander Safford’s office.

Now, is that a true or false answer?

Captain Kramer. That could very well be true; yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. For the record, that is on page 980 of the Naval Court of Inquiry.

Senator Ferguson. Now, you appeared before the Hewitt committee, did you not?

Captain Kramer. I did, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Had you talked to anyone before you appeared at the Hewitt Committee?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; I did.

Senator Ferguson. With whom did you talk?

Captain Kramer. To an assistant of Admiral Hewitt’s.

Senator Ferguson. Are you a lawyer?

Captain Kramer. No, sir. Every line officer, however, is required to take examinations on Navy law for each promotion in normal times.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Did he make any suggestions to you, did he show you any papers?

Captain Kramer. I recollect being shown no papers, sir, although he may have. I believe some dispatches were shown me. I recollect being shown no copies of the transcript of previous hearings I testified before, Admiral Murfin's. It was chiefly conversation with regard to discrepancies between my testimony and other witnesses before previous hearings.

Senator Ferguson. And what he did was to discuss with you the discrepancy between your testimony and other witnesses who testified before the Navy Board?

[10849] Captain Kramer. That is in effect correct.

Senator Ferguson. And therefore I assume that he pointed out what the other witnesses had testified to and what you had testified to?

Captain Kramer. The chief subject of conversation was concerning this winds thing in which it appeared my discrepancies chiefy rested.

Senator Ferguson. Now, he stated to you then that your testimony was not in accordance with other witnesses' testimony and he explained what these other witnesses had testified to as it related to the wind code?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And did he tell you who had testified and in what way they had testified?

Captain Kramer. I don't recollect that any particular names were mentioned. Some may have been. Captain Safford's may have been. The chief point of conversation was the discrepancies themselves.

Senator Ferguson. Well, to point out the discrepancies he would have to have with him the testimony or would have to tell you what they had testified to and how it contradicted or was not in accordance with your testimony; isn't that correct?

Captain Kramer. He would have had to study it, I presume;

[10850] yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And did he do that?

Captain Kramer. I do not know, sir. I knew that there were some papers before him. I recollect no copy of the Murfin Court of Inquiry being before him while we conversed at any time. He had various notes before him.

Senator Ferguson. Who did he tell you he represented?

Captain Kramer. Before I engaged in any conversations with him I was given a clear assurance that he was fully authorized to discuss radio intelligence, that he was fully authorized as an assistant of Admiral Hewitt's, to discuss with me these matters on which I had previously testified.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, I come back to the point, if he was telling you the purpose of the examination in relation to reconciling your testimony with other witnesses' testimony in relation to the winds message, wasn't it then by necessity necessary for him to tell you what these other witnesses had testified to?

Captain Kramer. Just what his source of information was in making statements to me I do not know, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What did he say to you about the other testimony?

Captain Kramer. That my testimony differed from other

[10851] witnesses.
Senator Ferguson. How did it differ?

Captain Kramer. In respect primarily to the existence of any wind-system message.

Senator Ferguson. I take it then that he stated to you that other people had testified that it didn’t exist?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you had testified that it did exist?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is correct?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And what did he say about that, what was wrong about that?

Captain Kramer. Whatever he said about that I do not precisely recall, Senator, but I insisted on the accuracy to my best recollection of what I had previously testified to.

Senator Ferguson. And did you so testify before him?

Captain Kramer. I did not testify before him, but before Admiral Hewitt, I believe in his presence.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, you kept to that first testimony before Admiral Hewitt; you didn’t change?

Captain Kramer. To my first testimony before Admiral Murfin and his court.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, what Sonnett told you didn’t cause you to change your testimony and you kept to the same testimony before Admiral Hewitt?

Captain Kramer. In most respects no change whatsoever, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Was there any relation to the winds message?

Captain Kramer. The only respect in which it differed—and, incidentally, I might state I never read to date the transcript of either the Court of Inquiry or the Board of Investigation, except certain parts of my testimony in the Court of Inquiry, not all of it, and such parts as appear in the Naval Narrative—I stated that in the light of thinking about that thing since my previous testimony, in which I believe he pointed out to me what you have just pointed out to me, that I testified it referred to the United States, that I believed that recollection was false at the time of these conversations. At the time of these conversations I was still unaware of what my subsequent testimony before Admiral Murfin’s Board was, which I have referred to.

Senator Ferguson. But didn’t he tell you what your testimony was before the Murfin Board?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; except in general terms.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did he tell you they were only taking testimony of those witnesses that had seen the winds code?

Captain Kramer. That was not the impression I gathered whatsoever, sir. I gained the distinct impression that the chief purpose of Admiral Hewitt’s inquiry or investigation was to fill in the gaps in previous hearings, specifically this I had first-hand knowledge of from being in the South Pacific, to get the testimony of Captain McCollum and Admiral Wilkinson who had not previously testified before a naval inquiry, also to reconcile discrepancies before this previous hearing.
Senator Ferguson. And he stated that the discrepancies were so that you would have an opportunity to change your testimony if you wanted to?

Captain Kramer. If I wanted to; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I want to read from the Hewitt investigation. Your testimony was taken on the 7th and 8th days.

Mr. Murphy. What page?

Senator Ferguson. 151. I am going to read the record of the 8th day before Admiral Hewitt. It is the 23d day of May 1945. Your previous testimony had been on the 22d day of May 1945. [10854] [Reading:]

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, at 2 p.m., Wednesday, 23 May 1945.


Admiral Hewitt. Careful consideration has been given to the evidence concerning the so-called "winds" message with a view to determining whether or not Read Admiral Leigh Noyes, U. S. N., formerly Director of Naval Communications, should be called as a witness. It appears from the testimony of Captain Safford that he thought that a "winds" message relating to the United States was received about 4 December 1941 and was shown to him by Captain Kramer and a watch officer and then delivered to Admiral Noyes. It appears from the testimony of Captain Kramer that he believes that there was some such message at about that time, but that he cannot recall whether or not it referred to the United States, and he is under the impression that it referred to England and possibly to the Dutch rather than to the United States although it may—— and "may" is underscored,

—have referred to the United States also. Captain [10855] Kramer believed that the message in question was delivered to Admiral Noyes. There is yet no other evidence to the effect that a "winds" code message relating to the United States was received.

Upon review of the sworn testimony of Admiral Noyes, given before the Naval Court of Inquiry, it appears that he recalled no such message and that he did not believe that any such message relating to the United States had ever been received by the Navy, although he had some recollection of a "false alarm". Accordingly, I find that no useful purpose would be served by calling Admiral Noyes as a witness in this investigation, and direct that the portions of his previous testimony relating to this subject be incorporated in this record. This decision will be reconsidered should further evidence be developed indicating that a useful purpose would be served by reexamining Admiral Noyes.

(The extracts of testimony of Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, U. S. N., before the Naval Court of Inquiry, follow.)

And then they put in certain questions and certain answers.

Now, is his description of your testimony a fair analysis of your testimony?

Captain Kramer. I believe it is, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?


Mr. Murphy. At page 7969 of the Naval Court of Inquiry, question 96:

Q. Do I understand you to mean that your Section could not have stated categorically that the message meant war or merely a break in diplomatic relations but that all three of those possibilities were available to anyone interpreting that message?

A. That is precisely correct. I can definitely state that I would not interpret that message as meaning definitely war.
That is also in the Naval Court of Inquiry.
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Are you through, Mr. Murphy?
Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Coming back to your testimony, Captain Kramer, testifying before Admiral Hewitt, after your memory had been refreshed as to whether or not it conflicted with other witnesses, you said this:

I would like to continue the statement, Admiral, by saying for that reason I am now at least under the impression that the message referred to England and possibly the Dutch rather than the United States, although it may have referred to the United States, too.

[10857] Or possibly it may have referred to Russia?—

Hewitt said. Said Captain Kramer:

I just don't recall.

Captain Kramer. In that connection, Senator, I would like to point out that my only intention in stating that I did not recall was that I did not and still do not recall precisely the wording of that piece of teletype paper.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Now, I want to read some answers that are in Admiral Noyes' testimony and ask you if you can enlighten me on those answers. Did you ever talk to Admiral Noyes on this question?

Captain Kramer. I have never seen Admiral Noyes since a few days, possibly as late as a month, after Pearl Harbor.

Senator Ferguson. Did you talk to him about Pearl Harbor?

Captain Kramer. I recollect no conversations although there may have been.

Senator Ferguson. Just recently did you meet with any admirals or any Navy men to discuss your testimony or discuss Pearl Harbor?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Who were they?

Captain Kramer. Admiral Stark, Admiral Schuirmann and

[10858] Captain McCollum.

Senator Ferguson. And where did you meet and when?

Captain Kramer. At Admiral Stark's home last fall.

Senator Ferguson. About when?

Captain Kramer. It was, I believe, the middle or latter part of September.

Senator Ferguson. That was after this inquiry was started?

Captain Kramer. I do not believe the inquiry had started then but was directed to be started.

Mr. Keefe. Will the Senator, as we are going along, to save time later, will you ascertain whether or not this meeting wasn't just before Captain Kramer went to the hospital?

Senator Ferguson. Was it, Captain, just before you went to the hospital?

Captain Kramer. It was a few days before I went to the hospital for the second time. The first time I had gone there for a routine check-up and remained there for about a week, following which I was given sick leave and went to Miami.

[10859] Senator Ferguson. But this second time was before you went back to the hospital the second time?
Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, how long were you, Admiral Stark, Admiral Schirrmann, and Captain McCollum together?

Captain Kramer. For a period of about 1 hour, perhaps one hour and a half, most of which time we were at lunch.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you discuss Pearl Harbor?

Captain Kramer. We discussed some aspects of it; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What were the aspects?

Captain Kramer. The principal one that stands out in my mind now, and I have referred to being refreshed on this point before this hearing by Captain McCollum, is with respect to the presence or absence of Admiral Stark's flag secretary, Commander Wellborn, or of Captain McCollum in Admiral Stark's office that Sunday morning.

Senator Ferguson. How did you get to Admiral Stark's home? I mean were you invited, called up, or by letter or what?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; I had a short note from him inviting me to a luncheon.

Senator Ferguson. At a specific time?

Captain Kramer. At a specific date and time; yes, sir.

[10860] Senator Ferguson. Did he tell you who would be there?

Captain Kramer. No, sir. I did not know until I arrived there.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, going back to this question, one of the questions brought up was as to what time Admiral Stark got down and whether there was a conference in his office at a certain time Sunday morning?

Captain Kramer. That was the chief point that now stands out in my memory that we specifically discussed. The other things that we discussed were of a very general nature. It was largely and primarily a social affair and we discussed old times at that luncheon.

Senator Ferguson. Well, at that time Pearl Harbor was rather old.

Captain Kramer. Of course it was, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. And do you now tell us that that is all of the conversation that you had at this meeting with Admiral Stark as it related to Pearl Harbor?

Captain Kramer. Senator, at no time during that luncheon do I recall that any details such as this winds message were discussed. It was very general in nature.

Senator Ferguson. Did you find out or ask Admiral Stark where he was Saturday night that you could not reach him on the telephone?

[10861] Captain Kramer. That point came up, too; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And what did he say as to where he had been?

Captain Kramer. My recollection now is that he does not or did not remember to this date where he was that particular night.

Senator Ferguson. Did you mention that you had tried to reach him?

Captain Kramer. I did, sir.

Senator Ferguson. This is Admiral Wilkinson's testimony. I want to see whether I can refresh your memory on this. This is page 4664 of our record. [Reading:]

I am not sure of my own recollection. Captain Kramer tells me I went to the phone and called up, apparently, Admiral Stark, or Admiral Turner. I asked Kramer whom he had shown it to, and he said he left a copy at the White
House, and had shown it in person to Secretary Knox, who had gone over it, made some telephone calls, and told him to bring it back to the Secretary of State the next morning.

This is Wilkinson.

**Captain Kramer.** Yes, sir.

**Senator Ferguson** (reading):

While Kramer was there, or perhaps after he left— again my recollection is stimulated by him, but it is not very clear—he said I made some telephone calls. I may have attempted to raise Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner again, on the basis of his information that they were not there. However, both General Miles and myself, and to some extent Captain Kramer, felt that this was a diplomatic message; it was a message that indicated, or that resembled the diplomatic White Papers, of which we had often seen examples, that it was a justification of the Japanese position.

The strain was largely in the fourteenth part which we discussed the next morning.

Now, does that recall to your memory that you discussed with Wilkinson these question?

**Captain Kramer.** On the night of 6 December 1941 I did, sir.

**Senator Ferguson.** 6th of December 1941?

**Captain Kramer.** Yes, sir.

**Senator Ferguson.** Well, then, as I assume, you and Wilkinson reviewed this on the night of the 6th and is that when he is telling that you refreshed his memory? Is that what he is talking about?

**Captain Kramer** tells me I went to the phone and called up.

If you were at his home you would not be telling him that. This is a later conversation?

**Senator Ferguson.** Yes, sir; it is.

**Captain Ferguson.** All right. When did you discuss that with Wilkinson?

**Captain Kramer.** I have seen Admiral Wilkinson since Pearl Harbor three or four times. Three of those times were in the South Pacific. At none of those three occasions were things discussed concerning Pearl Harbor in any way. They were all of very short duration, 3 to 5 minutes, because he was a very busy man, in charge of the Third Amphibious Force. The occasions of those conversations were purely social in nature. In fact, one of them was call by me at his office to meet him again.

On two of those occasions I recollect his introducing me to some of his senior staff officers, one of whom I had known as a midshipman, on a midshipman practice cruise. He was then Captain Doyle.

The next occasion on which I saw Admiral Wilkinson was after he returned to the United States from Japan, I believe around the middle of December 1945, by air after 4 days flight, when I saw him in one of the rooms in the Navy Department made available to contemplated witnesses before this hearing.

**Senator Ferguson.** Was that a room where the officers could get together and discuss the testimony?

**Captain Kramer.** It was a room which was made available to witnesses where they could have a desk if they wanted one—I have never requested a personal desk, although in the past 2 or 3 weeks I have been using one—and leave their outer garments and make such studies of the documents as Mr. Baecher, the liaison officer with counsel for this committee, had.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, do you remember having this conversation? You gave a long answer, but do you remember having such a conversation with Wilkinson?

Captain Kramer. There was a conversation with Admiral Wilkinson. In fact, during the course of the conversation—this was the afternoon of the day I arrived back from sick leave from Miami, I can refresh my memory on the precise date; I had arrived after an overnight train ride early in the morning.

During the course of that conversation Admiral Kirk came into the office, too. He is now, I believe, on the General Board of the Navy. Admiral Kirk was Admiral Wilkinson's predecessor in—

Senator Ferguson. Well, can't you answer that question a little shorter than you are answering? I don't want to cut you off in any way.

[10865] Captain Kramer. I want to be as clear as I possibly can on the circumstances of that meeting, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have a conversation such as he relates?

“Captain Kramer tells me.”

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; we did.

Senator Ferguson. You did have?

Captain Kramer. We did; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did Admiral Stark or anyone at the Stark meeting have any of the testimony, any particular testimony that you reviewed?

Captain Kramer. There were no papers whatsoever at that luncheon with Admiral Stark.

Senator Ferguson. And the wind message or any connection with it was not mentioned?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. The pilot message or the 14 parts were not mentioned?

Captain Kramer. Not that I presently recollect; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And the only thing that you remember in relation to Pearl Harbor was the fact as to whether or not there was a meeting on the morning as far as McCollum and Admiral Stark were concerned, is that correct?

Captain Kramer. It was at that point, sir, during the conversations we had that my memory was first refreshed on the fact that it was Captain McCollum and not Admiral Stark's flag secretary who had received those folders from me that morning.

Senator Ferguson. Now, were they trying to refresh your memory on a point like that?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; not at all. It just occurred in the course of our conversation.

Senator Ferguson. Well, was the conversation about Pearl Harbor?

Captain Kramer. There was some conversation about Pearl Harbor; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What was the other part of the conversation about if this thing just occurred in that conversation?

Captain Kramer. That point, Senator, is the only one in which I believe my memory was refreshed concerning Pearl Harbor.

Senator Ferguson. That is the only one that you can give us at this time?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. It is my belief that I did more refreshing during the course of that luncheon to these other officers than otherwise.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I want to go back to Admiral Noyes, to some of his testimony and ask you about it. Question 144 on page 155 of Noyes' testimony [reading]:

[10,867] Did you ever discuss the winds message or the receipt of it with the Chief of Naval Operations?

A. When the message came in, as I remember it, we considered it more important than a later study indicated. The message only said that relations were strained.

Captain Kramer. Which message?

Senator Ferguson. Talking about the winds message.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. The message of the fourth or fifth, or the third as it is now indicated, the implementing message.

Captain Kramer. The winds message; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; the winds. When I speak of the "winds" message I mean the implementing message.

Now, do you remember any discussion in the Department that it was not as strong as war, that it only said, the message only said that relations were strained? Do you remember a discussion about that?

Captain Kramer. You are speaking about a discussion in Admiral Stark's office, sir?

Mr. Richardson. I think you had better read the question to him.

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Captain Kramer. I recall no specific discussion with [10,868] Admiral Stark concerning the winds message.

Senator Ferguson. No, no; with Noyes, with anyone about it.

Captain Kramer. I have previously testified and it is my present recollection that in making deliveries after the winds message was received I very probably mentioned it to recipients, at least some of them; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, a message came from Batavia. Did you see that message?

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir, until quite recently.

Mr. Murphy. May I have the previous question and answer read?

(The question and answer were read by the reporter.)

Captain Kramer. Although I probably was shown it as one of the exhibits before previous hearings.

Senator Ferguson. Read the last answer.

Mr. Murphy. And the previous question also, please.

(The question and answer were read by the reporter.)

Senator Ferguson. Now, this Batavia message indicates that Batavia or the Dutch had anticipated or intercepted the two messages 2353 and 2354—

Captain Kramer. Not necessarily, Senator.

Senator Ferguson (continuing). In another message.

Captain Kramer. My recollection is that at the time I [10,869] was under the impression that in all probability the British at Singapore had given that information to the Dutch, although there was a possibility that the Dutch themselves were engaged in this cryptanalytical work.
Senator Ferguson. Now, going back: You said that you talked to the recipients about this winds message and when we are talking about the winds message we are talking about the implementing message.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. How would you have discussed that with them if you had never delivered it to them?

Captain Kramer. I knew of its existence. I knew in detail, in some detail the special provisions for its handling and it was only natural that I might have mentioned it; very probably did, during the course of deliveries of other traffic that day.

Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, there was a winds message. Now, let us leave out what was in it.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; there was.

Senator Ferguson. There was a winds message?

Captain Kramer. Which I recognized at the time as such.

Senator Ferguson. That is right. Now, we are definite on that one thing, that there was a winds message and you recognized it as such on the day in question?

[10870] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now I will ask you this: You mentioned this morning that you might be able to do some searching to find out some questions, and one was—and I am going to ask you to do two things. One was in relation to the file, and what I would like to have you do is to get an expert with you to ascertain whether the typewriter that wrote that “Cancelled?” on that file was ever used in your department or in some other. Now, there are Washington people that can help you on that question.

Then I would like to have you do another thing, to try to locate the winds message, I don’t care what is in it, that you now say definitely was received and, as you say, it was in line with what you thought on that day as being a reply to those two previous questions.

Mr. Murphy. Now, will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Now, wait.

Mr. Murphy. I think I ought to object, Mr. Chairman. I don’t see how this committee can assign to any naval officer, a captain who is a witness, the obligation of engaging experts to go over and test papers, and I think if we need an expert the committee ought to engage one.

Senator Ferguson. Let him try to find this winds message for us and let him then try to find how this file was. He [10871] offered this morning to do that, he thought that he could do it.

Mr. Murphy. You are assigning the responsibility to a witness to engage an expert. Let the committee engage one if we need one, but don’t let the witnesses go around to engage experts on their own responsibility.

Senator Ferguson. I will ask counsel to do the same thing. Let this man look. Maybe he can find some of this stuff.

Now, the next thing is—

Captain Kramer. Senator, with respect to the winds message, I would like to state that it would be an extremely unusual thing for such a winds message to be in existence for more than a few hours after receipt in the Navy Department unless it came into my section, which it never did. All that plain-language traffic for which special
monitoring was set up about 10 days before Pearl Harbor was burnt, to my best knowledge and belief, as a matter of routine. As soon as it had been scanned to determine whether there was or was not a winds message in it it was destroyed.

As far as the likelihood or otherwise of the existence of such a piece of teletype paper now in the files of the Navy Department, it is my present understanding, and was then, that it would not be preserved unless it came into my section, [10872] where everything that we translated was preserved and filed.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Then if it did not come into your section, as I understand the way it was set up that these cards were to be used and, therefore, delivery was to be made by telephone or some other handling than by you, it would not come into your section.

Captain Kramer. It very probably would not although it might come into my section.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Then if it might, see what you can do about it.

Now, let me take you to this message from Batavia. It is dated the 5th of December 1941, according to our copy, and this is not a photostatic copy. It is a mimeographed paper.

The photostatic copy is dated the 5th of December 1941. Now, I want you to look at the so-called date on when it was received, if you can give it to us. On the copy that I have got is “O” canceled through, 310, “O” canceled through, 30 “O” canceled through. You see what I am talking about?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, what is that date?

Captain Kramer. That is 10:30 Greenwich time on the 3d of December Greenwich date.

Senator Ferguson. Now, does that indicate that it was received here on the third?

[10873] Captain Kramer. Not necessarily; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, what date was it received here?

Captain Kramer. I see nothing on this piece of paper to indicate when it was received here, sir, except the date “5 December” at the top, which may be that.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, at least when that was received in the War and in the Navy Department and the State Department the Dutch interpreted the setting up of a winds code message, that it meant war, whereas we interpreted it as meaning a breaking off of strained relations, is that correct?

Captain Kramer. I never saw this message, Senator, at the time. I was told about it and the only reaction I recall to this message was in connection with the security aspects of my work, the wider dissemination of this crypt-analytical material than I had heretofore been aware of.

Senator Ferguson. I am now informed that the Navy records show that this message I am talking about, that is dated the 5th and is shown here as “313” was received at 1:21 a.m. on the 4th of December 1941 by the Navy.

So the Navy knew on the 4th at 1:21 a.m., on the morning of the 4th, that the Dutch interpreted these two messages that we had re-
ceved setting up the code as being a decision of war rather than just strained relations, because it reads this way:

[10874] From Thorpe for Miles War Dept.—
this is OPNAV—

Code intercept: Japan will—
showing that they got it by code, intercepted a code and cipher:

Japan will notify her consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end. East wind rain XXXXX United States: North wind cloudy Russia; West wind clear England with attack on Thailand Malay and Dutch East Indies. Will be repeated twice or may use compass directions only. In this case words will be introduced five times in general text.

Now, the part I was interested in is that the Dutch interpreted it to mean war and the Navy had a copy of that Dutch interpretation.

Captain Kramer. Senator, I have no first-hand knowledge of how this message was handled, but on that point I should like to remark that the British translation furnished to the Asiatic Fleet, Admiral Hart, I consider a precise and accurate translation now of those Japanese circulars; that from a present scanning of these documents I do not consider it unusual that the Dutch considered this thing as referring to a war decision so far as the Dutch were concerned since, as I recall it, the expression used with regard to the Netherlands East Indies was the Japanese word "koreauku," which means "occupation."

Senator Ferguson. All right. Then you explain that at least, that it would mean war with the Dutch the way it read?

Captain Kramer. There had been previous occupations which did not involve war, such as that of French Indochina.

Senator Ferguson. But it was not Holland.

Captain Kramer. It was the French, no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, if you surrender it never means war. That is what the French did.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, is it fair to say that what I read you from Batavia is a fair translation of message circular 2353, page 154 of Exhibit 1?

Captain Kramer. I do not consider that a translation, sir. It is apparently a version of that translation which passed through several hands before being drafted by Alusna of Batavia.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Well, at least it was their intelligence that it meant war, that same message?

Captain Kramer. That appears to be or have been the feeling in Java, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Were you ever instructed in any way that certain memorandums, files, and so forth were to be destroyed—not files. I will change that. Any memorandums, [10876] diaries, and things of that nature were to be destroyed or handed over to the service?

Captain Kramer. Until I arrived in the Central Pacific in June of 1943 I was aware of no such orders to destroy memoranda. Those I became aware of when I arrived there were orders and directives issued by Admiral Nimitz with reference to the keeping of diaries in the Pacific area.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know that in the Clausen report this
appears on page 253 as far as it relates to the Army, and I will try
and get another order of the Navy [reading]:

It is recommended that, for security reasons, the Secretary of War direct all
witnesses heretofore and hereafter examined by me—
that is, either Army or Navy witnesses—
to send or give me forthwith, for filing with the records of this investigation,
any copies of affidavits made before me and any incidental and related notes
or papers which may be in their possession or under their control, they to
advise me in writing that this has been done or that there are no such records,
and that they be advised that these records will be available in the War Depart-
ment in the event access thereto is ever required.

Now, did you hear of that instruction?

[10877] Captain Kramer. I never did; no, sir. I did receive an
official letter from Admiral Theobald, Director of Naval Intelligence,
last summer or late spring to the effect that Mr. Clausen, then I believe
a major, was conducting an investigation and was authorized to take
testimony. I was never called before Clausen.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did you know of any order in October
1942 in relation to memorandums and papers in the Navy?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. In your opinion did the destroying of codes
mean war, if a nation orders its codes and machines destroyed?

Captain Kramer. That is one construction, certainly, to be placed
on it; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, when did we instruct our mili-
tary and naval attaché in Tokyo to destroy their code machine and,
as a matter of fact, it was destroyed?

Captain Kramer. I am not aware that our attachés in the Far East
at any time held code machines, although I am not familiar precisely
with what cryptographic systems they held. I do distinctly recall in
connection with the drafting of those directives, at least, the first one
or two of them in Admiral Noyes' office, shortly after lunch on De-
cember 4, 1941, [10878] that Admiral Noyes' remarks while
I was present were to the effect that as a precautionary measure he
contemplated or intended to have all superfluous material destroyed
but that one channel was to be left to these attachés, namely, a private
channel between their post and Washington.

Senator Ferguson. So, then, you did not know that the naval attaché
in Tokyo had a machine?

Captain Kramer. I knew he used cryptographic aids. I never have
known just what ones they were; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you know that he was instructed on
the fourth or fifth to destroy the machine and the codes?

Captain Kramer. I know that Admiral Noyes contemplated and,
in fact, drafted in my presence a message directing destruction of cer-
tain or most, at least with one exception, of their cryptographic aids.

Senator Ferguson. Wasn't that on Guam where that message was
sent rather than to Tokyo?

Captain Kramer. I believe the second message drafted in my pres-
ence was only addressed to Guam, with many other information ad-
dresses. Captain Safford was called to Admiral Noyes' office while
this discussion in my presence took place, because Captain Safford
was in charge of the registered publications section of the Navy De-
partment, could determine in detail just what systems those attachés
held and could [10879] put those messages into final form for
sending.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, will you look at Exhibit 37, page 42?
Do you know what one was left, or did that indicate that one was left
on the 4th of December 1941?

Destroy this system at discretion and report.

Mr. Murphy. You have taken the copy, Senator. The witness
does not have any. Will you read the question to the witness?
(The question was read by the reporter.)

Captain Kramer. What was the question, sir?

Senator Ferguson. This would indicate that they were just to de-
stroy a part, and that part of the machine was to remain in existence?

Captain Kramer. That one cryptographic system, whether it was a
machine or not I did not and I do not know, was to be kept but could
be destroyed at discretion and if destroyed a report to that effect was
to be made during the word “Javorach.”

Senator Ferguson. Now, when were the language officers taken
from Japan?

Captain Kramer. In about August 1941, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what part of August?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that we had given Japan
[10880] a note on August the 17th indicating that she was not to
move any farther south?

Captain Kramer. I had no first-hand contact at any time with
diplomatic notes except what I saw in this decrypted traffic.

Senator Ferguson. And you do not recall that message delivered on
a Sunday morning when the President returned from the Atlantic
conference? You don’t remember that message?

Captain Kramer. I do not recall it specifically now. An exami-
nation of those documents might refresh my memory.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you know what our policy was in
relation to Japan moving south?

Captain Kramer. As regards high policy here in Washington and
of the United States Government most of my information—I cannot
state categorically that all of my information, but I say nearly all,
was based on newspapers and other periodicals.

Senator Ferguson. So far as the foreign policy of America was
concerned and as far as you were concerned, it was based on new-
papers and articles that appeared in the public press?

Captain Kramer. For the most part; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. You were not given any particular brief-
ing in what our policy was so that you would be able to interpret these
messages?

[10881] Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I will read to you this message and see
whether or not you know anything about the part I have in mind.
This is on page 556 of Foreign Relations of the United States and
Japan, 1931–1941, volume 2, printed about 1943, after Pearl Harbor.

[Reading from Exhibit No. 29:]

Such being the case, this Government now finds it necessary to say to the government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.

Did you know that that note was delivered on the 17th of August 1941?

Captain Kramer. If it appeared in this decrypted traffic I undoubtedly would have known of it.

Senator Ferguson. But you do not recall it; it did not impress you any?

Captain Kramer. I do not recall now on that point; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, having that in mind now, would it mean anything if they were going to strike down in the Kra Peninsula or the British near Singapore the morning of the 7th, after your memory being refreshed on this thing I just read you?

Captain Kramer. I do not know, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You took a file over to Secretary Forrestal's office while Mr. Knox was out at Pearl Harbor making an investigation, did you not?

Captain Kramer. I did, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And do you know where that file is today?

Captain Kramer. I doubt very much whether that file existed for more than a day or two, perhaps as long as a week after it was shown to Mr. Forrestal. It was made up from extra copies we still had in our office of this decrypted material not yet destroyed.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, there was then an investigation going on by Mr. Knox and only a little later, about a week later, by the Roberts commission?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you did not keep this extra material; it was destroyed later?

Captain Kramer. It was not kept in a separate folder that I recall, sir, although Mr. Forrestal may have held it for a few days. I simply do not recall that point.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did you have a conversation with Mr. Forrestal as to whether or not he wanted that for Mr. Knox' knowledge? Was that his purpose?

Captain Kramer. That is not my understanding of it at all, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Why was it taken to Mr. Forrestal?

Captain Kramer. Because of the fact that it was my understanding, and still is, that he saw practically none of this traffic but Mr. Knox saw most of it or all of it.

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, do I understand Mr. Forrestal was making an investigation of this case?

Captain Kramer. No, sir. The purpose of bringing that file up at all, as I understood it then, and still understand it, was simply to acquaint Mr. Forrestal, who then was Acting Secretary of the Navy in Mr. Knox's absence, with the traffic immediately preceding Pearl Harbor.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, war had started then. Did he explain why he wanted to see it if it was not an investigation?

Captain Kramer. He did not explain to me, sir, and it was not explained specifically in so many terms why he wanted to see it. I was told to prepare such a folder. I do not recall who told me; very likely Captain McCollum.

Senator Ferguson. Did you look for this wind execute message to put it in at that time?

Captain Kramer. There was no wind execute message in my files at that time, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Captain Kramer. Or at any time that I am aware of.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Then if it was not in your file you did not look for it to put it into this file for the Secretary of the Navy.

Captain Kramer. I specifically recall that this so-called hidden word message was included in that file. There was no discussion whatsoever as to the systems these different messages in that file came in. I further specifically recall that I pointed out to Mr. Forrestal that the United States should be included in the wording of that message as typed up.

Senator Ferguson. Then how do you account for this fact, that we were furnished at this late date the message on page 251:

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations—

and that you knew a few days later that that was a wrong translation?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

[10885] Senator Ferguson. Why were we not furnished with both copies? Why did we get this copy only that indicated a breach with England?

Captain Kramer. I do not know who prepared Exhibit 1.

Senator Ferguson. But that is not a correct translation of the message?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, look on page 204 of Exhibit 1. Did the President ever ask you for that message that he might retain it?

Senator Lucas. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. What is the difference between those two messages that you just inquired about?

Senator Ferguson. That the “United States” ought to be inserted. To make this clear for Senator Lucas and for the record:

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectations—

a true translation of that message is what?

Captain Kramer (reading):

Relations between Japan and England and the United States are not in accordance with expectations.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

[10886] Senator Ferguson. The corrected one, as I understand it, is in the Hewitt report, but to correct this one—we were handed this one and that is not a correct translation.
Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know of any other translations that are not correct in this book?

Captain Kramer. I have pointed out a discrepancy in our translation of Tokyo's circular 2353 and 2354 due to the garbled version of that message we had at the time of the translation. That is the only other one of which I am now aware of any discrepancy in.

Senator Ferguson. You have pointed that out in the record.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. All right.
Mr. Murphy. Will the senator yield?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. Is this not in the book 251 a correct copy of magic as such? I mean exhibit 1 is supposed to be the magic that was delivered to all of these recipients. It was delivered to the recipients as it is here. The correction was made after he went back to the department. As I understand it, he made some phone calls and then the war started.

[10887] Captain Kramer. That is correct, Mr. Murphy.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, do you understand that this is only the way it was delivered and no corrections have been given to us if there were corrections?

Captain Kramer. I do not know just what has been given to this committee, sir.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Now look at page 204. Were you ever asked by the President or his aide to leave with him or to return to him that Tokyo to Berlin message?

Captain Kramer. A day or two after the original version as it appears here was delivered to the President I received a request from the President's aide, Captain Beardall, to the effect that the President desired to retain a copy of this message. I, in compliance with that request, prepared a paraphrase of this message which was turned over to Captain Beardall. It's present disposition I do not know.

Senator Ferguson. To the best of your knowledge what date is that?

Captain Kramer. Probably about the 2d or 3d of December 1941.
Senator Ferguson. That is the one that says:

Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and [10888] add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.

That conversation was to be between the Jap Ambassador in Germany and Hitler and Ribbentrop?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You never took it back then to the office after you gave a copy to the aide?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, to make the record clear, we have been furnished a correct translation of that message on page 251 of 142-C and it reads this way:

Relations between Japan and ——— are approaching a crisis, on the verge of danger, England, United States.

Is that a fair translation?
Captain Kramer. That, sir, I consider an inaccurate translation of the Japanese translation, which in the light of seeing the work sheet just a few days ago I believe reads:

NIHON to —— TORRO KITAI NI HAN SU.

The essential part of that Japanese sentence is "KITAI NI HAN SU," which means, precisely, and can be determined from this standard Japanese-English dictionary before me, "Not in accordance with expectations," or it means "Disappointment in expectations," or things to that effect. There is nothing whatsoever implying crisis or war in the Japanese phraseology.

Senator Ferguson. Did you attend a meeting on the morning of the 6th between some Navy officers who were in consultation about getting news to the Pacific?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that McCollum had prepared a message of information?

Captain Kramer. I heard about that one during the course of the Roberts hearings from, I believe, Captain McCollum.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, you meant while the Roberts hearings were going on. You were not a witness there?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did McCollum tell you that?

Captain Kramer. In a few of the brief conversations we had my recollection is that I learned at one of those conversations that he had prepared some type of message. I never saw it and am unfamiliar and was unfamiliar at the time with the detailed phraseology used.

Senator Ferguson. Did he tell you what was in the message?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; not in detail, just in general terms that he had drafted a message about the general situation.

Senator Ferguson. Now, isn't this a fair statement, or is it, that the officers down in the Department, in the Intelligence Department there, were greatly concerned about information going or not going to the Pacific and that they were attempting to get some information out or drafting messages to suggest information? Is that a correct statement?

Captain Kramer. I believe it is; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I asked you this before but I want to be sure of this: You had no concern over the question as to whether or not relations were broken between Japan and England?

Captain Kramer. What do you mean by "concern"?

Senator Ferguson. Well, grave concern that it would mean war to us.

Captain Kramer. Naturally, Senator, as a United States citizen I was concerned, as I believe many other citizens were, with a possibility of the collapse of England.

Senator Ferguson. That is the way it concerned you, not that it meant war between Japan and this country?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, did we have a watch on the Tokyo-England-London circuit?

Captain Kramer. I am not familiar with the details of precisely what circuits we covered, sir. Certainly, during the period of days and weeks preceding Pearl Harbor we were getting some traffic addressed to London or originating in London.
Senator Ferguson. Now I come back to one question that I would like to work out and that is this 901 and 900. I can pass that now and look over it and then come back to it some time later. I will look at that and then I will come back later and ask you some questions.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is all I have at the present time.

The Vice Chairman. You are through for the present, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; and then I will come back later.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Keefe of Wisconsin will inquire, Captain.

Mr. Keefe. Captain Kramer, what is your age?

Captain Kramer. About forty-two and a half, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You and Captain Safford have always been, at least up until now, good friends, have you not?

Captain Kramer. Unless testimony I have given before this hearing has altered his views I do not think our relations have changed in any respect, sir.

[10892] Mr. Keefe. That is not an answer to my question. You have been good friends, have you not?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; office friends, not social friends.

Mr. Keefe. I was a little disturbed by some testimony that you gave yesterday with respect to a visit by Captain Safford to you in the hospital.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Am I to assume that you intended to convey the impression that that was a gratuitous visit on the part of Captain Safford which your relations with him did not justify?

Captain Kramer. That is not quite the impression I intended to convey; no, sir. I was somewhat surprised at that visit but not at all too surprised, I believe I expressed myself.

Mr. Keefe. Well, you stated that he had brought you a box of candy.

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. As though that were wholly unexpected and perhaps had some sinister purpose behind it. Did you mean anything like that?

Captain Safford. None whatsoever, sir. I believe it is customary in making visits to patients in a hospital to bring [10893] things of that nature.

Mr. Keefe. Why, of course, and you did not intend by that statement that you made yesterday to imply that Captain Safford had any sinister purpose in visiting you at the hospital, did you?

Captain Kramer. None whatsoever, sir.

Mr. Keefe. No. Or that he came out there for the purpose of trying to enlist your aid in connection with testimony to be given before this committee?

Captain Kramer. None whatsoever, sir.

Mr. Keefe. He did not even discuss Pearl Harbor with you at the time he visited you at the hospital, did he?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You played a game of chess?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Did he visit you more than once?
Captain Kramer. On two occasions, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Now, you stated yesterday that you had about eight visitors, you think, while you were at the hospital.
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Will you tell us who those visitors were besides Captain Safford?
Captain Kramer. I did not expect to be questioned on that point,
Mr. Keefe. [10894] Mr. Keefe. If there is anything——
Captain Kramer. I believe I could refresh my memory in detail on that. Offhand I can recall the name of one of them, Mister—rather, retired Maj. A. B. C. Graves, who is a member of the Washington Chess Divan, of which I have been a member.
Mr. Keefe. Did any person other than Mr. Gearhart and myself talk to you about Pearl Harbor at any time that you were at the hospital?
Captain Kramer. That is precisely accurate, sir, except one patient in the hospital, namely, a former classmate of mine, a Commander Powell, who was in a room near mine in the hospital. In the course of our general conversations I mentioned the fact that I was engaged at the time of Pearl Harbor in handling cryptographic material and I undoubtedly mentioned the fact and the thought I might be a witness before the contemplated hearing, this hearing.
Mr. Keefe. Commander Powell was a classmate of yours?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. He had been retired from the Navy for some years and had come back into the Navy?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; during the war.
Mr. Keefe. Mrs. Powell and Mrs. Kramer were friends, too, were they not?
[10895] Captain Kramer. Mrs. Kramer has never met Mrs. Powell until recently, last fall.
Mr. Keefe. I see, but she met Mrs. Powell then?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Are those all the people that you can recall? Commander Powell was a patient suffering from arthritis, was he not?
Captain Kramer. I am not sure what the diagnosis in his case was,
Mr. Keefe.
Mr. Keefe. Well, in any event he was taking treatment out there?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Now, then, you have told us of some General or some man that was in some chess divan. You talked about chess?
Captain Kramer. There was one other individual from the chess divan. Just which one I do not recall at the moment.
Mr. Keefe. Of course, the reason that I ask these questions is because the hospital record which I have examined only shows the visit of Captain Safford. You are sure that there were others?
Captain Kramer. I am positive of that, sir. In connection with the hospital record I would like to point out [10896] that it was not until last month that I was aware of a hospital rule to the effect that patients leaving the hospital during the day should sign out in a book. That, incidentally, Mr. Keefe, is the reason I believe why you were not able to be informed on the occasion of the day before our
interview last fall of where I was. I had apparently violated a hospital regulation in that respect.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, Mr. Gearhart and I did speak to you at the hospital?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. And we had about 4½-hour conversation with you?

Captain Kramer. Which I would characterize as very pleasant in nature.

Mr. Keeffe. A very pleasant conversation. There was no attempt to bulldoze you or change your opinion or anything of that kind, was there?

Captain Kramer. None whatsoever, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. And Mrs. Kramer was present during the entire course of that conversation?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. And Captain Duncan was kind enough to serve us a luncheon while we were sitting in the room?

Captain Kramer. A brief lunch, yes, sir.

[10897] Mr. Keeffe. You recall that very well?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Now, you had been chafing some because of the fact that you were required to stay out there in the hospital, weren't you, Captain?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. And you had expressed that to your Commander friend and others that came to see you, hadn't you?

Captain Kramer. I believe I expressed it only to Commander Powell, who was the only patient I had previously known.

Mr. Keeffe. Yes, and you gave expression to the fact that you felt if you could get word to Ross McIntire you might be permitted to leave the hospital, didn't you?

Captain Kramer. I don't recall that statement.

Mr. Keeffe. You don't recall that?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. You were clothed in pajamas and bathrobe, were you not?

Captain Kramer. That was customary for all patients.

Mr. Keeffe. Why, exactly. There was nothing unusual about it.

Captain Kramer. None at all, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. You were not permitted to eat at the officers' mess out there, were you?

Captain Kramer. No, sir. The meals were served to all patients in that particular part of the hospital on trays.

Mr. Keeffe. Exactly. Now, the day before Mr. Gearhart and I came out your uniform was restored so that you could go with Mrs. Kramer on a shopping tour?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. She had arrived just a few days before.

Mr. Keeffe. Yes. And there had been some publicity in the newspapers about the speech that had been made on the floor of Congress the day before, hadn't there?

Captain Kramer. I became aware of that, yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Yes. And the next day was the day that your uniform was restored to you and you were permitted temporary leave from the hospital, isn't that true?

Captain Kramer. I am not sure which event preceeded or followed which, Mr. Keefe. I undoubtedly could refresh my memory on that by going over it in more detail. I know, however, that the proximate and prime cause of the uniform being restored was so that I could leave the hospital with my wife who had just arrived there.

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

Captain Kramer. Before that there was no reason for my subsisting out.

[10899] Mr. Keefe. Yes. Now, you first went to the hospital in August, did you not?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. About the 28th of August?

Captain Kramer. That may be correct, sir. I believe it is.

Mr. Keefe. Yes, I checked it.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And then you went back to the hospital the 23d of September.

Captain Kramer. About that date I believe, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And in the meantime had you been down to Miami with your family?

Captain Kramer. On sick leave, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, you, Captain Kramer—and I want this to be said in the record—had, prior to that time, rendered a most distinguished service to your country, there is no question about that fact. That should appear clearly. Now, you would say also that Captain Safford had rendered a most distinguished service to his country, would you not?

Captain Kramer. Mr. Keefe, I have always had a very high regard for Captain Safford’s professional abilities.

Mr. Keefe. Well, have you had a regard for him in any other respect?

[10900] Captain Kramer. As a personal friend I had a regard for him which warranted the continuance of that friendship, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Yes. And you feel that way today, do you not?

Captain Kramer. I do, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, did you express any concern to any of your friends over the fact that you viewed with some apprehension the necessity for your appearing before this Congressional investigating committee?

Captain Kramer. At no time do I recall making expressions of that nature, sir. I have never been in a state of apprehension that I am aware of in any hearing I appeared before.

Mr. Keefe. After you left the hospital did you visit the Public Relations Department of the Navy Department?

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Did anybody visit you from that Department?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Were you given any instructions as to statements to be issued or not to be issued?
Captain Kramer. None whatsoever, sir. If you will recall, during the course of our conversation at the Naval Hospital, Captain Duncan broke into our discussions with words to the effect that the press was outside and champing at the [10901] bits to get an interview from me. I expressed myself in answer to Captain Duncan along the lines that it appeared as though I could not avoid such an interview and that it might just as well take place now.

With that expression of my opinion I ask Mrs. Kramer to leave the room; certain members of the press came in and I extemporaneously dictated a statement. On the completion of that statement I asked the correspondent who took it down what service he represented, turned to Captain Duncan, the medical officer in charge of the hospital, and requested him to obtain a copy of that statement and furnish it to the Navy Department Public Relations Officer because any further statement I might have occasion to make to the press would be of identical tenor.

Mr. Keefe. I see. Do you recall at that time that when Captain Duncan came in he stated that he had communicated with the Public Relations Department of the Navy and that it was all right for them to take pictures or for you to make a statement? Do you recall him making that statement?

Captain Kramer. I believe that at one time, either just before or just after that interview with the press, he indicated that the Public Relations Office desired to arrange an interview in the Navy Department that afternoon.

Mr. Keefe. No; I am asking you that specific question.

[10902] Isn't it a fact before any newspaper reporters or photographers were in that there was some objection expressed by me to the fact of their taking pictures or having newspaper reporters there and did not Dr. Duncan say that he had taken the matter up with the Public Relations Department of the Navy and that it was all right to take the pictures and make a statement at that time?

Captain Kramer. You are very likely precisely accurate in that respect, sir.

Mr. Keefe. All right. I don't like this "very likely" and "very probably." Isn't that it exactly.

Captain Kramer. I used that "very likely," Mr. Keefe, because I do not recall precisely. If I attempted to refresh my memory I probably could.

Mr. Keefe. Isn't that precisely correct, Captain Kramer?

Captain Kramer. I think it is, sir.

[10903] Mr. Keefe. Yes, you think it is, of course.

Well, now, Pearl Harbor happened, and the Secretary of the Navy flew out to Pearl Harbor to see what had happened, and while he was gone the first person that talked to you about the situation, as I understand your testimony, was the Unde- Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Forrestal, then acting as Secretary of the Navy.

He requested you, during the absence of Secretary Knox, to prepare a file showing the intercepts, is that correct?

Captain Kramer. Mr. Forrestal did not request me. I was directed, as I recall, by Captain McCollum to prepare a folder, which I was given to understand Mr. Forrestal desired to see.
Mr. Keefe. Well, all right, we will go through the chain of command, then. It went from Forrestal to your superior, McCollum, and from McCollum to you; is that right?

Captain Kramer. That is undoubtedly correct, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. By virtue of that order, or command, you then assembled the file and went to Mr. Forrestal?

Captain Kramer. Accompanied by Captain McCollum, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. So you and Captain McCollum discussed the intercepts for the first time during the absence of Secretary [10904] Knox with Under Secretary, and Acting Secretary, Forrestal?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, following that, who was the next person that you talked with, that you can now recall, with respect to Pearl Harbor, and the incidents prior thereto, during the month of December, or at any other time, in relation to Pearl Harbor?

Captain Kramer. Other than the usual conversations I might have had with normal recipients of this traffic, the identical type of conversations that I would have had through 1941. The only time I discussed in detail any events connected with Pearl Harbor was when I testified before the court of Admiral Murfin with one exception; that was Admiral Halsey.

Mr. Keefe. All right.

Now, you did talk with Admiral Halsey. When was that, and where?

Captain Kramer. About May 1944, at the headquarters building of Admiral Halsey in Noumea, New Caledonia.

Mr. Keefe. Was that after you had received the letter from Captain Safford which has been introduced in evidence?

Captain Kramer. Some months after, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And what was the occasion of your talk with Admiral Halsey?

[10905] Captain Kramer. A letter from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Halsey. It was a personal letter.

Mr. Keefe. Did you see the letter?

Captain Kramer. I did, sir.

Mr. Keefe. All right.

Is that letter in existence?

Captain Kramer. I do not know whether the original is or not, sir. I have a copy of it.

Mr. Keefe. Well, where is the copy?

Captain Kramer. Here [handing document to Mr. Keefe].

Mr. Keefe. Now, as I understand it, Admiral Halsey called you to his command post, or office, and told you that he had received a letter from Admiral Kimmel?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. How did you get the copy of that letter?

Captain Kramer. The letter requests that I prepare answers in the form of a deposition to certain questions propounded in that letter. Mr. Keefe. Did you prepare such answers?

Captain Kramer. I prepared no deposition as such. I did prepare, however, an answer to Captain Safford’s second letter, which I felt
was in the nature of a deposition, in case I wanted to comply with Admiral Kimmel's request.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, did you comply with Admiral Kimmel's request?

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir, other than what I have outlined.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, did you give to Admiral Halsey the answers to the questions that Admiral Kimmel had asked?

Captain Kramer. Well, when I went to Admiral Halsey's office, at his request, he showed me the letter, which I read. He indicated that he would leave it entirely to me as to whether or not I should comply with that request.

After reading the letter, I felt that the questions covered in that letter were of such limited character as regarding the events preceding Pearl Harbor, that a broader picture of events should be given Admiral Halsey.

In fact, my idea was to give a pretty thorough picture of the events as I knew them to Admiral Halsey, and request his advice on what I should do.

I did not, during the course of that first interview.

What I did request, however, was that I be given that letter, and I had in mind preparing a full reply to Captain Safford's second letter, which I felt would pretty thoroughly cover those events, that I would like a few days to prepare that reply and would then have something to show him, and would give him a fairly comprehensive picture of it.

Senator Lucas. Will the Congressman yield for just a moment?

Mr. Keeffe. Yes.

Senator Lucas. I wonder if the committee cannot have the letter.

Mr. Keeffe. Yes; I am going to read it into the record to facilitate this thing a little bit, without all this rambling around about it.

Now, let us get right down to the facts.

You got the copy of this letter from Admiral Halsey?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Is that right?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. In order that you might prepare an answer; is that correct?

Captain Kramer. If I so desired; yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. If you so desired.

Now, the letter reads:

250 Bronxville Road,
Bronxville, New York, 18 March 1944.

Admiral William F. Halsey, U. S. Navy,
Commander South Pacific Fleet,
[10906] c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California.

Dear Bill: You have on your staff Commander A. D. Kramer, U. S. N., who was on duty in the Communications Office in the Navy Department at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor and for some time prior to that date. I believe he has knowledge of facts and incidents which occurred in the Navy Department which are of interest and value to me. Will you please obtain from him an affidavit and ask him if he will supply me with a copy. I will assure him that I will make no use of the affidavit without his permission so long as he is alive. If he does not wish to supply me with a copy of the affidavit, I would appreciate it very much if he will make the affidavit, put it in a secure place and inform me when I can obtain it.
There was a message received in the Navy Department on December 4th or 5th, 1941, which came to be called the "winds message". I should like to know:

What station first received the Winds Message?
What date was it received in Washington?
When was it deciphered, translated, decoded and delivered to responsible officials in Washington?
What officials in Washington saw the translation of [10909] the Winds Message and when?
What was the substance of the information contained in the Winds Message?
What action towards notification of Field Commanders of contents of message and implications thereof was taken?

There was a note delivered by the Japanese Ambassador to Mr. Hull on 7 December 1941.

When were the first 13 parts of this message received, decoded, and delivered to responsible officials in Washington?
What officials in Washington received translations of the first 13 parts of this message and when did each receive them?
When was the 14th part of the message received, decoded and delivered?
What officials in Washington received translations of the 14th part of this message and when did each receive it?
What action was recommended by you or anyone else of which you have knowledge?

There was a message directing the Japanese Ambassador to deliver a note to Secretary Hull in person at 1:00 P. M., Eastern Standard Time on 7 December 1941.

[10910] When was this message received in the Navy Department?
What agency decoded the message and when was decoding completed?
What agency translated the message and when was the translation delivered to the Navy Department?
What officials in Washington received translations of this message and when did each receive it?
What action was taken as a result of this message?

When Commander Kramer delivered this message to Mr. Knox a memorandum pointing out that 1:00 P. M. Eastern Standard Time was sunrise in Honolulu and midnight in Manila and that the whole thing meant sunrise raid in Pearl Harbor within a few minutes after the delivery of the Japanese note.

Will you please have Commander Kramer answer all of the foregoing questions of which he has knowledge and put them in the form of an affidavit and also request him to include in his affidavit any other matters of which he may have first-hand knowledge. I shall be very grateful to him for this matter will be of considerable interest and value to me.

My kindest regards to you always Bill.

Most sincerely yours,

/s/ H. E. Kimmel.

[10911] Now, then, Admiral Halsey showed you that letter?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. On what date?
Captain Kramer. I do not recall the exact date. I believe it was about the middle of May. It may have been a few days before that.
Mr. Keefe. Now, at that time, did you have in your possession the letter which had been written to you under date of January 22, 1944, by Captain Safford?
Captain Kramer. I did, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And you have not replied to the letter that Captain Safford had written you?
Captain Kramer. Not only not replied, but did not contemplate replying, sir.
Mr. Keefe. You say you did not contemplate replying?
Captain Kramer. At no time, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Yes. Why not?
Captain Kramer. If it is not apparent from the letter itself, I will go into more detailed explanation, Mr. Keefe:

When I first received that letter, shortly after I arrived in the South Pacific, I was, to put it mildly, somewhat flabbergasted. I did not read through more than the first few paragraphs appearing on page one of that letter, and then put it away with my other papers.

[10912] Mr. Keefe. You did not read the rest of it?

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You decided you would not even answer it?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. All right.

Now, when Admiral Halsey showed you this letter you had in mind the letter that had been written by Captain Safford?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; as a fairly complete coverage of events preceding Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Keefe. Did I understand you correctly to say that you told Admiral Halsey that you would like to have a copy of this letter from Kimmel, and go over it for a few days to decide what the answers would be?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; the original letter was given to me. The copy was made only for the purpose of any future preparation of an affidavit, in compliance with Admiral Kimmel's request.

Mr. Keefe. Well, did you give any thought at that time to these requests of Admiral Kimmel?

Captain Kramer. I read through the letter; yes, sir. I was concerned at that time, and for some months afterward, on how any piece of paper covering this subject, whether affidavit or letter, or reply to that letter, could be [10913] returned to Admiral Kimmel without going through normal censorship channels, which, of course, would disclose to unauthorized persons many aspects of this cryptanalytic traffic, to which they were not entitled.

Mr. Keefe. All right.

So you did not make up a reply?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Mr. Keefe. In affidavit form or otherwise?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Did you discuss the matter with Admiral Halsey?

Captain Kramer. On my second visit to his office, I believe I touched on that point, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, you say you believe you touched on that point. That does not mean anything to me, and it will not when I read the record.

Captain Kramer. My recollection, Mr. Keefe, is—

Mr. Keefe (interposing). Did you discuss this letter and its contents with Admiral Halsey when you came to see him the second time? That is all I want to know.

Captain Kramer. I did, sir. I definitely stated, in my present recollection, that I would prepare such a deposition or affidavit for Admiral Kimmel and notify Admiral Kimmel where it was.

[10914] Mr. Keefe. Will you read that answer, Mr. Reporter?

(The answer was read by the reporter.)

Mr. Keefe. Now, if I read that in the record after this record is printed, it would seem to me that you did decide to prepare an affidavit and to advise Admiral Kimmel as to where it would be obtained.
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Is that what you mean to tell me?

Captain Kramer. That is what I mean, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Did you prepare such an affidavit?

Captain Kramer. No affidavit, as such.

Mr. Keefe. Well, did you prepare any paper?

Captain Kramer. I prepared some pieces of paper.

Mr. Keefe. Well, have you got them?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. All right, let us see them.

I would like to have this letter, Mr. Chairman, identified as an exhibit.

The Vice Chairman. Well, it has been read into the record.

Mr. Keefe. I think the letter perhaps ought to be in our file. I would like to have it marked as an exhibit.

The Vice Chairman. Permit the Chair to inquire, Mr. [10915]

Keefe, in addition to this letter being read into the record, as has been done, do you also want it marked as an exhibit?

Mr. Keefe. I think it would be advisable to do so.

Mr. Kaufman. This would be Exhibit 150.

The Vice Chairman. Exhibit No. 150, and it will be so ordered.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 150".)

Mr. Keefe. If you will pardon me being here next to you, Captain Kramer, it is just so we will understand it. I do not want to run back and forth.

Captain Kramer, if I understand your testimony up to date, with respect to this incident, correctly, you received from Admiral Halsey a letter, which has been read into this record, asking certain questions.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. At that time, you had in your possession a long letter from Captain Safford asking you certain questions?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You also had in your possession a previous letter from Captain Safford to which you had replied?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

[10916] Mr. Keefe. The first letter, with its reply, and the letter which you received from Captain Safford, which I have referred to as the second letter, is also in evidence.

Now, I want to know: Did you make any reply to the second letter written to you by Captain Safford? Your answer has been "No."

Captain Kramer. Correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. I ask you, did you make any reply to the questions pronounced in the letter from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Halsey?

Captain Kramer. No reply, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Did you make any memorandum at all for Admiral Halsey, or Admiral Kimmel, or Captain Safford, in response to the questions in both or either of these latter two letters?

Captain Kramer. Only those pieces of paper in your hand for Admiral Halsey. They have been shown to no one except Admiral Halsey until this hearing commenced.

Mr. Keefe. Now, let me just take a minute to compare these with these other ones.
In response to the last question, your answer is that you have handed to the member of the committee now interrogating you several papers.

[10917] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. The first one of which is a typewritten page, dated December 28, 1943, entitled "Memorandum for Captain Safford"?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Is that identical with the December 28 letter, which is in evidence, the "Memorandum for Captain Stafford"?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; it is a copy of it. The first part of the piece of paper you are discussing is a copy of my reply to Captain Safford.

Mr. Keeffe. No; it is not.

Captain Kramer. Except that it is not left in the cryptic form I used in my reply, but expanded for ready perusal by Admiral Halsey.

Mr. Keeffe. All right.

In other words, then, am I to understand that, so far as the first 2½ pages of these documents that you have submitted are concerned, you intended to write up for the use of Admiral Halsey, the exact information which is contained in your letter of 28 December, 1943, entitled "Memorandum for Captain Safford," without code language in it, is that right?

Captain Kramer. That is right, sir.

[10918] Mr. Keeffe. Well, then, there appears also a letter dated 22 January 1944, "My dear Kramer-san."

That is a decoding of the letter of Captain Safford to you?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. In plain English?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. And is it exactly the same as the letter which was written by Captain Safford to you, with some expansion on your part? Is it identical as you translate his code?

Captain Kramer. It is exactly Captain Safford's wording with the exception that it expands the code he used into plain English.

Mr. Keeffe. And in this instrument that you have given us now, you have inserted the answers to Captain Safford's questions, have you not?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. For the benefit of Admiral Halsey?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. In other words, had you answered the letter of Captain Safford which Safford had written you under date of January 22, 1944, and which you had not answered, you would have answered it as it appears in this memorandum which you prepared for Admiral Halsey, is that correct?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

[10919] Mr. Keeffe. Did you turn this over to Admiral Halsey?

Captain Kramer. I showed it to him and he read it. There was only the one copy made. I have retained it thereafter.

Mr. Keeffe. This is the first time that anyone on this committee has seen this correspondence, is it?

Captain Kramer. I believe that is correct, sir. Counsel has not been shown it, so far as I am aware, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. You have not turned it over to the Navy Department heretofore?
Captain Kramer. On that point, Mr. Baecher, Lieutenant Commander Baecher, the naval liaison officer with counsel for this committee, requested some days ago that he be permitted to photostat this in case it was called for by the committee while I was a witness, in case the subject came up and those letters were called for.

Mr. Keefe. How did he know that you had such a letter?

Captain Kramer. I mentioned that in conversations with Mr. Baecher, chiefly because a reference to that appears in the record of my testimony before Admiral Hewitt, I believe in reply to one or more questions when I referred to Captain Safford’s letters.

Mr. Keefe. When was this written?

Captain Kramer. About the middle of May 1944.

[10920] Mr. Keefe. Did you dictate it to anyone to type?

Captain Kramer. I typed it entirely myself, sir, taking many hours of about four nights to do so.

Mr. Keefe. And that perhaps accounts for the apparent differences in the ribbons that were used; is that right?

Captain Kramer. That could well be; yes, sir; or using different typewriters.

Mr. Keefe. Using different typewriters; is that right?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. So this was all typed by you yourself?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And contains the information and the study that you had given to this whole situation sometime in 1944?

Captain Kramer. That was the second occasion on which I had had occasion to recollect events about Pearl Harbor, the first occasion being my reply to Captain Safford’s first letter.

Mr. Keefe. Did you have this before you when you testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry?

Captain Kramer. I had that in my possession; not before me during those proceedings.

Mr. Keefe. Then, Captain Kramer, when you came back from the South Pacific and flew in there after 4 days, and all tired out, as you said, you were caught cold when [10927] you testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry, as a matter of fact, you had given long study to these facts and had reduced the story down to writing and had it in your possession at that time, had you not, as you remembered it out there in the South Pacific?

Captain Kramer. Mr. Keefe—

Mr. Keefe (interposing). Is that a fact or isn’t it?

Captain Kramer. It is not, sir.

Mr. Murphy. The witness is entitled to give his answer, I submit, and we are entitled to hear his answer.

Mr. Keefe. I want to hear it, too.

Mr. Murphy. Well, let us hear it.

The Vice Chairman. The witness may reply.

Captain Kramer. I have not read that letter at any time to date since our conversations, or my conversations with Admiral Halsey about the middle of May 1944.

Mr. Keefe. Well, you had it, did not you, when you testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry at Pearl Harbor?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Keefe. You had it with you in your files, didn’t you?
Captain Kramer. In my possession; yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. You could have referred to it had you wanted to, could not you?

[10922] Captain Kramer. I could have, had I wanted to; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. The point I am making, Captain, is before you testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry you had, in response to this request of Admiral Kimmel and prompted by Admiral Halsey, made up this statement which you have submitted to me and which I have not had a chance yet to read?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Now was that statement supposed to be a full and complete statement of the facts, so as to give answers to Admiral Kimmel’s questions in the letter written to Admiral Halsey?
Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Or was it supposed to be categorically answers to the questions asked of you by Captain Stafford?
Captain Kramer. For neither purpose, sir. It was simply to apprise Admiral Halsey with a fairly comprehensive picture and to request his advice regarding the request of Admiral Kimmel.

It was further retained by me as a piece of paper probably complying with Admiral Kimmel’s request, but I never reached a decision as to just what to do with it. I, of course, could not entrust it to the mail. The only other means of getting that piece of paper to a safe place other than keeping it in my possession would be to send it to the United States, to my wife, by a personal friend as courier.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I understand some members of the committee have copies of this, and I think all members ought to have it so we can examine it.

Mr. Keefe. I understood him to say that they had mimeographed it, the Navy had.

Mr. Murphy. If some members of the committee now have copies, I would like to see one, too.

The Vice Chairman. Perhaps counsel can advise us on that.

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, there is a matter in connection with this letter and the photostatic copy we have which I think might be discussed with the committee in Executive session.

The Vice Chairman. All right.

Mr. Richardson. That is why this has not been circulated.

Mr. Keefe. None of the members of the committee, I take it, have heretofore seen this letter. I did not see it before; I did not know it existed until Captain Kramer just stated so.

Senator Ferguson. Let the record show Mr. Richardson was sitting here reading it and I asked him what it was; I asked him if I could see a copy of what they were talking about.

[10924] Mr. Murphy. I think everyone else should get a copy.

Senator Ferguson. I am trying to compare it with the original copy, to see what it is.

Mr. Richardson. Until the committee makes a decision I am uncertain whether this is the copy that the committee wants. It should be taken up in the committee. It will not stop your examination at all, Mr. Keefe.
The Vice Chairman. The committee will abide by the advice of counsel.

Senator Ferguson. I have returned my copy to counsel.

Mr. Richardson. This is not a copy.

Senator Ferguson. This is not a copy, he says.

Mr. Keefe. Now, Captain Kramer, in preparing this memorandum which you handed to me this afternoon, and which I have seen for the first time, which you say you prepared for the information of Admiral Halsey, did you attempt to follow the questions that had been asked by Captain Safford in his letter to you of January 22, 1944?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Has counsel seen this before today?

Mr. Richardson. I never heard of it—oh, yes, Commander Baecher told me yesterday morning that he had some papers that had been exhibited to him by the witness.

Mr. Keefe. Well, it is mighty funny, it seems to me, [10925] Mr. Chairman, when all the other members down to the last member of the committee has examined Captain Kramer at length, that our counsel has here eventually, at the tail end of this examination, what appears to me a very important and vital instrument which has been in the possession of the Navy and no one knew anything about it.

Now how are we ever going to be sure unless these things are going to be turned over to our counsel in advance, what facts there are? I haven’t read it, I do not know what is in it, but it seems to me, if we are to believe what Captain Kramer says, that it represents his idea as to what these facts were when he wrote this in the spring of 1944.

Mr. Richardson. Now, Mr. Chairman, I think a word ought to go on the record at this point, because I have deliberately refused to have any preliminary conversations with either Captain Safford or Captain Kramer, because the testimony was in some controversy at rather high points, and I concluded I did not want to go over it with either one, inasmuch as I had the opportunity to read their earlier testimony.

I was just as surprised as any member of the committee when the letters appeared yesterday, or the day before, that Captain Safford had written including the code, the three letters, the letter of Captain Safford, the reply of [10926] Captain Kramer in the third letter, and the second letter of Captain Safford. I knew nothing about it, and I expressed myself, I think, with exceeding rudeness to Commander Baecher with reference to not having seen it, and he explained to me then he had certain papers that had to do, in part, with certain matters not connected with Pearl Harbor that the Navy was anxious should not be made public, and that those letters and papers would be available if I insisted on seeing them.

That is all I knew about that, and when the Congressman got this letter here that is the first I knew about that.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I would like the record—

The Vice Chairman. Just a moment. Let the Chair observe for the record that Captain Kramer has stated that he told Commander Baecher about this correspondence and that Commander Baecher suggested that photostatic copies of it should be made so as to be available for members of the committee in case questions were asked about it or this material was asked for of Captain Kramer.
Captain, is that a fairly accurate statement?
Captain Kramer. That is a precise statement; yes, sir.

[10927] Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman—
Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman—
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy.
Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the record note that there was the letter from Admiral Kimmel—we just learned about that, and Admiral Kimmel was a witness for many days. That was the first we heard of Admiral Kimmel having Admiral Halsey, after the witness refused to answer Captain Safford, call the witness into his quarters.

The Vice Chairman. I think this is not difficult to explain. This was personal correspondence that Captain Safford had.

Captain Kramer. Mr. Chairman, may I explain that I had no intention of introducing these letters into this hearing until they were specifically asked of me. I was a little surprised, if I may so state, that the issue came up during the questioning of Captain Safford. At that time Senator Lucas asked the question whether I was in the room.

I stood up in the rear of the room. He asked me the direct question whether I had those letters in my possession or not. I replied at that time that I did, and made them available.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I don't think there is anything unusual about this. I think the Hewitt report definitely shows that Captain Kramer did testify that he had written such letters. He only prepared these letters for any emergency that might come along in view of his previous testimony.

It is surprising to me that somebody hasn't asked for these before, in view of that testimony. All the captain did was to prepare these in the event any member of the committee wanted them.

Captain Kramer. I simply had them there.

Senator Lucas. Yes. There is nothing unusual about you presenting this testimony in view of your previous statement before the Hewitt committee.

Captain Kramer. Yes.

Senator Lucas. If the members did want them you were ready to serve with the memorandum you had.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would like for someone to point out where Captain Kramer, in his testimony, mentions this Halsey memorandum.

Captain Kramer. I previously stated in reply to a question of yours, Senator, that I have never to date read the record of the Hewitt investigation except such excerpts as appear in the narrative. I could undoubtedly locate it by examination of that record.

Senator Ferguson. I wish you would show me where it tells about the Halsey memorandum in this Hewitt report.

Captain Kramer. It was not a Halsey memorandum, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What?

Captain Kramer. It was not a Halsey memorandum.

Senator Ferguson. I mean in the Hewitt report.

Captain Kramer. It was a reference purely to Captain Safford's letters.
Senator Ferguson. Haven't you said something to the effect that this is a memorandum for Halsey?

Captain Kramer. I prepared it to show to Admiral Halsey, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. But never showed it to him?

Captain Kramer. I did show it to him.

Senator Ferguson. You say that is in this Hewitt record?

Captain Kramer. I do not believe there is any reference to any reply of mine to Captain Safford's second letter in that record.

Senator Ferguson. Then there is nothing in the record anywhere that you had made a memorandum and showed it to Admiral Halsey?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

[10930] Senator Ferguson. That is what is surprising to me.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I do not think there is anything surprising about that. There is evidence in the record about a letter that the Captain had received from Captain Safford; that is plain in the Hewitt report.

Now, in view of the chain of events that followed Captain Safford's letter, it was certainly a most natural thing that he would have all the evidence that in any way was attached to or followed that letter in his possession and ready for the committee if it was so desired.

Captain Kramer. Senator Lucas, I would like to remark on that, that if it hadn't been for the wording of Mr. Keefe's question, Did I discuss these matters with anyone? I would not have mentioned Admiral Halsey in connection with this hearing.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman—

The Vice Chairman. Permit me, Senator, to ask a question to see if I can clear this for the benefit of the record.

This memorandum that you prepared, as I understand it, Captain, is a reply to Captain Safford's questions?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And you showed that memorandum which was prepared in reply to Captain Safford's questions [10931] to Admiral Halsey?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. The memorandum was not addressed to Admiral Halsey?

Captain Kramer. It is not, sir.

It is a memorandum to Captain Safford. In other words, a reply to Captain Safford.

The Vice Chairman. But it was shown to Admiral Halsey?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, as I understand it, this witness delivered to us certain memoranda, the Safford letter, his first reply, and the second Safford letter and no reply to it.

Now, what I would like to know is this: Is there anything else other than that in the memorandum that you now have given to Congressman Keefe?

Captain Kramer. There is, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then why didn't you give that to the committee when you gave us part of the evidence, and led this committee to believe that was all of the evidence in relation to that?

Captain Kramer. Because it was a reply, it is true, but a reply that was never sent, and, therefore, not a mailed reply to Captain.
Safford. It was purely a memorandum prepared for Admiral Halsey which not necessarily need have been prepared. I might have covered the same thing verbally, but felt in covering that, that I should take a few days to refresh my memory on those events.

[10932] Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, the witness will recall that I was examining in relation to conversations or meetings he had with other officers about his testimony.

Now, you gave me the answer as to Admiral Stark. You gave me the answer on Admiral Wilkinson. How did you avoid giving me an answer on this, of your Admiral Halsey conversation?

Captain Kramer. There was no discussion whatsoever with Admiral Halsey, sir, regarding the events leading up to Pearl Harbor, except his perusal of that memorandum and my request following that of Admiral Halsey for his advice in the premises and some further remarks of his about his personal relations with Admiral Kimmel and what he was doing himself at the time of Pearl Harbor.

Senator Ferguson. So there is nothing in this—I haven't read it yet—there is nothing in it in relation to a conversation with Admiral Halsey about what happened up to the time of the bombing; is that correct?

Captain Kramer. That is not correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, there is something in there about what happened, what took place here in Washington in relation to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Captain Kramer. There is, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then how did you avoid giving me [10933] that discussion when you gave me the Admiral Stark discussion that you had, that you had a conference with officers, and you had had one with Admiral Halsey?

Captain Kramer. There was no discussion.

Senator Ferguson. Was this one with Admiral Stark? How did you keep that from your answer?

Captain Kramer. There was no discussion with Admiral Halsey, Senator, sir. It was my disclosing to him a background concerning Pearl Harbor with a view to asking his advice on what I should do in connection with Admiral Kimmel's request. That request appeared reasonable to me to this extent, that in case of my death in the Pacific Admiral Kimmel would not have my testimony in any proceedings which might subsequently take place.

Senator Ferguson. Now, is there any doubt, from now on, Captain, that you are going to give the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but? I mean in relation with whether you are asked a specific question or not. So that the committee might know that there is nothing being held back such as this. I would like to know whether you understand now.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I might say that I was taken to task by the Senator from Maine the other day for making an implication. I submit that if, while any man has [10934] been on the stand here he has attempted to tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth, it is Captain Kramer.

Senator Ferguson. I am not doubting that, but I wanted to know whether or not there was any other thing like this that the witness now has, that we could review over the night. I am not casting any doubts.
The Vice Chairman. Permit the Chair to suggest that none of us have read this material, let us try to compose our patience until we do read it, to see whether there is anything to it. I think we would make time if we just suspended on this point until we have had a chance to look at it and see whether there is anything that will challenge the interest of any member of the committee and justify all of this discussion that we are having.

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I am just beginning to wonder whether the floor has been completely taken away from me or not in connection with the examination.

The Vice Chairman. The Chair was wondering, too, and was trying to protect the gentleman from Wisconsin.

The gentleman from Wisconsin will proceed with his inquiry.

Mr. Keefe. Captain, so there can be no misunderstanding about it, this memorandum which you have given to me this afternoon was prepared by you out in the Pacific in 1944?

[10035] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. As a result of the conference which you had with Admiral Halsey when he showed you the letter that he had received from Admiral Kimmel?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. So in order to refresh your recollection as to the events—you sat down with the letter from Admiral Kimmel to Admiral Halsey before you and the letter from Captain Safford of December 22 before you and decided to make up a memorandum?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And the idea of making up that memorandum was so that you would have a complete record of the events referred to in those two letters so that if anything happened to you there would be some record or statement from you as to those events?

Captain Kramer. A fairly comprehensive coverage; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. As you remember the situation out there in the South Pacific?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, when you had completed the preparation of this memorandum you went back to Admiral Halsey and discussed it with him?

[10036] Captain Kramer. There was very little discussion. In fact, I don't think there was any discussion about the points appearing in that. The discussion concerned things that I have outlined in the past few minutes.

Mr. Keefe. Well, did you let him read it?

Captain Kramer. He read it completely; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Then what did you do with the memorandum?

Captain Kramer. I took it back to my quarters, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And then what did you do with it?

Captain Kramer. I retained it in my possesison until now.

Mr. Keefe. Well, you said something about sending it by courier to Mrs. Kramer.

Captain Kramer. I was interrupted in my reply to that, sir, in that connection.

Mr. Keefe. I want you to finish that reply.

Captain Kramer. Any possible way of depositing such an affidavit in a safe place would require means that I have already outlined or
that of a courier who could be trusted. By that I mean that I would have to give it to some close personal friend who was cognizant or aware or had worked with this material to take back and put it in a safe place in the United States.

[10937] Mr. Keeffe. Did you do that, Captain?

Captain Kramer. I did not do that, sir, because I did not want to impose on any friendships I might have to the extent of requiring them to perjure themselves.

Mr. Keeffe. Then, there isn't any necessity to go into that discussion, if you didn't put it into execution. That is the only thing I am interested in.

Captain Kramer. All right.

Mr. Keeffe. You didn't put this into execution?

Captain Kramer. That is correct. I thought about it in fact all through the summer of 1944, and it was only after my testimony before Admiral Murfin's court of inquiry that I felt no further necessity of even thinking about that.

I simply kept those papers with me.

Mr. Keeffe. And up to the time you testified before Admiral Murfin's court of inquiry you had been giving a lot of thought to this question?

Captain Kramer. A lot of thought only to what disposition I could make of those papers and to the form of such deposition if other than what I already had. Not to the subject matter of that piece of paper.

Mr. Keeffe. You were satisfied that the statements which you made in this memorandum prepared out there in the South Pacific were the truth?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir, as of that time.

Mr. Keeffe. And you had that memorandum and all of the thought that you could put on the general subject when you testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry out there at Pearl Harbor?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. I have indicated, I have not read that letter since I prepared it for Admiral Halsey.

Mr. Keeffe. You mean you have had it in your possession all this time, and you haven't read it until now?

Captain Kramer. I have not read it to this moment, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. All right. I haven't either, so you have nothing on me.

Mr. Ribhardson. Mr. Chairman, might I suggest, in view of that fact, there are one or two matters that ought to be referred to in an executive session, and might we have about a 10-minute executive session?

Mr. Keeffe. I am cognizant of that, as all members are, I assume, and I shall not violate that situation.

The Vice Chairman. Permit the Chair to suggest, while there is no doubt that is correct, yet counsel has two or three things that he wants to bring to the attention of the committee in executive session.

It is now almost 5, and some members of the committee have indicated they will have to leave pretty soon.

As I understand, counsel is suggesting that we now go into executive session, rather than wait another 10 or 15 minutes.

The Committee will now go into execution session.

(Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m., February 8, 1946 the committee recessed to meet in executive session and to reconvene at 10 a.m. Saturday, February 9, 1946.)
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in
the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben
W. Barkley (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster,
and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark,
Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H.
Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P.
Morgan and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[10941] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Congressman Keefe will proceed.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ALWIN D. KRAMER, UNITED STATES NAVY
(Resumed)

Mr. Keefe. Captain Kramer, yesterday afternoon just before we
recessed, you stated facts with reference to a conversation which you
had with Admiral Halsey at his headquarters in early 1944 in the
South Pacific?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And just where were his headquarters at that time?

Captain KRAMER. In the center of the city of Noumea, New
Caledonia.

Mr. Keefe. And do you recall the date?

Captain KRAMER. Not the exact date but within a few days of the
middle of May 1944.

Mr. Keefe. You further testified that at that time he discussed
with you a letter which he had received from Admiral Kimmel?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And gave that letter to you so that you could go over
it with the possibility that you might prepare an answer?

Captain KRAMER. An affidavit, yes, sir.

[10942] Mr. Keefe. You did not prepare a specific answer or
a specific affidavit in response to Admiral Kimmel’s request made to
Admiral Halsey?

Captain KRAMER. I did not, sir.

Mr. Keefe. But you stated that you did prepare a memorandum in
answer to the questions that had been asked of you by Captain Safford
in his letter of December 28, 1943?
Captain Kramer. I did, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And you felt that the answers to the questions propounded to you by Captain Safford would likewise be answers to the questions asked by Admiral Kimmel in his letter to Admiral Halsey?

Captain Kramer. I did, sir.

Mr. Keefe. After preparing that memorandum you showed it to Admiral Halsey?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Then you retained it with the intention of preserving it for some future reference in the event you were killed or lost your life in the Pacific and wouldn’t be available as a witness at some future time?

Captain Kramer. That was my purpose; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And the memoranda which you gave to me yesterday, is that original memoranda?

Captain Kramer. It is, sir.

[10943] Mr. Keefe. I believe you further testified that when you were called to testify before the naval court of inquiry at Pearl Harbor you had this memorandum with you at that time?

Captain Kramer. I had it with my papers, but not at that hearing.

Mr. Keefe. So am I to understand that prior to your testimony before the naval court at Pearl Harbor you had given considerable thought to all of the questions propounded to you by Captain Safford in his letter of December 28, 1943?

Captain Kramer. At the time I prepared that memorandum; yes, sir; but not subsequent to that. My only thought and consideration on that subject was the handling and disposition of that memorandum I had prepared.

Mr. Keefe. Yes. Well, I understood you to say yesterday that from the time you prepared it, and I assume put it in a file or envelope, you never looked at it?

Captain Kramer. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. From that time until the present moment?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You never read it before you testified at Pearl Harbor?

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Nor at any subsequent time?

[10944] Captain Kramer. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. And have never discussed it with anybody else?

Captain Kramer. Until the commencement of this hearing, no, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And then you exhibited it to whom?

Captain Kramer. Lieutenant Commander Baecher, liaison officer with this committee’s counsel, was shown it, sir.

Mr. Keefe. How did you come to show it to them?

Captain Kramer. I felt that there was at least a likelihood that I might be questioned by this committee concerning the letters of Captain Safford and all aspects surrounding them because of the fact that I had made reference to those letters in testifying before Admiral Hewitt.

Mr. Keefe. And you thought that in case somebody happened to accidentally ask you about it you would be prepared with the memorandum?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Keefe. You didn’t volunteer the fact that you had prepared such a memorandum when you testified before the naval court at Pearl Harbor, did you?

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And you didn’t volunteer that information when you testified before the Hewitt investigation, did you?

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir. I saw no point in introducing Admiral Halsey’s or Admiral Kimmel’s name into my testimony.

Mr. Keefe. You were given an opportunity to tell any facts that you had in your possession, though, were you not?

Captain Kramer. I was, sir. However, I further felt and was thoroughly convinced that all that could be elicited from the showing of my memorandum was my understanding of the facts at the time I prepared that memorandum. I am still of that conviction, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Well, after reading it I am inclined to agree with you.

Captain Kramer. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Keefe. I never saw it until yesterday. I am frank to say to the committee after studying it last night I think that a lot of undue importance has been attached to it.

Now, I want to go through this with you because of the fact that it appears to be necessary.

In preparing this memorandum you took the questions serially that Commander Safford had asked you in his two letters which are before the committee and in evidence?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. The questions are numbered from 1 to 43, inclusive?

Captain Kramer. I believe they run to 47. However, the last several I did not answer in that memorandum since they appeared redundant and covered previously in the memorandum.

Mr. Keefe. Yes; I think you are right about that.

So that the members of the committee can follow your memorandum they can observe the questions which were asked in the letter—

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, just for the convenience of the other members, I wonder if counsel has prepared copies for the members of the committee?

Mr. Keefe. Well, let me finish my statement so that it won’t be a blank.

Will you read it?

(The statement was read by the reporter.)

Mr. Keefe (continuing). Of Captain Safford dated December 22, 1943.

[10947] The Vice Chairman. Do you yield there, Mr. Keefe?

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. There were certain photostatic copies.

Mr. Kaufman. Copies of the Safford letter.

The Vice Chairman. Of the Safford letter distributed to the committee.

Mr. Kaufman. That is correct.

The Vice Chairman. But I had understood there was going to be a mimeographed copy prepared with the questions in them instead of these code numbers that were set up. Am I in error about that?
Mr. Masten. That was read into the transcript.
Mr. Richardson. That was done the other day in connection with the examination of Captain Safford, simply covered his letter and that has already been offered, it has been here and copies have been given to committee members.

Mr. Keefe. I think you will get this quite clearly as we go along.
The Vice Chairman. All right.
The Chairman. The Chair would like to observe that if this memorandum is to be the basis of inquiry that it would be a little more convenient for members of the committee to have copies of it, but I do not want to interfere; I do not want to interrupt your examination, but it would be a little more convenient.
The Vice Chairman. Is it your intention to read the memorandum?
Mr. Keefe. Yes; question by question, so that there will be no question about.
The Chairman. You mean that you are going to read the question?
Mr. Keefe. And his answer.
The Chairman. And his answer, so that it will be in the transcript?
Mr. Keefe. That is right.
The Chairman. All right.
Mr. Keefe. That is what I understood we agreed upon yesterday.
The Chairman. All right.

Mr. Keefe. Now, this memorandum, the first question. You have indicated 1510 as “First indications of arrival.” That is at the top of your memorandum.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. What does that have reference to?
Captain Kramer. That has reference to the first indications of arrival of the Japanese 14-part note.

Mr. Keefe. That is at what time?
Captain Kramer. That is 3 p.m.—3:10 p.m.

Mr. Keefe. And then the next entry is:

2100 Completed. Left after phoning to locate Admiral Beardall, Admiral Turner, Colonel Bratton of M. I. D., Admiral Wilkinson, etc.

What does that mean?

Captain Kramer. That 2100 is 9 p.m. That refers to the time of completion in my section of the first 13 parts of the 14-part note.

Mr. Keefe. Now, the first question:

No. 1. What time did you see Mr. Roosevelt that evening and show him the papers?
A. Did not, personally, but left with one of Admiral Beardall’s assistants in the situation room on Pennsylvania Avenue with positive instructions re urgency (to be delivered at once). He was entertaining at the time, but I learned later in the evening he had seen it.

When did you learn that Mr. Roosevelt had seen those first 13 parts of the 14-part message the evening of the 6th of December?

Captain Kramer. I cannot be precise on that, Mr. Keefe. It is my distinct impression, however, that I was told that by somebody. Whether Admiral Beardall that night late at Admiral Wilkinson’s home or the next morning or the following day sometime, I do not now recall.

Mr. Keefe. Well, you think it may have been that Admiral Beardall may have communicated with the White House after you delivered the papers to Wilkinson’s home?
Captain Kramer. I think he may. I do not know on that point, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. And you think that he may have told you that night while you were still at Wilkinson's home making delivery to him, that Beardall had telephoned the White House to find out if the President had seen the message, and you think he may have advised you then that the President had seen the message that night?

Captain Kramer. That is quite possible, sir. I think, however—

Mr. Keeffe. Now, I don't want to indulge, so far as I am concerned, Captain Kramer, in the realm of possibilities and speculation. Now, if you know that the President actually saw that message that night or if you learned from anybody who had reliable information and can testify to it, I would like to have you do so; but if you do not know, please don't indulge, so far as my examination is concerned, in the realm of speculation. That does not help anybody to determine the issues in this case.

Captain Kramer. In the light of your remark, sir, my answer must be I do not know.

[10951] Mr. Keeffe. Very well. Question 2:

Was Mr. Hull there or was he called in, or did you see him first and go over to Mr. Roosevelt with him?
A. No, on all counts. Army was taking care of that and I know only that he knew of it by 2230 (see item 9) and possibly had seen it care of Colonel Bratton by then.

That is your testimony today, isn't it?
Captain Kramer. That I think is in effect my testimony today; yes, sir, my understanding now.

Mr. Keeffe. Number 3:

What time did you see Admiral Stark that evening and show him the papers?
A. Did not. (See items 4 and 5.)

That is your testimony today, that you did not see Admiral Stark.

Captain Kramer. That is my understanding now; yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Number 4:

If answer to 3 is negative, how and when was Admiral Stark first informed?
A. Believe Item 5 phoned that eve (see next). Possibly Admiral Turner did too. I know he saw it as soon as he reached office next A. M. (about 0900).

Now, do you have any knowledge as to whether Admiral Wilkinson phoned Admiral Stark that night?

[10952] Captain Kramer. No positive knowledge, no, sir; simply the impression I had with me at Admiral Wilkinson's home that he left the room on one or two occasions, as I did, and that Admiral Wilkinson may well have phoned either Stark or Turner or both during that time. I do not know that he did, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. You did not actually see him or hear him?

Captain Kramer. And I was not told that he did or did not.

Mr. Keeffe. But you have this fact in mind, have you not, Captain Kramer, that Sunday was not usually a day for the big boys in the Navy to assemble at their offices?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. And when you got down to your office in the Navy Department the next morning, Sunday, there were 12 or 15 of them assembled, were there not?

Captain Kramer. There were many there, yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Including Wilkinson and Turner and Stark and all of them in the higher echelon?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Keefe, will you yield?
Mr. Keefe. Just one second.
I understand that it is your impression that the arrangements for that meeting which brought all these people together Sunday morning at Admiral Stark's office must have [10953] been made the night before?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And that is the reason why you concluded that Admiral Wilkinson must have telephoned Admiral Stark that night?
Captain Kramer. That, I believe, is one of the reasons; yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Now I will yield.
The Vice Chairman. I may be mistaken, I just wanted to be clear. Did your previous question state that "At the time you arrived at your office the next day they were there?" 
Mr. Keefe. Yes—no, no, at 9 o'clock.
Captain Kramer. That was my question when I prepared that memorandum; yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. That is when you got to Admiral Stark's office.
Captain Kramer. As to the time, approximate time that Admiral Stark arrived at the Navy Department, yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. You got to your office, as I understood it, about 7:30 in the morning?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. They were not there at that time?
Captain Kramer. No, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Now, then the next question, No. 5 :
[10954] How and when was Admiral Wilkinson first informed?
A. At 2105 by phone to his home where he was entertaining Admiral Beardall and others, told him what I planned to do. His chief concern was getting it to the President and Mr. Hull, which are covered above. Arrived at his home at 2320 where he, and Admiral Beardall also, saw it and were informed re others, particularly the White House. I don't recall whether Admiral Beardall then phoned to the White House to check delivery or not. Believe at this time Admiral Wilkinson phoned Admiral Stark.

No. 6. Linn remembers that you stayed till after 1 a.m. What time did you leave the Navy Building and go home?
A. Left Admiral Wilkinson's place about 0630—
What time would that be?
Captain Kramer. That would be one-half hour after midnight, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Yes. [Continuing:]
stopped by, then proceeded—stopped by the Navy Department to drop papers and check on anything new, then proceeded home.
That is as you have testified here before this inquiry?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
[10955] Mr. Keefe. No. 7 :
What time did you get down to the Navy Building the next morning? (Brotherhood said it was sometime after 0700.)
A. About 0730.
That is correct, is it?
Captain Kramer. That is correct, yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. That was your memory then and that is your memory today?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. So that your recollection when you were out in the South Pacific in your answers to question No. 7 and question No. 6, question No. 5 and question No. 4 is all exactly, practically, as you have testified here before this committee?

Captain Kramer. With very few minor discrepancies I believe it is sir.

Mr. Keefe. Question No. 8:

What time did you see Mr. Roosevelt that morning and show him the new papers?

Did not personally, but left first batch about 0945, second about 1100 at the White House care of Admiral Beardall.

That is as you have testified here...

[10956] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Question 9:

Was Mr. Hull there or was he called in?

A. No; at his office. Mr. Knox (first one) was shown it at his home about 2200 previous night and he made a number of phone calls including Mr. Hull. Meeting was then arranged for Mr. Hull. Mr. Knox, Mr. Stimson and others at Mr. Hull’s office at 10:00 A. M. where I was instructed to be with it and anything else.

Meeting held at 1000—

Well, he has got it at one thousand as scheduled.

Captain Kramer. That is 10 o'clock in the morning.

Mr. Keefe. I understand; it is one thousand. That is a thousand, as I remember it, not being a Navy man. I will read it again.

The Vice Chairman. It would help us to get the time so that we understand it on all dates.

Mr. Keefe. Well, I think I had better because I am all mixed up on all these things, so I will try to get it straight. [Reading:]

Meeting held at 1000.

That is 10 o'clock?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe (reading):

And new items (1st batch) delivered together with [10957] old. Colonel Bratton was on hand there too for Mr. Stimson.

Now, that is substantially as you have testified before this committee?

Captain Kramer. It is essentially the same I believe, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Yes. Question No. 10:

My check shows you had Part 14 plus another paper setting the conference at 1 P. M. Do you recall taking any other papers with you, and can you give me a hint as to their contents?

A. (a) I don’t recall precisely how our friend’s numbers ran in the hundreds (or thousands) but in units from about 02 to 09 or 10.

What does that mean?

Captain Kramer. That refers to the Tokyo serial numbers, which not only refreshment indicates—in fact, Exhibit 1 indicates run from 901 to 910—902 is the Japanese note, 901 is the so-called pilot message, 906 or 7 I think is the 1 p. m. message.

Mr. Keefe (reading):

(b) The first few of these messages, not including the one setting the conference for 1300—
That would be 1 o'clock, would it?

[10958] Captain Kramer. About 1 p. m., yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe (reading):

were on hand by 0900.

That is 9 o'clock, isn't it?

Captain Kramer. Nine o'clock in the morning; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe (reading):

And were completed and being delivered at 9:45 (to the White House) and at 10 o'clock to the State Department (See Items 9 above). Admiral Stark, Wilkin-
on, Turner and others got them about 9:30 at a meeting held in Admiral Stark's office.

(c) On returning about 10:20 from Mr. Hull's office the remainder of #02-10 were arriving, including the one setting the one o'clock meeting time and the 'Weather Report'. These were delivered to all hands, including Mr. Knox and Mr. Stimson at Mr. Hull's office with my comments to Mr. Knox on how the hour tied with the sun, and moves in progress, elsewhere.

That is substantially as you have testified before this committee? Captain Kramer. I believe it is, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You follow it very closely.

Captain Kramer. There are some discrepancies in that memo-
randum from——

Mr. Keefe. Well, what is the discrepancy?

[10959] Captain Kramer. Well, my impression at that time was that certain ones of that batch from 902 to 910 had arrived before my 10 o'clock appointment with Mr. Knox. In the light of my study the other night in compliance with Senator Ferguson's request I find my memory was faulty in that respect, that none of those additional ones were seen by me or arrived in my office until after my return from that 10 o'clock appointment.

Mr. Keefe. Now, when you say “none of them” you are referring, among others, to the so-called pilot message, are you not?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir, that is one of them.

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, if we might digress a while while we are on that question right now for just a moment, that is one of the things that I have difficulty in understanding and I know that other mem-
bers of the committee are in a similar quandary.

The pilot message, which is found in exhibit 1, page 238, No. 901, according to exhibit 41 was filed by the Japanese at 8:56 p. m. Decem-
ber 6, Tokyo time (A & N); that is 6:56 a. m. December 6, Washing-
ton time.

The exhibit further shows that this was intercepted in Japanese code by Navy station "S"—that is Bainbridge Island, Washington—at 12:15 to 12:20 GMT—Greenwich [10960] meridian time.

Captain Kramer. Greenwich meridian time; yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. December 6—Navy, with the parentheses around "S". 7:15 to 7:20 a. m. December 6, Washington time.

In other words, this was intercepted between 7:15 and 7:20 a. m., December 6, Washington time. It was teletyped in Japanese code to the Navy; no showing when it was received.

Now, then, we have this picture, that here is this pilot message, which is one of the important messages in this chain of messages, received by the Bainbridge Island intercepting station between 7:15 a. m. and 7:20 a. m. on Saturday morning, December 6, 1941. Now, that would come into the Navy Department, wouldn't it?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

[10961] And it would be taken off the teletype almost instantaneously, the teletype tape from Bainbridge, would it not?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. This exhibit shows that it was teletyped in Japanese code to the Navy. Why did not you get that message that morning early?

Captain Kramer. December 6 was a day of Army cognizance of Japanese ciphers. It would, therefore have been automatically under the existing arrangements, have been sent to the Army Signal Intelligence Section by our GY watch officers receiving that.

Mr. Keefe. Then, if I understand it, if it came in about 7:20 a.m. on December 6, it would be immediately taken off the teletype by the watch officer and transferred over to the Army Signal Intelligence Section?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; not necessarily immediately.

Those tricks, however were quite frequent; they averaged about 2 hours apart, and sometimes oftener.

Mr. Keefe. Now, Captain Kramer, here was a pilot message, which indicated the reply was to be made to the Hull note. You were all alerted to watch for that reply, were you not?

Captain Kramer. We had been looking for it for some days; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Would the watch officer, when this message came in on the teletype, have any way of knowing what its contents were?

Captain Kramer. None whatsoever, sir.

Mr. Keefe. He would have to rely upon the translators over in the Army? First the decoders, I suppose.

Captain Kramer. Decoders, and then the subject, of course, would not be known until final translation.

Mr. Keefe. Have you any explanation as to why it took from 7:20 a.m. to 12:05 p.m., on Saturday, December 6, to get that message over to the Army Signal Intelligence Service from the Navy?

Captain Kramer. I have no first-hand knowledge of the time schedules of handling those things, so I cannot testify on that point, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, this exhibit indicates that this message was received at 12:05 p.m. by the Army Signal Intelligence Service. How long would it take, from your examination and knowledge of that message, to decode it and translate it, normally?

Captain Kramer. I cannot testify, except from general understanding, how long it might take to decode it.

It might be, for example, that the cipher key for that day was not yet recovered, in which case it might have taken a week or more to recover. It might further be—

Mr. Keefe (interposing). Pardon me just a moment. There is no need to talk about "it might take a week or more," because we know it was decoded that same day.

Captain Kramer. It might be, in a more specific answer to your question, Mr. Keefe, that a cipher key had been recovered which was in error for two or three letters, giving a quite garbled text, in which case it might require considerable reworking before a fairly smooth text were deciphered.
Mr. Keefe. In any event, so far as you know, you did not get it in your section from the Army until the next morning, Sunday, December 7?

Captain Kramer. That is my present belief, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Sometime between 9 and 10:30 that morning?

Captain Kramer. That is my present belief, from a study of the other night, sir.

Mr. Keefe. All right.

Now, question No. 11:

Were Mr. Knox and Mr. Stimson called in that morning, or were they notified in any way?

Answer:

Yes. See 9 and 10 above.

Question 12:

How long did you stay with Mr. Roosevelt?

[10964] Answer:

Did not. See 8 above.

That is as you have testified here?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Question 13:

When did you see Admiral Stark that morning?

Answer:

About 0900 at his office with others, and left night-before matters. First batch of new given—

Well, I don't know whether this punctuation is right. I will start all over again. It appears I read it improperly.

Captain Kramer. I did not edit that thing after the first typing, sir. There might be typographical errors in it, and very likely there are.

Mr. Keefe. The answer to No. 13 is

About 0900 at his office with others, and left night-before matters.

Captain Kramer. That means the material disseminated the evening before, Saturday evening.

Mr. Keefe. I see. It means you left with him that material which you had received the night before?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; I find now, however, that my recollection on that point is incorrect, that it was first shown to Admiral Stark the next morning by Captain McCollum.

Mr. Keefe. Well, what am I to understand the fact is?

[10965] This memorandum says, "When did you see Admiral Stark that morning?" The answer is "About 0900 at his office with others, and left night-before matters."

Captain Kramer. Actually I did not go to Admiral Stark's office until about 9:30, sir, when I was starting on my way to the State Department.

Mr. Keefe. Now you push the matter up from 9 o'clock to 9:30.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You have been refreshed on that since you got to studying this on your arrival at Washington? Is that right?

Captain Kramer. Chiefly the other night, and since my arrival in Washington; yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. What do you mean by "chiefly the other night"?

Captain Kramer. As to the time when the messages were delivered, the study I made the other night for Senator Ferguson.

Mr. Keefe. That would not help you any on the matter of time, would it?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; I am still a little hazy on precise times. In fact, during our luncheon conversation at Admiral Starks' home in Spring Valley, we were [10966] still unclear as to exact times. The chief point cleared up was the fact it was Captain McCollum and not Commander Wellborn whom I had seen that morning in Stark's office.

Mr. Keefe. Am I to understand that at this luncheon at Admiral Stark's home you were trying to figure out, and figure accurately, as to what time you did see Admiral Stark and what time you did deliver the papers to him?

Captain Kramer. That was not the purpose, sir. It was in the course of a general conversation that one or two of those points came up, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, Captain Kramer, I have not asked you as to whether that was the purpose of the luncheon or not. You volunteered the statement here, in addition to what you said yesterday to Senator Ferguson about that meeting, that this question was discussed as to the exact time that you delivered papers o Admiral Stark.

Now, either it was or was not. I was not there. I will ask you the direct question.

At this luncheon meeting with Admiral Stark, was the question discussed as to the time at which you delivered the papers to him that morning of December 7, 1941?

Captain Kramer. Points regarding the——

Mr. Keefe (interposing). You can answer that "Yes" or "No," can't you?

[10967] Captain Kramer. I cannot answer a categorical "Yes" on that point, in the light of your precise wording of your question, Mr. Keefe. No effort was made to determine exact times. In the course of general conversation, the times of arrival of Admiral Stark and Captain McCollum came up in our discussion. In that respect my answer would be "Yes," otherwise, in answer to your question, the answer is "No," if you mean that we were trying to determine precise times.

Mr. Keefe. Well, all right.

When you prepared this memorandum out in the solitude of the South Pacific, when you were alone by yourself, preparing a sort of a message that was to be used in the event of your death, to state facts so you would leave a clear record as to events, you set down that you saw Admiral Stark at 9 o'clock at his office with others, and left with him then these papers.

Captain Kramer. That was my recollection then; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now then, since you got to talking it over with people after your arrival here at Washington, your memory became refreshed as to the events, and you now say you think it was about 9:30, is that right?

Captain Kramer. That is right, sir.

[10968] Mr. Keefe. All right.
Did Admiral Stark tell you that he thought you were mistaken in saying it was 9 o'clock, that it was nearer 9:30?

Captain KRAMER. He did not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did anyone else tell you that?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir. That was purely my own presumption and deduction from the fact that I have a recollection, still rather hazy, that I did stop at Admiral Stark's office on my way to my appointment in the State Department.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, did you leave any papers at Admiral Stark's office that morning?

Captain KRAMER. I apparently did not, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Did not you take any papers to Admiral Stark's office that morning?

Captain KRAMER. I did, definitely, that I recall, after my return from Mr. Hull's office at approximately 10:30. That time I am quite precise on.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now, I am getting more confused than ever by your answer. You tried to see Stark the night before, on the 6th, to deliver this 13-part message to him along with others, did you not?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

[10969] Mr. KEEFE. You could not find him home?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Then you went on and made your deliveries to others, as you testified, and you think Wilkinson called Stark that night, and made an appointment to get all the crowd together the next morning. You so stated?

Captain KRAMER. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Now, you had the pouch that Stark did not get, and took it back to the Navy Department that Saturday night?

Captain KRAMER. Yes.

Mr. KEEFE. Did not you deliver that pouch to him in the morning, so Stark would have the same papers you delivered to these other people?

Captain KRAMER. I left several pouches with Captain McCollum early that morning, sir. It could well be that my stopping about 9:30 at Admiral Stark's office was to see and find out for myself whether Admiral Stark had yet seen it.

[10970] Mr. KEEFE. Now, then, I will read on with your answer:

First batch of new given about 0940, second about 1045 (all this was not personal but via his senior aide because of meeting in progress. They were passed in to him promptly however).

Now you say that the first batch of the new stuff that came in was given to him at 9:40, and the second batch at 10:45, and that was delivered to his senior aide.

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Then you must have made three deliveries.

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Do I understand this—

Captain KRAMER. (interposing), My present recollection is that I am somewhat faulty on precise times in that memorandum. That 9:40 I now modify to the 9:30 stopping at Admiral Stark's office I have just referred to.
Mr. Keefe. Then am I to understand that you not only left the material that was in the pouch on the night before, but you also left the first batch of the material that came in on the morning of the 7th at 9:30, is that it?

Captain Kramer. The first batch, Mr. Keefe, now appears to be only the fourteenth part of that 13-part note. That was apparently the only new material, in the light of my study the other night, that was left on the first trip.

[10971] Mr. Keefe. Well, now, am I to understand that you left the pouch with the fourteenth part message in it alone?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; that together with the other material disseminated the previous night which Admiral Stark had not yet seen.

Mr. Keefe. Now why can't we get some simple little fact clear? Am I correct in the assumption that whatever you did deliver, whether it was 9:30, 9:40, or at any other time, the first delivery you made on the morning of the 7th, according to your present refreshed testimony, included the fourteenth part, together with the first 13 parts.

Now did it or didn't it?

Captain Kramer. It did, sir.

Mr. Keefe. All right. It is easy to say a simple little thing like that if you will only listen to the question.

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield? I think I can clear the confusion by showing you this part of the record.

Mr. Keefe. I do not think there is any confusion right now. I think we have got it clear.

Now question No. 14:

With reference to a certain conference held that morning, do you know who attended it and how long it lasted?

Answer:

There were two I know of, and I believe another c/o Colonel Bratton. The one in Mr. Hull's office was at [10972] least one and one-half hours. Another started about 9:00 o'clock with Op-10, Admiral Stark, 11 Admiral Ingersoll, 12 Admiral Turner, 16 Admiral Wilkinson, 20 Admiral Noyes, and others there, lasting to 1130 that I know of, and probably later.

Is that correct?

Captain Kramer. It now develops, Mr. Keefe, that there was no formal conference, but many officers were in Admiral Stark's office, and going and coming from his office. My impression, at the time I prepared that memorandum and at the time that Sunday morning, was there was a conference. It was in a similar manner that the normal 11 o'clock conference was held more or less daily in Admiral Stark's office, similarly assembled. That was the reason for my impression that there was a formal conference of that nature. However, it was no formal conference but a continuing discussion that Sunday morning.

Mr. Keefe. All right. Question No. 15:

"Did you ever tell Admiral Wilkinson what you told me?"

Your answers appears to be to 15 and 16:

Reference obscure. Would you clarify? If re-general security* (i.e. lack) late in spring, yes.

What does that refer to?

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Captain Kramer. That is rather cryptic, I will admit, Mr. Keefe. By “spring” I refer to the spring of 1942, regarding a number of security questions that came up at that time. Otherwise I was unaware of what Captain Safford was referring to.

Mr. Keefe. Well, he says, “Did you ever tell Admiral Wilkinson what you told me?” What was it that you told him?

Captain Kramer. I still do not know what he means by that remark, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Then you say, “If regeneral security (i.e., lack) late in spring; yes.”

What did you mean by that?

Captain Kramer. I thought I covered that point just now, sir. I referred to a security episode that came up late in the spring of 1942.

Mr. Keefe. Question No. 17:

When did Admiral Wilkinson first see or learn about part 14 and other papers?

Your answer is:

See items 13 and 14 above.

There is no question about that, is there?

Captain Kramer. I do not think so, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Your memorandum then is exactly the same as you testified?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

We can’t find the original “weather report” (sent on Dec. 5th) and its translation. What became of it?

Answer:

The first weather report was not on 5 December, 1941, but mid-morning of 7 December 1941, as indicated in 10-c above. It went into OP-20-GZ file. Op-20-GL should have it now unless it was among files turned over to Army.

Now there you are referring to the so-called weather report that came in on the seventh?

Captain Kramer. Which I learned only before Admiral Hewitt’s investigation I was mistaken in, and actually that was the hidden-word message.

Mr. Keefe. It was the hidden-word message instead of the weather report?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Question No. 18:

Can you offer any pertinent remarks?

Your answer:

For the most part covered above, until item 15 (16) is clarified.

Then your memorandum goes on and sets forth the first four paragraphs of Captain Safford’s letter to you under date of January 22, 1944, which is already in the record, and I shall not burden the record by reading it.

Then you put down his questions:

Please answer the following questions by item No."

Item 20:

Re your item #2, is Colonel B. Colonel Bratton?
Answer:

Yes.

Item No. 21:

What or whose job in the Navy did Colonel Bratton's job correspond to?

Answer:

McCollum's (head of FE Section), and mine insofar as dissemination of this material is concerned.

No question about that?

Captain Kramer. None whatsoever, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Item 22:

Do you know what Army officers were notified or shown the papers by Colonel Bratton, and when?

Answer:

Other than as indicated in 2, 9 and 14 I do not know, but since the Colonel was, on frequent occasions of which I am aware, always prompt and conscientious in handling this type of material I assume that all usual recipients in the War Department were getting everything promptly on 6–7 December, 1941. This assumption is further substantiated the morning of the 7th by the fact that he arrived at Mr. Hull's office about the same time I did on both trips, despite the fact I had a few minutes start each time while delivery was being made to him from my office. He, as you know, was responsible for getting it to State, as well as to Mr. Stimson. I believe his usual practice was [10976] to get it to the Chief of Staff and DMI prior to delivery to Mr. Hull.

No question about that, is there?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Mr. Keefe (continuing):

In amplification of my question 15–16 "Did you ever tell Admiral Wilkinson what you told me? Or McCollum or anyone else?" I recall your telling me that you saw Admiral Stark about 0900 (EST) on 7 December 1941.

He looked at the papers and exclaimed, "My God! This means war!"

You said, "Admiral, it has meant war for the past three months."

Admiral Stark continued, "I must get word to Admiral Kimmel," and picked up a message blank.

Then another idea entered his mind, and he said "Does General Marshall know of this?"

You replied, "Most of it was sent over to his office last night. This last part (Part 14) was sent over 10 minutes ago and should be on the General's desk by now."

(End of your tale).

Now, this was what amplified Captain Safford's previous question, which you asked him to amplify in your reply to his first letter?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; that is correct, sir.

[10977] Mr. Keefe. And he is attempting to tell you what you told him in amplification and asks you to verify it?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Item 23:

Can you verify or correct the foregoing?

Answer:

Cannot verify. (See Item 13.) I may have made the last remark, because quite often during the previous year, not only he, but others would ask similar questions regarding who had it. I therefore frequently answered such questions or volunteered such information at the time of delivery, and may have as indicated in this case.
Now this question and the answer thus far contemplate that you had had a conversation at some time with Captain Safford and had told him that you had delivered these papers, or these messages, to Admiral Stark at about 9 o'clock, and that when he looked at it he said, "My God! This means war!" and you said, "Admiral, it has meant war for the past three months." Admiral Stark then said, "I must get word to Admiral Kimmel," and picked up a message blank.

Now I understand you to say in your memorandum that you cannot verify that as having taken place, except possibly the last sentence.

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KEEFE. Yes, sir.

Most of it was sent over to [10978] his office last night. This last part (Part 14) was sent over 10 minutes ago and should be on the General's desk by now.

What were you referring to there?

Captain KRAMER. I was referring in the answer set forth there only to the general character of conversations regarding delivery, which I frequently made and talked about in my answer there.

Mr. KEEFE. You say in your memorandum:

I may have made the last remark, because quite often during the previous year, not only he, but others would ask similar questions regarding who had it.

Now what I want to know is, had you at any time told Captain Safford those facts that he set forth to refresh your recollection?

Captain KRAMER. I am extremely doubtful of that, sir. I had probably three or four conversations, between the time of Pearl Harbor and the time of my departure in the late spring of 1943 with Captain Safford. During those conversations I may have referred, at one time or another, probably in the days just following Pearl Harbor, to what deliveries I had made that morning. I kept him in general apprised of important items in this traffic. I cannot, however, verify that conversation which Captain Safford puts [10979] in mine and Admiral Stark's mouths.

Mr. KEEFE. You do not deny it, do you, that you told that to Captain Safford?

Captain KRAMER. I have no recollection whatsoever of having told Captain Safford of such a conversation.

Mr. KEEFE. Well, now Captain Kramer, it would be perfectly the most natural thing in the world for an officer like Admiral Stark to say, "My God! This means war!" when he got these messages, wouldn't it?

Captain KRAMER. In that respect, sir, Admiral Stark, that I recall on three or four occasions, used rather emphatic expressions of that nature.

Mr. KEEFE. It would not be unlike Admiral Stark to make a statement of that kind, would it?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir.

[10980] Mr. KEEFE. Then as I understand your testimony with respect to this particular situation, it boils down to this, that you just do not verify it. It may have occurred, you do not deny it categorically, but you do not have any present recollection that you told Captain Safford that?

Captain KRAMER. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. But when you were recording your last declaration, that was to be used in the event of your death in the Pacific setting forth the facts, you did say you may have have made the last remark, and I want to quote that, when he asked the question "Does General Marshall know of this?" your reply was:

Most of it was sent over to his office last night. This last part (part 14) was sent over ten minutes ago, and should be on the General's desk by now.

Captain Kramer. By stating I might have made the last remark, I was referring purely and simply, Mr. Keeffe, to the fact that assuming I saw Admiral Stark at 9 or 9:30 that morning, I may have informed him of who had already received that material.

It was nothing more or less, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. All right.

Now, I go on with your further answer:

[10981] My recollections and most vivid impressions of that morning almost 2½ years ago are of urgency and perspiration. The latter from dashing through the corridors of the Navy Department and two trips to the White House and State Department on foot (partly on the double), and the former from the certainty that the diplomatic haymakers exchanged since five November, 1941, and particularly since about the 26th, were reaching a climax. The immediate urgency for me was to get back to my office as quickly as possible to see if anything new had come in, and then get it pushed through the breakdown, translation, check for references, typing, arrangement of the 14 copies in folders for dissemination, phoning to see where recipients were, and then to dash out with it again.

Hence, my usual procedure of preparing summaries of the day's traffic and of references, as well as sitting alongside the desk of recipients while they read only the summaries if pressed for time, or the full text of the more important material to which I invited their attention, and so I could clarify obscure connotations, identify names, give background, or outline references, was entirely foregone that morning.

There was no need for any of it because the items were for the most part self-explanatory and the background, so [10982] far as this particular set of traffic was concerned, was well-known to all recipients, especially because the volume of new material during the preceding ten days had been small (though important) and had given opportunity for review.

If I appear to be hazy on some of the details you ask, in particular with reference to the conversation in Admiral Stark's office, the above background which I have given at some length should explain it in part.

More specifically, I recall making personal delivery to only two principals that morning, namely, to Mr. Knox and to Admiral Stark at 0600.

There again, after this long explanation, you say, and I read:

More specifically, I recall making personal delivery to only two principals that morning, namely, to Mr. Knox and to Admiral Stark at 0600, or 9 o'clock.

I go on with your statement:

In the case of Mr. Knox, I gave him the previous night's material, plus part 14, and one to two less important things when he arrived at Mr. Hull's office about 1000. My remarks then were confined to inviting attention to the new material, because he had studied the previous night's material from approximately 2200 to after 2300 in his apartment.

That would be for an hour, wouldn't it? [10983] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. It was somewhat less than that.

Mr. Keeffe (reading):

Part of this time he talked to me about various phases of the matter, and made phone calls. The rest of the time I conversed with Mrs. Knox, and the
Secretary's Chicago Daily News manager, who was visiting and whom I had
known slightly during the period when he was acting as Mr. Knox's personal
secretary at the Navy Department.

Right at that point, in this letter, which was written by you out
in the Pacific, without the benefit of notes, and without the benefit of
all this material, and without the benefit of refreshment from any-
body, you told, in pretty meticulous detail, the same story you told
before this committee; isn't that true, as to those facts?

Captain Kramer. I think so, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Yes. Now, I go on.

Again, at about 1100 when I delivered the "1300 msg." the "weather report"
and the final orders on destruction of cryptographic aids, I took time only to
invite attention verbally to the fact "that 1300 Eastern Daylight Time was 0730
at Pearl—

and that means 7:30 at Pearl, doesn't it?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

[10984] Mr. Keefe. "And 0300"—that would be what? Three
o'clock?

Captain Kramer. In the morning; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. In the morning.

approximately or shortly before morning twilight at Kota Bharu, where we had
been expecting confirmation of the deal with the Thai Chief of Staff for this
attack for some days. The implications were so obvious in the light of what
we know, that it was not necessary to state that invasion of British territory
was undoubtedly scheduled for 1300 (EDT), and that at least a complete break
with the U. S. was scheduled simultaneously.

That was clear wasn't it?

Captain Kramer. I think so, sir.

Mr. Keefe (reading):

In the case of the 0600 delivery to Admiral Stark I was in very much of a
hurry. I don't believe I spent as much as a minute in his office.

Now, you refer in this memorandum to the 9 o'clock delivery to
Admiral Stark, do you not?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; in that respect, Mr. Keefe——

Mr. Keefe (interposing). I have only asked for the "yes."

Mr. Murphy. I submit the witness is entitled to give an explana-
	
tion. We want the facts.

[10985] Captain Kramer. I would like to make a very short
further remark, that I was hazy then, and still am hazy. I believe
Captain McCollum is not precise, and that Admiral Stark too is
not precise as to those exact times. I do definitely recall now,
however, that the first delivery of that note to Admiral Stark was
made by Captain McCollum where I left the folder for the Admiral.

I may very well, since Admiral Stark's office was up on deck
and only one corridor's length away, have gone up there at 9 o'clock
with the flag secretary, if he were there, or to otherwise check to
see whether Admiral Stark were in and had gotten that.

Mr. Keefe. Well, of course, the whole thing is only a matter of a
half hour's difference.

Captain Kramer. Yes.

Mr. Keefe. The testimony is only a difference of a half an hour,
which was a vital half hour that morning, was it not?

Captain Kramer. I presume all time that morning was very vital,
yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Yes.

Well, I will go on:

I don't believe I spent as much as a minute in his office.

[10986] A number of other senior officers were standing about or coming in for the meeting. I hardly glanced at them, more than to note that Admiral Turner, Noyes, and Wilkinson, the principal other usual recipients, were also there, and consequently it would not be necessary to run them down in the building for separate and individual delivery.

I had been interrupted in finishing some of the hot new material in my office to make this delivery, and was literally almost jumpy to get back and get it out, and to deliver to the White House as quickly as possible, and also, of course to keep the 1000 appointment with Mr. Knox at the State Department.

I am almost positive I did not remain in the Admiral's office while he read the approximately 15 pages of single-spaced text. There were undoubtedly a few words exchanged with the Admiral, most likely along the lines of the remarks you quote as my last reply.

[10987] I want to stop right there. You say:

I am almost positive I did not remain in the Admiral's office while he read the approximately 15 pages of single-spaced text.

Now what were you referring to there? The whole 14 parts?

Captain Kramer. That was presuming that I delivered directly to Admiral Stark the 14-part note; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now did you or did you not deliver it to him?

Captain Kramer. I did not, in my present best recollection, make that delivery; no, sir. Captain McCollum did.

Mr. Keefe. Well, when you were making that statement that day you were certainly under the impression that you had delivered it to him, and you were setting down in this document, to be used in the event of your death, what you thoroughly understood the facts to be?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And you say in this that you are certain that you did not remain in his office while he read the approximately 15 pages.

There were undoubtedly a few words exchanged with the Admiral, most likely along the lines of the remarks you quote as my last reply.

What were you referring to there?

Captain Kramer. The last sentence that Captain Safford [10988] quotes me as saying.

Mr. Keefe. We will go back to it. In other words, "Does General Marshall know of this?", and your reply:

Most of it was sent over to his office last night. This last part (Part 14) was sent over 10 minutes ago and should be on the General's desk by now.

Is that what you referred to?

Captain Kramer. I referred, as I shortly before have outlined, only to informing Admiral Stark, a recipient, as to other recipients who may or may not have received that material.

Mr. Keefe. Now let us get a definite answer to my question.

Captain Kramer. That, I think, is a definite answer, sir.

Mr. Keefe. When you wrote these words:

There were undoubtedly a few words exchanged with the Admiral, most likely along the lines of the remarks you quote as my last reply, were you then referring to the suggested words contained in Captain Safford's letter to you?
Captain Kramer. I was not, sir.

Mr. Keefe. What were you referring to?

Captain Kramer. Only to my general practice of informing recipients who else had received the material I was delivering.

Mr. Keefe. Well, in this memorandum you say:

There [10989] were undoubtedly a few words exchanged with the Admiral, most likely along the lines of the remarks you quote as my last reply.

What did you mean when you set that down?

Captain Kramer. I have already stated, a few minutes ago, Mr. Keefe, that I did not edit that memorandum after I wrote it. I was under some pressure to confer with Admiral Halsey again, as I had indicated when he first showed me Admiral Kimmel's letter. Despite that urgency, or at least haste, on my part it took me approximately 4 or 5 days before I had this memorandum prepared. I recall now no attempt to go back, during the process of preparing that memorandum, to check in detail what I had said earlier.

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, let us go on. The memorandum further says:

The other actions of the Admiral would also be not unusual.

What were you referring to there?

Captain Kramer. I was referring to an emphatic comment that the Admiral had made on the several previous occasions when I delivered directly to him.

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, this portion of your memorandum, Captain, refers to what took place when you delivered this message to Admiral Stark at 9 o'clock on the morning of [10990] the 7th, or whatever time between 9 and 9:30 that you actually did deliver it.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Keefe. Yes; I yield.

Mr. Murphy. I think if you will refer to page 9144 you will find Captain McCollum's explanation on the delivery of the first part of the message.

Mr. Keefe. I am not interested at this time in what Captain McCollum said. I am asking this witness who is now on the stand.

Mr. Murphy. May I finish?

Mr. Keefe. No; I do not care to be interrupted for that purpose.

That does not add anything to this examination.

The Chairman. Go ahead.

Mr. Murphy. I am trying to avoid confusion.

Mr. Keefe. You simply add more confusion to it.

Now what remarks, if any, did Admiral Stark make to you that morning?

Captain Kramer. Admiral Stark, in my present best recollection, made no remark directly to me, sir. I could be—I have indicated my haziness on precise times prior to 10 o'clock, that is between about 8:15 and 10, at least—that I was in Admiral Stark's outer office at about the time that Captain McCollum arrived there to show that memorandum to Admiral Stark. I am uncertain of that, sir.

[10997] Mr. Keefe. Then your answer is that, according to your present recollection, after you have been refreshed, as it were, you think you did not deliver this fourteenth part message, together with the first 13 parts, that morning at any time, to Admiral Stark?

Captain Kramer. Directly; yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. So that you now contend you did not have any conversation with him at all that morning; is that right?

Captain Kramer. That is my present belief; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Therefore Admiral Stark did not say anything to you about this message at all?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Is that your present recollection?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Is that because you discussed it with Admiral Stark and Captain McCollum?

Captain Kramer. Partly that, and partly by general study of this whole subject in the last few weeks, the last couple of months.

Mr. Keefe. Since you got back to Washington?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. That is what you meant when you said, repeatedly throughout your testimony that you had been refreshed, [10992] so that your current recollection is so and so; is that right?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. A large part of my refreshing has been due to a study of documents which I had not seen until recent days.

Mr. Keefe. A study of documents would not help you any on this, would it?

Captain Kramer. No.

Mr. Keefe. So if any refreshing at all is to be done, it is because somebody talked to you about it; is that true?

Captain Kramer. Yes.

Mr. Keefe. Nothing else?

Captain Kramer. Nothing else.

Mr. Keefe. There are no documents that you could study which would determine whether you talked to Admiral Stark or whether you did not?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, let us go on with your statement:

On a number of occasions previously he had immediately phoned General Marshall, or had called the White House to arrange immediate access for me to Mr. Roosevelt if the material were important, and delivery had been to the Admiral first. I definitely recall a certain feeling of [10993] relief that Admiral Wilkinson was there, and consequently I need not be held up from getting back to my office while it was read, because Admiral Wilkinson had studied it thoroughly the night before and could answer any questions the Admiral had.

Now, there again, you say you definitely recall a feeling of relief that Admiral Wilkinson was there. Now, was where? In Admiral Stark's office?

Captain Kramer. How is that?

Mr. Keefe. Was Admiral Wilkinson in Admiral Stark's office?

Captain Kramer. He was quite definitely at my 10:30 visit in Admiral Stark's outer office. It could very well be that he was there at about 9:30 when I stopped by Admiral Stark's office, together with other senior department officers, standing about in his office.

Mr. Keefe. All right.

Now, let us go on.

Now, I want you to listen to this. You say you never read this statement before since you wrote it.

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. So it is quite new to you, too, isn't it?
Captain Kramer. There are some points that are new to me now, yes, sir. I do not recall just exactly what I put in that memorandum.

Mr. Keeffe. I want you to listen to this next one carefully:

One or more of the other remarks may have been made also. The quoted exclamation of Admiral Stark would have been typical in character, because he had used emphatic exclamation once or twice before during the fall when particularly 'hot' items were being shown him. But climax after climax had been so frequent during the previous several months that even this remark would not have impressed me specifically. I was used to it, with my mind focused on the technical and messenger boys aspects that morning, I simply do not recall the complete conversation in question.

Now, does that refresh your recollection as to whether you told Captain Safford about the exclamations that Admiral Stark had made when this message was delivered to him?

Captain Kramer. Not in the slightest, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. It does not refresh you in the slightest?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Your own words, your own language written by you?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Now, I ask you again, in the light of your present knowledge, did you or did you not deliver the fourteenth part message together with the first 13 parts that morning to Admiral Stark personally?

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Then all this stuff that you have written down here, couldn’t possibly have happened, or any inference that it happened, couldn’t possibly show that it happened?

Captain Kramer. It is possible that I was in Admiral Stark’s outer office at the time Captain McCollum arrived there. He may have phoned me that Admiral Stark was arriving. That would not have been unusual.

Mr. Keeffe. Do you have any present recollection that Admiral Stark made any of the statements which are set forth in Captain Safford’s letter to you?

Captain Kramer. I have none, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Now Captain Kramer, just so that we may thoroughly understand this, I understood you to say that you prepared this memorandum and intended that this memorandum should be your story of these events in the event you should happen to be killed in your service out in the South Pacific?

Captain Kramer. That is not quite accurate, sir. My intention in preparing that memorandum was simply to give Admiral Halsey a much broader picture of events preceding Pearl Harbor than would be indicated by replies to Admiral Kimmel’s letter. That purpose only. It was only later, after I had promised Admiral Halsey that I would prepare a deposition or affidavit in compliance with Admiral Wilkinson’s request, that I retained this memorandum as being in the nature of the affidavit which Admiral Kimmel had requested. I never reviewed that as to accuracy at any time. I never prepared any such affidavit.

Mr. Keeffe. Did you intend that this should be used in the event anything happened to you?
Captain Kramer. I, of course, hoped that it would be necessary to so use it.

Mr. Keefe. Well, in the event it would have been necessary to use it, did you intend this should be your statement of fact?

Captain Kramer. It would have been found with my papers; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Sort of a last declaration, or dying declaration or something of that kind; is that right?

Captain Kramer. I presume so, sir; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Then you knew that an investigation was on at the time you prepared this, did you not?

Captain Kramer. I did not; no, sir. I believe I had heard, I am not certain of that point, that a Navy investigation was contemplated.

Mr. Keefe. And you knew that on the possibility of the findings of that Navy court, the careers and perhaps the entire lives of individuals depended; you knew that, didn't you?

Captain Kramer. That undoubtedly was part of my presumption; yes, sir. I did not know just the purpose of the investigation.

Mr. Keefe. So you were quite meticulous, were you not, when you prepared this statement, to see to it that you recorded the truth?

Captain Kramer. I was not particularly meticulous. My only purpose and intention when I was preparing that was to give Admiral Halsey a broad picture. I took no time to rehash or attempt to refresh my memory precisely as to details in the preparation of that memorandum.

Mr. Keefe. Now, I read on. Let's see if this refreshes your recollection any. I am trying to refresh it from your own document. Not anybody else's.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. This is your own writing.

In later deliveries—

Get this:

In later deliveries to Admiral Stark that morning, I went only to his office door, which remained open, while his flag secretary took the material from me and gave it to the admiral.

[10999] Captain Kramer. That was referring specifically to the 10:30 delivery which I quite vividly recall.

Mr. Keefe. That would imply to me, reading this full statement, that the first delivery you made in person to Admiral Stark and then you say "In later deliveries to Admiral Stark that morning I went only to his office door."

Captain Kramer. In later trips to Admiral Stark's office. Again, possibly clarifying a point to a slight degree, it could well be that Admiral Stark's door was not closed at the first trip around 9 or 9:30, whenever it was, that I may have made to Admiral Stark's office. It was closed, I recall quite positively, when I arrived there about 10:30, because word had to be sent in to the admiral that I was outside.

Mr. Keefe. Well, it is quite clear from your testimony given here that you never delivered any papers to Admiral Stark personally that morning.

Captain Kramer. That is my present belief; yes, sir; before 10 o'clock.
Mr. Keefe. So when you say "In later deliveries to Admiral Stark, I went only to his office door;" the fact is you never went beyond his office door to make any deliveries; is that what you mean to tell us now?

Captain Kramer. That is what I mean to tell you now, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You have then refreshed on that point also since you got back to Washington?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Did you talk about that at Admiral Stark's luncheon?

Captain Kramer. I don't believe that came up specifically; no, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Then you go on to say:

I believe I also gave him additional folders on one or both occasions for other recipients in the conference. But in these latter deliveries I recollect conversations only for Mr. Knox' benefit regarding the implications of the 1300 hour. I distinctly remember that the tie-up of these times would be apparent to experienced naval officers, but that a civilian (Mr. Knox) might overlook it. Hence the pains I took to point it out at the State Department. I repeated this point at least half a dozen times that morning to others, chiefly subordinates, I think, but including one of Mr. Hull's secretaries who handled this material for him, to one or two of my office workers, and I believe also to Colonel Bratton in Mr. Hull's outer office, probably to Commander Wellborn, the Admiral's flag secretary, possibly to McCollum, and probably to you, too. However, such conversations as I had that morning were more in the nature of rapid comment and abrupt departure to keep up with my chief concerns, the messenger boy and technical jobs. Consequently, any remarks made by others have left practically no impressions or recollections with me.

Now, that is substantially, as to that point, what you have testified before us here?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. On that issue your mind is very clear, it is the same today as it was when you recorded this out in the Pacific in the early part of 1944?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, then, questions 24 and 25:

Did Admiral Stark get General Marshall on the telephone and what did he say; were there any other witnesses? If so, who?

See 23 above; also 13 and 14.

You mean by that that what I have just finished reading is the story so far as Admiral Stark is concerned and what you know about it?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Do you know whether Admiral Stark telephoned General Marshall that morning?

Captain Kramer. I do not, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Question 26:

Did you tell McCollum, or Admiral Wilkinson, or anyone else?

Since I don't recall the story, I rather doubt that I could have told it to these two also, but I could not swear to it.

Well, now comes this next question. That is the one you had reference to, Mr. —

The Vice Chairman. Who had reference to?

Mr. Keefe. Counsel had reference to it.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Richardson.

Mr. Keefe. You have seen this, Mr. Murphy. Can you see anything in it?
Mr. Murphy. I had the benefit of a half-minute glance at it. From what I saw I could see no reason for withholding it.

Senator Brewster. I can't understand.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Keefe asked me if I had seen it and I said that I had had the benefit of a half-minute glance at it. From what I saw I saw no reason to withhold it. I did not see all of it. Mr. Keefe had it overnight.

The Vice Chairman. Permit the Chair to inquire of counsel: Is there anything about this matter—counsel is familiar with it?

Mr. Richardson. We see no reason for withholding it except the request of Captain Baecher.

Mr. Murphy. The first part of the question has already been read into the record.

Mr. Keefe. That is right.

Mr. Murphy. Several days ago.

Mr. Keefe. Most of the facts set forth in the next question and answer are already in the record, having been referred to heretofore. Mr. Kaufman. Commander Baecher says that the Navy Department requests that it be withheld and before it is made public they would like to make very serious representations to the committee that it should not be disclosed.

The Vice Chairman. Well, in view of that——

Senator Lucas. Does that have to do with magic?

Mr. Kaufman. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. If there is anything in there of that character then I can't read English. I can't find it in there.

Senator Lucas. Does the Congressman think it is material?

Mr. Keefe. Well, I don't know. I don't want to be quoted as saying that I think it is material except we have a witness on the stand and the materiality of it, in my opinion, could only relate to a search of his memory.

Senator Lucas. Yes.

Mr. Keefe. To determine the possible credibility of testimony which he has given here and his ability to remember details and facts and not remember other details and facts.

The Vice Chairman. On that point, hasn't he had a pretty fair test applied to him up to this point?

Mr. Keefe. I only raise this question, Mr. Cooper, because I like to keep my word, and I stated that I would not refer to anything in this which might by the wildest stretch of imagination be assumed to interfere with the security of the United States.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I suggest, while I would have no question about its materiality, in view of the representation of the Navy Department I would suggest we defer decision until noontime. We are nearly ready for recess. We might take a little earlier recess and permit the Navy to tell us in confidence why this will wreck our national security.

I am at a loss to understand it, but I think we should defer to their desire.

The Vice Chairman. I think in view of the request made by the Navy Department certainly they are entitled to that consideration.

Mr. Murphy. May I suggest we go to question 28 and then let the gentleman from Wisconsin pass the sheet along and let the committee read it. Questions from 28 to 43 do not violate anything.
The Vice Chairman. Permit the Chair to inquire of Commander Baecher: Is the material upon which the Navy Department request is based on this one page to which Mr. Murphy has referred?

Commander Baecher. I think, Mr. Chairman, it goes over three pages.

Mr. Murphy. It is one question. Question 27.

[11006] Commander Baecher. Yes. It begins at the bottom of the page, takes up a full second page and ends on top of the third page.

The Vice Chairman. Is it all under one question?

Commander Baecher. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. Would that be agreeable, Mr. Keefe, to skip that one question and go on with your examination?

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. We will follow the suggestion of Senator Brewster.

Mr. Keefe. Question 28:

Do you know if any of the following were called as witnesses by the Roberts Commission? Admiral Wilkinson; Admiral Turner; McCollum; Kramer.

I was not called. Captain McCollum was, and he told me a little about it including the fact of the introduction of at least some of the Jap traffic as evidence. I do not know about the others, but presume they did appear.

Question 29:

Were the JD files in GZ custody or any messages from these files ever submitted to the Roberts Commission?

Answer:

See 28. The files from GZ were never called for, but were unnecessary for this purpose since MID had numerous copies of everything, and a complete set for about [11007] a month back was normally in ONI in Op-16-FE.

Captain Kramer. That is Captain McCollum's section, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Question 30:

Were Admiral Wilkinson, McCollum, or Kramer, or anyone else, cautioned or warned, or instructed not to ever mention the events of 6-7 December 1941, or the investigations conducted by the Roberts Commission? In this connection, I am sending you a copy of the Roberts Report by ordinary ship's mail. I will comment on it in further correspondence.

Answer:

Not that I am aware of. I was not. However, the sessions were, of course, secret, hence cautions or warnings of some kind should have been in order, as in ordinary courts. I cannot conceive of the crypto traffic being introduced in evidence without at least the elementary prudence of cautionary warnings regarding this material. However, I have no knowledge of this, or even of the rules of procedure used by the Commission.

Question 31:

Do you know when and how General Marshall first got news of Serials #901 and #902 (Parts 1–13 Inc.), and what action he took?

I do not know, but see 2, 14 and 22. I believe he got it that night. I am unaware of any action taken, but presume that a meeting in War Department the following morning [11008] was arranged that night. Sunday was not an all hands work day at that time.

What did you mean by that answer?

Captain Kramer. I meant precisely what it says, I think, sir, that Sunday was normally observed as a holiday from working hours, ap-
pearance at the office on Sunday except for special watches set up on a full week 24-hour basis. People did not come to the Navy Department on Sunday except on unusual occasions and as to the War Department I believe it was the same case.

Mr. Keefe. Well, you say that you believe General Marshall got #901 and #902 Saturday night.

Captain Kramer. I stated definitely above that I did not have any first-hand knowledge on that point, sir; it was just my presumption that he might have gotten it.

Mr. Keefe. And was that presumption based on the fact that they did have a meeting in the War Department the following morning?

Captain Kramer. I know nothing about any meeting that may or may not have taken place in the War Department Sunday morning, sir.

Mr. Keefe. So that your answer in this case is just pure speculation?

Captain Kramer. I could have answered simply “No” to that whole question; yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. His answer is covered in his answer above. In No. 22, about what material the Army had.

Mr. Keefe. Yes; I know. He refers to it in this answer.

Question 32:

Same for Part 14 of Serial #902, and for Serial #907 which set up the 1300 delivery time?

Your answer:

See 31.

In other words, you don’t know anything about whether General Marshall got it or when he got it if at all?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Question 33:

Re my 14, I meant the conference between Admiral Stark and General Marshall which resulted in dispatch described in Part XI of Roberts Report. I did not know of the other conferences and am delighted to learn of them. Can you add any names to those already given by you for:

That appears to be the end. There doesn’t appear to be any answer to that question. There is a little lapse there and it is hard to follow. Maybe you can explain it to me.

[11010] (The witness was handed a paper and there was a discussion between Mr. Keefe and the witness off the record.)

Mr. Keefe. In any event so far as this memorandum is concerned there does not appear to be any answer to question 33?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And your explanation to me just given is that it is very possible that you may have gotten up to that night that you were working on it and may have started in again later and forgot to record any answer to that question?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, then, question 34:

Conference in Mr. Hull’s office?
Answer:

I am quite certain Mr. Hamilton (head of FE Division of State) was there, and believe both Mr. Hornbeck (political adviser on FE) and Mr. Welles were there, since they were regularly seeing the traffic. Probably about 8 persons altogether.

Do you know whether Mr. Welles was there?

Captain Kramer. I do not, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You say you believe that he was there—when you wrote this memorandum.

Captain Kramer. I believe Mr. Welles was normally called in to conferences between those three Secretaries bearing on these Japanese-United State negotiations, sir.

[11011] Mr. Keefe. You know that Mr. Welles has testified here that he was not there that morning, do you not?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; this is the first I ever heard that point.

Mr. Keefe. That was just——

Captain Kramer. Presumption.

Mr. Keefe. Presumption on your part, too, wasn't it?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

[11012] Mr. Keefe. Question 35:

Conference in Admiral Stark's office?

Then your answer:

Cannot add my name to 14, but there were quite a number, possibly 15 or more standing around, not yet seated when first delivery was made about 0900.

Again you refer to the fact that all of these people were in Admiral Stark's office when you made the first delivery about 9 o'clock.

Now, you don't care to add anything to what you have already said on that question?

Mr. Kramer. No, sir; I do not.

Mr. Keefe. Question 36:

Conference in General Marshall's office?

Answer:

Have your information and am not even positive there was a conference. See 14 and 31.

Question 37:

The conference between Admiral Stark and General Marshall?

Know nothing of this.

Question 38:

How much does McCollum know?

I don't know exactly. I presume a good deal. I saw [11013] him only rarely after the new regime took over with delivery of material by young officer "couriers."

No. 39:

Will McCollum come through willingly?

I do not know.

No. 40:

What is your estimate of Admiral Wilkinson in this respect?

I frankly don't know. Our relations have always been most cordial and friendly, and remain so on three occasions I have met him in SOPAC. On two occasions when he introduced me to other senior officers, he introduced me with the remark that he and I had had a rather hectic night before Pearl Harbor.
But we have never discussed any aspects of this case or subsequent developments such as the Roberts’ Commission.

What was your understanding that Captain Safford was inquiring about when he said “What is your estimate of Admiral Wilkinson in this respect,” and you answered, “Frankly I don’t know”?

Captain Kramer. Mr. Keefe, one of numerous reasons why I did not reply to Captain Safford’s letter was the fact that Captain Safford was apparently putting me on some sort of a team. I proposed to be on no team. I referred in that [11014] answer there to that point.

Mr. Keefe. In other words, when you said, “I frankly don’t know,” you are referring to the fact that you weren’t going to be on anybody’s team; is that it?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. The question is “What is your estimate of Admiral Wilkinson in this respect,” and your answer is “I frankly don’t know.” You want us to understand that is to be interpreted as meaning you weren’t going to play on anybody’s team?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Did you know that, from your previous conversations with Captain Safford before you went to the South Pacific, that he was organizing a team?

Captain Kramer. The first intimation I had of any such development was Captain Safford’s second letter to me.

Mr. Keefe. And you just didn’t want to get mixed up with Captain Safford?

Captain Kramer. That is correct.

Mr. Keefe. So when he asked what you thought about Admiral Wilkinson, you just said, “I frankly don’t know.”

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. When he asked you whether McCollum would come through willingly, you said, “I don’t know.”

[11015] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Then the next question is:

Will he talk for Admiral Halsey?

Your answer was:

I have nothing on which to base an opinion in this regard.

That is the same situation isn’t it?

Captain Kramer. Precisely, sir.

Mr. Keefe. 42:

What about Admiral Turner?

Answer:

I have not seen him since he left Washington, and have nothing on which to base even an estimate.

Captain Kramer. The same thing, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, there appears on the next page, which appears to be comment apparently by Safford.

This is what it says:

With regard to the quotes of my Item 18 (the Weather Report sent 5 Dec ’41) and your reply in 10 (c), you were describing #80 (Circular #2494, a plain language hidden code msg. sent the morning of 7 Dec 41) of which we have copies
of the original and its translation in the GZ files. This was sent and received on 7 Dec 41. I was asking about the “General Intelligence Broadcast” containing false [11016] “Weather Report” which was broadcast at 0403 (EST) on the 4th and 5th of December 1941. (Not sure of exact date). It was heard by “M” and “W” and sent in by teletype. It was unheard by “S”, “H”, and “O”, who listened for it. (I have this from Station “S” files, plus statements of Wright and Mason.) This message (in Morse) included the words:

“Higashi no kaze ame.”

**Captain Kramer.** Very good, Mr. Keefe.

**Mr. Keefe.** Thank you, I hope I don’t fail when the next one comes.

“Nishi no kaze hare.”

**Captain Kramer.** Yes, sir, just as good.

**Mr. Keefe (reading):**

(Negative form of “Kita no kaze Kumori.”)

**Captain Kramer.** Kumori, sir.

**Mr. Keefe.** That is what I said. Do I get a hundred on that, Professor?

**Captain Kramer.** Very close to that, sir.

**Mr. Keefe.** All right. This has done something for us being on this committee. I got that much out of this hearing anyway.

Now then, going on with this:

The warning was not sent in the manner prescribed by [11017] Circulares #2353 and #2354, both of which listed a large number of plain language message texts with corresponding hidden meanings for each, but was a mixture. The GY watch officer was not sure of it so he called you and you came in early and verified it. Murray recalls it and so do I. Either you or Brotherhood (?) were waiting in my office when I came in that morning and said, “Here it is!” We had been waiting a week for it and Station “S” had been forwarding reams of P/L messages by teletype.

As a result of this “General Intelligence Broadcast containing false ‘Weather Report’ McCollum prepared the message described in Paragraph 50 (page 9—XI) of the Roberts Report. It was a very long message ending up with the translation and significance of the warning in the “General Intelligence Broadcast Etc.” I read the message in Admiral Noyes’ office and was witness to the discussion of it between Admiral Noyes and Admiral Wilkinson. I took for granted that the message to Admiral Kimmel originated by McCollum on 4 December 1941 (or 5 Dec) but never released would be sent and did not know otherwise until 2 December 1943. I learned from Wright that McCollum knew this last mentioned message had not been sent (Wright was informed by McCollum at Pearl Harbor).

Then follows more questions.

[11018] **Mr. Keefe.** Question 45.

**Mr. Murphy.** 43.

**Mr. Keefe.** Is it 43?

**Mr. Murphy.** Yes.

**Mr. Keefe.** All right, I am glad you read better than I do [reading]:

Do you recall the “General Intelligence Broadcast containing false ‘Weather report’ ”?

Yes, but I did not handle it. Without exception everything I disseminated was written up with 14 copies (7 for Army, 7 for Navy, with two typings). One copy of Navy’s went at once into JD or similar category-numerical-file of section Op—20—GZ. After routing and return of remaining 6 copies many items went into two other types of files we kept in varying degrees as needed, namely, a “Subject” file, and a Jap msg serial file at certain times, though the latter was basically taken care of by a carding system of originator’s serials.

I do not have a hazy recollection of being called down to the office as you described, a few mornings before Pearl Harbor. I had similarly been called
in by the GY watch officer who had standing orders from me to do so, at various
times of the night one to three times a [11019] week since mid-summer.

In the case of these “Weather Reports”, however, elaborate arrangements
had been made some days (or weeks) previously to have the GY watch officer
handle this type of message himself. The arrangements included the typing up
of a small card for at least five senior officers of the Navy Department, giving the
translation and meaning of these “Weather Reports”. I prepared these cards
for Admiral Noyes at his direction, but from that point he carried the ball. I
believe, but do not know, that he gave these cards to Secretary Knox, Admiral
Stark, and others. At least that was his intention in having them prepared.
And I think also that he completed arrangements with you for handling this
type of message. I think the arrangement including having the Navy Depart-
ment communication officer use his couriers at night to get the word to the
senior officers in Washington who were concerned, though this arrangement may
have consisted simply of phoning, with the Navy Department communication
watch officer keeping at it till he got the word through.

The above is given at some length to explain why this item made such a small
impression on my memory. I was not to handle it. Complete arrangements
to handle it expeditiously were fully set up by the Director of [11020]
Naval Communications, when I was replying to your first letter it did not even
occur to me as the msg. you referred to, and I in fact had completely forgotten the
incident of the arrival of this msg. until your second letter refreshed my memory.
The only “Weather” message I handled was the one late in the morning of
7 Dec. The above also explains why you did not find this earlier one in GZ
translation files.

That ends your story.

Now, Captain Kramer, Captain Safford started his testimony to
this committee by reading a prepared statement and the opening
sentence of that statement was, “There was a winds code message,” or
words to that effect.

Captain Kramer. I confirm that point, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Now you have distinctly and definitely confirmed that
fact.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. There was a winds execute code message that came in on
either the 4th or 5th of December 1941?

Captain Kramer. I believe on the 5th, sir, in my present conviction.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, now, I want to be sure that your answer is there
was a winds execute code message that came in, you think on the 5th,
Captain Safford has testified on the 4th.

[11021] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; there was a message.

Mr. Keeffe. And you were shown that message —

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe (continuing). By which the watch officer who brought
it to you and it is your present recollection that that watch officer
was Lieutenant Murray?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Do you have a present recollection that it was on yellow
teletype paper?

Captain Kramer. I am uncertain of the color. Two colors were in
vogue, both yellow and pink.

Mr. Keeffe. At the time that message was received you believed
that that was the message that these elaborate preparations had been
set up to intercept and decode, were you not?

Captain Kramer. I believed that it was an authentic message of
that winds system, yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Then on that most important part of this whole matter
you and Captain Safford are in agreement, are you not?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And you never had any other at any time, did you—
Captain Kramer. No, sir.

[11022] Mr. Keefe (continuing). From that time to this?

Captain Kramer. Until the last few days when I have—as I have
previously explained, I had been making further studies, including the
reading of interrogations of high Japanese officials by General Mac-
Arthur.

Mr. Keefe. By the way, where are those interrogations of Japanese
officials that you have read?

Mr. Kaufman. That is Exhibit 142, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Will you get it for me? I do not happen to have that
in my files. Will you get me Exhibit 142, please?

(Whereupon counsel handed Exhibit No. 142 to Mr. Keefe.)

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I would like to request, in view of the
readings and interpolations on the paper read by the distinguished
gentleman from Wisconsin, that it be spread in its entirety, with the
exception of question 27, in the record at this point so that those who
read the record will be able to see it and tie up the letter with the
examination, either that or made an exhibit so that we will have a
composite understanding of the letter itself.

Senator Brewster. Would the gentleman be agreeable to deferring
a decision until after recess, when, as I understand, we will discuss the
whole situation?

Mr. Murphy. All right.

The Vice Chairman. The committee will now take a recess.

[11023] (Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., a recess was taken until
1:30 p.m. of the same day.)

[11024] afternoon session—1:30 p.m.

The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order.

Does counsel have anything at this time?

Mr. Richardson. No.

The Vice Chairman. Do you have anything further before your
examination is resumed, Captain?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

The Vice Chairman. The Chair desires to announce for the record
that during executive session of the committee at noon that question
No. 27 and the answer thereto, appearing in the memorandum of Cap-
tain Kramer, was examined and it is the decision of the committee that
it is not material or relevant to this investigation and relates to mat-
ters after the Pearl Harbor attack, and it will not be included in the
record or released by the committee.

The Chair also desires to announce that the committee will adjourn
at a quarter to 4 as there is to be an important vote in the Senate at 4
o’clock and Senators will have to be present in the Senate Chamber
for that vote.

Mr. Keefe, of Wisconsin, will resume his inquiry. The committee
will adjourn at a quarter to 4 until 10 o’clock Monday morning. Mr.
Keefe.

Mr. Keefe. Yes, sir; I will proceed.
TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ALWIN D. KRAMER, UNITED STATES NAVY (Resumed)

Mr. Keefe. Captain Kramer, on July 24, 1944, you testified before the naval court of inquiry then sitting at Pearl Harbor?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You were duly sworn to testify to the truth at that inquiry, were you not?

Captain Kramer. I was, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Did you know the purpose of that inquiry at the time you testified?

Captain Kramer. Other than as indicated in the precept which was read to me, I did not, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Well, what impression did you get from the reading of the precept as to the purpose of the inquiry?

Captain Kramer. I have forgotten the wording of the precept. I recall no distinct impression left on my memory. My general impression, however, was that in view of questions raised since that attack a naval inquiry had been ordered; I do not recall at the moment whether it was initiated by the Navy or instigated by the desires of the Congress. That they were to examine, apparently, all aspects of incidents pertaining to Pearl Harbor. That was my general impression and still is, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Did you understand at that time that it was the purpose of this naval court of inquiry to assess responsibility for Pearl Harbor?

Captain Kramer. I believe that was part of the precept; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Yes, sir. So you knew when you testified before the naval court of inquiry that the testimony which you then gave might be used by that naval court as the basis, or at least part of the basis for their determination in assessing responsibility for Pearl Harbor?

Captain Kramer. I fully appreciated that point; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And you knew that the findings of this naval court, based in part at least upon the testimony that you were about to give, might affect the welfare and fortunes and perhaps the future of many men?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And you were conscious of that responsibility when you testified?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now I desire to ask you, referring to page 956 of the transcript of testimony taken before the naval court of inquiry, were these questions asked you and did you make these answers?

Q. Commander, I am going to show you some documents and ask you if you saw them on or before the 7th December, 1941. The first one I shall show you is document 15 from Exhibit 63?

A. Yes, sir, I did. This was written up by my section.

Q. Can you recall about when you first saw it?

A. The fact that the date "28 November" is on here would indicate that I saw it and confirmed it for writing up on that date for the first time. Also, there is an indication at the bottom that it was received by teletype, which would indicate it was handled promptly after received.

Were those questions asked you and did you make those answers?

Captain Kramer. I believe that is accurate, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And at that time document 15 from Exhibit 63 referred to the original set-up of the Japanese winds code, did it not?

Captain Kramer. I believe it did: yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Was this question asked you, and did you make this answer:

Q. Do you know what action was taken with reference to intercepting any communications which would have executed the phases of this code?

On receipt of this particular message, on instructions of the Director of Naval Communications, Admiral Noyes, I prepared some cards, about six as I recall it, which I turned over to Admiral Noyes. He indicated that his purpose in getting these cards was to leave them with certain senior officers of the Navy Department and I do know that he arranged with Captain Safford, the head of Op-20-G, the section of Communications that handled this material, to have any message in this phraseology handled promptly by watch officers, not only in Op-20-G but through the regular watch officers of the Communications section of the Navy Department, to those people who had the cards. These cards had on them the expressions contained in this exhibit, and the meaning. Because of that special arrangement for this particular plain language message, when such a message came through, I believe either the third or fourth of December, I was shown such a message by the GY watch officer, recognized it as belonging of this nature, walked with him to Captain Safford's office, and from that point Captain Safford took the ball. I believe Captain Safford went directly to Admiral Noyes' office at that time. Again, because of the fact that this was a plain language message, and because of the fact that special arrangements had been made to handle this Japanese plain language message which had special meaning, I did not handle the distribution of this particular message, the one of the third or fourth.

Was that question asked you and did you make that answer?

Captain Kramer. I believe I did, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Was that answer the truth?

Captain Kramer. I think it is accurate in all respects except that apparently my memory was faulty at that moment as to what was on the cards. My present belief and conviction is that the Japanese expressions did not appear on those cards.

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, Captain Kramer, you have so previously testified before this board or committee, that you only wrote on these cards, as I understand it, the meaning. Is that it?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Meaning of what?

Captain Kramer. The translations of those expressions and the countries referred to. I think that it would have been a very illogical thing to have put the Japanese expressions on those cards since that would have involved delays in teaching the Navy Communications officers not Section G watch officers, how to pronounce them and to do the same thing for the recipients of such a message.

Mr. Keefe. Now, Captain Kramer, again let's be clear about this.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. The original winds code message referred to the use of certain Japanese words which had a specific meaning?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And you were on the lookout for those Japanese words?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, it would seem to me to be perfectly in line with common sense to assume that when you made out these cards you would list these Japanese words on the card, together with their meaning, so
that these top-flight people to whom the cards were directed when furnished with a message in Japanese language would be able to compare it with the Japanese words on the card and then know the meaning of those Japanese words and that is exactly and precisely what you testified to before the naval court of inquiry. Now you say you want to change that testimony. Why?

Captain Kramer. Mr. Keefe, I can recall no time or incident at any time while I was on duty in that section where the question of the Japanese phraseology used in encoded or plain-language text was ever brought up with any of these recipients to whom I delivered this material. Further, the GY watch officer had additional pieces of paper or a piece of paper giving the Japanese translation, giving its translation and the country referred to and the instructions that were in effect regarding handling this message were to pass on to the Navy Department watch officers only the English translation of those phrases for phonning or sending by courier to the recipients who presumed they would get it.

Mr. Keefe. All right. Now, Captain Kramer, what did you put on these cards according to your present, current, refresh recollection?

Captain Kramer. The English translation and the country referred to and that was all, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, then, let's get that straight.

Mr. Richardson. What does he mean by "the English translation"?

Mr. Keefe. That is what I want to find out. What do you mean by the "English translation"?

Captain Kramer. "East Wind—rain—United States; west wind—clear—England; north wind—cloudy—Russia."

Mr. Keefe. Now, that is what you now claim you wrote on those cards?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Have you seen one of those cards since you came back to the United States?

Captain Kramer. I have never seen those cards since leaving them with Admiral Noyes.

Mr. Keefe. You now say that Admiral Noyes requested you to write out such cards?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And pursuant to that direction you prepared them?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Did you personally deliver them to Admiral Noyes?

Captain Kramer. I did, sir.

Mr. Keefe. When?

Captain Kramer. Within a few hours, as I recollect it, of the time he gave me those instructions.

Mr. Keefe. When was that? That doesn't mean anything.

Captain Kramer. That, I should say, would have been either the 28th or 29th of November 1941.

Mr. Keefe. All right. Have you made a search in the Navy Department to try to find one of those cards?

Captain Kramer. I have not, sir.

Mr. Keefe. They have likewise disappeared, have they not?

Captain Kramer. Apparently; yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Do you know, Mr. Counsel, whether or not a [11033] search has been instituted in the Navy Department to try to find one of those cards?

Mr. Richardson. I do not know that there has or has not, but I will inquire.

Mr. Keefe. At least they are not presently available so far as this committee is concerned.

Well, now Captain Kramer, was this question asked you and did you make this answer:

Q. You say it is your recollection that you received some Japanese plain language words which corresponded with the language set out in document 15; is that correct?

A. My statement was, not that I received it, but I was shown it.

W.as that question asked you and did you make that answer?

Captain Kramer. I believe that is accurate, sir.

Mr. Keefe (reading):

Q. Can you recall from looking at document 15 which Japanese language words you received?

Now, document 15 is the original message setting up the Japanese winds code?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And setting forth the Japanese language as meaning certain things?

[11034] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe (reading):

Higashi No Kazeame—

I am not so good this time.

Captain Kramer. I am afraid not, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. Keefe. Well, you pronounce it for me.

Captain Kramer. "Higashi No Kaze Ame."

Mr. Keefe, "Higashi No Kaze Ame." Well, that is because the reporters have got it all run together. Now, I will read your answer again:

Q. Can you recall from looking at document 15 which Japanese language words you received?

A. Higashi No Kaze Ame, I am quite certain.

Listen to this:

The literal meaning of Higashi No Kaze Ame is East Wind, Rain. That is plain Japanese language. The sense of that, however, meant strained relations or a break in relations, possibly even implying war with a nation to the eastward, the United States.

Was that question asked you and did you make that answer?

Captain Kramer. I believe I did, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Was it the truth?

Captain Kramer. It was not, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Well, then, is this committee to conclude from that last answer, Captain Kramer, that you testified [11035] falsely before the naval court of inquiry on this very vital and important question?

Captain Kramer. It was the truth as it came to my mind at the time, Mr. Keefe. I have earlier in my testimony, I think, covered that point fairly exhaustively, that that occasion, namely, the naval court

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1 See letter from the Navy Department in Hearings, Part 11, p. 5497.
of inquiry, was the first time that the question of what country appeared in that piece of teletype ever came up in any conversation in which I was participating.

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, Captain Kramer, the fact that it is the first time, that is an experience that we all have as witnesses in a court room.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. But here is a situation where you are testifying under oath and you have already admitted that you knew the purpose of this examination. You have testified that the testimony which you then gave might be used by this commission as the basis for affecting the lives and fortunes and the future of any number of men and still you testified before us this afternoon that the statement which you made, which I have just read to you, was false.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I object to the characterization of the testimony. The witness did not say it was false. He said that in the light of his recollection at that [11036] time that was his best memory.

Mr. Keefe. No, no, no.

Mr. Murphy. He is giving us his testimony now and I say it is grossly and manifestly unfair to so characterize it.

The Vice Chairman. Well, the record will show the witness’ previous answer.

Mr. Keefe. All right. Will you go back, Mr. Reporter, and read the questions and answers? I don’t want to treat the witness unfairly and I think he knows I do not.

(The record was read by the reporter.)

Mr. Keefe. All right, stop right there.

Now, did you testify to that? You did testify that that statement was not the truth, didn’t you, Captain Kramer?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Yes, sir. And your later answer is an attempt to explain why you did not state the truth at that time; is that not true?

Captain Kramer. What I now believe to be the truth, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Yes. So that we now have a situation where you make a statement on a vital issue before the naval court of inquiry which you admit was not true because you claim that subsequent events have now convinced you that the answer which you gave was not; is that the fact?

[11037] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Is that right?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. That is a fair conclusion, is it not?

Captain Kramer. It is, sir. I would like to point out at this time—I don’t think it has been particularly emphasized before—that despite the fact that I was caught cold on that point when the question was propounded my reaction even then was that only one country was involved on that piece of teletype paper.

Mr. Keefe. All right. Well, now, Captain Kramer, if there had never been any further investigation and this whole incident was stopped with the naval court of inquiry and its findings, then the findings would have been predicated in part, at least, upon a statement which did not reflect the truth, as you testify, at that time, isn’t that right?
Captain Kramer. I believe that is the case, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Yes. Now I want to ask you some more questions.

Q. Do you remember in what form this communication was that you saw which contained the words about which you have testified, Higashi No Kaze Ame?
A. I am almost certain it was typewritten. I believe it was on teletype paper.

[11038] Was that question asked you and did you make that answer?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Now, you will see again, Captain Kramer, that that question refers to the words “Higashi No Kaze Ame.”

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. You did not qualify it when you answered that question either, did you?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Were you asked this question and did you make this answer:

Q. Can you recall who had this paper in his possession when you saw it?
A. I don’t recall the name of the officer who had it. It was, however, the GY watch officer, the man who had the watch breaking down current systems that were being read.

Q. Can you indicate or state the source of the information that was contained in this communication?

No, sir, I cannot positively, but the fact that my recollection is that it came in on teletype would indicate that it was a U. S. Navy Intercept station.

Q. And I believe you have testified that you have no knowledge of what disposition was made of the communication after you saw it; is that correct?

[11039] A. No first-hand or direct knowledge. It would simply be inference.

And then was this question asked you and did you make this answer, appearing on page 968 of the Naval Court of Inquiry:

Q. In your testimony with respect to the so-called winds code and the execute message following it you stated that the execute was taken to mean that strained relations or a break in relations or, possibly, war might follow between Japan and the United States. Would you indicate to the court why you phrased your answer that way, that is, indicating that it might mean any one of those three things rather than one of those three specifically?

A. That answer is inherent in the character of the Japanese language in that they habitually speak in circumlocutions and by inference.

Q. Do I understand you to mean that your section would not have stated categorically that this message meant war or merely a break in diplomatic relations but that all three of those possibilities were available to anyone interpreting that message?

A. That is precisely correct. I can definitely state that I could not interpret that message as meaning definitely war.

[11040] Were those questions asked you and did you make those answers?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Were those answers the truth?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Now, you were referring in these questions and answers to this winds code execute message, were you not?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And you were referring to the words that were in that winds code execute message, were you not?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And as you have just testified, the words that you remember being in it were the words used in your answer, "Higashi No Kaze Ame"; and so forth; that is right, isn't it?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Yes. Now you want us to understand when I read your testimony before the naval court that according to your present refreshed and current recollection you were mistaken, that there were no such words in the message that you saw?

Captain Kramer. No words referring to the United States.

Mr. Keefe. Well, were there any words at all in it that you remember?

[11041] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Do you remember what words were in it?

Captain Kramer. I do not, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Well, that is the point exactly. You do not remember what words were in the message; is that your testimony, Captain?

Captain Kramer. What I mean to imply by that—I think it has been reiterated many times—is that I do not now and have never known since the time I saw that piece of teletype exactly what Japanese phraseology was in it, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Well, I think you should qualify that except when you testified under oath before the naval court of inquiry. Isn't that true?

Captain Kramer. Repeat that question.

Mr. Keefe. I will strike it. You pretended to know what words were in it when you testified before the naval court of inquiry, did you not?

Captain Kramer. That was apparently the impression I created; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Yes. Now, I want to understand what your testimony is today. Am I correct in the assumption that according to your present, or what you have referred to many times as your current, recollection after being refreshed, you are not able to tell this committee what words were in that [11042] code execute message?

Captain Kramer. My present belief and conviction is that piece of teletype referred to one country and that country was England.

Mr. Keefe. What were the words used that would refer to England?

Captain Kramer. "Nishi No Kaze Hare."

Mr. Keefe. All right. Now, I will go on a little further. Were these questions asked you and did you make these answers on page 980 of the court of inquiry of the Navy. Question 139:

Q. Now, referring to the winds message, you were familiar with the original winds message, wherein they designated at some future date in a weather report, if they gave execute and used certain words, it meant certain things?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were you standing by for an answer to that message? Did you consider it important enough that when that message was received it would be a most important message in reply? In other words, were you on the lookout for that answer?

A. I am not sure what you mean by "answer."

Q. Well, the execute of the message.

[11034] A. Yes, sir; not only myself but all that Op-20-G organization was very much on the qui vive looking for that. I prefer to refer to that as a warning.
Were those questions asked you and did you make those answers?

Captain Kramer. I believe that is accurate, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And that was the truth?

Captain Kramer. As I saw it then and as I see it now, yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe (reading):

Q. When this execute came in, did you receive it?
A. I did not receive it myself but was shown it by the watch officer who receives the information coming off the teletype.

Q. Were you the officer who went to the communications officer and said, "Here it is."
A. I believe I used that expression when I accompanied the watch officer to Commander Safford's office.

Q. You had that information then?
A. We had, as I recall it, this typewritten piece of paper with the meaning well in mind.

Were those questions asked you and did you make those answers?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And was that the truth?

Captain Kramer. It was the truth as far as it goes. My present recollection, still keeping in mind that my contact with that piece of paper was of only a few seconds' duration, probably less than half a minute, is that there was some handwriting on that piece of teletype paper in the GY watch officer's hand. There may when it was delivered to Captain Safford's office also have been a correction to his handwriting in my hand.

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, is there anything more you want to elaborate on?

Captain Kramer. Nothing, sir.

Mr. Keefe. I asked you the simple question as to whether the statement which you made, which I have read to you, the answers that you gave in response to those questions was the truth. Was it or wasn't it?

Captain Kramer. I appreciate that, sir, but it was not the whole truth as I see it now, inasmuch as there was no reference in that answer to any handwriting.

Mr. Keefe. Well, there is reference to the fact that it is a typewritten piece of paper with the meaning well in mind. What did you mean by that?

Captain Kramer. Of course, both myself and the watch officer, as well as everyone cognizant of this, had the meaning well in mind. That is all I meant by that, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Well, Captain Kramer, if I was sitting as a member of this naval court, having heard your first testimony that I have read as to what was on this message and then following this further examination which took place the next day, I necessarily would assume that what you were referring to was the meaning which you had already testified under oath was on that message, wouldn't I?

Captain Kramer. The question is broad and complicated, sir. I would like to have it reread.

Mr. Keefe. All right, strike it out. That perhaps is calling for a conclusion. I won't press it. [Reading:]

Q. About what was the time and date when you got that?
A. I am not certain. I believe it was about the 4th of December. It may have been the 3rd.

Q. Who handled it?
A. I left Commander Safford's office as soon as I knew he had the picture and knew what the message was, and I believe he at once went to Admiral Noyes' office. I knew that Admiral Noyes was highly interested in that particular plain-language code because of his previous instructions to me to make out these cards so that he could leave it with certain high officers and the Secre-

Was that question asked you and did you make that answer?  
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.  
Mr. Keeffe. Now, I want to ask you if these questions were asked you and if you made the following answers:

Q. When you took the execute of the winds message in to Captain Safford and, I believe, said, "Here it is," did you mean by that exclamation, "Here it is", that this was the execution of the Japanese War Plan, or did you have any further discussion with Captain Safford which would indicate he thought that this was the message which executed the Japanese War Plan?  
A. Nothing of that nature whatsoever. I did not deliver the message myself. I accompanied the GY watch officer on the way to Commander Safford's office, and the expression, "Here it is", simply meant that finally a message in this plain-language code had come through—a message which we had been looking for many days and that we had made special provisions to handle for many days.

Was that question asked and did you make that answer?  
Captain Kramer. I did, sir.  
Mr. Keeffe. Was that answer the truth?  
[11047]  
Captain Kramer. It was, sir.  
Mr. Keeffe (reading):  

Q. To your mind that was of no more significance then "here is the message which indicates a break in negotiations between Japan and the United States"?  
A. It meant more than that. This plain language code did not refer specifically to the United States-Japanese negotiations. It referred to the general diplomatic relations between the nations concerned and therefore meant a critical stage in the negotiations or relations which could very well involve a break.

Was that question asked you and did you make that answer?  
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.  
Mr. Keeffe (reading):  

Q. Do you recall whether there was any uncertainty in the translation unit with respect to the meaning of the words in either the "Winds" Code, that is the message setting up the code, or in the message of execution?  
A. This is very simple language and there was no doubt whatsoever of the literal translation of these terms.  
Your section had no difficulty in making the translation?  
[11048]  
A. Not at all. It is very simple, every-day language.

Now, after all that testimony which you gave before the naval court of inquiry you now tell this committee that you do not remember or recall at all what the words were that were in that winds execute message?  
Captain Kramer. No, sir.  
Mr. Keeffe. All right. Now, I want to go to your subsequent examination before the Hewitt investigating committee. You testified there under oath, too, didn't you?  
Captain Kramer. I did, sir.  
Mr. Keeffe. Was your memory thoroughly refreshed when you testified before the Hewitt committee?  
Captain Kramer. I should hardly characterize it as thoroughly refreshed; no, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Well, before you testified before the Hewitt committee you had many conversations with Mr. Sonnett, had you not?
Captain Kramer. Several brief conversations; yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Well, all right; several brief conversations. And Sonnett had talked over your testimony with you, hadn't he?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; some aspects of it.
Mr. Keefe. Well, he talked over your testimony with respect to this winds code, didn't he?
Captain Kramer. He did, sir.
Mr. Keefe. And you had a chance, then, before you went before the Hewitt committee, to think about that so that you were not cold, as it were, when you went before the Hewitt committee?
Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Keefe. So the testimony before the Hewitt committee was more likely to be the truth then than the testimony before the Navy court of inquiry, is that right?
Captain Kramer. On this winds subject I should say it definitely was, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Well, was the testimony that you gave before the Hewitt committee the truth in full with respect to the winds execute message?
Captain Kramer. I believe it was the truth in full and accurate in that respect so far as I recalled it up to the time of the Hewitt investigation.
Mr. Keefe. Well, then, that is not an answer to my question. Do I understand that you are now changing the testimony that you gave before the Hewitt committee as a result of your refreshing and so on?
Captain Kramer. Only insofar as I have modified my testimony before the Hewitt board by testimony I have already given in this hearing.
Mr. Keefe. Well, now, Captain Kramer, let us go into this further. That is the second time that you testified under oath, before the Hewitt committee, and this was—
Mr. Murphy. This is the second time before Hewitt or the second time under oath?
Mr. Keefe. The second time under oath was before the Hewitt committee. I thought that was perfectly clear.
Now, this one took place at the Navy Department at 12:30 p.m., Tuesday, the 22d of May 1945:
President: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lt. Comdr. Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold.

And you were sworn, were you not—
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe (continuing). To tell the truth?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. To tell the truth?

Mr. Keefe. Now, when you talked with Mr. Sonnett, getting you ready for this examination, were you advised the purpose of the Hewitt examination?
Captain Kramer. I don't recall precisely in what form he told me the purpose was but the general impression I gathered, whether from him or from other sources, was that the purpose of the Hewitt investigation was to fill in gaps in the court of inquiry investigation, and
further to attempt to reconcile discrepancies appearing in the testimony of that court of inquiry.

Mr. Keefe. Have you read the testimony before the naval court of inquiry?

Captain Kramer. Part of my own testimony and such parts as appear in the naval narrative only, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Do you know of any gaps in the testimony as to this winds execute message?

Captain Kramer. There certainly is, sir; not gaps, but discrepancies in the testimony.

Mr. Keefe. In the testimony before the naval court of inquiry do you know of any discrepancies?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; I was made aware of them when I was talking with Mr. Sonnett.

[11052] Mr. Keefe. All right. That is exactly it. What did Mr. Sonnett tell you the discrepancies were when he was getting you ready for this examination before Admiral Hewitt?

Captain Kramer. I believe among other things that he stated to me that no one appeared to recall this winds message except myself and Captain Safford. It was only incidentally in the last several weeks when I read some excerpts from the Army investigation that I was aware that certain Army officers also confirmed the existence of a message considered authentic in this wind system.

Mr. Keefe. Captain Kramer, the fact of the receipt of this wind execute message, its delivery to you by the watch officer, whom you believed to be lieutenant Murray, your delivery of it or taking it in to Captain Safford, and his going down, as you thought, to deliver it to Admiral Noyes, no one knows anything about those facts except Safford, Kramer, and this man Murray, if he was the one; isn’t that true?

Captain Kramer. I believe that is true; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. So there couldn’t be any gap in the testimony or anything strange in the testimony that any other witness could testify to because you were the only three people that knew those facts; isn’t that true?

Captain Kramer. Except as I presumed, and still presume, [11053] Admiral Noyes also saw it.

Mr. Keefe. Well, up to the time it reached Admiral Noyes he didn’t know what had transpired between its receipt on the teletype and its delivery to Captain Safford, did he?

Captain Kramer. I should think not, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, I want to read these questions and answers and see if they refresh your recollection any:

Admiral Hewitt. I believe that about the middle of the first week of December there was a teletype message which, to the best of your recollection, one of the watch officers had in his possession and which was subsequently delivered to Admiral Noyes. Will you tell me about that, to the best of your recollection?

Captain Kramer. I previously testified on that matter at Pearl Harbor, Admiral. I would like to go over that previous testimony again in the light of thinking it over since that time. I had no recollection of that message at the time it was first mentioned to me in the spring of ’44. However, after being given some of the details of the circumstances surrounding it, I did recall a message some days before 7 December ’41, I believe about the middle of the week 1–7 December, and I do recall definitely being shown such a message by the GY watch officer and walking down with him to Captain Safford’s office
and being present [11054] while the GY watch officer turned it over to him. A brief conversation ensued and Captain Safford then took it, I assumed, to Admiral Noyes, since that message we had all been on the qui vive about for a week or ten days. That is the last I saw of such a message.

Admiral Hewitt. Can you recall what the general subject of the message was?

Captain Kramer. It was, as I recall it, a "winds" code message. The wording of it I do not recall. It may have been, "Higashi no kaze ame," specifically referring to the United States, as I have previously testified at Pearl Harbor, but I am less positive of that now that I believe I was at that time. The reason for revision in my view on that is the fact that in thinking it over, I have a rather sharp recollection in the latter part of that week of feeling there was still no overt mention or specific mention of the United States in any of this traffic, which I was seeing all of and which also was the only source in general of my information since I did not see, as a rule, the dispatches from the fleet commanders or going out to them from Operations.

Were those questions asked you and did you make those answers?

Captain Kramer. I consider that accurate, sir; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. So as late as the time you testified before [11055]

Admiral Hewitt you were of the opinion that it may have contained the words "Higashi no kaze ame," but you were becoming uncertain about it in the light of your further refreshing?

Captain Kramer. I meant to imply by that specifically that I did not recall, and still do not recall, the precise wording of the Japanese on the piece of teletype paper.

Mr. Keefe. Well, then, let's go on:

Admiral Hewitt. Then it is still your belief, the best you can recall in view of that, there was no indication——

And then you broke in and said:

I would like to continue that statement, Admiral, by saying: For that reason, I am now at least under the impression that the message referred to England and possibly the Dutch rather than the United States, although it may have referred to the United States, too.

Admiral Hewitt. Or possibly it may have referred to Russia?

Captain Kramer. I just don't recall.

Were those questions asked you and did you make those answers when you testified before Admiral Hewitt?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, your answer before this committee is what you finally got to before Admiral Hewitt and that is [11056] you just don't recall what this message said on it; is that right?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. So we now get to the point in your testimony here that there was a message, it had something on it, and must have had something on it to designate it as a wind code execute message?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; and further, to warrant my accompanying the watch officer to Captain Safford's office, an instance that I recall no previous occurrence of.

Mr. Keefe. Then I am to understand, Captain Kramer, that this message, which was considered of top importance by everybody, which everybody was looking for and on the lookout for, and for which you have testified specific arrangements had been set up as in connection with no other message, after this message comes in you see it, you read it, you determine that this is the message you have been looking for, and you can't tell us now what was on that message?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Or what it said?
Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. All right. Let's go on a little further. When Admiral Hewitt got through examining you Mr. Sonnett took you on, didn't he, and asked you some questions?

Captain Kramer. I don't recollect, sir. The record of the testimony should show that, whether he asked them.

Mr. Keeffe. I will read it to you:

**Twenty-Fifth Day**

Pursuant to notice, the investigation met at the offices of the General Board, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., at 2:15 p. m., Friday, 6 July 1945.

Present: Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, USN; Mr. John F. Sonnett; Lieutenant Commander Benjamin H. Griswold, USNR; Lieutenant John Ford Baecher, USNR; and Ship's Clerk Ben Harold, USNR.

Captain Alwin D. Kramer, USN, was recalled as a witness and was warned that the oath previously taken by him was still binding.

Does that refresh your recollection?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Lt. John Ford Baecher is the gentleman that is here in the room?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. He was present at this hearing before Admiral Hewitt?

Captain Kramer. I did not recall it until you read that transcript, sir, but I believe he was.

[10658] Mr. Murphy. What page?

Mr. Keeffe. That is on page 576.

Now, I want to ask you whether these questions were asked you and whether you made these answers:

Mr. Sonnett. Captain, referring to the previous testimony concerning the receipt of a "winds" code message relating to the United States during the first week of December 1941, since your last testimony in this investigation, have you obtained any additional information concerning the receipt or non-receipt of such a message?

Captain Kramer. No first-hand information. Simply I do have some more specific recollection of it than I did when the matter was first broached to me at Pearl Harbor during Admiral Murfin's inquiry. That refreshing goes to the extent that I have already testified about, namely, a positive recollection of having accompanied the GY watch officer with a "winds" message to Commander Safford's office, at which point he carried the ball, taking it, as I understood, directly to Admiral Noyes, who was handling it by special set-up that he had for that type of message.

Did you make that answer to that question?

Captain Kramer. I believe I did, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. There was no refreshing about that, you had always testified to those facts every time you testified; [10659] isn't that correct?

Captain Kramer. I may have added more to that in subsequent answers.

Mr. Keeffe. Up to that point that had been your story all the time; isn't that true?

Captain Kramer. Precisely.

Mr. Keeffe. On those details there have been no question but you have testified to the same thing every time you testified; isn't that true?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
[11060] Mr. Keefe. Now, then the next question:

Mr. Sonnett. And you have now no clear recollection, Captain, as to which country the message referred to?

That is a rather leading question that Mr. Sonnett is asking you. And your answer:

Captain Kramer. No positive recollection. It may have been any or one or all three of the nations covered by that Japanese code set-up. The fact that we jumped on the ball on that message, however, would appear to me to have been applicable to at least England and probably the United States as well, but I have no first hand recollection of it.

Did you make that answer to Mr. Sonnett’s question?

Captain Kramer. I believe I did, sir.

Mr. Keefe (reading):

Mr. Sonnett. Do you mean to imply, Captain, if you found a message in that code, relating to Russia during that period you wouldn’t have given it as speedy treatment as you would if it related to England and the United States?

Captain Kramer. Of course, we would have but there isn’t the slightest indication that the Japanese had any intention of attacking Russia.

Did you make that answer?

Captain Kramer. I believe I did, sir.

[11061] Mr. Keefe. All right. Then Mr. Sonnett examined you about a lot of other matters.

Then, Captain Kramer, at the conclusion of the examination of Admiral Hewitt, is it a fair assumption to conclude that as far as your testimony discloses, there was a wind execute code message received in the middle of the week, the exact date of which you were then uncertain, which may have referred to the United States, England, or possibly Russia, you were not certain; you were not then certain, and you are not certain what the message specifically said, but it may have referred to one or both or all three of the countries in the original code set-up; is that what you meant to tell Admiral Hewitt?

Captain Kramer. That is what I meant to tell him at the time; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And if it did refer to the United States by the use of the words “Higashi No Kaze Ame,” if it did use those words, and those words appeared on that winds code execute message, that would refer to the United States, would it not?

Captain Kramer. It would, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And in accordance with the very simple translation of those words, as you gave it to the Naval [11602] Court of Inquiry, it might mean a sharp break in relations, or it might even mean war; isn’t that true?

Captain Kramer. With the United States; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. With the United States.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, you, as the man in charge of translations of these messages, with knowledge that the whole Government was set up to pick up this very vital and important message, who handled that message, who saw it, who read it, who checked the interpretation of the watch officer on that message, sit here before us today, and say you can’t tell us what the message said, you have no recollection of what it said at all; is that correct?
Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. However, I should like to point out to you, Mr. Keefe, that I think that an entirely unwarranted emphasis and importance is being attributed to that message, not only in this hearing but in past hearings, and in the press.

There were many other messages more specific as to Japanese intentions during this period.

Mr. Keefe. Captain Kramer—

Captain Kramer. A wind message would have been only one further indication of the general trend of this traffic as well as the general trend of the international situation.

[11063] Mr. Keefe. Well, I am very happy that you have made that statement, Captain, because I have concluded that, as one member of this committee, a long time ago that there were plenty of messages to have warned those who read them and saw them that war was imminent and just about to break, without this winds execute message.

But, Captain Kramer, the Navy Department and all of the officials in the Navy Department—and I assume the War Department, too—considered that that winds execute message was of supreme importance, otherwise why did they set up this great set-up of cards and treat it as they did, with complete priority over every other message that was received?

Captain Kramer. It was, of course, a very important straw, if it appeared.

Mr. Keefe. Well, it did appear, didn’t it?

Captain Kramer. Therefore, Captain Safford made rather extensive preparations to attempt to receive it, not only within this country, but by arrangement with Army and with our outlying stations.

Mr. Keefe. Well, Captain, let’s get down to the mechanics of this thing so that we will understand it a little better. I don’t know much about these teletypes. I have seen some of them in newspaper offices. Is that about what it is?

[11064] Captain Kramer. Just about the same; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. The ones that I have seen usually use a sheet of yellow paper about 6 or 8 inches wide.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. It comes on a continuous roll.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And the teletype types out the characters; is that right?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And that is what this was?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And the roll keeps unwinding and the teletype keeps on working and somebody there is watching it and reading it, and when a message of importance appears, they tear that portion off. Isn’t that right?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, this message came in over the teletype, didn’t it?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Yes. You saw it?

Captain Kramer. I saw it.
Mr. Keefe. And it is of little importance as to whether it was yellow paper, pink paper, or red paper, or any other color of paper; isn't that true?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. It came over the teletype?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Nothing unusual about it being torn off because they were all torn off?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. The watch officer had torn this off the teletype and came to you with it. Now, the thing that I would like to know is this:

There is always a duplicate of that teletype tape, isn't there?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. So that you had the original and some place there was a duplicate; isn't that right?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. What became of the duplicates of these messages?

Captain Kramer. I believe, Mr. Keefe, that the purpose of having duplicates for any of this traffic, whether encoded or plain language, was to have an extra copy for systems which we were not reading so that more than one person could work on that system in attempting to break it down.

Mr. Keefe. All right.

Now, Captain, I have never seen this winds execute message. Of course you saw it, you handled it?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And you think you may have written something on it correcting the interpretation of the watch officer?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, if there was any interpretation on it at all, it must have been an interpretation of the Japanese words that were on it; is that true?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. There would be no reason for you or the watch officer to write any interpretation on this message unless it was an interpretation of those simple Japanese words that appeared on it?

Captain Kramer. The very simple translation appearing in exhibit 1 regarding the set-up of this thing would have been all that appeared on that.

Mr. Keefe. Then, Captain Kramer, there must have been some reason for you to correct the interpretation of the watch officer as you have testified you think you did. Do you have any recollection at all of doing that?

Captain Kramer. I said I may have. I have no distinct recollection of doing it, sir.

Mr. Keefe. The point I am trying to understand is this: This message must have had Japanese words on it, then; isn't that true?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir, and——

Mr. Keefe. And it must have had the Japanese words on it that were specified in the original winds code set-up, otherwise why would the watch officer recognize it as a winds code execute; that is obvious, isn't it?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. The thing that attracted the attention of the GY watch officer was that in this message appeared the same Japanese-language words that were in the original set-up; isn't that true?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And you still want to say to us that you can't recall what those words were?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. They must have been the words of the original code, otherwise, you wouldn't have paid any attention to it; isn't that correct?

Captain Kramer. Precisely, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And it is because the words on this teletype tape were the original Japanese code words, in the [11069] original code set-up that you determined that this was the coded execute message at that time; isn't that true?

Captain Kramer. It is not, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Well, all right.

Captain Kramer. I should like to explain precisely what I mean by that.

The determination was not made by me in the case of this piece of teletype. On the number of previous times when I had been called down concerning possible messages in this winds system, I had examined long sheets of this teletype paper, had looked for the point of whether or not the expression was repeated or appeared as it was supposed to appear in the middle or at the end, or both.

In this particular case my presumption was that the GY watch officer had made that determination inasmuch as the piece of paper I saw was only a short piece of paper, 3 or 4 inches in length as I recollect, and that presumably he had identified this message as being an authentic winds message, not only from the wording that actually appeared in it, but from its location in the Japanese plain language broadcast. That was a function of the GY watch officer not only as regards this winds system, but as regards all systems to determine its authenticity and to break it down.

[11069] The only reason for having shown this piece of paper to me was in connection with the Japanese words thereon, and that is all, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Well, exactly.

Now, I want to go back over that once more, Captain Kramer; the GY watch officer brought you a piece of teletype paper which had Japanese language words thereon, which he interpreted as being the code execute message, and showed it to you.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And you looked at those words, and looked at the interpretation which he had given them. You may have corrected it in some particular, and you became convinced that the Japanese language words on that piece of teletype made that message the Japanese code execute message and you so determined at that time and went down to Captain Safford's office and handed it to him, or saw the watch officer hand it to him and said, "Here it is." "This is it." "The thing that we have been straining ourselves for and setting up all this intercepting apparatus." That is true, isn't it?
Captain Kramer. It is, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And that message went to Admiral Noyes' office because it was to be specially handled and wasn't to go through your office?

Captain Kramer. That is precisely correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Because the interpretation had been given to Admiral Noyes on 6 cards so that he could interpret those Japanese words himself when they came in; isn't that true?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And those cards were to be sent around to the top flight officials of the Navy Department so that when they saw that message they could interpret it, and determine that it was a code execute message; wasn't that the purpose of the cards?

Captain Kramer. I don't believe at any time was it intended to send any Japanese text to these other officers.

Mr. Keefe. No——

Captain Kramer. But that the translation was to be sent; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You misunderstood. They would get the Japanese words from the message itself, wouldn't they, and then with the Japanese words, you had the translations and gave them the translations on the cards? That is your story?

Captain Kramer. They had and would get by this special set-up only the translation.

[11071] Mr. Keefe. All right.

Now, then, so far as this committee is concerned, we have been unable to see that message, and we have been unable to see any of these cards. They are not in existence so far as you know, are they?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Now, you stated a few moments ago that other people down there knew about the receipt of this winds execute message. Whom did you refer to?

Captain Kramer. I am not aware that I ever testified to that effect, that other people knew about this message. I am reasonably certain that no one in my office saw it, although I believe that undoubtedly I mentioned it after my return to my office.

Mr. Keefe. Mentioned it to whom?

Captain Kramer. To some of the people in my office.

Mr. Keefe. Well, it would be the most natural thing in the world if you had done so, that you had told them that this very vital message had finally come in, isn't that correct?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. But you referred a few moments ago—and I do not easily forget testimony because I have been at this for a good many years—you testified that you [11072] had read the hearings or part of the hearings of the Army board——

Captain Kramer. In the past few weeks in the naval narrative.

Mr. Keefe. And from reading those hearings you have found out there were others that knew about this code execute message?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Didn't you make that statement a few moments ago?

Captain Kramer. I did, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Whom did you refer to when you made that statement?
Captain Kramer. Specifically, I recall the name of Colonel Sadtlcr.

Mr. Keefe. Col. Otis Sadtlcr?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You have no personal knowledge as to how Col. Otis Sadtlcr learned of this winds execute message?

Captain Kramer. I do not, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You have no personal knowledge as to what Admiral Noyes did with this message, have you?

Captain Kramer. I do not, sir.

[11073] Mr. Keefe. You don’t know whether Admiral Noyes telephoned to any other person in the Navy with reference to the receipt of this winds execute message, do you?

Captain Kramer. I do not, sir.

[11074] Mr. Keefe. Did you talk with Colonel Bratton about it?

Captain Kramer. I have no recollection of having talked to Colonel Bratton about it although it is possible I did since he was frequently in the Navy Building in Captain McCollum’s office.

Mr. Keefe. Now, in your testimony before this committee you testified very positively and emphatically that you would not use the word “war” on this interpretation of this winds code message as testified to by Captain Safford?

Captain Kramer. Most certainly not, sir.

Mr. Keefe. In your testimony before the Hewitt committee and before the naval court of inquiry which I have heretofore referred to—

Well, I wanted to specifically refer to you rtestimony before the naval court of inquiry in which you gave the interpretation of those Japanese words. Let me find it.

Captain Kramer. At no time, Mr. Keefe, have I attempted to put any construction or interpretation on those words other than what appears in Circulars 2333 and 2354, the Japanese indication of what they meant.

Mr. Murphy. You read from page 956.

Mr. Keefe. Now, the point that I wanted to make and get clear, Captain, is this: Certainly there is no need for refreshment or refreshing or change in recollection so [11075] far as the translation of the words “Higashi no kaze ame” are concerned?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Mr. Keefe. The translation remains the same, doesn’t it?

Captain Kramer. Identical.

Mr. Keefe. It will be the same when you testified at Pearl Harbor, the same when you testified before Admiral Hewitt, and the same when you testify here?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. That doesn’t change, does it?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Mr. Keefe. So if the words “Higashi no kaze ame” appear on this winds execute message the interpretation would mean “East wind rain”; that is right, isn’t it?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Then you say that is plain Japanese language. The sense of that, however, meant strained relations or a break in relations, possibly even implying war with a nation on the eastward, the United States.

Now, that interpretation is the same today as it was when you testified out there before the naval court of inquiry, isn’t it?

Captain Kramer. Exactly, sir.

Mr. Keefe. So that if you had wanted to you could have [11076] indicated that those words meant war with the United States, couldn’t you, and be within the interpretation which you had given to the naval court of inquiry? It was one of the three alternatives, was it not?

Captain Kramer. Only, Mr. Keefe, insofar as you would evaluate the Japanese instructions contained in the set-up of this wind message referring to the destruction of codes and classified papers. An evaluation which concluded that that meant war would then include that interpretation; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Well, looking at it from hindsight it did mean war, didn’t it?

Captain Kramer. It certainly did; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And we have spent an awful lot of time figuring these things out, when the thing was about ready to break, evaluating and refreshing and all that sort of thing.

Are you certain that on the evening of the 6th of December, when you made delivery to Admiral Wilkinson’s home, that General Miles was present?

Captain Kramer. I still have no positive recollection that he was there but apparently he was. That is something that my memory has been refreshed on only since reading the Navy narrative and other papers in the last few weeks.

Mr. Keefe. Well, reading that Navy narrative, do you mean to say that that refreshes your recollection?

[11077] Captain Kramer. By that I simply mean, Mr. Keefe, that General Miles states that he was there. If he so states I believe what he says.

Mr. Keefe. Well, you have no present recollection that General Miles was there?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; I do not have.

Mr. Keefe. You have no present recollection that General Miles read this 13-part message out there at Admiral Wilkinson’s house that night?

Captain Kramer. No present first-hand or positive recollection. He may have very well, however, been there.

Mr. Keefe. That is all.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman——

The Vice Chairman. Captain, allow me to ask you one question for information, if I may, please.

Was there a considerable volume of this so-called traffic, as you term it, about the time this so-called winds execute message was to have come in?

Captain Kramer. The enciphered and encoded traffic was somewhat below normal in volume but this plain language traffic was tremendous in volume by comparison 2 days before we started special monitoring of this plain language traffic.
[11078] The Vice Chairman. Was the so-called winds execute message in plain language?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; it was.

The Vice Chairman. And was the volume of the plain language traffic at that time the heaviest it was at any time?

Captain Kramer. At any time; yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Could you give us some idea of about the volume of that plain-language traffic?

Captain Kramer. Before special provisions were set up to monitor this plain-language traffic it was sampled only periodically, usually when monitoring stations were not too busy on other traffic, or it may be that they undertook themselves to intercept samples of this plain language traffic when their encoded traffic, the circuits carrying it, were low in volume. I would estimate that the plain language traffic normally received during 1941 up to this time amounted to not more than 3 to 5 feet in length of teletype paper per week. During the period of this special monitoring set-up for plain language traffic the volume amounted to perhaps 200 feet per day of teletype paper.

As soon as this paper was scanned to see whether anything in the winds system was in it it was thrown into a waste basket and burned.

The Vice Chairman. Well, you had to examine a considerable amount of that large volume of this traffic, did you?

Captain Kramer. Most of the examination was done by the GY watch officers. It was only in a number of cases when weather reports, actual weather reports appeared in this newscast traffic and there was some doubt in the minds of the watch officers as to its authenticity in being a weather or winds system broadcast, that they phoned me at home and called me to the office, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Well, was it rather frequent that you had to examine this traffic?

Captain Kramer. At night it occurred, during this period of a week or 10 days, two or three times. During working hours in the daytime, or when I was at the office, I think probably a half-dozen additional times.

The Vice Chairman. Then you consider it entirely reasonable that you might not now recall the exact wording of any one particular piece of that teletype paper?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas may inquire.

Senator Lucas. Captain Kramer, from this long and exhaustive examination by members of this committee one could easily conclude that you originated the message, intercepted the message, decoded the message, translated the message, and delivered the message to Admiral Noyes. The truth of the matter is that you saw this so-called winds message some 30 seconds, as I understand it.

Captain Kramer. Not over 30 seconds. Probably nearer 10 or 15 seconds.

Senator Lucas. And under the special arrangement or agreement that was set up between Admiral Noyes and Captain Safford, am I to understand that the responsibility for the translation and the delivery of that particular message was solely within the power and jurisdiction of Captain Stafford?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; his GY section and himself.
Senator Lucas. In other words, it was by mere chance, under that peculiar and special arrangement set up between Admiral Noyes and Captain Safford, that you happened to see this so-called winds execute message?

Captain Kramer. It was pure chance that I happened to be in my office as the GY watch officer was passing my door; yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. In other words, if you had, perhaps had your door closed or had been out of your office it was not necessary for the GY officer to find you to obtain your translation or your confirmation of this message before he took it to Captain Safford?

Captain Kramer. That is precisely correct, sir.

Senator Lucas. What its proper interpretation was, or [11081] what it actually meant, or what it actually contained in terms of breaking negotiations with either England, Russia, or the United States was the responsibility of Admiral Noyes and his subordinates under that special arrangement which they had?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Now, did Admiral Noyes, after he received this so-called winds message, assuming he did receive one, ever call you into his office, either on December 4, 5, 6, or 7, for the purpose of discussing this message with you and asking for your opinion as to the proper translation of that so-called winds execute message?

Captain Kramer. At no time, Senator, was I called to Admiral Noyes' office in connection with the minds message. I, however, may very well have discussed it briefly with him the next time I saw Admiral Noyes, in making normal deliveries of the other decrypted traffic to him.

Senator Lucas. Captain, in view of the fact that you were the one individual who had been translating nearly all of this magic code, don't you believe that if Admiral Noyes, after his examination of this message, had concluded that it was the genuine winds execute message that you were all looking for, that he would have sent for you in order that you might confirm his belief along that line?

Captain Kramer. I do not think that was necessary at all, sir.

Senator Lucas. Why would not he have sent for you, Captain? You are the one, as I understand it, who had translated most of these magic messages that came in.

Captain Kramer. That is not accurate, sir. There was only a small percentage that I translated. I edited a large percentage and translated some.

Senator Lucas. Anyhow, the magic messages that were of significance and tremendous importance, in sofar as our relations with Japan were concerned, were delivered by you to the proper recipients?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. I will ask you this question. I think it has been answered several times, but was there anyone in the Navy who ever told you to include this so-called winds execute message in the delivery to the recipients that obtained them from time to time?

Captain Kramer. There never was, Senator.

Senator Lucas. Now whose responsibility would that have been to have told you to include this message, if they had considered it important enough to send to those high in Government receiving this message?
Captain Kramer. I should say, Senator, that it would have been the responsibility of the GY watch officer on watch, or possibly his superior, Captain Safford, to have seen that I got a copy, if it was considered necessary to disseminate it additionally to the special provisions made up for this particular type of message.

Further, the fact that this message never came back into my section for the usual translation and dissemination processes carried on in my office could well be, although I know nothing of this from first-hand knowledge or other knowledge, could well be that Admiral Noyes may have determined that it was simply another of these false alarms on this wins system.

Senator Lucas. Well, Captain, this winds message comes right down into the hands, the judgment, and responsibility of Admiral Noyes, does it not?

Captain Kramer. I cannot presume to assign that responsibility, sir.

Senator Lucas. Well, now, under the arrangement that you had, if Safford sent this message, as he testified, by one of his subordinates to Admiral Noyes, would not it be the duty and responsibility of Admiral Noyes to make the determination as to whether or not it was a genuine winds executive message?

Captain Kramer. I should say Admiral Noyes, or his subordinate in section 20-G of Naval Communications.

Senator Lucas. That is exactly what I am talking about. It would have to be, under that arrangement, either Admiral Noyes or Admiral Noyes and his subordinates in that particular section that would finally have to pass judgment as to the type and kind of message they received?

Captain Kramer. On this particular type of message, yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. That is right. In other words, this is the only arrangement that was set up between Noyes and Safford during the first week of December or any time during November of 1941?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Do you recall that during the week from December 1 to 7, inclusive, there were other messages that were mistakenly considered, for a short time, to be a winds execute message?

Captain Kramer. I am specifically aware of being told by Lieutenant Brotherhood of one phone call that he made to Admiral Noyes' home at night concerning something of this winds character, that had been delivered or phoned to him by the Federal Communications Commission monitoring service.

Senator Lucas. Is that Brotherhood,

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. As I understand it, Brotherhood thought, as a result of the message that he had received, that it was one of those implementing winds messages?

Captain Kramer. I do not know what he thought, sir, but I do know that he did phone Admiral Noyes.

Senator Lucas. Well, at least there was some discussion and some stirring about at that time with respect to whatever he received?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; apparently he concluded it warranted phoning Admiral Noyes in the middle of the night.

Senator Lucas. Let me ask you this question, Captain:
Did Sonnett badger or beset you at any time in an endeavor to change your testimony?

Captain Kramer. He most positively did not, sir.

Senator Lucas. Captain Kramer, do you know anyone in the Navy, the Army, the State Department, the Chief Executive’s office in December—

Captain Kramer. Or any other time.

Senator Lucas (continuing). In 1940, 1941, or any other time, who provoked, angered, or tricked those peaceloving and harmless Japs into attacking Pearl Harbor?

Captain Kramer. I do not, sir.

Senator Lucas. Do you know anyone in the high councils of this Government who, from any information received prior [11086] to the attack on Pearl Harbor, knew when and where the attack was coming?

Captain Kramer. I do not, sir.

Senator Lucas. Do you know of anyone in the Army or Navy who maneuvered, conspired, or attempted to lay the sole blame for the Pearl Harbor disaster on Kimmel and Short?

Captain Kramer. I do not, sir.

Senator Lucas. From all information you received through magic, including the much-discussed purported winds execute message, was there ever received a single word, line, phrase, or sentence that would lead you to believe that Pearl Harbor was going to be struck by the Japs on December 7, 1941?

Captain Kramer. There never was, sir.

Senator Lucas. Are you acquainted with Admiral Noyes, Captain?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Do you know of any reason why Admiral Noyes would want to destroy an important message of this kind, assuming that one had been received?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Mr. Lucas. Do you know of anyone in the department of Admiral Noyes who would want to destroy, conceal, or secrete an important message of this character when everybody [11087] was looking for it?

Captain Kramer. Most definitely not, sir.

Senator Lucas. Can you give this committee any reason whatsoever, if this was the genuine winds execute message, why any man that you knew of in the Navy, in a responsible position at that time, would not want to take whatever action was necessary as the result of receiving that message?

Captain Kramer. I do not, sir.

Senator Lucas. Captain, there have been a lot of things said in this Pearl Harbor inquiry, a lot of things said before the Pearl Harbor inquiry started. One of the things that was said was this, and this was said by a responsible person long before the hearing started, who could not wait for the evidence:

Everybody in authority in Washington knew late on December 6, 1941, that the Japs had broken relations following the decoding of the 14 paragraphs, a message to their Ambassadors here directing them to deliver the message to the White House at 1 p. m. December 7, dawn in Hawaii.
Is that a true or false statement, as far as you know?

Everybody in authority,

it says—

in Washington knew late on December 6, 1941, that the Japs had broken relations following the decoding of the 14 paragraphs.

Was the fourteenth paragraph decoded on December 6?

Captain Kramer. It was not, sir.

[11088] Senator Lucas. It further says:

Every strategist interpreted it only one way, that the first bombs would fall on Hawaii about 7 a.m. Hawaiian time. Kimmel and Short were not advised of this crisis until too late.

Do you know any naval strategists that interpreted the 14 parts message as this statement says, "that the first bombs would fall on Hawaii about 7 a.m."

Captain Kramer. I know of none, whatsoever, sir.

Senator Lucas. Do you know Col. Henry C. Clausen?

Captain Kramer. I have never met the gentleman, sir.

Senator Lucas. You never testified, or gave him an affidavit at any time?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; I did not, although early last summer I received from the then Director of Naval Intelligence, Admiral Hewitt, a classified letter to the effect that I was authorized to testify before him if he desired to see me.

Senator Lucas. I think that is all.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman:

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy, of Pennsylvania, will inquire, Captain.

Mr. Murphy. Captain, in your reply from the South Pacific, the question was asked if you were in solitude [11089] in the South Pacific. Were you at Numea, New Caledonia, when you wrote this letter?

Captain Kramer. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. Is that the time you were still being bombed by the Japs in New Caledonia, or had it ceased by that time?

Captain Kramer. For some time prior to that, as the result of Admiral Halsey's effort, the Japs were at some distance from New Caledonia, with the exception of one or two submarines that got down that way.

Mr. Murphy. Right before that, even when Admiral Halsey was living in the home of the previous Jap envoy, there were some pretty bad times there with bombs, were there not?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, in that letter which the gentleman from Wisconsin described as your last testament, or possible last testament—I am being facetious about that—that the letter which might have survived you contains the statement that there never was a file in your section in which a winds execute was contained; isn't that right?

Captain Kramer. Never in my section; no, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Right. So it would be difficult, if it never got there, for it now to be missing from your section? [11090] That is so, isn't it?
Captain Kramer. Precisely.

Mr. Murphy. That is exactly what you say in this letter which you showed to Admiral Halsey before you appeared before any particular investigating body; is that so?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. So far as files were concerned, you know that Captain Safford had a paper. You know that it went to Admiral Noyes, but you know you never had it for the purpose of filing or distribution; isn't that so.

Captain Kramer. Exactly; yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, the question was asked you by the distinguished Senator from Michigan as to Admiral Turner, and apparently, by way of contradiction of your testimony, that Admiral Turner had said before this body, that he had seen the so-called 13 parts on the night of December 6.

I read from page 979 of the naval court of inquiry, the same Admiral Turner speaking: Question 53:

I show you Document 39 of Exhibit 63 which is the long dispatch, and is the reply of the Japanese to the American notes of November 26:

Answer. I remember the dispatch. I did not see that on the 6th of December. I don't remember when I saw it.

Now, there were some questions asked you about Lieutenant [11091] Sonnett. He asked you certain questions prior to your testimony, did he not?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. You felt there was nothing sinister or improper about that?

Captain Kramer. Not in the slightest, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now two members of this committee spent 4½ hours with you before we commenced hearings in this case, did they not?

Captain Kramer. They did, sir.

Mr. Murphy. They asked you quite extensively about your testimony, did they not?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Nothing improper about that was there?

Captain Kramer. None whatsoever, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Were you in a room or ward at the hospital?

Captain Kramer. We were in a conference room adjacent to the office of the medical officer in charge, Captain Duncan.

Mr. Murphy. I mean were you assigned to a room or ward at the hospital?

Captain Kramer. On my first detachment to the hospital in August, for the routine check-up, I was in a room in the tower of the hospital. After that routine check-up [11092] and ensuing sick leave, on my second return to the hospital, I was in a ward, in a room of a ward.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, there was some question about having clearance with Public Relations before photographs were taken. Is not that the usual and unvarying procedure in the Navy? Even if the Red Cross wanted a picture for a fund campaign, would not they have to have clearance before they did those things? Or do you know that?

Captain Kramer. I am not sure of the details of that, sir.
I do know this, however, that it has always been my understanding of naval policy in this respect, that the Navy's primary concern is with matters of security. If, for example, a naval officer writes books, or newspaper or magazine articles, that officer himself is held personally responsible for any breach of security. Along that line, the Navy Department, that I am aware of, for many years past, has had a policy of desiring—I cannot state requiring—that any contemplated publication of that kind should be accompanied by furnishing a copy to the Navy Department Public Relations office at about the same time it is sent to a publisher.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, there was some question asked you time after time about your being in Admiral Stark's house for lunch, and then your testifying or stating in this letter from the South Pacific about your having been in his office at 9, whereas your present recollection was 9:30.

I direct your attention to page 9143 of the record:

Captain McCollum. I went over the situation with Watts when I arrived and was trying to digest the 13 parts of this thing when I received word that Admiral Wilkinson, my chief had arrived, and desired to see me. I went up to Admiral Wilkinson's office and we entered into a discussion of the first 13 parts of this dispatch. I should say that would be nine o'clock or maybe a little later. While we were talking an orderly or someone came in and said Admiral Stark had come into his office, and Admiral Wilkinson said, "Well, come on, let's go and see the chief."

We went down the passageway and went into Admiral Stark's office. At that time there was no one in Admiral Stark's office except himself. None of his aides were present in the outer office. We went in and discussed this thing with Admiral Stark and then came out. That was the 13 parts.

Captain McCollum was at that same luncheon wasn't he, with Admiral Stark?

[11094] Captain Kramer. Yes, he was.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, on the night of December 6, you delivered the 13 parts to the White House, and your recollection of the time was that you got there about 9:15 that evening?

Captain Kramer. About 9:15 that evening, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Do you know whether it was at the time you arrived with the 9:15 dispatch, or before that that the President of the United States dispatched his message to the Emperor of Japan?

Captain Kramer. I did not know about that until I saw the newspapers the following day.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, you saw an account that the President on that very night did dispatch to the Emperor of Japan a message in order to forestall the war, if possible, did you not?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, you said when you received this letter from Captain Safford, that you were flabbergasted. You were rather surprised and astonished, were you not, to receive such a letter through the mails out in the South Pacific?

Captain Kramer. I certainly was; yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. At one time you were asked about your [11095] testimony at a previous hearing, and I am referring to the examination by the gentleman from Wisconsin.

The question was, "That was false?" And you said "Yes."

Did you mean by that that you were deliberately lying or did you mean that it was your best recollection in the light of the facts before you, and the condition of your memory at the time?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. Which does the gentleman mean?

Captain Kramer. I mean, of course, the last part of that question.

Mr. Murphy. Well, did you at any time mean to tell this committee that you have made a false statement anywhere in this proceeding before the Naval Court of Inquiry, before the Hewitt inquiry, or before this committee?

Captain Kramer. I have never meant to imply that I consciously made a false statement.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, at pages 829 and 828 of the record, when Admiral Ingersoll is speaking about having received the 13-part message on the night of the 6th, his recollection of it, he said he thought he had made some notes of indication indicating that he had received it.

Did you have customarily in your office any kind of [11096] a paper which would indicate by initials or otherwise, who had seen these particular messages?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; we did not, although, through 1941, up to a month and a half prior to Pearl Harbor, there was a gist of the traffic in a particular folder which was often initialed, but frequently was not.

Mr. Murphy. But it was not the consistent practice to have them all initialed, was it?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, you also referred, in your letter from the South Pacific, to the possibility of certain summaries.

Did you retain summaries, or was that just to meet the situation from day to day in order to explain to the recipients of magic what the developments were?

Captain Kramer. I meant simply the gist that I have just referred to, sir.

Mr. Murphy. I have just this last matter.

You stated in your letter from the South Pacific that there were several different sets of files where a winds execute, had it gone through your department, would have been found. Is that true? Would there have been several different places?

[11097] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; there would have been two places in which that would be found. One would be the translation file, and the other would be a file in which was kept every piece of decoded or deciphered paper that came into my section.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, your best recollection is there never was a file in your office containing a winds execute message?

Captain Kramer. That is precisely correct; yes.

Mr. Murphy. No further questions.

The Vice Chairman. Any further questions?

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask just one or two questions.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Brewster will inquire, Captain.

Senator Brewster. I understand we will recess early today.

The Vice Chairman. The recess announced at the beginning of this session was we would recess at a quarter to 4. The Senators would have to be on the floor by 4 o'clock.

Senator Barkley had informed me of that proposal.
Senator Brewster. Captain, I would like to have a little more clear in the record, and I understand it is not entirely clear, where you kept this memorandum that [11098] you prepared, during the interim.

Captain Kramer. Constantly in my possession, sir.

Senator Brewster. Was there only one copy of it?

Captain Kramer. One copy, sir.

Senator Brewster. Is that all that you ever made?

Captain Kramer. Only one, sir.

Senator Brewster. And was that dictated or did you write it yourself on the typewriter?

Captain Kramer. Entirely myself, sir.

Senator Brewster. On the typewriter?

Captain Kramer. On the typewriter.

Senator Brewster. You operate a typewriter yourself?

Captain Kramer. I have never prepared any longhand rough version, or that kind of thing.

Senator Brewster. And you had a file where you kept this?

Captain Kramer. I had many classified papers in my possession in connection with my work out there; yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. And you brought that file with you when you came back here?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. And you brought that file with you when you came back here?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

[11099] Senator Brewster. At what time did you first take this out of your file during the last few weeks?

Captain Kramer. It was never taken out of my file prior to the commencement of this hearing, sir.

Senator Brewster. We began this hearing in November. Do you mean since that time?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. Just about what time did you then get it? What were the circumstances under which you took it out?

Captain Kramer. Since this hearing started those papers have been removed from that file of mine three times, prior to the last couple of days when it was opened, in fact, prior to 5 or 6 days ago, when it was shown to Lieutenant Commander Baecher.

On these three occasions they were shown to Admiral Wilkinson, to Captain Rochefort, and to Colonel Bales, Marine Corps, at that time, and now still head of the Far East Section of Naval Intelligence.

Senator Brewster. When did those three examinations take place?

Captain Kramer. The first time this occurred, was with Admiral Wilkinson, the afternoon I first saw him, since I left the South Pacific, when I arrived in Washington from [11100] Miami, and he had just arrived by plane after a 4-day flight from Japan, and we met in one of the rooms in the Navy Department made available to witnesses.

Senator Brewster. How nearly can you fix that day?

Captain Kramer. It was either the 9th—I will correct that—it was either the 6th or 7th of December, sir.
Senator Brewster. You had a conference with him at that time on this situation?

Captain Kramer. No, sir, we had a general social conference. I showed him those papers.

Senator Brewster. When you say "those papers" you mean the memorandum?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. Or were there other papers that you had?

Captain Kramer. No, sir, simply these letters of Captain Safford, and my expanded reply.

[11101] Senator Brewster. That comprised all that you had on this matter?

Captain Kramer. That is all I showed him; yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. Will you answer my question?

Captain Kramer. Sir?

Senator Brewster. I asked you if those were all the papers you had bearing on this matter?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. You discussed this situation then with him?

Captain Kramer. What situation do you refer to, sir?

Senator Brewster. I mean the matter of the contents of these letters and your recollection as to the events with which they were concerned.

Captain Kramer. There was very little discussion, sir.

I handed these letters to him with some remark to the effect that I felt, as a previous superior of mine, a naval officer, an admiral whom I considered a personal friend that I would like to have him see these letters, so that he might appreciate the possible reasons for some of what I considered entirely unwarranted publicity in connection with my name that had taken place in previous months.

Senator Brewster. And this was to show him what your story regarding the situation was?

Captain Kramer. Not so much my story, sir, as to show him, or tell him what I considered a likely source of the origin of this unwarranted publicity.

Senator Brewster. How long were you with him at that time?

Captain Kramer. Probably about a half hour.

[11102] During half of that time Admiral Kirk came in and joined in some of our discussions. But not on this matter, however. Admiral Kirk has never seen this paper.

Senator Brewster. But Admiral Wilkinson read it through while he was with you?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. You did not leave any copy with him; did you?

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir.

[11103] Senator Brewster. When was the next conference on the matter?

Captain Kramer. It was a few days later when, with the identical purpose in mind, I showed these letters to Captain Rochefort, who is also a long-time personal friend and was a language officer in Tokyo, Japan, at the same time I was.

Senator Brewster. Where did he see you?

Captain Kramer. In one of these witness rooms in the Navy Department.
Senator Brewster. You met him there by appointment?
Captain Kramer. Not by appointment. We just happened to meet, and I told him I would like to show him these letters too.
Senator Brewster. You were on duty at the Department at that time?
Captain Kramer. I was still attached to the hospital, had been on sick leave and had been released by the hospital from the necessity of reporting in daily, awaiting the pleasure of this committee, sir.
Senator Brewster. What was his comment on this after you showed it to him?
Captain Kramer. He agreed with some of the comment I made as to the likelihood of that being a possible origin of some of this publicity.
Senator Brewster. Now tell us about the next conference. When did that take place?
Captain Kramer. That took place early last month, a few days after I arrived in Washington from Miami on sick leave over the holidays, the 9th of January. It was a Sunday morning at Colonel Vale's home in Washington, N. W.
Senator Brewster. You went there to see him?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. At his request?
Captain Kramer. No, sir, at my suggestion that I would like to show him these papers at his convenience, and he suggested that breakfast appointment at his home.
Senator Brewster. You took the papers there with you?
Captain Kramer. I did, sir.
Senator Brewster. And he read them over in your presence?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. What comment did he make?
Captain Kramer. Along similar lines.
Senator Brewster. With all of these gentlemen you discussed, to some extent, the problems that you felt you were presented with?
Captain Kramer. I was presented with no problem, sir.
Senator Brewster. That is what I thought you had previously said, that you were disturbed over these stories that appeared in the papers, that you discussed this with your personal friend the captain and asked to see the colonel, in order to point out to them what you thought was the source of some of these unfounded rumors which were disturbing you.
Captain Kramer. I, of course, had been annoyed at many of these things being published in connection with my name; yes, sir.
Senator Brewster. Now, Captain, I just want to ask you one final question.
Do you expect that it can be credited that during this month that elapsed from December 6 to January 9, during this period when you were showing these papers to three different men because of your very great concern, apparently, over your name being used in connection with this, asking your friend the captain about it, and asking for an interview with the colonel, that during all that period you never once examined, yourself, this memorandum which you present here now?
Captain Kramer. I did not, Senator.

Senator Brewster. You realize how difficult it is for anyone to credit a statement of that sort, Captain, when you [11106] were really disturbed, that you never once examined this paper which you present?

Captain Kramer. By “examine”, if you mean to infer that I read this paper, I did not.

Senator Brewster. Yes, that is what I mean.

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir.

Senator Brewster. You must realize what a strain that is to a man’s credulity.

Captain Kramer. I have, without question, looked at certain items that I may have pointed out or that they may have pointed out. I do not believe that that occurred, though, sir. I think in each case, Senator, there was practically no conversation throughout their perusal of this paper.

Senator Brewster. You were taking this to them without a statement of the background, and your recollection and your action? We are going to recess now over the week end. I wish you would ponder that question, from the standpoint of the difficulties which we face. I can see no reason why you should not have examined it. I do not think you would be subject to any criticism if you had examined it.

I have been amazed from the beginning that you insisted that you did not see it, that you base your entire present recollection on the refreshment you received from consultation with officers [11107] who examined that document; that under those circumstances it must have seemed proper for you to refresh your recollection from something you wrote more than a year and a half ago in Noumea. I think it would make it far easier for us to credit your story if we could believe you examined that paper at some time in the last month.

Captain Kramer. I appreciate, Senator, that that implication might be drawn from what I have previously testified to. However, the fact is that I did not read that memorandum, in whole or in part, beyond glancing at the heading of it, the first paragraph, perhaps, as I was showing these letters to these three individuals, to be sure I was showing them the piece of paper that they were to read in the sequence I wanted to present it.

The Vice Chairman. The committee will now recess.

Mr. Gearhart. Captain, I wanted to ask you—

The Vice Chairman. We agreed to recess at a quarter of 4.

Mr. Gearhart. I just have a couple of questions.

The Vice Chairman. He will be back Monday morning, so you will have a chance to ask him then.

Mr. Gearhart. All right.

(Whereupon, at 3:50 p.m., February 9, 1946, the committee recessed until 10 a.m., Monday, February 11, 1946.)
The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a.m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson; and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order.

Does counsel have anything at this time to present?

Mr. Richardson. No.

The Vice Chairman. Captain, do you have anything you desire to present before the examination is resumed?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; in the absence of Senator Brewster, unless he wants any further statement.

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you some questions about that.

Captain Kramer. All right, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson, of Michigan, will inquire at this point, Captain.

Captain Kramer. All right, sir.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ALWIN D. KRAMER, UNITED STATES NAVY (Resumed)

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, Senator Brewster is not going to be here this morning and that is why I will give you an opportunity to explain what he left rather up in the air on Saturday.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. As I recall, you told Senator Brewster that you had not read all or parts of the so-called Halsey—I will refer to it as that—memorandum or the Safford letter and Halsey memorandum.

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And he indicated that it was somewhat hard for him to understand that a man would have that in his possession so long and show it to several people, three people, and not read any part of it. If you will recall, I asked you some questions about a conversation with Admiral Wilkinson the last time that I
examined you and I asked you for the complete conversation that you had with him and as I understand it you never mentioned that you saw him and showed him this memorandum.

Now, how do you account for the fact that you did not give to me at that time an indication that you had discussed or shown him this memorandum?

Captain Kramer. Senator, I did not discuss that memorandum with Admiral Wilkinson other than the aspects—I think I have clearly indicated heretofore in my testimony—concerning the possible source of unwarranted publicity concerning me; in other words, primarily concerning Safford's two letters, not my memorandum for Admiral Halsey.

Senator Ferguson. But you showed him the Halsey memorandum?

Captain Kramer. I did, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, why didn't you disclose that when I tried to get the full information on your conversation with Wilkinson; why didn't you tell me that you had [1111] shown him a memorandum? Was it that, as you say, you were not going to disclose that unless you were asked a direct question in relation to it?

Captain Kramer. That is precisely correct, sir, and in view of your line of questioning; Senator, I feel that I should read this statement I have prepared over the week end in compliance with the request of Senator Brewster that I ponder that question.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, do I understand then that what you do in your testimony on any of these hearings is that you give only those things that are directly asked for and if the examiner does not happen to know that there is in existence a particular paper that it is not disclosed? I am trying to find out why I did not get the information when I tried to get from you everything that was said between you and Wilkinson.

Captain Kramer. I think that point is fully covered in my statement, sir, if I may be permitted to read it.

Senator Ferguson. Well, in just a moment you can. Did you discuss anything with Wilkinson in the last 6 months? On how many occasions did you see Wilkinson to discuss things?

Captain Kramer. On two occasions, sir, other than a simple greeting in this hearing room when he was testifying.

Senator Ferguson. On two occasions?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You gave me the other day the one occasion and then you gave Senator Brewster on Saturday the one?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That made the two?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, why did you keep from the committee when I examined you about all your conversations with Wilkinson the fact that you had had one about this Halsey memorandum?

Captain Kramer. The first occasion with Admiral Wilkinson did not bring up this question at all, sir. It was a discussion on our experiences in ONI in general in which Admiral Kirk participated for at least half of the time. The other half we discussed primarily—in fact, almost solely—the introductory remarks with which I presented those papers to Admiral Wilkinson, namely, what I considered the
likely source of publicity attending my name in connection with this Pearl Harbor affair.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, Captain, you gave to this committee two of those papers and only two of those, isn't that true?

Captain Kramer. Three, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Three. But you did not give them the memorandum, the Halsey memorandum?

Captain Kramer. That is precisely correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, how do you account for dividing them up and giving the two of them—

Captain Kramer. Three.

Senator Ferguson. Three of them—pardon me, three letters, two letters from Safford to you and one reply—but there was also a reply to one of Safford's which did exactly or almost exactly what Safford wanted you to do, to discuss it with Halsey?

Captain Kramer. Senator, how those—

Mr. Richardson. Just answer his question, Captain.

Captain Kramer (continuing). Letters first came up was in reply to a direct question to me on the part of Senator Lucas whether I had in my possession letters addressed to me by Captain Safford. I stood up in this room, in the back of this room, and I said I did. At that time, Senator, I not only produced the two letters but my reply to Captain Safford's letter, which was not asked for precisely by Senator Lucas' question.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, when you gave these three letters, two of the Safford's and your reply, to Commander Baecher did you at the same time give him the Halsey memorandum?

[11114] Captain Kramer. I did, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And then when he delivered the three letters to the committee did you have to authorize that? Was that an understanding?

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir. He had it in hand in case that question of necessity came into my testimony.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, he was holding in his possession four instruments; is that correct?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And if it became necessary for him to deliver he would deliver only those that he thought were necessary at the time and hold back from the committee the others.

Captain Kramer. I should like to point out, sir, that he also mentioned the existence of that fourth letter to counsel for this committee, Mr. Richardson.

Senator Ferguson. When was that?

Captain Kramer. I am not certain, sir. Baecher, I think, can supply that information.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you have a conversation about that?

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, how do you know that?

Captain Kramer. I think I heard Mr. Richardson say that in this committee while I was testifying last Friday or Saturday.

Senator Ferguson. You understood that from—
Captain Kramer. From Mr. Richardson's statement.
Senator Ferguson. From what was said here?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Then as I understand it you personally did not want to disclose to this committee any of these four instruments unless a direct question was asked and the committee somehow out of the magic would uncover the fact, or out of the blue, let us say, would uncover the fact that there was this Halsey memorandum, is that correct?

Captain Kramer. That is precisely correct, sir, and I think I gave at some length on Saturday my reasons for that position.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Captain Kramer. I also cover that in this statement.
Senator Ferguson. So you were of the opinion at that time that this committee should only get those things that it could find out from some other source and not from you? How could the committee ascertain if—

Captain Kramer. They found out from me—

Senator Ferguson. How could the committee members ever ask you about this Halsey letter? You and Baechor and Wil- [11116]kinson and a few others were the only people that ever knew about it.
Captain Kramer. The man who found out for this committee from me was Mr. Keefe, who asked me the direct question whether I had ever discussed these letters with anyone up to this moment. Your questions to me, sir, were not so phrased.

Senator Ferguson. You think that they are not direct enough when I ask you about the Wilkinson question?
Captain Kramer. I do, Senator.
Senator Ferguson. And, therefore, you did not give it?
Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, will you explain to me how it came by chance that you would have this Halsey letter in your possession down in the Navy Department the day that you met Wilkinson by chance?

Captain Kramer. I brought it with me from Miami in this case in which it has remained, incidentally, sealed, from the time I left the South Pacific on about December 10, 1944, until my arrival in this city on December 6, 1945, from Miami.

Senator Ferguson. So it was sealed all the time?
Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And how was it sealed?
Captain Kramer. It was sealed in a package referred to in the authorization to me from commander South Pacific area [11117] and South Pacific Force dated 10—

Mr. Richardson. Tell him how it was sealed. That is all he wants to know.
Senator Ferguson. Yes; that is all I want to know.
Mr. Richardson. What kind of a lock it had on it.
Captain Kramer. It was sealed in a package No. 47,102 by the flag secretary to commander South Pacific under date of 10 September and described on this authorization for me to carry classified papers from this (brown wrapping paper) originated by commander South Pacific addressed to Commannder A. D. Kramer by CINC South Pacific, signed by I. M. Mayfield, Chief of Staff.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, did you tell him when you got this memorandum that you had in there a memorandum that you had shown to Admiral Halsey?

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, how did he know what he was sealing? Did he seal among the official papers your personal memorandum to Halsey?

Captain Kramer. Among those, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So, then, this personal paper was sealed among or along with the official documents?

Captain Kramer. With official documents that were purely for my own use. I carried no official commander South Pacific [11118] mail. It was for use in connection with my work.

I want to repeat again, Senator, that I should like at this point to read my memorandum which covers those points explicitly and fully. [11119] Senator Ferguson. You go ahead and read it and then I will ask you some questions later on, because I apparently am not going to get direct answers from you, so you go ahead and read it.

The Vice Chairman. Read it, Captain.

Captain Kramer. Mr. Chairman, I prepared a statement, in compliance with Senator Brewster’s request on Saturday afternoon, which was put to me in the following terms, according to yesterday’s Washington Star:

That would put a strain on anyone’s credulity. I wish you would ponder over this question further over the week end. I am sure you will appreciate that it is difficult to believe your answer.

I believe I understand correctly that the Senator’s credulity applied only to my assertions that I have not read, since mid-May 1944, certain papers, principally and specifically a memorandum answering, in expanded form, the question set forth in Captain Safford’s two letters that I prepared for Admiral Halsey’s perusal, but it probably also included Captain Safford’s two letters and my reply to his first.

I have pondered this request, with the following result, which has become, I am afraid, rather lengthy in text. I have attempted to keep it short, but a question of credulity did not warrant, I felt, leaving out of this summary any [11120] matter I have included.

I have thought that it would not be necessary to bring these papers into the record of this hearing at all. I had no intention of doing so, unless directly asked for them. Such a direct request was addressed to me in this room by Senator Lucas last Monday when Captain Safford was on the witness stand. At that time I considered that furnishing the Captain Safford’s two letters and my reply to his first letter was complying fully with Senator Lucas’ request.

My memorandum answering, in expanded form, the questions set forth in Captain Safford’s two letters would not have been introduced if Mr. Keefe’s or other inquiries on behalf of this committee had not been phrased in a form requiring its introduction. Mr. Keefe’s question asking, in substance, whether I had ever discussed Captain Safford’s letters with anyone required, I felt, the mention at that time of my discussion with Admiral Halsey, the only person who has seen these papers, except Captain Safford and myself, prior to the opening of this hearing.

In the interest of the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, when Mr. Keefe asked his next question as to why such discus-
sion was held, I considered it incumbent on me to produce Admiral Kimmel's letter and my memorandum to explain the discussion.

[11121] I am of the complete conviction that no question pro-
pounded by Senator Ferguson to me required such mention of Ad-
miral Halsey or Admiral Kimmel, or this memorandum.

The reasons for my position on this matter, as outlined above, are
that I felt the only end that could possibly be served by their intro-
duction was a picture of the events preceding Pearl Harbor as I saw
them at the time the memorandum was drafted. That is a year and
a half to two years ago. Since both persons involved, namely Cap-
tain Safford and myself, were to be witnesses before this hearing, I
felt that first-hand, direct testimony would be developed by counsel
and the committee and be preferred to any letters or memoranda
which may have been written at a time when, at least in my case,
initial attempts were made to recall those events without benefit of
any files or pertinent documents to refresh the memory.

To cover the question of credulity to be given my testimony con-
cerning these papers, I therefore felt it necessary to explain the his-
tory of their custody by me in full.

When I received Captain Safford's first letter at the end of 1943 I
considered it a straightforward and proper request for information
on matters of which both he and I were cognizant. It will be noted
that his letter of 22 [11123] December 1943 is on the official
letterhead of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, Navy De-
partment, and uses the official classification stamp "Confidential."

The letter states that he is preparing a secret paper covering events
on early December 1941 with the aid of officers and records in the
Navy Department.

Three questions arose in my mind at that time. One concerning
the classification he had used, namely, "Confidential." I thought it
should have been "Secret."

Second, concerning his cautions regarding "unauthorized hands
seeing it"; and, third, concerning why such a request for information
had not come through official channels and the safeguards thus
afforded.

Since the letter had arrived safely, the first question was no longer
pertinent. Concerning the second and third, I felt he used this means
to keep from disclosing to unauthorized officers and enlisted men in
the office where I was stationed at Pearl Harbor matters which had
always been and still were restricted to only those people working
with it and certain senior officers.

Furthermore, the practice of discussing and reporting official mat-
ters in personal correspondence, although abolished in the Division
of Naval Intelligence in 1940, continued, I knew, in other divisions and
bureaus of the [11123] Navy Department. I, therefore, pre-
pared a reply, couching it in such language, by means of reference to
the original letter, that no compromise to unauthorized persons could,
I believed, possibly result from the letter going astray, or from ex-
amination by censors at Pearl Harbor, or elsewhere.

The letter thus censored by myself, was unclassified and was sub-
mitted to the officer in my section who was censoring for my section.
It was forwarded under his censorship seal after cursory examina-
tion, and assurance from me that it contained nothing likely to com-
promise security. I was fully prepared to answer and assume responsibility for any future questions that might be raised by other censors or the Navy Department regarding this letter.

Captain Safford’s first letter and my reply were carried by me to the South Pacific with other classified papers used by myself in my work under an official courier letter of the officer in charge, Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean areas, dated January 10, 1944, the original of which I have before me for presentation, if so desired.

Captain Safford's second letter arrived shortly after I reached the South Pacific. I never answered him for reasons I have set forth at some length in several parts of my previous testimony.

I did not read more than the first few paragraphs of this second letter until mid-May 1944, on the occasion of the arrival of Admiral Kimmel’s letter to Admiral Halsey and my first conference with Admiral Halsey resulted in my preparation of the expanded memorandum reply. This also I have covered at some length in previous testimony.

In the second interview with Admiral Halsey, in which he read all these papers, there was not only no question raised by Admiral Halsey as to the propriety of my retaining Captain Safford’s letters and as to the propriety of my reply to Captain Safford's first letter, but he expressed satisfaction with my promise to prepare an affidavit or deposition covering essentially the subject matter of the above-mentioned papers, and then informing Admiral Kimmel, either directly or through Admiral Halsey, regarding where such affidavit could be found in the event of my death.

The only instance when a security point arose during our conversation was when I expressed myself on and Admiral Halsey expressed agreement with the view that Captain Safford was rash in having sent a letter of the character of his second.

I, therefore, felt fully justified in the steps I had followed to date in this matter.

As I have earlier stated in testifying before this committee, the safe handling and eventual disposition of these papers gave me some concern during the summer of 1944, after Admiral Halsey left the South Pacific, about June 15, 1944.

I never prepared the deposition or the affidavit for Admiral Kimmel that I had promised Admiral Halsey I would. I did, however, continue to hold these papers, more particularly the expanded memorandum reply to all Captain Safford's questions as in the nature of the affidavit requested.

As long as I was in the South Pacific force and area headquarters, which was distant from the combat zone, I felt that the papers were safe in my custody at headquarters.

I left the South Pacific on September 10, 1944, carrying these papers, and other classified papers used in my work in two packages, sealed by the flag secretary to Com So Pac, and carried under the courier designation dated September 10, 1944, signed by the chief of staff, Captain—now Admiral—Mayfield. The original is now before me for submission, if so desired.

Since September 10, 1944, these letters have remained sealed in Com So Pac package No. 47103, mentioned in the above courier designation, until the afternoon of December 6, 1945.
[11126] Subsequent to my testimony given before the Naval Court of Inquiry at Pearl Harbor, I gave consideration, and in fact almost did destroy all of these letter and memoranda. The only reason, as I have already outlined why I retained them to that point was in compliance with Admiral Kimmel's request.

After testifying, however, before the court of inquiry held by Admiral Murfin at Pearl Harbor that reason no longer held, in view of the fact that my story was now a matter of record in the transcript of the proceeding of the court of inquiry.

However, I continued to hold these papers more in the nature of mementos of that occasion, and partly with a view to having documentary evidence of what my reply to Captain Safford's first letter had been.

[11127] I have previously gone into the circumstances surrounding my arrival from the South Pacific at Pearl Harbor around midnight September 12–13, 1944, and the fact that I was not aware I had been called north to testify, before a naval inquiry on Pearl Harbor. I have further testified previously that it was not until a few minutes prior to my appearance before this hearing that I was aware that I would be permitted to testify on matters involving radio intelligence.

In support of this testimony I can only call on Capt. E. T. Layton, U. S. N., at that time and still the intelligence officer of commander in chief Pacific Ocean area, Admiral Nimitz, the said Captain Layton being my informant in each case.

Until the Senator from Maine asked me the direct question, "Who has seen these memoranda and letters since this hearing opened in mid-November," or words to that effect, there was not only no necessity, but not even any occasion for dragging into my testimony the names of three close and long-time friends of mine.

In support of my previous testimony regarding my not reading the letters and the memorandum answering Captain Safford's questions in full when I presented them for perusal to three of my friends since this hearing opened, [11128] I can only call on Admiral Wilkinson, Captain Rochefort, and Colonel Bales, who are the aforementioned three friends.

I have not seen any of these three individuals since some days prior to my appearance in this witness chair, and have not communicated with any of these three individuals directly or indirectly for several weeks past.

At this point, in the interest of precision and accuracy of my testimony in the record, I should like to modify somewhat the testimony I gave Saturday, as to the exact dates I saw and showed these letters to the above-mentioned three friends.

I find that in some notes I kept during December last, an entry for the day I arrived in Washington from Miami was as follows:

December 6, Thursday, p. m.: Bull session with Wilkinson and later Kirk and Wilkinson. Kirk is with General Board. Saw Joe Rochefort briefly in office. McCollum and Layton were here for some days but left yesterday.

December 13, Thursday, 0830: Up and to Department.

1000 (about), showed Wilkinson Safford's letters and what had been done with replies (shown only to Halsey in case of No. 2). This was my explanation to him of all this unwarranted publicity I have been getting.

[11129] 1230: Lunch and bull session with Rochefort.
1430: Bales' office and discussed Saffo letters a little. Will show him these dates.

December 14, Friday, 1430: Had brief session with Safford in his office looking over some of his files of papers. Stated I would look at others tomorrow or Monday.

December 16, Sunday, 0000: Up, bathed, etc. Got to Bales' at 10:15. Cold as hell. Ten degrees last night. Had breakfast and bull session 'til after 1400. Showed him Saffo's two letters and memo.

December 18, Tuesday, 1200: Recessed. To Navy Department and had long bull session with Joe Rochefort and showed him Saffo's letters. This makes three people who have seen them: Halsey; Wilkinson; and Rochefort. Bull session continued 'til about 1530.

This, Senator, ends my quotation from the afore-mentioned notes. In the event Senator Brewer's or other's credulity is strained as to why I have had such notes in my possession and as to their authenticity, I can only assert the following, which is the sole explanation:

In November last year—

Mr. Richardson (interposing). Captain, just a minute.

Is there any need of carrying this on? The only question, as I understand it, that was asked you by Senator Ferguson [11130] was the question of keeping this memorandum in your possession without reading it.

Captain Kramer. I understood the question, Mr. Counsel, to apply to the credulity to be applied to my testimony regarding the showing of these memoranda, and not reading them while they were being shown.

Mr. Richardson. Go ahead. Get through with it.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, in fairness to the witness, the Senator from Maine did ask him to ponder.

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead, Captain.

[11131] Captain Kramer. In November last year my wife came to Washington from Miami and remained with me until our departure on November 14 for Miami. On my return alone to Washington in early December to await the pleasure of this committee I determined to keep notes in some detail of my activities, people I met, old acquaintances seen again, and so forth, so that on my expected return to Miami for the Christmas holidays she could read them over and I would thus be able to acquaint her of the above in some detail without depending on memory alone.

Such a set of notes or diary I have never kept since some years prior to Pearl Harbor. The sole reason for keeping it in this instance was because of the deep interest with which my wife was following these hearings and any connection I might have therewith. They cover the period from December 5, 1945, when I left Miami for Washington to December 20, 1945, when I left Washington for Miami. They were prepared by me on my return to the Bethesda Naval Hospital each evening before I turned in. No such notes were undertaken by me during my present stay in Washington for the past months because my wife was with me here most of this time. They consist of about eight and one-half pages and are rather meticulous and complete and mention the names of nearly every acquaintance I saw or conversed with.

[11132] I am confident that Admiral Wilkinson, Captain Rochefort, and Colonel Bales will substantiate my testimony previously given regarding my presentation of Safford's letters to them, as well
as all details of which they are aware with regard to the accuracy of
the above-quoted notes and my testimony.

The Senator from Maine and others may have received and may
now receive with some degree of incredulity the assertions I have made
in the previous testimony regarding my relations with Captain
Safford to the effect that up until last week at least they have con-
tinued on a friendly basis and so continue unless his attitude toward
me has changed in the past week. I have inserted above the quotation
from my notes in support of this assertion. I am sure that Captain
Safford's secretary, as well as certain officer subordinates of his can
support my assertion that during my four or five visits to his office
last year there continued to be friendly relations between us despite
disagreement on many points. Captain Safford himself can also sup-
port this.

The full set of these notes I would be glad to submit to Senator
Brewster, or others, for examination if so desired.

In support of my previous testimony that I have not shown this
memorandum to other than Admiral Halsey, Admiral Wilkinson,
Captain Rochefort, and Colonel Bales, prior to [11133] show-
ing it to Lieutenant Commander Baecher a few days ago, I can only
call on all persons with whom I could possibly have had contact since
mid-May 1944. I am confident no such peruser of these papers can
be found or could ever have been found.

In support of my previous testimony that I have not read these
papers, other than to glance at the headings or first paragraphs of
each, from mid-May 1944 to this moment, except for certain days
and times last December as given above, and a few days ago to
Lieutenant Commander Baecher, I can only give my word that this is
a meticulously truthful statement of fact.

I hope these comments comply with the wish of the Senator from
Maine that I ponder this question further during the week end,
namely, the question of assertions of mine with respect to these
papers, assertions which may possibly have resulted in straining the
credulity to be afforded my previous testimony before this committee
on this and other matters.

[1113½] The Vice Chairman. Does that complete your state-
ment, Captain?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; that completes my statement.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. I think I will leave that subject for a while
now and go to another one.

Will you take Exhibit 2 and turn to page 22.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. When is the first that you saw that message
either in code or the rough translation?

Captain Kramer. The first I recollect having seen this message
was in the form of a rough translation attached to the decoded
Japanese text on Monday morning December 8, 1941. However, I
have been informed—

Mr. Richardson. He just asked you when you first saw it.

Captain Kramer. All right.

Senator Ferguson. That is the first you saw it?

Captain Kramer. That is the first I recollect seeing it; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You had a Mrs. Edgers in your department?

Captain Kramer. It was she I was about to refer to, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you see her on Saturday; was she working?

Captain Kramer. She was; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And did you know that she translated that in the rough on Saturday?

Captain Kramer. I did not know she did. She has stated to me she did and——

Mr. Richardson. That answers the question.

Captain Kramer. And I believe her in that respect.

Senator Ferguson. These messages in Exhibit 2 were very important, were they not?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; they were.

Senator Ferguson. Now, turn to page 27. That message came in on the 6th and it has this at the bottom:

I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.

It was from Honolulu to Tokyo. That was a very vital message, was it not?

Captain Kramer. It certainly became one when we knew of the attack on Pearl Harbor; yes, sir. It would have been if we had seen it prior to the attack.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know why no particular effort was being made to translate these messages as to where the attack would be—or the same effort that was being exerted to ascertain whether there would be a breach of relations?

Captain Kramer. Senator, my answer to that will fall in [11136] two parts. In the first place, there is no clue to the subject or importance of a message until a translator has completed a translation. In the second place, this message is dated December 6, a date of Army responsibility, and I know nothing of their handling of this particular message.

Senator Ferguson. Now, turn to page 29. The last sentence of that message, from Honolulu to Tokyo reads:

It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the Fleet Air Arm.

Captain Kramer. Precisely the same remarks apply to this message, which was translated, according to the notation at the bottom, and my recollection, too, incidentally, on December 8, 1941.

Senator Ferguson. So as I understand it, our reply is that these were in the Army?

Captain Kramer. These were Army dates of responsibility to translate; yes, sir, process and translate.

Senator Ferguson. And not the Navy?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that part of the Army, at least part of the Army translators, went home at noon on Saturday?

Captain Kramer. Normally ours would have, too.

Senator Ferguson. Well, was it true that some of your translators were on their Christmas holidays as early as this?

Captain Kramer. They were not, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Were there any on furloughs or holidays?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; all six of my translators were on duty.

Senator Ferguson. Now, notwithstanding the fact that these messages were in and you anticipated a reply to the memorandum of the 26th to the Tokyo Government, certain Army translators went home for the afternoon on Saturday and they had to be called back later in the afternoon to help on the thirteenth part?

Captain Kramer. I do not know precisely what translators were or were not on duty Saturday afternoon, sir. Furthermore, as regards any possible connection I might have had with these messages on Saturday afternoon, these messages were unquestionably, in my mind, sent to Army as soon as received.

In fact, I will modify that statement because there is a notation in the lower right-hand corner, a parenthetical note to the effect that the station monitoring this message was station 2, received by teletype. Station 3 was an Army monitoring station. In the light of that, it would appear that this message was seen by Army and detained entirely at all times in the Army Signal Intelligence Section until processed and translated.

[III39] Senator Ferguson. Were any men in your department on Christmas leave as early as December 7?

Captain Kramer. I do not recall having given Christmas leave, except possibly Christmas Day, to any of my translators, sir.

Senator Ferguson. To anyone in your department, whether translators, or otherwise?

Captain Kramer. No, sir. My department consisted of six translators, one officer besides myself, and two yeomen.

Senator Ferguson. Then you were responsible for the translations?

Captain Kramer. Translation and dissemination; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, the one on page 27, No. 253. That would indicate that it came from the Army and therefore the Navy was not responsible?

Captain Kramer. At the bottom, the lower right-hand corner of page 28, is the same notation as appears on the other one, namely, that station 2, an Army station, monitored this message.

Senator Ferguson. Is that true of No. 245 on page 22?

Captain Kramer. That is true insofar as the figure 7 in the lower right-hand corner indicates that an Army station monitored this message. Since it is dated the 3d, [II139] an odd date, it would indicate that they sent it over to Navy, to the GY section, to be processed when or shortly after received by Army Signal Intelligence Section.

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that the Army or Navy at that time could shift responsibility for translation by merely transferring it over to the other departments?

Captain Kramer. They could and did, sir, based on the allocation of responsibility for attack on various Japanese systems and ciphers, which allocation consisted briefly of odd days being taken care of by the Navy, even days by Army.

Senator Ferguson. Have you read Mrs. Edgers’ testimony?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; I have not.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever hear that this was translated in the rough on Saturday afternoon?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; I did.
Senator Ferguson. Well, translation in the rough would indicate the contents of the message, would it not; show its importance?
Captain Kramer. Not necessarily, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Were you responsible to supervise these translators?
Captain Kramer. I was, sir.
[11140] Senator Ferguson. Reading from page 5412 of the Hewitt testimony, the testimony of Mrs. Edgers:

Well, at the time it was my work to roughly translate any message which was put on my desk, and this was among the messages that were put on my desk on December 6, Saturday morning, and at the time I had only been working in this section for about a little over two weeks, so at first glance this seemed to be more interesting than some of the other messages I had in my basket.

I am talking about the one about the lights in the windows, on page 22 of exhibit 2; you understand?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson (reading):
And so I selected it and asked one of the other men who were also translators working on other messages whether or not this shouldn't be done immediately, and was told that I should, and I then started to translate it.

Well, now, is that the way that the importance of the message was determined? If it was interesting to one they would go to somebody else and ask whether they were to translate it? Weren't you in charge that morning and didn't you know that there was a 13-part message coming in in reply to the message that Mr. Hull had given to the Japanese on the 26th that may or may not mean a break in [11141] relations?
Captain Kramer. Your question, I believe, is a double question, Senator.
I was in charge of that section that morning. I was not aware until about 3 p. m., or shortly after, about the arrival of the message you referred to, the note.
Senator Ferguson. Do I understand then, that you didn't know until 3 o'clock in the afternoon that there was a reply coming in to the message of the 26th?
Captain Kramer. That is precisely correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Then it was not an unusual day in the Navy translation department until 3 o'clock on the 6th?
Captain Kramer. It was no more unusual at 3 o'clock than it was all that day, and for some days prior to that time.
Senator Ferguson. Wasn't it usual that you would leave at noon on Saturday?
Captain Kramer. About a quarter of 1; yes, sir. That was the closing of working hours.
Senator Ferguson. How does it come that you didn't leave on that Saturday, then?
Captain Kramer. I would venture the guess that probably three-quarters of the days for several months prior to Pearl [11142] Harbor I did not leave at the close of working hours but retained in the section either alone or with one or more translators for periods varying from a few minutes to many hours after the close of working hours.
Senator Ferguson. Now, you never saw the Winant note which came in at 10:40 to the State Department indicating that there was going to be an attack on the Kra Peninsula on Sunday?

Captain Kramer. I did not, sir. However, I knew about that contemplated attack, at least insofar as it was disclosed in this traffic; and, further, I drafted a message, which I referred to a few days ago here, outlining the high points of that attack, a dispatch sent to the commander in chief. Pacific Fleet and Asiatic Fleet.

Senator Ferguson. Then up until 3 o'clock on Saturday there was no re-alerting of your department?

Captain Kramer. Re-alerting or change, that you were working harder or any different than you were in the normal day, because you hadn't received the Winant message and you had no other information which would indicate that there was any unusual message coming through on that day?

Captain Kramer. On that point, Senator, the alerting you refer to could not possibly have altered the situation in my office since not only that day but for many days during that fall we were working at full capacity and over, if I may so state, in my section.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I go on. Mr. Sonnett is examining Mrs. Edgers. He says:

About what time on that day did you complete your translation, Mrs. Edgers?

Now referring to this light message on page 22 of Exhibit 2. She says:

Well, it so happened that there was some mistakes that had to be corrected and so that took some time. That was at 12:30 or perhaps it was a little before 12:30. Whatever time it was we were to go home, it being Saturday. We worked until noon. I hadn't completed it so I worked over-time and finished it, and I would say that between 1:30 and 2:00 was when I finished my rough draft translation.

She was asked:

That is on the afternoon of December 6?

And Mrs. Edgers says:

On the 6th, yes, sir.

Mr. Sonnett. For the sake of the record will you describe briefly what that message is?

And the reply:

Mrs. Edgers. Well, without reading it over again now, just because of the fact that the message did keep in mind—I would say that it was a message saying how they were going to communicate from Honolulu to the parties interested the information of our fleet movements from Honolulu, and apparently it was something which they had had previous arrangements but they had changed some of the minor details of how to go about it. I think there was something to do with lights, a window of a certain house, and there was also something about newspaper advertising.

Now, here is a girl that is remembering this until 1945 without seeing the message, showing that she understood what it was from the rough.

Captain Kramer. I think, Senator, on the point of remembering that, I have not particularly read or studied this since I did on Decem-
ber 8, 1941, but I believe I could quote the whole message almost verbatim from memory.

Senator Ferguson. And you hadn't read it since the 8th of December?

Captain Kramer. Not in full; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. But you are having a great amount of difficulty remembering what was in the winds execute message which was only about two lines in length?

Captain Kramer. And, incidentally, seen by me for a period varying from 10 to 15 seconds and containing information [11145] that was not materially different than information we had already.

In the case of this message here, Senator, I spent several days clearing garbles and working with this message before it was completed in the form you now see it.

Senator Ferguson. When did you spend that time on it?

Captain Kramer. December 8–9–10, 1941, sir.

Senator Ferguson. But there was sufficient even in the rough to impress Mrs. Edgers with the facts that she has related in that answer, which would have tipped you off, would it not, that Pearl Harbor was in danger that day if there was going to be an attack?

Captain Kramer. That attention was not invited to me that I have any recollection of, sir. In that connection I would like to remark that Mrs. Edgers was still unfamiliar with the practices and procedures in my office, that it was the usual if not invariable practice of the three highly skilled and experienced translators in my office to always immediately invite my attention to important traffic they were working on or had completed.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, would you consider that or would you not consider that important traffic?

Captain Kramer. This particular message?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

[11146] Captain Kramer. If I had seen it Saturday afternoon I most certainly think I would have; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for the person Mrs. Edgers showed it to not coming to the same conclusion?

Captain Kramer. I cannot account for that, sir. He probably did.

Senator Ferguson. Then, the next question (reading):

Do you know whether that translation which you completed in the early afternoon of December 6, 1941, was brought to the attention of now Captain Kramer?

Mrs. Edgers. It was brought to his attention naturally because it was—well—well, in any case, he knew that I was working on it and I left it, as a matter of fact, in the hands of the Chief, whose job it was to edit messages and write them up, or one that was more complicated and more important, like this, the officer in charge looked it over and edited it.

Who would he be?

Captain Kramer. That would be myself, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you so edit it?

Captain Kramer. Not Saturday; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, the Chief would be you?

Captain Kramer. The Chief would refer to Chief Yeoman Bryant, now Chief Ship's Clerk, U. S. Navy.
[11147] Senator Ferguson. The first part of the answer would apply to Bryant and the last part of the answer to you, that you would edit it? Bryant would not edit it?

Captain Kramer. He would edit it as far as putting it in our usual form. The text and contents would be edited by myself so far as the translation was concerned.

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand now that your department was alerted to the fact that you were trying to get Intelligence to ascertain if the Japanese attacked where they would attack?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever talked to Mr. Bryant, Ship's Clerk Bryant, covering that, so that if a message came on the 6th indicating a transmission of information from Honolulu or Hawaii about our fleet by using lights in the window, that he would immediately sense that that was a very vital and important message and would take it up with his superior?

Captain Kramer. Most certainly did not, sir. I knew nothing about lights until I studied that message.

Senator Ferguson. Did you take up with him the fact that you wanted him to take up with you any messages indicating where an attack might take place?

Captain Kramer. I at no time was aware or believed that the Japanese would attack the United States, sir, until they actually did.

Senator Ferguson. Then we come to this point. On Saturday morning your department was not even alerted to the fact that the Japs might attack the United States?

Captain Kramer. I am afraid, Senator, that your construction of the word “alert” differs from mine.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Let's take out the word “alert” and say “aroused to that fact”?

Captain Kramer. We were aroused to the imminent diplomatic crisis, yes, sir, and were working to full capacity.

Senator Ferguson. Now, were you familiar with the fact that there was a movement south which might involve the United States?

Captain Kramer. I had no knowledge whatsoever that such movement south, of which we had a great deal of information, would involve the United States; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, if you had had information of our policy——

Captain Kramer. About what, sir?

Senator Ferguson. About our policy, of what it meant to the United States, a movement south into Malaya, would that have helped you on these messages to determine their importance?

[11149] Captain Kramer. I believe it would, sir, in that I would have paid far more attention to the details or elicited from Captain McCollum details about our fleet.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know our Fleet was in Hawaii?

Captain Kramer. I knew it was in the Hawaiian area, but whether in port or hundreds of miles away I had no knowledge of at any time for months prior to Pearl Harbor or in fact for months after Pearl Harbor.

Senator Ferguson. So you didn’t know whether we were out at sea or whether we were in port?
Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You didn't know what our policy was, if there was an attack on the British that we might expect an attack on our fleet which was on the flank, you had no knowledge of that?

Captain Kramer. I had no knowledge of that policy; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Therefore a message such as this fleet movement, this message on page 22, of the lights in the window to indicate when our ships were in the harbor, wouldn't have really meant much to you?

Captain Kramer. I think—

Senator Ferguson. Because you didn't know the fleet was there?

Captain Kramer. I think the message would have meant [11150] much to me if it were in legible form when I first perused it; yes, sir. However, I have already remarked on the fact that to get it into its present form required several days' work, to make much sense of it.

Senator Ferguson. Did you treat this message in the same way as you treated the fourteenth part message?

Captain Kramer. As soon as I saw it I did, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did your department treat or was it instructed to treat all messages alike on this morning, or were they put to work on the thirteenth part of the 14-part message?

Captain Kramer. I repeat again, Senator, the so-called 14-part message did not start coming in until the afternoon. There were no specific instructions, except general instructions about certain circuits being pushed through first, but it was the practice of my more experienced translators to glance through hastily the general tenor of all messages put on their desks and then give priority to those that appeared most important. Oftentimes consulting with me on that point.

Senator Ferguson. Now, as I understand it, Bryant had instructions when he saw the rough of this message so that he should have called it to your attention?

Captain Kramer. Not specific instructions on this message, [11151] no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Any message.

Captain Kramer. Any message which normally such attention would have been drawn to me in the first instance by the translator so translating it, sir.

Senator Ferguson. But you had never taken up with Bryant or your staff that matter?

Captain Kramer. Normally, Senator, Bryant did not get this material until I edited it.

Senator Ferguson. How do you account—

Captain Kramer. Unless a message was of simple form or was perfectly plain as to sense and meaning to the translator, in which case the translator, if it were not something that because of its content and importance should be at once brought to my attention, the translator would feel it should be typed up before bringing it to my attention.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever take up with Bryant or your staff the importance of ship movements as well as diplomatic matters?

Captain Kramer. I did, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What was your instruction to them? I am talking about these messages on ship movements in exhibit 2, where we find
three or four not translated, at least on the smooth copy, until after the attack, and if translated [11152] before would have given you definite information that there was going to be an attack on Pearl Harbor.

Captain Kramer. Every message bearing on ship movements, either of our Navy, our merchant marine, or foreign navies, specifically England, was given high priority in my section and all were translated and disseminated by my section.

Senator Ferguson. You knew that some of these messages were 22 days being translated. How do you account for that? And I find no diplomatic messages held up that long.

Captain Kramer. I would like to have a specific one pointed out, sir, before commenting on that.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I wish you would look over them.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. I wonder if the Senator knows that that particular message was also in Honolulu on the 5th. I mean as to this signal. They had it there. The lights in the window message was handed over to them on the 5th at Honolulu. It was in Pearl Harbor at G-2 and they did translate it after the 7th but they didn't before.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I am trying to find out what this gentleman knew about it.

Did you know what code machines they had at Pearl Harbor?

[11153] Captain Kramer. I knew that they had what we call a RIP, meaning Radio Intelligence Publication, in fact a number of them, which included all systems being currently read. I was not aware about the status of the unit at Pearl Harbor with respect to a machine. In other words, the purple machine.

Senator Ferguson. You didn't know whether they had one or did not have one?

Captain Kramer. I did not know until after Pearl Harbor; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. But you weren't relying upon Pearl Harbor getting these messages. You were relying upon the fact that you had to get them and give them to these high officials from the President down?

Captain Kramer. That was my prime responsibility; yes, sir. The Asiatic Fleet, in other words, our unit at Corregidor, I knew did have the purple machine.

Senator Ferguson. But your job was not to know or to understand what Pearl Harbor had, your job was to get the translations and give them to the President and from him on down in the Navy as you have described?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. The allocation of effort to be carried on by the Pearl Harbor unit was done by Captain Safford and his subordinates other than myself.

[11154] Senator Ferguson. You were not concerned with what they had at Pearl Harbor?

Captain Kramer. I had nothing to do with what they had or what they worked on; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And the fact that they may have had these messages was no concern of yours because your position was to get them translated, give them to the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Turner, Admiral Stark, and the President?
Captain Kramer. That was my prime responsibility; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That was your prime responsibility and that is what you were trying to do?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, the State Department didn’t call you or get in touch with you and tell you that they had a message at 10:40 indicating that there was going to be an attack on the Kra Peninsula and therefore you were to be alerted to get any message that might come in and get immediate translation so that they could ascertain what might happen other than in the Kra Peninsula where they saw the Japanese were going?
Captain Kramer. I knew nothing about that State Department message; no, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And you had no word from the State [11155] Department?
Captain Kramer. I did not; no, sir.
Senator Ferguson. How long has Commander Baecher been with the Department? Do you know him?
Captain Kramer. I first had contact that I recollect only after I returned to Washington from Miami on December 6, last year. I understand, however, that he was one of the assistants to Admiral Hewitt, though I do not recollect his being in those hearings.
Senator Ferguson. He was an assistant in the hearings to Admiral Hewitt and helped to conduct those hearings?
Captain Kramer. That is what I now understand.
Senator Ferguson. Now, he hadn’t been in your department?
Captain Kramer. No, sir; at no time.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether he is a Reserve officer or a Regular?
Captain Kramer. My understanding is that he is a Reserve officer with legal background, sir.
Senator Ferguson. This message, extension No. 2027, the one released by Admiral Noyes in relation to the Japanese movement in Thailand, are you familiar with that message?
Captain Kramer. The one dated December 1, 1941?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
[11156] Senator Ferguson. Did you draft that message?
Captain Kramer. I believe I did, sir; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well, why did you draft that message? Wouldn’t that be out of your line entirely?
Captain Kramer. Not necessarily, sir. I drafted that message, as well as the one on Japanese diplomatic post destruction of codes, which was similarly forwarded to Captain Safford and Admiral Noyes’ office.
Senator Ferguson. Well, if you thought that Cincafd and Cinpcac were getting the messages, why did you draft this one for Admiral Noyes to send out on December 1?
Captain Kramer. I felt that we should insure that they got that picture, sir, even though they may have received it and read it on the Asiatic station, the British also at Singapore, and the unit at Honolulu.
Senator Ferguson. If you knew nothing about our policy in case of an attack by the Japanese on the British, I am trying to find out, then, from this message, why you would take special interest to send this message, not only to CinCaf but for CincPac, when it has nothing to do with an attack upon America. Thousands of miles away from any possession of America, was it not?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Will the Senator yield?


Senator Lucas. Will the Senator tell me what that policy is?

Senator Ferguson. I am trying to find out.

Senator Lucas. The Senator has been assuming with this witness that we had a definite policy, that he didn’t know anything about, in the event the Japanese attacked the British and the Dutch.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I am trying to find out from this witness. If he knew nothing about any policy why, I would like to know, would he be sending a special message such as this.

Will you read the message now. Let’s see what is in it. Then I can cover it and find out whether or not you knew anything about policy.

Captain Kramer (reading):

Ambassador Tsubokami in Bangkok on 29th sent to Tokyo as number 872 the following: “Conferences now in progress in Bangkok considering plans aimed at forcing British to attack Thai at Padang Bessa near Singora as countermove to Japanese landing at Kota Bharu. Since Thai intends to consider first invader her enemy, Orange”—which means Japan—

“Believes this landing in Malay would force British to invade Thai at Padang Bessa. Thai would [11158] then declare war and request Orange help. This plan appears to have approval of Thai Chief of Staff Bijdito. Thai Government circles have been sharply divided between pro-British and pro-Orange until 25 November but now Wanitto and Shin who favor joint military action with Orange, have silenced anti-Orange group and intend to force Premier Pibul to make a decision. Early and favorable developments are possible.”

Senator Ferguson. Now, if you knew of no policy that we had—how far was this from American possessions?

Captain Kramer. Senator, the prime reason for ever having set up a crypt analytical unit at Corregidor and at other times in certain places in China, was to keep the commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, at that time Admiral Hart, as fully apprised as possible of political, military and other developments of like nature in his sphere.

Senator Ferguson. How far was this from the Philippines? You didn’t answer my question.

Captain Kramer. My guess is probably 800 to a thousand miles, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, look at the message in Exhibit 2, the message of September 24, page 12.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Where it sets up Pearl Harbor and tells exactly what areas are to be covered in the future. [11159] It asks Honolulu to tell what ships are tied up at wharves, buoys, and in docks. Are you familiar with that message?

Captain Kramer. I am, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Can you tell me why you would send a message that involved the British and the Japanese a thousand miles from any
of our possessions directly to the information of CincPac, which was Admiral Kimmel, and yet this message, which set up a plan of Pearl Harbor, indicating what they wanted it for was an attack later, you didn't send that out to either the Pacific or to the Asiatic Fleet, and here you were sending one that involved a country a thousand miles from our possessions.

Captain Kramer. I would like to invite the Senator's attention to a piece of paper which I believe is an exhibit before this hearing, namely, a gist of the traffic disseminated in early October 1941 to all recipients in the Navy Department. That gist was prepared by my section and was asterisked as being an item, a gist of this message, an item of special interest, sir.

[11160] Senator Ferguson. I would like——

Captain Kramer. I was not directed, and I do not know whether any briefs of this message were ever to be sent to Pearl Harbor. Your interpretation, Senator, that this was a bombing map, I do not believe, from conversations I had at the time in showing and going over days' traffic with various recipients; I do not believe it was interpreted by any of those persons as being materially different than other messages concerning ship movements being reported by the Japanese diplomatic service.

I recollect that this was interpreted. I am uncertain of the precise wording of the interpretation. This was considered, and I believe it was, approximately, my consideration at the time as being an attempt on the part of the Japanese diplomatic service to simplify communications.

That view is substantiated by many factors.

One is that the Japanese were repeatedly and continually directing their diplomatic service to cut down traffic. They were repeatedly preparing and sending out abbreviations to be used with codes already in existence. Diplomatic codes were frequently asking for additional funds for quarterly allotments, and so forth, to cover telegraphic expenses. Those expenses were usually paid [11161] and furnished in part when so requested by Tokyo. Those and other considerations I think explain probably the handling of this particular message, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that later they used this map, this bombing map, in code messages? Say the one on page 14 of November 18?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. They used it for all ship movements subsequently to setting up of this abbreviated system of reporting ships in Pearl Harbor.

Senator Ferguson. You brought up a question about an exhibit in this case that indicated that they had given information on this message on page 12, the bombing map message. Will you get it for me? I think that is very important.

Commander Baecher. I might say, Senator, that that was exhibited to a witness in the early stages of these hearings but was not introduced as an exhibit. I have a copy here on which I would like to write a short note to counsel, and hand it to him.

Senator Ferguson. Then it is not in evidence here, that this was ever briefed and sent out?

Commander Baecher. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. And the witness is wrong, and the record in that respect should be corrected.

[11162] Commander Baecher. At one time this document was shown to another witness. I think Admiral Wilkinson. This witness saw it also and he assumed it had gone into evidence, and I think not improperly because it was passed around.

Senator Ferguson. But it is not in evidence now, so there is no evidence before us that the contents of this bombing plot map had ever been sent out; is that right?

Commander Baecher. That is right. Here is a copy of it.

Senator Ferguson. Now, Captain, will you turn to page 15, the message which was translated on the 5th of December:

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein:

You notice they want to know what ships are in the harbor. Not what ones are going out and coming in.

Please report on the following areas as to vessels anchored therein: Area "N" Pearl Harbor; Manila Bay, and the areas adjacent thereto. Make your investigation with great secrecy.

Then the next message:

Please investigate comprehensively the fleet * * * [11163] bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian Military Reservation.

Next, translated on the 5th:

We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.

Wasn't that a very significant message, that the Japanese were trying to ascertain what was in the harbor and where they were located; whether there were any movements or not?

Didn't your Department or section evaluate those to mean that they were trying to ascertain what was in the harbor and therefore when you received this 1 o'clock delivery message and as you say you charted the globe time on it, wasn't it significant that it was 7:30 in the morning at Pearl Harbor?

[11164] Captain Kramer. I have two comments to make on your statement, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. That is not a statement. It is a question.

Captain Kramer. The little message which you read, I believe that the original Japanese version in ungarbled form if it were available would read: "Please investigate comprehensively" is probably "the fleet air bases."

In other words, that blank refers to or represents a garbled code group and was left blank by the Army translator. It undoubtedly refers to air or other types of bases than fleet bases in the neighborhood of the Hawaiian military reservation. On your other point, Senator—

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment.

Captain Kramer. On your point, Senator, regarding evaluation that was never at any time a function of my section, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, if they were to investigate comprehensively the fleet air bases didn't it even make the message more important that they were concerned not alone with the fleet, where it was moving, but they were concerned with the protection of the fleet in the harbor?
Captain Kramer. Not in the slightest, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Not in the slightest?

[11165] Captain Kramer. No, sir. I would like to tell you why

I make that reply.

Senator Ferguson. I wish you would.

Captain Kramer. Back in 1940, during the course of negotiations
with the Dutch in Java the Japanese shooehorn, if I may use that term,
was the delegation conducting those negotiations and ambassador or
special envoy, as I recall it, was named Yoshizawa.

Negotiations were conducted for a 6- or 8-month period. During
the period of those negotiations the Japanese conducted rather rigorous
reconnaissance of all military establishments, not only in Java but
in other islands of the Dutch East Indies.

I mentioned that in some detail, but the same thing applies to mili-
tary establishments, air bases, fleet facilities, in Panama and in part
of the Western Hemisphere under United States jurisdiction. The
Japanese diplomatic service, as well as their military and naval at-
chés abroad, were very conscientious people and reported in meticu-
lous detail all facts that they could learn of.

Senator Ferguson. Now, how do you account for the fact that these
ship movements, these locations were being called for in the latter part
of November as things were getting more critical between the two
countries? You told us about a [11166] long-range program.

Captain Kramer. Senator, it would have been a most weird phe-
nomenon for the Japanese military to not have paid close attention not
only during this week but during previous periods of crisis during
1941 and 1940 and earlier to every detail they could learn concerning the
United States Fleet. They reported in similar detail every ship move-
ment into and out of all ports on the west coast of the United States
and Panama, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Why were they wanting, though, to get the fleet
and air bases that you now tell us this message means?

Captain Kramer. They likewise reported in great detail the air
bases in the vicinity of Seattle and Bremerton Navy Yard, sir, simi-
larly on the San Francisco area.

Senator Ferguson. Show me any such messages in the latter part of
November or December in relation to San Francisco and Seattle.

Captain Kramer. I offhand do not know of any such message. Such
may possibly be elicited by a study of the files. It may well be, how-
ever, that no further reports in such detail were called for from the
west coast of the United States because they already knew everything
they wanted to.

Senator Ferguson. Will you refer now to page 248 of [11167]
Exhibit 1? The message is No. 25,850. It is at the top of the page. It
is the 1 o’clock message. I want to read you from page 167 of top
secret of the Pearl Harbor board in the Navy. Captain Safford is
testifying. He says:

Kramer took the message around, possibly the other message which said,
"Submit our reply to the U. S. Government at one P. M. on the 7th your time" and
reached the Chief of Naval Operations around 10:30 and then next the
White House, where he again gave a copy to Admiral Beardsell for the President
and finally reached the State Department about 11 o’clock with it. There is
another matter—
and this is what I want to call your attention to, but I wanted to read it in detail so that you would know what he was talking about.

There is another matter which I would like to add, that at the time Kramer submitted SIS 25,850—

which is the 1 o'clock message—

to Secretary Knox he sent a note in with it saying, in effect, that this means a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor today and possibly a midnight attack on Manila.

Now, what do you have to say to that?

Senator Lucas. Who said it?

Senator Ferguson. Safford. Do you want to see the original of this record?

[11168] Captain Kramer. No, sir; I do not. What I am looking for is an item in my reply to Captain Safford's first letter, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that you have a memorandum there that you made of your conversations with Safford, or is that the reply?

Captain Kramer. No, sir. I am merely looking at a copy which I retained of my reply to Captain Safford's first letter.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Captain Kramer. I refer, Senator, in answer to your last question to my reply, item 10–c to Captain Safford, to the expanded version of that reply which appears in the memorandum I prepared for Admiral Halsey, which I will now read.

Senator Ferguson. Now, is this to be an answer to my question?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Captain Kramer. A specific answer to your question. [Reading:]

10–c: On returning about 10:20 from Mr. Hull's office the remainder of No. 02–10 were arriving, including the one setting the 1300 meeting time and the 'Weather Report'. These were delivered to all hands, [11169] including Mr. Knox and Mr. Stimson, at Mr. Hull's office, with my comments to Mr. Knox on how the hour tied with the sun and moves in progress elsewhere.

All I can say, Senator, concerning Captain Safford's testimony is that he apparently got all his information for that reply from his interpretation of the wording of this reply I just read, or the abbreviated version of it, rather.

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you just read that again?

Captain Kramer. The last part is the pertinent part. I will read that again, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Just read that again.

Captain Kramer (reading):

These—

referring to the messages—

were delivered to all hands, including Mr. Knox and Mr. Stimson, at Mr. Hull's office with my comments to Mr. Knox on how the hour tied with the sun and movements in progress elsewhere.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, with your comments to Mr. Knox, that is what you are reading there?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, how did you make those comments to Mr. Knox?

Captain Kramer. Via his personal aide, a foreign service officer. I would like to point out, Senator, that—
Senator Ferguson. Nothing in writing?

Captain Kramer. Nothing whatsoever in writing, no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. But you told him this?

Captain Kramer. The word got to him via his foreign service officer, who when I was speaking to him was about 10 or 15 feet away, just outside the closed door of the room, Mr. Hull’s office, where the three Secretaries were conferring.

Senator Ferguson. Who was Mr. Knox’s foreign service officer?

Captain Kramer. There were four, Senator, who were indoctrinated and rotated—

Mr. Richardson. Who was the one that you gave the message to?

Senator Ferguson. Who was the one that you gave the message to?

Captain Kramer. I do not know which one of the four it was. I believe two of these were present that morning. As to their names, I recollect three names of the four, Gray, Stone, and Brown, because they associated with each other.

Senator Ferguson. You expected that service officer to tell Mr. Knox everything? You would expect that service officer to tell Mr. Knox everything that you said to him?

Captain Kramer. That is what my intention was, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And everything that you said to the foreign service officer for Mr. Knox, that there was something about the men being at breakfast or at mess who were at Pearl Harbor at that time, he would convey that to Mr. Knox then?

Captain Kramer. Not all those details, no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, wait a minute.

Captain Kramer. I have previously specifically covered that point, Senator, by stating that the reference to Pearl Harbor was purely a passing reference for the benefit of non-naval personnel, namely, these foreign service officers and the Army officer present.

Senator Ferguson. But you just told me in your last answer that you expected this foreign service officer to convey to Mr. Knox every word that you said.

Captain Kramer. I did not expect him to convey every word but the essential points of my explanation to him, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you tell him not to convey to Mr. Knox the idea that it was sunrise and these men would be off duty at 7:30 in the morning?

Captain Kramer. Of course not, sir. My only reason for the explanation was to have the gist or summary of my explanation to convey to Mr. Knox.

Senator Ferguson. Did you tell him to only convey the summary of your explanation?

Captain Kramer. I did not tell him which words to specifically convey; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, didn’t you anticipate that he would convey the entire message to Mr. Knox?

Captain Kramer. The essential points of it; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Why not all of it and let Mr. Knox be the judge as to what was essential or not essential?

Captain Kramer. In the first place, Senator, I indicated that I was not an evaluator of this material. I felt, however, that the essential points which I covered in that conversation should be pointed out to the foreign service officer, who in the same manner that I did for the
Navy Department high officials handled those documents in the State Department, passing it to the people who were permitted to see it.

Senator Ferguson. Captain Kramer, on many occasions Secretary Knox had asked for your opinion because you were familiar with the messages, isn't that true?

Captain Kramer. Rarely my opinion, sir. My comments in the presence of Secretary Knox almost solely and entirely concerned an explanation on my part, often volunteered, occasionally asked for, regarding particular names appearing in the text, regarding references appearing therein and background concerning obscure points in the traffic.

[11775] Senator Ferguson. Now, as I understand it you did have this conversation with this foreign service officer and it was your intention for him to convey it to Mr. Knox?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I am going to ask you this question, I am going to read this again:

That at the time Kramer submitted SIS 25,850 to Secretary Knox he sent a note in with it saying, in effect—

now, that note, as you say, would be a message through the foreign service officer?

Captain Kramer. That word “note” is apparently Captain Safford’s own construction of my sentence.

Senator Ferguson. So instead of it being in writing you sent it in verbally?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

In effect that—

this is “in effect”—

that this means a sunrise attack on Pearl Harbor today and possibly a midnight attack on Manila.

Now, do I understand that you swear now that that is not a fact, that last one?

Captain Kramer. I swear to it, Senator, and have always sworn that I never intended in the least to imply that those remarks I made indicated an attack on Pearl Harbor or, in [11774] fact, any overt intention on the part of the Japanese directed toward the United States.

Senator Ferguson. I am not asking you what you intended. I am asking you whether that is a fair substance of what you said to the foreign-service officer?

Captain Kramer. It is not, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Then General Russell asked this question of Safford:

How do you know that?

Reading from this transcript.

Captain Safford. Kramer told me.

General Russell. When did he tell you?

Captain Safford. Kramer told me that just before he left Washington to go to Honolulu for duty. He had not dared—

General Frank. Which was when?
Captain Safford. Which was the spring of 1943—he had not dared to let anybody know that at that time.

General Russell. Are there any further matters about these messages now before we go to December the 7th and the other messages?

Indicating that they had covered that subject. So you see that Safford again has testified that in 1943 that is [11175] what you told him.

Captain Kramer. That is not what I told him at any time, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. But you told here when Mr. Richardson examined you what you told this foreign-service officer. Your answer to Mr. Richardson was the substance of what you told the foreign-service officer to convey to Mr. Knox, is that correct?

Captain Kramer. I was referring specifically in my last reply to the word "dared." I don't know where Captain Safford got that part of it.

Mr. Richardson. He is talking about what you told me.

Captain Kramer. I did convey to Captain Safford, I believe—I do not recall specifically, but to many of my contacts, probably 8 or 10 or a dozen in the Navy Department, chiefly subordinates, the substance of what I told Secretary Hull's foreign-service officer; yes, sir. I also mentioned it to McCollum that morning.

Senator Ferguson. Did you tell them when you testified here in reply to Mr. Richardson's question—did you tell him what you said?

Mr. Richardson. Did you testify here about it to me in answer to my questions?

Captain Kramer. About what question, sir?

[11176] Senator Ferguson. About what you had told the foreign-service officer to tell Mr. Knox.

Captain Kramer. I did, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Mr. Richardson. That answers his question.

Senator Ferguson. How many deliveries did you make of messages on the 6th? You made one at 9 at night?

Captain Kramer. Two that I recall, sir, it may have been three. I could determine that, I believe, by a study of the files similar to the one I undertook previously for you, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I am going to take that up some with you later. So you made two or three deliveries on Saturday?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What was the name of the secretary to Mr. Knox that was at the apartment at the Wardman? What was the name of that secretary? You said there was a secretary.

Captain Kramer. He had been a secretary.

Mr. Richardson. What was his name?

Captain Kramer. I believe it was Mr. Keefe, sir. I am not certain of that.

Mr. Richardson. All right.

Captain Kramer. In any case he can be identified as at that time being, I believe, the manager of the Chicago [11177] Daily News.

The Chairman. John O'Keefe.

Senator Ferguson. John O'Keefe, the Senator tells me.
Now, have you named all of the officers of the Army, the Navy, or the Marines that you have talked your testimony over with in relation to Pearl Harbor since the time that you testified before the Navy board?

Captain Kramer. As to details, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, are there any other officers that you have discussed it with not as to detail?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; there are.

Senator Ferguson. And will you name them?

Captain Kramer. Colonel Laswell, Commander Rennick, Commander Benedict, Commander Hudson. In any case officers attached to the fleet radio unit at Pearl Harbor who were long-standing friends of mine and working in this kind of work.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever discuss it with Bratton?

Captain Kramer. Not that I have any recollection of, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You have had no conversations whatever with Bratton about the testimony or about the Pearl Harbor matter?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Since the Navy board?

[11178] Captain Kramer. Either before or after the Navy board, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you discuss it with Baecher?

Captain Kramer. There was some discussion concerning the availability of records to which I for the first time had access in December last year and chiefly my discussion with Baecher was concerning appointments with counsel for this committee and Mr. Baecher. Details concerning the content of my prior testimony or of testimony I would give I did not discuss with Mr. Baecher.

Senator Ferguson. And he asked you nothing about any of the points that you have covered?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Can you tell me just what the occasion was that you took these letters to him and the Halsey memorandum? Had he asked you or did you just volunteer that?

Captain Kramer. I volunteered that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. There wasn’t any request?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; it was not.

Senator Ferguson. Well, you were greatly worried, were you not, sometime in September and October, you were worried?

Captain Kramer. Of what year, sir?

Senator Ferguson. This last year, 1945.

Captain Kramer. About what, sir?

[11179] Senator Ferguson. Well, I am just asking you whether you were worried?

Captain Kramer. Not that I have any recollection of, no, sir.

Senator Lucas. Unless it is about Pearl Harbor I think it is an improper question to ask him.

Senator Ferguson. This is in relation to Pearl Harbor or I would not have asked him.

Senator Lucas. You said “about anything.”

Captain Kramer. I had some concern about my health. I don’t think I recall any worry, sir.

Senator Ferguson. There was nothing worrying you at that time that you went to the hospital?
Captain Kramer. No, sir; there was not.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that a letter had been written to your wife requesting her to come up on account of you worrying about something?

Captain Kramer. With respect to my health, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, no, worrying about Pearl Harbor—or not Pearl Harbor but having something on your mind that you were greatly concerned with?

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I think this is a highly improper question to ask this witness.

Senator Ferguson. It only relates to Pearl Harbor.

[11180] Captain Kramer. I am willing to answer that question.

Senator Lucas. Well, I know, but there is a limit to everything. The Senator from Michigan now is asking this question about whether the witness was worrying about anything.

Senator Ferguson. No, about Pearl Harbor.

Senator Lucas. But you don't go back to Pearl Harbor. If you confine it to Pearl Harbor, all right.

Captain Kramer. I would like, Senator Lucas, to answer that question.

The Chairman. The Chair thinks the witness is willing to answer that question and probably can do so satisfactorily.

[11187] Captain Kramer. At no time while I was in the Naval Hospital at Bethesda, either for the check-up during August or for my subsequent stay in the hospital in September or October, did I have any worries or concern about what I knew about Pearl Harbor, or any discussions with anyone about either my prior testimony, or what I knew about Pearl Harbor.

I did have a brief discussion, which I have previously indicated in my testimony, with a classmate of mine, namely, Commander Powell, to the effect—and this bears particularly on your question, sir—that I might be called as a witness before the contemplated congressional hearing.

Senator Ferguson. That is what I am talking about, Pearl Harbor.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I am not talking about anything else.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Now you had some concern as to whether or not you would be called as a witness?

Captain Kramer. No concern whatsoever sir. It was simply a conversation in which Halsey mentioned, I believe, as I now recollect it, something to the effect that I was working on things connected with Pearl Harbor in Washington [11182] at that time.

Senator Ferguson. Did you appreciate at that time that your testimony, that is, your so-called affidavit which you say now you did not swear to, but you considered it as such, that if you died, it was to be taken as your evidence in any case in which it might arise, and what you said at the Pearl Harbor board, that there may be a conflict in those two statements?

Captain Kramer. I was unaware of any such conflict, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And therefore, there was no concern over the fact that you had a memorandum, and you had also testified in relation to the matter before the Pearl Harbor board?

Captain Kramer. That is precisely correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You had also testified before the Hewitt committee. Now, was there any concern over the fact that there may be a conflict between your testimony, that is, your memorandum and your testimony before the Pearl Harbor board, and your testimony before the Hewitt committee?

Captain Kramer. None whatsoever, sir. I at no time had concern about the few facts with which I was familiar concerning Pearl Harbor.

Senator Ferguson. And, as I understand it, as far as you were concerned, there were no conflicts between those three?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Were you concerned over your testimony before this board, that it might conflict with one or more of the testimonies that you had given?

Captain Kramer. None whatsoever, sir. In fact, it was not until I began studying these documents in December last, that I was aware of such conflicts.

Senator Ferguson. When did you discover that there were some conflicts?

Captain Kramer. I learned of certain minor discrepancies, such as the fact that I had previously testified that Commander Wellborn was in Admiral Stark's office on Sunday morning, but it appeared to be not true, inasmuch as Commander Wellborn was not in the Navy Department on Sunday, or at least Sunday morning at all, during the luncheon engagement which I previously testified to at Admiral Stark's home in talking with Captain McCollum.

Senator Ferguson. I do not want any more detail on that, because you have already covered that; isn't that true?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you present here to the committee the papers and the documents that you say you have examined, and which have caused you to make some alteration or some change from your previous testimony, or statements?

Captain Kramer. I can refer in that respect, sir, only to the Navy narrative, all of which I have not read, and part of my testimony as set forth in the transcript of the Naval Court of Inquiry. Nothing else whatsoever, aside from the JD files, which I studied a few days ago, which I saw a week ago Saturday.

Senator Ferguson. That brings us to the JD files, and I would like to get them now.

Mr. Richardson. Where are they?

Senator Ferguson. Is he in the phone booth again?

Commander Bæcher. Which ones, Captain Kramer?

Senator Ferguson. 7001, and the ones he refreshed his memory from. I want to see what he used to refresh his memory.

Commander Bæcher. The JD files go back a long way, Senator. They are a vast volume.

Senator Ferguson. I want to see the files that this witness examined, from which he has made certain alterations.
Captain Kramer. The 7000 file.
Senator Ferguson. Are they here?
Commander Baecher. I will go to the phone booth, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I notice in this testimony I read here this morning that Safford says you told him that on Sunday morning you delivered these copies to Admiral Beardall for the President.

The Chairman. Maybe the files are in the booth.
Senator Ferguson. Does that refresh your memory that he was in charge of the White House map room?
Captain Kramer. It does not, sir.
Any implications of that kind may have been gained from the fact that I indicated it had gone to Admiral Beardall's situation room for the President in the White House.

Senator Ferguson. Have you got Exhibit 142 before you?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, it is relating to the winds code. Just a few questions on the winds code.
What did you hand counsel?

Senator Ferguson. Look at this page, at the 7,023. Will you refer to the 7,024, 7,025, the date of message [11186] 2d October 1941, date of translation 12/4/41.

Senator Kramer. The 7,023, 7,024, and 7,025 that you just read were all in the system known as JIG 19, which required delay in the recovery of keys.

Senator Ferguson. And that is what accounted for the delay?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; many keys, in fact, we never recovered.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Let me have Exhibit 2 again. Those messages I show you, do you have the ones from 12 on?

Senator Ferguson. What were they in?

Captain Kramer. It is not apparent from Exhibit 2, [11187] what system they were in, sir. That could be determined by further study of this JD file, however.

Senator Ferguson. Well, would you not say that the delay in those was due to the fact that you did not have the keys?

Captain Kramer. I cannot tell without knowing the system, sir.

Senator Ferguson. But you can specifically state that on 7,023, 7,024, 7,025, and so forth, that is true?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; because I have on my copy of exhibit 142 a brief notation of the system. I do not know from Exhibit 2 which JD file number these Army translations were, except the last one
Senator Ferguson. Does anyone from the Army here have the data that they were to get me on 900 and 901, the time of the translation and the other things from the work sheet?

Colonel Duncombe. Mr. Richardson gave you a memorandum on that.

Senator Ferguson. This only covers 900. I will read this into the record:

11 February 1946.
Memorandum for Mr. Richardson:

Examination of the Signal Intelligence files discloses that Tokyo to Washington message #900, dated 6 December, 1941, [11188] was intercepted by Army station No. 7 (Fort Hunt, Virginia) at 1212 GMT—

This is Greenwich mean time, is it?

Captain Kramer. Greenwich mean time.

Senator Ferguson (continuing):

on 6 December (7:12 a.m. Washington time). The message was delivered to SIS by courier and was decoded by SIS at 11:07—

And they have then got "m" and at the bottom they have got a star and they say: "Time stamp indistinct—not clear whether 'a. m.' or 'p. m.' " [Continuing:]

6 December.

So it would be either 11:07 in the morning, or 11:07 in the evening.

The following summary of the message was written on the decode sheet, "Domei chief praises Kato for good reportage". The message was not further disseminated.

Now, that came in immediately. Well, it came in with, as I am informed, with 901, at least it has a number before 901, so it would be very significant as to whether or not that was translated in the morning or in the evening, and if it was translated at the same time that 901 was translated—901 bears the date of translation on December 6.

Now, I come back to the point: How does it come about that this very, very important pilot message, which [11189] is translated on the 6th, was not delivered on the 6th, or early on the morning of the 7th, with the first delivery?

Captain Kramer. I cannot account, Senator, for the handling of the message by the Army. From the study I made for you a few days ago, my best knowledge and present conviction is that my section in the Navy Department did not receive it until approximately 10:25 or 10:30 Sunday morning, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And when I get the file we are going to go over it so you can tell me what is in the file to refresh your memory. So that you have changed your testimony, as I understand it, that you delivered it on the night of the 6th, your first testimony?

Captain Kramer. I don't believe I have changed that testimony materially, sir, inasmuch as any testimony on this point previously, including in this hearing, in any such testimony I have indicated my doubt of when that thing was delivered.

Senator Ferguson. Do you have any doubt now?

Captain Kramer. Not after a study of this file; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right. That is why I want the file here.
[11190] I am reading from page 17 of the Clarke report, Bratton’s testimony:

When we received the Japanese message concerning the code to be used in weather broadcasts, I discussed the matter with my opposite number in the Navy, Commander McCollum, and his assistant, Lieutenant Commander Kramer. They informed me that the matter was with their man in Hawaii, that he had all the information that we had and the same intercepts. They stated that he could explain in detail to the Commanding General, or his G–2 the significance of the code, and suggested that our G–2 in Hawaii get in touch with Commander Rochefort immediately as a means of saving time. In other words, we could get the desired information to the Commanding General in Hawaii or his G–2, much faster and in much greater detail and with far greater security than by means of a long involved explanatory message that we would have been forced to send through the Army communications system.

Do you remember that conversation with Bratton?

Captain Kramer. I have no recollection of that conversation, nor do I have any recollection of such a message being sent.

Senator Ferguson. Did you see General Marshall on the 6th or the 7th?

[11191] Captain Kramer. I did not, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Not to deliver to him anything, but just see him?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You know you did not see him?

Captain Kramer. I know that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I will come to one message, and I will try to be short on it.

If you just try to keep to answers as short as you can, we will get through sooner.

Captain Kramer. I will try, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever know that the Army had set up a similar system to yours, not using cards, but using sheets of paper?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; this is my first knowledge of that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You did not know that that was set up the same way in the Army?

Captain Kramer. No, sir, not in the least.

Senator Ferguson. But you did know that the system being used in the Navy was by means of these cards, and telephone conversations?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Had you ever on any other occasion set up a system whereby you were to deliver messages by means of a card system like this, and telephone conversations?

Captain Kramer. That was the first and only instance of which I am aware, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, was Admiral Noyes able to translate Japanese?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. When did you first hear that the winds message that you saw on the 5th—you place it as the 5th?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. The winds execute message, when did you first hear that that was phoney?

Captain Kramer. I never heard that, sir. I reached that conclusion myself, commencing sometime in early December of last year,
after I commenced a study of these documents, including those interrogations conducted in Japan last fall.

Senator Ferguson. Now wait. Do I understand that you have drawn this conclusion that it was a phoney from the Japanese messages, that they never sent it out?

Captain Kramer. I have, sir. I thought I had clearly indicated that in previous testimony.

[11193] Senator Ferguson. In the same message that the Japanese claim they never saw the winds execute message, they deny ever having set up the means of sending it out, and do you now claim——

Captain Kramer (interposing). I am unfamiliar with that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Will you show me what you draw that conclusion from?

Captain Kramer. I believe it is in interrogation No. 11, or it may be No. 10, conducted by part of General MacArthur's staff.

Senator Ferguson. I wish you would get me that file, because they deny having sent either 2353 or 2354.

Mr. Richardson. What difference does it make? He said he read it and based his conclusion on it. You have a right to bring that in, of course, but it does not do any good to call his attention to that question, except to have it go into the record.

I agree they say they never did send it.

Senator Ferguson. You now say you did not see the Japanese deny sending out the original two code messages, that they would set it up in that manner?

Captain Kramer. That did not impress me at the time, if it is included in that interrogation, sir, because I [11194] know that they did.

Senator Ferguson. And therefore when the Japanese say they did not send out the execute message, you came to the conclusion that it was phoney? The one that you saw?

Captain Kramer. It was not solely on that, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, what else was it based on?

Captain Kramer. On many other aspects of this so-called winds system, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What aspects, solely on this question that this was a phoney that you saw on the teletype?

Captain Kramer. I have clearly indicated, I think, Senator, that I was thoroughly convinced at the time I saw that teletype that it was an authentic winds message.

Senator Ferguson. I do not think there is any doubt but what that is your testimony.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You thought it was authentic?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And up until you saw the Japanese messages from Japan to MacArthur, you felt all the time that it was authentic, and then you came to the conclusion that it was a phoney?

Captain Kramer. That was very likely it, sir. I do not know still whether it was or not.

[11195] Senator Ferguson. All right.

Now, we have diluted it so it very likely was, and you do not know whether it was or was not.
Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now have you any other evidence that weakened it, and brought you down to the conclusion that it may have been a phoney? I would like to see it, if you have any other evidence.

Captain Kramer. No other specific evidence that I can recall now, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Captain Kramer. It was just a general conclusion I came to.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether or not there were any other winds execute messages, other than the one you saw, that ever came in on the teletype?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; there were a number, which proved to be false alarms in each case.

Senator Ferguson. And on those occasions, you demonstrated they were false alarms?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. But no undertaking was ever made to determine that the one you saw was not a legitimate execute message?

[11196] Captain Kramer. My understanding was that such a study was undertaken.

I should like to be more specific on that Senator, in case it does not appear clear to you.

Senator Ferguson. I do not want hearsay at this particular time.

Captain Kramer. No, sir; I am talking from first-hand knowledge now, sir.

There were as many as three or four hundred weather reports received during that 10-day period.

[11197] Senator Ferguson. I am only talking about the tele-typed weather reports.

Captain Kramer. That is what I am talking about, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Let us keep to that.

Captain Kramer. Over and above that there were the FCC voice broadcasts.

Senator Ferguson. I am not talking about that, only about the teletype.

Captain Kramer. I will leave that out. Those which I examined, which consisted of two or three during night hours and probably a half-dozen during daylight hours, on each occasion I saw the full sheet of teletype, including the whole of the Japanese news broadcasts, and examined the weather report contained therein as to the characteristics called for by the Japanese weather code system. The piece of teletype I saw on December 5 was a short piece of teletype. All these other weather reports I have referred to, several hundred in number, were examined by the GY watch officer and determination made as to authenticity.

In this particular case I was shown a piece of teletype paper torn off of the long strip, and my presumption was that the GY watch officer had made the determination I have just outlined. I remember his showing it to me and accompanying him, and my only check was as to the wording.

[11198] Senator Ferguson. You have gone over that before.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now what I want to know is whether or not in the Department, prior to the attack, there had been any survey, which you have personal knowledge of, that the winds executed message that you saw was a false one?

Captain Kramer. No, sir, not that I am aware of, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is all I want to get at.

You have handed me this sheet. As soon as I can get the original file 7001 and the others I want you to point out on the files themselves what there is that caused you to want to make certain statements in relation to a change in your testimony.

Now can I ask Commander Baecher whether we will have this?

Commander Baecher. That will be here at 1:30.

Captain Kramer. I have a photostat of that sheet, if you would like to see it, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Is this an original?

Captain Kramer. I prepared that.

Senator Ferguson. I want the whole file, I want to go through it with you. I have no other questions at the present time, except this last final one——

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, may I make a correction?


Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any other statements now, or any other information that you feel in any way will help or aid this committee in ascertaining the facts in relation to the Pearl Harbor catastrophe?

Captain Kramer. I have not, Senator. Those papers which have been introduced in the last few days are the only thing, in my best knowledge and belief, that might, by any construction, be considered as bearing on this issue.

Senator Ferguson. And there are no other papers or memoranda written by you, up until the time you took the witness stand, that are outstanding at the present time?

Captain Kramer. That is precisely correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So we are not quibbling on that word “memorandum,” or anything else?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; there are not.

Senator Ferguson. And as soon as I can get that file I will close.

Mr. Murphy. May I make one correction in the record?

The Chairman. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. On page 10927 there is reference on two occasions to a letter. The letter I was referring to was the letter written by Admiral Kimmel. The record shows Admiral Wilkinson. I ask that “Wilkinson” be changed to [11200] “Kimmel” on page 10927.

The Chairman. Very well. It is now 12:30, and we will recess to 1:30.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee recessed until 1:30 p.m. of the same day.)
The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order.

TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ALWIN D. KRAMER, UNITED STATES NAVY (Resumed)

Senator Ferguson. Captain Kramer, I spoke to you this morning about the message of the 24th of September 1941 and we left it hang in the balance because you said it had been pointed out in some way where the gist of it was determined and then I left it because I did not know what you were referring to, I had not seen what you were referring to.

Now, at the noon hour I have received three pages and one is a copy of page 12 in Exhibit 2, if I might come near there and refer to this exhibit and we will straight this matter out.

Now, page 12 is the so-called bomb plot of Pearl Harbor.

The Vice Chairman. Is that page 12 of Exhibit 2?


Now, I show you what is a photostatic copy of that message with the exception of “Original copy” in longhand writing at the top. Is that correct?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And the word “Secret” was in black and then there is “Top Secret-Ultra” in red. Is that correct? [11202]

Captain Kramer. Sir, at the time that message was disseminated the only thing that appeared was the “Secret” at the top and I believe at the bottom. The “Top Secret-Ultra” was not on it.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know when the words “Top Secret-Ultra” was put on top?

Captain Kramer. That has presumably been done at some time subsequent to Pearl Harbor, sir, by a new custodian of the files.

Senator Ferguson. “Top Secret-Ultra.” What is the “Ultra”? Is that the purple code?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; that was a code developed in 1942, I believe, applying to this cryptanalytical work.

Senator Ferguson. Now, at the bottom is a stamp and it has “1012-I, 2-OP-G, MIG, BE, B” what is that?

Captain Kramer. Pound sign, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Pound sign. “AF, XY, MONO.” Is that correct?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What is that stamp on the bottom of that message?

Captain Kramer. That was a stamp we commenced using in the fall of 1941 to indicate interesting and important messages. It was stamped on by the yeoman at the same time when he was applying the JD file number to it, but was not always done; there were some days we skipped it for lack of time. When it was on there and again if I had time to do so, I would circle those symbols to ensure that items of interest to the people or organs represented by those symbols were apprised.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Now on the original page 12 of Exhibit 2 that stamp does not appear?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. This photostatic copy is a photostatic copy of what now appears in the Navy Department as far as page 12 of Exhibit 2 is concerned?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. That was only used by Navy.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, did you circle anything on any of those numbers indicating that they should be of special interest to them?

Captain Kramer. There is nothing circled on this piece of paper; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, the next page that was in this exhibit is "Top Secret-Ultra" both in black print and red stamp. Is that correct?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. "GZ routing system." That would indicate the people that got this message that was attached to it, this Exhibit 12?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; not at all, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What is this?

Captain Kramer. That is simply an explanation, I believe, very recently drawn up of what those symbols mean, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Then "1" means special interest to "DNI", is that right?

Captain Kramer. That is an incorrect interpretation of that explanation.

Senator Ferguson. No, I am wrong. "1" is the Secretary of the Navy?

Captain Kramer. Secretary of the Navy; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is correct, is it?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And "10" was CNO?

Captain Kramer. Admiral Stark; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And "12" was War Plans?

Captain Kramer. Admiral Turner; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. "2X" was what?

Captain Kramer. I have forgotten what that symbol was used for.

Senator Ferguson. But it say, "Not used."

Captain Kramer. Well, apparently we actually used it, sir.

Senator Ferguson. For the White House?

Captain Kramer. For the White House.

Senator Ferguson. "S" for State; "G" for Captain Safford; "Mis." for miscellaneous, is that right?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. "B"—"BE-not used." "B-OP-16-BZ," I think. What is that?

Captain Kramer. That is Wilkinson-Intelligence. That would be in the Navy.

Senator Ferguson. Pound sign?

Captain Kramer. Pound sign—London.
Senator Ferguson. British, London?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. "AF CINCAF, Asiatic Fleet. X-20-G1"—

Captain Kramer. GX.

Senator Ferguson. "GX." "Y" is "20-GY"?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. "MONO" is for files?

Captain Kramer. That means a monograph file, separate from the numerical file.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I notice you had on the stamp an "AF" which was CINCAF, Asiatic Fleet, is that right?

[11206] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; that is true.

Senator Ferguson. That was Admiral Hart?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Why didn’t you have Admiral Kimmel’s symbol on that?

Captain Kramer. Senator, everything that went to CINCAF, Asiatic Fleet, also went either as an action addressee or information addressee to Admiral Kimmel.

Senator Ferguson. Who made up this designation of this so-called code at the bottom? We might call it a code.

Captain Kramer. I believe the present custodian of the JD file, Commander Boone, quite recently.

Senator Ferguson. But you knew all the time what these letters stood for?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you ever personally use "AF" to send messages to CINCAF?

Captain Kramer. Not that I recall, sir.

Senator Ferguson. But you did not have any designation for CINCPAC, which was Kimmel?

Captain Kramer. He was included in that "AF".

Senator Ferguson. Now I show you the third page and it is October the 10th 1941. Will you interpret it?

[11207] Captain Kramer. One asterisk means interesting messages. A double asterisk means especially important or urgent messages.

Senator Ferguson. Now, number—

Captain Kramer. No. 236-41 meant the two hundred thirty-sixth gist of that kind made up during 1941.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, what did you list this on page 12 of Exhibit 2 under?

Captain Kramer. Under JD file, No. 5696.

Senator Ferguson. And what is on this paper in relation to that message?

Captain Kramer. "Tokyo to Honolulu, 24 September." That being the originator’s date, originator’s message No. 83 meaning, asterisks, as an interesting message.

Senator Ferguson. Just one of them? Just one?

Captain Kramer. One; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Meaning “interesting message”?

Captain Kramer. That is right, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And what was there on that? Read what is on there?
CAPTAIN KRAMER. The gist of this message is:

Tokyo directs special reports on ships in Pearl Harbor which is divided into five areas for the purpose of showing exact locations.

Senator Ferguson. Now, this particular paper that I have [11208] in my hand and have shown you with this written on it:

Tokyo directs special reports on ships with Pearl Harbor—

CAPTAIN KRAMER. "In Pearl Harbor" I presume it should have been.

Senator Ferguson. It says "with." CAPTAIN KRAMER. Yes; "with Pearl Harbor," but it should have been "in Pearl Harbor," I presume.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

Which is divided into five areas for the purpose of showing exact locations.

That particular sheet of paper was delivered to the recipients who received Exhibit 2, page 12?

CAPTAIN KRAMER. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So that when they had Exhibit 2, page 12, showing this bomb plat as we have referred to it here, they had a signal or a flag showing them that it was an important, as you say, interesting message?

CAPTAIN KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you tell me from your records who received that sheet with the flag on it telling them what it was in your deliveries?

CAPTAIN KRAMER. I cannot recall who specifically received that but I must presume that all the usual recipients [11209] did receive that, namely, the Secretary of the Navy, Admiral Stark's office, Admiral Wilkinson, the head of the Far East Section and the Director of Naval Communications, Admiral Noyes, who has initialed this sheet, and the Director of War Plans.

Senator Ferguson. The President?

CAPTAIN KRAMER. No, sir; we did not send those gists to the President. We sent the original folder with the gist to the naval aide to the President, who I do not believe used those gists in showing things to the President.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, wait. Did you deliver the gists to the aide for the President?

CAPTAIN KRAMER. Yes, sir; it would have gone to him, too.

Senator Ferguson. And he would have it in the folder?

CAPTAIN KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So that when he would take the folder to the President he would have not only the message but your flag, being the gist?

CAPTAIN KRAMER. I do not know just what he did or did not show the President.

Senator Ferguson. But that was at least in there?

CAPTAIN KRAMER. It was delivered to him; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, can you tell us why we [11210] have been almost 3 months on this hearing and I suppose that we have spent many hours on this one message and we have never known
before that there was such a thing as a gist sheet which went to the various people who received these messages as a flag, calling the importance of the message to the recipient of the message?

Captain Kramer. I have no knowledge whatsoever, Senator, about what was furnished or has been or will be furnished this committee, except what I have furnished.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, you called this to my attention this morning on some question that I put to you.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That would not indicate in any way, except that the person who received this had a flag, that this was an interesting message, is that right?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. If I might just look at that: Now, on that flag sheet—let us call it a flag sheet—this flag sheet that carried this message No. 5696-A, Tokyo-Honolulu, September 24, 1941, I assume that is.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. No. 83, which is the identical sheet there?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

[11211] Senator Ferguson. Together with other papers, is that right?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That flag sheet would indicate that the messages indicated on that flag sheet were all delivered at the same time?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And the flag sheet had only a sheet with a flag showing “interesting messages”?

Captain Kramer. On that page; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, on that page; and there were 12 messages, is that right?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Delivered at that same time?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Is that correct?

Captain Kramer. There are more than that, of course, but 12 are shown there.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, where is the other? Do you know, Commander.

Commander Baecher. Senator, this other sheet I can get. I assumed if there are any others they would be in the Navy Department. We were only asked for the sheet showing the distribution of this one particular message.

[11212] Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know whether or not the 14 parts and the other messages delivered Saturday night had a flag sheet?

Captain Kramer. No, sir, because my section abandoned the preparation of those gists, I believe, in early November or it may have been nearer the middle of November.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, why did you abandon the flag-sheet idea when you delivered to the various parties 12 or 15 messages? Why didn’t you flag them on the most important?
Captain Kramer. Senator, the preparation of these gists required several hours work on the part of one officer and one yeoman in my office. The practice was abandoned in November because of the fact that the diplomatic crises were increasing in acuteness and it was felt by me that delays required by the preparation of these gists could not be accepted and therefore the original traffic without gists were delivered several times a day without waiting for the preparation of gists.

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, do I understand that after some time in November everything became important or interesting?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; that is the—

Senator Ferguson. That is, the gist of it?

[11213] Captain Kramer. That is the understanding; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Is that correct?

Captain Kramer. So much of importance that we wanted to get it out fast; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. But on this particular message, the September 24 message, this gist that went with it, this gist sheet went with it so that anyone receiving that file on that day would have called to his attention at least two items, his being the first one that was interesting?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now I want to turn you to these files.

Mr. Richardson. Are you going to put those files in?

Senator Ferguson. No, that would take too much time.

I want you to point out in those files the things that refreshed your memory that you did not see the pilot message until you had returned from the delivery of the fourteenth-part message to the Secretary of Navy and the Secretary of State in the Secretary of State's office. That was the second delivery on that day.

It will be well to put on the record that these are the files that I started on this morning and asked about. Don't look at your yellow sheets. Don't look at your own memorandum. I want to see on these original records the things [11214] that refreshed your memory that you did not make the delivery of the pilot message as you first stated on Saturday evening?

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I suggest that if the witness has work sheets which he prepared at the time when he examined the files that it is perfectly proper for him to refer to his work sheets in order to draw his attention to whatever sheets he wants to find in the file.

Senator Ferguson. I have no objection to him using the sheets to assist him to find the other sheet, but I want to see the original sheet and what he saw. I am talking now about the pilot message.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is 901.

Captain Kramer. I have transferred to this work sheet, Senator, considerable data from these files. It was not till I made a study of this compilation, the work sheet, that I reached that conclusion that the pilot message was not delivered until the time I have indicated.

Senator Ferguson. No. Now, we will have to come back. I want you to point on the pilot message or the other messages in these original Navy files the information that refreshed your memory that the delivery was made Sunday instead of Saturday.
Captain Kramer. Starting with file No. 7137, which is [11216] dated September 5—December 5, rather.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, wait. We had better describe it. It is from Berlin to Tokyo, 5th of December 1941?

Captain Kramer. Originator’s serial No. 1421.

Senator Ferguson. Now, is that in Exhibit No. 1? Will you get Exhibit No. 1 so that we can identify it for the committee?

Captain Kramer. According to my notes, sir, it is not in Exhibit 1. I compared this file with Exhibit 1 when I made the study.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Then will you read it; what is not in Exhibit 1, will you read that in?

Captain Kramer (reading):

Chief of Office Routing: Re your No. 986. * * *

Asterisks to a footnote. The footnote says:

JD-1:8944. I relayed the general outline of the Japanese-U. S. negotiations to the Germans. The United States will no doubt attempt to bring about a split between Japan and Germany by publishing details at some time in the future. It is quite possible that they will try to utilize them in an extensive propaganda program. I believe that it would be to our interest to advise the Germans and Italians in a very direct manner the [11216] contents of the Konoye message which received much publicity at the time and all other matters that we can. It may be more convenient for you to do this through the German and Italian ambassadors in Tokyo.

[11217] Senator Ferguson. What was this message, do you know, the Konoye message?

Captain Kramer. I believe, without referring to it, the message at the end of November disclosing to Berlin the tenor of the United States-Japanese negotiations. We can refer to that letter.

Senator Ferguson. The next page is what? That helped to refresh your memory that the pilot message was delivered Sunday instead of Saturday?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Is there anything on that?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. That is the latest date of a block of about 11 messages, arranged chronologically in this file, preceding that message I just read.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now the next page is what?

Captain Kramer. The next page is file No. 7138.

Senator Ferguson. Is that in Exhibit 1?

Captain Kramer. That is not in Exhibit 1.

Senator Ferguson. Well, will you read that?

Captain Kramer. That is from Berlin to Tokyo, dated December 3, 1941, originator serial No. 1408, Secret.

At the time of my interview with Foreign Minister Ribbentrop in my 1407 the Minister told me the following: “Britain and America have been making merry on the German [11218] defeat at Rostov. However, this is all a fabrication. The facts in the case are that the inhabitants of Rostov were so violent in their antipathy and resistance and Soviet Army were so persistent in its attack on the German Army where it had broken through that General Kleist, who had kept the place in order, not to inflict unnecessary losses on his mechanized forces, retired voluntarily to prepared positions in the West. I am in receipt of a report to the effect that operations in Libya are proceeding very satisfactorily and only recently Rommel’s Army has completely annihilated one division of New Zealand troops which came to the aid of Tobruk garrison. Also I have the report that the encirclement of Moscow is progressing favorably.”
Senator Ferguson. What is this message 1407?

Captain Kramer. It is JD–1: File No. 7132.

Senator Ferguson. Is it in Exhibit 1?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, will you find that message there? What is its date?

Captain Kramer. December 3, 1941, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right, will you read that one into the record?

Captain Kramer (reading):

From Berlin To Tokyo
[11219] 3 December 1941.
Orig. Serial 1407.
Re my 1405.

In compliance with his request I called on Foreign Minister Ribbentrop at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of the 3rd. He said that Dictator Hitler was at a distant place at the present. He further said that he did not like to use the long distance telephone and because of snow planes could not be utilized. There is nothing for him (Ribbentrop) to do but go to the military headquarters himself and await the Dictator’s arrival there. (He is expected to return to the headquarters tomorrow or the 4th, but if he could not be reached on this occasion he would be on the 5th) to establish contact with him. Although it is regrettable, he said the delay cannot be avoided.

Ribbentrop, “As I have told you before, we cannot make an official reply until the Fuehrer has given his approval. The Japanese Government is undoubtedly very anxious to have our reply as soon as possible. I myself am in agreement with it and have no objections, but will advise your home Government of that fact. Moreover I am of the opinion that the Fuehrer will be in agreement too, but we cannot say so definitely until the Fuehrer’s return.”

I told him that the situation is more critical than [11220] imagined and therefore we are very anxious to have a formal reply as soon as is possible. From my previous experience with Ribbentrop I feel fairly confident when I say that you will not be mistaken if you assume there will be no objections. Arrangements have been made for a direct telephone connection between Ribbentrop at the general headquarters and here. However he said that whenever possible he would come back here and contact me.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now what was the message they were talking about?

Captain Kramer. It is not available, or at least was not at that time.

Senator Ferguson. So you did not know, “Re my 1405,” you did not know what 1405 was?

Captain Kramer. Not from the reference indicated on this message. It might have appeared later.

Senator Ferguson. Will you try to find out if it did appear later, before the 7th?

Captain Kramer. That would have to be done by the present custodian of those index files, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Will you try to find out if 1405, referred to here, was ever received before the attack. Commander Baecher? 1

Commander Baecher. All right.

Senator Ferguson. Now what was there on any of those [11221] messages that indicated to you or that brought you to the conclusion that you had not delivered the pilot message on Saturday night?

Captain Kramer. This 7132 I just read is one of the block of 11 messages I previously referred to.

Senator Ferguson. What I am trying to get at is how do you know there were 11, that block was struck off at that one point?

1 See Hearings, Part 11, p. 5492.
Captain Kramer. The group of 11 I referred to was the extension back to only what appeared on my work sheet. It extends further back three more messages, so there are presumably 14 in the whole block.

Senator Ferguson. Now what is your next message in the file?

Captain Kramer. File No. 7139.

Senator Ferguson. Is that in Exhibit 1?

Captain Kramer. On page 235 of Exhibit 1; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is the long message and ends on page 236?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now will you go to the next message, the one in 7139? That is the one you just referred to?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And said it was on page 235?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. File 7140.

Senator Ferguson. Is that in Exhibit 1?

Captain Kramer. That is on page 234 of Exhibit 1.

Senator Ferguson. And it is the one at the bottom of the page?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What is this writing on that sheet?

Captain Kramer. That is my penciled notation using a double asterisk next to the name "Terasaki," with the footnote identifying Terasaki and his activities.

Senator Ferguson. So when this message at the bottom of page 234 was delivered did it have your memo on it?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir, in the Navy.

Senator Ferguson. Will you read what was delivered to the Navy?

Captain Kramer (reading):

* * * Terasaki, Second Secretary, is head of Japanese espionage in Western Hemisphere. He and his assistants are being sent to South America.

Senator Ferguson. So you called to the attention of the various people that were to receive this message the head of Japanese espionage in the Western Hemisphere was being transferred from Washington to some country in South America?

[11223] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That was used as a flag, was it not?

Captain Kramer. Not quite that, sir. It was an additional footnote added after this message was typed.

Senator Ferguson. Whose initial is on that message?

Captain Kramer. The initial "J," sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now do you know why that message as delivered was not put in exhibit 1 to be distributed to the committee, calling the attention of the committee to who this man was?

Captain Kramer. Apparently, Senator, the message appearing on page 234 of exhibit 1 was taken from the copy in the Army files and not the copy in this file.

Senator Ferguson. Now "this file" is the Navy file?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then do I understand that the exhibits in No. 1 were made from the Army file and may not be true copies of what was delivered to the Navy officials, or to the President?

Captain Kramer. I sometimes added penciled footnotes of that kind, sir. They were rather rare, however.
Senator Ferguson. But this is an example of one, and is one?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

[11224] Senator Ferguson. Now you must have thought at the time that the head of the secret service being transferred to South America was a very significant point.

Captain Kramer. I did, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And that is the reason for calling it to the attention of the various people that were to receive copies, is that correct?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. Primarily domestic intelligence would take action in the premises.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now when was that message delivered to OpNav, Admiral Stark, that is No. 7140, being the one in regard to the head of the secret service?

Captain Kramer. That was included in the block delivered Saturday evening, which could not be delivered to Admiral Stark. He would have seen it the following morning.

Senator Ferguson. At least it was delivered to the Secretary of the Navy and the White House, and to the various parties over at Admiral Wilkinson’s that night?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. I believe, at least I have brought it out in previous testimony, it was also specifically delivered to the domestic Intelligence Branch of the Navy, who saw occasional items of that nature bearing on domestic intelligence, Japanese agents, their movements and activities.

[11225] Senator Ferguson. How do you come to that conclusion? Is there something on this particular sheet that would indicate that?

Captain Kramer. No, sir, that is my distinct recollection, however, that I did that.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now we will go to 7141. That is the next sheet in the Navy file, is it not?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And is that in Exhibit 1?

Captain Kramer. According to my notes on this work sheet, it is not, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Will you read that?

Captain Kramer (reading):

From Washington  
To Tokyo  
5 December 1941  
Serial 1262.  
From Kurusu to Secretary Tashiro.

Re your S96. I feel confident that you are fully aware of the importance of the intelligence set-up in view of the present condition of the Japanese-U. S. negotiations. I would like very much to have Terasaki, who would be extremely difficult to suddenly replace because of certain circumstances, remain here until we are definitely enlightened as to the end of the negotiations. I beg of you as a personal favor to me to make an effort along these lines. I shall have him assume his post as soon as his work here is disposed of.

Senator Ferguson. What is the reference to? To what message?

Captain Kramer. To the one preceding this, 7140, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is 1245. In the book it is 1245?

Captain Kramer. No, sir, S96.

Senator Ferguson. S96 at the bottom?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. They have got both numbers, is that correct?
Captain Kramer. That is correct, yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now when was that message delivered to the parties that you have named?
Captain Kramer. The same remarks that I made regarding 7140 apply in respect to 7141.
Senator Ferguson. So that was delivered Saturday evening?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. The next is 7142, is it not?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Is that one in Exhibit 1?
Captain Kramer. On page 237, yes, sir.

From Tokyo
To Washington
December 6, 1941.
(Urgent)
#897
Re your #1268.

The footnote indicates that is not available.

To Counselor Iguchi from Kameyama.

What I meant in paragraph 2 of my #867—which footnote indicates is SIS #25640 regarding the destruction of codes and one code machine in the Washington office—was that of the two sets of "B" code machines with which your office is equipped, you are to burn one set and for the time being to continue the use of the other.

Senator Ferguson. Now this footnote was delivered to the various recipients of these messages on Saturday evening the 6th, is that correct?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir, as part of this message.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. And where will we find 25640? Do you know where that one is?
Captain Kramer. No, sir, I could not find it readily without the JD file number.
Senator Ferguson. And the JD file number is not on it?
Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. But the gist is here regarding the destruction of codes and one code machine in the Washington office?
Captain Kramer. That I would guess offhand—and it is probably more than a guess—is the Tokyo directive of December 3 regarding the destruction of cryptographic aids in Washington.
Senator Ferguson. It clearly indicated there was to be one code machine left in Washington?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. All others were to be destroyed?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. So we knew that on Saturday evening?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Incidentally that is the first time we knew they had more than one machine here.

Senator Ferguson. And that was delivered Saturday evening with the 13 parts?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, take the next page.

Captain Kramer. The next page is the first part of the 14-part note.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Now 7142 is Army 25835?

[11230] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Is that correct?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. How does the Army number get on the Navy file here?

Captain Kramer. That was an Army translation, and was so numbered before being delivered to my section.

Senator Ferguson. Now, when we come to the 13 parts, they are in exhibit 1, but they have no Army file numbers on them, do they?

Captain Kramer. No, sir. We had no Army file numbers on any Navy translations.

Senator Ferguson. That would indicate that all of the 13 parts of the 14-part message were translated in the Navy Department?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir, except for the rough translations, some of which were done by the Army and sent to the Navy for typing up.

Senator Ferguson. But if they were done in the rough no number was put on them?

Captain Kramer. No, sir, only our number was used.

Senator Ferguson. Now, let us come to the fourteenth part. It was made in the Navy also?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

[11231] Senator Ferguson. So all of the parts were made in the Navy?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All of the 14 parts have got “JD-1 #7143”?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Indicating that that is the Navy number?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, we will go to the next page after the fourteenth part in the Navy file, and we get a number 7144.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Is that correct?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is a Navy translation?

Captain Kramer. That is an Army translation, 7144 being the Navy file number of it.

Senator Ferguson. How does it come that the stamp, as we get back on these other Army files—here is the stamp 25835, is it not?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson (continuing). And no stamp is on the one that we were referring to, 7144?

[11232] Captain Kramer. I cannot account for that, except that it must have been a clerical error on that particular copy.
Senator Ferguson. The leaving off of the Army number?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, when was this message in 7144 delivered?
Captain Kramer. According to my study it was the first of the block that was delivered sometime between my departure for the State Department 9:30 Sunday morning and my return at about 10:20 Sunday morning.
Senator Ferguson. That is the message that is in exhibit 1, known as not to use a stenographer or typist?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. The next number.
Now, you claim that that is the dividing line, because there they were in the book and they were in numbers, and that gives you the idea you delivered the 13 parts and not the pilot message, because the pilot message is not in the group, is that correct?
Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir. It is also my distinct recollection, in that connection that there were no file numbers beyond the 13 parts of the 14-part note delivered that Saturday night.
[11233] Senator Ferguson. Now who would put these file numbers on these pages in the Navy file?
Captain Kramer. My chief yeoman, normally.
Senator Ferguson. What is his name?
Captain Kramer. Bryant. He applied these numbers just before we made up the folders for delivery.
Senator Ferguson. Now, I notice that some of them are in stamped ink and some of them have been copied over. How do you account for that?
Captain Kramer. That copying over is apparently a development of the last several years, subsequent to Pearl Harbor by the present custodians of these files.
Senator Ferguson. Not by Bryant, but by the present custodian?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know why he would do that?
Captain Kramer. I do not know, unless he was simply doodling, sir.
Senator Ferguson. How is that?
The Chairman. Simply what?
Captain Kramer. Doodling.
Senator Ferguson. Then, you find him doodling on these official Navy files, is that correct?
Captain Kramer. Presumably he was making a study that began to bore him.
[11234] Senator Ferguson. Well, it makes it rather difficult to read what was under this doodling, does it not?
Captain Kramer. It is perhaps possible to get another file number, if it exists, with our stamp not written over, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, that particular one did not have the stamp of the Army although it was translated by the Army?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, go to the next file, 7145, which has not been doodled.
It has a stamp 25850, does it not?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Is that in our book, Exhibit 1, here?
Captain Kramer. That is page 248 of Exhibit 1.
Senator **Ferguson**. That is the 1 o'clock message?

Captain **Kramer**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Ferguson**. Now, what is the next page? 7146?

Captain **Kramer**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Ferguson**. And that has a number 25853, the Army number?

Captain **Kramer**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Ferguson**. Is that in Exhibit 1?

Captain **Kramer**. On page 248, sir.

[11235] Senator **Ferguson**. That is 908?

Captain **Kramer**. That is the second one on page 248.

Senator **Ferguson**. Now we will come to the next one, 7147, and that has been written over, and it is difficult to read what was under it, is that correct?

Captain **Kramer**. Yes.

Senator **Ferguson**. That is Army #25854?

Captain **Kramer**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Ferguson**. Is that in the book?

Captain **Kramer**. Page 249, sir.

[11236] Senator **Ferguson**. That is the top message, or the destruction of the last remaining machine message?

Captain **Kramer**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Ferguson**. What is this last number on here, the SIS number?

Captain **Kramer**. 25858, sir.

Senator **Ferguson**. Do you know what that is? It is in pencil.

Captain **Kramer**. Presumably it was omitted from this copy at the time it was typed up by Army, but since it appears in Exhibit 1 presumably it was determined shortly after delivery of this message that it applied to their file number and it was phoned over to us.

Senator **Ferguson**. Do you know whether that is in the book?

Captain **Kramer**. It is on page 249.

Senator **Ferguson**. It is the one preceding in the book but not the one preceding in your official Navy files?

Captain **Kramer**. No, sir.

Senator **Ferguson**. All right. Now in the Navy files it is back how many?

Captain **Kramer**. It is ahead four numbers, sir.

Senator **Ferguson**. Ahead four numbers?

Captain **Kramer**. Yes, sir, in the Navy files.

[11237] Senator **Ferguson**. Well, let us go to the next.

Captain **Kramer**. The next one is the so-called hidden word message, sir, translated by Navy.

Senator **Ferguson**. That is at the top of page 258, is it not—or 253?

Captain **Kramer**. 251, I believe, sir.

Senator **Ferguson**. 251. And what is the Army number on that one?

Captain **Kramer**. It was a Navy translation, and we normally, in fact almost never had an Army file number on a Navy translation.

Senator **Ferguson**. Then there was no Army file number on that. Now the next one is a photostatic duplicate of it?

Captain **Kramer**. That is apparently an Army copy. I do not know who made that photostat.
Senator Ferguson. You know nothing about that photostat that is in there?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. In fact there are two photostats.

Captain Kramer. There are two photostats.

Senator Ferguson. Now what is the next one?

Captain Kramer. That is the so-called pilot message, Navy File 7149, Tokyo serial 901.

Senator Ferguson. Now on the bottom of this message [11238] there is scratched out in pencil “not available.” That is in re 902?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is scratched out. Now your file number on that is 7149?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. The Army file is 25838?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now that is the pilot message?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now just look at the Army one next to it. By the way, when this file is made up is it made up from the bottom up or from the top down? Which is the earlier paper, 7150 or 7149?

Captain Kramer. 7149, sir.

Senator Ferguson. 7149?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now the next sheet of paper, the Army number is 25857. 25838 was the pilot message?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And the next number beyond it is 25857?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

[11239] Senator Ferguson. Going the other way, the number was the so-called hidden word message, one of them, and then we come to the Army file No. 25854, is that right?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now how do you account for the fact that you have an Army No. 25838 between the two sheets 25854 and 25857?

Captain Kramer. I do not account for that, sir. I know in a general way that the Army system of numbering was quite different than ours at that time, in fact similar to what we had used a year or two before. In other words, I believe it was their practice to assign a file number at about the time a translation was to be worked on and completed. It would, therefore, be quite possible that a much later file number would be completed, because being a short message and delivered prior to an earlier file number which might require considerable work in clearing up garbles, and so forth, in translation.

Senator Ferguson. But if the testimony later should show that this pilot message was seen by an Army officer, translated by 2 o’clock on Saturday, you would not want any of these hypothetical things you have stated to indicate that it had not been sent to the Navy in the regular channels and as translated on the 6th, would you?

[11240] Captain Kramer. Not necessarily; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now let us try and find the next number as nearly as we can to 25838 Army instead of 25854.
Captain Kramer. I have an indication on my study of an Army file number 25835, which is Navy file No. 7142, appearing on page 237 of exhibit 1.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now let us come back to 7142, and that appears before any of the 14 parts of the 14-part message, does it not?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; it does, because that block was arranged chronologically by my section. The block 7138 through 7143 runs chronologically with the dates of originator, December 3, December 5, December 5, December 6, and December 6.

Senator Ferguson. Now there isn't any doubt that this pilot message is shown to have been translated December 6, 1941, which is Saturday, is that true?

Captain Kramer. That is true.

Senator Ferguson. The only reason why you say that the pilot message was delivered Sunday morning is due to the fact that in the Navy book it appears after the 14-part message and after the 1 o'clock message, and therefore you came to the conclusion that it must have been delivered [7143] Sunday instead of Saturday?

Captain Kramer. That is the sole reason. Senator, based on the practice in my office of disseminating these things as soon as we got them.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now I want you to look at this pilot message—and that is 7149 Navy and 25838 Army?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now this is the original file of the OP-20-GL. What does that mean?

Captain Kramer. That is the designation of the section having present custody of this file, sir. In the days about Pearl Harbor it was in the custody of section 20-GZ.

Senator Ferguson. Now in that same book, or set of papers, we have on the outside of it “JD-1: 7001-7500”?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That would indicate that you started your books on the 100 numbers?

Captain Kramer. When I had custody of these files they were started with an even number, sir. We have started this file with 7000. There has been apparently some regrouping of these in later custodian’s hands.

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand then that all of the JD book 6501 to 7000—by the way, so that this record may be clear, what you call a file is the intercepted decoded [7124] messages?

Captain Kramer. The translations; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. The translation is really the file?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. For each of these translations there is another file with the work sheets.

Senator Ferguson. Is there a work sheet for these exhibits which you have here, that you have been given?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; there is a work sheet file for each translation prepared by Navy. Just what the Army files are in that respect I do not know.

Senator Ferguson. Well, would that file come over when this pilot message came over from the Army?
Captain Kramer. No, sir; not at all.
Senator Ferguson. That would not come over and should be in the Army file?
Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. So someone apparently has remade these files and put on the top 7001, and it should be on the bottom of this other file?
Captain Kramer. That is my recollection of the way those files were maintained when I had charge of the section. It is probable that Chief Ship's Clerk Bryant can give more specific information on that point, sir.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Now what is this sheet [11243] of paper in this file? Is this the so-called JD-1:7001?
Captain Kramer. 7001; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well, 7001. And there is nothing on it, except almost in the center, typewritten, “No initials. JD-1:7001 appear cancelled.”
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. On the bottom of it in pencil and not in ink, or not in stamp, are the figures “7001”?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now if an original sheet was made up at the time for that number it should have a stamped 7001, should it not?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And that stamp was in red ink?
Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now how do you account for this 7001 having only a pencil memorandum on it?
Captain Kramer. That blank file number is a sheet inserted by the yeoman who had custody of the files, who added at the bottom of the sheet in pencil obviously——
Senator Ferguson. (interposing). Now wait. Of your own knowledge do you know this?
Captain Kramer. No, sir; only from the fact that I recognize his handwriting as being very similar and I believe identical with that of my chief yeoman at that time, Bryant.
Senator Ferguson. Where is Bryant now?
Captain Kramer. I believe he is in this room, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, when did you first learn that there had been a blank sheet of paper with the exception of what we have read in that file?
Captain Kramer. I first learned, Senator, a week ago Saturday that there was not only this blank——
Senator Ferguson. Just stick to this now.
The Chairman. Let him answer.
Captain Kramer. Not only this blank file, but a half dozen or more other blank files in the 1941 translation file, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, I will put the question again.
When did you first learn that there was a vacant place in these numbers, and that 7001 had this sheet in it?
Captain Kramer. From first-hand knowledge is what I was testifying to.
Senator Ferguson. Yes, first-hand knowledge.
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Just recently?
Captain Kramer. Just recently, yes, sir. I have heard about this blank file, of course, for a year or more past.
[11246] Senator Ferguson. Who had custody of these books that could have put this sheet in?
Captain Kramer. My chief yeoman, Bryant, primarily, who inserted them in that file. Although my officer assistant, Lieutenant Harrison, might and did at times earlier in the year, do so, or an assistant yeoman in training by the name of Densford might well have done it as part of his assistance to my chief yeoman.
Senator Ferguson. Now, will you tell us if there are any other blank sheets, we will call it blank because there are not translations in this book, that are not initialed, or dated?
Captain Kramer. Not that I am aware of, no, sir.
Senator Ferguson. All others, if they are blank they are dated, and initialed?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And the only one not dated and not initialed, is this 7001.
Captain Kramer. On that point I have testified that earlier in the year Lieutenant Harrison whom I have referred to, used these files in preparing his gists. That if he in the process of preparing the daily gists discovered a duplication, an extra part of a multipart message that had previously been assigned a file number, he would have [11246] removed that extra part, canceled the file number and combined it with the earlier file number of that multipart message, and apparently, in fact obviously, from what appears in these files, in doing so, he wrote the blank file notation out in handwriting and inserted it in the file he was not a typist, in my recollection, except of the "hunt and peck" variety.
Senator Ferguson. Now, answering my question, I want to know whether there is any other page in this book where there is simply a typewritten notation and with the number in pencil rather than in long-hand and initialed and dated?
Captain Kramer. Not that I am aware of, sir; no sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know of any reason why the committee should not have seen this so-called blank page with this memorandum on it that I have read prior to bringing it here in the last few days?
Captain Kramer. I am not familiar, Senator, with current policy.
Senator Ferguson. I am asking if you know of anything.
Captain Kramer. I do not; no sir.
Senator Ferguson. That is all.
The Chairman. Is it any part of your duty to know.
Captain Kramer. No, sir.
[11247] Mr. Richardson. I have a question or two, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Counsel wishes to pursue the inquiry.
Mr. Richardson. Captain, I wish you would turn your mind again to the Japanese words which were contained in the original winds code broadcast.
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. We have been talking here a great deal about the phrase "Higashi no kaze ame."
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Has there ever been the slightest question anywhere by anybody as to what the English translation of those words was?

Captain Kramer. Not that I am aware of, no, sir.

Mr. Richardson. And that translation was “East wind rain”?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Now, “East wind rain” either in the Japanese language or the English language, by itself, was of no significance, was it?

Captain Kramer. Not without knowing the code referred to, no, sir.

Mr. Richardson. There had to be some additional Japanese language in the instrument which set up the code that placed an understanding that was to follow the use of the words “East wind rain”?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Now, when you turn to the Japanese language contained in that dispatch, which is shown in Exhibit 142 under date of November 6, 1941—do you find it?

Referring now to the dispatch sent to the commander in chief?

Captain Kramer. Referring to the table of contents, sir, I can probably find it more readily.

Mr. Richardson. There is no paging on this thing.

Captain Kramer. I have it.

[11249] Mr. Richardson. Now, that document, as I understand it, purports to be a document sent to the MacArthur staff in Tokyo about November 6, 1941, and as I am advised it sets forth under the title—

The Chairman. You don’t mean 1941?

Mr. Richardson. 1941 is what it says at the top.

The Chairman. To the MacArthur staff in Manila?

Mr. Richardson. No. It recites here, November 6, 1941, from the War Department to the MacArthur staff. That may be an error.

Mr. Murphy. I believe you find that it should be 1945.

Mr. Richardson. It is of no importance because it refers to Circular 2353. Does it not, Captain?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. And Circular 2353 was the instrument that fixed the original winds code?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. The winds code which Captain Safford says related to the winds execute which he testified concerning?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Now, following the phrase “Circular 2353” are some 16 lines of Japanese?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

[11249] Mr. Richardson. And under the figure 1, about the middle of the Japanese phraseology in that dispatch, occurs, together with other words, the words “Higashi no kaze ame”?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. The words which you have identified as meaning “east wind rain”?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Now, in order to find out the meaning that the Japanese agents would get from reading from an execute under that code dispatch you would have to go back into the language which preceded the phrase “Higashi no kaze ame,” would you not?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. And when you do go back you find, do you not, in the fifth line of the Japanese words, the word “wagahoo”?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. And then there follows some nine Japanese words?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Ending with the word “wa”?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. And it is true, is it not, Captain, that the meaning of that phrase starting with “wagahoo” and ending in “wa,” constitutes in this dispatch which fixed the code, as to what, so far as the United States was concerned, the phrase “east wind rain,” “Higashi no kaze ame,” was intended to mean to Japanese agents who read the code execute?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Now, what is the definition of the words commencing with “wagahoo” and ending with “wa”?

Captain Kramer. “Wagahoo” is the Japanese word literally translated meaning “our side”, or in better English, “we”.

“No” is a preposition identical in character with our prepositions, a possessive.

“Gaikoo” means “foreign”.

“Kankei” means “relations”.

In other words, the first four words means “Our foreign relations”. “Kiken ni hinsuru” means “are approaching danger”, “kiken” meaning “danger”, “hin”, meaning “approaching”, or “in close proximity to”, something of that nature.

“Bani” means simply “when”.

Mr. Richardson. Then the definition would be “When our foreign relations are approaching danger”?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Is there any word there or any permissible translation which would give effect to such a word as “war”?

Captain Kramer. No, sir, except an evaluation which would be stretched to mean that.

Mr. Richardson. In other words, unless the phrase “our foreign relations are approaching danger” can be construed to mean “war” there is no “war” permissible under the Japanese translation of this dispatch?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. And has there ever been any translation by any of the experts in Washington of that dispatch that differs materially from the translation which you have just given?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; there has not.

Mr. Richardson. And when you refer to the translation which appears in the translation which we received from the Asiatic Fleet which is shown in Exhibit 142 as 1 (c) the phrase—have you it before you?
Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. The phrase contained in the dispatch which came to us from the Asiatic Fleet having reference to this same code establishment, the phrase is “If diplomatic relations are on the verge of being severed”, do you, as a Japanese scholar, believe that that phrase “If diplomatic relations are on the verge of being severed”, is a permissible translation of the Japanese words which you just read and [11252] which you interpreted as meaning “When our foreign relations are approaching danger”?

Captain Kramer. That is a close proximity to it; yes, sir. It might be translated that way.

Mr. Richardson. All right. So, Captain, it would be of no significance at all, would it, in determining whether a dispatch was construed to mean “war”, it would be of no significance at all that the language of “Higashi no kaze ame” was used?

Captain Kramer. Not “war”; no, sir.

Mr. Richardson. You would have to use those Japanese words I have just quoted simply as a flag to indicate that here was an east-wind rain message?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. And then to determine what east-wind rain meant you would be completely confined to the meaning which had been interpreted of the Japanese language that you have just spelled out for us word by word in the original dispatch creating the code?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. So I ask you, again, anyone looking at a dispatch and seeing the words “Higashi no kaze ame” on it would not have progressed in his understanding of what the dispatch might convey by way of meaning unless he went [11253] back to the original Japanese words in the original code message and obtained a translation of what these words between “wagahoo” and “ni”, mean in that original dispatch?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Now, one thing further. There has been some suggestion here that this blank page which the Senator from Michigan examined you concerning, 7001, that that blank page, it has been suggested here, might act as a telltale to the abstraction from the file of what is asserted may have been a wind execute message and, to be more specific, and, as I understand the inference in the testimony, simply for the purpose of bringing you to the point of my next question, the suggestion is that this message which you and Captain Safford have testified came in either on the morning of the 4th of December or the 5th of December, that went to Admiral Noyes, may have been the message which when it was abstracted from the file was succeeded in that file by that master page 7001, which, as the Senator pointed out, has no stamp on it and no longhand writing.

Now, did any dispatch ever go into your files of which these files are a part where the dispatch had not originally come through your office for transmission to the proper recipients?

Captain Kramer. None, sir.

[11254] Mr. Richardson. And if by reason of a special arrangement entered into by Admiral Noyes, as testified to by Captain Safford, a message was to come from the teletype and be transmitted direct
to Admiral Noyes for dissemination by Admiral Noyes under such system as he might authorized, could there be in your files at any time properly a copy of that message?

Captain KRAMER. No, sir, unless by some chance it was sent back to my office for additional dissemination.

Mr. RICHARDSON. That would mean, sir, would it not, that it would have to have come back to you from Admiral Noyes, or someone under his authority, the message which Captain Safford says was to go direct to Admiral Noyes and be disseminated by Admiral Noyes without reference to you?

Captain KRAMER. Yes, sir.

Mr. RICHARDSON. Would the return of such a message to you under those circumstances have been in the routine, or would it have been highly irregular?

Captain KRAMER. It would have been unusual in that that type of message was the only instance in which in the set-up directed by Admiral Noyes it ever occurred.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I have no further questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Captain——

[11255] Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman——

Mr. RICHARDSON. Mr. Chairman, I would like before we proceed further, to read a memorandum——

The CHAIRMAN. Unless there are some further questions of the captain——

Senator FERGUSON. I have a question, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. RICHARDSON. This has to do with my examination.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Mr. RICHARDSON. I would like to read a memorandum furnished me by Commander Baecher in response to a request made for information regarding the handling of the ALUSNA Batavia dispatch O31030 of December 1941, as to which, just for the information of the committee, I will suggest there has been some reference here, as to the possibility that someone may have read this dispatch from Batavia before the so-called winds execute message came in, and put on the winds message as a result the definition which the Batavia dispatch contained.

The information is this:

(a) As previously stated, the time of receipt of the above dispatch was 040621 GCT 4 December 1941 which was 1:21 a.m. 4 December 1941, local time.

(b) The time of decoding of this dispatch was 050645 GCT, which was 1:45 a.m. 5 December 1941 (local time). [11256] The 24-hour lapse between receipt and decoding is accounted for by the routing designation which was "deferred", the lowest priority in handling.

2. No further information is available regarding the exact time of delivery to a naval officer inasmuch as no written record was kept of delivery times.

That is all.

Senator FERGUSON. Mr. Chairman——

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ferguson.

Senator FERGUSON. In answer to some of Mr. Richardson's questions, and I think sometime ago you stated that the Japanese in their language were accustomed to understatements. That is, they described things weaker than we would.

Captain KRAMER. Often that is the case, yes.
Senator Ferguson. Could that account for the difference here between "war" and the other expressions?

Captain Kramer. No, sir, not in this case, I do not think. However, as I pointed out in the previous testimony in the case of the Dutch East Indies, later on in the message—

Senator Ferguson. I think you have described that before.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir, I have.

Senator Ferguson. Just one more group of questions on [11257] where these numbers are.

I wish you would look at No. 142. Have you got that page? I can bring it to you.

Go to 7119. Your number, JD number.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you have that on the page?

Captain Kramer. I do, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, that is translated—the date is not significant, when the message came in. You can't tell anything about its order that way?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Because you have got December 2, December 3, and then December 2 down under 7122, 7123, and 7124. So let's go to the date of translation 12–6–41. Navy, wasn't it?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. The next one, 7120, translated 12–6–41, Army; 7121, 12–6–41 Army. Now, following, 7122 12–5–41, Navy. So that is a Navy.

The next one is 7123, 12–6–41, Navy. There you have a Navy translation on the 5th between two Navy translations on the 6th. Isn't that correct?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then you have 7124, translated [11258] 12–7–41, Army. So you have a Navy of the 5th between an Army of the 7th and the Navy of the 6th; is that correct?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So, it wasn't anything unusual to have a number out of its sequence, was it?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; it was.

Senator Ferguson. Well, you will find all through this, the same thing as I checked on this one.

Captain Kramer. If you will notice, Senator, from the dividing line just below which is 7110 and the Roman numeral V——

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Captain Kramer. The chronological dates run in order from November 18 down to file number 7123, December 3. There should be another dividing line at that point indicating what was disseminated in that batch. All the dates of translation in that batch are December 5 or 6. The 5 would indicate that those were translated late afternoon or evening of the 5th, and they were not disseminated until some of the first translations the morning of the 6th.

Senator Ferguson. Go over to 7090.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. There you have 7.

[11259] Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. There you have a Navy, 12-5-41. Another Navy 12-5-41. The next one 7092, Navy, 12-41. 7095, Navy, 12-5-41.

So you have a 4 in between two 5's.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. The same explanation there?

Captain Kramer. All that block on that page is of similar character. They are 4 or 5 dates. That block carries through the dividing line after file No. 7109.

Senator Ferguson. But, there is no dividing line on here that I can see.

Captain Kramer. On the next page there is, sir, below 7109.

Senator Ferguson. Oh, yes. That is all.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman——

The Chairman. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. On page 252 of the intercepts, there is a message about which no witness has testified. We have had no word on it. That is exhibit 1.

There was a statement in the press at one time quoting Senator Ferguson, I believe, to the effect that that referred to the European war.

I do not think that we should come to a close of the [11260] hearings without something on that message.

Captain, before you leave, do you know anything about that Budapest message?

Captain Kramer. My study, Mr. Murphy, the other day for Senator Ferguson, did not extend to file No. 7184. It could be readily done in the next few minutes, I think, since the file is here.

Senator Ferguson. I don't think the witness understands your question.

Mr. Murphy. The particular message I am referring to is from Budapest to Tokyo, December 7, 1941, No. 104.

Captain Kramer. That is the one.

Mr. Murphy. On the page 252:

On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communique to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th.

Relayed to Berlin.

And then:

Army 25886.

JD 7184.

As I said, there has been a reference in the papers quoting Senator Ferguson as saying that that apparently referred to the European war. Am I correct?

[11367] Senator Ferguson. I don't know what the papers may have quoted.

All I do know, and will state on the record now, is that as I read that message it is the war between Great Britain and Hungary and has nothing to do whatever with Pearl Harbor or the Japanese-American war, or Japanese-British war.

Mr. Murphy. It would seem to me, Mr. Chairman, before we close, we ought to have a definite statement on that, so we can dismiss it from our thinking.
Senator Ferguson. I think it is clear from the page itself what they were talking about. There was a declaration of war delivered by the British to the Hungarian Government through the Japanese.

Mr. Gearhart. What is the fact? Was war declared on Hungary on the 7th?

Senator Ferguson. That is true—war was declared between Great Britain and Hungary on the 7th. I do think we ought to have testimony on it.

The Chairman. Are there any other questions?

Captain Kramer. Mr. Murphy, a hasty study in the last minute on that point would indicate that Navy File Nos. 7152 run chronologically from November 15, 1941, through December 7, 1941, which is the date of translation—[11262] of the message you were talking about.

Immediately following that block is one or more translations dated December 8, 1941. That would indicate to me from further study, my first reaction would be that it was translated by Army on the 7th and disseminated at least so far as Navy is concerned, probably the afternoon of the 7th.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, there has been a request made that the record be cleared on that. Apparently it referred to the European war, and I think the record should be filled in in regard to that gap so that we can dismiss that from our thinking.

The Chairman. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart. Captain, you testified that you had no intention of calling your memorandum to the attention of this committee until you were asked a question about it. Do I remember your testimony correctly in that regard?

Captain Kramer. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Why had you reached that conclusion? Because you thought the paper was unimportant?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; since I was here to testify myself regarding the fact.

Mr. Gearhart. But you have referred to other notes, from which you refreshed your memory, have you not?

[11263] Captain Kramer. The only notes or papers of any kind that I have referred to are papers since I arrived in Washington around the 6th of December of last year, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Of last year, you say?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Haven’t you looked at any papers since you have been here on this particular mission?

Captain Kramer. I have not.

Mr. Gearhart. Since you have been here to appear as a witness?

Captain Kramer. None, except as I have previously testified, those shown to me last summer as exhibits before the Hewitt Board of Investigation.

Mr. Gearhart. From the examination that you have had on the subject of this memorandum, it would appear that the members of this committee considered that memorandum a very important document in this proceeding. Isn’t that the impression you have gotten after listening to all the questions?
Captain Kramer. The impression I have gained, Mr. Gearhart, is that apparently at least some members of the committee attach a great deal of importance to the impressions I had of circumstances surrounding Pearl Harbor at the time I prepared that memorandum.

[11264] Mr. Gearhart. Circumstances that are at variance to a certain degree between the testimony you have given before and the testimony you have given now?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. I noticed in the testimony of Captain Safford, that he referred to some messages, intercepts, and so forth, that had not theretofore been introduced in evidence in this proceeding; do you recall that?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Have you during the course of your testimony referred to any messages of any kind that are not already in evidence or were not in evidence before you mentioned them?

Captain Kramer. I do not believe I have, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Do you know of any messages, intercepts of any kind, that have not been introduced in evidence in this proceeding?

Captain Kramer. No, sir, I do not, with the possible exception that from my own memory there are certain things in back traffic of a year or more before that simply parallel and throw some light on interpretation to be put on messages of a nature similar to those immediately preceding Pearl Harbor.

I refer, for example, to such things as messages [11265] concerning ship movements.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, there are some messages on ship movements that have been put in evidence. Do you believe there are others on ship movements that have been withheld from the record?

Captain Kramer. I do not believe that those in evidence extend back before the beginning of 1941, although I may be mistaken in that respect.

The 1st of January 1941, I mean.

Mr. Gearhart. The ones we have been referring to are rather recent. December 6, 1941. Referring to the exhibits that appear on page 14 of Exhibit 2. Do you mean that there are others that are closer, during the last week, that are not included in Exhibit 2?

Captain Kramer. Not that I am aware, no. I have not studied the files to determine that point.

Mr. Gearhart. Do you have any in mind that up to now have been withheld from the record of this hearing?

Captain Kramer. None that I know of; no, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. You are familiar with the President’s order of November 7, directed to all chief executives of all executive departments, agencies, commissions, and bureaus, including the General Chiefs of Staff?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

[11266] Mr. Gearhart. You are familiar with the fact that it is made the duty of every officer of the Army and Navy and whether presently in the service or out of the service to volunteer any information that may be of importance to this committee?

Captain Kramer. Fully aware of that; yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Then, if you knew of the injunction the President had imposed upon you to reveal to us whatever evidence may be
brought to your attention, why didn't you call that letter or memorandum that you prepared when in the South Pacific with Admiral Halsey to the attention of the committee?

Captain Kramer. I considered that by no stretch of the imagination as being considered as better testimony than I could give first-hand now, or better than I had given before previous hearings, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Don't you think it was your duty under that order of the President to state that the testimony you were giving at that time was not the testimony you would have given had you been called at the time you prepared the memorandum?

Captain Kramer. I am not at all certain I would have given that version in the detail I did if I had been called to testify at that time. That memorandum was prepared under some degree of pressure without any particular attempt to rehash or refresh my memory on it, purely and simply to give Admiral Halsey a broad picture of the situation in Washington at that time, and was not intended to be as meticulously accurate as I could make it at that time.

Mr. Gearhart. Certainly you had no idea of leading Admiral Halsey to conclusions that did not conform to the facts, did you?

Captain Kramer. No, sir. There was no question on that whatsoever raised during our conversations since he simply read that memorandum and we discussed no details concerning it.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, certainly you wanted to be accurate when you were relaying information to your commander, did you not?

Captain Kramer. Certainly.

Mr. Gearhart. Then, did you not at that time prepare it with the utmost possible care in order that your commander would not be deceived?

Captain Kramer. I did, sir, keeping in mind the pressure under which I was working to do so, and my previous remarks on this point.

Mr. Gearhart. Then you made every effort at that time to make that memorandum represent your then recollection of what had transpired during the days preceding Pearl Harbor?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. And you also prepared that paper with the fact in mind that it might sometime aid you in the case of you eventually appearing as a witness subsequently?

Captain Kramer. Would you repeat that?

Mr. Gearhart. As an aid to your memory in any subsequent proceeding?

Captain Kramer. At no time, whatsoever, Mr. Gearhart, did I have the conception in mind in preparing that memorandum. In fact, my expectation was when I prepared it that I would destroy it within a few days and prepare the deposition or affidavit which I had promised Admiral Halsey to do.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, there is one other question I want to ask you, and that is about all I have.

Do you remember of having intercepted any messages whatsoever from the civilian government of the Philippines to Washington?

Captain Kramer. No, sir; I don't believe I ever have seen a message from the High Commissioner or the Philippine government to Washington, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. You say you have never seen one?
[11269] Captain Kramer. I may have been shown one at some time, as an exhibit, or otherwise. I recall none now. I was not customarily shown such messages, however.

Mr. Gearhart. When you are monitoring for Japanese exchanges, you naturally pick up those other exchanges, don't you?

Captain Kramer. No; our monitoring system kept entirely clear of United States Government or dependency circuits.

Mr. Gearhart. You know nothing then, of a short-wave telephone call between any of the high officials of the Philippine government and of the State Department in the early days of December, December 6, 1941?

Captain Kramer. Nothing, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you ever hear it discussed among those with whom you were associated?

Captain Kramer. I may have. I don't recall having heard it previously to your mentioning it.

Mr. Gearhart. Who would intercept messages of that kind if any occurred?

Captain Kramer. I do not know.

Mr. Gearhart. Wasn't the Government monitoring everything that went through the air, the Army, the FCC?

Captain Kramer. I don't know what the rest of the Government was monitoring, sir. I only have in a general way, though I think a fairly comprehensive way, knowledge of what our Navy monitoring system was covering, and to a less degree what the Army monitoring system on foreign intercepts, was covering.

Mr. Gearhart. Was your station in Virginia equipped to pick up all short-wave broadcasts?

Captain Kramer. I do not know, sir.

[11271] Mr. Gearhart. Would it require different kind of equipment to pick up the dot-dash than oral discussion?

Captain Kramer. I believe the same radio sets can be used for both, sir, depending on the range. It would require different appurtenances, however.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you have as one of your responsibilities the transmittal of messages to our own commands?

Captain Kramer. None whatsoever, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. You had nothing to do with the transmittal of messages say to the Naval Stations on the Pacific Coast?

Captain Kramer. No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Or to the Coast Guard, for instance, that might be in charge of harbor defenses in different places on the Pacific Coast.

Captain Kramer. None whatsoever, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Who would have to do with that?

Captain Kramer. Presumably some division of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations, possibly War Plans, though I am not certain on that point, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. That is all.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, may I propound one additional question?

The Chairman. Yes.

[11272] Senator Lucas. Captain Kramer, there has been much speculation and much conjecture as to the conversation you had with
the foreign service officer of Secretary Knox on Sunday morning, December 7, when you were delivering important magic messages to the Secretary.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Now, as I understand from your previous testimony you were surprised when you learned of the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Captain Kramer. At about a quarter to 2 in the afternoon, yes, sir, very much so.

Senator Lucas. In other words, there was nothing in the statement that you made to the foreign service officer of Secretary Knox which could give him any impression that you knew or believed that the Japanese were going to attack Pearl Harbor at 7 or 7:30 in the morning?

Captain Kramer. None whatsoever, sir.

Senator Lucas. Whatever you said at that time to this service officer merely directed or called attention to the difference in time at the various places in the Pacific in line with what the 1 o'clock message called for?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir; that is it.

Senator Lucas. That is all.

The Chairman. Captain, when you first appeared here [11273] you gave in detail your record in the Navy, I don't recall whether anyone asked you about the decoration which you wear upon your breast.

Would you mind telling us what that indicates?

Captain Kramer. It is not a decoration, sir. It is simply a badge, of pure gold, I understand, presented to me by the Navy Department in 1930 as a result of getting three legs, as required, on this badge, which is known as the Distinguished Marksman's Medal for rifle shooting.

The Chairman. Had nothing to do with Pearl Harbor?

Captain Kramer. No, sir, none whatever.

The Chairman. The committee thanks you for your forthright testimony and before you are excused the Chair would like to ask you if there is any other statement or information you have to submit to the committee bearing upon the Pearl Harbor situation which has not been elicited by the "few" questions that have been asked you during your examination.

Captain Kramer. I think all knowledge I have of circumstances and details surrounding Pearl Harbor have been exhaustively elicited, sir.

The Chairman. The committee thanks you, Captain, very much for your cooperation.

Captain Kramer. Thank you, sir.

The Chairman. You are excused.

(The witness was excused.)

[11274] Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, I should like to present for examination Admiral Ingersoll.

The Chairman. Admiral Ingersoll, come around.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL R. E. INGERSOLL, UNITED STATES NAVY

(Having been first duly sworn by the Chairman.)

Mr. Richardson. Admiral, will you state your name to the reporter, please?

The Vice Chairman. Will you spell your last name, please, Admiral?

Admiral Ingersoll. I-n-g-e-r-s-o-l-l.

Mr. Richardson. How old are you, Admiral?

Admiral Ingersoll. I shall be 63 the 24th of June of this year.

Mr. Richardson. How long have you been in the Navy of the United States?

Admiral Ingersoll. I entered the Navy in March of 1901.

Mr. Richardson. What is your present rank?

Admiral Ingersoll. Admiral, United States Navy.

Mr. Richardson. Will you in a very brief way detail what your progression has been in the Navy in point of assignments generally during the time you have been with the Navy?

[11275] Admiral Ingersoll. I graduated from the Naval Academy in 1905. My sea service following graduation was 6 years in battleships, until 1911.

My next cruise was on the China Station, Asiatic Station, 1913 to 1916, most of which I was on the staff of the commander in chief.

From 1919 to 1921 I was the executive officer of the battleships Connecticut and Arizona.

My next cruise was in the command of a surveying ship.

From 1928 to 1930, I was at that time a captain and was chief of staff of the battle fleet, assistant chief of staff of the battle fleet, and also chief of staff of the United States Fleet.

In 1933 to 1935 I commanded the heavy cruisers Augusta and San Francisco.

From 1938 to 1940 I commanded a division of heavy cruisers in the Pacific Fleet.

And from the first of January 1942 until the middle of November 1944 I was the commander in chief of the Atlantic Fleet, during this war.

At that date I was detached in order to command the Western Sea Frontier, which is my present duty, which includes command of the Nineteenth Fleet.

Mr. Richardson. What was your assignment during November and December 1941?

[11276] Admiral Ingersoll. I was at that time Assistant Chief of Naval Operations.

Mr. Richardson. Your immediate superior was Admiral Stark?

Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. What were your duties generally speaking in that assignment, Admiral?

Admiral Ingersoll. The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations had no duties assigned by law or by Navy regulations. By Executive order he was a member of the joint board which was the forerunner of the joint chiefs of staff. By office regulations prescribed by the Chief of Naval Operations he had in general supervision of all officers of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations. I had no original cognizance of any manner. As a matter of fact I had no office other than myself. And all heads of sections took up their questions with me usually before presenting them to the Chief of Naval Operations.

Once the Chief of Naval Operations had established a policy, I endeavored then to relieve him of all of the load that I could of the details in carrying out that policy, in signing papers and releasing
dispatches, I kept him informed of correspondence when I thought there was something of which he should be informed.

[11277] Mr. Richardson. Now, you testified in connection with this Pearl Harbor matter first in what is called the Hart Investigation, did you not?

Admiral Ingersoll. I did.

Mr. Richardson. And then after that you also testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry?

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Are those the only two of the preceding investigations where you have been presented as a witness?

Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct. I talked to Admiral Hewitt when he passed through San Francisco. I am quite certain that he did not consider me as a witness but I did talk to him. I think he found I had no information which was of value to him for the particular thing he was looking for.

Mr. Richardson. You were not sworn except in the two investigations that I have referred to?

Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. Now, Admiral, I wish to say as far as counsel is concerned that I have made an examination of your testimony in both of these hearings. I have no further questions to ask you with reference to the general scope of your testimony in those hearings, which I think was rather full and comprehensive, but there has been developed in this [11278] case this matter, by previous witnesses, questions concerning the existence of what has been called an execute or the winds code.

When I speak of the winds code you know, do you not, what I am talking about?

Admiral Ingersoll. I do.

Mr. Richardson. Referring to page 429 of the testimony that you gave in the Hart investigation I should like to read you several questions and answers for the purpose of directing your attention to the particular subject there discussed. The question is this:

68. Q. During November or December, '41, you were cognizant of a special code which the Japanese had arranged under which they were to inform their nationals, concerning against what nations they would make aggressive movements, by means of a partial weather report?

A. Yes; I do recall such messages.

69. Q. Do you recall having seen, on or about 4 December, the broadcast directive, thus given, indicating that the Japanese were about to attack both Britain and the United States?

A. Yes.

70. Q. Do you know why that particular information was not sent to the commander in chief, Pacific?

[11279] A. I do not know except it was probably supposed that the intercept stations in the Hawaiian Islands had also received this broadcast. However, it may have been because of a message sent in regard to the destruction of Japanese codes which had been sent to London and Washington which indicated that war with the United States and with Great Britain was imminent.

Keeping that testimony in mind I also wish to read to you testimony which you gave before the Naval Court. I read from page 825; question 33:

Q. I show you document 15 of Exhibit 63. This document has been popularly termed by some witnesses as the "winds code." State whether on or before
7 December 1941, you had seen or been informed of the contents of this document.

A. Yes; I had been. I remember a message of this character.

34. Q. Will you relate the circumstances under which it came within your cognizance?

A. This document bears the inscription, "Translated on November 28". According to the system, I probably saw that on the following day, on the 29th. I also recall that at the time this message was received, or possibly the execution which is referred to in the message, that there was some difference of opinion among the translators as to just what was meant. Whether or not what I saw is exactly in the form as it appears there or not I am not certain. However, I did know definitely that they were setting up a code to be used in a weather broadcast.

35. Q. Can you state whether or not this information was discussed by you and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark?

A. I don't remember whether it was discussed with Admiral Stark or not.

36. Q. Did you take any action yourself as a result of the information that was contained in this document?

A. As far as I recall, we took no action on this dispatch at that time, because, as I have stated before, I believe there was some doubt in the minds of translators as to just what the translation should be.

37. Q. Can you remember in substance what this doubt was?

A. No; I do not recall, except that there was some doubt as to whether they had an exact translation—a difference of opinion among the translators as to what the Japanese words meant.

38. Q. Can you recall whether this difference of opinion related to the subject of a declaration of war or whether it related to severance of negotiations, or what the discussion was about—can you remember that?

A. No; I don't remember that point now.

39. Q. On or prior to 7 December 1941, did you receive any information as to whether or not code words had been received in the Navy Department which would put in effect the so-called "winds" message?

A. Yes.

40. Q. Will you state the circumstances?

A. I recall that sometime I did see the messages which were supposed to put this "winds" message, translated on the 28th, into effect. I do not recall whether I saw them prior to December 7 or afterwards. If I saw them prior to December 7, I am quite sure that would have been considered confirmation of the information which had previously been received and which had been sent to the Fleet on December 3 or December 4 regarding the destruction of codes at London, Washington, Manila, and elsewhere, which indicated definitely that war was imminent.

41. Q. Can you recall whether or not on or before 7 December 1941, any action was taken in the office of Chief of Naval Operations as a result of the information contained in this execution of the "winds" code which you state you saw?

A. As I stated before, I do not recall when I saw the answer, whether it was on or prior to December 7, or whether it was after December 7. If it was after December 7, there was no purpose in sending it out. If it was before December 7, I think it was not sent out because we considered that the dispatch sent to all Fleets regarding the destruction of codes was ample warning that war was imminent, or that diplomatic negotiations were going to be broken off, and that this dispatch was only confirmatory.

42. Q. Did you have any knowledge of the location of the dispatch or of the information which conveyed to you the execution of the "winds" code?

A. I have no knowledge regarding the location or disposition of any of these dispatches, as I have seen none of them since December 1941.

Now, Admiral, having called that testimony to your attention, what is your present recollection with reference to your having seen any dispatch which purported to be an execute of this winds code which it is agreed had been sent out by the Japanese and intercepted by our interceptors?

Admiral Ingersoll. During these two investigations the circumstances under which I saw these things were not asked me. I recall
that I was informed by officers who came to my office and not by the means of the sheaf of messages which was distributed daily that a message supposed to be in the winds code had been received. I assumed that it was correct, that they had the proper thing. I thought that when I testified before Admiral Hart and I thought so when I testified before the Naval Court of Inquiry.

However, inasmuch as it had come in after the dispatches sent to the fleets regarding the destruction of codes it was of no importance. Simply confirmed what we had already sent out.

Mr. Richardson. Do you recall whether your information with reference to this so-called execute came to you by reason of some writing in a dispatch or memorandum or by the telephone or orally?

Admiral Ingersoll. No. I remember distinctly that officers came into my office with it. They had a piece of paper with them which purported to be a message sent in the wind code.

Mr. Richardson. Now, there has been one discussion here, Admiral, that there were executed in connection with Captain McColllum’s office a group of cards which cards were, as I recall, 3 or 4 inches square, and that they contained thereon the English words, so far as the United States was concerned, “East Wind Rain, United States”, that there were no Japanese words on those cards at all, just the English words as relating the United States, the English words as relating to England, the English words as relating to Russia.

Now, do you recall having received one of those cards?

Admiral Ingersoll. No; I did not have a set of cards.

Mr. Richardson. Then the paper that you saw in your office was not one of those cards?

Admiral Ingersoll. I am not certain just what the paper was now that the officers brought in to me.

Mr. Richardson. Did you examine that paper?

Admiral Ingersoll. It is possible that I might have, but I do not recall it specifically.

Mr. Richardson. Do you speak Japanese?

Admiral Ingersoll. No, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Had you familiarized yourself with what an execute of the so-called winds code would be?

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes; I knew that from the original dispatch which had come in in the latter part of November.

Mr. Richardson. And that paper that was brought in to you, that you saw, you accepted as an execute under the wind code?

Admiral Ingersoll. I understood it to be a message which had been received in the wind code.

Mr. Richardson. Do you know what became of it?

Admiral Ingersoll. I do not know except that I know they took it out of my office when they left.

Mr. Richardson. Then the officers when they went away took it with them?

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Did you ever hear that made a subject of any conversation or reference thereafter as far as you can recollect?

Admiral Ingersoll. No; and I paid no further attention to it because of the fact that it simply confirmed, if it was a genuine message,
it simply confirmed what we had already sent out regarding the destruction of codes, which was absolutely positive.

Mr. Richardson. What would be the significance that you, as a high ranking naval officer, immediately below Admiral Stark, who was the head of naval operations, what was your then interpretation of the meaning of the information that an enemy, supposed, was burning, destroying their codes and diplomatic papers?

[11286] Admiral Ingersoll. I considered that the information which we received regarding the destruction of the codes and which was sent out to the fleets as one of the two most important messages that were sent out by the Chief of Naval Operations during the entire period before Pearl Harbor, the other one being the dispatch stating that, “This is a war warning” in effect and that all hope of negotiations had broken off.

Now, the wording in that winds message did not say that we are going to be in a state of war or that hostilities now exist. It referred to a rupture of diplomatic negotiations or that the situation between the countries was becoming critical.

The importance of the messages regarding the destruction of the codes is this: If you rupture diplomatic negotiations you do not necessarily have to burn your codes. The diplomats go home and they can pack up their codes with their dolls and take them home. Also, when you rupture diplomatic negotiations you do not rupture consular relations. The consuls stay on.

Now, in this particular set of dispatches they not only told their diplomats in Washington and London to burn their codes but they told their consuls in Manila, in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Batavia to burn their codes and that did not [11287] mean a rupture of diplomatic negotiations, it meant war, and that information was sent out to the fleets as soon as we got it and it made no difference whether we ever got an execute from the winds after that or not, and that is why I think officers in high positions are vague about it. It did not make any difference.

Mr. Richardson. You then, as the second ranking officer in the Office of Naval Operations at the time you saw this execute, so-called, did not regard it as of primary importance as a basis for information to be sent to the field?

Admiral Ingersoll. If it had been a truthful message in the winds code the most it could have done was to have confirmed what we had already sent out and it was not as positive that war was coming as we had sent out.

Mr. Richardson. Have you any recollection in your mind that this so-called execute, or any so-called execute had thereafter been determined to be what we may refer to as a false alarm?

Admiral Ingersoll. I have since heard it but I did not know it at the time and I did not know it when I testified before the investigation of Admiral Hart and the Court of Inquiry.

Mr. Richardson. Did you communicate the fact of the disclosure of this so-called execute to your chief, Admiral Stark?

[11288] Admiral Ingersoll. I cannot recall definitely that I did or did not. I may have done so.

Mr. Richardson. Any message which came to your attention that you deemed of sufficient importance, it would have been your duty to have seen to it that your chief learned of that message?
Admiral Ingersoll. It would have been.

Mr. Richardson. Do you think it at all probable, Admiral, that the fact that you do not remember having acquainted Admiral Stark with the information you had as to this winds execute was because of the little importance you attached to that document?

Admiral Ingersoll. I think I should state it another way, that because of the little importance which I attach to it is the reason I have forgotten whether I did or did not.

Mr. Richardson. Do you know what officers brought it in to you?

Admiral Ingersoll. No; I cannot remember definitely.

Mr. Richardson. Was there more than one?

Admiral Ingersoll. There were several officers for whom it would have been a logical thing to do. There were half a dozen officers who might have brought it in.

Mr. Richardson. Now, let me ask you how definite your information is, Admiral, on when it was brought in, whether before or after December 7?

Admiral Ingersoll. I am not absolutely positive of that except that I am absolutely certain that it was after we had sent out the messages regarding the destruction of the codes.

Mr. Richardson. Well, in view of the startling commotion caused by the attack on the morning of the 7th it would be fair, would it not, to assume that your best recollection is that it came to you before the 7th?

Admiral Ingersoll. I think that is correct but I can not fix it definitely.

Mr. Richardson. Was there more than one such so-called execute that was shown to you or discussed with you?

Admiral Ingersoll. I can only recall one occasion on which officers brought in a message to me of that character.

Mr. Richardson. Would there have been any duty after acquainting you with that information, a duty to also bring it to the attention of Admiral Stark?

Admiral Ingersoll. They might have done so, but having brought it to my attention they would have trusted me to give it to him.

Mr. Richardson. And it would have been your duty to do so?

Admiral Ingersoll. If I had thought it was of sufficient importance.

Mr. Richardson. Is there any other recollection that you have which throws any light on this so-called winds execute that you are able to state to the committee at this time?

Admiral Ingersoll. No; none that I can think of.

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, in view of my preliminary statement that after an examination I feel that all the other questions I might otherwise want to ask the admiral are covered by his earlier testimony which has been twice presented and is in the record which will be of record in this committee also, I have no further questions to ask Admiral Ingersoll at this time.

The Chairman. The Chair has no questions. Congressman Cooper?

The Vice Chairman. No questions.

The Chairman. Senator George?

Senator George. No questions.
The Chairman. Mr. Clark?
Mr. Clark. No questions.
The Chairman. Senator Lucas?
Senator Lucas. No questions.
The Chairman. Mr. Murphy?
Mr. Murphy. Admiral, there is a message on page 251 of Exhibit 1. Will you hand that to the admiral, please? [11291] Did you ever see that?
Admiral Ingersoll. Which number, sir?
Mr. Murphy. On the top of page 251, Admiral. Do you recall ever having seen that message?
Admiral Ingersoll. You mean the one stating:

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.

Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir. I am wondering if there would be any possibility that you might have confused that with some other message, Admiral; that came into the Navy Department on the 7th of December and was apparently submitted to the receivers of magic.

Admiral Ingersoll. If that came in on the 7th of December I would have normally seen it on the morning of the 8th. I do not recall this particular dispatch now.

Mr. Murphy. Well, I am wondering. You said you saw one winds intercept and that is something that might appear to be a winds intercept and I am wondering if you saw that or if you saw something other than that?

Admiral Ingersoll. I do not recall it sufficiently well to remember what it referred to, what countries it referred to or the status.

Mr. Murphy. Well, you do not have any recollection now, [11292] then, do you, of what the winds intercept which you feel you saw or had called to your attention, you do not know what country that referred to either, do you?

Admiral Ingersoll. Except that the winds code required definite answers in accordance with the code and as I recall now the general tenor was in accordance with the winds code.

Mr. Murphy. You mean all three countries?
Admiral Ingersoll. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. Of one or two?
Admiral Ingersoll. I think it was all three countries, as I recall it.
Mr. Murphy. Now, then, you say that it was received after the messages had gone out to destroy the codes?
Admiral Ingersoll. Oh, yes.
Mr. Murphy. You sent those messages out on what date?
Admiral Ingersoll. I believe the date was the third or fourth, I have forgotten which. It is in the record.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, do you have any recollection in addition to this particular officer handing you—or in calling it to your attention, what did he do after?

Admiral Ingersoll. I have every recollection that they took it away with them when they left my office and that I never saw it again.

Mr. Murphy. Were you one of the persons who ever saw the [11293] magic on the regular distribution?

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes; I saw them. They were brought to my office.
Mr. Murphy. Now, do you have any recollection of ever seeing anything like this in magic form in the dispatch case that contained the magic?

Admiral Ingersoll. I do not recall having seen it and from what I know of the system it would not have been in the magic because it would have been a copy of a broadcast in plain Japanese.

Mr. Murphy. In other words, what—

Admiral Ingersoll. It would not have gone through the magic set-up system.

Mr. Murphy. In fact, if it had not gone through the magic system it would not get into Captain Kramer's hands for distribution as magic, would it?

Admiral Ingersoll. No.

Mr. Murphy. And if it had not gone through Captain Kramer for distribution as magic it would not be in the magic files, would it?

Admiral Ingersoll. I don't know enough about the magic files to know. It would undoubtedly have gone through his section for translation.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, there has been testimony here that the Chief of Naval Operations and apparently his group in Washington participated in a frame-up of Admiral Kimmel. Do you know of anything, of any kind of evidence of anything like that?

Admiral Ingersoll. I have not the slightest bit of evidence of anything of that kind, that anything of that kind occurred or was contemplated or was talked about.

Mr. Murphy. Well, there is a Navy Captain that has testified here to a frame-up. You don't know anything about any frame-up in the Navy, do you?

Admiral Ingersoll. I certainly do not and Kimmel was my candidate for that job when he was appointed. I mean by that when my opinion was asked I suggested Kimmel.

Mr. Murphy. There has also been testimony here to the effect that someone in the Navy Department, and on one occasion the witness said he had a suspicion of Admiral Stark, although he changed it once or twice, but at any rate at one time he had a suspicion of Admiral Stark that if there was a winds execute message that they had ordered it to be destroyed because they had failed to notify Kimmel, that they were hiding their failure in ordering the destruction of that paper. Do you believe there is any foundation for that charge whatsoever?

Admiral Ingersoll. I have never heard anything like that, sir, and I do not believe it.

Mr. Murphy. Well, there is a Navy captain, Safford, who put it in this record. You don’t know anything about destroying any papers, do you?

Admiral Ingersoll. I don’t know anything about it.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, there also has been testimony in the record to the effect that you had a recollection that on the night of December 6 you did receive a copy of the thirteen parts of the fourteen part message. What is your recollection on that?

Admiral Ingersoll. My recollection is very distinct on that.

Mr. Murphy. That you did receive it?

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. And who delivered it to you?
Admiral Ingersoll. I cannot recall who delivered it to me. I recall very definitely that some time on the evening of December the 6th or early in the morning of December the 7th that an officer came to my house and rang the door bell and woke me up and I went down and read the first thirteen—read what they told me were the first thirteen parts of a long message.

Mr. Murphy. Now, Captain Kramer——
Admiral Ingersoll. And I don't know whether it was before [11296] or after midnight.

Mr. Murphy. Yes. Captain Kramer testified that about a week or so before the night of December 6th he had awakened you and had taken to your house another message but he said he was rather positive in his recollection that he had not taken it to you and attributed your saying that you received it to faulty memory.

Admiral Ingersoll. Well, I asked Captain Kramer about that today and he says he did not personally bring it to my house. All during the period before Pearl Harbor I used to be awakened up at least two or three times during the week by officers bringing messages, not only of this character but of every character of operational character to my house and so I could not recall every officer who brought them there.

I seem to recall, and I may be mistaken, it was some other occasion, that the officers that brought this thing to my house that night asked for my identification card, which Captain Kramer would not have done, so that would identify it, if Captain Kramer said he did not bring it out to me, that some other watch officer brought it. I also recall that they told me that the message had been taken or would be taken to the President and to the Secretary of the Navy.

Mr. Murphy. Now, you were familiar with the two documents setting up the winds code originally, were you not?

[11297] Admiral Ingersoll. The one document setting it up.

Mr. Murphy. Well, there is one on page 154, if you will refer to it, Admiral. There is one on page 154 which says:

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

Then on page 155:

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcast.

You were familiar, were you, with both of those dispatches?

Admiral Ingersoll. I remember very distinctly the one which appears on page 154. That is the one which we have been talking about as the "winds." My recollection regarding this other one, which I believe is now called the hidden word, is rather hazy.

Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate, Admiral, when the officer did come into your office and referred to a winds intercept, what did it mean to you?

Admiral Ingersoll. It meant to me that they had received a message which was sent in compliance with this one on page 154.

[11298] Mr. Murphy. Meaning what?
Admiral Ingersoll. Well, relations between the United States and Great Britain and—that is, Japanese relations with the United States, Great Britain, and Russia were as stated in the code message there.
Mr. Murphy. Did you have any understanding that that meant war or merely a breaking off in relations, the message as such?

Admiral Ingersoll. As stated there on the face it says "rupture of diplomatic negotiations," and that is why it seemed to me that the messages regarding the codes were so much more in place.

Mr. Murphy. Well, now, in view of your testimony do you see any reason in the world why anyone in the Navy, large, great or small, would want to destroy any paper which would show any receipt of the winds message?

Admiral Ingersoll. No; I cannot see any.

Mr. Murphy. No other questions.

The Chairman. Senator Brewster is away. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart. Admiral, you regarded the code destruction messages, both our directions to our agents in the Far East and the Japanese directions to their agents in our country, you regarded those messages as the most important ones, is that not correct?

[11299] Admiral Ingersoll. I stated that I thought that the messages which we sent to the commanders in chief that the Japanese were destroying their codes and the message regarding the war warning on the 27th of November as the two most important messages that were sent out. The messages which we sent out to the Pacific, to Guam and Peiping, I believe, to destroy their codes and the authority which we gave to Admiral Kimmel to destroy codes on outlying islands and possessions were, of course, in direct consequence of the messages which the Japanese had sent out, because they indicated that the Japanese expected to be at war in a very short time.

Mr. Gearhart. In addition to that we sent the message to the naval attaché in the American embassy at Tokyo directing the destruction of codes there?

Admiral Ingersoll. It was the same general idea, of course.

Mr. Gearhart. So in your estimation the winds activate or execute was unimportant because the code destruction orders had gone out as far as America was concerned and had been received as far as Japan was concerned?

Admiral Ingersoll. I considered one of the two most important messages sent out and it made no difference in my opinion whether there had ever been a winds message or whether a winds execute was ever received.

[11300] Mr. Gearhart. Now, your impression now is that the order to our foreign agents in the Far East had been sent out before we received the winds execute?

Admiral Ingersoll. I am sure of that. That is, before we received the message which I thought was a winds execute or was told was a message sent in the winds code.

Mr. Gearhart. And you say that our orders had been sent abroad on the third or fourth?

Admiral Ingersoll. The message which we sent to the commanders in chief informing them that the Japanese had ordered the destruction of their codes in Washington, London, Manila and other places I believe was sent on the third or fourth. I think the messages to our own people to destroy their codes were a day or two later, although I do not recall the exact dates now.
Mr. Gearhart. But whether or not the winds execute was received before or after we had sent out our notices would render it unimportant after the code destruction messages had gone out, is that not correct?

Admiral Ingersoll. That is the point I am trying to make all along, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, the point that I am suggesting to you as a companion and not a corollary is this, that the winds execute messages became unimportant, and to use a legal phrase—

[11301] Admiral Ingersoll. I did not understand you.

Mr. Gearhart. That the winds execute would become unimportant even if received before, after our destruction of code messages had gone to the field, because it would be, as the lawyers say, it would become functus officio?

Admiral Ingersoll. Well, when we received the original message which set up the winds code that became important then because that would be the first indication that we would get of when the Japanese thought they would rupture negotiations or be at war if a broader interpretation were placed on it and steps were taken to monitor that message and, also, Admiral Noyes took steps to insure that he would receive information as soon as it was received in the code, but once we had learned that they were destroying their codes then the winds message lost its importance.

Mr. Gearhart. I agree with you on that, but I am asserting the further idea that it is equally important whether received before or after the order went out for the destruction of our codes in the Far East because if it came in before and the fact of its receipt initiated the order sending out the code destruction orders, when the code destruction orders went out it had served its purpose and it was no longer important. Does that sound reasonable?

Admiral Ingersoll. I am afraid I don't get your point, [11302] sir.

Mr. Gearhart. That is what I was thinking, Admiral.

The point is this: Whether it came in before the orders were sent out for the destruction of codes in our far outlying Eastern agencies or whether it came in after we had sent out the order for the destruction of our codes it was after the fact equally unimportant, is that not correct?

Admiral Ingersoll. Oh, in regard to the destruction of our own codes; yes.

Mr. Gearhart. Of course.

Admiral Ingersoll. It made no difference at all and the destruction of our codes was not based on that supposition. It was based on the fact that the enemy had issued orders to destroy his codes.

Mr. Gearhart. Yes; but it would become an element in the fact that war was about to commence?

Admiral Ingersoll. Any true winds execute would confirm the other.

Mr. Gearhart. And it would not be any more important if it were received before our orders went out for the destruction of our codes or whether it was received afterwards.

Admiral Ingersoll. No.

Mr. Gearhart. It would be exactly in the same classification after the order went out.

[11303] Admiral Ingersoll. For the destruction of our codes.

Mr. Gearhart. Yes.
Admiral Ingersoll. Yes.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, that is what the lawyers call functus officio if it came in first.

Now, the reason why you knew that the destruction of the codes meant war and not merely breaking off of negotiations was the fact that if they were merely breaking off diplomatic negotiations with us they would not have to destroy their codes?

Admiral Ingersoll. Not necessarily.

Mr. Gearhart. They could pack them up, as you said with their second suit of clothes and take them home if they were merely breaking off diplomatic relations.

Admiral Ingersoll. Correct.

Mr. Gearhart. So that it was a dead tip-off, a foregone conclusion in the estimations of the higher ranking military officers that the order for the destruction of their codes within our areas meant nothing but war?

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes; and the fact that the consulates were included cinched it in my opinion that it was war and not a rupture of diplomatic negotiations or diplomatic relations.

Mr. Gearhart. As a matter of fact, the high ranking naval [11304] and military officers all felt that war was coming sooner than it did come. Wasn't there much talk about that preceding the seventh?

Admiral Ingersoll. So far as the Chief of Naval Operations was concerned war could have come at any moment after the 24th or the 27th of November and it would have been no surprise.

Mr. Gearhart. You knew about the deadline date of the 29th of November?

Admiral Ingersoll. I recall that dispatch.

Mr. Gearhart. That was a date after which things were going to automatically happen and so when that date passed you began to watch for things and look for things to happen, did you not?

Admiral Ingersoll. Well, in all these things, sir, when you consider a particular dispatch you cannot consider that dispatch alone and nothing else. You have to consider all the other things that you can.

Well, at this time, that is, at the latter part of November, we knew that they were assembling vast forces of ships and men and landing craft in southeast Asia, in China, and Formosa; we knew they were on the move and it would only be a question of a very short time when they would land somewhere. There wasn't any question about it. It was only the exact [11305] spot and when. Admiral Hart was watching them with his planes. We knew they were going down the coast of China and down Indochina. We did not know until the last moment whether they were headed for the Kra Peninsula or for Thailand, but they were on the move definitely, and it was only a question of the hour as to when it would come.

Mr. Gearhart. You knew that Secretary Hull had delivered the American note to the Japanese here in Washington on the 26th day of November?

Admiral Ingersoll. On the 27th of November the dispatch was sent out stating that all—in effect, I am quoting now from memory—that all efforts for peaceful solution had failed.
Mr. Gearhart. Yes. And when you sent it out on the 27th, was it because you felt that the Hull message had been interpreted by the Japanese as an ultimatum?

Admiral Ingersoll. I am sure that Admiral Stark felt that they could not accept it and also, as I say, things were moving in the East, the concentration of troops, did show that war was coming very, very soon.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, as it now appears, as it now turns out, we find that the Japanese fleet sailed from Tankan in the Kurile Islands on the night of the 27th and morning of the 28th, a day ahead of their deadline date, but we did not [11306] know that until later, but the 29th went by, and that was their deadline date, and we knew what that deadline date was, and we had been told by the Japanese that things were going to happen automatically. Then when nothing happened on the 29th, nothing happened on the 30th, nothing happened on the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, and 6th of December, did that long delay after their fixed deadline cause any discussions among the higher ranking naval officers with whom you were in daily conversation in a search for an answer to the question?

Admiral Ingersoll. Of course, we had no definite information that a task force had sailed from the Kurile Islands for the Hawaiian Islands but the time of the break, that is, the time of hostilities was indicated would come very soon in the movements of the Japanese in the Far East. It could not go on many days longer or many hours longer. They were approaching a place where they were going to land.

Mr. Gearhart. That is, we knew about the moves of the Japanese fleet in the China Sea?

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes.

Mr. Gearhart. We had received reports on that. We knew the deadline date of the 29th, and because of those circumstances and others, perhaps, it was the belief that the Japanese would do something over the week end of December 1, that was the general supposition?

[11307] Admiral Ingersoll. I cannot say that it was the belief that something would happen over the week end of the—did you say the 31st?

Mr. Gearhart. The week end of—no, the 30th was in November. Over the week end of the 1st of December, after the 30th of November?

Admiral Ingersoll. No; I think not. The forces had not yet reached a point in the Far East where actual hostilities were implied over that week end.

Mr. Gearhart. But you expected action to follow the 29th very closely, did you not?

Admiral Ingersoll. We did not know when it would occur.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, they told you in their own message, didn’t they, Admiral?

Admiral Ingersoll. We did not know how soon after that they would actually start to move. For example, forces were in Formosa and forces were in the Pescadores. They could have gotten to Manila in 24 hours or in 40 hours.

Mr. Gearhart. That is the point. After the 29th they could have gotten there in 24 hours if they wanted to make that attack as soon as they could in Luzon?
Admiral Ingersoll. Yes.

Mr. Gearhart. In your conferences with the other high ranking officers did you not discuss the point that they could [11308] have attacked within 24 hours after the 29th and they did not? Did you not speculate on why they had not attacked, give the subject some consideration?

Admiral Ingersoll. There was a conference in Mr. Knox’ office every morning in which the Director of Naval Intelligence presented the whole situation, not only in the Far East but in Europe, the Atlantic situation, everything and everywhere, and the possibilities were discussed. They were sometimes discussed by the Director of War Plans, Admiral Turner, who would point out the implications, and so forth. The situation was reviewed every morning.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you attend those meetings?

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, then, I am asking you the question and you are in a position to answer it. Were there in those meetings after the 29th discussions of why after that had occurred, after we had read the Jap intercept that after the 29th things were going to happen automatically?

Admiral Ingersoll. I cannot recall now, sir, that that particular point was discussed as to why they did not carry out what they said they were going to do in that message.

Mr. Gearhart. All right.

Admiral Ingersoll. As a matter of fact—

Mr. Gearhart. Pardon me.

[11309] Admiral Ingersoll. As a matter of fact the messages received in these codes were usually not discussed at the Secretary’s conferences and mentioned as such because there were more officers present there than who knew of the existence of these messages.

Mr. Gearhart. All right. The discussions go on. You had had daily meetings on the 1st, on the 2d and the 3d and we find we get further and further away from the deadline date of the 29th. Did anybody in those meetings raise the question that possibly the Japanese were sailing to a distant point of attack?

Admiral Ingersoll. No; none that I recall.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, you are a naval expert, one of the greatest living of naval experts. Didn’t it occur to you when the time began to lengthen out into close to a week after the date the Japanese said things were going to automatically begin to happen, didn’t it occur to you as a strategist that the Japanese fleet was sailing to a distant point of attack?

Admiral Ingersoll. The question of an attack on Pearl Harbor, of course, was always considered as a possibility.

Mr. Gearhart. Remote or close?

Admiral Ingersoll. It was considered, of course, as a possibility because there was no other reason for putting [11310] anti-aircraft guns there or stationing fighting planes on the island or having radar installation or anything of that kind except to keep Japanese planes away. That was the only reason for putting them there, so that is why I call it a possibility.

Mr. Gearhart. Why is that your position?

Admiral Ingersoll. Now, as to a probability as to whether or not they would attack is something else.
Mr. Gearhart. Was that frequently discussed in your conferences, in your morning conferences?

Admiral Ingersoll. I do not recall in the few days immediately preceding Pearl Harbor that they expected the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor in the manner in which they did.

Mr. Gearhart. Were you surprised?

Admiral Ingersoll. I was surprised that Pearl Harbor was attacked but I was more surprised that the attack was not detected, that was my first reaction, and if I express it in the words which I used at the time, it was, "How in the hell did they get in there without somebody finding it out?"

Mr. Gearhart. Then I will ask you if that was in your mind and that was always considered a possibility in your considerations why was Hawaii never mentioned in any of the so-called war warning messages as a place of possible attack? Why were other places in the Far East always stressed as the places of [11311] expected attack?

Admiral Ingersoll. Because the places in the Far East were the only places of which we had definite information towards which the Japanese were moving.

Mr. Gearhart. Didn't the fact that the Japanese were constantly pressing their Honolulu confederates for reports on the movement of ships in Pearl Harbor direct your attention to the rather acute possibility of an attack at Hawaii?

Admiral Ingersoll. Now you are referring, I presume, to the dispatch regarding the location of ships in Pearl Harbor?

Mr. Gearhart. Yes; the series of dispatches that reached your desk.

Admiral Ingersoll. Well, as far as I am concerned personally I have no recollection of seeing that dispatch, so it did not occur to me personally.

Mr. Gearhart. Might I say, Admiral, it is not one dispatch?

Admiral Ingersoll. Sir?

Mr. Gearhart. Might I say it is not one dispatch? It is seven of them.

Admiral Ingersoll. I meant that series of dispatches I did not see.

Mr. Gearhart. Didn't they bring you all of them in that [11312] leather case and didn't you open the leather case with the key that was supplied you——

Admiral Ingersoll. No.

Mr. Gearhart (continuing). And read all of those messages?

Admiral Ingersoll. No.

Mr. Gearhart. You don't know anything about this inordinate interest on the part of the Japanese in respect to the movement of ships in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Ingersoll. There are two kinds of movements which would afford interest: one which was a movement of departure of ships in and out of Pearl Harbor would excite no interest whatever because we do that all the time and continue to do it in time of peace; that is, to keep track of the strategic location of ships. So dispatches asking for departures and arrivals would excite no interest. I think if I had seen the dispatch which referred specifically to the location of ships in Pearl Harbor, I would have been interested very much.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you see the intercept which divided Pearl Harbor into five areas and the dispatch which called upon the Japanese
agents at Honolulu to report each shifting and visit of ships from one area to another, as well as the ships coming in and out of the harbor entrance?

Admiral Ingersoll. I think I first learned of that dispatch when Admiral Hart asked me about it on his investigation.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, if you had seen those dispatches and they had been called to your attention, what would you have done?

Admiral Ingersoll. Well, in the first place I would have wanted to know why they were interested in the actual location of a ship within a harbor as distinguished from whether or not the ship just happened to be in port. My suspicion would be aroused if I had seen that dispatch I am certain.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, there was nobody to ask anything. All you had to do was read these messages and you would have to draw your own conclusions, so if you had seen those seven or eight dispatches, impatient demands from Tokyo that reports be given even if ships did not move——

Admiral Ingersoll. I do not recall seeing that dispatch.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, what would you have done as a naval strategist, what would you have thought as a naval expert if you had seen that message?

Admiral Ingersoll. If I had seen the dispatches which indicated interest in a specific location within Pearl Harbor as distinguished from being within the Hawaiian area, that would have indicated to me that they had an unusual interest in that place.

Mr. Gearhart. That would have been out of the ordinary, wouldn't it?

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes, it would have been.

Mr. Gearhart. What would you have done if those messages had been called to your attention?

Admiral Ingersoll. I think Admiral Kimmel should have been informed.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, the fact is he was not.

Now, getting back again to this 29th deadline, the passing of the 29th, the passing of the 30th, the passing of the 1st, the 2d and the 3d and the 4th and the 5th and the 6th and nothing happened, did that not suggest to your mind, and this is back to the same question I asked before, did it ever suggest to your mind as a naval expert that the Japanese Fleet was sailing and steaming to a distant target?

Admiral Ingersoll. It did not to me; no.

Mr. Gearhart. Why would it not?

Admiral Ingersoll. Well, in the first place I did not think that the Japanese would risk an air attack on Pearl Harbor. While it was a possibility and while the defenses for Pearl Harbor had been set up for that purpose, the Japanese had very extensive operations under way at the time. Reports indicated, of course, that they were going into the Dutch East Indies, right into the Malay Peninsula, in the Philippines. Guam, of course, we knew would fall like a ripe plum any time they wanted to take it, which meant that the area of their operations was extended over a considerable stretch of territory.

Furthermore, if all of the installations at Hawaii had been working, had the planes been on the alert, the attack there, in my opinion, might have been detected, and there might have been very serious damage to the Japanese.
It would have deterred them from making an attack of that kind.

Furthermore, if our fleet had not been in Pearl Harbor and it was at sea, in a place where it might have intercepted them, they might have incurred a very serious naval loss at that time.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, my dear Admiral, if you had read the intercept I referred to, you would have known that the Japanese knew that our fleet was in Pearl Harbor and the battleships tied up one next to the other in pairs.

Admiral Ingersoll. As far as that goes, the Japanese had been reporting our movements of ships all over the world for a good many years. All you had to do was to stand back of the road at Pearl Harbor, and you could see everything that was in Pearl Harbor, where every ship was anchored.

I had no doubt when I was there in 1940 that they were reporting everything at that time.

Mr. Gearhart. You said a while ago, the high ranking naval officers and military officers were of the opinion that the Japanese would not risk an attack against Pearl Harbor in the light of the great obligations that they were assuming in the event of an attack on the Southwest Pacific: is that not correct?

Admiral Ingersoll. I think that was the opinion of most of the people in the Office of Naval Operations, that the Japanese would not make an attack on Pearl Harbor, although, of course, it was a possibility.

Mr. Gearhart. Did it occur to you, and the high ranking naval and military officers, that they would not make an attack on the Southwest Pacific if the American Fleet was left on their flank?

Admiral Ingersoll. I did not understand that question.

Mr. Gearhart. Then I will state it again.

Did it occur to you that the Japanese would not dare to make the attack we expected them to make in the Southwestern Pacific if the American Fleet was left on their flank?

Admiral Ingersoll. I still did not understand the question, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Did it ever occur to you, or was it ever discussed among the officers you have told us about, the high ranking military and naval officers of the United States, that the Japanese would not dare to launch a major offensive in the Southwestern Pacific if the American Fleet was left in fighting shape on their flank at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Ingersoll. They could have made the attack at that time, in December, on the Philippines and Malay Peninsula, even on the northern part of the Dutch East Indies, when our fleet was in Pearl Harbor, and they could have gotten away with it in time.

Mr. Gearhart. Why?

Admiral Ingersoll. The question is why they came to attack us. They hoped to cripple us so it never would be a factor in the rest of the war.

Mr. Gearhart. Don't you think, as a naval expert, that they came to Pearl Harbor for the purpose of attacking our fleet and immobilizing it for a time, so it would make it possible for them to complete their conquest of the Southwestern Pacific?

Admiral Ingersoll. I think what you stated was their line of reasoning.
Mr. Gearhart. Did that enter into your conferences with the other high-ranking naval and military officers, that the Japanese might be thinking about immobilizing our fleet so that they could accomplish their objectives in the Southwestern Pacific?

Admiral Ingersoll. As I stated before, the result of our estimate was that the Japanese would not do that, that they were fully occupied with what they were doing at that time, and that the risks were too great.

Mr. Gearhart. In other words, it was the studied and carefully arrived-at opinion of the high-ranking naval and military officers in Washington that the Japanese would not launch an attack on our fleet in Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Ingersoll. I could not answer it and say it was the opinion of all. I think it was the opinion of those with whom I talked.

Mr. Gearhart. Did Admiral Stark express that opinion?

Admiral Ingersoll. How is that, sir?

Mr. Gearhart. Was that the opinion of Admiral Stark?

Admiral Ingersoll. I think it was.

Mr. Gearhart. And other people that you were in daily association and frequent conversation with?

Admiral Ingersoll. I think so.

Mr. Gearhart. If you felt there was any possibility of doing that kind of thing, making that sort of attack, you would, of course, have sent special messages to Admiral Kimmel and General Short?

Admiral Ingersoll. I think there is no question at all, if we had any information, any definite information that the Japanese ships were moving toward Pearl Harbor or if the Chief of Naval Operations felt that there was a distinct probability, as distinguished from a possibility that there was a distinct probability that Hawaii was in danger, I know he would have told them.

Mr. Gearhart. But you have told us that the destruction of codes, code machines, secret papers by the United States in the Japanese sphere, and by the Japanese in the American and British sphere, you told us that that meant war.

Why did not you send a notice to that effect and relay that information on to Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral Ingersoll. We did.

Mr. Gearhart. You did?

Admiral Ingersoll. That is, we sent word that they had ordered the destruction of their codes. We had previously told them on the 27th that war would come at any time.

Mr. Gearhart. Yes; but you did not say anything in the message of the 27th about the destruction of the codes, did you?

Admiral Ingersoll. We did not know it then.

Mr. Gearhart. What other messages did you send about the destruction of the codes before December 7, when it got there too late?

Admiral Ingersoll. We sent them the instruction, or the information that the Japanese had ordered their codes destroyed, I believe, on the 3d or 4th of December; I have forgotten the exact date. It was on the 3d of December.

Mr. Gearhart. Is that the only message that was sent on that subject, the one of the 3d of December?
Admiral Ingersoll. That was the only message sent on the 3d of December informing him that the Japanese were ordering the destruction of their codes. Here is the one on December 3 which reads as follows: It was sent to the commander in chief, Asiatic Fleet, the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, the commanding officer of the Fourteenth Naval District, which was Hawaii, and the commanding officer of the Sixteenth Naval District, which was Panama.

Highly reliable information has been received that categorical and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once, and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

There is another one on December 3 that says:

[11321] Circular 2444 from Tokyo one December ordered London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila to destroy machine. Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo. December second Washington also directed destroy all but one code of other systems and all secret documents. British Admiralty London today reports embassy London has complied.

Here is our dispatch to Tokyo, that is, to the naval attaché at Tokyo, Bangkok, Peiping, Shanghai, to destroy their codes. That was sent on the 3d.

Mr. Gearhart. On the 3d?

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes.

And Peiping and the Marine detachment at Tientsin were ordered to destroy on the 4th. Guam was directed on the 4th, and Admiral Kimmel was instructed on the 6th:

In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific islands you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confidential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency. Means of communication to support our current operations and special intelligence should of course be maintained until the last moment.

Mr. Gearhart. That should be interpreted, and should have been interpreted by Admiral Kimmel, as the most conclusive evidence that war was coming, and coming quickly?

[11322] Admiral Ingersoll. It was the intention to convey that when they were sent.

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. You felt war was coming and coming quickly; and even though you thought that an attack on Hawaii was a possibility, every message in which places were mentioned directed the attention of the Hawaiian commanders to the fact that war was expected in the Philippines, in Indochina, the Kra Peninsula, and possibly Borneo and Guam; is that not correct?

Admiral Ingersoll. The information that we had of Japanese forces on the move at that time, was in that direction.

Mr. Gearhart. And even though all these days passed after the deadline date of the 29th of November, you and the high-ranking officers with whom you were in daily conference, thought that possibly the Japanese were scheming on a distant point as a place of attack?

Admiral Ingersoll. As I stated before we had no definite information that the Japanese were on the move toward Hawaii, and I do not think it was the opinion of the officers in the Office of Chief of Naval Operations that they were moving in that direction.

Mr. Gearhart. You did not know where the fleet was; did you? Was not this Japanese Fleet lost for a week or [11323] two?
Admiral Ingersoll. I do not know. The information regarding the location of Japanese ships was the primary responsibility of the commander of the Pacific Fleet. He was the man who was in charge of the methods of determining the location of the Japanese Fleet through radio intelligence, as it was called.

There were very long periods of time, and at various times, when we never knew where the Japanese Fleet was. They might go to their mandated islands; and they might just as well have been on the moon, as far as we knew where they were.

Mr. Gearhart. There were times when you did know where the Japanese Fleet was?

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes.

Mr. Gearhart. You got in touch with the Japanese whenever you could; is that not correct?

Admiral Ingersoll. It is like people that talk too much. Whenever they use the radio too much they get in trouble, because then they find where they are; and when you maintain radio silence, you don't know where they are. It was only by means of the radio direction finders and the analysis of the traffic that they could in most cases keep track of where they were.

[11324] There were long periods of time when we did not know where they were, or when we did not know where particular ships were.

Mr. Gearhart. And, as a matter of fact, there were days following the 29th day of November, the dead-line date, when it was known to you, and the men with whom you were in daily conference, that the Japanese were in a position unknown to American Intelligence; is that correct?

Admiral Ingersoll. I believe, although I did not keep track of the position of all Japanese ships, that there were some ships at that time that they did not know where they were, but there were a great many Japanese ships that we did know where they were.

We had sighted them off the coast of Indochina, lots of them.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you have to do with the preparation of the war plan WPL-46?

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes. As a member of the joint board, that war plan was finally approved by the joint board, before it was sent to the Secretaries and the President for approval.

Mr. Gearhart. WPL-46 was a revised plan, was it not?

Admiral Ingersoll. It was a result of several revisions.

[11325] Mr. Gearhart. We had plan after plan, and it is the forty-sixth war plan? Does that mean that it is the forty-sixth plan that had been worked out for the defense of the Pacific?

Admiral Ingersoll. No.

Mr. Gearhart. Were there that many plans, or more?

Admiral Ingersoll. No. As I recall, there were numerous plans that had been prepared for different situations, and different enemies over a period of many years, and that simply meant war plans volume No. 46.

In the old Orange war plan, which had been in existence 5 or 6 years, there were four volumes, and each one of them had a separate WPL number.

Mr. Gearhart. WPL-46, though had been recently, just a short time before Pearl Harbor on December 7, revised?
Admiral Ingersoll. I believe WPL-46 was approved in April.

Mr. Gearhart. In April of 1941. Now, that represented the joint opinion of a committee, in reference to the problem which might come on?

Admiral Ingersoll. It is a little more than that, because WPL-46 was based on another plan, ABC-1, which was the American-British-Canadian joint plan, which had been approved on the highest political levels. Once that plan was approved, then the basic Army and Navy joint plan was [11326] drawn up, and from that the Navy war plan, WPL-46 was evolved.

Mr. Gearhart. Was the high level political plan, the ABC plan, was that the ABC-1 plan?

Admiral Ingersoll. ABC-1 was the plan agreed upon by the conversations with the British and Canadians, prior to No. 46.

Mr. Gearhart. And was it the adoption of that plan that made necessary the making of the general defense plan which became known as WPL-46?

Admiral Ingersoll. The existing plan, the number of which I have forgotten at the moment, was to be brought into agreement with ABC-1, which had been approved on high political levels.

Mr. Gearhart. Generally speaking WPL-46 was an offensive plan, was it not? It contemplated offensive action on the part of the Pacific Fleet?

Admiral Ingersoll. On the contrary: no.

Mr. Gearhart. Did it not involve the sending of the fleet down into the Marshalls before the Jap attack, and we became involved in this war?

Admiral Ingersoll. I haven't the plan here, but my recollection of the plan was that the offensive movement to the Marshalls did not take place until D plus 180, [11327] which was 6 months, and the reason for that was we did not have the auxiliaries or the transports sufficient for the fleet to make an offensive movement.

Mr. Gearhart. But the ultimate purpose of WPL-46 was to capture the Marshall Islands?

Admiral Ingersoll. No. The principal task in WPL-46 which was in agreement with ABC-1, was to defeat Germany and Italy in the Atlantic, and then defeat Japan. That was the basic decision.

Mr. Gearhart. WPL-46 did not relate to the Atlantic warfare, did it?

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Was it such a wide plan?

Admiral Ingersoll. It was a plan for the United States Naval forces wherever situated. The Pacific Fleet tasks were only one chapter of it.

Mr. Gearhart. What did it provide for the defense of Hawaii?

Admiral Ingersoll. Sir?

Mr. Gearhart. What did it provide for the defense of Hawaii?

Admiral Ingersoll. Is the plan here so I can see?

Mr. Gearhart. I was not going into details. Do you remember, generally, the underlying scheme?

[11328] Admiral Ingersoll. One of the tasks of the Pacific Fleet was to defend the west coast and our possessions in the Western Pacific. That included Hawaii as a part of it.
Of course, the primary responsibility for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands was an Army responsibility and not a Navy responsibility. Under the joint action of the Army and Navy the Army was supposed to defend Hawaii so that the fleet could leave it without any naval ships there. But the fleet was supposed to cover it in its general operations, to prevent the Japanese from sending an Army there to capture it.

Mr. Gearhart. Was not that the underlying theory of WPL–46 that we would defend Hawaii and defend the United States by an offensive action against the Japanese?

Admiral Ingersoll. The basic task, the major task of the Pacific Fleet in WPL–46, for the first 6 months was largely defensive.

My testimony in the Court of Inquiry has that outlined in particular, where I have enumerated each task, and whether or not it was defensive or offensive. The reason for that was because the instructions which were sent to Admiral Hart and to Admiral Kimmel in the war warning dispatch of November 27, directed them to take a defensive deployment [11329] preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL–46.

Mr. Gearhart. You have heard the old phrase, the best defense is often an attack, have you not?

Admiral Ingersoll. I have heard that.

Mr. Gearhart. Is that not the theory on which WPL–46 was based?

Admiral Ingersoll. Sir?

Mr. Gearhart. Is not that the theory on which WPL–46 was based?

Admiral Ingersoll. No, sir; it was not.

Mr. Gearhart. That is all.

The Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment.

The Chairman. May I ask, while you are getting ready, there is one question that occurred to me with regard to not only the Pacific Fleet, but with regard to all fleets.

Is it or is it not true that the man who has risen to the rank in the Navy that he would be in charge of a fleet of the proportions of the Pacific Fleet, or the Asiatic, or the Atlantic Fleet, is expected to know enough about the situation and keep himself enough informed about the situation to exercise judgment based upon information he gathers on the ground, and it is not necessary for Washington to feed him out of a spoon every little detail [113330] of information that he ought to obtain in the field, on the ground where he is expected to have judgment and use it?

Is that a fair statement of the expectation of all officers?

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes, sir; that is a very good statement, sir.

Of course, there is sometimes information which exists in the Capital which the commander in chief has no means of obtaining.

The Chairman. Yes.

Admiral Ingersoll. Or perhaps an expression of policy.

The Chairman. Yes.

Admiral Ingersoll. Then it is the function of the Navy Department to keep him informed along those lines.
For example, in connection with that I said here before, Admiral Kimmel would have had no means of knowing that the Japanese had sent out instructions to burn their codes, except I have heard that they did see the Japanese consul burn stuff in his back yard in Honolulu, but I mean he would have no means of knowing that the Japanese in Washington or London, were to burn their codes.

The CHAIRMAN. Would there be information that he would obtain in the field, or in the ocean where he was in command that Washington would not have?

You mentioned a while ago that he had to keep up with where the Japanese Fleet was.

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes; because the coordination of all of the radio direction finder stations in the Pacific was under the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, and it was his assigned task to make the analysis of radio traffic in order to keep track as best he could with where the Japanese ships were. He was assigned that task because of his physical location and proximity, and nearness to them. He could do it better than anybody else.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, as I gather your answer, there is information that could be obtained at each end of the line, that the other one could not obtain, and in case Washington obtained information that was important and that the commander in the field could not get, or does not have, it is the duty of the Washington offices in the Navy, and the same in the Army, to apprise the commander in the field of that information, and also it is the duty of the commander in the field to obtain information and act upon it according to his judgment, along the lines, within his discretion that they could not obtain here in Washington; isn't that true?

Admiral INGERSOLL. That is true.

I mentioned before that we were obtaining information regarding the movement of the Japanese along the coast of Asia.

That information was obtained by the planes which Admiral Hart sent out from Manila.

It was also obtained by reports from Chinese agents and I think they were transmitted to him, and he, in turn, transmitted that information to us.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Admiral INGERSOLL. A commander in chief is considered by the Navy as almost a viceroy out in his own field. They tell him in broad terms what he is supposed to do and they do not bother him with asking him how he is going to do it, or keep bothering him with whether he has done it.

The CHAIRMAN. Would not any naval officer worthy of a command of that sort feel that he ought to have discretion and he ought to be depended upon and may be depended upon to act within the field of his own information, and to gather all the information on the ground that it is at all possible from any source, and would there be many sources of such information in Hawaii, or in Manila, or anywhere in the Far East or in the Atlantic on the part of a commanding officer of the Navy?

Admiral INGERSOLL. When you put a commander in chief out there you want to leave him, as far as possible, free to do his job, and you trust that he is going to do it, and you help him in such ways as
you can, where there are things of which he has no knowledge himself.

The Chairman. That is all.

The Senator from Michigan may inquire. Pardon the interruption.

Senator Ferguson. That is all right.

Admiral, is there any question in your mind that the chief source of intelligence of the United States Navy in the fall of 1941 was in Washington? Is there any question about that?

Admiral Ingersoll. That the chief what; sir?

Senator Ferguson. The chief source of Naval Intelligence was being assembled and evaluated in Washington in 1941.

Admiral Ingersoll. I should say the chief source of evaluation was in Washington, but not necessarily the sources from which all of the information was obtained.

Senator Ferguson. I appreciate not all of it was in Washington, as far as obtaining information is concerned, but the evaluation of intelligence was centered in Washington?

Admiral Ingersoll. Generally speaking, I think that is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. And in what particular office was it? Who had authority, and whose duty was it to evaluate intelligence?

Admiral Ingersoll. Generally speaking, the evaluation of intelligence was done in the Office of Naval Intelligence. Of course in nearly every case the credibility of the information, or the reliability of the information, was determined there. But in some cases you had to refer, say, to technical bureaus as to whether or not reports on this or that mechanical device, or plane, and so forth, was worth anything.

In regard to the evaluation of the combined political and military information, particularly as it might pertain to its effect on operations, or the strategic distribution of our own forces, that sort of evaluation was done in the War Plans Division. We did not call it evaluation there. It was the estimate of the situation which the War Plans Division made in drawing up the war plans.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, you have two sources of information, or you have two kinds of information, the military, or naval in your case, and political information?

Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. And the political part of the information was never given to the Naval Intelligence, so that they had nothing to do with the evaluation of political information or intelligence, as far as it related to or controlled Naval Intelligence?

Admiral Ingersoll. I am not sure that that is correct, that the political information was never given to Intelligence. I think that is not correct. I think Naval Intelligence had practically the same information that everybody in Operations had, except possibly the direct contact which Admiral Stark had with Mr. Hull, and of course that was as good political information as you could have.

[11335] Senator Ferguson. And Admiral Stark also had direct contact with the President?

Admiral Ingersoll. Oh, yes.

Senator Ferguson. Now how did that information that Admiral Stark got from those two men on the political side of our Intelligence
get down into Naval Intelligence that was headed by Admiral Wilkinson?

Admiral Ingersoll. Well, as I said before, we used to have these conferences in the morning. Admiral Stark discussed matters at those times. He had a liaison officer, Admiral Schuirmann, or Captain Schuirmann at that time, who saw the State Department officials I think every day, and sometimes more than once a day, and Admiral Schuirmann would not only, when he came back from the State Department, report to Admiral Stark, but he would tell the other officers in Operations, War Plans, Intelligence. I am almost certain, and myself, what he had learned at the State Department that day.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know what the political policy, foreign policy, was in 1941, in December, in the early part, prior to Pearl Harbor, as far as it related to Japan?

Admiral Ingersoll. I am not sure that I know what you mean by the political policy. I was kept informed by Admiral Stark as to the more or less general process of our relations with Japan.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Then I will ask you this question: Did you know what our policy was prior to Pearl Harbor—and that was on the 7th—that if there was an attack on the Malay Peninsula, what the position would be of the United States of America, as far as the Navy or the Army were concerned?

Admiral Ingersoll. As far as the Navy and Army were concerned, what we would do was contained in our war plans and had nothing of course, whatever to do with whether or not there would be war between the United States and Japan if Japan went into the Malay Peninsula.

I do not think there was anybody in the Navy Department who knew what would happen if Japan went into the Malay Peninsula, or into Siam, or Thailand.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, as far as the United States Navy was concerned—and I am talking about OPNAV, which was your department—you had no idea as to what the position of the Navy would be in case there was an attack by the Japanese upon the British and/or the Dutch and no attack upon any American possessions?

Admiral Ingersoll. The position of the Navy would have been the position taken by the United States Government, and what the President would have recommended to the Congress about declaring war. The Navy's position would have been exactly the position of the United States.

Now the only thing we had to go by was the destruction of codes, which indicated that the Japanese expected to be at war with us soon, and they were moving in the direction of the Malay Peninsula. So the only inference you could draw is that very soon we were all going to be at war and there were going to be hostilities. But the Navy did not know what the President was going to recommend to the Congress.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that there had been war in the Atlantic without any recommendation to the Congress?

Admiral Ingersoll. I certainly did.

Senator Ferguson. How does that account then for your answer about war in the Pacific?

Admiral Ingersoll. Then it was not a legal war, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well, did you, as one of the chief officers in OPNAV, expect the same kind of a war in the Pacific as they had in the Atlantic if there was an attack on the British possessions and not upon America?

Admiral Ingersoll. No, because the Germans were still here in Washington and they had not declared war on us for all that we had been doing to them in the Atlantic.

[11339] Senator Ferguson. Then do I understand it was because of the burning of the codes that you got definite information that there was going to be war with America?

Admiral Ingersoll. There is no question about it.

Senator Ferguson. Now when did you come to the conclusion that there was going to be war with America? Will you give us the date as nearly as you can?

Admiral Ingersoll. You mean when Japan was going to be at war with the United States?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Ingersoll. I think everybody in the Navy was convinced that we were going to have war with Japan for the last 20 years.

Senator Ferguson. Can we get a little closer than that?

Admiral Ingersoll. As the situation got worse during 1941 there was not any question about it, that sooner or later we were going to be at war. The resignation of the Cabinet in Japan in October looked as though it was going to be a very, very serious situation, that there was no hope of a peaceful settlement. Again on the 27th of November, when Mr. Hull, I believe, informed the Secretary of the Navy that there was no hope of a peaceful solution with Japan, there was no question in the mind of Admiral Stark, I know, that war was coming very soon. The destruction of their [11340] codes brought it still closer.

The Chairman. The committee will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

Admiral, you will be back then.

(Whereupon, at 5 p. m., February 11, 1946, the committee recessed until 10 a. m. of the following day, Tuesday, February 12, 1946.)
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 1946

Congress of the United States, Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack.
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a.m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[11341] The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Admiral Ingersoll is still on the stand. Senator Ferguson was examining him when we recessed.

TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL R. E. INGERSOLL, UNITED STATES NAVY (Resumed)

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Ingersoll, we knew of a great war being conducted in Europe, and we knew how Hitler had gone into Poland and into Denmark, and so forth, that all of the actions of war had changed, and we were unorthodox, did we not?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes, sir; I have almost humorously called the war in the Atlantic as illegal. It was more in the nature of irregular.

Senator FERGUSON. Then you want to change your language from yesterday, that the war that we were conducting from August in the Atlantic was irregular rather than illegal?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes; I think that is a better description of it.

Senator FERGUSON. You use the word "irregular" after I used the expression unorthodox method of Hitler in his attacks without declaration of war.

Admiral INGERSOLL. In the Atlantic we were doing some things which only a belligerent does. There had been no declaration of war. We had done a great many things that under international law, as it was understood before the last war, were unneutral, and Germany just did not see fit to declare war on us on many occasions when she could have assumed our acts as unfriendly.

It was apparently to her advantage to have us as a nonbelligerent rather than as a full belligerent.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, now, you say that Germany, under international law, as I understand it, had just cause for declaring war from the overt acts that we had been committing?
Admiral INGERSOLL. That is correct, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Did you know as to any reason why we were doing these acts without a declaration of war? Was it in any way that Germany was to declare war first?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I cannot answer that question, sir. This is a question of high policy, of political policy. The Navy Department was ordered to do certain things, which it did.

Senator FERGUSON. As an officer of our Navy, in fact, next to the Chief, you knew that these overt acts were going on?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Correct.

Senator FERGUSON. And they were all irregular and not in accordance with the old idea of declaration of war?

Admiral INGERSOLL. And of international law, as it was understood.

Senator FERGUSON. All right.

Now, what I am getting at, in asking you these questions is why did not we anticipate the same thing in the Pacific with Japan?

Admiral INGERSOLL. There are two reasons for that. One was that we ourselves were not ready, or as ready as we wished to be to go to war in the Pacific.

As a matter of fact, I think it was in November that the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy wrote to the Secretary of State, and I believe sent a letter to the President, urging that nothing be done which would precipitate hostilities in the Pacific in order that we would have more time to strengthen our defenses in the Philippines, and to get more strength in the Pacific.

Senator Ferguson. Does not that then add strength to the supposition when we were not ready in the Pacific, and knew from all of these messages what was going on, that Japan would take advantage of our unreadiness and attack without a declaration of war?

Admiral INGERSOLL. On the 27th of November, I think it was, on rather the 24th of November—I am speaking from memory now—Admiral Stark's message to the Fleet stated that an attack could be expected in any direction.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Then on the 27th another message, the so-called warning message, was sent out?

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. But Japan had notified us on the 25th, the deadline message had she not?

Admiral INGERSOLL. I believe that was the date. I am not sure that that was addressed to the United States.

Senator FERGUSON. No, no.

Admiral INGERSOLL. We picked it up.

Senator FERGUSON. It was an intercepted message to her ambas-
sador.

Admiral INGERSOLL. Yes.

Senator FERGUSON. Then they altered it to the 29th, which was our 30th, was it not?

Admiral INGERSOLL. No, we would be one day earlier than she would be.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. Their 29th——

Admiral INGERSOLL. Is our 28th.

The CHAIRMAN. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. That is right.

[11346] They set the 29th as the date, that is correct, is it not? Admiral Ingersoll. I believe so.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did anything happen between November 29 and December 7 that would indicate to your department that war was not coming?

Admiral Ingersoll. On the contrary, Senator, the information which we received on the Japanese, or from the Japanese messages, was that they had instructed their embassies and consulates to burn their codes, and that was positive evidence that they expected to be at war with the three nations indicated in those dispatches very soon.

Furthermore, the Japanese forces were on the move, and we had sighted them moving in the Far East.

Senator Ferguson. All right. That is just what I want to get at. Here we find them moving in the Far East. We know that on the 29th, they have stated that that is the last day, and after that they said “Things are automatically going to happen.”

Did not that indicate to you that there were other movements on foot and not only those that we could see down in the South Pacific, going to Siam? As a Naval strategist, did not your department see that there was [11347] a movement and anticipate that the movement could have been towards Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Ingersoll. There was nothing in the Japanese movement which we saw which indicated any movement anywhere except in that direction to where we saw them moving.

However, we knew there were troops massed in Formosa, in the Pescadores, and on the coast of China, whose most logical destination was the Philippines.

And there might also have been other forces whose location we did not know, who might be going in any direction, or that might have been going towards Alaska.

Senator Ferguson. So it is the ones that were going “in any direction” that we did not have the information on, that we should have anticipated their action rather than those that we did know their movements into Siam and into the Kra Peninsula?

Admiral Ingersoll. That was the reason that Admiral Stark put into the war warning message the words—and I should digress for a moment.

The war warning message was sent to all three commanders in chief. It was sent to the Atlantic, to the Pacific, and to the Asiatic.

It was sent for action to Admiral Hart and to Admiral Kimmel, and it was sent to Admiral King in the Atlantic [11348] for information, because the action required by that dispatch was to take a defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks in WPL-46, which was the war plan.

It was not sent to Admiral King for action because he was deployed all over the Atlantic at the time and could not do any more.

Senator Ferguson. I am going to come back to that defensive deployment a little later.

Were you familiar, Admiral, with the fact that on the 2nd of December—

Will you show the Admiral Exhibit 37, page 39?
Were you familiar with that message that the President directed, as to the charter of three small vessels?

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes; I am familiar with that message.

[11349] Senator Ferguson. You released that message, did you not?

Admiral Ingersoll. I am not sure whether I released it or not, but I had a large part in preparing the message.

Senator Ferguson. What was the purpose of that message? It was three small vessels to form a defensive information patrol. They were to go over into the Camranh Bay, Cape St. Jaques, and one off the point of Camau.

Now I have those marked on here, and they are many miles away from the Philippines, in fact they are way over so they can watch the movement into the Malay Peninsula, are they not?

Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us why you wanted to have these three small men-of-war out in the Gulf of Siam watching for a movement on the British possessions?

Admiral Ingersoll. The reason that we wanted them there is because it says in the beginning of the dispatch the “President directs that the following be done as soon as possible.” That was our reason for doing it. Admiral Stark was told by the President to do it.

Senator Ferguson. Was there any reason given by the President to do it?

Admiral Ingersoll. Not that he told me. I do not know what he told Admiral Stark, except to do this. I do not know whether he told Admiral Stark his reason or not.

Senator Ferguson. You had no reason but you prepared the dispatch?

Admiral Ingersoll. Admiral Hart was already conducting reconnaissance off that coast by planes from Manila.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know the reason for the statement:

Filipino crews may be employed with minimum number Naval ratings to accomplish purpose which is to observe and report by radio Japanese movements in West China Sea and Gulf of Siam.

Why did they want to use Filipino crews?

Admiral Ingersoll. The only reason I can ascribe to that is that possibly Admiral Hart did not have sufficient enlisted men to do it, and it simply authorized him to use Filipinos to do it, and he could simply take a ship which was already manned by Filipinos, put naval officers on it, put a gun on it, hoist an American flag on it and it would then be a man-of-war.

Senator Ferguson. That is what you were trying to do at that time?

Admiral Ingersoll. That is what we were told to do, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You took it rather as an order?

Admiral Ingersoll. That is the reason it starts off the “President directs that the following be done.”

[11357] Senator Ferguson. This was not something being done by the Navy as the Navy, it was the Commander in Chief doing it?

Admiral Ingersoll. I am sure Admiral Stark would not have done this unless he had been told.

Senator Ferguson. Did you see any useful purpose that could be accomplished by these three small men-of-war as lookouts there?
Admiral Ingersoll. We did not initiate this movement, sir, and we were getting, I think, so far as Admiral Stark was concerned, sufficient information from Admiral Hart by the searches which his planes were making.

Senator Ferguson. Now that brings up a certain matter on planes. Admiral, could you tell me as to whether or not these were really men-of-war, so if they had been fired on it would have been an overt act against the United States?

Admiral Ingersoll. May I read this again more carefully?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. It was to have a cannon and machine gun. Admiral Ingersoll. It says in the beginning:

Minimum requirements to establish identity as U. S. men-of-war are command by a Naval officer and to mount a small gun and one machine gun would suffice.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Would that have been an overt act if one of these small boats had been fired on?

[11352] Admiral Ingersoll. It would have been.

Senator Ferguson. It would have been?

Admiral Ingersoll. It would have been an overt act on the part of Japan.

Senator Ferguson. That is what I am talking about. And, therefore, we would have been in war?

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?

Senator Ferguson. Is that your idea, Admiral? I mean as far as the overt act was concerned.

Admiral Ingersoll. It would have been an incident on which we could have declared war had we wished to.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Ingersoll. Of course, our men-of-war had been fired upon before, like the Panay incident, and we did not go to war. I do not know whether this would have resulted in war or not, but it might have resulted in war.

Mr. Murphy. Will the gentleman yield?

The Chairman. Will the Senator yield to Mr. Murphy?

Senator Ferguson. Not at the moment.

Mr. Murphy. It is already developed anyway.

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, I want you to look at page 2 of Exhibit 78. This is on the 30th of November. Would you just read that?

Admiral Ingersoll (reading):

Indications that Japan about to [11353] attack points on Kra Isthmus by overseas expedition x In order to ascertain destination this expedition and for security our position in the Philippines desire you cover by air the line Manila Camranh Bay on three days commencing upon receipt this dispatch x Instruct planes to observe only x They must not approach so as to appear to be attacking but must defend themselves if attacked x Understand British Air Forces will search ARC 150 miles from Tedta Bharu and will move troops to line across KRA isthmus near Singora x If expedition is approaching Thailand inform MacArthur x British mission here informed.

Senator Ferguson. The idea there was that we were going to put planes out over this same area to watch for movements into the Kra Peninsula, is that correct?

Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. And if they were armed it was not to appear that they were doing the attacking, but they were to defend themselves?

Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. That is correct?
Admiral Ingersoll. If attacked.
Senator Ferguson. If attacked. I assume the same thing was true with these three small boats.
Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct.
[11354] Senator Ferguson. With the machine guns and cannon.
Admiral Ingersoll. They would have undoubtedly defended themselves.
Senator Ferguson. That would have been the intention, is that correct?
Admiral Ingersoll. That is a right of self-preservation which you have.
Senator Ferguson. Now, will you look at the previous message.
Admiral Ingersoll. May I enlarge on this one a moment before I go on?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Ingersoll. You have a perfect right to fly planes over the ocean. You have also a right to send ships and men-of-war over the ocean. A plane may also approach a formation if it is a large formation and ascertain what is going on without being sighted. So that the chances of an overt incident occurring in the case of a plane search are very much less than that of a small ship trying to trail a force.
Senator Ferguson. So you would have anticipated that there would be more danger of an attack on the three small men-of-war than on these airplanes?
Admiral Ingersoll. Much more.
Admiral Ingersoll. We had a perfect right to observe what they were doing.
Senator Ferguson. Now, look at the previous message.
Admiral Ingersoll. Do you wish me to read it?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Ingersoll. This is from the Commandant of the 14th District of Operations:

Following received by British Consul from usually reliable source. Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on one December without ultimatum or declaration in order to get between Bangkok and Singapore. Attackers will proceed direct from Hainan and Formosa. Main landing to be made at Songkhla.

Senator Ferguson. That is in line with the same, is it not?
Admiral Ingersoll. Yes, sir, except that it now turns out it wasn’t a good prediction.
Senator Ferguson. Now, attached to the November 29th memorandum of conversations of the Department of State I find this language—it is headed “Most Secret”. It comes from—I can’t tell. Cordell Hull’s initials are on the paper that it is attached to. But this is the significant part:

[11356] R. A. F. are reconnoitering on arc of 180 miles from Tedta Bharu for three days commencing November 29th and our Commander in Chief, Far East, has requested Commander in Chief, Asiatic Fleet at Manila to undertake air reconnaissance on line Manila-Camranh Bay on the same days.

Now, that would indicate that that is from the British.
Admiral Ingersoll. It is from the British, I think.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. And it is asking our Asiatic Fleet send out a reconnaissance on the line of Manila-Camranh Bay on the same days.

Now, that is the day that the deadline was placed, the 29th. So we really expected an attack on the 29th, did we not?

Admiral Ingersoll. We expected an attack when the Japanese forces which were proceeding around the south end of Indochina would land. Whether they landed on the Kra Peninsula or on Thailand we did not know at that time, but depending on the speed they were making and the distance they were away at that time we could predict very closely what day they might expect to land there.

Senator Ferguson. Didn't every message we received after the 29th indicate to you that the attack was coming, that there was going to be war?

Admiral Ingersoll. After the 27th we were expecting it [11357] any time, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You were expecting it any time and as it moved on, let's say three or four days, didn't you anticipate that there was a movement on Pearl Harbor, because it was taking the number of days that it was taking; that every time a day elapsed it would indicate more that the movement had been for a longer distance, and therefore anticipate that it was Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Ingersoll. The answer to that is no; it was not anticipated. Otherwise they would have told them about it.

Senator Ferguson. Who would have told them?

Admiral Ingersoll. Admiral Stark would have told Admiral Kimmel he had had the slightest idea, I think, that it was probable and that an attack on Pearl Harbor was impending.

Senator Ferguson. So I take it you did not anticipate, as the days elapsed, an attack of that character?

Admiral Ingersoll. I testified in the Court of Inquiry that we did expect that there would be Japanese submarines off Hawaii, that there would be Japanese submarines off our Pacific Coast, that they would be on a line of communications between Pearl Harbor and our Pacific Coast, that there might be an attack on our outlying possessions, as there were at [11358] Midway and Guam, and there were submarines off Hawaii, there were submarines off the Pacific Coast, and they were sinking ships, I believe, on the 7th of December between Pearl Harbor and the Pacific Coast. We did not anticipate—I say we did not anticipate—I am sure Admiral Stark did not anticipate an attack of the character which the Japanese made at Pearl Harbor, although it was always a possibility; but he did not anticipate it as a probability.

Senator Ferguson. How did you appraise it?

Admiral Ingersoll. I did not expect an attack of that character on pearl Harbor as I testified yesterday.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I wish you would look at these two exhibits. They are from the British Admiralty to the United States on Saturday morning of the 6th.

Admiral Ingersoll. Do you wish me to read them, sir?

Senator Ferguson. They are in the record. If you will just refer to them so you will know what is in them, because I want to ask you some questions about them.
Admiral Ingersoll. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that those reports were in the State Department on Saturday indicating that there was to be an attack with 14 hours on the Kra Peninsula?

Admiral Ingersoll. I don’t know whether I saw this particular dispatch and I can’t find my initials on it. However, at that time the Japanese forces were in that area and the attack might have come, I suppose, with 14 hours or any time, depending on what hour they selected for their landing.

Senator Ferguson. Now, you have indicated that Admiral Stark and General Marshall gave to the President a memorandum—I think one is dated on the 5th of November and one the 27th—at least both of them used the statement “to give no ultimatum to Japan”, is that correct? You are familiar with that?

Admiral Ingersoll. I would like to see the document if I could to refresh my memory.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Admiral Ingersoll. The date of November 28 seems to stick in my craw at the moment.

Senator Ferguson. 16 and 17 are the exhibit numbers.

While they are getting those exhibits I will ask you some other questions.

This war that we were talking about yesterday and this morning in the Atlantic was, of course, a Government decision? It wasn’t the Navy alone, it was the Government, our Government, that had made the decision?

Admiral Ingersoll. Everything that the Navy did in the Atlantic, except the details of carrying out the various movements, and so forth, was on direction, I presume, from the President. Of course, there was a certain part which was a protection of lend-lease stuff which we were sending to Europe.

Senator Ferguson. Now, priority of goods to the Atlantic was being used because of what was being done in the Atlantic; isn’t that correct?

Admiral Ingersoll. I don’t understand what you mean by “priority of goods”, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you have any priority to the Atlantic? I am talking about airplanes, ships. Didn’t we send some ships from the Pacific, from Pearl Harbor, out to the Atlantic?

Admiral Ingersoll. We did. The basic strategy of the war plan in effect, WPL-46, and which was also derived from ABC-1, was to defeat Germany and Italy first and to maintain a strategic defensive in the Pacific until we could defeat Germany and Italy and then concentrate on licking the Japs. And that was the strategy followed in the war.

Senator Ferguson. We are not talking about the right or wrong of the decision. We are just trying to get the facts.

Admiral Ingersoll. So far as the Navy Department was concerned, that decision was made for it.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, and it followed out the decision?

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, wasn't this true, that because of what was going on in the Atlantic we had a shortage of equipment in the Pacific?

Admiral Ingersoll. We had a shortage of equipment everywhere. There were certain tasks assigned to the Atlantic Fleet in that war plan. There were others assigned to the Pacific. There were tasks assigned to the Asiatic Fleet. The Chief of Naval Operations having those tasks in view endeavored to allocate the forces available to him in the proper proportion which he considered as nearly adequate as he could, the forces which were sufficient to carry out the tasks which he had assigned.

For that reason the forces in the Pacific were by no means as strong as they should have been for an offensive war, and I think the whole Navy would not have been, at that time, strong enough to carry on an offensive war in the Pacific.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, if we had had the entire Navy of the United States in the Pacific——

Admiral Ingersoll. At that moment.

Senator Ferguson. At that moment, when the war started, it would not have been sufficient to carry on an offensive war?

[11362] Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And, of course, this was all known when the fleet was moved to Hawaii, was it not?

Admiral Ingersoll. It was.

Senator Ferguson. And the insufficiency of the equipment at Hawaii was known prior to the time and at the time the fleet was sent to Hawaii?

Admiral Ingersoll. It was.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, as a result of that, didn't that place an extra burden on the Navy, creating a hazard by placing the fleet in Pearl Harbor, to be on the alert at all times to save that fleet?

Admiral Ingersoll. I don't consider that a hazard, sir. One of the tasks of the Pacific Fleet—I should like to have the war plan here so that I can answer some of these questions a little more accurately—to be defend——

Senator Ferguson. All right, we will see that you get the war plan.

Admiral Ingersoll. Was to defend. One of the tasks of the Pacific Fleet was to protect the territory of the associated powers in the Pacific and prevent the expansion of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying to the enemy the use of land positions [11363] in that hemisphere, the Western Hemisphere.

You can't defend the Western Hemisphere, that is our west coast, from a position on the coast. You can only defend it from an advanced position, which was the Hawaiian Islands. That was the best central location from which the fleet could cover the Pacific coast, Alaska, and the Panama Canal.

If is had been on the coast, and the Japanese had made an attack on Hawaii such as they did, they couldn't possibly have caught them even if they had attacked some place on the Pacific coast. If the fleet had been actually in the place of attack and not damaged, it
couldn't have caught them, because our fleet as a whole was slower than the Japanese Fleet.

[11364] Senator Ferguson. Now, by virtue of the lack of equipment when the fleet was at anchor in Pearl Harbor, it was in a position of peril, was it not?

Admiral Ingersoll. I do not consider that it was, no.

Senator Ferguson. You don't consider that it was?

Admiral Ingersoll. No.

Senator Ferguson. Did it have plenty to defend itself with while laying in the harbor?

Admiral Ingersoll. If all of the measures for the defense of Hawaii were operating, that is, if the radar were operating, if the planes in Hawaii had been alerted, if the Army had been deployed, and if antiaircraft in position, if a distant reconnaissance had been conducted in the most dangerous sector by aircraft, or if surface pickets had been sent out so that warning of an attack might have been received in time for the ships to go to general quarters, in my opinion the fleet was safer in Pearl Harbor than it would have been at sea, but I do not wish my answer to be construed that I think it should have been in Pearl Harbor because there were other circumstances which might have caused it to be out of Pearl Harbor.

But purely from the question of safety, I believe it was safer in Pearl Harbor than anywhere else.

[11365] Senator Ferguson. Did you know at that very time that General Short had previously, on the 28th day of November sent a message to the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, which was distributed to the Secretary of War, War Plans, and General Marshall, that he had interpreted the message of the 27th as an alert to sabotage and he was alerted to sabotage and had liaison with the Navy?

Admiral Ingersoll. I did not.

Senator Ferguson. Would that have made any difference in your last answer, if you had known that the Army which was the one to defend the fleet in Pearl Harbor was only alerted to sabotage and had so notified the authorities in Washington?

Admiral Ingersoll. Well, in order to know whether the Army had taken proper dispositions, I would have had to have known what their plan against sabotage was, but if it had meant that their planes were all lined up, wing-to-wing, that their antiaircraft guns were not in positions which they were expected to be, and that their radar was not operating, then I would have said certainly that that was not a proper condition to defend the fleet and it was their responsibility to defend the islands.

Senator Ferguson. It turns out that that is just what happened, the planes were wing-to-wing in a sabotage alert, so they could not be destroyed by sabotage, the guns were not manned and the ammunition was not there.

Now, will you look at exhibits 16 and 17 in relation to the “no ultimatum.”

Admiral Ingersoll. After a hurried glance, remember it.

Senator Ferguson. You remember it now?

Admiral Ingersoll. But I should—may I digress for a moment to show you how your memory can trick you?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Admiral Ingersoll. Because I presented at a joint board meeting on apparently the day before this memorandum was sent, I presented at that meeting the arguments why we should not precipitate a war, and when I came back here to Washington 4 years later, I had forgotten completely that I had ever presented such a memorandum at the joint board meeting. The only satisfaction I had was that it didn't sound silly after 4 years. And this was based on that.

Senator Ferguson. Sometimes that is the test, isn't it, as to how it does sound 4 years later?

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes. [11367] Senator Ferguson. Can you let me see Exhibit 16? I want to call your attention to something in it.

There was the minutes of a meeting. Yes, here it is; on the bottom of page 2 of this Exhibit 16 I am reading:

Action of the United States in the Far East in Support of China—At the request of Admiral Stark, Captain Schuirmann gave a statement of the action taken at the State Department meeting on Saturday morning, November 1, at which a discussion was held on the Far Eastern situation.

Were you familiar with that?

Admiral Ingersoll. I probably was but I have forgotten it.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that Admiral Schuirmann had—here, it says this:

He pointed out that on August 17, following the President's return from the meeting at sea with Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it would be necessary for the United States to take action in case of further Japanese aggression.

Did you ever know that?

Admiral Ingersoll. I cannot recall it now unless it was phrased at the time in some other way in the note which was not at that time called an ultimatum. I have no recollection of anything being called an ultimatum at that time.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you know in Peace and War that this statement is in Peace and War?

Admiral Ingersoll. I have never read Peace and War, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I will read it to you. [Reading:] During the August 1941 conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill of Great Britain the situation in the Far East was discussed and it was agreed that the United States and Great Britain should take parallel action in warning Japan against new moves of aggression.

Did you ever know that that appeared in Peace and War published by our State Department on page 129?

Admiral Ingersoll. I have never read Peace and War, sir. I do not know anything that is in there.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, if you had known that that was our policy and that the President on the 17th, as indicated by Schuirmann—I am just giving the date that Schuirmann indicates—on the 17th of August, on page 556 of Foreign Relations, that the President gave to the Ambassador of Japan a note containing these words, a memorandum containing these words [reading]:

Such being the case, this Government now finds it [11369] necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may
Admiral Ingersoll. I probably did, now that you have read it, but I never considered that an ultimatum, nor do I not think I ever heard it called an ultimatum. I remember what you have read.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, but I was only reading what Schuirmann had said on the 3d of November 1941 at a meeting.

Admiral Ingersoll. I remember that now.

Senator Ferguson. Now, having in mind what I have read here that the President told to the Japanese Ambassador and also what I have read out of Peace and War, the parallel action statement; then having in mind this note of Winant’s coming in to us at 10:20 on Saturday morning, having in mind that we were sending out three small men-of-war over to the Gulf of Siam, having in mind the fact that we had sent planes out, how do you account for the fact that we did not antici-\[11370\] pate that Japan, when she was going to attack Great Britain or in the Kra Peninsula would not at the same time consider that parallel action was being taken and that, therefore, she would attack our fleet which was on her flank and the only deterrent in the Pacific for her movement south? How does it come the Navy did not anticipate that?

Admiral Ingersoll. I have said before that we anticipated that the Philippines, Guam, and our outlying possessions might be attacked by Japan, as they were. We also anticipated that there would be submarines in the Eastern Pacific. We did not anticipate that—at least Admiral Stark and myself did not—that Japan would make an attack on Pearl Harbor of the character that she did.

I do not agree with your statement that the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor was the only deterrent that prevented Japan from going into the Far East.

Senator Ferguson. What was the other deterrent?

Admiral Ingersoll. The Pacific Fleet had no train, it had no transports, it did not have sufficient oilers to leave the Hawaiian Islands on an offensive campaign and Japan knew it just as well as we did and she knew that she could make an attack in the area in which she did, that is, Southeast Asia and the Philippines, with impunity.

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, as I understand it, that \[11371\] we were almost utterly unprepared for war in the Pacific, on your last statement.

Admiral Ingersoll. I do not agree with that, that we were utterly unprepared for war. We were unprepared to make an offensive campaign, to undertake an offensive campaign in the Pacific and the task that was assigned to Admiral Kimmel in the war plan stated as follows, so far as offensive action was concerned.

Senator Ferguson. To make raids on the Mandates, were they not?

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes, but a raid is not a—is only a minor offensive.

Senator Ferguson. Well, she was to make raids on the Mandates. They had to have a train to make raids, didn’t they, of any distance?

Admiral Ingersoll. Well, he had a sufficient train for minor raids but he did not have a sufficient train, nor transports, nor troops to proceed across the Pacific and establish bases and establish the fleet in the Pacific.
Somewhere in this plan—I cannot put my finger on it—is a provision that he was directed to plan for the occupation of the Marshalls and Carolines and I think that 180 days——

Senator Ferguson. That was Truk, was it not, that she [11372] was to take Truk in 180 days, or not later, D-day plus 180 days?

Admiral Ingersoll. I think it was confined only to the Marshalls, sir. I am not certain if Truk was mentioned. However, he would have required a long time for such an advance in force across the Pacific because he did not have the force to do it and we knew it and the Japs knew it, too.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you know that Admiral Hart had sent a message to OPNAV, which was your department, on the 6th to this effect?

Learn from Singapore we have assured Britain armed support under three or four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you.

Admiral Ingersoll. I probably saw the dispatch but I cannot recall it now.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you know that we had assured Britain armed support under three or four eventualities?

Admiral Ingersoll. Only as it was provided in the war plan and in ABC–1, that should the United States be involved in war then we would do certain things, we had certain areas allocated for our spheres, but there was nothing in the war plan which obligated the United States, so far as I know, to go to the assistance of Great Britain if Great Britain was attacked. That was a decision which the Navy Department could [11373] not make.

Senator Ferguson. I understand the Navy Department could not make it; it had to be made by someone else other than the Navy Department.

Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct.

Senator Ferguson. But what I am trying to find out is whether or not the Navy Department had any information along this line so that she could have acted?

Admiral Ingersoll. I have no information that the Navy Department had any directions to go to the aid of the British, we will say, if the British were attacked.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, that would indicate, then, that all this information about the movement into the Kra Peninsula was of no value in alerting you here in Washington in OPNAV because you knew of no commitments that we had to go to the aid of the British.

Admiral Ingersoll. I cannot agree with that statement, sir, because all our own possessions, such as the Philippines, were endangered by the concentration of Japanese troops, which still remained in the Pescadores and the coast of China and in Formosa. They were a direct threat there and only 24 hours away from the Philippines; also Guam, which is a little farther away.

Senator Ferguson. But you did not anticipate an air [11374] attack on Hawaii?

Admiral Ingersoll. I did not think that an air attack would be made on Hawaii; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And when you testified to what was meant by “preparatory deployment” in the dispatch of October the 16th you
said this, and I will read part of your testimony and ask you whether you agree with it today:

I think the preparatory deployment that would not constitute provocative action and disclose strategic intentions against Japan referred more to the withdrawal of certain units of the Asiatic Fleet from the China Sea area toward the south-eastern Philippines rather than to any particular deployment of the Pacific Fleet, with the possible exceptions of sending out submarines for observation.

Is that correct?

Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct so far as carrying out the tasks prescribed in the war plan. The withdrawal from the Manila area was a part of Admiral Hart's plan. Also, "take measures, whatever measures were necessary for the security of the Fleet at Hawaii" might be construed also as a part of a defensive deployment and, as a matter of fact, Admiral Kimmel in his own war plan had just such measures prescribed by him at the time we were not at war with Japan, [11375] in what he called the first phase.

Senator Ferguson. Now let us come back to Washington on the day of the 6th. Do you remember the 6th of December in relation to your work, anything happening up until the time that you went home that was unusual as far as messages were concerned or information?

Admiral Ingersoll. Well, all of those days were busy days.

Senator Ferguson. I appreciate that.

Admiral Ingersoll. And I cannot pick out now out of the air a particular thing.

Senator Ferguson. Well, when did you first learn that there was a message coming in, being intercepted from Japan, that was indicating an answer to the message of Secretary of State Hull of the 26th of November? You know the message I am talking about.

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes. I never learned that it was coming in. The first I heard about it was when I was awakened some time on the very late evening of the sixth or the morning of the seventh and, as I said before, I do not know whether it was before or after midnight when I was shown the first thirteen parts of the message that had been translated.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Admiral Ingersoll. I never learned that that message was coming in and that it was being translated.

[11376] Senator Ferguson. All right. And I assume that you read it that night when they showed it to you?

Admiral Ingersoll. I did.

Senator Ferguson. Now, were there any other messages with it?

Admiral Ingersoll. I do not recall any now.

Senator Ferguson. Was there a pilot message with it?

Admiral Ingersoll. I never heard of a pilot message until I heard them talking about it yesterday.

Senator Ferguson. Well, do you know what we are talking about when we are talking about this pilot message?

Admiral Ingersoll. No, sir; I do not.

Senator Ferguson. I want to show it to you. It is called "pilot" because it merely indicates that there was a message to come and it was to be delivered when they were told to deliver it.

If you will look on the bottom of page 238, it is the message there from Tokyo to Washington, December the 6th.
The Vice Chairman. Of Exhibit 1, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, Exhibit 1. And it is translated on the 6th of December.

Admiral Ingersoll. I do not know whether I saw that or not; I do not recall it. Being dated the 6th the usual thing would have been I would have seen it on the morning of the seventh, when dispatches of this character were distributed.

Senator Ferguson. Well, there was a distribution, though, Saturday night.

Admiral Ingersoll. There was a distribution, so far as I was concerned, on Saturday night, of what they told me were the first 13 parts of a 14-part message and they also told me that those 13 parts had been or would be taken to Mr. Knox and to the President.

Senator Ferguson. And that being true I assume that you assumed that it would be taken care of and proper action would be taken on the 13 parts.

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes; and when I read the 13 parts there was nothing on which the Navy Department as such could that night take action. The gist of the 13 parts was a restatement of the Japanese position which we had known, of course, all along.

Senator Ferguson. As a matter of fact, the Secretary of State had turned it over to the Navy and said that he was through as far as any negotiations were concerned on the 27th, did he not.

Admiral Ingersoll. That was correct. That is, I have read that he said so.

Senator Ferguson. Well, you knew that at the time?

Admiral Ingersoll. I did not know what the Secretary said at the time but I knew when Admiral Stark sent out the message of the 27th that so far as the State Department and the Navy Department were concerned negotiations were finished, but everything after that was just for the record.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; just for the record. Now, Admiral, you knew where you had been Saturday evening. You could be reached at your home.

Admiral Ingersoll. So far as I knew I was at my home from the time I left the Navy Department and I do not know now what time I left the Navy Department. I was there many nights until 8 and 9 o'clock in the evening and I do not remember now what time I left the Navy Department but I was at my home.

Senator Ferguson. Did you contact Admiral Stark that evening?

Admiral Ingersoll. No; I did not.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know where he was?

Admiral Ingersoll. I do not think I did but I am certain that after having seen what this 13-part message had in it that if the officers who brought it there had mentioned Admiral Stark I would have told them not to take it to him that night because all it had in it was a restatement of the Japanese position from way back and there was nothing on which the Navy Department as such could have taken action.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you know it was of sufficient importance that Secretary Knox of the Navy got in touch with the Secretary of State that night and the Secretary of War and called a conference for 10 o'clock Sunday morning?
Admiral Ingersoll. I did not know at the time but I presume that the reason for the conference was because they were expecting the fourteenth part, which would probably have the meat in it.

Senator Ferguson. Well, you say that it only indicated what you knew before, the 13 parts; that is, that everything was through, that this was for the record. You read that from the 13 parts?

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Then why wait on the fourteenth part? What difference does it make as to what the fourteenth part said? This was all for the record and you knew what it was saying.

Admiral Ingersoll. I don't know what the fourteenth part—I did not know at the time what the fourteenth part was going to contain, of course.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Then you went back to your home and went to bed. You got up the next morning and what time did you get down to the office?

[11380] Admiral Ingersoll. I was down there some time between 8 and 9 o'clock Sunday morning.

Senator Ferguson. And was there a meeting at 8 or 9, between 8 and 9 o'clock?

Admiral Ingersoll. There was no scheduled meeting. Admiral Stark came in somewhere around that time and the officers began bringing in dispatches. I believe the fourteenth part was delivered to Admiral Stark that morning.

Senator Ferguson. About what time?

Admiral Ingersoll. I do not know; sir.

Senator Ferguson. Were you at a meeting with Admiral Stark in his office?

Admiral Ingersoll. I was in and out of the office, of course, all the time. Our offices were—

Senator Ferguson. Adjoining?

Admiral Ingersoll. Not adjoining, but there was an entrance way and the Secretary's room between them and I was in and out all the time. I have forgotten exactly what we talked about when he came in or whether we even talked, whether I even talked to him the moment he came in.

Senator Ferguson. Now, there was nothing happened at any meeting where you were present with Admiral Stark on Sunday morning after the fourteenth part arrived that indicated war?

[11381] Admiral Ingersoll. I do not recall that Admiral Stark after—in fact, I am certain that Admiral Stark after he received the fourteenth part of the message did not call me at that time. I do not think—or I think that I did not learn of the contents of the fourteenth part and of the instructions to the ambassadors to deliver the whole message at 1 o'clock until after Admiral Stark told me of his conversation with General Marshall.

Senator Ferguson. So that was some time after 11:30?

Admiral Ingersoll. It must have been.

Senator Ferguson. After 11:30.

Admiral Ingersoll. But I had on my—when I got down there in the morning I would have a stack of dispatches as big as that and things to go over in connection with other matters of the fleet.

Senator Ferguson. It had nothing to do with this fourteenth part?
Admiral Ingersoll. Nothing to do with me. Other matters of the department, which were down in my sphere and not up in the high levels.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know whether or not Admiral Stark talked to the President that morning?

Admiral Ingersoll. I do not know.

Senator Ferguson. After he talked with General Marshall [11382] you had a conversation with him?

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes. He told me that he had talked to General Marshall.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. And did you see General Marshall on the 7th?

Admiral Ingersoll. I did not.

Senator Ferguson. What was the conversation that you had with Admiral Stark after he had talked with General Marshall?

Admiral Ingersoll. As I recall, Admiral Stark said that he had, after seeing the dispatch regarding the delivery of the Japanese message at 1 o'clock, that he had called up General Marshall about it and at first he thought that he would not send anything to Admiral Kimmel because we had already sent him a lot of stuff and then he almost immediately changed his mind and called General Marshall and said he thought they should send it to Admiral Kimmel and to General Short.

Senator Ferguson. And that is the conversation you had with him that morning?

Admiral Ingersoll. That is as I remember it in general terms; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; in substance.

Admiral Ingersoll. I do not know whether he used those exact words.

[11383] 

Senator Ferguson. Yes. That is it in substance.

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. We do not expect the exact language.

Admiral Ingersoll. That is the substance; yes.

Senator Ferguson. And you that morning were working on something else and, therefore, there was nothing unusual except this one conversation with Admiral Stark.

Admiral Ingersoll. It is difficult to remember all of the details of a day because the officers, the heads of departments would come in to talk over other matters, there were dispatches to release, to send out, there were telephone calls to answer. I cannot recall the details of everything that happened that morning.

Senator Ferguson. But at least nothing happened that indicated to you about this 1 o'clock message of delivery being dawn at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Ingersoll. No. I think that that just did not hit me, that is all.

Senator Ferguson. That just did not hit you.

Admiral Ingersoll. As a matter of fact, I do not know when Admiral Stark told me about the delivery at 1 o'clock or delivery—yes, 1 o'clock.

Senator Ferguson. Do you think it was after the attack that he told you about that?
Admiral Ingersoll. No.

Senator Ferguson. Some time before?

Admiral Ingersoll. It must have been; I know it was before. Yes; it was before.

Senator Ferguson. But when he discussed it with you nothing hit you, as you say, that 1 o'clock meant dawn at Pearl Harbor and that there might be an attack there, because war was unorthodox, as we have found out in Europe, as we had found out in the Atlantic, and you were looking for unorthodox things, were you not, at that time?

Admiral Ingersoll. I have said all along, Senator, that I personally did not expect an attack of that kind at Pearl Harbor, so it is natural that it did not occur to me.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you know that Admiral Kimmel was not receiving the magic as far as the purple was concerned and the diplomatic messages?

Admiral Ingersoll. I am not sure whether I knew that or not, sir. That was a part of the mechanics of that complicated system, and I do not know whether I knew that Admiral Kimmel was not receiving it or not. I knew, of course, that he was a source of information regarding movements of ships obtained by radio direction finders and analysis of traffic.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Admiral Ingersoll. And I am not certain whether I knew whether he was not getting those dispatches or not. It is very difficult after 4 years to know what you now know as to whether you knew it before that time or whether you learned it after.

Senator Ferguson. I appreciate that. Well, now, that fact that you knew that he was getting radio messages as far as finding ships were concerned—there had been a dispute between Com 16, which was at the Philippines, and Com 14, which was at Hawaii, and on the 24th—I will ask you to look at the message, whether or not that did not indicate that they were going to take Com 16's word instead of Com 14's word because they were nearer to Tokyo?

Admiral Ingersoll. I am not familiar with the details on which that dispatch was based.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, is this true then, Admiral, that when Admiral Stark was there at the office—

Admiral Ingersoll. Sunday morning?

Senator Ferguson. No, when he was able to be reached, that you did not get these intercepted messages and that you did not have full, detailed knowledge of what was going on in the Pacific?

Admiral Ingersoll. What messages are you talking about, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. I am talking about these diplomatic messages in Exhibit 1 there, the ship movement messages that we showed you yesterday, that someone showed you in Exhibit 2.

Admiral Ingersoll. I saw a great many of those when they were brought around and I am pretty sure that there are some that I did not see.

Just, for example, what I was talking about yesterday: I am certain that I did not see at that time any of the dispatches from Japan directing their consuls and diplomats to destroy their codes. There are half a dozen or more, maybe fifteen or twenty. They brought in to me for release the message to our fleets, informing them that the codes
were to be destroyed. I remember that very, very distinctly because that is important. I am absolutely positive that I never saw the fifteen or dozen messages on which that dispatch was based.

So that when I now say that I do not recall seeing this message, I am not sure that I did see this or that message. I saw a great many, some of which I remember, and I have seen other messages which I now recall that I had no recollection of seeing.

I remember one, for example, which reported the movements of a British battleship up at Puget Sound. I had forgotten it completely until I saw it in this exhibit and then I remembered having seen it. I would have sworn on a stack of Bibles as high as the Washington monument last July that I [11387] never had seen it.

Senator Ferguson. Now, Admiral, as I understand it, then, all these messages were not delivered to you and who selected the messages to be delivered to you, or was it on occasions when Admiral Stark was absent that you were shown the messages?

Admiral Ingersoll. The Director of Naval Intelligence was the one under whom the distribution of these messages was made and the officers would bring these dispatches around and they would sometimes leave the folder on your desk or they would leave it with Admiral Stark's aide and sometimes they would be clipped to show you an important message. There were some times where I might be absent from my office for a good part of the day for conferences or other reasons and I might have missed a day's messages.

Senator Ferguson. Then what I am getting at, how could anyone evaluate these messages if they were missing some of them?

Admiral Ingersoll. As I told you before—

Senator Ferguson. That was not your job.

Admiral Ingersoll (continuing). When I first started my testimony and when I was describing my duties there, I did not have original cognizance of war plans, nor of Intelligence nor of communications. I was a funnel through which [11388] stuff was relayed to try to take the load off of Admiral Stark of all the details and that I endeavored to do and that was a busy job.

Senator Ferguson. Well, you were working then on the details. Could you tell us this: Who would know why planes were not being sent to Pearl Harbor for defense as was being requested by Admiral Kimmel and if they were being sent elsewhere? Who would have charge of that? Would you know about that if you were handling the details?

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes, I would know about that but the actual distribution of planes between the Atlantic and the Pacific was almost exactly about in accordance with the distribution of forces assigned to the Atlantic and Pacific in WPL-46. Also, the distribution of ships was almost in accordance with that.

Senator Ferguson. What about the distribution of planes on lend-lease, and so forth? Who had charge of that?

Admiral Ingersoll. I cannot tell you anything about lend-lease, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So you do not know what proportion was coming to America for its defense and what was going to lend-lease in the war effort?

Admiral Ingersoll. I cannot tell you anything about that.
Senator Ferguson. You haven't knowledge of that and 
[11389] even though you had charge of the details you cannot give us that?
Admiral Ingerson. No, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?
Senator Ferguson. Not at this moment.
Who represented the Navy on this lend-lease?
Admiral Ingerson. Admiral Reeves, I believe, was the Navy Depart- ment's representative on that.
Senator Ferguson. But that did not come to you?
Admiral Ingerson. No.
Senator Ferguson. Now I want to ask you just a few questions on the winds execute message. They showed you the execute message prior to the 7th, as I understand it; someone came into your office and showed you the message.
Admiral Ingerson. They showed me what was supposed to be one at that time.
Senator Ferguson. That is right.
Admiral Ingerson. And I believed it.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. And you believed it. Now, you never knew until after attack that that was not a genuine winds message?
Admiral Ingerson. I do not know that I ever knew until some time after the Court of Inquiry last year that that was not a genuine message. I believed it was.

[11389] Senator Ferguson. Yes, you believed it was and, therefore, your conduct was based in relation to that message upon it being a genuine winds message, execute message?
Admiral Ingerson. No, because it came in after the destruction of the codes and it did not mean anything, particularly after that. It was not important.
Senator Ferguson. That is what you say, but it was not because you thought it was phoney?
Admiral Ingerson. No.
Senator Ferguson. It was merely because it was considered information, is that correct?
Admiral Ingerson. The use that I made of it was only that it was a confirmation of the other.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, is J. M. Reeves—was he the Admiral in charge of lend-lease?
Admiral Ingerson. That is correct, sir. He was retired.
Senator Ferguson. That is the same man that was on the Roberts Commission, is he not?
Admiral Ingerson. He is.
Senator Ferguson. Yes. So the Admiral who was in charge of lend-lease, the distribution of these planes to lend-lease or to our de- fense, was the same as the one on the Commission, there is no doubt about that?

[11391] Admiral Ingerson. I do not know to what extent Admiral Reeves made decisions as to who was given what. I simply know that he was the officer in the Navy Department who handled lend-lease matters until they got down to the bureaus for the actual release of material.
Senator Ferguson. Yes, all right. Now I want to talk to you about the code messages that you did not see but which came to you
to be sent out to Kimmel and Short. You remember the destruction of codes?

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, does the destruction of codes necessarily mean war, that a country that destroys its codes is going to commit an overt act of war or declare war?

Admiral Ingersoll. It meant that to us, particularly the destruction of codes in the consulates.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, if that is true, then did it mean the same thing when we sent a message to Tokyo to destroy our codes and our code machines, that we intended to declare war and commit overt acts?

Admiral Ingersoll. It would have meant to Tokyo had they been able to read the dispatch that we expected to be at war with Japan soon but not necessarily that we were going to declare war on Japan.

Senator Ferguson. Now, isn't that exactly what it could [11392] have meant here when they were destroying their codes, that no overt act would be necessarily committed but they did not want this country to be in a position to raid their embassy and take their codes whether or not there was war or not? Isn't that true?

Admiral Ingersoll. I don't know why they sent out the dispatch, sir.

Senator Ferguson. But would you say that all Navy men would come to the conclusion that the moment that codes were going to be destroyed that that meant war between the countries?

Admiral Ingersoll. That was what we construed it and I think everybody construed it, that it would mean that.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, you know of no one in the high command in the Navy that construed the destruction of the codes in any other way than you construed them?

Admiral Ingersoll. I think everybody in the Navy Department construed the destruction of the codes as the fact that Japan expected to be at war very shortly with the three countries that were involved in that series of messages.

Senator Ferguson. Then we come to this conclusion, that at least on the 4th—I think that is the date they sent the messages out, was it not?

Admiral Ingersoll. Third or fourth.

[11393] Senator Ferguson. Third or fourth, that everyone in the Navy, as far as the high command was concerned, were alerted that war was going to occur between America and Japan?

Admiral Ingersoll. Those instructions were sent to certain commanders, to the commanders of the fleet, to the naval attachés in Peiping and to the Marine detachments and others and the purpose of sending it to them was to inform them that we expected to be at war—or that Japan expected to be at war with those countries in a very short time.

Senator Ferguson. And our country was one of them?

Admiral Ingersoll. And our country was one of them.

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, why didn't you tell them when you sent out those messages that the Navy Department, the high command, had interpreted these destruction of code messages as meaning immediate war? Why did you leave it open for two constructions?
Admiral Ingersoll. It was expected that they would understand it and if they did not understand it nobody asked any questions about it. We never had one inquiry from any commander afloat as to what the dispatches from the Chief of Naval Operations meant or what their import was, nor asking for any elaboration and in the absence of those we had to construe that his instructions were understood.

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you look on page 45 of [11394] Exhibit 37? That is the message sent on the 6th and I understand was not delivered until Monday. That is the one reading:

In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific islands you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confidential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency. Means of communication to support our current operations and special intelligence should of course be maintained until the last moment.

Did you release or know that that had not been delivered until Monday?

Admiral Ingersoll. Admiral Noyes—

Senator Ferguson. At least until after the attack?

Admiral Ingersoll. Admiral Noyes and I discussed that message yesterday, sir, and I think Admiral Noyes is prepared to give you the answer to it. I cannot answer your question that it was not delivered on the 6th or the 7th or any other date.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now let us go to page 40 and 41 of Exhibit 37.

Admiral Ingersoll. 40 and 41?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I want to read this and I want to ask you a few questions about them. Now, you told me that [11395] you did not see these messages, that you were only brought in certain messages that you released. When did you release these?

Admiral Ingersoll. The one on page 40 I released.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Then you did see this one?

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. You did not see the intercepts is what you had in mind?

Admiral Ingersoll. It says in here that there were—the consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London. I did not see all of the dispatches that were received on which this dispatch was based.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Admiral Ingersoll. As a matter of fact, I don’t think I saw any of them.

Senator Ferguson. Now, it says:

Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Manila, Washington and London—

now, this is the important part—

to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents.

[11396] Didn’t that indicate that they were only to destroy most of them and hold on to certain codes and code machines so that they could get more information?

Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct.
Senator Ferguson. And do you say that that meant immediate war?

Admiral Ingersoll. I said that they expected to be at war in a very short time.

Senator Ferguson. Just the destruction of a number of their codes indicated they were going to be at war in a very short time, was that the interpretation?

Admiral Ingersoll. It meant that to us.

Senator Ferguson. It meant that to you?

Admiral Ingersoll. And apparently that was true because within five days we were at war.

Senator Ferguson. Well, it is proven—

Admiral Ingersoll. It is proven it was a correct assumption.

Senator Ferguson. But you knew that they were keeping some of the machines because you were getting traffic over it?

Admiral Ingersoll. That is right.

Senator Ferguson. Now, circular 2444, on page 41, from Tokyo, December 1, ordered London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila—not Washington, Washington is not mentioned in this message—to destroy machine. Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo. December second Washington also directed destroy. All but one copy of other systems and all secret documents. British Admiralty London today reports embassy London has compiled.

Now, doesn’t that still leave in Washington some code machines and does that mean war?

Admiral Ingersoll. It meant they were hanging onto something until the last moment, that is all it means.

Senator Ferguson. And you were waiting for that last moment.

Admiral Ingersoll. This particular dispatch I did not see. It refers to the details and is largely for the purpose of enabling the various people who were concerned with cryptography to know what had gone out and what systems were being maintained until the last moment.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, this one talked about machines. The previous one only about codes and it did not say anything about destroying the machines here in Washington.

Admiral Ingersoll. The purpose of this is for the experts who do the cryptography to know what particular systems were being used. The other was for the laity, so to speak, that did not care whether it was a machine or a code book or what.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know of a message being sent out of ONI and the Army to the effect that the embassy here were burning their codes on the night of the 5th of December?

Admiral Ingersoll. I don’t know whether I saw it or not, nor whether I knew it.

Senator Ferguson. Did you have anything to do with answering Admiral Hart’s inquiry about the Phillips conversation, that he had with Admiral Phillips?

Admiral Ingersoll. I will say I had nothing to do about drafting the reply because I did not sit in on the deliberations for ABC-1 and so certainly would not—I was not familiar with it. That would normally have been answered in the War Plans Division by
Admiral Turner, who had original cognizance of most of that, of matters of that kind and who was a member of our delegation who sat in on the preparation of ABC-1.

Senator Ferguson. All right. And you did not discuss with Admiral Stark what our position was in relation to ABC-1 or ABCD?

Admiral Ingersoll. I am not sure whether they were talking about ABCD-1 at that time or ABC-1.

Senator Ferguson. Well, at least you did not discuss with Admiral Stark as to what our position was going to be if an attack was made in the South Pacific and we were not attacked?

Admiral Ingersoll. I do not know whether I discussed it with him or not. We talked about everything under the sun, but, of course, it was perfectly clear in everybody's mind that if the United States possessions were not attacked that there was nothing that the Navy Department could do about it until we got further instructions from somebody.

Senator Ferguson. And that is what you had discussed with Admiral Stark?

Admiral Ingersoll. I do not know whether I discussed it or not but everybody understood that position and I do not know whether a reply was ever drafted to Admiral Hart. War may have come before the question was answered.

Senator Ferguson. That is all.

The Vice Chairman. Any further questions?

Senator Lucas. I have a few questions.

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart. Admiral Ingersoll, I have a faint recollection of reading something in the public prints back in 1940 or 1941 that you were sent on a very secret mission to London by the President. Is that correct?

Admiral Ingersoll. You are correct except as to your date, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. When did that occur?

Admiral Ingersoll. Just to show again how memory can trick a person, Admiral Richardson, I read in the paper, had testified that I went to London in 1940 when I was Assistant Chief of Naval Operations and when Admiral Stark was Chief of Naval Operations. As a matter of fact, I went in December, very late in December of 1937, when I was Director of the War Plans Division and when Admiral Leahy was Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral Richardson was perfectly sincere in what he said.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, that was pretty early, before events began to develop.

Admiral Ingersoll. I got there probably—I believe on New Year's eve of 1937, so if you want to ask me any questions about it, sir, my memory is just that much worse. It is 8 years ago. I will be glad to answer anything that you care to ask me.

Mr. Gearhart. Did your mission have anything to do with anything which later became important and material to the inquiry that is now being conducted?

Admiral Ingersoll. I think it had none whatever. I am perfectly willing to tell you what I can now. I was sent over there for two purposes.
[11401] Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I am just wondering as to whether or not this committee has a right to go into what occurred in London in 1937 that has nothing to do with Pearl Harbor.

Admiral Ingersoll. I think it is germane to the inquiry.

Mr. Murphy. Well, if it is germane, all right.

Admiral Ingersoll. There were two purposes. The primary purpose was to investigate and to talk with the British Admiralty officials as to what we could do if the United States and Japan were to find themselves at war with Japan in the Pacific.

Mr. Richardson. United States and England.

Admiral Ingersoll. United States and England would find themselves at war with Japan in the Pacific, to explore all the means, what means could be used, what arrangements it would be necessary to make in regard to command relationships, in regard to communicating with each other, of establishing liaison officers and preparing certain codes and ciphers, and so forth.

The purpose next of the visit, the other purpose was to take up with the British the question of getting out of the qualitative limitations of the size of battleships which had been stipulated in the London Naval Treaty of 1935 and 1936.

[11402] There was a great deal of mystery about the visit, according to the News Week, I think it was, in which there was no truth whatever in the story in News Week, except that I had gone to London, and when I came back there was considerable curiosity, I believe, on the Hill as to why I had gone and I think it was finally elicited out of Admiral Leahy that I had gone over there to discuss the London Naval Treaty of 1936 with the British.

I brought back with me a paper called, "Record of Conversations" and that paper was signed by Captain Phillips, who was the head of the War Plans Division, the British Admiral, who was later Admiral Phillips and killed on the Prince of Wales shortly after the war began.

I was in conversation with—I had no conversations with anybody but—I will detail the conversations first.

I saw the charge d'affaire, who was the American charge d'affaire and told him the purpose. He took me to Mr. Anthony Eden, who was the Foreign Minister at that time. He said it was entirely an Admiralty matter and the Admiralty turned me over to the War Plans Division and my only discussions were with the War Plans Division. It was of no higher level than the two Directors of War Plans of the respective Navy Departments.

Mr. Gearhart. Do you mean the War Plans Division of the British?

Admiral Ingersoll. The War Plans Division of the British Admiralty staff and our own. Captain Phillips and I were opposite members or parts of our staffs. There were no commitments in this document of any character. It became a dead cat when ABC–1 was agreed upon, because that superseded everything that was in the record of the conversations, primarily, of course, because Germany was in the war at that time.

So that there was nothing in this talk or any agreements between the British and ourselves that you might say that was based on that record of conversations except possibly the original distribution of codes and ciphers because we got up a reserve stock which were distributed in
case they were needed anywhere, which gave the communication officers code and call signs, and so forth.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you establish and agree upon a code for communications subsequent to that visit?

Admiral Ingersoll. We took an allied code which the British already had. The codes were not distributed to our Navy. They were placed in reserve in various places in British hands. There were a large number here in the British Admiralty so that they could be handled by the communications officers if they had to use them, but they were never distributed to each other. None of the documents that I speak of, I mean call signs and radio intelligence or anything like that—I mean radio frequency organization.

[11404] Mr. Gearhart. Were the assumptions upon which these conversations were based that the United States and Britain would be in war together?

Admiral Ingersoll. The assumption was that the United States and Great Britain might find themselves both at war with Japan in the Pacific.

Mr. Gearhart. And your purpose in going there was to work out a tentative plan as to how each nation would cooperate with the other in the event that should occur?

Admiral Ingersoll. That is right, to find out what we could do, what forces we could expect. The British had to be a little bit careful about it because they did not know at that time whether they were going to have, in a year or two, a European war on their hands, and they could not state definitely what forces they could allocate to the Pacific at that time.

It would depend on whether they were involved in Europe.

Mr. Gearhart. This was in 1937?

Admiral Ingersoll. I got to London, I think, on the New Year's Eve of 1937, so the discussions were in the first two or three weeks of 1938.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, Britain was not then at war with even Germany.

[11405] Admiral Ingersoll. That is what I say.

Mr. Gearhart. She was looking very deeply into the future at the time you entered into these conversations, was she not?

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes.

Mr. Gearhart. At that time was war with Japan considered as being more possible than war in the European Continent?

Admiral Ingersoll. As I said, this is 8 years ago, sir, and I cannot at the moment tell the exact diplomatic situation that caused the President to send me at that time. I have forgotten just what the international situation as regards Japan was at that time.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you go there to discuss Japan or Germany?

Admiral Ingersoll. Japan only.

Mr. Gearhart. And because England was more disturbed with the possibility of war with Germany, they could not give you definite answers in respect to what they would do in the Pacific in the event they were involved in a war there; is that correct?

Admiral Ingersoll. It referred largely to the numbers of ships that they could send to the Pacific if they were involved at the same time in a war in Europe and in the Mediterranean. In
other words, they could not say definitely how many battleships or how many carriers or destroyers they could send.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, you have said that you discussed the possibility of the United States and England both being involved in a war with Japan. Did you discuss the hypothetical situation of Britain being involved and the United States not being involved, or the United States being involved and Britain not being involved?

Admiral Ingersoll. No.

Mr. Gearhart. All of your discussions were based upon the assumption that both might be involved; is that correct?

Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct, as to what we could do together.

Mr. Gearhart. Was there any discussion of the possibilities that the United States might not be interested in being on the side of the British, or the British might not be interested in being on the side of the Americans in the event that hostilities arose in the Orient?

Admiral Ingersoll. These conversations were on a lower level than that, sir. They were conversations of the two war plans divisions to get down to brass tacks as to what we could do in the way of ships, men, and planes.

Mr. Gearhart. Was any other nation drawn into the conversations? For instance, the Dutch?

Admiral Ingersoll. The Dutch did not participate in the discussions. The only way in which the Dutch came into the thing was as to whether or not the Dutch would be allies, or whether we could hope for benevolent neutrality on the part of the Dutch. We did not know what the Dutch would do.

The Dutch were not told about it, as far as I know.

Mr. Gearhart. No representative of the Netherlands sat in on those conversations?

Admiral Ingersoll. No. The only representatives of the United States were myself and the naval attache in London, whom I took along so that he could bring along with him what we said, and we could prepare notes when we got through, and we could remember what was said by each party, and there was Captain Phillips, and two other officers, and sometimes three or four other officers of the British War Plans Division.

Mr. Gearhart. The Captain Phillips you refer to was a British officer?

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes.

Mr. Gearhart. He was your opposite there?

[11408] Admiral Ingersoll. He was my opposite over there in War Plans. It was quite a low level conference.

Mr. Gearhart. Were any naval officers of the French Government present in those discussions?

Admiral Ingersoll. There was nobody present, sir, except two Americans, and most of the time three and sometimes four British officers.

Mr. Gearhart. Who were the Americans that participated with you?

Admiral Ingersoll. Captain Russell Wilsson, the naval attaché, who is now Vice Admiral Wilsson. I took him along to remember what we had said, and what the British had said, and we wrote it down after each meeting.
Mr. Gearhart. You spoke of two or three Americans.

Admiral Ingersoll. No; two or three British, and sometimes four.

Mr. Gearhart. And yourself and the naval attaché from the American Embassy in London?

Admiral Ingersoll. That is right.

Mr. Gearhart. Before you returned to Washington, did you have any conversations independently with the French, the Belgians, or the Dutch in which you discussed the same general subject?

Admiral Ingersoll. I never talked about this thing [11400] with anybody except the three or four British officers that I told you about.

Senator Lucas. How about the Irish?

Mr. Gearhart. All right. Did you have any discussions with the Irish?

Admiral Ingersoll. Unless some of the British officers were Irish, I do not know.

Mr. Gearhart. That is not always so facetious, you know, because we were having discussions with Ireland later.

Mr. Murphy. What is going on about the Irish here?

Mr. Gearhart. And you were sent on that mission by the President?

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes, sir; I was called over to the White House before I went to London, to receive my instructions.

Mr. Gearhart. As you now remember it, will you tell us what those instructions were?

Admiral Ingersoll. The instructions were to explore with the British what we could do if we both found ourselves involved in a war in the Far East with Japan.

Also to take up the question regarding the limitation on the size of capital ships which was stipulated in the London Treaty of 1936. I am not certain whether [11410] I got the latter instructions from the President or from Admiral Leahy about the capital ships.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, will you say whether or not it was 1936 or 1937 that you made the trip?

Admiral Ingersoll. I stated definitely, sir, that it was in the latter part of December of 1936 that I arrived in London, I believe on New Year's Eve, of 1937, and the discussions took place the first 2 or 3 weeks of January 1938. I was away from Washington exactly 30 days.

Mr. Gearhart. You have said over and over again you wanted to explore what the United States could do, and what the British could do.

Admiral Ingersoll. That is right.

Mr. Gearhart. The discussions did not go as far as what the United States would do, or what the British would do?

Admiral Ingersoll. It was not an agreement. There was nothing binding on anybody. It was simply to ascertain what could be done.

Mr. Gearhart. It had only to do with possible cooperative military action?

Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct.

Mr. Gearhart. I did not know it started so soon.

[11411] Thank you, Admiral.

Admiral Ingersoll. As I say, that record of conversations became entirely obsolete when the later agreements in ABC-1 were in effect in 1940 or 1941.
Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I have a couple of questions.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas of Illinois will inquire, Admiral.

Senator Lucas. Admiral, you are sure you did not talk about the attack on Pearl Harbor December 7, 1941, when you were in London there in 1937?

Admiral Ingersoll. I am sure we did not.

Senator Lucas. Now, Admiral, all through these hearings there has been an implication that there was some sort of wrong that we had committed in this country by having these conversations with the British and Dutch.

I would like to ask you what our position would have been on December 7, 1941, with respect to the English and Dutch if we had not had some preliminary planning with these countries prior to that time, on the theory that Japan might attack both Britain and the United States at the same time, which she did?

Admiral Ingersoll. It would have been indefensible.

Senator Lucas. What do you mean by “it would have been indefensible”?

Admiral Ingersoll. Rather inexcusable, not to have done so.

Senator Lucas. Well, would you care to elaborate a little further and give us your reasons, give the committee your reasons as to why it would have been inexcusable? That question has been asked over and over again in these committee hearings, that is, the possibility of having some sort of joint agreement, or the possibility of having some joint warning against Japan has been given here in these hearings, and an inference, at least an implication that it would have been highly improper for us to have done anything of that kind.

That is the reason I want to have you answer that question.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, will the Senator yield for a moment?

Senator Lucas. I want him to answer the question first.

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead and answer it.

Admiral Ingersoll. The answer is that everybody knew as indicated by this trip that I made to London in 1938, that sooner or later we were all going to be involved in a war in the Pacific which would include the Dutch, the Chinese possibly, the Russians, the British, and ourselves, and we had to make preliminary arrangements to explore what could be done to arrange for a means of communicating with each other, for establishing liaison, intelligence, and other things, so if war did come, we would not be floundering around for months until we got together.

Does that answer your question?

Senator Lucas. That answers my question.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, will the Senator yield?

Senator Lucas. Just a moment. Let me finish. You had a long, long time with the Admiral, and I just had a second or two.

Senator Ferguson. I consider the insinuations that were made because of some questions that I asked, and I just wanted to make it clear on the record.

Senator Lucas. You make it clear after I finish, Senator. If the shoe fits on the question I asked, you will have to wear it and explain it later.
Senator Ferguson. I do not have to make any explanations to you, but I will on this record.

Senator Lucas. That is all right. I am part of the record here.

Admiral in the event these plans had not been originated between the English and the Dutch and this country you state it would have been indefensible and inexcusable, and in that I agree with you.

Do you further agree with me that if that had not been done and considering the months that it would have taken floundering around to then prepare a joint defense against the peace-loving Japs, that we would have lost probably many, many men and material, and what not, as the result of our failure to prepare in advance?

Admiral Ingersoll. There is no question that we should have done just exactly what we did. Of course it was difficult to estimate just what would have been saved or not, but there is no question about it, we would have been floundering about for months until we got together and be able to cooperate and operate with each other successfully.

Senator Lucas. Now I want to ask you one question, Admiral, with respect to a question that was asked yesterday by Congressman Gearhart. He said:

Did it not involve the sending of the Fleet down into the Marshalls before the Jap attack, and we became involved in this war?

Admiral Ingersoll. I haven't the plan here, but my recollection of the plan was that the offensive movement to the Marshalls did not take place until D plus 180.

Can you verify that?

Admiral Ingersoll. I was trying to look for that here.

Senator Lucas. Is that in the War Plans?

Mr. Murphy. Section 3212, volume 1, of the Naval Narrative, page 103, subsection B.

Admiral Ingersoll. That is the joint plan.

Mr. Murphy. Page 103 of the Naval Narrative, section 3212.

Senator Lucas. Here is the Navy plan here that was prepared, I think, by Admiral Kimmel, Exhibit 114.

Mr. Murphy. Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 5.

Mr. Richardson. He is looking for WPL-46.

Admiral Ingersoll. It should be in the Navy Basic Plan.

Mr. Murphy. Navy Basic War Plan, page 103 of the Naval Narrative.

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes. That says there:

Prepare to capture and establish control over the Carolines and Marshall Island area and to establish an advance fleet base in Truk.

But there is another place in the plan where the date is given for that. Here it is. It is on page 30, in section 3215. It says:

The plan for the execution of task B of paragraph 3212, assuming the availability of approximately 30,000 Army troops in addition to the forces of the Pacific Fleet, and assuming that the Pacific will be scouted on 180 M.

Senator Lucas. What does that mean?

Admiral Ingersoll. That means 180 days after the declaration of war, or the declaration of mobilization. There was no mobilization date.

Senator Lucas. Now do I understand by that plan, or that part of the plan that you have just read, that before any real offensive would
be taken by the Pacific Fleet it would be necessary for them to make proper preparations, and 180 days was required for that purpose?

Admiral Ingersoll. It was not only for their preparation but for Navy Department to acquire the necessary tankers, store ships, ammuni-tion ships, troop ships, to train the troops for amphibious operations, and everything else which was required in an operation of that magnitude.

Senator Lucas. Under those plans were there any particular rea-sons why those planes that were under the control of Admiral Kimmel and were equipped for long-range reconnaissance should not have been operating as such after the receipt of the war warning message at least of November 27?

Admiral Ingersoll. I answered that question yesterday by stating I was very much surprised that the attack was not detected. If I had Admiral Kimmel’s plan I could read you something there as one of the reasons why I expected the planes would be out.

Senator Lucas. All right, hand the Admiral the Kimmel plan. I want to get that.

Admiral Ingersoll. Admiral Kimmel had this thing divided up into two phases. The first phase was one in which we were not at war with Japan, and the second phase was when we were at war with Japan.

Phase I. The initial phase—Japan not in the war.

That would be the status from the time the war warning was sent out, or even before that, until we were at war with Japan.

Phase I–A was the initial task. “Japan in the war,” and phase II, and so forth, were succeeding tasks. Now he lays down the following task in his plan for phase I:

Two initial tasks, Japan not in the war: Complete mobilization and prepare for distant operations thereafter.

Maintaining all types in constant readiness for distant service.

Maintain Fleet security at bases and at anchorages, and at sea.

Transfer the Atlantic reinforcements, if required.

Assign 12 patrol planes and two small tenders to Pacific Southern and similar forces to Pacific Northeast Naval Coastal Frontier on M-Day.

Assign two submarines and all submarine rescue vessels to Pacific Northern Naval Coastal Frontier.

Protect communications and territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere by patrolling with light forces and patrol planes, and by the action of striking forces.

Senator Lucas. What does he mean by that “striking forces”?

Admiral Ingersoll. That would be anything sent out in the way of a raid.

Senator Lucas. Yes.

Admiral Ingersoll. One of the principal things he speaks of in here, as to why I expected they would have patrol planes out, was the security of his ships in bases, at sea, or elsewhere after or during phase I, which was Japan not in the war.

Senator Lucas. Well, in other words, under the plan that was agreed upon by the Office of Naval Operations and Admiral Kimmel in the beginning this was to be a defensive war in the event Japan struck us?

Admiral Ingersoll. I would like to differ with you a little bit.

Senator Lucas. All right.

[11419] Admiral Ingersoll. In the first place, it was not agreed upon with Admiral Kimmel. Admiral Kimmel was told by the Navy Department. Admiral Kimmel did not have to agree to the plan.
He was given certain tasks in the Navy basic plan, so I would not say that Admiral Kimmel agreed to it. He was just told.

Senator Lucas. He was told by the Office of Naval Operations what to do?

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes.

Senator Lucas. And, as I understand it, under that plan in the event Japan struck us, at least for 180 days we were to carry on more or less of a defensive war in the Pacific before we started out on an offensive?

Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct, sir. There is also one other task in here which I did not give. It says:

Guard against surprise attacks by Japan.

That was task M.

Senator Lucas. Now, Admiral, if we were not going to start a real offensive until 180 days after Japan struck us, can you think of any reason whatsoever that Admiral Kimmel, who under the joint arrangement out there, had charge of the long-range reconnaissance planes, should not have had long-range reconnaissance operating from November 27 on through [11/30] to the time we struck, with whatever planes we had even if it were only three?

Admiral Ingersoll. I had every reason to expect that he would do that, and I was surprised that he had not done it.

As I stated the other day, I was very much surprised that the attack had gotten in undetected.

Senator Lucas. What reason could be assigned for not using the planes for long-distance reconnaissance if we were not going to really start an offensive for six months afterwards?

Admiral Ingersoll. I think that is a question that Admiral Kimmel would have to answer. I expected that it would be done not only because the planes were there, but because this plan inferred that it was going to be done. It never occurred to me that it was not being done.

Senator Lucas. As I recall, Admiral Kimmel testified that he was training his planes and his fleet ready for war, and I got the distinct impression from his testimony—and I may be wrong—that he was getting ready to move out on a moment's notice, and therefore was training his fleet to fight, and his men to fight.

But there cannot be any question that under this war plan he could not really have taken any kind of a serious offensive in the Pacific until some six months after the war [11/21] began?

Admiral Ingersoll. His first major operation and the occupation of bases in the Pacific was 180 days. He was not required to do that just then. He had other tasks there.

Senator Lucas. I see counsel shaking his head, and I do not want to be wrong.

Admiral Ingersoll. He had other tasks which would fully occupy his forces. He could not undertake a major operation, such as we did later in the war, like the capture of Guam, or the capture of Saipan, or Iwo Jima, he could not have done that with the forces he had at that time.

Senator Lucas. I agree upon that, too, but in view of the fact that he could not move forward with a major operation of any kind, that would be all the more reason, as I see it, why he should use these planes for reconnaissance purposes, at least do what he could, rather than use them all for training, which he testified that he did.
Admiral Ingersoll. Frankly, I expected that they were being used for that purpose, and it never occurred to me that they were not used for that purpose after the war warning. I think that is one of the reasons why the Navy did not send out any dispatches and ask them what they were doing. We know more or less, or we expected what they were going to do from their own plans.

[11422] Senator Lucas. On page 7385 of the transcript this question was asked by myself of Admiral Kimmel:

As I understood you to say this morning, on the question of an appropriate defensive deployment, it did not necessarily mean, in your opinion at that time, that you should use these planes for reconnaissance and search?

And Admiral Kimmel answered:

No, sir. I might say that the "appropriate defensive deployment", and "defensive deployment" used in that letter, I mean that dispatch, was a strategic matter, not a tactical matter. I was a strategic defensive deployment—I mean our understanding was—and that was primarily to make sure that when we deployed the Fleet, or put them in any position that they would not take on an offensive character or anything that the Japanese could consider as offensive.

Do you agree with that interpretation of what "defensive deployment" really meant at that particular time, and what the Navy had in mind when they sent out that telegram?

Admiral Ingersoll. The methods that Admiral Kimmel took for the security of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor were his business. It had nothing to do with the strategic deployment, although you might call it defense deployment. If he wanted to send out ships around Pearl Harbor, or the Hawaiian Islands, that was his business. He could have done anything [11423] in order to make his forces secure there without orders from the Navy Department, and we naturally expected that he was going to do that. That is what you have a Commander in Chief out in the distant areas for.

As I said once before, never did the Commanders in Chief question any of the Naval Operations' directives, or ask for further amplification of them.

[11424] Senator Lucas. Now, in that message of November 27, you state:

Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46X.

I understand you to say that it was the responsibility of Admiral Kimmel in the Pacific at that time to carry on any immediate defensive deployment that he thought was logical or reasonable or necessary under War Plans 46X?

Admiral Ingersoll. May I have that plan? The Navy basic war plan.

The first task is:

(a) Support the forces of the associated powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier, through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions.

That is an offensive task, although raids on sea communication positions is not a major operation.

Second task:

(b) Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area and to establish an advanced fleet base in Truk.
That is a major operation, and that was the one he was [11425] told he would not have to initiate until 180 days after war came.

The next task is:

(c) Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

That is partially offensive.

(d) Support British naval forces in the area south of the Equator as far west as longitude 155 degrees east.

That is defensive.

(e) Defend Samoa in category "D."

He didn't have to do anything about that, except that Samoa was under him and that was the designation of the category.

(f) Defend Guam in category "F."

That meant it was defensive.

(g) Protect the sea communications of the associated powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling as required by circumstances and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

That is a defensive task. He was already engaged in that at the time war came because he had been issued orders to escort some ships carrying Army troops to the Philippines and also some in the direction of Australia.

The next task is:

[11426] (h) Protect the territory of the associated powers in the Pacific area and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the western hemisphere by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere.

That is wholly a defensive task, although you might have to conduct offensive operations against forces attempting to do that, but the task itself is basically defensive.

(i) Cover the operations of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces.

He did that by being stationed in Hawaii.

(j) Establish fleet control zones defining their limits from time to time as circumstances require.

That is simply a technical control over ships passing through his area.

(k) Route shipping of associated powers within the fleet control zones.

That is also of a technical character.

Senator Lucas. Thank you for that explanation, Admiral. One more question.

I want to propound one inquiry with respect to codes.

There were a number of questions asked by the Senator from Michigan about codes. There was a message sent on [11427] December 6, 1941, from Commander of the 14th Naval District to the Office of Naval Operations here in Washington. That message says:

Believe local consul has destroyed all but one system although presumably not included your 1855.

In that message the Commander of the 14th Naval District was talking about the codes there, I take it?

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes.
Senator Lucas. The Commander of the 14th Naval District was Admiral Bloch?
Admiral Ingersoll. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Did the officials in Washington have every reason to believe that Admiral Kimmel knew of this information that Admiral Bloch sent to Washington about the fact that the local consul had destroyed all but one code?
Admiral Ingersoll. It would be a logical assumption because Admiral Bloch was a subordinate of Admiral Kimmel.
Senator Lucas. Was that true of General Short? Should General Short have known that same thing? Should General Short have received that same information from Admiral Bloch under the arrangement they had there?
Admiral Ingersoll. I don't know, of course, how Admiral Bloch got the information. He may have gotten it from Army Intelligence, for that matter.
Senator Lucas. Anyhow, Admiral Bloch knew on December 6, 1941, that the local consul had destroyed all but one system of the codes that they were using in Hawaii at that time, according to this message, that is, Admiral Bloch knew?
Admiral Ingersoll. Yes.
Senator Lucas. So that is the only reply that is in the exhibits with respect to codes. Those in Hawaii knew definitely what the Japs were doing at that particular point, plus the information that you had sent them with respect to the destruction of codes throughout the world?
Admiral Ingersoll. They knew that on that date.
There is one thing: I don't know enough about the Japanese system, but it is, I believe, a fact that no instructions were sent by Japan to Hawaii to destroy their codes there. I presume the answer is that it was sent to the Ambassador in Washington and he was required to instruct the consulate to do that, and Hawaii was included in that distribution, although Manila was instructed separately, and I presume it was so far away, that although it was a U. S. possession they did not make Washington responsible for informing Manila to do that.
Senator Lucas. That is all.
[11428] Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman—
The Vice Chairman. The Senator from Michigan.
Senator Ferguson. The Senator from Illinois refused to yield at the time that he made certain insinuations about certain questions that I had asked this morning, and had previously asked.
His former tactics had been to interrupt when similar questions were asked.
Now, it isn’t always possible in a record of this kind to make a statement as to why you are asking certain questions. This is an investigation of the facts to try to ascertain how this great catastrophe could have happened at Pearl Harbor, and we not be prepared both in Washington and in Pearl Harbor for it.
I have asked certain questions. I make no apology for any question that I have asked in this hearing. My sole purpose has been to try to ascertain the facts. But when a member of this committee makes insinuations that I have an ulterior motive in asking such questions, I
feel that it becomes my duty to make on this record crystal clear, not that I have any opinions at the present time on these questions, but as to why I am asking these questions about the agreement with the Dutch and with the British, so the first thing I want to take up—and I will speak from official [11430] documents, I will speak only from official documents—At the present moment I want to cite "Peace and War," which is a document prepared by the Department of State.

It came out not before Pearl Harbor, but it came out long after Pearl Harbor. I want to read from page 129. And this relates to why I have asked certain questions about whether or not there were agreements. This is on page 129 of "Peace and War."

During the August 1941 conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill of Great Britain, the situation in the War East was discussed, and it was agreed that the United States and Great Britain should take parallel action in warning Japan against new moves of aggression.

Now, Mr. Chairman, you will notice—and for the record—that it said

it was agreed that the United States and Great Britain should take parallel action in warning Japan against new moves of aggression.

Mr. Chairman, the record should show that on the day the President of the United States returned to the United States that he called in the Ambassador and he made these remarks and delivered this message to the Ambassador:

Such being the case this Government now finds it necessary to say to the Government of Japan that if the [11431] Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy or program of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding the legitimate rights and interests of the United States and American nationals, and toward insuring the safety and security of the United States.

On and after that date, certain correspondence was exchanged between the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States. Part of it is now in the record. It is clear that we do not have in this record all replies to that information.

Therefore, the record is not complete on that.

The Secretary of War, after the Pearl Harbor inquiry as far as the Army Board was concerned, thought that certain leads were to be explored—and this is not out of my imagination that I am asking these questions, it is out of the official records of the United States that these questions are being asked, and it is because we have been unable to get the answers that I am asking these questions.

Now, on page 10 of the Clausen report:

Memorandum for Major Henry C. Clausen, J. A. G. D.,
Subject: Unexplored Leads in Pearl Harbor Investigation:

[11432] In order to assist you in the investigation you are now making, I am suggesting herewith certain unexplored leads which, in my opinion might advantageously be followed up in order to complete the general picture in this matter. The present memorandum merely contains suggestions and will not be construed as a directive, or as in any way fixing the scope of your investigation.

Now, who is speaking those words? Myron C. Cramer, major general, United States Army, the Judge Advocate General.

And he was speaking those to a man who he was sending out to make certain explorations.
Now, what does he say? On page 11 of this official record of the War Department, I find this. This is one of the unexplored leads and that is why I have been trying to explore it here, because I find nowhere in this record that it has been explored, and I think the facts should all be shown.

What is this unexplored lead? It is this:

\[11\text{433}\] Now, let me go to some other leads in this official document. C on page 12:

Whether General Miles, Admiral Noyes, Colonel Bratton, or Captain Safford knew about the Anglo-Dutch-U. S. Joint Action Agreement in which case they would have known that the “War with Britain” message would necessarily have involved the United States in war.

That is one of the leads that I have been trying to follow up and to explore.

\[11\text{434}\] In August 1941 Mr. Churchill, in a speech, said this:

It is certain that this has got to stop. Every effort will be made to secure a peaceful settlement. The United States are laboring with infinite patience to arrive at a fair and amicable settlement which will give Japan the utmost reassurance for her legitimate interests. We earnestly hope these negotiations will succeed. But this I must say: if these hopes should fail, we shall, of course, range ourselves unhesitatingly at the side of the United States.

Mr. Churchill, on the 27th day of January 1942, made this statement on the floor:

On the other hand, the probability since the Atlantic conference at which I discussed these matters with Mr. Roosevelt that the United States even if not herself attacked would come into a war in the Far East and thus made final victory sure seem to allay some of these anxieties. That expectation has not been falsified by the events. It fortified our British decisions to use our limited resources on the actual fighting fronts.

As time went on, one had greater assurance that if Japan should run amuck in the Pacific, we should not fight alone. It must also be remembered that over the whole of the Pacific scene brooded the great power of the United States Fleet concentrated at Hawaii.

It seemed very unlikely that Japan would attempt distant invasion of the Malay Peninsula, the assault upon Singapore, or the attack upon the Dutch East Indies while leaving behind them in their rear this great American Fleet.

\[11\text{435}\] Now, it has been my purpose to try to ascertain what the facts are on this point.

What I have been trying to elicit from these witnesses is to find out whether or not those people feel Admiral Stark and General Marshall knew of these agreements or these understandings, or whatever you want to call them, as expressed by Myron C. Cramer and Mr. Churchill and the various other parties.
[11436] Now, the record should be clear that if all of these facts were known, and I am not now passing upon the facts, but if the agreement was understood and known by all parties, then it is sure that we, as a committee, should inquire into the facts to ascertain whether, if we knew from the message of Mr. Winant to the Secretary of State at 10:40 that an attack was sure to be made within 14 hours upon the Malay Peninsula, then all of our armed forces should have been alerted to the fact that it meant not only war with Britain or with the Dutch, but whether or not it didn't mean war with us.

That being true, I am trying to seek out and just ascertain the truth, what are the facts. If everyone knew about these facts, that there was parallel action, why didn't someone in our Navy, why didn't someone in our Army, draw the same conclusions as Mr. Churchill drew, that there was a great American Fleet, and it seemed very unlikely that Japan would attempt—a distant invasion of Malay Peninsula, the assault upon Singapore, and the attack upon the Dutch East Indies, while leaving behind them in their rear this great American Fleet.

Now, as I say, I want the record to show why I have been seeking light and facts upon whether or not there was an agreement. That is all that I am trying to ascertain. [11437] And to find out so that this committee can ascertain the facts. I am not passing upon whether or not this was a good or bad agreement. That is not my province as a member of this committee at this particular time. It is to only find the facts and I am not now commenting upon the facts. I am merely stating reasons why I have asked certain questions, to make it crystal clear that in my humble judgment this issue is material as to how Pearl Harbor happened, as to whether or not the Army and Navy really knew, as Admiral Stark said, "God alone knew," as far as he was concerned, and he couldn't find out what we were going to do.

Therefore, I want to place upon the record these facts, not as an apology, but merely to answer these insinuations that there was an ulterior motive in asking these questions. Let the record show that there is no ulterior motive. I have no motive. I have not sat at this table for any other purpose than to get all of the facts that the American people and the world might know how this catastrophe could happen to this great Nation of ours and that it shall never happen again. [Applause.]

The VICE CHAIRMAN. The committee will be in order.

Are there any further questions of Admiral Ingersoll?

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one [11438] statement.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas. I see we still have the same group that come in every day to do the applauding. The committee is very appreciative of that fact. It sounds like organized propaganda of some kind to me.

However, Mr. Chairman, I am deeply appreciative of this lecture that has been given here by the Senator from Michigan. The Senator from Illinois was not born yesterday. The Senator from Illinois does not apologize for anything that he has said either I have
watched this proceeding from the beginning, long before any hearings ever started. I think I know what it is all about.

I, too, want the facts, but there are some folks who want political facts. What the Senator from Michigan said doesn’t bother me one iota. I propose to go along from here to the end in the same manner that I have in the past. When I know the background of this thing, when I know of the statements made upon the floor of the Congress, long before hearings were started, and then when I hear about a non-partisan investigation dealing with facts alone, I am tempted to laugh.

I know what the evidence showed with respect to the parallel agreements. I know what some people tried to prove. All the way through with respect to that. So far as I am concerned I don’t care one iota if there was a parallel agreement. It wouldn’t make any difference to me. I was interested long before Pearl Harbor in my country and the defense of it and I did some things in the way of legislation that didn’t please a lot of people at that time.

We had a policy in this country and we followed it through, and a lot of the same people who disagreed with that policy previous to Pearl Harbor still are disagreeing with it here, and that comes from some of those who are applauding constantly when some point is made against what this Administration did. But I will never defend Japan.

That is all.

The Vice Chairman. Are there any further questions of Admiral Ingersoll?

Mr. Richardson. I have some questions.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Richardson is recognized.

Mr. Richardson. It is now 12:30, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman. Yes. We will take a recess until 1:30.

(Whereupon, at 12:30 p.m., the committee recessed until 1:30 p.m. of the same day.)

[11440] *Afternoon Session—1:30 p.m.*

The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order.

Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I think it is only right and proper that I should make a few remarks to the last remark of the Senator from Illinois, even though he is not here.

The Vice Chairman. The Chair hopes we can go ahead with our witnesses, Senator, as soon as possible.

Senator Ferguson. I think it is important, Mr. Chairman. I found nothing in those remarks that was speaking of the facts, but I do not think I should let stand his last remark when he said that he shall never defend Japan.

No one would expect the Senator from Illinois, or any other Senator on this committee, to defend Japan. I know of no question that has ever been asked that was for the purpose of defending Japan.

I realize that that remark was made for headline purposes, and I feel certain that it was made from a feeling that he resented what had been stated here from the official record.

I know that my part here is only to bring out the facts, and I shall always try to be nonpartisan as far as this hear-
ing is concerned. I have definite ideas on politics, but not in this hearing; because to me this is a hearing for all America, by an all-American committee of both Houses of this Congress; and it certainly should remain such, and, for my part, it shall.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Richardson will proceed.

**TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL R. E. INGERSOLL, UNITED STATES NAVY (Resumed)**

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to read into the record at this time a memorandum that I have from Commander Baecher in answer to an inquiry made by Senator Ferguson.  

Memorandum.

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson.
Subject: Opnav dispatch 061743 December 1941.

1. With reference to the request of the committee for information concerning the time of transmission and receipt of the subject dispatch, please be advised as follows:

2. Opnav dispatch 061743 was transmitted from Washington to Radio Honolulu at 5:54 p. m. 6 December 1941 Washington local time (10:54 p. m. 6 December 1941 Greenwich time).

3. The records of the commander in chief, Pacific Fleet, do not indicate the exact time of receipt of this message nor do they indicate the time of delivery to Admiral Kimmel.

4. The commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, has been requested to check the files for this information. If any further information is received you will be advised.

Admiral, there are one or two questions that came to my mind during the examination by Senator Ferguson. There was during part of 1941 and prior to Pearl Harbor what has been familiarly called here a shooting war in the Atlantic.

Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct. I termed it an illegal or irregular war.

Mr. Richardson. That is right. And that condition was due to the governmental decision to give aid to the Allies against the Axis Powers in Europe, was it not?

Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. And as a result of that it was recognized, was it not, by the Navy that the Atlantic and the activities in connection with the Atlantic became the primary theater of naval operations?

Admiral Ingersoll. In the general concept of the war the Atlantic became the primary theater for the purpose of defeating Germany and Italy.

Mr. Richardson. That is right.

Admiral Ingersoll. And that our general attitude in the Pacific was defensive, and the only operations we could carry out in the Pacific of an offensive character were those which our forces there would permit, and in the assignment of forces in WPL-46 the difference in the strategic conception between the Atlantic and Pacific was made on that basis.

I do not wish the impression to be gained, however, that because in the Atlantic the primary aim was to defeat Germany and the strategic conception in the Pacific was defensive, I do not wish to give the impression at any time that the Pacific was not on our minds just as much as the Atlantic, despite the broad strategic plan.

1 Hearings, Part 6, p. 2890.
Mr. Richardson. I am not so immediately interested in what was on your mind, but when it came to sending ships, or guns, or munitions of war, the Atlantic was the primary theater in which the Navy was operating, wasn’t it?

Admiral Ingersoll. The distribution of ships between the Atlantic and Pacific was that prescribed in WPL-46, almost down to the last ship. That, in turn, was based on ABC-1, which was a decision made on high political levels.

Mr. Richardson. I am not interested in your war plan now, or WPL-46, I am stating, as a matter of general knowledge [11444] to the naval heads, that the primary theater of the war was in the Atlantic in aid to defeat Germany and the Axis?

Admiral Ingersoll. That was the first object of the war plan.

Mr. Richardson. And that area, and the operations in that area, had, in effect, what we may call a priority on the assignment of ships and munitions of war, in order to carry on that activity, is that not true? Is there any dispute about it, Admiral?

Admiral Ingersoll. It had priority in a great many things; not in everything, no.

Mr. Richardson. As a matter of fact, do you know that up to December 1, 1941, there were 2,000 bombing planes sent under Lend-Lease by the United States in connection with the war against Germany and the Axis in Europe?

Admiral Ingersoll. I have stated that I have no information of my own as to what was done under Lend-Lease.

Mr. Richardson. Well, you knew that the bulk, the great overwhelming bulk of our munitions of war that we could move during 1941 and up to November was being put into the operations which were being conducted in what we may call the Atlantic Theater?

Admiral Ingersoll. I knew it from reading the papers; yes. [11445] Mr. Richardson. All right. That is all I have been asking about.

Now, then, there were no major ships taken out of the Atlantic Fleet and put into the Pacific Fleet before Pearl Harbor, were there?

Admiral Ingersoll. No. The distribution of ships before Pearl Harbor was practically that in WPL-46.

Mr. Richardson. Well, in fact you depleted, if I may use that civilian term, the already inferior Pacific Fleet by taking away from it three battleships, four heavy cruisers and a number of other accompanying ships, assigning them to the Atlantic, did you not?

Admiral Ingersoll. That assignment, however, was one made in accordance with the distribution of forces under WPL-46.

Mr. Richardson. I don’t care what it was done under. It was done, wasn’t it?

Admiral Ingersoll. It was done; yes.

Mr. Richardson. And the naval authorities in Washington had control of the war plans, did they not?

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes; they had control of the assignment of ships between the two oceans.

[11446] Mr. Richardson. And the staff in Washington tried to get another assignment out of the Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic, according to Admiral Kimmel, and he blocked it. Do you recall that?

Admiral Ingersoll. I do not know what assignment you are talking about, sir.
Mr. Richardson. Admiral Kimmel testified here that upon his return to Washington in the summer of 1941, he was advised by his Naval superiors that it was proposed to take from the then depleted Pacific Fleet an additional consignment of battleships, carriers, and other ships for assignment to the Atlantic, and he went to President Roosevelt and convinced President Roosevelt that that ought not to be done.

Do you have any recollection of such transaction?

Admiral Ingersoll. I know of no additional ships that were expected to be taken away from the Pacific Fleet, except the division of three battleships of the New Mexico class, which did come into the Atlantic, and which was in accordance with the distribution of ships under the war plan.

I know of no other ships that we expected to take away from the Pacific.

Mr. Richardson. Well, was your connection with this picture, Admiral, of such a nature that any determination by the naval chiefs in Washington that there would be a second division of the Pacific Fleet removed to the Atlantic in addition to the one which took three battleships that you referred to, would your position be such that any move like that by the Navy in Washington would be known to you?

Admiral Ingersoll. I am certain it would have been.

Mr. Richardson. Then how do you account for Admiral Kimmel's specific testimony as to his conversation with the President in detail objecting to a plan of the Navy to do just that?

Admiral Ingersoll. I do not account for it. I do not know.

Mr. Richardson. Then that attempted assignment, if it occurred, was unknown to you?

Admiral Ingersoll. The detachment of the aircraft carrier, three battleships, the division of cruisers and some destroyers, is the only one I knew about, and was the only one which I knew was contemplated. Of course, the object of that, I believe, as has been testified before this committee was for the purpose of conducting an attack on the Azores, or getting ready to do it.

Mr. Richardson. Were you familiar with the fact, Admiral, that one June 10, Admiral Stark found it necessary to advise the Secretary of the Navy, with a recommendation that no further units of any kind be transferred from the Pacific to the Atlantic at that time? That was way along in June, long after the first consignment of ships had been moved to the Atlantic.

What would be the occasion of Admiral Stark objecting if there had not been any move to send some ships out of the Pacific into the Atlantic. Have you any explanation that occurs to you as to how it might have happened?

Admiral Ingersoll. No; I cannot recall that, because there again it did not happen, and the distribution of ships was in accordance with the plan.

If I did hear it, I have forgotten it.

Mr. Richardson. Was this plan that you refer to, and which I am rather oblivious of, so sacred that under no circumstances would anybody change it?
Admiral Ingersoll. No. If the circumstances were such that it was to be changed, it would be changed. For example, when the ships were destroyed at Pearl Harbor, they immediately sent back to the Pacific the three ships that had come around in June.

We have to make distribution according to circumstances. There was nothing at that time that I can recall which would have required a redeployment of forces other than that as prescribed in the war plan.

Mr. Richardson. Now, when the original fleet was sent to the Pacific, it was far too inferior in strength as compared with the Japanese Fleet to undertake a real offensive operation against Japan in the Far East, was it not?

Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct.

Mr. Richardson. And when this first detachment that you refer to was sent to the Atlantic, that situation was intensified, was it not?

Admiral Ingersoll. It was intensified, except that the remaining ships were considered by the Chief of Naval Operations adequate to carry out the tasks which he had assigned to the Pacific Fleet, without those additional ships.

Mr. Richardson. All right.

Now, it was part of the war plan that immediately upon a state of war, Kimmel should move his fleet into a raid on the Marshalls, was it not?

Admiral Ingersoll. May I see the plan?

He was directed, I believe to seize a position in the Marshalls, and to conduct raids there.

Mr. Richardson. All right. That is all I want.

Now, would it be necessary, Admiral, in connection with such a raid, with the distance that the Marshalls are from Oahu, for that raid to have the protection of patrol bombers?

Admiral Ingersoll. If somebody can give me the distance from Midway and Johnston and Palmyra to the Marshall Islands, I can answer the question a little bit more accurately.

This is snap strategy now, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Maybe you can tell from that map [handing map to Admiral Ingersoll].

Admiral Ingersoll. Your distance from Pearl Harbor to Johnston, which is the closest, is 716 miles, and the distance from Johnston to the Marshalls looks to be at least, oh, 1,000 or 1,200 miles.

The radius of patrol planes out there was about 600 miles, or somewhere in the neighborhood of a 1,200-mile flight. They could not have been used in that operation to cover actual operations in the Marshalls area, unless he was able to establish a base in the Marshalls from which the planes could operate.

They could, however, cover the movement of vessels to the westward of Johnston and Palmyra and Wake to the extent that their radius could take them. That is 600 miles from those positions.

Mr. Richardson. Admiral Bellinger testified here that the plan contemplated in connection with the raid was to base patrol planes on Wake and Midway for the purpose of scouting the advance of the raid into the Marshalls, and that it would not be possible, from the standpoint of proper naval strategy, to undertake the raid unless
those patrol planes were available for the purpose of proceeding in front of the raiding squadron for its information and protection.

Now, is that good strategy, or is that good tactics, or isn't it?

Admiral Ingersoll. It is protection for the vessels, to inform them whether there are any enemy vessels or submarines in the area, but if they are based on Wake—or Midway, I should say, and based on Johnston, they could only protect to one-half of their total flight, and that means they would have to go back the minute they had gotten out as far as they could.

If their raid was 1,200 miles, they could protect to 500 miles and no more.

Mr. Richardson. Leaving out the question of how far they could go, was it necessary for the Admiral, in order to make the raid, to use his patrol bombers as far as they would go?

[11452] Admiral Ingersoll. If there were enemy forces in the area which could have interfered with fast-moving task forces like a carrier group or submarines, it would have been very helpful to have them.

Mr. Richardson. In the week prior to December 1941, would you say from your information gained on the General Staff that Admiral Kimmel could have attempted a raid on the Marshalls without the aid and support of his patrol planes?

Admiral Ingersoll. The answer, of course, is that whenever you undertake an operation, it is desirable to use all the force and strength you have in order to aid in its success. However, when the war warning was sent out, and there was a possibility—I only say a possibility—of an attack, and he was not going to undertake the raid immediately—and I do not know when he contemplated setting out on that—I think the first thing should come first, and I think the security of his fleet was the first consideration.

Mr. Richardson. Well, you told him to get ready to execute WPL-46 in the very dispatch you sent him, did you not, Admiral?

Admiral Ingersoll. That is correct; yes.

Mr. Richardson. WPL-46 would take him nearly 2,000 [11453] miles to the Marshalls, would it not?

Admiral Ingersoll. It would for the raids; yes.

Mr. Richardson. To make that trip to the Marshalls he had to have his patrol planes, did he not?

Admiral Ingersoll. I do not say that he had to. I say it would be desirable to have had them, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Would you think the patrol planes should have been left at home if he undertook such raid?

Admiral Ingersoll. I think the patrol planes should have assisted to the extent he could use them; yes.

Mr. Richardson. That was because the use of those patrol planes would offer material protection to such operation?

Admiral Ingersoll. To the extent that they could fly out and accompany them; yes.

Mr. Richardson. And if they started from Wake, they could fly clear to the Marshalls, could not they?

Admiral Ingersoll. If they were based on Wake, they could have flown from there to the Marshalls and back.

Mr. Richardson. Well, if Admiral Bellinger is right in his statement that they proposed that two squadrons of their patrol planes
should be based on Wake, then those patrol planes would be in a position to scout practically the entire trip of the task force in the raid, would [11454] not they?

Admiral Ingersoll. If the task force had departed from Wake, but it could not possibly have departed from Wake because there is no harbor at Wake.

Mr. Richardson. Oh, no.

But if the task force left Oahu, when it went by Wake there would not be any particular difficulty of the patrol planes joining it, would there?

Admiral Ingersoll. There is no question about that.

[11455] Mr. Richardson. That seems perfectly obvious.

Now let me ask you this: Was there anything, Admiral, from a naval standpoint, essential to the defense of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor except long-distance reconnaissance, adequate anti-aircraft gun defense, radar and a state of readiness in the Fleet itself to repel an attack? Can you think of any other thing that would be essential there in the defense of the Fleet at the base than those four things?

Admiral Ingersoll. Radar, distant reconnaissance, the deployment of the guns and the fighting aircraft?

Mr. Richardson. That is right.

Admiral Ingersoll. The Army fighting aircraft on the islands in a state of readiness?

Mr. Richardson. Yes.

Admiral Ingersoll. And sufficient warning?

Mr. Richardson. Yes.

Admiral Ingersoll. By all of these means to permit the ships to go to general quarters, as we call it, that is man all their batteries, they simply could not stay up all day and night to man their batteries. I think Admiral Kimmel's arrangement whereby he had condition 3—that is what we continued to have all during the war unless an enemy was present—was the proper state of readiness, as [11456] far as his ships, that is the battleships and cruisers, and so forth were concerned.

Mr. Richardson. Now, Admiral, the evidence here discloses, I think without contradiction, that Admiral Kimmel had available to him 48 patrol planes of the Navy and six patrol planes of the Army, making 54 patrol planes.

Now you recognize, do you not, that the use of such planes continuously in long-distance reconnaissance wears the planes out?

Admiral Ingersoll. I certainly do.

Mr. Richardson. And it requires, in order to conduct a constant reconnaissance, a frequent replacement of crews?

Admiral Ingersoll. We endeavored to get two or three crews just before the war, so that they could work the plane more than they could the crews.

Mr. Richardson. I know that. In fact they had not been gotten to Hawaii by December 7, had they?

Admiral Ingersoll. I do not know just what the proportion of crews to planes was at that time.

Mr. Richardson. Now do you regard it as essential for Admiral Kimmel to have put his fleet in proper condition to move with a declaration of war under the War Plan?
Admiral Ingersoll. That was the aim which everybody was trying at, to get in the very best possible state of \([11457]\) readiness both in matériel and training to carry out what they had to do.

Mr. Richardson. Did you contemplate that immediately on a declaration of war, which you sensed was in the very immediate future, Admiral Kimmel should have his fleet in shape to move directly, under War Plan 46, on this raid to the Marshalls?

Admiral Ingersoll. There was nothing in the War Plan which required him to initiate that movement on December 7, or the date of the declaration of war, or any other date.

Mr. Richardson. I did not ask you that.

Admiral Ingersoll. No. I say he could have chosen any date, and we did not expect him to move on any particular date, we expected him to move to carry out that task when he was ready.

If I can digest a little bit on that, I do not know that Admiral Kimmel, or anybody, knew what was the state of the Japanese fortifications and defenses in the Marshall Islands. Any movement of that kind I have no doubt would have been preceded by reconnaissance, possibly from carrier planes or possibly from some of the long-range Army planes which were fixed up for photographic purposes, and they would undoubtedly have made a reconnaissance to determine where the Japanese strength was, what islands were fortified, \([11458]\) and so forth, and upon the receipt of that intelligence base their plans.

As a matter of fact, I think we were trying to get out of the Army a reconnaissance of those islands in connection with the flight of Army planes from Hawaii to Australia. I believe it did not take place until after Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Richardson. Now, Admiral, do you seriously intend to tell this committee that this language in the dispatch of November 27 where you say “Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46,” means that Kimmel was to stay cooped up in Pearl Harbor with his fleet in order to make use of the 54 patrol planes he had to defend the space by distant reconnaissance?

Admiral Ingersoll. I didn’t make any such statement and I didn’t wish it to be implied.

Mr. Richardson. All right. What did you mean? You have told me that he could go to the Marshalls when he pleased and that he shouldn’t go to the Marshalls, in effect, until everything was ready at home. You have agreed that if he used his planes in long-distance reconnaissance that it would wear them out.

Admiral Ingersoll. No, I didn’t say that.

Mr. Richardson. Well, what happens to planes constantly \([11459]\) used in distant reconnaissance?

Admiral Ingersoll. You can’t use planes all the time continuously without at the end of a certain period, of course, changing engines and replacing the crews. The crews cannot stand it even if the planes could. But I didn’t intend to infer that all of his ships should remain in port simply to conduct an aerial reconnaissance. He could also have conducted some sort of a protective screen with his destroyers. He had lots of destroyers and submarines.

I am not trying to state exactly how he should have taken protective measures. I am not trying to state that he had sufficient strength
there even in the most dangerous sector to have a complete defense, but I think he should have done something when the war warning dispatch went out to improve the security of his fleet, and I don’t know that he did anything except to station one or two destroyers in the defensive sea area immediately outside of Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Richardson. Did you, in Washington, representing the Navy chiefs, regard training and preparation of the fleet for war tasks as more important or less important than using the fleet and the planes for base defense?

Admiral Ingersoll. Up until the time that the war warning dispatch was sent the primary tasks of the fleet out in the Pacific, assuming that the Atlantic was engaged in war operations, was to prepare itself for war by training and getting itself in the best material condition that it could get. They were engaged at that time in implementing the antiaircraft batteries. Up to that moment the task was training. But once the war warning went out it seems to me, and I have stated before in the Court of Inquiry, that thereafter training was not the primary task and had to go along as operations would permit.

As a matter of fact, all during the war we were doing training, one of the primary tasks was training ships, all during the war, for the Pacific. You can’t stop operations for training, but you have to make a reasonable adjustment.

Mr. Richardson. Just what training advantages from the Atlantic got into the Pacific?

Admiral Ingersoll. I mean all during the war after Pearl Harbor we had to continue training. All during the war.

Mr. Richardson. The point of my question is that Admiral Kimmel testified here that he had to make a choice between using his planes for the development of War Plan 46 or using his planes for the defense of the fleet in the base, that he couldn’t do both, and that he made the choice to prepare the fleet and not use the planes for distant reconnaissance.

Now, I am asking you as a naval official if you were confronted with the issue that Kimmel states he was confronted with whether it was permissible for him to reach the conclusion which he reached?

Admiral Ingersoll. As I have stated before, I think up until the time that the war warning dispatch was sent that his primary mission was to train his fleet and to get his ships in the best material condition. After that dispatch was sent I think training took a secondary importance.

Mr. Richardson. You realized in Washington, Admiral, that the most precious defense position we had in the Pacific was that fleet? Admiral Ingersoll. It was one of the most important elements. Mr. Richardson. It was the great important element, was it not? Admiral Ingersoll. It was, of the Navy.

Mr. Richardson. Yes. And it was based at Pearl Harbor? Admiral Ingersoll. It was.

Mr. Richardson. It never had at Pearl Harbor a sufficient consignment of patrol planes to enable 360 degrees proper reconnaissance around the base, did it?

Admiral Ingersoll. As far as I know it did not, and I don’t know that it ever had during the war.
Mr. Richardson. Well, it had very quickly after Pearl Harbor an immense increase in planes, did it not? Nearly 300 percent, wasn't it?

Admiral Ingersoll. Not immediately.

Mr. Richardson. Well, within a month; by the first of January?

Admiral Ingersoll. I don't know what it had by the first of January. I recall we endeavored to replace by depleting the Atlantic the number of planes that were required to be there by the War Plan. We took planes out of the Atlantic and sent them to Pearl Harbor because Pearl Harbor was defenseless so far as Navy planes were concerned. We had to weaken ourselves to a greater extent than we wanted to in the beginning of the war.

Mr. Richardson. The same thing was true up to December 7, wasn't it, Admiral, with reference to fighters for the Army, they never had enough fighters for a proper defense of that base, did they, up to December 7?

Admiral Ingersoll. I can't answer that question as to whether they had enough. I believe the Army did not have the number of planes in Pearl Harbor that they stated they wanted to have there, that were assigned to that place.

Mr. Richardson. Isn't it also a fact that up to December 7 neither the Army—it would be the Army—never had the number of antiaircraft guns of various calibers that would be fairly required to efficiently defend that base?

Admiral Ingersoll. I can't answer whether they had enough to efficiently defend the base. I seem to recall that the last information that we had from the War Department was to the effect that they did not have at Pearl Harbor a short time before December 7 the number of antiaircraft guns that they planned to have there.

Mr. Richardson. You recall, do you, Admiral, the letter that Admiral Nimitz wrote in which he advised the forces in the Pacific that they were sitting pretty, that the war, the big war, was in the Atlantic?

Admiral Ingersoll. I don't think I ever saw such a letter.

Mr. Richardson. I am referring to—

Admiral Ingersoll. Was that written while he was Chief of the Bureau of Navigation or Personnel?

Mr. Richardson. The statement is—there is another document that I can't lay my fingers on at the moment—but the statement is:

In fact, a few days after Pearl Harbor we received an official letter stating "I know you would like to have 20,000 men. We would like to give them to you." As I remember the exact wording "The war is in the Atlantic and we here in Washington think you are sitting pretty in the Pacific."

Would that be in your mind a fair picture, for a layman, at least, as to the attitude in the Navy Department with reference to the Atlantic and the Pacific?

Admiral Ingersoll. May I ask again who wrote the letter, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Admiral Nimitz. That is in the record. Mr. Chairman, that is in the record.

Mr. Richardson. I tried to find it this noon and couldn't put my hands on it.

Admiral Ingersoll. If I may answer this way: Assuming that the Chief of Personnel, which was the Bureau of Navigation at that time,
wrote that letter, I assume he is referring only to the percentage of personnel that Admiral Kimmel had on his ships and to nothing else.

Mr. Richardson. Well, I am only assuming that Washington wrote to Hawaii stating, "You are sitting pretty at Pearl Harbor, the war is in the Atlantic." I am asking you whether from your recollection of the picture, Admiral, that is a fair run-of-the-mine definition of the attitude the Navy had with respect to the war in the Atlantic and the war in the Pacific?

Admiral Ingersoll. The date was what?

[11465] Mr. Richardson. It says a few days after Pearl Harbor.

Senator Ferguson. It is dated the 25th of November 1941, Mr. Chairman. It is right in the note there.

Mr. Richardson. This is in the testimony and I was looking for the letter.

Senator Ferguson. It is there.

Mr. Richardson. Yes. The examining officer identified the letter as being in the form of a Personnel letter from the Chief of Bureau of Navigation to Admiral Kimmel dated November 25, 1941. A copy now on file in the secret confidential file room, Washington, D.C.

Admiral Ingersoll. I think, if he is referring only to Personnel, that perhaps that is an accurate statement, although I am just guessing at it now, that the percentage of men on the ships as regards their full war complement was probably as good in the Pacific, if not better, as in the Atlantic. I do not think it reflects the proper attitude, simply because we were at that time engaged in operations in the Atlantic, that the Navy had no concern for the Pacific. As a matter of fact we were very much concerned in the Pacific.

Mr. Richardson. Was your concern based at all on the fact that you knew there had been no proper protection supplied for the base at Pearl Harbor?

[11466] Admiral Ingersoll. The Navy Department had been after the War Department since February to get Pearl Harbor ready and more planes and more ships and radar out there.

Mr. Richardson. Well, it needed all of that for a proper defense of the base?

Admiral Ingersoll. It was certainly a minimum requirement that they set up at that time.

Mr. Richardson. You recognized, did you not, Admiral, that it primarily would not be the duty of the fleet to provide its own defense in the base, that would be the duty of the Army, would it not?

Admiral Ingersoll. That is laid down in the joint action as a division of responsibilities between the Army and the Navy. It doesn't mean, however, that if the Navy is present that it should go to sleep and let the Army defend the base. It should use everything it has to help defend it while it is there. But it means, for example, that if a ship going into a place like Pearl Harbor, that you can take the power off of the ship and repair that ship and not have to keep her guns manned in order to defend the place; and also ships like submarines, when they come back from a long cruise, the crews have to rest, and the submarines have to work on them. The crew should not be required to defend their own ship while in that port.
though if an attack came they would do all they could. But not have the responsibility for doing it.

Mr. Richardson. Well, that is true, but you were familiar at Washington with the joint defense plan that was built up between the Navy and Army in Hawaii?

Admiral Ingersoll. Which particular plan are you referring to, the Coastal Defense Plan or the so-called Bellinger?

Mr. Richardson. It is that plan, Admiral, which contemplated that in time of emergency both the Army and Navy would joint their facilities in common defense.

Admiral Ingersoll. Yes, sir; I am familiar with it. Not only that, but we thought it was so good that we sent it out to the other naval districts as a pattern for them to follow.

Mr. Richardson. That plan was based entirely on the fact that neither the Army or Navy had sufficient equipment at the base to permit the Army to assume its primary duty of furnishing defense?

Admiral Ingersoll. I doubt if any plan was ever drawn up where anybody thought he had enough to do what he was supposed to do.

Mr. Richardson. Well, that doesn’t quite answer the question. I will state it again and see if I can do better.

[11468] The point that I am making is that this joint plan that I talked about was an emergency plan which had its origin in the fact that there had not been supplied to the base in Hawaii sufficient defensive equipment to enable the Army to carry on its full duty of defending that base?

Admiral Ingersoll. The Army, with the planes that it had, could not have carried out a long-distance reconnaissance with Army planes. I believe they had six.

Mr. Richardson. I think that is all the questions I have to ask, Mr. Chairman.

[11469] The Vice Chairman. Admiral, we are—

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I just want to ask one or two questions.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. Admiral, was the person who made the delivery of the thirteenth-part message on the night or very early morning of the 6th of December 1941 in Navy clothes? Was he in Navy uniform?

Admiral Ingersoll. I testified the other day, sir, I couldn’t remember who it was. I talked with Captain Kramer and he said that he did not deliver the message to me.

I seem to recall that whoever brought it to my house asked for an identification from me.

Senator Ferguson. That would indicate, would it not, Admiral, that he was not from the Department?

Admiral Ingersoll. Oh, no, it would mean that that particular officer who brought it did not know me personally—in a bathrobe, probably; that he didn’t recognize me as Assistant Chief of Naval Operations when I went down in the middle of the night in a bathrobe.

Senator Ferguson. You can’t recall whether he was in Navy uniform or not?

Admiral Ingersoll. I think we were not put into uniform until after Pearl Harbor occurred.

[11470] Senator Ferguson. Did you know the fleet was in Pearl Harbor on the morning of the 7th?
Admiral Ingersoll. The Navy Department always knew what ships were in the Hawaiian area. We knew when such task forces as Halsey's and Newton's left for, you might say, distant operations, to Midway and Wake. We did not know local movements; that is, we did not know what ships were in Pearl Harbor or might be over at Lahaina or out in an operating area if they were within, say, a hundred miles of Pearl Harbor.

Senator Ferguson. That explains it. That is all.

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have included in the record at this time, the letter from Admiral Stark to the Secretary of the Navy under date of June 10, 1941, being Serial 066912, which has reference to matters that have been taken up by Admiral Stark with Admiral Kimmel.

The Vice Chairman. You want it spread on the record at this point?

Mr. Richardson. Yes. Copies have been distributed to the members of the committee.

The Vice Chairman. It will be spread on the record at this point.

(The letter referred to follows:)

[11471] Op-12-CTB.
A16-3.
Serial 066912.
Secret.

Memorandum.

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: Discussion of existing strategic situation in the Pacific Ocean.

1. I desire to invite your attention to the fact that the strategic situation in the Pacific Ocean has very recently sharply deteriorated with respect to the combined interests of the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands East Indies. The particular elements which have recently arisen to favor Japan are the following:

(a) The United States has reduced the strength of the Pacific Fleet by three battleships, four light cruisers, one aircraft carrier, eighteen destroyers, 4,000 marines, and four combat-loaded transports. The truth is probably now apparent to Japan that the United States Pacific Fleet is no longer strong enough for sustaining an effective offensive against the centers of Japanese military power. It is, however, still strong enough to cause serious difficulty for Japan, and to constitute a threat which will probably not permit Japan to exert its full naval strength in Malaysia.

(b) By its rash naval action around Crete in the Mediterranean, the British Commonwealth is now not able to bring any important strength to India or Malaysia. So long as the British Mediterranean Fleet was intact, Japan could not dismiss the possibility that it might suddenly be transferred to the vicinity of Singapore. Consequently, a Japanese southward offensive at this time would encounter resistance from only minor naval and air forces.

(c) A break-down in Dutch-Japanese trade negotiations seems to have occurred. Forcible Japanese action against at least a part of the Netherlands East Indies is a distinct possibility in the immediate future.

(d) Japan seems to have made progress in her fortification of the Caroline and Marshall Islands. Her position there has been decidedly strengthened.

(e) The Japanese Army has recently had some important successes in China. Chinese morale is considerably lower than it was 3 or 4 months ago.

(f) Definite indications have been received that the continued diplomatic pressure by Germany and Italy is having an effect in inclining Japan to take positive action to the South.

2. While it would be desirable, in case of war, for the strength of the United States Atlantic Fleet to be greater than it now is, recent British successes against German naval forces in the North Atlantic have reduced the probability of successful German raider action, particularly by regular naval surface units. Furthermore, the situation in the Atlantic would not be particularly improved
by the transfer there of additional capital ships. Without question, additional cruisers, destroyers, and aircraft, could be usefully employed in the Atlantic, but the tasks of the Pacific Fleet in war, so tremendously increased in difficulty by the recent defeat of the British Mediterranean Fleet, require at least an initial strength as great as it now is.

3. It is my opinion that any further weakening of the Pacific Fleet at this time is almost certain to precipitate action by Japan against the British Fleet and the Netherlands East Indies. The difficult tasks that the Pacific Fleet would have on the outbreak of war give an additional reason for maintaining our naval deployment approximately as at present.

4. I therefore recommend that no further units of any kind be transferred from the Pacific to the Atlantic at this time. In this recommendation Admiral Kimmel fully concurs.

H. R. Stark.

The Vice Chairman. There being no further questions, Admiral, the committee thanks you for your appearance and the information you have given the committee, as well as your apparent desire to be helpful in every way you could in this investigation.

Admiral Ingersoll. Thank you.

The Vice Chairman. Do you have any further statement that you desire to make to the committee that would give any information that has not been called for by the questions?

Admiral Ingersoll. I think I have no further information of my own knowledge that I have not given to the committee, or previously given in the investigation by Admiral Hart, or in the Naval Court of Inquiry.

The Vice Chairman. We thank you for your appearance and the information you have given us. You may be excused.

Admiral Ingersoll. Thank you.

(The witness was excused.)

[11475] The Vice Chairman. The Chair recognizes counsel.

Mr. Kaufman. Mr. Chairman, we desire to present Colonel Clausen of the Army.

The Vice Chairman. Colonel Clausen, please come forward.

TESTIMONY OF HENRY C. CLAUSEN

(Having been first duly sworn by the Chairman.)

Mr. Kaufman. Colonel, when were you separated from the Army?


Mr. Kaufman. And prior to that time how long had you been in the Army?

Colonel Clausen. Since June 1942.

Mr. Kaufman. And where do you live now?

Colonel Clausen. San Francisco, Calif.

Mr. Kaufman. You have been asked to come here from San Francisco to appear as a witness?

Colonel Clausen. Yes.

Mr. Kaufman. With what branch of the service were you connected?

Colonel Clausen. The Judge Advocate General’s Department.

Mr. Kaufman. Now, referring to the Army Board of [11476] Inquiry, the so-called Grunert Board, what was your connection with that Board?

Colonel Clausen. I was assistant recorder.

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1 Formerly Lieutenant Colonel, Army of the United States. For suggested corrections in his testimony submitted by Mr. Clausen, see Committee Hearings, Part 11, p. 5513.
Mr. Kaufman. By whom was that board made up?


Mr. Kaufman. And when did that board commence its hearings?

Colonel Clausen. In July, 1944, as I remember.

Mr. Kaufman. How long did the board continue to hold hearings?

Colonel Clausen. For about 3 months.

Mr. Kaufman. And during the hearings before the board was magic brought to the attention of the board?

Colonel Clausen. It was in the, I believe, last week of the board's proceedings.

Mr. Kaufman. After the completion of the taking of testimony by the board, were you requested to make a further investigation into the Pearl Harbor matter?

Colonel Clausen. I was.

Mr. Kaufman. And will you tell the committee the circumstances under which you were appointed, and what you did in furtherance of that appointment?

[11477] Colonel Clausen. That is a rather broad question, but perhaps I can highlight it in this way:

The Grunert board did not obtain the details of the magic until the last week of the board's proceedings. I understood after proceedings had been terminated that on the first hearing of the chief of staff that he did acquaint the general officer members of the board with magic, in general.

It became obvious after the board's proceedings developed the magic phase which was in the last week that further investigation into this phase should be conducted, and there were also other what we called in the office of the Judge Advocate General, unexplored leads.

So I was instructed to conduct the additional investigation for the Secretary of War in conformance and compliance with the Public Law 389.

Mr. Kaufman. And did you hold hearings, or did you go into the field to see the various men that you desired to interview?

Colonel Clausen. The war was then on and as the Secretary of War stated in his public report which was given to the press on the conclusion of the board's proceedings, it was necessary for someone to interview the additional witnesses in the various theatres of active operation, and also, of course in Washington and elsewhere in the United States.

So I therefore had some witnesses come to see me who were available locally, but for the major portion, I suppose, I went to them.

Mr. Kaufman. And what procedure did you follow in getting information from them? Did you interrogate them, or did you get the information and then prepare affidavits for them to sign?

Colonel Clausen. I talked with them, found out what I could from them as to their knowledge of the facts, and then I proceeded to take testimony in the form of affidavits.

Mr. Kaufman. And after you collected your affidavits, did you make a report to the War Department?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. I will show you these eight volumes and ask you whether they are photostatic copies of the affidavits that you procured from various persons together with the exhibits?
Colonel Clausen. I prepared a large volume, one similar to that that you have on your desk there, which is what I called the report, together with, I believe eight volumes of exhibits.

There should be eight volumes of exhibits in addition to the large volume.

[11479] Mr. Kaufman. Eight volumes of exhibits, plus the—
Colonel Clausen. Yes.
Mr. Kaufman. Plus your report and affidavits?
Colonel Clausen. Well, the exhibits are part of the report.
Mr. Kaufman. You will find reference to the volume, this light-covered volume, to the exhibits.

[11480] We now desire to offer in evidence the report of Mr. Clausen, together with the exhibits.

The Vice Chairman. It will be so received.
There has been a number reserved for this particular exhibit.
The Vice Chairman. What is the number?
Mr. Kaufman. We will state the number as soon as we get the record from downstairs.
The Vice Chairman. That will be agreeable. You may supply it for the record.¹

Mr. Kaufman. There has been an indication in the course of the testimony of some witnesses, Colonel, that you made efforts to change the testimony of some of the witnesses that you interviewed.
Colonel Clausen. That is not borne out by the fact.
Mr. Kaufman. What is the fact on that subject?
Colonel Clausen. The fact is that every single witness who may have revised his former testimony to my mind was telling me the truth as he saw it when I talked with him and he certainly, so far as I could tell, told the truth when he testified before. There is not a single person that I interviewed against whom any reflection should be cast on the ground that he may have changed testimony. What he did if he gave different testimony to me was to— [11487] honestly and correctly and more correctly state that which he conceived to be the fact.

I can, for example, call to the attention of the committee that some of the witnesses who appeared before the so-called Grunert board at the time they testified stated that they would like to verify or press their recollection by perhaps an examination of documents or in some other form indicated that they would like time to reflect upon some of the answers.

I recall, for example, Colonel Bratton when he testified before the Grunert board did say something to that effect. In other words, I have a very distinct impression that the witnesses, when they appeared before the Grunert board and especially in the last week, were either then not allowed to give the Grunert board the magic features and details or exhibited some indication that they would like to press their recollection further.

I mean to state clearly that there is not a single person who I interviewed against whom any claim should be made of any invidious character because of the fact that he may have given me revised testimony. He either had his recollection refreshed or he was, when he was interrogated by me, permitted to go into the magic features, and that included the high and the low.

¹ Exhibit No. 148.
Mr. Kaufman. Colonel, at the beginning of the volume [11482] in front of you is a list of so-called unexplored leads. Did you in the course of your investigation complete the investigation of all of these so-called unexplored leads?

Colonel Clausen. The answer to that will have to be that some of these were later not followed to a final conclusion for various reasons, but in the main they were completed, and by completed I mean sufficient to a point to satisfy the Secretary that he could follow out the request of the Joint Resolution of the Congress which was to inquire into the facts of Pearl Harbor and, as I recall, specific emphasis being placed upon an inquiry sufficient to allow him to decide whether there should be court martial proceedings instituted.

And in connection with this document which you have referred to, 3-page document on pages 10, 11, and 12 of my report, that was prepared on my return from San Francisco where I had gone because my mother was ill. This paper was handed me and after this paper was handed me I had discussions with Mr. Harvey F. Bundy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, as to following out these leads and what should be done first. So that if you will go to the portion of my report that contains by periodical reports to the Secretary of War through Mr. Bundy and to the first one you will find that my method of proceeding with regard [11483] to subjects was as set forth on these subreports, the first one of which was 17 February 1945.

Mr. Kaufman. I have no further questions.

The Vice Chairman. The Chair is advised that there is only one copy of this exhibit that has been presented, so it will have to be used by the printer and we will follow the course we did with one other exhibit.

Mr. Kaufman. There are two copies, Senator. Senator Ferguson has one copy of the report. There are two copies of affidavits and report. There is only one copy of the exhibits. Senator Ferguson has one copy of the report and affidavits.

Senator Ferguson. I received this last night from counsel.

The Vice Chairman. One copy of the report and the only available copy, as I understand it, of the exhibits, will have to be used for the printing.

Mr. Kaufman. Correct.

The Vice Chairman. So they will not be available until released by counsel.

Mr. Kaufman. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. It will be so ordered.

Now, Colonel, allow me to ask you this question.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

[11484] The Vice Chairman. To see if I clearly understand the situation.

You were connected with the Army Pearl Harbor board of inquiry?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And at the conclusion of the work of that Board in order for the Secretary of War to be able to comply with the resolution passed by Congress he thought certain additional points
should be investigated with a view of clearing them up so that he could make the type of report that that resolution required?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. Specifically, sir, the magic. We—that is, I say we—the Pearl Harbor board, the Grunert board, I recall had gone to the office of Admiral Murfin and the Murfin board was going to conduct its inquiry. We asked for the Hart report, the so-called Hart report which we knew had been made by Admiral Hart. We were not given this report. We therefore didn’t have that before us. Meanwhile we went to Hawaii after conducting hearings in Washington, and when we came back we learned that the reason it had not been given to us was that the I believe the Under Secretary of Navy, Bard, had ruled against it but Secretary Forrestal had overruled Secretary Bard.

So we then were given the Hart report. And, sir, when [11485] you read that and came to the testimony of Captain Safford you found a great many new aspects to the Pearl Harbor disaster and one of those that especially should be followed down was where Captain Safford in his testimony before Admiral Hart mentions some dozen or so officers as being able to cast light upon this so-called winds code implement message.

Well, somebody should, from the Army, go and talk with these Army people.

Now, if I had that before me, for example, the Admiral Hart Safford testimony, I cold show you that those officers listed there by Captain Safford were later interviewed by me and testimony taken by me from them as to what they knew about this wind code intercept.

Then, in addition to that the whole subject of magic, sir, being opened up in the final week of the board proceedings, meant that somebody should go, like to General Miles, to General Gerow, and all of the people that had testified before us at a time when they were under compulsion not to reveal the details of magic and ask them all about magic.

The Vice Chairman. Then when you began this investigation under direction of the Secretary of War you found that many witnesses who had appeared before the board were then in the field and were holding responsible positions in [11486] fighting the war; is that the situation?

Colonel Clausen. That is the situation, sir. And, for example, counsel has just handed me here the page at which Captain Safford testified before Admiral Hart. We come, for example, to Colonel Schukraft, who was in Conserto. By the time you put the witnesses all together they were all over the world. So I had to go all over the world.

The Vice Chairman. And the war was still on and many of these officers were holding responsible positions in the battle areas; is that true?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir; including General MacArthur and General Bedell Smith in the European theater.

The Vice Chairman. I recall General Gerow stating that he was then in command of either a corps or an army, or some large body of troops, in the European theater of war.

Colonel Clausen. That is correct, sir.

The Vice Chairman. So naturally it resulted in you having to go wherever these officers were?
Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. That is what the Secretary of War announced in his public statement which he handed to the press after the Grunert board concluded its hearings. He made reference to the fact that inquiry would have to be made in the various theaters of active operations. That is [11487] in my report here.

The Vice Chairman. Then from a practical standpoint, Colonel, it being found necessary by the Secretary of War to have this additional evidence secured from these witnesses, we couldn't stop the war to assemble all the witnesses in a room again and get their testimony, you had to go wherever you found them?

Colonel Clausen. That is correct, sir; and also, sir, that by doing it that way, it kept the knowledge of this magic to a minimum.

The Vice Chairman. I assume as you were connected with the Army board investigating Pearl Harbor, the Pearl Harbor attack, that you found that there were a number of things in connection with the evidence presented to that Board that should be clarified or brought up to date, and that this supplemental investigation of the Secretary of War directed you to make was necessary for him to have sufficient information to act under that resolution of Congress?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

[11488] The Vice Chairman. Senator George of Georgia will inquire.

Senator George. You were not a member of the Army Board. You were not a member of the Board, were you?

Colonel Clausen. I was designated—not a member of the Board, sir. I was designated as being on the Board but in the capacity of an assistant recorder—the assistant recorder. There were two recorders, sir, Colonel West and myself, and in the Army the recorder's job is a job more or less like your counsel here, except that we did not do so much questioning, except that I did most of the questioning when it came to Colonel Wyman.

Senator George. You did not participate in the conclusions reached and findings of fact?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir. My position was very much subordinate to doing a thing of that kind.

Senator George. Did you make a finding of fact after you had completed your tour of duty about the world?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir. My position was subordinate to that. I was the collector of facts, the digger after of facts, not the fact finder. The fact finder was the Secretary. I was in the capacity of the gentleman here from the FBI who might go out and get evidence and bring it into the United States attorney, sir.

[11489] Senator George. So you reported to the Secretary?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator George. All right. I have no further questions.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Clark of North Carolina will inquire.

Mr. Clark. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas of Illinois.

Senator Lucas. Colonel, before you started upon this mission of obtaining additional evidence with whom did you discuss your assignment?

Colonel Clausen. I discussed my assignments with many people, sir. I discussed it with the Secretary himself; with Mr. Harvey H. Bundy, his special assistant; with my superior officer, general Myron
C. Cramer, the Judge Advocate General; with—I see Captain Ford over there. He participated in some of the analyses after the Grunert Board had completed its proceedings. With Colonel William J. Hughes; a great many people, sir.

Senator Lucas. What was your special mission as outlined originally by the Secretary of War?

Colonel Clausen. To follow up these so-called unexplored leads and they are set forth in subheads in my periodic reports to him through Mr. Bundy.

Senator Lucas. Was that a written order?

[11490] Colonel Clausen. No, sir; there was no written directive except in a general way. The Secretary had stated in his public statement of December 1, 1944—do you want me to read that portion of it, sir?

Senator Lucas. I would like to have it in the record.

Colonel Clausen. All right. He said:

In accordance with the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, I have decided that my own investigation should be further continued until all the facts are made as clear as possible and until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts can be obtained, and I have given the necessary directions to accomplish this result. Some of the testimony may be much delayed where witnesses are engaged in combat in active Theaters of Operation. My present decision will be reviewed when the investigation has been finally completed.

Senator Lucas. Now, let us take one witness and see how you operated. As I recall, there was some discrepancy in the testimony of General Gerow and the affidavit that he gave to you while he was fighting in France. Do you recall that?

Colonel Clausen. I read over, sir, while I was waiting to appear here as a witness very brief portions of General Gerow’s testimony, but I recall that he made some reference [11941] to the affidavit that he made before me, sir.

Senator Lucas. Well, did you examine his affidavit in line with his previous testimony that he had given, to see where the discrepancy was there?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir. What I did when I talked with a person—and it varied some with different witnesses—for example, General Fielder out in the Pacific I took with me to the Philippines from Honolulu and when he returned he dictated his own affidavit and General Bedell Smith called in a stenographer and dictated his own, but with General Gerow, I interviewed him at Bad Hanheim along the Rhine where he had his Fifteenth Army headquarters and we arranged to meet again in a day or so.

Well, when I called him in a day or so he had gone down to the Riviera. I therefore went to him there and since there was no stenographer available, I took down in longhand the answers he made to my questions and then I put it in the form of an affidavit, which would be the same as in making a bill of exceptions after the trial of a case. It is a much more laborious way of getting evidence but it sometimes makes it much more accurate because after I made a draft for General Gerow I gave it back to him to study over to make sure that it was correct and he made several revisions. I personally typed that myself.

[11492] Senator Lucas. In other words, after he made the revisions, why, you proceeded to retype another affidavit?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Which he finally signed?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Well, now, what was there about Gerow's testimony originally which was not full and complete that you desired to get from him when you went to France?

Colonel Clausen. The magic advice, all the magic advice, sir. I had with me the Top Secret exhibit "B" before the Grunert Board. That Top Secret "B" came to us, as I say, I believe in the last week through General Russell, which he had given to G–2 and we had then given him these questions.

Senator Lucas. In other words, the Board operated throughout the hearings without magic until the last week of the hearing?

Colonel Clausen. That is right, sir.

Senator Lucas. And because of that fact you were unable to produce, or you were unable to obtain all of the information which pertained to Pearl Harbor?

Colonel Clausen. That is right, sir.

Senator Lucas. So, consequently, when it was decided by the War Department that the magic should become a part of the hearing, then it became your duty under this assignment to [11,493] supplement the evidence that had already been obtained by the Board?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir; and then, sir, there were some additional leads also in addition to magic.

Senator Lucas. Yes; you have testified to that in giving us an example with respect to Captain Safford's testimony.

Colonel Clausen. Well, it dealt with magic, sir, but another unexplored lead was, for example, General Short's 5 November 1941, SCP. I believe the record was confused about it that was in the War Department—as to whether that was in the War Department before Pearl Harbor and somebody could look that up and find it, so that is the reason that we ran that down also, and you will find all of the affidavits here by Colonel Jansen and other references to that.

Another secret file lead was this: G–2 sent a wire to G–2 of the Hawaiian Department on, I believe, 5 November 1941 and General Fielder had I believe off the record given information to General Russell but there was nothing in the record about that and it appeared as though the wire had not been sent.

Now, Colonel Bratton testified that he had drafted it and to all intents and appearances it had gone to Hawaii. Well, somebody could have gone to Hawaii and found out whether it was actually there, whether it had been received and I ran [11,494] it down and find out if all the steps had been taken to send that wire. That is another example.

Senator Lucas. But in the main magic was the primary reason for your particular assignment?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Now, before you started this tour to obtain this additional evidence was there any officer in the Army or the Navy who gave you any particular instructions as to what you should do when you interviewed these witnesses?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir; except that Mr. Bundy and I discussed the most feasible way of getting the facts in an accurate, objective and impartial method and I had at one time been an Assistant United
States Attorney and I always liked the way the FBI would get the statements from the witnesses in the form of statements and then you could examine the witnesses from those statements. After the witness made the statement the statements were read back and they would sign them. So we discussed as to the method of conducting this additional investigation and it was agreed that I should receive the evidence in the form of affidavits.

Senator Lucas. Before you started it was obviously necessary that you go over the testimony of each and every one of these witnesses who had testified before the Board.

Colonel Clausen. Well, they had testified before me [11495] sir. I had been on the Board.

Senator Lucas. In other words, you were familiar with the testimony that the Board had received up to that time?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Now, in your conversations with the Secretary of War or—who was it, General Bundy?

Colonel Clausen. Secretary of War? Colonel Stimson.

Senator Lucas. Well, I know, but the next man.

The Vice Chairman. Colonel Bundy.

Colonel Clausen. No, sir; he was a civilian. Harvey H. Bundy was a lawyer.

Senator Lucas. All right. And in your conversations with the Secretary of War or any of these other officers that you had before you started on this assignment was there any particular piece of evidence that was discussed which they thought was vital one way or the other, that they told you to make a particular investigation upon to have it changed?

Colonel Clausen. You mean to slant the investigation?

Senator Lucas. That is right.

Colonel Clausen. No, sir. I would not have conducted it if they had.

Senator Lucas. In other words, there were no conversations of any kind as to what you should do in the way of attempting to have a witness slant or change his evidence when [11496] you went out there?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir.

Senator Lucas. Well, did you follow that?

Colonel Clausen. Sir, I was just as accurate and impartial and objective as I could be because I felt that this was an opportunity to get facts for the American nation and I would not have been a party to it; but furthermore than that I am quite sure that Colonel Stimson would never have authorized any such instructions and if he had I would not have carried them out.

Senator Lucas. Was there a single witness that you talked to in your long investigation that you attempted in any way to influence or to have him change or slant his testimony different than what he testified before the Board?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir; not in the slightest, but other witnesses told me—and Colonel Bratton. I believe, will bear me out—Colonel Bratton said to me when he finally left me in Paris that I was the easiest lawyer to talk to that he had ever talked to in his life.

Senator Lucas. That is quite a compliment.
Colonel, it was charged by a member of this committee, and the press carried it as follows:

Colonel Henry C. Clausen was sent around the world by Army to have officers change their Pearl Harbor [11497] testimony given originally to the Roberts Investigating Committee.

Do you care to comment on that statement?

Colonel Clausen. If I was an advocate, sir, I would comment one way but I am in the position here of a witness. All I can say, sir, is that it is not borne out by the facts. The press comment to which you refer I read and when I read it I dispatched letters to the gentlemen who had in the press supposed to have made such statements and I told them that they were not correct.

Now, I am a Republican. I don't suppose that has anything to do with the case.

Senator Lucas. No; but it is interesting.

Colonel Clausen. And I have always been a Republican, sir. Now, Colonel Stimson is a Republican. The impression that I had of Secretary Stimson was that he was a man who certainly under no stretch of the imagination would at this point in his career have been a party to any such such performance.

I recall one other newspaper comment something like this:

Why did they send a lowly Major all over the world to get this testimony when this lowly Major had all his Army career ahead of him?

At the time I read that the lowly Major was back in San Francisco practicing law. I at no time—they said I was a Reserve officer, I at no time was ever a Reserve officer. I volunteered my services when the war broke out. I cannot talk too much about the fact that I know that Secretary Stimson would not have been a party to any such thing.

As to my own part in this proceeding I can assure you, sir, that at no time did I try to get any witness to say anything but what they thought was the fact and that is one reason why I adopted the affidavit method of interrogation, because I realized that if you give the affidavit to the person to revise and correct or change—and you will find throughout here that corrections were made in their handwriting—that that makes for a more accurate way of getting the testimony. I was not a War Department "Yes man."

Senator Ferguson knows when the War Department was on the pan with respect to the Truman Investigating Committee, the Truman committee investigation of Air Corps derelictions and the Wright Aeronautical Corporation military men at Cincinnati, Ohio, the War Department assigned me to prosecute those men and I had the Senator as one of my witnesses and I also had Senator Kilgore as one of my witnesses and the men were convicted.

Now, the Truman committee proceedings gave the War Department—or, rather, was critical of the War Department [11499] and stated in the same proceedings that they were very well satisfied with the way I had conducted that investigation.

In other words, if you read that, sir, you would see that Clausen was no stooge of the War Department. Similarly with respect to Colonel Theodore Wyman, whom I investigated in connection with the Pearl Harbor disaster. If I was a War Department stooge I would not have conducted the interrogation that you will find in the
proceedings before the Grunert Board and the Board I am quite sure would not have come to the conclusions that were reached by the Board.

Senator Lucas. Colonel, when were you an Assistant United States District Attorney?

Colonel Clausen. I resigned, sir, 8 months after the Democrats came into power.

Senator Lucas. You came in the Army as a volunteer after the war broke out?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir; in June 1942.

Senator Lucas. And you went directly, I take it, into the Judge Advocate’s Department?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. And you stayed there how long?

Colonel Clausen. Over 3 years, sir.

Senator Lucas. And you are now back in California practicing law?


Senator Lucas. And you do not expect any promotions in the Army from major on up?

Colonel Clausen. Sir, they wouldn’t give me any if they could because they would be afraid to.

Senator Lucas. That is all.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy is not present. Senator Brewster would be next. He is not here. Mr. Gearhart of California will inquire, Colonel.

Mr. Gearhart. Colonel Clausen, I have the very nice letter you wrote in which you very gently take me to task for saying something about you and I was not conscious that I had said anything about you at all, because I had had no newspaper called to my attention that mentioned your name.

Could you have mixed me up with some other person who is a member of the committee?

Colonel Clausen. Well, Mr. Gearhart, the press evidently misquoted you.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, let it go at that, but I never read it.

Colonel Clausen. But the San Francisco Chronicle and Call and Daily News carried your name to the accusation which was to the effect Senator Lucas had mentioned.

Mr. Gearhart. All that that he said?

[11501] Colonel Clausen. No, not all but the impression I had was that you thought I had gone around the world with a great, big club in my hand and by force and duress had forced these people to sign statements.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, I am not conscious of ever having mentioned your name, Colonel.

Colonel Clausen. Well, I have got the clippings, Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart. That is all.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson of Michigan will inquire, Colonel.

Senator Ferguson. Colonel Clausen, did I understand you to mean that the leads were not in writing? You did not mean that, did you? Colonel Clausen. I meant, Senator, that if you go to my periodic reports you will find more particularly the leads that I explored.
Senator Ferguson. Yes, but I am talking about the leads beginning on page 10.

Colonel Clausen. Well, those are in writing; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. They are in writing and signed by General Cramer, are they not?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that the Grunert Board—[11502] as you and I will refer to the Grunert Board, we mean the Army Board under the statute, is that correct?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is, General Grunert was the chairman of the board.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. When did you first learn that you were to continue the investigation of the Grunert board?

Colonel Clausen. I believe it was just about this time of the—when I returned from an emergency leave to San Francisco, Senator. It was about the 1st of December or the early part of the next year, I don't remember exactly, and during the interim I had been assisting the Judge Advocate General.

Senator Ferguson. The investigation of the board had been closed, is that correct?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. They were limited, Senator, to 90 days by the order of appointment.

Senator Ferguson. Not by statute?

Colonel Clausen. No, Congress did not limit them, no, sir, but Congress passed Public 339, joint resolution of the Congress. Following that the Secretary, who was required under the law to conduct the investigation, appointed this Grunert board and the order of appointment, Senator, had [11503] “ninety days” in it.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I understand. The Secretary of War limited his own board to 90 days.

Colonel Clausen. I think it was General McNarney that did that, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. And General McNarney had been on the Roberts Commission?

Colonel Clausen. That is the same one.

Senator Ferguson. So it is assumed that at the time he knew about the size of the investigation.

Now, do I understand that the board had not finished its work and were compelled to close their investigation because of a limitation placed upon them by the Secretary of War.

Colonel Clausen. I would not say that, Senator, for the reason that if the board had felt that I assume as you assume, I assume they would have written in to the Secretary and so stated. In other words, they would have said they could not make their findings because of the limitation of time.

Senator Ferguson. They did not do that to your knowledge?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir; but they did have comments, Senator, in the report to the effect that there should be further explorations of leads.

Senator Ferguson. Now, the board never made any complaint to you or to anyone that you knew that they were going [11504] to
be compelled to file their report without being able to go into this matter completely?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So, then you assumed that when the board did file their report and you were one of their members looking up evidence, and so forth, that they had completed their job as far as they saw their job?

Colonel Clausen. Well, I would rather, Senator, not answer what was in the minds of the general officers but the impression I had was that they were pretty sick and tired of Pearl Harbor and wanted to get finished.

Senator Ferguson. Did you get the same way?

Colonel Clausen. I certainly did. I think it is time to conclude, in the words of the poet.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, on page 15 I find that you had a certain limitation placed upon you. The Secretary of the Navy wrote to the Secretary of War:

It being understood that you have instructed him to limit his inquiry—

talking about you—

to limit his inquiry strictly to matters which have a bearing on that part that Army personnel, organization, or action may have had in the disaster.

Colonel Clausen. That is right, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. In other words, the Navy said to you:

[11505] Now, stay out of this investigation as far as it affects any Navy personnel, any Navy organization or action upon the part of the Navy as to the disaster.

Is that correct?

Colonel Clausen. As I understand, Senator, the Army was to concern itself through me with whatever had to do with Army personnel, action, or responsibility, and Admiral Hewitt on the Navy side was to concern himself with the Navy phases.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, I am coming to the limitation next. The Secretary of War put the same limitation in his directive as the Secretary of the Navy did; that the Navy said that you were not to do anything or find any facts or go into any facts as far as the Navy was concerned.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. The Secretary of War said that you could not do the reverse, is that not true?

Colonel Clausen. That is right, Senator, otherwise it would be duplicitous.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, how could you make this investigation when they had a joint command out there in Hawaii, you had joint intelligence to a certain extent here? How could you make the investigation to ascertain the facts had you stayed entirely away from the facts as it related to the Navy?

Colonel Clausen. Well, I didn’t have to do that, Senator, at all and I do not mean to imply and you could not interpret these instructions in that way.

Senator Ferguson. Well, how should you interpret it?

Colonel Clausen. Well, this way, Senator, this is the way: Wherever it pertained to the Army and went into the Navy I was to go there
and I did go there, and I was to enter on it and I did enter on it. One of the first things that I did when I arrived in Pearl Harbor conducting this additional investigation was to check in with Admiral Towers for the purpose of running down all these intercepts and winds code messages and this super-duper radio stuff.

Senator Lucas. What was that Admiral’s name?

Colonel Clausen. Towers, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Did the Secretary of War that I read—no, that was to the Secretary of War. Now, the one to the Secretary of the Navy read almost identically:

I have also been happy to comply with your request that appropriate Navy representatives similarly be given Army information which is relevant to your investigation, it being understood, of course, that the Navy inquiry will be limited to matters which have a bearing on the part that Navy personnel, organization, or action may have had in the disaster.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

[11507] Senator Ferguson. Now, what was your interpretation of that limitation?

Colonel Clausen. Why, just the same, Senator. In other words, if the Navy wanted to interrogate Army people that was perfectly all right and they did do so. Admiral Hewitt, for example, went to Hawaii and did interrogate Army people there and you will find on page 2 of my report that I had these Navy people down that I did interrogate. There is Captain Rochefort, Captain Layton, Captain Holmes, Captain Huckins, all Navy people, interrogated here. Colonel Woodrum and others.

Senator Ferguson. Were you able to draw conclusions as to that testimony?

Colonel Clausen. You mean myself?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Colonel Clausen. No, sir; I did not draw any conclusions except the periodic reports that were made which set forth what I thought were running comments of ideas that I had as to the way the investigation was unfolding and what might be pursued as leads.

Senator Ferguson. That was really conclusions upon your part?

Colonel Clausen. Well, yes, they were opinions of myself.

[11508] Senator Ferguson. Major or Colonel—when were you promoted from a Major? When I knew you at Cincinnati you were a Major.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. I did not get my promotion, Senator, until the other men in my same group block were promoted and that was about March, I suppose, of 1945.

Senator Ferguson. 1945. You were still working on the investigation at that time?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. I finished—

Senator Ferguson. The so-called Sonnett investigation or the—

Colonel Clausen. That was the Hewitt.

Senator Ferguson. (continuing). Started in May, did it not?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. The Army had a great deal more investigating in this additional investigation, Senator, than the Navy for the reason that the Navy had this super-duper stuff and the Army did not have it.

Senator Ferguson. Now, we are talking about super-duper as magic-ultra?
Colonel Clausen. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. All right.
Colonel Clausen. Colonel Bratton calls it "boogie-woogie."

[11509] Senator Ferguson. Diplomatic messages of the Army that we have. As I understand it, Exhibit 1 is made up from the Army copies.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, Senator; but before the Murfin Board, that is the Navy Board of Inquiry, this magic information came out, it developed into a much finer point and with greater detail than the Grunert Board ever got it. I repeat it was not until about the last week of the Grunert Board's proceedings that we were given this information. The Navy was not in that position.

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell me, Colonel, who wrote the unexplored leads on pages 10, 11, and 12? Who is actually responsible for drawing them up?

Colonel Clausen. Oh, I suppose they were drawn up by Colonel Hughes.

Senator Ferguson. We haven't had Colonel Hughes on the record. Who was Colonel Hughes?

Colonel Clausen. Colonel William J. Hughes is an officer on the staff of—was an officer on the staff—of the Judge Advocate General and these were drawn up by him and others while I was—as I repeat—on this emergency leave to San Francisco.

Senator Ferguson. Well, where did he get the information, for instance, Hughes? He is a Washington lawyer, is he not?

[11510] Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what firm he is with?

Colonel Clausen. I think he is with William Leahy.

Senator Ferguson. Who drew these charges?

Colonel Clausen. You mean these leads?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, these leads?

Colonel Clausen. Well, I say I think it was Colonel Hughes and others from the Judge Advocate General, whoever assisted him.

Senator Ferguson. Well, where would Hughes get these facts?

Colonel Clausen. Well, he had assisted in the Pearl Harbor inquiry for the Judge Advocate General. Senator, when we, the Grunert Board went to Hawaii, Colonel Hughes was left in charge, sir, sort of in charge of the office during the time we were gone.

Senator Ferguson. Well, he was really an assistant then to the board?

Colonel Clausen. You would not call him an assistant, except in that capacity during the time we were away he was supposed to see that things went all right at home.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, the one I want to talk about is on page 11:

Whether Short was sent official notice of the Joint [11511] Action Agreement or of the Roosevelt-Churchill July 1941 compact for a joint warning to Japan.

Where would Hughes get that information that there was a joint action agreement?

Colonel Clausen. He would pick that out of the testimony. Here is what happened, Senator: The board wanted somebody to review the testimony in anticipation of a final report, so for that reason
Colonel Toulmin had charge of a group of officers and this group of officers—I don't know, there must have been 20 or 30 all in all, including some Wacs—who went over the testimony from day to day and the information, of course, as to the joint action agreement would, I assume, be brought out from the testimony given in the proceedings before the Board.

Senator Ferguson. Well, you had heard about the joint action agreement, had you not?

Colonel Clausen. General Marshall, it is my recollection, Senator, testified about it.

Senator Ferguson. In your opinion was there or was there not a joint action agreement?

Colonel Clausen. You want my opinion?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I want your evidence if you have got any evidence on it.

Colonel Clausen. Well, I was going to point out, Senator, that there were certain notes concerning the—I think they called it the ABCD bloc. Is that correct?

Senator Ferguson. At times it was referred to as a bloc.

Colonel Clausen. Well, if I may have my exhibit number 2 I can point something out.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Colonel Clausen. One of the men, Senator, I interviewed in Washington was Colonel Bicknell and he told me that it was very necessary in order to get the full facts on Pearl Harbor to get to his former office and there obtain various documents, so I did that.

Senator Ferguson. Bicknell?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir, Bicknell; B-i-c-k-n-e-l-l.

Senator Ferguson. What was his position at this time?

Colonel Clausen. Well, at the time of Pearl Harbor he had been General Short's assistant G-2, he had charge of what was known as the contact office, the downtown office. It would be more or less similar to combat intelligence.

Senator Ferguson. Well, he had some opinions then on the joint action agreement?

Colonel Clausen. Well, he mentions it here in one of the papers I got out of his office and that is what I was going to show you.

[11513] Senator Ferguson. Let me see what you have got.

Colonel Clausen. In the way of these exhibits, Senator, that I have got, there are eight volumes that are indexed at the start. Page 51 and 53—from page 51, Senator, to page 53 are excerpts from all the digests prepared in the contact office and you will find a reference there—

Senator Ferguson. Will you read us what the reference is?

Colonel Clausen. Do you want me to read the whole thing?

Senator Ferguson. Well, I want to get all I can on this joint action agreement.

Colonel Clausen. Well, I am going to start. He started his comment that on "November"—

Senator Ferguson. We have had great difficulty getting anything on it, so if you will just give me what you have. That is why I have questioned you.

Colonel Clausen. I don't mind reading it, Senator, but—well, I had better read it.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Colonel Clausen. All right [reading:]

November 29, 1941. (The last issue of the Digest)—

Now, what he is referring to there is a digest that he prepared for the use of the Hawaiian command. He was over there and prepared these digests from time to time based on [11514] sources of information that came to him from many places. This is what he says:

While the international situation centering in the Pacific and directly affecting the United States has been somewhat stabilized near the point of explosion during this period (Nov. 6-25), the situation in several other contiguous areas—Thailand, Indochina and Eastern Siberia—of strong indirect concern to the United States, have continued to deteriorate.

The Japanese government announced on Nov. 5 the appointment of Saburo Kurusu as Special Envoy to Washington for the avowed purpose of making final diplomatic effort towards a solution of American-Japanese problems and effect an easing of tension in the Pacific. While a certain amount of optimism was expressed in local quarters for the success of the Kurusu mission, the general opinion was indeed pessimistic.

The consensus of veteran observers seem to be that Japan had taken such a strong aggressive stand that she could not back down without incurring serious internal trouble; and that the United States, on the other hand, had even less reason to compromise its well-known demands which were diametrically opposite to those of Japan, hence the impending diplomatic talks were doomed [11515] to failure before they started. This opinion moreover appears to have been well-founded as subsequent events began to unfold.

Concurrent with the conversations in Washington came reports of extensive Japanese military movements in Indochina, toward Thailand, and elsewhere. The Japanese home press intensified its anti-American attitude. The Japanese Imperial Diet passed a supplementary extraordinary military budget of almost four billion yen with unprecedented speed. Japanese nationals continued to evacuate from potential danger areas (including Hawaii). Total mobilization in Japan proceeded—

Senator Ferguson. So far I don’t follow you. I don’t find any evidence about this joint action agreement.
Colonel Clausen. Well, he comes to it in the next one, Senator.
Senator Ferguson. All right, give us the next one.
Colonel Clausen. That is on page 52. He has got here—there is a “2 (Conclusions)” and then he has subparagraph “C-4, Simultaneous Attack on the ABCD Powers.”

You have really got to read the whole thing in order to get this.
Senator Ferguson. All right, read it.
Colonel Clausen. I am omitting the part that I was [11516] going to read.

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead and read it straight through, Colonel. We will get a better understanding of it if you do.

Senator Ferguson. All right. I thought we would save time.
Colonel Clausen (reading):

Total mobilization in Japan proceeded unabated and with an ever increasing tempo—involving even boys and girls down to 14 years of age.

The foregoing together with many other reported actions immediately aroused grave doubts as to the sincerity of the Japanese government, and led many to believe that the Japanese were merely aping Hitler’s favorite strategy of utilizing peaceful gestures to confuse, disarm, weaken, and otherwise destroy effective opposition to an early contemplated military move.

There is no marked change in the local situation. The very nature of the plight of the local Japanese dictates an extreme desire for peace. And while local Japanese commentators keep striking a tune of optimism, their statements
are frequently spiked with a note of despair. They appear to feel that an acid test of their attitude is near at hand.

[11517] It may be well again to emphasize that extreme and eternal vigilance is the only and safest course here in Hawaii.

Then he inserted here, this is his wording here but it is not the digest.

Let us now turn to a few statements in official documents which represent definite action of this office, taken as a result of the foregoing conclusions backed by certain other information at hand.

From the G-2 estimate of International (Japanese) Situation, H. H. D., Army Contact Office—

that means Headquarters Hawaiian Department—


Now, this is a quote from that estimate prepared at that time [reading:]

1. a. With the fall of the Third Konoye Cabinet, the 16th instant, tension in the Pacific reached a new high.

b. The situation is generally admitted as being extremely critical, and is still necessarily uncertain, due to the fact that the formation of the new cabinet has not been completed.

c. Based upon contemporary opinions from various sources, however, it is fairly certain that Japan's basic policy, as heretofore frequently stated, will remain unchanged; and it is expected that Japan will shortly announce her decision to challenge militarily any nation or combination of nations which might oppose the execution of said policies irrespective of what means she may choose to adopt or course she may decide to take in their achievement.

2. Conclusions.

c. 4. Simultaneous Attack on the ABCD Powers.

While a simultaneous attack on the ABCD powers would violate the principle mentioned above (the principle of defeating one opponent at a time—famous with her Axis partner, Hitler), it cannot be ruled out as a possibility for the reason that if Japan considers war with the United States to be inevitable as a result of her actions against Russia, it is reasonable to believe that she may decide to strike before our naval program is completed. An attack on the United States could not be undertaken without almost certain involvement of the entire ABCD block, hence there remains the possibility that Japan may strike at the most opportune time, and at whatever points might gain for her the most strategic, tactical, or economical advantages over her opponents.

Then the next, Senator, is—

[11519] Senator Ferguson. That is where he mentions the ABCD bloc?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That would be America, Britain—

Colonel Clausen. China and the Dutch.

Senator Ferguson (continuing). China and Holland?

Colonel Clausen. The Dutch.

Senator Ferguson. The Dutch. So there was evidence there that there was some evidence that there was an ABCD bloc?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. Senator, would you permit me to inquire?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Clark. Who made that report and to whom?

Senator Ferguson. Bicknell.

Colonel Clausen. It was from—it was made by General Short's assistant G-2 in Hawaii, Colonel Bicknell.

Mr. Clark. Made to General Short?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. It was designated to the—I have in other places in these eight volumes copies of at least one or more of
those with General Short’s handwriting on it as having seen it. Colonel Bicknell pointed that out to me as being his initials.

Mr. CLARK. That is all I wanted to know.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, you thought it was important to find out whether or not General Short knew about this joint action agreement, is that right?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I used to call it, Senator, the ABCD bloc.

Senator FERGUSON. All right, we will call it the ABCD bloc. It would be important to the investigation to find out whether or not there was an ABCD bloc?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I think so.

Senator FERGUSON. And that would be true, would it not, to ascertain that if we knew there was going to be an attack upon one of the bloc that we should expect an attack upon all of the bloc?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir; just like Colonel Bicknell said.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes. So that it became a very important question for all of our officials from the top to the bottom to know the contents of an ABCD bloc agreement because it would give them information that if we had direct information of an attack upon Britain we could have anticipated an attack upon America, is that correct?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I think that is the function of the committee to decide that question, but I am glad to answer, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Is that what you were trying to find out?

[11521] Colonel CLAUSEN. I was trying to find out, Senator, exactly what I am telling you here and that is why I asked General Miles and he said something in his affidavit concerning that same thing.

Senator FERGUSON. General Miles said that he knew that there was an agreement between the American and British and Dutch. Would you get us General Miles’ affidavit, if you can?

Colonel CLAUSEN. I am doing that now, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Colonel CLAUSEN. There is an item on page—I think it is page 215, Senator, of my report.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you just read us what he said about the bloc?

Colonel CLAUSEN (reading):

Further, concerning the intercepts mentioned as contained in Top Secret exhibit “B” and those which related to joint action by the ABCD bloc or members thereof, I knew at the time about the joint action agreement.

Senator FERGUSON. Which gave you some more information that there had been an agreement. Did you ever trace it down as to whether or not General Short knew about it?

Colonel CLAUSEN. No, sir; I did not get that far.

Senator FERGUSON. So you did not carry out—Colonel CLAUSEN. Senator, I assumed that the G-2 esti-

mate of Colonel Bicknell, which was prepared by General Short’s subordinate and being read by General Short would, of course, apprise him of the existence of that which his assistant G-2 knew.

Senator FERGUSON. But you made no further attempt to answer that unexplored lead except the Bicknell matter and the General Miles matter?
Colonel Clausen. No, sir. I did more than that.

Senator Ferguson. All right, I want to find out what you did.

Colonel Clausen. Well, I remember I reviewed the testimony of General Marshall. He had testified on the subject before the Grunert Board and I suggested at the end that this led to the White House. In other words, the existence of an agreement of this kind would lead to the White House and I was told that it was beyond the scope of my functions to investigate there.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, I understand that you finally got to the door of the White House in this ABCD bloc and you were told that you could not enter the White House as far as your investigation was concerned, is that correct?

Colonel Clausen. I was told, sir, not that I could not enter——

Senator Ferguson. Well, of course, we understand each [11523] other.

Colonel Clausen. (continuing). But that the scope of my investigation did not go that far.

Senator Ferguson. All right, the scope of your investigation did not go to the White House.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. I was supposed, as you pointed out, Senator, to be concerned with the investigation that the Secretary of War was conducting under Public 339 and for the purpose of determining what Army officer, if any, should be court martialed.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, was that the only purpose of the investigation, just to ascertain——

Colonel Clausen. No, I said “and.” It had two purposes as I read that: First, to get the facts concerning Pearl Harbor and to find out what, if any, Army officer should be court martialed.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Colonel Clausen. Senator, if you will allow me to point out——

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I don’t want to cut you off. We are both lawyers and we will both be lawyers on this.

Colonel Clausen. Well, we never had much trouble before.

Senator Ferguson. No. I meant that—I am not cut— [11524] ting you off: I am not cutting in.

Colonel Clausen. You were one of my best witnesses, Senator, I say that sincerely. There was a lot of error claimed by the defense about calling two Senators, one being a Republican and one being a Democrat.

Senator Ferguson. We were bipartisan.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir; but you were very good.

Senator, the first part of Public 339 dealt, as you will recall, with the extension of the Statute of Limitations.

Senator Ferguson. That is right.

Colonel Clausen. The second part of Public 339 would appear to be court-martial proceedings.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, who is the person that told you that you were not to enter into the White House with your leads?

Colonel Clausen. That was General Cramer, sir.

Senator Ferguson. General Cramer?

Colonel Clausen. Through Colonel Hughes.

Senator Ferguson. Through who? Colonel Hughes?

Colonel Clausen. Through Colonel Hughes, yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And, therefore, when it came to following an unexplored lead as to the joint action agreement or—we will take that same wording—"or of the Roosevelt-Churchill July 1941 compact for a joint warning to Japan," you [11525] stopped there because General Cramer told you through Colonel Hughes that you were not to go into the White House?

Colonel Clausen. He did not say it in that way, Senator. He said that he did not think that my investigation extended to that point.

Senator Ferguson. All right. And, therefore, you did not follow it into the White House?

Colonel Clausen. No; that is not the only reason.

Senator Ferguson. What is another reason?

Colonel Clausen. Japan had then been defeated and, in addition, it meant that the Congress of the United States could conduct the investigation itself in perhaps a much more thorough fashion than an independent individual by the Army or by the Navy.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, when did you get the notion at the time you got this unexplored lead that Congress would have desisted with what you and the Board had done to conduct its own examination? Because we did not get back here until September of 1945 and we got your report of the Army Board on August 28 or 29 of 1945 and this is back in March or back in the early part of 1945.

Colonel Clausen. Well, Senator, let me make very clear that this conversation that I had with Colonel Hughes occurred at the tail end of my investigation. In other words, that [11526] was around September 1945 and it was after the Japanese had been defeated, peace had been made and it was then apparent that there was no reason why the Congress itself could not conduct the investigation which the Congress had wanted in Public 339.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, Colonel, did you in any part of this investigation go into the State Department, the diplomatic messages?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. I did not get in there, I did not go in the State Department but I had the State Department diplomatic messages.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Did you have any correspondence or any information, memorandums between the President and Mr. Churchill?

Colonel Clausen. I did not see any, Senator, that I recall.

Senator Ferguson. All right. And you certainly could not go into a joint action agreement which concerned Britain if you did not get to the Executive offices to get your papers, could you?

Colonel Clausen. Well, I imagine what I would have done, Senator, if I had been pursuing the lead myself and war had not ended, I would have gone through the regular channels starting with the State Department.

Senator Ferguson. I haven’t any doubt that if you had [11527] been permitted to go into the White House to make the investigation that you would have used every possible means to get all of the information, I do not question that at all. I am just trying to find out what information you did get on the joint action agreement.

Now, the next thing mentioned in there was the Roosevelt-Churchill July 1941 compact for a joint warning to Japan. Now, the only place you could get that was in the White House, isn’t that true?
Colonel Clausen. Well, I don't know where it might be found, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Well, you would expect to find it there, isn't that correct?

Colonel Clausen. I would expect there would be a copy there if there is such a document, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Did you ask anyone for that joint compact?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Can you tell me why when it was in your leads?

Colonel Clausen. Well, for the same reason, Senator, that I just mentioned. In other words, that falls in the same category.

Senator Ferguson. All right, the same reason that Colonel Hughes gave you?

Colonel Clausen. That plus the fact—this second reason is very important because war had ended and the Congress could conduct its investigation if it had desired it to be conducted pursuant to Public 389.

Senator Ferguson. Then you know of no reason why Congress cannot go into this question that was not investigated by either the Board or by you?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Isn't that correct?

Colonel Clausen. I see no reason, no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. And it was not investigated by the Board or by you but you had the lead on it?

Colonel Clausen. Well, as I pointed out, Senator, there were certain aspects of that that I had in my papers and I am sure that you can find further references to them, but in answer to your question it was not investigated to finality, surely.

Senator Ferguson. That is right, you couldn't get the finality, did not get the finality?

Colonel Clausen. That is right, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, let us go over on page 12.

[Reading:]

e. Whether General Miles, Admiral Noyes, Colonel Bratton, or Captain Safford knew about the Anglo-Dutch-U. S. Joint Action Agreement, in which case they would have known that a "War with Britain" message would necessarily have involved the United States in war.

Now, did you find out—you did find out directly in the affidavit of General Miles, did you not?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That he knew something about it?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. But wasn't he quite hazy as to what it was?

Colonel Clausen. Well, there seemed, Senator, to be a unanimity of opinion that the nations who opposed the aggressor nations, such as America, the British, the Dutch and the Chinese, having mutual objectives, would all be overrun, of course, if the aggressor dictator nations were permitted to conquer them one by one.

Senator Ferguson. There is no doubt about that. That is what Hitler started out to do and was quite successful in the beginning, isn't that right?
Colonel Clausen. Divide and conquer.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. So, then, you say that General Miles, having that in mind, that he knew about this agreement.

[11530] Now, let us go to Admiral Noyes. Did you find out as to what his knowledge was about this joint action agreement?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir; I did not proceed that far. I will tell you what I did in that respect, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Colonel Clausen. I read over the Navy proceedings for the testimony of some of these incidents, and it more or less boiled down to what the Admiral testified this morning. I cannot recall specifically who said what to whom, but that is just about what it amounted to, that there was no binding agreement but that there was an informal agreement. Now, if that makes sense to you, I don’t know. It doesn’t make sense to me.

Senator Ferguson. It makes sense to me. We might say, in referring to these kinds of agreements, that the present agreement between Russia and the United States and Britain in relation to the Kurile Islands was not a binding agreement. Is that what you have in mind?

Colonel Clausen. Well, I don’t know the details of that agreement, sir. From reading the papers I assumed that it was; oh—

Senator Ferguson. An understanding?

Colonel Clausen. A moral commitment made from which you could not recede.

Senator Ferguson. All right, an understanding. Is that what you have in mind?

Colonel Clausen. No. From my understanding, sir, I would mean a binding agreement.

Senator Ferguson. Now, how do you distinguish this kind of an agreement? You are a lawyer. Now, what was this agreement?

Colonel Clausen. Well, I don’t know what the agreement was, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. You never found out?

Colonel Clausen. Well——

Senator Ferguson. You never found out, I understand that, because of what you were told, but did you get any testimony on it as to what it was?

Colonel Clausen. Well, I pointed out some places here—I don’t know where it is; it might appear in my proceedings. I don’t know where else it might appear in my proceedings.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, you come down into this joint action agreement here, “In which case they would have known”—you are talking about these officers—“that a ‘War with Britain’ message.”

What message are you talking about?

Colonel Clausen. Well, he had in mind there I suppose whether there was an authentic intercept which was an execute message to the winds code.

[11532] Senator Ferguson. And if it only applied to Britain?

Colonel Clausen. Then it would hook us in.

Senator Ferguson. It would put us in anyway under this joint action agreement?
Colonel Clausen. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. Isn't that true?
Colonel Clausen. That is right.
Senator Ferguson. All right. That is I think exactly what he said there:

would necessarily have involved the United States in war.

So that if we knew by any means that Britain was going to war with
Japan whether it was by a winds code execute message or in any other
manner that would necessarily have involved the United States in
war; that is what that says, isn't it?

Colonel Clausen. That is what it says there.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. All right. Now, did you follow a lead to
find out whether that was true or not?

Colonel Clausen. Well, just like I told you, Senator, and after look-
ing over the situation I am pretty sure it was a—I will say it boiled
down to a unanimity of opinion that if England were pounced upon
that America would come to her rescue.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. You took, then, from what you
[11533] found out in this investigation that Mr. Churchill was
entirely right in what he said in his speech to the Parliament on the
27th of January 1942 which I read into the record this morning.

Were you here when I read it in?

Colonel Clausen. I was here, Senator, but I may not have heard it.

Senator Ferguson. Will you look at it? It is on page 607 of the
official documents of the House of Commons [handing document to
witness].

Colonel Clausen. What is the question, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. Now the question is, your understanding of this
joint agreement as stated by Mr. Churchill in what he says?

Colonel Clausen. No, Senator. You want my opinion now and
here is what it is.

Senator Ferguson. From what you found out in the evidence and
then we will try to find the evidence.

Colonel Clausen. Well, it is simply this, that the United States,
British and Dutch and the Chinese stood for the free way of life,
the dictator nations stood for an opposite way of life. We realized
that we had common objectives. Therefore, if we did not stand to-
gether we would be killed separately.

Senator Ferguson. And then we come to that last line then:
[11654] Therefore, war with one, with Britain, would necessarily
have involved the United States in war and we could have anticipated
that, is that correct?

Colonel Clausen. Well, not necessarily. I think that is going too
far. If you mean that——

Senator Ferguson. I am just taking your words.

Colonel Clausen. Those are not mine, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Well, you were working under them. They
were a kind of directive to you.

Colonel Clausen. I don't want to quibble with you. Let us say
they are anybody's at all. Senator, any opinion given here you don't
want to assume that when there is, let me say, unanimity of purpose
in stopping aggressor nations, that the President would violate the
Constitution in declaring war or taking steps without going to the Congress.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now go to part "d":

Whether the partial implementation "War with Britain" was brought to Admiral Stark's or General Marshall's attention, it being clear that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff did know of the Joint Action Policy.

Now, there wasn't any doubt in your mind that General Marshall knew of this joint action policy, was there?

Colonel Clausen. Senator, my knowledge on the subject of what the Chief of Staff knew was from his own testimony. He said, you will recall, that there was no binding contract.

Senator Ferguson. But he said there was a contract, is that right?

Colonel Clausen. Senator, I would rather—I haven't read his testimony from then on. I would rather read the testimony if there is any question about what he said.

Senator Ferguson. But here didn't you have a personal conversation with him later?

Colonel Clausen. Yes; I had several, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, you had a personal conversation with him about this joint action agreement?

Colonel Clausen. Senator, he told me that it was as he had previously testified.

Senator Ferguson. Is that all he said about it?

Colonel Clausen. Well, that is all I can recall aside from the fact that he mentioned the previous testimony that he had given on the subject.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did he say anything about that it would not be necessary to follow any more leads on the joint action?

Colonel Clausen. No, no; not at all. In no way did he attempt to—

Senator Ferguson. I don't mean attempt, but that you had full knowledge of it, that the Secretary of War had full knowledge on it?

Colonel Clausen. What is the question, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. Did General Marshall tell you that the Secretary of War had full knowledge on the question of the joint policy?

Colonel Clausen. I don't recall.

Senator Ferguson. You cannot recall that?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you talk to Admiral Stark on that question?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir. I read the testimony of Admiral Stark over that he had given before the Naval Board of Inquiry.

Senator Ferguson. But you did not question him on it?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. As to whether he knew about the joint action agreement?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever talk to to General Cramer, who signed this instrument that I was reading from?

Colonel Clausen. Oh, I talked with the General many times; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. On this question of joint action agreement? You see there are three ——
Colonel Clausen. I must have talked with him, Senator, on numerous occasions about so many things that I do not recall any specific conversation.

Senator Ferguson. Colonel, there are three very important questions which were leads in writing for you. Now, have you taken testimony on them so that there is a report on those three questions by either you or the Secretary of War, or were they later ignored and nothing said about those three important questions?

Colonel Clausen. Senator, whatever testimony I took is in here; and I haven't in mind right at the present time who said what about what.

Senator Ferguson. I think I have read it all and at the present moment I am unable to discover anything that is said in here other than what you told me about General Miles and several other instances; but did you attempt to make a report, or did the Secretary of War, if I have missed it, attempt to make a report on those three important questions?

Colonel Clausen. What question? On the question of a joint action agreement?

Senator Ferguson. That is right.

Colonel Clausen. Not that I recall; no, sir.

Senator Ferguson. They did not?

Colonel Clausen. Not that I recall.

Senator Ferguson. All right. And that was left to this Senate and House committee to do as far as you were concerned?

Colonel Clausen. Senator, the answers I have given before I think are the correct answers to that question. In other words, the war with Japan had ceased, the purpose of Public 339 could be carried out better by the Congress than having an officer like myself or Admiral Hewitt try to get the information.

Senator Ferguson. Did you discuss that with the Secretary of War?

Colonel Clausen. I am pretty sure that I discussed it with Mr. Bundy, the nonnecessity of pursuing these leads to finality in view of the changed situation.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. And the Mr. Bundy you have already described was this legal adviser to the Secretary of War?

Colonel Clausen. Well, he is not the legal adviser. He was a special assistant.

Senator Ferguson. Special assistant, all right. But he was a lawyer?

Colonel Clausen. He is a lawyer.

Senator Ferguson. Is he at the Secretary of War's office now—do you know?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir. He is practicing law in Boston, Mass.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, it is very difficult to examine anyone in relation to taking affidavits of anyone until we examine the person who made the affidavit; you appreciate that? For instance, if I wanted to examine you on Colonel Bratton's affidavit I haven't the least idea of what he is going to say about it. Therefore, it is difficult to ask you questions on that affidavit. You will agree on that, will you not?

Colonel Clausen. Well, only that Colonel Bratton is here now.
Senator Ferguson. Yes; but I don’t know what he is going to say about that affidavit. You agree, do you, that there is direct conflict between Colonel Bratton’s affidavit and his previous sworn testimony?

Colonel Clausen. Well, I don’t like your use of the word “conflict.”

Senator Ferguson. All right, you choose a better word then.

Colonel Clausen. Well, he corrected, certainly, his testimony that he had previously given to the Board because of a refreshed recollection and examination of documents.

[11540] Senator Ferguson. Well, now, take the 13-part message.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Isn’t it true that Colonel Bratton originally swore that he had delivered a copy of the 13-part message in a locked bag to Col. Bedell Smith in the Chief of Staff’s office on the night of the 6th of December 1941?

Colonel Clausen. That is what he testified before the Grunert Board, I am sure.

Senator Ferguson. You were present when he testified to that?

Colonel Clausen. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. And later he made an affidavit that he did not deliver a pouch with the 13 parts on the night of the 6th of December 1941?

Colonel Clausen. That is right, Senator. He, on thinking it over and being shown testimony of other witnesses which I did for the reason of getting accurate testimony, said that he recalled that on the night of 6 December, if I remember his affidavit correctly, he was more interested in getting the 13 parts to the Secretary of State than anybody else, since it involved a diplomatic matter, and therefore when he testified before the Grunert Board he was [11551] confused and thought that he had actually delivered the 13 parts to the other usual recipients.

Senator Ferguson. Why were you trying to get testimony, Colonel, on the fact as to whether or not Bedell Smith had given the 13 parts to anybody? What was the point?

Colonel Clausen. Senator, I did not try to get testimony as to any particular point. I wanted to know just who delivered what to whom, and after Colonel Bratton had testified before the Grunert Board, I talked with Colonel Dusenbury, and Colonel Dusenbury happened to be in G-2 at the time that I started this investigation, and told me that he was the one who delivered these 13 parts to these people.

That meant there was then a discrepancy between what Dusenbury said and what Colonel Bratton said.

Now, then, I therefore went to Colonel Bratton and showed him what Colonel Dusenbury said, and said, “Who is correct”?

Senator Ferguson. Well, you had an affidavit then from Dusenbury that he had delivered the 13 parts to Bedell Smith; is that correct?

Colonel Clausen. I had affidavits, Senator, from various people, and several of these people had mentioned [11542] things concerning the deliveries of messages.

For example, Colonel Dusenbury, in his affidavit, put it down that he who took these intercepts around more in the latter part of the year 1941, than did Colonel Bratton.
Senator Ferguson. Do I understand that you took to Colonel Bratton the affidavit of Dusenbury, and the affidavit of General Bedell Smith, who became a general at that time, and took up the question with Colonel Bratton as to whether or not he was mistaken about giving it to Bedell Smith, the 13 parts, in General Marshall's office on the night of December 6?

Colonel Clausen. I took around with me, Senator, so there would be no question about it, the actual paper—that is, in the affidavit of Colonel Bratton, he mentioned exactly what I showed him, so there would not be any question about it.

I see in the affidavit, Senator:

Colonel Clausen has shown me and asked me to comment on certain testimony adduced before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and affidavits of Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury, Colonel, General Staff Corps; M. W. Pettigrew, Colonel; Ralph C. Smith, Major General; Charles K. Gailey, Brigadier General; Thomas J. Betts, Brigadier General; Walter B. Smith, Lieutenant—[11543] ant General; L. T. Gerow, Lieutenant General; Robert E. Schukraft, Colonel; John F. Stone, and George W. Renchard, which statements and affidavits were given by the above-named persons to Colonel Clausen in the course of the investigation mentioned.

In other words, Senator, I showed Colonel Bratton these affidavits, and said, "Now, what is your comment with respect to what these people say?"

Senator Ferguson. And those people said, in effect, that Colonel Bratton did not give Bedell Smith a copy of the 13 parts on the night of December 6?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I was only talking about that part. I am sorry, but I misconstrued what you were telling me.

Colonel Clausen. General Smith is the one who could say whether he got the 13 parts on that night or not.

Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, you took an affidavit of General Smith to Colonel Bratton and said, "Here I have an affidavit of Colonel Smith"—general at that time—"who says you did not," or showed it to him, and told him to read it, and it, in effect, said "You did not deliver to me these 13 parts on the night of the 6th," is that correct?

Colonel Clausen. I showed him that, and I also showed [11544] him these others, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. And some of the others, or all of them said that he did not deliver the 13 parts?

Colonel Clausen. On the night of the 6th.

Senator Ferguson. On the night of the 6th.

Colonel Clausen. Well, for example, the one of Dusenbury frankly said that he was supposed to have taken them around and did not do it.

Senator Ferguson. Did Dusenbury tell you why he did not take them around?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir; he says so in his affidavit.

He did not think it of sufficient importance, I remember that, because he said the next day he found out the importance.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand then that Colonel Bratton thought they were so important that he spent all of his time getting these to the Secretary of State?
Colonel Clausen. I mean, Senator, Colonel Bratton and Henry Clausen agree, I am quite sure, that the most important information that came into the War Department was information that the Jap consuls and their diplomatic representatives were burning their codes. That spells war in any man’s language, and we do not need that long, self- [11546] serving hocus-pocus 14-part message to know it.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Then you are one of the officers in the War Department that came to the conclusion that when you learned that Washington knew that the Japanese were burning their codes, that meant war in any man’s language?

Colonel Clausen. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. And war, in effect, would be on any moment.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir; was imminent.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Now, did you try to find out why an alert was not sent out on those codes?

Colonel Clausen. An alert was sent out on those codes. Colonel Bratton sent the message to General Fielder that General Fielder said he did not get. The G-2 War Department sent it on 5 November, if you read my affidavit, sir. You will agree, Senator, that it went from the War Department to Hawaii, and that Colonel Fielder, General Fielder now, said if he had gotten it, he would have given it to Colonel Bicknell, and Colonel Bicknell who is now in Washington said he saw it on General Fielder’s desk, so it is very clear it went to Hawaii.

Senator Ferguson. You mean just the Rochfort message, do you not?

[11546] Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. That is the message that Colonel Bratton and these other men had in mind as going out on 5 December.

Senator Ferguson. Read into the record what message you are talking about, and see whether it is not the Rochefort message.

The Vice Chairman. Just a moment, Senator.

Colonel, in order that we may be clear, once or twice you used November 5 as the date.

Do you mean November or December?

Colonel Clausen. I am sorry sir, I mean December.

The Vice Chairman. I think you will find several times you said November 5.

Senator Ferguson. Look on page 72.

Colonel Clausen. That is right here; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson (reading). Contact Commander Rochefort immediately through Com 14 Naval District regarding broadcast from Tokyo reference weather. Miles.

Colonel Clausen. Yes. He pronounces his name “Rochefort.”

Senator Ferguson. All right.

That was the message that Colonel Bratton sent and that Fielder said he never got, but Bicknell said he saw it on Fielder’s desk?

Colonel Clausen. That is right.

[11547] Senator Ferguson. I think that is the way you stated it.

Colonel Clausen. Except, Senator, when you send a message of this kind, as I understand it, when it comes out on the end of the
recipient, it does not have the same wording. Do you see what I mean? That is for security purposes.

Senator Ferguson. I understand it is coded, or it is paraphrased even after the translation is made.

Colonel Clausen. That is right.

Senator Ferguson. Now, that message was not sent "urgent" or "priority" was it?

Colonel Clausen. It certainly was. I have the slip here.

Senator Ferguson. Let me see where on the message it is marked "priority."

Colonel Clausen. Page 73, "Important. Place priority tag on here."

Senator Ferguson. Yes, but was a priority tag ever put on it?

Colonel Clausen. That is right. I did not find the message.

Senator Ferguson. No; but here we have a copy of it, a photostatic copy.

Colonel Clausen. Do you mind if I ask Colonel Bratton [interposing] here?

Senator Ferguson. Not at all.

(Colonel Clausen and Colonel Bratton conferred.)

Senator Ferguson. I am informed that these went out automatically on high priority.

Senator Ferguson. I did not understand from the Navy that that was true. They did not have priority unless they were marked "priority" is that right, Commander?

Commander Baecher. I do not know, Senator, what the Army system is.

Senator Ferguson. But your system is they have to be marked?

Commander Baecher. Yes: it is indicated on the message.

Senator Ferguson. Will you turn to page 75? That is a little different message.

Colonel Clausen. That is a paraphrase.

Senator Ferguson [reading:]

Commander Rochefort who can be located through the Fourteenth Naval District has some information on Japanese broadcasts in which weather reports are mentioned that you must obtain. Contact him at once.

Now, did you ever contact Commander Rochefort?

Colonel Clausen. I certainly did.

Senator Ferguson. To ascertain whether or not he had any such information?

[interposing] Colonel Clausen. He certainly did.

Senator Ferguson. What was the information?

Colonel Clausen. Do you want me to read his affidavit?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Did you know there was——

The Vice Chairman (interposing). Go ahead and read the affidavit.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what page it is on?

Colonel Clausen. I am going to find it, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. One affidavit he did not sign and one he did.

Colonel Clausen. Pages 52 and 53:
Affidavit of Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, United States Navy

Captain Joseph J. Rochefort, United States Navy, on duty at Office of Chief of Naval Operations, Navy Department, Washington, D. C., being first duly sworn, and informed of the investigation by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the Secretary of War, supplementary to proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and the authority of the Secretary of the Navy with respect to Navy personnel and records, does deposes and states:

During the period from the fall of 1941 to 7 December 1941, I was the Combat Intelligence Officer in charge of [11550] the Combat Intelligence Unit at Pearl Harbor, which was a field unit to the home office at Washington. I was attached to the headquarters of the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. My duties involved primarily the acquisition of intelligence as directed by the head office in Washington.

At Pearl Harbor there was also a fleet intelligence officer, and a district intelligence officer.

My opposite number in the Army in the Pearl Harbor area was, prior to December, 1941, Col. Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department. Prior to and during December, 1941, we had established and maintained liaison for the purpose of exchanging information pertaining to our functions on matters of mutual concern to the Army and Navy in the Hawaiian area.

For this purpose I had discussions with him and his staff at his headquarters and in Pearl Harbor. During the fall and including the period up to 7 December, 1941, we maintained most cordial and close relations, meeting informally.

My normal duties during the period from the fall of 1941 to December 7, 1941 did not include the gathering of information or intelligence from Japanese political or [11551] diplomatic sources.

On occasions, however, I would receive special assignments relating to this type of material.

I have read the various documents shown me by Major Clausen marked "Top Secret Exhibit B." I did not know the substance of any of these before 7 December 1941, except those numbered SIS 25392, SIS 25432, SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and SIS 25787, on the reverse side of which I have written my initials and today's date.

[11552] I believe, Senator, those refer to the winds code set-up and the destruction by the Japs of their codes.

Senator Ferguson. That is right on the set-up.

Colonel Clausen. You mean the authentic implement message?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Colonel Clausen. No. He says here what he found.

In my talks with Colonel Fielder I gave him such information as I received concerning the substance of these documents and similar matters. It was my practice to give Colonel Fielder all the information of importance in which the Army and Navy were jointly interested and which came to my knowledge in the course of my duties. This was done so that Colonel Fielder and I would keep abreast of intelligence developments in our common interests.

Following are examples of such intelligence. My assignment with respect to those numbered SIS 25392 and SIS 25432, after being informed of the substance thereof, was to monitor for an implementing message and, I in turn so informed Colonel Fielder, to the best of my knowledge and recollection, during the latter part of November 1941. I did not receive in Hawaii any implementing message of the kind for which I had been instructed to monitor. Concerning those numbered SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and SIS 25787, [11553] I was informed of the substance thereof and gave this information to Colonel Fielder and Robert L. Shivers, FBI agent in charge, Honolulu, about the 4th or 5th of December, 1941. This was done during the course of conversations relating to the destruction of secret papers by the Japanese Consul in Honolulu, which information I gave to my head office in Washington.

Signed, "Joseph J. Rochefort, Captain, U. S. Navy."

Senator Ferguson. Now he does not say in that affidavit that he ever had the implementing winds message, is that right?

Colonel Clausen. That is right, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Therefore he would know nothing about the implementing message to destroy the codes.

Colonel Clausen. Senator, these others here mentioned in this affidavit were the ones about the destruction of codes, which was the action contemplated, Senator, when the winds code was implemented, and which winds code, Senator, by the way, set-up was arranged for severance of the telegraph or radio. In other words, the set-up of the winds code, the way I read it, was in the event that you could not send in the normal channels, then they would have this last-ditch way of informing the consuls.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did not the messages that were [11554] sent out there by the Navy, as set up in Exhibit 37, did not they indicate that not all codes were being destroyed, that only part of the codes and part of the machines were being destroyed? That is on pages 40 and 41.

Colonel Clausen. Senator, I do not know what you mean by exhibit 37, or whatever it was that you said.

Senator Ferguson. Pages 40 and 41 of Exhibit 37. Do you notice the difference in those messages? One refers to Washington as far as the machines are concerned, and the other one does not, and we are intercepting messages showing that they have not destroyed their codes after the receipt of these.

Colonel Clausen. Some of the consuls, Senator, sent in the word "Haruna," you know.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, indicating that they had. Where did that come in from?

Colonel Clausen. That one came from another intercept.

Senator Ferguson. From what country?

Colonel Clausen. Well, they went from all over the United States.

Senator Ferguson. Was it destroyed in Washington?

Colonel Clausen. I do not know, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. You made a very broad statement.

Colonel Clausen. What was it, Senator?

[11555] Senator Ferguson. That the destruction of these code messages to you meant war.

Colonel Clausen. Senator, you have shown me in Exhibit 37 two documents that I never saw in that form before. If they are the ones, Senator, referred to in Captain Rochefort's affidavit, then I am in harmony with you, but I do not know that they are.

Senator Ferguson. Now we better find out on that. I think that is where we will have to stop for a moment to find out whether those are the same documents that Rochefort was talking about. The best of my knowledge is, from what we have here, this Exhibit 37, would indicate that that is true.

Now I want to be corrected. Now let us get Exhibit 1. Do you have Exhibit 1? Let us check the SIS number from Exhibit 1.

Colonel Clausen. I would rather see the top secret Exhibit B of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. I doubt whether that is in the room.

Colonel Clausen. That is the one that Captain Rochefort had reference to, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Can we get that to compare with Exhibit 1? I am sorry to delay it but this is a very important point, as far as I see it. I think you will [11556] agree on that.
Colonel Clausen. Very important, Senator. Did not one of those refer, Senator, to the destruction by Washington of the purple machine?

Senator Ferguson. Not that I know of. I do not think the words “purple machine” were mentioned in any that I have seen.

Colonel Clausen. You see “purple machine” means an awful lot.

Senator Ferguson. I appreciate that. If these messages had said “destroy the purple machine,” that is a different question.

Colonel Clausen. We can find out if you will let me have top secret exhibit B before the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Senator Ferguson. But you see the purple was coming in as late as Sunday morning.

Colonel Clausen. Senator, as I understood it, the purple machine was ordered destroyed.

I am reading here, Senator, from the affidavit of Capt. Thomas A. Huckins, which I took at Pearl Harbor.

He is in the Navy and I wanted to see from the Navy there just what dispatches they had gotten from Washington, so they at that time had preserved them on a microfilm. We [11557] sat down and they ran these things off while I watched to see what dispatches had come in.

Senator Ferguson. Just one moment, if you please, until we get these numbers straightened out here.

Colonel Clausen. Here is one, Senator, which says:

Please discontinue the use of your code machine and dispose of it immediately.

Senator Ferguson. What one is that?

Colonel Clausen. That is on page 209 of this volume of yours, Exhibit 1. Then it goes on to tell them how to break up the machine.

Senator Ferguson. That is from Tokyo to Washington, the first of December? Is that the one you were reading?

Colonel Clausen. I was reading the one from Tokyo to London.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. That has been put in evidence. It says:

Please discontinue the use of your code machine and dispose of it immediately.

That would indicate there was going to be war with Britain then on the first? You had that knowledge, but that was never sent to Kimmel and Short, was it?

Colonel Clausen. It certainly was. There was a dispatch that went to General Short’s G–2 stating that the war would [11558] break out with Britain, with America and not with Russia. It was sent on 3 December 1941. It came from the British Intelligence at Manila, based upon this magic traffic.

Senator Ferguson. That is something new now.

Colonel Clausen. I know it is in my exhibits here.

Senator Ferguson. I say it is new from this message. This particular message, being Circular 2443, was not sent to Kimmel and Short. Will you show him that? That is the one you just called my attention to on page 209.

Colonel Clausen. Senator, Captain Huckins’ affidavit—

Senator Ferguson (interposing). Will help us, will it?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, because he has got in his affidavit the intercepts. He looked my intercepts over. I cannot recall, as I am looking at it now, but there is some tie-in between the two.
Senator Ferguson. Just give me an answer to this one question and then we will go to the affidavit. Just look at that circular 2443 on page 209, Tokyo to London, and tell me, if you can, if you had any information or affidavit that that particular message was sent to Kimmel and/or Short?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sure.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Then you are going to find that later for us?

Colonel Clausen. I have got it right here.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Colonel Clausen. Shall I read a portion of it?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; I should like to have it.

Colonel Clausen. Senator, this affidavit that I now have before me is a joint affidavit of Capt. Thomas A. Huckins of the Navy, and Capt. Wilfred J. Holmes of the Navy, taken by me at Pearl Harbor. The reason it is in this form with some statements interspersed in here by a Commander Holtwick was that I had not, when I arrived at Pearl Harbor, been authorized to speak with Commander Holtwick. These things were cleared with the Navy.

Now this is what he goes on to say:

That he, Commander Huckins, on 7 December 1941, and for several months immediately prior thereto, was in charge of the IBM machine room; was assistant to the principal cryptanalyst, and was the administrative assistant to Captain Joseph J. Rochefort; that the records now available at Pearl Harbor concerning the intercepts SIS 25545, SIS 25640, and SIS 25787——


Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is the one that we had? That is Circular 2443?

Senator Ferguson. All right, just so the record will show it is the same number.

Colonel Clausen. This is tied in further.

mentioned in said affidavit of Captain Rochefort, consist of dispatch 4 December 1941 from OPNAV to CINCPAC concerning report of Japanese circular ordering destruction by Washington of purple machine and papers excepting one copy of certain system, and by London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila of purple machines, which dispatch has been microfilmed and is contained in Incoming Code Book No. 1.

Then I go on with the pertinent messages that come out of Pearl Harbor. Do you want me to read that?

Senator Ferguson. No, I do not think it is material to what we are looking for.

Now, as I understand it, there was a message there in Hawaii showing that the purple machines were to be destroyed?

Colonel Clausen. Just what this states, Senator. There is some more here about the Japanese consuls.

Senator Ferguson. All right, give us the rest of it.

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead and read it.

Colonel Clausen (reading).

"That the pertinent outgoing messages now available at Pearl Harbor are contained in Outgoing. [11561] Code Book No. 1 and consist of dispatch 26
November 1941 from COM14 to OPNAV of communication intelligence analysis, dispatch 28 November 1941, from COM14 to OPNAV of British Consul information that the Japanese will attack Krakaw Isthmus on 1 December 1941, and, dispatch 6 December 1941 from COM14 to OPNAV of opinion that Japanese Consulate at Honolulu destroyed all codes except one system; that the Communication Intelligence daily summaries covering the period 1 November 1941 to and including 6 December 1941 are included in exhibit "A" herewith attached and made a part hereof, and consist of a resume or evaluation showing the results of traffic analysis based on intercepts of Japanese naval radio communications only, and were prepared for Captain Rochefort with copies thereof disseminated on the dates of preparation, as indicated on the copies in Exhibit "A," only to Captain Edwin Tom Layton, U. S. N., Fleet Intelligence Officer; that on 7 December 1941, and for several months prior thereto, the said unit supervised by Captain Rochefort did not have any facilities for decrypting the Japanese diplomatic radio messages which required the use of a machine and the USN decrypting facilities at Pearl Harbor did not include a purple machine and the only machine available was one designed by Commander Holtwick and covered a Japanese code [11562] which was abandoned in 1938 and not used since that time.

This is then signed by Captain Thomas A Huckins, Captain Wilfred J. Holmes, and I had Commander Holtwick read and approve it.

[11563] Senator Ferguson. That indicates at the last that there was no purple machine or method of transmitting purple messages in Hawaii?

Colonel Clausen. That is what they told me, yes, sir.

I was very interested, because I had been given various versions of that before I left Washington, and I wanted to run it down.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know what code this 2443 was in, the one on page 209 of Exhibit 1?

Colonel Clausen. It should show on top secret Exhibit B.

Senator Ferguson. I sent out for that Exhibit B. These exhibits which you have here, these eight volumes do not contain these messages that you have been reading?

Colonel Clausen. They certainly do, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Could you find them in there?

Colonel Clausen. That is what I asked for.

I also, Senator, got from the British, from their secret place, corresponding intercepts when I was in England.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever get any information from the British when you were in England that there was a winds execute message?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir. I had that specific [11564] question put to the British people, and they investigated for me and gave me the report that there was no evidence of an execute message, but they did have two suspicious messages of that type that they would run down, and when I got back to Washington, I had them run these down through our super-duper agency that connected with the British and they got some information from out in the Far East, but they were not the ones that you and I would consider an authentic winds code intercept.

I expect that I have actual copies in my exhibits of these messages.

Senator Ferguson. Was there a Morse code execute in the British file?

Colonel Clausen. You mean with the one code word?

Senator Ferguson. No, with the three code words, but in a Morse code, or in international code, and not a voice.
I am talking about different kinds of messages. Did you find in the British file any suspicious message that was in Morse code, or international code, rather than voice?

Colonel Clausen. Senator, I would want to review that. They are in one of my exhibits. To me the most suspicious circumstance of a winds code intercept coming in about the time that Captain Safford said was a document that I saw in Hawaii, which was dated 3 December, and which [11565] gave a highly reliable source.

If you knew a winds code set-up, this would flag your mind. It said "War with Britain; war with America," and "Peace with Russia."

Now, when I saw that I thought, "There is the winds code."

Senator Ferguson. Where is that message?

Colonel Clausen. It is in my exhibits.

Senator Ferguson. I wish you would find that.

The Vice Chairman. Just a moment. Let me see if I understood it.

You say that message was in Hawaii?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, that was disseminated to the FBI, to the Navy and to Colonel Bicknell in the Army.

The Vice Chairman. In Hawaii?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir, that is where I got it. It did not go to Washington.

Mr. Richardson. Go ahead and find it.

Senator Ferguson. Find that one. I want to see that one.

Colonel Clausen. It is in Exhibit 1, and it is also in my affidavit, on the back of the affidavit of Mr. Russell.

I will tell you how I got the lead.

Mr. Richardson. Let us get the message first.

[11566] Colonel Clausen. You want to know who Mr. Russell is?

Mr. Richardson. No, I want the dispatch first.

Senator Ferguson. As soon as we find the message, I will try to find out about him.

Colonel Clausen. Here it is. It is page 87, Senator, in my report.

The Vice Chairman. Let me see, Colonel. I want to be clear about it. This is the message that you secured in Hawaii?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. It is one of many messages sent by the British, sir, to Hawaii.

The Vice Chairman. Read it slowly so we can understand it.

Colonel Clausen. The whole thing?

The Vice Chairman. Yes.

Colonel Clausen. It says at the top:

Urgent Cable received from Manila night of December 3, 1941.

We have received considerable intelligence—

The Vice Chairman. A little slower please.

Colonel Clausen (reading):

We have received considerable intelligence confirming following developments in Indochina.


2. Arrival since November 10 of additional 100,000 repeat 100,000 troops and considerable quantities fighters medium bombers tanks and guns (75 millimeter).

B. Estimate of specific quantities have already been telegraphed Washington November 21 by American military intelligence here.
C. Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early hostilities with Britain and United States. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present but will act in South.

Senator Ferguson. That is the part that you thought was the winds code execute?

Colonel Clausen. No. I thought whoever wrote this up had before him the winds code execute.

I haven't finished the message.
The Vice Chairman. Go ahead and finish it.

Colonel Clausen (reading):

You may inform Chiefs of American Military and Naval Intelligence Honolulu.

At the bottom, sir, it says:

Carbon copy: Colonel Bicknell, Mr. Shivers, Captain Mayfield.

[11568] Colonel Bicknell being General Short's G-2 in Hawaii, Mr. Shivers being the local FBI agent in charge, Captain Mayfield being the District Intelligence Officer of the Navy.

I have a statement from the man who got it. That was received by Theodore F. Davies, on the strength of which they cancelled some shipments from the Philippines. The British always tied in their magic to the commercial interests of their country.

Senator Ferguson. Colonel, when you say the British always tied it in, you mean that Britain used the messages to take care of and protect her commercial shipments?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. There, you see, this message that I have just read for the Vice Chairman, was one of many sent by a man named Wilkinson, who was in Manila.

Wilkinson was in the commercial business. And if you read the affidavit of General MacArthur and the affidavits of others, you will get somewhat the background of Colonel Wilkinson.

In any event, if you turn to my Exhibit 1, and page 50, you will find that what I did was to run down the source of this subparagraph C, where they say:

Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early hostilities with Britain and United States.

[11569] Senator Ferguson. I don't quite follow you, Colonel, that "our considered opinion concludes," could mean that the man or person who sent that had seen the winds execute message, because it would be a simple matter to say that he got it from the wind execute message.

Who is signing this memorandum?

Colonel Clausen. That is what I am going to show you.

The source of that information was magic.
The Vice Chairman. Go ahead and show us that.

Colonel Clausen. At page 50, in my Exhibit 1, is again set forth this same document I have just read.

Now, when I was in London, I talked with the British party in charge of all this magic stuff, and he couldn't find, he said, any connection between what I have just stated and an implement message to the winds code, but after I got back here, I gave more thought to it, and I went to see Colonel Wilkinson who then was working in New York.

I showed him this portion and I said I would like to know——

Senator Ferguson. This portion is "C"?
Colonel Clausen. "C".
I said:
I would like to know if you know the source of that.

[11570] He said he didn't know. And since it was British, I said, "Will you find out for me?"
And as a result of that request, this came from the British to the Americans in Washington.

Page 51-E.
The Vice Chairman. Read it.
Colonel Clausen (reading):

From London 31 August, 1945.
ULTRA.

You don't want me to read all of it?
Senator Ferguson. No. I want to get to the part that relates to this message.

Colonel Clausen (reading):

A. Colonel Wilkinson, who was stationed at Manila and is now with 48,000 and temporarily in U. K. was recently approached by Lieutenant Colonel H. C. Clausen, of Judge Advocate General's Department, U. S. Army, in connection with investigation of General Short and Admiral Kimmel for Pearl Harbor disaster. He carried credentials from the Secretary of War.

B. He brought copies of two telegrams from Manila to Honolulu, of November 26, and December 3 which were as follows:

I have already read you the one of December 3d. Do you want me to read you the one of November 26th?

Senator Ferguson. Does it have to do with this message?
Colonel Clausen. It speaks about the break. It talks about attacking the Krakow Isthmus. I had better read it.

1. "November 26, 1941. Most immediate. Secret source (usually reliable) reports:

"(a) Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus from sea on December 1st without any ultimatum or declaration of break with a view getting between Bangkok and Singapore.

"(b) Attacking forces will proceed direct from Hainan and Formosa. Main landing point to be in Songkla area valuation for above is No. 3 repeat 3 (i. e.), only about 55 to 60 percent probable accuracy. American Military and Naval Intelligence Manila informed."

Now, skipping down to paragraph "C":
Colonel C. anxious to know basic source of para C of telegram of December 2nd.

The one I read.
The Vice Chairman. December 3?
Colonel Clausen. They had December 2. They quote it. There is no question as to what it is.

And in particular whether this was in "special" category.
They mean whether it was magic.

In point of fact of fact, para C was based on a B. J. Wilkinson was unaware of source and passed information to Honolulu as he appreciated that I possessed no direct communications.

B. J. is magic.
If you want to prove that, you can call General Carter Clarke.

D. As far as can be judged, the earlier information was based on agents reports but Clausen only pressing for origin of para C.
E. You should consult with G-2, as security ultra at stake if this evidence made public.

Senator Ferguson. Is that the information you have on that paragraph C?
Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, there is only one thing that I want to inquire about. That is when I get back to this Exhibit B that you carried with you, I want you to compare it to those numbers so we can find out about this purple machine.
Do you have it now?
Colonel Clausen. Yes.

[11573] Senator Ferguson. If you will show me how the message is different from the ones on pages 40 and 41, of Exhibit 37?
Colonel Clausen. Here is 2578757.

Senator Ferguson. How does it read?
Colonel Clausen (reading):

Please discontinue the use of your code machine and dispose of it immediately.

Senator Ferguson. Wait just a moment. This is Circular 2443, Exhibit 1, page 209?
Colonel Clausen. That is right, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right.
Will you read it?
Colonel Clausen (reading):

Please discontinue the use of your code machine and dispose of it immediately.

In regard to the disposition of the machine please be very careful to carry out the instructions you have received regarding this. Pay particular attention to taking apart and breaking up the important parts of the machine.

As soon as you have received this telegram wire the one word SETUJU in plain language and as soon as you have carried out the instructions, wire the one word HASSO in plain language.

[11574] Also at this time you will, of course, burn the machine codes and the YU GO No. 26 of my telegram (the rules for the use of the machine between the head office and the Ambassador Resident in England).

That is what this says.

Senator Ferguson. And that is what this says too. They are identical. That was identified as being in Hawaii?

Colonel Clausen. From my affidavit there of Captain Huckins.

Senator Ferguson. Now, go to page 40 of Exhibit 37.

Mr. Kaufman. I think the Senator would be interested in the testimony of Captain Layton on the point of this purple machine.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Kaufman. He testified at page 228 as follows: Captain Layton was the fleet intelligence officer of Admiral Kimmel.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Kaufman. He testified.

On December 3, OPNAV addressed CINCAF and COM16, information CINCPAC and COM14, that Tokyo had ordered London, Hongkong, Singapore, and Manila to destroy their purple machines. The Batavia machine had already been sent to Tokyo. On December 2 Washington had been directed [11575] to destroy their purple machine and all but one copy of other systems. It stated that the British Admiralty that date had reported that the Japanese Embassy in London had complied with its orders to destroy it.

Mr. Sonnett. What was the purple machine, Captain?

Captain Layton. It was an electric coding machine.

Mr. Sonnett. Did you have any discussion with Admiral Kimmel concerning the destruction of the purple machine by the Japanese?
Captain Layton. All I recall of it is that Admiral Kimmel sent for me when he received this dispatch I have just mentioned, or one similar to it, and asked what was the purple machine. I told him that I didn't know, that I would find out. I then approached Lieutenant Coleman, the Fleet Security Officer, who had come from Washington, and asked him, and he told me it was the Japanese diplomatic electrical coding machine.

Mr. Sonnett. Did you communicate that to Admiral Kimmel?

Captain Layton. Which information I communicated to Admiral Kimmel.

Senator Ferguson. Had you known of that testimony, Colonel, of Captain Layton, in the Hewitt Report?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir. He testified before Admiral [11576] Hewitt after I had seen him. I saw Captain Layton at Guam. I took an affidavit from Captain Layton and I notice here on one of my intercepts he wrote this, apparently regarding this same message:

Message not seen but British reported that Japs had destroyed their purple machine in London. 26 April 1945. E. T. Layton.

He signed that. Captain Layton made that statement on that.

I haven't examined the affidavit of Captain Layton that he gave to me on the subject.

Senator Ferguson. The only thing I am not clear on is as to the two messages, 40 and 41, in Exhibit 37. You were going to clear that up for me. How your message differed from those.

Colonel Clausen. I didn't say they were different, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Well, is there any difference?

Colonel Clausen. I will see now.

Senator Ferguson. I took it from what you said that there was a difference.

Colonel Clausen. No. I don't want to say that at all. I just said that my top secret Exhibit "B" was the document that I showed the witnesses and that I had not seen beforehand [11577] these papers.

Senator Ferguson. Then you do not purport to say that there is any difference?

Colonel Clausen. No, I don't say there is any difference. I just say that the ones I showed these people were my top secret Exhibit "B."

Senator Ferguson. That is all I have at the present time.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman—

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, it is getting rather late and I do not care to ask any questions, but it does seem to me that in view of this examination and the tremendous amount of information that Colonel Clausen has, that this committee ought to have Colonel Clausen review overnight all of the traffic which these affidavits claim was received in Hawaii between November 25 and December 7.

Certainly there has been information brought before this committee that I didn't know anything about up to this time. Probably that is my fault because I haven't been able to read, sir, all of your affidavits. I doubt if any member of the committee has read all of the information that has been obtained through the various investigations that have been made. But you have demonstrated a very thorough [11578] knowledge of what happened as a result of your complete investigation, and as one member of the committee, if you could do that, sir, I would like to have you go over these affidavits overnight and give this committee definitely and completely the traffic that was received from November 25 up to December 7 by Admiral Kimmel or any
of Admiral Kimmel's staff or other subordinates and the same with General Short and his staff or any subordinates.

In other words, we have had the testimony of very few witnesses in this hearing who were in Hawaii outside of General Short. I think he is the only witness that has testified here from Hawaii on the Army's responsibility at Pearl Harbor. Your testimony raises some questions in my mind as to whether or not we ought not to go into that pretty thoroughly.

The Vice Chairman. Will you do that, Colonel, as requested by Senator Lucas?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I would like to join in that and I would like to have him tie that in to Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 37 if possible. Or Exhibit 2. If you can do that then we would know in previous testimony what you were referring to.

Colonel Clausen. I don't follow you because I don't [11579] know your exhibits, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. All right. That is what I wanted to give you. We can have a man with you to help on those exhibits. Exhibit 1, Exhibit 2, and Exhibit 37 have been referred to from day to day here. Now, if you will try to tie those in when you tell us what messages were received from the 25th of November to and including the 7th of December as to where they appear in our exhibits, if they do appear, then that would make our record clear here, so that we could understand this record.

Colonel Clausen. I will try to do that, Senator, but it is a large order. The thing that I thought you ought to have from me was perhaps my opinion as to what of these documents in my exhibits might tie in.

Senator Ferguson. Well, if you can tie them in with that we could have one of our men tie them in into some of the others.

Colonel Clausen. Some are important; some are unimportant. But there is a lot of tying in.

For example, the British in their file of intercepts, Senator, have some of the same messages I think that you have, and we also have others.

Senator Ferguson. That isn't quite the question. The question is to find out what traffic went into Hawaii and [11580] was there and in the hands of any subordinate or General Short or Admiral Kimmel.

Colonel Clausen. You won't think I am trying to put the blame on Hawaii if I do that?

Senator Ferguson. All we want are the facts.

Colonel Clausen. All right, sir.

The Vice Chairman. You can do that, as requested by Senator Lucas?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And as far as you are able you can try to comply with Senator Ferguson's request.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. The committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning.

(Thereupon, as 4:50 p.m., January 12, 1946, the committee recessed until 10 a.m. of the following day, Wednesday, January 13, 1946.)
[11581] PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 1946

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK,
Washington, D. C.

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in
the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office Building; Senator Alben
W. Barkley (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster
and Ferguson and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark,
Murphy, Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H.
Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P.
Morgan and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

[11582] The VICE CHAIRMAN. The Committee will please be
in order.

Does counsel have something at this time?

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, heretofore a request was made by
Senator Ferguson with respect to documents relating to the exchange
of views with the British Government which was referred to in Presi-
dent Roosevelt’s message to Chiang Kai-shek which is Exhibit 16. We
have been able to secure a copy of the telegram sent by the Secretary of
State to the American Embassy in London under date of November 7,
1941, which is the document we think that the Senator was interested
in, and we would like to have it appear in the record as Exhibit 16-B,
the Roosevelt message having been given the notation of 16.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. 16-B. It will be so received.

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit No. 16-B.)

Mr. Richardson. Now, Mr. Chairman, I received a communication
from the Commercial Pacific Cable Co. of 67 Broad Street, New York
City. It appears that earlier in the hearing by reason of certain, I
think, inaccurate testimony the press carried a notation that the trans-
mission of the dispatch to Honolulu known as the Marshall message in
relation to the 1 o’clock message which was part of the 14-part message
that we have been referring to——

[11583] The VICE CHAIRMAN. That is the Marshall message of
December 7, 1941?

Mr. Richardson. That is right. That, when it went to Honolulu,
it went over a, quoting the press notation, “a slow commercial cable.”
This cable company is the only cable company operating between
San Francisco and Honolulu. It is my understanding that the un-
contradicted evidence in the case shows the transmission of the mes-
message from San Francisco to Honolulu was over RCA and not over any
cable system, and I want to make the statement for the record in
answer to the suggestion of this company that the record ought to be corrected because this company had nothing to do with the transmission of this message and, therefore, are not responsible for the way in which it was transmitted or anything with reference to it.

This statement of mine is made to correct the impression which the press gave that the message went out of San Francisco to Honolulu over a cable company which is not correct.

Now, the third thing which I have to call to your attention is this: There appears in the record of the Army Board Investigation some testimony by Major General Henry T. Burgin, which is found at pages 174 to 177, inclusive, of the board record, criticizing in some detail what was [11584] conceived to be the difficulties which the military forces had with the business residents of Hawaii in connection, for instance, with the suggestion of Burgin that the owners of land objected to artillery positions and that going into an alert by the Army would have angered the prominent institutions of Hawaii.

Because of that testimony I have had presented to me a document which has been prepared by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters organization, which is a very reputable organization in Hawaii, for the purpose of stating the position of that company and its associated members on the point of the cooperation, assistance, help, effort, which they assert they made in aid of the interests of the United States and of its military forces both prior and during the war.

The Vice Chairman. Will you permit a question there? Was this company the owner of the land which was alleged to have been wanted, which the Army is alleged to have wanted to use and some difficulty was developed?

Mr. Richardson. It is my understanding that people associated with this organization, its members, were also the landowners that they may have referred to.

Now, it consists of a statement made by the association, and then it is followed by numerous exhibits which are verified by the secretary of the association. I have gone [11585] through it. I find nothing in it that displeased me at all, and I want to have the committee indicate whether it would have any objection to receiving this document as an exhibit as part of the files of the committee.

The Vice Chairman. Without objection it will be received.

Mr. Clark. Mr. Chairman, I don't know that I want to interpose an objection, but that really seems to me to be foreign to what we are investigating.

Mr. Richardson. I am not prepared to argue the point. It is an attempt to lay in paper here what they conceive to be the many efforts of the citizens of Hawaii to aid in the military effort.

Mr. Clark. It seems to me that if that was developed in the Army Board hearing, it would be a matter for the Army Board to consider. I have the feeling that we have already fixed this record so no human being will ever read it, and I hate to see it go any further with something unless it is pertinent.

Mr. Richardson. Well, conceivably, Mr. Congressman, members of this committee might be interested in what this document would show as to the cooperation of the citizens of Hawaii in the light of the testimony that alerts disturbed the civil population and might meet with
objection from the civil population. I am not making an argument in favor of it or against it except that it struck me that it comes from a responsible organization, it is a very well-prepared document, and it seems to me that it might be included as part of the exhibits so that if someone in the future should want to have a source of inquiry as to those facts it would be within the scope of your record.

The Vice Chairman. Permit me to inquire: The testimony to which you referred as given by the Army officer appears in the record of the Army Pearl Harbor Board Inquiry?

Mr. Richardson. That is correct; at the pages I indicated.

The Vice Chairman. And raises some question as to objections made by local people in Hawaii as to the use of land the Army thought was necessary for artillery purposes for a part of their defense program?

Mr. Richardson. That, Mr. Chairman, is only one portion, which I used simply as an instance to show you the character of the things which gave rise to this rejoining compilation. There are other things.

For instance, there is testimony, as you will recall, in this record that certain steps were not taken because they might alarm the civil population and might cause trouble with the civil population. These people are intimately connected with the civil population and state what the civil population was doing at the time in aid of our governmental and military efforts.

[11587] Mr. Clark. Mr. Chairman, I will not object but I want the record to show at least a mild protest on this point.

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman?

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Keefe.

Mr. Keefe. I feel a good deal as Congressman Clark does about this. This is a very highly controversial matter. I have read three books dealing with this very question. If the brief of these sugar plantation owners and producers is to be offered in evidence it will open an avenue of investigation that we will never finish.

I haven't any objections to reading it but I believe that we will run into serious controversy from the character of the books that I have read dealing with the subject and so far as I am concerned I am going to object to it being offered as part of the record in this case because an ex parte document of that character put in here without a chance to even examine it to know what it is or to know who the people are that prepared it or what their interest is it seems to me is cluttering up the record.

The Vice Chairman. Well, does that relate to the request?

Mr. Keefe. I do object.

The Vice Chairman. The objection is heard. Anything further, counsel?

Mr. Richardson. I feel very distinctly the force of the [11688] Congressman's objections because it is, just as he very pertinently suggested, a brief on behalf of these interests on the point. My only thought was that it would afford some reference indication and I could see no harm if it was not opening a door of a great succession of briefs that might be here pro and con.

I suggest the matter of the document might be left until the committee hearings draw to a close. Still that would not meet the Congressman's suggestion that there may be matters in connection with
this brief that he would like to ask some questions about and then it would be too late to ask them.

The Vice Chairman. Well, in view of the objection, why, you will hold it then, not as an exhibit but hold it available if any member of the committee desires to examine it.

Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, I was unavoidably absent yesterday and Monday and I do not know— I have just had a chance this morning for an hour to read the proceedings of yesterday, but in view of the fact that one of the witnesses before this committee, Captain Safford, occupied a very prominent part for a long period of time as a witness it seems to me that I as one member of the committee would like to have the record show what appeared in the public press as to the award by the Navy Department day before yesterday of the Legion of Merit to Captain Safford for his work as a cryptographic expert from March 1942 to September 1945 and I would like to have the Navy Department submit the citation upon which that Legion of Merit was awarded to Captain Safford day before yesterday as it was reported in the press.

The Vice Chairman. For the record?

Mr. Keefe. For the record.

The Vice Chairman. Is there objection to the request? (No response.) The Chair hears none. It is so ordered.

Mr. Richardson. We will secure a copy.

Mr. Keefe. Will you secure it and have it inserted in the record at this point, please? I can be obtained during the day, I presume.

Mr. Kaufman. Very well, Mr. Keefe.¹

Mr. Keefe. Thank you.

Mr. Clark. The only other thing I have on my mind, Mr. Chairman, is that we have got about everything in this record now except Turner's Almanac.

Mr. Keefe. I understand from some of this testimony that might be a good thing to have in here.

¹ A press release issued by the Navy relating to Capt. Safford's citation appears infra, pp. 4461-4462.
The Vice Chairman. All right, go ahead then, present the material you arranged for.

Colonel Clausen. I first will integrate the intercept numbers in the affidavits I obtained into the exhibits before this committee.

[11591] Referring now to the affidavit of Capt. Joseph J. Rochefort there are references to SIS numbers, Signal Intelligence Service numbers of intercepts.

The one numbered 25392 is your exhibit number 1, page 155. No. 25545 is your Exhibit 1, page 208 and 209. No. 25640 is your Exhibit 1, page 215. No. 25787 is your Exhibit No. 1, page 209.

With respect to the affidavit of Colonel Bicknell, George W. Bicknell, there are references in there to intercept numbers 25392 and 25432 which are in the exhibit I have already indicated.

Then there is a reference to his having seen in Hawaii before 7 December 1941 a wire from the Navy Department, Washington, D. C., in effect as set forth on page 183, Top Secret volume “C,” testimony of Capt. L. F. Safford, U. S. Navy. That refers to the Top Secret proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the Grunert Board. That is your exhibit 37, page 40.

Then he refers in here to the British SIS documents that he received before Pearl Harbor and those are contained in my Exhibit 6. Now, this Exhibit 6 are the British Secret Intelligence Service dispatches sent from Manila to Hawaii and what I did was to go in Hawaii to the three sources or three recipients. They were not always the same. In some [11592] cases you will see marked on these in my exhibit that the copies went to, perhaps, maybe in some cases just to Captain Mayfield. Now, Captain Mayfield was the District Intelligence Officer. In some instances they went to the three of them.

The Vice Chairman. District Intelligence Officer for Army or Navy?

Colonel Clausen. Navy, sir.

The Vice Chairman. They have captains in the Army and Navy both, you know, so be sure and distinguish those as you go along.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. He is now Admiral Mayfield. The copies in most instances went to the three, that is, Capt. I. H. Mayfield of the Navy, Mr. Robert Shivers of the FBI and this same Col. George Bicknell.

Now, when I found some case—for example, I have here on page 150 of exhibit 1 it says, “Captain Mayfield only.” What I did was to go to the three sources so as to get what I thought was the full scope of the dispatches.

The committee yesterday said something about showing what information was available in Hawaii.

The Vice Chairman. That is correct. Go ahead.

Colonel Clausen. The affidavit of Colonel Bicknell is very illuminating on that subject.

The Vice Chairman. Well, read it then.

[11593] Colonel Clausen. Incidentally, Colonel Bicknell was most helpful to me and he told me some of the sources of information in Hawaii for me to pursue.

Senator Lucas. Before you read that affidavit am I to understand now that his affidavit contains information that was received at Hawaii from Manila?
Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. And was that same information transmitted on to Washington?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir. As I understand it, sir, the prior SIS stuff that is in my Exhibit 6, I did not find it in Washington.

Senator Lucas. All right. Now, in the first part of your statement you gave to the committee certain information through code numbers that was received both in Manila and Washington—I mean both in Hawaii and Washington, or at least Washington and Hawaii both knew about it, put it that way. Now you are proceeding from there to give the committee information that was in Hawaii alone, is that right?

Colonel Clausen. Well, the intercept numbers that I gave you here, sir, with respect to Captain Rochefort and Colonel Bicknell were received in some instances in Washington and in Hawaii. The affidavit would have to be read to get the complete information.

[11594] Senator Lucas. All right.

The Vice Chairman. Well, go ahead and read it, Colonel.

Senator George. And who was Colonel Bicknell?


Senator George. G-2 of the Army?

Colonel Clausen. Assistant G-2, yes, sir; of the Army.

Senator George. Yes.

Colonel Clausen. Shall I leave out the first formal part?

Senator Lucas. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. That is all right. Go ahead.

Colonel Clausen. You just want the information. This is dated 25 February 1945, Col. George W. Bicknell [reading]:

I was Assistant G-2 of the Hawaiian Department in charge of counter-intelligence from October 1940 until April 1943. My immediate chief was Col. Kendall J. Fielder. Prior to this service I had training in G-2 work, and in this connection had served under General Nolan.

Before 7 December 1941 and in connection with my duties, I developed sources of information which included very close liaison with the FBI in Honolulu whose offices adjoined mine in the Dillingham Building; then [11595] Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, U. S. N., Combat Intelligence Officer in charge of the Combat Intelligence Unit, Pearl Harbor; the District Intelligence Officer, Captain Mayfield of the Fourteenth Naval District; the Fleet Intelligence Officer, Commander Layton of the Pacific Fleet; the British Secret Intelligence Service, and the various units of the Army. Each Monday I held meetings with Captain Mayfield and Mr. Shivers of the FBI. I knew at the time of 7 December 1941, and for months preceding this date that Commander Rochefort was in charge of the unit which consisted of an intercept radio station, a radio direction finder station, and crypto-analytical units in Pearl Harbor. I caused other sources of information to be available to me such as the FCC intercept radio station, interviews with visitors to Hawaii, the public press, and certain residents of the Hawaiian Islands.

Before 7 December 1941, and during the latter part of November 1941, I learned that the Navy had intercepted and decoded Japanese diplomatic messages from Tokyo to Japanese diplomatic representatives to the effect that when a false weather report was broadcast by Tokyo it would be a signal to know that war or breach of diplomatic relations had occurred between Japan and the United States, Russia, or Britain, or one or more of these [11596] three, and to destroy their secret codes and papers. The Intercepts contained in Top Secret Exhibit B shown to me by Major Clausen, numbered SIS 25392 and SIS 25432 which I have initialed, contained the substance of the information given me in the latter part of November 1941. I took immediate action to have the local FCC intercept radio station monitor for the execution message. The FCC later furnished me certain intercepts in pursuance of this request, but which were not the ones for which I was looking.
Later, my attention was again called to this “Winds” code information when, before 7 December 1941 and to the best of my recollection on 5 December 1941, I saw on Colonel Fielder’s desk a message from the War Department, Washington, D. C. in substance as follows:

“DECEMBER 5, 1941.

“Assistant Chief of Staff Headquarters of Hawaiian Department, Honolulu Territory, Hawaii.

“Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather.

“Miles.”

On the day I saw this message I communicated with [11597] Commander Rochefort to ascertain the pertinent information, and I was advised that he also was monitoring for the execution message of the “Winds” code. This information was also given me by Mr. Robert L. Shivers, then FBI Agent in Charge, Honolulu. The information they had as to the “Winds” code was the same as that which had been given me.

Before 7 December 1941 and about 3 December 1941, I learned from Navy sources of the destruction of codes and papers by Japanese diplomatic representatives in Washington, London, Hongkong, Singapore, Manila, and elsewhere. I was shown a wire from the Navy Department, Washington, D. C., in effect as set forth on page 183, Top Secret “C,” testimony of Captain L. F. Safford, U. S. N. At about this same time this information was discussed with Commander Rochefort and Mr. Shivers, when Mr. Shivers told me that the FBI had intercepted a telephone message from the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, which disclosed that the Japanese Consul General was burning and destroying all his important papers.

In the morning of 6 December 1941, at the usual staff conference conducted by the chief of staff for General Short I told those assembled, which included the chief of staff, what I had learned concerning the destruction of their important [11598] papers by Japanese Consuls, and stated that because of this and concurrent information which I had from proved reliable sources that the destruction of such papers had a very serious intent and that something warlike by Japan was about to happen somewhere. I had previously prepared and signed weekly estimates which were mimeographed and distributed to the chief of staff; G–2, Hawaiian Department; G–2, Hawaiian Air Force; G–2, Schofield Barracks; G–3, Hawaiian Department; FBI, Honolulu, and ONI, Honolulu, copies of two of which are set forth between pages 3684 and 3695, Secret Transcript, Volume 30. These weekly estimates reflected the information that I had received from the sources I have previously indicated and were in part the means I adopted of conveying the pertinent information to interested parties.

In the late afternoon of 6 December 1941, Mr. Shivers told me that the FBI had intercepted a telephone message between Dr. Mori, a Japanese agent then living in Honolulu, and an individual in Tokyo who ostensibly was connected with some newspaper in Tokyo, and that the conversation had been recorded and translated, a copy of which was given me. Mr. Shivers was alarmed at what he considered the military implications in this message [11599] concerning Pearl Harbor. I concurred in his views and considered the conversation as very irregular and highly suspicious. I recall that the subjects of discussion between the Japanese which caused me alarm were inquiries by the party in Tokyo as to the fleet, sailors, searchlights, aircraft, weather conditions, and references to “hibiscus” and “poinsettia.” My G–2 sense told me that there was something very significant about the message. I knew the intricacy and subtlety of the Japanese espionage system, that spies sometimes adopt very innocuous means of transmitting military information, and I had in mind the other items of intelligence I had received, including my prior estimates. I reasoned, also, at the time that while the message from Dr. Mori in Honolulu was ostensibly going by radio telephone to Tokyo still it could be intercepted elsewhere. I also considered the Dr. Mori message in the light of the information I had received concerning the destruction by Japanese Consuls of their codes and papers. This was the action which the Japanese Consuls were to take in execution of the “Winds” code.

[11600] I therefore telephoned Colonel Fielder, it being about 5:15 p. m., 6 December 1941, and told him that it was very necessary for me to come and see him and General Short immediately, that I had something that I considered to be of utmost importance. Colonel Fielder said that he and General Short were going to dinner at Schofield Barracks and since they were all ready to go the matter had better wait until tomorrow. I stated that I thought it was too
important to wait and that I had to see them right away. I was then told that if I could get out there in 10 minutes they would wait for me. I did rush out and make it in 10 minutes and handed the intercepted message to General Short who read it with Colonel Fielder. Both Colonel Fielder and General Short indicated that I was perhaps too “intelligence conscious” and that to them this message seemed to be quite in order, and that it was nothing to be excited about. Mr. conference with General Short and Colonel Fielder was comparatively brief and seemed to last only for about 5 minutes.

Following 7 December 1941, I met General Short while waiting to testify before the Roberts Commission. We were alone and at that time he stated to me words to the effect, “Well, Bicknell, I want you to know that whatever happens you were right and I was wrong.”

[11601] On 7 December 1941, immediately upon commencement of hostilities I caused all action to be taken looking toward the apprehension of Japanese agents for which I had theretofore taken preparatory steps. I caused, also, a search to be made of the Japanese Consulate, his papers seized, some of which he did not have time to destroy, and I had these turned over to Commander Rochefort for our joint investigatory action.

As leads I suggest that the files which were kept under my supervision and custody in the Dillingham Building be thoroughly reviewed, that Mr. Jack Russell of the Theodore Davies Company, Honolulu, be questioned concerning the warning to Short supposed to have been sent on 6 December 1941 by the British SIS, Manila; and that in this connection then Lieutenant Colonel Gerald Wilkinson and then Colonel Field, both of British SIS, be questioned.

Signed, “George W. Bicknell, 25th day of February 1945.”

[11602] After this, when I returned from Honolulu and got this additional information, I then consulted Colonel Bicknell and got an affidavit concerning some of this information. That is dated 14 August 1945 and reads as follows: I will omit the first part that has just to do with the formal part.

The Vice Chairman. All right.

Colonel Clausen (reading):

I wish to state further that prior to December 1941, namely about October 1941, I made and practised in collaboration with Mr. Shivers of the FBI, elaborate plans for rounding up dangerous aliens, especially Japanese, in the event of war with Japan. These plans were divided into three categories, called A, B, and C. They are specifically set forth in memoranda I prepared which should be in the G-2 and FBI files. Plan C was put into execution immediately on the proclamation of martial law.

In connection with such plans I wish also to refer to my written estimates given to General Short and his staff, including those dated 17 and 25 October 1941. In view of the impending events, I also, on about the middle of October, 1941, recommended to the Hawaiian Department G-2 and Signal Officer that a teletype system be installed which would link all the intelligence agencies in the Hawaiian Islands with [11603] the Headquarters, Hawaiian Department.

Colonel Clausen has shown me a file containing many of the reports which Gerald Wilkinson of the British Secret Intelligence Service sent to Mr. Harry Dawson in Honolulu. Those in this file which are marked for me, were received by me on or about the dates set forth on the documents. Included in this group are the two documents, dated as having been received at Honolulu 27 November and 3 December, 1941, and in turn delivered to the FBI at Honolulu on 29 November and 4 December, 1941, respectively, and which documents were received by me on the dates they were delivered to the FBI. I have identified a copy of each document by putting my initials and today’s date on the reverse sides.

The information which was thus received from Gerald Wilkinson, including that set forth on the two documents stated of 27 November and 3 December, 1941, as well as any pertinent information I received in connection with my G-2 activities, I gave to General Short promptly, in one form or another. Reference is made in this regard to the files of written memoranda which should be available in the G-2 offices at Honolulu and Washington, to my testimony heretofore on the subject, and to my personal conference with General Short on 6 December 1941.
I come now to the affidavit, sir, of Colonel Rowlett. I asked colonel with respect to the sheaf of intercepts contained in Exhibit B before the Grunert Board, to get for me the sources of interception, the dates of the messages, the dates of the interception, the dates of translation; whether Honolulu had copies; whether the activated message in pursuance of the winds code message was available, so he prepared for me a summary which is attached to his affidavit.

In response to the committee's request yesterday, I find that there are two numbered intercepts which were intercepted at Honolulu, and they are the Army SIS Nos. 27065 and 26158. They are in your Exhibit No. 2, pages 21 and 26.

I suggest that I read them.

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead.

Mr. Richardson. Let us get this clear, Colonel.

These are two dispatches which your investigation indicated had been received at Honolulu?

Colonel Clausen. They were intercepted there and sent on to Washington. My investigation showed that they were the ones which were sent on. The query in my mind, sir, was whether the facilities in Honolulu could decrypt them.

Mr. Richardson. That is what I was going to ask you, whether your investigation would permit you to state, on the affidavit of anybody, that Honolulu interpreted these messages.

Colonel Clausen. My investigation showed they did not, sir; but my investigation showed they might have been able to do it.

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead and read them, Colonel.

Colonel Clausen. No. 27065 reads as follows:

From Tokyo (Togo).
To Honolulu.
December 2, 1941.
#123. (Secret outside the Department)

In view of the present situation the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Here after to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advise me whether or not the warships are provided with antimony nets.

Now, there is a note which says:

This message was received here on December 23.

Further along in my investigation, I wanted to know why this delay, so I checked down with the Signal Intelligence people, our Army people in Honolulu, and I have here a [11606] statement by General Powell.

The Vice Chairman. What date was that intercepted in Honolulu?

Colonel Clausen. Well, it would be intercepted, you see, on the 2d of December, the day it was sent.

The Vice Chairman. On the 2d of December?

Colonel Clausen. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. It did not reach Washington until when?

Colonel Clausen. On the 23d of December.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, might I inquire now, to complete that record, as to whether or not that was decoded in Honolulu, or could be decoded?
Colonel Clausen. Mr. Richardson just asked me that question, Senator, and I told him that my investigation showed that it had not been decoded there. My investigation further showed—and we were attempting to verify this last night, whether this was in a code that they had facilities there to decrypt.

Senator Ferguson. That is what I am trying to find out now.

Colonel Clausen. The Army had no such facilities, but it was my understanding it was in a code to a consul, and that the Navy might have been able to do it at Honolulu.

[11607] Senator Ferguson. Do you have any knowledge on that?

Colonel Clausen. I have no knowledge, and I suggest that that be pursued.

Mr. Richardson. What code was it in? It was in PA-K2, was it not?


Mr. Richardson. Well, J-19 and PA-K2 were what might be termed minor codes?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. They were below the purple?

Colonel Clausen. That is the point, sir. You see, the purple machine was, well, the top flight, and highest level machine which would be given to an Embassy, and Honolulu was a consulate.

Mr. Richardson. And your investigation was to ascertain whether Honolulu may have had facilities to decode and translate the messages coming over J-19 or PA-K2?

Colonel Clausen. What they could do there in any respect, and I have already read the affidavit of Commander Holtwick, and you have Captain Rochefort testifying he was able to decrypt some of this stuff?

Mr. Richardson. All right.

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead now.

Senator Lucas. Let me ask you this.

[11608] Will you follow through at this point now, and disclose to the committee the reasons for the failure to send this message on to Washington?

Colonel Clausen. I understand, sir, they picked these up and sent them in by mail.

Senator Lucas. I see.

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead, Colonel.

Colonel Clausen. I was going to read the other message, which is No. 26158, and it is in your Exhibit No. 2, page 26:

From Tokyo (Togo)
To Honolulu
December 6, 1941

#128
Please wire immediately the latter part of my #123a the movements of the fleet subsequent to the 4th.

You will remember that No. 123 was the first one I read.

The Vice Chairman. All right.

Colonel Clausen. Then there is a note that that "a" is not available. Then that shows a mark as having been translated on December 12, 1941.
[11609] Senator Lucas. What code was that sent in?
Colonel Clausen. PA-K2. Now both those messages that I have just read, after the translation date noted thereon, have in parenthesis the number 5. 5 indicated Honolulu as being the intercept point, in other words, where the message was intercepted, and "5" is an Army number, showing it was intercepted by the Army at Honolulu.

Mr. Richardson. May I call the committee’s attention at this point to page 5515 of the committee’s record where the notation refers to the item on the message just read by the witness:

This message was received here on December 23.

Then appears this:

This decode and translation was based on a copy of the Japanese coded text received by Army SIS on 23 December, by air mail from Station 5, Hawaii (A). It had been mailed from Station 5 on or after 11 December (A). The files also contain a copy of the coded text, which is marked “Dupe” (“duplicate”) and therefore appears to have been received by Army SIS later than the airmailed copy noted above; the “Dupe” copy is on a Mackay Radio (Honolulu Office) form, and appears to have been the basis of the airmailed version forwarded by Station 5.

The Vice Chairman. All right, go ahead, Colonel.

[11610] Senator Lucas. Colonel Clausen, does the evidence that the Army Board took at Pearl Harbor show any arrangement that the Army had with the Navy in the decoding of any of these messages at Hawaii?
Colonel Clausen. No, sir; you see, sir, when the Grunert Board was there we did not know about the magic.

Senator Lucas. Yes.

Colonel Clausen. So we did not go into these details, and this was one of the things I was supposed to do.

Senator Lucas. So there is no evidence, so far as you know, which you could give to the committee as to any arrangement the Army might have had with the Navy to decode or decrypt any of these messages that came in?

Colonel Clausen. Except through the evidence that I collected, sir.

The Vice Chairman. The Senator has inquired about the Army Board, and the Colonel has explained that. Now he made his investigation after that.

Senator Lucas. All right.

Colonel Clausen. The Army Board, sir, in Washington, in the final week, did have testimony from Captain Safford and Colonel Bratton.

Senator Lucas. From your investigation now, is there any evidence that shows any arrangement that the Army had with the Navy whereby the Army, in the interception of one of these messages, might transfer it to the Navy for decoding any analysis?

Colonel Clausen. There is evidence from the affidavits that I collected that if you wanted to do it, you could do it; that Captain Rochefort, on special assignment, did do it; that Colonel Bicknell was working in liaison with him; that the arrangements were such even before Colonel Fielder was the G-2 of the Hawaiian Department, which I believe commenced about August 1941, where the G-2’s of the Hawaiian Department could get the commercial company cables.
In other words, Colonel Pettigrew, whose affidavit is in my report here, which I did not read for the reason that it was taken in Washington and he was not in Pearl Harbor at the time of the attack, but he shows in his affidavit, and also now General Marston, whom I interviewed in Hawaii, and who at one time had been G–2, could on occasions, if they wanted to, go down to the commercial companies and get the consulate telegrams and make arrangements to find out what was in them.

Senator George. Colonel, may I ask, did you take the affidavit of Colonel Fielder?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. He is a general, sir.

Senator George. He is a general now. Have you that affidavit there convenient?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator George. Where you can reach it and read it?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. Shall I read it now?

Senator George. I shall be glad to have it now, as far as I am concerned.

The Vice Chairman. Hold your place where you were starting to read and then read the one that Senator George requested. After that you can go back to the other.

Colonel Clausen. I have it here. It is on page 190 in my report. I will omit the first part.

1. I took charge of the G–2 Section, Hawaiian Department, about 4 months prior to December 7, 1941, and had had no prior G–2 experience.

Mr. Keeffe. Pardon me just a moment.

Mr. Chairman. I have been listening with some interest to this testimony and I just wonder where it is going to lead us. As I understand it, Colonel Clausen has before him his book of affidavits which constitute his report. It now appears that we are reading into the record as evidence the substance of some of these affidavits.

The Vice Chairman. They are already in the record, Mr. Keeffe.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, do I understand that we are to accept the affidavits of these witnesses, with no chance to confront the witnesses or see the witnesses? That we are just going to offer these affidavits with the explanation that Colonel Clausen may make, with no opportunity to see any of these witnesses who made these affidavits, or to examine them in any sense before this committee?

I thought that that was one of the things that the committee had decided they would not do. Perhaps I am in error.

Mr. Kaufman. Mr. Congressman, they were offered as an exhibit yesterday afternoon without objection.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, I had objected to them continuously. Unfortunately I was not here yesterday afternoon to interpose an objection to offering a series of affidavits, if they are to be accepted as evidence in this case, because I think it is highly irregular. I cannot see any probative value of a lot of affidavits when I have no opportunity to examine the witness, or to see him, or to know who he is by observation, or anything else.

Mr. Richardson. The introduction, Congressman, was not with the idea of foreclosing, as far as we were concerned, the point which you make. It was offered as an exhibit. I still understand that it is necessary for the committee to take a position as to whether the af-
fidavits [11614] noted and identified in the exhibit are to be received as testimony or whether they simply stand as an exhibit.

Mr. Keefe. Well, what is the distinction between the exhibit, under those circumstances, a lot of affidavits, and testimony?

Mr. Kaufman. They are affidavits of witnesses who at one time or another had testified either in the Army Inquiry or the Navy Inquiry, or one of the other inquiries. So that the committee has before it the testimony of all of these witnesses in one form or another, plus the affidavits procured by Colonel Clausen for the purpose of amplifying the testimony with respect to the points that were not covered in the Army Investigation.

Colonel Clausen yesterday explained that the Grunert Board, the Army Board, did not have before it and did not know of the existence of magic until the last week of its hearings, and therefore the hearings were closed subject to the procurement by Colonel Clausen of the supplemental information suggested by the magic that was not before the Board at the time.

It seems to me that these affidavits are in precisely the same class as the testimony of the witnesses before the Board, and so far as this committee is concerned, in its desire to have before it evidence from all sources, it [11615] cannot exclude these affidavits and the exhibits that have been attached to it.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman—

Mr. Keefe. Pardon me just a moment, Senator, please.

That may be your opinion, Mr. Counsel, but it is not my opinion, I will say very frankly. A witness who testified under oath before either the Army Board or the Navy Board and who subsequently, by virtue of an affidavit, completely changes the testimony he gave under oath before the Army Board or the Navy Board, presents a very difficult situation for me, as a member of this committee, and I certainly do not want to accept affidavits from witnesses who were sworn as witnesses and testified under oath without having an opportunity to see those witnesses and to examine them in person before this committee.

Now the question of credibility and everything else is involved, I think you, as a lawyer, would say.

Mr. Kaufman. I think that is so, Mr. Congressman, but I do not think there has been any change of testimony, according to the testimony of Colonel Clausen.

Mr. Keefe. I am certain there is, and I am prepared to show it in a number of cases.

The Vice Chairman. I think counsel is correct. I do not think any changes have developed so far in Colonel Clausen's [11616] testimony here.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. I think there is some mistake here about these affidavits, that they are from only people who have testified before the Army and Navy Boards, or some of these hearings. I wish to call to your attention that is not true.

Colonel Clausen. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Because General MacArthur's affidavit is in here, and Willoughby's affidavit is in here, and there are quite a number
of affidavits in here that the ones who made the affidavits have not testified before any Board.

Mr. Chairman, I want to correct the record, and I think it should be corrected, that the Army Board did not know about the magic until about the time it was closing. On September 29, 1944, General Marshall testified before the Board, and he had stated to them, in a private session off the record, about this magic, as he said, the first day of the hearing. I read from page 6 on "A," and it says:

[11617] As I stated to you the other day in secrecy off the record, that message became available to me in the neighborhood of, well, about 11 o'clock, or thereabouts, and the circumstances were these:

I was about to leave for the War Department, having been horseback riding Sunday morning, when a message came in that they had a very important document and used the expression "magic" which determined that sort of material, which they thought I should see at once, and they would bring it to me at Fort Myer.

Mr. Chairman, I did not understand yesterday, when we received this as an exhibit, that that was going to cut off or cut short the calling of any witness. As counsel states this morning, that is not his understanding. I think if we are going into these affidavits, we ought to consider the fact that there are alterations in the testimony which I am able to show here, I think, this morning.

Mr. Richardson. May I make just one statement? It is my recollection of the matters occurring before the committee that in connection with any earlier testimony that was to be received here before the committee, any member of the committee would have the right to ask the particular witness be summoned in person for the purpose of giving testimony. That may be the solution of the Clausen matter, [11618] because if, for instance, Colonel Fielder, or any of the other witnesses that appear in these affidavits should be desired here in person by the committee, it is my understanding that they can be produced.

The Vice Chairman. All right. Go ahead, Colonel.

Mr. Murphy. I would like to say one thing:

The fact is that we have been here since last November—

The Vice Chairman. We all know it.

Mr. Murphy. I want to make my statement. I do not mean to be belittled. The fact is there has been only one Army officer called before this committee from Pearl Harbor, only one Pearl Harbor witness, and if we are going to have the rule of the gentleman from Wisconsin, we will know nothing at all about Pearl Harbor, as to what happened with the Army there, and we have only three naval witnesses. So we have to look to the record, necessarily, of previous testimony in order to make an intelligent report.

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead, Colonel. Senator George has requested that you read at this time the affidavit of General Fielder.

Senator George. What I wanted, Colonel, was his testimony with respect to this information, whether it reached him, whether you gathered any information as to where [11619] it went from him.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator George That is exactly what I wanted. It is absolutely vital here, because I never have seen his testimony.

Colonel Clausen. Shall I proceed?
Senator George. Yes; you may proceed.
Colonel Clausen (reading):

1. I took charge of the G-2 Section, Hawaiian Department, about four months prior to December 7, 1941, and had had no prior G-2 experience. The organization of the Section just prior to and on December 7, 1941, was as follows: a small administrative section of one officer, two clerks; a public relations section of two officers and three clerks; a combat intelligence section of two officers and several clerks organized to expand rapidly in an emergency; a counter-intelligence section of approximately twelve officers and thirty agents, known at that time as the "Contact Office", in charge of Lt. Col. George Bicknell and located in the City of Honolulu. Other than the "Contact Office", the G-2 section was at Fort Shafter, and most of the personnel had dual responsibility since the section was small and the duties varied.

2. The G-2 section depended generally for information on Japan and the rest of the world on the War Department, [11620] on the local Navy Command, and on interrogation of travelers. I know now that some was also received from British SIS. No intercept facilities or other agencies were available to study Japanese communications.

3. While the principle mission of the G-2 section was to safeguard against internal disorders and sabotage, the Contact Office did prepare for publication certain estimates based on information obtained from all sources. It was customary for all military personnel to channel information to the Contact Office where summaries and estimates were prepared. Prior to December 7, 1941, the G-2 Section of the Hawaiian Department was mostly concerned with subversive matters since there were 160,000 persons of Japanese ancestry in the Territory of Hawaii, of whom 40,000 were aliens. The warnings that came to me were to take every precaution against possible sabotage and that nothing should be done which might precipitate an international incident, and that the public must not be unduly alarmed. I spent a great deal of time the last week of November and the first week in December of 1941 inspecting the various military establishments to check on sabotage preparations. Likewise this was done by other Department Staff Officers. I also devoted considerable time in the fall of 1941 speaking before various racial groups in an effort to avoid complica [11621] tions should war descend on the United States. Particularly were we worried about friction between local Filipinos and Japanese.

4. The Contact Office was directly under G-2 but it also functioned somewhat as a special staff section: the Contact Officer, Lt. Col. Bicknell, had direct access to the Commanding General and Chief of Staff. Actually, this sub-section of G-2 performed Combat Intelligence duties although another group was known as the "Combat Intelligence Sub Section." I refer to attempting to obtain and disseminate information of the potential enemy. In reality from the Army viewpoint, there is no combat intelligence unless there is combat.

5. It was customary prior to December 7, 1941, to hold weekly staff meetings, usually on Saturday morning; at that time the Contact Officer presented a brief summary of the international situation while the undersigned usually presented the European War situation. The Contact Officer often reported items of information to me or to the Chief of Staff, or the Commanding General, prior to 7 December, 1941. I informed both the CG and C/S of everything that came to my attention regardless of its source. The three of us were in adjoining rooms at headquarters and were in contact many times each. [11622]

6. My relations with the Navy were in general cordial, but none of their combat intelligence was passed on to me. The conferences and the passage of information between the Intelligence Agencies of the Navy and myself had to do primarily with counter-subversive measures. No information was given to me by anyone in the Navy which indicated in any way that aggression by the Japanese against Hawaii was imminent or contemplated. It was well known that relations with Japan were severely strained and that war seemed imminent, but all my information seemed to predict sabotage and internal troubles for Hawaii.

7. I have been shown a copy of a message dated December 5, 1941, sent by G-2 in Washington to G-2, Hawaiian Department, which directed that Commander Rochefort be contacted for information concerning a Japanese weather broadcast. This broadcast is commonly referred to as "the winds" message. I have no recollection of having received the War Department radio, but had it
come to me, I would in all probability have turned it over to Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell for action since he knew Commander Rochefort and had very close liaison with Captain Mayfield, the Fourteenth Naval District Intelligence Officer; particularly since the way the radio was worded it would not have seemed urgent or particularly important. The contents and details of the “winds” [11623] message was never made known to me. It is possible that Colonel Bicknell may have conferred with Commander Rochefort or others about this but I did not and Colonel Bicknell did not tell me if he did.

8. No direct liaison was maintained by me with Navy Intelligence Agencies except those concerned with local or Territorial problems. I believed that the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Section to have excellent information of the Japanese fleet and assumed that if any information which I needed to know was possessed by Navy agencies, it would be disseminated to me. I know now that had I asked for information obtained by the Navy from intercept sources it would not have been given me. For example Captain Layton stated that if he had turned any over to me he would not have divulged the source, but in fact, would have given some different derivation and that this he did do with Lt. Col. Bicknell. The Hawaiian Department was primarily a defensive command justified principally to defend the Pearl Harbor Naval Base with fixed seacoast batteries, anti-aircraft batteries, mobile ground troops and the 7th Air Force as the weapons. The latter being the only one capable of long range offensive action along with the Navy constituting the first line of defense for Hawaii. I have been told that prior to December 7, 1941, the Intelligence Officer of the [11624] 7th AF, Lt. Col. Raley, was in liaison with and received some information from Commander Layton, Pacific Fleet Combat Intelligence, but was honor bound to divulge it only to his Commanding General. It did not come to me and I didn’t know of the liaison until after the war started.

9. I have been shown by Lt. Col. Clausen a file containing information received by Lt. Col. Bicknell from British SIS and some few items struck a responsive chord in my memory, but I cannot remember which if any were brought to my attention prior to 7 December, 1941. The source of the information was not brought to my attention.

10. I have read the affidavit by Commander Rochefort, Combat Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District in which he states that certain intelligence was given to me. I feel sure Commander Rochefort is thinking of Lt. Col. Bicknell, who according to his own statement did receive information from Rochefort. If any of it came to me indirectly, it was in vague form and not recognizable as coming from reliable sources. I certainly had no idea that Lt. Col. Bicknell was getting the contents of intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages. In any event Rochefort did not give it to me direct.

11. Col. Clausen has shown me a file of messages marked Top Secret, Exhibit “B” which are intercepted Japanese [11625] dispatches. I had never seen any of them before nor was the substance of any of them brought to my attention prior to 7 December, 1941, except the destruction by Jap Consul at Honolulu of codes and papers which was related by Col. Bicknell at the staff conference on December 6, 1941. I gave this letter information to General Short the same day. With respect to Top Secret Exhibit “B,” had I been given this series of messages prior to December 7, 1941, I believe I would have recommended to General Short that he place in effect Alert No. 2 instead of Alert No. 1. It is my opinion that if General Short had seen these messages prior to December 7, 1941, he would have ordered Alert No. 2 without my recommendation. It is my recollection that the Commanding General ordered Alert No. 1 and then announced it to the Staff.


Mr. Richardson. What are those messages, Colonel, that are being referred to there? That is just to tie this in at this moment. He says that he had seen those messages.

Colonel Clausen. Top Secret Exhibit “B” before the Grunert Board.
The Vice Chairman. All right then back to the point where you were before you read that for Senator George, at Senator George's request.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

[11626] Mr. Kaufman. Colonel, that Exhibit "B", is that the messages that Colonel Bicknell stated that he had seen?

Colonel Clausen. No, he did not see them all, sir. He referred to certain of them by numbers, and I this morning have already tied in those numbers to the exhibit. The numbers he referred to are given, plus one quoted by Captain Safford in the Top Secret transcript of the Grunert Board, so I had three.

The Vice Chairman. I believe you concluded with Rowlett.

Colonel Clausen. I had concluded, sir, with Rowlett.

Senator Lucas. May I ask you a question on that last affidavit of General Fielder?

He referred to certain top secrets that he did not see.

Do I understand that Bicknell did see a part of those top secrets?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, he saw the winds code, that is, if I remember rightly without reading the affidavit again. He said he had the substance of the three given him.

The Vice Chairman. All right. Go ahead.

Colonel Clausen. I was going to point out that Colonel Raley, to whom reference was made in the affidavit of General Fielder, I had taken an affidavit from him at Langley Field, Virginia, where he was then stationed, and he pointed out in pursuance of his duties he did have certain information [11627] given him by Captain Layton in the Hawaiian Islands with respect to intelligence, Captain Layton being the Intelligence Officer.

The Vice Chairman. Do you want to read that?

Colonel Clausen. Yes. This is dated 11 March, 1945 and it is on page 76 of my report.

On 7 December, 1941, and for about one year preceding, I was G-2, Hawaiian Air Force. Shortly after assuming these duties, I established, for purposes of the Hawaiian Air Force, some form of contact with the Navy, through then Commander Layton, U. S. N.

Mr. Keeffe. Whose affidavit are you reading, Colonel?


Mr. Keeffe. Who is he?

Colonel Clausen. He just says here, sir, he was G-2, Hawaiian Air Force on December 7, 1941, and for about one year preceding.

Mr. Keeffe. All right.

Colonel Clausen (reading):

I established for purposes of the Hawaiian Air Force some form of contact with the Navy, through then Commander Layton, U. S. N.

Sir, may I interrupt at this moment on the subject of unexplored leads to point out after I reviewed the transcript of the Grunert Board, I noticed Captain Layton had [11628] referred to Colonel Raley as the man to whom he gave information, and therefore I selected his name, having nothing to do with magic, but as a person who could be interviewed and asked whether he was given information by Captain Layton and what he did about it.

The Vice Chairman. All right. Go ahead.
Colonel Clausen (reading): I told Commander Layton that my contact was for the Hawaiian Air Force. During this period of about one year, I had not more than six conversations with Commander Layton concerning the subject of my contact. These conversations were spread out during this period. As nearly as I can recall the last conversation I had with Commander Layton before 7 December, 1941, was about October 1941.

The information given me by Commander Layton was my only Navy source. He stated that if there was any Navy movement by Japan, coming to his knowledge, and which might imperil the Hawaiian Islands, he would inform me. The only specific information he gave me in this regard were studies he made of a possible Japanese Malay hostility and of Japanese fleet installations in the Mandates. I believe this was at least two months before 7 December, 1941.

Any information I received from Commander Layton I promptly gave to my Commanding General, General Martin. [11629] On 1 October, 1941, I conferred with Commander Layton and Colonel Bicknell who was then Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, concerning a conclusion I had reached that hostilities with Japan were possible within a short time or any moment. They apparently shared my view.

I reported this to General Martin.

Attached are portions of a letter written by me to my daughter on 2 October 1941, concerning this conference.

[11630] I recall the General Herron alert of 1940, which I believe was known to the civilian population, but to my recollection there was no alarm of the civilian population.

Signed “Edward W. Raley, Colonel,” and attached is the letter.

Then there is an affidavit of Col. Joseph K. Evans with regard again to the point of what information was available to Hawaii.

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead and read it, then.

Colonel Clausen. That is on page 83 of my report.

For about two months immediately prior to 27 November 1941 I was G-2, Philippine Department, and for two years prior to said two months period I was Assistant G-2, Philippine Department.

There was very close liaison and exchange of intelligence information between the Army and the Navy at Manila. The Army and the Navy each had facilities for intercepting, decrypting and translating Japanese radio messages. Each Service had a machine for the decryption of Japanese messages which were encoded in the classification known as Purple. The types of messages decrypted at Manila correspond generally to those shown me by Major Clausen and designated Top Secret, Exhibit "B". The customary practice of the Army or Navy at Manila was to inform the Army or Navy at Hawaii [11631] of intelligence on Japanese information thus obtained. More precise information in this regard as to particular messages was probably known to my Assistant for Signal Intelligence, Major Sherr, now deceased, and may be known to Commander "Rosie" Mason, USN. There was also close liaison with the British S. I. S. at Manila. For example, see Lieutenant Colonel Gerald H. Wilkinson, International Building, Room 3501, 630 Fifth Avenue, Rockefeller Center.

I left the Philippine Islands on 27 November 1941 enroute to the United States by Army Transport "H. L. Scott". About two days before I left I received information, which to the best of my recollection came from the British Secret Intelligence Service at Singapore, to the effect that hostilities between the United States and Japan were imminent and that large Japanese Naval forces were concentrating in the vicinity of the Marshall Islands. For these reasons, the convoy of which the "H. L. Scott" was a part did not proceed in the usual direct route from Manila to Pearl Harbor, but went by a circuitous route south through the Torres Strait which separates Australia and New Guinea. On my arrival in Pearl Harbor on or about 15 December 1941, I for several hours discussed G-2 matters with Colonel Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department, and Mr. Shivers, F. B. I. Agent in charge. During the course of [11632] these discussions I told Colonel Bicknell and Mr. Shivers of the information I had received and was in turn told by Colonel Bicknell that he also had received this information and at the same time.

Signed “Joseph K. Evans.”

It was signed March 22, 1945.
Then the next statement that should be read is the one I obtained from the president of the Theodore H. Davies & Co., Ltd., Honolulu.

The Vice Chairman. All right, go ahead.

Colonel Clausen. That is on page 85 of my report.

Memorandum to: Lieutenant Colonel Henry Christian Clausen.
From: Mr. John E. Russell, President, Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd., Honolulu, T. H.

You asked me to recall the circumstances surrounding my receipt of confidential information before December 7, 1941, which was so indicative of coming trouble in the Philippine area that I had acted immediately to cancel orders for shipment to that Territory.

My records indicate that on December 4th I telephoned to Mr. C. V. Bennett, Manager of our San Francisco Office, and asked him to take steps to cancel all outstanding orders for shipment to the Philippine Islands, and to endeavor to stop shipments that were enroute there.

I personally received no message on this subject from the Philippines, but I saw a copy of a message dispatched to Colonel G. W. Wilkinson (then working secretly for the British Government) addressed to his agent in Honolulu, and he had requested the agent to show me the message. Mr. Harry L. Dawson, the agent in question, is sitting beside me while I dictate this memorandum, and states that after showing this message to me a copy of it was left with Colonel Bicknell, Captain Mayfield and Mr. Robert Shivers, then with the FBI. Mr. Dawson finds that all his records of this instant were destroyed immediately after December 7, 1941.

On December 15th I wrote to Mr. Bennett as follows:

"Thank you for your letter of December 5th about Philippine indent orders. It is certainly interesting to say the least that we should have taken steps on December 4th to stop this type of business. I took some similar precautions here at the same time, but cannot give any logical explanation as to why I had taken such steps. It just looks like one of those lucky hunches that one gets at times."

I do not recall, exactly, what was in the message that was shown to me, but believe it indicated some Japanese troop dispositions which were very illuminating in the light of diplomatic exchanges then taking place. I do not believe that the message said that trouble would begin on December 7th; but as I told you today the general tone of the message was sufficiently alarming to cause a reaction in the mind of a businessman, strong enough to warrant the cancellation of a considerable volume of orders for delivery in the Philippines.

I am sorry that I have no other data that might throw light on this subject; and in the light of what I have said above in connection with Mr. Dawson’s files, he is not submitting a memorandum on this subject; but I can say that his recollection of the incident is substantially in agreement with what I have given you herein.

Dated April 10, 1945.

After I got that I went looking for the message in the sources where he said it had been distributed, namely, the Navy, the Army, and the FBI. I found what I thought was the message and brought it back. It is the same as I had yesterday. And I had him sign this on the reverse side:

On the reverse side of this document is a copy of the message referred to in memorandum to Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen dated April 10, 1945, which was received by the undersigned and copies distributed to the persons indicated in said memorandum, on December 4, 1941.

That is signed by Mr. Russell and Mr. Dawson at Honolulu, April 16, 1945.

That is the one that says, “Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early hostilities with Britain and the United States.”

Mr. Shivers, the local FBI Agent in Charge, gave me an affidavit in Honolulu.

The Vice Chairman. Read that.
Colonel Clausen. That is at page 88. There are several amendments to this. The reasons are that one agency would tell me something that they thought the other agency would have. I would go to the agency, find it out, and come back, come back to the original agency and in that way double-check them over there.

The affidavit of Robert L. Shivers reads:

On 7 December 1941 and since August 1939, I was FBI Agent in Charge at Honolulu, T.I.H.

During the year 1940 I developed close liaison with then Lieutenant Commander Joseph J. Rochefort, Intelligence Officer Hawaiian Detachment, U.S. Fleet. Commencing in the first part of 1941 I developed close liaison with then Captain Irving H. Mayfield, U.S. N., District Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District. Since August 1939 I had close liaison with then Lieutenant Colonel George W. Bicknell, MID, [I1636] Army Reserve. About July 1941 I developed close liaison with then Lieutenant Colonel Kendall J. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Department. This liaison with the foregoing persons continued down to 7 December 1941 and after. I held weekly meetings with Colonel Bicknell and Captain Mayfield. Colonel Fielder would sometimes be present.

I knew on 7 December 1941 and for months preceding that date that Commander Rochefort was in charge of the Navy unit which consisted of an intercept radio station, a radio direction finder station, and crypto-analytical units in Pearl Harbor. Commander Rochefort did not discuss with me his operations, nor did he disclose to me any information as a result of his operations, until after 7 December 1941.

Before 7 December 1941, about 1 December 1941, Captain Mayfield told me he was aware of the code the Japanese would use and announce by radio its war movements and break in diplomatic relations; and said to me if I suddenly call you and say I am moving to the east side of the island (Oahu) or north, south or west sides, it will mean that Japan is moving against the countries which lie in those directions from Japan. I passed that information on to Colonel Bicknell, on that date. At no time did Captain Mayfield give me the code indicating such movements.

On 3 December 1941 Captain Mayfield called me, asking [I1637] if I could verify his information that the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu was burning his codes and papers. At that time I thought his surveillance of the Consulate had disclosed this fact, but after 7 December 1941 I learned that he was referring to information intercepted by the Navy that such was being done in Singapore, Malaya and London. This latter information was given me by Commander Rochefort after 7 December 1941. About two hours after my conversation with Captain Mayfield on 3 December 1941, the FBI intercepted a telephone message between the cook at the Japanese Consulate and a Japanese person in Honolulu, during which the cook told this person the Consul General was burning and destroying all his important papers. This was about noon on 3 December 1941, and I immediately gave this information to Captain Mayfield and Colonel Bicknell. I was never informed by Captain Mayfield what use he made of it. Colonel Bicknell informed me that he personally gave this information to General Short's staff at the staff meeting on 6 December 1941.

On or about 28 November 1941 I received a radio from J. Edgar Hoover, Director, FBI, to the effect that peace negotiations between the United States and Japan were breaking down and to be on the alert at all times as anything could happen. On the same day I gave this information to [I1638] Captain Mayfield and Colonel Bicknell, each of whom said they had already received similar information from their respective headquarters in Washington, D.C.

About the period 8 December to 12 December 1941, Colonel Bicknell showed me a paraphrase copy of a radio intercept by the Army at Honolulu on 3 December 1941, of a radiogram sent by the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu to the Japanese Foreign Office at Tokyo, outlining a system of signals devised by Otto Kuhn, for the Consul General, through which the movement of the U.S. Fleet at Pearl Harbor could be made known to Japanese submarines off the islands of Oahu and Maui.

Signed April 10, 1945.

This is an amendment:
Concerning the paraphrase dispatch to the Commanding General Hawaiian Department signed Marshall dated 12 December 1941, relating to signals suggested by Kuhn, it is my understanding that the basis for this dispatch was an Army radio intercept. I received this information from Colonel Bicknell. When this dispatch was received by the Army in Hawaii, we had already received a translation of a full text of the message to which it relates. Commander Rochefort furnished this translation, after I had given him a copy of the message, which copy was found at the Japanese Consulate on 7 December 1941, and a copy of the Japanese code found at the said Consulate also on 7 December 1941. After getting the copy from the Japanese Consulate of the message, we got the original from the Mackay Radio Company.

Concerning the General Herron alert of 1940, the civilian population of Oahu considered it routine Army maneuvers and was not alarmed in any way because of the manner in which the alert was handled. It was designed to give the impression it created.

Concerning the affidavit of Colonel Joseph K. Evans, dated 22 March 1945, I talked with Colonel Evans, in company with Colonel Bicknell, when Colonel Evans arrived in Honolulu from Manila in December 1941. I do not recall the details of our conversation. I am, however, positive that he did not discuss in my presence the information set forth in paragraph 3 of his affidavit.


There is another amendment:

General Wilkinson, the manager for the Theodore H. Davies & Company, Manila, P. L., called on me about July 1941 and stated he was the representative in the Pacific area for the Special Intelligence Service of the British Government, reporting direct to the British Foreign Office, at London; that he had established Mr. Harry Dawson, an English citizen and British Vice Consul for the Hawaiian Islands, as the Operational Representative of the said S. I. S. in the Hawaiian Islands; that Mr. Dawson would be concerned with no internal matters of the Hawaiian Islands, but would be concerned with developing foreign intelligence information pertaining to Japanese, which information Dawson would get from persons returning to Hawaii from Japan; that Wilkinson proposed to furnish the FBI, ONI and G-2 at Honolulu information through Dawson, of information received from other S. I. S. operators in the Pacific area, concerning conditions and intelligence affecting Japan; that pursuant to consent of higher authority, arrangements were made for the receipt of such information by the FBI, ONI and G-2 at Honolulu, and such information was furnished as proposed during the period from July to and including December, 1941; that the files of this information so furnished include copies of cables dated 27 November and 3 December, 1941, upon which appear my initials.

Concerning telephone intercepts at the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, I ascertained during the latter part of November, 1941, that the ONI, which for several years had covered what were supposed to be all telephone lines at the Consulate, did not in fact cover one line to the [1641] cook's quarters; I thereupon covered this line, which resulted in information as to the destruction by the Consul of all his important papers on 3 December 1941, about which I have already testified; that I assumed the ONI had all other lines covered up to and including 7 December 1941, and did not receive any information to the contrary until today, when it was stated that the coverage by ONI ceased on 2 December 1941, at the order of the District Intelligence Officer; that had I known such ONI coverage had ceased, I would have caused FBI coverage in replacement.

Signed, “Robert L. Shivers, 20 April 1945.”

He attached here a wire that he sent to Mr. Hoover in Washington from Honolulu December 5, 1941, reading as follows:

Japanese activities Honolulu TH Espionage Conville J Japanese Consul General Honolulu is burning and destroying all important papers.

Signed “Shivers.”

Senator Lucas. Colonel, will you return to affidavit No. 1 and read the last paragraph for me?

Colonel Clausen. Affidavit by Shivers; yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. I should like you to return to affidavit No. 1 and read the last paragraph of that affidavit.

[1164\^2] Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

About the period 8 December to 12 December 1941, Colonel Bicknell showed me a paraphrase copy of a radio intercept by the Army at Honolulu on 3 December 1941, of a radiogram sent by the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu to the Japanese Foreign Office at Tokyo, outlining a system of signals devised by Otto Kuhn for the Consul General through which the movement of the U. S. Fleet at Pearl Harbor could be made known to Japanese submarines off the Islands of Oahu and Maui.

[1164\^2] Senator Lucas. Thank you.

Senator Ferguson. May I ask whether you ever identified that message?

Colonel Clausen. I tried to run it down.

Senator Ferguson. I mean while you were getting up your report.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. What I did last night was to go through the exhibits here to tie in some of these things I am referring to. I thought, in response to the committee where you wanted this outline, that you have the testimony but you also have the documents, and I was faced with conflicts in testimony and considered that documents would be reliable.

For that reason I have all these photos of documents.

Senator Ferguson. But what was the instrument you were talking about?

Colonel Clausen. The instrument was a—was quoted at length, and in more detail in ONI reports, which were made at Honolulu, some of which are in here, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Well, have you got the message? Did you ever find that message that he was talking about in that affidavit?

Colonel Clausen. It is in here.

Senator Ferguson. Well, you get it for us. That appears to be a very important message. I assume that is why the Senator had it read twice.

Did you ever actually find that message? Did you ask Colonel Bicknell or any other person for that message?

Colonel Clausen. As I say, Senator, the message is, I believe, quoted in ONI reports which I have.

Senator Ferguson. Will you try to find it for us?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So that we can identify that message.

Colonel Clausen. My Exhibit 2, page 151, contains an ONI U. S. Naval Intelligence Service investigation report that refers to this whole subject of Kuhn's signals. These were the lights in the dormer windows.

Mr. Richardson. Read that.

Colonel Clausen. Let me finish this first.

Mr. Richardson. Yes.

Colonel Clausen. In that same connection there should be read from my Exhibit 3, page 91, the U. S. Naval Intelligence Service investigation report. My Exhibit 5 also contains——

Senator Ferguson. My personal interest at that moment was and still is if we can get the message, actually get the message that was mentioned in that paragraph that Senator Lucas had you read twice.
Mr. Murphy. I think the Senator will find it in the record 25 times. It is the same one Mrs. Edgers translated in the rough, and it wasn’t translated at Honolulu until after the conflict started.

Senator Ferguson. From this, it appears that it was translated before the conflict.

Mr. Murphy. No.

Colonel Clausen. It doesn’t say that.

Mr. Murphy. It doesn’t say anything about it being translated before the fire started.

Senator Ferguson. Will you state that the affidavit says it was translated afterward?

Colonel Clausen. Senator, I am saying the affidavit says what it says. You see, I am not going to put my impression on the language. The lead is a very important one, and is very full covered in some of these ONI reports.

That is the reason I mentioned where they are in the exhibits, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. I show you Exhibit 2, page 22. Is that the message? That is what I have been trying to find out.

Colonel Clausen. I will have to go through these exhibits and find out.

Senator Ferguson. Or is there another message about the lights? Will you just show us the ONI report, and in that way we may save time, that quoted the message?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. This is the one. It is in those three places I have told you, Senator. I believe you will find reference to it in the three exhibits I mentioned, and I am now looking at page 151 of my Exhibit 2, which has to do with this subject.

Do you want me to read the portion of this—

Senator Ferguson. No.

Colonel Clausen. You want the message? Well, I think this is the message here, Senator. It is right here.

Senator Ferguson. Show it to counsel. Maybe he can tell me.

Colonel Clausen. As you see, this is a very long report.

Senator Lucas. If this isn’t a different message than what we have heretofore seen, then I am not particularly interested.

Senator Ferguson. Neither am I.

Senator Lucas. And neither is the Senator from Michigan, I assume.

Senator Ferguson. No.

Senator Lucas. I was under the impression it was an additional message.

Senator Ferguson. That was my impression.

Senator Lucas. If it is the same message, we will forget about it and proceed.

Colonel Clausen. It is set up as the lights in the dormer windows. It is on page 153 and 154 of my Exhibit 2, where it is set forth in an ONI report, and it is on page 22 of your Exhibit 2.

Senator Ferguson. All right. We have it solved.

Colonel Clausen. May I point out that the language is not the same, but the substance of the message is the same?

The Vice Chairman. Now, do you have anything further at this point you desire to read, Colonel?
Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. All right.
Colonel Clausen. You mean where I left off?
The Vice Chairman. Yes.
Colonel Clausen. I was going to read from the affidavit of Colonel Meurlott, page 98 of my report.

This is dated 16 April, 1945:

Memorandum for Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, JAGD.

Subject: Action taken on WD information concerning possible hostilities with Japan.

1. By direction, the undersigned, accompanied by Major (then 1st Lieutenant) C. W. Stevenson, met in conference with Lieutenant Colonel E. W. Raley, G-2, Hawaiian Air Force, and the various Air Force Intelligence officers in the Hawaiian area on 29 November, 1941. The purpose of the conference was to acquaint these officers with information contained in a secret radio received by G-2, Hawaiian Department, from the War Department dated 27 November, 1941, which advised that negotiations with Japan had reached a stalemate, that hostilities might ensue, and that subversive activities might be expected.

2. The conference was held in the office of Lt. Col. Raley at Hickam Field at 1430, 29 November, 1941. The assembled officers were advised by the undersigned of the context of the above referred to radio message and it was suggested to them that all practicable precautionary measures be taken to guard against possible sabotage of Air Force installations and equipment.

That is signed by Byron M. Meurlott, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Counter-Intelligence Division.

Now, I come to the affidavit of Captain Huckins of the Navy, page 100 of my report. I was asked to integrate these numbers with your exhibits in the light of my cross-files that I had seen in Pearl Harbor of incoming and outgoing messages to the Navy at Hawaii.

Now, Nos. SIS 25392 and SIS 25432, intercepts contained in my top secret exhibit "B" I have already indicated tie in to certain of your exhibits, and I asked there what communications they had going in or out of the Navy at Hawaii referring to the subject of those intercepts.

We found various dispatches, and I list those in the affidavit of Captains Huckins.

I find that two of the dispatches you have, one is your item 1 (c) on your Exhibit 142, the other is your item 2 (a) in your Exhibit 142—I find those. I can't find you have any place the dispatch 1 December, 1941, which was dispatch from Com 16 to Cincpac, concerning certain important Japanese news broadcasts.

Mr. Richardson. Have you got the copy of that dispatch?
Colonel Clausen. No, sir. I don't have a copy.
Mr. Murphy. I think you will find it in the record.
Mr. Richardson. I think so, too.
Mr. Murphy. I read it in the record two or three weeks ago.
Colonel Clausen. I just couldn't find it.
Mr. Murphy. I read it in the record from one of the Naval Intelligence summaries which was given to us that Com 16 sent to Hawaii, notice about these news broadcasts and setting up the arrangements.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

[11650] With respect to SIS Nos. 2564 and 25787, the only one I could find that you have is the dispatch of 4 December 1941, which is at page 41 of your Exhibit 37.
With respect to the outgoing communications, the only—

Mr. Richardson. Wait a moment there.

How can we identify them? Read the dispatches which your search didn’t indicate that we have so we know possibly whether an examination would show we had them or that we didn’t have them.

[11651] Colonel Clausen. You have the 4 December 1941, which as I said, is at your page 41 in Exhibit 37.

Mr. Richardson. What identification have you for the others?

Colonel Clausen. I will read what I have here. This will tell it to you better than I can:

Pertinent outgoing messages now available at Pearl Harbor are contained in Outgoing Code Book No. 1 and consist of: Dispatch 26 November 1941 from COM14 to OPNAV; of communications intelligence analysis dispatch 28 November 1941 from COM14 to OPNAV; of British Consul information that the Japanese will attack Krakow Isthmus on 1 December 1941; and dispatch 6 December 1941 from COM14 to OPNAV. Of opinion that Japanese Consulate at Honolulu destroyed all codes except one system.

Now, the only one I could find of those was the one 6 December 1941 which is at page 46, Exhibit 37.

I come now to the affidavit of General Marston.

The Vice Chairman. Will you spell that name, please?

Colonel Clausen. M-a-r-s-t-o-n.

The Vice Chairman. Very well.

[11652] Colonel Clausen. This was made before me at Honolulu on April 21, 1945. (Reading):

My attention has been called to the affidavit of Col. Moses W. Pettigrew, dated 15 Feb. 45; and, during the period about September 1939 to July 1941 I was G-2, Hawaiian Department, and had information that the Navy had a crypto-analytic unit; during the time I was G-2 the Army maintained a certain amount of liaison with the Navy in that regard for obtaining information derived from intercepts of the character indicated, although the Navy was far ahead of the Army in the local development of this phase of intelligence; it was possible on occasions to obtain information as to commercial cables sent and received by the Japanese Consul at Honolulu, it being my recollection that this was given to the Army by the Navy at liaison meetings.

Concerning the 1940 alert (all-out) ordered by Gen. Herron, from my observations there was no alarm of the civilian population.

That is page 102. Then I have here an affidavit by a Chief Warrant Officer named Louis R. Lane, on pages 103 and 104 of my report, who went over the records at Honolulu to see if he could find the 5 December 1941 G-2 warning sent from Washington to Hawaii. He could not find it any [11653] place but he found that the number which it had, 519, was missing from the microfilms; that preceding numbers, 517 and 518 were found, the following numbers, 520 and 521, but the number 519 that would have been this G-2 warning was missing from the microfilms.

Senator Lucas. Who testifies to that?

Colonel Clausen. There is a Louis R. Lane, Chief Warrant Officer, who had to do with the papers and records, Senator.

Senator Lucas. He was in Hawaii at that time?

Colonel Clausen. He was in Hawaii and was about the best man for the job of running these down.

Senator Lucas. Were there any other missing micro films outside of this one?

Colonel Clausen. Well, sir, I was just interested in the one message. I wanted to see whether the 519, the G-2 warning from Wash-
ingleton, got to Honolulu and that is why I asked over there for their
copies. I had been told by General Dunlop, who was in Hawaii at
the time of the attack, he told me that the copy should be in Honolulu.

Senator Lucas. Was there any explanation made to you by anyone
with respect to this missing file?

Colonel Clausen. No, except that—I went to the then Adjutant
General over there, I mean when I was there, who [11654] corre-
sponded then to the position that had formerly been held by General
Dunlop—I have a statement from him as to the fact that they destroyed
certain messages and I do not know why this one would not have been
micro filmed.

Senator Ferguson. Pardon me. May I interrupt, Mr. Chairman?
Did anyone testify, make an affidavit that they destroyed this message?
Colonel Clausen. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. The G-2 message?
Colonel Clausen. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Does that affidavit there state that 519 did con-
tain that G-2 message?
Colonel Clausen. No, sir; except that that was the number, 519 was
the number of the message, Senator. Let me see if the message at-
tached as an exhibit to the affidavit—

Senator Ferguson. It did carry the number 519?
Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir; it is right on here. It is attached to the
affidavit of Colonel Pettigrew given me on February 13, 1945. There
is “519” written right on it, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. So that is why you went to look for 519 and it
was missing?
Colonel Clausen. Sure, because I was told—you see, I traced it down
through Washington first because Colonel [11655] French said
if it had not gotten over there that according to their system of call-
back the numbers—

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I understand those affidavits.
Colonel Clausen. All right.

Mr. Kaufman. Senator Ferguson, if you will refer to your inquiry
as to the date when the 3d of December message, the setting up of the
light code, was translated, the witness testified that there was a refer-
ence to it in the ONI report.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Kaufman. And the report says it is paragraph 3 on page 153 of
Exhibit 2.

Senator Ferguson. Exhibit 2 of the Clausen report?
Mr. Kaufman. Of the Clausen report. (Reading)

Efforts to develop the meaning of such messages were commenced immediately,
but this testimony was not completed until the morning of 11 December.

which corresponds with the testimony already in the record.

Senator Ferguson. In Exhibit 2 here, page 22 is Navy translation
12/11/41.

The Vice Chairman. Well, now, Colonel, did you follow through
on all of this?
Colonel Clausen. I haven’t finished, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Oh, you haven’t finished yet?
The Vice Chairman. All right. I just wanted to ask you a question
at this point, if it is agreeable.
Did you follow through on all of this testimony and all of this evidence and all of this information as you have indicated by what you have given us so far?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. I finished last night like you asked me to.

The Vice Chairman. And you followed through on all of the witnesses?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. With respect to all information?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir, and also documents.

The Vice Chairman. And documents, just as you have indicated by what you have given us so far this morning?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Do you have something further that you want to present now?

Colonel Clausen. I would just as soon take a recess until after lunch.

The Vice Chairman. Well, we usually run till 12:30.

Colonel Clausen. All right, I will go on.

The Vice Chairman. All right, sir.

Colonel Clausen. I have here a statement by the Navy, [11657] given me at Honolulu by Lieutenant Donald Woodrum, Jr., W-o-o-d-r-u-m, United States Naval Reserve. (Reading)

"This statement has been prepared at the request of Lt. Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the U. S. Army Pearl Harbor Board. The statement is based on a personal recollection of events which occurred over three years ago, and on my personal understanding of what occurred at that time. To my knowledge, there is no documentary evidence available to support this statement.

"The telephone surveillance of local espionage suspects at, or centering around, the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, was maintained by the District Intelligence Office. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, cognizant of this activity, received almost daily transcripts and translations of conversations monitored.

"About 1 November 1941 the FBI, with the cognizance of the DIO"—that is the District Intelligence Office—"began a telephone surveillance of a suspect in its own office building. To the knowledge of the writer, this was the first such surveillance conducted by the FBI itself in Honolulu. This one surveillance was accidentally uncovered by some employees of the telephone company making routine installations. They reported their discovery to their superior, and subsequently this in- [11658] formation was casually passed on to a member of the DIO by the DIO contact at the telephone company. In a spirit of cooperation, the information that their surveillance had been exposed was in turn passed on by the DIO man to an FBI agent. On receipt of the information, the FBI agent in charge apparently went directly to the telephone company and made accusations there that an FBI confidence had been breeched by the DIO's having been given information concerning an FBI tap.

"When Captain Mayfield, then District Intelligence Officer, learned of the FBI protest at the telephone company, he was not only incensed at their failure to consult with him before taking such action, but he considered that action to be a serious breech of security. Cognizant of his instructions from the Chief of Naval Operations to avoid any possibility of international complications, and thoroughly aware of the explosive potentialities of the surveillances being conducted, Captain Mayfield ordered the immediate discontinuance of all telephone surveillances. This was on 2 December 1941. Surveillances were not resumed until the morning of 7 December 1941, following the Japanese attack.

"It should be added that very few of the personnel attached to the District Intelligence Office were in any [11659] way aware that such surveillances were being conducted, and considerable pains were taken to prevent that knowledge from gaining any currency in the organization."
Senator Lucas. Who made that last affidavit?

Colonel Clausen. That was made by a Navy officer, Donald Woodrum, in the 14th Naval District Office at Honolulu.

Senator Lucas. Was there any question in your mind as a result of your investigation and these affidavits that are in this record that the Office of Naval Intelligence around December the 2nd discontinued the obtaining of information from the Japanese because of the taking away of these phones?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir, except that I have an affidavit here from, I believe, a Ship's Clerk, a manual, which gives some date around December. That, in my opinion, is erroneous. In other words, I think—

Senator Lucas. Just what do these affidavits disclose as to the reason why they discontinued this surveillance work over there?

Colonel Clausen. Woodrum gave the reason here. What happened is the telephone company employee found out about the tap and the FBI became incensed at the disclosure. As he says here, "It is one surveillance." In other words, the Navy claimed that the FBI tap was discovered by the phone company man, the phone company man reporting it to his superior reported it in such a manner that it came back to the Navy and the Navy say here:

In a spirit of cooperation, the information that their surveillance had been exposed was in turn passed on by the DIO man to an FBI agent.

In other words, the Navy found out from the phone company that the FBI tap had been uncovered, so the affidavit told me, and then the FBI got peeved because that exposed their position and then the Navy got scared and took out their taps. That is what it amounts to.

Senator Lucas. But the FBI continued on?

Colonel Clausen. The FBI continued the one they had on and, as I read you this morning, Mr. Shivers said had they told him this he would have covered all the taps and I have here, sir, in my documents photostats of the last day's work by Navy, where the Navy man said he had been doing it for twenty-two months and he bids good-bye, after twenty-two months, and 2 December was this date, from which we knew they quit on December 2nd.

Senator Lucas. They quit on December 2nd after having done this surveillance work for twenty-two straight months?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You mean there was surveillance for twenty-two months at the Hawaiian Department?

[11661] Colonel Clausen. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. Why did they say they quit it?


The Vice Chairman. They quit it because somebody else did not like it that they were doing it?

Colonel Clausen. He says right here:

When Captain Mayfield, then District Intelligence Officer, learned of the FBI protest at the telephone company, he was not only incensed at their failure to consult with him before taking such action, but he considered that action to be a serious breach of security. Cognizant of his instructions from the Chief of Naval Operations to avoid any possibility of international complications, and thoroughly aware of the explosive potentialities of the surveillances being
conducted, Captain Mayfield ordered the immediate discontinuance of all telephone surveillances. This was on 2 December 1941.

The Vice Chairman. All right.
Senator Lucas. So the Navy just turned the work over to the FBI?
Colonel Clausen. No, they did not turn it over. They just quit.
Senator Lucas. They just quit and let the FBI handle it [11662] alone?
Colonel Clausen. No, they didn’t do that. They did not tell the FBI. They just quit and said nothing.
The Vice Chairman. They just quit, period, then?
Colonel Clausen. Period.
Mr. Gearhart. The FBI continued their taps of the kitchens or cook’s quarters?
Colonel Clausen. That is right.
Mr. Gearhart. And if the FBI had known that the Navy had withdrawn they would have extended their taps to cover the other parts of the consulates?
Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. I have heard of that.
Senator Lucas. It looks like the Navy could do no wrong.
Commander Baecher. May I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that the testimony of Admiral Mayfield before Admiral Hewitt may be considered of interest, in this connection.
The Vice Chairman. All right, Colonel.
Colonel Clausen. I come now to the affidavit given me by Captain Edwin T. Layton of the Navy.
The Vice Chairman. All right, read that then.
Colonel Clausen. This affidavit is an example of the reason I had to travel. Captain Layton was on Guam, which was the headquarters of the Commander in Chief and could not [11663] come to Honolulu, could not be spared from his station, so I went to Guam and, as the Captain pointed out in, I believe that last paragraph of this affidavit, he would have liked to have been at Pearl Harbor when he testified before me because he then would have had records before him and have more accurately been able to testify. He says——
Mr. Keefe. May I inquire what is the specific question that is being developed before this committee by the reading of these affidavits?
Senator Lucas. Congressman, last night Senator Ferguson and I requested that the colonel give to this committee all of the information that he had with respect to traffic that came into the Hawaiian station between November the 25 and December the 7 in view of a certain piece of information that was developed here by an affidavit that this committee had heretofore known nothing about.
The Vice Chairman. All right, go ahead, Colonel.

[11664] On 7 December 1941, and for one year prior thereto I was Fleet Intelligence Officer, U. S. Pacific Fleet. My duties consisted of the following: To receive, correlate and evaluate, and to distribute various intelligence matters to designated members of the Staff, and to Units of the Pacific Fleet; to provide Plans and Operations Sections with essential enemy intelligence for preparation of current estimates; to supervise counter-intelligence and counter-espionage within the U. S. Pacific Fleet; to maintain strategic and other plots of potential enemy Naval forces and to keep apprised of the general distribution or disposition of Fleets of potential Allies; to supervise projects concerning aerial photographic reconnaissance.

1 Navy Department liaison officer to the committee.
Liaison with other Government Agencies, including the Army, would normally be effected through established channels, i.e., the Naval shore liaison or representative in the area in which the Fleet was to move or to be based. To clarify the interlocking yet independent status of Fleet Intelligence Officer (myself), the Combat Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District (then Commander Rochefort), and the District Intelligence Officer, Fourteenth Naval District (then Captain Mayfield); Captain Mayfield was the District Intelligence Officer and responsible to the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and to the Director [11665] of Naval Intelligence for all intelligence matters, including counter-espionage and counter-sabotage ashore in the Fourteenth Naval District, and was my direct liaison on Naval matters with other Government Agencies in the Fourteenth Naval District. Commander Rochefort was the Head of the Combat Intelligence Unit, Fourteenth Naval District, working under direct orders of the Chief of Naval Operations, but under the administrative jurisdiction of the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and was my direct liaison in matters of Communications Intelligence. My intelligence field was limited to the vessels and forces of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and I was under the direct command of the Commander in Chief of that Fleet. Were the Fleet to proceed to San Francisco, for example, I would then contact the District Intelligence Officer, Twelfth Naval District, there and conduct any business with the Army or other Government Agencies through that office.

About 3 months prior to 7 December 1941, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Hawaiian Air Force, then Lieutenant Colonel Edwin Raley, called at my office and informed me that he had been directed to establish with me an Army liaison and requested all information we possessed on airfields in Australia, Netherlands East Indies, Australian Manated Territories, and any other Pacific Ocean [11666] airports and airways information. I furnished him with all the information we possessed, confidential and secret, including Dutch “Airways Guide” and Australian Air Force “Airports Directory.” Thereafter he, or his assistant, Lieutenant Brown, would request various items of intelligence material and as mid-November approached, the meetings between those officers and myself and my assistant, Commander Hudson, USN, increased in frequency.

By mid-November 1941 a series of intelligence reports from various sources, including Dutch, British, Chinese, and American, collectively indicated that Japan was on the move in a southerly direction. These consisted of Consular Reports, Attache and Agent Reports, Ship Master’s Reports, and reports from other Intelligence Agencies that there was a greatly increased movement of Japanese Army transports, Naval auxiliaries, and Naval vessels southward along the China Coast, with concentrations being seen in French Indo-China and South China. The general tenor of these reports was imparted to Colonel Raley and we informally discussed and exchanged opinions on the general significance thereof. In a period for about 2 to 3 weeks prior to 7 December 1941, as my recollection serves me, I talked with Colonel Raley on a general average every other day.

Now, in connection with that paragraph, it ties into [11667] your Exhibit 1, pages 202 and 203, and the testimony given before your committee at your transcript number 11,157.

During the period of about ten days to two weeks prior to 7 December 1941, without authorization from higher authority and on my own initiative, I imparted to Colonel Raley certain “Top Secret” intelligence from sources that had previously been found to be completely reliable and from other sources previously determined to be generally fairly reliable. I did not inform him of the true source and concealed its true origin, in keeping with the Top Secret Oath by which I was bound. I explained to Colonel Raley that I was not authorized to give him this information but would do so if he would promise that he would make no copy or written memorandum of it and would impart it only to his Commanding General, Major General Fred Martin, Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, to which Colonel Raley agreed. In pursuance of this agreement, I imparted certain “Top Secret” intelligence to Colonel Raley in person as follows: One item had to do with an intrigue in Thailand, in which the pro-Japanese Thailand leaders were, by circulating a false report of a Japanese landing on the East Coast at Singora, to get the pro-British faction of that Government to request immediate assistance from British Forces in North [11668] Malaya, so that as soon as the British Forces crossed the border into Thailand, the pro-Jap-
The Japanese element would declare Great Britain an invader and call upon Japan for assistance, thereby facilitating Japanese entry into Thailand and an invasion of Malaya.

To my best knowledge and recollection, I told him as "Top Secret" information that we were listening for certain cryptic weather messages to be included in the Japanese broadcasts which were to signal the breach of diplomatic relations or opening of hostilities between Japan and certain powers, namely, America or Britain or Russia. (No such message was ever intercepted or received at Pearl Harbor.) I do not recall positively, whether or not I told him of the message we had received stating that certain Japanese Diplomatic Officials were destroying their Purple Machines.

In connection with the reports of movements of Japanese amphibious equipment, transports, troops, and Naval vessels to the South, in addition to informing Colonel Raley of these reports I informed him we had other reliable information which seemed to substantiate a general movement to the South of a considerable portion of Japanese Naval Forces, including probably some battleships and carriers as well as cruisers, destroyers, and submarines. I distinctly recall that I informed Colonel Raley of the [1669] special searches being conducted in late November or early December of Camranh Bay and the French Indo-China coast by Naval seaplanes based in the Manila area, and that these planes had sighted Japanese submarines, cruisers, transports, and destroyers in Camranh Bay and along the French Indo-China coast. This search, in itself, was a very strict secret.

Prior to 7 December 1941, I received no information from dispatches sent by the Japanese Consul General at Honolulu by Commercial Cable or otherwise.

I was not apprised of the so-called "Mori" telephone message. I received a telephone call from Captain Mayfield on Saturday evening, 6 December. He said he wanted to see me the next morning at my convenience. I asked if I should come down immediately as I was free, and he replied: "We cannot do anything about it now, as I do not have the material and will not have it until tomorrow morning."

In connection with the Japanese activity in the Japanese Mandated Islands: Commencing in late December 1940 and until December 1941, and subsequently, I made it one of my principal tasks to follow the increasing Japanese activity in the Marshalls, Carolines, and the Marianas, including Marcus. That the Japanese were rapidly building air bases, garrisoning key islands, was very apparent. As [1670] Fleet Intelligence Officer, I wrote and disseminated several bulletins concerning this activity and also the organization of the Japanese Naval Surface and Air Forces stationed in the Mandates, for distribution to Fleet High Commands and the Chief of Naval Operations.

When the U.S. Army proposed to make photographic reconnaissance of certain of the Japanese Mandates in late November 1941, I held a series of conferences with Colonel Raley and furnished him with the latest Intelligence Bulletin (No. 45-11) concerning these installations and developments, with the proviso that the publication be not reproduced nor circulated except to the pilots of the reconnaissance planes and Commanders of the Army Squadrons to be stationed on Wake and Midway, with the further stipulation that the document be not carried in aircraft. Colonel Raley also requested, and I acquiesced, to sit in on all conferences after the arrival of the photo planes, and that I brief the pilots on all matters relating to the Mandates prior to their take-off. This reconnaissance did not materialize due to delays in arrival of the planes. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is my memorandum to Admiral Kimmel, apprising him of these conferences concerning the projected reconnaissance flights over the Mandated Islands. Exhibit B is one copy of Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin #45-11.

[11671] I do not specifically recall the term A. B. C. Block or discussions with Colonel Raley concerning it. I believe there may have been conversations concerning a geographical limit beyond which Britain and the Netherlands could not permit Jap penetration.

My only relationships with Colonel Bicknell was having met him at Colonel Raley's quarters at Hickam Field in mid- or late November, where the three of us discussed, in general terms, the world situation and the situation in the Far East, in particular. Normally, I would have no occasion to undertake direct liaison with Colonel Bicknell, as that was carried out by the authorities of the Fourteenth Naval District through whom the Fleet dealt on all matters pertaining to shore-side business.
From time to time prior to December 7, 1941 when Task Force Commanders returned to Pearl from sea, I was called into the Commander-in-Chief's office to give a brief summary of the general intelligence picture at the time in question. I cannot state positively that General Short was present at these times, but I believe he may have been. At other times when General Short was in conference with Admiral Kimmel, I was called to present the intelligence picture to them. During these intelligence briefings, I discussed the general disposition, location and activity of the Japanese Fleet and [11672] Major Japanese Naval Air Units as was known or inferred from all available intelligence, including Top Secret. I also discussed in considerable detail the Japanese militarization of the Mandated Islands, their building of Air Bases, Naval Bases, and facilities there, with particular emphasis on the Marshalls.

I had no official liaison with Colonel Fielder, as I had presumed from Colonel Raley's remarks when he first came to me and suggested setting up the liaison that he was then representing the Army, as the Hawaiian Air Force was a subordinate Command of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. His statement at that time was, in effect, that as the Navy and the heavy bombers of the Hawaiian Air Force were the offensive weapons for carrying out the war plans, he was directed to establish this liaison as it was felt that the Hawaiian Department was a defensive garrison. I gathered from his remarks that other liaison had been established with the Fourteenth Naval District in accordance with the existing directives for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands. I knew there was a specially designated Naval Liaison Officer, Lt. Burr, U. S. N., from Headquarters, Fourteenth Naval District, permanently attached to the Headquarters, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. Inasmuch as I had no direct liaison with Colonel Fielder, I did not impart to him any [11673] of the information that I gave to Colonel Raley. Colonel Fielder did not contact me nor request any intelligence from me prior to 7 December 1941.

I desire to state that being without my files and notes, which I had access to at all previous hearings concerning Pearl Harbor (the Roberts commission in December 1941, the Army and Navy Pearl Harbor boards in 1944). I am unable to make as clear or concise statements from memory as might be possible with the assistance of my files, notes, and memoranda.

I have read the various documents shown me by Colonel Clausen, marked top secret, exhibit B. I did not know of the substance of any of these prior to 7 December 1941, except those marked SIS 25432 and SIS 25787 on which I have written my initials and today's date.


[11674] Now, those two exhibits in exhibit B, SIS 25432 and SIS 25787 I have already tied into your exhibits, except it should be pointed out with respect to 25787, referring to the destruction of the purple machines, that my copy of that intercept contained in top secret exhibit B has written there in the handwriting of Captain Layton these words.

The Vice Chairman. Could you make a note of that, Colonel, and locate it and have it when we come back?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Let me ask you one question now to try to get it clearly in mind. Captain Layton was G-2 of the Navy?

Colonel Clausen. He was the fleet intelligence officer.

The Vice Chairman. Fleet Intelligence Officer?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Didn't he state there that he had not had any conferences with General Fielder?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Who was G-2 of the Army in Hawaii?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. He had not had any conferences with him?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. All right. The committee will recess now until 1:30.
(Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m. a recess was taken until 1:30 p.m. of the same day.)

[11676] Afternoon Session—1:30 p.m.

The Vice Chairman. The committee will be in order.

TESTIMONY OF HENRY C. CLAUSEN (Resumed)

The Vice Chairman. Are you ready to proceed, Colonel?
Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.
I was looking for the reference on the intercept 25787 which Captain Layton referred to in his affidavit, and I find it here in Exhibit 7. On it he has written in his handwriting:

Message not seen but British reported that Japs had destroyed their purple machine in London.

And he puts 26 April, 1945; signed E. T. Layton.
The next thing I was going to call to the attention of the committee are the exhibits following the affidavit of Captain Layton in addition to the memorandum to Admiral Kimmel, concerning the projected reconnaissance flights over the Mandated Islands, and the fleet intelligence report.

There are some very, very important communications which indicate the work that we being done at Hawaii by Commander Rochefort. I understand the committee has been furnished copies but these cover the period 1 November, 1941 to 7 December, 1941, and show the progress of intelligence with respect to the unit under Commander Rochefort. And you [11677] will find in here references to the Japanese carriers, radio silences, where the Americans tried to find the Japanese ships and were unable to do so, et cetera.

I then come to the affidavit of General Powell.
The Vice Chairman. Colonel, you are familiar with that. Do you think there is anything in that which you have just referred to that you should read to the committee, or especially call attention to?
Colonel Clausen. Well, you see, sir, I am not an expert in analyzing these, and it is very easy, with the benefit of hindsight to pick out certain portions and say that they were very suspicious.
Mr. Clark. These were made by Rochefort?
Colonel Clausen. They were made by Captain Rochefort's unit at Pearl Harbor and he had the facilities for decrypting and decoding this type of traffic primarily, as I understand it.
You see, for example, the one of December 6, contains this information:

Combined Fleet. Still no traffic from the second and third fleet commanders.
You see, they were losing fleets, losing carriers.
The Vice Chairman. Losing Japanese fleets and Japanese carriers? [11678] Colonel Clausen. That is right. And if you read these over, you will see this information also, the increasing activity in the Mandates. Very important piece of intelligence.
Mr. Clark. Those were made in his office?
Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Clark. He would be the responsible head of the division or set-up that made those memoranda?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Of course, Mr. Chairman, you have to keep in mind at the time that when the Japanese fleet came, it didn't come from the Marshalls, but it came from the Kuriles, north of Japan; so that while these ships may have appeared to have been listed, and there was activity in the Marshalls, when the blow came, it didn't come from either of those places and had we depended upon our information from the Marshalls, it wouldn't help us on this.

It further illustrates the uncertainty with reference to trying to find where fleets are by this form of intelligence.

Colonel Clausen. I understand that the intelligence reports I have indicated are your Exhibit 115?

The Vice Chairman. All right.

Colonel Clausen. We come down now to the affidavit [11679] of General Powell, page 179 of my report, and he states in here what he did to try to locate the intercept 27065 to which I have made reference.

Also No. 8007.

With regard to why the delay in sending that in; he also has some references. I asked him to also check on this G–2 message sent from Washington on 5 December No. 519.

Does the committee want me to read this?

The Vice Chairman. Yes.

Colonel Clausen (reading):

1. With reference to the message sent No. 519 December 5, 1941, which you handed me. I certify to the best of my knowledge and belief, there are no copies of clear or coded traffic of this particular message on file in the signal center, Fort Shafter. In fact, there are no copies of clear or coded traffic in the signal center prior to 1 July, 1944.

Mr. Clark. Will you identify that message for me otherwise than by number?

Colonel Clausen. That is the message that the War Department G–2 sent on 5 December, 1941 to the G–2 Hawaiian Department, and said "Go see Captain Rochefort regarding the weather broadcast."

Mr. Clark. Thank you.

[11680] The Vice Chairman. What was that you just read about no message being available prior to July 1944?

Colonel Clausen (reading):

In fact, there are no copies of clear or coded traffic in the signal center prior to 1 July, 1944.

The Vice Chairman. Yes.

Colonel Clausen (reading):

All coded traffic prior to 1 July, 1944 and all clear traffic dated prior to 1 March 1945 have been destroyed by burning. There are no records including the logs in the signal center which would give us any information as to whether or not this message was received at Fort Shafter. Search and inquiries have been made within the signal center as to whether this message had been received, and they have been negative.

2. You have asked me to recall the circumstances concerning intercept numbered Army 8007 and dated 2 December 1941. The procedure with respect to said intercept at the time stated was as follows:

Search has been made as to whether such intercepts were intercepted by the Army SIS at Honolulu and transmitted to Washington. As to whether they were intercepted, I have this to report:
There are at this time no records in the Hawaiian [11681] Department to show whether or not these intercepts were made by MS-5. The fact that Washington gives an intercept date-time group tends to show that the intercept was made by MS-5, but the lack of a receiving operator's personal sign is an indication to the contrary.

As to how they were transmitted to Washington, I have this to report.

Intercepts of this type which were to be forwarded to Washington via airmail were handled as follows; on the day following the date of intercept, each message was given a log sheet number, and entered on an index sheet. The entire lot of airmail traffic for that particular date was then fastened together to await the next scheduled departure of the Clipper.

Upon notification of the impending departure of the Clipper, all accumulated airmail traffic, together with a letter of transmittal, and a classified document receipt was taken to the classified files section of the Department Signal Office for packaging and was then forwarded to the classified files section of the Department AGO. The AGO forwarded this traffic via officer courier to the outgoing Clipper. The Clipper departed for the mainland approximately once each week, but this schedule was frequently interrupted because of weather conditions. It is known that [11682] this traffic was at times forwarded by ship, because of the long delayed departure of a clipper. The only messages transmitted to Washington by radio were those specifically selected in accordance with instructions from the chief signal officer.

The message in question was not within the first priority mission and therefore is not believed to have been included in the special instructions.

My search in this regard included:
A search of all signal intelligence files including Communications Service, Central Pacific Base Command, and Monitor Station No. 5. Such records as have been found pertaining to the assigned mission of Monitor Station No. 5 at the time in question, show that this station was intercepting traffic between Japan, Asia, and Europe.

In this connection, I inquired of Washington on 14 April, 1945, concerning the originals of intercepts, which I understood are or should be on file in Washington and received this information.

Mailing date of traffic was 11 December. Receiving operator's sign does not appear on the intercept. Log sheet No. 014037 appears on traffic and listed on log forwarded under signature of C. A. Powell. Intercept time shows 0207 on December 2, 1941.

[11683] A copy of the forwarding letter cannot be located and no receipts for traffic forwarded are available previous to 1943.

Then he talks about a scrambler phone. I don't think that is important.

Senator Ferguson. A scrambler phone to Washington?

Colonel Clausen. Well, I will read the whole thing:

3. Concerning your inquiry as to the testimony I previously made relating to the commercial scrambled phone between Honolulu and the mainland, we did not monitor the commercial radio telephone. Previous to December 1937 inverters were used on the trans-Pacific radiophone circuit between Honolulu and the mainland. The same type inverters were used on the radiophone circuit between Tokyo and San Francisco. Because these inverters were of the same type and design Tokyo could monitor the Honolulu-San Francisco circuit.

In December 1937 a new San Francisco-Honolulu radiophone circuit was commissioned using a new type of privacy which was called the A-3 privacy. At the time of this installation there were only two such A-3 privacy built; one for the Honolulu terminal and one for the San Francisco terminal. This type of privacy is much more complicated and furnished much more security than the previous old inverters.

[11684] The old inverters were still used on the Tokyo-Honolulu circuit as the A-3 privacy was for use only on the Honolulu-San Francisco circuit.

Shortly after the installation of this new Honolulu-San Francisco circuit the Tokyo technical operator asked the Honolulu technical operator what kind of a new inverter was in use on the Honolulu-San Francisco circuit as he was not able to understand the conversation.

Tokyo technical operator was advised that the equipment had just been installed and the only person who knew how this privacy worked was the Bell laboratory engineer who had just made the installation. This was proof that
Tokyo had in the past been monitoring the Honolulu-San Francisco radiophone circuit.

Signed "General Powell".

Now, I come to the statements of Commander J. S. Holtwick, U. S. Navy. I interviewed him at Honolulu after I had been there enroute to the Philippines. I asked would he investigate and see whether he could find a winds code intercept by interviewing personnel who had been on duty at the Intercept Station before 7 December 1941. So this is what he gave to me:

Memorandum to Lieutenant Colonel H. C. Clausen.

Subject: Information.

[11685] 1. I regret that results of search for amplifying information on the subject we discussed immediately prior to your departure has been quite disappointing.

2. The officers concerned with the monitoring watch were (present ranks given) Commander F. R. Biard, U. S. N., Commander J. R. Bromley, U. S. N., Commander A. Cole, U. S. N., and Commander G. N. Slonim, U. S. N. In charge of the radio station at the time was Lieutenant Lankford.

3. Commander Cole is the only officer currently present and available for questioning. He states that, as nearly as he can remember, a program issued by the Japan Broadcasting Company was obtained from the District Intelligence Office and used as a basic list. A few other frequencies were found by searching, but in practically all cases, they were merely duplicate transmissions of the listed broadcasts. Generally speaking, there were seldom more than three or more programs of the character being monitored on the air at the same time. In those cases, split-phone watches were used.

4. All broadcasts that were regularly monitored were the Japanese Government Japanese language voice news broadcasts, with particular attention devoted to those schedules on the hour and half-hour which usually contained weather information.

5. No positive results whatsoever were obtained from [11686] this monitoring at any time during the period under consideration. The monitoring which was naturally secured immediately after it became obviously redundant.

That is at page 182.

Now, I come to the affidavit of Ship's Clerk Theodore Emanuel given me at Honolulu on April 17, 1945:

Prior to 7 December 1941, and for over four years, I was assigned to the District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth Naval District. About the year 1938 I became acquainted with Colonel George W. Bicknell. When Colonel Bicknell was called to active duty, about 1940 or 1941, I discussed with him and Lieutenant Colonel Muerlott matters of mutual concern relating to the Army and Navy intelligence activities. It is my understanding that Colonel Bicknell was cognizant of my functions and activities. These included the obtaining of the telephone conversations originating in and going to the Japanese Consulate and persons therein at Honolulu. Such conversations were obtained by me during the period from January 1941 to and including 7 December 1941 by means of covering some five or six lines. My procedure was to have these conversations recorded, translated and reported to the District Intelligence Officer. These reports were written. This traffic would average about 50 to 60 in and out telephone calls a day. The translator was Commander [11687] Denzel Carr, N. S. Navy Reserve.

Signed "Theodore Emanuel, Chief Ship's Clerk".

I later talked with Commander Carr and got from him what is a wind code execute message dated 8 December 1941, after the attack. I have that in the exhibits and I am going to come to it. It is in a voice broadcast, in the middle and at the end, and it would be the one of war with Britain or breach of relations with Britain.

Senator Ferguson. The United States was not in that one?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Where did you get that?
Colonel Clausen. From this Commander Carr that Emanuel mentions. Commander Carr was the translator who translated the telephone intercepts for the Navy during this time.

Senator Ferguson. In Hawaii?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

The next affidavit I come to is that of General Sutherland, which I got at Manila.

You remember that some of the affidavits I read this morning said that Manila was sending information on to Hawaii and I was anxious to find out whether that was so. That is one of the reasons I went to General MacArthur and General Willoughby and General Sutherland. In other words, what information, if any, they sent on to Hawaii.

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead.

Colonel Clausen. This is dated May 6, 1945:

Immediately before 7 December 1941, I was Chief of Staff, USAFFE.

U.S. Army Forces in the Far East.

I have been shown what Colonel Clausen has designated top secret exhibit "B", consisting of a file of intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages. To the best of my recollection, I did not see any of these, nor was I informed of the substance thereof, before 7 December 1941, except possibly some of those relating to negotiations at Washington, D. C., of Kurusu. I did not see the messages described as the "winds code", nor any activating or implementing message. I saw every ultra message that was delivered to the headquarters.

I have not previously seen the British SIS messages, dated 27 November 1941 and 3 December 1941. I do not know the basis or source of this intelligence, other than it appears to have been disseminated by a Major Gerald Wilkinson, British Army, who had liaison status with the headquarters and, as such, had contact with Major General (then Colonel) Willoughby, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

The Signal Intelligence Service, United States Army, operated an intercept station at Fort McKinley, immediately before December 7, 1941. Diplomatic messages in purple code which were intercepted by the Signal Intelligence Service were delivered to the Navy at Corregidor where they were decrypted and translated. Some or all of these messages, decrypted and translated, were delivered to the Signal Intelligence Service officer who delivered them to the Headquarters, USAFFE.

Among the messages picked up by the Signal Intelligence Service were reports by the Japanese Consul at Manila requesting the arrivals and departures of ships in Manila Harbor.

Headquarters USAFFE did not disseminate any ultra information. All dissemination was effected through Signal Intelligence Service channels.

Signed, "R. K. Sutherland."

[11680] Colonel Clausen. Then I have the affidavit May 7, 1945, to General MacArthur [reading]:

Immediately before 7 December 1941, I was Commanding General, USAFFE.

I have been shown what Colonel Clausen has designated as Top Secret Exhibit "B," consisting of a file of intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages. I have no recollection of having seen any of these before. I did not see the messages described as the "Winds Code," nor any activating or implementing message. I believe I saw every ultra message that was delivered to the HQ, USAFFE.

I have not previously—

Senator Ferguson. Are you rereading that affidavit or is that another one? It sounds the same to me.

Colonel Clausen. It is not, Senator; it is not the same at all.

Senator Ferguson. Isn't that the same language that was used?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right, go ahead.

[79716—46—pt. 9—30]
Colonel Clausen (reading):

I have not previously seen the British SIS messages, dated 27 November 1941 and 3 December 1941. I have [11691] no knowledge as to the basis or source of this intelligence, and I did not know that these or similar messages were being transmitted to persons at Honolulu, T. H.

The Signal Intelligence Service, United States Army, operated an intercept station at Fort McKinley, immediately before 7 December 1941. Diplomatic messages in purple code, intercepted by this SIS were delivered to the Navy at Corregidor where they were decrypted and translated. Some or all of these messages, decrypted and translated, were delivered to the SIS officer who delivered them to the Hq. USAFFE. The decrypting and translating of these messages was a function of the Navy. The Army SIS monitored some circuits and turned the material over to the Navy for decryption and translation. The Navy had facilities and personnel, not possessed by the Army, for such processing of this intelligence. Whether all messages were transmitted by the Navy to the Army I do not know. All transmission of this subject material was entirely in the hands of the Navy.

Dispatches from the War Department gave me ample and complete information and advice for the purpose of alerting the Army Command in the Philippines on a war basis, which was done prior to 7 December 1941.

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR.


Mr. Keeffe. Mr. Chairman, is it the purpose to read into the record all of this mass of affidavits, is that the purpose?

The Vice Chairman. Well, the request to the committee yesterday, the request of Senator Lucas and Senator Ferguson was as stated this morning, may I say to the gentleman from Wisconsin.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, I read that request in the record but it does not seem to me that reading these affidavits is the identifying or the tying-in; as I understand that request, it was references in the affidavits or to messages to identify them with our record. Now, it appears that list itself—

The Vice Chairman. No, the request was that Colonel Clausen bring to the attention of the committee all of the messages and information received in Hawaii between November 25 and December 7.

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, this MacArthur affidavit does not put any of the messages in Hawaii, does it?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, how is that material to the action?

Colonel Clausen. Well, I have no desire to read that, [11693] Senator. If you don't want it read, I don't want to read it.

Senator Ferguson. It did not put any messages in. The Sutherland affidavit put in messages in Hawaii.

Colonel Clausen. Sutherland?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Colonel Clausen. No.

Mr. Richardson. The explanation was that there had been language indicating that information had come from Manila to Honolulu and his investigation went to Manila for the purpose of ascertaining if any such information came, what it was. Presumably, in reading these affidavits it was for the purpose of tracing some information that moved from Manila to Honolulu.

The Vice Chairman. That is the way I understood it.

Mr. Richardson. Now, if there was nothing in those affidavits that had anything to do with the transmission of evidence, then, Congressman, it would not be responsive to the original question.
Senator Ferguson. And as I understand that is what the witness now says, that there wasn't anything in those two. I suppose we ought to have something from Willoughby.

Mr. Keefe. We are taking up time. I am perfectly willing to sit here and listen and I suppose the Colonel is willing to read all of this stuff.

[11694] Colonel Clausen. I will if you want me to.

Mr. Keefe. Now, it seems to me that it is an awful burden on him to ask him to read all these affidavits.

Colonel Clausen. Mr. Keefe, as I understood it there was a question raised by somebody in one of the other affidavits as to what Manila did regarding the transmitting of information to Hawaii. These apparently prove the negative.

The Vice Chairman. You understood the request of the committee yesterday?

Colonel Clausen. Yes. I worked last night getting out the information for you.

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead then, please.

Senator Ferguson. I think the Willoughby affidavit will explain Wilkinson further.

Colonel Clausen. That is what I thought, Senator. I repeat, I have no desire, I, Henry C. Clausen, to sit here and read this stuff but there are some things in the Willoughby that tie in with the Wilkinson.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I think that is true in the Willoughby, there is something that ties in with the Wilkinson.

Mr. Clark. Merely by way of divestiture, you have enlightened me in two many respects. I don't think it has been in vain.

[11695] Colonel Clausen. Well, I am perfectly willing, sir, to take whatever time is necessary for anything that the committee may want.

General Willoughby (reading):

Immediately before 7 December 1941, I was ACofS, G-2, USAFFE.

I have been shown what Colonel Clausen has designated as Top Secret Exhibit "B", consisting of a file of intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages. I did not see any of these, nor was I informed of the substance thereof before, except isolated fragments of the Kurusu diplomat message series. Concerning those which are known as the "Winds Code" messages, neither I, nor anyone else in the USAFFE to my knowledge, received any information as to any activating or implementing message, nor any notice that such a message had been transmitted or received.

Concerning the British SIS messages dated 27 November 1941 and 3 December 1941, these were not seen by me before 7 December 1941. I do not know the basis or source of this intelligence, other than that it appears to have been disseminated by Mr. Gerald Wilkinson, subsequently appointed Maj. for, British Army, who had some liaison status with the Philippine Department, later, Hq. USAFFE, and as such had contact with me and my predecessor; [11696] in 1941. (See Appendix A).

I might add that another reason for going to the Philippines was I had run across this British thing in Honolulu and it would have come from Manila, so I wanted to go to Manila to the G-2 and ask what they knew about this British set-up (reading).

Various intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages were received by the Army in the Philippines (Hq. USAFFE) before 7 December 1941. The decrypting, translating and processing of these messages were functions of the Navy. The Army monitored some circuits and turned the material over to the Navy for decrypting and translating. Under this system the intercepted Japanese code
messages were given to the Navy at Corregidor where the Navy had a “purple” machine and other crypto-analytic facilities and personnel, not possessed by the Army, for decrypting and translating these messages. It was customary for the Navy, after these messages were decrypted and translated, to give the Army (Hq. USAFFE) such portion of the sum total of this intelligence, and the details and source thereof, as the Navy considered necessary to the functions of the Army. (See Appendix B). Those which were shown me before 7 December 1941 were handed to me by Colonel Shearer, S. C., now deceased, who was the Army [11697] liaison with the Navy for that purpose. Certain of these messages concerned inquiries from Tokyo and replies by the Japanese Consul at Manila as to United States military and commercial ships in Manila Harbor.  No record was made by the Army of the dissemination or substance of this intelligence, and the papers on which the intelligence was recorded have been destroyed.

To the best of my knowledge and belief, the Army did not transmit any of this intelligence to the Hawaiian Department, since the dissemination thereof was exclusively a Navy function.

(Signed) C. A. WILLOUGHBY.

Appendix A refers to the Wilkinson material. This is it [reading]:

The British SIA messages, their purport and evolution and the curious role played by Mr. Gerald Wilkinson in Manila and Hawaii are an integral part of this investigation, in my opinion.

The whole story is one of duplicity, evasion, bargaining, horse-trading of information and a sort of E. Phillipps Oppenheim International intrigue.

Wilkinson married into the Davies family and represented his father-in-law in Manila as a sugar broker for many years; hence, the casual reference to a “Colonel [11698] Wilkinson,” that appears in the affidavits of Mr. Russell and Dawson, suggesting a perfect stranger are obviously intended to be misleading. Wilkinson combined the convenient status of a respected local business man, with that of a secret agent, reporting to the British Ministry of Information; contrary to U. S. law, he never registered as a foreign agent. He apparently came out of hiding, in Manila, and contacted or obtained tolerance by the then G-2’s Philippine Department, Colonels O’Rear, retired, and J. K. Evans, MID. When I took over, he approached me, quoting Evans, etc. I was not impressed; the intelligence material he desired to file with me, they contained mimeo reprints of old Jap military data and some sprinkling of China-based reports. It became apparent to me, though, that Wilkinson had dealings with Hawaii and the local Navy, that he possessed his own cryptographic systems and decoding clerks, etc. I became convinced that his main purpose was to ingratiate himself into some official Army-Navy recognition, that he was willing to trade information for that recognition but that he was and still is an agent of British authorities, reporting thereto and executing orders therefrom. This net of potential spies is world wide; it is still in operation; I employ both SIA and SOE, British, and [11699] find them loyal to no one but themselves and the Empire.

My intelligence evaluation of his messages to Hawaii is not high—a horse trading proposition, pure and simple; I am convinced that this bundle represents not all of the messages sent; the commercial deductions are obvious; Davies cancelled sugar shipments in the nick of time.

Wilkinson is a completely untrained civilian. His government gave him a military status to protect him, in case of capture. He attached himself to us at the outbreak of the war, leaving his wife and children to fend for themselves, in the Japanese-occupied city; they were promptly interned, in Sto Tomas, for the duration.

We made use of him and his cypher system, to send an occasional message to Wavell and Singapore; he continued to report “home” through his stuff was severely edited by me; the General finally sent him to Wavell’s Headquarters, as a sort of liaison, utilizing his cypher system; he then made his way deviously to Washington and London, where he capitalized heavily on his “status” with GHQ, USAFFE; he was “promoted” to Colonel and attempted to return to our Headquarters, as a “liaison”; he even had the support of the Prime Minister; with a complete lack of military knowledge, such a position had its ludi—[11700] cross side, except for local espionage, and we declined to have him. He was promptly demoted and attached to duty with the British Office of Information at Washington—New York.

(Signed) C. A. WILLOUGHBY.
Appendix B has reference to what we call the "ultra," what was called the "magic" (reading):

In 1941, the Navy obtained and maintained a highly efficient crypto-analytical service, specializing in Japanese material; though the Army had notably participated in the development of this subject, the Navy appears to have obtained a lead; consequently, it can be said that the Navy enjoyed an almost monopolistic privilege. In an otherwise meritorious desire for security (though every modern nation knows that crypto-analysis is going on), the Navy has shrouded the whole enterprise in mystery, excluding other services, and rigidly centralizing the whole enterprise. At this date, for example, this same system is still in vogue; as far as SWPA—

That is Southwest Pacific—

is concerned, the crypto-analysis is made in Melbourne, forwarded via Seventh Fleet D. N. T.; the Melbourne station is under direct orders of Washington, is not bound by any local responsibilities, forwards what they select, and when it suits them. The [11701] possibility of erroneous or incomplete selection is as evident now as it was in 1941. The only excuse the Navy has is that its field is primarily naval intercepts, but there is a lot of Army traffic or other incidental traffic. This collateral traffic is not always understood or correctly interpreted by the Navy, in my opinion.

The solution to this vexing and dangerous problem is a completely joint, interlocking intercept and crypto-analytical service, on the highest level, with the freest interchange of messages and interpretation.

The sequence of messages referred to, had they been known to a competent intelligence officer, with Battle Order and tactical background, beginning with November 14th, would have led instantly to the inescapable conclusion that Pearl Harbor naval installations were a target for attack, with November 25th or November 29th as the deadlines, suggesting irresistibly that elapsed time was involved, for some sort of naval seaborne sortie.

(Signed) C. A. WILLOUGHBY.

Senator Ferguson. May I inquire, Mr. Chairman?

What credit did you give that part of the report where he analyzed that if he had had that information it would have been clear to him that an attack was going to be made upon Pearl Harbor?

[11702] Colonel Clausen. The credit that we gave it was, of course, Senator—I mean it is sort of presumptuous for me to say so and it is so easy to say so in hindsight, but he pointed out to me at the time that it showed target attack possibilities, target attack information.

Senator Ferguson. Well, is that referred to in any report either by the Secretary of War or the Adjutant General?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Or by you?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. Colonel Stimson in his report pointed out that the Hawaiian command, he spoke only so far as the Army was concerned, that the Hawaiian command and that the Washington command were not operating in the highest degree of efficiency and he said that with regard to this type of information, especially the ships in harbor reports, that they should have been analyzed by a man with more analytical and imaginative insight to see the possibility of an attack on Pearl Harbor.

Senator Ferguson. You say that is in the report?

Colonel Clausen. It is in Secretary Stimson’s report, sir, which he made after he had this report of mine.

Senator Ferguson. But you were getting this affidavit from the top General of Intelligence in the Philippine Islands?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.
[11703] Senator Ferguson. And he was making this comment when you showed him the exhibits of what they had in Washington?

Colonel Clausen. My top secret B.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Colonel Clausen. Just like he said, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. He made this comment on what they had in Washington?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Mr. Richardson. Will you tell us again just who Willoughby was?

Colonel Clausen. C. A. Willoughby was a major general who was one of those that left with MacArthur after the fall of Bataan and then returned with MacArthur as his G-2 during all that time, sir.

The Vice Chairman. All right. Go ahead, Colonel.

Colonel Clausen. I come now to——

Mr. Clark. Let me get one point straight. Is your secret B, I believe you call it?

Colonel Clausen. Exhibit B, sir?

Mr. Clark. Yes.

Colonel Clausen. That is the one that General Russell brought to the Board.

Mr. Clark. Does that contain these intercepts only from Washington?

[11704] Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. It contains the file of intercepts that were here in Washington in part.

Mr. Clark. Did it contain anything that you picked up at Hawaii?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. You see, I referred by numbers to these other people in Hawaii who had them. In other words——

Mr. Clark. The Senator’s question to you was whether or not what was in this B-2 came from Washington. I want to know whether there is anything else now other than from Washington in it?

Colonel Clausen. Well, the top secret exhibit B that we have referred to were a sheaf of intercepts that General Russell had obtained from G-2. Now, the intercepts were intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages that had been received in Washington and some of those—as I have pointed out here now in other affidavits—the substance of them at least were known to some people in Hawaii.

Mr. Clark. I understand now. Thank you, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead.

Mr. Murphy. May I ask one question? Did General Russell also have the dispatches in regard to the Aleutians and in regard to Panama and in regard to the Philippines?

Colonel Clausen. Mr. Murphy, I do not know. When the board got the winds code last week——

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, the one that General Russell concentrated upon was those segregated particularly as to Hawaii, is that right?

Colonel Clausen. That is what I understand.

Mr. Murphy. That is all.

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead.

Colonel Clausen. The next affidavit is that of General Fielder which I have read already for Senator George.
The Vice Chairman. Yes.
Colonel Clausen. Now, in looking over the Hart report, Captain Safford in there said that General Betts was one of the people that would know about the winds code execute message, so I got ahold of General Betts at Frankfort-on-Main, in Germany. This is his affidavit. June 13, 1945. [Reading:]

During the months of November and December 1941 I was the Executive Assistant of the Chief of the then Intelligence Branch, Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, Washington, D. C.

In that capacity I was required to have a general knowledge of the major intelligence problems confronting the Military Intelligence Division and with reference to the Japanese situation I generally obtained this knowledge from Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, GSC, who was in charge of the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch and to whom was decentralized the handling of all Ultra messages concerning Japan which came to the War Department. Colonel Bratton was assisted by Major Dusenbury, GSC. I know that Major Dusenbury, as Colonel Bratton's representative, received certain Ultra messages concerning Japan both from Army and Navy sources. I think that on occasion Colonel Bratton employed Major Dusenbury to transmit messages so received to authorized persons in the War Department.

In consequence I have no first hand knowledge of the handling of these messages, from whom they were received or to whom they were shown. To the best of my knowledge and belief I received no Ultra messages either in written form or by oral transmission on behalf of the Military Intelligence Division during the period in question. I believe, however, that during the period in question Colonel Bratton either showed me or informed me of the gist of most of the Ultra messages which he handled. I am certain that Colonel Bratton informed me of the message which established the so-called Japanese "Winds Code." I further recall inquiring of him on several occasions whether any message implementing the message on the "Winds Code" had been received. I do not recall that he informed me at any time of such a message being received and I further believe that if he had received such a message he would have told me and I would have remembered it. To the best of my knowledge and belief no other person informed me prior to 7 December 1941 that an implementing message had been received.

(Signed) Thomas J. Betts, Brigadier General.

He was on the staff of General Eisenhower.

Next is an affidavit of Lieutenant General Walter B. Smith, which I obtained at Frankfort-on-Main on 15 June 1945, Chief of Staff to General Eisenhower, and it had to do with some testimony of Colonel Bratton and Colonel Sadtler and it had to do with whether or not he had received on the night of 6 December, as had theretofore been testified, the pouch containing the thirteen parts.

Mr. Keeffe. Is that the fellow that is sometimes referred to as Bedell Smith, as General Bedell Smith?

Colonel Clausen. That is the same one; yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. The same one?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. Do you want me to read this?

The Vice Chairman. I think Senator Ferguson asked you questions about this. Do you want the affidavit read, Senator?

[11706] Senator Ferguson. Is there anything in it in relation to Hawaii?

The Vice Chairman. While your attention was directed on something there, Senator, Colonel Clausen stated that it related to the delivery of the thirteen part message, something in that connection.

Colonel Clausen. The general nature of the delivery of the Ultra to the chief of staff. General Bedell Smith at that time was secretary to the General Staff here in Washington in 1941.
Senator Ferguson. And this is an affidavit, this is not the Bedell Smith affidavit?
Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Oh, all right. Yes, I think you ought to read that.
Colonel Clausen. All right, sir.
Mr. Keefe. May I inquire here the date of that affidavit?
Mr. Keefe. Did you have that affidavit when you contacted Colonel Bratton?
Colonel Clausen. I showed it to him, sir, so that he could see what the others had said.
Mr. Keefe. Then you already had that affidavit at the time you took the affidavit from Colonel Bratton?
Colonel Clausen. Yes. Let me just make sure because, Mr. Keefe, I showed Colonel Bratton various papers and I listed them down in the first part as to just what I showed him. Yes, I did, I showed him that affidavit.
Mr. Keefe. All right, that is all I wanted to know.
Colonel Clausen. Do you want the list of those that I showed him?
Mr. Keefe. Not now.
Colonel Clausen. All right.
Mr. Keefe. I may want to ask you about that later.
Colonel Clausen. All right. [Reading:]

During the months of November and December 1941, I was stationed at Washington, D. C., as Secretary of the War Department General Staff. In that capacity and during the period mentioned, I received from representatives of G-2, for delivery to the Chief of Staff, containers carrying especially secret information which I later learned included various intercepts of Japanese radio diplomatic messages which had been decrypted and translated, and were then called "Magic". These were also delivered on occasions for the same purpose to whichever Assistant Secretary General Staff was on duty in the office of the Chief of Staff.

[11710] Mr. Keefe. Now, may I inquire, Mr. Chairman, right at this point? General Smith had not been a witness before the Army Pearl Harbor Investigating Board?
Colonel Clausen. No, sir.
Mr. Keefe. This is his first statement?
Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. I had about 15 witnesses that testified before the Grunert Board that I interviewed and got additional affidavits or testimony from and then there were 35, about 35 entirely new witnesses.
Mr. Keefe. Of which he is one?
Colonel Clausen. Of which General Smith is one.
Mr. Keefe. Very well.
Colonel Clausen (reading):

I did not personally see these intercepts. I did not know what messages were delivered to the various distributees, nor the method of distribution or screening, nor to whom or when they were delivered. They were always given to me in a locked pouch, the key to which was not available to me. I would always give the locked pouch to the Chief of Staff as promptly as possible. If received in the Chief of Staff's absence, these pouches were given him as soon as he returned to the office. I recall several occasions when the pouch was delivered to him at his home when the A. C. of S., G-2, considered the contents urgent. The Chief of Staff would occasionally mention to me matters.
connected with these intercepts, but I do not recall ever having seen a complete one, nor do I recall specific details.

Colonel Clausen has asked me to comment on what is stated to have been the testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board to the general effect:

1. On 5 December 1941, Colonel Otis K. Sadler, SC, after receiving information from Admiral Noyes, then Chief of Navy Communications, that the Japanese “Winds Code” had been implemented to signal rupture of diplomatic relations or war between Japan and Great Britain, and after talking this over with General Sherman Miles and Colonel Rufus S. Bratton of G-2, gave the information to General Leonard T. Gerow of WPDB, and asked him to give the Hawaiian Department more warning. General Gerow stated, “I think they have had plenty of notification.” Colonel Sadler then gave the information to me, and made the same request of me. I replied that since the War Plans Division had acted I did not want to discuss the matter further.

Now, do you want me to skip down to where he answers that No. 1? [11712] Mr. Keefe. Read the whole affidavit as long as you are about it.

Colonel Clausen. Well, you see I went down from 1, 2, 3, 4 and then he answered 1, 2, 3 and 4, so if you want me to I will answer one by reading one.

Mr. Keefe. All right.

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead.

Colonel Clausen. This is in response to what I just read. He says:

My recollection of the facts concerning these subjects is as follows:

I do not recall Colonel Sadler’s coming to me as he has stated. However, since the matter question was obviously a difference of opinion between the A. C. of S., G-2 and the A. C. of S., War Plans Division, both of whom had direct access to the Chief of Staff, it was not one in which I had any responsibility or authority, and I cannot imagine why Colonel Sadler would have asked me to intervene in a question of this kind, particularly since I was not at that time an “Ultra” officer, and it would have been impossible for him to give me any information to support his contention that I should step out of my rather minor province.

Number 2. This is what the general testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board was:

Colonel Bratton delivered the pouches containing the radio intercepts always in person to the officers concerned; and, when the Chief of Staff was not there, he delivered the pouches to be for delivery to the Chief of Staff.

This is his answer. Number 2:

Not only Colonel Bratton, but at least one other officer of G-2 delivered the pouches referred to. These were delivered not only to me, but to whichever Assistant Secretary General Staff happened to be on duty at my desk in my absence. When delivered to myself or to one of my assistants, our standard procedure was to place it immediately on the desk of the Chief of Staff if he were in his office, or, in his absence, to lock it in the safe until his return unless instructed that the contents should reach him at once. There were several occasions when we were so informed. On these occasions the Duty Officer of the General Staff Secretariat would take the pouches to General Marshall at his quarters or wherever he happened to be. On at least several occasions I recall definitely that I personally sent the G-2 officer to deliver the pouch to General Marshall at his quarters in the absence of a Duty Officer.

[11714] Number 3:

During November and December 1941, Colonel Bratton reminded me that the intercepts were of such value and importance that they should be shown the Chief of Staff without delay.

Answer to Number 3:

Both I myself and the Assistant Secretaries understood that these pouches contained information of such value and importance that they should be shown to the Chief of Staff without delay, and the officers of the Intelligence Division
who handed them to us were aware of the procedure followed in the Chief of Staff’s office as indicated above.

Number 4 of general testimony before the Board:

On December 6, 1941, before midnight, Colonel Bratton delivered to me for the Chief of Staff 13 parts of a 14 part intercepted radio message from the Japanese Government which in terms terminated peace negotiations with the United States. (I understand this testimony may possibly be qualified by other testimony to the effect that instead of giving these to me it “may have been one of others.”)

Answer Number 4:

To the best of my recollection, I left the office [117/15] at the usual time on the evening of 6 December 41, that is, about 7 PM., turning over to the Night Duty Officer. I am quite certain that I was not at the office after 10 PM. If the intercepted radio message referred to by Colonel Bratton was delivered either to me or to the Night Duty Officer, it would have been delivered in the locked envelope which I have previously described, and unless the officer who received it were so informed by Colonel Bratton, he would have had no definite knowledge of its contents as neither I nor any other officer of the Secretariat was classified as “Ultra”. If he had been informed of the contents or of their urgent nature, it would have been delivered to the Chief of Staff in accordance with our usual procedure, either by the officer on duty or by Colonel Bratton himself.

(Signed) W. B. Smith.

I come now to the affidavit of General Gerow.

The Vice Chairman. I believe that has already been read into the record, unless some member wants it read again.

Senator Ferguson. I have no desire to have it.

Colonel Clausen. All right. May I just say that the number of the intercepts referred to there—that there are two that have not already been referred to by myself. One is Number 23570, and you have that as your Exhibit 1, page 68, [117/16] and the other is Number 23850 and you have that as your Exhibit 1, page 81.

The Vice Chairman. General Gerow’s affidavit, as I recall it, was read into the record while he was testifying before the committee.

Colonel Clausen. All right, sir. Now, another that has been mentioned by Captain Safford before Admiral Hart as being a person that would have some light to shed on the winds message was Colonel Robert E. Schukraft, so I reached him at Cassette, Italy, June 26, 1945.

Senator Ferguson. Colonel Schukraft is present in the room—do you know whether he is present in the room?

Colonel Clausen. He is right here, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, is there any need of reading his affidavit, Mr. Chairman?

Senator Lucas. There is unless we are going to call him as a witness.

Senator Ferguson. I understood he was to be a witness.

Colonel Clausen. This is a short one.

The Vice Chairman. Well, read it. Maybe we can read it in less time than we can talk about it.

[117/17] Colonel Clausen. On 7 December 1944, and for some time prior thereto, I was stationed at Washington, D. C., in charge of radio intercepts for the Signal Intelligence Service, War Department. As such, my duties included the direct supervision of radio intercept stations operated by the Chief Signal Officer. In the course of these duties I saw at various times some of the intercepts which had been decrypted and decoded and translated.

Regarding the so-called “Winds Code”, I recall seeing, at about the time of their translation, the intercept in Top Secret Exhibit “B”, number 25432. When I saw this message I directed the San Francisco intercept station to intercept all
plain text Japanese messages and to pick up the news reports from Tokyo. The station did this and sent the messages and report in to me. To the best of my knowledge none of these containing the code words were ever picked up. I did, however, see an intercept of a telephone conversation between Kurusu and a person in Tokyo, who I believe was Yamamoto, similar in form to the intercepts in Top Secret Exhibit “B” number 25340 and 25497——

Now 25349 is your Exhibit 1, page 179, and No. 25497, is your Exhibit 1, page 206.

I continue:

[11718] ——but in which the person at the Tokyo end gave to Kurusu the “Winds Code” signal indicating breach of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States. Kurusu in reply said something to the effect that he was sorry to hear this. The message to which I refer came to the Signal Intelligence Service from the Navy, as a Navy intercept or translation, during the period about 28 November 1941 to 6 December 1941. I think this message also contained some code words translated as “It is a boy.” I did not know the meaning of this latter code. When the message mentioned was received from the Navy the Signal Intelligence Service sent it immediately to G-2.

As additional leads in connection with the foregoing, I suggest interrogation of my former superior Colonel Minckler; also especially Lieut. Colonel Rowlett and Miss Prather. Additional information may possibly be obtained from Colonel Doud, Miss Ray Cave (wife of Sgt. Liparini), and Mrs. Hazel Adams.”

Signed, “Robert E. Schukraft.”

Now then, the next affidavit is that of George L. Renchard, and following that is the affidavit of John F. Stone, whom I saw in London, and who at the time of Pearl Harbor was assistant to Secretary Hull. I do not think there is any reference there to Hawaii, unless the committee [11719] wants them read.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. Go ahead with the next one.

Colonel Clausen. The next affidavit is that of Major General John R. Deane, which is a very short affidavit. It has to do with the fact that he was one of the assistant secretaries to the General Staff in December, 1941, and he said:

On 6 December, 1941, I was not on duty after 5 p.m., and did not receive from Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, nor from Colonel Carlisle Dusenbury, or any other person, any pouch for the Chief of Staff.

Then he says on the next morning he got down to work about 9 or 9:30 a.m.

The next affidavit is that of Colonel Rufus S. Bratton. I will read that if the committee wants. So far as Hawaii itself is concerned, it refers to the fact that he sent the 5 December Rochefort message.

Mr. Keefe. He has been here for several weeks and he is in the room right now. He is going to be a witness, so I see no object in reading it.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. All right, Colonel, the reading is off.

Colonel Clausen. He refers in here to intercept 25483 which you will find at page 239 of your Exhibit 1, and also [11720] to intercept 25850, which you will find at page 218 of Exhibit 1. He also refers to the ABCD Bloc.

The next affidavit is that of Colonel Otis K. Sadtlter.

Mr. Keefe. Colonel Sadtler is going to be a witness isn’t he?

Mr. Kaufman. He is scheduled to be a witness.

Colonel Clausen. All right. I will skip that.

Next is the affidavit of Major General Charles D. Herron.

Major General Herron preceded General Short as commanding general of the Hawaiian Department, and in this affidavit he tells of his briefing of General Short concerning the matters that had to do
with the Hawaiian Command. It may be important for the part that had to do with the 1940 alert, and as to what he told General Short concerning subjects of that kind.

The Vice Chairman. Does any member of the committee desire that affidavit read?

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, I would think that it would directly involve General Short, if this consists of directions which were given to General Short by Herron on Short’s succeeding to the command out there.

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead and read it, Colonel.

Colonel Clausen. This was given to me in Washington, [11721]

D. C., on August 13, 1945.

Referring to my testimony given the Army Pearl Harbor Board on 9 August 1944, I wish to state further that when arrangements had been made for General Short to relieve me as Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, which command I had held since October 1937, I desired to acquaint him as fully as I could with my experience and knowledge of the affairs pertaining thereto. Since he was to arrive and I was to depart on the same ship, there was only a limited time in which to do this by personal conferences, namely, two and one-half days. Accordingly, in order that he might be prepared for his conferences with me, I sent to San Francisco for delivery to him there certain papers and material relating to the command, for his preliminary review on the ship’s journey of five days. These papers and material comprised in effect an agenda and exhibits. Upon my meeting General Short when he arrived at Hawaii, I asked him whether he had received the data at San Francisco and whether he had read the papers and material. He replied that they had been received by him at San Francisco but that he had not given them much time while en route.

I did what I could in the limited time of two and one-half days then remaining to brief General Short personally on matters pertaining to the command. This included my giving [11722] him my opinions on the officers and men. I told him of my estimate as to the efficiency of the staff officers and, with respect to G-2, that Colonel George W. Bicknell, a Reserve Officer, was an experienced and qualified, efficient man for that position, and that it had been my intention to make him my G-2. I further told him of the G-2 work being done, of the liaison with the Navy, the FBI and related sources of information, of the defense plans, of my experience and measures taken in the all-out alert of 1940 which I had ordered on receipt of a communication from the War Department, dated June 17, 1940, reading as follows:

"Immediately alert complete defensive organization to deal with possible trans-Pacific raid, to the greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or provoking undue curiosity of newspapers or alien agents. Suggest maneuver basis. Maintain alert until further orders. Instructions for secret communication direct with Chief of Staff will be furnished you shortly. Acknowledge."

I also told him of the relations and cooperation which had existed with the Navy, of the civilian population, of the Japanese situation, of the assumption that alien agents conducted espionage for the Japanese Government. I took him around the Island of Oahu, showing him the installations [11723] and gave him my ideas of possible attack and defense of that Island.

Following my talks with General Short at the time mentioned, in Hawaii, he did not ever ask my opinions or for information or correspond with me on the subject of command or related problems.

Concerning your question as to whether correct military practice, current in 1941, permitted a Commanding General of an overseas department to revise a War Department estimate of the situation, without consulting with or reporting to the War Department, my answer is that the Commander may and should take whatever action he believes dictated by necessity but must so report to the War Department at the earliest possible moment.

Signed, "Charles D. Herron, Major General, U. S. A."

The next affidavit is that of General Miles.

The Vice Chairman. He has already appeared as a witness.

Colonel Clausen. All right, sir.
In his affidavit he refers to quite a series of intercepts which I have looked up and tied into your exhibits.

If you want, I will read them and show where they are in your exhibits.

The Vice Chairman. All right.

Colonel Clausen, 24573, on page 100 of Exhibit 1.

[11724] 25322 on page 126 of Exhibit 1, 24878 on page 137 of Exhibit 1, 25432 on page 154 of Exhibit 1, 25138 on page 165 of Exhibit 1, 25455 on page 180 of Exhibit 1, 25445 on page 195 of Exhibit 1, 25496 on page 199 of Exhibit 1, 25552 on page 204 of Exhibit 1, 25553 on page 204 of Exhibit 1, 25554 on page 205 of Exhibit 1, 25555 on page 206 of Exhibit 1, 25727 on page 213 of Exhibit 1, 25545 on page 208 of Exhibit 1, 25640 on page 215 of Exhibit 1, 25785 on page 227 of Exhibit 1, 25836 on page 236 of Exhibit 1, 25838 on page 238 of Exhibit 1, 25843 on page 239 of Exhibit 1.

The General in this affidavit also referred to the ABCD Bloc, and his assumption that the Navy in Hawaii was doing some decrypting, and refers to some studies he had made on what he called an "out of the blue" attack on Pearl Harbor.

Senator Ferguson. Will you read what he said about the ABCD Bloc?

[11725] Colonel Clausen. I will read it, Senator.

Further concerning the intercepts mentioned as contained in Top Secret Exhibit "B", and those which related to Joint Action by the ABCD Bloc or members thereof I knew at the time about the Joint Action Agreement.

The next affidavit is also by an officer who was referred to by Captain Safford in his testimony before Admiral Hart, and that is Colonel Rex W. Minckler.

Shall I read that?

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead.

[11726] Colonel Clausen (reading):

On 7 December 1941, and for some months prior thereto, I was stationed at Washington, D. C., as Officer in Charge of Signal Intelligence Service. Colonel Robert E. Schukraft and Colonel Harold S. Doud were my subordinates in the Signal Intelligence Service at the time, and Colonel Otis K. Sadler was my superior. My duties included the direct supervision of the receipt and dissemination of intercepted radio messages. In the course of these duties I saw at various times most of the intercepts of Japanese radio.

Regarding the so-called Japanese "Winds Code", I recall having seen, and at about the time of its translation, the intercept numbered 25432 in Top Secret Exhibit "B", before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. I recall the action which was taken under my supervision to monitor for the execute message contemplated by the "Winds Code". I never saw or heard of an authentic execute message of this character either before or since 7 December 1941. It is my belief that no such message was sent. Before 7 December 1941 there were one or two "false alarms", one of which I think discussed with representatives of G-2 and the Navy, and which was to the effect that a possible execute message had been received indicating a breach of Japanese and British relations. My opposite number in the [11727] Navy was Captain L. F. Safford. I was in almost daily contact with Army and Navy representatives who were also on the lookout for such an execute message, and it is my belief that if an authentic execute message had been received, some of these persons would have discussed it with me.

The normal procedure in the reciprocal sending of messages by the Army and Navy, one to the other, was to send six copies.

Concerning the two messages shown me by Colonel Clausen, Army Serial numbers 25874 and 25877——
and they are to be found on page 29 of your Exhibit 2 and pages 27 and 28 your Exhibit 2. I will continue:

which appear to have been intercepted on 6 December 1941 and translated on 8 December 1941, I believe the time indicated for decrypting and translation by the Army was normal and then required for decrypting and decoding Code PA-K2. The Navy time was about four days. The Code indicated was not top priority and involved manual processing. When the intercepts were received by the Signal Intelligence Service they were sorted into categories of priority, and then after being decrypted and translated, one copy was retained by the Signal Intelligence Service and additional copies were then sent to G-2 and the Navy ONI for dissemination.

[11728] Signed, “Rex W. Minckler, Colonel, SC.”

The next affidavit I have is that of General Marshall.

Senator LUCAS. Colonel, do I understand in that last affidavit Colonel Minckler was the opposite of Captain Safford?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. The next affidavit is that of General Marshall.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. General Marshall has appeared as a witness.

Colonel CLAUSEN. All right, sir.

Now the next is another man mentioned by Captain Safford in his testimony before Admiral Hart as a lead on this winds execute business, and that is Colonel Harold Doud.

On 7 December 1941, and for some time prior thereto, I was stationed at Washington, D. C., in charge of the B Section, Signal Intelligence Service, which was the Code and Cipher Solution Section. My duties included the supervision of the solution of Japanese radio diplomatic and military messages. In the course of these duties my section solved and translated at various times many Japanese messages which had been intercepted.

Regarding the so-called Japanese “Winds Code” I recall seeing at about the time of its translation the intercept in top secret Exhibit B, No. 25432—that exhibit was the [11729] code—

I recall that when this intercept was translated arrangements were made to monitor for the execute message contemplated by the “Winds Code”. I did not see any execute message as thus contemplated and so far as I know there was no such execute message received in the War Department. My attention has been called to certain testimony of Captain L. F. Safford, USN, to the effect that I may have some knowledge concerning such an execute message. I do not know the basis for this testimony of Captain Safford as I did not have any information of an execute message.

My attention has also been called to the testimony of the subject of 13 parts of a 14-part message, which 13 parts was received the afternoon and evening of 6 December 1941 and is numbered SIS 25443. I recall having seen the message but do not remember the details connected with its receipt and solution. I went on duty on the afternoon of 6 December and came off duty sometime on the 7th of December, the exact times, however, I do not recall.

Concerning the time required to solve and disseminate the Japanese radio diplomatic messages in Code PA-K2, it is my present belief that the average time required was at least two days.

I have been shown top secret Exhibit “B” before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. The translation dates indicated [11730] theron were not always the dates of receipt. Reference to the records of the Signal Intelligence Service should be made to show the time required between the dates of receipt and actual solutions and disseminations.

Prior to 7 December 1941, according to my recollection, we did not solve any current Japanese military codes.

Signed, “Harold Doud, Colonel, Signal Corps.”

The next affidavit is an additional affidavit by Lt. Col. Frank B. Rowlett, whose other affidavit I read this morning in connection with my giving the top secret exhibit B and was asked to find out the
points of interception. Now it developed that there were two additional messages which are referred to in the affidavit of Colonel Minkler. I understood those were intercepted at San Francisco on 6 December. So I wanted to know why they were not decrypted sooner than 8 December, because those two were very significant ones pointing to Pearl Harbor, talking, I believe, about barrage balloons—maybe not barrage balloons but antitorpedo nets and barrage balloons. Colonel Rowlett was the man to see on that and I interviewed the Colonel and he gave me this affidavit. It relates to that subject, if the committee wants to hear it.

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead and read it.

[11732] Colonel Clausen (reading).

The average length of time required for processing—

These two messages I mentioned came in a code called PA-K2.

The average length of time required for processing messages in the Japanese system known by us as PAK-2, calculated on 19 messages for the period of 1 November to 6 December 1941, shows 3.5 days as average. Only messages which were actually published were included in the data on which the average was calculated.

No military systems which were in use by the Japanese Army or Military Attaches previous to the date of 6 December 1941 were readable. Some intercepts were available but not in sufficient quantity to permit the solution of any military system.

a. No written record has been discovered which would indicate positively the exact hour at which intercept traffic was received by teletype from San Francisco by the Signal Intelligence Service in the Munitions Building.

Where that question mark occurred with regard to those two messages, was whether they were sent in by mail or sent in by teletype. I have been given conflicting stories and that is the reason that point was run down.

My recollection is that the first call to initiate [11732] the use of the circuit with San Francisco was placed sometime after 6 o'clock in the evening of 6 December 1941. The response from Station 2 at San Francisco indicated that they had already forwarded by air mail the messages intercepted that day and that it would be necessary for them to use the station file copy for preparing the intercepts for transmission by teletype. This preparation required some time because tape had to be punched for the material to be forwarded. To the best of my recollection it was not until after midnight that actual intercept traffic was received by the Signal Intelligence Service from San Francisco.

b. Since this was the first time the Army had used teletype facilities to forward traffic to Signal Intelligence, my recollection is very clear. Also, I actually helped to operate the teletype equipment in the Munitions Building in both the preliminary discussions in which traffic was requested and also in receiving for the traffic. Colonel Robert E. Schukraft and Miss Mary Jo Dunning were present and also operated the teletype equipment. The conditions under which we operated were very unusual in that ordinarily we operated only day shifts, and this also tended to impress the matter on my memory.

Signed "Frank B. Rowlett, Lieutenant Colonel, Signal Corps."

That was dated September 12, 1945.

[11733] On the same subject, an affidavit of Captain Howard W. Martin:

At approximately 8:00 p.m. PST on 6 December 1941 I was in my quarters at Fort Scott, Presidio of San Francisco when the telephone rang and the man on duty at the station (MS #2) said Washington had called us on the teletype machine and had requested we transmit immediately all the day's intercepted traffic. It being Saturday night I had only one man on duty and other personnel could not be reached readily. Therefore I went down to the station
immediately and began transmitting all of Saturday's traffic using our retained copy, as the original traffic had been airmailed to Washington at approximately 4:00 p.m., on the same day. Because the following day the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor I have always associated the two things in my memory, and am certain that the TWX machine was not used for traffic prior to 6 December and the hours as given are approximately correct.

I was NCO in charge of MS #2 at that time.

Signed "Howard W. Martin, Captain, Signal Corps."

On the same subject, the affidavit of Mary J. Dunning:

On 6 December 1941 I left the Munitions Building around 1 p.m., the regular hour for the close of business on Saturdays. Between 2:15 and 2:45 that afternoon, [11735] I received a telephone call from Colonel Minckler's office requesting me to report for work as soon as possible. I fixed the hour by the length of time it takes me to drive from my home to the Munitions Building and by 3 p.m. I was in Colonel Minckler's office ready to work. I remember the hour because later in the evening when I was asked to report at the same time on the following day I asked to be allowed to report at 5 p.m. instead, since I had made plans to spend the day out of town.

I can't recall being told why we were called back to work, but the general assumption was that we wanted to process traffic without delay since the Japanese Ambassador was in conference with the President.

I was asked to work in the "cage" (a room where machine traffic was processed, so called because of the grille work at its entrance to restrict admittance) where I had not worked for some time. I think that as I entered the room, I was surprised to see a teletype machine. How long it had been installed, I don't know, but I thought it could not have been there more than a few hours, since I often had occasion to go to the door of the cage and it was clearly visible from the door. It must have been roughly around four o'clock that representatives of the teletype company came to instruct us in the operation of the machine. After that we [11735] spent some time practicing.

It is difficult to fix the time very definitely because time spent in waiting always seems longer than it really is, and we were expecting traffic from San Francisco at any moment. I remember that I was getting hungry but could not leave the room to get supper since we were waiting for S. F. to call. When Colonel Minckler came into the cage, I spoke to him about getting someone to relieve me just long enough for me to buy a sandwich. This conversation I remember because we joked about my teaching him to operate the teletype. To the best of my knowledge, we were in communication with our intercept station in S. F. not later than 7:00 p.m., although I cannot say whether or not they actually had any traffic for us at that time.

I believe I went home around midnight or 1:00 a.m. and I recall processing some traffic during the course of the evening before I left. I cannot say, however, whether it came to us by teletype, or not, since the Message Center had been asked to deliver traffic to us as soon as it arrived. That was traffic from Honolulu and the Philippines.

I did not return to the office until five o'clock on 7 December 1941.

Signed, "Mary J. Dunning."

[11736] The next is on the same subject, the affidavit of Louise Prather:

To the best of my knowledge, the teletype machine was used to transmit traffic from San Francisco for the first time during the night of 6 December 1941.

This particular point is clear in my memory because of the unusual circumstances. In the evening of 6 December I was called at home and told our unit was being placed on a 24-hour basis immediately and that I should report for work at 7:00 a.m. the following morning, 7 December. When I arrived at the office at this unusual hour I learned that the teletype was being operated and the reason for the urgent call had been to process this, and other, traffic as rapidly as possible. Since for some months, the highest priority had been given Japanese traffic between Washington and Tokyo by our unit, the transmission of such traffic by teletype seemed to me to be a matter of major importance. This further serviced to impress the event on my memory.

Signed "Louise Prather."
That is the end of the testimony.
Then the committee asked that I——
Mr. Clark. Mr. Chairman, before the witness leaves that subject,
I would like to ask a question.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Clark will inquire.
[11737] Mr. Clark. This seems to refer to the magic that had
some reference in it to the submarine nets and the balloons, or some-
thing of that kind?
Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Clark. Just what was the sense of that message?
Colonel Clausen. You will find them in your Exhibit No. 2. If you
will let me have Exhibit No. 2, I will find them. That is on page 29,
and is Army No. 25874, and this is the message:
From Honolulu.
To Tokyo.
December 6, 1941.
#254.
1. On the evening of the 5th, among the battleships which entered port were—
and there is a blank line—
and one submarine tender. The following ships were observed at anchor on the
6th:
9 battleships, 3 light cruisers, 3 submarine tenders, 17 destroyers, and in ad-
dition there were four light cruisers, 2 destroyers lying at docks (the heavy
cruisers and airplane carriers have all left).
2. It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.
The other one is on page 27 and 28 of the same exhibit 2. That is
SIS No. 25877. From Honolulu to Tokyo:
[11738] December 6, 1941.
#253 Re the last part of your #123-a.
1. On the American Continent in October the Army began training barrage
balloon troops at Camp Davis, North Carolina. Not only have they ordered
four or five hundred balloons, but it is understood that they are considering
the use of these balloons in the defense of Hawaii and Panama. Insofar as
Hawaii is concerned, though investigations have been made in the neighborhood
of Pearl Harbor, they have not set up mooring equipment, nor have they selected
the troops to man them. Furthermore, there is no indication that any training
for the maintenance of balloons is being undertaken. At the present time there
are no signs of barrage balloon equipment. In addition, it is difficult to imagine
that they have actually any. However, even though they have actually made
preparations, because they must control the air over the water and land run-
ways of the airports in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor, Hickam, Ford and Ewa,
there are limits to the balloon defense of Pearl Harbor. I imagine that in all
probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a sur-
prise attack against these places.
2. In my opinion the battleships do not have torpedo nets. The details are not
known. I will report the results [11739] of my investigation.
Mr. Kaufman. Does the record show whether or not it was received,
and when it was translated?
Colonel Clausen. It was translated on December 8, 1941, as was
the one I first read.
Senator Ferguson. Do any of your affidavits, Colonel, show when
they were transferred here, or came here to Washington?
Colonel Clausen. Those that I just read, sir, were supposed to have
been sent in on the teletype.
Senator Ferguson. Saturday night?
Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And they were supposed to be sent in, as I understood those affidavits, so they could be decrypted and decoded immediately?

Colonel Clausen. Well, it was in PA-K2, and those other witnesses said that not being the highest priority they took that length of time for the messages to get out.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ascertain at any time why they put this teletype work on at Saturday night, called these people back, sent these two messages over from San Francisco to Washington, and then did not translate them that night?

Colonel Clausen. No. I understood, Senator, that the two messages in question were in a volume. In other words, they were merely two of many that constituted the day's work on the 6th.

Senator Ferguson. I understand that, but they put people to work that night, called them back, and had this traffic sent in to Washington Saturday evening.

Colonel Clausen. Just like those people said.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. That included these two messages?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then they were not translated or decoded or deciphered until after the attack.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you did not go in to find out in the Navy Department here why they were not decrypted and decoded?

Colonel Clausen. I certainly did.

Senator Ferguson. What is the affidavit that relates to that?

Colonel Clausen. Those that I read, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. What ones? I want you to name them?

Colonel Clausen. Those of Prather, Dunning, Rowlett, and those other people, because we wanted to find out just what you have in mind.

Senator Ferguson. Why?

Colonel Clausen. Why these two very significant ones had taken this long. I understood the PA-K2 code was an easy code to unravel, and I asked these people those questions.

Senator Ferguson. Did you find out how many they did translate that night and the next morning?

Colonel Clausen. They translated these two on the 8th.

Senator Ferguson. I am talking about the night of the 6th and the morning of the 7th. Did you find out how much of this traffic that they had sent from San Francisco on the new teletype machine to Washington that they actually decoded and deciphered?

Colonel Clausen. I understood from what they told me, Senator, that they did not have any of it finished until the 8th. That is what I gathered.

Senator Ferguson. So then the fact that they wanted it sent in did not mean they wanted it translated that night?

Colonel Clausen. That is what I understand.

Senator Ferguson. Or the next morning?

Colonel Clausen. I understand the arrangement, Senator, for the teletype equipment had been made sometime before. In other words, the telephone company had been asked to set this up for sometime before and that there had naturally been delay in
having the equipment installed, but that the first working operation was on the night that they have indicated.

Senator Lucas. Colonel Clausen, as I understand it, from your investigation that was made, the people in the Department were decoding and translating, but they were working on a code that had a higher priority than the one that came in from San Francisco.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, that is what they told me, Senator.

Senator Lucas. That is the time they were working on the 13-parts message?

Colonel Clausen. The purple, yes. Here is what they also said: You get a bunch of intercepts and you segregate those into their priorities, and you naturally put into one pile for decrypting those relating to the purple, you get to work on them first, and then you put in a pile those that have priority and you go to work on those, but there is no way to tell until the child is born what it is going to be.

Senator Lucas. Shortage of manpower was one of the things that was involved in the translation and decrypting of these important messages?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, that is what they said.

Senator Ferguson. Colonel, did you inquire as to whether [11743] or not they knew in the Department here in Washington that this traffic in relation to the ships was coming in on this priority and in this code, and that they knew that the diplomatic messages were coming in in the purple?

Colonel Clausen. They knew that.

Senator Ferguson. What?

Colonel Clausen. They knew how the messages were coming in because they would decrypt them, Senator, and naturally they would read it as they decrypted it.

Senator Ferguson. Did not they have different people on different codes?

Colonel Clausen. Oh, they had quite a set-up. Some of these people here that I mentioned worked on the different phases of that, just like the girls mentioned.

Senator Ferguson. Now the diplomatic messages would have a tendency to show where it was coming from, and these other messages coming in this other type of code would indicate where they were coming from, isn't that true?

Colonel Clausen. Well, I prefer to say they speak for themselves, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Certainly they speak for themselves. They show that, as I read them.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Clark had not quite finished, Colonel. [11744] Mr. Clark. I am interested in these two messages, but you read about three affidavits and I may be a little confused. I wish you would state in your own way, from the affidavits and your examination of the facts, where and when these messages were intercepted, translated and transmitted, giving the dates.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. They were picked up out of the air by a station at San Francisco on 6 December. The messages in question were from the Japanese Consul at Honolulu to Tokyo, and when the intercept station picked them out of the air at San Francisco, following their usual routine they mailed them into Washington, and these
had been included with the mail. Later on that same day the inter-
cept system for sending in material to Washington was augmented
by the teletype system, so the San Francisco station was requested to
teletype the material in, and they replied, "Well, we have already
mailed it to you, but we will also teletype it to you," and they did that.

Mr. CLARK. Do you have any information now as what time
they reached Washington?

Colonel CLAUSEN. Nothing except from what I have seen here, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Mr. Chairman, there was read into the record some-
time ago the facts relating to these two messages, [17745] and
I have before me, called to my attention by Lieutenant Boskey, mes-
 sage No. 25577, dated December 6, translated 8 December, sent in code
system PA–K2, intercepted by the Army Station 2, San Francisco
0022 GMT, 7 December (7:22 Washington time December 6), sent by
teletype to Army SIS.

Mr. CLARK. Hold on a moment. Will you go back to 7:22? What
did you say about that?

Mr. KAUFMAN. 7:22 p.m. Washington time, December 6.

Mr. CLARK. You say p.m. now, as I understand it.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes, 7:22 p.m. December 6 Washington time.
Sent by teletype to Army SIS. Teletype sheet does not show the time
sent by teletype.

Another copy sent by courier by Army Station 7, Fort Hunt, Vir-
ginia, was received by Army SIS not later than 7 December. Time
not shown, and is marked "Dupe" (A), indicating that teletyped copy
had arrived previously, decoded and translated by Army SIS. That
is with respect to the first message.

[17746] Mr. CLARK. Before you leave that, does that mean that
that message got to Washington 7:22 p.m.?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes, on December 6th.

Mr. CLARK. Now see if you can fix it for the other one.

Mr. KAUFMAN. SIS 25574 is dated December 6, translated Decem-
ber 8, sent in code system PA–K2 and is exhibit 2, page 29, intercepted
by Army Station 2, San Francisco, at 0574 GMT, 7 December, 12:42
a.m. December 7, Washington time. That is early in the morning,
Washington time.

That was 18 minutes of 1, December 7, in the morning. It was sent
by teletype to Army SIS (A). Teletype sheet does not show time
sent by teletype.

Another copy sent by Station 2 by airmail was received by Army
SIS at 2:33 8 December and is marked "Dupe (A)," indicating that
the teletype copy had arrived previously.

The Congressman asked me as to whether or not the times given
here were the times of receipt in Washington. The time shown here
shows the time of interception at San Francisco. The first one was
intercepted at 7:22 December 6, 7:22 p.m.

Mr. CLARK. I thought you said that is the time they arrived in
Washington?

Mr. KAUFMAN. No, that is the time they were intercepted
[17747] in San Francisco.

Then I proceeded to read that the sheet does not show the time that
it was received in Washington. It must have been after 7:22 p.m.
Mr. CLARK. I did not understand that the affidavit showed any
interception at San Francisco, as late as 12 o'clock.
Colonel Clausen. The affidavits show interception of the messages on 6 December, but not the precise time of the interception.

Mr. Clark. Well, 12-something p. m., would be 7 December.

Mr. Kaufman. 12:42 a.m. 7 December. That is 42 minutes after midnight.

Mr. Clark. If there is any way that you can fix here definitely when these messages arrived in Washington, I would like to see it.

Mr. Kaufman. The record from the Navy Department says the tele-type sheet does not show when they arrived in Washington. All they have is the interception time in San Francisco.

The Vice Chairman. Can you give us any help on that, Colonel? Did you secure that information?

Colonel Clausen. Nothing more than I have given to [11748] the committee.

Each message is dated December 6, so it would have to be intercepted on December 6, if that is the date it went from Honolulu, because the time at Honolulu and the time at San Francisco are both the same day.

Senator Lucas. Colonel Clausen, did you investigate as to why the Navy apparently did not use a time stamp on any of these messages when they came in?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, I went into that question. There is no doubt, Senator, that some of these matters could have been handled this way:

Perhaps the receipts could have been copied and the time when people got the intercepts indicated, they could have put numbers down and the distribution accurately recorded, but those were all things which were not done. The fact is they were just not done, and I was getting what the facts were.

Senator Lucas. That question has arisen several times in connection with the hearing. We have never been able to ascertain the exact time when they arrived in Washington.

Colonel Clausen. Yes.

Senator Lucas. We had the date of the interception but not the time of the receipt.

Senator Ferguson. Is the same thing true of the Army?

[11749] Colonel Clausen. No, they kept records there. I do not want to make a broad, sweeping statement, Senator, about the time of receipt, because the Signal men would be able to give more accurate information on that.

Senator Ferguson. These messages were not to the Navy. They were to the Army.

Colonel Clausen. They were Army messages.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, but I understood the counsel was reading from a Navy record.

Mr. Kaufman. No, Army.

Colonel Clausen. Army.

Senator Ferguson. Did the Army keep the hour of receipt of the messages?

Colonel Clausen. I did not get more than what Colonel Rowlett fixed for me on this sheet here.

Senator Ferguson. You answered Senator Lucas that the Navy did not keep the hour. Now, did the Army keep the hour?

Colonel Clausen. I said I did not know, Senator. The dates of receipt of some of these I tried to get from the standpoint of time. I understand there is some system, but what I did was to get the dates.
[11750] The Vice Chairman. Are you through?
Senator Ferguson. I am through with that, but I have some ques-
tions along other lines.
The Vice Chairman. Have you finished, Colonel?
Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. I would like to ask you a question, if I may,
in connection with these two messages we have been discussing here
with you and also with counsel.
As I got it from the information given by counsel, the first of these
two messages was intercepted in San Francisco about 7:22 p. m.
December 6th.
Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And the other one shortly after midnight,
December 6.
Mr. Kaufman. December 7.
The Vice Chairman. Shortly after midnight.
Mr. Kaufman. Of December 7.
The Vice Chairman. Of December 6, or very early in the morning
of December 7. They were intercepted at the monitoring station in
San Francisco, is that it?
Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Well, now, did that monitoring station in
San Francisco have facilities to advise Hawaii about those messages
as well as it could have advised [11751] Washington here?
Colonel Clausen. I think not, sir.
The Vice Chairman. It did not?
Colonel Clausen. No, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Did you find out why not?
Colonel Clausen. Well, it was an intercept station, as I understand,
that sent the traffic in to Washington for decrypting and decoding.
The Vice Chairman. It it something like 1,000 miles closer from
San Francisco to Hawaii than it is from San Francisco to Washington?
Colonel Clausen. I understand that the decoding and decrypting,
sir, involves an intricate problem of security and personnel, and a great
many people required to do that work.
The Vice Chairman. You did not understand then that they had
the required facilities?
Colonel Clausen. At San Francisco?
The Vice Chairman. At San Francisco to send it to Hawaii?
Colonel Clausen. That is right.
The Vice Chairman. And it was sent to Washington?
Colonel Clausen. That is right, sir.
The Vice Chairman. All right. Did you get through [11752]
Senator Lucas?
Senator Lucas. Yes.
The Vice Chairman. Did you get through, Mr. Clark?
Mr. Clark. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. I have some questions.
Colonel Clausen. I was going to go through the exhibits, if you
want me to do that.
Senator Ferguson. There are some general questions that I want to
ask him.
The Vice Chairman. You are not through, then, Colonel?
Colonel Clausen. You asked me to pick out in my study what they had in Hawaii, so what I was going to do was go through my exhibits and show the documents that I got out of the G–2 office in Hawaii.

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead. I am sorry I misunderstood you.

Colonel Clausen. I have concluded with the affidavits and I am now going to the exhibits. They are set forth in my report as exhibit C, and in this volume is contained the index of each volume of exhibits, so I go first to Exhibit No. 1.

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead in your own way, Colonel.

Colonel Clausen. On page 11 of No. 1, the first exhibit in this No. 1, is the Japanese operation orders which we [11753] captured, showing that they had set up the big Y-day of 7 December 1941, a month in advance. I think that has already come before the committee.

The following papers after that in this Exhibit No. 1 are documents that were obtained in the main from the files of the headquarters and of the contact office, Hawaiian Department, unless I otherwise indicate.

In other words, in Hawaii they had these papers——

The Vice Chairman (interposing.) In other words, everything you are going to bring to the attention of the committee now is documentary evidence that you secured in Hawaii?

Colonel Clausen. That is right, sir.

The Vice Chairman. All right, go ahead.

Colonel Clausen. On page 11, I just merely noted the fact that General Short had initialled what we call in the Army the buck sheet regarding the information in regard to the Burma Road for the reason it tied in with his testimony. That is, whenever you have a paper that contains his initials it shows his familiarity with the subject and the procedure that was followed, I presume.

Page 27–E is a document which we got in Washington and which I identified in Hawaii, that was sent in by General Fielder 6 September 1941, to the War Department G–2, [11754] in which it says:

It has been noted that many of the summaries of information received from your office originate with Office Naval Intelligence, Fourteenth Naval District and have already been furnished this office by the Navy.

The cooperation and contact between Office Naval Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Military Intelligence Division in this Department, is most complete and all such data is received simultaneously with the dispatch of information to the respective Washington offices.

Inasmuch as such advices are received in duplicate and unless there are other reasons to the contrary it is recommended that such notices from your office be discontinued in order to avoid the duplication of effort.

Signed, "Kendall J. Fielder, Lieutenant Colonel, Infantry, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2."

The Vice Chairman. That is from Colonel Fielder to whom?

Colonel Clausen. To the War Department, Washington.

Senator Lucas. Let me ask right there, what was he discussing in particular there?

Colonel Clausen. The summaries of information. He calls for summaries of information received "from your office [11755] originate with Office Naval Intelligence." I will show you a few examples of what he has in mind when I come to them.
The Vice Chairman. What is the date of that?
Colonel Clausen. 6 September, 1941.
The Vice Chairman. In other words, on the 6th of September, 1941, G-2 of the Army in Hawaii notified the War Department in Washington that he wanted this information discontinued?
Colonel Clausen. Yes. He said (reading):
The cooperation and contact between Office Naval Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Military Intelligence Division, in this Department, is most complete and all such data is received simultaneously with the dispatch of information to the respective Washington offices.
In other words, he was saying it was duplicating the work.
The Vice Chairman. And asked to have it discontinued?
Colonel Clausen. He recommended that such notices be discontinued in order to avoid duplication of effort.
The Vice Chairman. All right.
Colonel Clausen. Then on page 30-E there is the start of an estimate of the international (Japanese) situation, prepared by the G-2, Hawaiian Department, signed by Col. George W. Bicknell, obtained from his office. He had told me to go to his office and get these papers. That was referred to yesterday when I spoke of what he called digests. In other words, this G-2 estimate was prepared in the so-called contact office under the direction of Colonel Bicknell. He speaks of the ABCD bloc and other things in here, and the "mounting situation."
I read portions into the record yesterday.
The Vice Chairman. All right, go ahead.
Colonel Clausen. Then on page 41 is a similar digest signed by Col. George W. Bicknell, and this contains the initial at the top of General Short, showing that it came to him, in which there is a continuation. This is a carry-on of the one I just referred to of October 17.
On page 48 there is one of these summaries of information from the War Department to Hawaii, and this is the type of thing that was sent out. This has a covering letter transmitting information to Hawaii, and in this case it sent along an analysis of information it received from the Orient on a one-page document dated November 3, 1941, and it says:

The following information received from the Orient, dated August 26, 1941, is considered reliable:
1. Mr. Hirota, a presiding officer at directors' meeting of the Black Dragon Society, told of an order issued (now premier) "to complete full preparation to meet any emergency with the United States in the Pacific. All guns to be mounted in the islands of the Pacific under Japanese mandate. The full preparation to be completed in November."
2. Hirota and others are said to have stated: "War with the United States would begin in December or February."
3. "Very soon," they say, "the Cabinet will be changed. The new Cabinet would likely start war within sixty days."

And there is a G-2 note:

Full name of individual mentioned above is Koki Hirota, who is reported to be a member of the House of Peers, former Premier of Japan and director of the Bureau of Intelligence, U. S. Section.

Then it has an evaluation placed on it as to the source, it is reliable; as to the information credible.

Senator Lucas. Who sent that out?
Colonel Clausen. The War Department sent it to Hawaii.

Senator Lucas. Did that come under G-2?

Colonel Clausen. That was sent by the War Department, G-2.

Incidentally, that contains at the top what appears to be again the initials of General Short. If you compare that with the others at the top you will see it is very similar.

[11758] Senator Lucas. Now do I understand this is one of the messages that G-2 in Hawaii said they did not care to receive?

Colonel Clausen. Some recent information; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What is the date of that?

Colonel Clausen. I do not say this is the type. It may not be exactly the type. I will come to some soon. This is of a special category.

Senator Lucas. This is one of the examples that you proposed to give to the committee?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What is the date of this?

Colonel Clausen. 3 November 1941, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. You referred back to a message sometime in September, and this is related to that, that this was not to be sent out, is that correct?

Colonel Clausen. I did not say this is the type not to be sent out. This, I believe, was a special type.

Senator Ferguson. You do not include this in the type not to be sent?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir: I do not include this in that type.

Senator Ferguson. Why did you read it then?

Colonel Clausen. Because this went from the War Department [11759] to Hawaii.

Now at page 50 in this exhibit 1 is the 3 December message that I showed came through Colonel Wilkinson to Honolulu. I already tied that in yesterday. In other words, that should be further identified by some papers in some of these other exhibits, Exhibit 5, for instance, at pages 214 and 232 of Exhibit 5, regarding the Wilkinson set-up.

Now this, I think, should be read, because it refers to the same subject of the authenticity of Wilkinson that was mentioned by General Willoughby, if you want it read.

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead and read it.

[11760] Colonel Clausen. This is a communication that I came across in the Office of the District Intelligence Office, Fourteenth Naval District at Honolulu and it is from the District Intelligence officer to the Director of Naval Intelligence, Office of Naval Operations, Washington, D. C.

Subject: British Secret Agent in Manila, Exchange of Information With.

Reference: (a) DIO conf. 14th ltr. dated 27 June, 1941. Subject Mr. Gerald H. Wilkinson.

(b) OpNav dispatch on same subject.

(c) DIO conf. 14th ND ltr. dated 22 August, 1941. Subject, British Secret Agent in Manila, Information Received From.

1. Subject: British Agent in Manila continues to forward information via Lock Box in Pan American clipper planes to the District Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District. Much of this information is of value to the Military Intelligence in Hawaii, and to this office as well as to the Office of Federal Bureau of Investigation. Reference (c) listed by numbers some of the cards containing this
information which have been disseminated by the Office of the DIO, Fourteenth Naval District.

2. Paragraph five of reference (c) stated that the District Intelligence Officer considered this information [11761] to be valuable and requested authority by dispatch to permit the sending of information by the local representative of subject agent to Manila in the lock compartment of Pan American Airways planes.

3. The dispatch reply requested in paragraph five of reference (c) has not been received to date.

Signed "T. H. Mayfield."

On page 232, also obtained from the Navy in Hawaii, referring to this subject is a letter dated August 22, 1941, from the District Intelligence Officer to the Head of Domestic Intelligence Branch, Office of Naval Intelligence.

In reference (a), the District Intelligence Officer outlined the proposal of a Mr. Wilkinson, a British secret agent in the Far East, that an arrangement be effected whereby correspondence between him and his Honolulu agent, Mr. Harry Dawson, be carried in the special locked compartments of Pan American Airways clippers flying between Honolulu and Manila, in return for which accommodation Mr. Wilkinson would furnish the District Intelligence Officer and the Military Intelligence Division with information gathered by himself and his aides in the Far East, and of particular interest to the United States Army and Navy. It was proposed that the District Intelligence offices of the 14th and 16th [11762] Naval Districts should make the necessary arrangements with Pan American Airways.

Reference (b) stated that the Department could not authorize the above plan at this time because of the status of the matter and the small amount of information submitted. The District Intelligence Officer informed Mr. Dawson of the Department's decision, and has decided to forward any further correspondence from Mr. Dawson to Mr. Wilkinson. However, every clipper from the Orient brings confidential mail from Mr. Wilkinson to Mr. Dawson, forwarded by the District Intelligence Officer, 16th Naval District.

By dispatch from the District Intelligence Officer, 16th Naval District, the Commandant, 14th Naval District was informed that Mr. Wilkinson was thoroughly reliable and trustworthy. Investigation in Honolulu discloses that Mr. Wilkinson is the properly accredited branch manager in Manila for Theo. H. Davies & Co., Ltd., and that his wife is a granddaughter of the original Mr. Theodore H. Davies. This company is one of the five largest corporations in the Territory of Hawaii and, although incorporated as an Hawaiian corporation, the majority of its stock is held by members of the Davies family who are British subjects and live in England.

[11763] Mr. Harry Dawson, above mentioned, is manager of the steamship department of Theodore H. Davies & Company, Ltd., a British subject, and British Vice-Consul for Hawaii.

The District Intelligence Officer considers the information received from Mr. Wilkinson to be of value and requests authority by dispatch to effectuate the arrangement proposed by Mr. Wilkinson.

Information so far received by this office from Mr. Wilkinson has been furnished the Director of Naval Intelligence on 14th Naval District dissemination cards . . .

[11764] Now, on page 57 of my Exhibit 1. I have three examples of how they got these phone intercepts, recordings, in Hawaii. This all came from Hawaii. These three were done by the Navy. You will find them on page 57, starting at page 57, going through 57, 58, and 59.

The last remark on page 59, as I said this morning, it says:

"At 4 p. m. Honolulu time in the 1941st year of Our Lord, December 2d inst. I bade my adieu to you my friend of 22 months standing. Darn if I won't miss you!!"

And then there is some Latin. I will look to Mr. Gearhart.
It means "rest in peace."

The Vice Chairman. That is where the Navy quit?

Colonel Clausen. That is when they quit.

Now, then, the same thing, that is, phone intercepts, and, incidentally, they are here if you want them read, but there is hash and conversation going back and forth, but on page 60 of this same exhibit I quote three from the FBI. You see they send these around to the FBI and the Army. The FBI have three. The last one was November 30.

The Vice Chairman. I think you made it clear, Colonel, that after the Navy in Hawaii quit, the FBI continued.

Colonel Clausen. With the one.

[11765] The Vice Chairman. With the one that it had.

Colonel Clausen. To the cook.

The Vice Chairman. To the cook's quarters.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. All right.

Colonel Clausen. Now, there is at page 75 in Exhibit 1 some memorandum which I quote from headquarters of the Hawaiian Department showing some notes made by the people there at the time as to why this message from General Marshall took so long to reach General Short on 7 December, 1941.

The Vice Chairman. All right. Let's have that.

Colonel Clausen. They run over to page 80 and page 81. These look like rough drafts. These were rough drafts, apparently, in part of a proposed answer to Washington.

Washington had sent a wire, which is on page 80, on December 9, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department:

Please advise immediately exact time of receipt of our No. 529 December 7 at Honolulu exact time deciphered message transmitted by Signal Corps to Staff and by what Staff office received.

Now, in answer to that, the Hawaiian Command, who were drafting some radios and one on page 75, which says:

[11766] Radio War Department 529 received filed at Washington D. C. 12:18 P. M. Washington Time (or 6:48 A. M. Hawaiian Time) (as RCA 1549 WS) received by RCA at Honolulu 7:23 A. M. Delivered to Signal Office at 11:45 A. M. Not marked priority other priority messages handled first delivered to decoding office 2:40 P. M. Decoded and delivered to Colonel Dunlop 2:50 P. M. Delivered to Captain Trueman in office of Chief of Staff Headquarters Hawaiian Department at 3 P. M.

On the following page, page 76, there is an account by Capt. William B. Cobb with respect to that message and what he did in taking certain action.

In other words, he confirms some of the things that I said about the message getting to the headquarters about 3 p. m., and what they did when they got the message. That was after the attack. I will read it if you want me to.

Now, page 84—

The Vice Chairman. Is that on the same thing?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir. I am passing to a different subject.

The Vice Chairman. Going back to that, I would like for you to give me those times again.

Colonel Clausen. Yes.
The Vice Chairman. I got the impression that the Marshall message arrived in Hawaii at 7-something.

[11767] Colonel Clausen. That is what it says:

Received by RCA at Honolulu 7:33 a.m.

The Vice Chairman. Yes.

Senator George. You gave one time as 6:28. What was that?

Colonel Clausen. 6:48.

Senator George. Oh.

Colonel Clausen. Hawaiian time is the same as 12:18 p.m., Washington time which this says was the time the message was filed.

Senator George. Oh, yes.

The Vice Chairman. Let me ask you this question, Colonel:

Did your investigation there in Hawaii disclose any information similar to that given to this committee by Mr. Justice Roberts when he appeared here to the effect that the Marshall message arrived at the radio station office, the RCA office, I think it is—is that the proper designation?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. The RCA office in Honolulu, and the agent on duty there was unable to raise General Short's headquarters and couldn't get the message to him, couldn't get any response from General Short's quarters, and got a [11768] boy on a bicycle to deliver the message and the boy was on the way with the message when the first bomb fell and he took to the bushes, and stayed in the bushes until the raid was over and then proceeded to deliver it.

Did you secure any information similar to that given us by Mr. Justice Roberts?

Colonel Clausen. Well, sir, while you have been asking the question I have been trying to read the statement of Captain Cobb. He had something to do with the message and he may refer to that.

Senator Lucas. I don't believe they had any means of delivery there on Sunday morning, did they?

Colonel Clausen. No; he doesn't mention that—those details. He was there when the message came. He had been assigned to the office of the chief of staff and this message came while he was there. He says it came in at 3 o'clock.

The Vice Chairman. I don't have Justice Roberts' testimony before me, but I have a recollection that for some reason, either because they couldn't raise General Short's headquarters, or couldn't get into communication with it for some reason, he had to get a boy on a bicycle to deliver the message.

Mr. Murphy. He said the teletype wasn't working on Sunday.

[11769] The Vice Chairman. Is that the way you recollect it? The teletype wasn't working and he had to get a boy to deliver it. Did you get any information on that?

Colonel Clausen. I got no further information; no, sir.

Senator Lucas. Colonel, before you leave that episode will you give to me the exact amount of time that ensued from the time that message left Washington until it arrived in Hawaii?

Colonel Clausen. You mean these dates that I have referred to?

Senator Lucas. It left at 12-something. 12:18. How many minutes was it before it actually arrived?
Colonel Clausen. You see, what I found in the Hawaiian Department, were these rough notes on the subject so I had the photostats taken. It appears in response to the wire from Washington inquiring about times this message was sent by General Short:

Re your 549. Radio 529 delivered Honolulu via RCA 7:33 morning seventh received signal office Fort Shafter eleven forty-five morning paren this time approximate but within five minutes paren seventh stop Deciphered message received by Adjutant General Hawaiian Department two fifty-eight afternoon seventh Short.

[11770] Senator Lucas. In view of the fact that I am not familiar with the various timetables between Hawaii and Washington, I would like to know from you the number of minutes it took after that message was sent from Washington before is actually arrived in Hawaii.

Colonel Clausen. This data, page 75-E, says:

Radio War Department 529 received filed at Washington D. C. 12:18 p. m. Washington time (or 6:48 a. m. Hawaiian time.)

Senator Lucas. I understand that, but all that I am asking for and maybe I haven't made myself clear. I was asking how many minutes it took this message to go from Washington to Hawaii.

Colonel Clausen. 7:33 a.m.

Mr. Kaufman. Forty-five minutes.

Colonel Clausen. Forty-five minutes.

Senator Lucas. Is that correct?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. Colonel French so testified, it was about 45 minutes.

Senator Lucas. Let me ask you this: Did you make an investigation as to why it took 45 minutes for that message to get through?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir. Colonel French testified before the Grunert Board that he thought that was pretty good time.

The Vice Chairman. As I remember, evidence came to this committee that General Marshall, or somebody inquired how long it would take to get that message out there, and was told about 30 minutes.

Colonel Clausen. About 30 minutes.

The Vice Chairman. So that wouldn't be over 10 or 15 minutes difference.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. Colonel French thought it was pretty good time.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, may I ask: Did you make inquiry, Colonel, as to whether or not there was a teletype from the radio station in Hawaii to the Army.

Colonel Clausen. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. At the time of the sending of this message?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir; but it is my understanding there was, but it was not working.

Senator Ferguson. Had it been completed?

Colonel Clausen. I don't know, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Was it not working because they were asleep, or because it had not yet been installed?

Colonel Clausen. That is what I don't know, Senator.

[11772] Senator Ferguson. You didn't inquire about that?
Colonel Clausen. No, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Justice Roberts led us to the inference that it was not working because it was Sunday morning, but I think we ought to clear that up.

Senator Ferguson. But it hasn't been cleared up yet.

Mr. Murphy. No.

Colonel Clausen. On page 84 of Exhibit 1, there is a buck sheet with an attached copy of wire to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, General Short, from Merle Smith. The significance of that, the reason I picked that out to include here, is because we had testimony before the Grunert Board that Australia, where Merle Smith was, I believe the attaché, sent a warning message to Hawaii, and the warning message forecast some action, some military move by Japan. And I remember that the question was raised before the Grunert Board as to whether Hawaii could decode the message, and I remember the witness who testified said that it could.

So, when I saw this in the files, at Hawaii, it substantiated the fact that Merle Smith had made direct communication to the commanding general at the Hawaiian command with respect to the information. And you can tell from this, on page 85, the type of information that he would send. He is reporting [11773] on changes of situations in the Malay Peninsula, and speaks of military information.

The Vice Chairman. Message from where?

Colonel Clausen. Merle Smith is in Australia.

The Vice Chairman. And sent the information to the Commanding General in Hawaii?

Colonel Clausen. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. When was that?

Colonel Clausen. That was, well, this only came in after December 7, but it indicates to me, it tied in with what went into the Grunert Board proceedings, and as testified, I believe, in the last few days, by a lieutenant, I think, O'Dell, this should tie in with Lieutenant O'Dell's testimony before the Grunert Board.

The Vice Chairman. All right.

Colonel Clausen. That is all for Exhibit 1.

Passing now to Exhibit 2. This exhibit, as I have noted on the cover sheet, contains the following papers, obtained by me from the files of Contact Office, Hawaiian Department. It says:

The following papers were obtained from the files of the Contact Office, Hawaiian Department, as noted on the cover sheets A through H.

Pages 51 and 53 I have already read yesterday. That is a portion where I read the excerpts [11774] from the digest.

Here is an interesting document, pages 56 and 57; the G-2 gives the situation as of 7:30, 7 December.

The Vice Chairman. Let's have that. That is the G-2 in Hawaii?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. G-2 of the Army?

Colonel Clausen. It is on stationery, "Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.", 22 December 1941.

That is when it is made. But it is a summary of the situation as of 7:30, 7 December 1941.

Do you want me to read the whole thing?

The Vice Chairman. Yes.
Colonel Clausen (reading):

A. NAVAL OPERATIONS:

No knowledge—

Mr. Richardson. Just a minute, please. Was that the division that was in charge at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir; this is made by—it is not signed. This is a carbon copy. I was told to look for this by Colonel Bicknell, and it is made for the signature of Lieutenant Fielder.

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead and read it.

Colonel Clausen (reading):

A. NAVAL OPERATIONS:

No knowledge of Japanese Naval vessels in waters farther east than the China Sea, although it was known that they had bases in the Mandate Islands and in all probability had naval craft in those waters. Nothing had been received from the Naval Intelligence, between November 27 and December 7, to indicate any movement of carriers east of the Mandate Islands.

B. AIR OPERATIONS:

No information to indicate operations of Japanese aircraft other than on the Asiatic Mainland and areas adjacent thereto. It was known that no land based Japanese aircraft could operate from nearer than the Mandate Islands (approximately 2,100 miles). It was also known that no nation possessed aircraft which could operate from that distance and return to its base.

C. LOCAL SITUATION:

Instructions from the War Department announced that the International situation was critical and directed precautions be taken against possible sabotage and subversive acts.

1. DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITIES:

On Saturday, December 6, it was learned through local investigative agencies that the papers at the Japanese Consulate were being destroyed by burning.

2. CONCENTRATION AND MOVEMENTS OF LOCAL ALIENS:

None. The entire local population was quiet and no indications of domestic unrest appeared.

3. SABOTAGE:

Warnings were prevalent that acts of sabotage were impending but no action on the part of the residents of the territory indicated that subversive acts would be committed.

On Saturday evening, December 6, at about 6:00 p.m., a transcription and translation of a trans-Pacific telephone conversation between a local alien and an unknown party in Tokyo was received. This conversation had taken place on December 5th. There were certain features about this conversation which were suspicious, although the communication in its entity appeared innocuous. Efforts were made Saturday night to evaluate this conversation but it was impossible to reach any specific conclusion as to the meaning thereof.

D. PRECAUTIONS TAKEN:

Alert No. 1 was in operation and had been since November 27, 1941, with the counter-subversive section of the G-2 office in a fully alerted condition. In addition thereto the Aircraft Warning Service was in operation from two hours before dawn until one hour after dawn each day.

CONCLUSION:

A. CAPABILITIES:

1. There was a possibility that disruption of relations, or war, might result at any time from overt acts by Japan either in the form of military action in the Far East, sinking of transports enroute to the Philippines or other similar acts.

2. With the large part of the American Navy based in the Hawaiian waters the probability of an attack by the Japanese carriers was believed to be negligible.

Page 69, I got a copy of a wire from General Short to the Adjutant General giving his estimate regarding the Nomura [11778] mission, just tying in to the intelligence over there that passed back and forth.
Page 77, part of the files of the Contact Office, and there is a memorandum for Colonel Bicknell dated 1 August 1941 giving high lights on the Japanese activity in the islands and in general the diplomatic and impending picture.

Page 78 is that cable of 27 November, 1941 from Wilkinson to Hawaii.

Page 79 is a buck sheet apparently signed by General Short concerning the general Japanese situation, information relative to the Japanese situation.

Page 82 is a War Department transmittal of information to the G-2 Hawaiian Odepartment.

This was the type of thing from Washington.

This was a letter that Washington sent to Hawaii, copy of a letter from J. Edgar Hoover to Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State, July 28, 1941, which says:

As of possible interest to you, information has been received from a confidential source, the reliability of which has not been determined, to the effect that if Great Britain were to suffer a major military set-back, the Japanese military party would force Japan's entry into the war, in which case Shanghai and Tientsin would be immediately occupied by the Japanese Army and would be completely [11779] blockaded by them.

That is on page 83.

Now, page 85 is a military attache report from the buck sheet initiated by General Short.

Special Intelligence Report regarding Tojo, giving his background.

And pages 91 and 95 contain what I think they call the summaries from Washington. This is one that was sent from Washington to Hawaii and it is a document that sets forth that they have received from a party in Mexico certain information which says in part:

If and when war comes between Germany and the U. S. or Japan and the U. S. the plan is to at once use this small fleet of submarines for lightning attacks on the U. S. Navy Fleet anchored Pearl Harbor.

That is at page 95.

Senator Lucas. What is the date of that?

Colonel Clausen. That is June 1941, from a military attache in Mexico City. June 17, 1941.

This same subject of midget submarines referred to in this dispatch from Washington is tied in in other ways because when that came to General Short he sent it to Admiral Bloch and there was an exchange of correspondence and after the attack there was a re-examination of this [11780] intelligence to see whether it related to the attack.

So you will find those references in my exhibit 3.

Also pages 15 and 20.

Page 105, there is some intelligence that passed back and forth regarding a George Paish—

Senator Lucas. Before you get to that, Colonel: You said that there was a re-examination of this intelligence between General Short and Admiral Bloch?

Colonel Clausen. I said that after the attack—

Senator Lucas. After the attack.

Colonel Clausen. At the time it was received, Senator, the intelligence was sent by General Short to Admiral Bloch.
Senator **Lucas**. Well, they re-examined it for one purpose and that was to ascertain whether or not the intelligence gave them any information that they had overlooked, I take it?

Colonel **Claussen**. Yes, sir.

Senator **Lucas**. What was their findings on it, do you know?

Colonel **Claussen**. I will read it.

Senator **Lucas**. All right.

Colonel **Claussen**. I see a note here on the buck slip, Senator, on page 91 of my exhibit 2:


1. The appended report is forwarded for re-evaluation in the light of developments since December 6, 1941. This matter formed the basis for requests to Commanding Officers of the outlying districts for close surveillance of near offshore waters soon after the attack on Pearl Harbor.

[11781]

Then in handwriting this appears.

This is like a Rube Goldberg cartoon, but is of interest to read. No particular significance. Believe informer got a tip on pigmy submarines and let his imagination run wild. Navy does not attach importance to theory. Searching could have been continued to extent of personnel available anyway. Return for file after anyone interested has read it.

Senator **Lucas**. What do you make out of it?

Colonel **Claussen**. I make out of it that this party who reported this information from Mexico, Senator, gave the information that when war would break out between the United States and Japan, Japan would strike us with submarines at Pearl, and the attack having happened they sent it out for re-evaluation, and they didn't think there was any connection between the two. That is what they say.

Senator **Ferguson**. I am not quite clear as to who wrote the instrument that you just read.

Colonel **Claussen**. Senator, it looks to me as if it is in the handwriting of General Fielder, but I am not sure. I say that because I seem to see here, "K. J. F."

Senator **Ferguson**. Whose initials would those be?

Colonel **Claussen**. That would be Kendall J. Fielder. But I am not sure. And he was G-2 after Pearl Harbor.

[11782] Senator **Ferguson**. Has it a date on it?

Colonel **Claussen**. This is the 30th of January, 1942, and it refers to the information which I have indicated came in in June, 1941.

Mr. **Murphy**. In addition, wasn't there some talk about them seeing those midget submarines around the Islands?

Colonel **Claussen**. Yes, sir.

Mr. **Murphy**. That was sometime before the 7th of December?

Colonel **Claussen**. Yes, sir.

Now, this instrument, in the photostating, is very hard to read. If the committee desires to read it, they should get the original, I mean the original from which the photostats were made.

The general idea was that these submarines would be planted in Pearl Harbor waters, and would there lurk to strike when the attack was about to commence.

Senator **Ferguson**. That information, as I understand it was sent from someone in Mexico?

Colonel **Claussen**. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. To Hawaii?
Colonel Clausen. It was sent from the War Department at Washington to Hawaii. It came to Washington and then went to Hawaii. [11784] Senator Ferguson. Came to Washington from Mexico in June of 1941?
Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Somewhat similar to Captain Zacharias's theory.
Senator Lucas. That is nearly as good as the Bellinger-Martin report.
Colonel Clausen. At any rate, when the information came there was an exchange of correspondence and you will find the additional data in my Exhibit 3, pages 15 and 20.
Now, page 105, regarding a warning that Mr. Paish had given the President—
Mr. Keefe. Mr. who?
Colonel Clausen. George Paish, P-a-i-s-h.
Senator Lucas. Who was he?
Colonel Clausen. He was a lecturer that came through the Hawaii Islands and wrote a letter to the President regarding what he called the inadequately guarded installations. That correspondence went back and forth between. Then the FBI was in the picture, and also G-2.
Now, these documents came from various offices, and for that reason some tie in to this and are in some of the other exhibits.
For example, this subject is page 105 in Exhibit No. 2 [11785] and there is also something on the same subject in Exhibit 3, page 6; Exhibit 1, page 18.
Page 105 is dated November 28, 1941, to the Hawaiian Department, G-2, transmitting a report by the FBI regarding this subject, and referring to previous communications.
Mr. Keefe. Regarding what subject?
Colonel Clausen. The subject that I stated, sir, the fortifications being what he said were inadequately guarded.
Mr. Keefe. Is that referring to this letter of this man Paish?
Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. That you are talking about?
Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. Who was he?
Colonel Clausen. He was a lecturer. Do you want me to read the FBI report?
Mr. Keefe. No.
Colonel Clausen. He was a lecturer.
Senator Lucas. Colonel, these last two or three exhibits that you have been talking about, I don't quite follow you with respect to the importance of the subject matter that we are trying to elicit from you.
Do you consider these last three or four exhibits you have given to the committee of any importance?
[11786] Colonel Clausen. No, sir; except that it was in the office, and Colonel Bicknell suggested that they be preserved, obtained and preserved.
[11787] Senator Lucas. Well, I am primarily interested in information that involves any information that Hawaii had out there that appraised them, that they did not get in Washington. I think that was the gist of the question last evening.
Colonel Clausen. These other documents, Senator, are documents that I have entered on my notes, documents of the same general character. In other words, they had been sending some information to Hawaii. You understand, sir, that one of the things General Short said before the Grunert Board was that he got no information from Washington.

Senator Lucas. I understand.

Colonel Clausen. So that was tied into that.

Senator Lucas. All right.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, do I understand now that that is what you were investigating then?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. To find out what he did get? Was that one of your tasks?

Colonel Clausen. Not exclusively, Senator. The files of the G-2, Hawaiian Department, and the other files over there showed that he had a great deal more information, Senator, than he testified before the Board regarding this general subject.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever take an affidavit from General Short?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever confront him with any of the information and take an affidavit from him?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Do you have a reason for that?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir. I just assumed that the hearings that had been conducted before the board and the other information that I gave to the Secretary was sufficient. I mean I was not told to do that.

Senator Ferguson. Well, were you told to do these other things, to interview these other people?

Colonel Clausen. I was told what, in general, to do and reported back, as I said yesterday, from time to time as to the progress of my investigation as shown in the report.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. But as I understand it now General Short had made a statement before the board about the information he got. You went out to find out what information you could find that was around in the files, is that correct?

Colonel Clausen. That is right.

Senator Ferguson. And then you did not go back to Short and give to Short—and inquire of Short as to whether or not he actually got the information?

Colonel Clausen. That is right.

[11789] Senator Ferguson. Now, why not?

Colonel Clausen. Well, one reason, Senator, was as I explained yesterday, that in my own mind the Congress was going to conduct its own investigation.

Senator Ferguson. Oh.

Colonel Clausen. So far as I was concerned—I mean I was willing to do anything that would be required but with the end of the Japanese War and with the opportunity of the Congress to confront General Short with whatever it wanted and to go into the matter it would seem to me that the entire subject then could be taken up at that time.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Then, as I understand it, you did not
complete your investigation because you understood and it was your understanding that Congress would complete it?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir; no, sir; that is not correct, sir. The investigation that I conducted was for the purpose of assisting the Secretary and if he wanted the additional testimony of General Short I assume he would have told me to do it, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did he tell you he wanted this other information, did he directly tell you?

Colonel Clausen. The additional information that I got here in this form was the information and all the affidavits and the data that I have referred to here presented to the [11790] Secretary and my job was from time to time to make reports as to what I was doing and what I had done and what I was going to do, so these periodic reports do appear in here—these periodic reports which appear in my large volume contain that progress information, these interim reports.

Senator Ferguson. Did you get any statement or any affidavit from Admiral Kimmel?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir. I have a memorandum——

Senator Ferguson. From Admiral Bloch?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir. Senator——

Senator Ferguson. No; I just want to know whether there is anything else in any of those books.

Colonel Clausen. You mean that I got?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Colonel Clausen. No, sir. I had been on the board and they testified when I was on the board.

Senator Ferguson. And you were satisfied with their testimony?

Colonel Clausen. Well, you see, so far as the Navy was concerned, as you pointed out yesterday, my functions were to extend to the Army personnel, responsibility and actions.

Senator Ferguson. And not the Navy?

Colonel Clausen. And not the Navy except insofar as they were tied in with the Army, like the officers whose affidavits [11791] were read this morning and today.

Senator Ferguson. This is what I am getting at: Rochefort was a witness as well as Bloch before the Board.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you went and took an affidavit from Rochefort, but did not take one from Bloch.

Colonel Clausen. Well, the reason for that, Senator, was that Rochefort was in the decrypting work at Honolulu and when he testified before the Grunert Board he did not give us any information concerning the magic. He was one of the witnesses who did not do that.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ask him about it?

Colonel Clausen. I have——

Senator Ferguson. Did the board ask him about it?

Colonel Clausen. No; the board did not ask him about it. I assume the board did not know the details.

Senator Ferguson. I will inquire later.

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead, Colonel.

Senator Lucas. Let me ask one question of Colonel Clausen first as a result of the questions asked by the Senator from Michigan.
As I understand, what you are testifying to at the present time is merely documentary proof that has been taken from the files in Hawaii?

[11792] Colonel Clausen. That is right.
Senator Lucas. And the documentary proof speaks for itself. It would not be necessary under those circumstances to obtain affidavit of General Short?
Colonel Clausen. That is correct, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Go ahead, Colonel.
Senator Ferguson. Do I understand now that all you are giving us is documentary proof? You are giving us a lot of other statements in affidavits besides reading out of a document?
The Vice Chairman: Well, probably, Senator, your attention was detracted there. He announced that he had completed the affidavit part of the evidence in response to the request of the committee and he was then taking up the documents and going through them.
Senator Ferguson. That is not my question. As I understand, his last answer to Senator Lucas would indicate that all he has been giving us, his whole investigation is based just upon documents.
Colonel Clausen. Not the whole investigation, Senator. What I have been giving you is just stated in the record. I have in the last memorandum here been reporting primarily to documents, referring primarily to documents.
Senator Ferguson. Primarily to documents, yes, but much [11973] of your other evidence is from statements.
Colonel Clausen. From affidavits.
Senator Ferguson. From statements of witnesses in affidavits.
Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. But you did not take any such statements from the three men that I have named.
Colonel Clausen. General Short, Admiral Kimmel——
Senator Ferguson. Admiral Bloch.
Colonel Clausen (continuing). And Admiral Bloch?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Colonel Clausen. No, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Go ahead.
Mr. Keefe. Mr. Chairman, permit me to inquire. Inasmuch as I was not here yesterday, this examination has been sort of a round robin, questions being asked by everybody of the witness. Have we reached a point where I can understand that at some time I will be permitted to inquire?
The Vice Chairman. Yes, you will be recognized, Mr. Keefe, after Colonel Clausen finishes. He is now intending to read all of the documents that he secured in Hawaii.
Mr. Keefe. I understand that.
The Vice Chairman. So go ahead, Colonel.
Colonel Clausen. Incidentally, these documents were as-[11794] seemed over a long period of time and it is like if you sent somebody out in an orchard to get some fruit and he came back with some that it too ripe and some that is no good and you cast that
out and somebody makes the selections. It is necessary, Senator Lucas—I don’t want to go over those, but Exhibit 3, page 17, contains some information of the same general type that I referred to which was in the Hawaiian Department. Page 28—

The **Vice Chairman.** More information of what general type, Colonel?

Colonel **Clausen.** Intelligence information, Mr. Vice Chairman, regarding—well, for example, at page 17 is a—I just have my rough note here—is a book slip, apparently acquired by General Short, which refers to a book.

Now, the Grunert Board I remember asked him various questions, whether he read various books about this and something else, and this is one of the books that was passed upon, that showed the intentions of Japan in the mind of one of these authors. It is entitled, "Three-Power Alliance and American-Jap War" by Kinoaki Matsuo and he predicts there is going to be a final battle of the world.

Now, on the Japanese consul’s desk pad on the day that the winds code message was expected, he thought that there were some references to a weather broadcast. That is on page [11795] 120 and I just offer it to the committee for what it is worth. I don’t know what it means. It might be probably he got the winds code and he put it on his desk pad himself. This is page 120 of this Exhibit 3 and he has there, in parentheses "J—Foreign radio program," and then he has the times at which a station will broadcast a news broadcast, so it looked to me as though he had gotten his winds code set-up and put it down on the desk pad.

The **Vice Chairman.** What is the date?

Colonel **Clausen.** That is November the 19th, which was the date of one of the winds codes set-up.

The **Vice Chairman.** I see.

Colonel **Clausen.** Now, Exhibit No. 4 contains translations and photographs of the Japanese log book or register from the consulate as gotten together after the attack. Also, there is a check against this winds code in there because it refers to the information that came into the Jap consul. In other words, after the attack they took these various dispatches and decoded them and one of them is the winds code.

Exhibit No. 5 is the District Intelligence Office information from the Fourteenth Naval District and that contains the winds code intercept which was the nearest I came to finding an implementing message; I means actually conforming to the [11796] formal set-up. This page 120 of Exhibit 5 is a—

The **Vice Chairman.** What is the date?

Colonel **Clausen.** Well, you see it came in on the 8th of December.

The **Vice Chairman.** 8th of December?

Colonel **Clausen.** Yes, sir; 1941.

The **Vice Chairman.** All right.

Colonel **Clausen.** And on page 120—this was a recording. It says:

Here a weather forecast was made—this is in the exact words he gives—"Here a weather forecast was made as far as I can recollect, no such weather forecast has ever been made before. His exact words were "Allow me to especially make a weather forecast at this time. 'West wind, clear.' Since these broadcasts are also heard by the Japanese Navy, it may be some sort of code.
In other words, a man is putting this down on the 8th of December. Then in addition to being in the center at the end he has this: "At this time allow me again to make a weather forecast 'West wind—clear' " and then in parentheses "Repeat this broadcast."

The Vice Chairman. That was on the 8th of December 1941?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. Now, exhibit No. 6 is a complete file of those British dispatches from Manila.

Exhibit No. 7 is from top secret exhibit "B," plus those two that we refer to as having been intercepted at San Francisco; and then my Exhibit No. 8 is a series of the intercepts that I got in Great Britain which covered the period of time immediately before 7 December 1941 and contains some intercepts similar to those that we had picked up.

The Vice Chairman. Does that complete your presentation of the documents you secured at Hawaii?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Do counsel have any questions now?

Mr. Richardson. No. I was just going to suggest that it might be feasible to regard the Colonel's testimony in the same way in which you regarded the written statements which were offered by certain witnesses, evidence that then would be open to examination, exactly the same as you carried on the examination before by members of the committee. That would make his appearance here and the evidence that he has given appear on the record in the same general way that other witness' testimony has appeared.

The Vice Chairman. All right. Well, as I recall now, the committee had questioned him some, had begun the examination of Colonel Clausen yesterday. I asked some questions and Senator George then asked some and Mr. Clark did not have any. Then Senator Lucas was recognized and was questioning the Colonel at the time he and Senator Ferguson made the request for what we received here today.

Senator Ferguson. And he has been answering all day the one question.

The Vice Chairman. He has been answering all day Senator Lucas' request, which was joined in by Senator Ferguson, so technically Senator Lucas still is recognized.

Senator Lucas. Well, I think I will pass in view of the fact that it has taken him all day to answer that one question.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania.

Mr. Murphy. Colonel Clausen, did you have here the Summary of Far Eastern documents?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. It was our top secret exhibit "A" before the Grunert Board.

Mr. Murphy. The committee has two copies furnished to it, one copy of which has been in Senator Ferguson's possession since November or October and one in Mr. Gearhart's possession since November and I would like to take a look at it. Do you have it in any exhibit where I can take a look at it?

Colonel Clausen. It should be readily available here.

Mr. Murphy. If you have it I would like to see it. I have no other questions.
[11739] Colonel Clausen. I just haven't seen it here, Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. I want to see it for the first time.
The Vice Chairman. Are you through now?
Mr. Murphy. Yes, I am through.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Brewster being absent, Mr. Gearhart will inquire at this time. Well, Mr. Gearhart is absent.

Mr. Murphy. I am looking for the Summary of Far Eastern documents prepared by one Moses Pettigrew and from a glance on Colonel Bratton's testimony he does not seem to have any familiarity with the facts in the record and I would like to see it. I don't know why it has not come in. There have been two copies furnished. Two members of the committee have had it all the time and now we are going to get to it definitely, so I ask now is there a copy of it that I can examine?

Senator Ferguson. I don't know that I have it.

Mr. Murphy. You have had it since October 25th and Mr. Gearhart has since November 17th.

Senator Ferguson. Well, it has been mislaid in my office then.

Mr. Murphy. I am not making any insinuations or anything. I am trying to get it. If we are going to read it we ought to reach it sooner or later.

[11800] Senator Ferguson. Summary of Far Eastern Documents?

Mr. Murphy. Yes. You never went into that, did you, the Summary of Far Eastern Documents? It was not prepared until 1943.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir, it was introduced as an exhibit before the Gurnett Board.

Mr. Murphy. But you did not file it and have it as an exhibit here so that I can look at it?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir, I did not.

Mr. Murphy. I have no other questions.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson of Michigan.

Senator Ferguson. Are you familiar with Exhibit 63?

Colonel Clausen. Your Exhibit 63?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Colonel Clausen. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Would you show it to him? It is on page 48, top secret. It is "Unexplored leads" and it is signed by Myron C. Cramer. I will read it to you:

In the course of my examination of the Report and record certain further inquiries have suggested themselves to me which, in my opinion, might advantageously be pursued. The answers to these inquiries would not, in all probability, in my opinion, affect the result; at the same time in order to complete the picture and in fair-ness to certain personnel these leads should be further explored. I do not mean to suggest that the Board should be reconvened for this purpose; the work could be done by an individual officer familiar with the matter.

That is signed by Myron C. Cramer. You have the document?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir, I have it before me now, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Whose language is that? Who drew that up?

Colonel Clausen. Well, that is signed by General Cramer, so it is assumed to be his language.

Senator Ferguson. Well, you know that in the Army they don't always do the work, the General that signs the order does not do the work.

Colonel Clausen. Well, I really cannot say offhand, Senator, whose
work it is. I know that there were various assistants to General Cramer in the preparation of the document.

Senator Ferguson. Did you help prepare this with Hughes?

Colonel Clausen. Well, Hughes, myself, Colonel—I mean Captain Ford, there was a Captain Eble and I suppose Major Burkhart. I just don’t know all who worked on it.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Colonel Clausen. I know that my contribution, Senator to the cause of—I mean of assisting the Judge Advocate General was in light of my experience in finding papers and documents, and so forth, and conferring for that purpose.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I want to get those words;

And in fairness to certain personnel these leads should be further explored.

Who were the personnel that in fairness to them certain leads should be explored?

Colonel Clausen. Senator, I really could not say. I mean I wouldn’t say that because I wouldn’t know who General Cramer would have in mind.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, here: General Cramer—that is not General Cramer’s words. Isn’t that what you say? This was prepared by other men and you had been one of them.

Colonel Clausen. No, I didn’t say that. This was prepared by General Cramer and he has other assistants.

Senator Ferguson. Well, this was given to you as an aid to ascertain certain facts, isn’t that true?

Colonel Clausen. You mean the—

Senator Ferguson. The document.

Colonel Clausen. The document itself, Senator, the document itself I had knowledge of and I have a copy of it in my report as an exhibit.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. You would not start out on an investigation when you were given an order such as this, “Unexplored leads” and “in fairness to certain personnel these leads should be explored” without knowing who the personnel were, would you?

Colonel Clausen. Well, by reading the document through, Senator, and having in mind those involved in this catastrophe and especially as I recall this document, I believe he took to task people like General Gerow and people of that kind, I would read the document and find out exactly what was in the document.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, Colonel, you were assistant recorder and someone was not satisfied with the Board’s report where you were an assistant on, isn’t that correct?

Colonel Clausen. The answer is that more investigation was certainly required by the situation.

Senator Ferguson. Wait. Somebody was not satisfied, somebody at the top was not satisfied with the investigation that was made by a Board of which you were a member in the capacity as an assistant recorder.

Colonel Clausen. Not satisfied implies something that might be misconstrued, Senator. You might be not satisfied with the result of a board, you might not be satisfied with the conclusions of the board. It might be the essence of the conclusions that would be unsat-
isfactory. I might read an [11804] opinion of the Supreme Court and be dissatisfied with it because it might find against my client, but that might be only one ground. Maybe I might be dissatisfied and thought the Judge rambled too much. Now, maybe—

Senator Ferguson. Your answer reminds me of a rambling answer on this question. Let me get back. Is it true that someone was dissatisfied for some reason with what the Board had done? Is that a clear question?

Colonel Clausen. Well, you ask such a broad question. General Grunert, who was a member of the Board, was not dissatisfied with myself as assistant recorder.

Senator Ferguson. I understand.

Colonel Clausen. You ask these broad questions, Senator, that it is hard to answer specifically. Now, I don't know just what you mean. When I testified yesterday I tried to point out that the Secretary of War felt there should be an additional investigation conducted. Now, if you mean by "dissatisfied" that he felt that the leads given by Captain Safford to Admiral Hart should be pursued, that these magic phases should be gone into and that some of the additional things that I have mentioned, such as, query, did the 5 December 1941 message from the G-2 War Department get to Hawaii, why, yes, that is a type of dissatisfaction.

Senator Ferguson. All right. But here was the Secretary [11805] of War who had a report of three Generals. You were the assistant recorder on that Board.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. They made a report, this Board did. You interviewed witnesses before they went into the chamber to testify, isn't that true?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever talk to the witnesses?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever interview any of them before they testified?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. I handled—Senator, on the Grunert Board my major activity was preparing for and interviewing and questioning those concerned with the allegations against Theodore Wyman, Jr., having to do with the House Committee report of 14 June 1944, which charged a connection between derelictions of Colonel Wyman and the Pearl Harbor disaster.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever re-investigate the Wyman report?

Colonel Clausen. I did also conduct an additional investigation with respect to some of the witnesses concerning Colonel Wyman.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, do I understand then that [11806] you did not have anything to do with the investigation of the Grunert Board except as to the Wyman end of it?

Colonel Clausen. Absolutely not, that is not what I said. I said my major functions on the Grunert Board. Now, Senator, certainly by "major functions" I do not mean to say that all my functions were. I had many requests made to me by the Generals of the Board. I sat next to General Frank. I on many occasions prepared questions for them to ask.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, will you tell me what the duties of an assistant recorder is in a Board such as you were serving on?

Colonel Clausen. Ours was a rather special Board, Senator, and I wondered myself. We did what we did and what we did were our duties.

Senator Ferguson. Well, that is a very, very definite and clear answer. That, I know, gives the committee a lot of information. Let us go back a little. You were a lawyer. You were sent down on the Board because you were a lawyer.

Colonel Clausen. Senator, why I was put on the Board I don't know but by being put on I am here today. Now, why was I put on I think probably was because somebody, including President Truman and Hugh Fulton, thought that I did a good job on the Cincinnati prosecutions and because I did that they put me on the Hawaiian assignment, on the Colonel Wyman [11807] case and then somebody thought that since the Colonel Wyman case was of grave import that that should be handled by the Grunert Board and since Clausen had been asked to do something on the Colonel Wyman case, I am selected to be assistant recorder of the Grunert Board and am called again today here.

Senator Ferguson. All right. That is as near as you can get as to why you were on the Grunert Board, but you did interview the various witnesses on occasions before they went in to testify before the Grunert Board?

Colonel Clausen. Well, I don't know what witnesses you have reference to.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you interview any of them?

Colonel Clausen. Before they went before the Board, as I said, I have interviewed some. I remember I interviewed General Reybold, for example.

Senator Ferguson. Now, this Board didn't do a satisfactory job of which you were assistant recorder.

Colonel Clausen. I think the Board did a very fine job myself if you are asking me my opinion of what it did. I think it did a fine job, and I think not only a fine job but I thing a most courageous job.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, why did you have to go out as an assistant recorder afterwards and spend many days?

[11808] Colonel Clausen. Well, I don't know, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Well, many many days. You interviewed how many witnesses?

Colonel Clausen. I interviewed about a hundred witnesses.

Senator Ferguson. Now, coming back, you had as one of your directives unexplored leads, "In fairness to certain personnel these leads should be further explored." Your senior officer, General Cramer, had signed a document that you were to use as carrying out your duties and that was one of them. I am just trying to find out who these people were.

Colonel Clausen. Well, Senator, I would like to answer your question but I cannot say that when General Cramer signs a document that it is or that he means to say more than what it says. I cannot put in his words about something he signed.
Senator Ferguson. Well, then, you don’t know who in fairness to you were to go out and get certain affidavits?

Colonel Clausen. I can let my imagination run and I can guess.

Senator Ferguson. I don’t want you to guess. You were the man doing the job and I wonder whether or not you had any information from which you could draw the conclusion that some injustice had been done to someone because there are those words, “In fairness to certain personnel these leads should be further explored.”

[11809] Colonel Clausen. Well——

Senator Lucas. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Now, just a moment. I would like to have him answer that one question.

Senator Lucas. I want to help if I can.

Colonel Clausen. Well, you are trying to get me to say, Senator——

Senator Ferguson. No, I am not trying to get you to say anything except to answer.

Colonel Clausen. I want to finish what you are trying to get me to say. Senator, you are trying to get me to say who General Cramer had in his mind when he signed the document and I am telling you I cannot answer your question more specifically than to say it means what it says. There is no ambiguity in it to me.

Senator Lucas. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Then there were no names ever mentioned by anyone and you had no specific people in mind under that command, is that correct?

Colonel Clausen. There were names mentioned in the document to which you refer, there were names mentioned in the press, there were names mentioned in the Roberts report and there were names in many sources as to people involved in the Pearl Harbor disaster. Now, query: When you have in the [11810] last week of a Board’s proceedings a situation where we start back ends first—now, you know, Senator, from what you know now of magic, that if you were going to start this thing from what you know now, and suppose you had gone on up to this point today knowing nothing about magic, and you now know about magic, what would you think? Why, the most important place to start would be on the magic.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Then under that view I am wondering what your conversation was with the Secretary of War, why he did not extend the time of this very able Board that you are talking about, who had all the knowledge that they had at that time, instead of having a major or a colonel do this job, why he did not have the three generals—there were three, were there not?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Why he didn’t have the three generals do this very important job instead of having the assistant recorder go out and do it?

Colonel Clausen. Well, I can only apologize for being a major. I don’t know. I am a major. If they wanted to pin a star on my shoulder I would have been satisfied, it would have been all right with me, Senator, but I was a major and I have to apologize for being my age. I mean I can’t help that. Now, you ask why they did not go out. All right. General [11811] Frank——

Senator Ferguson. I asked for your conversation with the Secretary of War.
Colonel Clausen. Well, do you want me to answer you?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
The Vice Chairman. Let him answer, Senator.
Colonel Clausen. General Frank had been given an important assignment by General Arnold. If you want I will tell you what it is; I know. Colonel Toulmin was on the Board and he was being let out of the Army at his request. Colonel West, who was the recorder, was professor of law at West Point and the general at West Point was clamoring and hollering for him to come back. This was taking him away from his school. General Grunert was the commanding general of the Eastern Defense Command and we are in war. So, naturally, he would go back there.

I do not delude myself. They selected me, of course, because I was the fellow they could spare the most.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, was that your conversation with the Secretary of War? That was my question.
Colonel Clausen. No, sir. The Secretary of War, as I understand, by his personal choice, by recommendations, no doubt, of which I know nothing, selected myself.
The Vice Chairman. It is now 5 o'clock.
[11812] Senator Ferguson. I am not through.
The Vice Chairman. We will recess until eight o'clock this evening.
(Whereupon, at 5:05 p.m., a recess was taken until 8 p.m. of the same day.)

[11813]

EVENING SESSION—S P. M.

The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order.
Does counsel have anything at this time?
Mr. Richardson. I think Mr. Masten has something.
Mr. Masten. Mr. Chairman, we would like to offer as Exhibit 151, the collection of memoranda that Captain Safford left with us for duplication in accordance with the request of the committee.
The Vice Chairman. What is the number?
Mr. Masten. 151.
The Vice Chairman. It will be received as Exhibit 151.
(The memoranda referred to was marked “Exhibit No. 151.”)
The Vice Chairman. Anything further?
Mr. Richardson. That is all.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson of Michigan will continue his inquiry.

TESTIMONY OF HENRY C. CLAUSEN (Resumed)

Senator Ferguson. Colonel Clausen, when you were conducting your examination, did you confer with the Hewitt investigators?
Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.
[11814] Senator Ferguson. And who worked with you as far as the Hewitt investigation was concerned?
Colonel Clausen. Well, all I did in that regard, sir, was on one occasion I met and talked with Admiral Hewitt and on several occasions met and talked with the commander who I see in the room here from time to time, John Ford Baecher.
Senator Ferguson. Was he in Navy uniform at that time?
Colonel Clausen. Commander Baecher?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Colonel Clausen. Yes. He was then Lieutenant Baecher. And I met and conferred with then Lt. Comdr. John Sonnett, later a civilian, and now the Assistant Attorney General of the United States.
Senator Ferguson. What was Lieutenant Baecher doing for the Hewitt committee?
Colonel Clausen. Well, I don’t know what he was going for Admiral Hewitt, Senator, but for me he dug out several references. I returned from Europe and from Hawaii, and on those two occasions I wanted to find out what some of these Navy men had testified concerning the winds code, et cetera. So I examined some of the testimony before Admiral Hewitt, and also had discussions with these people concerning the witnesses in whom I was interested.

[11816] Senator Ferguson. What was it that made the winds code an outstanding matter?
Colonel Clausen. To my mind, it was important. I don’t mean to answer your question and have you think that by you saying it was outstanding that I agree it was outstanding. To me it was an important link in the chain of circumstances pointing to what happened before Pearl Harbor. But I always assumed from the wording of the set-up where it said in there that it was to be used in the event that there were no regular channels of communication, and since there were regular channels of communication and those channels were used, to me it was not the outstanding piece, but it was important to me in this way, that if you had an implement message to that before Pearl Harbor obviously it would mean just what the implement said.
Senator Ferguson. The reason I asked about its importance is that I notice in your affidavits you probably spent more time on the winds code as far as volume is concerned than any one other item.
Colonel Clausen. I don’t think so, Senator.
Senator Ferguson. What was the other big item?
Colonel Clausen. What was the other big item?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Colonel Clausen. Let me have my report, please.

[11816] Senator Ferguson. You cannot give it from memory?
Colonel Clausen. I can give you a lot of things from memory, Senator, and I have given some.
Senator Ferguson. I will ask you about the pilot message. What did you spend on the pilot message? What time and who did you get affidavits from?
Colonel Clausen. I never used the term “pilot message.”
Senator Ferguson. It is the message that said that there would be an answer to the 26th of November message of Secretary Hull, and that there would be a time of delivery of that message.
Colonel Clausen. That was one of those in top secret exhibit B?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Colonel Clausen. Well, I can’t segregate my mind at that time, Senator.

Colonel Clausen. I was on the point of saying, Senator, that I cannot at this time disentangle from a mass of material that was in my
mind as important leads, one, and say that that was the important piece. That was one of many in top secret exhibit B, and General Russell had collected those from G-2 and brought them to the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Senator Ferguson. Will you look at this particular message.

Colonel Clausen. Surely.

Senator Ferguson. I will talk with you about that. I want to ask you what you did in relation to finding out when that came in and when that was delivered.

Colonel Clausen. Page 238?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; the bottom of the page, message 901.

Colonel Clausen. Well, I took all the messages, Senator, and asked Colonel Rowlett to run those things down for me, and he made a compilation, which I referred to this morning, as to all those messages.

Senator Ferguson. Well, have you anything in your report in relation to this pilot message?

Colonel Clausen. My report refers to top secret exhibit B, and so what I did was to include that when I [11818] handed top secret exhibit B to the various people whom I interviewed, and this was in there, it was there.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you try to ascertain when it was delivered?

Colonel Clausen. When it was delivered to the various people?

Senator Ferguson. Yes; the recipients, the White House, the Secretary of War, and so forth.

Colonel Clausen. They all fell into a certain pattern with me, Senator. In other words, I tried to run down each of those. I think everyone in the top secret exhibit B was an important message, or else General Russell wouldn't have selected them. The most important to me in that whole batch was the one that set up Pearl Harbor, carved it into sections, and asked that the consulate at Honolulu report regarding the ships, because I didn't see anything like that regarding any of the other ports.

Senator Ferguson. That is Exhibit 2, page 12.

Colonel Clausen. If you say it is—I don't know.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever see the flag, the gist?

Colonel Clausen. The flag or a gist?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Do you know what I am talking about?

Colonel Clausen. Is that in my top secret exhibit B?

[11819] Senator Ferguson. No. You said this was a very important message, this one laying out the duck pond.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, to me it was, and General Willoughby said that one like that definitely would indicate target areas for an attack. He called it an attack target.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, did you ever try to find out what attention was paid to that particular instrument?

Colonel Clausen. I surely did, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Just a few days ago we developed here for the first time that there had been a gist which went with this. A flag, in other words, so that no one would miss it when it was delivered. It was the top one that was flagged.

Colonel Clausen. That is the first time, Senator. I heard of that.

Senator Ferguson. Have you got the flag, counsel?
Colonel Clausen. Show me one of these flags. I will be glad to see if I know about it.

Senator Ferguson. I will try and find one.

Now, did you try to find out what attention had been paid to that Exhibit 2, page 12? That is the duckpond chart.

Colonel Clausen. If you don't mind, Senator, I will get the actual document, so that I can tell what we are talking about.


Colonel Clausen. Yes, I did. And some of the people whom I interviewed, people like General Gerow, General Miles, said that since this pertained—I am quoting from memory in answer to your question and, of course, if I misstate something it is because I am doing that, and recourse to the affidavits would show the actual wording used—but the substance of what they told me was that since this pertained primarily to the Navy that they assumed it was primarily a Navy matter, and since they knew that this was going to the Navy that they assumed that the Navy would take the proper cognizance of the message.

I might state further that some people did not recollect getting that message.

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it now, and as you understood it, did you not, the Army's job was to defend Pearl Harbor? In other words, if there were ships in this duckpond that had been located it was the Army's job to defend them in there. Did you understand that?

Colonel Clausen. Well, now, Senator, I mean, a quick curbstone answer to your question is that the Army's mission in Oahu was defend the Navy. That is the gist of the Army's mission. But, obviously you know how these military things are, the Army and Navy have things written down, and the Army mission was stated somewhere explicitly, just like General Short's mission was to do certain things, and his mission is stated.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I want to go back to that sentence in the Kramer memorandum, General Kramer's memorandum, in order to complete the picture, in fairness to certain personnel, these leads should be explored.

You indicated in one of your answers that certain names got into the newspapers somewhere.

Colonel Clausen. Into the newspapers?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Do you remember, in your answer?

Colonel Clausen. I don't remember, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. About 5 o'clock this afternoon.

Colonel Clausen. I say there were involved in the disaster many people in Hawaii and in Washington, and the people who were involved, their names got into the newspapers, obviously.

Senator Ferguson. What did you have in mind about the names that were in the paper, I didn't follow up at that moment, but you indicated that this personnel that you were talking about were people whose names had been connected in some way with the disaster at Pearl Harbor. Don't you recall that?

[11822] Colonel Clausen. A great many people from time to time have been mentioned in the newspapers connected with the Pearl Harbor disaster and I said I can't single out any name that General Kramer may have had in mind.
[11823] Senator Ferguson. Well, then, you cannot after thinking it over over the dinner hour—
Colonel Clausen. I did not think it over during the dinner hour, no, sir, Senator. I went home and took a rest.
Senator Ferguson. Now, I want to read this flag to you. The gist of this message is—he called it a gist.
Colonel Clausen. Where is that, Senator?
Senator Ferguson. It is on page 11207 of yesterday's testimony.
Colonel Clausen. Of my testimony?
Senator Ferguson. No, of Monday's testimony. That is right, you were here yesterday. Here is what is on the flag. It is really a sheet of paper attached to this message on page 12 of Exhibit 2. [Reading:]

Tokyo directs special reports on the ships in Pearl Harbor, which is divided into five areas for the purpose of showing exact location.

That is a pretty good description of that exhibit, isn't it?
Colonel Clausen. Well, senator, it speaks for itself.
Senator Ferguson. Yes, but isn't it?
Colonel Clausen. Let me say this. You are speaking now—I see what you mean. You are speaking of testimony given by a Navy—

[11824] Senator Ferguson. No, no. This was a flag attached to Exhibit 2, page 12. Look at the page.
Colonel Clausen. Yes, but the mistake you are making, Senator is this: You are speaking of something, as I understand it now, that was testified by a Navy man. Correct?
Senator Ferguson. Well, yes, it is correct but it was attached to this exhibit.

Colonel Clausen. I understand but, Senator, listen: The Army, as I understand it, did not do that and I am not investigating the Navy. The Army, as I understand it, took the magic material around in a certain way, in the raw, unevaluated, because that stuff is right out of the horse’s mouth; you don’t have to evaluate it.

Senator Ferguson. Will you tell me how this could be investigated and only investigate the Army?
Colonel Clausen. Well, Senator—

Senator Ferguson. Did you feel that it could be done? Weren't you handicapped?
Colonel Clausen. No, sir, because I will tell you, where the Army went into the Navy I had no trouble at all in getting my information. I did have trouble only in telling the Navy that I was entitled to see the magic stuff and I had the same trouble in the Army. Even when I had the high-powered authority that you people have seen here, where Secretary Stim— [11825] son told me that I could get top secret stuff, I was told there was stuff above top secret.

Senator Ferguson. All right, what was that?
Colonel Clausen. Well, that was the superduper magic and before I could ever get to see that stuff I had, according to the order of General Bissell, the head of G-2, to go in and to be, what he called, given the works by General Clarke and that giving the works meant that I had to go in and repeat all the dire things that would happen and be told that my head would roll if this stuff got into the hands of the enemy and then have to swear, take an oath that I would not reveal this to a single solitary person, and after I took that I remarked to
General Bissell that it is easy for me to see that no matter who asked these people concerning magic they could not tell it unless it was released.

Senator Ferguson. So that is the reason, because you had that much trouble, you call it the super-duper magic?

Colonel Clausen. Senator, you know our military successes in a large part in many parts of the world were brought about through that magic material. The Japs just kept using it and using it and using it and chattering like monkeys about things going on in Germany, so if you wanted to find out what was happening in Germany you listened to the Japanese Ambassador talking to Tokyo.

[11826] Senator Ferguson. Now I want to ask you again: After you found these various things that you now say conflicted with General Short's testimony you did not go to General Short and get an affidavit from him. I want to know just why?

Colonel Clausen. Senator, you asked me the same question.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, and I did not get what I thought was an answer.

Colonel Clausen. And I said I did not get an affidavit from General Short, that is correct.

Senator Ferguson. You got one from General Marshall?

Colonel Clausen. There is no argument, Senator. Yes, sir; I got it.

Senator Ferguson. You got one from General MacArthur?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir, but you see, Senator, General Short was interrogated by the Grunert Board. Now, here is a very important thing: General Short was interrogated by the Grunert Board after the Grunert Board got the magic.

Senator Ferguson. Wasn't General Marshall?

Colonel Clausen. After?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then why did you get an affidavit from Marshall?

Colonel Clausen. For the simple reason that I had these points to be covered that are in his affidavit.

Senator Ferguson. Well, aren't there points here that you wanted to find out about from Short? One of the questions you were to ask him was whether or not he knew about the joint agreement.

Colonel Clausen. Joint agreement?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Colonel Clausen. Well, I found out it was in all the G-2 stuff over in his command, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. What was it?

Colonel Clausen. Well, they had the ABCD bloc in their G-2 estimates. You didn't have to know more than that to know that if your G-2 knew, Senator—says that a certain thing is going to happen next to the ABCD bloc, whatever it might be.

Senator Ferguson. Well, you tell me then what the ABCD bloc was?

Colonel Clausen. The ABCD bloc, as I understand it, was what I said it was yesterday in my own conception but I have never seen more than what I said yesterday I saw, Senator.
Senator Ferguson. Well, did you ever find out whether Short—did you ever go to Short to get an affidavit as to whether or not he ever saw it?

Colonel Clausen. No. As I said, Senator, I did not get an affidavit from General Short.

Senator Ferguson. And that is your only reply, the only thing that you have in mind now, that you did not go to Short at that time?

Colonel Clausen. Well, my other answer would be that I would assume it would not be necessary.

Senator Ferguson. Can you tell me why the Board did not go into magic?

Colonel Clausen. You mean the Pearl Harbor Board?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Colonel Clausen. Because it did not know about it.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, just a moment. I will read you from the first hearing, where General Marshall met with the Board off the record and discussed magic with them.

Colonel Clausen. Well, sir, he gave them the general picture that there was magic, as I understand that testimony. In other words, here is what happened. The three general officers were asked by General Marshall to confer with him and everybody else went out of the room and then the three general officers must have talked there for over half an hour and then we continued with the hearing.

Now, as I understand that situation he told them about magic, what magic was and did not go into the full details and that it was not until we found it out from the Hart report in the latter week about of the Board’s hearings that we knew the details of magic.

Senator Ferguson. When did you first learn about magic?

Colonel Clausen. When we knew about it in the last week. I had no idea that such a thing existed until the thing came out with Colonel Bratton and General Marshall in the last week of the Board’s proceedings and at that time as I remember General Marshall was saying Colonel Bratton was here and that we could interrogate Colonel Bratton concerning the subject and that, I believe, was in the last week, it was about the last week, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. So the Army kept from the Board any reference to magic until the last week of the hearing. That being true didn’t it—

Colonel Clausen. I did not know it, Senator, until the last week.

Senator Ferguson. All right. That being true didn’t it destroy all of your previous testimony because you did not have the one thing that opened the door to much of your testimony and that was magic?

Colonel Clausen. I think, sir, that you are essentially correct in what you say and that it was a very integral part of this whole picture and should have been pursued.

Senator Ferguson. But didn’t it destroy your work because you did not have magic and did not go into it as you say?

Colonel Clausen. Well, no; it did not destroy my work. My work was assistant recorder of the board and the work I did later on was for the same source. In other words, Senator, you have to go back to your Public, 339. You told Stimson to investigate—first you extended the statute of limitations. The law even is entitled to extend the
statute of limitations. Then you have one paragraph known as the extension.

Then your second paragraph is to ask Colonel Stimson and Mr. Forrestal to conduct several investigations. In other words, each department conduct its own and that is the reason you should not put an invidious implication upon my not going into the Army, or the Navy going into the Army, because you put in there the word "several." Now, it would have been better, I think, if you had it all amalgamated and called everybody up and had sort of an adversary proceeding, but that law says "several."

Senator Ferguson. All right, but with that picture and the Army working with the Navy in the intelligence, going from one to the other, was it not necessary that you go into both to solve the problem?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir; because the thing that Colonel [11831] Stimson had in mind was to comply with your Public, 339, and he could not court martial Kimmel, he doesn't have any jurisdiction over Kimmel to court martial Kimmel.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever see the diary of the Secretary of War?

Colonel Clausen. He read excerpts, Senator, into the record before General Grunert's board.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; but I am asking you did you ever read it?

Colonel Clausen. You mean to—

Senator Ferguson. When you made your investigation did you ever look into his diary?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Why not?

Colonel Clausen. Well, you mean I should investigate the investigator? That would be like the grand jury investigating the grand jury. You told him to do the job. If you wanted somebody else to investigate Stimson you should have said so in the law.

Senator Ferguson. Stimson was Secretary of War?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And if he had anything relevant to the issue and the issue was how did this Pearl Harbor catastrophe happen, wasn't it material to the issue and why [11832] should you not have looked into it?

Colonel Clausen. There is a very pertinent question, Senator, on the face of it, but if you get down to the essence of your question it is this: He would know what was in his diary since he wrote it.

Senator Ferguson. And that is the reason that you did not look into it so you would have a complete record?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir; because he would know, since he was doing the investigating and I was just his assistant, like one of your FBI boys would be to J. Edgar Hoover.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand this then, that Colonel Stimson was doing the investigating and you were only one of his assistants?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir; he was complying with your Public, 339, and you did not say in there how he should do it. You did not say there that he should not take affidavits or that he should take affidavits.

Senator Ferguson. No.
Colonel Clausen. You did not say that he should appoint a board or not appoint a board and if you wanted him to have three high-ranking generals on a board you should have said so.

Senator Ferguson. But no one would expect that he would start out with an investigation by three generals and then in the middle of their investigation he would switch to the assistant recorder of that board to complete the investigation.

Colonel Clausen. Senator, you are misconceiving, sir, because the Board finished its job. They were glad to be gone. They were gone and they were finished and they made their report and then came the question of pursuing these additional leads and it would have been all right with Henery C. Clausen if he had picked somebody else.

Senator Ferguson. Now, you say that you did not know about magic early in the hearings.

Colonel Clausen. That is right, sir.

Senator Ferguson. When did you first learn about the 13 parts of the message?

Colonel Clausen. Until the last week of the Board’s proceedings. As a matter of fact, Senator—

Senator Ferguson. You had not even heard up until that time about the 13 parts of the 14-part message?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir; I had not heard of it. and our Board, incidentally, Senator, was so afraid to touch it that it delegated General Russell as custodian of the material and he alone had the combination to the safe in which this was kept and even the recorder and the assistant recorder were not given those documents to handle because it was such a vital and integral part of the intelligence for the war then being prosecuted.

Senator Ferguson. When did you first learn in the Board about the code destruction?

Colonel Clausen. Well, in that same—

Senator Ferguson. In that same period?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And not until that time?

Colonel Clausen. The whole general subject of magic, Senator, was brought up in the last week, about the last week of the hearings of the Board.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever read the Roberts’ testimony?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And how did you account for the report of the Roberts commission on page 12 [reading]:

The United States being at peace with Japan, restrictions imposed prevented resort to certain methods of obtaining the content of messages transmitted by telephone or radio telegraph over the commercial lines operating between Oahu and Japan.

Colonel Clausen. What page is that?

Senator Ferguson. That is page 12. and you say today the Navy were tapping wires for—what was it—22 months?

Colonel Clausen. Twenty-two months is what I read; yes.

Senator Ferguson. Well, how do you account for this in the Roberts report?
Colonel Clausen. They should have corrected that, shouldn't they?

Senator Ferguson. Well, you told us the Navy was tapping wires for 22 months?

Colonel Clausen. Yes. It should be corrected—the Roberts report.

I went out and found this out.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. And there wasn't any doubt in your mind that that was a fact that they were?

Colonel Clausen. My heavens, no.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know in that report that they mention the code destruction, on the bottom of page 8?

Colonel Clausen. You mean in the Roberts?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Colonel Clausen. We were told—let me say another thing, Senator. We were told in this last week, after the people had revealed to us, that if you read this Roberts report carefully—I mean an astute intelligence officer read it—he might detect in a way that we had broken their codes but I certainly did not detect it and I went over the Roberts transcripts as well as the report and the exhibits.

I noticed at one place in the proceedings before the Roberts Board that the Justice asked, I think General Fielder [11836] or Mr. Shivers or Colonel Bicknell, about those three code propositions, I mean the three words, but if you knew there was magic then you might think that that was the winds code afterwards, I mean if somebody told you, but not before. I didn't think so.

Senator Ferguson. There wouldn't be any doubt that if you read it now you would know that he was talking about the wind-code message?

Colonel Clausen. No, I don't think so, Senator. Even if you knew it now you wouldn't know that, but it would tip you off maybe. I say if you were an astute intelligence officer that might open the door to the subject, but on reading the transcript, I mean as I read it, I do not associate in my own mind—and that might be wrong—what the witnesses call the winds code today.

Senator Ferguson. Well, on page 294 Colonel Fielder—

Colonel Clausen. Of what, sir?

Senator Ferguson. When he talking in the Roberts testimony said this about the burning of the codes—

Colonel Clausen. Burning?

Senator Ferguson. The burning of the papers, which you describe in his affidavit.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I am going to read what he said there:

[11857] It was suspicious.

The Chairman said:

Did you attach any significance to the fact that the consul was burning his papers at the time?

Colonel Fielder. It was suspicious but we burn secret papers every day in the world and we have a can out there that does nothing but burn secret papers. I discussed that, I think, with the FBI.

The Chairman. You are familiar with the fact that when a consul or diplomatic representative is about to make his get-away that the first sign is the burning of the consulate papers?

Colonel Fielder. Yes. We were quite suspicious of that.

The Chairman. Wasn't the department commander convinced by that fact that was imminent?

Colonel Fielder. No, sir, apparently not. We knew war was imminent, sir.
But the burning of the papers did not seem to impress Fielder at all, did it, from that testimony?

Colonel Clausen. Well, it means just what it says.

Senator Ferguson. Now, is that what he told you?

Colonel Clausen. No. Senator, that testimony should be considered in the light of all his testimony.

[11838] Senator Ferguson. All right.

Colonel Clausen. In other words, his testimony before the—well, before anyone whom he may have testified before.

Senator Ferguson. All right. I will read you the testimony of Fielder on the same question from page 2986 of the Army Board transcript, and Colonel Fielder says:

The information came to us that the consulate was burning papers and if I am not mistaken that came from sources other than the FBI. I think it came from the War Department but it also came from FBI sources and that was reported to the staff meeting and it was discussed but that in itself, while significant, was not in any way conclusive because there isn't a day goes by that we do not burn secret papers right out here, for instance, and it was quite possible that the Japs have been directed to burn up certain codes. In fact, we know now from the material that was captured at the consulate that they were destroying their codes and a lot of their files of messages at that time.

Colonel Clausen. Yes; but, Senator, it is very unfair to take the testimony of a man who has not been authorized to reveal magic information and say that he testified so and so before so and so.

Now, as I understand it, the then Colonel Fielder was not [11839] authorized when he testified before the Grunert Board to testify concerning magic, nor when he testified before Justice Roberts. Now, therefore, you have to be considerate and appreciate that fact.

[11840] Senator Ferguson. Then what you are telling us is this, that we should disregard, in effect, the testimony before the Army Board and before the Roberts commission because these people were not in a position to testify to the truth?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir; I do not say that at all. I say that with respect to certain subjects that you may cover, that if those subjects are such that they could not testify fully before the Boards, that you must make allowance for the fact that they were bound by oath not to reveal it to a soul.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you think the burning of the codes was such a matter that the man was not authorized to tell the truth about the burning of the codes?

Colonel Clausen. Senator, I never said that anybody did not tell the truth. I think every single person that testified anywhere concerning Pearl Harbor told the truth as he then saw it.

Now, you cannot say that when he is under oath not to reveal things, like General Miles, that he did not tell the truth. You cannot gag him with one hand and say, "Oh, you did not say that to the Board."

Senator Ferguson. What I am getting at, as I understand it, these men were sworn to tell the truth, the whole truth, [11841] and nothing but the truth, and at the same time they were sworn by someone superior to them, those people in the hearing, the three generals, to not tell about magic. Is that where we stand?
Colonel Clausen. I think that is pretty fairly set forth there in the affidavit of General Miles, because he mentions in there the instructions he had received.

Senator Ferguson. And those instructions, according to Miles, came from General Marshall?

Colonel Clausen. No; I understood him to say they came from General McNarney; didn't he?

Senator Ferguson. No; he does not say that.

Colonel Clausen. As I understood, he said later on they came from General McNarney. Not that the Chief of Staff would not back it up, you understand.

Senator Ferguson. When did you first learn about the message of the 27th to Short?

Colonel Clausen. You mean 27 November?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, 27 November.

Colonel Clausen. That, I believe was in the Roberts hearing exhibits, and I must have seen it there, Senator, and that would be about July 1944.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you know that after that, General Miles, on the 5th of December, 1941, after the sending [11842] of that message to Panama, General Miles sent a message on the 5th of December, 1941, in which he promised to give them a warning, "if and when there would be imminent danger of a breach of diplomatic relations with Japan."

Colonel Clausen. He promised to do what, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. "If and when there would be any imminent danger of a breach of diplomatic relations with Japan," he would give them a further warning.

Colonel Clausen. You mean General Miles sent that wire?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Colonel Clausen. When? on the 5th of December?

Senator Ferguson. On the 5th of December, 1941.

Colonel Clausen. I thought he sent that Rochefort message on that day.

[11843] Senator Ferguson. He also sent this message. I want to read what you took from General Miles in the affidavit:

Concerning the testimony I gave before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, 8 August 1944, as corrected by my letter, 18 August 1944. I wish to add that I avoided any statement concerning details of information and intelligence which I had derived from Top Secret sources then called "magic", or any indication that such sources existed. The reason I so limited my testimony was because prior to my appearance before the Board, Brigadier General Russell A. Osman and then Colonel Carter W. Clarke, of G-2, War Department, transmitted to me instructions from the Chief of Staff that I was not to disclose to the Army Pearl Harbor Board any facts concerning the radio intelligence mentioned, or the existence of that form of information or intelligence in the period preceding 7 December 1941. Accordingly, I obeyed that instruction.

Colonel Clausen. I remember that going in the affidavit.

Senator Ferguson. All right; now, was the Chief of Staff General Marshall or was it General McNarney?

Colonel Clausen. I seem to think, Senator, that it was General McNarney, especially for this reason: On the Grunert Board we dealt with the Assistant Chief of Staff, McNarney. That was the procedure of dealing with the [11844] Assistant Chief of Staff.
Senator Ferguson. Anyone reading that affidavit would certainly say that it was General Marshall; would he not?

Colonel Clausen. That is what General Miles said. I certainly was not going to tell General Miles to say anything different than what he had in his own mind.

Senator Ferguson. Miles told you it was Marshall?

Colonel Clausen. No; I did not say that.

Senator Ferguson. The Chief of Staff?

Colonel Clausen. Did not he say that the man said it was the Chief of Staff?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Colonel Clausen. All right; he did not say it was the Chief of Staff; he said the man said so.

Senator Ferguson. Well, in other words, he was telling you what someone told him?

Colonel Clausen. It just says so there. That is what it says.

Senator Ferguson. Will you look at this message of Miles? It is at the top of the page.

Colonel Clausen. That is to the Panama Canal.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Colonel Clausen. I thought you said it went to Hawaii.

Senator Ferguson. No, no; I said, to the Panama Canal.


Senator Ferguson. Does not that entirely conflict with the information that was sent out to Hawaii in the message of the 27th to General Short?

Colonel Clausen. Oh, you would not want my opinion on that now, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Why not?

Colonel Clausen. In the first place, I did not investigate the Panama Canal. In the second place, what other messages went to the Panama Canal? Do you think you can single out one message, out of a whole series of messages, and ask me for my opinion? Where are the rest?

Senator Ferguson. What I am trying to find out is what you knew about this warning message to Short. I thought you made an investigation of the situation.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I am wondering if we are investigating the investigator instead of Pearl Harbor? Justice Roberts resented being investigated, and now we are investigating the man who should not have been sent because he was only a major.

Senator Ferguson. I have not yielded. I want to say this: We should know, if we are going to receive as exhibits the testimony of the various people in these hearings, we should know what the people were authorized to swear to, and what they did swear to; and if we are going to receive affidavits and not have the men here to examine them so we may ascertain their full knowledge, after what we know about these facts, then we have a right to examine those persons who took the affidavits.

Now the record is clear, as far as I am concerned, on that.

How do you account for the fact that in MacArthur's affidavit, for instance, if these men drew up their own affidavit, that his name was misspelled?
Colonel Clausen. Senator, Andrew Jackson once was twitted for his poor spelling and he said:

It is a damned poor mind that cannot think of two ways of spelling a word.

Senator Ferguson. Is that a comment on General MacArthur?

Colonel Clausen. I probably made a mistake. I did make a mistake in spelling that distinguished man's name wrong. But, Senator, I had three long conferences with him, I sat down with him and the thing was gone over very carefully by the general, he wanted me to sit alongside of him, and he went over the thing. If he did not find his own name misspelled then surely don't blame me for doing it.

Senator Ferguson. I am getting at who drew up the affidavit.

[11847] Colonel Clausen. Who drew up the affidavit?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Colonel Clausen. That was drawn up, Senator, in this way: The thing was given me in longhand, I mean I took down the information in longhand and I wrote it up and presented it to him, and he made revisions in that, and that was the final draft.

Senator Ferguson. Now I want to go to the last sentence in his affidavit. First, before I go to that, I want to know whether or not you learned that Japanese scouting planes for a number of days prior to the attack on the Philippines had flown over the Philippines so that General MacArthur knew they were scouting these airfields in various places. Let me have that statement.

Colonel Clausen. You mean his airplanes had flown over the Philippines?

Senator Ferguson. No, no, the Japanese were photographing and scouting over Manila and the airfields on the Philippines prior to that.

Colonel Clausen. I did not hear that, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Did you talk to General MacArthur about it?

Colonel Clausen. Yes; I had about three long talks with him.

[11848] Senator Ferguson. Did he say that he got his alert warning from messages sent from here in Washington?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, especially that 27 November warning, which was the same as the one that went to Short.

Senator Ferguson. Is that what you were talking about here, Colonel, “complete information and advice for the purpose of alerting the Army Command in the Philippines on a war basis?”

Colonel Clausen. I meant the war dispatches, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Just that which he received from Washington, or what he received from Willoughby in G-2 there?

Colonel Clausen. Senator, I can answer your question this way: After he got through reading all the magic stuff that was in Washington, he volunteered that statement that he did have from the War Department dispatches ample and complete information to alert his command for war, and that he did alert it for war before 7 December, 1941.

[11849] Senator Ferguson. Now was that from what he received from his G-2 and from Washington?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Or solely from Washington?

Colonel Clausen. From Washington, Senator.
Senator Ferguson. Do you remember an instruction that you received from the Secretary of War that all of the witnesses were to turn over to you all memoranda and all papers and notes that the witnesses may have?

Colonel Clausen. No; he never gave me such instruction Senator. I made a recommendation to that effect, because I was worried, since I had been all over the world, whether any of these witnesses might have notes and papers and so forth connected with my work which might fall into the hands of the enemy, and in that way involve, or compromise the security.

Senator Ferguson Did not I find that somewhere in your report?

Colonel Clausen. You read, Senator, a recommendation. My instincts as a lawyer led me to want to give to everyone who made an affidavit before me, a copy of that affidavit, but since many of them pertained to magic, I thought the most advisable thing to do would be to collect in one place in the War Department, copies of all these documents, [11850] so if at any time they wanted to see the documents, or have copies, they could come to the War Department.

I thought, since I heard wild rumors here and there that somebody had collected something, had secreted something in a safe deposit box, and if you haven't the key to open that box, you haven't the whole secret of Pearl Harbor, I thought it would be good to have everything together.

You have one example of it when Captain Kramer testified. In other words, that instruction went out "If you have got anything with regard to Pearl Harbor you send it in, and we will have it in this depository of the War Department."

That was my recommendation, but the end of the war with the Japanese surrender made it unnecessary, because then the security was not involved.

Senator Ferguson. Here is the recommendation:

It is recommended for security reasons the Secretary of War direct all witnesses heretofore and hereafter examined by me to send or give me forthwith for filing of record in this investigation any copies of affidavits made before me, and any incidental and related notes, or papers, which may be in their possession or in their control, they to advise me that this has been done or that there are no such records, and they will be advised that these records are available [11851] in the War Department in the event access thereto is ever required.

Colonel Clausen. That was my recommendation.

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it that never was carried into effect?

Colonel Clausen. I went down and talked with Mr. Bundy, and he agreed with me, we agreed as lawyers that these men who had their careers in the Army should have copies of these documents. Then he said, "Take it up with General Clarke." So I went down to see General Carter Clarke and he said, "No."

Then I had the recommendation there in mind, but the whole thing became unnecessary when Japan collapsed.

Senator Ferguson. And as I understand it now, that was never put into effect?

Colonel Clausen. That is right.

Senator Ferguson. And you did not collect any papers or memos, and so forth?
Colonel Clausen. Well, I collected various documents and related papers.
Senator Ferguson. Well, did anybody have any memorandum as to what happened here on the 6th and 7th?
Colonel Clausen. Oh, numerous people; for example: General Miles had a memorandum from which he refreshed his [11852] memory, and General Bedell Smith had one.
Senator Ferguson. I have never seen the Bedell Smith one.
Now, what happened to that one?
Colonel Clausen. I do not know. He thought there was one which he had made. At one time, as I understand it, search had been made for it.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever find it?
Colonel Clausen. No; I could not find it. I went to the secretary to the General Staff when I got back from Frankfurt, and looked for it.
Senator Ferguson. He had some papers in a safe?
Colonel Clausen. In a safe deposit box?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Colonel Clausen. That was Colonel Sadtler.
Senator Ferguson. Colonel Sadtler told you that he had some in the safe deposit box?
Colonel Clausen. No; he did not have them in a safe deposit box. He had them home.
Senator Ferguson. Did you get them?
Colonel Clausen. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Where are they now? Do you know?
Colonel Clausen. I do not know.
Senator Ferguson. Does he still have the papers, as [11853] far as you know?
Colonel Clausen. I do not know.
Senator Ferguson. You did not collect them?
Colonel Clausen. No, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And he told you that he had some papers?
Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did he describe what was in those papers?
Colonel Clausen. He gave me information there in his affidavit to the effect that these papers did not add anything to it.
Senator Ferguson. But you did not ask him to see the papers?
Colonel Clausen. No, sir. A lot of these people, like Captain Safford, I remember he testified before the board and I got the impression from him that he had made collections of papers or recollections of people.
Senator Ferguson. Now, this is what I want to read to you and find out why you did not get this information from Willoughby, Sutherland, or General MacArthur:

During the period December 2 to December 6, for four consecutive nights an enemy aircraft was sighted over Clark Field at approximately 5:30 a.m. After the first sighting [11854] instructions were given to force the aircraft to land, or destroy it. On the three succeeding nights it was impossible to make the interception due to inability to see the aircraft in the dark, or the aircraft not getting close enough to be picked up by the searchlight.

On the fifth morning all the aircraft were kept on the ground and anti-aircraft alerted for the interception. However, no aircraft was located.

During the same period enemy aircraft were tracked over 11a by the radar set.
That is from December 2, 1941, to December 6, 1941, the narrative of the activities of the Twenty-fourth Pursuit Group in the Philippine Islands.

And here in Washington we have the joint board’s meeting, the minutes of the joint board’s meeting of November 26, 1941.

Weekly meeting of the Joint Board scheduled for November 26, 1941, was held in room 2008 Munitions Building, 11:35 a.m. Members present: Admiral Stark, General Marshall, Rear Admiral Ingersoll, General Bryden, General Arnold, Admiral Turner, General Gerow, Captain Ramsley, Colonel Scoby.

The Board next engaged in a discussion of the Pacific situation. The Navy had information that Japanese airplanes had been making reconnaissance and photographic flights over the United States Islands in the Western Pacific.

Then they took up the question of having our planes take photographs.

Now, what I read you from General MacArthur, that there was a plane over Clark Field from the 2d to the 6th, did he mention anything about that?

Colonel Clausen. I do not recall that he did, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Would not that have been a very significant point, that they were scouting over there, as far as alerting him?

How could he be unalerted and have that going on?

Colonel Clausen. You mean General MacArthur?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Colonel Clausen. He said he was fully alerted by the War Department.

Senator Ferguson. Would not this alone alert him?

Colonel Clausen. If you are alerted for war, you are alerted for war, whether you get a thousand alerts or not. If you are going to press a button, button No. 3 for Honolulu, you might have the impelling impulse from one of several messages. What difference does it make, Senator?

I cannot see it.

Senator Ferguson. He at least did not tell you about this scouting plane?

Colonel Clausen. I did not say that, Senator.

I said I do not recall that he did. I knew I was not investigating General MacArthur; I was not investigating the Philippine Islands, but I did know there was a great deal of Japanese activity, military activity in the Mandates, in the Philippines, all over. That is the reason, of course, why the basic mistake was made of thinking the Japs were going to strike in the south.

It is not a question of not knowing the Japs were going to strike, but where.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever make an examination as to just what equipment and facilities they had for decoding the various messages in the Philippines?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir; that is one of the things that I ran down; and you will find in the three affidavits I mentioned references to that.

Senator Ferguson. Will you give us the names of those affidavits now?

Colonel Clausen. MacArthur, Willoughby, and Sutherland said something about it, and did not Col. Joseph K. Evans?
Senator Ferguson. Have you any particular one? From these affidavits, what is you conclusion? That they had full facilities for getting magic of all kinds?

[11857] Colonel Clausen. From those affidavits I have a hazy curbstone opinion, certainly, that the Navy had a purple machine at Manila; that the Navy short-changed the Army at Manila, if you want to use the word "short-changed" to mean that they did not give everything to the Army.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Now, as I understand it, the claim was there in the Philippines that the Navy was short changing—and you and I understand what is meant by that word—the Army, as far as intelligence was concerned, prior to the attack?

Colonel Clausen. On this magic information?

Senator Ferguson. That is right.

Colonel Clausen. That is what General Willoughby says in his affidavit. He said it existed down to the time of the Philippine campaign; after the reconquest of the Philippines, and for that reason he wanted an integrated, one over-all agency to handle this stuff, so you did not in the future have one service monopolizing the information to the detriment of the other, and neither one may be knowing what the other is doing.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I think we had better get on the record a definition of this "short changing." It was holding out some of the magic?

Colonel Clausen. That is right. In other words, if I [11858] have a basket of magic here, and I am the Navy, and you are the Army over there, then I would pick these up and determine in my mind what would affect you.

Senator Ferguson. That is, you would give me what you wanted to give me?

Colonel Clausen. I would give you what I wanted to give you and obviously that would be wrong, because I, as a Navy man, would not know what the military implications may be to you.

Senator Ferguson. Did you find that that same thing took place here in Washington?

Colonel Clausen. In Washington, sir, I think there was far more cordial and freer exchange, but the same thing applies, Senator.

For the sake of the country it should be known that there was evidently some jealousy between the services, and this thing existed prior to Pearl Harbor.

Senator Ferguson. And it existed in Washington, Hawaii, and the Philippines?

Colonel Clausen. That is what I understand. In other words, what a ludicrous situation is presented if you have a fleet intelligence officer, Captain Layton, saying he gave information to Colonel Raley but would not tell Colonel Raley where it came from! How would Colonel Raley know [11859] how to evaluate it?

Senator Ferguson. That is what I was going to get at for many days in this hearing here in Washington.

Colonel Clausen. If I can make one simple contribution to this case, and if anything came out of this hearing, it would be that you pursue the idea of having one agency and let that thing be coordinated on a
business basis, so you do not have monopolistic agencies trying to
hide the information for themselves.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Now, we found it in three places, Washington, Hawaii, and the
Philippines.

On that basis did you find any supervising head who was able in
any of the services to really evaluate the intelligence, so that it could
be used by the United States?

Colonel Clausen. Now, you hit the nail right on the head.

If one thing more should be done, it is this: You ought to train
people to look at this stuff and be able to read it.

Just like lawyers can pick up a case and find the pertinent part of
the case in a short time; you can do that by training people. You
cannot do it by going through normal communications, and so forth.

Have I found such a man? [11860] do not know.

I knew that in the Philippines there was a man by the name of
Shirer who was in charge and he was killed.

Senator Ferguson. I am talking about an over-all head that really
coordinated the various officers in the Philippines, the Hawaiian
Islands, and in Washington.

Colonel Clausen. Of course not. Then you would not have the
ludicrous situation of Admiral Turner saying that he thought Hawaii
was getting this stuff based on what Admiral Noyes told him. What a
silly thing that is! What kind of a set-up is that?

Senator Ferguson. That is what I am trying to find out here.

Colonel Clausen. I did not find any such thing, and I hope that
the future sees a different picture. Otherwise we are liable to have
Pearl Harbor all over again.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I have a summary here of interrogations
of Captain Takahashi on October 20, 1945, and if it was not for the
fact that we had some other evidence here on the same thing, I am
very loath to accept Jap information, but I will read it in, because
it is here in a summary, and there is other evidence to the same effect:

The primary mission of the Japanese Force in Formosa, composed of about
300 fighters and bombers, was the annihilation of the American Air Force in
the Philippines. In this [11861] it was successful partly because complete
information relative to the American Air Force was obtained by Aerial
Reconnaissance prior to commencement of hostilities.

Colonel Clausen. Speaking of the Philippines?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. So the Japanese themselves claimed they
had reconnaissance over the Philippines.

Colonel Clausen. I suppose they flew down from Formosa.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Now, I will give to the reporter the entire page that this is on, so
that he can copy the entire page. I will not undertake to read the
rest of it into the record.

(The matter referred to follows:)

[11862] INTERROGATION OF CAPTAIN TAKAHASHI ON 20 OCTOBER 1945

I. POSITIONS HELD BY CAPTAIN TAKAHASHI

May 1941—December 1942: On staff of Eleventh Air Fleet in Philippine Islands
and Dutch East Indies. This was the duty period on which Captain Takahashi was
questioned.
January 1943–June 1945: Senior member of Navy Aeronautical Bureau, Tokyo.  
July 1945–August 1945: Senior staff officer of Fifth Air Fleet and senior staff officer of Third Air Fleet.  
20 October 1945: Chief of Sendai Naval Personnel Bureau.

II. SUMMARY

* * * The primary mission of the Japanese Force in FORMOSA, composed of about 300 fighters and bombers, was the annihilation of the American Air Force in the PHILIPPINES. In this, it was successful partly because complete information relative to the American Air Force was obtained by Aerial Reconnaissance prior to commencement of hostilities.

"Q. What gave the Japanese impression that there were 900 planes in the area and how did you discover that there were 300 instead of 900?  
"A. The Navy received on 20 November 1941, a report [11863] from the Foreign Affairs Department that there were about 300 planes in the LUZON area. A photographic reconnaissance plane conducted a search on the 24th or 25th of November over that area and discovered that there were only 300 planes. One reconnaissance plane made flights at that time."

Senator Ferguson. As I understand, you left us with this idea this morning, that the best man you knew to give us the information as to what they could translate in Hawaii and what they could decrypt and so forth, as far as the Navy is concerned, was Commander Rochefort.

Colonel Clausen. Rochefort?
Senator Ferguson. Rochefort.
Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Is that correct?
Colonel Clausen. He was in charge of the unit there, and certainly a very keen man in that position.

Senator Ferguson. And you would not undertake to tell us what equipment they had there from the information you had?

Colonel Clausen. No, except I have in mind a talk with Captain Rochefort here, and then I went over there and talked with the men who worked in his department, [11864] like Commander Holtwick, and tried to find out that information. I especially wanted to find out this:

The type of equipment, the kinds of messages that they could decrypt, and just what could be done by the Navy at Hawaii that would give the impression in the minds of people like Admiral Turner, Colonel Pettigrew, Colonel Dusenbury, that Hawaii could decrypt this stuff.

Senator Ferguson. And you found no basis for Admiral Turner's so-called ideas that they could decrypt?

Colonel Clausen. Well, they could decrypt, but they did not have the purple machine. That is the key thing, as I understood. If you could decrypt this PA-K2, of course you could decrypt what the consul was sending out at Honolulu.

Senator Ferguson. Could they actually decode? Did they have the codes there?

Colonel Clausen. I am not sure about that, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. That is what I want to get at. If you are not sure we will try and get Rochefort.

Now, who in the Army out there would be the best witness in your opinion as to what they were able to decipher, and decode?

Colonel Clausen. I understood from my witnesses, the affidavits that we mentioned this morning, that the Army [11865] did
not have any facilities for doing that, that they were solely at the mercy of the Navy.

According to Colonel Fielder—I mean General Fielder—he says in his affidavit that he had asked the Navy for information and they would not give it to him, because he was with me when I went to Guam to talk with Captain Layton.

Senator Ferguson. Did you find any written orders in Hawaii that compelled the Navy to give to the Army all the intelligence that they had?

Colonel Clausen. No, Senator, I did not find any such written order in Hawaii. A lot of this stuff was done sub rosa. I mean the phone taps of the consul's office. Not only the consul, but they tapped the phone of the Jap steamship lines and the consul's home. That was all not supposed to be done, but it was done. When Roberts came out there—he was the man who wrote the opinion—he said "You will go to jail for a long, long time, if you do that."

Senator Ferguson. He did not know that was going on?

Colonel Clausen. Well, I guess he did not, but you will find in his proceedings off the record quotations, and what occurred at those times, I do not know.

[11866] Senator Ferguson. So you found nothing definite that the Navy had given in Hawaii all the information they obtained in intelligence to the Army?

Colonel Clausen. Well, as I size it up, the Navy was not doing it. In other words—well, it just comes down to that.

Senator Ferguson. It just comes down to the answer they were not doing it. And you said before there was some jealousy between the two services?

Colonel Clausen. No question about that, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. And you found it rather evident?

Colonel Clausen. I agree concerning that subject with General Willoughby. Here is a man fighting the war in the Philippines, mind you, when I was there, with guns booming, and he at that time is having this vexing problem of trying to get the information from the Navy then when the war was going on!

Senator Ferguson. How long after Pearl Harbor was it that Willoughby had this difficulty?

Colonel Clausen. The date of his affidavit there, 1945.

Senator Ferguson. That is May 8, 1945?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is all.

[11867] The Vice Chairman. Mr. Keefe from Wisconsin will inquire, Colonel.

Mr. Keefe. I have a couple of questions of Colonel Clausen.

Will you turn to the affidavit of Lieutenant Woodrum?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. I want to see if I understood correctly what you read when you read that affidavit.

Colonel Clausen. If you will pardon me just a moment, I will get the book. I guess you have the book.

Mr. Keefe. You perhaps can find it a little quicker than I can.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. That is the only copy the committee has now, as I understand it. You better let him have the copy.

Colonel Clausen. I have it, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Did you read that affidavit into the record?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Just let me see it.

Colonel Clausen. You want me to read it?

Mr. Keefe. No, not yet. Maybe I misunderstood when you were reading it. I just want to see it.

Colonel Clausen. I call your attention to the fact that the statement of Lt. Donald Woodrum, Jr., USNR., in the first sentence reads as follows:

Statement for proceedings supplementary to U. S. Army Pearl Harbor Board.

This statement has been prepared at the request of Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the U. S. Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Is that correct?

Colonel Clausen. No, that is an error, Mr. Keefe. The statement was prepared for me by the lieutenant, and I corrected it up here where I inserted the words, or told him to insert, "Supplementary to the Army Pearl Harbor Board". I should have had that put in that sentence, too.

Mr. Keefe. That is the trouble with this whole hearing, Colonel. At least I find a lot of difficulty with it. There is a statement in which the witness sets forth that it is prepared at your request, Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, for the United States Army Pearl Harbor Board. Did you represent to Lieutenant Woodrum at that time that you secured that statement that you were representing the Army Pearl Harbor Board?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir. I could not, Mr. Keefe, for the reason you will see the correction in the heading of this.

Mr. Keefe. I see the correction.

Colonel Clausen. "Proceeding supplementary."

Mr. Keefe. It says, "Statement for the U. S. Army Pearl Harbor Board", and somebody has written in "Statement of Proceedings Supplementary to the U. S. Army Pearl Harbor Board."

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Then follows the statement of Lieutenant Woodrum which clearly states that it is prepared at your request for the United States Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Colonel Clausen. Well, Mr. Keefe, the point is minor because the authorization for this man to talk to me was based upon a directive that came from the Secretary of the Navy to the Navy people out there that sufficiently told them that they were giving me this information and were to give it to me as conducting this inquiry for the Secretary of War.

Mr. Keefe. Well, of course, you may infer that, but the man who makes the statement says he is giving it to you.

Colonel Clausen. No, he has corrected it in the title, "Supplementary to the Board."

Mr. Keefe. Well: of course, I don't want to split hairs on that, the instrument speaks for itself.

Is there some place in this report of yours a receipt that you issued for certain documents?

Colonel Clausen. A receipt that I issued?
Mr. Keefe. Yes. Let me see if I can find it.
Colonel Clausen. I don't know what you mean, Mr. Keefe.
Mr. Keefe. I will see if I can find it.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Keefe, do you want us to go ahead? Perhaps some other member can inquire while you are looking for that.
Mr. Keefe. Are you in such a hurry?
The Vice Chairman. I don't know how long it will take you to look through that big book. I thought some other members might be asking questions to expedite the matter.
Mr. Keefe. I think you will admit that I haven't taken very much of the time of the committee with this witness or any other witness. I have been a spectator, sitting here through weeks of this investigation without opening my mouth, and when I do open my mouth I am told to get going. And we took a day for this witness to answer one question.
Knowing the man that preceded me, the Senator from Michigan, I didn't anticipate he would be through so early.
Well, am I to understand. Colonel Clausen, that each time you interviewed one of these witnesses you made it perfectly clear to him just who you represented?
Colonel Clausen. I showed him, Mr. Keefe—I will show you the document. I showed all the witnesses this document here. I carried that document, dated February 6, 1945.
Mr. Keefe (reading):
Pursuant to my directions and in accordance with my public statement of 1 December 1941, Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, is conducting for me the investigation supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

[11872] Colonel Clausen. That statement is in the book, too; that public statement.
Mr. Keefe. Yes. Well, you didn't let any of these people get the misconception that you were actually doing this for the Board, did you?
Colonel Clausen. No.
Mr. Keefe. And this Lieutenant Woodrum, when he wrote his statement, he seemed to be under the impression that you were, and did you correct him?
Colonel Clausen. I corrected the very document. The document looks to me like he did that himself. I recall the incident because I called it to his attention when he handed it to me. His superior officer was a Commander Burr and the district intelligence officer was away. I think he was out of town, anyway he was away, so they gave me his office there to work in, and Commander Burr gave me some facts that coincided with what Lieutenant Woodrum put down, and after I asked for a written statement to that effect. I wanted to know all about this taking out of the taps on the 2d of December, and I wanted a written statement, so they introduced me to this lieutenant and instead of Burr making it, Woodrum made it, which was all right with me, except he had in there that statement that you called attention to and I corrected him at the time. There could [11873] be no question about it, though, because all Navy witnesses were authorized direct by the Secretary of the Navy to give me the information.
In other words, the basic document that authorized them stated I was conducting this investigation for Secretary Stimson.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, I notice here a memorandum for the files, January 24, 1945, subject, interview of General Fielder. Was that in connection with your supplementary investigation?

Colonel Clausen. General Fielder?

Mr. Keeffe. Yes. F-i-e-l-d-e-r.

Colonel Clausen. I assume so, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. I notice that you signed that Henry C. Clausen, major, JAGD, assistant recorder, APHB.

Colonel Clausen. That is right. Assistant recorder of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. I was told to continue that designation after the Board had given its report for administrative purposes.

In other words, a lot of witnesses had to be paid and vouchers made out and things of that kind, so I continued in those matters sometimes to use that title.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, when you were conducting this investigation, were you conducting it as assistant recorder of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, or as Maj. Henry C. Clausen, investigator for Secretary Stimson, which?

Colonel Clausen. I told you, Mr. Keeffe, that I conducted it in the capacity as shown on that letter of authorization from Secretary Stimson, and prior to that he had given me another one, which was to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G–2, which I took down to General Bissell. That is the one that authorized me to get top secret stuff and they told me there was a level above top secret.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, I confess that in reading the report I became somewhat confused and I wondered if that confusion was also in the mind of some of these witnesses whom you examined.

Colonel Clausen. I think not.

Mr. Keeffe. And that they may have been under the impression that you were conducting it in your capacity as assistant recorder—

Colonel Clausen. I think not, Mr. Keeffe.

Mr. Keeffe. Rather than under a quite positive direction of the Secretary of War.

Colonel Clausen. It might seem so but the main point was the fact I was permitted to get that secret stuff. The mistake that you refer to couldn’t happen if the affidavits are read because in almost each instance in the first paragraph is set forth the capacity in which I was then appearing before the witness. In other words, the witnesses were told that I was acting for the Secretary of War supplementary to the proceedings of the Pearl Harbor Board.

I think you will find that to be true in each case there with the various affidavits. In some cases there I have just a statement there from the witness.

Mr. Keeffe. Do you recall signing a receipt for some files out at Pearl Harbor?

Colonel Clausen. What was that?

Mr. Keeffe. Did you sign a receipt for some files out at Pearl Harbor?

Colonel Clausen. Oh, I don’t remember. I think I know what you mean. You will find attached to one of my periodic reports two receipts from the Hawaiian Department. I could find that for you. And those documents are those which I referred to this morning.
Mr. Keefe. Well, I read it some place in here. This mass of stuff isn't indexed.

Colonel Clausen. Sure it is indexed. You have to really see the index. It is very simple. The first page gives the lead. I signed for the Army stuff and the Navy.

Mr. Keefe. Here is what I had in mind. Here is a receipt for all this stuff here and it says Henry C. Clausen, lieutenant colonel, JAGD, United States Army, for Army Pearl Harbor Board.

[11876] Colonel Clausen. The Navy drew that up. They made the mistake on the other one.

Mr. Keefe. There seem to be a lot of mistakes here.

Colonel Clausen. Well, you found two. Don't measure me by the scale of perfection, please.

Mr. Keefe. Oh, well, now, maybe before we get through we may find some more, but I am not criticizing you, Major, because you made some little infinitesimal mistakes. But, as a matter of fact, somebody had the impression that you were representing the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Now, if you were so meticulous to tell everybody just who you were representing, it is strange to me that here there would be receipts which you signed, to the Navy, and signed as lieutenant colonel—you were a colonel then?

Colonel Clausen. Lieutenant Colonel.

Mr. Keefe. Lieutenant colonel.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. I don't want to get mixed up on these titles. You were a lieutenant colonel then.

Colonel Clausen. I was a lieutenant colonel then, yes. Mr. Keefe, you will find sometimes, I think, the men who I talked to knew that I had been to Hawaii with the Board and they perhaps assumed I was still with the Board. In either event, I was working for the Secretary.

[11877] Mr. Keefe. Well, I think that definitely appears, that you were working for the Secretary, but what attracted my attention was the fact that these receipts were signed by you as lieutenant colonel, JAGD, United States Army, for Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Now, that is a mistake, isn't it?

Colonel Clausen. What is the date of that?

Mr. Keefe. April 19, 1945, page 271 of your report.

Colonel Clausen. I was then conducting the investigation under that directive of the Secretary supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Mr. Keefe. Infinitesimal and small as the mistake is, it is nevertheless a mistake.

Colonel Clausen. I don't concede that it is a mistake in this way that after all what difference would it make, when you are working for the Secretary, whether you are his assistant recorder, or for the Board as assistant or for the Secretary in some other capacity.

Mr. Keefe. My experience on this outfit here is that some people you talked with perhaps might feel that there was a difference as to who you were in fact representing.

Now, I want to make it clear, because I had that in the back of my head some place when I went through this report, that I couldn't quite understand why you would set forth this material in
that way, and which is quite contrary to the precept by the Secretary of War issued to you when you went out.

Now, you have explained that completely to my satisfaction.

Prior to your obtaining this commission from Secretary Stimson the Judge Advocate General, Cramer, I believe——

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Had made a survey of the Army Board's report; had he not?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. And that opinion was rendered to the Secretary, Mr. Stimson, on the 25th of November 1944; was it not?

Colonel Clausen. Is that the date on that, Mr. Keefe?

Mr. Keeffe. That is the date, I am certain of that.

Colonel Clausen. I don't remember the date.

Mr. Keeffe. I am not trying to make any point of the date, but he made the report and as a result of that report Secretary Stimson and also General Cramer decided that it was necessary to make some further investigation to clear up certain problems that were referred to in General Cramer's decision or opinion or brief or summary, whatever you may call it; isn't that true?

[11879] Colonel Clausen. Well, I don't know whether it is as a result of the recommendations of the Judge Advocate General or whether he had his own independent judgment in that sustained. I remember his public statement said something to the effect that in accordance with the opinion of the Judge Advocate General he was going to conduct his own investigation. I got the impression, I don't have the exact language in mind, there was something about he was going to do something then and that the Judge Advocate General had in some way recommended this.

Mr. Keeffe. I want to quote from paragraph 1 on page 48 of Exhibit 63 before this committee, from the Judge Advocate General's opinion, dated November 25, 1944, in which he says:

In order to complete the picture and in fairness to certain personnel these leads should be explored.

Do you recall that language?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. Now, I want to ask you who were the individuals or the personnel to whom General Cramer referred?

Colonel Clausen. I wouldn't be able to say. I would say that General Cramer should be asked, I mean, I can't tell what was in his mind. As I said before, the main subject of unexplored leads was that of magic, and I mentioned [11880] yesterday that Admiral Hart's investigation showed that Captain Safford had mentioned the winds code and he gave a list of people who should be interviewed, and there were other leads, also, unexplored leads that should be run down.

Mr. Keeffe. I have referred to a statement which appears in the Judge Advocate General's opinion and I have quoted correctly from his statement in the record and it states:

In fairness to certain personnel certain leads——

He used the words "these leads should be explored."
Now, it seems inconceivable to me, Colonel Clausen, that you would undertake an investigation to explore those leads without discussion with the Judge Advocate General under whom you served and perhaps with Secretary Stimson as to the individuals who were involved.

Colonel Clausen. Well, the individuals involved, of course, would be the persons who were concerned with the additional leads.

Mr. Keefe. Who were the persons?

Colonel Clausen. Well, you had 15 people, Mr. Keefe, who had, I believe, testified before the Board, who I reinterviewed and got affidavits from.

Now, for example, I remember very distinctly Colonel [11881] Bratton stating before the Board something to the effect that he could not recollect, that he could not verify, that he could not prove, and then the Board pressing him to answer the questions. Well, certainly in fairness to Colonel Bratton the matter should be clarified. And all the people, including General Gerow, General Miles—well, there were 15.

In other words, in the last week of the Board's proceedings we had just these few comments, I mean, concerning the magic, and it would be unfair to limit the inquiry, for two reasons, certainly for the reason of the persons who testified, and from the standpoint of getting all the facts.

Mr. Keefe. Now, in the statement of December 1, 1944, released through the press branch of the War Department, the Secretary says:

I recognize the importance to any individual concerned of having a decision taken as to what, if any, action is to be instituted against him and, after weighing all the considerations, I am clear that the public interest as well as justice and fairness will best be served by a statement of my present conclusions. So far as they now may be made public, consonant with the public interest, my conclusions are as follows:

[11882] Then he goes on and says:

The Army Pearl Harbor Board, although it recommended no disciplinary or other action, concluded that there were several officers in the field and in the War Department who did not perform their duties with the necessary skill or exercise the judgment which was required under the circumstances. On the recorded evidence, I agree with some but not all of the Board's conclusions.

So far as the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department is concerned, I am of the opinion that his errors of judgment were of such a nature as to demand his relief from a command status. This was done on January 11, 1942, and in itself is a serious result for any officer with a long record of excellent service, and conscientious as I believe General Short to be. In my judgment, on the evidence now recorded, it is sufficient action.

Was that perhaps the reason that you didn't interview General Short at all?

Colonel Clausen. No. I assumed, as I said before, that what I had investigated, to the point that you have seen there, Mr. Keefe, was sufficient to satisfy the Secretary, that he could then make a decision.

Mr. Keefe. Well, he had made a decision then.

Colonel Clausen. No. That is tentative, isn't it?

[11883] It would be, in its very nature. It says that in the last paragraph, where he says he is going to continue his investigation and reexamine then his decision when he had completed this additional investigation.
Mr. Keefe. Well, he said:

This was done on January 11, 1942, and in itself is a serious result for any officer with a long record of excellent service, and conscientious as I believe General Short to be. In my judgment, on the evidence now recorded, it is sufficient action.

Furthermore, I am satisfied that proper steps were taken to correct such inadequacies of either personnel or organization as were shown to exist either in the War Department or in the field at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster. My conclusion is that under all the circumstances the evidence now recorded does not warrant the institution of any further proceedings against any officer in the Army.

In accordance with the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, I have decided that my own investigation should be further continued until all the facts are made as clear as possible and until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts can be obtained, and I have given the necessary directions to accomplish this result.

Now, then, I have heretofore referred to the statement [11884] in the Judge Advocate General's opinion which the Secretary of War refers to in this press release from which I have just read.

Colonel Clausen. Mr. Keefe, didn't he say in the press release also that he was going to reexamine his decision later in the light of the additional evidence?

Mr. Keefe. That is all he said.

Some of the testimony may be much delayed where witnesses are engaged in combat in active theaters of operation. My present decision will be reviewed when the investigation has been finally completed.

Colonel Clausen. That is what I thought; yes.

Mr. Keefe. That is what he said.

Colonel Clausen. Yes.

Mr. Keefe. I have no desire to withhold anything.

Colonel Clausen. No; I know that. I just seemed to have remembered that point was in there.

Mr. Keefe. Yes. What I am getting at is this: He refers to the opinion of the Judge Advocate General.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. I quoted from the opinion of the Judge Advocate General in which he stated that in order to complete the picture and in fairness to certain personnel these leads should be explored. I have now asked you whether or not [11885] you had any discussion either with your chief, who was General Cramer—you were in the JAGD office?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. He was your chief?

Colonel Clausen. Well you have a chain of command. My more immediate chief was General Thomas Green and he was the attorney for General Short.

Mr. Keefe. Well, you were in that office, in the JAG Office, weren't you?

Colonel Clausen. I was in the Judge Advocate General's office; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. We call it the JAG office.

Colonel Clausen. That is a good name for it.

Mr. Keefe. Well, I don't want to cast any reflections upon the office. Colonel. I happen to have had at least one of my boys serve all during this war in that office and with some distinction, in the marine end of
it, and I know he always referred to it to me as the JAG office. I don't think that he meant they all got on jags, or anything of that kind, but that is just the short term.

Now, did you have any talk with General Cramer or with Colonel Stimson, Secretary of War, as to who these people were that you should be fair to in this investigation?

Colonel Clausen. Not in that way, Mr. Keefe. I have discussed with General Cramer at great length the whole picture presented by the investigation, of course, and just what the leads were leading from time to time. And, as I pointed out before, the best way to see exactly what is the type of lead being pursued is to go to my periodic reports because they were reviewed by the Judge Advocate General and Mr. Harvey H. Bundy.

Mr. Keefe. That is just exactly what I thought the situation would be. I couldn't conceive of you starting out on this world tour to interview witnesses until you had a pretty good idea from talking it over with General Cramer as to what you were going to do and what your purpose was in setting out and who you were going to see.

What I would like to know is did you have in your mind as a result of your talks with General Cramer that it was to be your purpose to investigate the leads which he had pointed out in his report and do it with the spirit of trying to be fair to the personnel that was involved?

Colonel Clausen. I certainly had it in my mind to be fair, Mr. Keefe, to all people involved. In other words—

Mr. Keefe. That does not answer my question. Were there any specific people involved?

Colonel Clausen. The only specific people involved as I repeated before were those who were involved in these leads. Now—

Mr. Keefe. Well, the leads must have tended to lead somewhere. Now, we had the report of Secretary Stimson. He made up his mind that certain things should be done. He did something to Short, he relieved him of his command and he read the Army Pearl Harbor Board report that was critical of General Marshall, that was critical of General Gerow and that was critical of other people; was it not?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, then, when you talked with General Cramer wasn't it considered that these leads that you were to follow up were to be followed for the purpose of seeing if it could not be made easier for those people that were named by the Army Pearl Harbor Board?

Colonel Clausen. Mr. Keefe—

Mr. Keefe. Now, that is what I am getting at.

Colonel Clausen. I, for one, would never be a party to such an instruction.

Mr. Keefe. But that is not a matter of instruction at all.

Colonel Clausen. Now, listen—

Senator Lucas. Let him answer the question.

Colonel Clausen. The Secretary would not be a party to it. I always had a high regard for Mr. Stimson because if we had followed his advice in 1932 you would not have had Pearl Harbor, there would not have been a war; when he wanted the Nine Power Pact enforced and the Kellogg-Briand Pact enforced we would not have had a war.

Mr. Keefe. Well, that is a nice statement and I am in complete
Colonel Clausen. Certainly, you bring up a motive now.

Mr. Keeffe. No; I bring out the fact that General Cramer himself stated in his report to Secretary Stimson that in order to complete the picture and in fairness to certain personnel these leads should be explored. Now, what personnel did he have in mind when he talked with you?

Colonel Clausen. As I said before—

Mr. Keeffe. That is clear; it is in his report.

Colonel Clausen. As I said before, the persons involved in the leads that I had in mind when I started out were those that I have mentioned. Now, if you gave me the book I could [11889] mention those who testified before. There were 15 people who had testified before the Board at a time when I assume they were gagged so far as this magic stuff was concerned.

Mr. Keeffe. You were aware when you started out, because you stated on the record that you knew what the findings of the Army Board were as to General Marshall and as to General Gerow and as to others.

Colonel Clausen. Why, yes, of course.

Mr. Keeffe. You knew that.

Colonel Clausen. Surely.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, did general——

Colonel Clausen. I also know the findings of the Board with regard to Col. Theodore Wyman and I agree 100 percent with those findings regarding Col. Theodore Wyman.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, didn’t you agree as to the findings as to the others?

Colonel Clausen. So far as the others were concerned, Mr. Keefe, if you want my opinion on the findings, my opinion is very much in the category of being presumptuous I think, but when you come down to the Theodore Wyman case, where he had derelictions charged to him in that particular category, I recommended court martial for him.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, he was not court-martialed, was he?

[11889] Colonel Clausen. No. That is why it might be a good thing now for you people to recommend the case be turned over to the Attorney General because in my opinion he lied before the Board and this Board was constituted pursuant to statute, so you might concede that there might be something to that.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, now, I don’t know all the facts about Colonel Wyman but from what I have read in this record I am inclined to hazard a guess that perhaps you are not far from the truth in that respect, but I do not have Colonel Wyman specifically in mind. He was pretty thoroughly castigated by the Army Board in this report, wasn’t he?

Colonel Clausen. Yes; and that, Mr. Keefe, was——

Mr. Keeffe. You agreed with that?

Colonel Clausen. Yes. I assembled a great deal of the evidence concerning that subject.

Mr. Keeffe. Yes. Well, now, then, Colonel Clausen, did you have any talk with reference to the castigation, if I may call it such—I don’t want to use that term—the report, I will say the findings of the Board with respect to the derelictions of General Marshall or General Gerow?
Colonel Clausen. We had discussions, Mr. Keefe, concerning all the people, as I have said before, that were involved in these leads and from time to time the matter would be re- [11891] examined and what should be done and what should not be done and what further progress could be made in this direction or that direction and that was mainly reported, as I have said several times, in my periodic reports.

Mr. Keefe. Well, what bothers me is the fact that Secretary Stimson stated in his press release that he agreed with some of the findings of the Board and he disagreed with others and because he disagreed with the others had decided to conduct further investigation and that was suggested also by the Judge Advocate General, so you went out to conduct the investigation.

Did you conduct your investigation as to those individuals against whom findings were made by the Board that he may have been satisfied with or that he expressed to you that he was satisfied with the findings that were made by the Board against any individuals?

Colonel Clausen. Mr. Keefe, I at no time went out with any preconceived idea to slant any investigation. I would not have been a party to it. Mr. Stimson would not have authorized it if he had and so far as my work with the Board is concerned, I have a letter here from General Grunert in which he commends me for my work on the Board.

Mr. Keefe. I am not criticizing you for your work on the Board. [11892] Colonel Clausen. You assumed, though, in your questions that I was some kind of a stooge sent out by the War Department to—

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, you are just jumping at conclusions.

Colonel Clausen. I am glad to hear you say that.

Mr. Keefe. I haven't assumed any such thing. I have asked you a simple question as to whether or not you discussed any of these individual personnel that are referred to in the report. Now, either you did or you did not.

Colonel Clausen. I say, Mr. Keefe, we discussed all the personnel involved and if I had—

Mr. Keefe. Did you discuss General Marshall?

Colonel Clausen. We discussed General Marshall in these leads.

Mr. Keefe. Did you discuss General Gerow?

Colonel Clausen. General Gerow in these leads.

Mr. Keefe. Did you discuss General Marshall? What did you discuss as to General Marshall?

Colonel Clausen. Marshall generally, yes. We discussed all the people who are involved in these leads and whose names came up from time to time.

Mr. Keefe. I would like to know what that discussion was, that is what I am trying to get at, what was the nature of the discussion? [11893] Colonel Clausen. The discussions, Mr. Keefe, revolved around the proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board and their testimony and my assistance in finding papers and documents and as to who said what about this and who interrogated so and so.

Mr. Keefe. Yes, but that was all in the report, wasn't it?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, but it is like you, Mr. Keefe, asking me to find an exhibit in there. I can find a thing if I can find it in the report.
Mr. Keefe. Well, Colonel Clausen, you and I are both lawyers and we have had some experience and I don't want to be splitting hairs nor engaging in double talk at all. I would like to get right to the point.

Now, when this investigation started on your part, General Cramer had made an exhaustive study of the findings of the Army Board and he had before him all of the evidence that had been taken before that Board, did he not?

Colonel Clausen. He read all the evidence—I believe he read all the evidence.

Mr. Keefe. Yes. So it was not necessary to go searching around much for papers unless it was a matter of previous exhibits. He pretended to have the whole thing because he very carefully analyzed it in a long report which he made to the Secretary of War.

Colonel Clausen. Mr. Keefe, you cannot just read, as a matter, transcripts, long transcripts involving the number of pages that represent the testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the Grunert Board, and have everything in your mind.

Mr. Keefe. All right. Now let us get down to—

Colonel Clausen. I mean one thing dovetails into another, one thing dovetails into another from that point to some place.

Mr. Keefe. Let us get right down to my question, and if you can answer it, all right, and if you cannot, all right. What did you talk with General Cramer about General Gerow?

Colonel Clausen. Oh, I cannot recall, Mr. Keefe. General Gerow came up in so many aspects, whether he saw the reply by General Short and where it was and whether he knew of the liaison with Navy, what liaison with the Navy meant and what that meant from the war plans and who got the war plans and where can we get the war plans and how about looking into this, it went into so many directions, and then there were exhibits to tie in.

Mr. Keefe. Was there any talk or suggestion that the Army Board had dealt unfairly in its findings with General Gerow?

Colonel Clausen. Well, that was a matter that he, General Cramer, would decide. It would be presumptuous for me to say.

Mr. Keefe. Well, in his talks with you did he indicate that?

Colonel Clausen. Well, so far as I was concerned, Mr. Keefe, I assumed that he said there in his final written decision and opinion is the essence of what he would, perhaps, in some way mention but to say that, "This is what I am going to find, Clausen," I do not recall that.

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, Colonel, you had a talk with General Cramer?

Colonel Clausen. I had many talks with him, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. Keefe. What?

Colonel Clausen. I had many talks with General Cramer.

Mr. Keefe. Of course you did. Did you talk with Stimson, too?

Colonel Clausen. I had about three or four conferences with Colonel Stimson.

Mr. Keefe. Yes. Well, in those conferences did you discuss General Marshall or General Gerow or any of these other people that the Army Pearl Harbor Board had found derelictions against?
Colonel Clausen. Well, as I repeated before, Mr. Keefe, we discussed the persons involved in the leads. Now, I brought to the attention of the colonel all these people who had testified; that the Board had gotten the magic in the last week and we mentioned some of the names; I am quite sure I mentioned the names of people that testified when we did [11896] not have the magic.

Mr. Keefe. Now, did you help prepare this report for General Cramer?

Colonel Clausen. In the way in which I said; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Yes. It is quite a voluminous report, isn't it?

Colonel Clausen. Well, you are speaking of the one of—what is the date of that?

Mr. Keefe. I am speaking of the report under date of November 25, 1944.

Colonel Clausen. Well, you will find it documented there with references to the exhibits and transcript pages. That represents some of my work and we had other officers, too, assisting in doing the same work, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. Keefe. Now, as near as I have been able to understand in reading this report—you have been referring all the time to the fact that there were unexplored leads. Now, this is what appears at the top of page 48 of Exhibit 63 under the heading of "Unexplored Leads." This is General Cramer's report to Secretary Stimson. [Reading:]

In the course of my examination of the Report and record certain further inquiries have suggested themselves to me, which, in my opinion, might advantageously be pursued. The answers to these inquiries would not, in all [11897] probability, in my opinion, affect the result; at the same time in order to complete the picture and in fairness to certain personnel these leads should be further explored. I do not mean to suggest that the Board should be reconvened for this purpose; the work could be done by an individual officer familiar with the matter.

In the event you approve of this suggestion I will discuss these matters in detail with the officer selected by you.

Recommendations:

As to General Marshall I have already expressed my opinion that the conclusions of the Board are unjustified and erroneous.

As to General Gerow I have stated my agreement with the conclusions of the Board (a) that he erred in not sending to Short more information than he did, and (o) in not checking on Short's reply to the 27 November message signed "Marshall." In my opinion these errors do not warrant disciplinary action against General Gerow. General Gerow admitted the error of his division in not checking Short's reply, for which he frankly took the blame. The nature of the errors and the fact that he has since demonstrated his great qualifications for field command indicate that his case is now performing duty elsewhere. [11898] disciplinary action.

As to Short I have concurred in the conclusions of the Board—

and so on, about two and a half pages.

Now, those are the only ones that he referred to in his report. Now, then, I am asking you these questions because in General Cramer's own report to Secretary Stimson he says, "In the event you approve this suggestion," namely, that he send out an individual officer, "to explore leads, I will discuss these matters in detail with the officer selected by you."

That is you, and you did discuss it with him.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir; many times.

Mr. Keefe. All right. Well, now, what were the leads that you discussed? They are not set forth in this report.
Colonel Clausen. Well, if you will let me have my volume I will be glad to.

Mr. Keefe. Let me withdraw that question for just a moment, please, Colonel Clausen. I want to ask you this question:

Now, in view of the fact that General Cramer refers specifically to General Marshall, General Gerow, and General Short, and agrees in part and disagrees in whole or in part with the findings of the Board as to these three individuals, is it a fair assumption on my part that these are the ones that he [11899] referred to when he said that, "In order to complete the picture and in all fairness to certain personnel these leads should be further explored"? Is that the personnel that he was referring to?

Colonel Clausen. Don't you see, Mr. Keefe, that is the same question that Senator Ferguson asked, and I said to him and I will now say to you, that I cannot presume to say what General Cramer had in mind when he put that statement down. It speaks for itself. What I should think I would do in trying to be fair to everybody would be particularly those people, all the people who testified before the Board when they were gagged with regard to magic. Now, there were 15 of them. I can give you their names if you wait a minute. Do you want me to give you the names of those that had testified before the Board and who I reinterpreted?

Mr. Keefe. No; I haven't asked you for that.

Colonel Clausen. All right. I thought you did.

Mr. Keefe. If you want to do it you can; that is not what I asked you at all.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir; but I mean that would be fair to do because they had gone before the Board, Mr. Keefe, at a time when magic was not open for discussion.

Mr. Keefe. Well, then, do I understand that the leads that you were out on then was to go out and get these people [11900] to supplement their testimony before the board and testify to what they know and understood about magic?

Colonel Clausen. No, Mr. Keefe, not in toto at all, because the whole scope and subject of magic was unexplored with regard to certain of the witnesses. I did not know, for example, that this big sheaf that General Russell had obtained called the top secret B, whether General Gerow ever saw one of them, whether General Miles had seen them, whether they knew about this cutting of Pearl Harbor into sections and area, and in order to be fair to a man like General Miles, for example, I thought, "Certainly you ought to ask him, 'Well, here, did you ever see these before?'"

Mr. Keefe. Well, what specific leads were indulged in or sent out with respect to General Marshall, or did you have any specific leads?

Colonel Clausen. With General Marshall?

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

Colonel Clausen. The whole scope of the subject. He testified—for example, if you want to take General Marshall, he testified, I think that he had in the War Department, he thought, SOP of November 5, 1941. Now, query? Did he have that? I could not find it any place, and these are the things that General Cramer asked me to ask him. He would say, "Did you have the SOP of 5 November 1941" and I would say, "Well, General, I remember
that General Marshall thought he did, and I remember that General Gerow thought he did not. "I will look and see." And by the time you ran a thing like that down it would take an awful lot of time. Finally it developed that the thing was mailed in from Hawaii after November 5, 1941, and after Pearl Harbor. It did not come in, I believe, until January or February of 1942. Now, that is the type of thing that we talked about from time to time.

Mr. Keeffe. Well, was one of the leads that you were running down to find out whether or not Colonel Bratton actually delivered the first 13 parts of the 14-part message to Bedell Smith on the evening of the 6th of December?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keeffe. And you had Bratton's testimony then, didn't you?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. I did also notice—

Mr. Keeffe. Now, just a minute. Now, he did testify—

Colonel Clausen. Well, just a minute. I don't mean to cut you off but don't cut me off.

Mr. Keeffe. I shall not do that.

Colonel Clausen. Now, listen: Colonel Bratton testified that he was trying to recollect and I sat there across the room from the man. We were in a little room, this was a very informal sort of thing, this Grunert Board, and I saw the colonel [11902] brought back and brought back. I think he came back three times. I believe he was our last witness because General Grunert made the same remark, "When we have got nothing else to do, Colonel, we bring you here."

Well, I could see the colonel being given additional documents to refresh his recollection and if I had been his lawyer I would have said, "You don't have to answer a question just because it is put to you." In other words, I would have forced him to protect himself more. He was a very cooperative fellow. But for the Pearl Harbor he would be a major general. He was en route to the—

Mr. Keeffe. What do you mean "but for Pearl Harbor"?

Colonel Clausen. Because he was en route to Fort Benning with other men who had been carefully selected and would have gone down there in all probability and have gotten a division; because he, in loyalty to his chief, General Miles, stayed when his general said, "Please stay here for a few days"—this was before Pearl Harbor—"I can't relieve you right now," Colonel Bratton acquiesced, so don't be too harsh on Colonel Bratton.

Mr. Keeffe. What is this, a sort of a preliminary instructions to me?

Colonel Clausen. Well, you seemed to think that because Colonel Bratton gave me a different story than he gave the [11903] Grunert Board that he lied either one of the times. He didn't do any such thing.

Mr. Keeffe. Oh, no, no, you have just got some false notion, you have just got something in the back of your head. I never had that in the back of my head at all. I know Colonel Bratton and I have got a different opinion of him than that. Now, don't be putting that stuff in the record and don't be putting into my mouth or into my head something that is not true. I will take care of it when the time comes. I have seen poor, old Colonel Bratton sitting around this room pretty nearly since this hearing started, waiting to tell his story and they wouldn't let him tell it until after you got on the stand. The man
has been here for weeks waiting for a chance to tell his story and I am sure he will tell the truth.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I want to know who the gentleman means by "They wouldn't."

Mr. Keefe. No.

Mr. Murphy. You are making accusations that they would not let him tell his story. Who is the "they"?

Mr. Keefe. Time; lapse of time.

Mr. Murphy. All right.

Mr. Keefe. Circumstances.

Mr. Murphy. All right.

[11904] Mr. Keefe. That includes you and me and everybody else that has taken up so much time in this hearing.

Senator Lucas. You wouldn't include Senator George, would you, in that?

Mr. Keefe. What is that?

Senator Lucas. You wouldn't include Senator George in that?

Mr. Keefe. No: I wouldn't include Senator George.

Senator Lucas. I will speak for the Senator. He won't speak up for himself.

Mr. Keefe. Well, as a matter of fact, Colonel Bratton did testify, didn't he?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And you thought it was necessary to interview him in order to clear up some discrepancies?

Colonel Clausen. Well, he had testified to the delivery of these messages and then after I got to interviewing people also involved in this magic thing, I think one of the very first ones told me that he had delivered the messages with Colonel Bratton.

Mr. Keefe. Who was the first one?

Colonel Clausen. One of the first ones, Mr. Keefe. That was Colonel Dusenbury.

Mr. Keefe. Did he say that he had delivered them that night?

Colonel Clausen. Oh, not that; I am not talking about the 13 part deliveries.

Mr. Keefe. Now, I am talking about the 13 parts. Now, let us not go all over the bush. Let us stick to that.

Colonel Clausen. He said he delivered that the next morning; in other words, the morning of the 7th.

Mr. Keefe. Who did?

Colonel Clausen. This Colonel Dusenbury.

Mr. Keefe. Did Colonel Bratton say that he delivered it the night before?

Colonel Clausen. Well, I understand the Colonel did say in general effect that he had given one to—a locked pouch to a Colonel Bedell Smith and deliveries had been made to these other people.

Mr. Keefe. Well, he did say it pretty clearly and plainly, didn't he, before the Army Board, that he delivered that 13-part message in the locked pouch to General Bedell Smith?

Colonel Clausen. That is my recollection; yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. That is my recollection and it is right here in the record. I won't take time to go and read it because everybody on this board has read it and knows that it is a fact.
Now, that was one of the things that had to be cleared up, wasn't it, that testimony?

[11906] Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And that was the reason why it had to be cleared up? What did Kramer say that had to be cleared up for?

Colonel Clausen. Well, he didn't say that.

Mr. Keefe. Who did?

Colonel Clausen. Well, it was obvious, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. Keefe. Obvious to whom?

Colonel Clausen. It was obvious to me.

Mr. Keefe. It was obvious to you because you set there as recorder or assistant recorder?

Colonel Clausen. No; it was obvious to me that the leads regarding the magic should be carefully explored as to who got what, when, and so forth, because one of the things that Captain Safford said in the Hart report was that in order to find out about the winds code message you would have to see these various officers. If I am not mistaken, he had listed down the several Army officers and I later, Mr. Keefe, did interview all those people. In other words, the whole subject as to who got what and how it was brought around and when, if you could find who had, and so forth, should be gone into.

Mr. Keefe. Well, prior to the time that you started on your investigation was there any evidence anywhere before the Army Pearl Harbor Board that would indicate that the first thirteen parts was not delivered in this regular routine of delivery by Colonel Bratton to the people who were entitled to receive it on the evening of the 6th of December? Can you point to a single witness that testified before the Army Board that cast any doubt upon that question?

Colonel Clausen. You mean before I commenced—

Mr. Keefe. Before you started out on your search.

Colonel Clausen. You mean if there was a conflict right in the testimony before the Grunert Board?

Mr. Keefe. Exactly.

Colonel Clausen. Well, yes, in Colonel Bratton's own testimony.

Mr. Keefe. What is that? Where is the conflict?

Colonel Clausen. Well, he said he could not verify or prove it. At one place I remember he said he could not verify or prove certain things and then at another place he said with regard to giving it to Bedell Smith that he thought that he had given it to him. There was some qualification, Mr. Keefe.

Mr. Keefe. And you thought that was a lead, a sufficient lead, Colonel Clausen, is that right? Then you went over to Europe and saw Bedell Smith.

Colonel Clausen. Oh, no, Mr. Keefe, I saw people before I ever went out there. The first man that I saw was—I mean one of the first people that I saw was a man who had been subordinate of Colonel Bratton's. That was Colonel Dusenbury; and he told me that he had had the job of delivering these things himself.

Well, Colonel Bratton had said in his testimony that he personally took it around. Now, here was Dusenbury saying this other thing. And then next I had various people who were supposed to have gotten them on the night of December 6 and various people who were supposed to have gotten other messages before.
I think the most important thing after I got into it was who got that one of September or October which cut Pearl Harbor into areas, five areas, because that—

[11909] Mr. Keefe. You see, we are getting way off the subject. It is getting late and maybe that is the reason you are not sticking to the question. I am talking only about the 13 part message that was alleged to have been delivered to Col. Bedell Smith, according to the testimony of Colonel Bratton, on the evening of December 6, 1941.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You claim that Bedell Smith was not quite conclusive in his testimony on that, and you thought that was a lead that ought to be investigated?

The Vice Chairman. You mean Colonel Bratton?

Mr. Keefe. Yes; Colonel Bratton.

Colonel Clausen. That he had not testified to that.

Mr. Keefe. Then you took the testimony of Bedell Smith over in Europe, didn’t you?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, I did.

Mr. Keefe. You got his affidavit?

Colonel Clausen. That is right.

Mr. Keefe. Then after you got the affidavit of Bedell Smith, you sent for Bratton, and had him come to Paris, I believe.

Colonel Clausen. I went to Berlin. I was there for several days, and they would not send this stuff up there.

[11910] Mr. Keefe. Where did you meet Colonel Bratton?

Colonel Clausen. What is that?

Mr. Keefe. Where did you meet Colonel Bratton?

Colonel Clausen. I met him when I was en route going into Berlin. I happened to see him as I was traveling along in a British car. A British colonel had arranged for me to meet him in Berlin.

Mr. Keefe. Where did you meet him? In Berlin, or on the road some place?

Colonel Clausen. En route. Then he took me to his home where he was living in Berlin with the Chief of Staff of the Berlin Military District, General Ransome, and General Matchett, and they gave me a room there.

It was my intention to have the memoranda sent up by courier from Paris, and they would not send it up.

Mr. Keefe. Did you then submit these affidavits that had been given to you by Bedell Smith to Colonel Bratton?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. Mr. Keefe, I have been looking at this. You are asking about telling Gen. Bedell Smith about the 13 parts delivery on December 6, 1941, before midnight.

I put down what Colonel Bratton had testified concerning that, and then I put down in parentheses—or, rather, this is his affidavit, of course, but I quoted the testimony. [11911] “I understand this testimony may possibly be qualified by other testimony to the effect that instead of giving these to me it ‘may have been one of the others.’”

In other words there was a qualification, you see, right in the testimony of Colonel Bratton. So that you did not have to talk to other people or with other people in order to see that there was some qualification,
Mr. Keeffe. All right.
You think you had this affidavit from Gen. Bedell Smith?
Colonel Clausen. That was one.
Mr. Keeffe. What other affidavits did you have with reference to
this episode?
Colonel Clausen. Colonel Bratton says in his affidavit—I can read
it, it is in the second paragraph—he says:
Statements in affidavits of Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury, Moses W. Pettigrew,
Ralph C. Smith, Charles K. Gailey, Thomas J. Betts, Walter B. Smith, Leonard

[11912] Mr. Keeffe. What did he say about it?
Colonel Clausen. I showed it to him. The statement says:
"Colonel Clausen has shown me and has asked me to comment on
certain testimony adduced before the Army Pearl Harbor Board and
on statements and affidavits of" naming these people. Then it says,
"which statements and affidavits were given by the above-named per-
sons to Colonel Clausen in the course of the investigation mentioned."
Mr. Keeffe. Did you let him read those affidavits?
Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. Did he read them?
Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. In other words, I wanted him to see
what the others had said about the entire subject.
Mr. Keeffe. Did he write out his own affidavit?
Colonel Clausen. No; I borrowed a typewriter from the headquar-
ters of the military there in Paris, and Colonel Bratton and I sat
down together in our hotel, and I typed—
Mr. Keeffe (interposing). Hotel where? I thought you were in
Berlin.
Colonel Clausen. Well, when they would not send the papers to us
in Berlin we had to go to Paris, and we did that.
Mr. Keeffe. Then you were in Paris?
Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

[11913] Mr. Keeffe. You took Colonel Bratton back to Paris?
Colonel Clausen. No, sir; he came himself. I went 1 day ahead
of time. He had to stay for some work. He could not come back
with me.
Mr. Keeffe. It took you a long time to get back to Paris where this
job took place. Now you are in Paris and you are in a hotel room;
is that right?
Colonel Clausen. That is right.
Mr. Keeffe. You finally got your papers together?
Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. You borrowed a typewriter from the Army?
Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keeffe. And you had the typewriter up there?
Colonel Clausen. That is right.
Mr. Keeffe. And then after showing these affidavits of all these
people to Colonel Bratton, letting him read them, as I understand it,
you discussed the matter with him?
Colonel Clausen. He told me what to put down, and I put it down.
Mr. Keeffe. He just dictated the affidavit, and you took it down in
longhand?
Colonel Clausen. No, sir. I do not know whether I took it down
in longhand or not. He is here, and you can ask him. I got so many
of these. Maybe I did take it down in longhand. I do not remember that; I really do not recall.

Mr. Keefe. At any rate, either from the conversation or longhand, or something else, you drew up an affidavit?

Colonel Clausen. I acted as the stenographer, you might say, for Colonel Bratton in preparing this after he had his memory refreshed.

Mr. Keefe. He had his memory refreshed. I have heard that before.

That is all.

The Vice Chairman. All right. Any further questions of Colonel Clausen?

Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, I would like to propound some questions tomorrow.

Senator Lucas. I would like to ask some questions, too.

The Vice Chairman. The committee will now stand adjourned until 10 o'clock in the morning, Colonel.

(Whereupon, at 10:20 p.m., February 13, 1946, the committee recessed until 10 a.m. of the following day, Thursday, February 14, 1946.)
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 1946

The joint committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 10 a. m., in the caucus room (room 318), Senate Office Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas, Brewster, and Ferguson; and Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy, Gearhart, and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, general counsel; Samuel H. Kaufman, associate general counsel; John E. Masten, Edward P. Morgan, and Logan J. Lane, of counsel, for the joint committee.

The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order.

Does counsel have anything at this time?

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, yesterday Congressman Keefe requested the inclusion in the record of the so-called Safford citation. It has been furnished to me, and my suggestion is that it be handed to the reporter to be included in the record.

The Vice Chairman. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(The citation referred to follows.)

Immediate release press and radio.

Navy Department,
February 11, 1946.

Captain Laurence Frye Safford, U. S. Navy, Receives Legion of Merit

Captain Laurence Frye Safford, U. S. N., 52, today received the Legion of Merit from Vice Admiral Richard L. Conolly, U. S. N., Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Administration. The award was made at ceremonies in the Navy Department.

Captain Safford was cited for his work as assistant director of Naval Communications for cryptographic research from March 1942 to September 1945, during which machines for encipherment were perfected.

Text of the citation accompanying the award reads:

[11917] "For exceptionally meritorious conduct in the performance of outstanding services to the Government of the United States as Assistant Director of Naval Communications for Cryptographic Research from March, 1942, to September, 1945. A dynamic leader combining strong purpose and creative imagination with a profound knowledge of mechanical and electrical science and their cryptographic applications, Captain Safford was the driving force behind the development of the perfected machines which today give the United States Navy the finest system of encipherment in the world. By his devotion to the tasks of rendering the Navy's dispatch communications safe from analysis by the enemy and of perfecting the operational characteristics of cryptographic aids to..."
achieve greater reliability and speed, Captain Safford contributed essentially to
the successful prosecution of the war."

Home address of Captain and Mrs. Safford is 2521 Dumbarton Avenue, Washing-
ton, D. C. He is on duty in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations.
Captain Safford was born in Somerville, Massachusetts.
(Biography available, Biographies and Research Section, Office of Public
Information.)

Mr. Richardson. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
The Vice Chairman. Colonel, do you have anything to [11918]
present to the committee before your examination is resumed?
Colonel Clausen. No, sir.
The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas, of Illinois, will inquire.

TESTIMONY OF HENRY C. CLAUSEN (Resumed)

Senator Lucas. Colonel Clausen, when the night session closed you
were being examined by the Congressman from Wisconsin with respect
to unexplored leads as found in the Army Board report or, rather, in
the statement made by Myron C. Cramer, major general, and one of
the statements in his opinion is as follows:

The answer to these inquiries will not, in all probability, in my opinion, affect
the result. At the same time, in order to complete the picture and in fairness
to certain personnel these leads should be further explored.

Now, many questions have been asked by the Senator from Michigan
and the Congressman from Wisconsin on that one point, "fairness to
personnel." Do I understand you to say that the reason for that state-
ment was primarily because the Army Board went along for 3 months
without the benefit of having an opportunity to examine these witnesses
with respect to magic?

[11919] Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. As I told Senator Ferguson
and Mr. Keefe. I don’t know what was in the mind of General Cramer
when he used that language; but the necessity for the additional inves-
tigation, or what I termed, as I interviewed people, "the supplementary
investigation," was primarily because of what you state as the fact,
namely, that in the course of the Board’s proceedings extending over
some 3 months it was not until the last week that the Board received
the magic details.

Senator Lucas. All right. In the beginning of these hearings, when
it was not permissible for the Board to use magic in the examination
of any witnesses. I presume that in so examining these witnesses it
was necessary from time to time to get very close to the question of
magic; and when that time came, that was when many of these wit-
nesses began to wonder as to how far they could go and resolved every
doubt against giving any information which would do away with, or
which would give to the public, that secret?

Colonel Clausen. There is no question about that at all, Senator,
and my experience as a trial lawyer led me to see the various witnesses
as they testified; and there seemed to be, in two instances, at least, a
sort of—as though they were on the brink of saying something and
wanted to stay something and could not say something; and after
the magic picture was unfolded [11920] in the last week of the
Board’s proceedings it was very apparent to me why that occurred.

Senator Lucas. And those leads, or that personnel affair being dis-
cussed by Cramer, necessarily dealt primarily with the fact that magic
up to that time had not been explored in any sense whatsoever?
Colonel Clausen. The additional leads; yes, sir; primarily magic.

Senator Lucas. Then, in addition to that, you had other leads that have testified to which had nothing to do with magic, which you felt, under the directive that you received from the Secretary of War, was necessary for you to follow through?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. I mentioned some of those.

Senator Lucas. And that is the reason why you took this tour all over the world?

Colonel Clausen. Well, it is the reason why I went all over the world. I don't like to fly, and I had to fly over 70,000 miles. I don't like the use of the word "tour." When I tour after this, I am going to tour on the ground.

Senator Lucas. Well, that is the reason that you went where you did, and it was because you were delegated to do that under an order that was issued by the Secretary of War?


Senator Lucas. Now, there was much to do in the testimony on yesterday about a couple of statements that were made by certain witnesses, as though it appeared that you were still operating under the power and authority granted to the Army Board, as I recall.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Now, I ask you this simple question: Who, in your opinion, had more power and authority at that time on the question of investigation or anything else having to do with war matters, Secretary of War Stimson or that Army Board?

Colonel Clausen. The Secretary of War, who was the person designated under your Public Law 339 to conduct the investigation. As I pointed out yesterday, Senator, there was no form prescribed by that law as to how that investigation would be conducted.

Now, that is a very important point. In other words, you told the Secretary to conduct an investigation, and he was conducting the investigation. If he used me as an assistant or if he picked up a book at home himself—

Senator Lucas. Well, in other words, it didn't make any difference, as far as the witness was concerned, whether Henry Stimson was carrying on the investigation or the Board [11922] was carrying on the investigation.

Colonel Clausen. No, sir. The Board was an assistant to him for that purpose.

Senator Lucas. Certainly. Now, the Congressman from Wisconsin interrogated you at some length with respect to the conversations that you had with Colonel Bratton in Europe.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Now, as a matter of placing this in the record, I want to read what the Congressman from Wisconsin said on the floor of the House November the 6th, 1945, before we started this hearing on that point, in answer to, or following, a statement made by Congressman Gearhart.

"Mr. Keefe"—well, I will read Congressman Gearhart's statement also.

Mr. Gearhart. I agree with that. Colonel Rufus Bratton is a very important figure in this investigation.
Mr. Keefe. And that Colonel Bratton testified at length before the Army Board. He testified from memoranda which were made at the time of the incidents prior to Pearl Harbor and he testified clearly and to the point and without equivocation; that thereafter this Colonel Clausen at the instigation of the War Department and the Secretary of War went to Colonel Bratton along with all the other witnesses and browbeat him apparently into signing an affidavit a year later in which his testimony is subject to some change. The gentleman and I want to talk to Colonel Bratton—and so forth.

Now, that is a pretty serious charge against you, Colonel Clausen.

Colonel Clausen. I considered it so after having served in the Army and went back to my practicing law and picking up the newspaper and reading such stuff as that when it is not true and correct.

Senator Lucas. The only reason I am reading this—I am not attempting to embarrass anybody in this investigation—but a witness who held the position that you did and in view of your record which has been placed before this committee, it seemed to me that it was necessary that I should read this in order for you to make an answer one way or the other to that.

Colonel Clausen. Yes. I, of course, say that I treated every single person whom I interviewed with as much fairness as I knew how. I certainly did not conduct an inquisition. I went to them and in all cases where I could, showed them what other people had said about the subject.

Now, one example, General Fielder. General Fielder had been the G-2 for General Short in Hawaii. He was a very important figure because he was the man who would obtain information in Hawaii and pass it on to his chief. There had been statements and you know how it is in an inquiry of this kind, you hear some wild rumors here, there and elsewhere.

Well, there had also been testimony about the Navy giving the Army all information. That immediately put General Fielder on the spot and in order to be fair to him I took him with me to Guam and there confronted him with Captain Layton, who was the fleet man and who had the information of this super-duper character and Captain Layton said that he did not give it to General Fielder. Now, that is the kind of investigation I tried to conduct.

[11925] Senator Lucas. What I want to specifically know is whether or not your browbeat this 225-pound Colonel here into giving evidence that was other than what he considered at that time the truth.

Colonel Clausen. No, sir.

Senator Lucas. Did you browbeat him into signing this affidavit?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir.

Senator Lucas. Since I have seen the Colonel here I would not want to attempt to browbeat him into anything.

On yesterday, Colonel, you testified about some things that happened in Hawaii which, frankly, I was amazed and startled at. I confess that I had not had an opportunity to read your report. I tried to get it a couple of times, but it was being used by some other member of the committee. In view of the fact there are only two copies it was difficult for us all to get it. But I cannot see how this committee can conclude this hearing without calling a couple of wit-
nesses from Hawaii. We have been investigating Washington all this time. Because some of the affidavits have been filed here, it seems to me we ought to have a couple or three of these witnesses come in and testify, and I refer primarily to Captain Dickins, Captain Mayfield, and Captain Rochefort.

[11926] One of the things that intrigued me was your testimony on yesterday that for 22 months, as I recall, the Navy had been tapping Japanese communication lines.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir; telephone lines running to the Consul, and then they had some taps on lines running to the Japanese Consul’s home, and some taps running to the line of the Jap steamship company.

Senator Lucas. Then on December 2, 1941, because of the fact that they were under the FBI, which was also tapping wires—am I right about that? What was that, Colonel? Give me that again, because I want to get that clear in my mind, just briefly.

Colonel Clausen. Perhaps the best thing to do is to read Lieutenant Woodrum’s statement rather than to take mine, because it is a very serious matter and I do not like to be quoted—I mean I do not want my quotation to be misconstrued.

Senator Lucas. All right, read it again.

Colonel Clausen. It is on page 105 of my report.

Senator Lucas. All right.

Colonel Clausen. He says here:

About 1 November 1941 the FBI, with the cognizance of the DIO—

Senator Lucas. What is that?

[11927] Colonel Clausen. That is the District Intelligence Office of the Navy at Honolulu.

Senator Lucas. Yes.

Colonel Clausen (reading):

began a telephone surveillance of a suspect in its own office building.

In plain language, the FBI tapped the phone running to the cook’s quarters in the Jap Consul’s home.

To the knowledge of the writer, this was the first such surveillance conducted by the FBI itself in Honolulu. This one surveillance was accidentally uncovered by some employees of the telephone company making routine installations. They reported their discovery to their superior, and subsequently this information was casually passed on to a member of the DIO by the DIO contact at the telephone company. In a spirit of cooperation, the information that their surveillance had been exposed was in turn passed on by the DIO man to an FBI agent. On receipt of the information, the FBI Agent in Charge apparently went directly to the telephone company and made accusations there that an FBI confidence had been breached by the DIO’s having been given information concerning an FBI tap.

When Captain Mayfield, then District Intelligence Officer, learned of the FBI protest at the telephone company, he was not only incensed at their failure to consult with [11928] him before taking such action, but he considered that action to be a serious breach of security. Cognizant of his instructions from the Chief of Naval Operations to avoid any possibility of international complications, and thoroughly aware of the explosive potentialities of the surveillances being conducted, Captain Mayfield ordered the immediate discontinuance of all telephone surveillances. This was on 2 December 1941. Surveillances were not resumed until the morning of 7 December 1941, following the Japanese attack.

Senator Lucas. I thank you for that.
Now I want to read Captain Mayfield's testimony that was given in the Hewitt Report, page 570:

Mr. Sonnett, Admiral, did any information come to you prior to December 7, 1941, of military significance which had been obtained from tapping a telephone line to the Japanese Consul?

Rear Admiral Mayfield. None that I recollect and I do not believe that any information received by this method was considered of military or naval importance by me or my assistants.

Mr. Sonnett. You have, Admiral, examined at my request, have you not, Exhibit 38-A and 38-B, the transcripts from October 1, 1941, to December 2, 1941? Can you state whether [11929] having examined those transcripts, there appears to be anything of military or naval significance contained therein?

Rear Admiral Mayfield. I do not believe there is anything of military or naval significance contained therein.

Mr. Sonnett. Will you state, Admiral, why there are no transcripts after December 2, 1941, and up to December 7, 1941?

Rear Admiral Mayfield. On or about December 2nd, it was reported to me by one of my assistants that employees of the telephone company had discovered a jumper put across the connections in a junction box by a member of the FBI organization, and that an employee of the telephone company had reported this discovery to one of my assistants. It was further reported to me that one of my assistants reported this matter to one of the agents of the FBI. It was further reported to me that a member of the FBI organization, name unknown to me, had taken the matter up with the telephone company. What representative of the telephone company I do not know. To the best of my recollection, I discussed the matter with Mr. Shivers and the report made to me did not agree with the report made to him by his assistants. My organization long before my arrival had worked up a contact with an employee of the telephone company and through this contact was able to obtain any telephone interception [11930] desired by my office. Because of the highly explosive nature of such practice, I did not desire to enter into an argument or controversy as to the merits or demerits of the case since I was afraid that by doing so, the fact that such interceptions were being made might be discovered and thereby jeopardize the future of any further interceptions. Furthermore, since the interceptions to that date had revealed nothing of particular value, I considered the wisest thing to do was to cease all interceptions of whatever kind and so instructed my assistants.

[11931] Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, I show you Exhibit 39 of this investigation—

Rear Admiral Mayfield. I would like to add that later along—the exact date I do not remember, but I believe after December 7 the whole matter was satisfactorily straightened out and we were again able to resume interceptions.

Mr. Sonnett. Admiral, I show you Exhibit 33 of this investigation which has been previously identified as a transcript of the so-called Mori conversation. Will you state whether that conversation and transcript came to your attention and fully the circumstances surrounding that?

Rear Admiral Mayfield. To the best of my recollection a transcript of this exhibit was brought to me by Mr. Shivers on the morning of December 6. I believe it was very late in the afternoon. We discussed the transcript and were unable to determine that it did have any definite or particular significance. It was thought desirable to have Lieutenant Commander Cary listen to the recording and give us his further opinion as to the value of the contents of the transcript before decision was arrived at as to whether or not it should be reported to the Commandant of the District.

Mr. Sonnett. Was it brought to the attention of the Commandant, or to any other superior officer prior to the [11932] attack?

Rear Admiral Mayfield. To the best of my recollection it was not.

Mr. Sonnett. Do you know whether or not it was brought to the attention of General Short prior to the attack?

Rear Admiral Mayfield. I have no knowledge of that.

Now, is that the same message that we are talking about now, that was delivered by Captain Bicknell?

Colonel Clausen. That is Colonel Bicknell—brought the Mori message out to General Short.
Senator Lucas. That is the message we are talking about that Colonel Bicknell telephoned General Short about on Saturday evening, December 6, 1941.

Colonel Clausek. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. And Short told him that he was going out to dinner, that if he could get out there in 10 minutes he would hear him?

Colonel Clausek. General Fielder, I think, said that, relaying it for General Short.

Senator Lucas. All right. He finally got there and this was the one in which General Short told us he could not see anything wrong in?

Colonel Clausek. He could not see anything wrong with it.

[11933] Senator Lucas. Later on, General Short admitted that this fellow was right, and he was wrong?

Colonel Clausek. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. That message, Senator, is Exhibit 84 in this proceeding.

Senator Lucas. Thank you.

Now, continuing:

Mr. Sonnett. Referring, Admiral, to the transcript of the telephone conversation between Mori and a person in Japan which you have before you, it appears, does it not, that after a question from Japan concerning the United States Fleet and the number of ships present, the person in Japan inquired what flowers or whether the flowers were in bloom, and that that question was answered by Mori, who pointed out that poinsettias and some other flowers were in bloom?

Rear Admiral Mayfield. It does. The question from Japan asks "What kind of flowers are in bloom in Hawaii at present?" The reply from Honolulu was to the effect that flowers in bloom were the fewest out of the whole year, but that hibiscus and poinsettias were in bloom.

Mr. Sonnett. When you studied that transcript on December 6, 1941, Admiral, did that particular portion of it come to your attention?

[11934] Rear Admiral Mayfield. It did.

Mr. Sonnett. What were your thoughts concerning it at the time?

Rear Admiral Mayfield. Our thoughts at the time were it was somewhat curious but that it was a disconnected conversation in which Mori seemed to be somewhat at a loss, and, according to my recollection, that was the reason for our desire to study it further and have Dr. Carr listen to the recording itself.

Mr. Sonnett. Did you have any knowledge at that time, or have you now any knowledge, as to the establishment by the Japanese of a code in which by the broadcast of trans-Pacific radio telephone conversation references to flowers would signify movement of United States ships from Pearl Harbor?

Rear Admiral Mayfield. I think that is rather a complicated question to answer, did I have then or do I have now.

Mr. Sonnett. Would the answer be different?

Rear Admiral Mayfield. Yes.

Mr. Sonnett. Let's make it, did you have then? Then we will ask you the other.

Rear Admiral Mayfield. I did not have knowledge of any such code at that time.

[11935] Mr. Sonnett. Have you knowledge of any such code at this time?

Rear Admiral Mayfield. Of my own personal knowledge of the existence of such code, I have none. I mean I have heard or read something about it, but then—

Mr. Sonnett. Well, I think you might just state that.

Rear Admiral Mayfield. I have heard or read something to the effect that such a code may have been in existence. I have no personal knowledge of the existence of such a code.

Upon that point, had any of your inquiries been as to whether anybody in Hawaii, either in the Navy or Army, did have knowledge of the existence of such code?
Colonel Clausen. No, sir. The point was in Colonel Bicknell’s mind that these words to him, as G–2 officer, might be code words. That was his thought on the night of December 6.

You remember in his affidavit, Senator, he said he had been trained under General Knowland; General Knowland was in charge of that G–2 in the European war, and he had always instructed his men no matter how insignificantly the detail might appear, the information might have some important bearing.

Colonel Bicknell was especially alarmed because of the use of these two words, poinsettias and hibiscus, and he testified before the Grunert Board that the next morning when the attack was going on, he stood on the veranda of his home, repeating automatically to himself, as the Japs were dropping bombs on the ships, “poinsettias and hibiscus.”

He said those two words stood in his mind. He was almost automatically doing this at the time the attack was going on.

The Vice Chairman. Who was doing that?

Colonel Clausen. Colonel Bicknell, sir, George Bicknell.

The Vice Chairman. He is the man who took the message to General Short?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir, the preceding night.

The Vice Chairman. All right.

Senator Lucas. That is all I have.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Gearhart of California will inquire, Colonel.

Mr. Gearhart. Colonel Clausen, I have in my hand what purports to be a memorandum for Maj. Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, from the office of the Judge Advocate General, the first part of which reads:

Subject: Unexplored Leads in Pearl Harbor Investigation.

[11936] In order to assist you in the investigation you are now to make, I am suggesting herewith certain unexplored leads which in my opinion might advantageously be followed up in order to complete the picture in this matter. The present memorandum merely contains suggestions and will not be construed as a directive, or as in any way fixing the scope of your investigation.

Then follow three pages of suggested subjects of investigation.

During any course of other examinations by other members of this committee, there was a similar memorandum in slightly different words that was also handed to you; is that not correct?

Colonel Clausen. You mean what you read is different than the other, Mr. Gearhart?

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. I thought that there were some lines in the second one which I heard read about “protect the reputations and justice to individuals who had come under criticism,” that you should follow a certain line.

Colonel Clausen. I think what you are reading there, Mr. Gearhart, is the three-page memorandum entitled “Unexplored Leads.” What they were referring to, Mr. Gearhart, was part of General Cramer’s critique of, well, I think it was about November 1944.

[11938] Mr. Gearhart. Yes.

Colonel Clausen. They were reading from a page in General Cramer’s memorandum, and Senator Ferguson also referred to that memorandum.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, my purpose in calling attention to that is you were expected to investigate the entire picture, to tie up all the loose
end, and to pursue any avenues of investigation that might be revealed to you during the course of the investigation that you were conducting; is that not correct?

Colonel Clausen, No, Mr. Gearhart. As I said in answer to, I think, a question of Senator Ferguson's, my mother became ill; she had pneumonia, and I went to San Francisco on emergency leave. When I returned I was given that memorandum, and after I got into the investigation to find out what it was all about, on these unexplored leads dealing especially with magic, what I was supposed to do, Mr. Gearhart, was to get additional facts, so that the Secretary could make his decision, which he did make at the conclusion of my investigation.

For example, that memorandum that you read from there, in the first part it has something to do with the Navy.

Well, after I got going on my own investigation, I was given to understand that letters passed between the [11939] Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War to the effect that where it concerned only naval matters, having nothing to do with the Army responsibility, that I was not to investigate that.

It was always my understanding that I was to get sufficient facts for the Secretary to make his ultimate final decision, which was made, so that he could comply with your Public, 339.

As I said many times in this hearing, and nobody has followed it up, I have included in my report an exhibit D, which contains my periodic reports; in other words, running reports on just what I did, starting from the start to the finish, and that sets up more accurately than anything else the leads I was to pursue, and what information should be obtained in this additional investigation. It was always primarily something revolving around magic.

As I mentioned before, the main thing was magic, and we had, in the last week, been given the magic picture.

[11940] Mr. Gearhart. Now, reading from the document referred to, I will call special attention to this sentence:

The answers to these inquiries would not in all probability, in my opinion, affect the result. At the same time in order to complete the picture and in fairness to certain personnel these leads should be further explored.

I was interested in the part of that sentence "in fairness to certain personnel." Did you not follow up leads that you encountered for the first time during the course of your investigation and carry your investigation of these leads through to their logical conclusion?

Colonel Clausen. Yes; but, for example, I always had a bunch that in Hawaii they must have tapped phone lines. When I got over there to Hawaii I went first to a man who was a ship's clerk. I had been given his name by Colonel Bicknell. Well, when the man sat down and said that he was a Navy agent I, of course, said, "What do you do?"? I had no knowledge of phone taps. He said, "I am a technician."

Well, you know, Mr. Gearhart, when a fellow is secretive and says he is a technician, and a private detective, we, as lawyers, immediately think of dictaphones, et cetera. When I found out he was a technician, why, then that was very interesting. And the more I talked to him the less he [11941] wanted to talk. When he finally did say that his technique extended to phone taps, when I put the question to him direct, he didn't even want to sign the paper.
Now, that is an example of some of the things that were brand new. Mr. Gearhart. That is the point I wanted to make. That is, to bring out that you were under an injunction to bring out new evidence as well as to eliminate the uncertainties of old evidence. Isn’t that correct?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, but, Mr. Gearhart, I was just as free as the wind as to what I could do so far as uncovering evidence was concerned. I mean by that, Mr. Gearhart, and I want you to believe this, there was no compulsion, no restraint, nothing put upon me except that in which I agreed. I agreed it didn’t seem to me to be my province to go into the Navy to find out whether Admiral Kimmel should be court-martialed by the Navy. My functions resolved around, Mr. Gearhart, as I read your Public Law 339. I agreed with that scope of my investigation completely.

And let me point this out to you, Mr. Gearhart, because I think you, unknowingly, assumed something of the character that Senator Lucas mentioned this morning, my immediate superior officer was General Short’s lawyer. That is, then Deputy Judge Advocate General Thomas Green. He is today [11942] the Judge Advocate General.

Now, if you are going to assume that because people represent people and they are over you that you are going to slant your investigation there would be more hypothesis to suspect that I was slanting it in favor of General Short.

Mr. Gearhart. I am trying to bring out by these questions that you were a free agent.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. That you had the right to pursue any investigation, follow anything to its logical conclusion, anything that you felt was worthy of investigation.

Colonel Clausen. That is right.

Mr. Gearhart. That is what I want to bring out. I am not casting any aspersions as to the motives behind making any investigation, that some people were trying to control your investigations, somebody in higher position.

Now, you have told us in answer to questions that have been pro pounded by other members of the committee that you have gone quite thoroughly into the so-called winds message trying to find out all you could about that.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. You have laid great emphasis upon your efforts in that regard. I wondered why, because the winds message is just one of many, many bits of evidence that [11942] point to the same conclusion. Why should we get so excited over the winds message when you have other messages, the dead-line message, when you have the ship movement message, and all of the others which are pointed to almost immediate commencement of hostilities. So I wondered why in the world you spent so much time on that particular item.

Colonel Clausen. I quite agree with you that the winds message, the implement, and all that, is magnified out of all proportion to its connection with Pearl Harbor. I came to that conclusion, however, after I went into the investigation myself. In other words, when I started out, you see, Mr. Gearhart, I had been shown the Hart examination. In other words, Admiral Hart’s examination. And we had
in the Hart examination—understand now, this is very important in answer to your question—Captain Safford's testimony, but he didn't testify, Mr. Gearhart, that he got message so and so which was the winds set-up message. He testified that war information was received in Washington to the effect that war was going to break out at once. And then when you pressed him down to find out, well, where was this information, why he was evaluating the winds code set-up.

In other words, he was putting his evaluation on it. So if you took Captain Safford's testimony before Admiral Hart and analyzed it you would find many assertions of a broad sweeping character, even going so far as to say, I believe in one place, that all the Japanese intentions were known on December 6. Well, that would imply that you even knew that Pearl Harbor was the attack target, you see. But when you get underneath, what he was doing was evaluating, giving his opinion of the messages.

Now, therefore, that distinction being borne in mind, and realizing that Captain Safford said this, and yet it is based on the wind code, that is one reason why it is magnified out of all proportion.

Another reason was the dramatic thing about the missing implement message, whether somebody wiped it and whether somebody destroyed it. That gave rise to a matter of importance.

Mr. Gearhart. And it gave suggestion to others to deny that there was a winds execute message and some people have done so, isn't that so?

Colonel Clausen. I don't know what suggestion may have been given to other people, what suggestion may have been created in their minds, but I agree with you, Mr. Gearhart, the winds code set-up and the query and implement message is magnified out of all proportion to all the aspects of this tragedy.

Mr. Gearhart. The most that could be said of the winds message, if there was a winds message, is that it added one more element of evidence to an abundance of evidence to the same result already in the record and not denied by anyone?

Colonel Clausen. That is right, that war is going to happen between the United States and Japan imminently.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, I think there are some questions very, very much more important than the winds message. I am just wondering if you investigated them with the same zeal that you did the winds message.

For instance, the greatest mystery of all of these Pearl Harbor investigations is the mystery of where the Chief of Staff of the Army was and where the Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy was on the night of December 6, 1941. Did you go into that?

Colonel Clausen. He told us, I think—I am not sure now—that he couldn't recall. I am not sure.

Mr. Gearhart. That is the amazing evidence before this committee and that was before every other committee that has investigated this thing back to the very event of Pearl Harbor. "I don't remember where I was Saturday night the 6th of December 1941." That is the amazing assertion of all of these investigations and no one seems to have been interested enough to try to find out how it happened that these top men in both the Army and the Navy don't remember where they were on the night of December 6, 1941, though
they remember where they were all during the day of December 6 and everything they did on the day of December 7 of 1941.

Colonel Clausen. Well, you see, Mr. Gearhart, the 13-part message that gave the 13 parts of the Jap reply to the Secretary of State's answer to the Japanese, that came in the night of December 6. I showed by my affidavit of General Miles that he knew about it that night.

Mr. Gearhart. That who knew about it?

Colonel Clausen. General Miles.

Mr. Gearhart. General Miles knew about it. There were a lot of high dignitaries of both the Army and the Navy that knew about it because they received the message that night, the first 13 parts.

Colonel Clausen. No, Mr. Gearhart, if I remember General Miles correctly, he testified before me that he was dining I think with Admiral Wilkinson—

Mr. Gearhart. That is right.

Colonel Clausen. And somebody brought it out to Admiral Wilkinson's home and so it was purely, you might say, accidentally that he, being there at the time, was [11947] apprised of it.

Mr. Gearhart. That is right. He got it from the message that was brought by Captain Kramer that night.

Now, here you were under an injunction to do something about the personnel that were under a cloud as a result of investigations to look into it further and see if you couldn't clear some of that fog away.

Colonel Clausen. No, sir, Mr. Gearhart, it is not the way you ask the question.

Mr. Gearhart. I don't want to have you draw any invidious conclusions. I want you to understand that I think you were under injunction to do justice to those people by revealing evidence in their favor or evidence against them what the facts were as to those people that were under a cloud; isn't that correct?

Colonel Clausen. Not those under a cloud. As I said yesterday I don't want to try to forecast what General Cramer may have had in his mind, but what people I had in mind were those participants, in any way remotely connected with Pearl Harbor and, as I answered to Mr. Keefe, the people involved, and who they were are set forth in my exhibit here. There were some 15 who had testified before the Grumet Board and some 35 who were new witnesses. And if you turn to my exhibit C and see the leads and run it down you see what leads I was working on.

[11948] Mr. Gearhart. What I thought you were supposed to do, I thought you were given a free hand and told to go out and clear up these mysteries and I wondered why you hadn't given your first attention to the greatest mystery of all.

Colonel Clausen. What is that. Mr. Gearhart?

Mr. Gearhart. Where General Marshall was and where Admiral Stark was on the night before when things were happening with such rapidity.

Colonel Clausen. Mr. Gearhart, when a man tells you he can't recall where he was on a certain night, I mean, if that is his answer, that he can't recall where he was on a certain night, and you have got all of these other things to do, I mean, you have got magic to go into——

Mr. Gearhart. Yes; magic figures very largely in this question.

Colonel Clausen. That is what I mean.
Mr. Gearhart. Where General Marshall was on the night of the 6th?

Colonel Clausen. No, Mr. Gearhart. Listen—

Mr. Gearhart. All right.

Colonel Clausen. Just take, Mr. Gearhart—

Mr. Gearhart. Go ahead.

Colonel Clausen. Let me answer you. You are saying that where General Marshall was on the night of the 6th [11949] of December is the most important.

I am telling you that to my mind—and you may be right, I don’t know—the magic was the most important to me, because here we had sat for over 3 months, mind you, I preparing questions and asking questions and finding out about SOP’s and war plans, and going to Hawaii, holding hearings in San Francisco, Washington, and Hawaii, and not knowing a blooming thing about magic.

Mr. Gearhart. Then you considered magic the most important?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir; to me it was.

Mr. Gearhart. I think magic has a very, very direct connection with the absence of General Marshall on the night of the 6th, and for that reason in order to emphasize that, I will read you a paragraph from the report of the Army Board, from page 56 of the United States News.

We have here these words:

The Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in the following particulars:

Subsection C:

To get to General Short on the evening of December 6th and the early morning of December 7th, the critical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan, though [11950] there was ample time to have accomplished this.

That is the finding and the conclusion and the indictment, if you please, of the Army Board itself, and that ties in the absence of General Marshall with magic as closely as any two ideas could be associated.

Did not that paragraph, with which you were thoroughly familiar, generate in your mind the thought that you should look into it as deeply as you could, as to where General Marshall was on the night of December 6?

Colonel Clausen. Mr. Gearhart, to be entirely fair now—

Mr. Gearhart. Yes.

Colonel Clausen. I say, to be entirely fair, you must realize that the Board when it made its findings and conclusions, not only the report that you are reading from, but the top secret report, did not have the benefit of this magic information. Now—

Mr. Gearhart. You had heard about the magic information during the last 2 or 3 weeks of your Board’s investigation, hadn’t you?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir. I think it was in the last week.

Mr. Gearhart. In the last week, and now we know more [11951] about magic.

Colonel Clausen. We know a lot more now; yes.

Mr. Gearhart. We know that there were a great many intercepts translated on the night and during the day of the 6th day of December 1941; don’t we?
Colonel Clausew. Well, I don’t know what you mean by a great many.

Mr. Gearhart. In Exhibit No. 1, I have found over 20 messages. Colonel Clausew. That is the reason I don’t like to answer. I don’t know what you mean.

Mr. Gearhart. Over 20 messages were decoded, intercepted, and decoded on the 6th day of December.

Colonel Clausew. I say, I don’t like to answer——

Mr. Gearhart. And during all of the night up from the evening hours, rather, straight through the 13 parts and the pilot message, they were coming in one after the other, being decoded, information which General Marshall should have had.

So you, in spite of that evidence of the tremendous volume of intercepts that were dealt with that night, you did not feel it was incumbent upon you to try to find out by independent evidence where General Marshall was on that occasion?

[11952] Colonel Clausew. Well, as I said before, Mr. Gearhart, in the first place, I don’t like to answer “Yes,” when you say “great volume,” because I don’t know whether your mind and my mind have the same thought as to what a great volume means.

Mr. Gearhart. I fixed that by saying 20 intercepts appear in exhibit No. 1, as having been translated for the first time on the 6th day of December. How many other intercepts are printed in the other exhibits as having been intercepted or decoded on that day, I don’t know. But 20, over 20, is considerable in my estimate, and among those 20 was the 13 parts and the pilot message, on the Japanese answer to the Hall proposals. And the Board condemns General Marshall because he wasn’t around on the night of December 6 receiving and acting upon such intercepts.

Didn’t that suggest to you that you should try to look into it and try to find some independent evidence?

Colonel Clausew. I did, but listen, Mr. Gearhart, you can’t have a chief of staff be a superhuman man, in 20 different places at one time. Mr. Gearhart, you have got the tremendous magnitude of a world to consider. You have got——

Mr. Gearhart. That is correct, but——

Colonel Clausew. Just let me finish, please.

[11953] Mr. Gearhart. You were in the Judge Advocate General’s Department——

Colonel Clausew. Let me finish, Mr. Gearhart.

You have got the world to consider. You have got global consideration. You have got first and foremost a G-2 when it comes to information of that kind. So I did follow it down. Nobody had shown that General Miles had this thing.

In other words, the 13-part message.

Mr. Gearhart. You were in the Judge Advocate General’s Department, and were supposed to be familiar with Army Regulations; were you not?

Colonel Clausew. Well, Mr. Gearhart, you are not going to catechize me on Army regulations now; are you?

Mr. Gearhart. Well, doesn’t a member of the Judge Advocate General’s Department have to do with regulations?

Colonel Clausew. From time to time; yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, you know that the Chief of Staff of the Army is on duty for 24 hours a day; do you not?
Colonel Clausen. That is what we are supposed to be. We are supposed to be on duty. I don't think that means that you can't go out and take a horseback ride or exercise.
Mr. Gearhart. It means that his office is open for 24 hours a day; doesn't it?

[11954] Colonel Clausen. The office; yes.
Like the Supreme Court—I think it never closes—our California Supreme Court. Isn't that right?
Mr. Gearhart. That is right.
Colonel Clausen. But I bet the justices go out to play golf on Sundays once in a while.
Mr. Gearhart. I will get to that, but answer my question.
Colonel Clausen. You are asking about 24-hour duty.
Mr. Gearhart. He is on duty for 24 hours a day.
Colonel Clausen. It is obvious, Mr. Gearhart, that you have got to sleep. You can't sit at a desk 24 hours; that isn't what it means.
Mr. Gearhart. But it means you must be in touch with your office, in touch with your command, for the full 24 hours of the day, doesn't it?
Colonel Clausen. It means what it says.
Mr. Gearhart. That places upon the Commander in Chief—
Colonel Clausen. Let me go on. One of the things it means, it means that you must have a staff functioning, and he had G-2's, G-3's, G-1's, G-4's, all the G's.
Mr. Gearhart. That is right.
Colonel Clausen. His G-2 got the information the night of December 6.

[11955] Mr. Gearhart. But isn't it a fact that the personnel of the Army, that is on duty for 24 hours a day by Army regulations, should always leave word, the Chief of Staff should always leave word as to where he can be found every minute of the day if necessary?
Colonel Clausen. I don't know of any such regulation.
Mr. Gearhart. Do you mean to say that General Marshall came to his office and stayed there when he pleased, and when he left, never left word where he could be contacted if anything should arise?
Colonel Clausen. I mean, Mr. Gearhart, he did just the opposite. You were asking about regulations.
Mr. Gearhart. Of course, it is logical to reason it out, isn't it, that he left word at the office where he could be found in case of emergency at all times; isn't that correct, whether in the city or out of the city?
Colonel Clausen. The way they have things set up in the Army they just overdo what you are talking about.
In other words, you have to sign in and you have to sign out. I assume that if anybody wanted to get a hold of General Marshall, the night of the 6th of December they could have easily done so.
Mr. Gearhart. Did you in your efforts to investigate the subject and assist the General in recollecting where he [11956] was, query or make any investigation of the office of the Secretary of the Chief of Staff of the Army, to find out whether they kept any records of where the Commander in Chief could be found?
Colonel Clausen. I think you will find, Mr. Gearhart, in some of the affidavits given before me, some statements, to the effect that the Chief of Staff could be reached. Something to that effect.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, you knew that the Chief of Staff was in Washington on the day of the attack, he was in Washington the day before the attack, and we know also from the testimony of Justice Roberts that General Marshall and Admiral Stark were assisting him within 2 or 3 days, up to 10 days after the event in the gathering of the facts together concerning Pearl Harbor. Certainly he ought to be able to remember at that time, the time of the Roberts report, as to where he was, but strange to say he didn’t remember at the time of the Roberts investigation where he was the night before Pearl Harbor.

Then there came a succession of other investigations in all of which General Marshall participated and in none of them was he able to refresh his memory.

I was wondering what you were trying to do in your investigation to bring out some facts by which General Marshall’s testimony might have been refreshed as to where he was on the night of December 6.

Colonel Clausen. Mr. Gearhart, you see, the best way to get the answer to the question about the availability of the Chief of Staff on the night of December 6, is to read the affidavits. I pick up at random the one of his secretary, and he is talking about the 13-part message, the last sentence. He says:

With regard to the secretariat if he had been informed of the contents or of their urgent nature—

They are speaking of the 13 parts—

It would have been delivered to the Chief of Staff in accordance with our usual procedure, either by the officer on duty or by Colonel Bratton himself.

I assume that means what it says. In other words, they could have gotten the Chief of Staff.

Mr. Gearhart. If that is true then Gen. Bedell Smith knew where General Marshall was the night before. Certainly he has learned that General Marshall has forgotten.

Colonel Clausen. That is a nonsequitur that you are saying.

Mr. Gearhart. Let us talk English for the present.

Mr. Murphy. “It does not follow.”

Mr. Gearhart. I know what it means.

Colonel Clausen. You gave us, Mr. Gearhart, defunctus officio.

Mr. Gearhart. I thought you would enjoy that.

Colonel Clausen. That is California Latin. They did not understand it. Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, then, if that is true, if General Smith did know where General Marshall could be reached on Saturday night, how does it happen he has not reminded General Marshall where the general was?

Colonel Clausen. That is not what he said.

Mr. Gearhart. He said he could have gotten it to him.

Colonel Clausen. Here is what he says:

It would have been delivered to the Chief of Staff in accordance with our usual procedure either by the officer on duty or by Colonel Bratton himself.

Mr. Gearhart. But that presupposes that somebody knew where General Marshall was.

Colonel Clausen. That is what I am trying to say—that it would seem to me, based on this, that if the Chief of Staff needed to be reached on the night of December 6 he could have been reached.
Mr. Gearhart. Well, he is bitterly condemned by the Board because he wasn't around on December 6 when these messages were coming in.

Colonel Clausen. Mr. Gearhart, let me point out—he's fair—you are speaking of a board report, the Grunert board, and which I am proud to have been a member of, in a subordinate, very minor, capacity, say, as an assistant lawyer—but they didn't have the magic information; they didn't know that General Miles the night of December 6 had the 13th part.

Mr. Gearhart. All right. Now, since General Marshall [11960] couldn't remember, and has not been able to remember or refresh his memory during all of these 8 or 9 or 10 investigations, and when he comes here in 1946 and says that he cannot remember where he was, did you try to find out by a search for independent evidence as to where he could have been?

Colonel Clausen. Where General Marshall was?

Mr. Gearhart. Yes.

[11961] Colonel Clausen. Well, you see, Mr. Gearhart. I interrogated all the witnesses on the aspects of magic. I am just trying to thumb through here and find a few references.

I found General Smith's recollection. I thought General Gerow said something about it.

Mr. Gearhart. General Smith's testimony presupposes, doesn't it, the assumption that somebody knew where General Marshall was on that night?

Colonel Clausen. No. It presupposes this—that the Chief of Staff, according to the procedure set up in his office, would have had machinery so that if you pressed a button you would ipso facto see the Chief of Staff. I see here where General Gerow said something about a December 4 incident. He says:

I believe the Chief of Staff was then available for that purpose.

In other words, for a conference.

I think you will find through here, Mr. Gearhart—I think you will find through here plenty of evidence that according to the procedure then in operation, if it became necessary to see the Chief of Staff the night of December 6, he could have been seen.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, now——

[11962] Colonel Clausen. I don't know—Mr. Gearhart, let's prove the negative—I don't know of anybody that tried to see the Chief of Staff the night of December 6 and could not find him.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, maybe there will be some testimony that they were trying to deliver to him, as they delivered to other people, these intercepts.

Colonel Clausen. Colonel Bratton testified before me that he gave the 13 parts to Colonel Dusenbury to bring to the Chief of Staff at his home at Fort Myer, Colonel Dusenbury living in Arlington, or that side of the Potomac, and I believe Colonel Bratton said he gave it to Colonel Dusenbury to bring to the Chief of Staff on his way home, and then Colonel Dusenbury told me in his affidavit that he didn't deliver them to the Chief of Staff then; that he didn't deliver them until the next morning.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, now, did you ask General Smith what the basis of his assertion was that he could have contacted General Marshall that night?
Colonel Clausen. Oh, I asked about the procedure, and I talked with General Deane; I interviewed him, got an affidavit from him at Potsdam. He was there during the Peace Conference.

Mr. Gearhart. But you didn’t do anything to find out?

[11963] Colonel Clausen. I did all these things, Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart. General Marshall has testified that he had three orderlies that served 24 hours a day at his home. Did you interview those orderlies as to whether they had any remembrance of where the general was on the night of December 6?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. General Marshall had an automobile assigned to him and a series of chauffeurs. Did you ask any of those chauffeurs as to where General Marshall was on the night of December 6, 1941?

Colonel Clausen. Mr. Gearhart, if the thought had occurred to me—I mean, if it had come into my mind—to go and see the orderlies, or the chauffeurs, I would have dismissed it from my mind as attacking one of the tiny twigs on the tree when my job was to attack the roots.

Mr. Gearhart. The great mystery of this whole Pearl Harbor investigation is where the Chief of Staff was on the night of December 6 and where the Chief of Naval Operations was on the night of December 6, 1941.

Now, if you had been able to find some evidence which you could have brought to General Marshall to refresh his memory, would you have considered that beneath your dignity in your special capacity as a special investigator into this [11964] great catastrophe?

Colonel Clausen. Mr. Gearhart, I tried to tell you that I had no dignity. My dignity was comparable to that of a major, and in this man’s Army a major is very, very low, and a lieutenant colonel I don’t think is much higher. I apologize for that.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, I rather resent you speaking so disparagingly of colonels, since I was a second lieutenant once. Where does that put me?

But the point is this: Here for 6 years we have gone on with the same mystery, and no one seems to have made a common ordinary district attorney investigation to assist General Marshall in remembering where he was, when there are, in my imagination’s eyes, perhaps a hundred people who might have been able to throw some light on that question.

For instance, the chauffeurs for General Marshall’s automobile; the orderlies in General Marshall’s home; the cook in General Marshall’s home; and the office staff here were supposed to keep a record of what the Chief of Staff of the Army is doing at all times.

None of these people seem to have been interrogated by anybody in any of these investigations. There is the mystery of where he was.

Colonel Clausen. Mr. Gearhart—

[11965] Mr. Gearhart. The mystery still remains—the big mystery of the Pearl Harbor investigation after 5 years of investigation. How do you account for that?

Colonel Clausen. Well, you want me to answer your opinion. I can’t very well argue with you; I means, it isn’t my function. I am here as a witness. But I don’t agree; in other words, I don’t think that is the big mystery of Pearl Harbor at all.

The big mystery—there are some big high lights.
Query: What information did Washington have?
Query: What did Washington do about it?
Another question: What information did Hawaii have?
Another question: What did Hawaii do about it?
I mean, those are basic big questions. Those are the things I had in mind.

Mr. Gearhart. Those are the big things, but this question of the whereabouts of the Chief of Staff of the Army is so important in the mind of the Grunert Board that they make it a specification upon which to condemn the general.

Colonel Clausen. And I say to you quite frankly, Mr. Gearhart, I am very proud to have been a subordinate member of the board; but, Mr. Gearhart, again remember the board made its finding at a time when they did not have the magic.

Mr. Gearhart. Yes; but——

[11966] Colonel Clausen. Did not know that General Miles knew the night of December 6 about the 13 parts. I would suggest, Mr. Gearhart——

Mr. Gearhart. Don't you see that the subsequent discovery of magic and all its ramifications merely intensifies and makes more important the basis of the specification upon which the Grunert Board condemns General Marshall?

Colonel Clausen. No; you are not correct, Mr. Gearhart. I would suggest to you that you get the actual transcript volumes of the Grunert Board.

In other words, what we called before the board; the secret volumes. Not the top secret; the secret volumes. Read that testimony. Read, for example, the testimony of General Miles.

Here is a man—I remember how he sat there when he was not allowed to give magic information, and we were asking him all kinds of questions about what he knew in Washington, and whether he got his information from spies, and why didn't he have spies out in the islands; and, of course, when the magic picture was unfolded, it was a different story. We knew what he was getting. We got that right out of the horse's mouth.

You find out the enemy's intentions, because they speak their intentions.

[11967] Therefore, I do not think that the Army Pearl Harbor Board report should be read word for word, because they did not have before them the magic.

Mr. Gearhart. That is just the point that I have been making. They had slight knowledge of the magic when they wrote that report.

Colonel Clausen. No; that is not fair.

Mr. Gearhart. Wait a minute. You said they only in the last week of their investigation——

Colonel Clausen. Mr. Gearhart——

Mr. Gearhart. Of the existence of magic. Didn't you say that?

Colonel Clausen. Not exactly. That is not the sum total. I understand that the three general officers were told by General Marshall in a general way at the first hearing about the magic. Now, the lawyers—that is, Colonel West and myself—we'ren't told about it. We didn't know anything about it. They didn't tell us, because there was a war going on. I am not drawing any comparisons, or making
any assertions that by reason of the fact we weren't told it was wrong, but the fact is that we did not know about this magic. We were so scared of it that finally, when we did know, it became a frightening aspect as to what to do with these papers; and we gave General Russell—I mean, the board gave General Russell—the job to take care of the Hart report.

[11968] Mr. Gearhart. All right.

Colonel Clausen. And they got a special file; nobody but he was supposed to have the combination.

Mr. Gearhart. All right. With the very, very limited information of the Grunert Board, in respect to magic, they nevertheless condemned General Marshall in these words:

to get to General Short on the evening of December 6 and the early morning of December 7 the critical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan.

That is a reference to intercepts, isn't it?
Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. And let me point out—now, be fair—

Mr. Gearhart. Don't raise the question of my fairness. I am trying to get answers.

The Vice Chairman. Let him answer the question.

Colonel Clausen. I say that to be fair you must consider in connection with your question, sir, the fact that there was testimony, positive testimony, before the Board that there had been delivered to General Bedell Smith the 13 parts, and certainly the indication that they went the night of December 6 to the Chief of Staff. Later on, the witness who made that assertion corrected his testimony that he, the night of December 6, was more concerned with getting the 13 parts to the Secretary of State; that that involved a diplomatic matter, those were diplomatic questions; and [11969] the Chief of Staff said that he didn't get them, and it was borne out by the fact that the man who was supposed to have brought them around, Colonel Dusenbury, frankly and honestly told me that he didn't do the job.

Mr. Gearhart. I must comment you in being so ingenious in turning the question, but the question is that the specification condemning General Marshall is based upon the fact that he did not pass on to General Short critical information.

Colonel Clausen. Well—

Mr. Gearhart. Now, wait. You say that that critical information was very limited.

Colonel Clausen. No—

Mr. Gearhart. And it was so far as the Board knew at that time—now, wait a minute; hold your horses. After and during the course of your investigation you learned all about the critical information, and you find that there is a tremendous amount of that critical information that was subject to dissemination in the Army and which should have been called to the attention of the Chief of Staff of the Army. So this specification in condemnation of General Marshall becomes more significant and is sustained by the subsequent knowledge that you acquired of all about the intercepts.

[11970] Colonel Clausen. No; that doesn't follow, Mr. Gearhart, for the reason, as I said before, that the last week of the Board's hearings they first found out the details of magic, and as to who it
went to, what it was, what it consisted of, who got it, et cetera, was not thoroughly pursued and explored by the Board.

Mr. Gearhart. Yes; I admit that.

Colonel Clausen. Whose function is it to send out G-2 information?

Mr. Gearhart. There was the function of taking it to the Chief of Staff of the Army and to other persons on the list as distributees. One of the persons who was supposed to get all this information doesn’t remember where he was on that night and didn’t get it that night, and therefore didn’t act on it that night, and therefore is condemned for it.

I say in justice to that individual you should have directed your investigation to all of the collateral information that could have been collected for the purpose of assisting him in recalling where he was in order that he could better defend himself against these accusations.

Colonel Clausen. Mr. Gearhart, if you and I in Fresno were trying a damage action involving automobiles, we are going to be following, according to the judge, the rules of the road. We are going to square our proof to certain [11971] rules, certain standards.

Now, in assessing responsibility against Army officers you can’t just discard all the rules of the military. You have to consider the military rules. They are contained in books. There is nothing secret about it. The functions of the staff officers and what they are supposed to do. And your proof here, or in any other case involving the military, must be by the standards of the military.

Mr. Gearhart. And that, you think, foreclosed you from interrogating General Marshall’s chaffeurs or his orderlies, his office staff and any other persons who might know where he was and from whose statement his memory might be refreshed?

Colonel Clausen. If I found him the night of 6 December, he still didn’t get the 13 parts, and his G-2, the man supposed to be charged with certain aspects and obligations, just like the Chief of Staff, he did know.

Mr. Gearhart. But no one had any right to act except the Chief of Staff.

Colonel Clausen. No, I don’t consider that to be so. There again it brings up what I mentioned. What are the military rules? What do the rules say? Who was supposed to act on what, what question? There is no secret about those things.

[11972] Mr. Gearhart. The one supposed to act is the one who must do something about information that has been brought to his attention.

Colonel Clausen. I remember some testimony by General Marshall to the effect that in his absence other people could act. I don’t recall the precise details.

Mr. Gearhart. He made a specific order requiring them to send him the intercept itself and not to send him alone the interpretation of any other Government officer.

Colonel Clausen. That is what I understand. I understand he wanted them, as I say, in the raw.

Mr. Gearhart. That is right.

Colonel Clausen. He wanted the intercepts in the raw, unevaluated.
Mr. Gearhart. When he did get this information on the late morning of the 7th he acted on it, it was General Marshall who acted on it, wasn't it, but unfortunately acted too late?

Colonel Clausen. Well, you are asking me for my memory as to the testimony. As I recall it on the morning of the 7th he had on his desk the 13 parts I believe with the 14-part message, and he also had the 1 o'clock message. When he got down to the 1 o'clock message, why, he saw that there was a great significance. I mean, he assumed there [11973] was a great significance concerning that because he thought it was an ultimatum date or time, rather.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, strange though enough it may seem the same lack of memory as to where he was on the night of December 6 is the story of the Chief of Naval Operations, too; is that not correct?

Colonel Clausen. Well, can't he remember where he was?

Mr. Gearhart. No, neither the Chief of Staff of the Army or the Chief of Naval Operations can remember where they were on the night of December 6, even though they were in their offices during all the day of December 6 and were on the job on the early morning of December 7. That is the greatest mystery of this investigation.

Colonel Clausen. I don't agree with you, Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart. If you did you would have investigated it, wouldn't you?

Colonel Clausen. I can't put it in more graphic form.

Senator Lucas. Will the Congressman yield?

Mr. Gearhart. I not only yield but I surrender the witness.

Mr. Lucas. I suggest to the Congressman that the committee is still functioning and that we might get those orderlies, those chauffeurs, those shoe clerks, and one thing and another.

[11974] Mr. Gearhart. You will find them all over the world and some of them, perhaps, under the sod.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy of Pennsylvania will inquire.

Mr. Murphy. Colonel, as I understand it before the Grunert Board they had in the last week certain information about the 13 parts. Did they know what the 13 parts were of the 14-part message?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir; General Russell finally got from G-2 a sheaf of these intercepts. Mr. Murphy, and they were then introduced before our Board as Top Secret Exhibit "B".

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, the Board had the 13 parts so they could read it?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir; we had the 14 parts.

Mr. Murphy. Well, I am talking about the 13 parts because the 14th part didn't come in until Sunday.

Colonel Clausen. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. Did the Board have any information before it on the pilot message? The pilot message was the one that came in saying there would be a long message and it would be in 14 parts.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, the Board had that in its Top Secret Exhibit "B," but I want you to understand that they hadn't run down as to who had gotten what, and so forth.

[11975] Mr. Murphy. That is what I am coming to. Did the Board have any information concerning the pilot message, that is the preliminary message saying there would be a message in 14 parts, did the Board have any information as to when it was delivered to General Marshall?
Colonel Clausen. Oh, I think in the testimony—
Mr. Murphy. I don't want any guesses now.
Colonel Clausen. You mean that 1 o'clock?
Mr. Murphy. I want to know whether the Board knew when the pilot message, not the 1 o'clock message now, the so-called pilot message, the message that said there will be a message in 14 parts, a long message—do you know anything about that particular message?
Colonel Clausen. I know the one you are referring to.
Mr. Murphy. Now, did the Board have any definite information as to when it was delivered, if at all, to General Marshall?
Colonel Clausen. The answer is hard to give for the reason that the testimony in that regard was—well, it just was by, I think, one or two witnesses and the details, Mr. Murphy, were not clear at all.
Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate there has been much said here about where General Marshall was on the night of the 6th. General Marshall told this committee in this record that he [11976] felt he was at home, in his own home, and we have had no evidence to contradict that, not a single word of evidence in this record that the General was not at home on that night.
Colonel Clausen. I don't know that he said that. That just proves further what I said before, that I haven't found anybody who brought it to him on the night of 6 December and could not.
Mr. Gearhart. Will the gentleman yield? That is another strange statement. The General said that he may have gone to a picture show, that he had not seen a picture for a long time; that he went to look at his wife's social book and it didn't show that he had been out for dinner that night and therefore he concluded that he was at home. He didn't say that he was at home but he didn't remember any place that he might have gone to that night.
Mr. Murphy. He said that he didn't know whether he was out or whether he was in.
Now, as I understand it, you did not inquire whether he had grape-nuts or grapefruit for breakfast.
Mr. Gearhart. If that would have been relevant, I would have asked him.
Mr. Murphy. Just a moment. You were assigned to do important things, you were assigned to investigate important matters.
[11977] Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. And that is what you did?
Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. As a matter of fact, when this Board made its report they said this:
The Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall—
Mr. Richardson. What page are you reading from?
Mr. Murphy. Page 56 of the United States News. [Reading]:
The Chief of Staff of the Army, General George C. Marshall, failed in his relations with the Hawaiian Department in the following particulars.
Mr. Gearhart read subsection C:
To get to General Short on the evening of December 6th and the early morning of December 7th, the critical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan.
Now, then, do you know, sir, what information General Marshall would have sent to General Short on the night of the 6th?
Colonel Clausen. No, sir; that would be speculative.

Mr. Murphy. On the night of the 6th there were 13 parts of an incomplete message. Do you know whether or not the Board felt that he should have sent the 13 parts out to General Short to read them? I mean is that what the Board meant?

Colonel Clausen. I don't know. I don't know what the Board meant.

Senator Brewster. I think you will find very clearly what the Board felt on that if you will refer to page 62 and read what the Board said, because they discussed that matter very thoroughly.

Mr. Murphy. Are you through?

Senator Brewster. Well, it is there if the gentleman is interested in that.

The Vice Chairman. The gentleman will be in order.

Mr. Murphy. Now, at the time of the interruption you said you did not understand.

Colonel Clausen. I said I did not like to answer what the Board may have felt.

Mr. Murphy. Now, they also include the early morning of December 7 and I assume there they are speaking of the 11-part message or the 1 o'clock message. Did they have information about the 1 o'clock message, the board?

Colonel Clausen. We had some testimony before the board as to the 1 o'clock message. The exact details I do not know. I tell you what we had, Mr. Murphy. As I said before, we had the Hart examination and we had Colonel Bratton testify, Colonels Sadtler testify, Captain Safford testify.

Mr. Murphy. That is all.

The Vice Chairman. Any further questions? If not——

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman. Do you have another question, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, more than one.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. Colonel Clausen, did you make any investigation as to who saw General Short's reply to General Marshall's message of the 27th of November?

Colonel Clausen. The reply being the alerting against sabotage, liaison with Navy?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, that he alerted against sabotage.

Colonel Clausen. I believe it was gone into to some extent. I cannot remember, Mr. Ferguson, whether I have got comments on that, whether I had that in mind. I remember that in one particular I wanted to know whether that was sent over to the Navy.

Senator Ferguson. Now, that was one of the things that was——

Colonel Clausen. I am in the process of answering, Mr. Ferguson.


Colonel Clausen. I noticed in the Navy Court of Inquiry proceedings that there was some admiral. I don't like to put the name down definitely, whether it was Turner—I don't recall, but some admiral saw it.

Senator Ferguson. But who in the Army saw it? It was very vital as to who saw it.
Colonel Clausen. Well, the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, accepted responsibility, in my opinion, of seeing that. In other words, he had a stamp on it and said he presumed he saw it.
Senator Ferguson. All right.
Colonel Clausen. Then there was General Gerow. I think he initialed it, I am not sure. I would like to see it if I am to be tied down.
Senator Ferguson. You are right.
Colonel Clausen. And then there was Mr. Stimson here, I think his initials were on it and I just don't know.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, the fact that General Marshall accepted the responsibility of seeing it, that ended it as far as you were concerned?
Colonel Clausen. Well, no; he said he presumed he saw it, Mr. Ferguson.

[II981] Senator Ferguson. Now, did he ever deny to you that he saw the 13 parts on the night of the 6th? Did you ever question General Marshall about whether he saw the 13 parts on the night of the 6th?
Colonel Clausen. The whole subject was gone into and there was testimony, you see, from the General. I should have included him in the former answer. The General testified to magic, too. In other words, he was quizzed as to what he knew and you will find his testimony at several places in what we call the Top Secret Report of the Board, I mean the Top Secret testimony, transcript.

Senator Ferguson. Here is what I am trying to get at: You did not question him to get an affidavit from him as to whether or not he ever saw the reply, this reply, because you say he assumed that. Now I am going to the 13 parts. You never questioned him about whether or not he saw the 13 parts on the night of the 6th?
Colonel Clausen. I talked over the subject with him, Mr. Ferguson, and he couldn't add anything to his testimony on that subject before the Board.

Senator Ferguson. Well, why didn't you put that in the affidavit then, in the Marshall affidavit?
Colonel Clausen. I was not proving negatives. I mean I had the Top Secret transcript of the Board for that pur-

[II982] pose.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you try to follow the so-called pilot message at all? Did you ever question Bratton about when he delivered the pilot message?

Colonel Clausen. Well, I questioned them all, Mr. Ferguson. That is the reason I took the things around and you will find the references in the affidavits to—

Senator Ferguson. Where is there any reference in any affidavit that you took in relation to the pilot message?
Colonel Clausen. Why, it is in almost everyone, where I refer to these intercepts, because it is part of the top secret exhibit B and my procedure was to ask them concerning the papers in the top secret exhibit B, so what I did was would be to ask the various witnesses, for example, like General Gerow, I would hand him these papers and I would say, "Do you recall seeing these?" Lots of times they would say they couldn't remember, you would get varying answers.
Senator Ferguson. But the pilot message is a specific, very important message, because it indicated that this message—

Colonel Clausen. Well, I think they are all important in there, Mr. Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. Now, don't let's go around the bush too many times. Let's keep on the pilot message.

[11983] Colonel Clausen. It is not fair because your characterization, Mr. Ferguson, honestly on the one message as being the important one but to me I thought everyone that General Russell selected and put down were important.

Senator Ferguson. Coming back to the pilot message, did you know that the pilot message was decrypted, decoded, and translated by 2 o'clock on the 6th of December 1941?

Colonel Clausen. You mean 2 o'clock in the afternoon?

Senator Ferguson. Afternoon.

Colonel Clausen. Well, I assume it is in there, wherever we have it. I mean if you say that is a fact. I went over to get the affidavit and tried to find out and run down those things, too. I mean by that I went over their proceedings and there seemed to be some confusion. There would be confusion as who got what and who translated it and during these last days—

Senator Ferguson. Where is the evidence on the confusion? If you found it wouldn't that me important to give to the Secretary of War, about this confusion?

Colonel Clausen. You have got the actual transcripts. In other words, for example, one place, I think it is Captain Safford said that the Army translated the message. I remember Colonel Bratton said it was the Navy and during the last days there when they were supposed to be working back and forth there on odd and even days, the Navy were doing it on odd days, the Army on even, they would also cut across that line. In other words, you could not depend on that as a rigid guide.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Clausen, if the pilot message was in the Army, as I say, translated and ready for delivery at 2 o'clock p.m. on the afternoon of the 6th, did you investigate as to why General Marshall had not at least seen that message?

Colonel Clausen. I say to you, Mr. Ferguson, that I do not know what the record and the evidence shows on that. I do not like to be tied down to these times.

Senator Ferguson. Did you make any investigation as to whether or not the pilot message was or was not delivered to General Marshall on the afternoon or evening of the 6th?

Colonel Clausen. I give you the same answer, Mr. Ferguson. In other words, I cannot recall just what there is in there on that subject. I do know that I tried to find out in general about who got what messages when.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Show me—

Colonel Clausen. Senator Ferguson, there was no sure way; I mean by that every statement on receipt had said that when a person receipted for that the receipts were later destroyed. In other words, I ran it down. I am not sure now [11985] but I think Colonel Bratton gave some testimony in his affidavit because I wanted to find out if I could just how it was done.
Senator Ferguson. But in the Dusenbury affidavit, in the Bratton affidavit do you mention the pilot message?

Colonel Clausen. It is included in top secret B.

Senator Ferguson. No, no. Show me where you include the pilot message in the Bratton affidavit where you asked him specifically about the pilot message? You asked him specifically about the 13-part message.

Colonel Clausen. Well, what I said before will have to stand, I am sorry, because I had these intercepts in what I called top secret exhibit B and my procedure was to show them to the people. Now, I have before me the affidavit of General Gerow. He says here—

Senator Ferguson. Let us get back to this pilot message.

Colonel Clausen. I want to answer your question, Mr. Ferguson.

Mr. Richardson. Just read him the question and see what it was. I have been lost for 5 minutes on this. Read him the question.

(Question read.)

Senator Ferguson. Don’t get to Gerow. Let us keep to [11986] these two. In either one of those affidavits do you mention to those gentlemen the pilot message?

Colonel Clausen. I think you will find I have if you refer to what I said.

Senator Ferguson. Point it out.

Colonel Clausen. I have reference to top secret exhibit B.

Senator Ferguson. No; point out where you mention any pilot message to either one of those gentlemen.

Colonel Clausen. The whole is composed of its parts and if the top secret exhibit B had the pilot message in there it was done in that way.

Senator Ferguson. Isn’t this true? Did you go to Bratton and specifically question him about the testimony that he had already given before the Board that he had delivered the 13-part message? There isn’t any doubt in your mind that he testified before the Board and you heard him testify, that he had delivered the 13 parts on Saturday night to Bedell Smith and told him they were important? Is there any question in your mind about that?

Colonel Clausen. I refer back to what I said before to Mr. Keefe concerning my interview of Colonel Bratton, that I mentioned to him the whole subject that we are talking about now and then I wanted to show him the papers. I had these [11987] papers with me, so he was shown these. Now, if he had—

Senator Ferguson. What was he shown? Tell us now.

Colonel Clausen. He was shown the statements and affidavits of Carlisle Clyde Dusenbury, Moses W. Pettigrew, Ralph C. Smith, Charles K. Gailey, Thomas J. Betts, Walter B. Smith, Leonard T. Gerow, Robert E. Schukraft, John F. Stone, George W. Renschard. Now—

Senator Ferguson. Just there. Did you show him at the same time his testimony before the board?

Colonel Clausen. I had a transcript with the testimony taken down. Senator Ferguson. That was not my question. Did you show it to him?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir. I had other notes.
Senator Ferguson. Please answer my question. Did you show him a copy of the testimony he had given before the board?

Colonel Clausen. I say I did not show him that but I did have with me and read to him my notes on the testimony, given before the board. In other words, I had taken a brief of the testimony.

Senator Ferguson. Now, isn’t this true, Colonel? Isn’t this true that Clausen, being asked in an affidavit to change his sworn testimony—


Senator Ferguson. Bratton, being asked to change his sworn testimony before a Board of Generals appointed by the Secretary of War—

Colonel Clausen. That is not so and never was so and never would be so in my case because I did not ask him to change anything.

Senator Ferguson. Then why did you go to him?

Colonel Clausen. For the reason that I wanted to find out about this. The other men, Mr. Ferguson, who testified concerning the same subjects that Colonel Bratton testified about gave great details and those details were different than Colonel Bratton had testified about and I remembered that Colonel Bratton when he testified stated that he was pressing his recollection, that he could not recollect, that he could not verify.

Senator Ferguson. Do you think in your experience as a lawyer that when Bratton was before that board testifying that he gave Bedell Smith these papers on the night of the 6th, did you think that he was mistaken and did not know what he was talking about in that testimony before the board where you were the attorney and assistant recorder?

Colonel Clausen. I did not say that he was—I mean I don’t think that conclusion came to my mind. That was not my point, that was not my purpose.

Senator Ferguson. No; but you were the record and the attorney there. Why didn’t you tell the board that you did not believe Bratton before the board?

Colonel Clausen. Why didn’t I tell the board?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Colonel Clausen. What do you mean. I did not believe him before the board? You are assuming something that is not correct.

Senator Ferguson. Did you believe him?

Colonel Clausen. I believed every witness before the board. I said before that I thought all the witnesses told the truth as they knew it at the time, but you cannot drag a man in during the last days of a hearing and have him come in there under the circumstances that we were operating under and expect that that testimony in this vital testimony should not have further verifications. If he said at the time that he can’t verify, can’t prove certain statements, which I think he said, that would mean that you would have to go out and get further proof in verification.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did Bedell Smith actually swear that Bratton did not deliver the messages to him?

Colonel Clausen. Well, he said what he said in his affidavit.

[11990] Senator Ferguson. He had no definite recollection that he did not or that he did. He said he thought he went home.
Colonel Clausen. That is his recollection, Mr. Ferguson. That is all any witness can do, is give his best recollection.

Senator Ferguson. Did you go back to Bratton to get him to confirm his testimony or to change it in line with the affidavits of Dusenbury and Smith?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir; I did not go with any such purpose as that. I went to him and stated what these men had stated and to get the further details, because I was pursuing all the leads.

Senator Ferguson. Now, on page 52 of the report of the Board, the Board made a finding on the testimony of Bratton.

Colonel Clausen. Page what?

Senator Ferguson. Page 52, and this is the United States News edition of Official Reports concerning attack on Pearl Harbor. The Board made a specific finding on Bratton's testimony. [Reading:]

As elsewhere related in detail, when vital information of December 6th reached G-2 of the War Department, not later than nine o'clock the evening of December 6, it was placed in the locked pouch and delivered to the Secretary of the General Staff, Colonel [11991] Bedell Smith, now Lt. Gen. Smith, with a warning from Colonel Bratton, Chief of Far Eastern Section of G-2, that it contained a vitally important message. In fact the message implied war and soon.

Now, there is a specific finding by a Board of three generals appointed by the Secretary of War that Bratton had delivered these 13 parts to Bedell Smith for delivery to the Chief of Staff. Now, why were you going to Bratton with affidavits or papers which showed that he did not deliver it and take an affidavit from Bratton that he did not so deliver that message?

Colonel Clausen. I cannot do more than to say what I stated before. One of the very first men that I interviewed in Washington was Colonel Dusenbury and when I showed him these Top Secret exhibits and to try to get the details from him he said it was he who was charged to deliver those particular 13 parts. Then he says in his affidavit—or whatever he says in his affidavit. Now, apparently, then, either one or the other were mistaken.

Senator Ferguson. No; but what I am trying to get at; why did you go to Dusenbury and to Colonel Bratton? There was a specific finding of facts by the Board.

Colonel Clausen. My heavens——

Senator Ferguson. Was it because General Marshall objected and the Secretary of War objected to that finding?

Colonel Clausen. Why, of course not. Sir, I went to Dusenbury as I went to the other witnesses, in pursuance of investigating unexplored leads, the major portion of which and the most important of which were magic and we had to pursue that because in the last week of the Board's proceedings was the only time we had been given the magic, which had theretofore been withheld, and that meant that it was a very vital link that should be explored.

Senator Ferguson. Now there wasn't any doubt that the board knew about the 13-part message and the delivery date was not involved, because here a board had made a specific finding and you were one of the attorneys of the board.

Colonel Clausen. Senator, would you want me to just stop with the inquiry at that particular point, because there was a finding by the board, when I knew the circumstances? When, by my experience,
my knowledge of the facts, that I had sat on the board for over three months that we had taken testimony and we heard witnesses and we were not interrogating on magic?

Senator Ferguson. When did you first have doubt in your mind that delivery had not been made on the night of the 6th to the Chief of Staff's office?

Colonel Clausen. I cannot assess any particular moment that I got down to it. I do recall Colonel Dusenbury was one of the first men I talked with.

Senator Ferguson. Why did you question Dusenbury to find out if the 13 parts had been delivered?

Colonel Clausen. I had been told by some one, I do not know who, Senator, that Dusenbury was one of the men involved in this ultra picture before the 7th of December, that he had been charged with this knowledge, and it was [II994] all right for me to talk with him about it. So I just called him and had him come to the office.

Senator Ferguson. Here are some of your other leads, and I want to know if you took any testimony on them. I will pick out just a few of them. It says:

2. In the War and Navy Department in Washington the following matters can be investigated:
   a. Whether Kimmel notified the Navy Department and the Navy Department notified the War Department of the order to sink Jap subs, and the reason for such order.

   Did you investigate that?

Colonel Clausen. I believe that was one of the leads that was considered not necessary to the Army's viewpoint, except that I recall having found—I mean I cannot recall getting any—

   Senator Ferguson (interposing). Now who had the conference and who decided that that was not to be looked into?

Colonel Clausen. I had many conferences, as I said yesterday, with General Cramer, and I had conferences with Mr. Bundy, Harvey H. Bundy, special assistant to the Secretary. You have to again, I repeat, go to my progress reports to find out just what I did. I set it all down there so there would not be any question about it.

   [II995] Senator Ferguson. Will you tell us whether or not Mr. Bundy, or General Cramer, actually told you, other than on the ABCD, and the so-called joint agreement, which you told us why you did not investigate. You were specifically told not to go to the White House on them.

   Senator Clausen. I was told it was not within the scope of my investigation. Senator Ferguson.

   Senator Ferguson. That is right.

   Senator Clausen. That was after the investigation had been completed abroad and I was back and the war with Japan had been concluded.

   Senator Ferguson. That is right. You were told not to go into the White House. Now, were you told by any of these men not to investigate any of these specific items?

   Senator Clausen. Mr. Bundy had in mind the injunction of the Secretary that my investigation was not to investigate purely Navy responsibility, personnel or action.
Senator Ferguson. You see these first items have nothing to do with magic. You do not get to magic until you get to No. 3, concerning the magic intercepts, the ABCD, and so forth.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. These first have nothing to do with magic. For instance, the next one, No. b, did you investigate this, "What was the naval condition of readiness at Pearl Harbor?" Did you look into that one?

Colonel Clausen. What was that?

Senator Ferguson. "What was the naval condition of readiness at Pearl Harbor?"

Colonel Clausen. No; that is one of the leads on which purely naval aspects appeared to be involved. I do recall, though, having read certain testimony. I went over the Navy proceedings to pick out the Army features. I do not remember exactly. It seems to me, from a sort of curbstone statement, that the Navy condition of readiness at Pearl Harbor was somewhat on the same plane as the Army's. I do not remember.

Senator Ferguson. Do I understand you that when you got this mandate to make this investigation you read over the testimony and if you were satisfied with the testimony you did not make any further investigation?

Colonel Clausen. No.

Senator Ferguson. If you were not satisfied you went out and got further affidavits?

Colonel Clausen. No, that is not it at all. As I said before, I was an assistant to the Secretary and I showed the results of my work from time to time to the Judge Advocate General, to Mr. Bundy, or the progress, what I had done, what I should do and what I was going to do, and then supplemented that with written reports.

Senator Ferguson. This is the mandate to you:

Memorandum for Henry C. Clausen, JAG.
Unexplored leads in Pearl Harbor Investigation.
Signed by Kramer.

Whether Kimmel had any order from Washington requiring a large part of the Fleet to remain in Pearl Harbor.

Colonel Clausen. That is one of the same character. My only recollection on that subject is from having familiarized myself somewhat from the Navy proceedings. It just seems to ring a bell in my mind that he was in command there; he was free to take all the ships from the harbor if he wanted to.

Senator Ferguson. That is not my question. Did you get any affidavits on that point?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir, I did not.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

"g." This is not the Navy.

Whether the June 1940 alert message to Herron—

that is General Herron—

was specific and indicative of an established War Department policy of being specific when war alerts were believed required by the situation.
Colonel Clausen. I investigated that and got an affidavit from General Herron and attached to it, or quoted [11998] in the affidavit, the specific alert, so there would not be any question about it.

Senator Ferguson. That is not the question at all. Herron would not know this. This was whether it was indicative of an established War Department policy of being specific when war alerts were delivered, or when war alerts were believed required by the situation. That would have to come out of the War Department here in Washington, not out of Herron in the field.

Colonel Clausen. So far as that is concerned, the most important thing that appeared to me in that connection, Mr. Ferguson, was to get the actual alert, and go to General Herron and have him identify it, and ask him what happened at the time.

Senator Ferguson. Colonel Clausen, are you answering my question?

Colonel Clausen. Certainly.

Senator Ferguson. To find out what the established War Department policy was?

Colonel Clausen. Sure.

[11999] Senator Ferguson. You said all you wanted to do was to get a copy of the alert and ask Herron if he got it.

Colonel Clausen. It speaks for itself.

Senator Ferguson. It certainly does. What this question here was, "Was it an established War Department policy?"

Colonel Clausen. If you get the actual document it shows what the policy was.

Senator Ferguson. And is that the answer now to that question?

Colonel Clausen. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. That is was the policy to be specific?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir. I am saying my scope, Mr. Ferguson, did not extend to matters of an analytical military nature.

For example, the Secretary, or the people higher than I, surely would be able to tell from an actual document as to what happened at a certain time, as to what the policy was.

Senator Ferguson. Then do I understand that you left this question out and did not investigate it, because you thought General Marshall and the Secretary of War would know what it was and there was not any use of you looking into it?

[12000] Colonel Clausen. No, sir. General Marshall stayed right clear of this whole investigation.

Senator Ferguson. Why was that?

Colonel Clausen. What is that?

Senator Ferguson. Why did general Marshall stay clear of this whole investigation?

Colonel Clausen. He did. This was the Secretary's investigation.

Senator Ferguson. Was it because the Secretary knew what the established policy was and therefore you did not look into it?

Colonel Clausen. Well, he would certainly know.

Senator Ferguson. And is that the reason you did not look into it?

Colonel Clausen. I did look into it. I got the documents. Suppose you made a contract in 1936 with a governmental agency and you wanted to find out what the policy was, you would find out what it was by reading it.
Senator Ferguson. Don't put that in. I am trying to find the policy. You do not find policy by an instrument, do you?

Colonel Clausen. Sometimes you do.

Senator Ferguson. Then you do not say it was the policy to be specific?

[12001] Colonel Clausen. No; I do not.

Senator Ferguson. That is all.

The Vice Chairman. Any further questions?

Mr. Keefe. I would like to have that affidavit of Colonel Dusenbury.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Keefe will inquire, Colonel.

Mr. Keefe. The affidavit of Colonel Dusenbury that you have repeatedly referred to, Colonel Clausen, in reference to the 14-part message, reads as follows:

During the time in question I was assistant to Colonel Bratton, having reported to him in August, 1940, and continued as his assistant until and after 7 December, 1941. For the four or five months immediately following August 1940, Colonel Bratton received from the Signal Corps, the translated intercepts of Japanese diplomatic messages, and delivered certain of these to Colonel Harrison, aide of the Secretary of War; John Stone, Secretary to Secretary of State Hull; Colonel Ralph C. Smith, Executive Officer of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, and Colonel Bedell Smith, and Colonel Thomas T. Handy, or Colonel Bundy in OPD.

The procedure followed by Colonel Bratton and myself as his assistant was to destroy all copies of the translated intercepts received, except such as were thus distributed, [12002] and those distributed were inserted in binders and delivered to the recipients who received for them. These receipts and the intercepts which were covered thereby were then later returned to Colonel Bratton or myself as the case might be, and the receipts and the intercepts were then destroyed, except one copy of the intercept which was retained by G-2.

At the expiration of the four or five months period referred to following August, 1940, Colonel Bratton and I alternated in assembling and delivering these intercepts and continued this practice until about 7 December, 1941, although towards the end of this period I handled the sorting and delivering almost exclusively. No record is now available in G-2 to my knowledge, of the messages which were thus sorted and delivered, and none was kept because of the top secrecy requirements.

While I cannot recollect specifically each message which I delivered, I believe that this information can be obtained elsewhere than in the War Department.

For example, the State Department may have briefed and recorded the intercepts. Normally, we would receive daily about 50 to 75 of these intercepts which would be sorted to about 25 for distribution.

I recall the intercept Tokyo to Washington, consisting [12003] of 14 parts SIS No. 25843, which started coming in the night of 6 December 1941, when I was on duty. Colonel Bratton was also on duty then and saw the message coming in and he remained until about half of it had been received.

Thereupon he left and went home at about 9 p.m. I stayed so he could go home and sleep. I waited for the remainder. The 14th part being the final part of the message, was received about 12 that night. Thereupon, I left and went home. I returned the next morning to begin the distribution of this intercept consisting of the 14 parts and I began the distribution of the 14 parts comprising this intercept
about 9 a. m., on 7 December, 1941, and finished the delivery to the State Department as Kurusu and Nomura were meeting with the Secretary of State.

When I delivered the copy for OPD that morning I handed it to then Colonel Thomas T. Handy who, upon reading it, said to me, "This means war," or words to that effect. None of these parts comprising this intercept was delivered before the morning of 7 December, 1941, because the first half had been received while Colonel Bratton was on duty and he had seen this and had not had it delivered that night; furthermore, it being late at night when the final part was received, I did not wish to disturb the usual recipients who probably were at home asleep, as I did not see the implications of immediate hostilities.

It is to be noted that the intercept translation SIS 25843 was received by the Army from the Navy and which indicates that the contents thereof were known to the Navy prior to receipt by the Army.

I recollect that the intercept Tokyo to Washington SIS No. 25850, being the instruction to the ambassadors to deliver the reply to the United States at 1 p. m. on 7 December, 1941, was received by G-2 the morning of 7 December, 1941. It is my impression that it was received by Colonel Bratton after he arrived that morning, between 9 and 10 a. m.

I gathered, from listening to your testimony and the conclusion that you had in your mind that after talking with Colonel Dusenbury, you came to the impression in some way that Colonel Bratton had given him this folder with the idea of taking it over to Fort Myer that night, because he, Colonel Dusenbury, lived over in Arlington.

Colonel Clausen. Mr. Keefe, that is what Colonel Bratton said in his affidavit.

Mr. Keefe. Well, you did not get that from Colonel Dusenbury then?

Colonel Clausen. No, no. Colonel Bratton said that he, Colonel Bratton, gave the information to Colonel Dusenbury to take to the Chief of Staff on his, Colonel Dusenbury’s, way home.

Mr. Keefe. Then the further we get into it, the more complex it becomes.

Colonel Clausen. That is a fact. You said something very true there. There were a lot of inconsistencies and confictions in this thing.

Mr. Keefe. From reading this affidavit of Colonel Dusenbury, it appears that Bratton went home about 9 p. m., before the first 13 parts were finally assembled.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, and you see, Mr. Keefe, that is one of the reasons I showed that and the other affidavits to Colonel Bratton, because I wanted, in farness to Colonel Bratton, for him to see what the others said.

Mr. Keefe. Yet, in the face of Colonel Dusenbury making this one statement that Bratton went home before the 14 parts ever got in, Bratton makes an affidavit to the effect that he delivered the 14 parts to Dusenbury with instructions to deliver them out to General Marshall, because Dusenbury lived over in the general direction of Fort Myer.

Colonel Clausen. You say he delivered it to Dusenbury. I thought that Dusenbury and Colonel Bratton were working together. You see, they were in the same section, Mr. Keefe.
[12006] Mr. Keefe. I understand that.
Colonel Clausen. If you will read the affidavit of Colonel Bratton you will see precisely what he says.

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, this also says that the fourteenth part, being the final part of the message, was received about 12 that night, and "thereupon I left and went home."

Colonel Clausen. That is what he told me.

Mr. Keefe. Now, the evidence up to date is, as I recall it, that that fourteenth part did not come in, or did not start coming in until about 5 o'clock in the morning, and was finally decoded and translated about 7:15 on the morning of the 7th.

Now, you had that information before you, did you not, when you were taking this affidavit of Dusenbury?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir. The fact that you mention I am not aware of yet, even, but Colonel Dusenbury was one of the first witnesses whom I called on, and he was leaving for Chungking.

Mr. Keefe. Obviously he did not add very much to the clarity of the situation. He fumbled it a lot more than it was even before you took his affidavit, it seems to me, and we are still in a fog on the facts of the situation.

Colonel Clausen. In fairness to these men, Mr. Keefe—

Mr. Keefe. What is that?

[12007] Colonel Clausen. I say, in fairness to these men, I was asking them questions in 1944, concerning what happened in 1941.

Mr. Keefe. Well, I understand that thoroughly, but this committee has got to determine from all of this evidence what the facts are, and the more the investigation is proceeding, instead of assuming clarification, we get into more difficulties in connection with the matter.

Now, you showed this affidavit, I understand, to Bratton in Paris.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. You let him read it.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. And he and Bratton disagree then as to what the transaction was.

Colonel Clausen. I will tell you really what I thought might be a good idea some day, and that is to get all of these people together—they are all honest people—get them all in a room, get them together—

Mr. Keefe. Give them some refreshment, is that it?

Colonel Clausen. I do not like the way you say "refreshment" like it might connote something wrong. If two people cannot remember something, if they get into a room and discuss it, it might help them by someone saying, "So and so happened," and thereby refreshing the memory of the other.

Mr. Keefe. The difficulty is this. I very carefully read the testimony of Colonel Bratton, given under oath, before the Army Board, and he certainly testified with clarity, and with distinctness and with definiteness, as to the delivery of this 14-part message.

Now, as the result of your investigation, the thing is up in the clouds. Nobody would be able to determine, from reading these affidavits, what the fact was as to that particular incident.
Colonel Clausen. No; that is not it, Mr. Keefe. Colonel Bratton is here, and any other witness that you want to reinterrogate, you can surely do so, because, as I understand it, they are available on any questions of doubt.

Mr. Keefe. Now, then, how did you reconcile it, as the investigator for the Secretary of War?

Colonel Clausen. I told you before, Mr. Keefe——

Mr. Keefe. How did you reconcile it?

Colonel Clausen. It was not my function to reconcile, to weigh, decide, and act as a judge. I was merely the gatherer of facts. The facts disagree. A man who goes into the orchard to pick a bunch of fruit says he picked so many and another man who brings them out gives another figure.

Mr. Keefe. I heard that before.

Colonel Clausen. You heard it because I said it. I think it is a good analogy. It is exactly what I did.

I was like an FBI agent working for Mr. Hoover.

Mr. Keefe. The Army board had made a finding against General Marshall based upon Colonel Bratton's testimony, that these 13 parts were delivered that night, the 6th of December.

Now, as the result of your investigation, what did you recommend to the Secretary of War as to what the facts were? Could you determine from your investigation what the facts were, as to whether the 14 parts were or were not delivered?

Colonel Clausen. You will find, Mr. Keefe, in the volume there of my report, that there are two additional critiques by General Cramer.

You will also find that there is volume the final report of the Secretary of War, and those men decided the facts.

Mr. Keefe. Well, did you discuss this particular incident with them when you came back, after you got the affidavits?

Colonel Clausen. Oh, yes; I discussed it periodically, Mr. Keefe, with Mr. Bundy and with General Cramer. I discussed the results of my investigations, what the affidavits showed, and I showed them the affidavits.

You see, I was working for the Secretary of War.

Mr. Keefe. Oh. I understand that.

Colonel Clausen. Well, you asked the question, did I discuss it, and I said I showed the affidavits.

Mr. Keefe. Did you state to the Secretary, or to General Cramer, the conclusions that you, as this special investigator desired to draw from the affidavits that you had taken with respect to the delivery of this first 13-part message?

Colonel Clausen. I did not do more than to state the facts, Mr. Keefe, and make those periodic written reports.

Mr. Keefe. What facts did you state with reference to this particular matter?

Colonel Clausen. The fact that the men had given the affidavits, and I gave them the affidavits to read.

Mr. Keefe. In other words, you said:

I have taken an affidavit from Dusenbury and in the affidavit it says so and so. I have taken an affidavit from Bratton. Here is Bratton's affidavit. It says so and so. Now you fellows make up your mind as to what the fact is.

Is that the way I understand the situation?
Colonel Clausen. No; that is not the way it operated at all. I say from time to time the progress of my investigation was given to these men in the form of affidavits, and the periodic reports, and then from the picture as a whole you would find that the facts sometimes, of course, would be in conflict. Well, now, if I said one thing or another thing I cannot recall at this time, but the affidavits were the best proof of what the witnesses themselves said.

Mr. Keefe. You said this volume was indexed. Can you put your hands on the affidavit of Colonel Bratton?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. I find some difficulty in looking for it. I have to paw all through it to find it.

Colonel Clausen. There is an index. Col. Rufus S. [12012] Bratton is No. 42, so you just go to 42.

Mr. Keefe. That is all.

The Vice Chairman. Any further questions?

(No response.)

The Vice Chairman. Like other witnesses who appeared, Colonel, I will ask you, do you know of any other information that you think would be helpful to this investigation, that has not been called for by questions asked you?

Colonel Clausen. I do not know of any other information, sir, except I would like to say that I did not know the Chief of Staff or the Secretary of War, and I met them only in the course of the Board's work here. I think I have already mentioned the fact that certainly I acted with the utmost fairness, in my own mind, to get accurate, impartial testimony. Since the questions have arisen, I thought, in fairness to myself, and especially in line with what Senator Lucas asked me this morning, it is only fair to myself to make a part of the record of these proceedings a letter that I had from General Grunert commending me for my work on the Board, and the fact that I was a free agent, which is certainly indicated by the letters of commendation I have had from the then chairman of the Truman committee, the then counsel for the Truman committee.

I think it is only fair to myself to make these part [12013] of the record at this time.

The Vice Chairman. Without objection, they will be received.

(The letters referred to are as follows:)

[12013–A] UNITED STATES SENATE, SPECIAL COMMITTEE INVESTIGATING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM, April 29, 1944.

In reply refer to:

H–429–F

Maj. Henry C. Clausen,
Trial Judge Advocate,
Office of the Judge Advocate General, War Department.
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Major Clausen: Permit me to express my congratulations upon the effective manner in which you presented the evidence at the court martial proceedings in Cincinnati. Some time when you are free to do so, I would like to have lunch with you.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Hugh Fulton.

Hugh Fulton,
Chief Counsel.
SPJGE

[12013-B] [1st Ind.]

W. A. G. O.,

26 May 1944.

War Department,

To Major Henry C. Clausen, J. A. G. D.

(Through the Chief, Litigation Division.)

I have noted with pleasure the very fine letter of commendation of Senator Harry S. Truman relative to your work in connection with the court-martial proceedings at Cincinnati. The original of Senator Truman's letter has been made a part of your official record and you may retain the attached copy. I want to add my commendation for the good work you did.

/s/ Myron C. Cramer,

Myron C. Cramer,

Major General,

The Judge Advocate General.

[12013-C] [1st Ind.]

United States Senate,

Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program,

May 23, 1944.

Major General Myron C. Cramer,

The Judge Advocate General,

War Department, Washington, D. C.

Dear General Cramer: The Committee has followed closely the proceedings of the court martial at Cincinnati relating to the conduct of three officers at the Lockland Plant of the Wright Aeronautical Corporation.

Major Henry Clausen did an exceptionally good job in preparing a most difficult and complicated case, and in presenting it fairly and in such manner as to enable the court thoroughly to understand the issues and facts involved.

Sincerely yours,

(signed) Harry S. Truman,

Harry S. Truman, U. S. S.

A true copy.

[12013-D] [1st Ind.]

War Department,

26 October 1944.

To Major Henry C. Clausen, J. A. G. D.

(Through the Chief, War Crimes Commission, Office of the Judge Advocate General).

1. I have noted with pleasure the remarks contained in the attached copy of letter of Lieut. General George C. Grunert in connection with your work as Assistant Recorder of the Pearl Harbor Board. Your good work reflects credit on our department and I wish to express my own gratification.

2. A copy of General Grunert's letter has been placed on your personal file.

/s/ Myron C. Cramer,

Myron C. Cramer,

Major General,

The Judge Advocate General.

[12013-E] [1st Ind.]

Headquarters Eastern Defense Command,

Governors Island, New York 4, N. Y., 21 October 1944.

Subject: Appreciation of Services.

To: Major Henry C. Clausen, O-907613, JAGD, Room 4747, Munitions Building, Washington, D. C.

1. Upon completion of the strenuous work of the Army Pearl Harbor Board I wish personally and as President of that Board to thank you for your excellent services as Assistant Recorder of the Board.

For nearly three months you labored most diligently without regard to hours and were of great assistance to the Board in ferreting out witnesses, in assisting
in their interrogation, and in the preparation of that part of the record as per-
tained to your assignment.

The Board wishes you every success in your future endeavors.

For the Board:

/s/ George Grunert,

George Grunert,

Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,

President.

[12014] The Vice Chairman. Are there any further questions?

Senator Brewster. I would like to ask a question.

The Vice Chairman. I asked twice if there were any other ques-
tions.

Senator Brewster. There was some commotion going on to my left
about matters that I will not mention that made it impossible for
me to ask for the opportunity to ask any further questions.

I have not been here through all the testimony, but I have been
here this morning. You yourself recognize after the completion of
your inquiries, that the situation was not an entirely satisfactory one,
from the standpoint of reconciling the various affidavits?

Colonel Clausen. You want my opinion? If you want my opinion
I certainly believe, Mr. Brewster, that it was sufficient for the decision
of the Secretary of War.

Senator Brewster. I was not asking you that. You indicated to
Mr. Keefe that you thought it would be a good idea to get these wit-
esses all together in a room, to see if they could not straighten these
stories out, from which I take it you yourself were not satisfied with
what you were able to do.

Colonel Clausen. I was satisfied, so far as I was personally con-
cerned, that my work was sufficient for the Secretary. The essential discrepancies were all mentioned. If you will read, Mr.
Brewster, the critiques prepared by the Judge Advocate General I
think you will find that those discrepancies are mentioned in there.

Senator Brewster. As I understand, you were going out to conduct
the inquiry, and, as you know, after all of the investigations and re-
ports it was the considered opinion of the Congress, without dissent,
a unanimous opinion of Congress that the matter did require a very
much further exploration, in which we have been engaged ourselves for
some 3 months here.

Colonel Clausen. I always felt, Mr. Brewster, that the Congress
could do a far better job than anybody else.

Senator Brewster. You felt it certainly was not a waste of time to
try to get all the information available on this matter?

Colonel Clausen. You mean this proceeding?

Senator Brewster. Yes.

Colonel Clausen. I think it is a very, very fine thing. I also think
that the basic recommendation that can come from this committee
is a very fine one if you make it that never again shall magic, this
information, be monopolized by one service or the other service, but
have it distributed by one agency on an over-all basis.

[12016] Senator Brewster. The Army Pearl Harbor Board had
criticized General Marshall and some other high officials rather vigor-
ously, had they not?

Colonel Clausen. Yes. The Board’s proceedings show what they
said.
Senator Brewster. Yes.
Colonel Clausen. The actual reading of it would be a matter of opinion.

Senator Brewster. The net result of your unilateral investigation was to considerably modify the conclusions of the Secretary of War, as far as the Army Pearl Harbor Board was concerned? Is that a fair statement?

Colonel Clausen. I do not think so. In the first place, I do not think my investigation was unilateral. It was more supplementary.

In the second place——

Senator Brewster. Just a moment.

Colonel Clausen. The Judge Advocate General——

Senator Brewster. Just a moment.

The Vice Chairman. Let the witness answer, Senator. He has a right to answer.

Senator Brewster. It is a divided question. He said it was not unilateral. I would like to know why he does not consider it unilateral.

Colonel Clausen. As I was starting to finish my answer, [12017] I think you will find, Mr. Brewster, that the net result, as stated by the Secretary in his opinion, was that he did not change his opinion. So mine was more supplementary.

Senator Brewster. You are through answering?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. Why would you not call your inquiry a unilateral inquiry? Nobody accompanied you, did they?

Colonel Clausen. If you mean I was the sole man, no.

Senator Brewster. Yes.

Colonel Clausen. That is the point I make, Mr. Brewster. You are making a mistake if you think it was only mine, because I was assisting the Secretary of War.

Senator Brewster. You were representing the Secretary, and you took what documents and what notes you thought were useful, and you went to these various men and showed them to them and then you got an affidavit. Certainly an attorney would not consider that an inquiry in which anyone else who might have been blamed was in any way concerned. There was no representative of General Short present. Can you answer that question?

Colonel Clausen. You mean along with me or at the Board proceedings?

Senator Brewster. With you.

Colonel Clausen. I did not have any representative of [12018] General Short, but let me answer further, I at no time, Mr. Brewster, was asked by General Short, or his counsel, who was my superior, Brig. Gen. Thomas Green, to accompany me.

Senator Brewster. Were they fully advised of the circumstances?

Colonel Clausen. I do not know.

Senator Brewster. You do not know about that?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir.

Senator Brewster. Now you have this morning repeatedly placed great stress on the fact that the primary purpose of your inquiry was because the Army Pearl Harbor Board did not have the material in magic. You said that several times; is that correct?

Colonel Clausen. Yes; that is correct.
Senator Brewster. The implication being that that particularly required further exploration.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Senator Brewster. I find a little difficulty reconciling that with this affidavit taken by you from Gen. George C. Marshall, in which he says:

On my second appearance before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, 29 September 1944, I discussed with the Board at length the general problem concerning the method of including "magic" in the report of the Board and also the availability to the Board of any officers concerned for the purpose of giving testimony on the Top Secret "Magic" phases of the investigation. I informed the Board, for example, as indicated on pages 18 and 37, of the top secret transcript mentioned, that Colonel Bratton was available in Washington for that purpose.

How do you reconcile that with your repeated statement that the Army Pearl Harbor Board did not have information or did not have the means of information available, so far as they thought it advisable and desirable, regarding magic?

Colonel Clausen. You are making a mistake. You are assuming that this refers to the Pearl Harbor Board proceedings except in the last week.

Senator Brewster. I do not care when it was.

Colonel Clausen. Well, it was in the last week.

Senator Brewster. Well, that is all right, it was the last week, but the Army Pearl Harbor Board had either the information or the full means of information offered them by General Marshall that they considered material for the purpose.

Colonel Clausen. You were not here when I testified before, but that same point was brought up. These are the facts on that: At about the last week of the Board's proceedings General Marshall testified, as he indicated there, and I recall very distinctly he said what he refers to there about Colonel Bratton. That is how we got him. The top secret report shows all that.

But the Board had a 90-day limit. Mr. Brewster, and this limit might even have expired by then, or been very close to the edge, so the 90 days was the limitation in the order of appointment.

[12021] Senator Brewster. I think, from what I heard here this morning, you were hanging your most extraordinary procedure upon a very slender peg.

Colonel Clausen. I do not agree with you at all.

In the first place, it is not an extraordinary procedure, and it is not hanging on a very slender peg. You are wrong.

Senator Brewster. That is all.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one statement. The Vice Chairman, Are you through, Senator Brewster?

Senator Brewster. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, the Senator from Maine has just said the witness is hanging his conclusions on an extraordinary peg, as I understand it.

Senator Brewster. His procedure, I said, his most extraordinary procedure upon a very slender peg.

Mr. Murphy. Speaking about a slender peg, I see where the Senator from Maine, in an interview in Chicago, said—and I am reading from the Chicago Tribune of Saturday, February 9—

Senator Brewster said yesterday that much of the responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster must rest upon the late President Roosevelt, and figures in his
administration who sought strenuously to fasten the blame exclusively on Admiral Kimmel and General Short.

I would say that is based upon an extremely slender peg, because there is not one word of evidence in this record to justify it.

Senator Brewster. Since the interview has been brought into the matter, I should just like to have it corrected to this extent:

What I actually said was that very much more of the responsibility for Pearl Harbor rested upon the people in Washington in the upper echelon, than had certainly been indicated in any of the four preceding years. I did not name individuals, but I think that statement I made is a very fair one.

If the paper interprets it as President Roosevelt, that will all have to be considered when the time comes for an opinion.

Mr. Gearhart. At least the Senator from Maine has not foreclosed himself.

Senator Ferguson. I have another question from the witness.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. Now, Colonel Clausen, this is a fair conclusion, is it not, that the person responsible for keeping magic from the Board was the Chief of Staff's office, either the Chief of Staff, General Marshall himself, or General McNarney, his Deputy Chief?

Colonel Clausen. I think that is a fair statement Senator.

Senator Ferguson. That is a fair statement?

Colonel Clausen. Yes: for the reasons given by the witnesses.

Senator Ferguson. But here was an order from the Congress to the Secretary of War, and the Secretary had appointed a Board to look into this matter fully.

Then his Chief of Staff was responsible for blocking the testimony going to that Board, which would have given the Board fuller information. That is a fair statement, is it not?

Colonel Clausen. I do not like the use of the word "blocking," Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Well, they could not do it without the magic, and they were not allowed to get the magic because the Chief of Staff's office would not give it to them?

Colonel Clausen. Under the policy set up at the time, there is no doubt that the Board did not get the magic until the last week.

[12024] Senator Ferguson. And that required the Secretary of War to take the recorder, the assistant recorder on that Board and send him out personally and alone, without any representative of General Short, Admiral Kimmel, or anyone else, to take ex parte affidavits? Isn't that a fair statement?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir: it did not require him to do that. The Secretary could have done his investigation in any manner he chose. If he wanted to, he could have called another board; he could have had myself; he could have gotten an assistant of another kind, or he could have conducted it himself in some manner.

Senator Ferguson. But he actually did do that. He sent you out to get ex parte affidavits?

Colonel Clausen. Senator, he sent me out to do what I said I had done.

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you tell us whether your affidavits disclosed when the 13 parts were delivered to the Secretary of State, it being the duty of the Army to deliver to the Secretary of State?
Colonel Clausen. The night of December 6, Colonel Bratton says in his affidavit, he took the 13 parts to the Secretary of State, and I believe the reason he made that statement was that it was, in his opinion, a primary [12025] diplomatic or State Department matter, and for that reason his main interest that night with respect to the 13 parts was to bring them to the attention of the Secretary of State.

Senator Ferguson. Now, how do you reconcile that with the evidence that you have brought in here in the affidavit, that Bratton went home before the 13 parts were drawn up? How did Bratton get the 13 parts to take them to the Secretary of State?

Colonel Clausen. He must have had the 13 parts to bring to the Secretary of State, Senator. So that the recollection of Colonel Dusenbury in that regard, if it indicates the contrary, is probably mistaken.

In any event, it is one of the things I ran up against, just what you are mentioning.

Senator Ferguson. What time did Dusenbury say in his affidavit that Bratton went home?

Colonel Clausen. I think Mr. Keefe read that and said about 9 o'clock.

Senator Ferguson. About 9 o'clock. Did not he say he went home before the 13 parts were completed?

Colonel Clausen. I think he said when about one-half had come in.

Senator Ferguson. Does not he say "Thereupon he left for home," or "went home about 9 p.m. I stayed so he could [12026] go home and sleep. I waited for the remainder."

Did not he also say the fourteenth part of the message was received at 12 o'clock that night? However, I am now talking about the 13 parts.

How do you account for the fact that Bratton said he took the 13 parts? I will read it again:

Colonel Bratton was also on duty then and saw the message coming in and he remained until about half of it had been received.

That is certainly not 13 parts out of the 14 parts.

Colonel Clausen. I say, Senator, that is one of the things, one of the confictions in the case.

Now, by that information, and by all the other information maybe you people can resolve this.

Senator Ferguson. You did not find any facts that made it impossible for this man to take it over to the Secretary of State, the 13 parts by 9 o'clock, and did not also take it to Bedell Smith or someone in his office?

Colonel Clausen. Senator, he said he did not do it. I mean Colonel Bratton is the one who said he took it to the Secretary of State. Then he also said that he did not take it to Col. Bedell Smith, that he did not take it to Colonel Gailey, that he did not take it to these other people.

[12027] Senator Ferguson. I am talking about his testimony before the Board. He swore absolutely that he took it to Bedell Smith.

Colonel Clausen. Senator, he corrected himself.
Senator Ferguson. Did you try to find out who was in charge of the Chief of Staff’s office on the night of the 6th?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, I did.

Senator Ferguson. Who was in charge of it?

Colonel Clausen. I tried to find out. I remember that I asked Lt. Gen. Bedell Smith, and he gave me the name. That is what you run up against. He said he was pretty sure it was General Deane, whereas General Deane was in Moscow.

Senator Ferguson. He never said——

Colonel Clausen. Senator, if you will let me conclude.

When I was in Berlin, I found out that General Deane was over at the Peace Conference, so I went over there, and got an affidavit from him.

Senator Ferguson. Did he say he was in charge?

Colonel Clausen. His affidavit is not in accordance with the thought that was in the mind of General Smith, and that is the situation you run up against. In other words, these men were trying to recollect, and you could not get, on [12029] these points, on some of these points, you could not get a reconciled answer from all the witnesses.

Senator Ferguson. Then you never did find out, you never followed it up to find out who was in charge of that office that night, and go and see that person to find out as to whether or not he got the 13 parts that night, did you?

Colonel Clausen. I did run the information down, I did follow it up.

Senator Ferguson. Answer that question.

Colonel Clausen. Senator, Gen. Bedell Smith thought he made a memorandum which he thought was very helpful, and I could not find that. He said he thought it was in the office or the Chief of Staff.

Senator Ferguson. I am trying to make this question specific, so we will get a short answer.

Did you find out who was in charge of the Chief of Staff’s office that night?

Colonel Clausen. I cannot recall, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Don’t you think that is a very important question? Would not you remember that, if you did find out who was in charge?

Colonel Clausen. Senator, I cannot recall, I am sorry.

Senator Ferguson. Did you take an affidavit from any [12029] person who was in charge of that office, who swore that Bratton did not deliver at that office the 13 parts that night?

Colonel Clausen. I think General Deane. This is a pure recollection.

Senator Ferguson. I don’t want any guesses on it.

Colonel Clausen. You want me to do some recollecting. General Deane, as I said, recalled that he did not get any pouch such as contained the 13 parts.

Senator Ferguson. General Deane said he was not in charge of the office that night?

Colonel Clausen. Did he?

Senator Ferguson. You just told me he did.
Colonel Clausen. I say the affidavit is the best proof of what General Deane said.

Senator Ferguson. Then get it. Let us find out what he said. I understood you to say from his affidavit he was not in charge on that night.

Colonel Clausen. What I told you, Senator, was when I talked with General Smith he at that time said he thought General Deane would be able to give me some information.

Senator Ferguson. That is not in Smith's affidavit, is it?

Colonel Clausen. In Smith's?

[12030] Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Colonel Clausen. I do not know if it is in there.

Senator Ferguson. He does not mention Deane.

Colonel Clausen. Lots of times, Senator, these people that I talked with would give me leads themselves, as to people that might be able to shed some light on the subject.

Senator Ferguson. Get the affidavit.

Colonel Clausen. I do not have it. Mr. Keefe is looking at it.

Senator Ferguson. When you get the affidavit, will you give us the page number in that exhibit?

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir. It has got an index. Affidavit No. 41.

Senator Ferguson. Mr. Chairman, I see it is past the hour.

The Vice Chairman. I would like to finish with this witness.

Colonel Clausen. Page 205. It says:

During the month of November and December, 1941, I was on duty in the War Department, Washington, D. C., as Assistant Secretary, General Staff.

On 6 December, 1941, I was not on duty after 5 p.m., and did not receive from Colonel Rufus S. Bratton, nor from Colonel Carlisle Dusenbury, or any other person, any pouch [12031] for the Chief of Staff.

Senator Ferguson. Then he specifically says he was not on duty that night?

Colonel Clausen. That is right.

Senator Ferguson. And Bedell Smith says he was not on duty?

Colonel Clausen. General Smith, as I recall, said he did not think he was there after 10 o'clock, that he might have been up there up to 10 o'clock.

Senator Ferguson. Who was in charge of the office that night?

Did you ever find out?

Colonel Clausen. General Smith was there. He was the headman.

In other words, General Smith was the secretary of the General Staff.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, you indicated General Greene, who was then Colonel Greene, was counsel for Short.

Colonel Clausen. He was brigadier general then.

Senator Ferguson. He was brigadier general?

Colonel Clausen. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Did he ever discuss with you these affidavits, as far as Short was concerned?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Or anything in relation to your investigation?

[12032] Colonel Clausen. Well, he got some papers in once, that he sent over to me.

Senator Ferguson. Do you have any of the memoranda that you had when you saw Colonel Bratton?
Colonel Clausen. In connection with your previous question, we conferred concerning some corrections that General Short wanted to make in his testimony before the Board.

[12033] Senator Ferguson. Yes, but that was before you started out on your tour.

Colonel Clausen. I cannot recall when that was. I think it extended on quite some time because I wanted to put the corrections at the pages in the transcript so that the corrections would be noted.

Senator Ferguson. But you do not claim that he was representing Short and, therefore, working with you in getting all the affidavits?

Colonel Clausen. No, sir; Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Colonel Clausen. Senator Ferguson, we don't do that in the Army.

Senator Ferguson. That answers that. So you don't do that either, do you, in the Army?

Colonel Clausen. I say in the Army you have courtsmartial proceedings and you might be a defense lawyer and you might be a prosecutor. You are supposed to do your duty. The mere fact that you are assigned to do a certain job does not draw any inference from that that you are going to slant anything.

Senator Ferguson. Have you any of the memorandums that you have spoken about that you took from any of these witnesses outside of what you have delivered here?

[12034] Colonel Clausen. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right, that is all.

Mr. Keefe. Now, there is one question, Mr. Chairman.

In reading the Army Pearl Harbor Board testimony, Colonel Clausen, I was impressed with the fact that right here at the beginning of General Marshall's testimony there appeared to be a lapse when the Board went into a sort of executive session and General Marshall testified or made a statement for about an hour, according to the proceedings of the Board, in which he made a statement off the record.

Colonel Clausen. Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe. Were you present at that time?

Colonel Clausen. No; that is the period, Mr. Keefe, I referred to as off the record proceeding when lie conferred only with the general officers.

Mr. Keefe. Now, in his affidavit General Marshall says this, and that is why I have been wondering if the testimony that you have given here all along to the effect that this Board did not have any information about magic until the last 2 weeks is correct. General Marshall in his affidavit states this:

1 did not see General Miles, Colonel Bratton or Colonel Sadtler, officers of G-2 and the Signal Corps, who were some of the officers concerned with "Magic", [12035] prior to or after their testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Though I personally and secretly informed the voting members of the Board of the existence and important part played by "Magic", it was not until it developed that the "Magic" papers were being disclosed before the Navy Court of Inquiry that the Army officers concerned were authorized to go into all the details regarding "Magic" before the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Colonel Clausen. That is right.

Mr. Keefe. Now, as a matter of fact, in that off-the-record talk right at the beginning of his statement General Marshall took an hour out
of his testimony according to the report of the Board, they gave the specific time limit when the recess came and when they reconvened and during that period of time he discussed with the voting members of the Board this subject of magic.

Colonel Clausen. Well, I don't think you should assume, Mr. Keefe, that the only thing he talked about during that time was magic. I don't know.

Mr. Keefe. He did not say that but I am reading his affidavit in which he says that he did.

Colonel Clausen. That is what I testified, Mr. Keefe. I testified very clearly on the fact that in the first meeting of the Grunert board that we were not there but I found [12036] out later that he then at that time in general told them about magic and it was only when the Navy, you see—while we are in Hawaii the Navy released this magic to the Navy court of inquiry and when we came back then the Army gave it to us.

Mr. Keefe. Well, now, you sort of gave me the impression that the findings of this Board were made without particular reference to or knowledge of magic. Now, General Marshall states this in his affidavit [reading]:

Concerning testimony I gave the Army Pearl Harbor Board, I wish to add that, as indicated on page 6 of the Secret Transcript of Proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, the General Officers comprising the voting members of that Board, namely, Lt. General George Brunert, Major General Henry D. Russell and Major General Walter H. Frank, participated in a closed session with me from 11:10 A. M. to 12:07 P. M. on 7 August 1944. As indicated on pages 4 and 6 of the Top Secret Transcript of the Proceedings, during this closed session I informed the General Officers mentioned the character of information which had been derived before 7 December 1941 from Top Secret sources then called "Magic". I told them, among other things, that the source of this information included intercepts of Japanese radio diplomatic messages which were decrypted, decoded and translated under the [12037] supervision of the Signal Corps and G-2. I further stated that neither this information nor the source thereof should be made public because it would result in at least temporarily, if not permanently extinguishing that source.

Colonel Clausen. That is what I said.

Mr. Keefe. Now, as a matter of fact, he gave them the information about magic in the record?

Colonel Clausen. Not all—not the information. If you mean by that the information that you have or that I got—as I understand he gave them in general the information that there was magic and the important part it played in the war.

Mr. Keefe. Well, you were not there, were you?

Colonel Clausen. No; that is what I say.

Mr. Keefe. You are just guessing at it, but here is his affidavit.

Colonel Clausen. No, I am not guessing; I mean his affidavit. What I have read is in his affidavit, that he said the magic was opened up to the three general officers, in general.

Mr. Keefe. Well, you don't want to give the impression that this subject of magic was not before this Board, do you? It was before the Board but not all those specific telegrams and all that sort of thing.

Colonel Clausen. Just what I said before.

Mr. Keefe. All right.

Colonel Clausen. It certainly was not known to myself, as I say.

Mr. Keefe. All right; that is all.
The Vice Chairman. We thank you for your appearance, Colonel, and the information you have given the committee and your apparent desire to be helpful in every way you could. You may be excused.

(Witness excused.)

The Vice Chairman. Counsel, please call the next witness.

Mr. Kaufman. Colonel Bratton.

The Vice Chairman. Colonel Bratton, will you please be sworn?

(Colonel Bratton was thereupon duly sworn by the Vice Chairman.)

The Vice Chairman. The committee will now stand in recess until 1:45.

(Whereupon, at 12:40 p.m., a recess was taken until 1:45 p.m. of the same day.)

[12039]

Afternoon Session—1:45 p.m.

The Vice Chairman. The committee will please be in order. Colonel Bratton has been sworn as a witness before we recessed at noon. Counsel will please proceed.

Testimony of Col. Rufus S. Bratton, United States Army

Mr. Kaufman. What is your full name?

Colonel Bratton. Rufus S. Bratton, colonel of Infantry, United States Army.

Mr. Kaufman. Will you state for the record your experience in the Army?

Colonel Bratton. I was graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1914. From 1914 to 1917 I performed the usual duties of a lieutenant of Infantry with the First Regiment of Infantry on Oahu. From 1917 to 1919 I performed the usual garrison and field duties of my grade in the continental limits of the United States.

In 1919 I was detailed as an instructor at the Military Academy at West Point, N.Y. From 1921 to 1922 I served as a student at the Infantry School at Fort Benning. From 1922 to 1924 I was a student officer of Japanese in Tokyo. From 1924 to 1926 I was assistant military attaché in Tokyo.

From 1926 to 1929 I commanded a battalion of Philippine Scouts in the Forty-fifth Infantry in the Philippines. From 1929 to 1931 I was a student at the command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kans. From 1931 to 1932 I was a student at the Japanese General Staff College in Tokyo. From 1932 to 1934 I was military attaché at the American Embassy in Tokyo. From 1935 to 1936 I commanded a battalion of the Seventh Infantry at Vancouver Barracks, Washington.

For 6 months in 1936 I was professor of military science and tactics at the University of Idaho. In the fall of 1936 I was ordered to Washington, to the War Department General Staff. From 1936 to 1937 I was assistant to the chief of the far eastern section, Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff. From 1937 to 1943 I was the chief of the far eastern section, Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff.

In 1943 I went to the Third Army, which was then in Texas. I accompanied the headquarters of the Third Army to Europe and stayed with General Patton's headquarters until the headquarters
reached Luxemburg, where I was detached and made G–2 of a planning group which under the auspices of SHAEF was planning the occupation of Berlin.

I went into Berlin as G–2 of the United States district headquarters. I returned from Berlin in September of 1945 on transfer orders to the western Pacific. I was about to take off for my new station when I was notified that I would remain in Washington waiting the pleasure of this committee, and I have been here since.

[12041] Mr. KAUFMAN. Will you tell us in greater detail your assignment during the month of December 1941 and what your duties were at that time?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir. At that time I was chief of the far eastern section of the Intelligence Branch of the Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff. As such I supervised the general work of the far eastern section, and was the custodian and processor of the material known as magic from the time it reached the Intelligence Division on.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you were the opposite number to Captain McCollum in the Navy?

Colonel BRATTON. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And you combined the duties of both Captain McCollum and Captain KRAMER, did you not?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And in connection with the delivery or the dissemination of magic, did you do it all yourself, or did you have assistants?

Colonel BRATTON. Toward the latter part of 1941 this material had increased so much in volume and so much time was taken up in putting it into pouches and delivering the pouches to the various recipients that I found it necessary to have help, so with the knowledge and approval of my chief, General MILES, I did utilize two or three selected officer assistants [12042] of mine in processing this material.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, let us direct your attention to the 6th of December 1941.

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And I will direct your attention to exhibit 1, page 238, to the so-called pilot message that is printed on that page. Do you recall when that first came to your attention?

Colonel BRATTON. Sometime around about 2 o’clock of the afternoon of Saturday, December 6, 1941.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, you heard Captain KRAMER testify here, and he testified, as I recall it, that his attention—or he did not receive the so-called pilot message until later on Saturday night.

Colonel BRATTON. I recall that statement, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. But so far as you are concerned, you did receive it at about 2 o’clock on Saturday, December 6?

Colonel BRATTON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Now, coming to the 13-part message—

Mr. KEFFE. Counsel, would you inquire at that point from whom he received it and where he got it?

Mr. KAUFMAN. Yes, sir.

From whom did you get the so-called pilot message?
Colonel Bratton. It came over from the Signal Intelligence Service with the usual envelope full of assorted material.

Mr. Kaufman. And that pilot message was translated by the Army?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. Do you know where that message was intercepted according to the records of the War Department?

Colonel Bratton. It was intercepted by the Navy at Bainbridge Island at 7:20 a.m. December 6, 1941, Washington time. The tele-typed copy intercept was delivered to the SIS, that is Army Signal Intelligence Service, at 12:05 p.m. December 6, Washington time. It was translated by the SIS, typed and delivered to me the same date at about 2 o'clock.

Mr. Kaufman. Does that answer the Congressman's inquiry?

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

Mr. Kaufman. Turning now to the first 13 parts of the message, do you recall when they commenced to come in?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. Now, before answering your question I would like to state that this is the fifth time I have appeared as a witness in this Pearl Harbor investigation, I hope it will be the last time, but it is also the first time that I have had an opportunity to examine files, records and documents in the War Department to refresh my memory as to the details of various events and it is the first time that I have had an opportunity to talk to the people that I worked for and with at that time. In consequence my memory of the details of certain other events is foggier than ever for the reason that I have heard and seen so many conflicting arguments and statements here and elsewhere since my return to Washington.

Mr. Kaufman. Well, now, for the record will you state the times when and the places where you have testified in connection with the Pearl Harbor matter?

Colonel Bratton. I appeared as a witness with General Miles before the Roberts committee.

Mr. Kaufman. Did you personally testify?

Colonel Bratton. I do not recall having to testify. I was more or less in the nature of a paper carrier for General Marshall.

Mr. Kaufman. And that was only in connection with informing the Board as to so-called magic?

Colonel Bratton. Correct, sir. I should have said General Miles instead of General Marshall.

Mr. Kaufman. According to the record as I have examined it it is not recorded that you ever testified before that Board.

Colonel Bratton. And I do not recall having actually testified, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. And that was in December of 1941?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. When was the next time that you testified with respect to Pearl Harbor?

Colonel Bratton. The next time was in the fall of 1944 before the so-called Clarke Board. I had been flown back from the advance command post of the Third Army some 50 miles east of Verdun on a first priority order to report to the A. C. of S. of G-2, War Department, Washington.
Mr. Kaufman. And that is the first time that you testified before any board regarding Pearl Harbor?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. And that was nearly 3 years after the happening of the event?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. And at the time that you were sent for you had been on duty with the Third Army in Europe?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. And you were flown back to this country and did you have an opportunity at that time to examine any of the papers or records?

Colonel Bratton. I did not, sir. As I remember it, I arrived here on a Wednesday afternoon tired, cold, and dirty, and started testifying early the following morning.

Mr. Kaufman. And how long did your testimony continue?

Colonel Bratton. I appeared before the Clarke Board several times covering a period of from 5 to 10 days. From there I went to appear as a witness before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, known as the Grunert Board.

Mr. Kaufman. And that was in what month, do you recall, Colonel?

Colonel Bratton. September 1944, September and October.

Mr. Kaufman. And then did you go back to Europe after you had completed testifying before the Grunert Board?

Colonel Bratton. I did, sir. My commanding general had paid me the compliment saying that he wanted me to come back as soon as I got released from duties in Washington, and as soon as I was so released I caught the next plane that could accommodate me and returned to the Third Army Headquarters. I did not have time to review the testimony that I gave before the Grunert Board, not that the right was denied me at all. I simply did not have time to do it.

Mr. Kaufman. And we have it also that not only did you not read the testimony that you gave before the Clarke Board but that you did not have an opportunity of examining any of the papers or records in connection with what happened in December of 1941?

[12047] Colonel Bratton. I did have an opportunity to read the evidence that I gave before the Clarke Board.

Mr. Kaufman. But you did have no opportunity to examine the papers or the records of the Department?

Colonel Bratton. No, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. Now, what was the next time that you gave any testimony respecting Pearl Harbor?

Colonel Bratton. The next time was in August, I believe, of last year, when Colonel Clausen reported to me in Berlin.

Mr. Kaufman. And you heard Colonel Clausen testify here during the last few days?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. And at that time you did not have any of the papers or records from the War Department to refresh your recollection again?

Colonel Bratton. I was thousands of miles away from them.

Mr. Kaufman. And this is the fourth time that you are actually called to testify?
Colonel Bratton. The fifth time.
Mr. Kaufman. You include the Roberts Commission as the first time?
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. But we have it that at the Roberts Commission you did not give any testimony, according to the record.

[12049] Colonel Bratton. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. Now, waiting to be called as a witness here, have you read the testimony of other witnesses before this committee and in other proceedings?
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir; in great volume.
Mr. Kaufman. And do you believe now that your memory has been refreshed as to many of the details?
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. Let us come now to the first 13 parts of the message of December 6. I asked you before as to what time that day, according to your best recollection, did that message begin to come in?
The Vice Chairman. That begins on page 239 of Exhibit 1, does it?
Mr. Kaufman. That is correct, sir.
Colonel Bratton. That message began to come into my office in the late afternoon or early evening of Saturday, December 6.
Mr. Kaufman. Do you recall which part came in first?
Colonel Bratton. I do not, sir. They were all mixed up; they did not come in in any numerical sequence.
Mr. Kaufman. You recall Captain Kramer testified that his recollection was that part 8 was the first part of the message that he received. Does that refresh your recollection as [12049] to which part of the 13 parts you received first?
Colonel Bratton. No, sir; I do not remember.
Mr. Kaufman. Will you tell us to the best of your recollection what time of the day the last of the 13 parts came in?
Colonel Bratton. The last of the 13 parts came into my office some time between 9 and 10 that night. I was there at the time when the last part came in.
Mr. Kaufman. Let us go back a moment, Colonel, to the pilot message.
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. You testified that that came to you about 2 o'clock in the afternoon?
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. And that was before any one of the 13 parts had arrived?
Colonel Bratton. That is correct.
Mr. Kaufman. Will you tell the committee whether you made distribution of that so-called pilot message and when you did so?
Colonel Bratton. Distribution of the so-called pilot message was made that afternoon about 3 o'clock. I do not now recall whether I did it in person or whether one of my assistants did it, but I do recall discussing the subject both [12050] with General Miles and General Gerow Saturday afternoon.
Mr. Kaufman. Then we have it that the so-called pilot message was disseminated around three o'clock that day?
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. Now, will you give us the list of the persons to whom that pilot message was disseminated?
Colonel Bratton. Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Chief of the War Plans Division, G-2, and my own section.
Mr. Kaufman. Did you deliver to the White House?
Colonel Bratton. No; I was not delivering to the White House during this period.
Mr. Kaufman. Who was delivering to the White House?
Colonel Bratton. Captain Kramer.
Mr. Kaufman. So that as between Captain Kramer and your department you took the State Department and he took the White House?
Colonel Bratton. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. Now, you say that you recall having talked to General Gerow and General Miles about the pilot message some time on the afternoon of December 6?
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. Will you tell us your conversation with General Miles first and then later your conversation with General Gerow?
Colonel Bratton. Unfortunately, I cannot remember it in any great detail. It was to the effect that here was an indication that a reply to the State Department’s note to the Japanese Government was on its way. There was at that time no indication as to when we would receive that reply, but I wanted them to know that we could expect this message at some time in the near future and that as soon as it started coming in I would acquaint them with its contents. That, in general, was the substance of my conversation both with General Miles and General Gerow.

Now, I have discussed this matter with both of these officers since that time, recently. They have no recollection of my conversation with them or, if they have, it is very vague.

Mr. Kaufman. Your recollection is that you did talk to both of them?
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. Now, come back to the 13 parts of the message and you began to tell us before that it was completed some time between 9 and 10 o’clock.
Colonel Bratton. Thirteen parts of the message had arrived by that time; yes, sir.
Mr. Kaufman. And what did you do with that message, the 13 parts?
Colonel Bratton. There are several details as to what I did during the remainder of that evening that stand out very clearly in my memory; others do not. I will recount those that I remember very clearly first, if you will allow me to do so.
First, I called up the SIS, got the officer who was on duty there that evening, to ask him if there was any likelihood of the fourteenth part coming in later that night.
Mr. Kaufman. Do you recall who that officer was?
Colonel Bratton. I don’t remember who the officer was; no, sir.
After some discussion in the SIS this officer returned to the phone and he said:

No, there is very little likelihood of that part coming in this evening. We think we have gotten all of that message that we are going to get tonight.
I did not ask him why or discuss the matter with him at all. I accepted his statement. So I, realizing that the Secretary of State was primarily interested in this message, it being a diplomatic one and it being a reply to a message that he had sent to the Japanese Government, gathered up his folder, put it in the pouch, locked the pouch and personally delivered it to the night duty officer in the State Department some time after 10 o'clock that night. I told the night duty officer whose name I have forgotten that this was a highly important message as far as the Secretary of State was concerned and that I would like to have it sent out to his quarters. He assured me that he would do so. I left it with him, securing from him a receipt for what I had given him.

I then returned to my quarters, and as I remember it now about 11 o'clock called up General Miles to report to him about leaving a part of the message and what I had done with it. My recollection is that some one answered the phone in General Miles' home, said that he was out at dinner but that he was expected back any moment. I left word that I would like to have him call me when he came in, which he did.

I described in guarded terms to General Miles the context of this message, told him that the fourteenth part, the most important part, had not been received, told him that I had delivered the first 13 parts to the Secretary of State. I remember his saying yes, that he had seen the 13 parts where he was a dinner guest.

Mr. Kaufman. Did he tell you where he was a dinner guest?
Colonel Bratton. I don't remember that he did, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. Did he tell you he was at Admiral Wilkinson's home?
Colonel Bratton. I must have known that that is where he was because it was our practice at that time to tell each other where we could be found on the phone.

The next point that sticks out in my memory that I am positive is that when I found General Marshall in his office at 11:25 Sunday morning, the 7th of December 1941, he had in front of him on his desk in a folder similar to this not only the 13 parts of this message but all 14 of them. I had not put it there.

Mr. Kaufman. Well, now, let us go back to the night of December 6. You told us that you delivered the 13 parts to the Secretary of State's office.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. You have told us that you talked with General Miles on the telephone.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. Did you ask General Miles as to whether or not delivery of that should be made to the Chief of Staff that night?

Colonel Bratton. I don't remember, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. Did General Miles instruct you at that time that it was unnecessary to deliver the 13 parts to the Chief of Staff that night?

Colonel Bratton. I do not recall that he did, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. I direct your attention to the testimony of General Miles at page 4118 of the record where he testified regarding the 13 parts of the message as follows:

I had a conversation on my return from Admiral Wilkinson's house, as I testified, with Colonel Bratton. I take full responsibility for that thirteen part message not going to the Chief of Staff that night.
Does that refresh your recollection as to whether or not you were instructed by General Miles not to make delivery of that to the Chief of Staff that night?

Colonel Bratton. No, sir; I remember no instructions of that nature from General Miles, and I would like to say further at this point that if there was any error of omission or commission with respect to the delivery of the 13 parts of that message Saturday night of the 6th of December 1941 to Army personnel the error was mine, and I accept full responsibility for it. That was my error.

Mr. Kaufman. Who were the persons in the Army who customarily were to receive this information, this magic?

Colonel Bratton. The Chief of Staff, the Chief of the War Plans Division, and the Chief of the Military Intelligence Division.

Mr. Kaufman. And do we have it now that no delivery was made to any of those persons other than to the Secretary of State and excepting General Miles who had already seen it at Admiral Wilkinson’s house?

[12056] Colonel Bratton. This is the point at which my memory begins to go bad on me. I cannot state positively whether there was any delivery made that night or not at this time.

I testified before the Grunert Board that I had made delivery to the Secretary of the General Staff, to the night duty officer, or to General Gerow and to General Miles. That was my normal procedure. I tried to make simultaneous delivery to all of these people.

Since making that statement before the Grunert Board—I withdraw that statement.

At the time when I made the statement to the Grunert Board I had not remembered, or I did not remember, that Colonel Dusenbury was working with me in the office that night. Now, since making this statement to the Grunert Board I have been shown a number of affidavits by various officers, General Smith, Bedell Smith, General Ralph Smith, General Gailey, General Gerow, and others, to the effect that they did not receive the 13 parts of this message from me or from anybody else Saturday night.

Now, I know all these men. I do not doubt the honesty and integrity of any one of them, and if they say that I did not deliver these pouches to them that night, then my memory must have been at fault.

Mr. Kaufman. And to that extent you want to correct the testimony that you have given before the Grunert Board?

Colonel Bratton. I would prefer to put it this way: Starting from the point which I explained to you are quite clear in my memory, any other statement that I now make would be a reconstruction of events based upon my knowledge of what was standard operating procedure in my office under various sets of circumstances.

Mr. Kaufman. Have you any explanation at this time as to why the standard operating procedure was not followed on this occasion on December 6?

Colonel Bratton. No, sir; except that at this time and when I testified before the Grunert Board I was convinced that undue emphasis was being placed upon two messages. One the so-called winds message; the other the 13 parts of the 14-part message.

Upon my second appearance before the Grunert Board, I tried to explain to them why I considered these two messages were being given undue importance by the Board, and we got lost in the ramifications
of the winds message and I never did get to explain to them why I considered the presence of the 13 parts in Washington relatively unimportant militarily that evening.

I did so consider it upon their receipt and I still consider it now. They contributed no information, they contributed no additional information to the matters that we already had from magic and other sources as to the impending crisis with Japan. The message was incomplete. It ended on the note, in the thirteenth part:

Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

This was primarily of interest, immediate interest to the Secretary of State, not to the Secretary of War or the Chief of the General Staff for it was not an ultimatum, it was not a declaration of war, nor was it a severance of diplomatic relations.

Mr. Kaufman. You knew, of course, there was another part to come, did you not?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. And you couldn't anticipate by seeing the first 13 parts what the fourteenth part would contain, could you?

Colonel Bratton. Quite the contrary, sir. As a matter of fact there was a possibility that the fourteenth part might have contained another proposal from the Japanese Government.

Mr. Kaufman. And it might well have ended with a break in diplomatic relations or a declaration of war?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. Didn't you think that that was of sufficient interest to point out to General Miles and General Gerow, the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff, that night?

Colonel Bratton. I don't think it was necessary to point that out to those gentlemen. They were capable of arriving at their own conclusions on their own.

Mr. Kaufman. So that we have it now, Colonel, that on December 6 you delivered to the Secretary of State, you talked to General Miles who had seen the message, and you made no delivery either to the Secretary of War, the [12058] Chief of Staff, or the Chief of War Plans?

Colonel Bratton. As far as I know now that is correct, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. When did you return to duty on the morning of December 7?

Colonel Bratton. I got to my office on Sunday morning the 7th of December sometime between 7 and 8 o'clock, sir, in the morning.

Mr. Kaufman. And at that time did you get the 14th part of the message?

Colonel Bratton. No; the fourteenth part of the message was not delivered to me until between 8 and 9 o'clock; around 8:15 or 8:30. Now, that message was delivered immediately to the State Department. Whether I took it or not I don't know. It is entirely possible that I may have gotten a car and rushed over there with the 14 parts so that the Secretary of State's book would be complete. On the other hand, I may have given it to Colonel Dusenbury to deliver. All I know now is that the Secretary of State had all 14 of the parts before 10 o'clock that morning.
Mr. Kaufman. About the time that you met Captain Kramer there about 10 o'clock on the morning of December 7?

Colonel Bratton. I couldn’t possibly have met Captain Kramer at the State Department at around 10 o’clock. The only time he could have seen me there would have been between 8 and 9 a.m. that morning, for from that time on I was busily engaged in something else in the War Department.

Mr. Kaufman. What time did you return to your office at the War Department after making this delivery to the Secretary of State?

Colonel Bratton. If I made the delivery to the Secretary of State I was back in my office before 9 o’clock.

Mr. Kaufman. And when did you deliver the 14 parts of the message, together with any other traffic, to the other persons entitled to receive it?

Colonel Bratton. As I remember it now, sir, I believe that all those deliveries within the War Department that morning were made by my assistant, Colonel Dusenbury. And I can give you the reason.

Mr. Kaufman. Will you give us the reason.

Colonel Bratton. For the reason that at about 9 o’clock or shortly before 9 o’clock there was placed in my hands the so-called 1 p.m. delivery message. This immediately stunned me into frenzied activity because of its implications and from that time on I was busily engaged trying to locate various officers of the General Staff and conferring with them on the exclusive subject of this message and its meaning.

Mr. Kaufman. The so-called 1 o’clock message?

Colonel Bratton. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. Who did you talk with that morning about the 1 o’clock message?

Colonel Bratton. Colonel Dusenbury, my assistant; General Miles, after he reached his office——

Mr. Kaufman. What time did he reach his office?

Colonel Bratton. General Miles reached his office, as I remember it, sometime around 10 o’clock, after I had called him on the telephone.

Mr. Kaufman. Who else did you talk with that morning about the 1 o’clock message?


Mr. Kaufman. What time did you talk with General Gerow about the 1 o’clock message?

Colonel Bratton. I didn’t see General Gerow until he joined us in General Marshall’s office.

Mr. Kaufman. What time did you see General Marshall?

Colonel Bratton. 11:25 a.m., immediately after he reached his office. I may say that there are two doors going into General Marshall’s office. One opens directly into the hall and the other goes in from the office of his secretary. He went in through the door that opens off the hall and I went in through the door that opens off the secretary’s office.

Mr. Kaufman. Was General Gerow there?

Colonel Bratton. Not at that time but he and Colonel Bundy joined us a few minutes thereafter.
Mr. KAUFMAN. Was it at that time that General Marshall proceeded to write out a message to be sent to Hawaii?

Colonel BRATTON. Not immediately; as I have stated he had this 14-part message arranged in a book in front of him. When General Miles and I walked into the room he was reading the 14 parts. I had the 1 p.m. delivery message in my hand. General Miles and I attempted to interrupt General Marshall to get him to read this 1 p.m. message but were unsuccessful and he didn't read it until after he had gone all the way through the 14-part message.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And then after he had read the 14 parts you gave him the 1 o'clock message?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. And then what happened?

Colonel Bratton. He read it and asked General Miles and myself what we thought it meant. General Miles and I both said that we were convinced it meant Japanese hostile [12064] action against some American installation in the Pacific at or shortly after 1 o'clock that afternoon. At about this time General Gerow and General Bundy came into the room and there was some discussion of the 14 parts, which were then regarded in the light of an ultimatum, and of the 1 p.m. delivery message.

General Marshall asked us each in turn starting with General Miles for an evaluation of the situation. We all concurred in reiterating the statement that General Miles and I had previously given him to the effect that it was our belief that the Japanese intended to attack us somewhere in the Pacific at or shortly after 1 p.m. that afternoon.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Was there any discussion that 1 p.m. meant 7:30 Hawaiian time?

Colonel Bratton. No, sir.

Mr. KAUFMAN. Was it at that point that General Marshall began to write a message to be sent to Hawaii?

Colonel Bratton. It was at that point, after we had all concurred in urging that our outlying possessions be given an additional alert at once by the fastest possible means, General Marshall drew a piece of scratch paper toward him and picked up a pencil and wrote out in longhand a message to be sent to our overseas commanders. When he reached [12065] the bottom of the page he picked up the telephone and called the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark. I couldn't hear the other end of the conversation at all, but General Marshall, in a guarded way, told Admiral Stark what he had in front of him and what he proposed to do, in effect that he was going to send a warning to Hawaii, Panama, the Philippines and so no.

After some conversation with the Chief of Naval Operations he put down the phone and said:

Admiral Stark doesn't think that any additional warning is necessary.

There was some few minutes discussion on that point. The telephone rang again and it was apparent that it was Admiral Stark calling because General Marshall, when he put the receiver down, said:

Admiral Stark requests that we add to our message "Inform the Navy."
So he added a short sentence at the bottom of his pencilled message, gave it to me and told me to take it to the Message Center and see that it was dispatched at once by the fastest safe means.

As I went out the door there was some discussion as to priority and General Gerow called out to me as I was leaving the Chief of Staff's office.

If there is any question of priority give the Philippines first priority.

I went into the Army Message Center, which was down the hall from us, found the Chief, Colonel French, handed [12066] him the message and said:

The Chief of Staff wants this sent at once by the fastest safe means.

He looked it over and said:

Well, will you help me get this into readable script. Neither I nor my clerk here can read General Marshall's handwriting.

So I took the thing back from him and stood beside a typist while he typed what I read from what General Marshall had written. It possibly took a minute. I then gave it to Colonel French, who immediately started processing the message. I looked at my watch at that time, and, as I remember it, it was about 11:58 a.m.

I returned to General Marshall's office and reported to him what I had done. He said:

Go back and find out how long it is going to take for this message to be delivered to the addressees.

I went back, got ahold of Colonel French, told him what I wanted to know, he did a little figuring mentally, and he said:

It will take about 30 or 40 minutes for it to be delivered to the persons to whom it is addressed.

I went back and reported that fact to General Marshall.

Mr. Kaufman. Did you know at that time that the message was going to be relayed to San Francisco, and then over the RCA lines?

Colonel Bratton. No, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. Did you know whether the Army had direct communication with Hawaii?

Colonel Bratton. By what means?

Mr. Kaufman. By radio or telegraph?

Colonel Bratton. I didn't know it. I assumed that we always had had up until that moment.

Mr. Kaufman. When did you find out for the first time that this message went by Western Union to San Francisco and then by RCA to Honolulu?

Colonel Bratton. Several days after the attack took place.

Mr. Kaufman. Now, Colonel, let us go back to the so-called winds message. You are familiar with the—

The Vice Chairman. Will counsel permit an interruption?

Mr. Kaufman. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. It would be helpful to go back to the so-called 1 o'clock message and find out what the colonel did with that. If it has been covered, I didn't catch it.

Mr. Kaufman. I think that that has been covered, but, [12068] sir, we will do it again.
Colonel Bratton. That is the message that I have been talking about, Mr. Cooper. The one that I handed in person to General Marshall in his office.

The Vice Chairman. I understood that, but how about other recipients of magic; what was done with respect to them as to the 1 o'clock message, if anything?

Colonel Bratton. All the other recipients were right there at the time, except the Secretary of War, who had an adjacent office to the Chief of Staff, and the Secretary of State.

I personally called up one of the assistants to the Secretary of State by telephone prior to my meeting with General Marshall to tell him about this 1 p.m. delivery thing. He said that he would inform the Secretary of State right away.

I don't know whether the Secretary of War was in town that morning or not. I didn't see him all day long.

The Vice Chairman. All right. Thank you.

Mr. Kaufman. Now, let us go back to the so-called winds message. You are familiar with circular 2353 and—

Colonel Bratton. What page is that?

Mr. Murphy. 154.

Mr. Kaufman. Pages 154 and 155, Japanese circulars 2353 and 2354.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir; I am familiar with those messages.

Mr. Kaufman. Will you tell us, if you know, what was done by the Army to get any implement to these two codes?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Upon receipt of 2353 on the 28th of November, I made arrangements through Colonel Sadtler of the Signal Corps to have the FCC monitor this broadcast for us through their station on the west coast, and through Colonel Sadtler I got in contact with a Mr. Sterling, I believe his name was, of the FCC, gave him my office telephone number, my home telephone number and those of my assistant, Colonel Dusenbury, and arranged with him to have me called on the telephone at once upon the receipt of any implementation of this code.

Colonel Sadtler. I believe, explained to him in detail what it was we were looking for.

During the period November 28 and the first week in December, we got from the FCC a number of false alarms on this thing. Incidentally, I told the Navy what I had done, and they told me what they had done. We agreed to pool our results.

Mr. Kaufman. When you say you told the Navy, who did you tell it to?

Colonel Bratton. Captain McCollum and Captain Kramer.

So that ONI and G-2 were working hand in glove trying to pick this thing up from whatever sources were available.

I know that the Navy got a number of false alarms too, from conversations with Captain McCollum and Captain Kramer.

I received three or four. I was waked at all hours of the night on several occasions by the FCC who repeated what they had picked up, believing it to be a part of the implementing message.

Mr. Kaufman. Do you recall on the 5th of December whether or not Colonel Sadtler communicated with you and told you that Ad-
Colonel Noyes had told him that the winds implement message was in?

Mr. Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. Will you tell us about the circumstances and the
talk that you had with Colonel Saddler at that time?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Sometime around 9 or 10 o'clock on the morning of the 5th, I was
called to General Miles' office where Colonel Saddler and General
Miles and his Executive Officer, Colonel Roderick were discussing
some matter, and General Miles turned to Colonel Saddler, and said,
"Tell Bratton what you [12077] have just told me."

He said, "Well, Noyes has just called me up to say that it is in."
The winds execute message.

I said, "Well, what does it say, in English or Japanese?"

He said, "Well, I don't know, he didn't tell me."

So General Miles, at my suggestion, requested Colonel Saddler to
go back, or to go to Admiral Noyes, and get a copy, either of the
Japanese text or of the English translation, so we could look at it to
determine whether or not it was what we were waiting for, or another
false alarm.

So Colonel Saddler took off and some while later came back and re-
ported to General Miles and myself that he couldn't get access to
Admiral Noyes, that he was in a board meeting, something of that
sort. We requested Colonel Saddler to go back and keep on the trail
of Admiral Noyes, or talk to one of his assistants, or get somebody
from over there who knew what they were talking about a copy of
what they had received, so we could satisfy ourselves that this was
really the execute message and not a false alarm.

Colonel Saddler went off and I never saw him again that day, to
my recollection, or in connection with this matter.

I called up the Navy upon my return to my office and [12072]
got either Captain McCollum or Captain Kramer on the phone, I
don't remember which at the moment, to ask them if they had gotten
in the winds execute message and they said "No."

I said, "Please let me know if you have one anywhere in the Navy."
They said they would.

I then called up the SIS and asked them if they knew anything about
the arrival anywhere in Washington of an execute message of the
winds code, and they said "No," they knew nothing about it, and I
repeated my request to them, if anything came in to please let me
know, and then put the matter out of my mind.

Senator Lucas. Whom did you call in the SIS?

Mr. Kaufman. Whom did you call in the SIS?

Colonel Bratton. I don't remember now, sir. It was either Major
Doud or Captain Schukraft, or one of the other officers on duty there.

Mr. Kaufman. Now, you began to tell us before that you felt that
the winds code message was expanded all out of proportion to its real
value.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. I asked you to tell us about it when we got to the
winds code situation. Will you tell us what [12073] statement
you want to make about it now?

Colonel Bratton. Even if we had received an execute message of the
winds code after the third of December, it would only have contributed
or confirmed information that we already had. It is perfectly obvious from an examination of this code and the messages in connection there- with that it was a device figured out by the Japanese for informing their diplomatic agents around the world of danger in the breach of diplomatic relations with certain powers if other means of communication failed.

Well, it never failed in Washington right up to the last minute. They could always communicate with their ambassador here.

On the 3d of December we intercepted a direct order given to the Japanese Ambassador to start burning his codes. That was the pur- pose of the whole thing. That was it.

Any winds execute message received after that would simply just be another straw in the wind confirming what we already knew.

Mr. Kaufman. And by the 5th of December you had already re- ceived intercepted messages from consuls in various parts of the world advising Tokyo by the word “Haruna” that they had complied with the request to burn the codes?

Colonel Bratton. I remember seeing a number of those [12074] messages; yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. And they are in the record in this proceeding?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. After the date when Colonel Sadtler told you that Admiral Noyes had advised him that the winds message was in, did you continue to monitor for winds execute messages?

Colonel Bratton. Oh, yes, sir; we continued to monitor for the winds execute message and a variation of it was delivered to my assistant, Colonel Dusenbury, on the afternoon of the 7th or 8th after the attack when it was utterly immaterial and useless.

Mr. Kaufman. When Colonel Sadtler made this report to you, did you communicate with the Federal Communications Commission?

Colonel Bratton. No, sir; I don’t remember that I did.

Mr. Kaufman. You have talked about a message delivered to your assistant, Colonel Dusenbury, on the 7th or the 8th. Is that the mes- sage in Exhibit 142, page 3 (a)?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir; I believe that is the message.

Mr. Kaufman. I direct your attention to Exhibit No. 142A, the record of the Federal Communications Commission [12075] that they telephoned you at 7:50 on the night of December 5, and that you were advised—you stated:

Results still negative but am pleased to receive the negative results as it means that we have that much more time.

Do you recall that conversation?

Colonel Bratton. Not in that detail, but it is in the nature of similar conversations I had with those people during that period.

Mr. Kaufman. I ask you to look at a record given to us by the FCC which records the substance of a conversation that you had on the 5th of December at 7:50 that night, and ask you whether that refreshes your recollection as to the conversation that you had with the Fed- eral Communications Commission on that day?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir; I remember that.

Mr. Kaufman. Well, will you tell us as nearly as you can the con- versation that you had with the Federal Communications Commission
on the 5th of December, after using this memorandum to refresh your recollection?

Colonel Bratton. As nearly as I can remember, it was to the effect as stated in that document.

Senator Lucas. Will counsel read that?

Mr. Kaufman. The memorandum from the Federal Communications Commission, which is part of 142-A, is as follows:

Phoned Colonel Bratton and gave him the message at 7:50 p.m.

Remarks by Colonel Bratton:

"Results still negative but am pleased to receive the negative results as it means that we have that much more time. The information desired will occur in the middle of a program and possibly will be repeated at frequent intervals. (Asked if I should communicate the information to Portland concerning the fact that the desired data will be in the middle of a program.)"

Colonel Bratton. That latter part is a bit garbled, according to my present recollection. I don't remember making any such statement as is contained in that last sentence.

Mr. Kaufman. You wouldn't say that you didn't make it?

Colonel Bratton. No, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. It goes on to say:

No. I will have a conference with Lieutenant Colonel Dusenberg in the morning and will contact Mr. Sterling in that regard.

With regard to communicating with Portland,

Colonel Bratton. I don't recall making that statement, but it is quite possible that I did, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. This is a record made by the Federal Communications Commission at the time.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kaufman. It is part of their diary records, apparently.

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

The Vice Chairman. Colonel Bratton, about what was the difference in time of the receipt of the fourteenth part of the 14-part message and the so-called 1 o'clock message?

Colonel Bratton. About a half-hour, as I remember it, sir.

The Vice Chairman. About a half-hour?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. You received the fourteenth part of the 14-part message—

Colonel Bratton. First.

The Vice Chairman. First.

Colonel Bratton. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. About what time?

Colonel Bratton. Sometime between 8:30 and 9 o'clock as I recall it, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Then about 30 minutes later, you received the 1 o'clock message?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. That would put both of them into your hands at about what time?

Colonel Bratton. Between 8:30 and 9 o'clock that morning, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Well, did you do anything during that 30 minutes between the receipt of the fourteenth part and the 1 o'clock message about getting word to any of these recipients of magic?
Colonel Bratton. Word of the receipt of the fourteenth part you mean, sir?

The Vice Chairman. Yes, sir.

Colonel Bratton. I don’t remember that I did, sir, for the reason that I took the fourteenth part, assembled it with the remaining 13 parts, and started reading the whole thing off to see just exactly what it meant.

While I was doing that, the 1 p. m. delivery message was placed in my hands.

The Vice Chairman. And I believe you stated that after receipt of the 1 o’clock message you then became very much concerned?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. I washed my hands of all other matters, turning them over to my assistant, Colonel Dusenbury, and proceeded to take steps with the 1 p. m. delivery message.

The Vice Chairman. About what time was the 1 p. m. delivery message ready in your hands for distribution?

Colonel Bratton. I made no distribution of it except to the Chief of Staff. I kept his copy in my hands until I gave it to him in his office. Any other distribution that was made that morning must have been made by my assistant, Colonel Dusenbury.

The Vice Chairman. Then what did you do in the way of trying to contact the Chief of Staff from the time you had the 1 o’clock message ready to deliver and the time you actually saw him?

Colonel Bratton. I discovered that neither the Chief of Staff, Chief of War Plans Division, or G-2, were in their offices, so I immediately put in a phone call for General Marshall at his quarters at Fort Myer. One of his orderlies answered the telephone and informed me that the General had gone horseback riding.

I said, “Well, you know generally where he has gone. You know where you can get a hold of him?”

He said, “Yes, I think I can find him.”

I said, “Please go out at once, get assistance if necessary, and find General Marshall, ask him to—tell him who I am and tell him to go to the nearest telephone, that it is vitally important that I communicate with him at the earliest practicable moment.”

The orderly said he would do so.

Then I called General Miles at his home, and told him what I had done and urged that he come down to the office at once, because I felt that General Marshall would want to see him and talk with him.

There was some discussion between General Miles and myself as to who was to call General Gerow. I don’t remember whether I called him or whether General Miles called him but he was summoned to his office by telephone by one of us.

The Vice Chairman. Allow me to interrupt for a moment, Colonel. Just what was the time that you delivered this message to General Marshall’s orderly?

Colonel Bratton. Shortly after 9 o’clock. That is, shortly after my reading the message. The message was placed in my hands at about 9 o’clock. As soon as I had read it and realized its import, I immediately started calling General Marshall. That was sometime between 9 and 9:15.

The Vice Chairman. So it was between 9 and 9:15 that you talked to his orderly at his home.
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

[12081]  The Vice Chairman. And urged him to get hold of General Marshall and ask him to contact you as promptly as possible?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And you did not get any call from General Marshall then?

Colonel Bratton. Not until sometime after 10 o'clock.

The Vice Chairman. After 10 o'clock.

Colonel Bratton. General Marshall called me in person sometime between 10 and 10:30. I explained to him that I had a most important message that he must see at once, and that if he would stay where he was, I would get a car and bring it to him.

He said:

No, don't bother to do that. I am coming down to my office. You can give it to me then.

The Vice Chairman. That, you think, was about 10:30?

Colonel Bratton. Between 10 and 10:30; sometime closer to the half-hour.

The Vice Chairman. Between 10 and 10:30.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. So, naturally, you followed his instructions and waited until he got to the office?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. That was 11:25?

[12082]  Colonel Bratton. That was 11:25 when I reached him in his office.

Prior to talking to General Marshall in his office, however, I did discuss this whole business with General Miles in his office, who in the meantime had reached the War Department. So that General Miles was thoroughly conversant with the entire matter before he and I went together into General Marshall's office.

The Vice Chairman. How soon did you get to talk to General Miles and acqquaint him with what you had?

Colonel Bratton. I called General Miles immediately after talking to General Marshall's orderly, and requested him to come down to the office, that I had some very important matters to discuss with him, and that I felt that the Chief of Staff would want to see him too.

The Vice Chairman. I believe you stated General Miles arrived at his office at about 10 o'clock?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. You showed it to him promptly then?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. You were about to say something about General Gerow, when I broke in.

Colonel Bratton. I don't remember seeing General Gerow that morning until he joined us in General Marshall's office.

The Vice Chairman. And that was at 11:25; the 11:25 meeting?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. All right.

Senator George.
Senator George. Colonel Bratton, you are familiar with the September 24 message? I believe it is the one that divided Pearl Harbor into areas.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir, I am familiar with that message.

Senator George. Did that come to you also, or was it handled entirely by the Navy?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir, that came to me, and my record shows that I delivered it to the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of the War Plans Division.

Senator George. To whom? I didn’t quite get it. Delivered it to whom?

Colonel Bratton. The Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, and the Chief of the War Plans Division.

Senator George. The Chief of the War Plans Division was General Gerow?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

[12084] Senator George. Did you also handle the messages beginning December 3 relating to the burning of codes, destruction of papers?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator George. Did you get those messages?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator George. Your duty was to distribute the information?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator George. Did you have any further duty to perform with regard to any of those messages, say the code burning messages?

In other words, did you issue any orders on them?

Colonel Bratton. Well, upon receipt of the intercept directing the Japanese Ambassador to starting burning his codes and ciphers, I requested the Signal Corps to prepare a message which G-2 could send to its attachés and observers in the Far East directing them to burn certain of their codes and ciphers.

I took these messages when prepared up to General Miles, secured his O. K. for sending them out.

Senator George. Those messages regarding the burning of codes went to General Short at Hawaii and—

Colonel Bratton. Not from my office, sir, and not, as [12085] far as I know, from G-2, because we were informed that the Navy was transmitting that information to the naval commander in Hawaii, the Philippines, and elsewhere, and that they would pass this information on to their Army opposite numbers.

I accepted that as being sufficient because, as you know, it is inadvisable to send the same message in two different codes when it can be avoided.

Senator George. What knowledge did you have of the facilities and means available in the Hawaiian Islands to intercept and decode and translate these messages?

Colonel Bratton. I knew that they were capable of breaking in Hawaii, certain low-grade diplomatic messages. I knew that they did not have the purple machine, but through my contact with my opposite number in the Naval Intelligence, I knew that extracts from the more important magic messages were being sent to the Navy in Hawaii, and that by mutual understanding, that is, what ONI thought was an un-
proper understanding, the substance of those messages was available to the proper officials in the Army.

Senator George. Colonel, I understood you to say that as you now recall, or as you now recollect, you are not able to say to whom you did make delivery of the first 13 parts of the 14-part message on the evening of December 6, beyond the point where your recollection was positive; is that correct? [12086]

Colonel Bratton. That is correct, sir.

Senator George. Do I understand that you simply do not recollect whether you made delivery, or whether you, according to your usual course of operations, you assume that you may have made the delivery? In other words, are we to understand you have no positive recollection on that at this time?

Colonel Bratton. I have no positive recollection at this time, Senator.

When I testified before the Grunert Board, I didn’t realize that Colonel Dusenbury, my assistant, was working with me in the office that evening.

Now, when I processed this material alone, I did it a certain way. When he and I worked together we did it another way. We had a standard operating procedure, so to speak.

Now, if I had remembered when I was testifying before the Grunert Board that Dusenbury was with me there that evening, I would probably have said he and I made the normal distribution that evening. That is when I went to the Secretary of State, he delivered to the War Department officials because that was our standard operating procedure.

We had done it over, and over, and over again, that way.

[12087] On numerous occasions when I went to deliver pouches to the Secretary of State late at night, he would stop off at General Marshall’s quarters on his way home to see that General Marshall got copies of these messages that were of sufficient importance to deliver late at night.

Senator George. Colonel, as I understand it, you considered the 14-part message when it had been completed as a message of supreme importance, of very great importance? That is, with the fourteenth part in hand?

Colonel Bratton. It was an important message, yes, sir; but if I may go back to the so-called pilot message and discuss it for a moment, and my reaction to it, the gist of it was that the Japanese Ambassador was to take this 14-part message and without the aid of a stenographer, and in great secrecy put it in nice shape, preparatory to delivery, lock it up in his safe and keep it there pending further instructions.

This, if anything, meant that we probably had a little bit more time before the shooting war started.

After the receipt of this pilot message, the vital factor in my mind was the date and hour of delivery of the 14-part message. Its physical presence in Washington had little significance.

Senator George. And as soon as you saw the 1 o’clock [12088] message, the message directing delivery, you realized then the importance of the message?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir; because it was peculiarly worded, and the implication was inescapable that it was of vital importance.
Senator George. And you shortly thereafter undertook to locate General Marshall?
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Senator George. You did locate him over the phone as you told the committee, but you actually saw him at 11:25 on the morning of December 6?
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Keefe. December 7.
Senator George. December 7. And at the time you saw him, all others to whom you were obligated to make distribution were present except the State Department, and you have already described that the fourteenth part and the 1 o'clock message had gone to the State Department, I believe?
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
All concerned in the War Department were present except the Secretary of War.
Senator George. All except the Secretary of War.
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Senator George. In the War Department?
[12089] Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Senator George. Colonel, is your recollection positive with respect to the so-called winds execute message? That is, positive that you never saw such message?
Colonel Bratton. It is most positive.
Senator George. That is, until after the attack on Pearl Harbor?
Colonel Bratton. That is correct, sir.
I can state most positively that no execute of the winds code was ever received by me prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. I find it hard to believe that any such execute message could get into the War Department without passing over my desk.
It is inconceivable to me. I might have missed it but I had some assistants who were on the watch for it, and there were some people in the Army SIS who were also on the watch for it. They couldn't all have missed it. It is simply inconceivable to me that such a message should have been in the War Department without some one of us knowing about it or seeing it.
Senator George. Your recollection is that you never handled such message, never saw it?
Colonel Bratton. No sir; most positive.
Senator George. If it came?
[12090] Colonel Bratton. Most positive.
Senator George. No further questions.
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Clark, of North Carolina, will inquire.
Mr. Clark. I want to ask you, Colonel, one or two brief questions. You mentioned taking a receipt when you delivered the 13 parts to the Secretary of State's office.
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Clark. Did you keep that receipt or was it destroyed shortly thereafter?
Colonel Bratton. It was my practice during this time, sir, as far as the State Department was concerned, to take a receipt by serial number, that is, by the SIS number at the bottom of the page, from the confidential secretary of the Secretary of State.
I would take the bag over to him, unlock it, and we would thumb through these things bound in a book like this, check the numbers at the bottom of the page, and he would give me a receipt, a signed receipt, for SIS number so and so, to number so and so. I kept that receipt in my possession until after all of these flimsies were returned to me from the State Department, generally within a day or so.

Mr. Clark. You had no further occasion to keep the receipt after that?

Colonel Bratton. I then destroyed the receipt and the intercept itself.

Mr. Clark. I believe you said you have been reading this record we made here, and I have not, but is there any controversy about the fact that you delivered the 13 parts to the Secretary of State at that time?

Colonel Bratton. I don't see how there could be.

Mr. Clark. There has not been any conflict of testimony here that you recall?

Colonel Bratton. No, sir, none that I know of or have heard of.

Mr. Clark. Taking the 13 parts along, was there anything in that upon which military action of any kind could be based?

Colonel Bratton. Not as I interpreted it, sir. As I look at it, I see nothing in it which would have prompted General Marshall or General Gerow to take any action on the night of Saturday the 6th of December 1941. And I would like to remind you, sir, if I may, that all the high officials of the Navy Department saw those 13 parts on the night of Saturday the 6th of December 1941, and they took no action other than to decide to have a conference at 10 o'clock the following morning.

I don't think that General Marshall or General Gerow would have done otherwise under the circumstances even if they had had these 13 parts. Their first reaction would have been to call up General Miles and ask his advice. General Miles saw nothing alarming from a military point of view in these 13 parts, and I think he so would have stated to General Marshall or General Gerow on that night.

Mr. Clark. The contents of the 13 parts that had come in, as I understand you, really didn't change the existing situation any?

Colonel Bratton. I don't believe I understand, sir.

Mr. Clark. I mean, was the situation or the intelligence that you had, or the action you would take, any different after you received the 13 parts than it was before?

Colonel Bratton. No, sir. We had known for some time that this message was coming. We surmised its contents, and we knew that the Ambassador had been told to polish it up, put it in his safe, and wait further instructions. That didn't alter the picture that we had.

Mr. Clark. So there was nothing significant about that message until the fourteenth part came in?

Colonel Bratton. There was nothing even after the arrival of the fourteenth part; there was no military significance to its presence in Washington as long as the Japanese Ambassador kept it locked up in his safe.

Mr. Clark. Did you see the reply of General Short to the message that you spoke of General Marshall sending?

Colonel Bratton. Not until after the attack, sir.
Mr. Clark. I was referring to General Marshall's message of the 27th.

Colonel Bratton. I understand, sir. There is no reason why I should have seen it. I was on a lower echelon in the Intelligence Division. This was an operational matter, and a matter of countersabotage which was another division of intelligence. I was in the intelligence branch.

The counterintelligence branch would have been the one to see that, if anybody in G-2 had seen it upon its arrival in Washington.

Mr. Clark. Well, I was prompted to ask you that question because you and so many others were present and intensely interested in what General Marshall was doing. That message was sent out on the 27th.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, but I didn't see the message until after the attack.

Mr. Clark. Did it occur to you to look up the reply to that message? [12094] Colonel Bratton. These things were being handled on a higher level than my own, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Clark. Well, that isn't exactly what I asked you, Colonel, quite.

Colonel Bratton. Well, I must say that I was quite perturbed and anxious and very much alerted all during this period, and I, of course, was anxious to find out what was going on, what was being done.

We were feeding all this intelligence up to higher echelons, and I naturally wanted to know what was being done with it.

I was told that a warning message had been sent out by the Navy on the 24th and another warning message by the Army on the 27th, and a warning against sabotage also.

I knew that those messages had gone out, but I didn't read them at that time. I knew only in a general way what their contents were.

Now, General Miles has testified that he did not see General Short's reply.

Mr. Clark. Who?

Colonel Bratton. General Miles.

Mr. Clark. Yes.

Colonel Bratton. Has testified, and it is in evidence here that he himself did not see that reply when it came in, [12095] and if he had seen it, he would have taken immediate action to point out that it was not a reply to General Marshall's message.

Well, if General Miles never saw it, I certainly wouldn't have seen it either because the only way I could have seen it would be through him.

Mr. Clark. Well, it just seems a little strange to me, as a layman, as far as military affairs are concerned, that the intelligence set-up you had down there wouldn't have been checking to see the response from General MacArthur and General Short and from Panama and the west coast to this most important message of the 27th.

Now, you are saying that it was not your duty or in your line of duty, and that you did not check on it.

Colonel Bratton. They were not given to me to read, sir. I was told that they had been sent, and I was told their general contents.

Mr. Clark. Would you have been permitted to look up the replies if you had wished to do so?

Colonel Bratton. I think I could have gotten access to them.
Mr. Clark. Then why didn’t you look to see what had come in in response to this message of the 27th from the Chief of Staff?

Colonel Bratton. Well, I had confidence that my Chief General Miles, was handling that situation adequately.

Mr. Clark. If you had seen the reply of General Short at that time, what do you think your reaction would have been?

Colonel Bratton. I could only speak from hindsight.

Mr. Clark. No, let’s not do that. Let’s go back to the day that message came into the War Department saying that he was on a sabotage alert. What would have occurred to you about that?

Colonel Bratton. Well, I think my reaction would have been the same as General Miles has testified. I would have noticed, I think, that it was not a reply to General Marshall’s message, because he quoted the number of General Marshall’s message, said “in reply to your No. so-and-so,” and it wasn’t a reply to General Marshall’s No. so-and-so at all; he was talking only about sabotage.

Mr. Clark. I see.

Colonel Bratton. I think I would have checked that discrepancy. I can’t say with any degree of positiveness.

Mr. Clark. Do you think it is a little strange, Colonel, that with all the money we have spent and the precautions we have taken in the Hawaiian Islands to make it a strong outpost, and with this crucial situation developing, that no one in War Department should discover the reply of General Short showed completely that he hadn’t appreciated the gravity of the situation?

Colonel Bratton. Well, I think it is most deplorable.

Mr. Clark. Well, where does the fault lie?

Colonel Bratton. I understood that was the duty of this committee.

Mr. Clark. I am afraid you are right. I am not really trying to get you to pass on the conduct of some fellow officer, or something of that kind. You say the fault in this case does not lie in the G-2 Department; is that right?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. The fault did not rest in the G-2 Department?

Colonel Bratton. Definitely not, sir.

Mr. Clark. Or the War Plans Division?

Colonel Bratton. I think General Gerow has already accepted full responsibility for that error.

Mr. Clark. Is that where it belongs, as a military matter?

Colonel Bratton. Will you repeat that, sir?

Mr. Clark. I say as a military matter, is that where the responsibility belongs, in the War Plans Division?

Colonel Bratton. Are you asking for an expression of my opinion, sir?

Mr. Clark. Here is what I am asking for, sir: It has been almost conceded that the reply of General Short to this important message was admittedly inadequate, and that if that had been discovered additional action would have been taken.

Now what I am asking you, as a military man who understands all the ins and outs of this procedure and this organization, where does the responsibility rest for not having discovered the inadequacy of the Short reply to General Marshall’s message of the 27th?
Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, might I just suggest, it strikes me as being rather improper to ask this witness to make an answer which constitutes a direct criticism of another branch of the service of which he was not a part.

Colonel Bratton. Not only that, but it involves my making a criticism of officers who are far superior to me in rank and experience. It does not lie within my province to fix the responsibility for this blunder.

Mr. Clark. This what?

Colonel Bratton. It does not lie within my province, and I am unable to fix the responsibility for this blunder. General Gerow has already assumed full responsibility for that error.

Mr. Keefe. So has General Marshall in his testimony.

Mr. Clark. I will try to get around to my point this way: Was it the duty or responsibility of anybody below the [12100] chief of staff in the War Plans Division to have examined the replies to General Marshall's message of the 27th of November?

Colonel Bratton. That was the duty of the War Plans Division.

Mr. Clark. That is what I am trying to get at. I am not trying to get you to reflect on your superiors.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. I appreciate your position.

Colonel Bratton. Yes: but I want to emphasize the fact it was not the duty of the Intelligence Division. This was an operational order.

Mr. Clark. Of course, not knowing all about those things, I did not know but what the Intelligence Division should have examined these messages from time to time and seen what was going on.

Colonel Bratton. No, sir; that was an operational order which implemented a war plan.

Mr. Clark. And it belonged in the War Plans Division?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark. I want to make it very clear to you that I have no disposition whatever to embarrass you in any way.

Colonel Bratton. I understand, sir.

[12101] Mr. Clark. I have admiration for your record and your apparent frankness before this committee.

That is all I have.

The Vice Chairman. Senator Lucas, of Illinois, will inquire.

Senator Lucas. Was General Miles present when the message was prepared by General Marshall that went out to General Short originally?

Colonel Bratton. You mean the message of the 27th of November?

Senator Lucas. The message of the 27th of November.

Colonel Bratton. I have no first-hand knowledge of that, sir.

Senator Lucas. I have forgotten whether he testified that you were present at that meeting or not. Anyhow, you made very clear to this committee that there is a distinction between an operational order and one that comes through the Intelligence Division, where it is merely an evaluation of information that has been received from time to time.

Colonel Bratton. Very, very different functions, sir.
Senator Lucas. Yes. And you told the committee that in this inverse chain of events, where Stimson saw the message, Marshall saw the message, and General Gerow saw the message, that under the war regulations General Miles would not see that message.

[12103] Colonel Bratton. I think, in view of the fact that the reply dealt with sabotage measures, a copy of the message should have been routed to General Miles. We know from his testimony that it was not. Now sabotage and countersabotage are all definitely in the province of the Intelligence Division. Now a mistake was made—by whom I do not know—in the routing of this message. It clearly stated in the message that it was a reply to a certain numbered message from General Marshall. It obviously was not, if you read the body of the thing. The body of the thing dealt with something that was an intelligence matter. For that reason the message, or a copy of it, should have gone to General Miles.

Senator Lucas. When General Miles sent his sabotage message on November 28, I presume he did so without knowing anything about Short's reply.

Colonel Bratton. I presume so, sir. I am not the best witness on that.

Senator Lucas. I thought perhaps you had something to do with the preparation of that message and knew about it.

Colonel Bratton. No, sir.

Senator Lucas. Did you know anything about the message that General Arnold had sent out?

Colonel Bratton. Not until after the attack, sir.

[12103] Mr. Keefe. Will the Senator yield, to clear the record here?

Senator Lucas. Yes, I will yield.

Mr. Keefe. So we will not get confused. My recollection of the testimony is that the message which was sent by General Miles to General Short was sent on the 27th and not the 28th.

Senator Lucas. I think perhaps the Congressman may be correct.

Mr. Keefe. And there was a question, as you recall Senator, that came up as to whether or not General Short got the Miles message before he had replied to the Marshall message. My recollection of the testimony is he said it came in shortly after he had sent his reply to the Marshall message, on the same day, November 27.

Senator Lucas. The Congressman is correct on that. General Short testified that he sent the reply to Marshall's message about 30 minutes after it was received, and a short time after the sabotage message came in.

Mr. Keefe. The Senator will recall the message that was sent by the Adjutant General and the message by General Arnold. They went out on the 28th.

Colonel Bratton. They went out on the 28th, and General Miles' message went out on the 27th.


Now one question further with respect to the magic that came in dividing Pearl Harbor into five different sections. You told Senator George that you were familiar with that, as I recall.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. Did Miles ask you for your opinion as to what you believed that sort of a message meant?

Colonel Bratton. No, but I was prepared to give it to him if he had, because I had discussed this message and similar messages with my opposite number in the Navy at some length on numerous occasions.

I would like to explain that "enemy order of battle."

Senator Lucas. The what?

Colonel Bratton. The "enemy order of battle." I will explain the term, sir. This information about the strength, disposition, location, commanders of major units of the Japanese Army and of the Army Air Force, Intelligence along those lines, and countermeasures, that is measures that we would take to prevent the Japanese from securing similar intelligence as to our ground and air forces, were a function of the Intelligence Division of the Army, and, by the same token, information about enemy fleet movements and countermeasures are a function of Naval Intelligence.

I felt that the Japanese were showing unusual interest in the port at Honolulu, and discussed this matter with my opposite numbers in the Navy on several occasions. They were securing information in as great detail as possible on the Japanese Navy. They had a great big map up on the wall that showed the location of every battleship in the Japanese Navy, as far as they could find out. All Intelligence units had that sort of thing.

Senator Lucas. They traced the fleet, as best they could, from day to day on this map?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. Now this business about dividing up Pearl Harbor was explained to me by my opposite numbers first as a device to reduce the volume of radio traffic, they had a code, to reduce the volume of the thing in making these reports.

Mr. Richardson. How would they do that, Colonel?

Colonel Bratton. By substituting numbers or letters for entire sentences.

Next, that it might be a plan for sabotage of such ships as were in Pearl Harbor, or it might be a plan for a submarine attack, or it might be a plan for an air attack. But—and I was assured of this on numerous occasions—when the emergency arises the fleet is not going to be there, so this is a waste of time and effort on the part of the Japanese consul. Nobody in ONI, nobody in G-2, knew that any major element of the fleet was in Pearl Harbor on Sunday morning the 7th of December. We had all thought they had gone to sea.

Senator Lucas. Why did you think that?

Colonel Bratton. Because that was part of the war plan, and they had been given a war warning.

Senator Lucas. Colonel, who in the intelligence branch of the Army here in Washington had the custody of these files of magic?

Colonel Bratton. I did, sir. That is, as far as any existed outside of the SIS.

Senator Lucas. Yes. Well, there have been a number of messages that have been introduced in evidence, and contained in one of these exhibits, which show the amount of traffic that came from Tokyo to Hawaii and from Hawaii to Tokyo.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Senator Lucas. You recall I examined General Miles at some length with respect to the number of messages that went direct from Honolulu to Tokyo.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. As I recall, it was some 22 or 23 messages between the early spring and around September 23, \[12107\] and then for the first time in September a message came from Tokyo to Honolulu. As I recall, some 5 messages came after that from Tokyo to Honolulu.

Now you were familiar with all of these messages that came, I take it?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Did that make any different impression upon you, the fact that Tokyo started sending messages to Honolulu in September 1941, when for months before that they had been silent, as far as sending any messages to that point is concerned?

Colonel Bratton. I do not recall that it made any impression on me at the time, sir.

Senator Lucas. How long did you stay in G-2 after December 7, 1941?

Colonel Bratton. Until the fall of 1943.

Senator Lucas. Then, where did you go?

Colonel Bratton. Headquarters of the Third Army at Fort Sam Houston.

Senator Lucas. And from there?

Colonel Bratton. To Europe.

Senator Lucas. You were in Europe when Colonel Clausen took your affidavit?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

\[12108\] Senator Lucas. Well, there has been some question about what Colonel Clausen did or did not do over there in Europe. Were you ever mistreated by Clausen in the way of being browbeaten into signing the affidavit?

Colonel Bratton. Not in any manner whatsoever, sir. My relations with Colonel Clausen were cordial in every respect.

Senator Lucas. Did he seek, at any time while he was there, to have you change your testimony from what it was in previous hearings?

Colonel Bratton. No. He asked me to comment on certain papers that he had brought with him to Europe, most of which were in the form of affidavits from various officers bearing on certain parts of magic and their delivery.

Senator Lucas. How long was it after Pearl Harbor that you first testified before any board?

Colonel Bratton. Three years.

Senator Lucas. Three years. And did you know at any time during that 3 years that you might be called to testify before any board of inquiry?

Colonel Bratton. I suppose that I would be, if they ever had one.

Senator Lucas. Did you immediately following Pearl Harbor make any memorandum or notes of your activities around \[12109\] the 5th or 6th of December?
Colonel Bratton. The one that has already been introduced by General Miles in evidence as a memorandum of the events of the morning of the 7th of December 1941. I read over what he had written and offered a number of suggestions and recommended a number of changes based upon my recollection of what had happened, and we got together in the preparation of the thing. That is the only memorandum that either he or I made at the time, that I can remember now.

Senator Lucas. And then it was some 3 years before you were again called upon to testify?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. Where were you at that time?

Colonel Bratton. What time, sir?

Senator Lucas. When you testified before the Grunert Board?

Colonel Bratton. I was at the advance headquarters of the Third Army, 50 miles east of Verdun, in the midst of a campaign.

Senator Lucas. You were in battle?

Colonel Bratton. Well, I was on the commanding general's staff.

Senator Lucas. I say you were up there fighting the Nazis. I think that is all.

[12110] The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy, of Pennsylvania, will inquire, Colonel.

Mr. Murphy. Colonel Bratton, do you have any memorandum or any recollection as to the delivery of the pilot message?

Colonel Bratton. I have no memorandum as to the delivery, sir, but my recollection is fairly clear that that pilot message was delivered at about 3 o'clock on Saturday afternoon and that I did discuss its contents with General Gerow and General Miles.

Mr. Murphy. Did the pilot message come from the Navy or was it translated by the Army?

Colonel Bratton. It was intercepted by the Navy at Bainbridge Island at 7:20 a.m. December 6, 1941, Washington time. The tele-type copy of the intercept was delivered to the SIS at 12:05 p.m. December 6, Washington time. It was translated by the Army SIS and delivered to me, sir.

Mr. Murphy. What time was it translated by the Army?

Colonel Bratton. There is no record of that, sir.

Mr. Murphy. I understood Captain Kramer to say he did not get the pilot message from the Navy until Sunday morning.

Colonel Bratton. No, sir; he said he got it late Sunday evening.

[12111] Mr. Murphy. Later on he came back and said to Senator Ferguson sometime Sunday morning.

The Vice Chairman. You did not mean to say "late Sunday evening," did you?

Colonel Bratton. Late Saturday. I heard portions of Captain Kramer's testimony myself.

Mr. Murphy. After he made a check, at the request of the distinguished Senator from Michigan, it is my understanding he then placed it as having not been delivered until Sunday morning.

Colonel Bratton. I cannot account for that.

Mr. Murphy. I wonder where it could have been, if he got it on Sunday morning and delivered it to a Navy man and you say you think it was delivered at 3 o'clock Saturday afternoon.
Colonel Bratton. Well, I am not the best witness on that procedure, sir. It was automatic between the Navy code and cipher people and Army SIS. They exchanged this stuff in bulk.

Mr. Murphy. Do they have any record at all in SIS as to the translation of this particular message?

Colonel Bratton. I do not think there is any such record at this time, sir.

Mr. Murphy. They had no time stamps either then?

[12112] Colonel Bratton. Sir?

Mr. Murphy. They had no time stamps as to the receipt of these important messages, as to when they came in and went out?

Colonel Bratton. No, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Do you have any distinct recollection of discussing the pilot message on Saturday afternoon?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. When did General Marshall get that, and under what circumstances?

Colonel Bratton. I did not discuss that with General Marshall. I do not know where he was at that time.

Mr. Murphy. Who delivered it to him and when did he get it; do you know?

Colonel Bratton. I do not know, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Who does know? Do you know that?

Colonel Bratton. No, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Is there anybody in the Army who has got a record or who could tell as to when these things were delivered? Kramer said he could tell by the numbers that were assigned to them approximately what pouch they were contained in. I would like to know, and I think the record should show, if General Marshall got that pilot message on Saturday night, and if he got it, whom did he get it from?

[12113] Colonel Bratton. I do not know of any record that could prove that which is now in existence, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Then I would like to go over with you a bit, your testimony before the Grunert Board, on page 58:

General Russell. Not by you. Now, did you ever get information, from any source, relating to this, I will call it, weather intercept about which you have testified that you made some requests on the FCC?

Colonel Bratton. As I have stated, sir, I got several reports from the FCC about an intercept of a weather broadcast which they thought might be what I was looking for. The message that I was waiting for, that is, the one which, deciphered, would indicate a break in the relations between Japan and the United States, never reached me from any source whatever prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

That was what you testified to today, was it not?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy (reading):

I had conversations on one of two occasions with Colonel Sadtler of the Signal Corps, with Lieutenant Kramer of the Navy, and with Commander McCollum of the Navy, the latter being my opposite number in ONI, concerning messages that had been picked up, either by the Navy or by the FCC, containing weather broadcasts and containing phrases similar to those that we were waiting for.

[12114] Colonel Bratton. Yes.
Mr. Murphy. Did you ever hear from any of them about any weather implementing message having been received up to December 7?
Colonel Bratton. Not any implementing message, but the Navy got a number of false alarms, just as the FCC did.
Mr. Murphy. Now, you said on page 59:

On the morning of December the 5th I have a vague recollection of a meeting in General Miles' office where Colonel Sadtler was present, in which he said something to the effect that the message had come through. Questioning developed the fact, however, that the message he was talking about was one which indicated a break in diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Japan.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, do you have any recollection as to just what it did mean?
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir; I remember now that that is what he said.
Mr. Murphy. Between Great Britain and Japan?
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now, to go further:

That was beside the point at that time because it was our belief that relations between Japan and [12115] Great Britain were on the point of rupture and had been for several days. The message that we were waiting for was one which would indicate a break in relations between Japan and the United States. I never received that message from any source prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.

And again at the bottom of the page:

General Russell. Colonel, I am going to show you a discussion of this message of December 4. I think we can take it up about here [indicating] and read down to that point.

That was referring to the Safford testimony, was it not? The Safford testimony is contained on page 361 of the record.

Will you please read that, and after which I will ask you a question or two.
I understood he handed you a paper at that time.
Your answer:

This message never reached me, sir, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor nor, to the best of my knowledge and belief, did it reach any other official of G-2 or the War Department.

You were then referring, were you not, to the testimony of Captain Safford?
Colonel Bratton. I think so; yes, sir.
[12116] Mr. Murphy. Now, then, on the bottom of page 60:

Colonel Bratton. As to the first phrase, "Higashi no kaze ame", that has been correctly translated.
General Russell. And what was that translation?

By the way, were you here during the testimony of Captain Kramer when he talked about the translation of that particular set of words?
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. What page are you reading from now?
Mr. Murphy. Page 60 at the bottom of the page.
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Do you have it there?
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy (reading):

General Russell. And what was that translation?
Colonel Bratton. War with—it meant a break in diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States.
Captain Kramer said that he would not have translated that as meaning war. You are a Japanese student, are you?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, but the Japanese has got nothing to do with war or diplomatic relations, or anything else.

Mr. Murphy. In other words, these words would mean “East Wind Rain”?

Colonel Bratton. It simply means “East Wind Rain”.

[12117] Mr. Murphy. “East Wind Rain”?

Colonel Bratton. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. In other words, if it was translated that is all it would mean, is “East Wind Rain”.

Now, then, “Higashi no kaze ame” would mean strictly a reference to the weather itself?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. And then to decide what particular significance that had you would have to go, would you not, back to the basic message, to the code itself on page 154 of Exhibit 1?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. And what did that say on page 154? That was a strained diplomatic relation, was it not? Will you give us the exact words?

Colonel Bratton (reading):

In case of a Japanese-U. S. relations in danger.

Mr. Murphy. Right. Now in your testimony you said:

General Russell. And what was that translation?

Colonel Bratton. War with—it meant a break in diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States. The code message that we intercepted and deciphered did not say that when this “winds” message came through it meant war. It did say that it meant a break in diplomatic relations. Stop.

Now when you were saying “Stop” there, you were referring to the hidden word message, were you not?

Colonel Bratton. I do not remember saying “Stop”, sir. I think that was the stenographer’s contribution.

Mr. Murphy. Do you see it there?

Colonel Bratton. I see it there.

Mr. Murphy. There was a winds code, a hidden words message that would also indicate a break in relations that had a stop in it?

Colonel Bratton. It was not referring to that at all.

Mr. Murphy. You just put a “Stop” in there to mean stop, is that it?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now on page 61:

I believe that the second phrase, “Nishi no kaze hare”, is correctly translated: War with Britain: That is, a break in diplomatic relations between Japan and Great Britain.

Did you mean it meant war with Britain?

Colonel Bratton. No, it simply meant diplomatic relations were in danger.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, I go to page 62. On the 5th, after you had your conversation in General Miles’ office with Captain Sadler, there was a message sent at that time, [12119] was there not, to Hawaii, the so-called Rochefort message?

Colonel Bratton. That was sent on the 5th, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Now in that connection you said on page 62:

There were several codes sent out by the Japanese Foreign Office at about this time, to their diplomatic officials abroad, which they hoped to use in the case or in the event of a sudden rupture of communications. There were several versions of this wind and weather code sent out. I discussed these codes with my opposite number in the ONI, Commander McCollum, on a number of occasions. Learning from him that they were monitoring the Japanese communication system in Honolulu as a function of Naval Communications, and learning also from him that their expert there was a Commander Rochefort, who was thoroughly familiar with the whole matter, I deemed it advisable, on or about the 5th of December, to have our G-2 in Honolulu contact Colonel Rochefort, with the end in view that the latter could explain to G-2 what it was we were waiting for, and could explain to him orally, with complete security, the significance of this message. G-2 did send a message.

Now why did you send that message? Let me refresh your recollection. Shall I real your answer to that question at that time?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

[12120] Mr. Murphy (reading):

General Frank. G-2 in Washington?
Colonel Bratton. G-2, the A. C. of S. G-2 in the War Department, then General Miles, upon my recommendation, did send a message to G-2 in Honolulu, on or about the morning of the 5th of December, directing him to contact immediately Commander Rochefort with respect to the significance of certain weather broadcasts coming from Tokyo. That document is available in the files of G-2 now, sir. The message did go out. I did it this way as a means of saving time and for security reasons.

Now, why was the message sent?
Colonel Bratton. Well, as I have stated here, as a means of saving time and for security reasons.

Mr. Murphy. Were you giving information or seeking information?
Colonel Bratton. I had had a discussion with Commander McCollum, now Captain McCollum, as to the amount of knowledge that the Navy had in Hawaii. He assured me his man Rochefort there at that time knew practically everything that there was to be known about the U. S.-Japanese relations through one means or another. I knew that suitable warning messages had been sent out to Hawaii and elsewhere. I had not read the messages and did not know their exact contents. I wanted to make sure that our G-2 in Hawaii got in touch [12121] with the ONI man in Hawaii, to get from him all the intelligence that he had in his possession, and I knew that if they got together on the subject of this winds message—I did not know, but I felt that they were going from there, and that there would be a complete exchange of intelligence and that the Army G-2 would then be in possession of just as much intelligence as Rochefort, the ONI man, had.

Mr. Murphy. Did the Army at any time up to December 5 send to their G-2 in Hawaii the material on the winds message set-up?
Colonel Bratton. No, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Fielder said he never heard about it, didn’t he, at Hawaii?
Colonel Bratton. I do not know.

Mr. Murphy. The fact is, I believe you will find from the record, the Navy had it and did not give it to the Army, and Fielder knew nothing about it even though the Navy knew about it for days at Hawaii.
Colonel Bratton. I felt, and I know my opposite number in the Navy felt, there was much closer liaison between those two people than actually existed. We had the very closest liaison and cooperation in Washington between ONI and myself with respect to the Far East. I was told on innumerable occasions by my opposite number in ONI that [12122] they were giving all this stuff to the Army.

Mr. Murphy. In other words, if you had seen General Short's message "Liaison with the Navy" you would expect just that, would you not?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. You would not expect the Navy to have something in Hawaii that the Army would not know about, would you?

Colonel Bratton. I was told if the Navy was informed that the Japanese Ambassador was burning his codes and ciphers, and other diplomatic officials in this country and American possessions were doing the same, that the information would be transmitted to the Army.

Mr. Murphy. The difficulty there, Colonel, was that the FBI, who apparently supplied the information, informed Washington that the Japanese consul was destroying most of his important papers and yet the Navy and Army felt it was a routine process, just burning some papers, one of these day-to-day transactions.

Colonel Bratton. What I meant is this: A message did go out from Naval Operations or Naval Intelligence informing Admiral Kimmel that the Japanese were burning certain codes and ciphers in Washington and elsewhere. That is the message that I was told would be repeated to the [12123] Army, so I felt that it was not necessary for us to send the same message in a different code, because that jeopardized the security of the code.

Mr. Murphy. You have learned from these records, have you not, that Admiral Kimmel did not give that information to General Short?

Colonel Bratton. I have heard that in the testimony.

Mr. Murphy. Now when you sent this message on the 5th, as I understand it, you wanted to have Fielder contact Rochefort and go over the whole situation.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Did you mean, as I understood Captain Safford to indicate, that you were informing Hawaii that there was a winds intercept?

Colonel Bratton. No.

Mr. Murphy. And that that information would be available there?

Colonel Bratton. No, sir.

Mr. Murphy. All right. Now then, I go to page 64. On page 64 you were discussing with the Grunert Board the question of the necessity of secrecy in connection with these codes, and particularly the one setting up the winds code. This is at the bottom of the page:

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. I think, if I understand [12124] your question, if the Japanese knew today that we were reading any of their codes or ciphers, they could so effectively change them as to make them unreadable from now on over a period of considerable time.

By the way, this is on September 30, 1944.

General Russell. Two to six weeks?

Colonel Bratton. Such an act on their part might well prolong our war with Japan much longer than necessary.
Would you think it would be proper, Colonel Bratton, as an Intelligence man, during the month of September, 1944, to be sending through the mails in English letters describing the winds code and discussing it in detail?

Colonel Bratton. No, I think it would have been very inadvisable to indulge in any such practice.

Mr. Murphy. Now continuing:

General Russell. If they knew, therefore, that we had intercepted these messages and had broken that code at that time, it would convey to them no information as to whether or not we had broken the code which they are using today, would it?

Colonel Bratton. Oh, yes, sir, it would, because these code phrases are a code within a cipher. I didn’t make that clear. The whole message about this “wind” signal was in a very secret cipher, and these code expressions [12125] were contained in that. This was their most secret cipher, and it contained a code which was to be broadcast as part of a weather broadcast.

General Russell. And they are continuing to use that cipher?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

General Russell. And this would disclose the fact that we did have information on that secret cipher which they do not know that we have, if they should learn that we have picked this up?

Colonel Bratton. That is correct, sir.

General Russell. Yes.

General Grunert. Therefore, the danger of any leak exists now as much as ever?

That is September 30, 1944.

Colonel Bratton. Sir?

General Grunert. Therefore, the danger that any leak of this thing might affect the war effort exists now as it has in the past?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

You made those answers to those questions at that time?

Colonel Bratton. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. Now on page 66:

Colonel Bratton. Yes, there is this point to it: My [12126] recollection is very definite to the effect that I did not get it prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. It may have been made available to me thereafter, and it would not have made much impression on me at that time because the attack had been made; it would no longer have as much significance in my mind.

* * * * * * * * *

Colonel Bratton. My recollection of that is very vague General, and I have discussed the matter with General Miles and his memory is equally vague. I have seen a statement made by Colonel Sadtler to the effect that on the morning of the 5th of December 1941 he went to General Miles with the oral statement that the “winds” implementing message had been received by the Navy. He says that General Miles then sent for me and the three of us discussed it in General Miles’ office. Colonel Sadtler further stated that he got this information from Admiral Noyes of the Navy, and it was to the effect that the phrase had come through which meant a break in the diplomatic relations between Japan and Great Britain. I don’t remember the incident. Colonel Sadtler is so positive in his statement, however, that something of the sort must have happened. But the point I wish to emphasize is this: We knew that relations between Japan and Great Britain were on the point of being [12127] broken at any minute. We had been telling everybody so. That is not the message that we were waiting for. The one we were waiting for was one which would indicate a break between Japan and the United States.

General Frank. Since you were waiting for this, and you did have some information on a message that did come through, so far as you remember you did not investigate it further to find out if the “winds” message concerning the United States had come through; is that correct?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, I did make further inquiries about this message, but prior to investigating the thing more thoroughly I had dispatched to G-2 in
Hawaii the message that I have previously referred to, so that if this "winds" code implementing message did come through, they in Hawaii would be alerted just as quickly as we were.

Now, that leads to the possible inference that on the 5th of December you felt that there should be special precautions taken about Hawaii. Did you mean to create that inference?

Do you understand me?

Colonel Bratton. No, sir, I do not understand you.

Mr. Murphy. Colonel Bratton, you say here:

Yes; I did make further inquiries about this message but prior to investigating the thing more thoroughly, I had dispatched to G-2 in Hawaii the message that I have previously referred to, so that if this "winds code" implementing message did come through they in Hawaii would be alerted just as quickly as we were.

Which, I understand to mean that after the event you felt Hawaii at least had as much information as you did. Is that what you mean?

Colonel Bratton. Well, everybody was making such a hullabaloo about this winds business, I thought, to be on the safe side, we might as well alert Hawaii to this thing, to let them listen in and get it, just as soon, if not sooner than we did.

Mr. Murphy. Well, did you send the message to the Philippines? I mean it was Hawaii you were alerting now, you were singling them out. How about the Philippines? How about the Panama Canal, and how about the Aleutians? Or was it that you were going to Rochefort, because you understood he was an expert?

Colonel Bratton. That was one of the reasons; yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. If it was an alert, the question is why did it not go to the Philippines where there was more danger? Why would not you alert them?

Colonel Bratton. I do not know from what source I got the information, but my feeling at that time was that the Philippines had been adequately alerted, and that the replies from the Commanding General there were satisfactory.

Mr. Murphy. This is on the 5th.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. What replies? There were no replies then—I see. The replies that came in to the message of the 27th. All right.

Now, then, I would like to ask you some questions about this paper here, called Secret Summary of Far Eastern Documents. What do you know about that? Who prepared it and why?

Mr. Chairman, there is something of immediate importance that has just come up. I ask permission to pass the question and pass the examination, with the right to ask a few question after I return. I mean, after the others had completed their examination.

The Vice Chairman. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Colonel Bratton. This was prepared as the result of a letter written by the President of the United States to the Chief of Staff on the 14th of July 1943. I have a copy of the letter here, sir, if you would like to have me read it.

The Vice Chairman. Suppose you just hold that until Mr. Murphy is able to return, Colonel. He had to go to answer a roll call in the House.

Senator Brewster would be next. He is not present at the moment.
Mr. Gearhart of California will inquire, Colonel.

Mr. Gearhart. You have listened to the testimony, Colonel, of Captain Kramer?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Did you understand his testimony in reference to the deliveries he made on December 6, that he delivered one to the White House and left it there in what they call the plan room?

The Vice Chairman. The situation room.

Mr. Gearhart. The situation room.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. That he delivered another one to Colonel Knox, that he read them and returned them to him?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. That he delivered a third set to Admiral Wilkinson and General Miles who were dining together in Alexandria?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Those are the only three deliveries he made of the 13 parts on the 6th day of December?

Colonel Bratton. I believe so, yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, on the 6th you made how many deliveries of the 13 parts?

Colonel Bratton. One that I can positively recall. That was to the Secretary of State, through his night duty officer.

Mr. Gearhart. Are you positive, in your present memory of your deliveries, that you did not make a delivery to the office of the Secretary of the Chief of Staff of the Army?

Colonel Bratton. No, sir; I am not positive. Neither am I positive that I did. The only thing that I am positive about in connection with the copy that went to the Chief of Staff is that he had it on his desk in front of him, all 14 parts, when I reached him Sunday morning. I am quite positive that I did not make that delivery, and I did not put it on his desk.

Mr. Gearhart. You say now that you are positive that you did not make a delivery of the 13-part message to the office of the Secretary or to General Marshall himself on the night of the 6th?

Colonel Bratton. I am not positive, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. You are not positive?

Colonel Bratton. I am not positive whether the delivery was made or not.

Mr. Gearhart. Have you on a prior occasion testified that you did?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. But today, as you look back through the years and consider all that you have learned in the meantime you are now not positive that you made that delivery?

Colonel Bratton. My memory must have been at fault when I made those statements before the Grunert Board, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, do you remember the testimony of Admiral Kramer, as to the morning of the 7th?

The Vice Chairman. Captain Kramer.

Mr. Gearhart. Or Captain Kramer?

He testified, did he not that he delivered a full set 14 parts, to the White House at about 9 o'clock in the morning; is that correct?
Colonel Bratton. Yes. That was a duplication of my effort. There was no necessity for his doing so, and that [12133] was my task at the time.

Mr. Gearhart. To deliver to the White House?

Colonel Bratton. Not to the White House, but to the State Department.

Mr. Gearhart. Yes; but he testified, as you remember, and I think you will verify my memory of it, he testified at these proceedings he delivered at 9 o'clock a full set of 14 parts to the White House.

Colonel Bratton. I believe I remember that statement, yes.

Mr. Gearhart. And around 10 o'clock he delivered a full set of the 14 parts to the Secretary of State's office.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Did he testify—I am not sure about this—that he made any other deliveries on the morning of the 7th?

Colonel Bratton. Captain Kramer?

Mr. Gearhart. Captain Kramer. They are the only two, is that not correct?

Colonel Bratton. My recollection is that he testified that he delivered the 14 parts to the Chief of Naval Operations in his office sometime that morning.

Mr. Gearhart. That is right. I remember that.

As you remember it, that is all?

Colonel Bratton. I haven't any clear recollection about what Captain Kramer did, Mr. Gearhart. His evidence is before the committee.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, you listened to it, just as I have been listening to it.

Colonel Bratton. I listened to an awful lot of evidence here. I remember some of it, and some of it I do not.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, what deliveries did you make on Sunday morning of the fourteenth part?

Colonel Bratton. I may have delivered the fourteenth part of this message to Mr. Stone, the confidential secretary of the Secretary of State, over in his office sometime between 8 and 9, but I do not remember doing so.

I do remember calling Mr. Stone on the telephone to make sure that the Secretary of State had all 14 parts that morning.

Now, Captain Kramer has testified that he saw me over in the State Department sometime around 10 o'clock. Captain Kramer's memory is at fault in that respect, because he could not possibly have seen me there at that time of day. I was busy doing something else.

Mr. Gearhart. But you know that the State Department [12135] got its fourteenth part?

Colonel Bratton. I know that because I verified it by telephone.

Mr. Gearhart. And you know, from hearing Captain Kramer testify, that the White House got the fourteenth part?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. At 9 o'clock?

Colonel Bratton. Yes.

Mr. Gearhart. Delivered by Captain Kramer. Did you deliver the fourteenth part to the secretary of the Chief of Staff in his office?
Colonel Bratton. I have no recollection of making any delivery that morning, except of the 1 p. m. delivery message which I handed to General Marshall in person.

Mr. Gearhart. Now, you rang up General Marshall and told him you had a very important message, that you could get it to him in 10 minutes if he would wait there. That was 9 o'clock in the morning.

Colonel Bratton. Shortly after 9 o'clock; between 9 and 9:15 I would say, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. Did not you talk with General Marshall himself?

Colonel Bratton. Not until he called me back sometime after 10.

Mr. Gearhart. You first talked to the orderly; then he called you back and you said to General Marshall that you would bring out to him a very important message if he would stay there, that you would get out there in 10 minutes.

Colonel Bratton. I did not mention how long it would take me to give it to him. I said if he would stay where he was I would bring the message to him.

Mr. Gearhart. Did not you, at sometime in your testimony, use the phrase "10 minutes"?

Colonel Bratton. I do not think so, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. You could have gotten out there in how short a time?

Colonel Bratton. I could have gotten there in 10 minutes, I think.

Mr. Gearhart. But he said he was coming in and you would meet him in his office.

Colonel Bratton. Yes.

Mr. Gearhart. When did you enter his office?

Colonel Bratton. After my conversation with General Miles, I went up towards General Marshall's office, and stood around there in the hall, or in the office of the secretary of the General Staff, waiting for General Marshall to arrive.

Mr. Gearhart. You got there ahead of General Marshall then?

Colonel Bratton. Oh, I had been there ever since half-past 8 in the morning.

Mr. Gearhart. And waited for the general to come in?

Colonel Bratton. I was waiting for him to come in after he told me he was coming; yes.

Mr. Gearhart. And you were in the reception room of General Marshall's office?

Colonel Bratton. In the office of the secretary of the General Staff.

Mr. Gearhart. Yes.

Colonel Bratton. Either there or standing in the door or out in the hall.

Mr. Gearhart. And General Marshall entered from the hall directly into his office; is that right?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. And when you went into General Marshall's office it was about what time?

Colonel Bratton. 11:25.

Mr. Gearhart. So although you could have gotten out to him in 10 minutes, it took General Marshall from 9 or 9:15 to 11:45 to get in to his office; is that correct?

Colonel Bratton. I did not see him until 11:25, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. And when you saw him he was sitting at his desk reading that 14-part message?
Colonel Bratton. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. That was a long document?
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. And you had to wait awhile until he completed reading it?
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. And he had all 14 parts?
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. And the only places that the 14 parts had been delivered before that meeting at 11:25 was at the White House and the State Department and to Admiral Stark?
Colonel Bratton. That was by the Navy, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. That is the Navy and Army together making deliveries of the 14 parts.

Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to break in on the Congressman——

Mr. Gearhart. I would just as soon suspend for a few minutes.

Senator Lucas. The assumption is wrong.

Colonel Bratton. I know the fourteenth part got over to the State Department shortly after it reached me. I do not know whether I took it or sent Colonel Dusenbury over with it.

Mr. Gearhart. You heard Captain Kramer testify he delivered one at 9 o'clock or shortly after 9 o'clock to the State Department, too?

Colonel Bratton. That means by that time the State Department must have had two complete sets.

Mr. Gearhart. Yes. And you heard Kramer testify he delivered one to the White House?

Colonel Bratton. I think so, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. And you have heard Kramer testify he delivered one to General Stark—I mean Admiral Stark?

Colonel Bratton. I think I remember his saying that he delivered one to him in his office that morning; yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. You did not deliver one to General Marshall's office?

Colonel Bratton. I do not remember delivering anything to General Marshall that morning except the 1 p. m. delivery message.

Mr. Gearhart. It took General Marshall 2 hours and a quarter to make the trip that you could have made in 10 minutes, and when you saw him he had the 14 parts in his hand?

Colonel Bratton. That is very definite, sir. He had it on the desk in front of him and was reading it. I think if you will go back and look at General Miles' testimony you will find that he supports me in the statement that we tried to interrupt him with this 1 p. m. delivery business but he would not be interrupted, and he went right ahead with his reading until he got to the end of the 14 parts.

Mr. Gearhart. Then the sum total of this is that General Marshall, at 11:25, had the fourteenth part and 13 other parts in his possession. You did not deliver it to him, and the only place he could have gotten it would be from the State Department, from Admiral Stark, or from the White House?

Colonel Bratton. No; it could have been delivered to his secretary by Colonel Dusenbury, my assistant, because Colonel Dusenbury
reached the office, oh, sometime after 9 o'clock that morning and he could very readily have grabbed up all these pouches, assembled them together, locked them up and made his rounds in the building, as well

[12141] as in the State Department. But from the time that I received this 1 p.m. delivery message I just wiped everything else out of my mind and let him run the rest of the office.

[12142] Mr. Gearhart. Did Colonel Dusenbury ever tell you that he had made such delivery?

Colonel Bratton. Colonel Dusenbury's memory is worse than mine. He doesn't remember what he did that morning.

Mr. Gearhart. Well, then, you have been very definite on these questions I have been asking you in reference to where deliveries had been made by you and Captain Kramer, have you not? Your memory is pretty good on those deliveries so far as your testimony is concerned now?

Colonel Bratton. Fairly good, but I have heard these statements by Captain Kramer within the last day or so. All this happened 5 years ago.

Mr. Gearhart. Is Colonel Dusenbury in the city now?

Colonel Bratton. He is on duty in G-2, War Department General Staff.

Mr. Gearhart. In Washington?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart. What makes you think his memory is so vague?

Colonel Bratton. Because I have talked to him since his return from Chungking trying to get this thing straightened out in our two minds.

Mr. Gearhart. And he has told you that he does not remember about what he did on the morning of the 7th of December [12143] 1941 in reference to the delivery of the fourteenth part of the message?

Colonel Bratton. He has no definite recollection as to what he did on the night of the 6th or the morning of the 7th.

Mr. Keefe. So that I can relate that last remark, did you say, Colonel, that Colonel Dusenbury has no recollection of what he did on the evening of the 6th or the 7th?

Colonel Bratton. I mean at this moment, Mr. Keefe, or, rather the last time I talked to him, which was some 3 weeks ago, he did not have a definite recollection at that time as to the details of what he did on the night of the 6th or the morning of the 7th.

Mr. Keefe. I was interested because we have Colonel Clausen's affidavit in here.

Colonel Bratton. It interested me, too.

Mr. Keefe. Yes.

Mr. Gearhart. Then you haven't any explanation of what caused General Marshall to spend two hours and a half, approximately, in making a trip that you could make in 10 minutes?

Mr. Kaufman. Mr. Chairman——

Colonel Bratton. I haven't any idea.

Mr. Kaufman. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest to the Congressman that the testimony of the witness is that he called [12144] General Marshall's home, his orderly, at 9:15; that General Marshall called him back somewhat after 10 o'clock and the time between the time General Marshall called Colonel Bratton and 11:25 is the time, not the 2 hours, I think.
Mr. Gearhart. Is that correct, Colonel?
Colonel Bratton. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. All right. What time did you receive a call back from General Marshall?
Colonel Bratton. Some time between 10 and 10:30; about 10:25 I would say.
Mr. Gearhart. An hour before you saw him at his office?
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. Can you account why it took him an hour to make a trip that you could have made in 10 minutes?
Colonel Bratton. No, sir.
Mr. Gearhart. When you told him there was a very, very important message that you had to deliver to him?
Colonel Bratton. No, sir; except that I remember hearing General Marshall say that he was taking a bath some time that morning. He may not have been fully dressed at the time.
Mr. Gearhart. Mr. Chairman, I was relieving the gentleman from Pennsylvania who was examining some papers and I have completed my examination at this point and will let him make his own examination.

[12145] The Vice Chairman. Thank you very much. Would it be agreeable for me to ask a question while you are getting your papers together, Mr. Murphy?
Mr. Murphy. Yes, surely.
The Vice Chairman. As I recall General Marshall's testimony, Colonel—you doubtless were present when he testified about that. As I remember—see if you can help straighten me out—didn't he state that he had returned from the horseback ride and was in the act of taking a shower when he got word that you wanted to come out to see him?
Colonel Bratton. That is my recollection of his testimony; yes, sir.
Senator George. That is what he said.
The Vice Chairman. And when he got this message while he was in the act of taking a shower, that you wanted to come out there and see him, he then told whoever it was that delivered that message to you that he was coming right on to the Department and he stated that he thought he got there within about 10 minutes.
Colonel Bratton. That is my recollection of General Marshall's testimony; yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. But in the light of what he stated it is still your recollection as you have given it to us here?
Colonel Bratton. As I have given it to you today, sir.

[12146] The Vice Chairman. That you called his home and talked to an orderly about 9:15?
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
The Vice Chairman. And left the message that you were very anxious to talk to General Marshall and that General Marshall called you about 10:25 and you told him that you wanted to see him and he told you that he was coming on to the Department and about 11:25 you saw him in his office?
Colonel Bratton. Well, a possible explanation for this may lie in the fact that the orderly did go out to look for him and missed him and did not contact him until the general himself had gotten back to
his quarters and was taking a bath. That is the only explanation I can think of to account for this long gap.

The Vice Chairman. But as I recall General Marshall’s testimony, he did not indicate that he talked to you on the phone that morning at all.

Colonel Bratton. I know that, sir, but my recollection on that point is very clear.

The Vice Chairman. That you talked to him on the phone?

Colonel Bratton. I did talk to General Marshall in person. He called me at my office.

The Vice Chairman. Well, General Marshall stated, as I recall, that he was called at his home and was in the act of [12147] taking a shower bath and whoever talked to you on the phone told him that you wanted to come out there and see him and that he told them to tell you that he was coming right in to his office.

Colonel Bratton. Well, of course, there is a conflict between General Marshall’s recollection and mine but mine is just as positive as his was.

The Vice Chairman. I see, all right. And you do definitely remember that he did call you back and you talked to him on the phone?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And that that was not later than 10:30?

Colonel Bratton. No, sir.

The Vice Chairman. And you waited then till he came in and you saw him at 11:25?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Gearhart. You cannot offer any explanation, however, as to how General Marshall got that fourteenth part?

Colonel Bratton. Other than I have given you, sir, I have no explanation.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy will continue his inquiry.

Mr. Murphy. I now refer to page 76, Colonel, of the test-

Colonel Bratton. What page is that, sir?

Mr. Murphy. Page 76. You were talking there about the memo-

[Reading:]

General Russell. Yes. Now let us consider the long memorandum which you stated a moment ago that you placed on the Chief of Staff’s desk that morning. From what source did you get the long memorandum?

Colonel Bratton. I would like to correct that statement at this time if I may, sir. That is not in accordance with my recollection.

Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate, before the Grunert Board you said you placed it on the Chief of Staff’s desk and now you say your recol-

Colonel Bratton. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Murphy. All right. Now, down at the bottom of the page you say:

May I refer to some notes that I made at the time, sir?

Where are the notes?

Colonel Bratton. You say where are the notes?

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

May I refer to some notes that I made at the time, sir?
You said:
I handed it to him in person. [12149] General Russell. About what time?

He was referring then to the 1 o'clock message.

Colonel Bratton. May I refer to some notes that I made at the time, sir?
Where are the notes?
Colonel Bratton. These are the notes that General Miles and I compiled together some time between the 10th and the 15th of December, as I understood it at the request of the Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff asked General Gerow and General Miles both to prepare memoranda as to what transpired in his office on the morning of the 7th of December. General Miles wrote it out and then asked me to edit it for him and make such corrections as I thought were necessary based upon my own recollection.

Mr. Murphy. At any rate, you restricted your notes entirely and exclusively as to what happened at Marshall's office after his arrival, is that it? If you were going to cover that morning and you thought it important enough to cover some of the high lights, I am wondering why you did not make a memo——

Colonel Bratton. As I recall it now, sir, it was the events that took place after his arrival in the office.

Mr. Murphy. But you did not include anything as to what happened before?

[12150] Colonel Bratton. Not in that memorandum; no, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Did you make any memoranda yourself when you knew that this was the day that war started, and being an expert in intelligence and knowing the importance of notes and knowing in all likelihood you would want to refer back to it, did you make any memorandum of the events of that morning, if for no other reason, for historical purposes?

Colonel Bratton. Sir?

Mr. Murphy. If for no other reason, for historical purposes, did you make any notes?

Colonel Bratton. No, sir; I don't remember making any notes.

Mr. Murphy. Then the notes you referred to there were the notes, the memoranda as to what had happened in Marshall's office?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir; and as I remember it, I then read to General Russell the statement that I had made before the Clarke board, which was a direct quotation from the combined notes that General Miles and I made.

Mr. Murphy. You then read:

The message in question was delivered to me from the Navy some time between 8:30 and 9:00 that morning. It was immediately apparent that it was of such importance that it ought to be communicated to the Chief of [12151] Staff, the A. C. of S. G-2, and the Chief of WPD with the least practicable delay. Neither of these officers were in their offices at that time.

Now, did you go to their offices or did you call them?

Colonel Bratton. Well, I seem to have contradicted myself here, sir.

Mr. Murphy. In what way, Colonel? I don't think you did, but if you can tell me how you think you did, I may be able to help you out. What contradiction do you find there?
Colonel Bratton. Down to line 4 on page 77 I was quoting from my memory. From there on I think I was quoting from the combined memorandum that General Miles and I made.

Mr. Murphy. As I understand it, you got this message between 8:30 and 9 o'clock, and you told the board that you called Marshall's quarters around 9 o'clock. You told us that you called General Miles about the same time. Now, there was some—

Colonel Bratton. No; not about the same time. I called General Miles to report to him what I had done with respect to trying to get aboard General Marshall.

Mr. Murphy. Well, you found out that when you could not locate General Marshall—that would take about 2 or 3 minutes, wouldn't it, to make a phone call?

Colonel Bratton. Five minutes at the most.

[12152] Mr. Murphy. Well, that would make it, say, 9:15.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Then you called General Miles?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Why did it take from 9:15 to 11:25 for General Miles to get down, do you know that?

Colonel Bratton. It did not. General Miles got down to his office some time around 10 o'clock, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Let us go into that:

I called General Marshall's quarters by telephone and was informed that he had gone horseback riding. I requested his orderly to go out and find him at once and ask him to call me on the telephone as soon as practicable, as I had an important message to deliver to him. I then called General Miles and reported to him the step that I had taken, and recommended that he come down to the office at once. I do not remember whether I called General Gerow or whether General Miles called him, but we had some discussion as to which one of us would do it, and I don't remember now which one of us did, but in any event General Gerow was summoned to his office.

I waited for the telephone call from General Marshall, which I received some time between ten and eleven.

As I understand it, when you are testifying to us you [12153] made it a definite time, did you not? Do you recall what time it was you said you called Marshall when you were testifying to us?

Colonel Bratton. I said a little while ago that it was about half past 10, sir.

Mr. Murphy. All right. Well, here you said between 10 and 11 [reading]:

I informed him that I had a message of extreme importance which he should see at once, and told him that I would bring it to his quarters if he so desired. He said to report to him in his office, as he was on his way there. I reported to him in his office at about 11:25, immediately upon his arrival. Shortly thereafter General Miles arrived.

Now, where did he arrive from?

Colonel Bratton. That statement in the light of my present recollection is incorrect. General Miles and I went in together.

Mr. Murphy. Now it is quite important. You said that you called General Marshall around 9:15 and that it took from then until 11:25 in order for him to show up at his office; that you talked to him about 10:30 and it took from 10:30 till 11:25 for him to show up at his office.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. You say that you talked to General Miles about 9:15 and then he shows up at 11:25.

Colonel Bratton. No, sir; General Miles got to his office at 10 o'clock.

Mr. Murphy. Where do you say that? You say:

He said to report to him in his office, as he was on his way there. I reported to him in his office at about 11:25, immediately upon his arrival. Shortly thereafter General Miles arrived.

Now, do you mean arrived from his office or from his home?

Colonel Bratton. I meant there that General Miles arrived in General Marshall's office.

Mr. Murphy. All right.

Colonel Bratton. And the statement is incorrect because General Miles and I went into General Marshall's office together.

Mr. Murphy. Do you know when General Miles got to his office that morning?

Colonel Bratton. Do I know when General Miles got to his office?

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

Colonel Bratton. I think it was about 10 o'clock, sir, because I had a conversation with him in his office before we went up to see the chief of staff.

Mr. Murphy. Well, at any rate, you meant that he arrived and you were incorrect on that because he went with you instead of arriving?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. After you got there?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. And you were incorrect in that detail. Now, then, General Miles at page 78 [reading]:

General Miles and I stated that we believed there was important significance in the time of the delivery of the reply, 1 p.m., an indication that some military action would be undertaken by the Japanese at that time. We thought it probable that the Japanese line of action would be into Thailand but that it might be into any one or more of a number of other areas. General Miles urged that the Philippines, Hawaii, Panama, and the West Coast be informed immediately that the Japanese reply would be delivered at one o'clock that afternoon, Washington time, and that they, the Commanders in the areas indicated, should be on the alert.

Is that your recollection at present?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, at the bottom of the second paragraph [reading]:

There was some discussion at this time, I believe, as to whether or not the Philippines should be included.

Why would there be any doubt about the Philippines when the war warning said they were going to raid there, or that they would? Would that be because—

Colonel Bratton. Well, I believe—my recollection as to the details of this conversation between General Gerow and Colonel Bundy and General Marshall are not very clear, but my recollection is that General Gerow mentioned the fact that the Philippines had been adequately alerted and that General MacArthur's reply indicated that he was on the alert.

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Mr. Murphy. Now, right there: If you saw MacArthur's reply why didn't you see Hawaii's reply?

Colonel Bratton. If I saw what?

Mr. Murphy. You are here discussing the kind of replies that were received and that the Philippines were on the alert. You said you knew that because you saw the reply. Why would you see one and not the other?

Colonel Bratton. I never testified that I had seen any of them.

Mr. Murphy. Well, you say that General Miles said they were adequately alerted.

Colonel Bratton. I said General Gerow said that.

Mr. Murphy. General Gerow. Well, did you discuss whether Hawaii was adequately alerted at that time?

Colonel Bratton. Not that I remember; no, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Gerow said that the Philippines were adequately alerted. Was there some doubt about that?

Colonel Bratton. I prefaced my remark, Mr. Murphy, with the statement that my recollection as to the details of the discussion about the Philippines was not clear.

Mr. Murphy. Well, I am just wondering why—

Colonel Bratton. Now, if there was a discussion about whether or not the Philippines should be alerted it must have stemmed from the facts that I have stated.

Mr. Murphy. Well, isn't it rather singular that there should be some discussion about the Philippines being adequately alerted and that would lead to the inference that Hawaii was not adequately alerted if you were going to send it to Hawaii and not to the Philippines? Isn't that a pretty fair argument or thought to follow, or are you in doubt?

Colonel Bratton. Well, I have no explanation to make at this time as to why Hawaii was not discussed, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Well, on page 79 you said:

General Miles said he thought it probably meant an attack on Thailand but that the timing had some significance, and that warning messages to our people should be sent. General Gerow, Colonel Bundy, and I, concurred.

[12157] Now, then, on this question of sending the message, you testified that your recollection was that it would take 30 to 40 minutes to send a message. I direct your attention to page 80—well, the bottom of page 79 first. [Reading:]

I took the message to ColonelFrench, Signal Corps officer in charge of the message center, explained to him that it was General Marshall's desire that the message be transmitted to the addressees by the fastest possible safe means, giving the Philippines first priority. Colonel French said that he would give it his personal attention and processing of the message would commence immediately.

I then returned to the office of the Chief of Staff. The latter directed me to find out how long it would take for the delivery of the message to the addressees. I returned to the message center and talked the matter over with Colonel French, who informed me that the message would be encoded in about three minutes, on the air in about eight minutes, and in the hands of the addressees in about thirty minutes.

Now, would that be your best recollection, or would 30 to 40 minutes be?

Colonel Bratton. Well, it is about 30 to 40 minutes.
Mr. Murphy. But he did tell you that it would be encoded in about 3 minutes, is that right?
Colonel Bratton. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Murphy. And he told you it would be on the air in about 8 minutes?
Colonel Bratton. That is correct, too.
Mr. Murphy. And be delivered in Hawaii in Short's hands in an over-all period of 30 minutes?
Colonel Bratton. He didn't say that. He said it would be delivered——
Mr. Murphy. He said—
in the hands of the addressees in about thirty minutes.

That is what you said, isn't it? Will you look at the top of the page? I am reading your words in this record—
and in the hands of the addressees in about thirty minutes.

Did Colonel French tell you that?
Colonel Bratton. Yes; but that does not mean that it would be in General Short's hands. This message would be sent out in secret cipher. It had to be deciphered, then decoded and delivered to General Short so that he could read it.

Mr. Murphy. Let me read the line here:
And in the hands of the addressees in about thirty minutes.

You meant what you said there, did you not? Isn't that [12160]. English and doesn't that say, "In the hands of the addressees" and wasn't General Short an addressee?
Colonel Bratton. I do not mean and I don't think Colonel French meant that this message would be in General Short's hands in readable form in that time.
Mr. Murphy. What does it mean, "In the hands of addressees"? Who was the addressee? Wasn't it Short?
Colonel Bratton. Well, a message that goes out in code and cipher addressed to the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, first goes to his Signal officer for decoding or deciphering, then it is typed up, and it goes to the adjutant general for delivery.

Mr. Murphy. Did you say anything like that before General Marshall, or anything like that before the Board?
Colonel Bratton. It wasn't necessary to say anything like that to General Marshall. He is just as familiar with Army procedure as I was, or more so.

Mr. Murphy. Let me see exactly what you said in English:
And in the hands of the addressees in thirty minutes. I looked at my watch at this time and saw that it was 11:50 A.M. I returned to the Chief of Staff's office and reported to him the information as to speed of delivery that had been given me by Colonel French.

Did you so testify before the Army Board? You did so [12161] testify before the Army Board, did you not?
Colonel Bratton. I did return to the Chief of Staff's office and report to him on the information that I had gotten from Colonel French; yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. And you also testified that it would be in the hands of the addressees in about 30 minutes, did you tell him that?
Colonel Bratton. I told him just exactly what Colonel French had told me.

Mr. Murphy. What is it?

Colonel Bratton. I told him just exactly what Colonel French had told me.

Mr. Murphy. Isn't that what you said?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. I mean, is that it in the record?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. I now direct your attention to page 82—well, I will pass that. That is just that you made your memorandum on the 10th of December. You did not make any memo on what French had told you? I mean, you did not make any memoranda covering your recollection of what Colonel French had told you when you went over to him?

Colonel Bratton. I cannot remember at this time, sir.

Mr. Murphy. All right.

[12162] Colonel Bratton. I would like to correct that last statement I made, sir. I think that this whole business is incorporated in the memorandum that General Miles read into the record when he testified and was part of the combined memorandum that he and I prepared.

Mr. Murphy. How does it compare with what you told the Grunert Board, do you know, about the 30 minutes, being in the hands of the addressees in about 30 minutes?

Colonel Bratton. I think it is the same thing; that is, in other words, about 3 minutes to encode and 30 minutes to be in the hands of the addressees. I think you will find that in the memorandum that General Miles submitted in evidence.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, I go to page 85. I come back to Miles. You say that General Miles came to his office at 10 o'clock. I direct your attention to the bottom of page 84. [Reading:] General Russell. Well, when did G–2 get to the office that morning?

Colonel Bratton. My recollection is, sir, that he came in at about the same time General Marshall reached his office.

Colonel Bratton. That statement is incorrect, sir.

Mr. Murphy. You were off an hour and a half on that one, [12163] weren't you?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. You say:

I had been waiting in the anteroom or in the hall so I could catch them the minute they got there, and my recollection is that General Miles came in right on the heels of General Marshall, and I followed them both to the latter's office.

That is what you told the Army Grunert board, wasn't it?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir, and I was giving my best recollection at the time.

Mr. Murphy. I am not quarreling with you. I am just trying to find out what time they did come in. At any rate, in September 1944 that was your testimony about General Miles' arrival?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, I come to page 87. On page 87 General Russell places in the record the following:

On November 26 we received specific evidence of Japan's intention to wage an offensive war against both Britain and the United States.
What information did we receive of that intention on the 26th of November, do you know? He said:

Independently of records, do you know whether or not such a message as that was received by the War Department from the Navy Department?

And you say——

Colonel Bratton. I think General Russell was reading there from some statement made by Captain Safford, sir, and I notice that I have a notation here in this evidence in my handwriting which says, "Wrong".

Mr. Murphy. Well, I wish you would refer to page 87 and see what General Russell put in.

Colonel Bratton. I am looking at page 87.

Mr. Murphy. He said to you:

Independently of records, do you know whether or not such a message as that was received by the War Department from the Navy Department?

Mr. Keefe. I would like to find some place along in these notations where it says "Right". All the testimony is being completely shifted about now in so many of the important things. I am getting disturbed about it.

Mr. Murphy. You mean right, r-i-g-h-t?

Mr. Keefe. R-i-g-h-t, yes.

Mr. Murphy. Right.

Mr. Keefe. I would like to find one of those things.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, at any rate you say:

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. On page 34 of this Summary of Far Eastern Documents you will find under "G-2 153" this statement——

and then you refer to a statement, but is there anything at all there that shows the United States is going to be attacked?

Colonel Bratton. This whole thing stems from the fact that there was a misunderstanding between General Russell and myself as to this document that he was reading from. If you go on further down the page you will see where General Grunert says:

Let the record show that that is continuing quotations from the document.

Well, General Grunert is referring to the Summary of Far Eastern Documents and General Russell was talking about something else. We never did get that thing straightened out until——

Mr. Murphy. You think the board was confused?

Colonel Bratton. Sir?

Mr. Murphy. You think the board was confused? I mean if they are both—if General Russell is talking about one thing and General Grunert is talking about another there was some apparent confusion.

Colonel Bratton. There was; yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Well, now, do you know now of any record of November 26th that gave specific evidence then of Japan's intention to wage war against the United States?

Colonel Bratton. No, sir; of course not.

Mr. Murphy. Well, I have been looking for that in this record and I am wondering where it is and here we have been here 3 months or more and I have seen nothing like that. I would like to know what they were referring to, if you know?

Colonel Bratton. Well, I have gone over this thing a number of times trying to figure out what it was that General Russell was refer-
ring to and I cannot place it. I don't know what the document was.

Mr. Murphy. Now, then, he says:

On December 1st we had definite information from three independent sources that Japan was going to attack Britain and the United States.

What were those sources, do you know?

Colonel Bratton. Captain Safford.

Mr. Murphy. Captain Safford?

Colonel Bratton. I think now——

Mr. Murphy. I will pass that.

Colonel Bratton. I think what he was reading from was a statement from Captain Safford, sir.

Mr. Murphy. You mean Captain Safford presented something about us having information we were going to be attacked?

Colonel Bratton. They had in their hands at this time [12167] some of Captain Safford's evidence about Japan's intentions to go to war with us on a certain date and all that sort of thing. He was reading from that document and I was trying to read from another document and we got rather confused.

The Vice Chairman. It is now 5 o'clock. We will recess until 8 o'clock this evening, Colonel.

(Whereupon, at 5 p.m., a recess was taken until 8 p.m. of the same day.)

[12168] EVENING SESSION—8 P. M.

The Vice Chairman. The committee will be in order.

Mr. Murphy will resume his inquiry, Colonel.

TESTIMONY OF COL. RUFUS S. BRATTON, UNITED STATES ARMY
(Resumed)

Mr. Murphy. Colonel Bratton, I would like to direct your attention to a message which you sent to Pearl Harbor in the month of November 1941 referring to a meeting of the Black Dragon Society. Do you remember that? I will get the page for you. It was in the last appearance October 6, 1944. Do you recall that?

Colonel Bratton. I think I do, sir. I think it is quoted in full in part of my testimony before the Grunert board.

Mr. Murphy. It is quoted in full at page 289 of your testimony before the Grunert board. You did, did you not, send that message to Hawaii under date of November 3, 1941, in which Hawaii was notified of a meeting of the Black Dragon Society and of the fact that the Japanese were to have full preparations completed in November and that war with the United States would begin in December or February? That is on page 290, under paragraph 2:

Hirota and others are said to have stated that war with the United States would best begin in December or February.

[12169] Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir, I see it.

Mr. Murphy. That letter was sent to Hawaii.

Now I direct your attention to page 292 which shows that you received a letter from General Fielder and General Fielder suggested you stop sending summaries of information to Hawaii, did he not?
Colonel Bratton. Yes; and this first letter that you have mentioned is typical of the type of summaries that we were sending him.

Mr. Murphy. In other words, you had been sending him material which you felt was pertinent to Hawaii and then under date of September the 6, 1941, received September 17, 1941, General Fielder said:

It has been noted that many of the summaries of information received from your office originated with Office Naval Intelligence, 14th Naval District and have already been furnished this advice by the Navy—and in that letter he asked you not to duplicate it by sending copies to him, isn't that true?

Colonel Bratton. That is correct, sir. The important paragraph of that letter, to my mind, was paragraph 2.

Mr. Murphy. Paragraph 2:

Cooperation of contact between Office Naval Intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation and the [12170] Military Intelligence Division in this Department is most complete and all such data is received simultaneous with the dispatch of information to the respective Washington offices.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. So after the receipt of that you took it, as I understand, that there was complete liaison between the departments of the Navy and the FBI and the Army at Hawaii?

Colonel Bratton. I had it right here in his own words.

Mr. Murphy. That was from General Fielder himself.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Now I direct your attention to the testimony of General Miles before this committee. On page 4118 General Miles said:

I had a conversation, on my return from Admiral Wilkinson's house, as I testified, with Colonel Bratton. I take full responsibility for that 13-part not going to the Chief of Staff that night.

Do you recall the conversation with General Miles?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir; I recall it in a general way, not in detail.

Mr. Murphy. Now, he says at page 4119:

I returned to my house and telephoned Colonel Bratton, and my recollection is that he said the message [12171] was not complete. I knew its substance. I did not consider that it was necessary to arouse the Chief of Staff at that time of night for that message.

And again——

Senator Lucas. Is that Miles testifying?

Mr. Murphy. Yes; General Miles.

And again at page 2438:

General Miles. These thirteen parts had little military significance. They concluded only with a Japanese refusal to accept the American proposal of November 26 as a basis of negotiation—a result which had been expected and discounted for some time. I therefore contented myself that night by calling Colonel Bratton at his home about 11:30 P. M., and assuring myself that the full reply would be disseminated the next morning on Sunday, and that he and I would be in our offices then.

And then again at page 2464:

General Miles. I do remember telephoning Colonel Bratton when I returned home that evening. I do remember what I have testified to, and what I wrote out eight days after Pearl Harbor as to what happened on Sunday morning. Beyond that I cannot recall.
And again at page 2483:

[12172] There was no reason for alerting or waking up the Chief of Staff, we will say, or certainly Secretary Hull, on the night of December 6th that I could see.

Senator Ferguson. So, then, is it your—

Colonel Bratton. May I interrupt you there just a moment, sir?

Mr. Murphy. Yes.

Colonel Bratton. I think he meant Secretary Stimson instead of Secretary Hull.

Mr. Murphy. Yes; because Hull would be the Navy obligation, wouldn't it?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy (reading):

Senator Ferguson. So, then, it is your opinion now that you told Bratton it would be all right to wait and deliver the remaining sections on the morning?

General Miles. I think that is probably what happened, sir. When the total message was in he was to see that it was promptly delivered, but I am not sure.

Is your recollection different from General Miles' on that subject?

Colonel Bratton. No, sir.

Mr. Murphy. No other questions.

[12173] The Vice Chairman. Senator Ferguson.

Senator Ferguson. I think Congressman Gearhart is next.

The Vice Chairman. Had you finished?

Mr. Gearhart. I think I have finished.

The Vice Chairman. All right, Senator Ferguson will inquire.

Senator Ferguson. What was the year, Colonel Bratton, that you went into the Far Eastern Section?

Colonel Bratton. In September of 1936.

Senator Ferguson. You speak and write and read the Japanese language?

Colonel Bratton. I used to be able to, sir, but through lack of practice I have forgotten a great deal of it.

Senator Ferguson. Well, at the time you were in that service did you read the language?

Colonel Bratton. I was reasonably proficient in it; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You were the top of that section?

Colonel Bratton. Not when I first joined it, sir. I was the assistant to Colonel Homer Slaughter, now retired, who at that time was the chief of the section. He left G-2 in February or March of 1937 and I took over the section upon his departure.

Senator Ferguson. Now, this Far Eastern Section had the duty of evaluating the intelligence in relation to the Far East, which included Japan?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And the head of your department was Miles?

Colonel Bratton. He was the chief of the Military Intelligence Division, sir. The Military Intelligence Division—

Senator Ferguson. You need not explain it. He was, in effect, chief of the whole division?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Who was chief of the Far Eastern?

Colonel Bratton. I was chief of the Far Eastern Section, sir. Now, the chief of the Intelligence Branch when I joined G-2 was Colonei Fay Brabson.
Senator Ferguson. Now, do I understand, then, that you, as chief of the Far Eastern Division, that one of your duties was to deliver these messages to these respective parties?

Colonel Bratton. Deliver what, sir?

Senator Ferguson. These decoded messages. You, as chief, were delivering the messages?

Colonel Bratton. That was one of my primary duties; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, who else delivered? Who else was authorized to deliver these messages?

[12174-A] Colonel Bratton. Nobody else until the fall of 1941, when the volume of this material increased so that I had to have help and at that time I secured from General Miles permission to utilize one or more of my assistant commissioned officers in this work.

Senator Ferguson. Who did you authorize to deliver? Who beside you?

Colonel Bratton. General Miles authorized me to use assistants.

Senator Ferguson. What assistants did you use to deliver these messages?

Colonel Bratton. Colonel Dusenbury for one, Major Moore, a Reserve officer who had had long experience in Japan and was on duty in my section, and a Lieutenant Schindel, another Reserve officer.

Senator Ferguson. Now, by the end of November and during November I assume that the duty of the Far Eastern Section was to try to correlate all intelligence in relation to that section to ascertain three facts: First—probably connected with the first one was whether or not there was going to be a war between the United States and Japan; second, as to where that war might start; third, the capabilities of the enemy.

Colonel Bratton. That is correct, sir.

[12175] Senator Ferguson. Would you say that that was the purpose of your section?

Colonel Bratton. Well, let me put it in another way, sir; for further clarification. My section was charged with the collection, compilation, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence concerning Japan, the Japanese Empire, among other countries bordering on the Pacific.

Senator Ferguson. Other countries in the Far East. Now, did you ever send Pettingill out—was it Pettingill?

Colonel Bratton. In the Army it was Pettigrew.

Senator Ferguson. Pettigrew? He was in the Army?

Colonel Bratton. He was one of my assistants, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever send him to the Far East on a mission?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Will you explain that, as to when it was?

Colonel Bratton. In the spring of 1941. It was perfectly apparent to us in the Far Eastern Section that Japan’s war potential was increasing by leaps and bounds. It was becoming increasingly evident that war between Japan and the United States ranked high on the list of probabilities unless either or both countries changed their policies.

[12176] It became evident that we needed an inspection, a tightening up, a revision and general betterment of our intelligence system.
Senator Ferguson. You were not satisfied then with the set-up of the intelligence system, as far as the Army was concerned, as it related to the Far East?

Colonel Bratton. No. It lacked coordination, cooperation, and collaboration among the various agencies in the field.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Colonel Bratton. Those agencies themselves, it was apparent, were not themselves functioning in some respects, as they should. So, with General Miles' concurrence, I had Colonel Pettigrew sent to all of our agencies in the Pacific area. He traveled mostly by air. He went to Hawaii, the Philippines, Tokyo, Hongkong, Shanghai, the Netherlands East Indies, and one or two other places that I may have omitted, for the purpose of inspecting our G-2 set-up, making such corrections on the spot as were possible, getting these people in line, so that their trend of thought followed ours in Washington, improving our communications, our systems of report, mail and otherwise, informing them as to our trend of thought in Washington, and in general tightening the net up.

[12177] He was gone a month or two, returned, reported what progress he had made in writing to the A. C. of S., G-2, and submitted a number of recommendations as to changes here and there in set-ups, personnel, reassignments, improvements in communications, lateral exchange of intelligence, so on and so forth, that he himself had not been able to effect.

I scanned his report—or rather I studied his report very carefully, found it was an excellent one and forwarded it to my chief, General Miles, for such action as might be found possible in complying with Colonel Pettigrew's recommendations which I thought were perfectly sound.

Senator Ferguson. Now, what month did you submit that to your chief, General Marshall?

Colonel Bratton. Sir?

Senator Ferguson. What month was it in 1941?

Colonel Bratton. It think it was in May. I am not sure sir, I would have to look at the record.

Senator Ferguson. In May. Now when did you next hear from those recommendations?

Colonel Bratton. From the recommendations, you mean?

Senator Ferguson. Yes. You made certain recommendations.

Colonel Bratton. Yes.

[12178] Senator Ferguson. That certain things be done to improve the services between Washington and Hawaii and the Philippines, and the various places, in the correlation of intelligence.

When did you next hear of that?

Colonel Bratton. I do not think I ever got the paper back.

Senator Ferguson. Well, did you ever get any of those things done?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. I followed the thing up to the best of my ability, as did Colonel Pettigrew. We encountered a number of administrative obstacles that at the time seemed insurmountable.

Senator Ferguson. Will you name those?

Colonel Bratton. Sir?

Senator Ferguson. Will you name those?

Colonel Bratton. Yes. At that time we were suffering under a number of limitations as to personnel available for duty in Wash-
ington. We were then under the Manchu laws which prohibited the
detail of officers in certain positions for longer than a fixed period
of time.

There was a great dearth of trained Japanese specialists in the
Army. They were all, or many of them were, serving \[12179\] with troops, as was required by law at that time, and were not avail-
able for detail service or for special assignments.

Senator Ferguson. You mean statutory law required them to be
with troops and not here in Washington?

Colonel Bratton. Oh, yes, sir. Those regulations all stem from
laws passed by the Congress.

Senator Ferguson. What law required the United States Army to
put a man with troops and not put him here in Washington, if he can
do the job here in Washington?

Colonel Bratton. That is what we call the Manchu law. I vaguely
remember now that it requires an officer to serve with troops 2 years
running out of every 6.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ask Congress to change that law, that
you knew a war was coming on, and that you needed some more intelli-
gence officers, or did you just let it ride?

Colonel Bratton. I did not myself, sir, but I did go to a committee
of Congress on another matter at about that time, trying to get a law
passed which would give us some control over these dual citizens of
Japanese ancestry.

General Miles and I, and my assistants in the Far Eastern Section
argued this thing with a committee of Congress for about 2 months,
and did not get anywhere, so we just stopped.

\[12180\] We had other things to do.

Senator Ferguson. I appreciate that.

That was in 1941?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you try to get the rule changed so you could
get more men in this intelligence branch here to do the job that you
saw coming, and coming very fast?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir, we did the best we could under the
circumstances.

Senator Ferguson. Will you be able to get the memorandum which
you gave to General Miles?

Colonel Bratton. It should be somewhere in the files of G-2 in the
War Department, sir. I am not connected with that office in any way
at all, but I am sure the liaison officer can secure the document.

Senator Ferguson. Will the liaison officer obtain that document?

Lieutenant Bosket. We will try to, sir.\footnote{The memorandum was subsequently admitted to the record as Exhibit No. 156.}

\[12181\] Senator Ferguson. When did war between the United
States and Japan, in your opinion, become imminent?

Colonel Bratton. I myself thought that war between Japan and
the United States ranked high on the list of probabilities in 1940.
In 1941, in the spring of 1941, I was convinced that war was inevitable.
It was simply a question of timing. In the latter part of 1941 it
was apparent to all of us that the time was running out, that a crisis
was approaching. My personal feeling was that Japan’s major effort
would be a drive to the Southwest Pacific to secure the tin, rubber,
and oil that she so badly needed, that she would run over any installa-
tion of ours that stood in her path. That seemed to be the logical procedure.

It did not appear logical to me for Japan to go out of her way deliberately to attack an American installation. As a matter of fact, I think the attack on Pearl Harbor was the stupidest thing the Japanese ever did. If they had gone about their way down through the Netherlands Indies, Malaya, Indochina, and leave us stewing in our own juices, the war might still be on, or we might still be arguing here as to what to do about it. We might never have declared war on Japan.

But by this deliberate attack upon an American fortress [12182] in the mid-Pacific she inflamed the American people to such an extent that we had nothing left to do, we had to go to war.

Senator Ferguson. Then do I understand you feel if Japan had not attacked an American possession we would not have gone to war, and that you did not anticipate she would attack an American possession?

Colonel Bratton. If she had bypassed the Philippines and had not attacked any American installation, had simply invaded Malaya or the Netherlands Indies and Indochina, we might have been dragged into the war eventually; yes. We had certain tentative commitments with the British and the Dutch and the Chinese. Those commitments were tentative, but pressure might have been brought to bear upon us so great that we would have been dragged into that conflict. But it would not have happened the way it did as the result of the attack upon Pearl Harbor.

Senator Ferguson. Now you have mentioned our tentative commitments with the British. What were those tentative commitments with the British?

Colonel Bratton. I am not the best witness on that, sir. My knowledge of the ABCD agreement is only general.

Senator Ferguson. If you are not the best witness on that, will you be the witness that you are?

[12183] Colonel Bratton. My understanding was and is that we had a tentative agreement that had been initiated by a meeting of Army and Navy representatives of those powers in the South Pacific. Their recommendations had been forwarded to Washington and were considered by the joint chiefs of staff, who in turn prepared memoranda for the President, recommending that certain action be taken or that certain recommendations of ours be tentatively approved.

I believe that this paper was later withdrawn and held in a suspense file when they learned that the President would not approve it, and it remained in that status for some time.

Senator Ferguson. Now, where did you get your knowledge on that?

Colonel Bratton. Oh, I saw the documents as they came into Washington.

Senator Ferguson. Were they in the suspense file on the day of the attack?

Colonel Bratton. To the best of my knowledge they were, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Where was that suspense file?

Colonel Bratton. I think it was in the files of the joint chiefs of staff.
Senator Ferguson. In your affidavit you use this sentence:

[12184] I did not mention to the chief of staff the subject of Colonel Sadler's report, nor do I know that anyone else in G-2 did. General Miles and I, by reason of our knowledge, among other things, of the existence of the ABCD Bloc, were aware of the implications which would be inherent in any implementing message in the wind code indicating Japanese aggression against Great Britain.

Now, if the ABCD agreement was in the suspense file on the day of the outbreak, what obligation did America have under it, and then why did you make this affidavit?

You say:

We were aware of the implication which would be inherent in any implementing message in the wind code indicating Japanese aggression against Great Britain.

Colonel Bratton. Well, the obligation was only a tentative one. It had not been signed or approved by the President; it had not been approved by the Congress. We just do not barge off to war whenever the spirit moves us; we have to go through certain formalities.

Senator Ferguson. You knew the war was on in the Atlantic and you did not go through the formalities.

Colonel Bratton. An unofficial war; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now what did you mean by this:

We were aware of the implications which would be inherent in any implementing message in the wind code indicating Japanese aggression against Great Britain—

What were the implications?

Colonel Bratton. Well, I meant those that were tentatively agreed upon in this ABCD conference down in the southwest Pacific. That is the one that was initiated there, that the United States would take certain action if the Japanese crossed a certain line or invaded a certain body of water.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever see a message that came from Australia about the 6th of December?

Colonel Bratton. I don't think I saw it until after the attack, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You are familiar with exhibit A to Army Pearl Harbor Board top secret transcript, Summary of Far Eastern Documents?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Page 36 under FE–366—what is that, Far Eastern Document—366?

Colonel Bratton. You refer to FE–366?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir; I see it.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

Melbourne radioed that on 6 December the Netherlands Far East command had ordered the execution of mobilization Plan A-2 upon learning of Japanese naval movements out of Palau.

What was that?

Colonel Bratton. I don't remember sir, but the document which this refers to is in the files of G-2 and can be produced for the committee.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I will show you this document.
Colonel Bratton. I think you will find that that document was held up, that message was held up by the Australian authorities for some reason best known to them, and did not reach us until after the attack on the 7th of December.

Senator Ferguson. Do you know how many hours it was held up by the Australian Government?
Colonel Bratton. Not at this time; no, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know whether it was held up 17 hours by the Australian Government?
Colonel Bratton. I was going to say——
Senator Ferguson. Wouldn't allow our military attaché to send it out?
Colonel Bratton. I was going to say that I think it was held up for a day.
Senator Ferguson. Did you ever learn why the Australian Government held up a message from our own authorities to Washington advising them in relation to this war that was [12187] breaking out?
Colonel Bratton. I was told that the Australian authorities wished to take the matter up with their own parliament before they released the information to us.
Senator Ferguson. Well, didn't they release it first and then demand that we hold it up and not give it to our Government until they could have a Cabinet meeting?
Colonel Bratton. I think that was it, sir. That is my recollection.
Senator Ferguson. I show you this exhibit and ask you whether Merle Smith—well I will put it in the record. Read it into the record.
Colonel Bratton. It states here in the message:

This message held 17 hours by Government.
Senator Ferguson. Blank government isn't it?
Colonel Bratton. Blank government; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. That is the Australian Government?
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Read the whole message into the record.
Colonel Bratton (reading):

December 7, 1941.
7:58 P. M.
From Melbourne, Australia, via Honolulu.
[12188] To War Department and Commanding General Hawaiian Department.
Secret.
Number 24. December 6th.

Based on Dutch intelligence report (unconfirmed here) of naval movements from Pelau objective Menado and/or Ambon, Dutch ordered execution plan A-2 and suggested RAAF reciprocal movement be directed Laha Ambon and Keopang. So ordered pm yesterday including flight Catalina to Rabaul task reconnaissance Buka and northwest passage Australian Army reinforcements Ambon Keopang subject to request Dutch East Indies. This message held 17 hours by . . . Government eight am. Dutch reported advancing planes to be on Keopang not now considered necessary. Eleven a m Chief of Air Corps desired proceed with all aircraft forward movements Manila informed. Merle Smith.

Senator Ferguson. What investigation was Carter Clarke carrying on? General Carter Clarke?
Colonel Bratton. At present?
Senator Ferguson. No. Is he carrying on one now in relation to Pearl Harbor?

Colonel Bratton. Not that I know of, sir. You say what investigation was he carrying on?

[12189] Senator Ferguson. Yes. Was he carrying on an investigation about Pearl Harbor?

Colonel Bratton. Upon my return to this country in the fall of 1944, I found that Colonel, now General, Carter Clarke was carrying on an investigation directed by the office of the Chief of Staff, as to the details of the handling of magic when I was the chief of Far Eastern Section.

Senator Ferguson. Now, was the Carter Clarke investigation going along at the same time as the Clausen investigation?

Colonel Bratton. No, sir. This was a year before Clausen—a year before the Army board started operating.

Senator Ferguson. It was going on before the Army board even started to operate?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did it continue while the Army board was in operation?

Colonel Bratton. The Army board was in operation but not in Washington when I appeared before the Clarke board the first time.

Senator Ferguson. What I am trying to get at is this: Was the Army board in operation and functioning while the Carter Clarke investigation was going on?

[12190] Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. How do you account for these two investigations going along at the same time in relation to Pearl Harbor?

Colonel Bratton. The Clarke Board's primary objective, as I remember it had no relation specifically to the Pearl Harbor disaster. It was an investigation of the handling, processing and delivery of Japanese intercepts which we now know as magic at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster.

Senator Ferguson. But that was, wasn't it, one of the very things that the Pearl Harbor board was looking into?

Colonel Bratton. The Pearl Harbor board was investigating that at that time, but, as you have heard from Colonel Clausen today, did not have complete access to magic information.

Senator Ferguson. But the only person that kept them from having access was the chief of staff; isn't that correct? And at the same time, he was carrying on his own investigation into it by General Clarke; isn't that correct?

Colonel Bratton. In general, that is correct; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And Carter Clarke's investigation of magic was not turned over to the Army board?

Colonel Bratton. I don't know whether a report of Colonel Clarke's investigation was turned over to the Army [12191] board or not, but I, after being examined by the Clarke board as to my part in the handling of magic, and after some discussion between General Clarke and General Bissell, and I believe either General Marshall or General McNarney, I was given a free hand in testifying before the Grunert board as to what I knew about magic, with the understanding that every time I touched upon that subject in that testimony before the Grunert board I would call the attention of the
President of the board to the fact that I was now about to state that which was classified as top secret.

Senator Ferguson. Now, what I want to get at on this Carter Clarke investigation, on the 6th of October 1944 at 9 a.m.—do you know whether the board, the Army board was functioning at that time?

Colonel Bratton. Well, I know that they were functioning on the 30th of September, because I testified before them on that day.

Senator Ferguson. Now, a man by the name of Lieutenant O'Dell appeared before the Carter Clarke investigation on the 6th of October 1944 at 9 a.m., and he was asked these questions by Colonel Clarke:

All right, now tell me your story. We got the story that you wrote to Kemper and said you knew who did Pearl Harbor, or something to that effect, so you can start telling us what you know.

Lieutenant O'Dell said:

Well, sir, here's the part of the information that I thought might not have come out through other sources.

There was a cable that was sent on the fifth of December to the Commanding Generals of the Hawaii and Philippine Departments concerning the movement of a Japanese task force in the South China Sea. The information had come to the Military Attaché through the Australian Government, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Burnett, who called Colonel Merle Smith and myself to his office.

General Clarke said:

You were then Merle Smith's assistant?

Lieutenant O'Dell said:

That's right. There were the two of us and he is now dead. That's the reason I struck my nose in this. We were called over on Thursday afternoon about 5 o'clock.

That would be the 5th.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Burnett, myself and Colonel Merle Smith and Commander Saom, who is the Naval Liaison Officer from the Dutch East Indies. The information was primarily in regard to the Netherlands, through the Indies, and principally concerned itself with the movement of a Japanese task force in the South China Sea.

[12193] However, within an hour after we had gotten there some additional information came in, the exact nature of which I wasn't told at the time, but when we went out, Colonel Merle Smith had me prepare a cable which he revised to send out and the principal part of that other than the movement of this convoy was that the Dutch has ordered the execution of the Rainbow Plan A-2.

I remember it's been almost three years now, and I can distinctly remember that particular part of the cable where it said A-2, repeat A-2, which was a part of the joint Abducan Plan only to be taken in the event of war. It provided for specific occurrences they would counteract by certain other action.

In other words A-1 would have been some other direction expected attack, A-2 was from a particular direction, and they ordered the execution of this A-2. That was significant because the plan called for joint operations for the Australians and the Dutch, and to the best of my knowledge, our Navy if nothing else.

In other words, our Navy was to take part in it.

That was to go into effect only in case of war and here the Dutch had ordered it. That was the definite information that it had gone into effect. There was a bit of furriety excitement with that, and Sir Charles Burnett asked us not to send that cable and Colonel Merle Smith, although impatient to send it, said that he would wait 12 hours at Sir Charles Burnett's specific request.

In other words, they didn't say they wouldn't let that cable go out, but I dare say they probably would have stopped it had we tried to launch it.
Now, we get the cable and we find that the Australian Government held it up 17 hours and we didn’t get it until after the war started; is that correct? Is that what you found out?

Colonel Bratton. To the best of my recollection, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Doesn’t that indicate just what you said in your affidavit:

—by reason of our knowledge among other things of the existence of the ABCD Bloc, were aware of the implications which would be inherent in any implementing message to the “winds code,” indicating Japanese aggression against Great Britain.

Now, the ABCD involved the Dutch too, did it not, down there?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And didn’t it provide that in case of war with any of these countries we had certain obligations [12195] and isn’t that just exactly what the Australians held up?

Colonel Bratton. That was the hope of the people who drew up this tentative agreement. As far as I know it was never officially agreed by our Joint Chiefs of Staff that we would take this action, nor was the proposed action ever approved by the President.

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, I want to ask you this, Colonel:

To you, at the time and up until the time of the attack, it didn’t make a particle of difference, as far as the United States was concerned, that there was a war being started against the Dutch, that didn’t mean anything to you?

Colonel Bratton. Oh, in what way, sir?

Senator Ferguson. That we would get into it at that time.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir, but we wouldn’t get into it within the next 24 hours, until certain formalities were gone through and certain Government action taken.

Senator Ferguson. Isn’t that the point, that everybody in your Department had the understanding that you would have 24-hour notice after they had struck against the Dutch or the English?

Colonel Bratton. That we would have 24 hours notice?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, that you would have something [12196] you would have some time, some notice.

Colonel Bratton. No, sir. You are out of my depth now. I am afraid I don’t follow you.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know on the 6th that the Japanese were going to attack the Kra Peninsula?

Colonel Bratton. On the 6th?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Colonel Bratton. All the evidence pointed to that event, sir.

[12197] Senator Ferguson. Did you see the Winant message?

Colonel Bratton. Which message? No, sir; not until after the attack.

Senator Ferguson. Not until after the attack, and it came in at 10:40 on the morning of the 6th, saying that there would be an attack in 14 hours on the Kra Peninsula.

Colonel Bratton. I don’t doubt that, sir, but it didn’t filter down to me until long after the attack.

Senator Ferguson. If it had filtered down to the Intelligence Department—as I understood it the Intelligence Department was to filter things up, it ought to come to the Intelligence Department first?
Colonel Bratton. Quite so; but this was a State Department dispatch.

Senator Ferguson. Then do I understand that if the State Department got a message that involved the question of intelligence, that they were on a higher level and therefore it took quite a long time to filter down to you?

Colonel Bratton. It took what I thought was an unreasonably long time for us to get any type of intelligence out of the State Department during this time.

Senator Ferguson. Well, how did you account for that? Was it a higher level there?

Colonel Bratton. Due in a large measure to the way the [12198] State Department handles its dispatches. Certain dispatches were of such a highly secret nature that they would not give them to other departments of Government. Those of the lower level had to be processed, reproduced in quantity, distributed, and so on. All that took time. That is under the set-up they had at that time.

Senator Ferguson. Could anything have been more secret than the codes that you were intercepting from the Japanese?

Colonel Bratton. Our own codes and ciphers were equally secret.

Senator Ferguson. Equally. Then why didn't you get them so that you could evaluate them with the Japanese information? In other words, Colonel—

Colonel Bratton. I understand, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. If you had the Winant message from the Royal Navy that there was going to be an attack and you had the pilot message which showed we were going to get an answer to our note of the 26th, that it was going to be delivered at a specific time, later to be announced, and that that note was to be typed, not by a typist or anyone else, but was to be put in good shape, would that have helped you to evaluate the first 13 parts that it meant war with America?

[12199] Senator Lucas. Mr. Chairman, I don't like to object, but I don't see how this witness can answer that question intelligently unless he had the Winant message in front of him and studied it and had all the other things.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I don't know of a better witness to get on the question of intelligence in the Far East. This was the man in charge.

Colonel Bratton. I think I understand your question. It is to the effect that if I had this message from Melbourne before me—

Senator Ferguson. Not from Melbourne.

Colonel Bratton. From Winant.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Colonel Bratton. Together with the pilot message and several other communications—

Senator Ferguson. Yes, sir.

Colonel Bratton. Would it not have led me to arrive at the conclusion that war between Japan and America was imminent?

Senator Ferguson. That is right.

Colonel Bratton. I didn't need those extra messages to know that war between Japan and the United States was highly probable at that time, sir, but if I had had these other messages it would have confirmed my already arrived at [12200] estimate of the situation.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, when you got the announcement that bombs had been dropped on an American possession at Hawaii, were you or were you not surprised?

Colonel Bratton. I was not surprised that war had broken out. I was not surprised that the Japanese had attacked. I was surprised at the point that they attacked.

Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, you anticipated an attack at 1 o'clock our time?

Colonel Bratton. Afternoon.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; 1 o'clock afternoon, our time on Sunday.

Colonel Bratton. Immediately.

Senator Ferguson. But you didn't anticipate it at Pearl Harbor?

Colonel Bratton. Immediately upon receipt of this 1:00 o'clock delivery message I became convinced the Japanese were going to attack some American installation in the Pacific area.

Senator Ferguson. At 1 o'clock?

Colonel Bratton. At or shortly after 1 o'clock.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. All right. So at 9 o'clock on Sunday morning you came to the conclusion that an American possession in the Pacific would be attacked by the Japanese at 1 o'clock or shortly thereafter on that same day?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And at that time you conveyed that information to what superior?

Colonel Bratton. I tried to convey that impression to the Chief of Staff at once.

Senator Ferguson. All right. And by trying you say that you called his home in Virginia at about 9 o'clock?

Colonel Bratton. Between 9 and 9:15; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. I said about 9 o'clock.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you talked to his orderly?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you told him that you had a very vital and important message, did you?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you asked him if he knew how to locate the General and he said he did?

Colonel Bratton. He said he thought he knew where the General was riding and thought he could find him.

Senator Ferguson. Then you waited until 10 o'clock before the General called you and you held this information for 1 hour or practically an hour?

[12202] Colonel Bratton. No, I didn't hold it exclusively in my possession. I got the information to the Secretary of State. I called General Miles and either he or I called General Gerow. I told General Miles, in a guarded way, what this thing was and recommended, or requested, that he come to the office at once. I told him that I was trying to get in touch with General Marshall and I felt sure that General Marshall would come to the office and would want to see him. General Miles, and General Gerow, as soon as they could get together.

Senator Ferguson. Now, what time did you reach Gerow on the telephone after you came to this conclusion about the attack on American possessions?
Colonel Bratton. As I stated before, sir, I don’t remember whether it was General Miles that called General Gerow or myself. If it was myself it was immediately after calling General Miles.

Senator Ferguson. All right. That would be around 9:15?

Colonel Bratton. Around about 9:30, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. About 9:30. So General Gerow was reached at 9:30?

Colonel Bratton. Approximately.

Senator Ferguson. Approximately?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

[12205] Senator Ferguson. And then you don’t get to see him for two hours, which is 11:25, and you have in your possession this message that brought you to the conclusion that there was going to be an attack upon an American possession at 1 o’clock?

Colonel Bratton. The Secretary of State and myself had it in our possession at that time.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, and it took two hours before you reached General Gerow; is that correct?

Colonel Bratton. No, that isn’t correct, sir. General Gerow, I didn’t see General Gerow until 11:00, sometime after 11:00 in General Marshall’s office.

Senator Ferguson. That is what I am talking about. So it was 2 hours from the time he was notified about this very important message before you saw him.

[12204] Colonel Bratton. Well, it was 2 hours, Senator, approximately between the time I tried to get all these people together and the time they all did get together, if that is what you mean.

Senator Ferguson. No, I want to take them separately. The War Plans was General Gerow and it took 2 hours in order that you might show him this pilot message, is that correct?

Colonel Bratton. Two hours elapsed before he saw it; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right, that is what I am talking about. Now, General Marshall called you at 10 o’clock?

Colonel Bratton. No, I think I testified that he called me at about half past 10, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Then it took his orderly from between 9 and a quarter after 9 and 10:30 to get General Marshall to call you back on the phone?

Colonel Bratton. Presumably so; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Then it took you another hour before you could show this pilot message to General Marshall because he did not come down and he told you not to come out?

Colonel Bratton. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right. And this is the message that made you feel there was going to be the attack that you [12205] have explained?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, when you went to General Marshall’s office was General Marshall in his office? When you got into his outer office, we will call it the waiting room, was he in his office?

Colonel Bratton. He was in his office sitting at his desk.

Senator Ferguson. Sitting at his desk. And when you walked in there you saw a brown folder with the 13-part message in it?
Colonel Bratton. All 14 parts in it, all 14 parts were in it.
Senator Ferguson. Fourteen parts were in it?
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, did you make inquiry—well, I will first ask you, do you know how long General Marshall had been in his office?
Colonel Bratton. He has just gotten into his office, sir. He went into his office from the door that opens into the hall and General Miles and I, oh, in not more than a minute or 2 minutes after that walked in through the other door.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Then you arrived practically at the same time?
Senator Ferguson. Now, had he started to read the 13 part message before you got into his office?
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. He was reading the 14 parts of the message when you entered his office?
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And you attempted to stop him to show him what you had?
Colonel Bratton. Well, I had this message in my hand and made a statement to the effect, "General, I have a very important message here which I think you should see at once," and he did not look at it until after he had finished reading the 14 parts.
Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, how do you account for General Marshall having in a folder before him and reading it when you went into his office at 11:25 if you did not give them to someone Saturday night?
Colonel Bratton. Well, if I did not give it to someone Saturday night or Colonel Dusenbury, my assistant, did not give it to someone Saturday night, Colonel Dusenbury must have delivered it to Colonel Deane, who was the secretary on duty Sunday morning, to place on General Marshall's desk.
Senator Ferguson. Well, you said that that is the man [12207] that you questioned and he doesn't remember anything of those two dates.
Colonel Bratton. His memory is not very clear as to the happenings on those two dates, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You have talked to him and his memory is not very clear?
Colonel Bratton. That is correct, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Have you asked him about the delivery of that message to anyone Sunday morning?
Colonel Bratton. I have, sir, repeatedly and he cannot remember.
Senator Ferguson. Did you deliver it Sunday morning?
Colonel Bratton. I am certain that I did not, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, you mentioned in your testimony three secretaries and you did not name Deane. He had a number of secretaries in there. They were Major Max Taylor, Colonel Bedell Smith, Colonel Sexton, and one or two others, but at that time Colonel Smith was the senior secretary.
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Did you know Deane was in that office at that time?
Colonel Bratton. Oh, I saw Deane standing around in his office and in the hall Sunday morning when I was waiting for General Marshall to arrive.

Senator Ferguson. Now, you delivered the pilot message at what time, or had it delivered?

Colonel Bratton. About 3 o'clock Saturday afternoon the 6th.

Senator Ferguson. Did the Army translate that pilot message?

Colonel Bratton. I think so, yes, sir. I can tell by looking at this.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Colonel Bratton. Army translation.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know when that was delivered to the Navy?

Colonel Bratton. No, sir, and there is no way that I would know that because I did not do the delivering to the Navy. That was done by the SIS.

Senator Ferguson. Well, how would you suggest we find out what time it was delivered to the Navy? You got it at three o'clock and delivered it at three?

Colonel Bratton. I got it at about 2 o'clock.

Senator Ferguson. About 2 o'clock.

Colonel Bratton. And delivered it among other messages that Saturday afternoon at about three o'clock.

Senator Ferguson. Now, do you know of any other reason that it would not go to the Navy at two o'clock, at the time you got it?

Colonel Bratton. I think it probably did but it was buried in a mass of other intercepts in an envelope that had to be sorted and sifted out and evaluated.

Senator Ferguson. But it was translated?

Colonel Bratton. They were all translated when they went out of the translating section, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Colonel Bratton. They were all translated; they were all in English when they reached my desk.

Senator Ferguson. That is right, at two o'clock, and the ordinary procedure was that the message, together with whatever other messages were translated, would be taken to the Navy?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Is that correct?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then there is no reason to doubt in your mind that at two o'clock or shortly thereafter on Saturday the 6th the Navy had the translated pilot message?

Colonel Bratton. No, I can't say that, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Well, what can you say along that line?

[12210] Colonel Bratton. I don't know when the SIS delivered its batch of translated intercepts to the Navy.

Senator Ferguson. Was it its duty to deliver it at the same time they delivered it to you?

Colonel Bratton. That was standard operating procedure, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. That is what I am getting at, the standard operational procedure was that your department and the Navy would get them at the same time.
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Colonel Bratton. Let me modify that a moment. If the same man delivered the two envelopes he obviously could not deliver them in two opposite directions at the same time.

Senator Ferguson. I would say that would be correct.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

The Vice Chairman. Will the Senator yield to Mr. Murphy?

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment, until he gets through,

The Vice Chairman. Are you through, Colonel?

Colonel Bratton. Sir?

The Vice Chairman. Are you through with your answer?

Colonel Bratton. With what, sir?

The Vice Chairman. Are you through making answer to that question?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Mr. Murphy. I was just wondering if the SIS was working on Saturday afternoon and the Army translators were not?

Colonel Bratton. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. They left at 1 o'clock that day; it was Saturday.

Colonel Bratton. They were there.

Mr. Murphy. They were working?

Colonel Bratton. The SIS was on a 24-hour shift during the latter part of November and I know that there were translators and decoders and decipherers in the Army SIS on Saturday afternoon, Saturday night, Sunday.

Mr. Murphy. Captain Kramer said he had to call them and ask them to come back and I think he said they started to work around 6 o'clock that evening.

Colonel Bratton. I think Kramer's memory is at fault in that respect. Captain or now Colonel Schukraft, who was one of the officers on duty in the SIS at this time, is here in Washington and has been waiting to testify before this committee. He can give you much better evidence than I can on that subject, sir.

Senator Ferguson. He has not been waiting as long as you have.

[12211] Colonel Bratton. Sir?

Senator Ferguson. He has not waited here as long as you have to testify?

Colonel Bratton. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Will you look at page 245 of Exhibit 1, No. 902? Have you got that message?

Colonel Bratton. What number?

Senator Ferguson. 902; Army 25,844.

Colonel Bratton. The fourteenth part?

Senator Ferguson. No, 902—no, it is 904, pardon me.

Colonel Bratton. That is Army 25,844?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, that is the one not to use typists. When did you get that message?
Colonel Bratton. I cannot state definitely, sir; I do not remember definitely, but the presumption is that I received it at the same time that I got the pilot message.

Senator Ferguson. And then it would be delivered with the batch that the pilot message was in?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. When did you first—

Colonel Bratton. May I make another statement in that connection, sir?

[12213] Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Colonel Bratton. You will notice that the SIS number on the pilot message is No. 25,838.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Colonel Bratton. The SIS number on this No. 902 is 25,844; that is 6 numbers apart, so the presumption is that they both came over to me at the same time.

Senator Ferguson. And then the 1 o'clock message does not get a number till—that is 25,850; that is 6 later. And then the one on destruction of the codes is 25,854, 4 later; that is on page 250.

Colonel Bratton. These numbers were stamped on in the SIS as they passed over the desk of the person who was assembling them and sending them to me and to the Navy.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, when did you first learn that the embassy here was destroying their codes, their code books?

Colonel Bratton. On the 3d of December.

Senator Ferguson. Well, I have a message here and I would like for you to identify James F. Perry, First Lieutenant, Military Intelligence Evaluation Sub-section. Do you know Perry?

Colonel Bratton. He was not in my section.

Senator Ferguson. This was a message December the 6th.

[12214] Saturday.

Memorandum for Colonel Holbrook.

Do you know Colonel Holbrook?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. He was an officer in the counter-intelligence division.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

Word has just been received from ONI by telephone to the effect that the Japanese embassy in Washington, D. C. was reliably reported to have burned its code books and ciphers last night.

When did you get that message?

Colonel Bratton. I don't remember seeing that message until recently, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, that would be an important message, would it not?

Colonel Bratton. Not to me, no, sir, because when I read the order to Admiral Nomura to start burning his codes and ciphers I sent one of my young officers up to the Japanese embassy to find out if they were burning any papers in their back yard and he came back and reported to me that they were.

Senator Ferguson. They were?

Colonel Bratton. They were.

Senator Ferguson. And what date did you send a man up [12215] to the embassy and find out they were burning papers in the back alley?
Colonel Bratton. On the 3d of December, when I received the message.

Senator Ferguson. On the 3d of December?

Colonel Bratton. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. Who did you transmit that message to, that information that you had sent a man up and found them burning their codes and ciphers?

Colonel Bratton. I delivered the Japanese intercept directing the Japanese ambassador to start burning his codes and ciphers to the usual recipients on that day, on December the 3rd. I went in person to General Miles and to General Gerow to invite their attention to this particular message.

Senator Ferguson. Did that mean war between the United States and Japan when you received that message, did that mean war to you?

Colonel Bratton. It meant that time was running out and the approach of the crisis. It meant, if they destroyed their codes and ciphers a breach, at the least a breach in diplomatic relations and probably a war.

Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?

Senator Ferguson. Just a moment. Did you know at that time that they were asking to send to [12216] South America their chief intelligence officer in this hemisphere?

Colonel Bratton. Oh, I think that is among the intercepts, yes.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir, I remember seeing that message.

Senator Ferguson. And that the man named was the chief intelligence officer?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did that mean anything?

Colonel Bratton. Well, yes, that was another straw in the wind. It meant that the time was running out, that the crisis was approaching.

Mr. Murphy. At page 280 of the Grunert hearings he testifies unequivocally that it meant war, at page 280.

Senator Ferguson. The Congressman calls my attention that you said that it did mean war. Now you say that if they were burning all their codes and ciphers you figured it would mean war, but you knew that they had not burnt them all, didn't you?

Colonel Bratton. I knew that they had not burnt them all, that they still had one or two in reserve. Admiral Nomura requested permission from his government to keep one until [12217] the last moment.

Senator Ferguson. Did you intercept a message like that?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. It is in the book here.

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I think there is, now that you bring it to my attention.

Colonel Bratton. Don't you remember?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I do. They asked to keep one code; that is correct, isn't it?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Colonel Bratton. I believe they had two purple machines and requested permission to retain one until the last moment.
Senator Ferguson. Now, you were instrumental, were you not, in getting a message to Panama on the 5th?

Colonel Bratton. On the 5th that was, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Do you remember that message to Panama?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ferguson. Signed by Miles?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, you sent this message on the 5th, after a war warning had gone to Panama, isn’t that correct?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir; but I must remind you that I did not see the messages that went out to Panama or to Hawaii until after the attack. I knew in general what their text was; I knew that they were war warnings. I did not know to what extent they touched upon the diplomatic situation as between America and Japan. My purpose in sending that message to Panama was to inform the G-2 there that whereas our diplomatic relations were still strained, war at that moment did not appear imminent and by “imminent” I mean immediate, a matter of hours.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now, we have General Marshall—

Colonel Bratton. I must remind you, sir, that at that time we had not even received the pilot message.

Senator Ferguson. I appreciate that, but on the 27th General Marshall had sent a message to General Short.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You are familiar with that message now?

Colonel Bratton. Oh, yes.

Senator Ferguson. But you had not seen it, had you, up until after the attack?

Colonel Bratton. I did not see that message until after the attack.

Senator Ferguson. This went to Hawaii:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes, with only the barest possibility that the Japanese government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future acts unpredictable—and so forth.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, that kind of a message went to Panama. You caused on the 5th—this is the 27th.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You had the burning of the codes messages after that.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You had sent up to the Embassy and heard they were burning codes; that is correct?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you caused to be sent to Panama a message like this:

In the event severance of diplomatic relations is near this office will notify you. Japanese-U. S. relations are now very difficult.

(Signed)

Miles.

The actual message reads this way. That was a paraphrase—
Colonel Bratton. I think what you have read is a paraphrase, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. I am going to read you the message:

U. S.-Japanese relations. Stop—

which is period—

[12220] Will inform you if and when severance of diplomatic relations imminent.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. So on the 5th you changed, in effect, General Marshall's message to Panama and told them that Japanese-U. S. relations were strained and that you would inform them if and when severance of diplomatic relations were imminent.

Now I want to know when, in your opinion, severance of diplomatic relations became imminent?

Colonel Bratton. Upon delivery of the 14-part message to the Secretary of State.

Senator Ferguson. And did you then wire to Panama that it was imminent or did you ever get a message to Panama?

Colonel Bratton. No. The bombs started falling on Pearl Harbor while the Japanese Ambassador was delivering this message.

Senator Ferguson. But you say that you believed at 1 o'clock—or at 9 o'clock that there was going to be an attack on an American possession in the Pacific and you have outstanding, as far as Panama was concerned, a message that you would, if and when severance of diplomatic relations was imminent, notify Panama.

Colonel Bratton. Well, I didn't do it, sir.

[12221] Senator Ferguson. You didn't do it. Now, you were talking today about General Short's reply not being an answer to General Marshall's message.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Why, it even answered it by number; did it not?

Colonel Bratton. Yes; he referred to General Marshall's message by number.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. And isn't it true that the messages that went out from Adams on sabotage was answered specifically by General Short, so that no one could make his short answer to General Marshall's message by number, because he specifically answered the sabotage messages, so that there were answers to all of the messages.

Isn't that a fact?

Colonel Bratton. I believe that to be, sir; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, how could anyone be mistaken that he did answer the Marshall message by saying that he was alerted to sabotage?

Colonel Bratton. I do not believe I understand your question, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. How could anyone be mistaken that his answer which gave General Marshall's number to his message, having answered the other sabotage messages specifically and by number, that this message was intended to answer General [12222] Marshall's message?

Colonel Bratton. How could anybody have thought it was intended to answer it?
Senator Ferguson. Yes, because Adams had seen this reply was to Marshall and gave the Marshall number.

Colonel Bratton. Well, I don't know how anybody could have made the mistake. The message was not shown to me. General Miles has testified that he did not see the message. The message was handled by the War Plans Division, and by the Chief of Staff.

Senator Ferguson. Is this true, that the Chief of Staff and all persons in the General Staff were satisfied with his answer that he was alerted to sabotage, because that is all they expected at Hawaii?

Colonel Bratton. No, sir; I do not agree with that.

Senator Ferguson. Was that your conclusion at that time?

Colonel Bratton. I did not see this message, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. No. Was that your conclusion, that you thought that the only danger at Hawaii was sabotage? You told me you were surprised not that there was an attack on an American possession but you were surprised that they attacked Hawaii.

Colonel Bratton. Yes. This thing has been called an attack on Pearl Harbor ever since the event. It really was not an attack on Pearl Harbor. It was an attack on the fleet unit they found in Pearl Harbor. I was not surprised that they attacked our fleet if they could catch it by surprise. I would have been surprised at an attack on the installations of Pearl Harbor, the land installations.

[12223] Senator Ferguson. Now do I understand then that you did not know where the fleet was but you anticipated an attack on the fleet? Is that what you want to tell me?

Colonel Bratton. I did not know that any major unit of the fleet was in Pearl Harbor. My opposite number in ONI did not know it, because I went and asked him. I asked that specific question in the Navy several days before the attack, in a conference that I had with my opposite number, Captain McCollum. I said to him, "Are you sure these people are properly alerted? Are they on the job? Have they been properly warned?"

He said, "Oh, yes, the fleet has gone," or, "is going to sea."

Senator Ferguson. Now we get something that has not been developed here yet. You went to McCollum?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. I saw McCollum every day at least once, and sometimes two or three times a day. We were in very close contact.

Senator Ferguson. But you saw McCollum 2 days before the attack?

Colonel Bratton. I would not say 2 days before the attack. It was in that first week of December.

Senator Ferguson. All right. And you at that time asked him where the fleet was and whether it had been properly warned, and he told you that it was out?

Colonel Bratton. In effect that is correct; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Colonel Bratton. Captain McCollum himself has testified before this committee that he did not know any major unit of the fleet was in Pearl Harbor. Admiral Turner has made the same statement.

Senator Ferguson. But did not OpNav's board show this fleet in Pearl Harbor?

Colonel Bratton. I have no knowledge of that, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Then, as I understand it, the Japanese Intelligence Section getting information that our fleet was in Pearl Harbor knew more than our own Intelligence Section.

Colonel Bratton. That appears to be correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What?

Colonel Bratton. That appears to be correct.

Senator Ferguson. So we boil it down to that, that as far as our Army and Navy Intelligence system was concerned, the Jap Intelligence knew more about where our fleet was.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now are you surprised that there was an attack at Pearl Harbor?

[12226] Colonel Bratton. You have got me in a corner now, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. I am trying to be fair.

Colonel Bratton. It was a perfectly logical action for the Japanese to take, if they knew that any large unit of our fleet was in Pearl Harbor, to attack that unit wherever it was, Pearl Harbor or elsewhere.

Senator Ferguson. Now let us look at Exhibit 2. We will find that their intelligence did know more than your intelligence did.

Senator Lucas. I don't think anybody disputed that.

Mr. Richardson. He admits it.

Senator Ferguson. Look at page 29. There the Japs were learning that there were in Pearl Harbor nine battleships, three light cruisers, three submarine tenders, seventeen destroyers, and in addition there were four light cruisers, two destroyers lying at docks, the heavy cruisers and airplane carriers having all left.

Colonel Bratton. That is right, sir; but it did not reach us until the 8th of December. It was not translated until then.

Senator Ferguson (reading):

It appears that no air reconnaissance is being conducted by the fleet air arm.

Colonel Bratton. I see the message, sir.

[12227] Senator Ferguson. All right. This message comes from Honolulu to Tokyo on the 6th. We got it but did not decode it. That is right, isn't it? The Japanese had that knowledge on the 6th?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

[12228] Senator Ferguson. And we were depending upon their information to get where our fleet was?

Colonel Bratton. Well, we were not getting the information, because I did not read this until on or after the 8th of December.

Senator Ferguson. Now, on page 27, Honolulu notified Tokyo:

I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places.

Now, did your intelligence system know that?

Colonel Bratton. What message is that you are reading?

Senator Ferguson. That is on page 27. It is the last sentence.

Colonel Bratton. That message was not translated until the 8th either.

Senator Ferguson. I know, but Honolulu sent it to Tokyo on the 6th.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. In this language:

I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places—

meaning Pearl Harbor.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir; and if we had gotten that message on the 6th, I assure you the whole picture would [12229] have been different.

Senator Ferguson. Colonel Bratton, you had the same information—or did not you have—that a surprise attack could be made on Pearl Harbor?

Colonel Bratton. How do you mean, I had the same information?

Senator Ferguson. Did not you know that a surprise attack could be made on Pearl Harbor?

Colonel Bratton. It is written into every Hawaii war plan that I have any knowledge of, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Then you did not have to wait for that information from the Japs. But if you had known that the Japs were sending it, then it would have meant something? That is what you mean, is it?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, did you know that on page 22 of Exhibit 2—that is the one where they were going to put lights out. Are you familiar with that message?

Colonel Bratton. This tabulation, this code message—

A number of carriers, preparing to sortie, signal No. 2—

is that it?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Did you know that that was translated [12230] in the rough in the Navy by 2 o'clock on Saturday the 6th?

Colonel Bratton. I did not know it until I heard the statement made before the committee here the other day, sir.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Now, let us look at the one on the 24th, on page 12.

Did you have what was known as a gist system, that you would put the gist of the message on? It was a flag, wasn't it?

Colonel Bratton. No; but I had a similar system of my own.

Senator Ferguson. What was your system?

Colonel Bratton. You appreciate the fact that we were not evaluating this material for the chief of staff or anyone else who wanted to see it in the raw.

Senator Ferguson. I will get to that a little later.

Colonel Bratton. Notwithstanding that fact, I took it upon myself to pin a little buck slip to the inside cover of the book that I delivered to General Miles, General Gerow, and General Marshall, listing all the SIS numbers of messages that would be found in that book, and I put a red check mark against those that I considered of special importance, meaning that those were the ones I wanted those officers to pay particular attention to.

[12221] Senator Ferguson. All right. Now when did you stop doing that?

Colonel Bratton. I never stopped doing it until I turned over this work to my successor.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know why there has not been delivered to this committee any of those tabs?

Colonel Bratton. They were destroyed by me as soon as I got the books back.

Senator Ferguson. You would get the book back and destroy the tabs?

Colonel Bratton. Well, there was no point in keeping them after that. I knew by the return of the book containing the message that it had been seen by the officer to whom it was delivered.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now did the book that you saw on General Marshall's deck on Sunday morning, with the 14-part message in it that he read, have one of these tabs on checked by you?

Colonel Bratton. I do not know, sir, because I did not examine that book.

Senator Ferguson. Was it one of your regular books?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you don't know whether that had the tab on it or not?

Colonel Bratton. I do not, sir, because the events happened so rapidly after I left General Marshall's office that looking at those books—I just did not do it. I had something else to do.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Now I want to take up this proposition about the delivery of these messages in the raw.

You said that you—your Department had taken away from it the evaluation of messages, is that correct?

Colonel Bratton. I did not say it in that way, sir. When I first started handling this material it was brought to me in the form of a memorandum by the then chief of the Plans and Training Division of G-2, who received it from SIS. It was a rough memorandum saying that a certain message had been intercepted from Tokyo to Washington. It said, in brief, such and such a thing, and so on. That went on for awhile after I took over the Far Eastern Section, and I changed that system. I had set up an arrangement whereby the SIS delivered to me in person the actual translated intercepts, because there was too much bypassing, there was too much waste effort and waste time in the system in effect when I took over the section.

I then instituted a system whereby periodically I assembled, evaluated and briefed one or more of these intercepts in the form of a secret memorandum for the chief of staff, giving the gist of the information and placing my evaluation upon it.

I would say, for example, "It has been learned from a secret source hitherto reliable that the following has taken place", or "is about to take place. We evaluate this" a certain way. That went on for some time.

Senator Ferguson. Can you give us about when that started?

Colonel Bratton. May I refer to some notes I made on this, sir?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Colonel Bratton. If there is no objection, sir, I would like to read these notes that I prepared a month or so ago.

Senator Ferguson. Is it along that line?

Colonel Bratton. It is only a page and a quarter.

Senator Ferguson. All right.

Colonel Bratton. As to the handling of magic intercepts by myself.
Senator Ferguson. All right.

Colonel Bratton. When I joined the Far Eastern Section G-2 in September 1936, and for some time thereafter, this intercept material was delivered from time to time in memorandum form from the SIS through the chief of the Operations and [12234] Training Branch G-2. When the intelligence was of sufficient importance it was then made the subject of a special confidential memorandum for the chief of staff, the chief of the War Plans Division, or both, sometimes the State Department was so served.

Shortly after I became chief of the Far Eastern Section G-2 in February of 1937, I made arrangements to have exact copies of decoded or deciphered and translated messages delivered to me direct from the SIS. This type of intelligence was the result of combined efforts on the part of the section of naval Communications and SIS of the Army Signal Corps.

As time went by and additional codes and ciphers were broken the material increased in volume and importance and the A. C. of S. G-2 made me responsible for the selection and screening of this material and for its security in G-2, and for its dissemination as intelligence to the proper officials of the Government.

By direction of G-2 the number of persons so served and the number of persons so handling and who had access to this material was, for security reasons, kept down to the absolute minimum. I worked in close cooperation with my opposite number in the Navy, chief of the Far Eastern Section ONI in seeing that the proper officials of the Government had access to the intelligence derived from this [12235] source.

In early spring 1941, however, it became apparent that some more formal understanding between ONI and G-2 was desirable in order to insure proper dissemination and evenly distribute the work involved, provide adequate security and prevent duplication of effort.

Such an understanding was arrived at in the form of a chart dated January 23, 1941, and signed by General Miles and Captain James. This chart has already been introduced as evidence.

In compliance with the provisions of this chart I have served the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, A. C. of S. G-2, and chief of the War Plans Division by means of special confidential memoranda or intelligence reports such as IB No. 1 so and so. They were all given serial numbers up to 1-175—173 of them during the months of January, March, May, and July of 1941.

On about 5 August 1941, by direction of the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, I stopped writing this type of memorandum and started serving the designated officials with the raw material instead, that is, exact copies of the decoded or deciphered and translated Japanese messages.

Does that answer your question, sir?

[12236] Colonel Bratton. That was on or about the 5th of August 1941.

[12237] Senator Ferguson. Now, sometime in 1943, you prepared a secret summary of the Far Eastern documents, did you not?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And that was prepared on whose orders?

Colonel Bratton. I have a copy here, sir.
Senator Ferguson. You have a copy. Whose order was it on?
Colonel Bratton. It was prepared as a result of a letter from the
President of the United States to the chief of staff, a copy of which
I have here, which I secured from the G-2 files.
Senator Ferguson. Is the letter in the exhibit?
Colonel Bratton. I don't think it is. Not the one that you have,
sir.
Senator Ferguson. Is yours a photostatic copy?
Colonel Bratton. It is not, sir. It is a typewritten copy.
Senator Ferguson. I want you to see the photostatic copy. When
you prepared the copy to whom did you submit it? Who did you pre-
pare it for?
Colonel Bratton. The President.
Senator Ferguson. Who had to approve it before it went to the White
House?
Colonel Bratton. The Chief of Staff.
Senator Ferguson. Did he approve it?
Colonel Bratton. Not in the form in which it was originally gotten
up.
Senator Ferguson. Well, that is what I want to show you, the orig-
inal. On page 3, at the bottom of the page, FE39, has the photostat
of a paper clip.
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And it is crossed out there.
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. It reads:
"The seriousness of the Far Eastern situation was summarized in
a memorandum to the Chief of Staff from the Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2, War Department, dated 4 November. The memorandum reads
in part, as follows:
"There is a possibility, fantastic as it may seem that Japan contemplates mil-
itary action against Great Britain in the Orient at a time when she is involved
in Europe, with the idea of seizing Hongkong and Singapore, and ultimately
acquiring the Dutch oil fields and control of trade routes to the Orient.
"—it is not improbable that this country will be compelled to apply the Neu-
trality Act and ultimately become involved.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator give the date of that? It is in 1937,
is it not?
Senator Ferguson. Yes. Is that correct, Colonel Bratton?
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now who struck that out of the report?
Colonel Bratton. To the best of my knowledge and belief it was
stricken out by General Marshall in person.
Senator Ferguson. Well, now, will you tell us whether or not that
was a false report that you had inserted in there or was it true?
Colonel Bratton. The report was true to the best of our knowledge
and belief and was based on intelligence that we had secured from
various sources.
Senator Ferguson. Now, is there anything else that is stricken out?
Let's look at 1940. There is a paper clip there, and three-quarters of
a page stricken out. It says:
As the year began the seriousness of the Far Eastern situation was summarized
on 8 January—

page 15.
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.

[12240] Mr. Murphy. Isn't there a letter in the front, to which you did not refer, showing why they are stricken out, a letter from Colonel Sexton?
Senator Ferguson. Did you know there was a letter as to why they were stricken out?
Colonel Bratton. There is a—I started to give the history of this document, sir, but you stopped me.
Senator Ferguson. You started to read a letter that you said was written by the President.
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir; to the Chief of Staff.
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
And you were trying to prepare this in 1943, in compliance with that letter?
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And you prepared it and the Chief of Staff struck certain things out of it?
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, I am trying to find out what he struck out, and if you know, as to whether or not it was true when you put it in.
Colonel Bratton. All of the items that were stricken out of this book, to the best of our knowledge and belief, were supported by documents now on file in G-2.
Senator Ferguson. Where did the Chief of Staff get his information that would cause him to strike these items out that I am going to show you here?
Mr. Clark. Mr. Chairman——
The Vice Chairman. Mr. Clark.
Mr. Clark. Will the Senator yield?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.
Mr. Clark. I want to be patient, as we all do, but I am wondering if this investigation has gotten down to where we have to figure out how some documents came to be written in a particular way in 1937.
Senator Ferguson. No; this is 1943.
Mr. Richardson. What good is it? In 1943.
Senator Lucas. 1937 is the first page stricken out.
Mr. Clark. Mr. Chairman, the only point I make, and I do it with the greatest deference to the Senator, if we are going to conclude here, it just seems to me that we ought to hold to the main track a little more than we are doing.
Now, whatever was done in making up this thing, it got down to some final form and that is the form in which it exists. If we have to go back into how it was revised and how it got into the present form, I don't see how we will ever conclude.
Senator Ferguson. The President, as I understand, and the witness will correct me if I am wrong, the President requested this to be made up in relation to Pearl Harbor.
He wanted the whole far eastern situation outlined and he asked for it in 1943. Is that correct?
Colonel Bratton. He asked for a coverage from 1937 down to and including Pearl Harbor.
Senator Ferguson. That is right.
Mr. Murphy. Will the Senator yield?
Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. If you will look at the letter from the President, you we find that he asked for a report from the military attaché. 'On the second or third page of that document is a letter signed by Sexton from the Chief of Staff's office saying that it didn't comply with the request and asked that the things that didn't comply be stricken out. That letter is in that document there.

Senator Ferguson. Well, going back now, you wanted to produce a letter from the President; is that right?

Colonel Bratton. I have here a copy of a letter from the President.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Will you produce that and read it into the record?

Senator Lucas. What is it about?

Senator Ferguson. It is about this far eastern situation, is it not?

Colonel Bratton. Partially. It is about the Axis war potential, and what we knew about it from various sources.

Mr. Murphy. May we have the letter read?

Colonel Bratton. Shall I read the letter?

The Vice Chairman. Read the letter.

Senator Lucas. What is the date of the letter?


Senator Lucas. Let me ask, does this relate to Pearl Harbor or something else?

Colonel Bratton. It relates to the probability or improbability of an outbreak of war between us and any and all of the Axis powers.

Mr. Clark. 1943?

Colonel Bratton. Covering the period—that is, our knowledge of the probability or improbability of the outbreak of war between us and the Axis powers; that we acquired from various sources during the years 1937 down to and including a certain date, which in one or two instances went beyond Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Kaufman. Mr. Chairman, I think the President’s letter will give an indication as to what was required.

The Vice Chairman. Go ahead, Colonel, and read it. That seems to be the best way to get at it.

Senator Lucas. If we are ever going to get through, I agree we can't go back to 1937.

Colonel Bratton. I may say this is a document that has been referred to a number of times by my Chief, General Miles. He attempted to get this committee to take cognizance of this document on a number of occasions while he was testifying but nobody seemed to take an interest.

Senator Ferguson. As I understand it, Congressman Murphy asked you about this document today.

Colonel Bratton. He started to.

Senator Ferguson. And then quit. I want to talk about——

Mr. Murphy. I asked for it yesterday, Senator, and stated on the record that you had had a copy from October and that Mr. Gearhart had had a copy from November. I got it last night, after a pretty hard day. I read a little of it at my hotel room, was busy here today, and didn't read the rest of it.
But I read the part in the beginning. I don't like to question a witness about a thing with which I am not familiar. But, as I understand it, the President wanted a report in this respect, and there is a letter from Sexton [12245] showing the parts which were stricken out.

Mr. Clark. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry I brought the matter up.

Colonel Bratton. This volume is only part of it. There was one volume on the European Axis. This volume is on the far eastern Axis. Each of these volumes is supported by 10 to 15 volumes of photostate of documents, original documents that are on file in G-2.

Senator Lucas. Can we get those for the instruction of the committee, those 10 or 15 volumes that you have down there? Colonel Bratton. I saw them in the safe of Gen. Carter Clarke a month ago.

Senator Lucas. I think it is very important that we have them.

Colonel Bratton. I don't think the actual documents themselves will give you any more information than you can get out of this summary. They simply support the summary.

Senator Lucas. I will withdraw the request then.

Mr. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, how far does the committee intend to go with this character of proof?

Here is a review made by a person 2 years after Pearl Harbor. It is of no more importance than a review [12246] made by the Washington Post or the Chicago Tribune. It is an historical review made by the colonel. If you are going into this situation, you will have to accept anything that is offered by anyone, any book that has been printed by anybody since Pearl Harbor as to what happened at Pearl Harbor.

Now, not a single thing is fact. Everything is conclusion of this witness, historically, as to what happened.

I don't care how many times it has been referred to here, but I am wondering as counsel how far the committee is going to go into the hindsight of some historian as to what the situation was at Pearl Harbor when we have all this trouble here trying to get foresight.

Senator Brewster. Mr. Chairman, we are getting near the adjourning time.

The Vice Chairman. Let's finish with Colonel Bratton tonight.

Colonel Bratton. Shall I read this letter or not, sir?

The Vice Chairman. Well, Senator Senator Ferguson has requested that it be read: is that correct?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. Is there objection to the colonel reading the letter?

[12247] The Chair hears none.

Proceed to read it.

Colonel Bratton (reading):

Dear George: I would like to have copies of the dispatches of our military attaches which estimate or express any opinion regarding the probability or improbability of an outbreak of war, or which refer in any way to the estimate of potential military strength of any of the countries involved.

I am concerned with those dispatches dating from January 1, 1937 until such time as our military attaches left the following countries:

Germany, Japan, Italy, Bulgaria, Austria, Occupied France, Belgium.
I should also like the similar dispatches from England dating from January 1, 1937, to the outbreak of the war in September, 1939. I should like our dispatches bearing on this subject from Russia from January 1, 1937 until the present time.

Sincerely yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

[12248] Senator Lucas. What is the date of that?
Colonel Bratton. July 14, 1943.
Senator Ferguson. All I wanted to speak about was Japan. As I understand they are in this Far Eastern document?
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Now, will you tell us—it is difficult for me to tell what was stricken out by General Marshall because of the nature of the photostating. Was there anything stricken out of FE149, FE-147, rather, on page 16?
Mr. Murphy. If you will let the witness read Sexton's letter, I think you will understand what was stricken out, Senator. It is in the beginning of the volume about the third page, by Sexton.
The Vice Chairman. If that will be helpful, go ahead and read that letter.
Senator Ferguson. Do you know of anything that will tell us what was stricken out?
Colonel Bratton. All you have to do is look at the book itself.

[12249] Senator Ferguson. That is what I was trying to do but he says there is some memorandum in it.
Mr. Murphy. There is a memorandum by Sexton of the Chief of Staff's office telling why it should be stricken out, because it didn't comply with the President's request.
The Vice Chairman. Do you find the Sexton letter?
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
WASHINGTON, AUGUST 26, 1943.

Memorandum for General Strong:—

who was then G-2.
The Vice Chairman. Go ahead and read it.
Colonel Bratton (reading):

The attached tab does not comply with the directive in that it contains much material other than MA reports. The Chief of Staff desires that it be revised to contain only MA reports.

By direction of the Chief of Staff.

(Signed) W. T. Sexton,
Colonel, General Staff,
Secretary, General Staff.

[12250] The Vice Chairman. Proceed.
Senator Ferguson. Do I understand everything was stricken out except MA's? What is an MA? That is a military attaché?
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. Was everything stricken out except that?
Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. The book was torn all to pieces by the Chief of Staff and everything deleted therefrom except the raw MA and MO meaning military observer.
Senator Ferguson. How can we tell what items come under that category? Take the first item which I talked about which was stricken out.
Colonel Bratton. All right. Take that first item. If you will turn to the index at the back of the book and find out what FE-39 was, you will see.

Senator Ferguson. FE-149.

Colonel Bratton. FE-39.

Senator Ferguson. 149, isn't it?

Colonel Bratton. You will find it on page 4, roman numerals, of the index in the back of the book. It says FE-39—

[12251] Mr. Richardson. 149.

Colonel Bratton (reading):

Washington, Memorandum to Chief of Staff—

dated the 4th of November 1937—

Subject, Far Eastern Situation.

In other words, this was a memorandum prepared in my office for the Chief of Staff based upon intelligence that I had secured from a number of sources, including, probably, MA's and MO's and probably including other sources.

Senator Ferguson. Well, take FE-149.

Colonel Bratton. What page?

Senator Ferguson. Page 16.

Colonel Bratton. Well, this is the substance of a confidential lecture delivered to the faculty and students of the Army War College but it gives the opinion of the Far Eastern section as to the approaching crisis in the Far East. You will see FE-142 on the next page—it is page 16.

Senator Ferguson. Let's look at FE-159.

Colonel Bratton. What page?

Senator Ferguson. Page 18:

On 19 June G-2 forwarded to the Chief of Staff details of a Japanese ultimatum to Great Britain which required that the Hongkong and Burma borders be closed and that British troops be withdrawn from Shanghai if a Japanese declaration of war was to be averted.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir. That was stricken out.

[12253] Senator Ferguson. Was that a military attaché, or what was that?

Colonel Bratton. That was a memorandum for the Chief of Staff drafted in my section based upon intelligence that we had acquired from various sources. It wasn't the raw military attaché or military observer's report. It was considered an evaluated paper containing intelligence secured from a number of sources.

Senator Ferguson. Let's take something that isn't stricken out. The top of page 18:

This G-2 report of 31 May to the Chief of Staff outlined the Pacific situation—

Or is that stricken out? I can't tell from this.

Colonel Bratton. What item is that?

Senator Ferguson. It is the second paragraph at the top of the page, page 18.

Colonel Bratton. That is all stricken out, down to FE-156 on page 18, the middle of page 18. Starting on page 17, you will see FE-155, the last paragraph on the page. That was all stricken out as was all the first half of page 18 down to and not including FE-156.
Now, FE-156 was a Tokyo MA report. It states:
Tokyo reported concentrations of Japanese troops—
That was not striken out.

[12254] Senator Ferguson. Take the top of page 27 for a moment, 1941. There are some lines drawn in after the word "Canton" and before June 25. What is that?
Colonel Bratton. Well, that means that the Chief of Staff wanted part of that taken out and part of it left in.
Senator Ferguson. Now, was that because that was not in the report, that he wanted it taken out?
Colonel Bratton. He wanted the sentence, he wanted the first four lines stricken out.
Senator Ferguson. Is it all MA or not? How did you get MA mixed up with your others?
Colonel Bratton. I will have to look at the index to identify these things that are referred to on the margin to find out what they were.
Senator Ferguson. Will you do it on that one to see whether that was an MA or not?
Colonel Bratton. All right.
FE-248, the basis of the first four lines was a report from G-2, the headquarters of the Philippine Department No. 176, dated 24 June 1941.
Since it was not a military attaché report or a military observer report, the Chief of Staff directed it be stricken out.

[12255] FE-254 was another report from the headquarters of the Philippine Department, a cablegram No. 1236, dated 26 June 1941, reporting Japanese troop movements and parachute training.
Since it was not an MA or MO report it was stricken out.
Senator Ferguson. Take 249.
Colonel Bratton. 249 was a radiogram from the military observer in Hong Kong, dated 25 June 1941.
Since it was a military observer’s report, it was left in.
Senator Ferguson. What did the letter say here?
An MA isn’t a military observer.
Colonel Bratton. The report of the military attachés and military observers were to be left in.
Senator Ferguson. What were the initials for the military observers?
Colonel Bratton. MO.
Senator Ferguson. It doesn’t say that the Chief of Staff desires that it be revised to contain only MA reports.
Colonel Bratton. That is true, but General Strong on or about the 26th of August, at about 2:45 p. m., on the 26th of August 1943, General Strong directed me to include military observers’ reports with military attaché reports in tab A.
The reason that MO reports were included in here was because I was ordered to do so by General Strong. That is in the revision of the copy.

[12256] Senator Ferguson. You told us that had some importance to this investigation. Do you think so now?
Colonel Bratton. I think the document would be of interest and important to this committee; yes, sir.
Senator Ferguson. And important in solving the problem before it as to the intelligence that was given to the various departments out of your department?

Colonel Bratton. Well, if the committee is interested in what G–2 did, as well as what it did not do, this volume is very important.

Senator Ferguson. All right. Mr. Chairman, I move that we include this as an exhibit.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I would like to state in that connection that this very witness in a previous hearing said that it is far from complete.

Senator Ferguson. It will speak for itself on that.

Mr. Murphy. But the witness himself said so.

The Vice Chairman. Is there objection to Senator Ferguson’s request?

Mr. Kaufman. I am told that that volume is already a part of the Army Pearl Harbor Board report.

Senator Ferguson. If it is, why, we don’t want it duplicated.

Mr. Kaufman. And it is all being printed as an exhibit [12258] in that matter.

Senator Ferguson. All right, then it is an exhibit in that.

Mr. Kaufman. Yes.

The Vice Chairman. Do you withdraw your request, then?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. May I ask one question at this point, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Mr. Murphy. Were you present, Colonel, when General Marshall read those 37 pages and studied this index?

Colonel Bratton. No, sir.

Mr. Murphy. How do you know he drew these lines through there?

Colonel Bratton. To the best of my knowledge and belief, that is his handwriting.

Mr. Murphy. How do you know, sir? Those are just lines. How do you know that those are his lines up and down? Can you recognize his handwriting by lines up and down and waves across the page, is that what you mean? There are just pencil lines up and down and waves and can you recognize his handwriting as making those waves?

Colonel Bratton. Well, Mr. Murphy, I cannot state, of course, that the up and down lines and zig-zag lines were made [12259] by General Marshall.

Mr. Murphy. The other lines are vertical lines, just one after the other, and you can tell that is General Marshall’s handwriting?

Colonel Bratton. I examined the original document, however, on its return to General Strong by the Chief of Staff. It contained in addition two deletions by pencil of certain paragraphs and has marginal notes.

Mr. Murphy. Then that is not a true copy?

Colonel Bratton. In his handwriting.

Mr. Murphy. This is not a true copy then, is that it?

Colonel Bratton. This is a photograph of it.

Mr. Murphy. Is there anything in there in General Marshall’s handwriting? Everything I see are lines up and down, or waves, and
I am wondering how any handwriting expert in the world could identify who made them, even Osborne?

Colonel Bratton. Well, on page 32, for example, in the margin is written, “Singapore M. O.” I believe that to be in General Marshall’s handwriting. There are numerous comments on the margin all through the book which I believe, and General Strong also believed, to have been made by General Marshall in person.

Mr. Murphy. When did you talk to General Strong about it?

Colonel Bratton. Sir?

Mr. Murphy. When did General Strong tell you that?

Colonel Bratton. Upon the return of the volume, the original volume, to G-2 on or about the 26th of August 1943.

Mr. Murphy. All right.

The Vice Chairman. Anything else, Senator?

Senator Ferguson. I am not through. I just was waiting on the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Senator Lucas. Will the Senator yield while I ask a question?

Senator Ferguson. Yes, I will yield.

Senator Lucas. Colonel Bratton, where are you stationed at the present time?

Colonel Bratton. I am on temporary duty with the headquarters of the Army Service Forces awaiting the pleasure of this committee, sir. My permanent station, to which I shall proceed when released, is Headquarters, Western Pacific, now at Manila.

Senator Lucas. In other words, you will go to Manila as soon as the committee has finished with your testimony?

Colonel Bratton. I believe so; yes, sir.

Senator Lucas. You have been waiting for that trip for some time?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, you were talking about the higher levels on this intelligence. Do you remember that expression? There was a higher level on this intelligence, somebody else was handling it higher than you?

Colonel Bratton. Well, there was a joint intelligence committee that was a part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff installation set up some time in the summer of 1941.

Senator Ferguson. Did it ever function?

Colonel Bratton. To the best of my knowledge and belief it never functioned prior to Pearl Harbor.

Senator Ferguson. Were you greatly concerned and had some meetings with other members in the lower echelons about what information was getting out to our fronts?

Colonel Bratton. Will you repeat that question, sir?

Senator Ferguson. I say, were you greatly concerned and holding meetings or holding conferences with other members in your section and in the Navy in relation to what messages were getting out to the front or what information was getting out to our outposts?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, will you tell us what meetings or what conferences—I don’t suppose you call them meetings—what conferences you had with Army officers about getting intelligence out to the front? You know what I mean by “front” To Hawaii and the Philippines and to vari-
Colonel Bratton. What kind of intelligence, Senator?
Senator Ferguson. Well, any kind that you had any conferences about.

Colonel Bratton. We had a system by means of which we provided our overseas garrisons with encyclopedic intelligence on Japan, China, and various other Pacific countries, a system whereby they were provided with periodic combat estimates. The combat estimates were kept revised and brought up to date from time to time as the picture changed.

On special occasions, where time was important, we would send cables or telegrams to our overseas garrisons reporting the information that we thought they should receive. However, the restriction placed upon us by the Chief of Staff prevented me from transmitting any magic to overseas commanders or overseas G-2's.

Senator Ferguson. Now, I want to know when the restriction was placed on you by the Chief of Staff not to send any magic to the overseas theaters?

Colonel Bratton. I received orders from the Chief of Staff through General Miles sometime in August as to exactly who was to be given magic.

Senator Ferguson. And that has included what you gave us here and they were all in Washington?

[12265] Colonel Bratton. Sir?

Senator Ferguson. I say that included what you have already stated here and everyone was in Washington?

Colonel Bratton. Everyone was in Washington.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. Now, were there any civilians outside of the State Department that ever received any magic from you?

Colonel Bratton. Yes. The Secretary of War.

Senator Ferguson. Who else besides the Secretary of War?

Colonel Bratton. I believe that from time to time the Secretary showed some of this stuff to one or more of his civilian assistants, such as Mr. Bundy or one or more of his other assistants.

Senator Ferguson. Anyone outside of the Secretary of War's office?

Colonel Bratton. No, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now, you testified to this; I want to read it to you and ask you about it:

I managed to get General Miles to O.K. this message to G-2 in Hawaii because he and I both thought that we could get that message out without violating any of the policies that were in effect about getting concurrence from OPD.

What were you talking about?

[12264] Colonel Bratton. The message that went to Fielder directing him to get in touch with Rochefort.

Senator Ferguson. Yes; but what is this part, "Without violating any of the policies that were then in effect about getting concurrence from OPD"?

Colonel Bratton. At this time, and for some time previous thereto, we were operating under a limitation laid down upon us by OPD and approved by Chief of Staff, to the effect that we would not send any intelligence to overseas garrisons which might have tactical repercussions without the approval of the Operations Division.

Senator Ferguson. Give me an example of that.
Colonel Bratton. Well, we could not send an intelligence message to Hawaii, for example, that would have the effect of implementing their war plans without the approval of the Operations Division.

Senator Ferguson. Well, then, in other words, you could do nothing that would alert?

Colonel Bratton. Not without the approval of the Operations Division.

Senator Ferguson. That is what I mean. If it would in any way alert you could not send it out?

Colonel Bratton. That is correct, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you were a little fearful—

[12265] Colonel Bratton. If I had had authority to act upon this 1 p. m. delivery message I would have done so immediately upon its receipt. I wouldn’t have waited for General Marshall, General Gerow, or anybody else.

Senator Ferguson. Well, now, there were two restrictions placed on you, were there not?

Colonel Bratton. Yes.

Senator Ferguson. One that you could not send any magic. The other one—

Colonel Bratton. The other one was that we could send no intelligence out based upon magic and upon an Army code or cipher system because the Navy did not trust our systems and they objected to our sending this material out over the Army net for security reasons.

Senator Ferguson. Did you ever have authority to alert or to send anything that might alert?

Colonel Bratton. Not from the time that relations between the United States and Japan became serious or critical.

Senator Ferguson. Now, you were quite concerned about this one item, as to whether or not this Rochefort message would not violate this one rule, and you took a chance, you and who else? Who was the other man, Miles—and sent it out, is that correct?

Colonel Bratton. General Miles has testified that he had [12266] no such notion in his mind, of trying to get around or circumvent the Operations Division.

Senator Ferguson. But you did?

Colonel Bratton. Well, I wanted to get the message out, and in drafting it the way I did I felt that we were not violating the limitations imposed upon us, and I got General Miles to O. K. it.

Senator Ferguson. Now did you not testify that he felt as you did?

I still felt uneasy about this thing and went over in the Navy where I had a conference with Commander McCollum, the head of the Far Eastern Section. McCollum felt as I did, that further warning should be sent out and said that he was going to write one up and try to get the Chief of Naval Operations to dispatch it.

Colonel Bratton. And you heard Captain McCollum testify to that effect before you the other day.

Senator Ferguson. Yes. And you got this out because you got the approval of Miles.

Colonel Bratton. In that rather innocuous form, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. You were trying to convey that you had to put it in this innocuous form, as you describe it?
Colonel Bratton. I was trying to get Colonel, now General Fielder, in close personal touch with Captain Rochefort, who was the ONI No. 1 man in Hawaii, who knew everything that we did in Washington at that time, and I felt if I could get Fielder to go and talk to this Naval officer under any pretext whatsoever, that I would be accomplishing my purpose, which was to bring them closer together for an exchange of intelligence.

[12265] Senator Ferguson. Do you mean that part of your answer where you said he knew everything that you did?

Colonel Bratton. I was told that in almost those exact words by Captain McCollum, that Rochefort knew the situation between Japan and America practically as well as we did at that time.

Senator Ferguson. So you did not have any knowledge except what McCollum told you on that question?

Colonel Bratton. Well, I had to accept his say-so as to Rochefort’s knowledge.

Senator Ferguson. Now did you have any reason to believe that there was not close relation between Rochefort and Fielder?

Colonel Bratton. No, sir, but I wanted to make them as close as possible. I wanted them to get to sit in each other’s laps, if necessary.

Senator Ferguson. Because you really felt war was coming and you wanted them to be alerted?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now did you have knowledge as to where all the purple machines were?

Colonel Bratton. It was my understanding that there was one in the Philippines. There was not one in Hawaii. We had one in the SIS, and the Navy had one, I believe. The [12269] only other one in existence at that time had been, on orders of the Secretary of War, delivered to the British.

Senator Ferguson. That is all that you knew about?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Now do you know of anything else that you can add here that would enlighten in any way this committee on this problem as to how this could happen at Hawaii and we not be alerted to it? Have you got any memorandum or papers or information?

Colonel Bratton. Will you read that, please?

(The question was read by the reporter.)

Colonel Bratton. You mean as to how the attack could be delivered against Pearl Harbor and we not know about it beforehand?

Senator Ferguson. That they were not alerted to it.

Colonel Bratton. That they were not alerted to it?

Senator Ferguson. Or you were not alerted to it, either one or both.

Colonel Bratton. Well, Admiral Kimmel and General Short have both testified before this committee that if they had had all the information that Washington had they felt that they would have been better prepared for the attack when it came.

Mr. Richardson. Colonel, I do not think he is asking [12270] for your opinion, he is asking whether you have any more facts or any more papers.

Senator Ferguson. I am trying to cover this broad field, now that you do not even say “Well they did not ask me about that.”
Colonel Bratton. I have no documentary evidence to submit to you, sir, that you haven’t cognizance of already.

Senator Ferguson. Do you have any facts that you know about, whether it is in documents or not?

Colonel Bratton. No, sir; I cannot think of any at this time.

Senator Ferguson. Now there is one question in relation to your testimony. Which do you want the committee to take as the fact, what you said at the Grunert Board as to the delivery of the 13 parts to the Chief of Staff’s office on the 6th, or what you have testified here, that you did not make such a delivery?

Colonel Bratton. I think what I testified before the committee today is more nearly correct than the statement that I made to the Grunert Board, sir. It is my best recollection at the moment. I realize it is not a good recollection, but it is the best I can do.

Senator Ferguson. But your recollection, when you were before the Grunert Board, was as you stated it there?

[12271] Colonel Bratton. At that time that was my recollection. Right now I have the feeling that my testimony before the Grunert Board as to the delivery of those messages on Saturday night was erroneous.

Senator Ferguson. So, therefore, you want this committee to believe the statements that you are making now? Is that as I understand it?

Colonel Bratton. That I have made before the committee during the course of the day represents my best recollection on the matter.

Senator Ferguson. Can you point to any specific fact that caused you to change your testimony?

Colonel Bratton. It was a combination of facts, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Well, give them to us so we will know what they are.

Colonel Bratton. My subsequent recollection that Colonel Dusenbury was at work with me in the office that evening, I had not remembered that when I made my statements before the Grunert Board, and the affidavits of various officers stating that I did not make deliveries to them on Saturday evening, and my recollection of the telephone conversation with General Miles at about half-past eleven Saturday night, my subsequent conversations with Colonel Dusenbury, with whom I have talked here in Washington, my [12272] conversations with General Gerow, with whom I talked here in Washington, my conversations with General Miles before he appeared before the committee, all these have combined to lead me to the belief that the evidence that I have given before the committee today is my best recollection of the facts.

Senator Ferguson. That is all.

Mr. Chairman, I just want to say for the record Congressman Keefe, as I understood him today, indicated that he could not be here this evening, but he had some questions that he wanted to ask Colonel Bratton.

The Vice Chairman. Well, I will state that Senator Brewster stated to me awhile ago that he thought Mr. Keefe might have some questions. I went over and asked Mr. Gearhart, who, as you all know, sits next to Mr. Keefe, and asked him if he knew of any reason why Colonel Bratton should be held over to the morning. He said he did not. I
asked him if he thought Mr. Keefe was interested in asking him any questions, and he said he did not think so.

I asked him then if he thought it would be all right to get through with Colonel Bratton tonight, and he said yes.

Now that is the situation.

Mr. Gearhart. Congressman Keefe told me he could not be here tonight. He did not say anything about desiring to examine this witness further tomorrow. That is all I can say.

The Vice Chairman. I would have thought he might have said something to me, if he was interested, or certainly something to Mr. Gearhart. So that is the situation.

Colonel Bratton. I cannot get away. I cannot go anywhere tomorrow morning, Mr. Chairman. If you want me to be here, I will be glad to report to you any time you say.

The Vice Chairman. Let us do this, then: When we get through with you, Colonel, we will excuse you in the usual way, and I will proceed to swear the next witness that counsel calls. If Mr. Keefe wants to make the request that you be returned for questions, you will be available here in the morning?

Colonel Bratton. You want me to be here in the morning?

The Vice Chairman. Would it be convenient for you to be here in the morning?

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman. With that understanding, we will swear Colonel Sadler.

Mr. Murphy. Mr. Chairman, I have one question.

The Vice Chairman. Mr. Murphy.

Mr. Murphy. Colonel, I understand you to say that you knew about the 1 p.m. message at 9 o'clock on December 7. If you knew about the 1 o'clock message on December 7 at 9 o'clock, how do you explain the fact that you had no memorandum, no suggested message, nothing at all for General Marshall until such time as he read the message at 11:25, or 2 1/2 hours later? Neither you nor General Miles had any memorandum and no suggested warning messages.

Colonel Bratton. It was not the function of G-2 to prepare messages of that nature. Those were Operations messages.

Mr. Murphy. You mean you never drew suggestions before?

Colonel Bratton. Sir?

Mr. Murphy. You mean neither you nor General Miles drew suggestions before?

Colonel Bratton. Did we ever draw these suggestions before?

Mr. Murphy. Yes; messages; information messages before.

Colonel Bratton. Neither of us considered it necessary at the time, sir.

Mr. Murphy. You did not consider it necessary?

Colonel Bratton. No, sir.

Mr. Murphy. And yet you say here tonight that you expected an attack at 1 o'clock, and you did not consider any message necessary; is that it?

[12275] Colonel Bratton. No; I did not say that. If I did I wish to correct the statement, sir.
Mr. Murphy. I understood you to say that at 9 o'clock you expected an attack at 1 o'clock.

Colonel Bratton. Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Did you mean that?

Colonel Bratton. I expected an attack on some American installation at or shortly after 1 o'clock; yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. You and General Miles both said before the Grunert Board you expected an attack on Thailand, did you not?

Colonel Bratton. As the Japanese major effort we had been expecting for some days; yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy. Did you say at any time at all in your previous testimony before this very night that you expected an attack on an American possession at 1 o'clock?

Colonel Bratton. I told that to General Marshall when I saw him, sir, and I told that to General Miles.

Mr. Murphy. Did you ever tell any board before in any of your testimony? You heard me read what you said.

Colonel Bratton. I do not remember now, sir. When I saw this 1 o'clock message, as I have indicated, it told me that there was going to be an attack on an American installation at or shortly after 1 o'clock.

[12276] Mr. Murphy. It is your opinion, I take it, now, that you got in before 9 o'clock and you were not at the State Department at 10 o'clock that morning?

Colonel Bratton. Sir?

Mr. Murphy. It is still your opinion that you got in before 9 o'clock and you were not at the State Department at 10 o'clock that morning?

Colonel Bratton. No, I was not at the State Department at 10 o'clock that morning.

Mr. Murphy. That is all.

The Vice President. Does counsel have anything further?

Mr. Richardson. No.

The Vice Chairman. Colonel, we want to thank you for your appearance, the information you have given the committee, and your apparent desire to be helpful to this inquiry, and with the statement made a while ago, you will be present in the morning if convenient.

You will now be excused until the morning.

Colonel, would it be more convenient for you to be at the War Department subject to call here?

Colonel Bratton. I shall be here at any time you tell me, sir.1

The Vice Chairman. Colonel Sadtler, will you come forward, please, sir? Please be sworn.

[12277] TESTIMONY OF COL. OTIS K. SADTLER, SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

(Having been first duly sworn by the Vice Chairman.)

The Vice Chairman. You will please be here tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock.

There being nothing further, we will recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow.

(Whereupon, at 10:40 p. m., February 14, 1946, the committee recessed until 10 a. m. of the following day, Friday, February 15, 1946.)

Part 10—February 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946—follows.

1 Col. Bratton's testimony is resumed in Hearings, Part 10, p. 4607.