



# PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES

SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PURSUANT TO

# S. Con. Res. 27

(79th Congress)

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES RELATING THERETO

## PART 13

JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 7 AND 8

Printed for the use of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack





167

Pt. 13



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
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS \* D767

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 1946

.92 1946 Pt. 13

II. S. SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS

## SFP 23 1946

## JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

## ALBEN W. BARKLEY, Senator from Kentucky, Chairman

JERE COOPER, Representative from Tennessee, Vice Chairman

WALTER F. GEORGE, Senator from Georgia JOHN W. MURPHY, Representative from SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois **OWEN BREWSTER**, Senator from Maine HOMER FERGUSON, Senator from Michi-

Pennsylvania BERTRAND W. GEARHART, Representa-

tive from California

gan J. BAYARD CLARK, Representative from North Carolina

FRANK B. KEEFE, Representative from Wisconsin

### COUNSEL

### (Through January 14, 1946)

WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, General Counsel GERHARD A. GESELL, Chief Assistant Counsel JULE M. HANNAFORD, Assistant Counsel JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel

#### (After January 14, 1946)

SETH W. RICHARDSON, General Counsel SAMUEL H. KAUFMAN, Associate General Counsel JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel EDWARD P. MORGAN, Assistant Counsel LOGAN J. LANE, Assistant Counsel

II

## HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part No.	Pages	Transcript pages	Hearings
1	1 - 399	1- 1058	Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
<b>2</b>	401 - 982	1059- 2586	Nov. 23, 24, 26 to 30, Dec. 3 and 4, 1945.
3	983-1583	2587 - 4194	Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.
4	1585 - 2063	4195 - 5460	Dec. 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.
5	2065 - 2492	5461 - 6646	Dec. 31, 1945, and Jan. 2, 3, 4, and 5, 1946.
6	2493 - 2920	6647 - 7888	Jan. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, and 21, 1946.
7	2921 - 3378	7889- 9107	Jan. 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, and 29, 1946.
8	3379-3927	9108-10517	Jan. 30, 31, Feb. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6, 1946.
9	3929 - 4599	10518-12277	Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.
10	4601-5151	12278 - 13708	Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.
11	5153 - 5560	13709-14765	Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.

## EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Part	
No.	Exhibits Nos.
12	1 through 6.
13	7 and 8.
14	9 through 43.
15	44 through 87.
16	88 through 110.
17	111 through 128.
18	129 through 156.
19	157 through 172.
20	173 through 179.
21	180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.
22 through 25	Roberts Commission Proceedings.
26	Hart Inquiry Proceedings.
	Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.
32 through 33	Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.
34	Clarke Investigation Proceedings.
35	Clausen Investigation Proceedings.
36 through 38	Hewitt Inquiry Proceedings.
39	Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board,
	Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorse-
	ments.

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INDEX OF EXHIBITS	Description	Selection of intercepted diplomatic messages sent and received by the Japanese Government and its foreign establishments between July 1 and Dec. 8, 1941.	Selection of intercepted messages sent and received by the Japanese Government and its foreign estab- lishments between Dec. 2, 1940, and Dec. 8, 1941, concerning military installations, ships movements, espionage reports, etc.	Navy Department dispatch No. 252203 dated Nov. 25, 1941, directing the routing of trans-Pacific shipping through Torres Straits.	Chart showing plotting record of early plane flights Dec. 7, 1941, obtained by Opana Radar Detector Station.	Army compilation of documents, tables, photographs, and maps offered by Colonel Thielen as illustrating his narrative statement.	Navy compilation of documents, tables, photography, and maps offered by Admiral Inglis as illustrating his narrative statement.	Photostatic copy of Opana Radar Detector Station plot, submitted by Senator Ferguson, identified by Admiral Inglis, previously marked "Exhibit 3-B in evidence" in proceedings before Army Pearl Harbor Board.	Material obtained by Army and Navy primarily from Japanese sources, relating to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)	Report dated Nov. 29, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.	Report dated Nov. 29, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.	Report dated Dec. 4, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.
	Exhibits page No.	1	254	317	318	318	337	391	391	413	415	424
	Hearings, page and date intro- duced	$23 \\ 11-15-45$	$24\\11-15-45$	$87\\11-16-45$	$142\\11-16-45$	$153 \\ 11-16-45$	$153 \\ 11-16-45$	$172 \\ 11-17-45$	$233 \\ 11-19-45$	$1792 \\ 12-18-45$	$1792 \\ 12-18-45$	1792 12-18-45
-	Exhibit No.	1	2	3	4	5		77	8	8^A	8-B	<b>A</b> 8-C

Description	Report dated Dec. 13, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.	Selection of letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral J. O. Richardson, from Jan. 18, 1940, to Feb. 10, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)	Letter dated Jan. 24, 1941, from Secretary of Navy to Secretary of War regarding defenses of Pearl Harbor, and reply by Secretary of War, dated Feb. 7, 1941; letter from Adjutant General to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated Feb. 7, 1941, transmitting the above letters with instructions and receipt therefor.	Memorandum dated Oct. 16, 1940, from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Hart, concerning a proposed blockade of Japan in the event of aggressive action over the reopening of the Burma Road.	Letters from War Department and Navy Department with enclosures, dated Nov. 7, 1945, and Nov. 14, 1945, respectively, to Congressman Frank B. Keefe, concerning data on amounts requested by the services, amounts approved by the Bureau of the Budget, and contract authorizations for the years 1932 through 1941.	Study of the air situation in Hawaii dated Aug. 20, 1941, by Maj. Gen. F. L. Martin, Commanding General, Headquarters Hawaiian Air Force, for Commanding General, Army Air Forces, through Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.	Letter dated Apr. 14, 1941, from Assistant Adjutant General, Hawaiian Department to the Adjutant General, entitled "Air Defense of Pearl Harbor" in reply to letter of Feb. 7, 1941, on this subject (see exhibit No. 10); enclosing Annex No. 7 to Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Joint Estimate Hawaiian Air Force, and Patrol Wing 2 (Naval Base Defense Air Force), and Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Scenrity).	Dispatches from Ambassador Joseph E. Grew, Tokyo, to Department of State, dated Jan. 27, 1941, Nov. 3, 1941, and Nov. 17, 1941; memorandum dated Feb. 1, 1941 from Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Pacifie Fleet, advising him of contents of above message dated Jan. 27, 1941, which reported Japan would make surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in event of trouble with United States.
Exhibits page No.	425	923	1000	1006	1013	1019	1040	1042
Hearings, page and date intro- duced	$2480 \\ 1-5-46$	$\begin{array}{c} 256\\ 11\text{-}19\text{-}45\end{array}$	$279\\11-20-45$	$319 \\ 11-21-45$	363 11-21-45	387 11-21-45	397 11 -21-45	401 11-23-45
Exhibit No.	8-D		10	11	12	13	14-	15

<ul> <li>(a) Memorandum "Estimate Concerning Far Eastern Situation", dated Nov. 5, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark;</li> <li>(b) Minutes of The Joint Board for Nov. 3, 1941;</li> <li>(c) Memorandum "Far Eastern Situation" dated Nov. 3, 1941, for General Marshall by General Gerow.</li> </ul>	Undated note from President Roosevelt to Secretary Hull, attached to letter dated Oct. 30, 1941, from Secretary Morgenthau to the President, transmitting a message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.	Message dated Nov. 7, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, delivered through the Department of State.	Memorandum "Far Eastern Situation" dated Nov. 27, 1941, for the Fresident, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark.	Documents relating to proposed "Modus Vivendi," including Secretary Hull's recommendation dated Nov. 26, 1941, to President Roosevelt. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit).	Memorandum dated Nov. 29, 1941, by Secretary Hull for the President, and attached draft of a proposed message from the President to Congress, and proposed message from President to Emperor of Japan.	Message dated Dec. 6, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Emperor of Japan, and related documents, including draft of proposed message dated Oct. 17, 1941.	Two dispatches dated Dec. 6, 1941, from Ambassador Winant, London, to State Department; memo- randum of conversation dated Nov. 30, 1941, between Secretary Hull and British Ambassador, with attached memorandum; memorandum handed to Mr. Hornbeck by Netherlands Minister on Nov. 21, 1941; dispatch from Secretary of State to United States Consul, Manila, P. I., dated Nov. 29, 1941. All documents concern intelligence information relating to Japanese military and naval units in the Far East.	<ul> <li>(a) British draft, dated Aug. 10, 1941, of proposed parallel communications to Japanese Government;</li> <li>(b) Two messages from the President (at Atlantic Conference) to Secretary Hull, Nos. 121645 and 160115;</li> <li>(c) Draft, dated Aug. 15, 1941 (not used), of proposed communication to the Japanese Ambassador brought to State Department by Sumner Welles following (Atlantic) conference between the President and British Prime Minister.</li> </ul>	Revised draft (not used), dated Aug. 16, 1941, of draft dated Aug. 15, 1941 ((c) above), of proposed statement to the Japanese Ambassador, prepared by Summer Welles. (See p. 556, vol. 11, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931–1941, Joint Committee Exhibit No. 29, for text of statement made to Japanese Ambassador by the President on Aug. 17, 1941.)
1061	1077	1081	1083	1084	1201	1226	1246	1252	1262
401 11-23-45	3839 2-6-46	$\frac{4341}{2-13-46}$	$\begin{array}{c} 402 \\ 11-23-45 \end{array}$	$^{402}_{11-23-45}$	$402 \\ 11-23-45$	$402 \\ 11-23-45$	$402 \\ 11-23-45$	458 11-23-45	$12-15-45 \\ 2065 \\ 12-31-45 \\ 12-31-55 \\ 12$
16	16-A.	16-B	17	18	19	20	21	22	22-A

L

-	Exhibit No. Hearings, page Exhibits and date intro-page No.	22-B 1783 1269 Memorandum, dated Aug. 10, 1941, pre 12-18-45 Atlantic Conference with Prime Minis parallel action with reference to Japan	22-C 1783 1275 Memorandum, dated Aug. 11, 1941, 12-18-45 Atlantic Conference between Preside Sir Alexander Cadogan, and Harry F	22-D 1783 1292 Memorandum, dated Aug. 11, 1941, of 12-18-45 concerning "British-American Coop conversation with the President.	23 476 1300 Message, dated Nov. 26, 1941, from P 11-24-45 Ambassador Winant.	24 476 1300 Message, dated Nov. 30, 1941, from P 11-24-45 Ambassador Winant.	25 574 1301 Dispatch, dated Dec. 1, 1941, from An in Japan to the Secretary's proposal to 770, vol. II, Foreign Relations of 1941, to the Japanese Government.	26 634 1303 Dispatch, dated Sept. 24, 1940, from 11-27-45 general policy toward Japan (so-calle	27     670     1315     "Peace and War, United States Foreign Department of State Publication 1853	28 670 1315 "Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 11-27-45 1943), Department of State Publication 1983	29 670 1315 "Foreign Relations of the United Sta 11-27-45 State Publication 2008.	30 670 1315 "Ten Years in Japan", by Joseph C. G
	Description	Memorandum, dated Aug. 10, 1941, prepared by Sumner Wells of his conversations that date at the Atlantic Conference with Prime Minister Churchill and Sir Alexander Cadogan, concerning proposed parallel action with reference to Japan.	Memorandum, dated Aug. 11, 1941, prepared by Sumner Welles, of conversations that date at the Atlantic Conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, attended by Welles, Sir Alexander Cadogan, and Harry Hopkins concerning "British-American Cooperation".	Memorandum, dated Aug. 11, 1941, of conversation between Sumner Welles and Sir Alexander Cadogan, concerning "British-American Cooperation" at the Atlantic Conference, and Welles' subsequent conversation with the President.	Message, dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, transmitted by Ambassador Winant.	Message, dated Nov. 30, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, transmitted by Ambassador Winant.	Dispatch, dated Dec. 1, 1941, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to Secretary of State, reporting reaction in Japan to the Secretary's proposal of Nov. 26, 1941 (the so-called Ten-Point Note). See pp. 766 to 770, vol. II, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931–1941, for proposal dated Nov. 26, 1941, to the Japanese Government.	Dispatch, dated Sept. 24, 1940, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to Department of State concerning general policy toward Japan (so-called "green light" dispatch).	"Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941", Introduction (pamphlet edition, 1942), Department of State Publication 1853.	"Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941", Introduction and Documents (cloth edition, 1943), Department of State Publication 1983.	"Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1931-1941", vols. I and II (1943), Department of State Publication 2008.	"Ten Years in Japan", by Joseph C. Grew, Simon and Schuster (1944).

16 Six dispatches bearing various dates from April 4 to Dec. 2, 1941, from United States diplomatic officials in foreign countries reporting to the Department of State inquiries and comments of Japanese repre- sentatives in those countries concerning possible break in United States-Japanese relations.	26 Selection of messages between War Department and Hawaiian Department from July 8 to Dec. 7, 1941. Included are certain messages sent by the War Department to the Western Defense Command, to General MacArthur in the Philippines, and to Commanding General, Panama, as well as their replies. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)	34 Selection of Military Intelligence Estimates prepared by G-2, War Department, Washington, D. C., covering period July 7 to Dec. 6, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)	85 Secretary of War's copy of memorandum, dated Oct. 2, 1941, from Col. Hayes A. Kroner to the Chief of Staff, concerning "Japanese-American Relations", bearing note in handwriting of Secretary Stimson.	89 Memorandum, dated Oct. 18, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, for Chief of Staff, concerning "Resignation of Japanese Cabinet" and proposed message to Army outpost commanders.	90 Memorandum, dated Jan. 31, 1942, prepared by Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, concerning "Warnings Sent to Hawaii Prior to Dec. 7, 1941", with enclosures.	93 Photostatic copy of draft of General Marshall's message of Nov. 27, 1941, to General Short, containing phrase "hostile action possible at any moment", which draft contains a sentence that did not appear in the message as transmitted to General Short. (See Exhibit No. 32 for message sent.)	1395 Selection of dispatches sent and received by the Navy Department entitled "Basic Exhibit of Dispatches". (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)	1409 Paraphrase of message, dated Dec. 3, 1941, from General Miles to Military Attaché, Tokyo, concerning the handling of his codes and secret documents.	1409 Memoranda for the record on events of Dec. 7, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff; Col. W. B. Smith, Secretary, General Staff; Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2; Col. J. R. Deane, Secret ry, General Staff.	1412 Dispatch, dated Dec. 7, 1941, from CinCAF to OPNAV (Ø70645) concerning report of promised armed support to British under certain conditions.	1413 Information from documentary evidence on interception, decoding, and translating of Japanese messages Nos. 901, 902, 907, 910 (so-called pilot message, 14 part message, 1 o'clock delivery message, and code
1316	1326	1334	1385	1389	1390	1393	136	14(	14(	14]	141
737 11-28-45	778 11-29-45	$\frac{778}{11-29-45}$	$2092 \\ 12 - 31 - 45$	$\begin{array}{c} 825\\11-30-45\end{array}$	$\substack{828\\11-30-45}$	$830 \\ 11-30-45$	$839\\11-30-45$	$841 \\ 11-30-45$	$928\\12-4-45$	$954 \\ 12 - 4 - 45$	$988 \\ 12-5-45$
31	32	33	33-A	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41

Description	Copy of Army Regulation No. 10-15, dated Aug. 18, 1936, with amendments up to Dec. 7, 1941, entitled "General Staff—Organization and Duties".	Instructions dated Jan. 27, 1941, of Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff concerning staff conver- stions to be held with representatives of British Commonwealth.	Compilation entitled "Copies of Defense Plans", which contains extracts from various basic Army and Navy plans, to illustrate defensive measures contemplated against air attack. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)	Memorandum, dated Nov. 27, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, for the Chief of Staff, concerning "Far Eastern Situation" and warning messages to outpost commanders.	Photostatic copies of replies by General MacArthur and General Short to warning messages of Nov. 27, 1941, with routing slip.	Supplementary documents concerning the Nov. 5, 1941 Marshall-Stark memorandum for the President (see Exhibit No. 16), including dispatch dated Nov. 3, 1941, from Ambassador Gauss to State Department; message dated Nov. 2, 1941, from Chiang Kai-Shek to President Roosevelt; memorandum for Director of Naval Intelligence concerning "Dispatch from Alusna, Chungking, 300850"; dispatch 300856 from Alusna, Chungking, to OPNAV dated Oct. 30, 1941, and another same date, same correspondents; message dated Oct. 28, 1941, from General Magruder, Chungking, to War Department.	Two memoranda dated Nov. 17, 1941, by Brig. General Gerow, for the Chief of Staff, concerning "Method of Coordination of Command in Coastal Frontiers", and letter dated Dec. 20, 1941, to Gen. Delos C. Emmons, from General Marshall, concerning unity of command in Hawaii.	Memorandum, dated Dec. 5, 1941, from General Marshall for General Gerow, concerning coordination of command.	Report dated Mar. 27, 1941, of United States-British Staff conversations (ABC-1).	Report of American-Dutch-British Staff conversations at Singapore, dated Apr. 27, 1941 (A. D. B.).
Exhibits page No.	1416	1422	1423	1471	1472	1476	1481	1484	1485	1551
Hearings, page and date intro- duced	$990 \\ 12-5-45$	$997 \\ 12-5-45$	$1001 \\ 12-5-45$	$1019 \\ 12-5-45$	1027 12-5-45	1041 12-5-45	$1044 \\ 12-5-45$	2093 12 $-31-45$	$\begin{array}{c} 1053\\ 12-6-45\end{array}$	1053 12-6-45
Exhibit No.	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	48-A	49	50

1585   Report entitled "Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defense Plan No. 2" (ABC-22).	23 Compilation of communications between the War Department and General Herron at Hawaii, con- cerning 1940 alert of Hawaiian Department. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)	00 Compilation of correspondence between General Marshall and General Short from Feb. 7 to Oct. 28, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)	27 "Notes on General Council Meeting", Feb. 19, 1941, concerning "Defense Objectives" (revised Feb. 13, 1941).	28 Minutes of "Conference in the Office of the Chief of Staff", on Feb. 25, 1941, at which air defense of Pearl Harbor was discussed.	30 Memorandum, dated May 13, 1941, concerning "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft, Hawaiian Department" by Brig. Gen. Harry J. Malony, for the Chief of Staff.	Minutes of "Conference in the Office of the Secretary of War, May 19, 1941", concerning use of planes in proposed expedition against Martinique, referring to supply of B-17 bombers that were not dispatched to Hawaii.	22 List of President's appointments with military representatives from Oct. 1 to Dec. 7, 1941; telephone calls through White House switchboard on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941; White House dinner guests on Dec. 6, 1941; list of President's appointments on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)	35 General Marshall's aide memoire to the President concerning "Defense of Hawaii".	36 General Marshall's memorandum for the President concerning "Ground Forces".	40 Photostatic copy of Dec. 7, 1941, warning sent by General Marshall to theater commanders.	11 Minutes of The Joint Board meeting, Nov. 26, 1941, at which the situation in the Pacific was discussed.	14 Top Secret Report, Army Pearl Harbor Board, and Top Secret Memorandum of Judge Advocate General in connection therewith.
158	1593	1600	1627	1628	1630	1631	1632	1635	1636	1640	1641	1644
1053 12-6-45	$1053 \\ 12-6-45$	1063 12-6-45	1067 12-6-45	1067 12-6-45	$1076 \\ 12-6-45$	1077 12-6-45	$\begin{array}{c} 1088\\ 12-6-45\end{array}$	$1092 \\ 12-6-45$	$1094 \\ 12-6-45$	$1112 \\ 12-7-45$	$1284 \\ 12-10-45$	1345 12-11-45
51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63

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Description	Tentative draft of Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, 1941.	Memorandum, dated July 3, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, to Special Navy and Army Observers, London, instructing them to advise British that United States disapproves A. D. B. Report for reasons stated.	Dispatch, dated Dec. 6, 1941 (061255), from CinCAF to OPNAV, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941, by R. E. Schuirmann, for the State Department, relating contents of the dispatch which reported the sighting of Japanese convoys in Far Eastern waters.	Intercepted messages, dated Aug. 17, 1941, from Japanese Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Gov- ermment, repeating the material handed him that date by President Roosevelt after the President's return from the Atlantic Conference (so-called "parallel action message").	Log of U. S. S. Boise for period Nov. 25 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and map showing position of the ship on certain dates.	Table showing scheduled inspections of ships at Pearl Harbor during October, November and December 1941.	Message, dated Aug. 18, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, concerning the President's statements to the Japanese Ambassador on Aug. 17, 1941.	Message, dated Aug. 25, 1941, from State Department to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, quoting an extract from radio address, of Prime Minister Churchill on Aug. 24, 1941. The extract refers to Japanese policies.	Dispatch dated Aug. 1, 1941, from State Department to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, and the Ambassa- dor's reply dated Aug. 2, 1941; both concerning the report of Japanese aggression against Thailand; digest of Secretary of State's news conference on Aug. 6, 1941, when he was questioned concerning	reports of Japanese aggression against Thailand. Three State Department drafts, all dated Oct. 16, 1941, of a proposed message from the President to the Emperor of Japan, and a memorandum expressing views of officers in the Far Eastern Division of State Department on the matter. No message was sent to the Emperor at that time (fall of the Konoye cabinet in Japan).
Exhibits page No.	1645	1677	1680	1682	1689	1715	1716	1719	1721	1727
Hearings, page and date intro- duced	$1544 \\ 12-13-45$	$\begin{array}{c} 1541 \\ 12 - 13 - 45 \end{array}$	1642 12-15-45	$1642 \\ 12-15-45$	$\begin{array}{c} 1675\\ 12{-}15{-}45\end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c}1677\\12{-}15{-}45\end{array}$	$\begin{array}{c} 1695\\ 12 \\ -15 \\ -45\end{array}$	$1696 \\ 12-15-45$	$\substack{1696\\12-15-45}$	$1700 \\ 12-15-45$
Exhibit No.	64	65			68	69	02	71	72	73

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Three messages from State Department to Far Eastern offices, advising American citizens to leave the Orient, dated Oct. 6, 1940, Feb. 11, 1941, and Nov. 19, 1941.	Memorandum, dated Dec. 4, 1941, from Far Eastern Affairs Division officers to the Secretary of State concerning British suggestion on exchange of nationals with Japanese Government in event of hostilities.	Three messages, all dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Secretary Hull to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, explaining the delivery of the so-called "Ten Point Note" on that date to the Japanese Ambassadors and their oral comments upon its receipt, and furnishing Ambassador Grew with the text of the note.	Translation of notes regarding discussion between Adolf Hitler, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, State Minister Meissner, and Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin, Apr. 4, 1941, as introduced at the Nuremberg trials on Nov. 23, 1945.	Message, dated Aug. 31, 1940, from United States Embassy. Peiping, China, to State Department presenting summary of situation in Japan and Manchuria as prepared by A. T. Steele, correspondent for Chicago Daily News, which summary is referred to in Ambassador Grew's message dated Sept. 12, 1940 (Joint Committee Exhibit No. 26), his so-called "green light" dispatch.	Navy dispatches concerning "Kra Peninsula Alert (1941)". (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)	Navy dispatches concerning Netherlands East Indies Alert (1941). (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)	Office of Naval Intelligence "Fortnightly Summary of Current National Situations" dated Nov. 1, Nov. 15, and Dec. 1, 1941.	Selection of Office of Naval Intelligence periodic estimates and memoranda dated from Apr. 17 to Dec. 6, 1941.	Navy Regulations concerning Duties of Intelligence Division (OP-16).	Message, dated Dec. 3, 1941 (\$31850), from OPNAV to CinCAF, CinPAC, COM 14, and COM 16, advising them of instructions Japanese sent on Dec. 2, 1941, to certain consular and diplomatic posts to destroy most of their codes and secret documents.	Transcript of telephone call on Dec. 3, 1941, between Japanese citizen in Honolulu and person in Tokyo (so-called "Mori telephone call").
1.735	1741	1744	1754	1757	1768	1770	1774	1837	1864	1866	1867
1703 12-15-45	2768 1-19-46	1705 12-15-45	1709 11-15-45	$1712 \\ 12-15-45$	$1724 \\ 12-17-45$	1724 12-17-45	1724 12-17-45	1724 12-17-45	1728 12-17-45	$1754 \\ 12-17-45$	1775 12-17-45
74	74-A	75	26	12	78	62	80	81	82	83	84

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date intro- duced	Exhibits page No.	Description
85	$1799 \\ 12-18-45$	1870	Selection of Navy Department memoranda reporting Japanese fleet locations during period Nov. 4 through Dec. 3, 1941.
868	$1825 \\ 12-18-45$	1901	Tabulation showing Naval combatant strength of the Axis and Allied Powers as of May 1, 1941, and Dec. 7, 1941, in both Atlantic and Pacific Ocean areas.
87	$1889 \\ 12-19-45$	1907	Memorandum, dated Dec. 15, 1945, prepared by Maj. Gen. George V. Strong, concerning "Alert of Panama and Hawaiian Departments on June 17, 1940", with attached documents referred to therein.
88	$\begin{array}{c}1912\\12-19-45\end{array}$	1937	Sections of document "Organization of the Office of Naval Operations, Oct. 23, 1940", concerning duties of "War Plans Division (OP-12)".
89	$1938\\12-20-45$	1937	Memorandum prepared by Gen. L. T. Gerow, regarding the respective responsibilities of the Army and Navy "For Defense Against Air Attack in Hawaii".
90	$2066 \\ 12 - 31 - 45$	1941	Dispatch dated Dec. 18, 1941, from the State Department to the American Legation, Bern, Switzerland, concerning Swiss Government's offer to represent American interest in Japanese-occupied territories, and instructions for closing of diplomatic stations under certain emergencies.
91	2067 $12-31-45$	1950	Dispatches dated Dec. 15, 1941 (2), Feb. 16, 1942, and Mar. 25, 1942, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to State Department, relating action taken in Tokyo to destroy codes, ciphers, and confidential papers and records after outbreak of hostilities.
92	2068 12 $-31-45$	1960	Photostatic copy of pp. 591 to 618, vol. 377, Official Reports of the Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, containing statement by Prime Minister Churchill before the House of Commons on Jan. 27, 1942.
93	$2075 \\ 12-31-45$	1974	Photostatic copy of p. 2, G-2 Record Section Register of Incoming Cables on Dec. 5, 1941.
94	$2078 \\ 12-31-45$	1975	3 intercepted messages dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Government, transmitting the so-called "Ten Point Note" which was handed to the Japanese Ambassador by Secretary Hull on that date.
95	$2091 \\ 12-31-45$	1987	Memoranda dated July 12, 1940, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, concerning his conversation with Admiral J. O. Richardson on July 11, 1940, and a handwritten note by Admiral H. R. Stark.

Memorandum dated July 16, 1940, and study "Reflections on Certain Features of the Far Eastern Situation and certain problems of United States Far Eastern Policy, July 4, 1940", attributed to Stanley K. Hornbeck.	Memorandum dated Sept. 21, 1940, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, for Under Secretary Sumner Welles, con- cerning a Navy proposal for execution of a fleet problem involving simulated attack on the Panama Canal during January 1941, and three related memoranda.	Memorandum dated Nov. 26, 1941, by Secretary Stinson for the President concerning "Japanese Convoy Movement Toward IAdo-China".	Memorandum dated Sept. 26, 1944, prepared by J. W. Ballantine and M. M. Hamilton, relating their recollection of the delivery of intercepted Japanese messages to Secretary Hull's office by Lieutenant Commander Kramer on the morning of Dec. 7, 1941.	Transcript of Interrogation on Dec. 8, 1941, of (Japanese) Prisoner of War No. 1, by Naval Intelligence officers at Honolulu, statement by the prisoner, and memorandum concerning "Investigation of Japanese Submarine Aground in Waimanalo Bay".	Log of U. S. S. <i>Ruterprise</i> from Nov. 24 to Dec. 16, 1941, inclusive.	Log of U. S. S. <i>Lexington</i> from Dec. 5 to Dec. 8, 1941, inclusive.	"Report of Action With Japanese Air Force at Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941", by Commander, <i>Euterprise</i> Air Group to his Commanding Officer, dated Dec. 15, 1941.	"U. S. S. Lexington War Diary" for period Dec. 7 to Dec. 25, 1941, inclusive.	Certain estimates of Japanese Situation and Intentions as made by British agencies and relayed to this Government during period from Oct. 21, to Nov. 22, 1941.	Compilation of letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral H. E. Kimmel from Jan. 13 to Dec. 12, 1941.	"Appendix to Narrative Statement of Evidence at Pearl Harbor Investigations", prepared by Navy Department. It contains endorsements by Secretary James Forrestal, Judge Advocate General, Admiral T. L. Gateh, and Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, to the Hewitt Report, and endorsements by the same officials to the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry's Findings of Fact.
1989	2007	2014	2015	2016	2023	2107	2118	2122	2140	2144	2258
2091 12-31-45	2091 / 12-31-45	$\begin{array}{c} 2093 \\ 12-31-45 \end{array}$	$2094 \\ 12 - 31 - 45$	$2095 \\ 12 - 31 - 45$	$2095 \\ 12-31-45$	$2095 \\ 12-31-45$	$2095 \\ 12-31-45$	$2095 \\ 12-31-45$	$2096 \\ 12 - 31 - 45$	$2096 \\ 12-31-45$	2349 1-4-46
96	677	98	66	100	101	102	103	104	105	106	107

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date intro- duced	Exhibits page No.	Description
107-A	$2479 \\ 1-5-46$	2393	"The Findings, Conclusions and Action by the Secretary of the Navy", including the Fourth Endorse- ment by Secretary Forrestal to the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry, and a summary of an offer by the Navy Department of a General Court Martial for Rear Adm. H. E. Kimmel.
108	2364 1-4-46	2432	Memorandum, dated Nov. 2, 1944, by Stanley K. Hornbeck attached to his memorandum of Feb. 28, 1944, which related to an attached third memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck dated Nov. 27, 1941, entitled "Problem of Far Eastern Relations. Estimate of situation and certain probabilities", described by him as "a memorandum regarding the contents of which there have been leaks and misrepresentation".
109	$2476 \\ 1-5-46$	2444	Guide to Symbols, and series of maps submitted by Admiral R. N. Turner, showing the location of ships Dec. 1 to 6, inclusive, 1941.
110	2477 1-5-46	2444	Compilation of letters from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral T. C. Hart, from Feb. 9, 1940, to Nov. 8, 1941.
111	$2495 \\ 1-15-46$	2457	Letter dated Dec. 5, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Mr. Wendell Willkie, concerning proposal from Australian Minister for Mr. Willkie to make a trip to Australia, together with related correspondence and memoranda.
112	$2496 \\ 1-15-46$	2458	Dispatches and other material referred to in footnotes to Admiral Kimmel's prepared statement before the Joint Committee. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
113	$2558 \\ 1-16-46$	2502	Letter, dated Aug. 13, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet Task Force Commanders, concerning Employment Schedules, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Second Quarter, Fiscal Year 1942, and attached Employment Schedules for Task Forces 1, 2, and 3.
113-A	2807 1-19-46	2532	Letter, dated Feb. 21, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet Commanders, concerning "Battle Organization and Condition Watches".
113-B	2807 1-19-46	2534	Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41, dated Oct. 31, 1941, concerning "Task Forces-Organization and Missions".
113-C	3449 1-31-46	2538	(a) Revised Employment Schedules of Task Force 9, submitted pursuant to Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41, together with documents which approve same; (b) Watch and Duty Schedules for Patrol Wing 2 (December 1941).

· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	2568 WPPac-46, and letters from Admiral Kimmel to his commanders, dated July 21 and July 25, 1941, promulgating WPPac-46, which is U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan-Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow 5).	Communications Intelligence Summaries concerning location of Japanese Fleet Units: (a) Fourteenth Naval District Summaries, dated Nov. 1 to Dec. 6, 1941; (b) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer Reports dated Oct. 27 to Dec. 2, 1941; (c) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Memorandum dated Dec. 1, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)	2672 Fourteenth Naval District "Communication Intelligence Summaries of Dec. 9 and 10, 1941, showing assumed Composition of Japanese Striking Force".	Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41, dated Nov. 27, 1941.	2700 Selection of correspondence of Admiral H. R. Stark, Admiral H. E. Kimmel, and others from Feb. 11, 1941, to Oct. 3, 1941, concerning anti-torpedo baffles for protection of ships in harbor against torpedo plane attacks.	2707 Selection of Army and Navy correspondence from Jan. 16, to Feb. 14, 1941, concerning the air defenses of the Hawaiian Islands.	2713 Letter dated Feb. 17, 1941, concerning "Maximum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area," from Gen. W. C. Short to his Commanders.	2714 Memoranda, dated Nov. 30 and Dec. 5, 1941, of Admiral Kimmel, entitled "Steps to be Taken in Case of American-Japanese War within Next Twenty-Four Hours".	2716 Radio Log of Bishop's Point Radio Station, Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941.	2721 (a) Memorandum dated Dec. 19, 1941, by Admiral Bellinger for Admiral Kimmel concerning "Avail- ability and Disposition of Patrol Planes on morning of Dec. 7, 1941"; (b) Compilation of dates on which Pearl Harbor Air Raid drills were held during 1941; (c) Report of Army-Navy Board dated Oct. 31, 1941, convened to prepare recommendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas, Hawaiian area.	2727 Statement by Admiral H. E. Kimmel and copies of correspondence submitted by him, concerning the circumstances of his retirement by the Navy Department, and related matters.	2735   Selected correspondence in June and August 1941 of Admiral H. E. Kimmel, Admiral C. C. Bloch, and
2558 1–16–46 2558 1–16–46 3449 1–31–46 3450 1–31–46 2559 1–16–46 2559 1–16–46 2559 1–16–46 2559 1–16–46 2559 1–16–46 2559 1–16–46 2559 1–16–46 2559 1–16–46 2559 1–16–46 2559 1–16–46 2559 1–16–46 2559 1–16–46 25559 1–16–46 25559 1–16–46 25559 1–16–46 25559 1–16–46 25558 1–16–46 25558 1–16–46 25558 1–16–46 25558 1–16–46 25558 1–16–46 25558 1–16–46 25558 1–16–46 25558 1–16–46 25559 1–16–66 25559 1–16–66 25559 1–16–66 25559 1–16–66 25559 1–16–66 25559 1–16–66 25559 1–16–66 25559 1–16–66 25559 255559 255559 25559 25559 25559 25559 255559 255559 255559 255559	25(	2601	26	2677	270	270	27	27	27	27:	27:	27:
	2558 1 $-16-46$	$2558 \\ 1-16-46$	$3449 \\ 1-31-46$	$3450 \\ 1-31-46$	2558 1-16-46	2559 1-16-46	$5015 \\ 2-20-46$	$2559 \\ 1-16-46$	$\begin{array}{c} \textbf{2559} \\ \textbf{1-16-46} \end{array}$	2559 1-16-46	$2561 \\ 1-16-46$	2588

Description	Selection of correspondence, memoranda, and dispatches concerning the proposed construction of a combined operating center for Army and Navy in Hawaii from Oct. 29, 1941, to Jan. 7, 1942.	Additional selection of correspondence and memoranda concerning Joint Operations Centers for Army and Navy from Oct. 17, 1941, to Jan. 10, 1942. (See also Exhibit No. 123.)	Intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages between Washington and Tokyo, dated Aug. 18 to Aug. 29, 1941, inclusive, concerning United States-Japanese negotiations and the United States note to Japan dated Aug. 17, 1941. These intercepted messages are additional to those published in Joint Committee Exhibit No. 1.	Log of the U. S. S. Wright from Nov. 27 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and chart of locations of the ship on Nov. 27 and Dec. 7, 1941.	(a) Navy Department General Order No. 143, dated Feb. 3, 1941, entitled "Organization of the Naval Forces of the United States"; (b) excerpts from Navy Regulations, setting forth the general duties of a Commander in Chief; (c) Pacific Fleet Staff Instructions (1941), dated July 14, 1941.	Correspondence, memoranda and dispatches concerning the aircraft situation in Hawaii after Dec. 7, 1941. (See also Exhibit No. 112, p. 77, for letter dated Jan. 7, 1942, by Admiral Nimitz on same subject.)	Selected correspondence relating to the proposed prosecution of Japanese consular agents in Hawaii, recommended by United States Attorney in Hawaii by letter dated June 4, 1941.	Navy Basic War Plan-Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46), and letter dated May 26, 1941, from Admiral H. R. Stark promulgating the plan.	Selection of memoranda and dispatches contained in files of State Department concerning Japanese and United States air recounsissance in Pacific prior to Dec. 7, 1941, including dispatch dated Nov. 29, 1941, from Ambassador Grew to State Department forwarding note from Japanese Government protesting reported flight of United States planes over Tiawan Nov. 20, 1941, and State Department's reply to Ambassador Grew.	Testimony of Admiral H. E. Kimmel before the Roberts Commission, Navy Court of Inquiry, and Army Pearl Harbor Board.
Exhibits page No.	2736	2743	2749	2801	2832	2867	2870	2875	2941	2943
Hearings, page and date intro- duced	$2588 \\ 1-16-46$	$5015 \\ 2-20-46$	$\begin{array}{c} 2674 \\ 1-17-46 \end{array}$	2678 1-17-46	$\begin{array}{c} 2767\\1-19-46\end{array}$	2768 1-19-46	$2768 \\ 1-19-46$	$2842 \\ 1-19-46$	2879 1-21-46	$2892 \\ 1-21-46$
Exhibit No.	123	123-A	124	125	126	127	128	129	130	131

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<ul> <li><sup>13</sup> Selected items obtained by War Department from General MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo (see pp. 7874–7877, Joint Committee Transcript):</li> <li>(a) Memorandum "Report on Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the American Ambassador, 7:30 a. m., Dec. 8, 1941";</li> <li>(b) Memorandum "Cist of Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the British Ambassador, 8:00 a. m., Dec. 8, 1941";</li> <li>(c) Memorandum written by one Matsumoto, Head of Treaty Bureau, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "On the Declaration of War against the United States and Great Britain-Meeting of Privy Council, Dec. 8, 1941."</li> </ul>	46 Additional selected items obtained by War Department from General MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo (see pp. 13662-13665 Joint Committee Trarscript): (a) Diplomatic messages between Tokyo and Washington which had not been completely intercepted, being Washington to Tokyo Nos. 881, 941, and Tokyo Circular Nos. 2288, 2313 and 2193; (b) Memoranda of three conversations on Aug. 19, 29 and 30, 1941, between German Ambassador Ott and Japanese Foreign Minister Toyoda and Vice-Minister Aman; (c) Memoranda dated Sept. 6 and 13, 1941, concerning basic conditions for a peace settlement between Japan and China; (d) Memorandum dated Nov. 26, 1941, summary of the progress of Japanese-American negotiations.	53 Statement by Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, of events and conditions leading up to the Japanese attacks Dec. 7, 1941, introduced at his request. Identical with exhibit he introduced before Roberts Com- mission and Army Pearl Harbor Board.	24 Dispatch dated Nov. 29, 1941, from War Department to Gen. W. C. Short, concerning reinforcement of advance Pacific bases, and five charts and Bureau of the Census publication on the Population charac- teristics of Hawaii used by General Short in his prepared statement before the Joint Committee.	71 Compiled summary of evidence concerning time of sending and receipt of War Department warning messages of Nov. 27-28, 1941, and replies thereto, together with photostatic copies of the messages.	37 Memorandum dated Nov. 14, 1941, by Lt. Col. C. A. Powell, Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, concerning operation of radar equipment during recent military exercises, and attached transmitting memorandum for Special Assistant to Secretary of War.	Four original reports concerning training and operations time schedules of radar stations, Hawaiian Department, from Nov. 27 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and related material.	Photostatic copy of memorandum bearing approval of Gen. W. C. Short of report prepared by Gen. F. L. Martin dated Aug. 20, 1941, entitled "Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii". (See Joint Committee Exhibit No. 13.)
2943	2946	2953	3124	3171	3187	3187	3195
2917 1-21-46	5137 2-20-46	$2965 \\ 1-23-46$	2965 1-23-46	$2965 \\ 1-23-46$	2966 1-23-46	$2966 \\ 1-23-46$	2976 1-23-46
132	132-A	133	134	135	136	137	138

Exhibits page No.	3196 Two reports dated Oct. 17 and 25, 1941, entitled "G-2 Estimate of International (Japanese) Situation" by Lt. Col. G. W. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, Hawaiian Department.	3203 Selection of memoranda by the Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Judge Advocate General, including proposed charges against Maj. Gen. W. C. Short, retired, prepared by the office of the Judge Advocate General, and related material.	3254 File of Capt. E. M. Zacharias, U. S. Navy, entitled "Notes, Correspondence, and Reports Relating to Pearl Harbor and Events Leading Up to It".	3302 Compilation of Material Relating to so-called "Winds" code. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)	3318 (a) Memorandum dated Dec. 5, 1941, concerning interception by Portland F. C. C. station of Japanese Weather Broadcast; (b) Federal Communications Commission, Radio Intelligence Division, Night Watch Log for Nov. 24 to Dec. 8, 1941, inclusive.	3321 Additional material concerning translation of Circular No. 2494, from Tokyo, dated Dec. 7, 1941 (see p. 251, Exhibit No. 1), subsequent to the original translation.	3322 Letter dated Feb. 4, 1946, from State Department to Committee Counsel enclosing paraphrases of three messages, two from London dated Dec. 15, 1945 and Jan. 31, 1946, and one from The Hague, dated Jan. 26, 1946, regarding the so-called "winds" messages, indicating no interception by the British or Dutch Governments of a "winds execute" message prior to Dec. 8, 1941.	3323 Material from Hawaiian office, Federal Communications Commission, concerning the so-called "winds" code.	3332 Proceedings of the Roberts Commission appointed Dec. 18, 1942, by the President. (See Parts Nos. 22 through 25.)	3332 Proceedings of the Inquiry conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, retired, pursuant to precept dated Feb. 12, 1944, of the Secretary of the Navy. (See Part No. 26.)	3332 Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, convened by the Secretary of War pursuant to the pro-
Hearings, page 1 and date intro- duced	$3006 \\ 1-23-46$	$3188 \\ 1-26-46$	$3311 \\ 1-28-46$	$3324 \\ 1-29-46$	$3324 \\ 1-29-46$	3674 2-4-46	3741 2-5-46	$3780 \\ 2-5-46$	$3929 \\ 2^{-7-46}$	$3929 \\ 2^{-7-46}$	3929
Exhibit No.	139	140	141	142	142-A	142-B	142-C	142-D	143	144	145

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Proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry, convened by the Secretary of the Navy pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Cong., approved June 13, 1944. (See Parts Nos. 32 and 33.)	Proceedings of Investigation conducted by Col. Carter W. Clarke, U. S. Army, Sept. 14, 15, and 16, 1944, and continued from July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945. (See Part No. 34.)	Report of Investigation during the period Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945, conducted by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, A. U. S., for the Secretary of War, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. (See Part No. 35.)	Proceedings of the inquiry conducted by Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt, U. S. N., pursuant to precept dated May 2, 1945, of the Secretary of the Navy, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry. (See Parts Nos. 36 through 38.)	Letter dated Mar. 18, 1944, from Admiral H. E. Kimmel, retired, to Admiral W. F. Halsey, suggesting questions for Comdr. A. D. Kramer concerning the so-called "winds" message.	Six memoranda prepared by Capt. I. F. Safford, U. S. Navy, during May, June, and July, 1945 in con- nection with the inquiry conducted by Admiral H. K. Hewitt, concerning intercepted Japanese mes- sages. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)	Memorandum dated Dec. 23, 1941, "General Observations of Damage by Projectiles in the City of Hono- lulu on Dec. 7, 1941", prepared by employees of the Honolulu Board of Water Supply, and a map of the city of Honolulu, T. H., showing points struck by projectiles, Dec. 7, 1941.	Prepared statement dated Dec. 1, 1945 entitled "The War Record of Civilian and Industrial Hawaii", with attached Exhibits, submitted to the Joint Committee by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Associ- ation.	Compilation of selected correspondence between Gen. H. H. Arnold and Gen. F. L. Martin from Aug. 15 to Nov. 27, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)	Original Radar Plot of Detector Station OPANA, Dec. 7, 1941.	Memorandum dated June 21, 1941 prepared by Col. Moses W. Pettigrew concerning "Final Recommendations Far Eastern Intelligence Organization".	Reports, findings, and conclusions of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorsements. (See Part No. 39.)
3332	3332	3332	3332	3333	3335	3351	3353	3430	3435	3436	3441
$3929 \\ 2-7-46$	$3929 \\ 2-7-47$	$3929 \\ 2^{-7-46}$	$3929 \\ 2-7-46$	4083 2-8-46	4421 2 $-13-46$	4794 2-18-46	5009 2-19-46	$5013 \\ 2-20-46$	<b>5</b> 068 2-20-46	$5122 \\ 2-20-46$	5201 4-1,1-46
146	147	148	149	150	151	152	153	154	155	156	157

Exhibit No.	Hearings, page and date intro- duced	Exhibits page No.	Description
158	$5201 \\ 4-11-46$	3441	Compilation of selected documents obtained from State Department files relating to United States- British Conversations concerning the Japanese situation(See table of contents attached to this exuibit.)
159	$5201 \\ 4-11-46$	3488	Compilation of selected material obtained from State Department files relating to United States-Chinese Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
160	$5240 \\ 4-11-46$	3502	Transcript of remarks of the President on the occasion of the meeting of his cabinet at 8:30 (p. m.) and continuing at 9 o'clock with legislative leaders, on Dec. 7, 1941.
161	$5241 \\ 4-11-46$	3508	Drafts of Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson of a proposed message for the President to deliver to Congress on the state of relations with the Japanese Government. (See Joint Committee Exhibit No. 19 for final draft by Secretary Hull.)
161-A	5464 5-23-46	3520	Draft of a proposed message to Congress as prepared in the State Department, which contains suggestions made in the memoranda by Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox, as shown in exhibit No. 161.
162	$5269 \\ 4-11-46$	3534	Log of the Watch Officer, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, from 1145, Dec. 6, 1941, to 2000, Dec. 7, 1941.
162-A	$\begin{array}{c} 5464 \\ 5-23-46 \end{array}$	3543	Naval communications referred to by serial numbers in Log of the Watch Officer, as shown in exhibit No. 162.
163	$5292 \\ 4-11-46$	3557	Log of the U. E. S. Helena from Nov. 26 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive.
164	$5292 \\ 4-11-46$	3593	Reports made by Gen. W. C. Short and his subordinate officers to the War Department concerning the attack on Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941.
165	$5292 \\ 4-11-46$	3643	Copy of a partial translation of a document relating to a Feb. 23, 1941, conference between German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and Japanese Ambassador Oshima.
166	5468 5-23-46	3648	State Department dispatch No. 5682 dated Dec. 5, 1941, to the American Embassy in London. (This dispatch is mentioned in American Embassy, London, dispatch No. 5923 dated Dec. 6, 1941, to State Department, which appears in exhibit No. 21.)

(a) State Department file copy of document handed by Secretary Hull to the Japanese Ambassador on Nov. 26, 1941 (the so-called Ten-Point Note); (b) State Department statement to the press on Nov. 26, 1941, relating to the delivery of $(a)$ ; $(c)$ State Department Press Release No. 585, dated Dec. 7, 1941, concerning the delivery and text of $(a)$ ; and $(d)$ memorandum dated Dec. 2, 1941, concerning President Roosevelt's remarks at his press conference that date, relating to delivery of $(a)$ and general Far East matters.	Compilation of documents from State Department files which are dated in November and December 1941, concerning a proposed <i>modus vivendi</i> , which documents supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 18. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)	Compilation of documents relating to conversations between State Department officials and represent- atives of the Thailand Government, between Aug. 6 and Dec. 8, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)	Compilation of documents from War Department files concerning the retirement of Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) These documents supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 140.	Compilation of documents from Navy Department files concerning the retirement of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)	Compilations made by War and Navy Departments of data concerning airplanes and antiaircraft guns produced and their distribution from Feb. 1 to Nov. 30, 1941.	Memoirs of Prince Konoyc, former Prime Minister of Japan, and related documents.	Compilation of miscellaneous documents from State Department files. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)	Memorandum from Secretary of Navy dated Dec. 5, 1941 and letter from Secretary of War dated Dec. 6, 1941, submitting estimates concerning Japanese forces in Indochina and adjacent areas, to the Secretary of State for delivery to the President, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941, from Secretary of State for the President.	Compilation of location of United States naval forces in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Far East, also foreign naval forces in the Pacific and Far East, as of Dec. 7, 1941.	Compilation of State Department documents dated in 1939, concerning a proposal made by former Japanese Prime Minister Baron Hiranuma for United States-Japanese understanding. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
3652	3666	3696	3789	3942	3978	3985	4030	4115	4121	4132
5468 5-23-46	5468 5-23-46	5469 5-23-46	5469 5-23-46	5469 5-23-46	5469 5-23-46	5469 5-23-46	5469 5-23-46	5470 5-23-46	5470 5-23-46	5-23-46
167	168	169	170	171	172	173	174	175	176	177

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Description	Compilation of documents from Ambassador Joseph C. Grew to the President and the State Department, and attached memoranda. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)	Miscellaneous documents from the files of the late President F. D. Roosevelt, as furnished to the Committee, concerning Far East matters.	Organization charts of the Army and Navy at Washington, D. C., and Hawaii, as of Dec. 7, 1941.	The United States News, extra number, Sept. 1, 1945, publishing reports of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the Navy Court of Inquiry, and related documents.	Compilation of military intelligence estimates, prepared by G-2, War Department, for period Jan. 1 to July 1, 1941.	Material compiled at request of Senator Ferguson by letter dated May 20, 1946, to Committee counsel (p. 5464), including data concerning the test bombing of the <i>Utah</i> by the Army Air Corps in 1937, and data concerning the program of the Army Air Corps for 1940–45 production of B-17 4-engine bombers.	
Exhibits page No.	4209	4241	4551	4565	4702	4766	
Hearings, page and date intro- duced	5470 5-23-46	$5470 \\ 5-23-46$	5471 5-23-46	$5520 \\ 5-23-46$	5537 5-23-46	5-23-46	
Exhibit No.	178	179	180	181	182	183	

## **EXHIBIT NO. 7**

(Exhibit No. 7 is a map of Oahu, T. H., showing the record of the Opana radar detector station, 7 December 1941. This map is printed as Item No. 18 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee.)

## **EXHIBIT NO. 8**

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### CONFIDENTIAL

### PARAPHRASE OF MESSAGE DATED 14 OCTOBER 1945 FROM MACARTHUR'S HEADQUARTERS TO WAR DEPARTMENT

Japanese say many records were burned. However, complete report, with chart of task force, now being written and to be sent by air. Preliminary information received from the Japanese Navy is as follows: On 5 November 1941, plan for attack on Pearl Harbor was adopted, and on 1 December 1941 Cabinet Council decided on commencement of hostilities. Order that hostile action should open on 8 December was issued by Imperial General Headquarters on 2 December. Navy section of Imperial General Headquarters and Combined Fleet Headquarters were involved in discussions and decisions to make attack. Commander in Chlef Combined Fleet on 25 November ordered task force to leave Hitokappu Bay next morning and proceed to 42° North—170° East by afternoon 3. December for complete refuging.

Commander in Chlef Combined Fleet on 25 November ordered task force to leave Hitokappu Bay next morning and proceed to 42° North—170° East by afternoon 3 December for complete refueling. Attack force was organized as follows: 1st Air Squadron (Kaga and Alagi [Akagi]), 2nd Air Squadron (Hiryu and Soryu), 5th Air Squadron (Zuikaku and Shokaku), 3rd Squadron (Hiei and Kongo), 8th Squadron (Tone and Chikuma), 4 destroyer divisions making one squadron, 8 transports and 2 submarines.

Japanese lost 27 aircraft; estimate damage to U. S. Navy at 2 battleships (Oklahoma and West Virginia) sunk, 4 battleships and 4 heavy cruisers damaged, one transport and one destroyer sunk, and 350 planes burned or shot down.

Intelligence from Hawaii was obtained through (a) American broadcasts from Hawaii, (b) reports from Naval Attache in Washington, (c) reconnaissance submarines in Hawaiian waters just before outbreak of war and, (d) things heard from ships which called at Hawaii mid-November.

PARAPHRASE OF MESSAGES DATED 15 OCTOBER 1945 FROM MACABTHUR'S HEAD-QUARTERS TO WAR DEPARTMENT

1. We are continuing local investigation.

2. As early as possible information available to Allied Technical Intelligence Service on Pearl Harbor attack will be forwarded. Material consisting of partial coverage from captured documents is already collated, but still on way to Tokyo from Manila. Documents on which collation is based have already been sent to Washington.

#### GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

### SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLED POWERS

AG 350.05 (26 Oct 45) GB

26 OCTOBER 1945.

Subject: Additional Data with Reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C. (Attn: A. C. of S., G-2) 1. In compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec. 7 October 1945, and

1. In compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec. 7 October 1945, and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the attached documents, Inclosures Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 5, are forwarded in amplification of preliminary report contained in our radio CAX 53287, 13 October 1945.

2. Investigation is being continued through the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy. A copy of a questionnaire which has been furnished and Liaison Committee in order to guide their efforts into the most productive channels and to insure the most complete coverage possible is attached hereto as Inclosure No. 4. A further report will be submitted as soon as answers to the questionnaires are received and translated.

For the Supreme Commander:

/s/ H. W. ALLEN, Colonel, A. G. D., Ass't Adjutant General,

5 Incls:

Inel 1—Report, Liaison Committee, 8 Oct 45. Inel 2—Report, Liaison Committee, 10 Oct 45. Inel 3—Report, Liaison Committee, 11 Oct 45.

Incl 4-Questionnaire to Liaison Committee.

Incl 5-Map, Routes of Jap Fleet.

## (Incl. #1)

LIAISON COMMITTEE (TOKYO) FOR THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY AND NAVY

8 OCTOBER 1945.

N. D. No. 108.

To : Colonel F. P. Munson, USA G-2, GHQ of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

We forward herewith a general survey concerning the attack on Hawaii which has been hastily prepared in accordance with your oral instruction to Commander Yamaguchi, I. J. N. of the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy, 1,000 hours 8 October 1945.

K. NAKAMUBA,

Rear Admiral, I. J. N., Representing the I. J. Minister of the Navy.

General Survey of the Attack on Hawaii Prepared in Accordance with Oral Instruction by Col. Munson to Commander Yamaguchi of the Liaison Committee for the Imperial Army and Navy.

### **1.** Operational Orders

(A) Orders of the Imperial General Headquarters

- (1) Imperial Naval Order
  - (a) (Issued 1 December)
    - Japan, under the necessity of her self-preservation and self-defense, has reached a decision to declare war on the United States of America, British Empire and the Netherlands. Time to start an action will be given later.

(2) The Instruction by the Chief of the Naval General Staff under the Authority delegated to him by the Imperial Naval Order. (Later abridged: Naval General Staff Instruction).

(a) (Issued 1 December)

The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet shall, at the start of war, direct his attack on the enemy fleet in the Hawaiian Area to reduce it to impotency, using the First Air Fleet as the nucleus of the attack force.

- (3) Imperial Naval Order
  - (a) (Issued 2 December)

The hostile actions against the United States of America, the British Empire and the Netherlands shall be commenced on December 8.

- (4) Naval General Staff Instruction
  - (a) (Issued 2 December)

Bear in mind that, should it appear certain that the Japanese-American negotiations will reach an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostile action, all the forces of the Combined Fleet are to be ordered to reassemble and return to their bases.

(B) Orders of the Headquarters of the Headquarters of the Combined Fleet and other Headquarters.

> The subject matters are being investigated through members connected with the said forces of that period.

II. Means used to gain intelligence from Hawaii and other sources

(1) Reports of Naval Attache in Washington D. C. (Announcements by American Authorities and Press reports were the sole source.)

(2) Hearings of ships which called at Hawaiian ports in mid-November.

(3) Through submarines on reconnaissance duty in Hawaiian waters immediately preceding the outbreak of war.

(4) Radio Broadcasts from Hawaii.

**III.** Organization of Attacking Force

First Air Squadron (Akagi and Kaga) Second Air Squadron (Soryu and Hiryu) Fifth Air Squadron (Shokaku and Zuikaku) Third Squadron (Kongo and Hiei) Eighth Squadron (Tone and Chikuma) First Destroyer Squadron (Abukuma, 6th Destroyer Division, 17th Destroyer Division, 21st Destroyer Division and 27th Destroyer Division)

Supply Force (8 Transports) Submarine Force (2 Submarines)

IV. Movement of Attacking Force (See attached Map)

V. Estimated Damage inflicted on American Navy

Sunk-2 Battleships (West Virginia and Oklahoma) 1 Destroyer 1 Transport Seriously Damaged-4 Battleships 4 Heavy Cruisers Aircraft shot down or burned-over 350

VI. Losses of Japanese Navy

Failed to Return-27 aircrafts

N. B.—As this report hastily prepared based on the combined memory of those who were connected with the event, certain corrections will be expected to be made.

(Incl #2)

LIAISON COMMITTEE (TOKYO) FOR THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY AND NAVY

10 OCTOBER 1945.

N. D. No. 123

To: Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2, General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

Re: N. D. No. 108, 8 October 1945.

Subject: Additions to the Answers already given to the questions regarding the Attack on Hawaii.

1. Additional operational orders:

(a) Units of the attacking force assembled in Hitokappu Bay (Etorofujima), by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet.

N. B.—About 14 November the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet issued the above order because he recognized Hitokappu Bay as the most suitable place for enabling the attacking force to meet any new development in the situation, as well as to keep its location and movements secret.

(b) The attacking forces left Hitokappu Bay by order of the Imperial General Headquarters.

N. B.—Around 21 November the situation had seemed to be approaching to a stage where commencement of hostilities would be inevitable. The Navy Section of the Imperial General Headquarters, therefore, issued the following order (Imperial Naval Order) to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet: "The Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet shall order necessary forces to advance to the area in which they are to wait in readiness and shall station them in such positions that, in the event of the situation becoming such that commencement of hostilities be inevitable, they will be able to meet such situation promptly."

But as the Japanese Government had sent Ambassador Kurusu to the United States by that time and was doing its utmost to bring the Japanese-American negotlations to an amicable settlement, an instruction had already been issued by the Chief of the Naval General Staff to the effect that the attacking forces were to return and re-assemble in the event of the negotiations with the United States proving successful.

[2] 2. Information regarding the departure from Hitokappu Bay of the force, of which the nucleus was the First Air Squadron, was given to no one outside of the Japanese Navy.

Even within the Navy, the only those who knew of the above fact were in addition to the attacking force itself, the leading officers of the Navy Section of the Imperial General Staff and of the Combined Fleet Headquarters and a certain restricted number of officers intinately concerned with the fleet operation. 3. "Radio broadcasts from Hawaii" which we have mentioned as one source

of information were the broadcasts made to the general public.

K. NAKAMURA,

Rear Admiral, I. J. N. Representing the I. J. Minister of the Navy.

## (Incl #3)

LIAISON COMMITTEE (TOKYO) FOR THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY AND NAVY

11 OCTOBER 1945.

N. D. No. 130

To: The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, General Headquarters of The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

In compliance with your letter delivered on 11 October, we forward hereby our report as follows:

1. Order to the attacking force to assemble at Hitokappu Bay.

The following order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet on 7 November:

"The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret, shall assemble in Hitokappu Bay by 22 November for re-fueling".

2. Order giving the details of the mission of the attacking forces.

The following order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet on 25 November :

(a) "The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters, and upon the very opening of hostilities shall attack the main force of the U. S. Fleet in Hawaii and deal it a mortal blow. The first air-raid is planned for the dawn of X day (exact date to be given by later order).

for the dawn of X day (exact date to be given by later order). "Upon completion of the air-raid, the Task Force, keeping close co-ordination and guarding against the enemy's counter-attack, shall speedily leave the enemy waters and then return to Japan".

(b) "Should the negotiations with the United States prove successful, the Task Force shall hold itself in readiness forthwith to return and re-assemble".3. Order directing the attacking force to proceed on its mission:

[2] The following order was issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet on 25 November:

"The Task Force, keeping its movement strictly secret, shall leave Hitokappu Bay on the morning of 26 November and advance to  $42^{\circ}$  N  $170^{\circ}$  E (standing-by position) on the afternoon of 3 December and speedily complete re-fueling".

4. Exact time when the attack on Hawaii was decided upon.

(a) By way of preparation for the opening of hostilities, the plan of naval operations against the United States, Great Britain and Netherlands (including the plan for the attack on Pearl Harbor) was adopted on 5 November.

(b) Commencement of hostilities was decided upon by Cabinet Council on 1 December.

(c) On 2 December the Imperial General Headquarters issued an order that hostile action was to be opened on 8 December.

5. The following agencies of the Imperial Japanese Government were concerned in the discussions and decisions to execute the attack on Pearl Harbor: The Navy Section of the Imperial General Headquarters and the Headquarters of the Combined Fleet.

N. B.—Since this report is based on the combined memory of those who were connected with the matter, it is possible that some revisions may have to be made as a result of further investigation.

#### K. NAKAMURA. Rear Admiral. IJN.

### Representing the I. J. Minister of the Navy.

## (Incl #4)

[1]

#### QUESTIONNAIRE

### 17 Остовев 45.

To be answered completely. Answers to be substantiated by copies of all plans, orders, maps, photos, reports, and other official documents available. In case a question is answered from memory, so state, giving name, rank, and official position.

- 1. Who first thought of or proposed a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor? (Give names or agencies, e. g. Admiral ------, General Staff, Naval General Staff, War Ministry, etc.)
- 2. When?

(Give date or approximate date as accurately as possible, e. g. August 1940, Spring of 1941, year 1922-any time such a proposal first was considered either for actual use or in strategic planning, study, or discussion).

3. Was this maneuver or any similar maneuver included in pre-war Japanese plans for possible use in event of war with U.S.?

4. If so, describe it as given in these pre-war plans.

(State objectives, forces to be employed, routes of approach, what you expected to accomplish, etc.)

5. When was the decision made to actually attack Pearl Harbor.

(Gives dates as accurately as possible, e. g. 1 September 1941, Spring of 1941)

6. Who made this decision? (e. g. War Ministry, Chief of Staff, War Ministry, or some combination of persons or agencies.)

7. If this decision was made in a conference give date (or approximate date) of that conference and the names of all known persons attending.

8. What factors were considered in arriving at this decision? (e. g. Desire to cripple Pacific Fleet so as to gain freedom of action against P. I.?; Destroy U. S. main Pacific base?; Gain time for P. I. campaign? Protect mandated islands? or what?)

Who worked up the details of the plan as it was actually executed? [2] (e. g. Planning Section, General Staff? Naval Staff? Individuals?) Note: When I say Plan, I differentiate between plans or staff studies and the actual orders issued to put the plan in effect.

10. When did this work begin?

11. When the plan was completed who finally approved it?

12. When was the plan finally approved?13. What persons and agencics knew about this plan? (e. g. the Emperor, the War Ministry, the General Staff, the Naval Staff, the Cabinet, The consul at - ----- The Amassador at Wash-Honolulu, Military Attaches to ----ington, Kurusu, etc) Note: Names of individuals and agencies are both desiredfor example, the Cabinet as a whole might not have been informed but the War Minister would. Also: state persons who had partial knowledge, e.g. the Emperor might have known you planned to attack but not without declaring war, etc.

14. What sources furnished information on which the plan was based? Give names, rank and positions. (e.g. Military attaches, Consuls, Japanese Civilian resident of Honolulu, Broadcasts, New articles).

15. What features of information were obtained from each of the above-listed sources?

16. How and by whom was the detailed information plotted on the maps carried by your aviators obtained? (e.g. Accurately plotted and named ship berths, barracks, azimuths on which to approach, etc.).

17. How was this information checked while the Task Force was en route? 18. What part did local agents in Hawaii play?

[3] 19. Were any photographs taken by the above persons of fleet units in the harbor:

20. If so, when (particularly the date of the last taken).

21. Give complete details of how the plan was developed. Discuss:

a. Obstacles considered and how they were overcome.

b. Partial decisions made and by whom.

c. How were the commanders and particular units to participate (Both fleet units and air units) selected?

d. Why was the route you selected chosen?

e. What provision was made against discovery en route?

f. What action was to be taken if discovered?

g. What deceptive measures to draw U. S. attention elsewhere were employed?

 $\hat{h}$ . What action was to be taken if the attack failed?

22. How was the date of December 7 selected and for what reasons?

23. How was the time of attack selected? For what reasons?

24. Give detailed composition of Task Force (Naval Vessels and Air Units).

25. Were any of these Fleet Units or Air Units to be detached at any time during the operation, e. g. to attack secondary targets?

26. Give scheme of maneuver for air attack. Include:

Number and type of planes assigned to attack each target. Why?

Routes of groups of planes from carrier to target. Why?

Time each group was to strike its target.

Route(s) of escape after attack? Why was this route (these routes) selected?

27. Discuss use of midget-submarines.

(Why used, number used, whether you expected any back, did you get any back, ann other details, conclusions, as to usefulness of this weapon.)

[4] 28. Was the plan in any way tentative or contingent. If so, give details: (e.g. If the U.S. had made some concession was it to be abandoned or changed? If the U.S. Pacific Fleet had put to sea what changes would have been made?)

29. Furnish a copy of each of the following:

a. The Plan for the Pearl Harbor Operation.

b. Any Staff Studies or other subsidiary documents thereto.

c. The Order (with all amendments thereto) that put the plan in effect.

NOTE: If any document is not available give all details of it you can from memory if necessary. (Items furnished from memory will be so marked.)

30. When did you begin assembling the Task Force?

31. Where did it assemble?

32. When did it move out on its mission?

33. Had an amicable settlement appeared likely or been agreed upon while the Task Force was en route what action was then to be taken.

34. Did everything go as planned?

35. If not, what change or mishaps occurred and why?

36. Was the task force ever discovered and/or attacked while en route?

37. Were any non-Japanese vessels sighted en route?

38. If so, what was done about them?

39. Why did you not follow up the air attack with a surface attack? With a landing?

40. List your losses.

41. List estimated U.S. losses.

42. From what sources did you determine U. S. losses?

[5] 43. Did you launch any additional raids or make any reconnaissance against Hawaii by either air, submarine, or surface vessels immediately following the attack. (e. g. night after attack, following day, etc.)


44. If any questions remain unanswered, state exact reason in each case. (e. g. "All copies of order burned on surrender," "Adm. —— who is only person who knew this was killed on (date).").

45. Did you have any submarine operating in the Hawaiian area prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

46. If so, where were these submarines based, what were their operation instructions, what reports did they render during and after the attack, and were there any casualties among these submarines?

47. If submarines were used, how long did they remain in the Hawaiian area?

48. What information pertaining to the Pearl Harbor attack was received from Japanese merchant vessels before the attack on Pearl Harbor?



6

#### GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

#### SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (1 Nov. 45) GB

1 NOVEMBER 1945.

Subject: Additional Data With Reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor. To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.

(Attention : A. C. of S., G-2)

1. Reference our communication AG 350.05 (26 October 1945) GB, same subject, and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec. 7 October 1945 and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, a partial detailed report is forwarded herewith.

2. This report was compiled by the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy in response to our Questionnaire furnished the Liaison Committee on 17 October, a copy of which was forwarded as Incl. No. 4 to our communication of 26 October (refered to above) and includes detailed information in answer to questions 1–13 inclusive, 21–28 inclusive, and 30–47 inclusive, thereof.

3. In view of the fact that the Japanese records of this operation have been largely destroyed, the bulk of this information has been obtained by interrogation of important figures in the Japanese Military and Naval Establishments of the time. Sources of such items of information are stated in the text.

4. The Japanese report that answers to questions 14–20 inclusive and question 48 (which concern their sources of military intelligence on which operational plans were based) will require further investigation, which is now in progress. Documentary evidence required by Question 29 was destroyed at the time of surrender; however, efforts to reconstruct it, at least partially, from memory and from fragmentary sources, are being continued. This additional information will be forwarded as soon as received and translated.

For the Supreme Commander:

/s/ H. W. ALLEN, Colonel, A. G. D., Asst. Adjutant General.

1 Incl: Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire.

#### (Incl. 1)

1032

#### ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION

#### UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

**NOTE:** Translation of a document requested by Colonel MUNSON, Historical Investigation Section, G-3, 17 October-20 October 1945.

REPLY TO A QUESTIONNAIRE CONCERNING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

Doc. #1032

DRM/FMO/HDP

Pp. 1 I. Paragraphs 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 48 (that is, the information therein) are under special investigation and the answers will be forwarded later.

II. The reply to Paragraph 29 (concerning orders) will be delayed because all the copies of the orders were burned at the time of the surrender. A detailed report based on the recollections of the people concerned and on fragmentary sources, without the aid of documents which should be available, is in preparation.

**Pp.** 2

(Note: The following Paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 are based on the recollections of Chief of Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt. TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi; member of Operations Section Naval General Staff, Comdr. MIYO, Tatsukichi; Combined Fleet Staff members Capt. KUROSHIMA, Kameto, and Comdr. WANATABE, Yasuji.)

1. Who conceived and proposed the PEARL HARBOR surprise attack? Adm. YAMAMOTO, Isoroku, then CinC, Combined Fleet.

2. When was this done?

The first part of January 1941. (CinC YAMAMOTO ordered Rear Adm. ONISHI, Takijiro, at that time Chief of Staff of 11 Air Fleet, to study the operation.)

3. Was the said action (or similar actions in anticipation of a war against the UNITED STATES) included in JAPAN'S prewar plans? No.

4. If this is so, write the facts shown in the prewar plans.

(No statement.)

(Note: The following Paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 are based on the recollections of Adm. NAGANO, Osami, then Chief of the Naval General Staff.)

5. When was it decided to attack PEARL HARBOR?

3 Nov. 41. This date was set by the Chief of the Naval General Staff, NAGANO, when CinC, Combined Fleet, YAMAMOTO came to TOKYO. 6. Who made the foregoing decision?

Chief of the Naval General Staff NAGANO.

7. If the decision was made in conference, give time of said conference and names of all persons present.

It was not made in conference.

(Note: The following Paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 are based upon the recollections of Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt. TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi; Comdr. MIYO, Tatsukichi, a member of the Operations Section Naval General Staff; and Capt. KUROSHIMA, Kameto, a member of the Combined Fleet Staff.)

8. What important factors were considered in reaching this decision?

The factors considered were: (1) rendering impotent the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet in order to gain time and maintain freedom of action in the SOUTH SEAS Operation (including the PHILIPPINE Islands), and (2) the defense of our mandated islands.

9. Who were the persons who worked out the details of the actual plan? Members of Naval General Staff Operations Section, Combined Fleet Operations Staff and 1 Air Fleet Operations Staff.

10. When was the above undertaking started?

In the first part of September 1941.

11. Who made the final confirmation of this plan when it was completed?

CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

12. When was the final confirmation of this plan made?

1 Dec. 41.

13. Who were the people and organizations who knew of this plan?

(Note: This answer is based on the recollections of the Chief of the Naval General Staff, Adm. NAGANO, Osami; Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt. TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi; and Comdr. MIYO, Takkichi, a member of the Operations Section Naval General Staff.)

Those connected with the Navy are as follows:

(1) Those who knew the complete plan in advance:

Chief of the Naval General Staff

Vice-Chief of the Naval General Staff

Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff

Members of Operations Section Naval General Staff

The commanders in chief, the chiefs of staff and most of the staff members of the Combined Fleet Hg and 1 Air Fleet Hg

(2) Those who knew a part of the plan in advance:

Chiefs of Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 of the Naval General Staff Navy Minister Navy Vice-Minister

Chief of the Bureau of Naval Affairs, Navy Ministry

Chiefs of Sections 1 and 2, Bureau of Naval Affairs, and some of ftheir personnel

Commander in chief of each fleet of the Combined Fleet, their chiefs of staff and some of the staff members.

Pp. 3

Pp. 4

**Pp.** 6

Pp. 5.

(3) Those who knew the general outline of the plan in advance:

The Emperor. (The Emperor knew of the objective of attacking the main strength of the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet with a task force after the last ultimatum to the UNITED STATES Government had been delivered.)

(Note: Any persons other than those connected with the Navy are unknown. However, it is certain that none of the Japanese officials who were in the UNITED STATES or its possessions, including Ambassador NOMURA, Ambassador KURUSU, the Navy and Army officers attached to the embassy in the UNITED STATES and the Imperial Consul in HONOLULU, knew anything about this plan in advance.)

(Note: The replies in Paragraphs 21, 22 and 23 are based on the recollections of the Chief of the Operations Section Naval General Staff, Capt. TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi; Comdr. MIYO, Takkichi, a member of the Operations Section Naval General Staff; Combined Fleet Staff members Capt. KUROSHIMA, Kameto, and Comdr. WATANABE, Yasuji; and the commanding officer, officer of the Air Unit, Comdr. FUCHIDA, Mitsuo.)

21. Write a detailed report on how this plan could have been improved.

a. The obstacles which were considered and how they were overcome. (1) The impossibility of refueling at sea due to rough weather was considered. To overcome this difficulty, the ships with a limited cruising range were deet leaded with drums of heavy oil were been only as the set of t

ing range were deck-loaded with drums of heavy oil, and heavy oil was stowed in open spaces inside the ship. In the eventuality that there were no opportunity to refuel at sea, all the ships except the destroyers had a cruising radius extending to approximately E Long 160°. In the event the destroyers were unable to refuel there was a plan to have them separate and return. In actual fact, however, the sea was comparatively calm and the scheduled refueling was possible.

(2) It was decided that a torpedo attack against anchored ships was the most effective method of putting the main strength of the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet in the HAWAII area out of action for a considerably long period of time. Hence, the following two obstacles were considered:

(a) The fact that PEARL HARBOR is narrow and shallow.

(b) The fact that PEARL HARBOR was probably equipped with torpedo nets.

(c) In regard to point (a), it was planned to attach stabilizers to the torpedoes and launch them from an extremely low altitude.

(d) In regard to point (b), since success could not be counted on, a bombing attack was also employed.

b. Were local decisions made and, if so, by whom?

There were none.

c. How were the units and commanding officers who were to participate selected (surface forces and air forces)?

Air forces: The basic unit was organized by attaching the flight personnel of Car Div 4 (RYUJO and RYUHO) to Car Div 1 (AKAGI, KAGA) and Car Div 2 (SORYU and HIRYU), which were at that time the most highly trained units in the Combined Fleet. Car Div 5, because it had just been organized, was supplemented by highly trained flight personnel from every unit in JAPAN, and, by further concentrated training, it was planned to bring them to peak efficiency.

Surface forces: As for a possible, vessels with a long cruising range were selected. Persons of ability were selected for commanding officers. d. What were the reasons for the actual course selected?

Three courses were considered for the HAWAII Operation. The northern course which was actually used, a central course which headed east following along the HAWAII Archipelago, and a southern route passing through the MARSHALL Islands and approaching from the south. On the northern route, although it was far from the enemy patrol screen of land-based airplanes and there was little chance of meeting commercial vessels, the influences of weather and topography were strong. Refueling at sea and navigation were difficult. On the central and southern routes the advantages and disadvantages are generally just the opposite to those of the above-mentioned route. Although

**P**p. 9

Pp. 10

it may be assumed that these routes would be preferable for purposes of refueling at sea, the chances of being discovered by patrol planes were great because the routes near WAKE, MIDWAY, PALMYRA, JOHN-STON Islands, etc. Consequently, it could hardly be expected that a surprise attack could be made.

The ability to refuel and a surprise attack were the keys to this operation. If either of them failed the execution of the operation would have been impossible. However, the refueling problem could be overcome by training. On the other hand, a surprise attack under all circumstances could not be assured by our own strength. Therefore, the northern route was selected.

e. What preparations were made for the prevention of discovery enroute?

(1) By electing the route so as to pass between MIDWAY and the ALEUTIANS, we would pass outside the patrol zones of the patrol planes.

(2) Screening destroyers were sent ahead in the path of the fleet and in the event any vessels were encountered, the main body of the fleet would make a severe change of course and endeavor to avoid detection.
(3) Complete radio silence was carried out.

f. In the event of being discovered what countermeasures would have been taken? The day of the attack was designated as X-day.

If discovered prior to X-2 day, we would have returned without executing the air attack. In the event of being discovered on X-1 Day, the question of whether to make an attack or to return would have been decided in accordance with the local conditions.

g. What means of deception were taken so as to direct the attention of the UNITED STATES elsewhere?

The Main Force in the INLAND SEA Area and the land-based air units in the KYUSHU Area carried on deceptive communications, and deceptive measures were taken to indicate that the Task Force was still in training in the KYUSHU Area.

h. If the attack had failed, what countermeasures would have been taken ?

In order to bring in the Task Force it was planned to send the Main Force in the INALAND SEA out to the PACIFIC Ocean.

22. State reasons for and particulars of the selection of the date of 7 December.

(1) The Imperial Headquarters Navy Section generally acknowledged 8 December (JAPAN time) to be suitable from an operational stand point and made the decision in cooperation with the leaders of the Combined Fleet.

(2) For a dawn attack in the HAWAII Area in December, the tenth would have been suitable from the standpoint of the dark of the moon. However, since it was expected that the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet, in accordance with its habits during maneuvers, would enter the harbor on Friday and leave on Monday, the eighth was decided on so as to hit between these days.

Pp. 13

**Pp.** 12

23. How was the time for the attack selected and for what reasons?

In order to assure the success of the attack and still avoid a night attack, the take-off time of the airplanes was set as near to dawn as possible. The attack time was set at 0330 hours (JAPAN time). Sunrise that day was at 0230 hours.)

#### PF 14 gi. Brulain in detail the armainstion of the Task Force (Skine and air streamth).

(Note: These answers are based on the recellections and inquiries of Comir FUCHIDA, Mitsue, who was then commander of the AXADI Air Unit.)

(1) Shipe.

Ta Fo

	UNIT		COMMAND	8 TREN TS	DOTT
	Air Attenk Force		Under direct commader	SIZ GITCTAIL GATTISTE ARADI ZUITATU TAGA HIRTU SORTU SHORAKU	Air etteck
	Screening Unit		Com Des Rom 1 Rear Adm OMCRI, Sentaro	One light cruiser Raara Bide destroyste URALZE KASUNI ISOLATE ABARE TABITZA KASPO RANALAZE SIRARUTI ALIGUNO	Screea; cover
		CinC 1 Air			
bek	Sapport Force	Fleet, Vice Adm HAQUNO,	Com Bet Div 3 Bear Adm MIKAWA, Bunichi	Two battleebips HIBJ HIISHNA Two bsevy cruiters TOBE CRIEDA	Screea; support
'or ce	Patrol Unit	Chuichi	Com Sub Div 2 Capt INAIZUMI, Éljiro	Three submariaes I-19 I-21 I-23	Petrol ship laces
	Nidwmy Wentralisa- tion Dait		Com Des Div 7 Capt KOMISHI, Kaname	Two destroyers AITROMO USBIO	Attack air base og Nidway
	l Supply Unit Supply		Captain Captain of of ETORUYO MARU ITORUYO (気量 東) MARU (special) Suty ehip)	71 ve tanko fe Kerto (14 %) karu Kouto (26 %) karu Sotificaro (26 %) karu Sotificaro (26 %) karu Aktooro karu	
	Borce Porce 2 Supply Unit		enipj Captaia of TORO (東方) MARU	Three tankere Todo MaRU (* Todi (* (* ) BIPPON MARU	Supply

Pp. 15 (2) Air Strength. (a) Reconnaissance Unit.

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Type	Type of airplane	Number of air- planes	Ships on which based	Duty	
Airplancs for recon- naissance just be- fore the attack.	Type Zero Recon- naissance Sea- planes.	2	Tone (1) Chikuma (1)	Reconnaissance of PEARLHARBOR and LAHAINA Anchorage just be- fore the attack.	
Search-patrol planes	Type 95 Reconnais- sance Seaplanes.	4	Hiei (1) Kirishima (1) Tone (1) Chikuma (1)	Patrolling waters around OAHU.	

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
#### pp 16 (b) Attack Unit


UNIT	CONTRACTOR	III.S.	NUMBER OF	ATTACE	ARMANERY (RACH AIRPLANE)	TARGET	
1 Attack Unit	Condr. FOCHIDA Lt Candr HASHIGUCHI	žype	15. 15. 50	Herisontal bombing attack	One SOO-kg armor piarc- ing bomb	Sattleships	
Group 3 Attack Unit (SEUDAN) irst 4 Attack Unit ttack 1 Special Attack Unit	Lt ABR Lt Comdr KUBUMI Lt Comdr MURATA	97 Carrier Bomber	10 10 12	20TDeúo	One 800-kg	Bettleerips	
nit .2 Special Attack Unit	<b>F</b> U-		12 40	bombing attack	aerial toroedo	Aircraft carriere	
3 Special Attack Unit	Lt. BAGAI	-	8 189				
4 Special Attack Unit 2 9roup: 15 Attack Unit 16 Attack Unit	Lt NATSUMURA Lt Comdr TAKAHASHI Lt SAKANOIC		27 54 360 27	Dive boabing attark	250-kg lend bosb	Air Brere FGRD Island Wrize Lik	
1 Fighter Striking Unit. 3 2 Fighter Striking Unit Group 1 Fighter Striking Unit 4 Fighter Striking Unit 5 Fighter Striking Unit.	Lt. Comdr ITATA Lt. SHIGA Lt. SHIGA Lt. SUGAFANI Lt. OKAJINA Lt. SAIŌ	Type Zero Carrier Fighter		àir cootrol and strafing attack	Тию 20-ња ИСе 1ио 7.7-ња ИСе	<ol> <li>Aircorte Mirplan</li> <li>Strafing of grounded Airclan FORD Telend alCE HAK whill raREAS club KANADEL</li> </ol>	
6 Fighter Striking Doit 1 6 Attack Unit Group 5 Attack Unit	Lt KANEKO Lt Comdr SHIMAZAKI Lt Lt ICHIHARA	Type 97 Carrier Attack Plane	6. 27 54 27	Horivortal bombing stinck	One 250-kg leni bost. Sir ólekg práinary bombe	Air Baces HICKnak EXTONA FORD Island BARSERS FOLLI	
13 Attack Unit cond 2 14 Attack Unit Group 11 Attack Unit ttack 12 Attack Unit	Comdr Lt Comdr EGUSA SHIMA Lt KOBATASHI ZAKI Lt CHIMATA Lt MAEIFO	CELLIGL	18 18 81 18 171 27	Dive bombing attack	One 250-kg ordinery boxt	Airoraít carriere Gruigere	
nit I Fighter Striking Unit Group 2 Fighter Striking Unit J Highter Striking Unit L Fighter Striking Unit	Lt SHINDO Lt SIKAIDÕ Lt IIDA	Type Zero Cerrier Fighter	9. 9-36 9	Air control and strafing attack	Iwo 20-ma MGe Iwo 7.7-an MGe	<ol> <li>Airborne airpinni</li> <li>Strafing of smonadei airpinni</li> <li>ElökHaM</li> <li>Fu J Friand</li> <li>WHELLAR</li> <li>KARMONE</li> </ol>	

pp 17 (c) Combat Air Patrol

Patrole	Type of Airplace	Number of Airplanes	Snip on Whice Sased	Type of Patrol
Patrol 1	Type Zero	18	AKAGI - 9 KAGA - 9	Direct air ecort
Patrol 2	Carrier Fighter	18 54	SÖRTÜ - 9 HIRYU - 9	Airplanes ready on flight deck Airplanes ready
Patrol 3		18	2UIEARU - 9 SHORARU - 9	on Dangar deck (fueled and armed)
Eotee '		escort was car 45 simutes aft		an hour Sefore sun-
	2. The patrol	alternated 🕽 🔻	ery two houre.	•

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Pp. 18 25. During this operation were any of the fleet units or air forces diverted to attack secondary targets?

(Note: These answers are based on the recollections and inquiries of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, who was in command of the AKAGI Air Unit at that time.)

(1) The MIDWAY Neutralization Unit (AKEMBONO, USHIO) left TOKYO Bay about 1 December, arrived at MIDWAY during the night of 8 December, bombarded the air base, and returned to the western part of the INLAND Sea. The SHIRIYA moved with this unit and served as a supply ship.

(2) On 16 December, while proceeding back from HAWAII, two aircraft carriers (ZUIKAKU, SHŌKAKU), two cruisers (TONE, CHI-KUMA), and two destroyers (TANIKAZE, URAKAZE) were diverted to WAKE Island. They were sent by Combined Fleet orders to support the WAKE Invasion Operation.

26. (NOTE: These answers are based on the recollections and inquiries of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, who was in command of AKAGI Air Unit at that time.)

a. Explain the plans of action and the reasoning therein, for the air attack, giving the number and type of airplanes used against each target. (1) First Attack.

 (a) Horizontal Bombing Unit (50 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes). Target: Battleships.

Reasoning:

(1) It was presumed that the American battleships could be effectively crippled by 800-kg armor piercing bombs, dropped from an altitude of 3,000 meters or more.

(2) Horizontal bombing is relatively inaccurate, however, it was estimated that, with the degree of training the bombing unit had, an 80% ratio of hits could be expected against stationary battleships if formations of five airplanes were employed from an altitude of 3,000 meters or more. Therefore, it was concluded that about four battleships could be effectively crippled with 10 formations of bombers.

(3) Because of the accuracy of torpedo attacks, we desired to use as many of them as possible. However, both bombing attacks and torpedo attacks were used for the following reasons:

(a) If torpedo nets were layed, the attack would otherwise be unsuccessful.

(b) Launching torpedoes into shallow water such as that in PEARL HARBOR requires a special technique.

(c) Ordinarily, ships were moored in pairs abreast each other. Consequently, bombing attacks were the only effective method against the inside ships.

(b) Torpedo Bombing Unit (40 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes).

Target: Battleships and aircraft carriers.

**Reasoning:** 

Torpedo bombing is very accurate. Therefore, the pilots most skillful at shallow water torpedo bombing were selected and an attempt made to put as many battleships and carriers temporarily out of action due to underwater damage as the conditions previously related in "(c)" would permit. (Because the carriers were not at their anchorages on the day of the attack, the airplanes concentrated on the battleships.)

(c) Dive Bombing Unit (54 Type 99 Carrier Bombers).

Target: Air bases.

15 Attack Unit (27 airplanes)—Hangars and grounded airplanes at FORD Island.

16 Attack Unit (27 airplanes)—Hangars and grounded airplanes at WHEELER.

Reasoning:

Pp. 22

(1) Since the primary objective of this attack was to put the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet temporarily out of action, the attack was directed at the battleships and carriers. However, fighter plane bases were attacked first because it was necessary to prevent a counterattack by American fighter planes against our

Pp. 19

main attack units-the horizontal bombing and torpero bombing nnits.

(2) It had been concluded that WHEELER Field was a UNITED STATES Army fighter plane base and that carrier planes from the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet were usually kept at FORD Island.

(d) Fighter Striking Unit (45 Type Zero Carrier Fighters).

Targets: Airborne airplanes, grounded airplanes.

2 Fighter Striking Unit—FORD Island and HICKMAN. 4 Fighter Striking Unit—WHEELER and BARBERS POINT.

6 Fighter Striking Unit-KANEOHE.

Reasoning:

(1) At the beginning of the attack the fighter striking unit was to maintain a single formation and patrol over OAHU, attacking any enemy fighter planes which got into the air.

(2) If no fighter opposition were met in the air, the unit was to split up as indicated above and attack grounded airplanes on the various airfields on OAHU, thereby preventing a counterattack.

(2) Second Attack.

(a) Horizontal Bombing Unit (54 Type 97 Carrier Attack Planes).

Target: Air bases.

6 Attack Unit-Hangars and grounded airplanes at HICKHAM.

5 Attack Unit-Hangars and grounded airplanes at KANEOHE,

FORD Island and BARBERS POINT.

Reasoning:

By putting the American airplanes on OAHU temporarily out of action, a counterattack against the Task Force could be prevented.

(b) Dive Bombing Unit (81 Type 99 Carrier Bombers).

Target: Aircraft carriers and cruisers.

**Reasoning**:

(1) Although the 250-kg bombs which the airplanes were able to to carry could not pierce the armor of the battleship, it was estimated that they would be effective against the UNITED STATES cruisers and carriers of that time.

(2) It was estimated that there were then four or five American carriens operating in the HAWAII Area. They were the targets of this dive bombing unit. (Since the aircraft carriers were not at their anchorages on the day of the attack, most of the blows were directed against battleships.)

(c) Fighter Striking Unit (36 Type Zero Fighters).

Targets: Airborne airplanes, grounded airplanes.

2 Fighter Striking Unit—FORD Island and HICKHAM. 4 Fighter Striking Unit—WHEELER and KANEOHE.

**Reasoning**:

Same as stated previously.

b. Explain the courses, and the reasoning therein, which the air units followed from the aircraft carriers to the targets.

Both the First and Second Attack Units proceeded directly from the carriers to OAHU. They flew at an altitude of 3,000 meters. (Dense clouds hung at about 2,000 meters that day, so the airplanes flew above them.)

The positions of the carrier groups were as follows:

(1) The airplanes in the First Attack Unit took off at 0130 hours. The carriers were 230 nautical miles bearing 0° from the western tip of LANAI Island.

(2) The airplanes in the Second Attack Unit took off at 0245 hours. The carriers were 200 nautical miles hearing 0° from the western tip of LANAI Island.

The movements of the airplanes after they came in sight of OAHU is shown in the appended sketch.

c. Give the times at which each unit attacked its target.

First Attack Unit.

Dive Bombing Unit

WHEELER Field-0325 hours.

**Torpedo Attack Unit** 

Battleships at FORD Island Anchorage-0327 hours.

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**P**p. 25

Horizontal Bombing Unit

Same as above—0235 hours,

Fighter Striking Unit

Began ground strafing-0330 hours.

Second Attack Unit.

All three units—Dive Bombing Unit, Horizontal Bombing Unit and Fighter Striking Unit—attacked their targets about 0430 hours. However, details are not available because the Commanding Officer of the Second Attack Unit, Lt. Comdr SHIMAZAKI, was killed in combat in January 1945.

(Note: The times at which the attacks started have been indicated. Both First Attack and the Second Attack continued for 30 minutes to an hour).

d. What courses did the airplanes follow on their flight back to the carriers? Why were these courses chosen?

A rendezvous was made with the Fighter Striking Unit 20 nautical miles bearing 340° from KAENA\* Point. From there all units proceeded directly back to the carriers.

Because of the flying time involved, no thought was given to withdrawing on courses designed to deceive possible opposition.

27. How were midget submarines used?

(Note: This reply is based on the recollections of Rear Adm MITO, Hisashi, Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet, at that time.)

a. Reasons for use:

To cause the greatest possible damage to the enemy through co-operation in the assault by the air forces.

b. How many were used?

Five.

c. Were they expected to return?

While the probability that they would be able to return was very small, it was not thought to be wholly impossible. All midget submarine personnel, however, were prepared for death and none expected to return alive. (They were precursors of the KAMIKAZE Attack Units.)

d. Did any return?

None were recovered, though all possible recovering measures were exhausted.

e. Give a detailed report and criticism on the effectiveness of this weapon.

The submarines which were on patrol duty outside the entrance to PEARL HAREOR witnessed a great explosion within the harbor at 1631 hours 8 December (2101 hours, 7 December, HAWAII time). A radio report on the success of the attack was received from one of the midget submarines at 1811 hours the same day (0041 hours, 8 December, HAWAII time).

It was impossible to determine the total damage inflicted since there were no further detailed reports. This report did not confirm the daylight attack on 8 December; but it was verified that the night attack on the same day had been carried out, and it was inferred that great damage was caused to one or more large war vessels.

Pp. 31 28. Was this a well-elaborated plan or one developed for the emergency?

(Note: This reply is based on the recollections of Capt TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi, Chief of Operations Section, Naval General Staff, and of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at that time.)

a. Had the UNITED STATES made concessions would the plan have been discarded or modified?

(TOMIOKA) It would have been discarded.

b. If the American fleet had been at sea, how would the plan have been modified?

(**R**eplies by **FUCHIDA**:)

(1) Had the American fleet sought to intercept our Task Force or had there been a significant threat to the attack as planned, we would have counterattacked.

(2) Had the American fleet left port we would have scouted an area of about 300 miles around OAHU and were prepared to attack. If the American fleet could not be located, we were to withdraw.

**Pp. 30** 

Pp. 27

Pp. 32 (Note: The following replies, Paragraphs 30–38, are based on the recollections of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at the time of the attack.)

30. When did the Task Force begin to form?

The various forces were to leave the several areas where they might be on or about 15 November, to proceed as single vessels or in small formations and to rendezvous in TANKAPPU-WAN by 22 November.

31. Where was the rendezvous?

TANKAPPU-WAN.

32. When did the Task Force get underway on its mission?

It sailed from TANKAPPU-WAN at 0600 hours 26 November.

33. Was there any provision to receive word of a settlement while this Task Force was underway? What steps would have been taken if a compromise had been reached?

Depending on orders, the Task Force would have returned to TAN-KAPPU-WAN, HOKKAIDO, or to MUTSU-KAIWAN.

34. Did everything proceed according to plan?

Yes.

Pp. 33 35. If it had not done so, what changes or mishaps might have arisen and why?

(No statement.)

36. Was the Task Force sighted or attacked while underway? No.

37. Was any shipping, other than Japanese, seen while underway? None.

38. If any such shipping had been encountered, what measures would have been taken?

(No statement.)

**Pp. 34** 

39. Why was the air assault not continued, and why was it not followed up by surface units or by a landing?

(Note: This reply is based on the recollections of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at the time of the attack.)

(1) The object of this attack was to destroy the capital strength of the UNITED STATES PACIFIC Fleet and to delay any attack which it might make across the PACIFIC. Hence this objective could be accomplished by air attack alone. Furthermore, since the whereabouts of the American task forces were unknown, and since the chances of scouting them were small, in face of a possible counterattack in co-operation with the 50-odd remaining HAWAII-based large airplanes, the advantages of a quick withdrawal were apparent. Consequently, no naval assault was undertaken.

(2) No landing operation was planned because it would have been impossible to make preparations for such a landing in less than a month after the opening of hostilities, and because it was recognized that the problems of speed and of supplies for an accompanying convoy would have made it unlikely that the initial attack could have been accomplished without detection.

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5 (Note: The following paragraphs, 40, 41 and 42 are based on the recollections and inquiries of Comdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit at that time.)

40. What damage did the Japanese receive?

In the First Attack:

In

The First Attack.	0
Fighter planes	. 3
Fighter planes Dive bombers	. 1
Torpedo bombers	. 5
Total	9
the Second Attack:	
Fighter planes	6
Dive bombers	
1	
Total	. 20
Grand total	. 29

41. What was the estimated damage to American forces?

- (1) Naval vessels:
  - Sunk: 4 battleships
    - 1 cruiser
    - 2 tankers

Heavily damaged: 4 battleships

Lightly damaged: 1 battleship

(2) Airplanes

Pp. 36

Pp. 37

Shot down: Approximately 10 Airplanes.

Burned or destroyed on the ground: Approximately 250 airplanes

Total: Approximately 260 airplanes.

It is impossible to determine how many others, presumably a considerable number were destroyed in the hangars.

42. How was the ramage inflicted on the Americans determined?

(1) From reports of flight personnel upon their return.(2) From studies of photographs taken by flight personnel.

(Note: No reconnaissance planes were used to assess the results immediately after the attack, but one element of fighter planes was ordered, after completing its mission, to fly as low as possible to observe the results.)

43. Were any of the air, submarine or surface units employed in additional attacks on HAWAII or in reconnaissance immediately after the main attack?

(Note: The following paragraph is based on the recollections of Cmdr FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, at that time Commanding Officer of AKAGI Air Unit, and of Rear Adm MITO, Hisashi, Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet.)

A part from reconnaissance by submarines stationed at the mouth of PEARL HARBOR on the eve of the day of the attack, none engaged in follow-up attacks or in reconnaissance.

(Note: The replies in paragraphs 45, 46 and 47 are based on the recol-**Pp. 38** lections of Rear Adm MITO, Hisashi, Chief of Staff, 6 Fleet, at the time of the attack.)

45. Were any submarines operating in Hawaiian waters prior to the attack on PEARL HARBOR?

Submarines were stationed on lookout duty in Hawaiian waters, the day before the Task Force strike, on the evening of 7 December. They were ordered not to attack until the Task Force strike was verified.

46a. If there were, where were these submarines based?

Most of the submarines departed from JAPAN for a rendezvous at KWAJALEIN, to proceed thence to HAWAII. A few, which were delayed in leaving JAPAN, changed course and proceeded directly to HAWAII. b. What were their operation orders?

Pp. 39

The orders given to the submarines were as follows: Part were to proceed with the Task Force, screening it as it proceeded toward HAWAII; the majority of the submarines were to take up lookout stations in Hawaiian waters by the evening of 7 December, while the midget submarines were to scout and reconnoiter a possible attack by the enemy fleet as well as strike into PEARL HARBOR.

At the same time, they were given strict orders not to attack until the Task Force strike had been verified.

c. Were reports made during and after the attack?

When the Task Force and the Lidget submarine strikes were completed, the midget submarines reported as follows:

(1) Report of the attack as observed by a midget submarine on the of 8 December.

(2) A midget submarine radioed the same night "Surprise attack succeeds".

(3) A report on the departure of midget submarines and that it was impossible to recover their personnel though all recovery measures had been tried.

d. What damage was sustained by the submarines?

One submarine was detected and depth-charged by patrol vessels near the entrance to PEARL HARBOR. Though it ran afoul of the antisubmarine net, it extricated itself, after some damage, and returned safely. Apart from this case there was one other submarine lost off PEARL HARBOR; the time and place of its sinking are unknown.

47. How long did the submarines remain in Hawaiian waters? The submarines continued operations in the vicinity of HAWAII from 8 December, the day of the attack, until early January of the following year. During this time, most of the submarines proceeded to the west coast of the UNITED STATES to destroy shipping, and part of the submarines returned to JAPAN. Only a small number remained in the Hawaiian area for the maximum length of time.

End

#### GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

#### SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (8 Nov 45) GB

8 NOVEMBER 1945.

Subject. Additional Data With Reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor. To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C.

(Attention: A. C. of S., G-2)

1. Reference our communications AG 350.05 (1 November 1945) GB, and AG 350.05 (26 October 1945) GB, same subject, and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec. 7 October 1945 and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, an additional partial report is forwarded herewith.

2. This report contains answers to questions 14-20 inclusive and to question 48 of our questionnaire to the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Japanese Army and Navy, a copy of which was forwarded as Incl. No. 4 to our communication of 26 October referred to above.

For the Supreme Commander:

/S/ H. W. Allen H. W. ALLEN, Colonel, A.G.D., Asst. Adjutant General.

1 Incl: Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire.

(Incl 1)

Doc No. 1668

ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION

#### UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

Note: Translation of document requested by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

PEARL HARBOR QUESTIONNAIRE

26 October 1945

The answers to questions 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 48 of Colonel MUNSON'S questionnaire of 17 October, the PEARL HARBOR Attack are contained herein. NOTE: Because of the deaths of Commander KANAMOTO, Yoshihira (28 December 1942), and Commander NAKAJIMA, Minato (6 August 1943), who were staff officers in the Intelligence Department of the Naval General Staff, and because of the pertinent records have been burned, these answers are based upon the recollections of Commander TACHIBANA, Itaru, who was on duty in the Intelligence Department at that time.

14. Sources of intelligence?

Such matters as the strength of the UNITED STATES Fleet in the HAWAII area, the condition of military installations, the days upon which the fleet moved out of and into port, the location and condition of moorages, waters in which maneuvers were held, air patrols, etc.; were used as basic intelligence material. This material was collated by the Intelligence Department of the Naval General Staff and used as the basis for the operation plan.

The primary sources were:

1. Naval attache to the Japanese Embassy in Washington.

2. Public newspapers in the UNITED STATES.

3. American radio broadcasts (public).

4. Crews and passengers on ships which put in at HONOLULU.

5. General information.

15. Characteristics of intelligence?

Emphasis was placed on material collected statistically over a number of years.

16. How and from whom were the details on the maps carried by personnel of the air units obtained?

A. The location of the anchorages shown on the maps was determined on the basis of information gathered from the sources mentioned in "14", beginning in the early part of 1941. Information on the condition of the fleet moorages in **PEARL** HARBOR in the early part of November was forwarded to Fleet Headquarters. Fleet Headquarters then corrected its information accordingly.

B. Information on barracks and other military installations was compiled from the sources listed in "14".

C. The general outlines of the approach to OAHU for both the Attack Force and the air units were determined from information provided by the previously named source. Factors taken into consideration in the choice were American alr patrols, sea patrols, etc. The routes selected were judged to be those upon which there was slight chance of encountering a patrol, merchant ships, etc.

17. In what way did the Attack Force check on information while it was underway?

As information was gathered from the sources mentioned in "14" it was forwarded to the Attack Force.

18. What role was played by agents in HAWAII?

None.

19-20. Photographing of ships in the harbor and opportunities for same.

Applicable facts not available.

48. What pertinent information was received from merchant ships prior to the attack?

Merchant ships provided fragmentary information on moorages in PEARL HARBOR, ship and air unit maneuvers, the names of vessels encountered in the HAWAII area, etc. This information was used in the statistical collation of information mentioned in "14".

## EXHIBIT NO. 8-A

#### GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

#### SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

#### AG 350.05 (12 Nov 45) GB

12 NOVEMBER 1945.

Subject: Additional Data With Reference To Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor.

To; Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C. (Attention: A. C. of S., G-2).

1. Reference previous correspondence above file and subject, and in compliance with your radios WX 73711 War Sec, 7 October 1945, and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 1941, an additional document is forwarded herewith.

2. This document provides further amplification previously furnished by the Japanese in answer to question 27 and questions 45–47 inclusive of our questionnaire of 17 October 1945 with respect to submarine operations in connection with the Pearl Harbor attack, and which was forwarded on 1 November 1945.

For the Supreme Commander:

/s/ H. W. Allen H. W. ALLEN, Colonel, A. G. D., Asst Adjutant General.

1 Incl: Notes of Correspondent.

[1]

[A newspaper Article Published in the Yomiuri-Hochi, 30 October 1945]

THE EVE OF "PEARL HARBOR"

An early chapter in the History of War Crimes.

December 8, 1941. This is the fatal date when the American People as one resolved themselves to "Remember Pearl Harbor!" But long before this date Japan's submarine offensive on Pearl Harbor were going on and several eery periscopes were feeling out movements of American fleets from the rough sea. The former War Correspondent Hanakata has only now made public his notes taken at that time from direct narrations of the late Captain (then Lt Commander) Katsuji Watanabe of "I No. 69" and the late Rear Admiral (then Captain) Shinki Nakaoka of the 11th Detachment of the 3rd Submarine Fleet.

"The Japanese submarine detachment belonged to the Sixthar Fleet, whose flagship was the light cruiser Katori. In early November orders for war preparation were given to this detachment, and on 11 November over ten submarines of the First and 3rd Detachments, including "I" Nos. 69, 74, 75 and others left Yokosuka Naval Base, with knowledge of the growing war fever in Washington and Tokyo.

"The submarine fleet followed a course due east in line ahead, stretching over 20 miles. They navigated at surface speeds of from 12 or 13 to 20 knots. But when they got near the Hawaiian waters they extended and followed their respective courses. The duties of the submarine fleet were known as (a) to feel the movements of American fleets around Pearl Harbor; (b) to disptach "special submarines" from their decks and to observe their war results; (c) to attack escaping American war vessels, if any; (d) to rescue operators of "special submarines", down fliers and others wherever possible.

"In Hawaiian waters the submarines floated on the sea in the night, and in the day time they submerged to periscope depth. The schedule of Pearl Harbor attack at 0300 on December 8th was transmitted to the submarine fleet two or three days beforehand. On 7th "I No. 74" sighted the carrier *Lexington* but no trouble ensued.

"The surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was carried on as had been scheduled. Before this, five large sized "I" type submarines belonging to the First Submarine Detachment had launched "special submarines" from their decks. That was the departure of the now well known Commander Iwasa and other members of "special attack parties".

"The submarines followed the upheaval in the harbor only through occasional land explosions coming through the deep water, and they confirmed the Harbor Battle at night when they emerged from the bottom of the sea. At 1631 (2101 Hawaiian time) Rear Commander Watanabe of "I No. 69" detected from the periscope a huge flery column which marked the end of the USS Arizona.

[2] "Lt. Commander Watanabe's radio intercepted dispatches in relation to this were by the enemy and his "I No. 69" was pursued by enemy destroyers which dropped depth charges madly. Under this circumstance "I No. 69" dived 60 to 70 meters beneath the surface, though her ordinary diving capacity had been set at 30 meters. The submarine sustained damage here and there and finally was caught by submarine wires. She struggled hard and just managed to get away from the wires, Altogether this old submarine remained submerged about 39 hours, All hopes of rescuing fellow-fighters who had been shot down had been abandoned."

The notes from direct narration by Captain Watanabe and Rear Admiral Nakaoka end here. But Mr. Hanakata observes that most of the officers and crews of Japanese submarines, including those participating in the siege of Pearl Harbor, perished at the bottom of the Pacific Ocean, the prey of American radio locators. For example, the said Captain Watanabe perished with his submarine in 1943 around the Gilbert Islands. Rear Admiral Nakaoka was promoted to be captain of the crack cruiser Atago but he also was killed in action by enemy hombs on the bridge of that vessel.

The Yomiuri-Hochi 30 October 1945.

I certify that to the best of my knowledge and belief the foregoing notes represent a true report of the information given me by the late Captain Watanabe and the late Rear Admiral Nakaoka at the time of interview.

/S/ M. HANAKATA.

## **EXHIBIT NO. 8-B**

#### GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

## SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (29 Nov 45) GB

29 NOVEMBER 1945.

Subject: Additional Data With Reference to Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor.
To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C. (Attention Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2).

1. Reference our communications of 26 October 1945, 1 November 1945, and 8 November 1945, same file number and subject, and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec, 7 October 1945, and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, an additional partial report is forwarded herewith.

2. This report contains a reconstruction from memory of certain Japanese documents relative to the attack, all originals of which are reported to have been burned at the time of surrender. The reconstructions have been obtained by the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Japanese Army and Navy in compliance with question 29 of our questionnaire of 17 October 1945, a copy of which was forwarded as Incl. No. 4 to our communication of 26 October referred to above.

For the Supreme Commander :

/sgd/ H. W. Allen H. W. AlLEN, Colonel, A. G. D. Asst. Adjutant General.

1 Incl: Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire.

[1] Dec 1976

ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

Note: Translation of a document requested by Colonel MUNSON, Historical Investigation Sction, G-2.

REPLY TO A QUESTIONNAIRE CONCERNING THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

22 OCTOBER 1945.

Navy Ministry

The answers to Question 29 of Col. MUNSON's questionnaire on the PEARL HARBOR attack, dated 17 October, are contained herein.

29. Copies of the following will be submitted :

1. Operation plan for the PEARL HARBOR attack.

2. Operational research and other documents related to the attack.

3. Orders relative to carrying out the plan (together with all revisions).

All copies of the above items were burned at the time of the surrender, and as a result no documents are available. The essential points in the orders relative to carrying out the operation are hereby submitted. The information is based on the recollections and inquiries of the following three men:

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff. Section Orders and Directives

section Orders and Directives

Real Admiral TOMIOKA, Sadatoshi (then a captain and chief of Operation's Section, Naval General Staff).

**Combined Fleet Orders** 

Rear Admiral KUROSHIMA, Kameto (then a captain and member of Combined Fleet Senior Staff (SHUSEKI SAMBO).)

Task Force Orders

Capt FUCHIDA, Mitsuo (then a commander and in command of AKAGI Air Unit).

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Order 1 (essentials).

5 Nov 41.

From : Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

A. Because it is feared that war with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS is inevitable, it has been decided that for the sake of the Empire's defense general operational preparations will be completed by the first part of December.

B. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will carry out the necessary operational preparations.

C. The details will be set forth by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

79716 O-46-pt. 13-4

#### Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 1 (essentials)

9 Nov 41.

From : Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

A. The Combined Fleet will prepare itself for the possibility that war with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS may become inevitable in the first part of December. The necessary forces will be sent to the prepared points at a suitable time prior to the beginning of operations.

B. A strict watch against possible surprise attacks will be maintained during these movements.

[3] C. The operation policy in the event hostilities break out with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS is set forth in the Separate Volume.

Note: The part of the operation policy relating to the HAWAII area is recalled as follows:

"At the very beginning of hostilities the UNITED STATES Fleet in the HAWAII area will be attacked by a force having 1 Air Fleet as its nucleus. An attempt will be made to destroy the American fleet"

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Order (essentials).

21 Nov. 41.

From : Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami. To : CinC Combined Fleet, YAMAMOTO.

A. At the appropriate time the Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will order the forces necessary for carrying out the operation to proceed to rendezvous areas.

B. If friendly forces are challenged by American, English or Dutch forces during the operational preparations, the Commander in Chief Combined Fleet is anthorized to use force in order to protect the friendly forces.

C. The details will be set forth by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 5 (essentials).

21 Nov. 41.

From : Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami,

To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

A. In the event that an agreement is reached in the negotiations between the UNITED STATES and JAPAN the Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will immediately order the forces for the operation to return.

B. The use of force mentioned in Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Order 5 is limited to the following cases:

1. If American English or Dutch surface forces should proceed into Japanese territorial waters for reconnaissance purposes.

[4] 2. If American, English or Dutch surface forces approach Japanese territorial waters and it is recognized that they are jeopardizing our forces.

3. If aggressive action imperiling our forces is taken by American, English or Dutch surface forces outside territorial waters.

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Order 9 (essentials).

1 DEC, 41.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

A. It has been decided that JAPAN will commence hostilities with the UNITED STATES, ENGLAND and the NETHERLANDS in the first part of December.

B. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will destroy enemy surface and air forces in the ORIEN'T, and, in the event enemy fleets attack, will intercept and destroy them.

C. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet, in co-operation with the Commander in Chief Southern Army, will rapidly attack important American, English and the Dutch bases in the ORIENT, and will occupy and protect them.

D. The Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will co-operate in the operations of the CHINA area fleet when necessary.

E. The times for starting the movement of forces for the above will be given in a later order.

F. The details will be set forth by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 9 (essentials).

1 DEC. 41.

From : Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami. To : CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

The Combined Fleet operations against the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRIT-AIN and the NETHERLANDS will be based upon the Separate Volume-"Imperial Navy's Operation Policy against the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS".

[5] NOTE: As far as can be remembered, the Operation Policy in the Separate Volume was entirely the same as the Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive of 5 November.

Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 12 (essentials).

2 DEC. 41.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO.

A. Beginning 8 December, the Commander in Chief Combined Fleet will start using military power in accordance with Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Order 9.

B. The use of military force against the NETHERLANDS will be started after moves have been made against the UNITED STATES and GREAT BRITAIN.

C. The details will be set forth by the Chief of the Naval General Staff.

Chief of Naval General Staff Verbal Directive.

2 DEC. 41.

From: Chief of Naval General Staff NAGANO, Osami.

To: CinC Combined Fleet YAMAMOTO (given to him while he was in TOKYO). It is to be understood beforehand that if an agreement is reached in the negotiations between JAPAN and the UNITED STATES before the use of military power has started, the Combined Fleet forces will be directed by special order to return.

Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order—(essentials), Flagship NAGATO HIROSHIMA-WAN 7 Nov. 41

> YAMAMOTO, Isoroku CinC Combined Fleet

[6]

#### Combined Fleet Order

The Task Force will gather in HITOKAPPU-WAN and remain there to take on supplies until 22 November. Every precaution will be taken to insure secrecy in movements.

NOTE: About the time the above order was issued, a Combined Fleet order (giving directions for carrying out the Operation Policy) based on Imperial Headquarters Navy Staff Section Directive 1 was also issued. Detailed information as to its contents is not available. (It is thought that it was about the same as Paragraph 1 of Task Force Operation Order 1, which was issued later).

Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order-(essentials).

Flagship NAGATO HIROSHIMA-WAN 22 Nov 41

> YAMAMOTO, Isoroku CinC Combined Fleet

#### Combined Fleet Order

A. The Task Force will move out from HITOKAPPU-WAN and proceed to the HAWAII area and inflict crippling damage on it.

The first attack will be at dawn on X-Day (to be given in a later order). At the conclusion of the air attacks the force will regroup and withdrawn immediately to JAPAN, being prepared at all times to meet enemy counterattacks. B. In the event an agreement is reached in the negotiations with the UNITED

STATES, the Task Force will immediately return to JAPAN.

Note: In ND No 130 of 11 Oct 45 it was stated that this order was issued 25 November. However, that was an error, and the date of the order has now been corrected to 22 November.

Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order-(essentials).

Flagship NAGATO HIROSHIMA-WAN 25 Nov. 41

[7]

Combined Fleet Order

The Task Force will move out of HITOKAPPU-WAN on 26 November and proceed without being detected to the evening rendezvous point (Lat 40° N, Long 170° W), set for 3 December, where refueling and supply will be carried out as quickly as possibly.

NOTE: In accordance with this order the Task Force moved out of HITOKAPPU-WAN at 0600 hours on 26 November.

Combined Fleet Dispatch Operation Order-(essentials).

Time of origin: Approximately 1730 hours, 2 Dec 41.

Text: X-Day will be 8 December.

Task Force Ultrasecret Operation Order 1 (essentials).

Flagship AKAGI, HITOKAPPU-WAN 23 Nov 41

> NAGUMO, Chuichi Task Force Commander

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku **CinC** Combined Fleet

#### Task Force Order

A. The Task Force will proceed to the HAWAII area, taking every precaution to insure the secrecy of its movements. The force will attack the enemy fleet in the HAWAII area and attempt to cripple it.

The first air attack has been set for 0330 hours on X-Day.

When the attacks have been completed the force will quickly withdraw. Upon returning to JAPAN the force will be re-equipped and supplied and then. assigned a task in the Second Phase Operations.

If, while underway, the Force is intercepted by the enemy fleet, encounters a powerful enemy force, or it appears that the enemy is going to attack in order to gain the advantage, the Task Force will attack immediately.

B. Chart (See next page.)

B. The allocation of strength will be snown in the table below.

			1				
LUL	Air Attack	Screen; cover	Screen; support	Petrol ship lanes	Attack on MIDWAT Air Base		Arddine
ML-DATELS	l Air Fleet	Flag of Des Ron 1; Des Div 17 Des Div 18; AKIGUMO	Bat Div, 3, - 2D (TN Fresumably, less 2 elements.) ; Cru Div 8	Flag; 1-19; 1-21; 1-23	Dis Div 7, - 2D (TH Fresumably less 2 elements.)	KENYO (* *) MARU; KYOKUTO MARU; KOKUYO ( ) *) MARU; SHINKOKU (*) AKEBONO MARU	TOHO MARU; TOBL (* * ) MARU; NIPPON MARU
COMMAND	l Air Fleet	Com Des Ron 1	Com Bat D1v 3	Com Sub Div 2	Com Des Div 7	Ceptain Ceptein of of KYOK- XYOXUTO UTO MARU	MARU (Specialof TOHO duty (Hyp MARU ahip)
0	OinC						
	e g Unit	s Unit	Screening Unit Support Force	ait -	Midway Neutralization Unit	l Supply Unit	2 Supply Unit
TINU	Air Forc	Air Force Screening Unit		Patrol Unit	M1dway Neutral1	Supply	9 5 6 7
			Task		Force		

[8] C. Movements of each force.

1. General:

The entire force (except the MIDWAY Neutralization Unit) will leave HITO-KAPPU-WAN by special order. The force will proceed to the rendezvous point (Lat 42° N, Long 170° W) in convoy at a speed of from 12 to 14 knots, making every effort to conceal its movements and maintaining a strict watch against submarine and air attacks. Refueling will be carried out at every opportunity en route. When X-Day (the day upon which hostilities will be started) is designated, the force will proceed from the rendezvous point to the point where contact will be made with the enemy (Lat 32° N, Long 157° W). Beginning at 0700 hours on X-1 Day, the force will proceed due south at high

Beginning at 0700 hours on X-1 Day, the force will proceed due south at high speed (approximately 24 knots), arriving at the point from which the airplaneswill be launched (200 nautical miles north of the enemy anchorage) at 0100 hours on X-Day. Air attacks will then be made against the enemy fleet and important air bases on OAHU.

Upon completion of the air attacks, the airplanes will be taken aboard and the force will withdraw. It will proceed west, staying at least 800 nautical miles north of MIDWAY, to the regrouping point (Lat 30° N, Long 165° and from there the western part of the INLAND SEA. It will arrive there about X-15 Day and begin preparations for the Second Phase Operations.

If the air attacks have been a complete success and there is little chance of an enemy counterattack, or if the problems of supply necessitate it, a return course which passes near MIDWAY may be taken. In this event, Car Div 5 and the two ships of Bat Div 3 will be dispatched from the Task Forse on the night of X-Day to early in the morning of X-1 Day, and will make an air attack against MIDWAY.

If by some chance a powerful enemy force has cut off the return route, the Task Force will proceed south through the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS to the MARSHALLS.

If it is anticipated that this fuel supply is insufficient for proceeding to the return route rendezvous point, the Screening Unit will be detached and sent back.

2. Patrol Unit:

The Patrol Unit will accompany the main unit.

If the Screening Unit is detached, the Patrol Unit will be the advance screen for the main unit, and it will be responsible for screening the airplanes, during landings and takeoffs.

After the air attacks the Patrol Unit will screen on the side nearest the enemy; if the enemy attacks, the unit will engage and pursue him utilizing all available strength.

3. MIDWAY Neutralization Unit:

The unit will leave TOKYO Bay about X-6 Day, and after refueling, will proceed to MIDWAY taking every precaution to conceal its movements. It will arrive at MIDWAY on the night of X-Day, attack the air base, and withdraw. After refueling, it will return to the western part of the INLAND SEA.

[9] The SHIRIYA will accompany the unit and act as the supply ship.

The Supply Force will accompany the main unit to the point there the enemy will be contacted. After refueling the ships there, it will proceed immediately to the regrouping point and wait for the rendezvous to be made arriving there by 0800 hours on X-6 Day. While proceeding to the regrouping point the unit will stay at least 800 nautical miles north of MIDWAY.

D. In the event that the operation is concelled while the Task Force is under way, the force will return immediately to HITOKAPPU-WAN, HOKKAIDO or MUTSU-KAIWAN.

Task Force Ultrasecret Operation Order 3 (essentials).

Flagship AKAGI, HITOKAPPU-ŴAN 23 Nov 41 Nagumo, CHUICHI Task Force Commander

#### Task Force Order

The plan for the air attack against HAWAII is as follows: A. Movements of Air Attack Force.

At 0600 hours on X-1 Day the force will be 700 nautical miles bearing 0° from Point Z (western tip of LANAI Island). Beginning at 0700 hours on X-1 Day the force will increase its speed to 24 knots, following a 180° course. At 0130 hours on X-Day the First Attack will take off from a point 230 nautical miles bearing 0° from Point Z. At 0245 hours the Second Attack Unit will take off from a point 200 nautical miles bearing 0° from Point Z.

When all the airplanes of the Second Attack Unit have taken off, the force will withdraw on a northerly course at approximately 24 knots.

It is estimated that the airplanes of the First Attack Unit will return between 0530 hours and 0600 hours and the airplanes of the Second Attack Unit between 0645 hours and 0715 hours.

When the units return preparations will be made immediately for the next attack. Carrier attack planes will be armed with torpedoes.

If the land based air power has been completely knocked out, repeated attacks will be made immediately in order to achieve maximum results. However, if a powerful enemy force is in route to attack, subsequent attacks will be directed against it.

B. Organization of air attack units.

As shown in Separate Tables.

C. Targets.

1. First attack unit.

[10] 2. 1 Group (SHUDAN)

- (1) Not more than four battleships and four carriers.
- (2) Order of selection.

First battleships, then carriers.

B. 2 Group will attack enemy land based air power as indicated below (1) 15 Attack Unit

FORD Island—hangars and grounded airplanes.

(2) 16 Attack Unit

WHEELER Field-hangars and grounded airplanes.

(3) Fighter Striking Unit

Enemy airborne or grounded airplanes.

2. Second Attack Unit 2. Group will bomb enemy air bases as indicated below.

(1) 5 Attack Unit

KANEOHE, FORD Island and BARBERS POINT—hangars and Grounded planes.

(2) 6 Attack Unit

HICKHAM Field—hangars and grounded airplanes.

b. 2 Group will have four or five aircraft carriers as its target. If there are an insufficient number of carriers present, cruisers and battleships will be attacked in that order.

c. Fighter Striking Unit

Enemy airborne or grounded airplanes.

D. Outline of attack procedure.

1. First Attack Unit.

2. Surprise will be the basis of the attack. 1 Group Torpedo Bombing Unit will attack first; 1 Group Horizontal Bombing Unit next, and 2 Group last.

b. The Fighter Striking Unit will, as a single formation at the beginning come in over the target area at about the same time as 1 Group. Its main function will be to eliminate opposition from enemy fighters.

If no opposition is encountered in the air, the unit will switch to the following strafing assignments against grounded airplanes.

(1). 1 and 2 Fighter Striking Units

Ford and HICKHAM

(2). 3 and 4 Fighter Striking Units

WHEELER and BARBERS POINT

(3). 5 and 6 Fighter Striking Units

KANEOHE

C. In the event that the enemy has maintained strict lookouts and opposition is strong, the units will attack in the following order, with only a slight time interval between attacks.

(1) Fighter Striking Unit

(2) Ship Bombing Unit

(3) Horizontal Bombing Unit

(4) Torpedo Bombing Unit

2. Second Attack Unit.

The entire unit will attack at about the same time.

The Fighter Striking Unit will follow the outline of movements given for the Fighter Striking Unit of the First Attack Unit. However, if no opposition is encountered in the air, strafing will be carried out as follows: 2. 1 and 2 Fighter Striking Units.

FORD AND HICKAM

b. 2 and 4 Fighter Striking Units.

WHEELER and KANEOHE

[11] 3. Outline for attack in case most of the carriers and battleships are anchored outside of PEARL HARBOR.

2. The organization, targets, etc will be the same as that set forth in the previous section. However, 1 Group of the First attack Unit will increase its use of torpedo planes.

b. Each air attack unit will first hit the fleet and then OAHU, maintaining its formation as a single group and striking under Air cover of the Fighter Striking units.

However, if the attacks against the fleet anchorage proceed smoothly, the forces which didn't participate in those attacks will move on immediately to OAHU, while the units which participated will return to their ships.

4. Regrouping and returning:

a. The regrouping point following the attack will be 20 nautical miles bearing 340° from the western tlp (KAENA POINT) of OAHU. The airplanes will rendezvous at an altitude of 1,000m (if clouds are present at about that altitude the rendezvous will be made below them).

b. The attack units will wait at the regrouping points for about 30 minutes. After making the rendezvous with the fighter striking units they will return to their ships.

c. The fighter striking units will cover the return of the main attack units and intercept any enemy pursuit.

#### E. Reconnaissance:

1. Reconnaissance before the attack.

No special reconnaissance will be made.

2. Reconnaissance just before the attack.

The two reconnaissance seaplanes of Cru Div 8 (DAIHACHI SENTAI will be launched at 0030 hours on X-day. Without being detected they will reconnoiter the PEARL HARBOR and CAHAINA anchorages, and report whether or not the enemy fleet (particularly carriers and battleships) is at these anchorages.

3. Scouting and search.

The reconnaissance seaplanes of Cru Div 8 (DAIHACHI SENTAI) will be launched about 0300. They will search over as wide an area as possible, between the Task Force and the enemy and along the channels on the east and west sides of OAHU. They will report the presence of enemy surface force moving out to attack and its movements, the presence of counter-attacking enemy airplanes and their movements, etc.

4. Following the attack, if conditions permit, one element of the fighter planes (will be designated by the commanding officer of the fighter units) will conduct a highspeed, low altitude reconnaissance of the damage done to ships and alrplanes.

F. Air Patrol:

From 1 hour before sunrise until 45 minutes after sunset on the day of attack, Air Patrol Readiness Disposition 1, Plan B will be used.

SEPARATE FARLE									
τ	THIT		сож	HIJDER	TIPE of	NUMBER of AIMPLANES	TIPE of ATTACE	ANGAMENT (each plane)	
FILST	1 Group	1 Atşack Unit 2 Attack Unit 3 Attack Unit 4 Attack Unit	Comdr.	Condr FUCEIDA Lt. Condr HAMMICOCHI Lt. AND Lt. Condr EUSUAL	<b>TTP3</b> 97	15 15 10 10	Korisontal bombing attack	ens No 80, Mark 5 Bomb	
	(BRUDAR)	1 Special Attack Unit Attack Unit 2 Special		Lt. Condr MURATA Lt. ETTAJIMA	Carrier BOMBER	12	Torpedo Bombing Attack	ens Type- 91 Aerial Torpedo	
TOATAO		3 Special Attack Unit 4 Special Attack Unit		Lt. MAGAI Lt. MATSUKURA		8			
	2	15 Attack Unit 16 Attack Unit	<b>7</b> 5-	Lt. Comdr. 241414	SEI Type 99 Oarrier Bomber	21 : 21	Dive Bonding Attack	One Io,25 Land Bomb	
ANIS	Enree (3) Group	1 Fighter Striking Unit 2 Fighter S.U. 3 Fighter Striking Unit 4 Fighter 5 Eighter Striking Unit 5 Sighter	CELIDA	Lt. Condr. ITATA Lt. SHIGA Lt. SHIGA Lt. SEATURA Lt. SARO	Type ZERS Garrier Fighter	9 9 9 6 6	Air Control and Strafing Attack		
	1 Group	6 Fighter Striking Unit 6 Attack Unit 5 Attack Unit	Lt.	Lt. EANERO Lt. Condr. SETMALARI Lt. ICHTRADA	Type 97 Carrier Attack plane	6 27 टा	Eorisontal Bombing Attack	One No 25,1and bomb, Six No 6 Ordinary Bombs	
	2	13 Attack Unit 14 Attack Unit 11 Attack Unit	Condr.	Lt. Comdr. MGDAA Lt. CDRATASWI Lt. CHIMATA	Type 99 Carrier Bomber	18 18 18	Dive Bombing Attack	One To 25. Ordinary Bond	
ATTACI	Gerongo J	12 Attack Unit B Fighter Striking Unit 3 Fighter Striking Unit	SECUL-	Lt. MARINO Lt. SHINDO Lt. MILAIDO Lt. ZIAA	Type 2009 Carrier Fighter	27 9 9	Air control and		
	Gerongo	4 Fighter Striking Unit		Lt. 30390		9 9	Strafing Attack		

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STRATE PARA

## **EXHIBIT NO. 8-C**

#### GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 350.05 (4 Dec 45) GB

4 DECEMBER 1945.

Subject: Additional Data With Reference To Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor. To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C. (Attention Assistants Chief of Staff, G-2)

1. Reference previous correspondence same file number and subject and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec., 7 October 1945, and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, an additional partial report is forwarded herewith.

2. This report contains data in amplification of the original Japanese answer to question 14 of our questionnaire of 17 October 1945. A copy of this questionnaire was forwarded as Inclosure No. 4 to our communication of 26 October 1945, and the original Japanese answer to question 14 thereof was included in inclosure to our communication of 8 November 1945.

3. This report completes the series of partial reports obtained through the Liaison Committee (Tokyo) for the Japanese Army and Navy ,which series collectively provide all data available from known apanese sources on subjects listed in your radio WX 73711, War Sec., 7 October 1945. However, should additional data come to light incident to future investigations of Japanese conduct of the war, same will be promptly forwarded.

For the Supreme Commander:

/S/ E. D. Law, Jr. E. D. Law, Jr. *Major, AGD, Asst. Adj. Gen.* 

1 Incl: Partial Report in Answer to Questionnaire.

[1] 3543 B N. D. 406

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION

NOTE: Translation requested by Colonel MUNSON, G-2.

17 NOVEMBER 1945.

To: Colonel F. P. MUNSON

From: Rear Admiral NAKAMURA

Answers with reference to a letter to Rear Admiral Nakamura from Colonel Munson dated 10 November 1945

1. In the report sent by the HONOLULU consul-general to the Foreign Ministry, anything concerning the Navy was reported to the Intelligence Section of the Naval General Staff by that Ministry. These reports, it is recollected, were gradually increased in number as the relations between AMERICA and JAPAN became more tense.

The above reports by the consul-general were chiefly items concerning the general political and economic situation in HAWAII and the UNITED STATES as seen from HAWAII, items concerning the Japanese living in the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, and partly items concerning military matters. Thus, although there were things going on in HAWAII, as was reported at that time such as concentration of American fleet units in the PEARL HARBOR area and the considerable hastening of expansion of military installations in the HAWAIIAN area, to which great attention was attracted as compared with reports by diplomatic establishments located in other areas, it is recalled that there was nothing which required special surveillance as far as the data for an attack on the UNITED STATES fleet in HAWAII were concerned.

(Since the staff officer connected with the documents reporting the above facts has died and the various records have been burned, the foregoing is the conjecture of commander TACHIBANA, Tomo who worked in the same department at that time.)

The Intelligence Section of the Naval General Staff was having a most [2] difficult time judging the habits, strength, and security situations of the Ameri-

can fleet in the HAWAIIAN area. Owing to this, the Intelligence Section of the Naval General Staff had been for years compiling material by carefully collecting, making into statistics, and analyzing bits of information obtained from Naval officers at WASHINGTON, newspapers and magazines published in AMERICA, American radio broadcasts, signal intelligence, passengers and crews of ships stopping over at HONOLULU, other foreign diplomatic establishments. commercial firms, and the like.

The foregoing statistical method of estimation had been in use for a considerable length of time. Publications with information on important moorings within PEARL HARBOR had already been compiled.

Furthermore, if we were to go into the facts mentioned above more minutely, and if two or three examples which made a relatively strong impression were given, they would appear as follows:

A. American radio broadcasts 5 December 1941 (or 6 December 1941) (American time).

The UNITED STATES broadcast of the number of battleships, cruisers, destroyers, and others entering (or anchored) in PEARL HARBOR was overheard.

B. Signal intelligence.

According to the signals of the American ships, the number of ships and small craft of the UNITED STATES fleet anchored in PEARL HARBOR or out on training was deduced. Again by combining the flying time (judged according to signal situations) of airplanes shuttling between bases and aircraft carriers out on training missions, and the location of UNITED STATES fleet units as seen by passengers and crews of ships stopping over at HONOLULU, the training areas of the UNITED STATES fleet were determined. The zone, time, etc., of airplane patrols at HAWAII were deduced in the same way.

C. Newspapers and magazines published in the UNITED STATES

Material was obtained for deduction of AMERICA'S war preparation, progress and expansion of military installations, location and capabilities of warships and airplanes, army strength at HAWAII, PANAMA, PHILIPPINES and other places, etc. D. Observation submarines

With an observation submarine operating at a lessening distance outside the Islands, the sphere of observation of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS was gradually made smaller (It reached outside of PEARL HARBOR on 6 December-American time). Thus, the ships out at sea, ships at LAHAINA, the airplane patrols, etc., were ascertained.

The above submarine, while out at sea, did not discover an American fleet at sea or at LAHAINA, but met aircraft carriers and patrol planes.

The gist of ". . . and other general intelligence" contained in the last TT. items of the answer with reference to question No. 14, dated 17 October, was the reports for foreign diplomatic establishments, commercial firms in [3] foreign countries, etc., to the Foreign Ministry, the main store of the commercial firm, etc., chiefly on the general political and economic situation (some military matters included) of the country where the establishment or firm was located. These reports were not important enough from the standpoint of intelligence to have a special write-up, and were considered on their own merits.

## **EXHIBIT NO. 8-D**

#### GENERAL HEADQUARTERS

#### SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

#### AG 350.05 (13 Dec 45) BG

13 DECEMBER 1945.

Subject: Additional Data With Reference To Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor To: Chief of Staff, War Department, Washington, D. C. (Attention : A. C. of S., G-2.)

1. Reference Par 3 of our communication, same file number and subject dated 4 December 1945, and in further compliance with your radios WX 73711, War Sec., 7 October 1945 and WX 75561, 14 October 1945, requesting certain information to be obtained from the Japanese with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, copies of three (3) interrogations of Japanese Navy and Civil Officers are forwarded herewith.

2. These interrogations, obtained by Naval sources, are believed to provide further amplification of data previously forwarded.

For the Supreme Commander:

/s/ E. D. Law, Jr., E. D. LAW, Jr. Major, AGD, Asst. Adj. Gen.

3 Incls:

Incl 1-Interrogation Capt. Genda.

Incl 2-Interrogation Mr. Kase.

Incl 3-Interrogation Mr. Tanomogi.

[1]

#### [Copy]

#### NAVAL TECHNICAL MISSION

Place: FLTLOSCAP

Date: 28 Nov. 1945. Interrogation No. 10

Subject: Pearl Harbor Attack.

Personnel Interrogated: Captain Minoru Genda; Air Operations officer on staff of Admiral Nagumo during attack on Pearl Harbor. He was with Admiral Nagumo aboard his Flagship Akagi. Captain Genda was given the responsibility of planning the attack.

Interrogators: Captain Robinson and Captain Payton Harrison, USNR.

Interpretor: Douglas Wada.

Summary:

The idea of the surprise attack originated with Admiral Yamamoto during a conversation with Admiral Omishi of the 11th Carrier Division about February 1, 1941. Captain Genda was present at this meeting and remembers Yamamoto saying, "If we have war with the United States we will have no hope of winning unless the U. S. Fleet in Hawaiian waters can be destroyed." After some further discussion Yamamoto directed Onishi to draw up a plan for a surprise attack. Captain Genda was later called in by Onishi to draw up broad outlines for such a plan and determine its feasibility and possibility of success.

About September 1st map games were begun at the War College in Tokyo, to test the plan on the game board and work out all details connected therewith. The following Naval officers were the only ones who had knowledge of the plan and who worked on it at the War College at this time; Admirals Yamamoto, Ugiki, Naguno, Yamagushi, Okusaka; Captains Onishi, Genda, Kuroshima; Commanders Sasaki, Ono; following members of the Navy General staff: Admiral Fukudome, Captains Sanagi and Tonioka, Commander Miyo.

On about November 15th Admiral Yamamoto finally approved the plan and gave it to Admiral Naguno with orders covering the manner of its final execution. On November 22nd the striking force rendezvoused at Etorofu and departed on its mission at 0600 hours Nov 26th. A speed of from 12 to 14 knots was maintained and the Task Force fueled at sea whenever the weather permitted, in order to keep full tanks. The weather was stormy and refueling difficult. It was, however, because of the weather conditions prevailing in this part of the Pacific at this time of year that the northern route was chosen. They didn't expect to meet any shipping, and fog and stormy weather would impair visibility conditions, anyway. Twice after departure information was received from Naval General Headquarters in Tokyo giving the dispositions of the U. S. Fleet in Pearl Harbor. The second despatch on this subject was received three days before the attack, or December 5th.

[2] The green light to execute the attack was sent by Admiral Yamanioto from his Flagship the Yamato on December 2nd. The message was "NIITA KAYAMA NOBORE" and menas climb mount NIITAKA. This was the code phrase meaning "proceed with attack". There was an additional part to the message specifying X-Day as December 8th at the time this message was received, the striking force was near the 180th meridian at latitude 42. In the early morning of December 7th the Force was 700 miles north of Lanal, at which time it turned south and commenced the dash in at a speed of 26 knots. The following was the composition of the striking force;

6 Carriers with Akagi Flagship of Admiral Naguno.

2 Battleships; Hiei and Kiroshima.

2 Heavy Cruisers; Tone and Chikuma.

9 Destroyers with light cruiser Abukuma as flagship.

3 Submarines; I-19, I-21, and I-23.

Following is the number and type of planes used in the attack:

Fighters	81
Dive bombers	
Horizontal bombers	104
Torpedo planes	40

Total \_\_\_\_\_ 370

Of the fighters, 39 were kept around the Carriers as intercepters, in case the U. S. planes got in the air and made an attack. They went out in two waves about one half hour apart. At time of launching position of striking force was about 200 miles north of western tip of Lanai.

Several planes were sent early which got over Pearl about daylight and reported that the Fleet was in.

Surprise was expected, but if the U. S. Forces were on the alert and the attacked discovered, all attacking planes were to drive home the attack regardless.

A very close watch was kept on Hawaiian broadcasts by Commander Ono, Staff Communication officer. Admiral Naguno and his staff felt that they could sense from these broadcasts whether or not the Forces on Oahu had an inkling of the impending attack. They felt they could judge the tenseness of the situation by these broadcasts. Since KGU and KGMB were going along in their normal manner, Nagumo felt that our forces were still oblivious to developments.

For several days prior to the attack the Jap Force had been intercepting messages from our patrol planes. They had not broken the code, but they had been able to plot in their positions with radio bearings and knew the number of our patrol planes in the air at all times and that they were patrolling entirely in the south western sector from Oahu.

[3] The three submarines were placed in a line 100 miles ahead of the carriers for the final dash southward. Surface speed of these submarines was 23 knots. If they sighted any planes or shipping they were to submerge, get clear and radio the striking force as soon as it was safe to surface.

Everything went off according to plan. Total Japanese losses were 29 planes.

(Incl 2)

#### [Copy]

#### NAVAL TECHNICAL MISSION

Interrogation No. 9.

[1]

Subject: Information received by Ministry of Foreign Affairs from Japanese Consul General in Honolulu.

Personnel Interrogated: Mr. Toshikazu Kase, in charge of North American Section of Foreign Office at time of attack on Pearl Harbor. Undergrad work Amherst; graduate study at Harvard in international law, and relations 1928. Member of Foreign Office since late 1940. Became Chief of Section 1 (dealing with North America, i. e. U. S. and Canada) in October 1941. Held this post

Where Interrogated: Office of the Fleet Liaison Officer with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

for about a year.

Interrogator: Captain Peyton HARRISON, USNR.

Interpretor: Lt. (jg) S. E. SPRAGUE.

#### Summary:

Mr. Kase stated that he was personnally acquainted with Mr. Kita, former Consul-General in Hawaii. Prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor Mr. Kita sent

messages to the foreign office every few days informing it of the presence of units of the U.S. Fleet in Pearl Harbor. Although the Foreign Office received these wires, they paid little attention to them. Instead, they passed them right along to the Navy Ministry. Mr. Kase believes that all these despatches have been destroyed. At the time of receipt these despatches were not considered of any significance by the foreign office, but were considered just a matter of routine. However, "in the light of after events", Mr. Kase "can look back and see that Kita's telegrams had some significance". The foreign office was very busy with its negotiations with accredited representatives in Washington, and matters concerning the whereabouts and activities of the U.S. Fleet were not a matter of interest. Mr. Kase was busy sending despatches to Nomura and Kurusu and trying to improve the tense situation. The Navy department was not cognizant of these messages being sent to the foreign office representatives in Washington. The foreign ministry deliberately kept things from the Navy Department and vice versa. "Every Ministry had its own secrets". Mr. Kase had no recollection of the presence of a certain Mr. Morimura who arrived at the Consul-General Office Honolulu, in the spring of 1941. Mr. Kase "could not speak with authority" on the question as to whether or not Mr. Morimura could have been sent by the war or Navy Departments with special and secret instructions to Consul-General Kita.

[2] Q. What instructions were given Mr. Kita, Japanese consul at Honolulu, regarding transmission of information about U.S. fleet or military installations in Hawaii?

A. I don't recall any specific instructions he had. He may have had general instructions to be followed in case of disturbances because of the presence in Hawaii of many "hyphenated" citizens. After I became Chief of Section in October 1941 I don't recall any specific instructions being given him.

Q. We know that Kita sent messages to Japan before the outbreak of war concerning the U.S. Fleet. To whom were messages sent? Did you see them? A. They came through the Foreign Office and I saw them, perhaps without

knowing their significance. As far as I am aware, the Foreign Office gave him no specific instructions about sending such information. He made reports as a routine matter. Messages were addressed to the Foreign Minister.

Q. Those messages sent about the whereabouts of the U.S. Fleet; are any copies of these messages now in the Foreign Office?

A. No, I don't think so. When I left my section, I take it for granted my section had these telegrams. There were two successors to me since I left my office. Department buildings were destroyed in May. I doubt if copies of messages are there.

Q. Did Kita state every two or three days what ships were in Pearl Harbor?

A. I remember there were a few telegrams of that sort. I would put them aside. We were more interested in the course of negotiations. At that time we were intensely absorbed in negotiations proper between Tokyo and Washington. Such affairs as Kita's telegrams did not get much of our attention.

Q. Who was most interested in these telegrams?

A. I suppose the Navy Minister.

Q. Who would know whether such telegrams are available. A. The chances are they have all been destroyed, don't you think so? Very short telegrams, usually, not even occupying a full page. been burned. The Foreign Office served as a channel—we just had a look at them. We thought they were just matters of routine. In the light of afterevents, I can look back and see that Kita's telegrams had some significance. But we did not know at the time.

Q. Do you recall any trouble Kudo got into involving shipment of scrap iron? A. No. I don't recall him.

Q. Interrogator recounted l'affaire Kudo and its expose in newspapers.

A. Rather crude practice, wasn't it? I don't like to impugn his honor, but I don't think Mr. Kudo is one of our career men. I don't think that was done with knowledge of the Foreign Office.

Q. Boxes were addressed to Foreign Office in Tokyo.

A. Oh?

Q. Can you find out where Mr. Kudo is?

A. We can find out for you. I shall have his whereabouts found out.

Q. You say you were absorbed in negotiations at the time. You were [3] sending despatches to Nomura?

A. Yes, we were primarily interested in that. I was engaged in clerical work of the negotiations.

Q. Did Navy Ministry have knowledge of these despatches?

A. No, I don't think so. Some were kept secret from Navy Department. Every ministry has its own official secrets. The majority of telegrams were not given to the fighting services. They were not in a position to request that just as we were not in a position to request their despatches. The gist of negotiations and their progress were sometimes discussed at joint conferences.

O. We know Kita was sending telegrams. Who would have given him such instruction?

A. I don't know who would have given him such instructions.

Q. Couldn't someone in Navy Department have given him instructions without your knowing it? Wouldn't that have been possible?

A. (Hesitation.) It might have been possible. But not through Foreign Office by telegram. Every telegram to Kita had to pass through Foreign Office and be approved. I don't recall any specific instructions transmitted to Kita through Foreign Office.

Q. In the spring of 1941, Mr. Morimura arrived in Honolulu to assist Mr. Kita. Do you know Mr. Morimura?

A. I was not aware of his existence. I became Chief of Section in October 1941 and was deeply absorbed in the Tokyo-Washington negotiations. I really did not have time to learn about minor officials in all the consulates.

Q. Well, who would know of his existence and his work? Whose place did vou take?

A. Mr. Yuki, who accompanied Mr. Kurusu to Washington. I don't know exactly how long he was there before me. He is now councillor of embassy at Bangkok.

(At some point about here, interrogator described Morimura's activities.)

Q. Would it have been possible for the Navy Department to send Mr. Morimura to Honolulu?


A. I don't know. I can't speak with any authority. That was before my time.

Q. Who was Foreign Minister and Vice-Minister. A. Togo was Foreign Minister and Nishi was Vice-Minister. They assumed office in October 1941.

Q. Would it have been possible for Morimura to have had instructions from Navy Department to give to Kita? A. I'm not qualified to answer that question. I don't know anything about

this affair. I can't even say whether it was possible.

Foreign Minister-Togo Vice Foreign Minister-Nishi



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## EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON

## SOURCE DOCUMENT #1 "JAPANESE COMBINED FLEET TOP SECRET OPERATION ORDER #1" USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE "NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR" (Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

(EXTENDED AN A PART OF EXHIBIT #8 IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

SECRIT

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COMBINED FLEET . OP SECKE. OPELATION ORDER 1

Flagship NAGATO, SAEXI BAY 5 Nov 41

YANAMUTO, Isoroku Commander in Chief Combined Fleet

145 of 700 copies

COMBINED FLEET ORDER

Combined Fleet Operations in the War Against the U.I. 20 STATED, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS will be conducted in accordance with the Separate Volume. Combined Fleet Top Secret Operation Order 1

Separate Volume

#### Page Combined Fleet Operations in the War Against the 2/2 UNITED STATES, CREAT BRITAIN and the METHERLANDS

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I. Joint Army-Navy Agreement (Separate Volume) (TH Missing.)

II. Operations of the Combined Fleet in Case War with RUSSIA Begins during the War with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, the NETHERLANDS and CHIHA

A. Operation policy

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B. Allocation of forces

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III. Miscellaneous Regulations

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A. Time to be Used

- B. Charts to be Used
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Page I. COMBINED FLEET OPERATIONS IN CASE WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES, 2/7 GREAT BRITAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS BEGINS DURING THE CHINA OPERATIONS

A. Outline of Operations

1. In the east the American Fleet will be destroyed and American lines of operation and supply lines to the ORIENT will be cut.

2. In the west British MALAYA will be occupied and British lines of operation and supply lines to the ORIEST, as well as the BURMA Road, will be cut.

 Enemy forces in the ORIENT will be destroyed, bases of operations will be seized, and areas with natural resources will be occupied.

 Strategic areas will be seized and developed; defenses will be strengthened in order to establish a durable basis for operations.

5. Enemy forces will be intercepted and annihilated.

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Page 2/9 6. Victories will be exploited to break the enemy will to fight.

B. Preparations for War and the Outbreak of War

1. Preparations for the outbreak of war

a. The empire is expecting war to break out with the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS. When the decision is made to complete over-all preparations for operations, orders will be issued watablishing the approximate date (Y Day) for commencement of operations and announcing "First Preparations for War". The various forces will act as follows:

(1) All fleets and forces, without special orders, will organise and complete battle preparations in accordance with the allocation of forces for First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations of First Phase (DAI ICHI DAM) Operations. When directed by the commanding officers of the various forces, they will proceed at the proper time to the pre-operation rencessous and wait in readiness.

(2) All forces will be on strict lookout for unexpected attacks by the American, British and Wetherlands forces.

(3) The commandin; officers of the various forces may carry out such sucret recommaissance as is especially necessary to the operation.

\_(4) Pursuant to defense plans, 4th Fleet will begin mining the MAMPO GUNTO.

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Page 2/11

b. When the advance forces necessary for carrying out the operation have been dispatched to the area of operations, the order "Second Preparations for War" will be issued, and each force will act in accordance with the following:

(1) Submarine forces attached to the Advance Expeditionary Force (SEMKEN BUTAI), Striking Force, Commerce Lestruction Unit, Southern Area Force and South Seas Force, on orders from the commanuing officers of the various forces, will proceed at the proper time to the area of operations.

(2) Remaining forces, on orders from the commanding officers of the various forces, will proceed so as to be in position for the outbreak of war.

c. After the required preparations for war have been made, if the situation changes significantly, specified forces may be returned from "Second Preparations for War" to "Pirst Preparations for War".

2. The outbreak of war and the use of arms theretofore

a. The time for the outbreak of war (I Day) will be given in an Imperial General Headquarters order. The order will be given several days in advance. After OOOD hours, I Day, a state of war will exist. Each force will commence operations according to plam.

b. If a serious enemy attack is received before I Day, the following measures will be taken:

(1) Forces which are attacked will counterattack immediately. Before the X Day oriers are issued, counterattacks by base air forces will depend on Imperial General Headquarters Orders.

Page (2) After the X Day order is issued, all 2/12 forces will enter into a state of war and begin operations without waiting for special orders.

> (3) Prior to the issuance of the I Day order, the outbreak of war will depend on Imperial General Headquarters orders.

c. After "Second Preparations for War" has been ordered, military force may be used in unavoidable cases such as the fellowing:

(1) If American, British or Metherlands ships or airplanes approach the vicinity of our territorial waters and such action seems to create a danger.

(2) If our forces, while on the move outside our territorial waters, are involved in positive actions which appear to endanger them by forces of these countries.

- 3 -

X

7440 2/4

#### 6. First Phase (BLI INE MAS) Operations

#### 1. Operation solier

a. The Advance Expeditionary Force (SHEAN BUTAI) (TH "6th Floet" in pensil.), Striking Force (TH "lat Air Floet" in blue pensil.), South Seas Force (TH "4th Floet" in blue pensil.), Northern Force (TH "5th Floet" in indelible pensil.) and Main Body (TH "Combined Floet" in Elus pencil.) will operate against the American floet.

(TH Fertion of page out out and "Advance Expeditionary Force (SHMLEN SUTAI) .... and "Striking Force ...." inserted in blue pencil. Along with "South Seas Force" they are presumably subjects of the following sentence.) The South Seas Force will occupy and destroy important areas in the vicinity and will be ready for the energy fleet in the AUSTRALIA Area. The Hor therm Area Force will be responsible for patrols against SOVIET EUSBIA.

b. While maintaining local superiority, the Southerm Area Force (TH "2nd Fleet, 3rd Fleet, Southern Expeditionary Fleets and lith Air Fleet" in indelible pencil.) will annihilate energy fleets in the PHILIPPINES, British MALAYA and METHERLANDS INDIES Area. At the same time it will co-operate with the Army as follows:

(1) The operations against British MALAYA and the PHILIPPINES will be commenced simultaneously, and the energy air forces and fleets in these areas will be repeatedly battered by air attacks. Army advance expeditionary groups (SEMEEN HEIDAN) will be landed in strategic areas of MALAYA, the PHILIPPINES and British BORNED as quickly as possible. Air Forces will be sent to reinforce air operations.

Page (2) The results of the operations will be exploited, 2/15 and the main body of Army invasion groups (HEIDAM) will be landed in the PHILIPPIMES and then MALAIA in order to occupy their respective areas guickly.

> (3) During the early stages of the operations the strategic areas of the CELEBES, DURCH BORWEO and Southern SUMATRA will be occupied in the order named. The strategic areas of MOLUCCAS and TIMOR also will be occupied. Hecessary air bases will be prepared in these areas.

(4) As these air bases are completed, air forces gradually will be sent forward, and enemy air strength in the JAVA Page Area will be crushed. When this is accomplished, the main mody of 2/16 the Army invasion group (HEIDAM) will be landed in JAVA to occupy it.

> (5) After the fall of SINGAPORE the strategic areas of northern SUMAIRA will be occupied. Operations against SURMA will be carried out at the appropriate time to cut off the energy supply route to CHIMA.

c. If the American fleet attacks, 3rd Fleet and Southern Expeditio:ary Fleet will carry out Southern Area operations temporarily. The buck of combat strength will meet the attack.

d. An element (TH "245"" written in blue pencil.) of the Combined Fleet will destroy enemy sea traffic in the PACIFIC and INDIAN Ocean Areas.

e. In origr not to arouse the hostility of THAILAND Page and FRANCH INDO-CHINA, avery effort will be made to secure their 2/17 voluntary co-operation. But in the event of hostility, obstructions to our operations will be eliminated by force.

SECRET

#### 2. Outline of operations against the American floot

The elassification of operations and the outline of operations are established in the following table. Each force will operate in accordance with the elassification of operations indicated.

Page 2/17 2/18

SITUATION	CLASSIFICATION OF OPERATIONS	OUTLIER OF OPERATIONS
At Outbreak of War	(TH This portion out	out.)
At Outbreak of War (Situation complicated by using task force for attack)	Nethod 2 for opera- tions against Ameri- can fleet	<ol> <li>The Advance Expeditionary Force (SENKEN EUTAI) will reconnoiter and make a sur- prise attack on the Ameri- can fleet. If conditions warrant, air bases at HOWLAND, TUTUILA, FLMI, etc., will be attacked with appropriate forces.</li> <li>The Striking Force will pre- pare for the American fleet.</li> </ol>
In Case Ameri- can Fleet Op- erates	Nethod 3 for opera- tions against Ameri- can fleet	<ol> <li>The Advance Expeditionary Force (SEMMER BUTAI), Striking Force, South Seas Force and Morthern Area Force will operate against the American task force.</li> <li>If necessary, the Main Body will give support.</li> <li>If conditions warrant, an element of lith Air Fleet may be temporarily diverted to the east.</li> </ol>
In Case Ameri- can Fleet Pro- ceeds to At- tack.	Method 4 for opera- tions against Ameri- can fleet	<ol> <li>The Advance Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI), Strik- ing Force, South Seas Force, Morthern Area Force and Main Body, deployed for interception, will operate against the American fleet. The decisive battle strength of Southern Area Force will join immediately to meet the attack.</li> <li>Southern Area operations will be continued oy 3rd Fleet, Southern Expeditionary Fleet and fighters of 11th Air Fleet.</li> </ol>

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3. Outline of Southern Area Operations

Southern Area Operations will be based on the operation policy and on the agreement between Commander in Chief, Combined Flext and Commanier in Chief, Southern Area Army. The Southern Area Force Commanier will direct the operations unless otherwise ordered.

- 5 -

SECRET 4. Operation periods

First Phase (DAI ICHI DAM) Operations will be classified as follows. Changes will be by special order.

.

a. First Period (DAI IKXI) Operations: I is period will cover operations from the outpreak of war until the main body of the invasion army has been landed in the PHILIPPISES.

b. Second Period (DAI NI KI) Operations: In general, operations from the First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations until the Page 2/20 main youy of the invasion army has been landed in British MALAYA.

c. Third Period (JAI SAN KI) Operations: Operations from the end of the Second (JAI NI KI) Period Operations to the completion of the occupation of the NETHERLARDS EAST INDIES.

5. Allocation of forces

Allocation of forces \_uring the First Phase (DAI ICHI UAN) Operations will be as follows.

a. Allocation of forces for First Period (DAI IKEI) Operations - Separate Table 1

b. Allocation of forces for Second Period (DAI NI KI) Operations - Separate Table 2

c. Allocation of forces for Third Period (DAI SAN KI) Operations - Separate Table 3

d. Allocation of forces for interception operations -Separate Table 4

D. Second Phase (DAI NI DAE) Operations

Page 2/21

1. Operation policy

a. The Advance Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI) will continue to make recommaissance raids on the American and British fleets. These fleets will be attacked by base air forces, carrier air forces, etc, at opportune times.

b. American and British lines of operation and supply lines to the OdIENT will be cut in order to strengthen the defenses of strategic areas.

c. Enemy forces in the waters under our control and remants of the enemy in occupied areas will be mopped up in order to secure resources and protect sea traffic.

a. If the American and British fleets attack, they Page will be destroyed individually by taking advantage of inner lines 2/22 of defense.

> e. Operations to destroy American and British sea traffic will be intensified.

2. Important points which must be defended and advance bases in occupies territory

a. Important points in occupied territory which must be defended are as follows:

MANILA, DAVAD, SINGAPORE, BATAVIA, SOERABAJA, TARAKAN, BALIKPAFAN, MEMADO, MAKASSAR, AMBON, PENANG, RABATL. (TW DAVAO and MEMADO emphasizes by blue pencil circles.)

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b. Advance bases in complet territory are expected to be as follows:

#### MANILA, SINGAPORE, SOERABAJA

Page 2/23

#### 3. Areas expected to be occupied or destrayed

The following are areas expected to be completed or destroyed as quickly as operational conditions permits

- a. Eastern MEW GUINEA, MEW BRITAIN, FIJI and SAMOA
- b. ALEUTIANS and MIDWAY
- c. ANDAMAN Islands
- d. Strategic points in the AUSTRALIA Area
- 4. Allocation of ferces

The allocation of forces for Second Phase (DAI NI DAN) Operations is established in Separate Table 5.

The allocation of forces for interception operations will be based on Separate Table 4.

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B. Pretection of Sea Emefils, Destruction of Rasey Sea fraffie and Mine Marfare.

1. Operations to protect ees traffic

2/23

See traffic dill be protected as preseribed by force commanders, in accordance with the Plan for Erghechion of Martine Commerce (1901), in addition to the following:

SECTORS O	SECTORS OF RESPONSIBILITY	PACIFICIPAL DUTIES
Pailippines and Metherlands Met Jadies Fores	West of long 136°02'E (FE Add "excipating the defease area of 3 Mess Porce.") South of a lise pastag through the action of a lise pastag through the action of 315°	<ol> <li>Control of thip moreanests within analyzed sectors</li> <li>Matters related to escort of ships within assigned sectors</li> <li>Gethering and disseminating information 4. Control of commutanting information within assigned sectors</li> <li>Foreing and esconting alarms within assigned sectors</li> </ol>
Malay Porce	South of a line parsing through the arcthres edge of Marsharm accession at an angle of 315	
Forth Sean Force	Mast of long 13602'3 (#8 Add "plus dafease area of 3 Mase Force.") See area south of Lat 24"	
Arthern Force	See artes acrish of Lat 24 <sup>0</sup> See artes acrish of Lat 29 <sup>0</sup>	
Other Operational	All sectors of operation	Co-operation in the following matters:
		1. Destruction of energy forces in all sectors of operations
		2. Recort (Chiefly direct escort, depending on the elbastion or indirect escort)
		3. Commutestoss

Page 2/26

<sup>1</sup> MALIOF's Mote: Movieed by "errata" Asrued by Flag Secretery, Combined Fleet as <u>Combined Fleet Uniquescret Sarial</u>, Part 99, dated 17 Mov 41, aboard the MAGATO, AMELYAM.

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440 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

SECRET 2. Operations to destroy sea traffic

a. Policy

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Page

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The immediate destruction of vital points in the swa traffic of the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the METHERLANDS, combined with a checking of enemy forces, will aid our principal operations. We will endeavor to crush the enemy will to fight by gradually strengthening our efforts and by realising our size over a long period of time.

b. Outline for execution

(1) Seisure of enemy ships at the outbreak of wars Enemy ships will be seised, provided that our principal operations are not thereby impaired. Close lisison will be maintained with Imperial General Headquarters and with homeland combat forces (NAISER 6UTAI). Sectors of responsibility for each unit, in observation and seisure of enemy ships, will correspond in general to sectors of responsibility in 1, "Operations to protect sea traffic".

(2) The Commerce Destruction Unit, as prescribed by its commanding officer and as opportunities arise in the South Seas Area after the outbreak of war, willoperate between CLNFRAL and SOUTH AMERICA and AUSTRALIA. Depending on the situation on the west coast of SOUTH AMERICA, one element will proceed to the INVIAN Ocean Area and will operate between AUSTRALIA and AFRICA.

(3) According to the progress of operations and to what is prescribed by the Advance Expeditionary Force (SEKKEW BUTAL) commander, expeditionary forces not exceeding one submarine division will operate off the coasts of CENTRAL and NORTH AMERICA to the extent that the principal operations are not thereby himered. The Hawaiian Area Force will endeavor to cut rear lines of supply at every opportunity.

(4) One element of DesRons 4, 5, 6, and 7 at the end of First Period (DAI IKKI) Operations of First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations, will be assigned as directed by Southern Force Commanier to destruction of sea traffic off the south coast of JAVA and at the Western entrance to the MALACCA Straits. When southern First Phase (JAI ICHI DAN) Operations are completed, they will carry out a vigorous campaign of destruction of sea traffic in the INDIAN Ocean and AUSTRALIA reas.

(5) In the pause after First Phase (LAI ICHI LAN) Operations or when opportunities arise during operations, forces for destroying sea traffic will be strengthened and will operate vigorously with surface ships and airplanes.

3. Mine warfare

Concined Fleet mine warfare will be directed by individual force commanders, in addition to conformance with the following:

Page 2/30

#### a. Southern area of operations

(1) Standard practices in offensive mine warfare -Appended Table 1

(2) (Stancard) Summary of bases to be protected by mines and antisubmarine nets - Appended Table 2

(3) Summary of mine and antisubmarine supplies - Appended fable 3

- 9 -

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(4) Outline for establishin; mine barriers at the end of First Phase (DAI ICHI DAM) Operations - Appended Table 4

b. South Seas Area

The 4th Fleet defense plan will be followed and offensive mine warfare will be carried on as directed by the South Seas Force Commander.

c. When mines are laid or swept, the force commander in each case sill report positions of mines, navigable sectors, etc., to the proper authorities.

J. Declarations concerning the laying of mines

Declarations will be issued by Imperial General Headquarters, after being routed through Combined Fleet Headquarters; they will be issued chiefly as a threat to the enemy.

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rivet Period (DAI INC) Operations of First Phase (DAI IONI DAW) Operations.

			19551	в.	The ded		royer		:
SOLAN	To hinder passage of energy vessels.	To hinder passage of energy vessels.	<ol> <li>To kinder pasage change vielesr, de- stroyers, or sibmarisse.</li> <li>Nooring seales vill sead strongthand to vich- stand trong tide, our- rents.</li> </ol>	To hinder passage of energy orulaers, de- stroyers or summarines.	Mines will be laid according to the samey edtuation and is decided	by Southern Foros Com- muder.	To hinder passage of shear orulasse, destroyer or submarines.	To hinder passes of ensay orulaers, de- stroyers or submariaes.	To hinder passage of easey oruisers, de- stroyere or submithes.
TO ME LAD	Approximately 60	More than 80	300 te 500	300 to 500	Approximately 300	Approximately 300	Approximately 130	Approximitaly 600	Approxim tely 650
FORCES TO ME PART	Cas submarine from Subfor 6 (first stage) (sesond stage)	Oce submarthe from Subform 6 (first stage) One submarthe from Subform 6 (second stage)	71 VIG Tetal Gain of 1 008	· See 1 of Mine Layer Div 17		See 1 of Mine Layer Div 17	Two submarines of SubBon 6 (firt tage) One submarine of SubBon 6 (second stage)	One aftan layar of 9 Base Force	Ship No 3 of Mine Layer Div 17
100	X-1 - X 2+6 - X+8	X-2 - X-1 X+6 - X+10	9+X - 6+X	i I+3 = I+6	X+10	01+3	X-1 - X about X+12	X-1 - X mbout X-10	X-1 - X about X+11
BEA AREAS TO RE MOUDD	Area outeide MANILA Bay	BLIABHD BLIABHD BLIABHD	AMI MERIADINO Strofte	SURIDAO Streits	SULU Sea SIPIT Straits	JULU Sea PANLAAN Straits	3DIGAPORE Straits	Waters south- east of MAIATA (between TIO- MAN and DJIMAJA)	MATUM Channel JESSELTON COTITAS
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	SPANDAND PRACTICAN IN OFFENSING AND FRACTICAN IN OFFENSING MARKAN IN THE SOUTHING AIKA OF CONDUCTIONS Second Parton (Bill Will Domentions of Mired Phone (BAKE Edit Dial) Onsertions	PORCHAS TO ME USID	Submariane from Saldon 6	One mine layer of 9 Mare Pores Ship So 5 of Mine layer Div 17	During and after Daird Period (Dai JEES) Operations of First Phase (Dai IGHE DAE) Operations	PORCER TO DR UARD	Mine Layers of Mine .	One of tee sybmarines from Buildon 6 One mine layer from Mine Lay w Div I7	Une or 800 submarkmes from bublion 6	12
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Aupended Table I Peco 2/35 2/33

SUPPLINS Type 93 Mines - approximately 4,000 Type 58 Mines - approximately 220 (am additional 120 until about March 1942) Antisubmarine nets for 2 Mase Unit (EGHTOGHI) - one set	Type 93 Mines - avororiately 4,000 Antisubmarine nets for 1 Base Unit (KOWITOCHI) - ome set	ded ration Ourlist FOR ESTABLISSING WINE BARRIES AT THE END OF SOUTHERS FLAST (ICHI DAN) OFTAAFIONS Then the southern First Phase (ICHI DAN) OPPERTIONS and, who berriers will be laid, as shown beine, By making the SOUTE CHIMA	These operations will depend on special orders. Run Poaces to BE USED
11 about March 1942)		THEM FIRST PRAST (ICHI DAN) OFTRAFIONS be leid, as shown below, By making the	peolal orders.

First stage mine warfare will be intensified. To prevent penetration by energy submarines To prevent penetration by energy submarines . -----One element of Mine 1 9 Base Force Layer Div 17 2 Base Force 9 Base Force 5,000 1,000 <u>8</u> . ALACCA Straits CASPAR Stratte SUNDA Stratte · · · · · · · CARIMATA and

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Y. Communications 2/11 SECRET Poller

Combined Flest operational communications are based on Combined Flest Fireless Communications Regulations and on the <u>Joint</u> Arme-New Armemant Concerning Communications in <u>Southern Operations</u>. Is addition, they will conform to the following provisions.

2. Dispositions for communications

a. Dispositions at the outbreak of war

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Table 1 (base) communications - Appended Table 2 (refer to appended ahart) These dispositions will be changed in the future to most built conditions. The respective force communications will

Ship, submarine and airplane communications - Appended

to meet battle conditions. The respective force communders will change the dispositions for submarine and airplane communications as meeds arise.

b. Times for taking up assignments at the outbreak of war are as follows:

CLASSIFICATION	TIME	REMARK S
Communiontions Unit Communiontions	2400 hrs, I-8	After 2400 hrs, I-2 and until specially designated, 2nd China Expeditionary Fleet and Hainan
Ship Communications Submarine Communi- entions	2400 hrs, I-6	Guard District will be in the ship communications system.
Airplane Communi- entions	2400 hrs, I-3	
Communications for Specially Designated Forees	By special orders	÷π.

#### Notes:

1. For forces which must take up their assignments before the times set forth in this table, the respective force commanders will determine the time and report it to the proper authorities.

2. In some cases, one element will take up its assignment at a time differing from that of the remainder of the force.

#### 3. Communications procedure

a. Broadcasting will be the principal means of communication within an operational force. Acknowledgment will be required when there is uncertainty concerning receipt of the message or when confirmation is required because the message is sepecially important.

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2/13

b. Each force, at the direction of its commanding officer, will some into the short-range communications system of the necrest communications unit (TM Add "and into its broadcast communications system.")<sup>1</sup> (In cases of special necessity, it will come into the long-range communications system.) Communications dealing with transportation, supply, personnel and other communications not urgent from the standpoint of operations usually will come under this

IEditor's Note: Revised by "Errata" issued by Flag Secretary, Combined Fleet as <u>Combined Fleet Top Secret Serial 1 Part 99</u>, dated 17 Nov 41, aboard the NAGATO, SAEKI WAW. communications water. The Striking Force, Commerce Destruction Unit and other forces operating on special missions at great distances, when they set out from their rendesvous, will come under specially designated communications systems centered around the Tokyo Communications Unit (TOTSU).

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c. All communications units will relay to the proper authorities communications of operational forces within their respective areas. Relay usually will be by broadcast, and acknowledgments will be required when confirmation of receipt is especially needed. Relays of messages classified urgent or higher will be broadcast immediately, other important messages at the times indicated in Paragraph d, below.

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COMMUNICATIONS TO BE RELAYED
Communications of Striking Force, Commerce Destruction Unit and other forces under specially designated communications systems
Communications of submarine and airplanes under Southern Force
Communications of SubRon 5 and of airplanes based in PALAU within Southern Force
Communications of sirplanes and submarines operating in the SOUTH CHINA See Area
Communications of submarines and airplanes under South Seas Force
Communications of Advance Expeditionary Force (SENKEN BUTAI) submarines

#### Note:

Frequencies to be used in broadcasts will be as shown in d. When there is no danger of interferring with the operational communications of forces, frequencies of ships may be used.

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	0,100-1,600	30 minute inservale beginning at 30 minutes	J.,794 Eo	Communitervisions, as above, directed to advanced expeditionary (mutitus) submarized
	0,600-1,800	No minute intervale beginning at NO minutes part each orns lowr	3	Communications, as above, directed to builden & and Builden 5
Tables Committee that and Units (TATATER)	One test		7.155 Es (8A°27) 18.510 Es (8A°27)	Insurface the community of the operations directed to Somethers are
	20 miles to 10 miles	PO minute intervuls beginning at MS minutes east each hour	Prequencies used by builden 5 and builden 6	Important ecomonications directed to enhancing forees of Seatharn Perse
Jrs Commatestications Units (250)	Beginning of teach hour	Beginning of 30 minutes past	7.200 го (1447)) (12,560 го (11472)	Important communics these damines with sport tions directed to Mastern Area Furce of Samtharn Purce
Elat Commutes tiens Onts (TSU)	Beginning of	Beginning at 15 minutes past	7, 715 Ko (100° 77)	Important communications dealing with operations directed to South Class "as Area Porce
	20 minute to	20 atumbo integralo begiming at h5 atumbo past and bour	Trequencies used by Dalam h	Important communications directed to enhanciess of Bubliss &
5th Commutantians Units (2000)	Mermine at	Begraning at 15 minutes past	h, Bio Ee (114°61.) 9.720 Ee (114°62.)	Important communications directed by fourth Same Force and be forces operating is the ILIERI SHOFO
6th Computentions Date (200)	Beguarding at such hour	Begranting at M5 minutes past	5,990 Es (84411) 11,900 Es (84412)	Important communications directed to South Seas Porces and to Advanced Rupold tionary Forces (SHIRES BUTAI)
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k. Pokyo Commalest at sight, and b	rtions Unit (TO	red) and Takao Commaniontion 1 1600 kours, depending on c	as Dais (212,4220) vill branasis on p dironna banasa, they will make combin	Yadro Communications Dait (70789) and fabro Communications Dait (EAL2097) will branati on proceeded frequencies. Other maits will branati es des frequency at sight, and between 1000 and 1500 hours, depending on atronothemen, they will mis combined us of hear depine frequencies.
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directed 3 with requests or 5. As the stimution demands, these of broadmast may be sharged in accordance the respective areas.

buindle sharpes in broadcasting frequencies may be made by the commutantions units in secondance with cooks. (in much assess the proper authorities will be section in adverses.)

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e. When the Main Body is in the homeland area, transmission from the flagship of Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet will control the transmission facilities of the Tokyo and Kure Communications Units (TOTSU, KURETSU), or the Tokyo Communications Unit (TOTSU) will be assigned this work.

f. Communications outside the fleets

Except in cases of special urgency, communications will be effected by means of the communications system through the nearest communications unit.

4. Safeguarding communications

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a. Safeguarding frequencies

Coabined Fleet Top Secret Order 177, <u>Standard Control</u> of Frequencies Used During Operations, will be applied.

b. Safeguarding messages

(1) Code tables and call signs to be used are given as follows: Combined Fleet Top Secret Order 171, <u>Use of Codes;</u> Combined Fleet Top Secret Standing Order 52, <u>Table of Combined</u> <u>Fleet Special Wartime Call Signs;</u> Combined Fleet Top Secret Order 169, <u>Abbreviated Call Signs; Cor Exclusive of Strategic Information;</u> Combined Fleet Top Secret Order 179, <u>Table of Symbols Indicating</u> <u>impergency Classifications for Special Combined Fleet Communications</u>.

Page (2) Methods of safeguarding and distinguishing 2/51 deceptive dispatches: Combined Fleet Top Secret Standing Order 49, Methods of Safeguarding and Distinguishing Deceptive Dispatches.

> (3) Method of indicating dates: Combined Fleet Standing Order 51, Table of Combined Fleet Special Abbreviations for Dates.

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mathed 11 for indianting	CRIME® 11	Combined Flagt Abbreviated Code Table for Emergency Military Place Hames.	Emergeney was of GEINS® 10; used on special orders
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8	From the 16th to th	From the 16th to the and of odd-numbered months	

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From the let to the 15th of even-numbered months From the 16th to the end of even-numbered months Reserve (Depending on special ordere)

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SECRET ,

Utilising and interfering with enemy communications

a. Utilising enemy communications

(1) Intercept squade attached to each fleet will willise energy communications as directed by the commanders in chief of the respective fleets.

(2) Intercept squade attached to communications white will be assigned to utilisation of enemy communications in accordance with the following:

COMMUNICATIONS UNIT	OUTLINE
Tokyo Communications Unit	The unit will obtain information chiefly on movements of the American home fleet and airplanes; also on movements of Russian forces. Details to be prescribed by Commanding Officer, 1 Combined Commun cations Unit.
Takao Communications Unit	<ol> <li>The unit will obtain information chiefly on movements of American British and Dutch fleets and airplane in the FAR EAST.</li> <li>Details to be prescribed by</li> </ol>
	Commanding Officer, 1 Combined Commun cations Unit. 2. Depending on conditions, one
	element will come under the command of Commander in Chief, lith Air Fleet. 3. As the couthern operations
	progress, it will proceed to occupied sectors whenever suitable.
Other Communications Units	Under direction of Commanding Officer 1 Combined Communications Unit, they will gather operational information.

b. Interference with enemy communications will be

directed by the force commanders, except in cases of epecial orders. Each force commander (Commanding officer, 1 Combined Communications Unit), whenever conditions are favorable, will direct communications units in the area (subordinate communications units) to obstruct enemy communications.

#### Appended Table 1

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SHIP, AIRPLANE AND SUBMARINE COMMUNICATIONS

COMMUNICATIONS SISTEM	COMMUNICATIONS DISPOSITION	REMARKS
Ship Communi- cations		1. Flagship communications system frequencies used mainly by the flagship of the commander in chief of each fleet and by the flagship of specially established squadrons.
	Strategic Commun- ications 2 (2 SETSUHA*)	2. Ordinary short wave is used by the flagship of the commanding officer of a squadron and when especially needed by ordinary vessels.
	Frequency System 3 (DEMPA SOSHIKI) (3 TEM+)	3. Frequencies used in ship communications are mainly employed by Southern Force and those forces closely connected with it. Other forces use them
	Communication Classification 2 (2 KUN*) (Pleet or force co- ordinated communications)	for urgent communications. Now- ever, when the Combined Fleet is taking up interception (TGEMI) dispositions, their main uss will no longer be restricted to the Southern Force.
		4. Southern Force communi- cation classification is Classi- fication 3.
irplane communications	Frequency System 4 (DEMPA SOSHIKI) (4 TEM*)	
Submarine Communications	Frequency System 3 (DEMPA SOSHIKI) (3 TEN=)	The communications of Advanced Expeditionary Force (SENEEN BUTAI submarines will be determined by the community officers of the Advanced Expeditionar, Force (SENEEN BUTAI).

The use of day and night frequencies will conform with <u>Combined</u> <u>Fleet Wireless Regulations</u>, as well as with the following:

In the main, night frequencies will be used. If reliability of communications cannot be expected of night frequencies only, day frequencies also will be used.

Note: The symbol \* indicated the exact ROMAJI transliteration of the original KANA.

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TINU	-
COMMUNICATIONS	

2/61 COMMUNICATIONS AT	ATTACHED SHIPS	COMPUTERTIONS FREQUENCES	COMPLUATIONS FREEDENCIES (AC)	EQUENCIES (NC)		
STSTR	AND STATIONS		DISPOSITION 1	NOILLEOASID	~	REMARKS
		ORD TNARY	SUPPLEMENTARY	ORD INARY	SUPPLEMENTARY	
Communications System 1	Take o Communications Unit (T.K.1880) Torre Communications Unit (T.OrsU) 5th Communications Unit	6,505 (NA <sup>+</sup> 56) 3,010 (NA <sup>+</sup> 57)	5,550 (RI*51) 11,100 (RI*52) 7,590 (RI*75) 15,180 (RI*76)	6,505 (MA*56) 13,010 (NA*57) 5,550 (RE*51) 11,100 (RE*52)	7,590 (RE*75) 15,180 (RE*76)	
Communications System 2	3rd Communicationa Unit Takar Communications Unit (TAKATSU) Blat Communications Unit	6,760 (TA*25) 13,520 (TA*26)	7,155 (TA*27) 14,310 (TA*28) 7,750 (RE*77) 15,500 (RE*78)	6,760 (TA*25) 13,520 (TA*26) 7,155 (TA*27) 14,310 (TA*28)	7,750 (RE*77) 15,500 (RE*78)	
Communications System 3	3rd Communications Unit Toryro Communications Unit (Interfor) Sist Communications Unit	4,745 (TO*17) 18,980 (TO*19)	7,855 (NA*33) 15,710 (NA*34) 7,315 (RE*73) 14,630 (RE*74)	4,745 (T0°17) 15,710 (M4°34) 8,610 (RE°81) 17,220 (RE°82)	7,315 (RE*73) 14,630 (RE*74)	6th Communications Unit will anter this ocamunica- tions system in accordence with special orders.
Communications System 4	3rd Communications Unit 4th Communications Unit 5th Communications Unit 6th Communications Unit	5,180 (NA* 31) 10,360 (NA*15)	7,290 (MA*31) 14,580 (NA*32) 7,655 (NA*18) 15,310 (NA*19)	5,180 (RA*14) 10,360 (RA*15) 7,290 (NA*31) 14,580 (NA*32)	7,655 (KA*18) 15,310 (NA*19)	
Communiteetions System 51	Mainam Communications Unit (HAIRUANTSU) Takto Communications Unit (TAEATU) Blet Communications Unit	7,010 (HE*71) 14,020 (RE*72)	6,260 (RE*61) 12,520 (RE*62)	7,010 (RE*71) 14,020 (RE*72)	6,260 (RE*61) 12,520 (RE*62)	
Communicationa Bystam 6	Chicki Jima Communications Unit (CHICHITSU) 5th Communications Unit Marcus Island	5,725 [RI*14]	4,925 (RE*41) 9,850 (RE*42)	5,725 (RI*14) 11,450 (RI*15)	4,925 (RE*41) 9,850 (RE*42)	
communice tions gystem 7	Tathato Communicetions Unit (PSEC) (1952/0 Communicetions Unit (1973/0) (1973/0) (1974-2014) Communicetions (1974-2014) Communicetions (1974) Jian Communicetions (1974) Jian Communicetions (1974) Jian Communicetions (1974) Jian Communicetions	5,925 (Y0°17) 11,850 (Y0°18)	6, 300 (TAN*23) 12,600 (TAN*223)	5,925 (T0°17) 11,850 (T0°18)	6,300 (TMN*23) 12,600 (TMN*223)	
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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

. Matter's Note: The frequencies for Communications Sustee been corrected in secondance with changes given in Trrets" issued by Flag Secretary. Combined Flagt as Constinut Flag: Fop Jacret Sarial 1 Part 99, dated 17 Nov 41, should be MAGNO, SART MAN.

Editor's Note: Correction dariyad from same source.

gote: The symbol \* indicates an exact ROMAJI transliteration of the original KANA.

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Appended Table 2 (Continued)

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1. The times of communications will be as usual unless specially determined.

2. When sending and receiving conditions between shipe and stations in the same system are poor, an intermediate communications unit will be responsible for relay.

3. Unless otherwise ordered, Disposition 1 will be used. Subsequent alterations in dispositions or frequencies will be as prescribed by the Commanding Officer, 1st Combined Communication Unit.


4. Communications unit (base) communications in occupied territories, except where specially determined, will be as prescribed by the commanding officer of each force.

5. Reserve frequencies

5	085	(TA#14)
	170	(TA#15)
	325	(TO+23)
10		(TU#24)
5		(SA+25)
10,		(SA#26)
4		(90-71)
		(80472)
	,820	(10=73)
	030	(RE+11)
	,060	(RE=12)
	,120	(RE+13)
	,820	(T0+51)
	040	(TO+48)
	,665	(SA+14)
	,330	(SA#15)
		(SA#16)
		(TO+43)

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12,360 (TO\*44) Note: The symbol \* indicates an exact ROMAJJ transliteration of the original KAMA.



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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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SECRET G. Supply 2/65 Supply policy 1. a. Generally, each ship will replenish its fuel when it falls below 60% of capacity. If battle is anticipated, however, every effort will be made to maintain capacity. b. Ordnance, amunition, bombs, rations and stores will be replenished to capacity at every opportunity. 2. Outline of supply The allotment of bases of operations for the initial period of operations is established generally as follows: Ath Fleet. 5th Fleet. 6th Fleet - YOKOSUKA 2/66 1st Fleet, 2nd Fleet, 1st Air Fleet, forces attached to Combined Fleet - KURE 11th Air Fleet, Southern Expeditionary Fleet, 3rd Floet - SASERO b. The allotment of bases of operations and supply points to the supply vessels attached to each force is established generally as follows: Main Body, Striking Force, Advanced Expeditionary Force (SERKEN BUTAI), South Seas Force - IOKOSUKA, KURE and vicinity Southern Force - MAKO, TAKAO, SASEBO and vicinity Horthern Force - IOKOSUKA, UMINATO and vicinity Commerce Destruction Unit - any suitable place The allotment of supply bases is established generally 2/17 €. as follows: Horthern Force - PARAMUSHIRO, AKKESHI, WAKKAHAI, CHICHI JIMA, MARCUS Island South Seas Force SAIPAN, KNAJALEIN, Advanced Expeditionary ) WOTJE, JALUIT, Force (SEMEN BUTAI) TAROA, TRUK, FOMAPE, PALAU (Second Period (DAI NI KI) Operations and thereafter) Southern Force - PALAU (until First Period (DAI INKI) Operations have ended), SAIGOS, CAMPAIN The initial full allowance for supply bases and special supply points is as determined in Appended Table 1. d. As the operation develops, special supply points (special stores department and special air depot) will be set up 2/68 in occupied areas. They will be under the direction of the commanding officer of the forces in such areas. The following

locations have been chosen:

DAVAO
 TARAKIN
 BALIKPAPAN
 MANILA
 MAKASSAR
 SOERABAJA
 SINGAPORE
 BATAVIA

(8) BATAVIA
(9) PENANG

Page e. The various forces will be supplied by supply ships 2/69 attached to them.

f. If possible, supply bases will not be used to supply other than airplanes and small vessels. In particular, except in unavoidable cases, supply bases will not be used to replanish stocks of supply ships.

g. Supplies and stores for forces which have advanced into captured areas will be unloaded and transported by base forces (KONKYOCHI) (IN "Base forces" changed to "special stores department.")<sup>1</sup> in cooperation with forces in the area.

Page h. When several forces are to be supplied at the same 2/70 time, the senior commanding officer present will determine priority.

i. The assignment of supply shipe is given in Appended Table 2.

j. The rencezvous and subsequent movements of supply ships attached to the Combined Fleet are given in Appended Table 3.

3. Important supply matters

a. As shown in Appended Table 5, the Combined Fleet Supply Dept will direct the over-all planning of supply for the Combined Fleet and will keep in contact with Imperial General Headquarters and each base of operations.

Page b. The organization of the supply departments of the 2/71 various forces (fleets) will be determined by the respective force (or fleet) commander. The supply departments of the various forces (fleets) will supply the various forces (fleets) and will maintain contact with Combined Fleet Supply Dept, each base of operations and supply points.

c. When a force is supplied by a supply ship attached to another force (fleet) or by a supply base, a report will be sent to the commanding officer of the force to which the ship is attached or to the commanding officer of the supply base.

d. When the commanding officer of the supply base furniches considerable quantities and supplies to surface forces other than those for which he is responsible, he will submit a report on current stocks to Imperial General Headquarters, the commanding officer of the base of operations and Commander in Chief, Combines Fleet.

Editor's Note: Revised by "Errata" issued by Flag Secretary, Combined Fleet as <u>Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Serial 1 Part 99</u>, dated 17 Nov 41, aboard the NaGATO, SAEKI WAN.

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f. Commanding officers of supply bases and officers in obarge of special supply points will maintain a current inventory of stocks and requisition necessary items from the base of operations, taking into consideration stocks carried by the latter.

g. Force commanders (or commanders in chief of fleets) will indicate the quantities and types of military stores which must be carried on the supply ships. When supply ships are directed to a base of operations or to a supply point in order to restock, they will notify the commanding officer of the base (TM Add "or supply point.") regarding time of arrival and quantities and types of material required.

Page h. When stores on supply ships have to be replenished 2/73 or supplemented, the force commander (or fleet commander in chief) concerned will submit a report inucediately to Imperial General Headquarters and to Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet.

> i. Each force commander (or fleet commander in chief) will secure from the commanding officer of the base of operations the necessary information about the movements of and the types and quantities of materiel carried by supply ships which are dispatched as replacements or additions from the base of operations or supply base to the force (or fleet).

> > 4. Replenishment of supply ships and supply bases

Page a. Supply will be carried out in such a manner that the 2/74 various supply ships will not have to be restocked at one time. Supply ships will be restocked one at a time at a supply base or base of operations.

> b. Supply bases and special supply points usually will be restocked by Imperial General Headquarters or the commending officer of the base of operations.

Special orders will be issued to effect co-operation of supply ships of a force (or fleet).

The monthly replenishment allowances for supply . bases and special supply points are given in Appended Table 4.

## Page 2/75

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.5. Protection of ships

Then supply ships are to be dispatched, the force commander (fleet commander in chief) concerned will furnish suitable protection by forming a convoy, charting the course and providing escort. Supply ships attached to the base of operations will be protected in like manner.

<sup>1</sup>Editor's Note: Revised by "Errata" issued by Flag Secretary, Combined Fleet as <u>Combined Fleet Jlrasecret Serial 1 Part 99</u>, dated 17 Nov 41, aboard the NAGATO, SAEKI HAN.

APPended Teals I (gubetituted for previous page) 2/76

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Notes:

1. Ammunition and torpadoes are to be loaded on munition ships.

2. Mines will be handled as set for in Mining Operations, Appended Muble 3 (TW Above.).

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I indicetes plasss whare speciel supply points are to be sstabilahed. O indicates supply points whose owpwolty must be increased.

4. Expondable ouppilsh like fuel (heary oil, coal, eviation fuel) will be prepared.

ah MLMC and MKALIZIN one month's supply of air purifying mitarial and orygon will be prepared (MMLT - air purifying material 18,000, orygan 1,600; ZMANAZIN - air purifying material 30,000, orygan 3,000). \$

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460 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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Supply Porce		Will add SHINKOKU MARU, TOKI MARU (TN Insert SHIRIYA LARU.) <sup>1</sup>	Total 13 (TN Changed to 12.) <sup>1</sup>

1 Editor's Note: Revised by "Errata" issued by Flag Secretary, Cembined Fleet as Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Serial 1 Part 99, dated 17 Nov 41, aboard NAGATO, SABEL 4TN.

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
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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Appended Table 5

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# **SECRET**

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H. Operations Other Than Those of the Combined Fleet

1. Operations of forces at naval stations and auxiliary naval stations

a. These forces will strengthen the defense of strategic points, protect sea traffic and co-operate with the Combined Fleet or China Area Fleet in operations in the area in their charge.

b. Air forces and other necessary forces will be moved to the necessary places as conditions demand. They will be placed under the operational command of the commander in chief of the fleat concerned or of the commanding officër of the force at the naval station or auxiliary naval station in charge of the area concerned.

2. Operations of CHINA Area Fleet

Page 2/97

a. In general, the fleet will continue operations against CHIMA with its present strength. It will annihilate land forces and wrest control from them.

b. At the outbreak of war the force of which 2ND CHINA Expeditionary Fleet is the nucleus will co-operate with the Army to occupy HONGKONG and annihilate enemy forces stationed there.

c. The defenses and security measures within the occupied areas will be strengthened and sea traffic along the UHINA coast will be protected. At the same time every effort will be made to deny the use of the CHINA coast to enemy ships and airplanes.

d. It will co-operate, as the occasion demands, with the Combined Fleet and Southern Army in escorting Army surface transports and in defending assembly points.

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II. OPERATIONS OF THE COMBINED FLEET IN CASE WAR WITH RUSSIA BEGINS DURING THE WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN, THE NETHERLANDS AND CHINA

A. Operation Policy

1. The operations against the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS will be modeled generally after the operation policy set forth in I.

The policy for operations against RUSSIA will be as follows:

a. In the event war breaks out during First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations

(1) For the most part, 5th Fleet and the homeland combat forces (NAISSE BUTAI) will be changed with defense. They will protect vital sea traffic along the coast of JAPAN and will protect strategic areas from air attack.

(2) Thereafter, as quickly as southern operations and operations against the American Fleet permit, elements of light forces and air forces will be diverted to operations against RUSSIA.

The operations described in the above paragraph thus will be strengthened.

SECRET In the event war breaks out after the completion b. of First Phase (DAI IGHI DAN) Operations.

The greater part of 5th Fleet and one element of the light forces will be shifted to operations against RUSSIA. Russian fleet in the ORIERT will be immediately annihilated. The Pressure will be brought to bear along the coast of Russian territory in the FAR MAST. In co-operation with the Army, these forces will destroy energy air strength in the MARITIME Province and USSURI Province, and occupy VLADIVOSTOK and other strategic points in the FAR LAST.

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Page

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B. Allocation of Forces.

Separate Table 6 (Will be sent later) (TH Missing.)

C. Operations Other Than Those of the Combined Fleet

1. Operations of forces at neval stations and auxiliary mayal stations.

a. The naval stations at IOKOSUKA, KURE, SASEBO and MAIZURU and the sumiliary naval stations at OMINATO, CHINKAI and Port ARTHUR will strengthen security measures against Russian submarines and airplanes and will annihilate them if they appear in areas under their jurisdiction.

b. When the outer combat forces engage in active operations, air forces and other necessary forces will be transferred to the necessary points and will co-operate in these operations.

2. Operations of the China Area Fleet

The force which has I China Expeditionary Fleet and 3

China Expeditionary Fleet as its mucleus will cover the movements of the Army forces which will be diverted from central and northern CHINA. It will escort these forces during transport at sea and deploy suitably.

III. MISCELLANEOUS REGULATIONS

A. Time to be Used

Central standard time

B. Charts to be Used

Charts (charts of military places) to be used are as followst

Page 2/102

CHART (CHART OF MILITARY PLACES)	USE (ON SHIPS)
Navy Ultrassoret 347 Chart of Military Places in PACIFIC Ocean	For use in general operations (ships)
Special Chart of Military Places	<ol> <li>For use in joint Army-Navy operations</li> <li>For use in operations in merrow waters</li> </ol>

- 4 - -



Charts for general operations in the MALAY Area will be established separately. (IN This note subsequently has been deleted.)<sup>1</sup>

C. Identification of friendly and enery forces

The identification of friendly and energy forces will be based on <u>Combined Fleet Destring</u> and the following:

Identification between Navy ships and Japanese merchant shipping (including transports and ships attached to the Army) and between the various Army and Navy land installations (including forces) will be in accordance with <u>Signal Acgulations for Identifica-</u> tion of Japanese Ships in Martine.

(TN Insert "but, in oda-numbered months wethod 1 sill be followed, in even-numbered months wethod 2.") (TN Add "identification among sirplenes will be based on the <u>Joint Army-Mary Agreement</u> <u>Conserving Heptification of Friendly Military Airplanes.</u>)

<sup>1</sup> alitor's lote: ....vised by "Errata" issued by Flag begretary, Combined Fleet, as <u>Combined Fleet Ultrasecret "wrial 1 Part 99</u>, dated 17 Nov 41, abourd the NAGATO, MAKKI WAN.

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	<ol> <li>Will small a dama when the state of the state and the state state of the s</li></ol>	2. Anno operation middle ( and ) and antibaction (first), and (first) antibaction (first), and (first) antibaction (first), antibaction (first), antibaction (first), antibaction (first), and (first	
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Separate Table 1 (Continued)

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Forse Supply Unit	5th Fleet	5th Floot Anartern Argroup CHICH TMA Commaletions CHICH TMA Commaletions (TH "Mine land steat plane from This land steat plane Thise ourgo allys	<ol> <li>Will patrol and defauld 2. Will patrol the poule 2. Will patrol the poule of the Strifter force and of the Strifter force and 5. Will the security measures against MOSSIA.</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>Will operate in accordance the principal days.</li> <li>In Operation Mathod 1 against American Fleet, land atteck planes from Kisarten Airgroup dill patrol the route of the Striking (Bases will be BOXANDO and MARCUS Island.)</li> </ol>	As directed by command- ing offloer.
Commerce Destruc- tion Unit	CO 24th Bquedron (SERTAI)	24.s One eargo ship	Will destroy ean traffic.	Will operate in accordance with the Outline for Sea Traffic Destruction Operations.	MANERO GUNTO
Commiss- tions Force	CONTRACT CONTRACT Defined Contract Dations	1 Unit (leas CHICHL JIMA) of 1 Combined Communications Unit	Operetional comunications. Comunications intelli- gence.	Operational communications. Will operate moording to F, Communications intelli- gence.	The various places where stationed.
Attached Forces	10	Bes 2 of OarDir 4 CHIYODA SETTSU TALAZE	Will be appointly ordered.	Will be established separately.	We stars part of INLAND SEA.
		11 transports (TH Changed to 11 transmorts.)	Will furnish supplies for operational forces.	Will operate according to G.	

The operational boundary line between Southern Force and South Sees Force will be the boundary of BEITISH and DUTCH NEW GUINEA. MI AND "Band mine land attack planes from TOMO AU".) will be under the operational command of CinC Combined Fleet after J-Day. The division of strength within the various forces may be obanged appropriately. Morthern Force area).

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2/106 PORCE	COM	COMMANDING OFFICER	ETONIE S	A THE LAST DUTY	SHOLSWEED IN INITION	<b>BRARKS</b>
Mais Body			<pre>metDiv 1 metDiv 1 metDiv 1 metDiv 2 metDiv 7 metDiv 2 metDiv 2 metDiv 7 metDiv 2 metDiv 3 metDiv</pre>			
Teak Force		CinC Let Air Fiant	l Air Flact (lass & CurDiv, des- troyer division) DesDon 1 (lass three DesDive) MatDiv 5 (lass Sas 2)	•		
Sepply Unit	1		One DeaDiv of Deskon 2, ALCOUND Six trais vessis	Contiountion of First Period (PAI 1883) Operations	(PAI IMMI) Operations	
Advanced E1- peditionary Force		Cind 6th . Fleet	6 Flast Sir train veseele			
Unit						
Force Force		CLMD 4th Fleet	<pre>%th Flast %th Flast Ded Youts of lat Combined Com- munications Usit munications Usit neonor</pre>			
Bupply Unit			EXTISU/ (TM Groemed ont in panoil.) 22 train vessels			
	feel benideo0		Cruthr 4 Sae 2 Thattyr 3 Car 2 Thattyr 3 Can Paulyr 4 Tana Sae 2 Can Paulyr of Paulon 1 Can Paulyr 4 Paulon 1 Aburt 1, Autt Autt Aburt 1, Autt Autt Aburt 1, Autt Autt	<ol> <li>Continuation of First Found (11 IRC) Oper- seried (11 IRC) Oper- sition, apploited atta operation</li> <li>Conversa Conversa at mas and invalue of forms.</li> <li>Investor forms.</li> <li>Investor forms.</li> </ol>	<ol> <li>Phillippiae operations forces will be required and understand and the revealed of a mirror bind of the revealed of a mirror bind of and a many fib while the Mirror at Privachul JODES Ava will be indvatited.</li> <li>Risser of the mirror of the Layer force ail and the mirror of the mirror of the mirror of the Layer force ail and the mirror investigation.</li> </ol>	AIF Flot 12 will be midded to before the before the lunding uf the mels willAT in-
Air Porce	0440	Cind 2nd Flast	<pre>Il Air Flast (less AirFlot 22) and 36 stack plunes; Two battalions of special mavel landing party</pre>	*. Defense of occupied ray points in the PHILIP- FINES	ares off month JAA to observe and ettack sharp, ships, diarupt mea traffic and lay mines. J. Kay points of the markEnAldS J. Kay points of the markEnAldS	TOFO.
Foree	8		SubRon 5 (lass one SubDiv)		tacks in the following order: (a) MENALD, TARAKAN: (3) BALLE- DIANN FRANKAN: (A) BALLE-	
Retberlande Lodies Force	eţe		<pre>Jrd fleet (less one elament) CruDiv 5 Dealog 2 (less one destroyer Afvision)</pre>		MARKASSAR, and If the situation requires SOBAVD, AMBOR and EODPAN.	
			Design % (less one destroyer division) division) fight petrol craft		<ul> <li>the stripted stripted by the time of the LUCENES Area by the time of the ladding of the smin MALAY inve- sion forcose.</li> </ul>	
Pairi ppicare Force			One element of Jrd Fleet (TH Crossed out in peoril) Jrd Boutharo Krpeditionary Fleet (TH Leeored in peocil.)			
Malay Force			Lat Southere Expeditionary Fleet GruDiv 7 Deskon 3 Air*lot 12 Sec 2 of 178 (1W Creased out in peopl.)			

# EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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Artoply Unit 6		35 train vessels			
Ber thern Joree Bauply Dails	ctad 5 Pleet	5 Fleet KISALATSU AIT Group GIGHI JIAN Commint cations Wait (GEIGHISEN) Fire train resols			
Commerce Destruction Unit	00 24 Berunduron (STERTAL)	24 geo Das trais vessi			
Commission to the Commission of the Commission o	00 1 Combined Communition tion Unit	I Unit (less GHIGH JIMA Communi- cetions Unit) of 1 Combined Com- munications Unit	Continuentics of First Period (DAI 1421) Operations		
Attached For ces		800 2 of CarDiv W BLODA STRUDA STRUDA STRUDA TALLA 13 transports			
Jote		Same as for First Period (BAI IEC) Operations	Operations		

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ALLOGATION OF POROND FOR THIES PERIOD (BAI BAN EE) OF FRATIONS OF 71 ST PEARE (BAI LORT BAN) OF BRATIONS

(Wp to end of Southern First Phase (DAI IGHI DAN) Operations)

	POROB	604	MANDING OFFICIE	STIMBOUN .	PRINCEPAL BUTT	OFFLIDS OF OFFLIDS	EBRANE
Hain B	*		<b></b>	B-tHiv 1 Floot (loss BatHiv 3, GruDiv 6, Dealon 1 strongt ton Dealive, Beales 3)			
Shriki	Bapply Walk		Bind 1 Air Floot	1 Air Floot (1000 Ger- Dir 5) Ballir 3 (1000 Bos 20 GruDir 5, Dealtm 1 (1000 Swe Dealtwe) Six train voscele	Continuation of Second (DAI WIKI) Operations	Periol	
Advano Taree	ed Expeditionsury Supply Dais		GLAG 6 Flort	6 Floot Six transports			
South :	Same Force Supply Unit		01mC \$ 22.005	Bth Flost GraDiv 6 JMETEU (IN Grossed Mat.) 2 Unit of 1 Compleme Communications Unit 22 Evain vessels			
prethe	ra 70 ma	Bind Dockinet Fleet	Jind 2nd Floot	AraDir b Fro DesDirs of Des- Ens & Gribt b (Less Sec 2) d Sec of BabDr 3 AMATURI AMATU	1. Continuation of Second Ports: (Dal BILI) Operations, exploiting totals successes 2. Convering of the each Java and Busstre invasion faces 3. Disruption of twerfic in the Streits		
A.	ir Pores	9		11 Air Fleet (less AirFlet 22' and 36 attack planes) fro bettaliens of eyecial moval land- ing party	of MALACOA and the eress south of JATS and SUMAFELA		
	abmarine Force			Baldon 4 Baldon 5 Paldon 6			
	otherlanda ladice ores			3 The et (loss and alexant) Gradin F Dealow P Dealow R (loss two dealtraper divi- einme) Airflet 11 Hight mirel areft			
	hilipplass Yores			One element of 3 Fleet			
-	alay Perce.			Southern Impeditionary GruDiv 7 Float Dealan 3 AirFlot 22 35 attack ploase ASAN DEALED			
	upply that			35 trois vemels		1	1

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Separate Table 3 (Continued)

ALLOCATION OF FORCES FOR THIRD FERIOD (DAI SAN KI) OPERATIONS OF FIRST PHASE (DAI IGH DAN) OPERATIONS

(Up to and of Southern First Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations)

FORCE	COND	COMMAND ING OFFICER	STRENGTH	PRINCIPAL DUTY	OUTLINE OF	REMARKS
				•	OPERATIONS	
Morthern Force		CinC 5th Fleet	5th Fleet KISARAT3U A17 Group GHICHI JIMA Communi- Cations Unit (CHI-			
Supply Unit	J.0		CHITSU) Five transports			
Commerce Destruction Unit	rueg Ljeu	CO 24 Squadron (SENTAI)	24 9** One train vessel			
Communications Force	tomoð Snið	CO 1 Com- bined Communi- cations Unit	1 Unit (less CHICHI JIMA Communications Unit.) of 1 Com- bined Communications Unit	Continuation of 3econd Period (DAI NI KI) Operations	d Ferlod	
Attached Forces	-		360 2 of CarDiv 4 SFTTSU CHITODA YAXAZE 13 train vessels			
Notes	Combin	ed with First Peri	Combined with First Period (DAI IXXI) Operations			

The symbol \*\* after a conventional sign or abbreviation indicates that this is an axect reproduction of that appearing in the original document. 49 Note:

ALLOCATION OF PORCES PUR IN NUMBER ( PORCE)

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-	Strength	BeiDfe 1 Lef Timet (laee BeiDir 3) CRIYODA AirFlot 11	<pre>construction a 24 Fact restruction and and construction a 24 Fact restruction and construction and and fact. construction and f</pre>	<pre>ct citle the fleet [1] find ender iii be inter- tions and the properties of the interface there and the properties of the interface representation into the interface of the properties of the operation of the representation of the operation of the rest and the rest inter- tions and the interface of the inte</pre>	9th First. (13540471) Types are any entry for an and and and and and and and and and
PUBLICATION ACTION - 2 (Other matters will be an prepried by Worttas.)	Strangth ; Outline of Gperations	Settr 1 Support tilb effera the antiper state of Afrees 14 These force by marine a works force by marine a team force of a setting for a opprovide time. Attriot 11	2nd Freet Seame or Altheetica in Pregnantion for Battin 3 Decision Action - 1 Cambie 4	<pre>ull Flagt 1. One Dismet club channel club channel buildon 7 cperete 10 the base and 5 shoo 5 service sint crossin club club club club club club club sint club club club club club priver action the store force, and couldren tion force and couldren the store force, and couldren the store force and store the store store stor</pre>	Alt Group) Alt Group)
ALLOCATION IN PERPARATION TO 2 INCIDENT ACTION - 1 (Other matters will be se preserving by forevise.)	Outline of Uperations	Strike monthy still be rein- tiant in the waters part of the Mikub Sas and the attra operation sported. Develope operation is stilled. a active will be and at an opproversite time.	Mugnet till be redered the operation of South Mane Torse and the pyrop- rate time and the pyrop- rate time to operation. A main operation. A main operation. A main article and a data the artective and data the artective and data was distant.	1. Partol and defense will be constructed and defense will be constructed and defense will be constructed any and and and and and any and and and and any and and and and any any and and and any any and and and any	The start is a sequencial and a sequencial and a sequencial and a second second and a second second and a second second and second a
FOR I	Strangth	BetDiv 1 Let Fleet (Lee BetDiv 3) GHIYODA AirFlot 11	2nd Fleet BatDiv 3 CarDiv &	4th floot Subbon \$ Subbon 5	Sth Freet (III SAMATSU ALF OFOUP)
PRINCIPAL		1. Support of tectre gystre- tione. 8. Desteive ection.	1. identing and destroy- ing soury teak (inve- sion) force. 2. Decisive setion.	1 Defense of pstrol of try sec- tions of sec- tions of sec- dharge. 2, Locating and destroy- lag secry test (irea- stoc) force. 5, Booistre stion.	1. Defeose by settors of set tree of set tree 1. Lotte thaffe. 2. Losting 2. Losting 1. A set of 3. Defeive- sion free. 3. Defeive-
FORCE COMMANDING		/ last	7 1aos		P 1495
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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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ALLOCATION IN PARPARATION POR DBOINTY ACTION-3 (Paber Will be as	pressribed by doctrime.)	Outline of Operations		Same as Allocation-2	Bame na Allocation-2	Sume rs Allocation-2							
ALLOCATION POL DOCI (Other mail	preseribed	Strength	Eight patrol eraft One slement of 11 Air	71 ee 1 24 3ee	1 Combined Communi- cations Unit	STRAPOL &	f Joros						
MALOGATION IN PERFAMATION POM IMCISITS ACTION-2 (Other mattern will be no	I want and a most rate of	UNITIME OF OPPERATIONS Strength		Same me Allocation-1	Base as Allocation-1	Seme se Al'ocetion-1	brantics of the Striking		MANSHALLS Aree; one Aree; one Jeto Aree; one	are used to	. (DAI ICHI DAS)		that af that measured
			Bight patrol arafs One alsons of 11 Air	24 See	1 Combined Communi- cetions Unit	Train.	rations, the f		element - the sent - SairAH r element - T	aft carriers	in Piret Pha		Tect renewa
AlloCATION is Prevaling To Decision Anti- (Obs. Decision Anti- (Obs. Anti- prevaling Anti- prevaling Anti- prevaling Anti- prevaling Anti- An	Outline of Operations			la socordamos «ità Outliam for Sea Traffic Destruction Operationa			rst Phase (DAI ICHI DAM) Ope.		Then the energy is structing in the MASSMALLS Area: the major element - the MARSMALLS Area; one Determinant of the structure of the Area: The first first and MASSMALL Area: the major element - SAITAM Area; one Determinant - TAUR on MASSMALLS Area: and Office the structure area; Determinant - MARCMS followed; Arman and Office theorem.	Deployment depends on the seift soift of the MICONSTL. However sircraft carriers are used to shift fighter place units.	in the slloc-tion of forces	a of listed above.	n indicates that this is as
ALLOCATI PON DI (Other meant)	Birneth	The second second	ALT PLAN	24 500	1 Combined Communics tione Umit	Treis	atione during Fi. rder.	10 <b>0</b> 1:	attacking in the land, SAIPAM and ettacking in the attacking in variant MAMASHALIS Areas attacking in variant teinad, SAIPAM an	is wift wolft of is.	o is the same as	for other force	n or abureviatio
PRISCIPAL DOTI				Disruption of eas traffic	Operational communications and communications intelli- gence (fSUSEIN CHOMO)	Sumly	<ol> <li>These obtaching to these allocations during First Phase (DAI IGSI DAU) Operations, the formation of the Striking Force will be revised by special order.</li> <li>Outline of deployment for the hase air forces:</li> </ol>	a. Deployment arage as follows:	<ol> <li>Then the entry is standarding in the MLHSTMLIP Area: standard-MLHSU(S) signal of ALPAN and TEDT Areas.</li> <li>Then the sharp is standarding the ALAMAL Area; U (s) then the sharp is standard Areas.</li> <li>Then the sound is standard areas.</li> <li>Then the sound is altacting in maters asst of Jaka standard - MLGUS feiland, AlFAM and OHIMNO Areas.</li> </ol>	b. Decloyment depends on the shift fighter place units.	<ol> <li>The evaluations of auchiv abins is the same as in the vilocrtich of forces in First Phase (bai [CHI Dus) Operations.</li> </ol>	<sup>4</sup> . Special orders will be issued for other forces out listed above.	Bote: The symbol ** mft.r convectioned sign or aburevisiton indicates that this is as even.
ONWARDING OFFICIES				00 24 Jerudron (STUTAL)	00 1 Combined Communi- Communi- Communi- Communi-	Under Direct Command	lotes				<i>p</i> ,	3	ote: The sy
Polici				Commerca Destruction Unit	Communicat- CO 1 fors Forces Combined Communi- cetions Dails	Faroes							1 a

# EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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		(1)	ALLOCATION OF FORCES FOR SPCT	ND PHASE (DAI SI DAI) OFERATIONS Tirst Phase (DAI ICHI DAN) Operations	ов)	규
PORCES	COMMANDING OFFICER				OF OF OF ELATIONS	IRALI
Body			BatDiv 1 1 Floot (less SetDiv 3 and CruDiv 6)	Summert of entire operations.		
Advance Force		inC Fleet	2 Fleet BetDiv 3 CarDiv 4	1. Support of operations of Forthern, South Seas and Southern Furces-		
Carrier Air Force	1	in0 Air leet	1 Air Fleet (lese CerDiv 4)	2. Destruction of enemy task force.		
Advanced Broed- itionery Force		inC Fleet	6 21002	Continuation of First Phase (DAI ICHI DAS) Operations.		
Bees Air Fornes	1	iaC 1 Air 1est	11 Air Floot (less one ele- ment) Two bettalions of special navel landing perty.	Fairol of Becessary areas; base air combei.		
Southern Farce	3	inC Fleat	3 Fleet 1 Southern Expeditionary Fleet (FT Estered in pencil.) 3 Southern Expeditionary 9 bloc b 9 bloc 5 Afrif Sui Asaii WARD Fight patrol planes Fire bettellous of special mary Landing perty ASANI	<ol> <li>Morping ap of snewy remains in dormpied kay areas; checking of snewy posstration; disfesse and stabilistion of kay points.</li> <li>Disruption of snawy sea Kraffic off northeset onset of AUSTRAILS and in INDIAN Ocean.</li> <li>Depending on the situation, attacks on ensay air bases in northern AUSTRAILS.</li> </ol>	•	
South Seas Force		inC Fleat	MTROTO One element of 11 Air Flees & Flees GraDiv 6 AirFloi 11 2 Unit of 1 Gomeined Communications Unit	<ol> <li>Fatrolling and strengthening of dafasses in Sonth Same Area; securing and garrisoning of occupied kup points.</li> <li>Attacks on key points in the BloakdKK Archipelage and BEITISH ENW GUNER.</li> </ol>		
Forthern Force		linC ; Fleat	5 Jigot (KIKU) CalCal JIMA Comunatications Unit (CalCENTSU)	<ol> <li>Petroling and strengthening defenses in Her there Ares.</li> <li>Observation of and attacks on key points in ALMUTIAN Islands.</li> <li>Sacurity measures against 20051A.</li> </ol>		
Comperca Destruction Unit	1.5	O 24 Squadres SENTAI)	5k 3x.e	Same ee First Phase (DAI 1081 DAN)		
Comminida- tione Force	0000	20 1 Combined Jommuni- Setions Thit	1 Unit (lees CHICHI JIA Communication Unit) of 1 Combined Communications Unit	Operstions		
Attached Forces			CHIIODA SZTTSU TAKAZE			

Note: The symbol \*\* after - conventional sign or abbreviation indicates that this is an exact repredention of that appearing in the original document.

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# EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #2 ENTITLED "JAPANESE COMBINED FLEET TOP SECRET OPERATION ORDER #2" USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE "NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR" (Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460)

> (EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8 IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

# SECRET

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COMBINED FLEET TOP SECRET OPERATION ORDER 2

Flagship NAGATO, SAEKI BAY, 7 Nov. 41

YAMAMONO, Isoroku Commander in Chief, Combined Fleet

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COLLINED FLE.T ORDER

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First proparations for war

Y Lay will be 8 December

## EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #3 (A NAVY STUDY RE ENEMY SUBMARINES) ENTITLED "JAPANESE SUBMARINE OPERATIONS (PEARL HARBOR ATTACK)" USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE "NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR" (Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

> (EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8 IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

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# JAPANESE SUBMARINE OPERATIONS (PEARL HARBOR ATTACK)

The operations of Japanese submarines, both midget and full-size, was one of the main factors in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. The Combined Fleet Secret CpOrder \$1, which contained the basic plans for the Pacific-wide attacks which launched the war, contained a paragraph referring to submarine operations at Pearl Harbor. The text of this paragraph, as recalled by a reliable Japanese Chief Yeoman who was attached to the staff of the late Admiral Yamamoto, CinC Combined Fleet, read as follows:

> \* 7. The Commander of the Surprise Attack Force (Submarine Force), having the 6th Fleet (Submarine Fleet) as its main element, will have most of the submarines leave the vestern part of the Inland Sea on X-20 Day to attack Fearl Harbor. Its entire strength will be so disposed so as to command the harbor mouth. It will attack any enemy warsnip which may have escaped from the harbor. It will also carry out reconnaissance before the attack, and if the opportunity presents itself, will carry out surprise attacks on enemy warships with midget submarines. The time for such attacks will be after the flights of planes have attacked OAHU. Every possible means for recovery of midget submarines should be considered.

The organisations participating in the Pearl Harbor attack, on the basis of POW and documentary evidence, included Subrons 1, 2, and 3 (Minus Subdiv 20). This is a total of 20 submarines, not including the 5 midgets carried on the decks of five of the large submarines. Sixteen of the twenty submarines have been definitely identified as having participated (I-1,2,3,4, 5,6,7,17,16,18,20,22,24, (1)68,(1)69,(1)74). The other four, which are assumed to have participated because they were part of the same Subdive both before and after December 7th and are not known to have had other assignments, are the I-8,9,15, and (1)75. A fairly reliable POW has suggested that the I-10 was also present, but there is no other evidence to indicate that it was.

All of the submarines participating (with the exception of the 45-kon midgets) were of the I-type; i.e., over 1,000 tons. Sixteen of them were of the Long-Range Cruiser type-over 1900 tone, with a range of above 12,000 nantical miles at 14 knote. Of these, five (I-16,18,20,22,24) were equipped with midget submarines, the five midget submarines which attempted to get imb

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Pearl Harbor. The remaining eleven Cruisers were plane-bearing submarines.

Four of the twenty were I (1)68 Class Submarines: 1400 tons, 6 torpedo tubes and a range of 8,000 miles at 16 knots.

The midget submarines used in the Pearl Harbor action (which subsequently were referred to as the "Pearl Harbor Type") were 41<sup>t</sup> in length, carried two 18" torpedoes, had a range of 175 miles at 5 knots and 13 miles at 20 knots.

When carried by the mother submarine, the midget sub is secured to the pressure hull with four heavy clamps and one euxiliary clamp. An access hatch, telephone and battery-charging leads connect the two submarines. The midget is launched by releasing the four main clamps from the parent ship and the auxiliary clamp from within the midget.

With regard to the anticipated results of the midget-submarines borne by the I-16 Class submarines, it is interesting to note that the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet, in clarifying Secret OpOrder #1 is reported by the above-quoted Japanese Chief Yeomen as stating:

> The midget submarine unit has been studying and training at the Mavy Yard with the CHIYODA for a year and a half, but it is still too much to hope that it has reached a stage of perfection. In any case, the crew members are supremely confident. The 6th Fleet will attempt to use them in attacks within the harbor.

#### PHASES OF THE ATTACK

Preliminary. According to the Secret OpOrder #1 schedule, most of the submarines in the attack force were supposed to leave the Inland Sea (presumably Kure, the major submarine base) on X-20 Day (November 18th, Honolulu time). Subron 2, composed of I-1,2,3,4,5,6,7, is reported by a reliable POW to have left YOKOSUKA two days later. The Commander of the Sixth Fleet remained behind at Kure.

Apparently most of the submarines arrived in the Pearl Harbor area a day or two before the attack. The log of the I-1 reports that on December 5th (all dates Honolulu time) it was 600 miles from Pearl Harbor. According to POW's from the I-17, this sub arrive off OAHU on the 6th.

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#### SECRET

Before the attack started, the submarines took up scouting positions. The area around Pearl Harbor had been divided into various sectors. Thus, the I-(1)69 cruiser submerged, engaged in surveillance in Scouting Sector D, about 17 miles Southwest of Pearl Harbor, according to the captured report of its skipper. The I-17, according to POW<sup>2</sup>s, took up a scouting position 1° North of Honolulu. There was also an E Inner Scouting Area: a circle with a radius of 8.5 nautical miles, with Pearl Harbor as the center.

One of the features of the submarine attack plan was to send at least two midgets into the harbor prior to the air attack in order to check on the ships present and their position. One midget was detected by the USCG CONDOR at 0350, four hours before the full aerial attack, as it was trailing the USS ANTARES, apparently hoping to slip through the net defenses following the ANTARES. This particular midget was apparently sunk by the USS WARD in 1200 feet of water. Another midget was sunk in the harbor, probably having slipped in through the net-gate which had been opened at 0458 to permit the passage of two minesweepers and not closed until 0840, three-guarters of an hour after the aerial attack, A navigation chart was recovered from a third midget which beached itself and the navigation track which was charted would have taken it all around Ford Island in Pearl Harbor. (See attached chart) The original chart was evidently a U.S. Navy H.O. chart, with detailed navigational data carefully translated into Japanese. Rough notes were scribbled on the chart. On the reverse side were further notes on navigation, etc. The sub carried a simple code which would have enabled it to transmit its information to the main force awaiting outside.

<u>The Attack:</u> Prior to the full aerial attack which was launched about 0800, the main function of the submarines, both full-size and midget, was reconnaissance and surveillance. After the opening of the attack the fullsize submarines were supposed to exploit the situation by torpedoing the ships which were trying to escape the confinement of the Harbor while the

- 3 -

#### SECRET

midgets were supposed to slip into the harbor during the confusion and contribute to the destruction caused by the carrier-borne aerial bombardment. Simultaneously they were supposed to report the damage inflicted by all Japanese efforts back to the Commander of the Striking Force. This information was gained not only by periscope observation, but also by the aerial reconnaissance of the observation planes carried by eleven of the participating submarines. One of the factors restricting the use of this type of observation was the heavy weather which made launching difficult.

Apparently all five of the midget subs launched were lost without causing any direct damage. The Japanese admitted the loss of five midgets and only five midget-bearing submarines (I-16,18,20,22,24) are known to have participated. There is no known damage by midget submarines and at least three are known to have been sunk before they could do any damage. In addition to the one sunk trying to follow the ANTARES into the Harbor, before the full attack, two were sunk in the harbor. One damaged itself on a reef to the right of the entrance channel, and north of Buoy \$1. It was spotted there at 0817 by the USS HELW which opened fire. While being fired upon it slipped off the ledge and submerged. It was apparently this midget which beached itself at OAHU, because the apparatus of the latter had been put out of commission by reef damage.

The conning towers of two midget submarines were sighted in the North Channel, one by the CURTIS. This latter midget was sunk by the USS MOWAGHAN, the ready duty destroyer which rammed it and depth-charged it. The fifth midget was presumably sunk in one of several successful A/S attacks which were reported by the ELUE, the RAMSET and the BREEZE. These attacks presumably accounted for the I=170(which Japanese documents show as being unreported after December 8th) as well as the fifth midget.

<u>Post-Attack Phase</u>: It is clear that one of the principal functions of the submarine attack force was that of remaining in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor to pick off any damaged ships which might try to limp back to the mainland, or any other ships which might bring reinforcements to Pearl Harbor.

- 4 -

#### SECRET

We know that the I-1, which arrived on the eve of the attack did not leave the vicinity of Pearl Harbor until January 9th.

One of the most difficult situations experienced by the Japanese subs was that of the I-(1)69. At 1830 on December 7th it was ordered by the Commander of the Japanese Submarine Forces to shift from Scouting Sector D, about 17 miles Southwest of Pearl Harbor, to surveillance in the central sector of E Inner Scouting Area, a circle with a radius of 8.5 nautical miles with Pearl Harbor as the center. On the way it was forced down before it could complete recharging its batteries and subsequently was caught in an anti-sub net 4.2 miles, 130° off Barber's Point. It was kept down on the bottom below its maximum safe diving depth for 38 hours, but escaped with minor damage.

After December 7th, submarine activity, at least on the part of those submarines which took part in the original attack, tapered off. About December 14th the I-17 left for the Oregon coast. On December 20th the I-174 left the Oahu area for Kwajalein. The I-1 which remained until January 9th, had an eventful cruise, but little success. On December 10th it sighted a CV but couldn't attack. On December 13th it sighted an AO but was prevented from attacking by A/S activity. On 20th of December it sighted an AK but was unable to attack. On December 25th it was depth-charged without damage. On December 30th it shelled the harbor at Hilo. On January 1st it was sighted and attacked twice by U.S. planes without damage.

Results: In summing up the part played by Japanese submarines in the attack on Pearl Harbor it is important to note that the Japanese lost one full-size submarine (the I-(1)70) and five midgets, while American forces suffered no known damage from submarines. Balanced against this is the fact that the submarines served an important scouting function and tied up American naval units.

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# EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #4 ( A NAVY STUDY RE ENEMY SUBMARINES ) ENTITLED "TIME TABLE OF JAPANESE SUBMARINES OPERATIONS" USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE "NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE A TTACK ON PEARL HARBOR" (Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

> (EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8 IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

SECRET

#### JAPANESE TIMETABLE OF SUBMARINE OPERATIONS

- 18 Nov. '41 Submarines scheduled to leave Western part of Inland Sea for attack on Pearl acc. to Combined Fleet Secret OpOrd #1.
- 20 Nov. The I-1, I-2, I-3, I-4, I-5, I-6, I-7 left Yokosuks for Pearl.
- 25 Nov. Com. 6th Fleet was on Hashira Shima. (KURE)
- 5 Dec. OHATA, PO, says I-174 arrived off OAHU at this time with 15 or 16 others.
- 5 Dec. I-1 was 600 miles from Pearl.

7 Dec.

- 6 Dec. . I-17 arrived off OAHU, took scouting position 1° North of HONOLULU.
- 7 Dec. ' I-(1)6°, Flag of Subdiv 12, took up surveillance position 17 miles SW of Pearl, before attack started.
  - 0350 USCG CONDOR sighted the periscope of submerged sub when conducting sweeping operations approx 1-3/4 miles SW of the Pearl Harbor entrance buoy.
    - 0357 CONDOR informed the USS WARD by visual signal. WARD, which was patrolling off Pearl Harbor instituted search.
    - 0458 Net opened to parmit the passage of two minesweepers. Not closed until 0840.
    - 0633 Navy patrol plane dropped two smoke pots near midget following ANTARES.
    - 0637 NARD sighted the periscope of unidentified sub apparently trailing the USS ANTARES then enroute to Pearl Harbor.
    - 0640 WARD commenced attack, which is believed to have been successful.
    - 0645 WARD reported to Commandant 14th Naval District, first time this had been reported.
    - 0732 Patrol plane sank a hostile sub south of the entrance buoy, according to telephone call of Operations Officer, Patrol Wing TWO at 0740. This was later revealed to have been in cooperation with DD. Presumably this is the same action in which the WARD participated.
    - 0751 The ready duty Destroyer, USS MONOCHAN, received orders to "proceed immediately and contact the WARD in defensive sea area" and also apparently to close the netgate. See above.
    - 0755 Navy Yard Signal Tower telephoned Cincpac: "Enemy air raid---not drill." Almost simultaneously Japanese torpedo planea attacked the battleships.
    - 0817 The USS HELM spotted the conning tower of a submarine to the right of the entrance channel and northward of Buoy #1. Though immediately submerging, fire was opened when the submarine again surfaced temporarily, no hits were observed.

-,1 -

This sub appeared to be touching bottom on ledge of reef and in line of breakers. While still being fired at, it slipped off ledge and submerged.

- 0830 The USS MONOGHAN, ready duty destroyer, which had been ordered to sea at 0751 but had been temporarily delayed by the initiation of the enemy action, got under way.
- 0836 The conning towers of two midget subs sighted in North Channel; one by CURTIS (AV4).
- 0837 The MONOGHAN, having observed an enemy submarine under fire of both the CURTIS and the TANGTER, proceeded at flank speed and at about 0843 rammed; thereafter dropped two depth charges. The fire of the CURTIS resulted in two
- 0843 direct hits on the coming tower. This submarine (midget) was later salvaged for inspection. Before the MONOGHAN dispatched it one midget fired a torp which was apparently aimed at the USS RALEIGH but passed under the bow of the DALE and exploded on Ford Island.
- 0840 Net closed. Had been opened at 0458 to permit passage of two minesweepers.
- 0915 USS BLUE dropped four and two DCs in two successive attacks on sound contact approximately four miles bearing 190° from DIAMOND Head Light.
- 0950 USS BLUE dropped 6 DCs on good sound contact; resulted in large oil slick and air bubbles over a length of 200 feet. 20° 11' 30" N 157° 49' 45" W.
- 1020 Two DCs dropped on sound contact by USS BLUE 6 miles, 200° from Diamond Head light.
- 1108 MTB reported a periscope to USS BREEZE, patrolling off Pearl Harbor.
- 1115 BREEZE dropped two DCs with no results: bearing Barber Point 297° T, Diamond Head 078 T, Hickham Tower 357° T.
- 1135 BREEZE picked up sound of submarine in same vicinity (see 1115); dropped DCs, which brought up oil and debris. A second attack a few minutes later with four deeper DCs brought no tangible results.
- 1204 GAMBLE on sound attack dropped 3 DCs 168 T from Diamond Head, 2.5 miles.
- 1830 Commander of the Japanese Submarine Forces ordered I-(1)69 shift from Scouting Sector D, about 17 miles SW of PEARL HARBOR to surveillance in the central sector of E Inner Scouting Area (a circle with a radius of 8.5 nautical miles with Pearl Harbor as the center.)
- 2000 L-(1)69 reports sighting five DDs "during night". Received close-range DC attack from them apparently no damage.

8 Dec.

0145 (HONOLULU LOCAL) I-(1)6° surfaced, on course of 300° for Barber's Point, hurriedly charged batteries, while at battle speed. Sighted 2 patrol vessels, about 3 miles away.

- 2 -

		0536	$I_{-}(1)69$ is forced down by the DD; before it had completely recharged; DD attacked it with DCs without result.
		0910	I-(1)69 Gaught in anti-sub net. 4.2 miles off Barber's Point, at $130^\circ$
		1205?	A few minutes after noon RAMSEY DCed submarine on ex- cellent sound contact 11 miles due west of Barber's Point, bringing up positive oil bubbles.
		1225?	Ramsey heard sub again and DCed, deepest about 250 ft. getting positive oil indications.
Q	Dec.	1950	I-(1)69 surfaced after 38 hours submerged.
10	Dec.	P1	I-l sighted CV but couldn't attack.
13	Dec.		1-1 sighted AO but was counter-attacked and couldn't attack. About this time 1-17, which had held scouting position $1^{\circ}$ North of Oahu, left for the OREGON coast.
19	Dec.	94	I-(1)74 left OAHU area for KWAJALEIN, acc. to POW PO OHATA.
20	Dec.		I-l sighted, AK but couldn't attack.
25	Dec.		I-1 DCed without damage.
27	Dec.		I-1 Departed Pearl Area for HILO.
30	Dec.		I-l attacked HILO harbor, shelling prob. DD.
31	Dec.	94,	I-3 reached deployment line; received report of CV and left line to shadow.
l	Jan.		I-1 sighted by US PLANES, attacked twice; no damage.
2	Jan.		I-3 returned to deployment line.
4	Jan.	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	I-1 proceeded to East of Oahu and resumed patrol.
6	Jan.		I-1 made unsuccessful attack on US DD. I-3 sighted and attacked group of AKs, unknown result.
9	Jan.	9:00	I-1 headed for KWAJALEIN. (us) I-18 rushed to attack on hearing report of CV but no result.
11	Jan.	gotes	(4.3) I-6 attacked CV Lexington Class; claimed sinking.

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# EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #5 (TRANSLATION OF CAPTURED JAPANESE DOCUMENTS) ENTITLED "JAPANESE SUBMARINE SCHOOL NOTES CONCERNING EARLY WAR EXPERIENCES OFF HAWAII" USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE "NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR" (Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

> (EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8 IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

It is needless to state that combat education in this current emergency is of great necessity, and it is extremely reprotable that there has been no op ortunity to gather sufficient material before the production of the lith, period special course students. Since, however, some materials in the category of combat instructions has been obtained with the arrival in port of submarines I-16 and I-66 recently, it has been decided to immediately mineograph and distribute it as study material to this period's special course students. Although it is difficult to guarantee that among the items heard directly there are no points of difference with actual facts, it is believed that there are no great errors in the instructions obtained.

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NO. 1. TACTICS

1. Use of submarine carried planes. .

- A. After the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 3. the submarine I-7 received an order to carry out an aerial reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor when the opportunity presented. Although she attompted to send off a plane from the neighborhood of Niihau, it was impossible to do so due to the weather. Hence she proceeded southward until in the neighborhood of Hawaii and carried out the aerial reconnaissance,
- B. When on picket station, it may be possible, depending on the weather, the enemy's alert condition, terrain and other conditions, to send off the planes carried from a certain area, but it may be impossible to do so from another area, Consequently, besides the necessity of deploying airplane carrying submarin.s. there is also the necessity of deploying many airplan: carring submarines.

Since urgent execution of the above mentioned r.connaissance was not necessary, we suffered no great disadvantage, but it would be of great disadvantage, when urgency of execution is required.

2. Movement against enemy depth charges.

3.23 F 12

- A. Since merica's depth charge setting, for the most part, has been definitely ascertained to be in the nei borhood of 35 meters by previous investigations, submarines attached to the Sixth Fleet have evaded them at depths of 50 to 70 meters. (Some subs have evaded them at a depth of 100 meters). In the case of the I-1% (70 meters depth), she received three charges directly over her, but suffered no damage. (Judging from the opinion that the bursting charge of America's dopth charges appeared to be feeble, it is doubtful as to whether the charges were directly overhead.}
- B. When the safe submerging depth is thought to be about 20 meters more than the supposed depth setting of depth charges, it is deemed best to assume as far as possible a position of 20 meters or more below the depth charge's depth setting.
  - If not, it is deemed best to assume a position up high, but impossible to be detected, and as far above as possible from the supposed depth setting of the depth charge.
- (A) The ISS primarily used sound listening patrol [choon shokai 13 5 16 10 (2)

to prevent any decrease in the efficiency of the listening gear, the folhowing southed was used and no uncapinees, as full here we of the second listening patrol.

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3. Asarvation patrol.

- ... (1) Slowest spued used.
  - (2) Voltilation storman.

(3) In stuaring, mechanical power was used only for the diving rudder, while the rist was all can power.

(4) Although it was stipulated in the operational order that factories should be charged at might at the order edge of the pitrol zone (about 10 navideal miles from her our entrance), it was impossible to do so.
Hence, butteries our energed at a distance of 40 milech miles from the harbor entrance and after that we returned to the patrol zone.

B. At night, when pic sting by energy patrol vessels is to be projected, it is deemed, best to increase the dot h of the patrol zone.

4. Patrol method of American destroyers.

A. It seems as if American destroyers are equipped with repurate and good sound detectors and they, for the most part, are elecuting stationary or slow speed schol.

5. Oven when an American destroyer is stationary, he on many.

NO. 2. 00: 2.47 D'TY

- 1. Identification mothod of friendly units when returning to friendly harbor.
  - A. The sethod carried out by I-16 is as follows:
    - (1) Moistor a "Treadth Four" Ensign at the ip of the periscope.
    - (2) Spread a "Breadth Four" Lasi a on the ladder to the wridge.

(2) Notified the time of its arrival within the 300 metical mile are, its osition a course one or to days previously to the home combat force  $\Box \not \rightarrow \Im$   $\Im$   $\Xi$   $\Bbb K$   $\sub$ 

First returning to an avanued-base, [Te7 took the same of Laving the commandant of the avenue base force indicate the mint of passive into the 900 mutical millions.

E. There is an excepte of submarine I-63 being obtained with depth charges by a friendly destrojer when leaving an dvended balle. Closust attention should be vaid to the id. diffication of friendly whits then enturing and leaving a fit only when not to being liert. · (4)

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## No. 3. NAVIGATION, WEATHER AND SEA CONDITION

1. Onshore Current.

- A. The onshore current in the area of Barbar's Point, Oahu, is very strong. Since submarine I-58 paid little attention to this, she si hted the breakers of Barber's Point roef at a very close distance when she raised her periscope up to observe, but she was able to prevent anything from happening by turning immediately.
- B. When stationed on observation on the front line, it is necessary to take into proper condideration the onshore current when close to the shore. NO. 4. MANEUVERING FOR ATTACK
- 1. Protracted submerged navigation.
  - A. (1) In rog rd to submarine I-68, the number of days of submerged navigation was 30 for an average of 14 hours per day. Air purifier chem.cals were used only once (20 pieces) and the cooler was not used. (2) Although CO<sup>2</sup> reached 4.6%, O<sup>2</sup> reached 16% and the temperature reached 32°C.. there seemed to be no great effect upon the men. (3) Other than being used once when her submerged navigation continued for 35 hours, submarine I-16 did not use the air purifier. Just as in the above case, there seemed to be practically no effect upon the men.
  - B. (1) Although there is need for the use of air purifiers in a submerged navigation of about 14 hours, there is still a necessity for the gathering of more data for further study.
- (2) It is necessary to accelerate the completion of the study "Mashing purifior" L法 澤式 J \*ype air purifying method. 2. daves in the Hawaiian Arca.
- - A. During the operations of submarines of the Sixth Flect in the Hawaiian aroa, waves were high every day and it has been reported that submarine I-16 found it difficult to maintain her depth even at the depth of about 18 meters and had to use her standard splod many times. Besides, there appeared to be two or three submarines that revealed their conning tower in the presence of the enemy.
  - B. It is necessary to maintain the accuracy of the sound detector excellently in order to do away with any uncasinees in cound detection patrol. Also, considering this, the periesope should be made as long as possible.

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NO. 5. COLIMICATION

- 1. Underwater wireless reception ability.
  - A. According to the experiences of the I-16, it is reported that sonsitivity is 4 at a depth of 18 m ters and 3 at 20 meters in the Hawaiian area. (Sending station USAMI)

TW. S. (IS MISSING)7

NO. 7. HULL

- 1. Change in working of the machine guns during operations.
  - A. then I-16 test fired her machine guns without taking the trouble of cleaning, after conducting operations for 30 days, of which 20 days were spentin submerged mavigation, one machine gun fired without any trouble, while the other fired only one shot.
- 2. Danages caused by depth charge attack.
  - A. Aile observing in Hawaiian area, submarine I-60 was depth charged. Of about 100 depth charges dropped, 12 exploded within 200 meters and 2 exploded directly above. The depth charge setting was within 35 meters and the sub's depth 45 meters. The damage suffered from this attack, for the most part was as follows:

(1) Of the 172 electric lights, 75 were famaged. (Those that were not lighted were not damaged).

- (2) Shall amount of leakage from the forward door(s) of the torpedo tube(s).
- (3) Two depth indicators began to function incorrectly.

(4) Sensitivity of sound detector became bad.

(5) Became impossible to use the transmitter of the echo range depth finder.

(6) Leakage in the high pressure air valve group and air pressure within ship increased greatly.

(7) Lakage in the Mingston value of the negative buoyancy tank increased.
(3) Due to the damage to the 50 volt power supply, the rudder order telegraph went out. Because of this, the helmsman mistakenly thought that the rudder had been damaged.

(9) The accuracy of the (---?---) armeter decreased.

(10) Laskage from the corroded tube(s) of mamber 1 cooler.

(11) Considerable leckage from the "constant use" and reserve fuel tanks.

- B. (1) Disconsemble the damaged right indicator and remove the sea water between the 1/1 and 1/2 beaks  $\int \sigma_{(f)}^{(f)} -7$ 
  - (2) To have turned off as many electric lights as possible.

# EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #6 (TRANSLATION OF CAPTURED JAPANESE DOCUMENT) ENTITLED "PATROL OPERATIONS OF JAPANESE SUBMARINE I-69 OFF PEARL HARBOR" USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE "NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR" (Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

> (EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8 IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

#### "PATROL OPERATIONS OF JAPANESE SUBMARINE I-69 OFF PEAHL HARBOR"

N. N. I. 96-1942

#### ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS NAVY DEPARTMENT

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#### **INTELLIGENCE REPORT**

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Serial	Monograph Index Guide No. 907-4400					
(Start new series each year, i. e. 1-40, 2-40)	(To correspond with SUBJECT given below. See Q. Mr.I. Index Guid Make separate report for each main title.)					
From Op-16-FE, ONI	at <u>Mashington</u> , D. C. Date <u>April 22</u> , 19					
(Ship, fleet, unit, district, office, station,	or person)					
Reference Op-16-FE Serial #4	1-43 of April 14, 1943.					
(Direct	tive, correspondence, previous related report, etc., if applicable)					
	Evaluation					
(As official, personal observation, publi	cation, press, conversation with- (As reliable, doubtful, unverified, etc.)					
Subject Japan	Navy Submarines					
(Nation reported an) (Main t	itie as per index guide) (Subtitles) (Make separate report for each title)					
BRIEF (Here enter careful summary of report,	containing substance succinctly stated; include important fects, names, places, dates, etc.)					

CORRECTION

The reference report, a translation of a captured documen's written by the Commander of Submarine Division No. 12 dealing with patrol operations of the Japanese submarine I-69 off Fearl Harbor, erroneously gives the date of these operations as December d-10, 1942. This error occurs in the fourth line of the cover sheet, in the heading of the first page of the report, and in the fourth line of page 1. The date in all cases mentioned should read. "December 8-10, 1941".

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#### ISSUED BY THE INTELLIGENCE DIVISION OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS NAVY DEPARTMENT

# **INTELLIGENCE REPORT**

Seria 1-43	907-4400 Monograph Index Guide No.
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From <sup>Op-16-FE, ONI</sup>	Washington, D.C. Make separate report for each main title.) 4:
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(Nation reported on) (Main title as )	er index guide) (Subtitles) (Make separate report for each title)

BRIEF .-- (Here enter careful summary of report, containing substance succinctle stated ; include important facts, names, places, dates, etc.)

The attached report is an abridged translation of a Japanese captured document written by the Commander of Submarine Division No. 12 dealing with patrol operations of the I-69 off Pearl Harbor, December 8-10, 1944, during which time the I-69 was believed to have been caught in an underwater obstruction.

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Op-16 Op-16-1 Op-16-1-F Archives Menograph Op-16-FA-1 (8) Op-16-P-1 Op-16-P-2	Gen'l Board War College MIS (5) BuOrd (3) BuShips (3) USEC Comineh (10) CineLant (9)	Op-10/11 Op-12 Op-20 (5) NA Chungking Com 11 (5) Naval Aide USJIC List I	List II, less q List III, ff only List III, ff only Lz. Staff Histon (2) (und grind Staff (2) h. Z. South Staff (2)

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Report of I-69's Operations off Pearl Harbor, Dec. 8-10, 1941

The Japanese submarine I-69, (Flagship of Submarine Division 12), attached to the 3rd Submarine Squadron of the Submarine Force, was caught in an underwater obstruction while conducting surveillance of Pearl Harbor on December 9, 1941 but finally freeing herself, was able to carry on with her specified task.

The following is an abridged translation of the report of the event, submitted with various pertinent conclusions by the Commander of Submarine Division 12, and officially distributed (Japanese 6th Floot Socret Letter #2, Part 5, Jan. 10, 1942) as reference material of value for training. (Dates are in accordance with Japanese time).

#### I. Circumstances. Bofore the Event.

During daylight on Docember 8, the I-69 was cruising submerged, engaged in surveillance in Scouting Scotor D (about 17 miles southwest of Pearl Harbor). Immediately after the attack upon the enemy by the Striking Force and the Special Attack Force, we were able to hear easily, by means of submarine sound detectors, explosions of bombs and torpedoes, and upon hearing the sound of dopth chargos, I judged that the Special Attack Force was engaged in heavy fighting.

At 1400 radio orders from the Commander of Submarine Forces were recoived, assigning the I-69 to surveillance in the central sector of E Inner Scouting Area (a circle with a radius of 8,5 nautical miles, with Pearl Harbor as the center). The orders further specified the annihilation of the remaining enemy forces.

After sunset we surfaced, in an attempt to assist as much as possible, but during the night we sighted five destroyers. While submerging, we received a close-range depth-charge attack. After that we heard enomy patrol beats costinually, and could not surface. I judged that these patrol beats were disposed in all directions at intervals of 3 nautical miles. Just at this time, the waves were from 4 to 5 (sie), and . . . in proceeding awash there was difficulty in maintaining depth control without using standard speed, and battery dispharge was comparatively high.

I felt keenly the need of recharging the batteries that night, judging that demands on battery power the next day would be great, and recharging difficult, because of the presence of enomy patrol boats. So, although it involved arriving at the designated patrol area somewhat bohind schedule, I set course  $(300^\circ)$  for the area southeast of Barker's Point, where I thought the enomy patrol might be comparatively lax. At 0015 on the 9th, we surfaced, making certain that no enemy patrol boats were within close range. On a course obliquely to the west, and at battle speed, we hurriedly recharged batteries.

We sighted 2 patrol vessels on our port quarter and port beam respectively, each about 5 kilometers away, and in about 30 minutes we reversed course. Pourl Harber shone red in the sky, like a thing afire. It was already dawn, and although we operated with the land as a background, an enomy patrol vessel discovered us and fired what looked like a green Very flare. The time was 0106 and our recharging was not yet finished (73% of used power had been replenished). In that condition we immediately submerged, and although we were depth-charged by the destroyer, the distance was great.

# II. Circumstances of Running Afoul of Underwater Obstacle and Measures Taken

At 0440 (Decombor 9) we experienced a strange vibration of the ship, and the navigator ordered the engines stopped. At the time, our course was 80°, 4 metors were running together, and dopth was 37 metors. I was in my cabin resting, and upon receiving the report want directly to the conding tower. Upon learning of conditions from the submarine's Commanding Officer, I decided that we had been cought in an anti-submarine net, and ordered the engines put into reverse in order to get.clear. However, the needle of the speed-gauge did not move, as if the pit log tube were broken. It being difficult to detormine our movement, I began to surface the ship, and increased the angle of trim.

A slight tromor was folt in the ship, and I stopped headway. Again I backed at full speed, but the ship did not move. The ship's trim and depth were not normal. I ordered "Blow main tank", and "Regain negative bueyaney." During these operations we surfaced, or rose to a point at which we were awash, three times. According to the absorvations of the Commanding Officer of the Submarine, taken at the time of surfacing, within the limits of observation of the periscope (forward of the forward end of the gun platform) we were not caught in anything. Two enemy destroyers were about 5 kilometers dead ahead. As we had now reached a situation in which we could not continue either submerged or on the surface, I decided to lie submerged and to surface at sunset.

At 0454, I stopped the electric motors, but the ship began to sink. I ordered "Blow main tank". The reading of the depth-gauge in the tower reached the extreme limit (85 meters). (We actually reached 125 meters). Seeing this condition, I thought we must be free of the net, and ordered "..head standard" at a depth of 40 meters, but as before thore shortly occurred a slight tremor, headway was 'lowed, and I ordered "Stop". ..gain we began to sink. I ordered "Blow the main tank", but before we regained buoyancy control, the ship slowed to a stop, almost lovel, at a depth of 87 meters. It was 0506 when I realized we were resting on the bottom. Our estimated position was 4.2 mutical miles off Barbor's Point at 130'.

#### III. Situation and Measures Taken

# .. fter Reaching Bettem

Although the sea bottom was below safe submersible depth, (70 meters for the I-69), our resting on the bottom was an extremely goed thing for us in our situation. As seen as we had bottomed we know from sounds similar to these made by the destroyer we had proviously sighted, that it was close by; and from other sounds we learned of the approach of other patrol vessels. The enemy would step occasionally, and if we thought they were attempting sounddetection, we exercised rigid sound control. That is to say, the use of all pumps except the eil-pressure pump, and the movement of all rudders, electric fans, gyro-compass and ventilation blower were suspended. I decided to surface at sunset, but though many heurs passed there were continual sounds of patrol vessels coming and going, and since our position six miles from the harbor entrance effored considerable chance of discovery and consequent battle to the death were I to surface at sundown, I decided to wait if possible till dusk of the following night, the 10th.

After bottoming, we recorded overy hour the amount of bilgo water, the inclination, the air pressure and the dopth. The fact that the increase per hour of bilgo water was about one and a fraction metric tens, and pressure in the air reservoir was 90 (kilos), convinced me that it would be possible to surface at dusk on the following day.

Anticipating that we would have to submerge after only a short time on the surface, I charged the air reservoir with high pressure air from our (6) reserve torpedees, and was able to raise its pressure 25 kilograms. Although I thought it impossible to use the high-pressure air compressor, since, on account of our depth, we could not take in sea water for cooling, - the engineer suggested circulating the bilgewater as a cooling medium. After effecting sound control and recharging from the reserve torpedees, I became concerned, as time pressed, ever the lowering of pressure in the air reservoir, and although I didn't use the high-pressure air compressor that day, I did use it on the 10th, raising the air reserveir pressure from 105 to 138 kilograms, and reducing the air-pressure inside the ship from 891 mm to 780 mm. The additional air thus obtained subsequently proved most officiencieus.

Other measures consequent upon the length of time on the bottom were as follows:

## A - Air purification:

To escape detection due to noise of ventilator meters, and to economize on electric power, we used air-purifying chemicals three times when we did not hear the enomy in the vicinity (the amount of air purifier used was 60 units) even a total period of about twelve hears; exygen was released three times for e total of 45 minutes. At 0800 on the 10th there was a reading of 4.5% carbon dioxide, and just before surfacing we must have reached approximately 5.5%, and the erew had headaches. A state was reached where walking for even a slight distance, or any exertion, caused parting.

B - Stopping of bilgowater accumulation:

We tightened propellor-shaft packing by stuffing with waste and completely closed all values to the outside.

C = Mools:

To prevent rise of air temperature in the ship, and to economize on power, wo used no heat for cooking, but ate biscuits, canned fruit, improvised rice cakes, etc.

D - Rest:

To check increase of carbon-dioxide, we had everyone not specially employed sleep as much as possible. In antisipation of a battle to the death, and to incite the desire for a hard fight, we served sake to all hands at supper on the 9th, the first time since loaving base.

E - Defecation:

In the absence of facilities for discharging excrement, we made use of empty oll cans.

# IV. Situation and Measures Taken Prior to Surfacing

On the 10th we detected the presence of enemy patrol vessels, but not so frequently us on the previous day. Sunset on the 10th being at 1253 and moonrise at 1827, I decided to surface at 1500. By estimate of the situation was as follows:

A - It was possible that there might be no enemy patrol craft in the vicinity, since they know that the I-69 was caught underwater; and in the event that we might be able to free the ship easily and escape to a place of comparative safety. I decided to withdraw from the area and ascertain by radio the current state of affairs, before continuing the task assigned.

B - In the event that freeing the ship might require some time, and that there might be considerable chance of discovery by the enemy, and a consequent battle to the death, I decided upon preparations to make utmost use of all wapons.

C - The possibilities were that we might be unable to move; that we might have to engage the enemy whether freed or not; that if freed, we might attempt to enter Pearl Harbor, or if unsuccessful in that, to block the channel.

The measures I took with the above estimate of the situation as my basis, were as follows:

A - Preparations for battle:

Made preparations for gun, machine-gun and torpedo action. (Anticipating action against small ships, put 2-mater depth setting on torpedocs)

B - Net Cutting Detail:

Arranged a detail of 3 officers, 2 petty officers and 14 men to take charge of appropriate stations, tools, etc.

C - Proparations for Self-destruction:

Powder from 10 high-angle gun charges was collected and arranged in the magnetine with 2 tins of kerosene. Self-destruction was to be earried out if the worst came to the worst, and would follow the broadcasting of the  $mess_{ege}$ : "We are unable to communicate".

D - Preparations for Destruction of Socret Books:

Operational orders and special instructions for use of Codebook A

(trsl. note: K5, in Japanese), together with other papers of a highly secret character wave cut up, and destroyed by being churned and pulped in a receptacle filled with sea water. Such things as secret charts and easily combustible documents were removed to the magazine for burning at the time of explosion. Things hard to burn, and which would have to be thrown into the sea were torn up and weighted, to avoid being picked up by the enewy. The time for throwing these away was to be specially designated before the explosion.

#### E - Disposal of Bilge Water:

Although we tried as much as possible to prevent accumulation of bilge water, the amount was very great in the motor room. Since a large change in trim was naturally to be expected at the time of surfacing, there was great concern lest the main electric motors be soaked with bilge water. Accordingly, the bilge water in the motor room was pumped into the after torpede tube compartment, so that, even though the after torpede tube compartment was flooded with bilge water above the dock plating before surfacing and during subsequent dive, in spite of a great inclination. We estimated that, before surfacing, the amount of foul water in the ship totaled 50 metric tons, so propared to pump it overboard immediately upon surfacing.

# V. Circumstances and Measures

# Taken at time of Surfacing

Upon completion of all pre-surfacing preparations, I assembled all Warrant and higher officers, prayed for a good battle, and drank toasts with beer. We then went directly to our stations. The man in charge of listoning gear reported all quiet in the vicinity. At 1457 we blew main tanks. Although the pressure in the air reservoir dropped from 138 to 85 metric tons (sic) the ship did not seem to be rising. The Senior Officer said, "Té don't float". I then ordered "Cut in motors", "Port and starboard motors ahead standard", and immediately we saw that we were free of the bottom. However, the change of trim gradually increased, and although we stopped blowing the forward main tank, this inclination did not change. We then opened vonts in the forward main tank, and gradually provented further change in trim, with a maximum inclination of 25°. At 1520 we surfaced. Our period of submersion had been 38 hours.

As soon as the surfacing preparations had been completed, the netcutting workers had been assembled, and I had instructed them not to be concerned with enomy fire, but rather to concentrate with calm certainty on cutting the net. As soon as we surfaced, the working party went directly out on deck. The lookout reported no enemy in the vicinity, and immediately the not-cutters reported no entanglement above the water line. Because the pit log tube had been damaged the previous day, it was pushed out through the bottem of the ship.

At this point, although I ordered stand-by on main engine, the oil in the engine room sump tank overflowed, as a result of the previous inclination, and for a short time it was impossible to use the engines. Both motors were ordered ahead standard, but the starboard motor didm't work. I wondered whether or not the starboard propeller were fould in some obstruction, but when I saw the ship move forward I realized this was not so, and was greatly relieved, inasmuch as we could make out the light of an enemy attempting to challenge us. Our course was 270°. Drawing near to the coast (to starboard), I headed for other areas.

#### VI. Circumstances and Measures Taken After Surfacing

As the port engine had been made ready, I ordered port engine cut in, ahead standard, at  $1519\frac{1}{2}$ . At 1533 we sighted an enemy destroyer on opposite course about 3 kilometers away at  $30^{\circ}$  to port, and quickly submerged. Immediately after surfacing we had started pumping bilge water and replenishing air, but about 25 metric tons of bilge water still remained. After diving, trim was unsteady, varying from a maximum of 55 degrees (sic) down by the head to a maximum of 35 degrees (sic) down by the storn. We reached a maximum depth of 75 meters. The pressure in the air reservoir fell to 35 kilograms and I realized it would be impossible to continue submergod. I ordered the ship to surface and fight it out, but after surfacing we did not sight the destroyer. The time was 1600.

Again neither engine would run, because of the overflow of oil in the engine room sump tank. I ordered both motors ahead, and theneeforth proceeded on the basis that if we met the enomy we would fight a surface battle. Our course was generally northwest, with the coast for a background. At 1630, both engines were in shape, and were cut in. We went to shead standard, ahead full, and finally flank speed. We were able to withdraw from the area without meeting any enemy.

On account of the inclination during the dive mentioned above, the inside of the ship was extremely dirty from bilge water, oil and exercment. In the after torpede compartment, the torpede tubes were inundated at time of submersion, then when we tilted back the forward bulkhead was covered with dirty water. Also, the battery fluid from the main storage battery had leaked out, producing a foul oder. Many hours were required for emergency repair measures. When our communications apparatus had been repaired, I radioed a report of our condition.

# VII. Damage

Damage was chiefly to electrical equipment, from bilge water; and to outside optical and listening gear, from long submersion at great depth. We were not prevented from continuing our patrol, and were able to carry on our assigned task.

#### VIII. Views

A. I am profoundly convinced that the I-69's escape from danger was entirely due to Divine Providence, in that:

1) The depth at which we bottomed was such that a ship could remain there for a long time. Just before bottoming we had sunk to 125 meters, and although it might be only by chance that we touched bottom at an 87 meter spot, it is certainly unthinkable that we could have stayed submerged for so long a period at a greater depth.

2) There was no enemy nearby at the time of surfacing, and that we were already free of the underwater obstacle. Had we needed a long time to cut ourselves free, and had there been a very strict enemy patrol in the vicinity, we should containly have been discovered and ended up with a fight to the death.

3) At the time we sighted the enemy destroyer at 1533, and submerged, we were not sighted by the enemy. We were unable to rig for noiseless running, and were in poor condition for submerged operation; in addition.our bow broke weter.

B. More research into and improvement of stoppage of oil-leakage in submarines are nonded. We know, from sound detection, that several enemy patrol vessels were directly above us. That we ascaped being depth-charged is due entirely to prevention of oil-leakage.

C. Research and improvement in the field of noiseless running are needed. Although we were not depth-charged when bottomed, that was because of an entire absence of sound on our part. At many other times when we were running quiet we were depth-charged. This indicates both that the enemy's sound-detection is superior to ours, and that our being detected was because of the noise of our equipment.

D. The depth at which the overboard discharge pumps (main and auxiliary), and the electric power pump in the head can be used is too limited; it needs to be increased by about 60 meters.

E. There is immediate need of automatic dopth-control gear. When entangled and unable to move, it is necessary, in order to remain below surface, to use discharge pumps a good part of the time. The sound of these pumps might ensily lead to dotection and attack by the enemy.

Furthermore, night-time charging of batteries is extremely difficult in patrol areas. At the outset we were barely able to de 73% of our recharging. I consider the installation of automatic depth-control gear in

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submarines assigned to recommaissance of enemy harbors an immediate and urgent necessity.

F. Submarines should be equipped with 4 pairs of net-outting shears of proper design. The army wire-outters lent to this ship by the Kure Military Supply Department would be practically useless in net-outting.

G. There should be a supply of explosives for self-destruction. When we reached our crisis, I ordered preparations for blowing up the ship, but when I saw the crew panting in the foul air of the ship, and realized they would have to suffer further while waiting for the flames from the ignitioncharge to explode the magazine, I felt that it was an unbearable situation.

H. Morale was excellent.

I. We threw overbeard large quantities of waste, sandals, eil, etc., upon surfacing. I am not sure whether the enemy, seeing all this in the daytime, were made to accept it as proof of our sinking. I believe there will be many cases in which there will be difficulty in determining the effects of depth-charges or attacks after a submarine is caught in a not,

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# 512 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #7 (TRANSLATION OF A CAPTURED JAPANESE DOCUMENT TELLING THE EXPERIENCES OF A JAPANESE IN THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR) ENTITLED "THE SOUTHERN CROSS BY KURAMOTI, IKI" USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE "NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR" (Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

> (EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8 IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

Op-16-FE Translation No. 290 25 July 1945

THE SOUTHIRU CROSS

# KURAMOTI, Iki

An account written in flowery language of the experiences of KURAMOTI, Iki in the attack on Peerl Karbor and in various other operations in the South Sens in 1942. The euthor has not been identified but was probably an enlisted man. Interspersed in the account will be found information of military interest from unhistorical point of view.

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# 514 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONFIDENTIAL

## THE SOUTHERN CROSS

## INTRODUCTION

When, in after years, one looks back on the events of the pest, the recollection brings with it s mood of deep and poetic emotion. Even the most unhappy events of former years are touched with beauty by the light of the past, and their unpleasantness forgotten like a dream.

Just as the sun, sinking into the sea, paints the twilight sky with rosy clouds and impresses the eye of the beholder with its beauty as its majestic form sinks moment by moment below the horizon, so the und of man, loving the beautiful and hating the ugly, instinctively transmutes everything into beauty.

. When I look at the moon, I recall an evening in my native village when I watched it together with a tender companion, in an ecstacy of love.

When I look at the clouds, I think of a day in my childhood when, scolded by my mother, I flung myself down forlornly on the bank of epool and watched the clouds drifting away into the distant sky, until finally my grief subsided to a vegue sedness and in the twilight my mother led me home.

When I look at the stars, I remember fondly a night when,out of work and wandering simlessly, I saw through my tears the weeping Pleiedes twinkling in an elien sky.

With the passage of time, all these memories of the past become ever dearer to my heart.

Now, in the midst of this great world conflict of the Twentieth Century, I have taken up orms in the service of my beloved homeland, and have made the daring voyage to the South Sens, where shines the Southern Cross. My heart is joyful. I shall set down here for future years a record of these unforgettable days, so that their recollection may bring me a lifetime of delight.

The Southern Cross!

Thether or not that name is a fitting title for this work, I do not know; but during my voyage to the South Seas that constellation impressed itself, I know not why, unforgettably upon my mind, and its name is indelibly written in my heart. Battles have followed battles, and I believe their dazzling number will remain recorded for posterity in this book, The Southern Cross.

KURANOTO, Iki(1)

(1)倉元生

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The Great East Asia War! Accursed conflict of nations!

The peoples of this world, seeking to enlarge their countries to gratify their boundless ambition, have rushed like a raging wave into a great war such as has never before been seen in the history of the world.

Epoch-making conflict of nations!

O tragic sight!

The weak become the victims of the strong. Those who have strength are victorious; those who have not strength are defeated. The victors use the netural resources and extensive territories taken from the enemy for the benefit of their own country; and, at the same tile, expand their military preparations more and more in order to prevent the lies of enemy nations from ever again gaining a foothold. Like a great tree putting down roots deeply into the ground, they try to build a firm and enduring Paradise on earth.

The vanquished are driven from their country, and as an exiled race, gathered together into forlorn companies of the living dead, drift about simlessly on a journey without end.

As long as there exist great numbers of people leading a crowded life on the limited surface of the earth, will not their innate passions of self-interest and ambition lead them to seek the means of living a more secure existence, and thus embroil them inevitably in war after war? A study of the past history of the world will immediately make this problem clear.

However, the wars of the past have been conflicts between two nations or at most a few nations only, in which only a part of the : world has stood divided. I believe it is no exaggeration to say that they are mere trifling altercations in comparison to the Great Last Asia Jar, which may be truly called a world revolution.

Now that we have been swept into this world conflagration, I shall attempt to set down in this book a record of my part in the Great East Asia Mar, and the impressions I have received from the many battles in which I have taken part. But first I must express my earnest hope that, by means of the supreme love for humanity which I take as my slogan, this horrible war may soon be ended in mutual understanding among nations, and that the peaceful days of before the war may again return to the earth.

Then I write thus solemnly, those who may read this book in later days may think that I am glorifying the second coming of Christ, or such a great love as described in the poems of Goethe. However, as already stated in the beginning of this book, I am an ordinary mortal born in this twentieth century, and a soldier who has taken part in this tragic upheaval out of a fervent love for the land of his ancestors.

Ah! when one thinks of it, this is a century of endless change; he who in the morning is drunk with dreams of glory may, by evening, know the bitterness of affliction. The world is on the brink of a great transformation.

While generally praising the holiness of love and mourning the tumult of the world, I must yet take up arms for the land of my ancestors and fight to the last drop of my blood. Therein lies the bitterness of life.

What a contradiction!

Below I shall attempt to set down, just as I recollect at random, a record of my participation in the war.

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### HATAII Operation (8 December)

At the time of year when green leaves turn suddenly to red in the cool winds of approaching autumn, and one begins to feel the piercing breath of the North Wind - that is to say, on 18 November 1941 -[we loof MULE harbor and sailed for the distant northern seas. The purpose of this operation was unknown to us.

We had taken on board warm clothing, materials for protecting the guns against the cold, and a great quantity of sea nets, but we understood nothing of this.

Day after day and night after night the ships carried out | target practice.

In the newspapers that we had on board it was said that we were to attack DUTCH HARBOR, but we did not believe it.

'Thy did we not believe it? Consider the moderate course of Japanesediplomacy up to that time. It seemed unlikely that Japan meant at this time to lift up her hand against Britain and America. Indeed, was there not at that moment a conference in progress at Mashington between America and Japan?

Our hopes were betrayed. We learned this when we went into port to refuel. Then we learnt for the first time how grave the situation was. Within the bay in that island of the bitterly cold North Pecific the air fleet was gathered. The crews, who every day were busy at conferences and discussions, were in an excited state of mind.

Finally the Navigation Officer, Lieut. Comdr. YAJO, told us we were to make a surprise attack on HAVAII. At last Japan would be at war with Britain and the U.S.A.!

An air attack on HATAII! A dream come true. That will the people at home think when they hear the news? Ton't they be excited! I can see them clapping their hands and shouting with joy. These were our feelings. The would teach the arrogant Anglo-Saxon scoundrels a lesson!

We must be inflexible in our course...We could not expect to return alive...Thinking that, for all we knew, we might now be eating and drinking for the last time, we gorged ourselves on wine and cakes from the canteen.

Finally, early in the morning of 26 November, our magnificent . air fleet set out through the thick fog and stormy waves. Following a pre-arranged course it continued on its way toward PLAAL MARBOR exporting to destroy the enemy's Pacific Fleet.

The <u>genther grove</u> worse, a gale blows, the seas rage, a dense fog descends. In this bitter weather, a show of actual force, a test by the gods, though tossed about in their struggle with the elements, the ships continue on their glorious way.

In the several days of danger when flags were blown eway, and men washed overboard, throughout the storm, the target practice went on ceaselessly.

Every man was completely exhausted by continuous watches without sleep, and by the silent struggle with Nature; but our spirits were buoyed up by the thought that we were to strike the very first blow in this greatest of all wars.

Behind us there were a hundred million people, amongst them our own families, who had limitless faith in us. Imagine the joy of these people on the morning when we should successfully carry out this operation!

Soon the fleet crossed the 180° date-line into the Eastern Hemisphere. About this time we received a report that a steanship was proceeding on the same course as ourselves, from SAN FRANCISCO to RUSSIA.

It was most important now to keep a good watch. There could be no doubt of our success, provided that this operation was not discovered by the energy. Thereafter the whole crew kept watch for sight or sound of this ship; but fortunately even when near 0 point we had caught no sight of it. Considering the dense fog, we seemed to be under divine protection.

Finally, on the long-awaited X-Day, 8 December 1941, at 0130, we reached a point 300 miles to the north of HATAII. Then the Imperial decree on the great battle was made public.

On this day there appeared in the clear sky a dense white cloud as if it were blessing our passage. Then from the decks of the aircraft carriers, plane after plane rose, flashing their silver wings in the sunlight, and soon there were a hundred and more aircraft in the sky.

Our Sea Engles were now moving into a great formation. Our ten years and more of intensive training, during which we had endured many hardships in anticipation of this day -- would they now bear fruit? At this thought a thousand emotions filled our hearts as, close to tears, we watched this magnificent sight. One and all, in our hearts, we sent our pleas to the gods, and putting our hands together, we prayed.

Meanwhile.our Sea Eagles, with the drone of their engines resounding across the heavens like a triumphal song, turned their course toward PEARL HARBON on the island of OAHU and set forth on their splendid enterprise.

About thirty minutes later the fleet received the first report that the raid had been successful.

The second wave of the air attack force, in a large formation composed of some two hundred planes, took off in the same way an hour later.

Reports come in one after another: "Enemy anti-aircraft fire is becoming more and more intense -- we are now attacking against the main force of the enemy -- we are bombing enemy sirfields, the damage is enormous--"

In this moment we are repeid for all our painstaking labors. The gods themselves will bear witness to the glory of our great enterprise!

The deck is now transformed into a whirlpool of excitement. As the glorious battle results are announced one after another by the pipes of the hurrying orderlies, shouts of joy are raised on all sides, and all gloom is completely swept away.

Meanwhile the fleet moves swiftly onward at a high speed of 26 knots.

About 0900 the welcome shapes of the returning raiders begin to appear through the clouds. One by one, like fledglings longing for their nest, they come to rest on the decks of the carriers.

Well done! But have they all come back? At this moment, my most carnest hope is that our losses may be small.

Within an hour, all the planes were brought aboard. We had lost only 29 planes. It was an incredibly small number when compared with our glorious battle results; nevertheless, when their heroic and was ennounced, the hearts of the crew were filled with sorrow for these men, [and for the fate of our special submarines(1)]

(1) TOKUSHU SENKOTEI 特種潜行般 -4-

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Suddonly the anti-aircraft defense signal was sounded. An enemy plane, above the clouds, was insolently following in the trail of our aircraft. Intending to shoot it down with one blast from our ship, we manned our battle stations, but in a moment the enemy got away.

It was also reported that the enemy fleet was on our trail; but this was only a false alarm, and all the ships withdrew towards 0 point.

Thus, having inflicted upon America a loss which cannot be wiped out in a lifetime, we finally set out upon our homeward journey.

On the way, the 2nd AirFlot and the 8th Cardin were detached and headed for TAKE Island as an attach force.

On a morning near the end of the year -- 25 December -- we entered the hurbor at KURE, which we had long been yearning to see again.

On thinking back, it was a long journey. The heroic men who took part in it, the public excitement at home of which we learned by radio, and the wild waves of the stormy North Pacific, are all etched upon my heart like a vivid drema.

Ah, memorable day - 8 December 1941!

(This concludes my recollections of the

HAWAII Operation)

# (NEW GUINEA) RABAUL Operations

I had but a short while, but nevertheloss I celebrated a victorious New Year's Day in the homeland and enjoyed to the fullest the taste of my networlend. Leaving KUED behind, I set out on the long set voyage to my second field of operations in the South Seas - to that southern land which I had longed for and dreamed of since my childhood. I stood at my lookout station watching while seas of dancing silver and gold waves and naked natives dancing in the shadow of coconut trees floated before my eyes. At length the fleet passed TAUVAN and entered the Tropical Zone. At TRUK, the land of eternal summer, we changed to our tropical uniforms.

The bright sun sent out blazing rays and it was steaming hot inside the ship. This completely dissipated my cherished illusions about the tropics. Even so, tho squalls which occasionally asseiled us, accompanied as they were with cool winds and rain, ameliorated the heat. Then at night the gentle evening breeze, blowing drowsily, gave delicious coolness to my hot body. Looking heavenward, stars like scattered gold and silver twinkled here and there in the evening aky. The Southern Cross, which I was seeing for the first time, glittered there among them.

The nights in the South Seas roused vegue feelings of longing for home. Giving consolation for our indequacies, the rippling waves broke against the side of the boat like aparkling scatterings of beautiful pure silver. The South Sea vegetation grew luxuriantly directly down to the beating waves and its beautiful contours were reflected on the surface of the see. Adding the moon to this, the mid-day heat seemed a dream.

We stopped here for a certain number of days, then when the supplying was completed, finally turned toward the RABAUL theator of operations and wont forth to the attack. The gun shields were put up, and lookouts posted as usual.

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Since leaving KURE Harbor, how many times have I longed for a peaceful sleep in a hasmock! Exhausted by work during the day, at night I lay among the machine guns on the upper deck, never closing my watchful eyes for an instant. Are the men on the homefront really aware of these hardships?

Finally, on 20 January, we launched our planes from a point 200 miles north of RABAUL and NEW GUINEA. From that time until the 24th, when army units and landing forces carried out a bold landing in the face of the enemy, we sailed back and forth across the squator, moving northward during the day and southward at night. We bombed every day at dawn for about 10 times. Our beloved plane, the ABUKUMA(1) also took part in the bombing, receiving its beptism of fire. .de did not see the enemy in this operation. Bitterly disappointed at this, we returned once again to TRUE.

#### Port DARUTN Operations

On 1 February we received word of the appearance of an enemy striking force on the east end of the WARSHALL Ialands. Our striking force, under orders to take and externinate this oneny immediately, beeded straight for the WARSHALL Islands.

However, the hour arrived and the enony was nowhere about, so there was nothing to do but to sail for the next field of operations, namely PALAU, where we were to carry out joint operations with the Southern Force.

PALAU Island boasts of being the most civilized among the various South Sea Islands. The South Sea Islands Government Office is located here, and both the buildings and the inhabitants are civilized in comparison with TRUE and other islands.

With its stores, perks, shrines, APAI<sup>(2)</sup>, elementary schools, and in the military line the Air Group, Stores Department, etc., it reminded me of country towns at home.

Here I approached two native girls and in exchanging conversation with them on various subjects was amazed at their skill in Japanese, at their simplicity and naivety, and at the intelligence of their profiles.

On a cortain day here we were sent out to dcatroy PORT DARTIN, on important port on the extreme northern tip of hostile AUSTRALIA. The planes took off as in the previous battle from a point 200 miles nuay, and inflicted tremendous damage on the port.

Our striking force next had to prepare for the JAVA Operations in the Indian Ocean. Giving chase to an enewy submarine, we sailed into STARING BAY in the Dutch-held GLIEBES, which were now under occupation by our peratroop forces and Lending forces.

#### Indian Ocean (JAVA) Operations

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England and America's ambitious 100-year-old dream of advencing into the South Seas and the Orient was finally shaken to its foundations as defeat followed defeat. In spite of the fact that they were taking their deathbed gasp; still stubborn, they despatched the

(1) ABOTATIONA 阿武隈 (2) APAI 7/14 unidentified.

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Combined British, Dutch and American Flact, which now had no capital ships, and continued their throes in the JAVA area, their last defense. Our striking force, which was to help this enemy across its last river, acting in close cooperation with other South Sen forces, weighed anchor in STARING BAY on 25 February and was on its way to the salty Indian Ocean.

The fleet, keeping a strict anti-submarine patrol in the sea areas where enemy submarines navigate, advanced between the islands which intersperse the OMBAI Straits.

These waters, ripple-free as flowing oil, reminded me of the Inland Sea...(T.N. Remainder of sentence illegible)

Words at such a time fail to express what I feel. Wild ducks flying together, clouds floating majestically, a great school of dolphins -- the very picture of pace. Could it be that a bloody war was being fought on such a sea? It is not surprising that we felt a sense of wonder.

Finally the fleet mede its splendid appearance in the Indian Ocean. A few hours later the 4th Gruiser Division(1) separated from the force as a detached force and left for an undisclosed destination. The remainder, 4 chroraft carriers, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, and several destroyers arrived in the vicinity of CHRISTANS ISLAND to -try to sink the enemy's fleet. The received reports from the Air Fleet 11 that one enemy carrier and one destroyer were trying to make port at CHRISTANS ISLA. The approached this island end sent up a reconnaissance plane, but it was not able finally to locate any trace of them. No doubt the swiftly retreating enemy had learned of our approach, and had usened under cover of night.

Grunbling over our ill luck in being again cheated out of an engagement, we changed our course and formation and headed for a supply base. Suddenly the alarm mas given to man our battle stations and saw to our right a cloud of black smoke rising on the distant horizon. The big guns of the TONE (2) opened fire, belching black smoke. The destroyers up shead also began firing.

Soon the enemy merchant ship broke into flames, and in a few minutes sank to the depths of the Indian Ocean.

From this first bombardment by our striking force, I was able to realize something of the difficulties of artillery warfare; I was surprised to learn that we had fired several hundred shells at a single merchant vessel. Several hours later we were again ordered to man our battle stations. As we took up our posts, full of fighting spirit, the big gues of the TONE in the rear were already firing and shouly there after the HIEI(3) also opened fire.

Finally we sighted the two energy cruisers which were following astern. They at once made a quick  $130^\circ$  turn and fled into the clouds and mist.

(1)四戰隊 (2)利根 (3)比叡

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Apparently it was considered too much trouble to finish them off with artillery fire; so our Sea Lagles rose with one flap of their wings from the decks of the carriers. In a few moments they sent the enemy to the bottom and came triumphantly back. In a short time the TAE rescued members of the enemy crew from the same ship and returned to its group. In the meantime the destroyer ANIAKE(1) came back with 27 crewmen and lother persons from the merchant ship which had previously been sumk.

We, who had not fired a single shot while we watched the artillery fight of the other ships, grieved with vexation beyond description, staring at the sky. In the meantime, off the coast of SOERABAJA and BATAVIA, our destroyer squadrons opened a day and night battle, and brilliant battle results followed in quick succession.

The enemy must have escaped somehow to Australia; not one of them was caught in our net. Finally, as a last resort, we carried out a great bonbing attack on a large group of transports that were entering the harbor of NILLAYAP.

About that time the weather began to get worse, belying the reputation of the Indian Occan as the most penceful of the seven seas. The wind velocity increased to 20 meters per second, and the ships rolled with a 20-degree list to port and starboard. Finally we gave up taking on oil from alongside and began to take it stern on because of the heavy seas.

Afterwards in the midst of the rough weather, our force resumed its censeless reconnaissance, noving east and west in irregular novements in search of the energy. At that time the statements of the survivors picked up by the TONE were made public.

These men knew nothing of the movements of their own floct; they did not even know that HAMAII had been attacked. They seemed to believe that our fleet was concentrated only in the CELENES. From this we could see how America was concending her crushing defeats in a desperate attempt to prevent a decline in morale.

England and America, sacred countries of disguise, now your last time has come. Enemy of mankind, evil spirit of peace, the harsh blow of heaven has fallen against you.

Heaven will by no means forgive you, who for your own profit have planned an unscrupulous attack on Japan, the nation of righteousness, and on the Oriental people - you, who are trying to subjugate the world and to make the world a paradise for the white race!

Among the races who have been exploited up till now by the English and Americans are the Indians, the Malayans, the Chinese, the Burmese, and countless other ignorant races whom civilization has bypassed. They have become the victims of the characteristic English-American policy of "squeeze and take", while the latter line their purses and nurture their overweening ambition.

They cause GANDHI to cry out for the independence of India and far away they carry on an opium war in the Republic of China.

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All this is a cry from the heart of the splendid peoples of the Oriont who are trying to eacape the pressure which is being brought upon them by England and America.

However, now the blood of the Oriental peoples has returned to the original cherished desire of the Orientals and has been embraced by them. Their feelings are shown by the fact that they have pledged their mutual cooperation and essistance for the great undertaking of Japan, the leading power of the Orient.

Japan, who, as the leader of the Orient has opposed the power ful countries of England and America, really loves Asia and is laboring for the peace of mankind.

Our task group was now passing in the vicinity of ADLIRALTY BAY and on the eleventh we were scheduled to enter the port of KEDANI.

Although scarcely two months had passed since we left the homelend, it seemed like two years.

In the Indian Ocean, where once the German ship ELDEM played a spectacular part in the destruction of trade, there is now not a shedow of the energy, and an uncenny silence pervades the surface of the sea where there is a faint reflection of the moon.

# Operations in the Indian Ocean (CEYLON)

With regard to the attack on CEYLON, which must grace the final pages of the history of our striking force, every possible proparation for battle had been completed during the 15 days when we lay at enchor in STARING BAY. Actually it was at the very erack of dawn on 26 March 1942 when once again it sallied forth into the fleecy-capped waves of whe kindian Ocean. We saw, just as we did in the Java operation, the porpois-se playing near the ocean's surface, as if the quiet, gently-lapping waves of OMBAI Straits were hulling them to sleep.

There is a aaying that the Indian Ocean has mountainous waves and that it is the ocean of the devil. But the Indian Ocean, shining before our eyes, was like an extremely quiet bay or a gently-rocking cradle.

Sailing around from place to place like this, a mundanè feeling touched me. I was reminded of the days when I was a young bachelor with my pay envelope containing my monthly 50 ¥ converted into pure happiness, when I was swaggering through the street shops with an air of independence showing on my pimply face.

While I was writing, so tense with excitement was I that I might easily have sold my dearest possession at bargain prices. As the saying goea, my duties were like heavy weights on my shoulders.

We continued to sail swiftly and uncventfully, loading oil from time to time, standing watch, and keeping anti-submarine lookout. What strength there is in being with speedy airplanes!

At daybreak of the day before the attack, 4 April 1942, 400 miles from CEYLON, an enemy Consolidated Flying Boat met us. The bugle stirringly sounded "aerial attack" and the entire crev took up their posta.

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Happy day! My blood ran fast and my flash tingled as the enemy planes for which I had been waiting since the outbreak of the war appeared 30° off the port side. The shells were bursting in the air. It was more stirring than I had imagined it would be. The enemy tried to hide himself, using the white clouds as a snoke screen, but to no swail; our ships' fire sough thim out, and after a few minutes of aerial warfare he came crashing down, trailing a long tail of snoke against the sky. Ah! They have exhausted all their secret methods! What feelings the enemy must have experienced during those few minutes! What a lamentable way to spend one's last few moments of life!

Early on 5 April, for which we had been waiting, our force reached a point 200 miles south of CEYLON. The weather was excellent for good aerial bombardment.

Before daybreak, a huge formation of planes set out for the enemy's last stronghold, COLOLEO in CEYLON. This attack was timed to take place just at the time of an Anglo-Indian conference. Piercing the morning haze like impetuous falcons, the planes soon disappeared from sight.

In less than an hour we received our first reports. According to these, we obtained brilliant results from serial stracks on an enemy escorted convoy, on ground installations and airfields, and on an enemy plane on patrol duty. The planes returned to the ships safely.

Meanwhile, shipborne reconneissance seaplanes went out to search for the enemy, looking to the west and to the south for ships and small craft. Presently, we received a wireless message from a plane of the 8th Cruiser Division to the effect that one carrier and one destroyer had been sighted. A carrier bomber unit was despatched instantly and sank them immediately. (Two enemy cruisers were mistaken for a carrier and destroyer).

The force, going outside its patrol radius, sailed north and then south in irregular movements.

Finally, after our supplying was completed, we turned to our next field of attack, TRINCOMALEE.

We launched the attack from a point 200 miles to the east at dawn on 9 April, in fine weather. Inasmuch as our Irrge flying boats had been shooting down enemy craft for some time, we thought it likely that the enemy was expecting an attack on this occasion. However, our bold and intrepid fliers will turn the tables on the English by using their own strategy of crushing the enemy with a single blow. Unon we see the enemy, we will shoot him down without fail. The enemy faces the grim prospect of certain death.

The enemy's military installations at TRINCOLALEE were bonded until there were none remaining. Furthermore, our fleet dispatched its reserve forces and in the work of a moment senk the aircraft carrier HERMES and a destroyer which were cruising in neighboring waters. We seemed to be inspired with superhuman powers.

At this point, an enemy heavy bomber unit consisting of 9 planes audaciously attacked our force; but because the bombs fell from an altitude of 6000 meters, they did no more harm than startling the fish in the see. Our 25 mm. machine guns pursued the planes above the ships and spurting fire in unison, brought down seven of them. This one battle certainly proved how weak the fighting capacity of enemy planes is. 523

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The face of the braggart Churchill who before the war disdnined and scorned Japan, and the face of the miserable Churchill who now stumbles straight to defeat, would beer resemblance to the face of an actor who plays a double role of sorrow and glee.

The striking force in the BAY OF BENGAL and our force half d each other; the BAY OF BENGAL force shid it had been carrying on operations for five days and had obtained great results.

The English sun of military power in India, having finally lost its last vestige of defense, seemed on the point of setting.

The great British Empire has been shaken to its foundations, and its dream of world domination has been turned into a nightmare.

The pessage of time has now fulfilled its purpose. Hencen has sent down its blessing upon the righteous, and crushed the wicked with an iron hand. Now this earth, which was made for the general benefit of all mankind, will be wholly transmuted into the pradise that has been the cherished hope of Eastern peoples. Japan, at the herd, loudly sounds the knell of tyranny, and Japan, who leads the East to rebirth, is most fitted to bestow the blessing of the rods.

Back to our longed-for mother country! At long last we return to our home port. In frankness 1 admit that I shed a term as we bade farewell to the skies of the Southern Sens. The ship, seering to quiver with joy, passed through the bonutiful MILACCA STRAINS on a mortherly course.

We were on our way to our distant homeland, our hearts filled with emotion; loaded with honor, the best gift we could take to our native land was our glorious victory and our triumphal song.

Soon, as we were approaching the most northerly extrusity of the PHILIPPINES, we received word by radio that an enery task force and subdenly appeared at a point 750 miles south of Tokyo. Our force and subto destroy the enery innediately. We speed to the extreme force are surflyed of 20 kmots, intending to attack the energy as long as our fuel head out. By an irony of fate, however, before we ware able to reach this point, on the 18th of December several cities in the TOKOKU district of Japan suffered an dir attack on a small scale.

We wept bitter tears and were filled with indignation; but ithough we continued the search for the energy we were unable to find him. However, it could not be helped and we followed the pro-arranged course that should have led us to the energy, until, on the 28th, the whole fleet dispersed in home waters and we heatened to our longed-for home ports.

Friends and commades of the striking force, for a long time we have suffered and been happy together: together we have rendered a great service to our country. Now the time has come for us to part; but, sooner or later, the day will come when we shall be together again. Until then, enjoy yourselves and be happy! While my heart is grieved at this and parting, I shall try to write a few lines of feeble verse.

(T.N. The "few lines of feeble verse" (eight pages) have been omitted)

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# EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #8 (TRANSLATION OF THREE CAPTURED JAPANESE DOCUMENTS ) EN TT TLED (A) "JAPANESE SUBMARINE SCHOOL NOTES CONCERNING EARLY WAR EXPERIENCES OFF HAWAII" (same as SOURCE DOCUMENT #5, SUPRA) (B) "JAPANESE INSTRUCTIONS TO THE YATSUMAKI BUTAT" (C)"JAPANESE PLACES OF MILITARY IMPORTANCE IN THE KURILE ISLANDS" USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE "NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR" (Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460). (EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8

(EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8 IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR) 526 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

INTELLIGENCE CENTER, PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS NAVY NUMBER 128 (ONE TWO EIGHT) c/o Fiset Post Office San Francisco, California

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30 June 1943 Serial AS-300921

From:

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Subj: ICPOA Translation of Ceptured Enemy Documents, Item No. 472 - "Gubmarine School Notes Conserning Early War Experiences off Hawaii."

> ICPOA Translation of Captured Enemy Documents, Item No. 473 "Instructions to the Yatsumaki Butai." ICPOA Translation of Captured Enemy Documents, Item No. 474 - "Places of Military Importance in the Kurile Islands."

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## C-O-N-F-L-D-E-N-T-I-A-L-

CAPTURED DOCUMENTS - TRANSLATED BY ICPOA

Original Item #\_\_\_\_,ICPOA Item # <u>472</u> Transl.byICPOA Date <u>10 June 1943</u> Title of Publication <u>SUMMARINE SCHOOL NOTES CONCERNING DARLY #AR</u>

# EXFERIENCES OFF HAWAII

IN CASE OF DIARY, R.CORD, LOG, etc., GIVE (RITER'S Organization\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Initial Date\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_Final Date\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

 Jan. 12. 1941
 Instructor Macshima

 It is needless to state that combat education in this current emergency

 ie of great necessity, and it is extremely regrettable that there has been

 no op ortunity to gather sufficient material before the graduation of the

llth. period special course students. Since, however, some materials in the category of combat instructions has been obtained with the arrival in port of submarines-I-16 and I-68 recently, it has been decided to immediately mineograph and distribute it as study material to this period's special course students. Although it is difficult to guarantee that among the items heard directly there are no points of difference with actual facts, it is believed that there are no great errors in the instructions obtained.

# NO. 1. TACTICS

- 1. Use of submarine carried planes.
  - A. After the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 8, the submarine I-7 received an order to carry out an aerial reconnaissance of Pearl Harbor when the opportunity presented. Although she attempted to send off a plane from the neighborhood of Niihau, it was impossible to do so due to the weather. Hence she proceeded southward until in the neighborhood of Hawaii and carried out the aerial reconnaissance.

(2)

B. When on picket station, it may be possible, dopending on the weather, the enemy's alert condition, terrain and other conditions, to send off the planes carried from a certain area, but it may be impossible to do so from another area. Consequently, besides the necessity of deploying airplane carrying submarines, there is also the necessity of deploying many airplane carring submarines.

Since urgent execution of the above mentioned reconnaissance was not necessary, we suffered no great disadvantage, but it would be of great disadvantage, when urgency of execution is required.

- 2. Movement against enemy depth charges.
  - A. Since merica's depth charge setting, for the most part, has been definitely ascertained to be in the neighborhood of 35 meters by previous investigations, submarines attached to the Sixth Fleet have evaded them at depths of 50 to 70 meters. (Some subs have evaded them at a depth of 100 meters). In the case of the I-16 (70 meters depth), she received three charges directly over her, but suffered no damage. (Judging from the opinion that the bursting charge of America's depth charges appeared to be feeble, it is doubtful as to whether the charges were directly overhead.)
  - B. When the safe submerging depth is thought to be about 20 meters more than the supposed depth setting of depth charges, it is deemed best to assume as far as possible a position of 20 meters or more below the depth charge's depth setting.

If not, it is doemed best to assume a position up high, but impossible to be detected, and as far above as possible from the supposed depth setting of the depth charge

(A) The ISB privarily used sound listening patrol Choon shokai 脑 音哨成了

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to provent any decrease in the efficiency of the listening gear, the following.method.was used and no uneasiness.was felt because of the sound listening.matrol.

# 3. Observation patrol.

- . A. (1) Slowest speed used.
  - (2) Ventilution stopped.
  - (3) In stuering, mechanical power was used only for the diving rudder, while the rost was all man power.
  - (4) Although it was stipulated in the operational order that batteries should be charged at night at the other edge of the patrol zone (about 10 nautical miles from harbor entrance), it was impossible to do so. Hence, batteries were charged at a distance of 40 nautical miles from the harbor entrance and after that we returned to the patrol zone.
  - B. At night, when picketing by enemy patrol vessels is to be expected, it is deemed best to increase the depth of the patrol zone.
- 4. Patrol method of American destroyers.
  - A. It seems as if American destroyers are equipped with accurate and good sound detectors and they, for the most part, are executing stationary or slow speed catrol.
  - E. Even when an American destroyer is stationary, be on guard.

## NO. 2. COMBAT DUTY

1. Identification method of friendly units when returning to friendly harbor.

A. The method carried out by I-16 is as follows:

- (1) Hoisted a "Dreadth Four" Ensign at the sip of the periscope.
- (2) Spread a "Breadth Four" Ensign on the ladder to the bridge.
- (3) Notified the time of its arrival within the 300 nautical mile arc,
- its mosition and course one or two days previously to the home combat force CP7 戰 音图 隊 了

Alen returning to an idvanced base,  $\sqrt{m}\sqrt{2}$  took the system of having the commandant of the idvance base force indicate the point of passage into the 300 nautical mile arc.

B. There is an example of submarine I-68 being attacked with depth charges by a friendly destroyer when leaving an advanced base. Closest attention should be paid to the identification of friendly units when entering and leaving a friendly harbor and to being alert.

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# No. 3. NAVIGATION, WEATHER AND SEA CONDITION

## 1. Onshore Current,

- A. The onshore current in the area of Barber's Point, Oahu, is very strong. Since submarine I-68 paid little attention to this, she sighted the breakers of Barber's Foint roof at a very close distance when she raised her periscope up to observe, but she was able to prevent anything from happening by turning immediately.
- B. When stationed on observation on the front line, it is necessary to take into proper consideration the onshore current when close to the shore. NO. A. HANEUVERING FOR ATTACK

### 1. Protracted submerged navigation.

- A. (1) In rog.rd to submarine I-68, the number of days of submerged navigation was 30 for an average of 14 hours per day. Air purifier chemicals were used only once (20 pieces) and the cooler was not used.
  (2) Although CO<sup>2</sup> reached 4.6%, O<sup>2</sup> reached 16% and the temperature reached 32°C., there seemed to be no great effect upon the men.
  (3) Other than being used once when her submerged navigation continued for 36 hours, submarine I-16 did not use the air purifier. Just as in the above case, there seemed to be practically no effect upon the men.
- B. (1) Although there is no.d for the use of air purifiers in a submorged navigation of about 14 hours, there is still a necessity for the gathering of more data for further study.

(2) It is necessary to accelerate the completion of the study "Washing purifier" 「洗 浮 式 J \*ype air purifying method.

- 2. Haves in the Hawaiian Area.
  - A. During the operations of submarines of the Sixth Fleet in the Hawaiian area, waves were high every day and it has been reported that submarine I-16 found it difficult to maintain her depth even at the depth of about 18 meters and had to use her standard speed many times. Besides, there appeared to be two or three submarines that revealed their conning tower in the presence of the enemy.
  - B. It is necessary to maintain the accuracy of the sound detector excellently in order to do away with any uneasiness in cound detection patrol. Also, considering this, the pericsope should be made as long as possible.

(4)

# (5)

# NO. 5. COLLUNICATION

- 1. Underwater wireless reception ability.
  - A. According to the experiences of the I-16, it is reported that sonsitivity is 4 at a depth of 18 m ters and 3 at 20 meters in the Hawaiian area. (Sending station USAGE)

# NO. 6. (IS MISSING)7

## NO. 7. HULL

- 1. Change in Working of the machine guns during operations.
  - A. When I-16 test fired her machine guns without taking the trouble of cleaning, after conducting operations for 30 days, of which 20 days were spent in submerged mavigation, one machine gun fired without any trouble, while the other fired only one shot.
- 2. Danages caused by depth charge attack.
  - A. Mule observing in Hawaiian area, submarine I-68 was depth charged. Of about 100 depth charges dropped, 12 exploded within 200 meters and 2 exploded directly above. The depth charge setting was within 35 meters and the sub's depth 45 meters. The damage suffered from this attack, for the most part was as follows:

(1) Of the 172 electric lights, 75 were amaged. (Those that were not lighted were not Canaged).

- (2) Small amount of leakage from the forward door(s) of the torpedo tube(s).
- (3) Two depth indicators began to function incorrectly.
- (4) Sensitivity of sound detector became bad.
- (5) Became impossible to use the transmitter of the echo range depth finder.
- (6) Leakage in the high pressure air valve group and air pressure within ship increased greatly.
- (7) Luckage in the Kingston value of the negative buoyancy tank increased.
  (3) Due to the damage to the 50 volt power supply, the rudder order telegraph went out. Because of this, the helmsman mistakenly thought that the rudder had been damaged.
- (9) The accuracy of the (---?---) ammeter decreased.
- (10) Leakage from the corroded tube(s) of number 1 cooler.
- (11) Considerable leakage from the "constant use" and reserve fuel tanks.
- B. (1) Disassemble the damaged Pepth indicator and remove the sea water between the 31 and 32 beaks  $\int \sigma_{j+1}^{jk} = 7$ 
  - (2) To have turned off as many electric lights as possible.

(5)

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

CAPTURED DOCUMENTS - TRANSLATED BY ICPOA Original It4m #\_\_\_\_,ICPOA Item #473 Transl.byICPOA Date 6 June 1943 Title of Publication INSTRUCTIONS TO THE YATSUMAKI BUTAI Originator\_\_\_\_\_

The following translation was made from a document recovered from a two-...an submarine raised Hay 7, 1943, by the salvage ship, USS ORTOLAN, under the Command of Lt. Commander A.A. Holland. The sub was located in Visale Bay, N.M. GUADALCANAL. The submarine w s raised, but on account of a storm, broke locate and sank again.

October 14, 1942

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At Sea

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE YATSUMAKI BUTAL

- On the evening of the 14th. after 2300 the midget subs will be launched dest of Savo Island.
- 2. Each unit will accomplish its mission according to the plan.
- In order to avoid confusion with the 8th Fleet and the Transport Group tonight, you will proceed submerged at a great depth until 0300 on the 15th.
- 4. Kidget submarines which have fired torpedoes and/or which have insufficient battery power remaining will proceed immediately to the shores of friendly places, if possible, to KALEO.
- 5. As there is at present no information for the evaluation of the true worth of the midget submarine, it is expected that each man will, both in the attack and the withdrawal, exert his every effort, and in this way (do his part) in supplying this information.
- Be confident in the August Virtue of His Majesty, in Frovidential Assistance, and in your ability which you have constantly developed. Go forth undaunted.

"Heaven helps those the help themselves".

#### End.

Commanding Officer of the CHIYODA, HARADA, SATORU (AKIRA?).

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CAPTURED DOCUMENTS - TRANSLATED BY ICPOA				
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Title of Publication PLACES OF MILITARY IMPORTANCE IN THE KURILE ISLANDS				
Originator Technician of the Fisherics Experimental Station				
IN CASE OF DIARY, RECORD, LOG, etc., GIVE MRITER'S				
Orginization				
Initial DatoFinal Dato				

#### TRANSLATOR'S FOREWORD

The following is a revised translation of a Japanese document captured in the recent ATTU operations. The original translation was made by the Advanced Intelligence Center, North Pacific Area. The ICPOA Revision includes the following points:

- Addition of positions ( in latitude and longitude) of all geographical points mentioned in the original document.
- The promunciations for all geographical points in the following revised translation, are the promunciations listed in <u>Index of Japanese Place Names, Appearing in</u> <u>Japanese Hydrographic Publications, propared by In-</u> tolligence Section, CinC Pacific Floet, 1942.
- 3. Explanatory notes have been added.
- 5. Minor errors in the original translation have been corrected.

There is disagreement concerning the proper pronunciation of many place/manes in the Kurile Islands, even in Japanese reference materials. For the sake of uniformity, and because it is thought to be the most accurate source, the CinCPAC Index has been used to asdertain the correct promunciation for the place names included in the following translation. The CinPAC: Index contains every geographical point mentioned in the following translation with one exception. This exception is GNUKAKU,  $47^{009!N}$ . 152°18'E., on SHEAUSHERU Island. The translators have ascertained the position of GNUKAKU with the help of "Japanese Naval Air Chart," NO.11 ( War Department Map Collection Office reproduction). 'my material in the following which is not a direct translation from the original document is indicated by brackets and the abbreviation "T.N.", meaning "translator's note."

(1)

PLACES OF MILITARY IMPORTANCE IN THE KURILE ISLANDS

Notes by a technician of the Fisherics Experimental Station

AKATSUKI 6174 Force

INFORMATION BULLETIN

 This publication contains statements by a technician of the HOKKAIDO Government.

2. By hir.

Time: 1935 - 1940

Season: June to August

Place: Kurile Islands /T.N. - Chishima Islands7

A general investigation of aquatic fauna has been made (salmon, salmontrout, shark, shellfish).

The vessel used was a 26.76 ton, 50 HP, semi-diosci.

PROTECTED HARBORS IN THE KURILE ISLANDS

1. The Kuriles:

The Kurile Islands are divided into the Southern Kuriles, Central Kuriles, and Northern Kuriles.

- A. Southorn Kuriles: KUNISHIRI Island ZT.N. KUNASHIRI Island 44°16' N, 146°00' E.Z., ETOROFU Island ZT.N. 45°04' N., 147°48' E.Z. (These are populated.)
- B. Contral Kuriles: URUPPU Island [T.N. 45°56' N., 150°00' E.T., CHIRIHOI Islands [T.N. North CHIRIHOI, 46°32' N., 150°53' E.; South CHIRIHOI, 46°23' N., 150°49' E.T., SHINCHI Island [T.N. SHIMUSHIRU Island, 46°58' N., 152°02' E.T., KEITOI Island [T.N. KETOI Island, 47°20' N., 152°30' E.T. USHISHIRU Island [T.N. KETOI Island, 47°20' N., 152°30' E.T. KETOI Island, 47°20' N., 152°30' E.T. KETOI Island [T.N. HASHOHA Island [T.N. 47°32' N, 152°49' E.T. RISHOHA Island [T.N. HASHOHA Island, 47°45' N., 153°01'E.T. KATSUHA Island [T.N. 48°05' N. 153°13' E.T. SHASHIKOTAN Island [T.N. 49°07' N., 154°31' E.T. ONNEKOTAN Island [T.N. 49°07' N., 154°31' E.T. ONNEKOTAN Island [T.N. 69°25' N., 154°45' E.T.
- C. Northern Kurilas: HOROLUSHIRO Island <u>(T.N. PARALUSHIRU ISLAND, 50°20'N.</u> 155°50' <u>Z</u>, SHURUSHU Island <u>(T.N. SHILUSHU Island. 50°45'N., 156°20'E</u>, ARAITO Island, <u>(T.N. ARAIDO Island, 50°52' N., 155°34' E</u>, (Fopulated during the summer for fishing.)

(3) CONFIDENTIAL

- 2. Animals to be Found in the Kuriles
  - Jalrus, sea-otters, and seals are native. Foxes are bred by the Department of Agriculture and Forestry only in the Central Kuriles. Near the shore, ABU-ANI, SOHI /T.W. Translation for these f.sh unknown/, salmon and salmontrout (returning up the rivers) and BOTAN Shrimp are found. Cod and TARASA Crabs are to be found off-shore.
- 3. Plants to be Found in the Kuriles:
  - There are forests as far north as URUPPU Island; but on the islands north of CHIRIHOI Island, only creeping pines and black alders, no taller than 6 feet, and weeds exist. There is a type of sea-weed known as KAIROPPA, about 15 meters in length, which has its leaf sections floating on the surface. Also there is sea-weed and sea-moss.  $\sqrt{T}$ . M. The Japanese term NORI has been translated as "sea-moss". NORI, or ASAKUSA NORI, is an ediblo red sea-weed. Its leaves are about 10 cm. wide and 20 cm. long. It grows best in winter. The weed is made into dried NORI, and is largely cultivated in estuaries where the water is brackish. It grows on sticks which are stuck into the sand at low tide. The mature leaves are dried. Yearly production of NORI is valued at 15,000,000 YEN, ranking next after serdines and herring as a fisheries product.
- 4. Sea Routes from OTARU /T.N. Position of port is 43°12' N., 141°01' E.7, HOKKAIDO to the Northern Kuriles.
  - A. OTARU to the SOYA Straite [T.N. 45°45' N., 142°00' E\_]; heading in a southerly direction along KITAMI Coast [T.N. The area known as the KITAMI Coast extends along the northern coast of HOKKAIDO from "bout 142°10' Z. to 145°23'E\_7; going from AEASHIRI [T.N. 44°01' N., 144°17'E\_7 toward IKABANOTSU Point [T.N. 45°26'N., 147°56' E..] on ETOROFU Island; heading in a Northerly direction along the archipelago; passing through the ONEKOTAN Channel [T.N. 49°50' N., 155°05' E.7; and coming out on the Pacific side. Distance: 860 nautical miles.
  - B. OTARU to SOTA Straits and direct to the Northern Kuriles. Distance: 800 nautical miles.
- 5. Protected Harbors.

Harbore suitable for small vessels ("\*" indicates harbors suitable for large vessels also).

- (1) ETOROFU Island:
  - \* SHANA area: /T.N. Position of port of SHANA is 45°14' N.,147°53'E.7

· (4)

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Offers good shelter even from north-westerly winds. There is a waterfall suitable for drinking water urposes. There is a salmontrout canning factory. Fractical Importance: It is a natural harbor; there are fishing establisiments.

Remarks: On the Pacific shore, there is the harbor of HITOKAFFU  $\sqrt{T_{*}}N$ .  $44^{\circ}58^{\circ}$  N.,  $147^{\circ}41^{\circ}E_{*}$  Which is suitable for large vessels.

- (2) URUPPU Island:
  - FUTAGOSHIMA  $\overline{T_{*}}$ N. Small island near S.J. tip of URUPFU, position of island is  $45^{\circ}38^{\circ}$  N.,  $149^{\circ}27^{\circ}$  E\_7: There are shoals between FUTAGOSHIMA and URUPFU which reduce the force of the breakers. There is no water suitable for drinking.

\* MISHIMA Bay  $\langle \overline{T}.N. 46^{\circ}14$  ' N., 150°20' E,7; a sheltered harbor with a sandy bottom. Water from the KAIMEN River  $\langle \overline{T}.N. 46^{\circ}13'$  N., 150° 20' E. (position of mouth)7 is suitable for drinking. Salmon end Salmon-trout ascend the KAIMEN River in the fall. Nemarks: KOBUNE Bäy  $\langle \overline{T}.N.$  Position of KOBUNE port is 45°56' N., 150°12' E,7 is on the Pacific side. Off the mouth of the Bay, is

**DOGART** INA, 28 meters high, which serves as a good landmark for entering the Bay.  $\sqrt{T}$ .N. TOGARI L/A is a pointed rock,  $45^{\circ}55^{\circ}$  N., 150°  $12^{4}$  E<sub>0</sub>7. There is water suitable for drinking.

() CHIRTHOI Islands:

\* SURA Bay [T.N. 46°32' N., 150°56' E.7 on Northern CHIRIHOI Island. Has sandy bottom. No drinking water.

(4) SHIINSHIRU Island:

SHEDSHERU Bay  $\sqrt{T}$ .N. 46°52' N., 151° 51'E<sub>4</sub>7: It is not a good harbor, but has a sandy bottom. Nearby is UMEURA  $\sqrt{T}$ .N. probably is indict; position is 46°52' N., 151°48' E<sub>4</sub>7 where there is drinking water. BUROTON Bay  $\sqrt{T}$ .N. 47°09'N., 152°13' E<sub>5</sub>7: A harbor suitable for multiple. Water has entered the crater; and the depth of the water and quality of the bottom is suitable for mooring in the area on the eastern side of a line running from the mouth of the bay to the Agriculture and Forestry Department's fox farm. The mouth of the bay is narrow and shallow, and therefore it is easier to enter the harbor by having small boats indicate the shallowest areas, and having the ship pass in between them. (5) CONFIDENTIAL

\* GEŪKAKU /T.N. Promunciation not confirmed. Fosition is 47°09' N., 152°18' E.; Do not confuse with GYŪKAKU on PARAMUSHIRU Island, Although the bottom is not good, it offers good shelter from N.W. winds. There is a road connecting with EUROTON Bay.

(5) MATSUWA Island

There is shelter between YAMATO Bay  $(f.N. 48^{\circ}051 N., 153^{\circ}161 E_{0}7)$  and BANJO Island  $(f.N. 43^{\circ}051 N., 153^{\circ}171 E_{0}7)$ . Although the bottom is rocky, the area is bounded by the two islands, and the wind and waves can be avoided. Drinking water is available. There is a naval airfield.

(6) SHASUKOTAN Island:

OTCME Bay  $\sum T.N. 48^{\circ}48' N.$ , 154°04' E<sub>a</sub>7. A semicircular bay with sandy bottom. It is not a good harbor because of the wide mouth. Drinking water is available.

(7) ONEROTAN Island:

NEWD Bay  $f.N. 49^{\circ}37$ ' N.,  $154^{\circ}49$ ' E $_{\star}7$ : It is not a good harbor, but is suitable as shelter from south-casterly winds. There is drinking water. In respect to the nort's-westerly winds, the Facific side is of value.

**EUROISHI Bay**  $\sqrt{T}$ .N. 49<sup>°</sup>26' N., 154°49' E<sub>4</sub>7: Since KUROISHI Bay is on the **Pacific side**, it is of value when prevailing winds are from the west.

(6) PARAMISHIRU Island:

KARUMARETSU [T.N. Position of port is 50°22' N., 155°36' W\_7: There are harbor facilities and a fine breakwater.

PARAMUSHIRU Straits  $[\overline{T}.N. 50^{\circ}43^{\circ} N., 156^{\circ}10^{\circ} E_{0}7$  are the straits between PARAMUSHIRU and SHIMUSHU Islands, and constitute the most valuable area in the Northern Kuriles. KATAOKA Eay  $[\overline{T}.N. 50^{\circ}44^{\circ} N., 156^{\circ}11^{\circ} E_{0}7, KASHIWABARA$  $Bay <math>[\overline{T}.N. 50^{\circ}41^{\circ} N., 156^{\circ}09^{\circ} E_{0}7]$  and canning factories are located along the \$traits. There are turbet  $[\overline{T}.N. flatfish]$  in KASHIWABARA Bay. The fishing industry flourishes on PARAMUSHIRU and SHIMUSHU dùring the summer, and fishery installations are located at various points clong the seaceast.

KATLOKA Bay is a naval base and KASHIWABARA Bay is an army base.

[ T.N. The original document was not classified ]"

(5)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON

# SOURCE DOCUMENT #9

(THANSLATION OF A CAPTURED ENEMY DOCUMENT DEALING WITH EVENTS IN THE JAPANESE WAR COMMENCING THREE WEEKS BEFORE THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR AND CONTINUING THROUGH MANY JAPANESE-UNITED STATES ACTIONS INCLUDING THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR, GUAM, WAKE ISLAND, THE BISMARCK SEA OPERATIONS, RABAUL, THE BATTLE OF THE CORAL SEA, THE FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD SEA BATTLES OF THE SOLOMONS ISLANDS, THE JAPANESE CAMPAIGNS IN ATTU AND KISKA ISLANDS IN THE ALEUTIANS, ETC., TO 20 SEPTEMBER 1943) ENTITLED "PROFESSIONAL NOTEBOOK OF AN ENSIGN IN THE JAPANESE NAVY" USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPLILING THE "NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR" (Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

> (EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8 IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

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JICPOA Item #4986

## TRANSLATION OF CAPTURED JAPANESE DOCUMENT,

Captured TARAWA 24 November 1943 Received JICPOA 6 December 1943

## TRANSLATOR'S FOREFORD

JICPOA Items #4986 and #4986-A represent a complete translation of the professional notebook of Ensign NAKAMURA, Toshio ( $\Psi / H / H / H / H / H$ ), IJN. Although the material in the notebook is of uneven value, it was felt that a complete translation would be of interest inasmuch as it represents the activities of an officer from the time he first boarded ship until shortly before the GILBERTS operation.

Part of the material in the book seems to have been examined by some higher ranking officer, and, in some cases, the notation "Not Permitted" accompanied by a series of blue pencil marks, is found over passages which were thought censorable. However, the notebook itself bears the classification "MILITARY - VERY-SECRET"(GUNGOKUHI) on the cover, which seemed protection enough to the writer of the book for including material of a highly confidential nature.

Nothing is known of the circumstances of capture of the notebook or of the fate of the writer. Since no torpedo boat unit was at TARAWA at the time of the American landing, it is entirely possible that the author escaped and is still alive.

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# CHRONOLOGY OF PERSONAL HISTORY

15	November 1941	Received commission as Passed Midshipman from the Navy Department.
15	November	Received orders from the Navy Department assigning me to the KAKO (CA). Junior Division Officer, 2nd Division, and Machine Gun Fire Control Officer.
].	December	Received orders from Mavy Department assigning me to the AOBA (CA). Staff Officer and Look-Out Officer.
l	April 1942	Received orders from the AOBA relieving me of duties as Look- Out Officer and appointing me to Navigation Department, and as Junior Division Officer 7th Division.
15	April .	Received orders from the AOBA relieving me of duties to Navi- gation Department and as Junior Division Officer 7th Division and appointing me Coding Officer and Junior Division Officer 6th Division.
25	April	Received orders from the AOBA relieving me of duties as Coding Officer and appointing me Communications Officer.
1	June	Commissioned Ensign by the Cabinet.
1	June	Notified by the Navy Department of my assignment to the AOBA.
15	July	Assignment to AOBA confirmed by Navy Department.
15	August	Attached to the DosDiv 9 by the Navy Department.
5	September	Notified by AOBA to leave the ship and to take up position on NOWAKI (DD).
9	September	Assigned to the MINEGUMO (DD) by the Com DesDiv 9.
23	September (?)	Assigned to the ASAGUMO as Navigating Officer by the Co Desbirg.9.

# DIARY

15	November 1941	Graduated from the Naval College at ETAJIMA. Made a midship- man in the Navy.
	November	Ordered aboard the KAKO (CA) at KURE as Junior Officer, 2nd
2.0		Division and Machine Gun Fire Control Officer.
	November	KAKO entered drydock #3 at KURE.
	llovember	Granted leave and returned home.
	November	Returned to my ship.
	Nevember	KAKO left drydock.
	November	KANO left KURE; anchored in HASHIRA SHIMA Channel.
26	November	Paid our respects to the Commander-in-Chief, 6th Fleet, on HASHIRA SHIMA.
29	November	Left HASHIRA SHIMA Channel. (20)
2	Dccember	Anchored at HAHA SHIMA.
4	December	Ordered aboard the AOBA (CA) as lookout officer (MIHARISHI).
	December	Left HAHA SHEMA (to assist the GUAM Occupation Force).
- 7	December	Imperial Rescript to the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet:
		(rendered elsewhere).
		The Reply of the Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet:
		(rendered elsewherc).
		The Commander-in-Chief, Combined Fleet, to the Combined Fleet,
		(rendered elsewhere).
8	December	The Emperor has proclaimed war on the UNITED STATES and ENGLAND.
		Imperial rescripts sent to the Ministers of the Army and Navy.
		Our striking force has delivered a successful surprise attack
		on HAWAII.
		Results:
		Sunk: Heavily Damaged:
		1 CALIFORNIA Class BB 1 CALIFORNIA Class BB
		1 MARYLAND CLass BB 1 MARYLAND CLass BB
		1 ARIZONA CLASS BB 1 NEVADA CLASS EB
		1 UTAH Class BB 1 Cruiser
		l Unidentified Ship
		2 Heavy Cruisers
		1 Oiler

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	December 1941 continued)	<u>Moderatoly Damaged</u> : 1 NEVADA Class BB 4 Cruisers	Our Losses: 9 Fighter Planes 15 Bombers 5 Reconnaissance Planes
	- 01 ·	Shot Down: 450 planes	
		Our troops entered the Interna The British Gunboat, PENGUIN, of American Marines at PEKING SINCAPORE, MIDWAY, WAKE, CLARK were bombed.	was sunk there. A detachment laid down their arms. FIELD, GUAM, HONGKONG, DAVAO
	Decembor Docember	The Emperor was overjoyed with ation, sending another rescrip Combined Fleet.	cc with THAILAND signed. WAKE TE and KISARAGI were sunk by the sub-chaser sunk. GUAM, te mouth of the CAGAYAN River. d in a naval battle of the
11	Dccember	Tripartite Pact signed. WAKE Combined Fleet, the receipient declaring the Emperor's pleasu the MALAY PENINSULA. GERMANY UNITED STATES. Landings effect	attacked. Commander-in-Chief, of another imperial rescript re over the naval battle off and ITALY declare war on the ted at LEGASPI.
	December December	Our ship, the AOBA, anchored a Left TRUK.	t TRUK.
	December	The main naval force has arriv	red at HASHIRA SHIMA.
	December December	AOBA anchored at ROI. SHINONOME (DD) wrecked 15 kms. on patrol duty off MIRI. The and sank.	north of BARAM Point while R0-66 collided with the R0-62
20	December	PANAMA, COSTA RICA, NICARAGUA, GUATEMALA, CUBA and HAITI all	HONDURAS, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, declared war on our Empire.
		AOBA left ROI (to assist the W	
		Landings effected at LINGAYEN. Occupation of WAKE completed.	·
-	December	The (TS: HAWAII) Striking Force AOBA returned to ROI and anche	e has arrived at HASHIRA SHIMA.
2)	December	HONGKONG surrenders. Landings offected at JOLO in a Two enemy subs sunk off LINGAN ASAKAZE and SATSUKI).	a surprise attack. GEN Bay (by the destroyers
26	December	sunk. The MURASAME (DD) colli TAKAO. MANILA bombed. One er ten merchantmen sunk. The ASA	hemy destroyer, two subs, and KAZE sank a sub off LINGAYEN.
27	December	The American Army commander in MANILA an open city. MANILA v sunk. The NOJIMA (AF) was ton	vas bombed and ten merchantmen
	December December	The RO-60 ran aground south of The YAMAGUMO (DD) hit a mine of An enemy sub sank off LAOAG.	ROI.
1	January 1942	LABUAN and BRUNEI occupied.	
	January	MANILA surrendered.	
	January	The MYOKO (CA) was bombed off returned to SASEBO, damaged ar	MALALAG in DAVAO Bay. Has ad with casualtics.
5	January	AOBA left ROI at 0000, returned received that an enemy carries	ed at 1000. (A report had been

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6 January 1942 <b>7 January</b>	Left ROI at 0200, returned at 1030 on same mission.
9 January	Left ROI for TRUK. The KANKO Maru ( 弦 與 光, ) was torpedoed and sunk in the DUTCH EAST INDIES.
10 January	Two more enemy subs have been sunk. Anchored at TRUK.
12 January	The LEXINGTON sunk by the I-6.
	TARAKAN surrendered. Minesweepers #13 and #14 sunk off LINKAS.
	The minelayor, PRINS VAN ORANJE, sunk.
13 January 18 January	MENGACHU FORT on LINKAS Island captured. Left TRUK.
	The I-131 sank a 10,000 merchantman north of TIMOR. The BANSHU Mary (方 1) 光 ) hit a mine and sank. The ASO Maru (万 法 北 ) (AP-AK) was severely damaged.
20 January	At 1800 crossed the equator at 148°37' E. Long. going south.
	(Fighter planes from the ZUIKAKU shot down an enemy flving
	boat that was approaching us. We spotted five of its cruw floating on the water, and picked them up as prisoners.)
	floating on the water, and picked them up as prisoners.) One special duty ship and several of our merchantmen have
21 January	been sunk at SINGAPORE. Our forces attacked an enemy force concentrating at CEBU
· ·	and sank several merchantmen.
	The NANA Mary(打子, 九) (AP-AK) was sunk (in the south). The ASAGUMO (DD) collided with the OI Mary (大井九).
	Landings effected at the mouth of the SAMUPARA River and the mouth of KENDARI Bay.
	One of our destroyers has damaged six enemy merchantmen in
22 Januar	the INDIAN OCEAN. Have reached the southernmost point on our course $(4^{\circ}9^{\circ})^{\circ}$ S.,
22 January	150°55'30" E.)
23 January	BANAKA (?) Airfield on GERLIN (?) Island occupicd. as the result of an enemy torpedo attack, the TATSUKAMI Maru / (茶 赤 丸 ) (AK), TSURUGA Maru (家 魚 L ) (AK), and the KUNETAKE Maru (茶 汚 丸 ) were sunk; the SUMANOURA Maru /
	(短期八氏九) and Patrol Boat #37 were heavily dunnaged. RABAUL occupied.
24 January	Crossed the equator at 150°E. going north at 0555. Recrossed it going south at 150°5' E. at 1240. The MYÖKEN Maru / (4) [2, A.) (AK) was sunk off GILI J.N.G. Landings effected
25 January	at KEND.dI and BALIKP.P.N. The TONICAWA Maru (分) 根川丸) was grounded.
26 January	Reached the southernmost point on our course at 1430
27 January	(4 <sup>0</sup> 45' S., 149 <sup>0</sup> 52'E.). The British destroyer, TH/NET, was sunk.
20 1	Landings made on PAMAMGKAT. SANBASU (?) occupied.
30 January	AOBA anchored i. ALBAUL Harbor at 0800. (Handed over our prisoners.) Left RABAUL at 1730.
31 January	KULLI OCCY icd. Anchored in YSA EL PAJSACE.
	Our forces have progressed towards SINGAPORE.
29 January	Landings effected at AMBON, ROTAN, and Chrysler A.
1 February	MINKATAN (?) and PONTIANAK occupied. Left YSABEL PASSACE. An enemy striking force appeared in the MARSHALLS Area and we have received reports that they
•	are attacking there. We left immediately for KWAJALEIN. The enemy force is composed of 2 carriers, five heavy (?)
3 February	cruisers, and five destroyers. The Submarine I-62 sank a 10,000 ton tanker off COLOMBO.
4 February	JAVA SEA Battle. Encmy Losses:
	l Dutch Cruiser (JAVA Class) sunk. 1 Dutch Cruiser (DE RUYTER Class) sunk. 1 Dutch Cruiser (JAVA Class) medium damage.
	l Dutch Cruiser (JAVA Class) medium damage. 1 American Cruiser (MARBLEHEAD Class) medium damage.

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# EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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5 February 1942 2 February 4 February	The Submarine RO-34 sank a destroyer in the SUNDA STRAITS. Oll6. Crossed the equator bearing north, 153°50' E. K"AJALEIN. Entered the Harbor at ROI.
5 February	KMAJALEIN. Left HOI. Anchored at the main island at KWAJALEIN.
6 February 7 February	KMAJALEIN. Departed from the main island. The HOYO ( $\mathfrak{T}$ $\mathfrak{H}$ $\mathfrak{H}$ ) Maru ran aground outside KEBIN Bay. The Submarine I-124 had a gunnery engagement with an English destroyer and was sunk.
8 February 9 February	The NATSUSHIO (DD) was such by torpedoes. The KISOGAWA ( $\pi$ $\Im$ "  $\pi$ ) Maru was such off SAIGON by an enemy submarine. Successful landings were carried out at MAKASSAR, AENBATO- BATO, SURUMI, and GASMATA.
10 February 12 February 15 February	TRUK. Entered the harbor at TRUK. The YAMATO (BB) became the flagship of the Combined Fleet. SINGAPORE fell.
16 February	A message from the throne on the occasion of the fall of SINGAPORE. The MYOKO (4小点 私) Maru was sunk off NOMO SAKI by an
19 February - 20 February	normy submarine. TRUK. Departed from TRUK. An enemy task force composed
·	of 1 BB, 2 carriers, 2 cruisers and 9 destroyers has appeared at a bearing of $75^{\circ}45^{\circ}$ off RLBAUL and our force has set out to capture or annihilate it. It seems that the enemy is planning to carry out a surprise attack on TRUK.
	Successful landings were carried out at DEL and KOEPANG. BALI Island has been occupied. The Submarine I-60 was sunk, in a naval battle off BATAAN.
	A (catroyers were sunk and 2 cruisers and 1 (astroyer were badly damaged. The MICHISHIO (DD) and OSHIO (DD) were badly damaged.
23 February	TRUK. Entered the harbor at TRUK. R.HATO (?) has been occupied.
24 February	2 enemy cruisers and 2 destroyers have carried out an attack in the vicinity of WAKE Island.
25 & 26 February	A submarine shelled the American mainland. The submarine RO-63 met with an accident in the vicinity of <u>APTER</u> Island.
27 February	In a naval battle off SOERABAYA, 5 cruisers and 6 destroyers were sunk. Their force consisted of 5 cruisers and 9 destroyers.
28 Fobruary	The Submarine I-58 sank a 15,000 ton fueling ship in the SUNDA STRAITS. The Submarine I-4 sunk a freighter south of JAVA.
2 March	TRUK. Departed at 1000. Engaging in the Fourth Campaign (SR Operations).
4 March	Crossed the equator at OO15 bearing southward, 150°54' E. An enemy carrier attacked MARCUS Island. The enemy force was composed of the ENTERPRISE, SALT LAKE CITY, NORTHAMPTON, and a number of destroyers. The ERIMO (梵 说 ) (AO) was sunk by torpedoes.
5 March	At 0600 entered the harbor at RABAUL. Took on provisions. Departed at 1700.
8 March 9 March	Successful landing carried out in MENATEI Well or s Swept the sea around KUINKARORA (?) and anchored there.
10 March	The SNLF has Landed and are cleaning out the enemy along the coast. Departed at 1615.
11 March	Entcred the harbor at RABAUL, Fueled.
14 March	Departed from RABAUL. Entered the harbor at KUINKARORA and stood by.
15 March 17 March	Departed from KUINKARdia
18 March	Anchored in MELLE CHANNEL (メウエパセーシー).
26 March	Departed from MELLE CHANNEL.
27 March	Entered the harbor at RABAUL. Fueled.

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28 March 1942	Departed from RABAUL. Engaging in the Fifth Campaign.
30 March	Landing at SHORTLAND successful.
1 April	Entered harbor of RABAUL. Left the same day.
2 April	Anchored in MELLE CHANNEL.
7 April	Departed from MELLE CHANNEL.
	Crossed the equator bearing north, 148°13' E.
10 April	Entered the harbor at TRUK.
30 April	Departud from TEIN to angage in the Fifth Conneign
5 Mart	Departed from TRUK to engage in the Fifth Campaign.
5 May	Entered the harbor at SHORTLAND.
	Departed from SHORTLIND.
	Attacked by enemy planes. The SHOHO (CV) was sunk at a
	bearing of 56°, 52 miles off DEBOYNE Island.
9 May	Intered the harbor at SHORTLIND.
	Took on provisions and departed the same day.
ll May	The OKINOSHIMA (沖 / 岳 ) (CM) was sunk by torpedoes.
12 May	Entered the harbor at KIETA, The SNLF landed. There was
	no sign of the enemy.
13 May	no sign of the enemy. Anchored at SHORTLAND. Took on provisions and departed
	the same day bound for TRUK, our destroyer alone.
16 May	Entered the harbor at TRUK.
17 May	Departed from TRUK bound for KURE
22 May	Departed from TRUK, bound for KURE. Entered the harbor of KURE at 1300.
25 Mar	Entered No. 2 Deals at MUDE
25 May 26-31 May	Entered No. 3 Dock at KUPE.
20-31 May	Had leave. Returned to ship.
29 May	Left the Dock. Moored to lend at A Anchorage.
8 June	Changed mooring to No. 18 Buoy. Departed from the harbor on a trial cruise. Returned the
10 June	Departed from the harbor on a trial cruise. Returned the
	same day. Practiced avoiding torpedoes while cruising.
	Tested our speed over a measured course.
16 June ?	Departed at 0900. At 1745 entered the harbor at NAGAHAMA.
17 June	Departed from N.G.H.MA at 0900. At 1745 entered the harbor
	of KITSUKI.
18 June	Departed from KITSUKI bound for TRUK
23 June	Entered the harbor at TRUK. Departed from TRUK. Crossed the equator_(the 9th time) bearing south. Time - 0230. The HOYO (17) * ) Maru drew alongside our port side and we refueled in tow. Entered the harbor at KIETA.
30 June	Departed from TRIK
2 July	Crossed the equator (the Oth time) bearing south
~ 0023	Time = 0220 The HOVD (17 18 1) Kerry draw elergeide eur
	Time = 0250, The Holo (5.74 × ) Maru drew atongside our
5 July	Fortand the hamber at KIFTA
6 July	Drew alongside the HOYO Maru (王 洋 木 ) and refueled.
6 July	Drew alongside the HOIO Maru ( A ) and refueled.
	When we had finished, we left the harbor.
7 July	Anchored in REKATA LAGOON.
10 July	2 destroyers dropped anchor.
14 July	Departed at 1200.
16 July	Enterod MELLE Channel.
18 July	Set out for KUINKARORA.
19 July	Entered the harbor at KUINKARORA.
21 July	Inne - 0290. The NOI (2 / X ) mart drew alongside our port side and we refueled in tow. Entered the harbor at KIETA. Drew alongside the HOYO Maru (2 / X ) and refueled. When we had finished, we left the harbor. Anchored in REKAT. LAGOON. 2 destroyers dropped anchor. Departed at 1200. Enterod MELLE Channel. Set out for KUINK.RORA. Enterod the harbor at <b>UUNKARORA</b> . Departed from KUINK.RORA bound for R.BAUL (our destroyer
	alone). Refueled and left port the same day bound for
	YSABEL PASSAGE.
22 July	Anchored in YSABEL P.SSAGE. There were 2 destroyers and
	we remained there until the 26th.
	Departed from YSABEL PASSAGE and anchored in MELLE CHANNEL.
7 August	RABAUL. Departed from RABAUL. Anchored in MELLE CHANNEL. Departed from MELLE CHANNEL. Received news that an anemy
7 August	beparted from MELLE CHANNEL. Received news that an aneny
	task force was attacking TULAGI, we made a forced run to
	RABAUL. The enemy had started to land at TULAGI. We joined
	the CHOKAI (CA).
8 August	We made a night attack on TULAGI.
10 August	The KAKO (CA) was struck by torpedoes from an enemy sub-
	marine and sank. (30,500 metres out from MARWIU Island
	at a bearing of 48°; at about 2°28' S., 152°11' E.)
	Anabarad in WETTE CUIMIET
17 August	Left MELLE CHANNEL.
19 August	Anchored in REKATA BAY.
20 August	Left MELLE CHANNEL. Anchored in REKATA BAY. Left REKATA BAY.

## EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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21 August 1942	Joined the CHOKAI (CA).
22 August	Separated from the CHOKAI and the 2 DD's, anchoring at
	SHORTLAND for supplies. When finished here, left.
24 August	Spotted a convoy. Rejoined the CHOKAI and the 2 DD's.
26 August	Anchored at KIETA.
27 August	Left KIETA. Anchored temporarily at SHORTLAND.
28 August	Left SHORTLAND for the south.
4 September	Anchored at KIETA.
5 September	Left KIETA. Anchored temporarily at SHORTLAND. Left ship
) bopbounder	after supper and reported on board the NOWAKI (DD) for duty.
6 September	Left SHORTLAND. Headed for TRUK, escorting the TOA Maru
0 Deptember	(東重九) (XAO or AK?)。
9 September	Anchored in TRUK Harbor at 1400. Was transferred aboard
A Sebremper	the MINEGUMO (DD) after supper.
10 Contonhon	Left TRUK for the south, escorting the KENYO Maru (XAO).
10 September	(好洋九)。
22 Contorbor	Anchored at TRUK. Left the MINEGUMO and reported on board
23 September	the ASAGLAO (DD) for duty.
0/ 0	Left TRUK for SHORTLAND (Apart from being in DesDiv 9,
26 September	Left TRUE for SHORILARD (Apart from being in besty 7,
	the ASAGUMO had also been made a part of the SOUTH SEAS
	Force (NANYO BUTAI).
29 September	Anchored at SHORTLAND.
2 October	Took on board materiel to be landed at GUADALCANAL and left
	SHORTLAND. Began unloading at 2058, completed it success-
	fully at 2230.
3 October	Returned to SHORTLAND for supplies.
5 October	Enemy carrier-based bombers attacked us (one bomb dropped
	very close: 200 metres on our port bcam), but no damage.
	We repulsed them. Left SHORTLAND for the second time on
	the "ferry sorvice" to GUADALC.NAL. Were attacked by enemy
	planes. The NATSUGUMO (DD), MINEGUMO, and MURASAME turned
	back.
	(Reinforcement Butai)
26 September	The DesLiv 9 (TN: dg) was attached to the Outer South Seas
	Force and set out from TRUK.
29 September	Entered the harbor at SHORTLAND.
2 October	O800 Departed from SHORTLAND on a coutherly course. Our force
	was composed of the DesDiv 9 (TN: dg) and the DesDiv 2
	(TN: dg) (minus the YUDACHI and the SAMIDARE). Had as
	passengers 250 soldiers who were to be put ashore; also
	carried provisions and 15 rear-cars which were to be put
	ashore.
	2048 Arrived at KAMIMBO and commenced unloading operations.
	2230 Work was completed.
	2246 Departed from KAMIMBO, following a southerly course.
3 October	1036 Anchored at SHORTLAND.

- 5 October
- 0630 Departed from SHORTLAND, following a southerly course. Our force was composed of the Destivs 9 and 2 (TN: dg). Carried as passengers 650 soldiers who were to be put ashore.
- As cargo carried 2 mountain guns, telegraph apparatus, and tools for laborers, which were to be put ashore. 1505 Were attacked by 10 enemy planes. The MINEGUMO (DD) was damaged by a near hit forward, sprang a leak and returned to SHORTLAND escorted by the NATSUGUMO (DD).
- 1552 Were attacked by nine enemy planes. Our ship was attacked by 3 carrier-besed bombers. Bombs Landed 100° to starboard, distance 50 meters, 50 meters off the bow, and 150° to star-board, distance 100 meters. Sustained no damage.
- 1705 The MURASAME (DD), having sprung a leak, because of a near hit by a bomb, returned to SHORTLAND.
- 1924 Enemy planes on patrol dropped llares.
- 2116 Arrived at TASSAFARONGA and commenced unloading operations. 2254 Unloading completed. 2257 Departed from TASSAFARONGA, following a central course.

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	Page 9
6 October	1019 Dropped anchor at SHORTLAND, having entered the harbor
8 October	through the North Chaunel. 0551 Set cut from SHORTLAND, heading down the "Slot". (TN: CHUO-KORD 守死知道句). Our force was composed of the Dediv
	CHUO-KORO 中共 抗(分). Our force was composed of the Ded iv 9 (minus the MINEGIMO) and the Des <sup>1</sup> iv 2 (minus the MURASAME and the SMINDER) Commission and the Des <sup>1</sup> iv 2 (minus the MURASAME)
	and the SAMIDARE). Carried as passengers 560 men who were to be put ashore. As cargo, carried 18 trench mortars.
	Also carried a MAIZURU 4th Special Naval Landing Force Communications Unit and Work Unit.
	1607 Were attacked by 11 enemy planes and our escort planes joined battle with them.
	2056 Reached TASSAFARONGA and commenced disembarking operations. 2219 Operations concluded.
	2224 Departed from TASSAFARONGA proceeding along the "Slot".
9 October	0453 Were attached by ll enemy carrier-based bombers and our escort planes joined battle with them.
/	0506 The enemy's carrier-based bombers attacked us and bombs landed 90° to port, distance 50 meters, 110° to starboard,
	<ul> <li>landed 90° to port, distance 50 meters, 110° to starboard, distance 100 meters, and 80° to starbourd; distance 50 meters. Shot down one of the energy planes.</li> </ul>
11 October	1120 Dropped anchor at SHORTLAND. 0558 Departed from SHORTLAND. Our force was composed of the
	MISSHIN (CVS), CHITOBE (CVS), AKITSUKI (DD), the Des iv 9
	and the Dus iv ll (IN: dg) (minus two destroyers). Carried as passengers 728 num who were to be put ashore. Also ca-
	ried 4 15 cm. howitzers, 4 tractors, 2 field guns, 16 cases (?) of ammunition, 1 antizircraft gun, 1 fixed radio
	(HÖTEI-MUSEN). The above materials were aboard the NISSHIN and CHITOSE. The ASAGUMO (DD) and the Desdiv 11 (minus 2
	destroy.rs) carried 1 regimental gun, 2 battalion guns, 2 rapid-fire guns, 1 trench mortar, and ten tons of provisions.
	2023 Arrived at TASSAFARONGA and commenced disembarking operations. 2123 Operations completed.
	213C Departed from TASSAFARONGA.
	2135 Sighted our forces engaged in battle with the enemy a little north of SAVO Island. (The losses sustained by our 6th Fleet were: FURUTAKA (CA), sunk; AOBA (CA), badly damaged, and FUSUKI (DD), sunk).
	2236 Returned to our anchorage. The NISSHIN and CHIIOSE had not
	completed the disembarkation of the materials she carried. 2304 Operations were completed, and we changed our course to
12 October	the south. 0655 Joined the SENDAI (CL).
	0850 The MURAKUMO was hit by bombs from enemy planes and was unable to proceed and the Desiiv 9 went to her assistance.
	1105 Arrived at our destination where we were assigned to patrol
	duty. Tried to tow the SHIRAYUKI (DD). 1255 Sighted 2 enemy carrier-based bombers.
	1323 Sighted the two planes again. 1343 Attacked by 11 carrier-based bombers and 8 fighters.
	1348 The NATSUGUMO was damaged by a bomb and was unable to pro- ceed, and gradually began to list.
	1415 The MURAKUMO was struck by a torpedo which exploded 1427 The NATSUGUMO sank but the crew was saved.
	1445 Made our escape from this place.
	1538 Joined the Deslon 3 (sd). 1640 Proceeded to tow the MJRAKUMO
	1850 Arrived at this place. 1850 The SHIRAYUKI was disposed of with torpedocs. (RAIGEKI SHOBUNSU).
13 October	1909 Started back. 0630 Put in at SHORTLAND.
14 October	0353 Set out from SHORTLAND via the North Channel.
	2021 Arrived at TASSAFARONGA where we changed our anchorage and established patrols.
15 October	2350 The CHOKAI (CA) and the KINUGASA shelled the airfield. 0400 A transport fleet (SENDAI (CL), YURA (CL), and TATSUTA
	(CL), ) completed disembarking operations.

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15 October 1942				
(Continued)		Started back, following a course north.		
		Put in at SHORTLAND.		
17 October		Departed from SHORTLAND, following the northern route.		
	2025	Arrived at ESPERANCE where we commenced disembarking		
	0005	operations.		
		Finished the operations.		
18 October		Departed from ESPERANCE going down the "Clot". The SENDAI was struck by a torpedø from an enemy submarine		
TO OCCODEL	0440	but sustained no damage. Three depth charges were dropped		
		with unknown results.		
	0930	Put in at SHORTLAND where we were attached to the main		
	-,,,-	Fleet (?) (TN: SHUTAI 主 成 ).		
24 October	1616	Departed from SHORTLAND in order to carry out an all-out		
		attach against GUADALCANAL.		
25 October		Though we occupied one corner of the airfield on GUADAL-		
		CANAL, we did not seize the airfield. Our forces stood		
		by to the west.		
26 October		Put in at SHORTLAND.		
30 October	0100	Enemy planes dropped bombs and 3 landed 50 meters off		
		the bow.		
	0123	Enemy planes dropped bombs and 6 landed 40° to, port,		
		distance, 30 meters. UCHIDA, Seaman, 3rd Class, was		
l November	0800	killed. The flag of the CinC of the DesCon 4 (4 sd) was run up		
T MOASHDEL	0000	on the ASAGUMO (DD).		
	2230	Set out from SHORTLAND, following the northern route.		
2 November	2020	Left our companion ships and proceeded to the anchorage		
ic nov anovi	2020	of a transport fleet. Maintained patrol outside (the		
		anchorage).		
	2330	Stopped disembarkation work and started back, following		
		a course north.		
3 November		Put in at SHORTLAND.		
4 November	2330	Set out from SHORTLAND, following the northern route.		
	2357	Enemy planes dropped some bombs 90° to port, distance,		
		about 1000 meters.		
5 November	2010	Parted ways with the transport fleet and continued on to		
	2101	the anchorage where we took up patrol.		
	2101	The MURASAME sighted a torpedo-boat which it illuminated		
	2227	and shelled. Disembarking operations were finished and we started back.		
6 November	nee 1	The SHIGURE (DD) sighted a periscope (proceeding along a		
0 110 0 0110 01		central course) and dropped depth charges.		
	0941	Dropped anchor at SHORTLAND.		
7 November	0800	The Command Flag was transferred to the TENRYU (CL) where		
		it was run up.		
	2300	it was run up. Departed from SHORTLAND, following the northern route.		
8 November	1926	Separated and proceeded to our patrol station. Went to		
		the anchorage of the transport fleet.		
8 November	1937	The MOCHZUKI (DD) sighted a torpedo-boat and illuminated		
		it.		
	2220	The SHIGURE, YUGURE (DD), and MOCHIZUKI went on ahead,		
	2215	starting back.		
	2243	The transport fleet completed the disembarkation work and started back.		
9 November	0551	Torpedocs were fired at us by an enemy submarine, which		
/ 1404 011001	0))4	was proceeding along the "Slot". The SHIRATSUYU (DD) and		
		YUDACHI -roceeded to attack the submarine and sink it.		
	0850	Put in at SHORTLAND.		
	1500	The DesRon Flag of the CinC of the DesRon 4 (4 sd) was		
		transferred to the ASAGUMO and run up.		
11 November		Returned to the Des on 4, our original unit.		
10.17	1520	Set out from SHORTLAND (departing by the North Channel).		
12 November	1330	Joined the Desivs 10 and 11 and set off for the south		
		where a battle developed off LUNGA.		

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550 CONGRESSIO	INAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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	000 Torpedoes were fired from starboard but we continued on our way. We illuminated and shelled an enemy destroyer and inflicted great damage.
O e	052 The YUDACHI was hit by a bomb and was unable to keep under way.
	126 It withdrew. 906 Met up with the KIRISHIMA (BB).
C	935 Set out to do rescue work at the HIEI (BB). 414 Stopped rescue work and tried to join the Main Force.
2	010 Met up with the Advance Force.
	355 Were fueled by the HARUNA (BB). 435 Three torpedoes passed underneath our ship. We dropped
2	depth charges. A battle broke out off SAVO Island. 200 Sighted 3 enemy battleships. A battle in which both
2	torpedoes and guns were used broke out. 205 Launched a torpedo with unknown results. Our main bat-
	teries were very effective. The KIRISHIMA was hit with bombs and was unable to keep under way.
2	355 Put in alongside the KIRISHDA. The entire crew abandoned ship (TN: the KIRISHDA).
	123 The KIRISHIMA sank.
	233 Ceased rescue operations and withdrew. 110 Joined the SENDAI (CL) and at 2100 joined the CruDiv
16 November C	8 (85). 600 Were supplied (with fuel) by the NICHIEI (日葉丸) Maru
18 November C	(XAO). 719 Put in at TRUK, entering by the North Channel.
21 November 1	000 The Command Flag was transferred to the NAGARA (CL) and run up.
	800 Entered the dock. 730 Left the dock.
6 December C	630 Left the harbor and carried out patrol to the north.
8 December C	513 Entered the harbor. 600 Departed from the harbor and carried out patrol while the SPICURE had firing practice.
	540 Entered the harbor. 706 Departed from the harbor and carried out patrol to the north.
13 December 1	530 Departed by the north entrance and proceeded to escort the CFUXO (ACV).
	420 The CEFTO sighted the UZUKI (DD) off the bow. 445 Cought up with her. She turned around and we proceeded on to TRUK.
17 December 2	335 Sighted a submarine on the surface and dropped 6 depth charges but were unable to determine results.
	627 Put in at TRUK by the North Channel.
נ	200 Departed from the harbor to carry out maneuvers. 903 Returned.
	Ol5 Left the harbor, escorting the CHUYO and bound for YOKOSUKA.
	715 Sighted FUJIYAMA. 415 Entered t <u>he h</u> arbor where we were given leave.
27 December	Wont to TOKYO where I paid my respects to the Imperial Palace, and worshipped at the shrine of MEIJI, and YASU- KUNI-JINJA.
1	545 Departed from YOKOSUKA bound for TRUK escorting the CHUYO. 700 Left TOKYO Bay.
8 January 0 11 January	700 Arrived at TRUK via the North Channel. Were attached to the Southeast Area Flect and were placed
15 January 1	under the CinC of the CarDiv 2. 200 Departed from TRUK with a patrol unit for an air-craft carrier force, CarTiv 2 (minus the HIYO) in order to
17 January 1	carry out "C" (HEI) transport operations. 140 Proceeded to a place about 200 miles north of WEWAK. 25 fighters and 6 attack-bombers took off from the JUNYO. We headed for TRUK.

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19 January 1943	0712 Put in at TRUK via the South Channel and our escort task was concluded. Set out to finish off an enemy submarine which a float reconnaissance plane from the TAKAO (CA) had sighted and attacked at a place 25 kilometres from the South Channel at a bearing of 155°.
20 January	#6C (?) Convoy was attacked by a submarine 286 nautical miles (TN: " ' " denotes a nautical mild) from TRUK at a bearing of L450. The SURBAYA Marauズ ネッパス ペ パ ) was sunk and the MEIU Maru (明洋君 ) soverely damaged.
21 January	<ul> <li>2323 Proceeded to the rescue.</li> <li>1115 Arriv.d rt our destingtion.</li> <li>1915 The MEIU Maru sank. Then turned back for TRUK. Picked up, however, 13 Army officers (warrant and above) and 419 enlisted men; 146 members from the crews of the two ships; and two Navy men.</li> </ul>
22 January 25 January	<ul> <li>0840 Returned to TRUK. XCVS) had engine trouble and halted in her course 300 nautical miles from TRUK at a bearing of 132°.</li> <li>0523 Left TRUK to stand by her.</li> </ul>
-	2130 Contact was made with the ship and we took charge of escorting her.
26 January	1200 The repairs on the KUNIKAWA Maru having been completed,
27 January	proceeded to return. 1200 Arrived at TRUK.
31 January	O642 We left TRUK, as the screening unit for the advance force (AdB) and main force which were to assist in the "ke" (*) Campaign. (TN: "ke" Campaign seems to be a general Jepanese term for an evacuation operation.)
l February	Our ship has been assigned to the Reinforcing Force (ZOB) of the Outer South Seas Force (SNB). Consequently, we detached ourselves from the advance force (AdB).
4 February	0700 Arrived at SHORTLAND. 1000 Left there (for our second transport duty at GUADALCANAL).
5 February 7 February	Returned to SHORTLAND. Left SHORTLAND (for our third transport duty at GUADAL- CANAL).
8 February 11 February 12 February	Returned to SHORTLAND. Campaign "ke" (5) is finished. Loft SHORTLAND to escort the SENDAI (CL). 0130 Joined the SENDAI and returned to SHORTLAND. Left there
	for PALAU (with the SAMIDARE of Desriv 10). 1814 Spotted an energy submarine. Dropped doubt charges but results were undetermined. Left the SAMIDARE and headed back to RABAUL to relieve our commander (SHIREI).
13 February	0900 Capt. KONISHI relieved our commander and assumed his
14 February	new dutic <u>s</u> . Capt. SATO loft the ship. 1340 Left R/BAUL for PALAU.
17 February	1400 Appived at PALAN
19 February	0900 Left FALM for WEWAK, escorting the KIYOSUMI Maru (法) 注 名 ), the AIKOKU Maru (XCL), and the GOKOKU Maru (投) 例 人 ), engaged in Operation #81.
22 February 23 February	1000 Entered mawik inchorage, kept a mobile gurd. 0530 Unloading completed. Left the convoy and headed back to RABAUL.
24 February	1450 Arrived at R.BAUL.
27 February 28 February	1250 Took on supplies (at KOKOPO) for the Army. 2255 Left RABAUL (in a transport operation to LAE).
1 March	Came in contact with enemy planes in the evening.
2 March	<ul> <li>0630 Fought several group places (PBY's and B-17's). The KYOKUSEI Maru (18 3 1 ) was so damaged by bambs that she sank. Rescued those aboard, however.</li> <li>1420 Raided again by several B-17's. Together with the YUKIKAZE</li> </ul>
	(DD) went on shead to LAE. Supplies were unloaded for our
	troops.

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3 March 1943	0700	Rejoined the convoy. Fought off a 100-odd enemy fighters, bombers, and torpedo bombers, 10 or so of our own planes came to our defense. The convoy was destroyed. Rescued survivors, but dis- continued this at 1300 and withdrew, changing our course southward and scouting. Able to detect nothing, however.
4 March		Arrived at KAVIENG. Came alongside the SENDAI and got some supplies. Left KAVIENG for RABAUL.
5 March		Arrived at RABAUL.
7 March		Left RABAUL for SHORTLAND (with the YUKIKAZE, SHIKINAMI (DD), and URANAMI (DD)).
8 March	1043 1700	Arrived at SHORTLAND. Left there through the south entrance (in the KOLOMBANGARA ferry service). Completed our unloading there and pro- ceeded to return.
9 March	1642	We separated from the SHIKINAMI and URANAMI. Arrived at RABAUL.
12 March	1700	Left RABAUL for SHORTLAND (with the YUKIKAZE and MINATSUKI (DD) ).
13 March	1700	Left SHORTLAND through the south entrance (in the KOLOM- BANGARA ferry service). Completed our unloading there and proceeded to return.
14 March		Arrived at SHORTLAND. Moved supplies, then left again. Arrived at RABAUL.
30 March		Left RABAUL for SHORTLAND (with the SAMIDARE, YUGUMO (DD), KAZEGUMO (DD), and AKIGUMO (DD)).
31 March .		Arrived at SHORTLAND, then left through the south entrance (in the KOLDMBANGARA ferry service). Were in continual contact with enemy planes, making it difficult to unload. Abandoned all thought of unloading finally and proceeded to return.
l April	1700	Left again through the south entrance (in the KOLOMBAN- GARA forry service). Completed our unloading there and proceeded to return.
2 April		BUKA and picked up fuel.
3 April	0500	Left BUKA for SHORTLAND. Arrived there and found the KAZEGUMO and a merchantm damaged by a mine. (We suspect magnetic mines had been laid in the harbor.)
5 April	1700	Left through the south entrance (in the KOLOMBANGARA ferry service). Completed our unloading and proceeded to return.
6 April		Returned to SHORTLAND, leaving again for TRUK. One B-25 attacked us, but its bombs went wide of their mark.
9 April		Arrived at TRUK.
10 April		Left TRUK for YOKOSUKA.
13 April 20 April	1000	Arrived there, mooring to Buoy Y-17. Received a furlough and returned to my home at 1030 (until the 24th).
26 April	1130	Left for the (ATAMI) Health Resort.
28 April	1000	Returned (T.: To YO, TA).) I was now to be stationed aboard the USUGUMO (DD).
29 April		Left my old ship after lunch.
30 April	0954	Arrived at OMINATO (by train). Went aboard my new ship the USUGUMO.
12 May	2345	The situation in the northern area having changed sud- denly, stopped our present work. Left OMINATO for PARAMUSHIRO.
15 May		Arrived at the PARAMUSHIRO Straits.
20 May	0725	Moving through the north entrance to PARAMUSHIRO, we went on patrol duty.
21 May		Returned to PARAMUSHIRO.
25 May	1630	Left PARAMUSHIRO for ATTU. (We ware to attack the enemy fleet by surprise, transport urgently needed material, and pick up liaison men.)

## EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

## CONFIDENTIAL

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30 May 1943	0240 Ceased our operations and proceeded to return.
31 May	0825 Returned to PARAMUSHIRO.
2 June	0612 Left to clean out enemy subs operating south of ARAIDO Island.
3 June	1100 Ceased this work and returned to PARAMUSHIRO.
5 June	Today was the occasion of the national funeral of YAMAMOTO, Admiral of the Fleet.
	0700 Observed his passing with a half-mast ceremony.
7 June	The SHIRAKUMO (DD) collided with the NUMAKAZE (DD) 12 nautical miles off CAPE LOF.TKA at a bearing of 122°.
	Oll5 Headed in that direction to lend assistance.
	0355 Joined the SHIRAKUMO.
	Returned to PARAMUSHIRO, escorting her. 0950 Entered the harbor there.
19 June	1125 Left to determine the calibration of our direction
·	finder.
	1455 Having done this, returned again.
23 June	0320 Left PARALIUSHIRO Harbor escorting the IKUSHIMA Maru (いくしまれ).
	1530 Ceased escorting and left the other ship.
24 June	2025 Joined the NITTEI Maru (7時九) and escorted it. 0648 Ceased escorting and entered the harbor (11:1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.
cd oute	MUSHIRO ?)
	1000 Came alongside the HAKKAI Maru (ハビアル). Equipped her with counter-radar (GYAKUTAN) and loaded landing
	barges on her.
26 June	1155 Left the side of the HAKKAI Maru.
30 June	1700 Received warning to go on watch duty.
	1950 Weighed anchor and left port (headed for a spot 23
	nautical miles out of BETTOBU NUMA at a bearing of 350°
1 111 11	where a submarine attack had been reported).
l July 5 July	0930 Entered PARAMUSHIRO Harbor. 1930 Left (to participate in the "ke" Campaign at KISKA).
10 July	0205 Planned to make a dash for KISKA, but the weather was
	not favorable for it, so at 2030 we changed our course and withdrew.
ll July	0550 Joined the NIPFON Maru (XAO) and recoived oil.
12 July	0735 Made a second attempt to dash into KISKA, but reversed
	our course again at 1520 because of unfavorable condi-
13 July	tions. 0240 Made our third attempt.
	2145 Made our fourth attempt.
14 July	0156 Gave up once more.
15 103 7	0/30 Gave up again
1) outy	0820 Ceased our operations and returned to PARAMUSHIRO.
18 July	0830 Entered F. LAUSHIRO Harbor.
19 July	0630 Received an air raid warning for the northern KURILES.
22 1.1.1	0645 Five B-24's bombed us but there was no damage.
er outy	<ul> <li>1703 Gave up again.</li> <li>2145 Made our fourth attempt.</li> <li>0156 Gave up once more.</li> <li>1500 Tried for the fifth time.</li> <li>0430 Gave up again.</li> <li>0820 Ceased our operations and returned to PARALUSHIRO.</li> <li>0830 Entered F. WAUSHIRO Harbor.</li> <li>0630 Received an air raid warning for the northern KURILES.</li> <li>0645 Five B-24's bombed us but there was no demage.</li> <li>2000 Left for the second phase of our participation in the "ke" Campaign.</li> <li>1750 The KUNIJIRI (CM) and the ABUKUMA (CL) collided (due to this, there was some confusion produced in the rear of the formation, and the WAKABA (DD). HATSUSHIMO (DD), and</li> </ul>
26 July	1750 The KUNIJIRI (CM) and the ABUKUMA (CL) collided (duc to
	this, there was some confusion produced in the rear of
29 July	NAGANALI (DD) also collided). 1105 Sighted the outline of an island.
2) bury	1316 The ABUKUMA sighted the enemy and fired some torpedoes.
	It developed that we had mistaken LITTLE KISKA for the
	enemy.
	1321 The SHIMAKAZE fired its guns. 1350 Dropped anchor in KISKA Harbor.
	1405 Had finished taking abourd the men.
	1420 The 2nd Transport Unit had finished.
	1427 Departed.
31 July	0604 The weather cleared up.
	1530 We entered the harbor at PARAMUSHIRO.

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1 August 1943 3 August	1000 The 1st Transport Unit arrived. 1700 Departed from PARAMUSHIRO bound for OMINATO. 0600 Put in at OTARU.
6 August	
7 August	0730 Went ashore at YOKOSUKA Naval Base.
8 August	1400 Arrived at YOKOSUKA having received orders to report to
	the Commandant of the Naval Torpedo School for duty,
16 August	Started courses for torpedo-boat captain.
15 September	Concluding my courses,
20 September	Received orders assigning me to the YOKOSUKA Guard Unit (SHUBITAI) and placing me in command of the Number 10 Torpedo-Boat.

#### AN ACCOUNT OF THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES

7 December 1941 Imperial Rescript to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet:

"We, by ordering this despatch, delegate you to have the responsibility of commanding the Combined Fleet. The responsibilites of the Combined Fleet will be extremely heavy and success or failure of the matter concerns the fate of the country. You have made progress by urging the achievements of Fleet-drill for many years, and you must be determined to meet our expectations by exalting our force and authority throughout the world by annihilsting the enemy."

Reply to the Emperor by the C-in-C of the Combined Fleet: "I was overwhelmingly impressed by the gracious Imperial Rescript, at the outbreak of the war, and I shall carry out his great orders with reverence. The officers and men of the Combined Fleet have sworn to do their utmost and they will accomplish the aim of the despatch. They are determined to accept and carry out the Emperor's Commands."

Orders from the C-in-C to the Combined Fleet: "The fate of our empire hangs on this war. Each man must do his utmost to fulfill his obligations."

8 December 1941 The Imperial Edict veclaring var against the UNITED STATES and ENGLAND was issued. Impurial Rescript to the Ministers of the Army and Navy was received. Acceptance by the Minister of the Navy. Orders to the Minister of the Navy and his department in general. Success of the surprise ttack on HAWAII by our striking force:

> Surface Crift Sunk: 4 BB's, 2 Cruisers, 1 Oiler Seriously Damaged: 2 BB's, 2 Cruisers, 2 DD's. Moderately Damaged: 2 BB's, 4 Cruisers.

Aircraft Seriously Damaged: 157 Planes Razed: (sould) Hangars Our Losses: 39 Planes

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At this time our southern forces started to make landings. Successful ones were made at KOTA BHARU, SINGORA, BATAAN, BANGKOK, and ALBOINA. The wireless station and airfield at BASCO in the BATAAN Islands north of LUZON were occupied. At SHANGHAI, the British gunboat PENGUIN was sunk. The International Sottlement was entered. At PEKING, the American Marines laid down their arms. SINGAPORE was bombed. MIDWAY and WAKE Islands were bombed. CLARK.Field and IBA on LUZON were attacked. We have taken over British and American rights and privileges in the southern islands. GUAM was bombed. HONGKONG and DAVAO were bombed.

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- 9 December 1941 WAKE and CUAM were bombed. The American seaplane carrier LANGLEY was sunk (in DAVAO BAY). An energy sub appeared off TAKAO Harbor.
- The results of our HAWAII Operation were the occasion for joy; 10 December an Imperial Rescript was presented to the Commander-in-Chief. Combined Fleet. A THAI-JAPANESE offensive and defensive alli-(DD) and KISARAGI (DD) were shelled and sunk. Successful land-ings were made at VIGAN on LUZON; we suffered the loss of one sub-chaser. Occupation of GUAM completed. APARRI on LUZON also captured. MAKIN and TARAWA occupied. Minesweeper #19 wrecked off the mouth of the CAGAYAN River on LUZON. An English fleet was attacked off the MALAY coast, and two of the latest British battleships, the PRINCE OF WALES and the REPULSE, were sunk.
  - Imperial Rescript: "At the very outbreak of this war, our Combined Fleet has displayed a brilliant strategy and fought bravely. At HAWAII it has heavily crushed the enemy's fleet and air strength. We have received the report of this signal achievement ourself. Moreover, we extend our deepest praise to our fighting forces, officers and men alike. If they should strive harder and harder, we foresee a magnificent future for our Empire.
- Establishment of the ROME-BERLIN-TOKYO Tri-partite Pact. 11 December Attack on WAKE. The results of the naval action off MALAYA were the occasion for joy; an Imperial Rescript was presented to the C-in-C, Combined Fleet.
  - "The Air Force of the Combined Fleet has crushed the main force of the English Asiatic Fleet in the SCUTH CHINA SEA and has enhanced our power and prestige throughout the area. We are deeply pleased." Answer of C-in-C.
    - Declaration of war against AMERICA by ITALY and GERMANY. Success of landing at LEGASFE.
- 1 Enemy Sub off TOKYO Bay 15 December 1 Encmy Sub in the BUNGO CHANNEL 3 Enemy Subs near CHICHIJIMA
- WAKE attacked. 16 December 10 Enemy subs near CHICHIJIMA 1 Enemy subs near TRUK 3 Enemy subs at SHIO SAKI (19 14)
- The SHINONOME was lost 15 km north of BARAM POINT while on 17 December patrol off MIRI. The RO-66 collided with the RO-62 twenty-five miles west of WAKE and sank instantly. The RO-62 suffered practically no damage.
- WAKE borbed. A Dutch submarine near PALAU. 19 December

20 December

PANAMA, COUTA RICA, NICARAGUA, HONDURAS, GUATEMALA, DOJINICAN REPUBLIC, CUBA, HAITI have declared war on JAPAN. MEXICO has broken off relations with JAPAN. Enemy Submarines:

Near	TOKYO Bay	2-4	BUNGO Channel	2-4
11	KII	2-4	BONIN Islands	3-4
**	MARCUS Islands	1-2	TAIWAN STRAIT	2-4
11	HAINAN Island	2	PALAU	4-5
n	MARIANA Islands	1-2		

- 22 December Successfully landed at LINGAYEN.
- Complete occupation of WAKE. Striking Force arrived at 23 December HASHIRA SHIMA (near KURE).

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25 December 1941	Surrender of HONG KONG.
	A successful surprise landing was made at JOLO on MINDANAO.
26 December	The SAGIRI (DD) received a submarine torpedo attack north
	of KUCHING (SARAWAR) and sank. KUCHING occupied.
	The #6 Minesweeper and the UNYO #2 Maru(第二型 注入) were
	sunk by air bombing.
	The MURASAME (DD) collided with the #20 Minesweeper at TAKAC.
December	Air attack at MANILA.
	1 DD, 2 SS, 10 merchant ships sunk.
	The ASAKAZE sank 1 SS at LINGAYEN.
27 December	The C-in-C; of the American Army of the PHILIPPINAS declared
	MANILA an open city. MANILA was heavily bombed.

## DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF GUAM (ONTVALIMA)

(12 December 19/1)

Installations:

There are facilities for 1 Naval Station. There is one land air-base. There is also a scaplane base and dredging facilities. There is a PAA flying boat base whichis used as a scaplane base. Submarine base facilities are being expanded. There are shore batteries. Naval Personnel - about 500 men. Army Personnel - about 1600 men. Supplies: Coal - about 6,000 tons. Heavy oil - there are o heavy oil tanks but their capacity is not known. There are ammunition storehouses.

Fresh water and provisions - small quantities.

Others.

APRA Harbor is suitable for protection from the wind all year around. 8 or 9 large warships can put in here. There are no suitable anchorages for other vessels.

## GUAM CCCUPATION FORCE BATTLE REPORT

The GUAM Island Occupation Forces protocted the Southern Detachment (TN: NAN SHI TAI南支隊 ) and began landing at 0500 on the tenth. While they continued mopping up activities and this force (TN: the GUAM Occupation Force) and the SNLF advanced to the important positions surrounding APRA Harbor (TN: 河港 ) and occupied it completely. The enemy lost his fighting spirit because of the attacks of several days previous 'y' our air forces. Results of the Battle:


Α. We took prisoner the governor and many government employees,

- and about 200 Marines, including their commander. There was fighting in the streets of AGANA (TN: 3) 33 в. ). 50 were killed.
- C. It was estimated that APRA harbor would be cleared of mines and ships able to anchor within ten days. One oil tank, the gun batteries and powder magazines had been blown up, however, the oil was still burning after 3 days.
- D. & 3,000 ton merchantman was seized. 100 kilolitres of airplane fuel was taken, as was much construction material (steel, bombs, too).
- E. The wireless and cable stations were both severely damaged and unfit for use.


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& CHICHI SHIMA

SKETCH MAP OF HAHA SHIMA - 2 December 1941



Eleven transports were in the harbor (part of the GUAH Occupation Force) HASHIRA SHIMA  $\rightarrow$  HANA SHIMA



HAHA SHIMA ---- GUAM 800 miles

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#### My Opinions:

For about 6 months before it was attacked, construction was in progress on GUAM: plans had been made on a large scale to make the island a sub base. Looking at the condition of the project after our occupation, I would venture to say that by strengthening these installations, the enemy will be unable to avoid damage by our(TN: submarine) forces a few months later on. I think the success of our occupation here was primarily due to the enemy's

I think the success of our occupation here was primarily due to the enemy's utterly deficient (defense), and then, too, the bold way in which we carried out our surprise attack. But I realize that, our next operation must, at all costs, be bergun as soon as possible.

#### SUMMARY OF WAKE ISLAND

27 December 1941

#### Military Installations

There is a base for the Pan-American Airways flying boats. Planes draw up alongside docks. As a base for flying boats, its value is greater than that of MIDWAY. There is a wireless station. Supplies

There are some facilities. On PEALE Island are the facilities of the Pan-American Airways. There is an air-craft beacon, a powerplant, a hotel, and a wireless station. It is on the supply line which runs to MIDWAY and MARAI and (going southwest) to GUAM.

## Harbors

As a haven from wind and waves its value is greater than thet of MIDWAY. Work had been proceeding on a channel which was to be 300 feet wide. At the ent ance to the channel, the corel ref was to be cut to a depth of 35 feet and on the inner side, to a depth of 30 feet (TN: This refers to the channel under construction at the outbreak of the war. The outer channel was to be 35 feet deep, the turning basin 30 feet deep, and the width of the channel, 300 feet.)

There are no anchorages in the vicinity and vessels tie up to buoys.


#### OPERATIONAL SUMMARY OF THE WAKE ISLAND OCCUPATION

#### 28 December 1941

- 1. Occupation schedulod for X  $\neq$  4 day. (Occupation forces began operations after  $\frac{N}{v}$ .) (TN: Noon on X Day; X Day = December 23 ?).
- 2: Reconnaissance carried out 4 December $(\frac{4}{12})$  by 6 flying boats  $\delta$  (from 22nd squadron (CHUTAI) headquarters) and 12 land-based aircraft ( $\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} x/3$ ).
- 3. 8 December 1000
  - 30 land-attack planes (f<sup>1\*</sup>) carried out a bombing attack. (2 land planes (f<sup>4\*</sup>) out of 9 were probably destroyed, one tank at the seaplane base (12) was destroyed by fire; 3 Fighter planes (fc) were sighted, but they did not engage our aircraft.) (Japanese casualtics: 1 Petty Officer killed, several planes demaged by shell-fire.)
- 4. 9 December 0940

A bombing attack was carried out by 26 land attack aircraft (TN: flo) (5 fighter planes were shot down, the north wing of the barracks was destroyed by fire, part of the airfield ( ${}^{4}\vec{p}$ ) was demolished, the seaplane base ( $1\vec{z}^{1}$ ) radio station was bombed. No flying boats (fd) were sighted. Radio communications were disrupted from 1005 to 2145.) (Japanese casualties: 1 Air Warrant Officer killed, 1 man slightly wounded, 14 planes damaged by shell fire.)

 10 December 2230
 A convoy of eleven merchant ships approached the south coast in a heavy swell. Landing operations were postponed, waiting for an improvement in weather conditions.



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COMF	IDENTI	AL		JICPOA Item #4986 Page 19
6.	11 De	cember	0645	The "AKE radio began transmitting to FEARL HARBOR (TN: "NPM").
7.	11 De	cember		Jap casualties: The HAYAKAZE (DD) exploded and sank at 0452. The KISARAGI (DD) exploded and
				sank at 0531. The MCNGO Maru (MCL) was damaged by a hold fire. Rough weather still prevailed in the afternoon and (the landing force) decided to withdraw to NUAJALEIN to make further plans. At 0715, 11 December, 17 land attack planes (TN: flo) attacked the PEALE Is- land shore batteries and MG positions, and were engaged by fighters for 30 minutes. One fighter was shot down. (Japanese losses: 2 land planes destroyed, 1 reserve 1st Lieutenant, 9 petty officers, and 5 enlisted men killed, 11 aircraft damaged by shell- fire, 1 man slightly wounded.)
8.	ll De	eoember	2330	The positions of two naval craft were fixed by RDF in the vicinity of WAKE Island (the ships were thought to be patrol craft, seaplane tenders or oilers).
9.	ll De	ecember	2 <b>05</b> 0	$c \to \gamma 27$ has withdrawn from the WAKE (attack) force and is joining the submarine force. Most of the sub- marine force is engaged in patrolling WAKE.
10.	ll De	esember	1100	The TSUGARU (OM) and the MAIZURU 2nd SNLF are standing by for the eccupation of "AKE. At 0900 12 December (the attack group) secured from readiness and the . SNLF units retyrned.
11. 12.		ecember ecember	1000	The HOTO Maru (XAO) returned to RUOTTO for supplies. CruDiv 6 (TN: 55) is to return before 16 December to RUOTTO in order to aid in the operation of the area.
13.	12 De	ecember	0840	26 land planes ( Scherhold by Lieut. Commander MATSUDA) bombed WAKE. (A warehouse and the western sector AA gun were demolished. Two fighter planes engaged the attack group.) (Japanese casualties: 1 plane exploded, 6 petty officers and 2 enlisted men killed,
14.				4 planes damaged by shell-fire.) An (American) naval vessel appearing at "AKE radioed COM 14th Naval District at C552, 0721, and 0937, 12 December.
15.	12 De	cember	1145	The position of the American naval vessel which was transmitting is nautical miles from "AKE at a bearing of 115° 60'.
16. 17.		ecember ecember		The "MAE occupation force has arrived at RUOTTO. Fifteen land planes bombed "AKE with undetermined results. Two 5 place flying boats (TN: ? $f^d \ge 2/5$ ) bombed the airfield $\underline{\Im}$ . There was an air battle. (Japanese casualties: 1 flying boat failed to return.)
18.	13 De	ecember	0130	COM Cruliv 6 requested of Chief of Staff, 4th Fleet to include the MAIZURU 2nd SNLF and the KIYOKAWA Maru / (APV) in the WARE occupation force.
19.	13 De	ecember		A fighter-reconnaissance plane attached to Airflot 24 (at 5000 meters altitude) observing through a hole in the clouds (reported the following): One or two fighter planes in the revetments at the west side of the runway; no flying boats; one merchant ship carry- ing out unloading operations.
20. 21.		ecember ocember	2320	Cooperated with Striking Force (TN: KB). The gunboat (TN: C) group has been disbanded. The "MARE (occupation) force has been reinforced (TENYO Maru (APV), KIYOKAWA Maru (APV), one company of the MAIZURU SNLF, 2 DD of des iv 24.)
22.	14 De	cember		Three 10 place flying boats (TN: $f^d \ge 3/10$ ) (under Licut. Commander TASHIRO) at 0137 and 30 land-based planes at 0855 under Commander UCHINO bombed WAKE. (Direct hits were scored on the runway, revetments and one fighter plane set afire; the warehouse was set on fire. (Japanese casualties: 11 fighters damaged by shell-fire.)

## EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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			•
23.	15 December	K	flying boats (under the command of Licut. Commander OIZURI) effectively bombed the barracks area in the
24.	16 Decemb	cr 3 a f	orthern part of the main island. 2 land-attack planes (commanded by Lieut. WATANUBE) nd one fighter (at 7000 altitude) (reported the ollowing): About 20 AA mobile guns, and a number
		0	f high-speed torpedo boats have appeared. ( A heavy il tank, an ammunition magazine and a warchouse were et on fire, and the base on PEALE Island effectively
			ombed.) (Jap. casualties: 3 land-attack planes were
25	17 Decemb		lamaged by shell-fire.) I flying boats bombed the southeast section of PEALE
270	TI Decemb	Ĭ	sland. (Causing explosions at the AA gun, the hotel, ind wireless station.
26.	18 Decemb	er 0940 L	and-attack bombers (Type I) carried out resonnaissance. The southeast channel was blocked up.
27.	19 Decemb	er 0845 2	7 land-based attack bombers bombed the airfield 15
		a	m "MLKES Island. 1 fighter engaged them. The anti- ircraft guns on the airfield on "MLKES Island and
		0	ne MG Unit were destroyed. (Japanese losses: One
		m h	an killed aboard planc. 12 attack bombers (TN: ere fld) were hit by shells.
28.	20 Decemb	er 1330 A	. flight of enemy patrol planes arrived (TN: HOKAIKI).
		<b>-</b>	nonairi).
	(D		CONDITION OF THE ENEMY
	(Based up	on Aerial re	connaissance and sundry ntelligence seports)
	1.	Marines	
	2. 3.		mployed by the Military 1000 me Juns 12 (part with mobile emplacements).
	4.		se batteries, machine gun positions - a great number.
	5.	Fighters -	
	0.	Submat Tues	and torpedo-boats are lurking in the vicinity
			OUR FORCES
	1.		of the South Seas Force are carrying out bombing
	2.		after day. afterce (RO-60, 61, 62) - is carrying out patrols
		around the	island.
	3.	Reinforceme	nt Butai (SORYU and HIRYU) on the 20th cooperated operations by sending their planes in to attack.
	4.	Attacking F	orce - Summ.
		(Flags	orce
			g Force - KONGO Maru, KINKTU Maru, Patrol Boats 2 and 33;
		Combin	ed SNLF.
			leadquarters.
		2nd Co	mpany (Company commanded by UCHIDA, MAIZURU SNLF) mpany (Company commanded by TAKANO, 6th Base Force) mpany (Company commanded by ITAYA, MAIZURU SNLF)
	5.	Covering Fo	rce —
	6.	Supporting	U(CL) and TATSUTA (CL). Force —
		Cru iv	6 (6s).
	PROCED	URE TO BE FO	LLOWED SHOULD ENEMY (SHIP) BE ENCOUNTERED

- The ships which sight the enemy shall expend every effort to conceal our force by laying smoke screens and by other means.
   In the event that enemy surface naval vessels approach, in accordance with orders, the KINNYU may and the patrol boats shall avail themselves of every opportunity to retire from the disputed area. The SubRon 6 (6SS) and the Cruliv 18 (18S) are to annihilate the enemy.

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#### MAINTENANCE OF SECRECY

- 1. Limited use of radio.
- 2. Light control
- Localized use of lights for signalling at night and, as demanded by the situation, proper control of illuminating strength. May be used to determine bearing.
- 4. Throwing overboard things which will float in the water is strictly forbidden.
- 5. Disposal of bilge water which contains oily matter.

## OFERATIONS OF THE SUPPORTING FORCE

- On the 21st at 0800 the Force will leave MELLU Channel. The landing force will carry out a landing at 0200 on the same day. The Force will proceed to a point about 50 miles to the east of W.KE Island and thereafter, shell act as the oneany situation may warrant.
- When the attack on "MAKE gets under way, the Force shall proceed to a point about 50 miles to the southeast of the island and patrol in support (TN: of the attack).
   23 December 1030 The occupation of WAKE Island has been completed.

#### SUMMARY OF THE BATTLE

1. Enemy prisoners: Lt.-Colonel and his command --- 430 Skilled laborers --- 1100

In addition to this, many were killed and we acquired many installations, gun emplacements, and ammunition.

2. Our Losses:

Killed ---- UCHIDA Company ---- 9

Seriously Hounded --- 19 Men on Patrol Boat No. 32 Slightly Hounded --- 34 In addition to these losses, 2 patrol boats were heavily damaged and 1

In addition to these losses, 2 patrol boats were heavily damaged and 1 plane was shot down.

## LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE BATTLE

- 1. When we think about the lessons that may be leaned from a battle, we must view it with the eyes of a critic and to the end maintain the point of view of the other side.
- 2. Strive to the utmost to learn about the state of affairs of the enemy; though you may have exhausted every means to learn this, and you may be-lieve that you know enough about it, you never know enough. However, after you have learned about the enemy and have made thorough preparations, there remains only the necessity for resolute action.
- 3. "Then it comes time to carry out the operation, look at the situation as the enemy does and try to discover his weak points.
- 4. Always take into account obstacles that may result from the weather (wind and waves, and range of vision).
- 5. Do not be defeated by a multiplicity of plans. Assemble similar plans into one whole.
- 6. In the light of the battle, it is foolish to refrain from delivering an all-out attack.
- The distribution of military strength should be considered principally with regard to the main strategy. The decision as to the time of commencement of action must be made carefully.
- 8. It is essential in an operation that the various types of aircraft be brought together.
- The fact that damage from accidental explosions (YUB-NU) of torpedoes and depth charges was very great should be borne in mind.
- 10. In war, the chances of success are three to seven. Out of 81 men 50 were killed. However, several hundred prisoners were taken and we captured the whole island. The side that fights well the last five minutes is the one that wins.
- "Then battle is undertaken, the leadership of the commanding officers should be firm. By no means, may there be any faltering, or hesitation. "Then preparations have been made, action should follow.

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- 12. Though it is easy to throw away one's life by being impetuous, when once it is realized that death is pleasant, to live and do one's duty is difficult.
- 13. The idealist and the materialist are complimentary. The fallacy of AMERICA which worships materialism has been exposed.
- 14. Leadership in battle: Inform even the engine-room hands who cannot see the enony of the situation. Exhaust all one's knowledge and ability when he is in a fatal position.
- 15. Acquisition of air supremacy is necessary. However, naval vessels still fulfill their (colim proce.
- 16. In glorious battle, the function of the supporting force is a thankless task.
- 17. Orders must be carefully considered. Once, however, they have been given, they should be carried out to the letter.
- Inventiveness and originality. The most profitable use of new weapons is the responsibility fo the strategist. (Believe earnestly in certain victory.)
- 19. Since the advancement of AA weapons is very slow we must fight planes with planes, and also we must destroy the base before the enemy can rise.
- 20. Importance of ir Tascs (Bases for action). Planes must inevitably have bases.
- 21. The capture of the isolated island by occupation operations will be comparatively difficult as the whole island is a fortress; and, in addition to this, operating freely will be extremely difficult.
- 22. There are opportunities in battle. Seizing these opportunities wins victories; when one misses these opportunities he cannot win a victory no matter what he does.
- 23. Occupation operations and submarines. The enemy can only prove a threat by means of its submarines. It must be said that if the enemy were to conceal even one or two submarines in the vicinity of WAKE Island, they would be a great menace to cur operations.
- 24. Operational Directions.
  - (A) Combined operations (KYODO S.KUSEN) are not feasible, as a rule. If there were a Naval Special Landing Force of 20,000 men, landing operations would be easy. In combined operations there are many occasions where opportunities are missed for striking at weak points with force. (JITSU "O 10TTE, KYO "O UTSU)
  - (B) Insufficient military strength causes unforeseen failure. It is said that the lion exhausts his entire strength even to catch one rabbit.
  - (C) A force without a central unit (SHUTAI) is not possible. There is a need for operational leaders to amass (information).

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# THE BISPARCK SEA OPERATIONS 28 January, 1942

#### SIGNIFICANCE OF THE BISMARCK SEA OPERATIONS:

1. POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE (FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC):

Foreign: In our war with ENGLAND and the UNITED STATES we are bringing to bear, as might have been expected, economic pressure and we are dispatching against ENGLAND in the Orient armies of deliverance. We shall deliver a fatal blow against AUSTRALIA and shall carry out such attacks as will uproot the foundations of the British Colonial Empire which even now is in the process of disintegration.

Domestic: In reading the history of the sea-girt Island Empire of JAPAN, as is natural, traces of those peerless men who ventured upon the seas and embarked upon adventures abroad are not lacking. Though it may be said that it was the WAKO (IN: A band of pirates who reamed the seas of CHINA and KOREA during the ASHIKAGA period) who revealed the spirit of the Japanese nation by hoisting the ancient flag inscribed "HACHIMAN, GREAT EODDHI-SATVA" (TN: HACHIMAN is the God of War in the Japanese pantology; BODDHI-SATVA" is the BUDDHA-ELECT) and crossing the seas, the TOKUGAWA's closed the country for the long period of three hundred years (TN: 1638-1867) and the overseas expansion dissolved into nothingness like a dream. The delusion of national isolation was finally destroyed. Though it may be said that great strides forward were made during the period of MEIJI, it was a period of self-examination and development. During the TAISHO era we saw the nation carried away by the tide of international liberalism and effiminate ideals of peace. Retrenchment was a mistake.

The present invasion, however, will awaken a billion people. Our confidence is unshaken and we proceed with the conviction that we shall smash through the strong points of the enemy by this southern advance and that we shall bring the campaign to a most successful conclusion. We shall spare not the slightest effort.

2. ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE:

The resources of NEW GUINEA have not yet been exploited. The mining industry, especially in the production of gold, is well-known. There are fisheries. Being an intermediate trading place, its future possibilities as a relay base for transportation and communications are enormous.

- 3. MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE:
  - a. A stronghold from which aggressive offensives may be launched.

It cuts the most advantageious South Pacific line of the American offensive strategy against JAPAN—HAWAII, HOWLAND ISLAND, SAMOA, FIJI, SOLOLON ISLANDS, and BISMARCK ARCHIPELACO.

b. From the standpoint of defense, it is a buttress against invasion.

It presents a powerful defensive front against the south.

c. A base from which to carry out blockade:

The sea routes which bind AUSTRALIA to ASIA will lie within bombing range of our planes. The shipping lanes, bays and ports which lie beyond bombing range may be threatened by our submarines based in  $d_{\rm eff} \in \Omega_{\rm betaco}$ .

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## STRENGTH OF THE ATTACKING FORCES:

- 1. NAVY:
  - a. Striking and Holding Fleet (TN: KAKUCYO KANTAI):

Main Units:

Minediv 19 (OKINOSHILA Flagship, TSUGARU, TENYO KARU, MOGAUIGAMA KARU)

Sublon 6 (YUBARI Flagship);

Despiv 29 (OITE Flagship, ASANAGI and YUNAGI);

Des iv 30 (MUTSUKI Flagship, YAYOI and MOCHIZUKI);

KIYOKAWA (理ビ) れ ) ,KONGO Tara,5th Gunboat Squadron, 14th Minesweeper Squadron, and Submarine-chaser Div 56.

Supporting Units:

CruDiv 18 (TENRYU Flagship, TATSUTA);

DesDiv 23 (KIKUTSUKI Flagship, UZUKI and YUZUKI).

KINRYU \_\_\_\_(TN:を能之)

MAIZURU 2nd SNLF

HIROSHINA Naval Landing Force, one company.

b. Air Forces at TRUK:

YOKOHAMA Naval Air Group (14 flying boats);

CHITOSE Naval Air Group (9 fighters and 18 medium attack bombers).

c. Indirect Guard Forces:

TRUK Area Guard Force;

SAIPAN Area Guard Force;

Cooperating Forces:

Car iv 1

#### 2. ARMY:

Commander-in-Chief of South Seas Detachment: Major-General HCNII To.nitaro, Infantry------3rd Company; Mountain Gun Troops-----lst Battalion; Engineers-----lst Company;

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Commissary-----2nd Company;

Mobile Field AA---lst Company:

(The above all from the 55th Infantry Division).

(TN: In the original, this to "Navy and Army", is ruled through and marked "not permissible".)

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY IN THE BISMARCK AREA:

- 1. Surface Vessels:
  - a. Australian Fleet;

2 heavy cruisers, 3 light cruisers, a few other ships. Location not clearly known.

b. Anglo-American Fleet;

5 battleships, 2 carriers, 4 heavy cruisers, unknown number of destroyers. It is not known whether or not they will engage in battle (TN: RAIKO 东龙、).

2. Aircraft:

Several flying boats; several torpedo-bombers. Airfield. Total planes, all types: about 50 (British and Australian). Total flying boats: under 50 (American).

3. Submarines:

There is as yet no information concerning the situation of enemy submarines. There is a great possibility that American submarines have gradually made their way west. We assume, too, that British and Dutch submarines have made an appearance in the BISMARCK Sea Area.

## IMPORTANT POINTS ABOUT RABAUL

#### 29 January 1942

## I. MILITARY AFFAIRS:

- 1. Air Fields (TN: 12): RABAUL and VUNAKANAU
- Defenses:
   Volunteer Defense Army (1 rifle company; 1 MG platoon), Roving Patrols (JUNKEITAI 後年 算法) about 172. Australian soldiers: About 500 Batteries: Under construction at 3 places.
   Security:
   20 miles outside the harbor guard by planes.
- Security: 20 miles outside the harbor guard by planes. Outsiders forbidden to approach the air field and at night the movements of the Japanese are watched.

## II. ESSENTIALS OF GOVERNMENT:

"Territory of NE" GUINEA" Government Offices, Customs House, Law Courts Post Office, Wireless Station, Prison, Hospital.

III. POPULATION:

Urban Areas ----- about 4,000 If nearby villages are included: about 12,500

Of which are:

Natives	10,300	(majority	MICRONESIAN)
"hites	1,000		
Chinese	1,200		
Japanese	25		

## IV. CONDITIONS OF THE HARBOR:

- 1. It is easy for a formation to enter the harbor.
- 2. The body of water which lies north of an east-west line drawn through DAWAFIA Rocks has a length of approximately 2 miles and a maximum breadth of 1.5 miles. Mud bottom. Dopth of the water is from 84.1 -- 100 metres, but the northern half is 47 metres or less in depth. The anchorage for warships is, for the most part, between 10.9 and 31.5 metres in depth while the anchorage for merchant shipping is 36.5 metres deep.
- 3. Berthing capacity for the harbor is 5 CruDivs.
- 4. It affords excellent shelter.
- 5. "Thenever there is a steady south-cast wind blowing strongly, the southern half is bound to be rough.
- 6. Sea-defense is easy.

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## METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE RABAUL AREA

(31 January 1942)

#### 1. GENERAL

Two periods are distinguished -- that of the northwest seasonal wind which extends from December to April and that of the southeast seasonal wind which extends from April to November.

In the winter, the northeast tradewinds of the northern hemisphere are constantly blowing, part of which cross the equator and penetrate into the southern hemisphere. When the northwest seasonal winds begin, the southeast seasonal wind gradually recedes with the fall of the southern hemispheric high pressure. It is believed that, about January, the area of variable winds at the ends of the north and south air fronts (IN: doldrum area) passes over the KABAUL region. As a consequence, the weather in this area is generally undertain.

- 2. SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE WEATHER
  - (a) Land and sea breezes are conspicuous. However, they rarely exceed an altitude of 500 metres and their area are generally restricted to about 10 miles including inland and sea.
  - (b) Windless Nights. It is said that this phenomenon is more conspicuous during clear weather than during cloudy weather.
  - (c) Daily change of atmospheric pressure. The atmospheric pressure, as in the case of the inner South Seas shows a regular daily change. Maximum highs are at 0900 and 2200 while maximum lows are at 0/00 and 1600.
  - (d) Amount of Rainfall. January has the heaviest rainfall of the year. An average amount of over 400 mm. of rain fall.
  - (e) Wind. In January, southerly winds are slightly more numerous, 35% while northerly winds are somewhat fewer - 30%. However, in February, the southerly winds are reduced to 20% while north erly winds are increased to 40%. Judging from this in January, the winds alternate north and south with this area as the center of the doldrums region while in February the doldrums line has moved south.
- 3. WEATHER FORECASTING

Judging from various conditions:

- (a) In the case of a northwesterly wind, heavy rains accompanying sudden squalls. Weather generally bad and continuing for several days.
- (b) In the case of a southeasterly wind: "Winds are generally light. "Weather in this region probably good.
- (c) In the case of the doldrums line same as paragraph (b). Weather bad and uncertain.

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## RESULTS OF THE "R" CAMPAIGN (At the beginning of the landings - 0000 on 23 January 1942)

- 0025 Succeeded in unloading at KAVIENG without mishap. Met no resistance. 0415 Occupied the airfield in the town. The city streets were razed by the fires the enemy had started. The telegraph office and all its installa-
- tions were smashed. Completed sweeping the anchorage for mines.
   Occupied VANAKANAU; enemy resistance there. Captured 17 foreigners at NEW HANOVER; many heavy and light machine guns, rifles, ammunition and weapons were also confiscated. No defense installations at G.SMATA. The mopping up on CREDNER Island is finished.
   Ozou filedult has been completely occupied. There was a counter-attack
- 0250 Town of RAEAU has been completely occupied. There was a counter-attack by enemy planes. We have surrounded and are attacking the enemy in the "WALAUR Sector. The inhabitants of (RABAU) have all flod. Apparently all the Japanese residents there had been transported to SIDNEY on the 14th. 100 prisoners taken. 6000 bombs and 60 drums of plane fuel were also captured. Our losses were one carrier-based torpedo bomber and one carrier-based bomber: The Army lost 14 dead and 15 wounded.

OUTLINE OF THE S.N.L.F. LANDING

31 January 1942

#### at YSABEL PASSAGE

Flag signals from the commander (SHIREIKAN);

Clean out the area along the shore near the anchorage.

- I. The objects of the operation.
  - A. Hostile persons (deserters, recalcitrant white men, etc.)
  - B. Enemy installations (wireless, gun, rifle installations, etc.)
- II. Area to be cleaned out.

The North shore of NEW HANOVER Island is to be covered from 150°20' E. Long. eastward to 150°28' E. Long. in sectors of two minutes longitude each. Our ships are to cover these sectors in reverse numerical order.

#### III. The dispatched SNLF

Four platoons commanded by a company commander aboard each ship (1 WO or above, 10 rated and non-rated men in each platoon); one command platoon; total personnel, 60 or less.

Ł

#### IV. Landing Boats (HAKENTEI)

They shall be armed, shall move along shore in pace with the progress of the SNLF, and shall stand ready to do signalling and any sudden mustering.

V. Dress

'The usual SMLF battle outfit will be worn.

VI. Unless there are special orders to the contrary, the landing boats will leave their ships at 0700 on 1 February. They shall have returned by 1500.

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#### CONDITION OF THE SHORES AND ANCHORAGES OF YSABEL PASSAGE

## 4 February 1942

From what we saw with our glasses, the entire island (NEW HANOVER) was one large, dense jungle, upon which no axe had made its mark since time began. Here and there along the shore, however, were human habitations. The mode of living was not altogether strange; indeed, the general aspect was Occidental. I was surprised at the blackness of the natives. Only a picce of cloth was wrapped about their loins. In general, they were resting in an absent-minded fashion, as if they didn't know the meaning of work. There was one man among them scratching his head just like a monkey. They would crawl about when changing their positions. Their behavior approached that of an animal.

At TSOI KOTO we spotted about twenty natives gathered together. Two or three persons stood in the center, surrounded by the others. They all seemed to be discussing something. Or else they were surprised at our anchoring and had called a meeting.

Living things were everywhere. "We saw only drooping trees spreading out their leafy branches. If we could have penetrated to the depths of the jungle, we would surely have seen many strange things.

At TSOI KOTO an'Australian managed a plantation. He had a western-style house.

The natives used a "canoe" in moving about on the water.

The water's depth at our anchorage was about 15 metres. There was a shallow spot 10 métres deep, however. The bottom was sandy.

The island had yet to be exploited at all; but with the coming of our countrymen in the future. I believe it will be greatly developed.

## SALICA-LAE OPERATIONS:

10 February 1942

## "LAE"

Although there is no place which can be called a natural harbor, buildings and air field installations have been dot up; there are docks where sca-going vessels can the up, and on calm days liners can put in there. Moreover, this harbor is equipped with 10-ton cranes and lighters with a capacity of 4000 tons and these transport and unload cargoes on ships which are bound for (TN: or are coming from) the SOLOMON Islands.

#### "SALAMOA"

Because this harbor is the port of entry to MOROBE and "GOLDFIELD" (TN: ?) it is also called NEW GOLDFIELD HARPOR. As a result of the harbor construction of 1926 there is a good harbor which affords shelter of various depths of water. Ships anchor about 550 metres off-shore; although small-type vessels can approach the shore inside the harbor and drop anchor there is nothing of particular importance at present in the way of harbor facilities.

(TN: The next few lines were marked "Not Permitted" in original document.)

- 1. Forces occupying the SE Area: Flag DesBon 6; DesBon 6; Mineswepper Division 14; KIYOKAWA Maru LIPU); . TSUGRAU (CM); TENYO Maru; KIINYU Maru (XCL); KONGO Maru (XCL); KOKAI Maru (英语文); Sth Base Force (TN: Bg) SNLF.
- Supporting Forces (SHIEN BUTAI) Flag CruDiv 6; CruDiv 18; DecRon 23; TOHO Maru (XAO).

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- 3. Submarine Forces Flag SubRon 7; SubRon 7.
- 4. Land Based Air Forces Flag Airflot 24; Airflot 24; OBORO
- Carrier-based Air Forces Captain, SHOHO (CV); SHOHO (CV); HOKAZE (DD).

Conditions of the Enemy:

- 1. The Volunteer Defence Forces of the enemy in this area consist of 2 rifle companies and 1 machine gun platoon.
- 2. The enemy air forces are based at LAE and SALAMOA and they are in close communication with PORT MORESBY and TOWNESVILLE while operating in the RABAUL Area (TN: "R" Area). There are less than 10 planes for each base and their activity is not very lively; they fly in mobile deployment in each place, however, and it will be difficult to wipe them out.
- 3. We doubt that the American striking force will restore its operations in the SOUTH SEAS Area and there is only a possibility that they will strike in this area.

PORT MORESBY (TN: MO)

Operations and Disposition of Strength 15 May 1942

(TN: In the original document the following lines were crossed out and labeled "Not Permissible".)

Central Unit (SHUTAI)

Flag 4 Fleet KASHIMA (CL) TOKI'A (CM) YUNAGI (DD) SEISEN Maru (WV)

MORESBY Striking Force

Flag CruDiv 5 (TN: 5S) (Minus the NACHJ) CarDiv 5 (Sf) DesDiv 27 DesDiv 7 (dg) (minus 1 DD) TOHOWAARU (XAO or APV)

MO Occupation Forces:

Flag CruDiv 6; CruDiv 6; DesRon 6 (minus the l DD of DesDiv 23); SHOHÖ; DesDiv 7 (only l DD); SubDiv 21; Minesweeper 20; CruDiv 18; TSUGARU (CM); KAMIKAWA Maru (XCVS); KIYOKAWA Air Group; KOEI Maru (5)  $\not\equiv \pi$  ); AZUMASAN Maru ( $\not\equiv j, \ell$ ); GOYO Maru ( $\not\equiv j, \ell$ ); OSHIMA ( $\pi, R$ ) ( $\pi \ell \not\equiv \ell$ ); HOYO Maru ( $\not\equiv \ell$ ); RO ( $\pi O$ ) ( $\pi \ell \not\equiv \ell$ );

TULAGI Occupation Operations

Flag MinDiv 19; MinDiv 19 (TSUGARU) and TOKT"A (CM) ); DesDiv 23 1 DD; SHOEI Maru (政治人力).

Submarine Forces:

Flag SubRon 7; SubRon 7 (minus SubDiv 21). Surface Escort Unit 2 (TAI). Flag Escort Unit 23 Surface Escort Unit (TAI) 2.

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Conditions of the Anemy:

- American Air Forces in the Australian Area --- presumably 200 planes (1st line).
- 2. It appears that considerable strength is concentrated in the PORT DARVIN and TOUNSVILLE sectors.
- There is no information about the A crican Striking Force since (TN: their arrival), but there is a great possiblility that they are becoming stronger in this area.
- 4. Eloreover it appears that the British Navy has dispatched a force composed of 2-3 cruisers and some destroyers with a battleship as main strength to the Australian area.
- 5. Although submarine activities have not been very lively, submarines still exist in the RABAUL area.
- Transportation of materiel for AUSTRALIA. Transportation by plane is becoming gradually more active.
- Since the activity of enemy reconnaissance planes has increased, it has become difficult to conceal our plans from them; security precautions are particularly important.
- 8. It has become necessary to take especially strict AA precautions.

## DEVELOPMENT OF THE CORAL SEA BATTLE

Outline of Battle of 4th Fleet.

On 4 Hay information concerning the enemy striking force (TN: KB) which had attacked TULACT was not "vry clear. On 6 May at 0830 a YOXOHAMA Air Group (TN: HAHAKU) search plane discovered an enemy force composed of 1 CV, 1 BB, 2 cruisers and 5 DD at  $815^{\circ}$  55' E158° 35' proceeding south. This was outside our radius of attack and about 0900 contact with the enemy was lost. As a result while the HORESBY (LO) Striking Force (KB) was preparing for enemy opera tions, the LORESBY (LO) Occupation force acted in accordance with established plans (Å shipping group left RABAUL (RR) at 1600 on 4 May).

On 7 May at 0600 5 enemy carrier-based planes and at 0622 35 carrier-based planes, attacked in the area assigned to the MORESBY occupation force. Reconnais sance planes of the CruDiv 6 at 0640 sighted 1 BB, 1 CV, 2 cruisers and 7 DD proceeding north at a point  $S12^{\circ}$  15'  $B154^{\circ}$  30'. Later, at 0230 it was announced that there were 2 CV. At 0558 patrol-attack planes of the MORESBY Striking Force sighted a force which included a ship resembling an aircraft carrier at at a point  $S15^{\circ}$  55'  $E157^{\circ}$  50'. The planes wont to destroy the enemy force with its entire strength. However, a tanker was recognized to the right (this ship was bombed by part of the planes; heavily damaged and sunk). The IDRESBY Striking Force (MORB) hurried toward the enemy in the west.

0700: The NORESBY Occupation Force (TN: "HO" - KORYAKU BUTAI) has withdrawn its shipping group (TN: SLNDAN) to the northwest and it is continuing strict AA precautionary measures.

0920: 52 miles bearing 59° from DEBOYNE approximately 60 enemy carrier-based bombers and fighters attacked us. They concentrated a torpedo and bombing attack on the SHOHO(CV). CruDiv 6 (65) mustered all available force and tried to protect the SHOHO but she had been hit by more than 3 torpedoes and 6 bombs. She fought bravely until the vury last and at 0935 she sank.

The Occupation Forces prepared for a second attack by the enemy and withdrew to the north for a while. The main force (TN: SHUTAI) retired to the north to avoid an air attack.

1500: The SAZAMANT (DD) while preparing for a counter attack at night picked up survivors of the SHOHO.

1244: Land-based attack-planes from the Base Air Force attacked the enemy Striking Force (TN: Enemy "KB"), sank 1 battleship, and heavily damaged 1 battleship.

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The MORESBY Striking Force planned to attack at dusk and at 1420 15 carrier based attack and bombing planes were sent out, but we did not locate the enemy because of a sudden squall over the target area. While searching for the enemy in that vicinity we were attacked by enemy carrier-based fighters which came from the clouds and we engaged in an air battle with them. On the way back (TN: to the base) one group(ICHI BU) of carrier-based bombers discovered the enemy Striking Force (TN: "KB") in a squall at 13° South 154° 14' East at 1700, but it could not attack them on account of the squall and darkness. At 2010 the planes returned and landed, 7 planes failed to return. At about 1800 tracking planes lost contact with the enemy was about 300 miles and the faight battle stopped. At dawn on the 8th the attack was resumed and the day for the occupation of PORT WORESBY was postponed until X plus 2 days.

CruDiv 6 (TN: 6S) and 2 DD (TN: 2 D) were added to the MORESBY Striking Forces.

On the 8th at 0622 reconnaissance planes from the SHOKAKU (CV) sighted an enemy striking force composed of 1 battleship, 2 carriers, 3 cruisers, and 6 destroyers at 14° 30' South 154° 40' East. The MORESBY Striking Force dispatched an attack unit at 0730. At this time CruDiv 6 (TN: 6S) 100 nautical miles southwest of SHORTLAND Islands, was attempting to refuel from the IRO (A0) when patrol planes of the 11 Air Fleet (TN: 11 AF) reported that their and our striking forces were fighting. The ships stopped refuelling immediately and were ordered to join the CruDiv 18 and the Desmon 6 (TN: 6 Sd) and advance southward at full speed in order to cooperate with our striking force (TN: KB).

At 0930 we attacked the enemy carriers of the SARATOGA Class and YORKTOWN Class. We hit the SARATOGA Class ship with more than 9 torpedoes and 10 bombs and we hit the YORKTOWN Class ship with more than 3 torpedoes and 8 bombs. Definitely sumk. In addition we scored torpedo hits on 1 battleship.

From 0856 to 1020 more than 60 enomy carrier-based planes attacked the MORGSEY Striking Unit 3 times. They scored 3 bomb hits on the SHOKAKU (CV) and 8 more missions impossible to take off or land because fires broke out. It left the battle area.

At 0830 land-based search-attack planes sighted 1 BB, 2 cruisers and 4 DD of the enemy at 13° South and 149° East. Although we contacted them we could not dispatch an attack unit with the Base Air Force because of rain the the VUNAKANAU Area.

At this point we had to take into consideration the condition of the enemy surface forces and the difficulties of protecting transport groups with carriers against enemy land-based planes. We have postponed the occupation of PORT MORESBY. The group (TN: transport group) will return to RABALL.

Moreover, in consideration of the fuel situation, etc., the Striking Force was ordered at 1300 to stop the attack and to go north. The MORESBY main force (SHUTAI) also reversed its course and went to fuel. Thus, while the MORESBY operational force (SANUSEN BUTAI) was preparing for the enemy striking force (KB) the order was issued to fall into position to help the occupation of the NAURU and OCEAN Areas. At 2045 the C-in-C of the Combined Fleet issued an order to strike to the utmost to annihilate remaining units of the enemy force.

The MORESBY Striking Force (MOKB), the CruDiv 6, 1 DD, DeaRon 6, and the seaplane scouting squadron (SUITEITAI) were ordered to expedite fueling and to make attack preparations.

On the 9th most of the float reconnaissance planes from the DEBOYNE base, acting in concert with the Base Air Force in reconnoitering the enemy searched in the region to the south. The MORESEY Occupation Force also set out to search for and pursue the remaining enemy forces but was unable to follow the movements of the enemy.

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Results of the Engagement

Enemy <u>Strongth</u> (a) 2 BB, 2 cruisers, 4 DD (b) 1 BB, 2 CV, 3 cruisers, 6 DD (c) 1 AO, 1 DD ٦. 2. Sunk and Damaged 1 large type tanker (about 20000 tons), 1 DD sunk almost certainly. certainly. 1 CV, SARATOGA Class. Sinking confirmed. 1 CV, YORKTOWN Class. Sinking confirmed. 1 BB (Class not cortain). Set afire and made to release 8 May: heavy oil by a torpedo. 1 Cruiser (Class not certain). After receiving a torpedo from a carrier-based attack plane, exploded, caught afire and listed. (The above results were obtained by CarDiv 5 and an air group (fg). 7 May: 1 BB of CALIFORNIA Class sunk. 1 BB of WARSPITE Class. Heavily damaged. 1 CA of CANBERRA Class. Heavily damaged. (The above results were obtained by the Base Air Force.) 3. Planes Shot Down (7 May - 8 May) Ship-board fighters - 58 planes Type unknown - 8 Shipboard bombers and attack planes - 32 TOT/L - 98 (10 not positive) Remaining Strength 4.

(a) 1 BB (heavily damaged); 2 Cruisers (1 heavily damaged); 4 DD.
(b) 1 BB (medium damage); 3 Cruisers (1 medium damage); 6 DD.

COMBAT LESSONS FROM THE WAR FOR GREATER EAST ASIA

## SECTION I - AN OUTLINE OF IMPORTANT BATTLES

CHAPTER I. First Sea Battle of the SOLOMON Islands.

1. (A) Forces which participated:

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Flagship (TN: ?): CHOKAI (CA); Crubly 6
(Flagship (TN: ?): AOBA (CA), KAKO (CA), KINUGASA (CA), FURUTAKA (
Flagship (TN: ?): TENRYŪ (CL), YŪBARI (CL), YŪKAZE (DD).
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(B) Enemy Forces:

9 CA; 1 CL (TN: CXL); 8 DD's.

- 2. Developments:
  - (A) On the 7th at 0435 the TULAGI Communications Base reported that an enemy striking force accompanied by an occupation force had begun landing operations at TULAGI and at GUADALCANAL. Our forces have therefore decided to penetrate their anchorage and annihilate them
  - (B) On the 8th at 2100 a search-attack plane with flares took off from the ships.
  - (C) 2120: Commanding Officer formed a single column with his ship at the head and moved to the attack.
  - (D) At 2246 and at 2250: Sighted enemy destroyers sailing individual courses away from us but in order to conceal our plans we avoided being seen by the enemy and so passed them without action.

## EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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- (E) 2331; "All forces, Attack", was ordered; Course 120°, Speed; 26 knots.
- (F) 2337: Sighted ACHILLES type enemy ship to the Mortheast. CHOKAI fired torpedocs. Thenceforth, each ship made a surprise torpedo attack on the enemy
- (G) ships which were making a rendezvous. By 2350 we had blown up and sunk (or attacked and sunk) 3 cruisers (TN: CX 3) and 1 destroyer.
- (H) After the FURUTAKA torpedoed and sank a large type energy destroyer at 2346 she was dangerously close to colliding with a large damaged enemy cruiser but she changed her course by porting her rudder and torpedeed and sank said large cruiser. ... She become separated from the ship next ahead and proceeded with the YUBARI and the TENRYU.
- (I) After we split to the bast and west the CHOKAI (CA) and CruDiv 6 (minus the FURUTAKA), which made up the Eastern Unit, shelled and torpedeed the enemy 4 cruisers and 5 DD's newly sighted to the Morth. The FURUTAKA, TENRYU, and YUBARI, which made up the Western Unit, shelled the enemy. The two groups, cooperating, attacked from both sides and by 0012 they had completely destroyed the enemy.
- (J) YUNAGI (DD) torpedoed and sank an enemy cruiser at 2355. Considering the movements of the YUBARI she executed a turn.at. a very great angle. Because she was exceptionally far removed from the main force she reversed (TN: made a complete turn), and continuing to battle with one enemy destroyer, withdrew by herself. (K) On the 9th at 0200: In order to withdraw from the sphere of enemy
- bombing, the whole force received orders to withdraw.
- Results of the Battle: 3.

	2 CA, 1 CL (TN: LCx1), 1 DD.
Attacked and sunk:	1 CA (by torpedo), 2 CA (by torpedo and gunfire),
	2 Ch, 6 DD.
Damaged:	1 CA (by terpede), 2 DD.

CHAPTER II. 12 November. The Third (sic) Sea Battle of the SOLOMONS Islands.

1. Forces which participated:

> 1 BatDiv (TN: "11S") (Flagship (TN: 11S) HIEI (BB) and the KIRISHIMA (BB) bombarded the airfield on GUADALCANAL. (BB) bombarded the affileld on GONALANAL. Crubity 10 (TN: "105) (TN: written a second time and crossed out) (Flag-ship (TN: P) NAGARA, Deebity 61 (TN: 61 dg) (TERUTSUKI) Deabity 16 (TN: 16 dg) Divisional Command (TN: P?) YUKIKAZE and the AMATSUKAZE DesDity 6 (TN: 6 dg) (AKATSUKI, IKAZUCHI and the INAZUMA) screened the firing units (SHAGEKITAI). DesRon 4 (TN: 43d) DesDiv 9 (TN: 9 dg) (Flagship: / TN: / / ASAGUMO) DesRon 4 (TN: 2dg) Divisional Command (TN: / ?) MURASANE, SAMIDARE, YUDACHI, HARUSAME.

Minesweeping and protection for the advance. DesDiv 27 (TN: 27dg) (Division Command (TN: 15) SHIGURE, SHIR. TSUYU, and the YUGURE.) Protecting GUAD/LCANAL and the RUSSELL Islands.

Enemy forces:

LUNGA Area: 4 CA 2 CL 7 DD 6 Torpedo Boats (TN: Txf). 3 CA TULAGI Area: 2 DD 1 Torpedo Boat (TN: GYORAITEI X 1)

2. Developments:

> (A) 0830. A B-17 flying from the south came in contact with BatDiv 11 but was driven off by fighters of CarDiv 2 (TN:  $\frac{f_c}{2sf}$ .

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- (B) At about sunset a Type Zero float reconnaissance plane from the
- HIEI (BB) sighted some 10 enemy vessels anchored at GUADALCANAL. (C) 2312: Unable to find the enemy even by taking a firing course
- (b) 2343: The YUDACHI and the HIEI sighted the silhouettes of severa enemy ships and charged with full force and began to battl
- (E) The Screening Force (CHOKUEI TAI) and the Firing Force (SHAGEKI TA fired guns and torpedoes at the enemy from his west flank. The YŪDACHI (DD) conformed with this and doubled the attack from the sast and one after another we blew up and sank the enemy. On account of this the enemy gradually retreated to the north; par of the Screening Force (CHOKUEI TAI) and the Firing Force (SHAGEKI TAI) swept the enemy from the seas firing torpedoes and guns in succession.
- (F) The mopping-up thit, before going ahead, fell behind (KORAKU) when the main force had maneuvered to retire to the north of SAVO Islany It came up almost abreast with the main force but passed astern of the main force at the south side of SAVO Island and went to the north side of the island. It cooperated with the Screening Force and part of the Firing Force causing the annihilation of the enemy forces remaining.
- (G) From 2350 to 0034 we destroyed the major part of the enemy power in the area and we then withdrew to the North.
- 3. Results of the Battle:

Sunk (by torpedoes):	3 Heavy Cruisers (TN: Ca x 3)
	l Light Cruiser (TN: Ca x l)
Sunk (by gunfire):	2 Hcavy Cruisers (TN: Ca x 2)
	1 Light Cruiser (TN: Ca x 1)
	3 Destroyers (TN: d x 3)
Severely Damaged:	2 Heavy Cruisers (TN: Ca x 2)
• •	5 Destroyers (TN: d x 5)(sank later)
	1 Torpedo Boat (TN: t x 1) (sank later)
Medium Damage:	2 Destroyers (TN: d x 2) (sank later)
U U	1 Destroyer (TN: d x 1)

CHAPTER III. 14 November. The Third Sea Battle of the SOLOMON Islands.

1. Forces which participated:

CruEiv 4 (TN: 4S) (Flagship (TN: |<sup>7</sup>) ATAGO, TAKAO, KIRISHIMA; bombarded the airfield on GUADALCANAL. CruEiv 10 (Flagship (TN: )<sup>7</sup>) NAGARA and the Squadron Command (?) (TN: )<sup>3</sup> SHIRAYUKI, HATSUYUKI, SAMIDARE, INAZUMA. DesBon 4 (Flagship and Squadron Command (TN: )<sup>6</sup>) the ASAGUMO. DeeDiv 6½ (TN: 61 dg) (division command (TN: )<sup>6</sup>) TERUTSUKI, Protection (TN: screen) for the Firing Forces. DesBon 3 (TN: 3 sd): (Flagship (TN: )<sup>6</sup>) SENDAI (CL) ) DesDiv 19 (TN: 19 dg) Division Command (TN: )<sup>6</sup>) the URANAMI, the AYANAM and the SHIKINAMI. Clearing the course for other ships.

Enemy Strength:

4 BB, 2 CA; and 4 DD.

- 2. Developments:
  - (A) According to various intelligence reports from the planes of the SANYO Maru (XCVS) and other sources we expected to encounter a.str enemy force. At 1940 we withdrew our screen (CHOKUEI WO TESSURU) and moved it forward on the course ahead. At 2010 all forces were ordered to annihilate the enemy.

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- (B) At 2010 the Mopping-Up Whit sighted silhouettes of ships to the northeast of SAVO Island and gave chasa. Ab about 2116 they engaged in battle. The AYANAMI was ordered to separate (from the main force) and to proceed to the LUNGA Point Area via the south side of SAVO Island. While proceeding there she blew up and sank one enemy cruiser which she met at the south side of SAVO Island.
- (C) The mopping-up Unit (minus the ASAGUMO and the TERUTSUKI) went ahead of the main force at 2120 and sailed 6-7 kilometres astern of the AYANAMI. While proceeding, it met 1 enemy cruiser and 3 enemy destroyors. It destroyed these and then at 2145 it sighted 2 battleships northwest of ESPERANCE. While reporting this to the entire force it tried to attack them, but the destroyers did not have their guns loaded in time to fire (JIH.TSU SOTEN MANIAWAZU). After that the enemy withdrew to the south and we pursued them with all our effort. At about 2340 we overtook them and carried out our second attack on them.
- (D) Just before 2200 CMUDiv 4 (TN: 4S), KIRISHIMA, ASAGUMO, TERUTSUKI sighted 4 Battleships in succession and attacked and sank 2 of them by torpedo and gunfire.
- (E) At 2325 the C-in-C of the Second Fleet (TN:  $\frac{P}{21}$ ) took into consideration the present situation, their and and the time of day and ordered our withdrawal to the north after carrying out an attack on enemy forces which had been contacted.
- 3. Results of the Battle:

2 BB's attacked and sunk; 1 BB considerably damaged; 2 CA's blown up and sunk.

1 DD blown up and sunk.

3 DD's attacked and sunk.

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(End of Extracts)

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ACCOUNT OF THE MORTHERN CAMPAIGN (May-August 1943)

#### I. CHRONOLOGICAL DIVISIONS

- ٦. ATTU Campaign. From 25 May to 1 June; campaign ("ke"4 ) against ATTU.
- 2. KISKA Campaign. From 2 June to 26 June: first part of campaign ("ke" ") against KISKA (by submarine). From 27 June to 18 July; first phase in second part of campaign ("ke" against KISKA (by destroyer forces). From 19 July to 1 August; second phase in second part of campaign ("ke" 5 ) against KISKA (by destroyer forces).

#### II. SITUATION AT ATTU BEFORE THE ENEMY ATTACK

On 8 May the enemy issued an official communique on ANCHITKA (monitored by the radio of the 51st Communications Unit (Cg) ). In view of this intelligence, therefore, we were certain that the American army and mavy had comple ted an air base and other installations there. On the 9th BIGEYATTO Island in the MALOELAP Group was bombarded at 1615, PAGAN Island (in the MARIANAS) at 1910, and HOROBETSU Village, 15 kilometres northeast of MUNORAN, at 2350. Were these bombardments meant to be made in concert with the TUNISIAN Campaign as propaganda for an aggressive American offensive in the PACIFIC? Or, they might have been judged as the heralding of a campaign in the NORTH Or, they might have been judged as the heralding of a campaign in the Norm or SOUTH (PACIFIC). Be that as it may, it should have been considered in connection with the recent prominence given to an enemy offensive in the PACIFIC, particularly in the ALEUTIANS; and our forces should have been very much on guard against an enemy counter-attack. Hence, at 2335 on the 10th, there was the following order from the (HQ). Combined Fleet (GF):-"(1) In view of communications intelligence (from 6th Communications Unit?) and the appearance of enemy submarines, there is suspicion of one campation by an energy thank forme.

- of an operation by an enemy task force.
- (2) Maintain a vigilant watch for an enemy occupation (force) and air attack."

At this time the airfield installations on ATTU were expected to be almost finished by the end of May. But the air-raid trenches, fuel storehouses, shell and powder magazines, and other projects had yet to be started, while their completion had been scheduled for the first of June. Furthermore, DesRon 1 (CL KISO, DD SHIRAKUMO, DD "AKABA) convoyed the KIMIKA"A Maru (XCVS bringing float planes for ATT". The ships left PARAMUSHIKO at 1200 on the lith. Meanwhile, the NACHI (CA) and the HATSUCHIMO (DD) had left YOKOSUKA at 0014 on the 11th, bound for PARLMUSHIHO. Both groups were at sea then, when the American attack was made. Each of the Submarines I-31, I-34, and I-35 was engaged in transporting material for KISKA.

#### III. SITUATION AT ATTU FOLLOVING THE ENEMY ATTACK

At 0449 on the 12th the 51st Communications Unit detected the call signal "BOU", making its first appearance on a frequency of 4385 K.C.; reception was extremly good. In the KISKA Area, enemy planes delivered a hour-long attack at about 0700. Enemy reconnaissance planes were also very active. From 0200 until 0900 attacking enemy planes invaded the mists of ATTU, soaring over the island ceaselessly, relentlessly, as they strafed and bombed it. At this time absurd leaflets urging surrender were dropped in the CHICHLAOF Harbor sector. At 1000 the observation crew at HOLTZ Point spotted enemy boats headed for WEST ARM Point. The Shipping Engineers were sent out immediately to investigate from the sea. From them it was confirme that the enemy was landing at WEST ARM Point and along the morthwest coast. The forces in this sector at once entered upon Condition One as they determi to prevent the enemy landing even a part of his forces. At 1030 another enemy landing was announced in MASSACRE Bay. The enemy strength here was about 2000 men; but it scemed as if there were many more in reserve. In th meantime, enemy ships bombarded our forces with a threatening fire. At the report of an attack by a large enemy force, the ATTU Dispatched Force immed. ately set about burning all its documents save those in Cipher B (OTSU).

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The strength of the attacking forces remained unknown because of the poor visibility at the time. However, judging from the noise of the guns, it was thought that there was a support force composed of several cruisers and smaller ships, and having seen the attacks delivered by carrier-based planes. the presence of carriers in the vicinity was suspected. By 1520 the following was known about the strength of the enemy force: There were 29 ships in HOLTZ Bay and at WEST ARM Point, 27 in MASSACHE Bay, and 6 in WEST ARM Bay. Furthermore, more troops were continuing to land, and poor visibility prevented our forces from determining their number. According to communications intelligence at the time, a strong enemy force was operating in the southern ALEUTTANS.

- IV. ORDERS OF THE 5TH FLEET AND STATE OF OUR FORCES FOLLOWING THE ENEMY ATTACK
  - (1) Submarines I-31, I-34, and I-35 will coase their transport activities, and proceed at once to ATTU to attack the enemy transports. (2) The USUGUMO (DD) will cease its work and hasten to PARAMUSHIRO to
  - supply our forces.
  - The commander of the escort force will attack enemy shipping in the (3)
  - (3) The Commander of the Oscolt force will attack energy shipping in the MASSACRE Bay Are, with planes from the KHIKAWA Maru.
    (4) The ASKA Maru (25 Å) will sail to ACMORI and pick up for transport to PARAMUSHINO some army reinforcements.
    (5) The AWATA Maru (2017) will stand ready at YOKOSUKA (to transport
  - naval reinforcements). The Commander-in-Chief of the 5th Fleet, commanding the MAYA (CA), Left

PARAMUSHIRO to join the escort force. At this time, the TAMA (CL) (at EATZURU) also stopped its work and was able to leave on the 20th; the ASAGUMO (DD) (at YOKOSUKA) was able to leave on the 21st. The ABUKUMA (CL) (at SASEBO), however, was able to set out on

the 16th.

Thus, the strength with which we could counterattack the enemy's assault was morely one heavy cruiser, one light cruiser, and three destroyers. Moreover, an air force was ordered to go to PAHAMUSHIRO; but was delayed because of unfavorable weather.

Summary of the Operations of the Combined Fleet:

- Α. Northern Forces
  - Submarines concentrated in the ATTU Area to destroy enemy shipping. 1.
  - 2. Land-based air forces carried out patrols and attacks.
  - Surface units awaited a favorable opportunity to destroy enemy 3. fleet units in the ATTU Area.
  - As it proceeded, our task force kept patrols on the enemy task force (by observation craft, fishing boats, submarines, and float 4. reconnaissance planes).
  - An army of reinforcements was being transported to ATTU. 5.
- Task Force. Β. Proceeded from YOKOSUKA on the 22nd. Went through the waters east of the KURILES during the last of the month. Its purpose was to crush enemy fleet units and task forces and to assist our Morthern forces. Combined Fleet. С.

Left TRUK on the 17th for YOKOSUKA.

V. EVENTS UNTIL THE FALL OF ATTU

> The composition of the enemy flect as seen from the land on the 13th was as follows:

In HOLTZ Bay - One CV (no bridge), one CHICAGO Class Cruiser, one OMAHA Class cruiser, three DD's.

In MASSACRE Bay - One BB, two cruisers, five DD's, ton transports. About 1318 our submarines attacked the energy fleet, causing the main body to withdraw eastward temporarily. About 1900 lights were lit on ships enchored in MASSACRE Bay, apparently for something important which had happened. A destroyer ran aground near shore.

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The enemy forces that had landed by 1300 on the 14th totalled not less than a division. Before long the enemy had put his carriers and battleships out to sea. However, the destroyers audaciously dropped anchor in the bay despite the attacks of our submarines, and observed us. (Thus, the enemy knew the weakness of our forces from previous reconnaissance.)

An enemy battleship was greatly damaged in an attack by our submarines on the 14th. In general, however, our ships were checked by the enemy destroy By the 24th they had only inflicted severe damage on a cruiser and some dam on two unidentified warships.

19 Medium bombers (CHUKO) made the first attack by our planes on the 14th. They returned because of unfavorable weather, however. Thereafter, on consecutive days, our planes were unable to attack due to unfavorable weather. Finally, on the 23rd, they attacked, destroying a cruiser and a destroyer, and setting fire to another ship. But on the following day, the enemy (flect) had generally withkrawn an hour before our attack force arrived. Hence, no results could be gained at sea, and our planes had to confine them

Hence, no results could be gained at sea, and our planes had to confine them selves to bombing land targets. At this time, the destroyer force which had at last completed the assembling of a force planned to evacuate our forces on ATTU Island, but though it put out from PAKAMUSHIKO on the 25th, its efforts were of no avail because of continuous bad weather. In the meantime the Guard Unit on ATTU Island, although out-numbered, valiantly withstood the fierce attacks of the enemy, even at times carrying out night attacks an other operations which were doomed from the start. They waged bitter battle but, in the end, having received no reinforcements and having exhausted ever last artifice (to the last man), they met their deaths calmly. Finally, on

VI. FIRST PART OF KISKA CAMPAIGN

KISKA, of course, was placed in a helpless position by the fall of ATTU. Therefore, it was decided to evacuate the island. We were entrusted with the task of evacuating the troops from the island by means of 10 submarines runni back and forth. Since there were over 7000 men to evacuate and submarines have very limited capacity, it was not known how long it would take to finis! the evacuation. In addition to this, the patrols around KISKA had finally become most strict and dam ge to our ship had increased. Finally, the I-7 was lost. No matter how enshrouded by the fog we would be, we would instant be bombarded, for the effeciency of the enemy's radar was far superior to wh we had expected.

#### VII. FIRST PHASE OF SECOND PART OF KISKA CAMPAIGN

To meet this situation, as a last resort we carried out "ke" (TN:4 ) plan of operations by which we emm<sup>3</sup>oyed a force of destroyer forces (SUIRAISUTAI). In order to do this we installed as quickly as possible, on the destroyers counter-radar equipment (TEKI-DENTAN NI TAISURU GYAKUTAN) and equipment to take aboard the landing barges to be used in the evacuation. On 6 July this work was, for the most part, completed. Because, however, there was uncertainty about the frequency of the enemy's radar there was some uncasiness about our counter-radar.

On 7 July at 1930 we set out from PARAMUSHIRO. Our force was composed of 2 cruisers and 10 destroyers. At that time the state of affairs, as seen by the Grand Fleet (TN: GF), was as follows:

"Regarding the situation, it may be said that the possibility of the enemy attacking us in the vicinity of KISKA is great."

But, on the other hand, it was folt that though the onemy had isolated KISKA he was hoping to starve out the garrison. Only patrols around the island were strictly maintained. It was folt that an aggressive offensive and Landing were not to be expected. According to intelligence reports up to the 7th, about the 26th a fleet of transports had departed from the west coast of NORTH AMERICA and about the 3rd had reached the DUTCH HARBOR Area. Still more, we had received intelligence reports that transports had arrived at ATTU frequently during June. Furthermore, there was information that a powerful force had set out from DUTCH HARBOR on 1 July and had arrived at AMCHITKA on the 4th. The enemy's northerm submarine force had been making preparations about the 30th, had assembled at DUTCH HARBOR.

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A squadron (TAI) of submarines, reinforcements for the submarine force, had reached DUTCH HARBOR from the American mainland about June 20th. Again there was intelligence that at the end of June, transports had arrived at ADAK and ATTU several times. On the 21st the air strength at AMCHITKA had been somewhat increased and the base for land planes at ATTU was nearing completion. Atmospheric conditions in the KISKA Area up to the time we set out were as follows:

On the 2nd and 3rd visibility was good, from 30 to 40 kilometres; on the 4th and 5th visibility was bad, from 2 to 3 kilometres. On the 6th it was about 30 kilometres.

In the meantime, a number of enemy planes -- B-17's, B-24's, B-25's, PBY's, and others, in formations, singly, or in pairs were carrying out day after day bombing and reconnaissance missions. Patrol about the island was main-

tained by a number of cruisers and destroyers. On the 7th, the destroyer force (SUIRAL BUTAL) set out as scheduled. After they had set out, a thick fog rolled up and discovery and destruction by enemy submarines was rendered improbable. Thereafter, until we returned to PARAMUSHIRO the percentage of fog was constantly about 85. On the 7th, visibility around KISKA was about 7 kilometres. Enemy planes, (each time a reconnaissance plane), approached at 0550, 0724, and 0835, and at 1140. 6 gruisers and 4 destroyers bearing from the NV approached to a point 15 miles south of GETRIVDE COVE and shelled it. At 1455 3 enemy ships were sighted about 30 kilometres from SHIROZAKI (TN: 345).

The above ships, judging from shell splinters, duds, and shell holes, were PENSACOLA dlass, 1 ship, HONOLULU class, 2 ships, a new class, 1 ship, and 4 Destroyers. On the 8th, there was a thick fog from the morning on ind during the day visibility was from 1 to 3 kilometres; in the evening about 6 kilometres. On this day no enemy planes came.

On the 9th, visibility to the SE was from 30 to 40 kilometres and from the afternoon on clouds covered the entire sky without a break. Though the clouds were 200 metres high and a thick fog hung upon the sea, visibility was from 8 to 10 kilometres. One enemy wership was sighted at 0833 forty kilometres, 220°, from SOUTH HEAD. At 1057 a ship was sighted at 340° off TAKAZAKI (TN: 5) ). From 2050 to 2230 GERTRUDE COVE was shelled by destroyers on patrol with guns of about 12cm.

On the 10th at 0205 we speeded along our course and though we proceeded along our way until 2030, the fog was thin enough to allow airplane flights and since this was to our disadvantage, we turned back. The weather forecast from the fieldquarters of the Desirch 1 was as follows:

"On the 12th there will be fog rolling up from the SE at 8 metres per second with occasional breaks. On the 13th there will be prevailingly east winds flowing from 8 to 12 metres per second and thick fog." "We prepared to make a dash for it on the 13th. Today (10th) there was fog around KISKA at the end of the day and visibility was from 1 to 2 kilometres. Enemy planes and also 2 single planes (TN: TANKI) came two or three times on reconnaissance flights.

11 July: About 0200 visibility was about 20 kilometres and though the sky was covered with clouds, the fog was light. Generally, visibility was from 8 to 10 kilometres. At 2006 CERTRUDE COVE and at 2217 LITTLE KISKA were bombarded. Moreover, according to intelligence reports, the Army Air Base on ATTU and the airfield for Army heavy bombers at AMCHITKA and AGATU were almost completed. Our observation boats (KANSHI-TEI) based at PARAMUSHINO had discovered that patrols by the enemy to the west were becoming stricter and they were certain that along with the near completion of the land-plane base on ATTU patrols by the enemy carried out by aircraft, naval vessels, and submarines would be even stricter.

12 July: At 0735 we sped along our course but the fog was light and at 1520 we turned back. We expect to dash forward on the 14th. Todey in the morning visibility around KISKA was from 6 to 8 kilometres, and though about noon it was 15 kilometres, the barometer fell. From 1300 on there was thick fog. Enemy planes, P-40's, B-25's, PBY's, all on reconnaissance missions came during the morning and about 1245 a small type naval vessel was sighted about 20 kilometres off TAKAZAKI at 330°.

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13 July: Having taken in consideration weather around KISKA, at 0240 we hastened along our course. Patrol planes could not take off because of bad hastened along our course. Patrol planes could not take off because of bad weather at AMCHITKA and ATTU. No enemy planes were seen around the island. Only a small type naval vessel was carrying out patrol. However, because the visibility in the morning was from 8 to 10 kilometres we broke off our course and at 1703 turned back. Though we made the dash again at 2145, wtu 'back at 0156 on the 14th. The following is the weather forecast given out by headquarters on the 13th:

- "1. Tomorrow the weather around KISKA will not differ much from today' There will be a light fog and it is expected that visibility will be fair.
- 2. The high atmospheric pressure which provails in these waters is slowly shifting to NE or ENE. Thus, should we proceed along our course, thore is a possibility that the present state of weather and visibility will provail as far as KISKA in the same general direction as the aforementioned high atmospheric pressure.
- 3. At the same time as this high atmospheric pressure progresses, the possibility of flights from ADAK is great.
- 4. We may conclude from the above that the possibility of success in our advance is extremely slight and that we shall have to turn back and wait. We may look forward to proceeding on our mission on the day after tomerrow."

(Insert)

According to the communications intelligence report of 13 July new call signals appeared on the 9th from the places we had presumed to be naval air bases: these were presumed to be at Illion the island neighboring. New call signals also appeared from the places we had presumed to be army air bases; we had figured two to be on ATTU and one in the neighboring islands. On the 11th, 6 army planes flow to ATTU. The total number of army and navy planes permanently based in the ALEUTIANS has grown rapidly since the 9th; 173 planes were in the ALEUTLINS by the 10th.

Enemy planes have been active on the 9th and 10th. Our patrels in the PARAMUSHIRO Area are vigilant.

And we have great numbers of powerful flect units operating in the CENTRAL PACIFIC.

According to the communications intelligence report of 15 July, a powerful enemy force has been under radio silence for several days. The number of enemy ships operating around KISKA is very large. According to the communications intelligence report of 16 July, one part of the enemy fleet is apparently operating in the ALEUTIAN Area. Liaison activities between AMCHITKA and KULUK Bay have been great. The enemy seems to be concentra-14 July: In the morning the weather charged for the worse. The velocity of the wind was 14 metres per second; atmospheric pressure was 757mm.

Visibility was about 6 kilometres. In the afternoon conditions improved and the wind velocity, was from 5 to 8 matres per second and visibility was 5 kilometres. Today 3 or 4 energy naval vessels were patrolling around the island. At 1500 we started but but there was a statement from headquarters:

"The weather in the vicinity of KISKA and along the course we shall follow has had a change for the botter. For the present, there is no prospect of meeting a favorable fog from the sea. We shall turn back now and return to PARAMUSHIRO where we shall plan a second operation."

15 July: At 0430 we turned back. Today visibility around KISKA was 10 kilometres and in the morning reconnaissance was carried out by a B-25, a P-38, and a PBY; and a formation of 7 B-24's and 5 B-25's bombed (KISKA). At 2202 enomy warships shelled GERTHUDE COVE.

16 July: Visibility - 10 to 15 kilometres. 17 July: There was thick fog in the morning and visibility was 1.5 kilometres. In the afternoon it was  $\theta$  kilometres at times Enemy planes were carrying out reconnaissance and navai vessels were maintaining patrols. 18 July: At 0830 we entrered the harbor at PARAMUSHIRO.

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VIII. SECOND PHASE OF SECOND PART OF KISKA CAMPAIGN

At 2000 on the 22nd we entered upon the second phase. On the 19th and 20th the visibility in the KISKA Area was 15 to 20 kilo-metres; on the 21st, it was 3 to 4 kilometres. To generalize the enemy's plans to the situation: There have been seven days out of 21 on which the enemy did not come over. Since the 9th enemy ships had bombarded KISKA five times. Our sorties recently have been an hour later than planned because of the thick fog. Moreover, it has been difficult to maintain our formation. In our first change (of position) the relative positions were totally In our lifst change (of position) the relative positions were could unknown. Communication by telephone is poor. On the 24,th, while it was clear and only slightly misty, we looked about and adjusted our formation. The TAMA, NIPPON Maru (XAO), and KUNIJIRI (CM) were not to be seen. (The Commander-in-Chief 5th Fleet, was aboard the TAMA.) At 0800 on the 24th, a patrol plane made a forced landing in Sector #10 on the ATTU patrol line, and dispatched a special urgent operational message. Indeed, there were 'several urgent messages to that effect. A dispatch from the 51st communications unit had arrived, saying that it was doubtful that the aviator had been located by the destroyer force. For 30 minutes after 0945 on the 23rd enemy ships bombarded from the northeast and south. And, as the skies were clear, formations of encmy planes strafed and bombed several times. The number of participating planes was over 96. The enemy employed delayed action bombs, incendiary bombs, and parachute bombs. The delayed action bombs were set at 30 minutes, one hour, 15 hours, 24 hours, etc. Non the 25th, it was clear, and formations of from three to nine P-40's raided KISKA seven times from AMCHITKA; all formations bombed only the landing field. The enemy bombers at AMCHITKA and KULUK Bay on ADAK, 51 all told stood ready, their operating wave-frequencies lengths adjusted. The activity of enemy patrol planes at both bases was great. About 1700 the KAZEGUMO (DD) detected an enemy submarine transmitting a message. In view of our poor radio interception control, it is doubtful whether the sub was located. About 1500 on the 26th we made contact with all the ships save the KUNIJIRI and the locations to which our formation had been adjusted again were visible. Suddenly, at 1750 the KUNIJIRI collided into the starboard side of the ABU-KUMA. Damage to both ships was slight, but because of the accident some confusion was produced in the rear units. The WAKABA, HATSUSHIMO, and NAGANAMI (DD) collided, the latter receiving only slight damage. However, the WAKABA and NAGANAMI were now handicapped for operational cruising. The "JAKABA returned to PARAMUSHIRO; the HATSUSHIMO entered the Naval Supply Unit. On the 27th we set our course south and tried to pick up the lost trail of an enemy submarine. We decided to make a dash for KISKA on the 28th. Conditions there had been (none too good) up to now. The visibility had been excellent on the 26th and hence a handicap to our operating units; for a total of 46 planes raided KUKA that day. On the 25th a similar formation of P-40's had attacked seven times. Enemy bombers were generally in readiness at every base, their operating wave-frequencies lengths adjusted. Patrol planes were active, and a vigilant watch was kept in the north. Several enemy ships were operating in the waters south and west of KISKA. At 1925 there was a night bombing. On the 27th, it was clear in the morning; visibility 20-30 kilometres, cloud ceiling at 3000 metres. But the fog appeared around 1800. On this day a total of 87 planes attacked. 8 B-24's bombed twice; afterwards, KISKA was subjected to reconnaissance for about three hours. At night single planes bombed three times; afterwards they dropped flares, which scemed strange and purposeless. The barometer fell gradually during the morning of the 28th; the mist thickened, and the visibility was only 8-10 kilometres. Perhaps because the weather changed for the worse enemy planes did not fly over KISKA after 0340. By afternoon the fog had taken in the whole sky; the visibility was 6-8 kilometres.

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On the 29th, too, a heavy fog hung over our route. We pressed forward to KISKA, plotting our course from its radio waves. We only awaited the grace and aid of our gods. At 1105, while it cleared, for a bit, we recognized the outline of the island. Then the inevitable fog again. We sailed around to the north of KISKA, but saw no sign of enemy ships. At 1316 the ABUKUMA sighted an enemy vessel and launched several torpedces, but it had mistaken LITTLE KISKA Island for the enemy. Again, at 1321, the SHDWAKAZE (DD) mistook the island for the enemy and

Again, at 1321, the SHIMAKAZE (DD) mistook the island for the enemy and opened fire with her guns. At 1325 we set our course to enter the harbor. Only within the bay, strangely enough, was the mist completely absent, and the visibility was extremely good. The clouds were at about 100 metres, and dense. We anchored at 1350. Immediately the landing barges which had been in readiness came alongside our ship and loaded the men aboard; in two trips, they had completed their work. The 500-odd men that came aboard did so in an orderly fashion and in fire spirits. By 1420 each of the ships in the 2nd Transport Unit (YUSOTAT) had completed its loading. We left then at once. The 1st Transport Unit left the harbor a 'little later. After that the mist gradually became thicker in the bay. Thereafter, the 2nd Transport Unit did not see anything whatsoever of the enemy. We left and went on ahea at a speed of 30 knots. The 1st Transport Unit, with the ABUKUMA, spotted a periscope, northeast of KISKA, but the submarine immediately disappeared beneath the waves and thereafter wasn't seen again.

At 0600 on the 31st the mist had completely cleared, and at 1530 we entered PARAMUSHIRO Harbor. It seemed that the heaven were celebrating our success (in returning safely). At 1000 on the 1st of August the 1st Transport Unit entered the harbor; they had not lost a man. The evacuation of the defense force at KISKA, over 5,000 men, had been a success. The enemy apparently had not discovered the evacuation of our troops at all. Thereafter, for day after day, they bombed and bombarded KISKA, and on August 15, the landing of emerican and Canadian troops on the island was announced.

Truly the height of the ridiculous.

# EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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	Lage dd
OFFICERS' REGISTER FOR TH	HE KAKO (16 November 1941)
Commanding Officer:	Capt. TAKAHASHI, Yūji (高橋雄次)
Executive Officer:	Cmdr. TAWARA, Yasuedao (侥安岐夫)
First Lieutenant (UNYOCHO) and 8th Division Officer:	Lt Cmdr AKUTAGAWA, Tadataro (芥河唯太郎)
Gunnery Officer:	Lt Cmdr NISHIMURA, Haruyoshi (西村春芳)
Navigating Officer and 7th Division Officer:	Lt Cmdr YAMAGUCHI, Tokio (山口時男)
Torpedo Officer and 5th Division Officer:	Lt. YONEI, Tsuneo (米井恒雄)
Communications Officer and 6th Division Officer:	Lt. KONDO, Nobuichi (近藤信一)
Aviation Officer and 9th Division Officer:	Lt. SAITO, Yasukuni (斉藤安邦)
2nd Division Officer and Officer of the Guard:	Lt. KAGA, Makoto (加賀誠)
lst Division Officer:	S.D. Lt.(jg) MATSUNAGA, Isuke (松永亥助)
3rd and 4th Division Officer:	Lt. (jg) OCHIAI, Otoichi (落合乙市)
Deputy Gunnery Officer (SHOHOCHO):	S.D. Lt.(jg) MIZUNO, Toru (水野享)
Junior Officer, 1st Division:	S.D. Ens. OMURA, Sotaro (大村惣太郎)
Assistant Navigating Officer (KOKAISHI) and Junior Officer 4th Division:	Ens. KIKUCHI, Giichi (菊北義一)
Junior Officer, 2nd Division:	S.D. Ens. DATE, Jiro (伊達二良))
Assistant Gunnery Officer and Junior Officer 3rd Division:	Ens. OMURA, Masao (大村正雄)
Assistant Communications Officer and Junior Officer, 6th Division:	Ens. ISHIKAWA, Takatoshi (石门琴壽)

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FACTS ABOUT THE KAKO (17 November 1941)

I. TYPE: Heavy (first-class) cruiser.

 Where built:
 At the KAWASAKI Dockyard in KOBE

 Keel laid:
 17 November 1922

 Launched:
 10 April 1925

 Completed:
 20 July 1926

 Modification completed:
 28 December 1937

II. PRINCIPAL MEASUREMENTS:

Α.	Overall length:	185.2 metres	
в.	Length between perpendiculars:	176.8 metres	
с.	Maximum beam:	16.9 metres	
Э.	Draft:	4.8 metres	
Ε.	Displacement:	7,100 tons	
F.	Tonnage displaced per cm. of draft:	23.3 tons	
G.	Moment required to change the trim 1 cm.	: 246 metric tons	
н.	Shaft horsepower:	103,300 H.P.	
I.	Speed:	33 knots	
J.	Fuel carried:	1,842 tons	
К.	Fresh water carried:	156 tons	
	Drinking and all-purpose water:	66 tons	
	Water, in drums:	90 tons	
. L.	Water evaporated in a day:	244 tons	

#### III. ARMAMENT:

Α. Guns: 6 20cm 50 cal. twin-mount guns, 3 year type, Model 2 4 12cm 40 cal. dual-purpose guns, 10 year type 1. 2. MG's: 4 13mm Hotchkiss MG's. 2 7.7mm Lewis MG's 3. 8 25mm twin-mount MG's, Type 96 179 Rifles, Type 38 43 pistols, Army type 4. 5. в. Torpedoes: 1. 2 mounts of Type 92 quadruple torpedo tubes each 2. 6 depth bombs 3. 1 set of paravanes Searchlights: C. 1. 3 110cm searchlights, Type 92 2 40cm searchlights, Type "SU" 2. D. Range Finders: 2 6-metre range finders, Type 14 2 式 type 6-metre range finders 2武 type 4.5-metrc range finders for dual purpose guns 2 孔 type 1.5-metre range finders 2 A type 3.5-metre range finders (for torpedo work) <u>Planes</u>: Float reconnaissance planes: 1 in use (1 in reserve) Ε. Wircless Equipment: F. a. Transmitters: 1 500-watt transmitter, Type 91 Mark 4 (Special) Modification 1 1 500-watt transmitter, Type 92 Mark 4 Modification 1 1 1000-watt short-wave transmitter, Type 95 Mark 3 1 500-watt transmitter, Type 95 Mark 4 1 350-watt transmitter, Type 95 Mark 5 Receivers: b. 3 receivers, Type 91, Model 1 3 short-wave receivers, Type 91 16 special receivers, Type 92 Modification 3

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c. Wireless telephones: d. Mireless telephones:
l ultra short-wave wireless telephone, Type 93
l ultra short-wave wireless telephone, Type 90, Modification 2
l ultra short-wave wireless telephone, Type 90, Modification 4
2 wireless telephone microphones, Mark 2, Modification 3
d. Signal strength indicators (SOKUH4LI) and Cathode-ray Tube Screens (KANSAKI) 1 Twoe 92 Electric "Jave Cathode-ray Tube Screen, Modification I 1 Type 92 Short Wave Cathode-ray Tube Screen, Modification I 1 Type 92 Short Wave Signal Strength Indicator, Modification I 2 Type 15 No. 2 Cathode-ray Tube Screen, Modification I Wireless: e. 1 Type TM Light Vireless, Modification I f. Radio Direction Finders:

1 Type 93 Mark I, Radio Direction Finder

# IV. ENGLIES:

- (1) Main engines "BURANKACHISU" Type Turkine 4 (screw propellers - 4
  - (cog-wheel speed reduction gear installed)
- (2)
- R.P.H. of screw-propellers (Maximum 360) Boilers: Fleet Type Mark "RO" crude-oil fired boilers exclusively 0 (3)(4)(5)(6)
- Auxiliary Engine and Electric Engines
- Lewis Type refrigeration machine \_ SEGAR (5-0-) double-effect (FUKKO) type carbonic acid gas type ice machine - 1
- Type "MU" (TN: A. ) 8 "att Type Air Compressing Pump--3
- (8) 4 6-pole, compound-wound generators with interpole A compound-wound. D.C. electric motors with megapole and interpole;

### V. BOATS:

<u>Type</u>	Weight	Length	Beam	Draft Men	Carried
Motor Boats (2)	4.4 Tons	11 Metres	2.7 Metres	.6 Metres	30
Launch (1)	3. "	9 "	2.5 "	"ó "	35
Cutters (4)	1.5 "	9 <b>"</b>	2.45 "	•4 "	45
Dinghy (1)	.6 "	6 "	1.5 "	"2 <sup>II</sup>	10

VI. LOCATION, TYPE, AND WEIGHT OF ANCHORS:

Bower anchors (2)	Stockless bow; both sides each 4.8 tons
Stream anchor (1)	With removable stock (?) stern; starboard 1.4 tons
Kedge anchor (1)	Navy-type stern; port .5 ton

#### VII. ANCHOR CABLES:

Bower anchor cables (2); 57mm. diameter; 15 shots on starboard side for 340.5 metres; 16 shots on port side for 351.4 metres; each cable shot is 22.7 metres Stream anchor cable (1): 35mm. diameter; 182.9 metres long; of steel wire Kedge anchor cable (1): 48 mm. diameter; 182.9 metres long; of Manila rope

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	HEADQUARTERS STAFF, 6TH FLEET (1 December 1941)
Rear-Admiral	GOTO, Zonchi (五京存乐); Commanding
Engineer Captain	ONUKI, Jisaku (大餐 治作); Fleet Engineering Officer
Commander	KISHIMA, Kikutoku (黃島孫)徳); Staff Olficer
Lt. Comdr.	MINAMI, Iwau ( 南 示沉, ); Staff Officer
Lt. Comdr.	SEKINO, Hideo (関野英夫); Staff Officer
Eng. Lt. Comdr.	ISHISAKA, Harukichi (石坂浩吉); Staff Officer 🚏
Warrant Officer	IZEAI, Iwao (泉岩加); Attached to Hdq. Staff

# OFFICERS OF THE AOBA

Captain	HISANUNE, Yonejiró (久宗 禾 次 郎 ) Captain
Commander	NAKAMURA, Kenji (中村議治) Executive Officer
Eng. Comdr.	MINT, Kiroku (孝 毅文 六 ) Engineering Officer
Lt. Comdr.	NISHIKORI, Yūji (西那雄次) Navigator
Lt. Comdr.	DOI, Yasumi (土井 泰三 ) Gunnery Officer
Lt. Comdr. (M.C.)	MIURA, Ontaró (三浦温太郎) Medical Officer
Lt. Comdr.	LIYAZAKI, Isamu (宮山东 亨 ) Torpedo Officer
Lieutenant (sg)	DYAMURA, Hashi (今村立端 ) Aviation Officer
Lieutenant (sg)	IDETA, Hirokuni (出田博國) 1st Lieutenant
Lieutenant (sg)	TAKUBO, Tatsuo (田久保龍雄 )2nd Division Officer
Lieutenant (sg)	HOSHINO, Seisaburð (星野清三郎 ) Communications Office
Eng. Lt.	SHIBATA, Yoshinori (柴田养貝)) 10th Division Officer
Lt. (sg) (SC)	MATSUNAGA, Seiryū (松永也隆) Supply Officer
Special Duty Lt. (	jg) KAJITA, Yoshisaburð (施田芳三郎) 1st Division Offic
	Lt. (jg) IKEBA, Tadamasa (池田虎王) 12th Division Offic.
Eng. Lt. (jg)	NAKAJIMA, Riichi (中島方) — ) Division Officer
Lt. (jg)	YOSHIMUTA, Coro (吉村五茚 ) Division Officer
Eng. Lt. (jg)	NACASE, Takeshi (長源武) Division Officer
Lt. (jg) (M.C.)	HOSOKI, Daisaburo (紀田木大三郎) Ship's Company
Lt. (jg)	NOMOBU, Sadasuke (野々部定活) Ship's Company
Special Duty Ens.	HASHICKA, Gihachi (橋間儀 / ) Ship's Company
Ens. (S.C.)	KITAYA, Yoshikichi (北谷田吉 ) Ship's Company
S.D. Ens.	YAMABAYASHI, Tokuji (山林得次 ) Ship's Company
Eng. Ens.	HANAYA, Haruo (浸存春雄) Ship's Company

# EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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Ens.	MAEGAWA, Shinichi (前 m) 信一 ) Ship's Company
Res. Eng. Ens.	OSHIMA, Magane (.)、高真全 ) Ship's Company
Ens.	SATO, Tadashi (佐藤正) Ship's Company
Ens.	ODERA, Shunsaburo (大手俊三民) Ship's Company
Eng. Ens.	KOIZUMI, Yasutaro (小泉保太郎 ) Ship's Company
Ens. (S.C.)	WADA, Isamu (不回旁) Ship's Company

#### FACTS ABOUT THE AOBA

I. TYPE: Heavy (first-class) cruiser

Where built:	MITSUBISHI Dockyard at NAGASAKI
Keel laid:	4 February 1924
Launched:	25 September 1926
Completed:	20 September 1927
Nodifications finished:	30 October 1940

## II. PRINCIPAL MEASUREMENTS:

Α.	Overall length:		181.36	metres	
	Maximum beam:			metres	
	Length between perpendiculars:			metres	
D.	Draft: •			metres	
	Displacement:		11,660.		sic)
	Tonnage displaced per cm. of draft:	1			sic)(TN:tons?)
	Moment required to change trim 1 cm:				sic) (TN;tons?)
	Shaft horsepower:		103,000.		
I.	Speed:		33.	knots	
J.	Fuel oil carried:		20,400.		
К.	Fresh water carried:				
	Drinking water: 31.04	tons			
	All-purpose water: 43.23	tons			
	Water in drums: 127.	tons			
	Water evaporated in a day:200.	tons			

III. ARMAMENT, ETC. (same as the KAKO)

#### FACTS ABOUT GOING ASHORE AT HOI (RUOTTO) (12-15-41)

Flag Signal for the AOBA.

- 1. While anchored at ROI and up until the 29th, all hands are permitted to go ashore and stroll about for three hours.
- Extent of our liberty ashore; islands in the vicinity, swimming in the surf, and the wanton picking of fruit are prohibited.
- For alarms, the AOBA will shoot two flares off in succession, in addition to its use of the regulation signals.
  - Liberty ashore every day from 0600 to 0900, and from 1100 to 1400.
     Complement -- about 120.
    - (3) Small boats in use: 1 lighter holding 90-100 men

1 cutter holding 25-30 men


(4) Place -- EDGIGEN Island (uninhabited island)

Warnings when going ashore.

- This island is a breeding place for dengue fever, and the mosquitoes are extremely numerous here. When stripping or when you step into a thicket you must not be bitten by any mosquitoes.
- thicket you must not be bitten by any mosquitoes.You must not be naked at any time while ashore. Further, swimming is strictly prohibited.
- The wanton picking of fruit is forbidden. Nor is it permissible to bring aboard ship fruit that is unnecessary.
- 4. You must be assembled on the beach 20 minutes before it is time to return to the ship.

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5. Concerning Alarms: All hands will always be mindful of their ship, and must be able to assemble together when the alarm is sounded. Therefore, at an alarm two flares will be fired in succession three times or more times from our ship. You must take care so that in this eventuality the conduct of our defense is not imperiled.

,12

THE REEFS AT TRUK HARBOR (as observed from a 'notorboat) (TN: To accompany #11)

I. Time and Place 12 December 1941, 1430 (one hour before sunset). Off the south shore of DUBLOW Island in the TRUK Island Group.

II. Weather; Sea Conditions. Clear weather. South wind, velocity of approximately 6 meters (TN: per second).

III. Summary of Activities.

We were unable to transport the official messenger to the Government Branch Office jetty, and the 15 Supply Department workers to the Munitions Section jetty at MEBERAI, but had accompany us the nine midshipmen on a hydrographic survey. "E were familiar with the Government Branch Office jetty from our morning's experience. We were not familiar at all, however, with the location of the Munitions Gection jetty. Even the charts we brought with us were not detailed. At the Branch Office jetty we asked people (for details, but without result), and although uneasy, we set out. We proceeded along, seeing marker posts A & B on our right. Then we passed two or three moored large flying boats. From point B we proceeded directly towards an object resembling a jetty. Because of our lack of self-confidence through this channel and of our uneasiness over the depths, we went along at slow speed. When we reached Point C, a rasping sound suddenly rent the air and our boat was jolted. The engine, of course, stopped at once. The boat, too, stopped, its bottom grating on the reef for a while. We felt that the boat was baroly being supported near its center. This was 300 meters from the shore (to the right). The wind direction was on the starboard beam. The sun's angle of elevation was 15°.


IV. Measures Taken.

As stated above in describing the position of the bottom of the bost, it was aground on the reaf at the center of the boat and to the left, the water was rather deep and the bow of the boat was slowly being rocked to the right by the wind.

Accordingly, I ordered the passengers to draw back onto the stern as far as possible and had four men rock the starboard bow to the right, and, at the same time, the motor was placed in reverse. When they had rocked the boat two or three times, we easily drew away from the rocf. After that, we continued in reverse and when we went some distance from the reef, we inspected the engine and gunwale and saw that no damage had been sustained. At that time we received a message by semaphore from the shore which said: "Do not go there".

I immediately asked for the channel used by boats navigating in that area. When we were stranded on the reef and I thought about the impact I believed for sure that we must have sustained some damage. However, when I was told that there was no damage, in answer to my inquiry, we proceeded ahead.

- V. Causes and Lessons.
  - First of all, the foremost cause of this incident is the fact that we sat out without knowing clearly our mission and without knowing where we were going.
  - 2. The charts which we had taken along werenot clear at all and should not have been used.
  - 3. It will not suffice to guess at the depth of the water by advancing in the direction of the sun and, moreover, one must not fail to keep a sharp lookout at all moments and to pay attention to the large flying boats moored in the vicinity.
  - 4. We did not take soundings.



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VI. Measures Taken After Our Return to the Ship. I reported to the Executive Officer and to the Officer of the Day. As it was sunset I had the launch hoisted aboard. Thus, I was present when the launch was hoisted aboard and when the bottom of the bott was inspected, , aside from the fact that the keel plates had separated more or less, the boat was the same as ever. When the coxswain and I inspected the boat two or three times, we could discover no danage. Accordingly, I made as report to that effect to the Executive Officer, the Officer of the Day, and to the Officer-in-Charge of the Division and thereby committed a grave error. By this I mean that when we inspected the boat the following morning there was a concavity of about 100 square contineters in area on the starboard keel in the center and the bottom of the boat was full of water. The damage, however, had already been repaired with copper plates by the boat's crew. I immediately notified the Executive Officer, the Officer of the Day, and the Division Officer.

#### VII. Observations.

- When in command of a boat, take full responsibility for matters affect-1. ing the boat, and do not listen to the opinions of others with regard to measures to be taken when stranded on a reef. I should have relied upon my own opinions.
- Lookouts should have been most strictly posted. 2.
- "Then I did not know how deep the water was. I should have proceeded 3. at a reduced speed. The examination of the damaged place should have been done more
- 1. thoroughly.
  - "To caution add care".
- I should have been quick to get in touch with this ship. 5.

(End of narrative)

#### **#1**0

FACTS ABOUT TRUK (12-13-41)

Waters Suitable for Anchorage. Α.

On the west side of MOEN Island (and in the waters between the north side and RUAC).

In the vicinity of TRUK Harbor (i.e., in the waters south of UMAN Island and extending to OTTA Island and FANAN Island).

Shelter from "Vind and Waves. R.

Depending on the selection of an anchorage, shelter can be afforded, no matter which direction the wind may come from. с. Passes.

- Northeast Pass.
  - In the center of the pass are reefs 7.1 meters under water. 1. They are floating, crimson, circular markers here.
  - 2. When there is a strong northeasterly wind, there are great
    - swells at the entrance to the pass. Tidal current is 2 knots.
  - 3.

North Pass.

- 1. Fair sailing with northeast winds.
- 2. The coconut grove to the northeast makes a good landmark.
- Channel is sinuous. 3.

South Pass.

- 1. Navigable by large ships.
- 2. There is rather deep water at the end of the reefs on both sides of the pass. You cannot, however, distinguish the change in the color of the water.
- Maintaining your distance abeam of FALEU Island, it is easy to 3. pass through the narrows.

EVERETT (EBARITTE) Pass. 1. Free of obstacles. Navigable by large ships.


D., Supply.

Coal may be had at the naval coaling station on the south shore of DUBLON Island.

Fuel oil (JUYU) may also be had here.

Fresh water is to be had in containers of 260 and 160 tons (one each). Daily water allowance is 200 tons. Fresh provisions include egg-plants, small melons, sweet potatoes, taro, all kinds of fish, beef, and pork.

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VARIOUS INFORMATION CONCERNING SAILING AND ANCHORAGES IN THE MANDATES

#### INFORMATION FOR NAVIGATION т

- The use of charts showing swept and sounded areas (SOLAI-SOLURYO-KAIZU). 1. These island groups are mainly composed of coral atolls. Since the bottom of the sea is very undulating, sweeping and sounding must be carried out even when comparatively detailed sounding charts are available in order to avoid uncharted sunken reefs.
- The carrying out of soundings. 2. When in the open sea and among several atolls, even though you may be carrying out to the best of your shilty, sounding of the deep waters and soundings for hidden reefs, when you have not navigated throughout the entire\_area, it is necessary to continue sounding navigation (SOLUSFILKOKO) most strictly. Post strict look-outs.
- 3.

A good part of the sea in these parts has not yet been sounded and in order to learn about changes in depths, it is necessary to post strict lookouts when navigating around these island groups.

(Note) Though recognition of shallow reefs depends, in the main, upon changes in the color of the water, great care is necessary since conditions of light, climate, and the nature of the sea bottom vary.

		Depth of Water
1.	Dark purple-indigo	70 metres & more
2.	Purple-indigo	
3.	Purplish blue	About 30 metres
4.	Blue	About 20 metres
5.	Pale blue	
6.	Bluish green	
7.	Bluish yellow	
	Brownish green	

The southern part of these island groups is the region of countorial 4. counter currents, generally from the east. However, around both the RALIK and RATAK chains the northern equatorial current (from the vest) and the equatorial counter current (from the east)run longitudinally south and north. Hence, the tidal currents and the winds interact with an extreme complexity, and particular caution must be taken in navigation.

### II. CAUTIONS WHEN ENTERING AND LEAVING THE PASSES TO LAGOONS

- "hen there are large waves on the sea outside the lagoon, and when ٦. waves at the entrance to the pass will be remarkably high. But you must allow for a sufficient margin in your estimate of depths.
- In general, the tidal currents running through the passes are strong. You may make it a general rule to head inward at flood tide and outward 2 at abb tide, but you should also maintain a cereful watch in steering your ship, as the tides may be irregular, depending on the topography
- of the ocean floor. When you are about to enter or leave a long and narrow pass, you must 3. keep a sharp eve on the weather lest a squall, proceeding inward, engulf you. Furthermore, in the event you are beset by a squall, you must have a plan of action ready beforehand.
- As the markers are, on the whole, inconspicuous, it is necessary that 4. you do take soundings as you enter the pass, so that you may ascertain the positions of the marker and your ship with room to spare.
- If you should use small scale charts, you must bear in mind that the notations on sweeping and depths have been omitted. 5.

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#### TIT. CAUTIONS IN DECIDING UPON AN ANCHORAGE

- Throughout the year northeasterly to easterly winds prevail; the 1. former are generally strong. Aside from the period July to October, when the winds are calmest, you should be careful in the selection of your anchorage.
- Within an atoll there are several reef spots (TENSHO). Hence, in 2. determining upon an anchorage, you should seek a place with an even depth and conspicuous markers nearby. You should also drop your
- anchor to determine the depth. In selecting an anchorage for fueling, especial consideration must 3. be paid to wind, waves, and tides.

About 1315 on 21 January 1942, a large enemy flying boat was sighted closing About 1919 of 21 bandely 1920, the bandely we notified the task force by radio. Three Zero fighters left the task force in our direction, but they turned around at our instruction and headed for the enemy plane. "Ithin as few minutes a trail of smoke was seen in the direction they had flown. Then we Within a saw the three fighters circling at low altitude. It was certain now that the enemy plane had been shot down. He changed our course at once and proceeded in the direction of the fight. Shortly we saw the fighters flying toward us. waved our caps in greeting, whereupon they returned our salute by dipping their wings. "Then we reached the vicinity of the place where we supposed the plane to have been shot down, sure enough, there was a large oil slick on the sea. We also sighted five of the plane's crew drifting about; we took them aboard as of the five we rescued, two were officers and the others rated men.

#### THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR

#### (23 January 1942)

#### From Lt. HOSHINO

#### LAT'S ON THE SUBJECT τ.

- Regulations for the Treatment of Naval Prisoners of War Laws for Aerial Warfare (Clauses #36 to #38) Α.
- в.
- C. Laws for Land Warfare
- Applicable Precedents .D.
- "HO SHALL BE A PRISONER OF "AR TT.
  - Combatants, non-combatants (personnel in the Medical Corps are not Α. considered PO""s)
  - Those in active service at the front (personnel with the Signal Corps Β. in the field, etc.) Rulers (SHUKENSHA) and similar persons.
  - с.
  - Responsible government officials, diplomatic envoys, etc. D.
  - Civilians employed by the military (GUNZOKU). Ε.
  - Natives who shall have defended themselves against their captors. F.
  - The sick and wounded in the military service. G.
  - Crews of captured ships and aircraft. Н.

R

С.

# TIL. TREATHENT OF PRISOMERS OF WAR

A. A General Approach

A General Approach It is of course essential that prisoners of war not be mistreated. The idea that aside from necessary restrictions, they should be treated as military men who have been taken prisoner, is widely accepted. Even though they are enemy officers and men, if it is considered that they were all doing necessary service, and that they were sacrificing their lives for their country, one must feel respect and sympathy for them.

Such springs from a common essence found in our so-called "BUSHIDO" (TN: "The "Jay of the "Tarrior"). However the handling of prisoners of war during the first "orld "Tar was quite harsh and there were many cases of it not being effected in accordance with previously existing rules. Our "BUCHIDO" has as its basis the orinciple "respect for honor",

Our "BUCHIDO" has as its basis the orinciple "respect for honor", and the belief that giving a prisoner the opportunity to kill himself is noble treatment.

Respect for the enemy on the field of battle rises above the spirit of combat in response to the enemy's bravery. It is baced on the belief that the warrior who views the battlefield as an exercise ground is pleased to have taken an enemy, regarding him as an opponent of exercise ground practice. In order to utilize this general conception concerning prisoners, it is basic that one's attitude should not embrace any individual admiration for the prisoner. It is thought that the differences in Western and Occidental schools of thought regarding "I have done my duty" (TN: In English in original) gives rise to dissimilarities in the concept of prisoners of war. Prisoners of war should be committed to the cuthority of the Cov-

Prisoners of war should be committed to the authority of the Government of the country which has taken them prisoner and they should be treated humanely. The prisoner may keep anything belonging to him other than implements of war, horses, or military documents. Therefore, the prisoner of war must be given suitable treatment by us. (It is necessary to act according to the various articles and provisions in question.)

Almost all confiscated documents and articles will be returned to these persons in view of the fact that they are personal articles. Excerpts from Measures for Treatment of Nevel Prisoners of War

- Then you have captured a person who shall be a prisoner of war, immediately inspect the articles he carries with him.
  - Confiscate weapons, ammunition, and other military articles (catalogue the articles). If he has any other possessions (it is necessary to catalogue the articles) they should be carried by this person if convenient.
  - Only when it is necessary to recognize the dignity of an officer prismer, can the naval officer-in-charge wear his sword. (The circumstances and the officer's names are to be reported to the Minister of the Navy).
     A daily account, a list of names, and a catalogue of belongings
  - A deily account, a list of names, and a catalogue of bolongings should be made concerning the prisoner, including the POT's ago, social position, rank, residence, Naval District to which attached (SHOZOKU KANSENCHO
  - 4. Officer prisoners and non-combatent officer prisoners should be distinguished from petty officers and man and they should be treated in accordance with their social position and rank. Make exceptions for infringements of the law or insincerity in answering questions of name and rank.
  - 5. "Then POT's are disobedient or have plans to escape, etc., the necessary measures for imprisonment or punishment con be carried out. There will be no objection to the use of armed force.
  - 6. In connection with a POT's attempts to escape or misdemeanors apply the Naval Disciplinary Regulations. The disciplinary cuthority is a senior naval guard officer (GUNEI) who actually takes in the prisoners.

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- 7. The Naval officer in charge shall surrender the POW accompanied by his various documents and articles to the following:
  - (a) He shall surrender him to the Guard District of the Naval Base.
  - (b) In unavoidable circumstances he may surrender him to another Cuard Officer(TN: GUNEI)
  - (c) When he finds it advantageous he may confer with the Army or the Line of Communication (TN: HEITAN) Transportation and Communications Officer and he can surrender the prisoners of war to them. (In such instances, the officers, non-combatant officers (SOTOKAN #9.5 ), and men shall be segreeated and their number reported ouickly to the Minister.)
- When the PO<sup>TI</sup>s are picked up, a custodian will be appointed who shall look after the prisoners under the supervision of a naval officer.
- Telegrams and letters will be censored by the supervising officer. Only the hardless ones will be let through. The franking privilege shall apply. (You must consult the PO"'s last P.O. first, however.)
- 10. A POW may be permitted to purchase daily necessities or other articles he may like with his own money, only when the supervising officer sees no reason why he should not.
- When a POW dies, a funeral service befitting his station and rank in life shall be held.
- 12. The Last Will and Testament of a POW shall be handled as if it were from a member of the Imperial Japanese Navy.
- D. Extracts from the General Bules for the Treatment of POW's (as established in the Laws for Land Warfare).
  - POT's are obligated not to leave a certain area and may be detained in a fixed place. POT's may be imprisoned as long as it is necessary, as a measure to preserve the peace of the community, which must come first.
  - 2. The capturing nation ...ay utilize the FOW's as laborers, according to their rank and ability.
    - Officers may not be employed.

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- The PO"'s duties shall not be excessive.
- The labor shall have no relation whatsoever with the military strategy and actions of the capturing nation. (This is very inexplicit, so that in such matters the capturing nation enjoys a freedom of interpretation and may exercise its discretion.) If worked, the POT must be granted a remuneration comensurate with that given Army personnel of his rank in the capturing nation. They say that in this present war GENMANY grants its POT laborers a remuneration 60% of what they are entitled.
- 3. The government of the capturing nation is obligated to feed and clothe every PO". . "Incent there is no special acreament between two warring nations, the capturing state shall treat matters of food, bedding, and clothing on an equal footing with its own troops.
- 4. The POW shall submit to the rules in force. If he does not, the supervising officer may take stringent measures. If a POW shall escape and be cau ht again before he has reached his objective, he shall be punished. However, if he shall have reached his objective, but become a prisoner again at a later date, he shall not be punished in the least for the former escape.
- 5. The capturing nation may permit a PON to take a prescribed oath and set him free; but it may not force the PON to take this oath. Moreover, the government of the capturing nation need not accede to the request of a PON to take the oath and be set free.
- 6. At the commoncement of hostilities between belligerents, a neutral country shall establish a Prisoner of War Information Bureau, to be in operation the moment the first enemy nationals are rounded up on alien soil.
- 7. POW mail shall be exampted from the local postage regulations; presents and relief society boxes addrossed to POW's shall be free of import duties and railroad freight charges.

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- Officer POW's shall receive the same pay that is granted officers of identical rank in the detaining country. This pay shall then be redeemed by the POW's government.
- 9. With the single stipulation that he shall abide by the rules governing order and discipline, as prescribed by the Army authorities, the POW is granted religious freedom.
- 10. After peace is restored, the POW shall be returned to his country as rapidly as possible.
- IV. MY O'N VIE'S (CONCERNING THE INTERROGATION OF POW'S)

Throughout the above stipulations, the freedom to interrogate PO.M's to further the operations of the capturing mation has not been granted. However, I believe that when there are POM's, as between any warring states, it should properly be the conventional thing to interrogate thus for information on their fighting forces. Therefore, I conclude that there is no need to adhere to the rules of international law and to besitate in conducting interrogations. However, if the POW's feelings are not given consideration, results either cannot be gained from the interrogation or will be meagre indeed.

- That is to say:
- A. Insofar as possible, POU's should be picked up separately.
- B. Conversation and communication between POW's should be restricted.
- C. To help clicit testimony from POW's material recognized to be of value (documents, messares, etc.) should be gathered and arranged to the best of one's ability. The principal function of interrogation then, should be the further interpretation of this material.
- D. In interrogating, coercion should be the principle. Since in cases when the PON's native language differs from one's own, it is difficult to take advantage of any slip of his tongue, to practice detailed examination or to use indirect questioning (especially at times when one lacks confidence in one's vocabulary), it is easier (TN: for the interrogator) to adopt the formalities of a consultation.

The feeling that the victor is superior, the loser inferior should pervade the interrogation. If necessary, you should derived that questions and answers be made in writing.

E. Until the object of the interrogation has been attained, the PO" should be made to feel anxious about his fate, should become haggard physically. Consideration should be given to the PO"'s quarters, sustemance, surveillance, etc.

#### INTERNATIONAL LAW IN MARTIME

#### From Lt. HOSHINO

I. The UNITED STATES declared MANILA an open city (TN: "undefended town" written in English). In answer, our importal forces continued to bomb it. Finally, on 3 January they entered the city. Now shall our action be explained in the light of international law?

We had to consider MANILA a defended city (TN: this term rendered in English), and hence our attacks were lawful.

(Reference Material:)

A. The meaning of an "open city".

The question of what military installations and troops constitute a city's defense is one to detailed on fact; (in practice, the question is whether or not the city is defended). However, there is no explicit authority on the subject.

no explicit authority on the subject. In general, the following cities are recognized as "defended cities":

1. A city surrounded by fortifications.

- 2. A city in whose visinity gun batteries and other positions have been erected.
- 3. A city in which troops are located and attempt to prevent the entrance of the energy. (If there be a small number of troops, but recognized to have no "ability to resist", the city shall not be treated as a "defended city".)

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- A city where the waters at the entrance to the harbor have 1. been laid with (sutomatic) contact mines.
- What shall be selected as attack objectives?
- There is some difference of opinion because of the divergence of operational methods employed in naval, land, and air warfare. Targets in a "defended city": ٦.
  - There is no necessit" to limit the objectives in this instance to fortifications and other defensive instal ations for troops.
  - In air warfare (bombing) the objectives shall be the same as those listed, in the next section.
  - Targets in an "open city": 2
    - Naval vessels (all ships used b the military services) Troops (i) there are many troops located in the city, it а. h
      - shall be considered a defended city).
      - Constructions with military possibilities: с.
        - Airfields (those which are privately owned but may be given over to military use in the future must be (1)included).
        - (2) Foris, trenches, obstructions.
      - d. Military, neval, (and airforce) installations (barracks, hangars, arsenals, etc.).
      - e.
      - Storage points for arms and other materiel. Factories and other installations that may be put to f. military use. (Privately owned plants which will be definitely turned over to the military are included. However, accessory and sub-contract factories are exceptions.)
        - Railroads, wireless stations, harbor installations. In land warfare, armies must conduct their operations by entering cities which render their attack and bombardmer impossible. In naval and air warfare, however, there an no obstacles to an attack.
  - An "open city" not responding to levies on its populace (Ther 3. are regulations to meet this situation in neval warfare only However, the same rules should apply in land warfare. In ai warfare, the application of such rules would be imposcible.) а.
    - Should a naval force order a city to supply it with the necessary provisions and stores for its immediate needs in a formal depand and the city resist: (For details ( the execution of a levy, consult levying orders and the "Regulations for Levying".)

A lovy should correspond to the resources of the place u on which it is made, and must have the approval of the commander of the naval force.

Unrestricted leving by a SNLF., etc., and leving done by each ship is wrong. Should the city officials fail to submit to our orders

- b. It is permissible to assess all people in the city form of tax, but an "open city" cannot be bombarded
- breause this levy has not been collected. When cities, towns, and villages may be bombed in air warfare 4. as objectives (this included "open cities").
  - a. If a large force is in an area immediate to the operatio of the opposing land force (including a SNLF) and is con
  - Centrating at the city, town, or village in question. (Civilians way be in danger, but that cannot be avoided. However, in such instances all possible steps shall be b. taken to reduce the danger to them.)
  - (Bombing which has as its object the intimidation of с. civilians, the injury of non-combatants, and the des-truction of non-military things is illegal.)

However, there is no objection to destroying individual targe even if the city as a whole may not be made an objective.

# EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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- Targets which may not be attacked (common to land, naval, and air warfare).
  - 1. Religious buildings
  - 2. Buildings used in the learning of arts and crafts
  - 3. Buildings used by charity orgainizations
  - 4. Historical monuments
  - Mospitals, collection stations for the sick and wounded, and hospital ships.

But if it had been assumed that these things would not be put to military use, and the enemy violated this assumption, there could not be the slightest objection to an attack. However in such an instance, the existence or non-existence of the breach must be made clear and attacks kept to the minimum necessitated.

D. Is an attack without warning lawful? (a step tiken at the outset of an attack).

In general, the city officials should be notified beforehand, regardless of whether the city is defended or not.

The method of notification is left to the discretion of the attacker. The scattering of leaflets advising evacuation is one way. Especially should an attack on objects within an "open city" be announced, giving its residents a considerable period of grace. (The length of this period will depend on circumstances.)

If the situation is urgent, it is not necessary to warm the city. It will suffice if as much a nsideration as possible is given to the reduction of inconvenience to the city's inhabitants.

When an assault, surprise attack, etc., is an unavoidable military necessity, an attack without warning is not unlawful. And in air attacks, too, it is not necessary to warn the city beforehand, be it defended or not.

However, an attack provoked by resistance to a lavy must be receded without fail by notification.

- preceded without fail by notification.
  E. Is it necessary that non-combatants be allowed to such refuge outside the attack sectors when the city is being surrounded? This may be readily refused, for favors based on pity need not be carried to excess.
- II. There is evidence that the PHILIPPINE Covernment employees withdrew from MANILA on a hospital ship. "As there anything to prevent us from subjecting this ship to a visit and search and calling it?

As necessary, it is possible to take charge of a ship, conduct a visit and search, and then set it on an isolated course or detain it.

However, a hospital ship may not be molested as long as it does not commit an act against the enemy.

(Reference Material:)

A. Definition of a hospital ship

- A public vessel, private vessel, or ship of neutral registry which is employed with the single purpose of succouring the sick, wounded, and ship-wrecked.
- 2. Types and markings:

A flag bearing a red cross on a white field flown with the national flag is accepted identification.

a. Naval hospital ships

In each case, the statos in conflict with the said belligerent must be notified of the use of these ships in advance.

- Painted white with a lateral green stripe of about one metre in width. Built and outfitted in the country using it. b. Privately owned hospital ships
- Painted white with a lateral red stripe of about one metre in width. Equipped by a private individual or corporation, and operated under orders from the belligerent state.
  C. Hospital ships of neutral registry

Painted white with a lateral red stripe of about one metre in width. Equipped by a private individual or corporation in the neutral stite, and must have the previous sanction of the government of registry and belligerent state.

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4.

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- Β. The Rights and Obligations of a Hospital Ship: No matter what nationality a ship may be, it may rescue from the 1.
  - sea the sick and wounded of belligerent powers. 2.
    - Hospital ships may not be usef for military purposes.
    - Hospital ships may not interfere with the transport of combat-3. ant troops.
      - Accordingly, the warships of belligerent powers may direct a hospital ship on an isolated course. If necessary, the warships can exercise the right of scarch and detention. Hospital ships operate at their own risk:
      - If the symbol of the hospital ship is not recognized and it is attacked, the responsibility lies wholly with the hospital ship.
- In cases where a hospital ship engages in forbidden activities by С. taking advantage of its special rights as a hospital ship, such as engaging in the transportation of personnel other than the sick, wounded, and survivors of ship-wreck or when it makes available information or engages in any other such military function, it forfeits its special rights and may be considered subject to the treatment afforded ordinary ships. (According to British opinion, it is not permissible for a hospital ship to return to the functions of a merchantman). When we consider, however, these rights which international law per-mits for the special hendling of cases even in sick bays abourd warships we note that the hospital ship goes beyond its allotted powers when it takes aboard (from a warship) sick and wounded. Although it is permissible to open fire immediately upon it, except in absolutely
- unavoidable cases, it is "llowed to got away. III. How would you, if you were Commander of the MANE Island Occupation Force, have dealt with the bearer of a white flag?

Though the situation is handled according to the decisions of the Commander of the Occupation Force and according to the principles estab-lished for land warfare, those articles which treat of the situation in international law are given below:

- Α.
- What is meant by the bearsr of a flag (TN: in Inglish): 1. He is acting under the orders of one of the belligerent parties (which indicates that he is represent ng one of the belligerent parties).

His Duty: To negotiate on behalf of one of the belligerent partie

- His Identification: He bears a white flag. The bearer of the flag and the interpreter, drummer, and bugler 2. who accompany him possess certain inviolable rights.
- в. Treatment of the Flag Bearer:
  - The question of whether or not to acknowledge the flag bearer who 1. has been sent out is left to the discretion of the Force Commander and he is not always obliged to receive him.

(However, in the above case, a declaration that the flag bearcr will not be received is customary.)

- If the flag bearer takes advantage of his position to determine 2. the state of affairs on our side, the Force Commander in order to prevent this may use what ever means he follow dressary,
- If the enemy has abused the privilege of sender a flag bearer, 3. he can be detained for a while.
- Circumstances in Which the Flag Bearer Loses his Inviolable Hights: с.
  - When he incites treachery or when he takes any inspecte highest special right to further his own intervets. When he does either of the above acts, he special right forfoits his special rights (There should be no currenters in about treating 1. him as the encay).
  - 2. The flag bearer who has been donied reception scall inmediately withdraw but because of this, he doesn't lose his op will rights. That is to say, because reception has been denied it is not permissible to perform immediately a hostile and prainer the flag bearer.

# EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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SPECIFICATIONS OF THE NO. 10 TYPE MTB

# 1. HULL:

Length Overall	32.400 metres
Length at Waterline (official)	31.770 metres
Beam	5.000 metres
Depth	2.800 metres
Displacement (official)	84.600 tons
" (fully loaded)	89.381 tons
" (light condition)	68.277 tons
Draft' forward	1.104 metres
Draft aft	1.116 metres
Mean draft	1.111 metres
Fuel capacity	17.000 liters
Cruising Range (official)	Speed of 23 Knots for 410 Miles
" (under special conditions)	Speed of 16 Knots for 1200 Miles
Maximum Speed	30 Knots

# 2. ARMAMENT:

Type 96 25mm dual-mount machine guns, Model 1, Modification 1	1	
Provisionally termed 40 kilogram smoke laying gear (TN: HATSUEN-KY) 教授定置)	4	
Type 99 7.7mm rifles	5	
Pistols	5	
Type 97 Gas Masks	18	
Steel Helmets	15	
" (rifle) 1	400	rounds rounds rounds

# 3. TORPEDO EQUIPMENT:

Torpedoes Type 44 (Type 97)	4
Side Dropping Gear, Model 2	4
Director, Type 14, Model 2	l
Type 95 Depth Charge (when torpedoes aboard, 10)	18
Depth Charge Hand Launches, Model 2	6
Air Reservoirs	2

U1	CONGRESSION AND INVESTIGATION TEAME IN	
CONF	IDENTIAL	JICPOA Item #4986 Page 60
4.	NAVIGATING EQUIPMENT:	
	Type 90 Magnetic Compass, Model 2, Modification 1	1

OPTICAL EQUIPMENT: Manoueverable Range-Finder 7 Power Prism Binoculars (NOVA, Model 1) Type 96 Sextant, Modification 1 ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT: Primery Source of Power:

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Gasoline powered 6 K! 105 V DC Generators (for steering power and cooking use)

Secondary Source of Power:

Compass for Small Boats, Model 2

Storage Batteries, Model 3 (for use in starting and illumination)

Navigation Light

Illuminating Equipment (including 300% working lights)

Communication Apparatus

7. RADIO EQUIPMENT:

Type 96 Mark 4 Air (TN: KŪ 空	) Wireless, sending (and receiving)	1
Secondary Power Equipment		1

Hydrophones (furnished by special orders)

8. ENGINES:

5.

6.

 Main Engines - Mark 71 Model 6 internal combustion engines - 950 HP

 Gasoline Engines (VULCAN (7 + 2 × ) speed reduction 4 equipment installed)

 Shafts and Screws
 2

Auxiliary Engines, Steering Engines (MHS Model 2 Steering Equipment)

# 9. CREW:

Officers and "arrant (	Officers	3
Enlisted Men		15

605

## 10. PRINCIPAL STORES:

Anchor 100 kilograms	l
Anchor cable - diameter 15mm	l
Hand-operated Windlass	l
Fire extinguishing equipment, carbon dioxide type ventilators (electrically operated)	1
Training port (SENKAISO) (electrically operated)	3

# 11. RUDDER:

Balanced Rudder

#### REFUELLING IN TOW

#### 1 February 1942

### 1. ESSENTIALS:

To execute refuelling safely and swiftly at any time and place desired, maintaining the desired mobile strength and preparations for immediate response to the energy.

#### 2. PRECAUTIONS:

Since refuelling is an operation requiring cooperation between the fuelling and refuelling ships, careful preparation and investigation are necessary before the fact in order to insure close intercommunication. Arrangements made beforehand; unity of planning.


### 3. METHODS:

Refueling alongside: mainly done with cruisers and destroyers; suited to a pitching motion; large-scale refueling possible; simple to perform. Refueling in tandem: possible for ships unsuited to refueling alongside; Diagonal refueling.

V (sub patrol plane) FURUTAKA КАКО 5000 METRES .3000 KINUGASA


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- REFUTLING ALONGSIDE DIAGRAM: 5. (See Enclosure) REFUELING RECORD: 6. Refueling method: alongside Date: 24 January 1942, 0600 Place: (150° E. Long. on the equator) A. в. c. Place: (1)0 B. Dong, on the square) Course: 0° Course intersection angle: Shaft Speed: 8 knots (dangerous at 10-12 knots) Speed thru water: D. Ε. 6.6 knots. Rudder compensation: 5° outboard Wind direction: 340° Wind force: 3.5 metres per second Roll: port 1.5°, starboard 2° F. G. н. I. Barometric pressure: 758.4 mm Temperature: 25° C. Distance between ships: 30 metres. Pressure of oil pumped: 3 kilograms (TN: per sq. cm.?) J., К.
  - L. ·
  - Veights: 1.5 tons each Neight line: 24mm S.W. (steel wire) Μ.
  - N. Forward rope: 48mm S.W. Mooring Rope: 48 mm S.W.
- HOW TO CALCULATE SHORT DISTANCES: 7.



As is shown by the chart, puncture a piece of cardboard in two places with large match sticks and then hold the cardboard in a perpendicular position. Align the points where the sticks are visible so that the two points and the waterline of the fueling ship will be in the same plane. The bearing on which the distance being calculated lies in on the beam.

#### 8. PROPER POSITIONS FOR THE SHIPS:

Port to Starboard - Ships should be about 35 metres apart. For to Starboard - Ships should be about 35 metres apart. For and Aft - The number flag flying aboard the fueling ship should be slightly forward of the bridge on the refueling ship. When the ships are out of line, the proper position for each will be shown by numbers indicated on the side of the fueling ship. STANDARD SIGNALS:

9.

When the refueling ship hoists a white flag ..... "The forward lines have been secured. No hindrance to putting out the weight."

When the refueling ship hoists a red flag ..... "The inboard line has been secured. No hindrance to running out the weight."

"Then the refueling ship hoists a blue flag ..... "The hoses have been connected. Begin to pump oil."

When the fueling ship hoists a blue flag ..... "Have started to pump oil." After the fueling ship has started to pump oil, when it hoists a blue flag ..... "Have ceased pumping oil. Cast off the hose."

When the refueling ship hoists a blue flag ..... "Flow of oil has ceased. Hoses cast off.".

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Completion of the Operation:

"Then the fueling ship hoists a red flag ..... "Cast off inboard line." "Then the fueling ship hoists a white flag ..... "Cast off forward line.

(For additional communication during the operation, write the message on a small black board and hold it up (so it may be seen).)

- 10. CAUTIONS TO BE OBSERVED THEN MANEUVALING THE SHIPS INTO POSITION:
  - (1) There must be close coordination between the turn and the compass. When both ships draw near, there should be proper orientation of the magnetic compass. When the ships are maneuvering into position, changes in distances shall be made by the fueling ship and because of the deviations caused by prevalent currents, waves, and other elements, in the adjustment of positions, allowances shall be made for these variable influences.
  - (2) When the angle of intersection of the courses of the ships is too great, since this has a direct relationship to the process of suction between the ships, it is dangerous for them to approach too rapidly.
  - (3) When there is a viriation in speed because of the displacement of the refueling ship, weather, and other reasons, this variation may be decreased when high speeds are involved by means of a standard rule:

Cruisers .... Decrease from 0 - 1/4 knots.

Destroyers .... Decrease from 1/4 - 1/3 knots. If the differences in speed are too great, great strain will be claced upon the forward line and upon the inboard line.

(4) The angle of intersection of the course which the refueling ship should maintain with respect to the fueling ship should be fixed by considering the type of the ships, speed, weight, distance between the ships, influence of wind and waves, etc. Generally,  $1^{\circ} - 2^{\circ}$  will be suitable.

If the angle of intersection is freat, there is open space between the ships and if there is not much strain upon the forward and inboard lines, there is a tendency for the ships to mutually draw together.


# DRY-DOCKING OF THE KAKO

#### (19 November 1941; KURE)

- I. THE SUBORDINATE WATCH OFFICER'S DUTIES
  - A. Hereafter he shall manage the docking operations
  - B. We plan to dock at 1030. Stand easy until then.
  - C. He shall supervise the deck crew in the changing of the anchor cables and wire-rope for hawsers fore and aft.
  - D. He shall prepare to cast both anchors.
  - E. Using a cuttor, he shall change the wire-rope in the stern for a hawser. "Then finished, he shall supervise the hauling up of the bower cables.
  - F. Afterwards, the cutter shall be sent ashore.
  - G. He shall then supervise the securing of the gang ay and boom by the division assigned to the task.
  - H. Davits shall then be turned inboard.
  - I. After the men from the Harbor Master's Office have come aboard, the starboard gangway shall be raised.
  - J. After 0930 the use of the head is prohibited.
  - K. After docking, he shall immediately put into effect the port fire bill. Each division shall make its preparations.
  - L. Otherwise, he shall do such work as is prescribed in the port bill (SHUTSUNYUKO BUSHO).
  - M. Attention! Carry on work at hand!

JTC POA Item /4986 Page 64

II. (Enclosed a sketch).



#### III. DOCKING ESSENTIALS

First, the wire rope aft shall be taken in and replaced by a hawser. "Thile paying this out, the wire-rope forward shall be taken in and replaced by a hawser. Then haul in the anchor cable.

One (150 ton) tug-boat forward and one on each side amidships and aft. "Thile paying out the forward hawser take in the ones ait and let go the one forward. The forward buoy will be changed to the starboard by the tug. When the tug turns at "A" (TN: see sketch) this ship will to the dock. Forward there are 2 clearly visible markers. The officersin-charge of the work party are 1 Harbor Master on "top" (TN: + / 7 and 1 officer-in-charge forward on the forecastle.

There will be hand-flag communication between the forward and aft masts.

Just a little before (TN: reaching) the dock the tug-boat changes course by turning to starboard, and lines are passed from the shore to both sides of the ship. As the stern approaches the entrance the tugs let go and lines are passed to both sides of the stern. Then while the starboard and por Flines are being hauled the bow is pointed toward the two markers and the ship proceeds only by this power. (TN: i.c. by hauling on lines).

When dry-docking is completed, close the rear gates and begin drainage.

#### (End)

#### CONCERNING DRY-DOCKING

STANDARDS OF DRY-DOCKING (Regulations for Construction and Repair of Vessels, Item 61).

Combined Fleet: Battleships and Carriers (those officially designated as being over 1. 30,000 tons displacement). and Special Duty Vessels --- Once a year. Marships: (Battleships, Carriers (as above) excluded) ---2. Twice a year. Destroyers, Submarines

Torpedo Boats and Mine-Sweepers

JTCPOA Item #4986 Page 65

### DATLY ROUPTNE WHILE DOCKED

0530	All hands turn to; calisthenics (outside the dock); swabbing outer decks.
0645	Breakfast
0730	Daily routine; Inspection
0845	Lay to duties
1130	Secure from duties
1145	Lunch
1305	Calisthenics
1315	Commence instruction
1600	Secure from instruction
1615	Begin leisure time
1700	End of leisure time
1715	Supper
1745	Fire detail secures

#### · INSTRUCTIONS WHILE IN DRY-DOCK

- 1. There must be no running about on board ship.
- 2. Beware of what lies under foot. Take care that you don't fall down onto the dock.
- 3. A WO or above should be present when any heavy things are being moved or transported.
- The safety rope must be used without fail whenever work is being done on 4. the sides of the ship.
- Secrecy shall be maintained. Be especially careful of the movement of 5. laborers.
- 6. Fires are strictly prohibited. Do any work on the reverse side of a piece of oil-cloth.
- 7. The fire bill in dock must be thoroughly carried out.
- The ship shall be fumigated upon entering and leaving the dock. 8.

### WHEN THE KAKO LEAVES DRY-DOCK

#### Preparations for Leaving the Dock (25 November 1941)

- Hereafter (the subordinate watch officer) shall conduct the preparations 1. for leaving the dock.
- 2. We expect to leave the dock at 1315. Afterwards we shall moor to buoy #4.
- 3. The fore deck crew shall prepare to moor the forward part of the ship.
- The anchor crew shall prepare to cast both anchors. 4.
- 5. The division assigned shall prepare to get out both gangways, swinging booms and propeller booms.
- 6. The 1st and 2nd Divisions shall prepare to take aboard ammunition.
- 7. All small boats shall proceed to the mooring place.
- 8.
- All hands away from their ship shall return by 1300. Men performing work away from their ship will make certain of their life net 9. 10. Set about preparing to leave the dock.

JICPOA Item #4986 Page 67

Ships and shore stations spotting these signals shall indicate that they have received and understood them by hoisting the UNCLE flag or by transmitting the U (or cancel-U) code signal.

#3

#### ADDRESS BY OUR CAPTAIN UPON MY BOARDING SHIP

# by Capt. TAKAHASHI, Yuji (Captain, KAKO)

#### 16 November 1941

"For three years you have studied your duties diligently. And now I believe that as you stand here, at the battle front, your emotions have been heightened, as you sense impending action.

When you reflect upon it, this is no training sugadron; you have been assigned directly to the front. Officers in charge of your guidance and their assistants have been selected; but the fact of the matter is that each and every one of them has his battle station and shall not be able to devote his whole-hearted attention to your instruction. You appreciate, I am sure, the present situation, and will not depend on others too heavily. You must undertake your duties assertively, with a healthy spirit of initiative. Moreover, at this time special emphasis should be given to the caution, 'Always be at your station! '. It is extremely important that line officers always be on the upper deck, and that they observe everything. "Then they are on the upper dock, they are able to master anything that comes along.

In short, the present situation is certainly nearing its climax; indeed, it is in its most pregnant stage. I earnestly desire from you an uncommon amount of determination and effort."

#### ADDRESS ON NEW YEAR'S DAY, 1942

#### by Capt. HISAMAN, Yonejiro (Captain, AOBA)

"If we put aside our merriment and stop to consider, we find that we have greeted this New Year's Day, in the 2602nd year of our Empire on the scene of battle. First, however, we should offer congratulations on the long life of our Emperor and Supreme Commander. I feel that it is not only a great honor for military men to greet the New Year on the battlefield, but that we shall long remember partaking of 'ZONI' (TN: a traditional Japanese New Year's Day dish of rice cake boiled with vegetables and meat), clad in our hot-weather gear.

"However, our foe is of great strength, too. In particular, it has been judged that a large American force of cruisers, in conjunction with carriers, has designs on the SOUTH SCA Islands. This force, which is charged with the heavy duty of protecting the SOUTH SCAS, must not relax its vigilance for one second. We have whethed our swords ten years for this one battle. 1942 shall be the year in which we will exalt our military might before the world, and in which we will achieve the object of our sacred war. Let each man strive his hardest."

JICPOA Item #4986 Page 68

## ADDRESS NO. 4 TO THE COMBINED FLEETS

#### (2003, 23 May 1943)

By the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleets

On this occasion we pay our respects to the memory of a leader of the Combined Fleet, to a man whom we still remember. YMAALOTO, the late Com-. mander-in-Chief, died at the front. If we annihilate our stubborn enemy even at the cost of our lives, we will know that his spirit lives on. During the past year and a half of this struggle, we have smashed

During the past year and a half of this struggle, we have smashed the power of our great enemy and though we have, in the main, carried out our basic strategy, our enemy is striving for ultimate victory by expanding his preparations for offensive action and by devising plans for the strategic application of new weapons. Furthermore, taking advantage of the tide of the war in EUROPE, he is concentrating his main power in the GLAT EAST ASIA Area and is preparing to launch a counter-offensive. No matter how many times the enemy may advance against us, we shall always welcome combat with him and in exterminating him and securing for ourselves the ultimate victory, we shall by united effort and perseverance forge for ourselves a greater and greater military power. At the same time that wo manifest a relentless spirit of attack, we shall be prepared to meet, the changing conditions of warfare with new strategies and new weapons, always keeping one stop ahead of the enemy.

attack, we shall be prepared to matt the changing conditions of warrare with new strategies and new weapons, always keeping one stop ahead of the enemy. The war is now at its peak. We defend what is ours and the task of meeting and striking the enemy must be the prerogative of the Imperial Navy. We shall defend ourselves to the last breath and shall totally destroy the enemy. Should we cross paths with the enemy upon the seas, that will be fine. We shall in our traditional way close in upon him and deliver fierce attacks. We look forward confidently to seeing our enemy vanquished.

If in accordance with this desire we devote ourselves wholeheartedly to the utter destruction of the enemy, being animated by the spirit of the late Commander-in-Chief YAL/AMOTO, we shall be united, first of all, with the brave soul of the Admiral of the Fleet and then with those many others now in Heaven, and shall be able to look forward to the crushing of the enemy and the fulfilment of the great responsibility of the defense of our fatherland. Let each and every one ponder well upon this task; let us all, by

Let each and every one pondor well upon this task; let us all, by exerting our efforts look forward to the realization of the Imperial wishes by carrying to its conclusion this responsibility.

(END)

# EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #10 (INTERROGATION OF JAPANESE PRISONER OF WAR CAPTURED FROM THE JAPANESE SUBMARINE I-1 WHICH PARTICIPATED IN THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR) ENTITLED "KUBOAKI, TAKEO, SUPERIOR CLASS ENGINEER PETTY OFFICER, INTERROGATION OF" USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE "NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR" (Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

> (EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8 IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

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A8/(25) OF THE UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET HDH/rww HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER Sorial' (1351

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR 2 1943

M. R. ENAWNING CHILCH OF SLAPP.

From: The Commander South Pacific Area and South Pacific Force. To: Distribution List.

Subject: KUBOAKI, TAKEO, Superior Class Engineer Petty Officer, interrogation of.

Enclosure: (A) Subject Interrogation.

1. Enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith for information and use.

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--noulto H. D. MOULTON,

Flag Secretary.

#### CONDAT INTELLIGENCE CENTER SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE

#### CONTLUENTIAL

February 26, 1943.

# EXALINATION OF: KUBOAKI, TAKEO. SUPERIOR CLASS ENGINEER P. O.

(Interrogator: Lt. Col. H. D. Earris, U.S.M.G.) (Interpreter: Capt. J. R. Shively, U.S.E.C.R.)

# Personal History:

POW was captured from the I-1 after having spent 24 hours in the water. He was suffering from shark bites on the right heel and left forearm. POW had completed 9 years service in Mip Navy; was 28 years old; and had attended high school. The POW had a course at the Mechanics School and then finished the submarine school and had returned to Mechanics School for an additional course. POW served aboard I-4 for 1 year. POW had been on the I-1 for 28 months; previously to that he was on the KATORI from November 1939 to October 1940. The POW was on duty with the diesel engines on both the KATORI and the I-1.

## Identifications:

The POW said that the commander of the 6th Fleet was Vice Admiral KOMATSU. Vice Admiral SHIFIZU formerly commanded the 6th Fleet.

The POW gave the following names for the officers of the I-1:

Commanding Officer	-	SAKAMOTO, Lt. Comdr.
Engineer Officer	-	BUTO, Hisao, Lt.
Gunnery Officer	-	OIKAWA, Ensign
Asst. Eng. Officer		FUJII, Warrant Officer
Electrical Officer	-	TLAI, Warrant Officer
Torpedo Officer		was a warrant officer - name unknown
Navigator	-	was a Lt. (jg) - name unknown

# Operational Information:

Following represents a chronological record of I-1 operations obtained from POW;

1. December, 1941 - operated in Pearl Harbor area, firing several torpedoes at transport - no hits, I=1 was attacked on 2 or 3 occasions without effect.

2. January 13, 1942 - returned to Japan via Marshalls where I-l refueled. Torpedo supply replenished in Japan.

3. February 2, 1942 - departed Japan and proceeded to Indian Ocean remaining there 2 months. One merchant ship was attacked and sunk (probably Australian). The I-1 developed angine trouble (broken shaft).

-1-

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4. April 2, 1942 - returned to Japan for overhaul, remaining there 3 months. The after gun was removed and ship rigged to carry one large motor landing oraft (DAIEATSU). Ship's complement was supplemented by 3 additional men to man landing boat.

5. During July the I-1 was in Aleutian waters on a cruise which lasted about 50 days, during which no U.S. ships or planes were sighted.

6. September 10, 1942 - departed Japan for Rabaul, operating in Solomons area without incident until end of October.

7. November 1, 1942 - returned to Truk.

8. November 10, 1942 - departed for Japan.

9. November 20, 1942 - arrived Japan, remaining there until end of December.

10. Jenuary 3, 1943 - departed Yokosuka, Japan, for Truk in company with I-17. The MUSASHI and YAMATO were observed at Truk. The HAYATAKA left a day or two later.

11. January 10, 1943 - proceeded to Rebaul (ship repainted; engine trouble developed (clutch)). Proceeded to Guadaloanal.

12. January 29, 1943. - I-1 was attacked and destroyed January 29, 1943, while transporting stores and supplies to Guadalcanal.

# Technical Information:

1. The I-1 carried 53 centimeter torpedces - the speed of which was estimated to be 50 knots. Air pressure was 200 kg. per sq. cm.

2. The KATORI is powered with turbines, main angines, supplemented with diesel auxiliaries. Speed under diesel is 14 knots; diesel and turbines combined is 18 knots (carries one plane).

3. The I-17 is equipped with a monoplane (silver color) which when submerged is housed forward of conning tower.

4. Class "I" submarines carrying planes are the:

7, 8, 9, 15, 17, 19, 21 and 23 (planes were recently removed as battle gear from the I-5 and I-6).

- 2 -

# CONFIDENTIAL

5. "RO" subs, which are smaller than the "I" class. do not carry planes.

The "I" class submarizes carrying midget make 6. marines are:

16, 18, 20, 22, 24.

The MUSASHI and YAMATO (BBs) are apparently the 7. same size with 3 turrets of 3 guns each believed to be very large.

8. The 1-1 required about one minute and 30 seconds to submerge completely and did not change course while submarging.

#### Miscellaneous:

Submarine sinkings developed were on the approxi-1. mate dates as follows:

<b>I-63</b>		prior to December 7, 1941.
I-124	-	January, 1942.
I-123		September, 1942.
I-15		October, 1942.
I-4	-	about December 15, 1942.
I-3		December 15, 1942.
I-28		no date.
I-1		January 29, 1943.

Temperature rises to 40° centigrade aboard larger 2. subs.

3. The following submarine divisions (SENSUITAI) are reputed to be based at Yokosuka:

1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9.

4. Four submarines are reported to be under con-struction at Yokosuka (interval of construction 3 to 4 months, output - 1 sub per month). No information on rate of production at other yards could be given by POW.

5. Air attack alarms used at Rabaul are:

- (a) Siren during day.(b) Red rockets at night.

- 3 -

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6. An cirfield is known to be on Truk (Island of TAKESULTA). Service personnel at Truk is principally navy (5,000), practically no army. Recreational facilities are provided.

7. There is a base hospital at Truk, possibly on NATSU ISLAND.

8. Following comments were also made by POW:

(a) While in Rabaul (January, 1943), he did not get ashore much. However, sake was to be had aboard.

(b) Believed sub sinkings in general principally caused by depth charges.

(c) Preference of duty is aboard "I" class of Subs. However, has had no experience with "RO" class.

(d) Doesn't consider submarines are particularly good protection against enemy submarines (however, PO%/ has never encountered enemy submarines).

9. POW had beard that HOSEO (CV) was sunk and saw the SHOKAKU under repair at Yokosuka in December.

10. Repair capacities at Rabaul are limited to the facilities carried on the one repair ship stationed there.

- 4 -


## EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #11 (INTERPOGATION OF JAPANESE PRISONER OF WAR WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR AS A MEMBER OF THE CREW OF THE (CV) KAGA) ENTITLED "PRISONER OF WAR YOKOTA, SHIGEKI" USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE "NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR" (Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460)

> (EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8 IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK (N PEARL HARBOR)

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SERILL NO. 290

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# UTREROS-11CT AREOFT CO. 148 . YORUTA, S.

 Attached is a Report on information edited from Japadase PW YEARUL, Shareko.

 information contained in this Report has been extracts this PW source only. Its value should be assessed and the distribution restricted asperdiculy.

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
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
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#### EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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were not posted, this duty being carried out by A/A MG crews. Task Force did not-fuck while on return passage.

(vii) Theorem and prior knowledge of Operations. Before leaving SiSBO, 7 Nov 441, which near any of KAGA were instructed to aptile all their bills. (11) frequently proceeding in albums, mutch instruments, and all when uncertaining items are put ashers. - N-Rect Starts). This gave then the investion that have more about to go at some relation.

ifter loyeing SiarRC, the Ender of Officer addressed then and information that they same going to an area Such of Diver Biy, from they found they same redeen dee marker Forth, they mare very surprised, and ansages they same soing on a salater separation, worship against Caller

F 118 not edult that, he had ony idea of their real restimution, stating bhat he was a vary juster rating, knew very little and did not there much about the readout.

# 17. 1000 841 18

TANKET, FROMBER 15., TOTAL P. indicated on a map that 7 White and HITCHLEFU BUT on South coast of 2000/7 F. He know no manage of placed in viriative, as since mapel description merson with that of HITCHLEFU BET reach is realised white an event of the sector that he do no correct Bhices consectors for TANK, but househt they show to ap the Desk force assumbled to TANK, but househt they show to ap the Task force assumbled to TANK for the learning for actuark of funct HIFENT (Sec S).

(1) Second & eriction (Sec. raning of T'lls shokes below).



serve, not higher their 2 or 3 feet, and no treas could be seen. Ground was average with snow, but there was no ice in bay of aptors. We saw no signs of labor, rivers or awamps. The Costal rise appeared to be inducabiled are proby fisheren who lives in 3 houses near pier. It was, however, informatic to see details of sampre or works-Estern aids of bay from Kaid, and view bayond pier was obscurve by law fills and an emberkment.

FW estimated within of buy to be 6,000 metres and distance between entremete and opposite shore to be 2,000 metres. He thought there and a large rock close instant near cuntre of bay. Bay was "desper than most hardcure", but he did not from most depth. There was deep water right up to foreshows.

Wine was area North-Slast.

(11) Pier and Violarity. There was only mer pier, hituisted at Southtotern side of big. It use constructed of comparise and atomos, about 15 metric long, a metric wile, 7 to i metric high, and had stope with at the ond. Its bodght was sufficient to estimate an environment fully high alongside. There was no errise of structure on it. Fighth of water at steps was should be atres. We have the insection on the fight of water at steps was should be atres. We have the insection on the structure to be an adverted with any ideal fightmicros. We have the insection vibring or be areas with any ideal fightmicros. The start is insection.

Ground immore of poor was tone with inort grass chowing above prom.

There were 3 Elshermon's provide indexers on a little to South of there many ner and visible from NACA's uncharage, but could be seen from pier. South bruess anoth advantages has have constructed, about 1 JC (10 %) high. Nothing pruis b, seen haven spintheads asset 3 d/T means (See Sub-See (iv)). FV could not see which r there was a village in vicinity, but stated there was no sumk, or which signs of hobitation.

Bothern brusses wit substituted there is performent and very rough read, which possis purposes used by overs. Physical know when read led. He saw to carse. There were an fishing books to be over.

(113) <u>Dispipe Plone</u>, Teacing would be all include between play the Southbestern also of antrance, One bass, which is pucker of rocks of Pakers, height store which about 2 ft. Fishing clokes were also demong these rocks. FW app no send of teach in this orea.

It would not that lowers from MLD would be only between plar and output all hay. There was, for reache officiers, and which of correspond shows makes did not agreed about 1 metry. Noter appeared to be sure up to show, but We saw not backing in Loweright visiting of plars.

From control by to NetH-Eastern via with france inding would be improvible burness of cliffs. In east to becale in this over, but we would be observe details from KNE.'s restorage.

(iv) <u>M/T Station</u>. Citation (wright coherimant tear pater, but no actilies of buildings were if inly, Physical wright a static study be such, but PM could not estimate height or arrange, but his part of the period of the period. As do not have an distributed of the statement, is another of the period. As did not, how any Schulle of the experience, as marked of percented.

(v) <u>Defense</u>. By new in defense, must, in terpers but a municipation. There was no evidence of A/but is a probability of the probability of the fields, which might same of all fields, which suppose entries or mutid, and no buys which might same channels. There were a building visible of sitter side of attracts.

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# EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #12 (A NAVY STUDY OF JAPANESE ESPIONAGE IN HAWAITAN ISLANDS CONSISTING OF (A) COMIL LETTER TO CNO SERIAL OOOD WITH ENCLOSURE LAND SERIAL 234 (B) CINCPAC-CINCPOA LETTER TO CNO SERIAL 000742 (C)CONFIFTH FLEET LETTER TO COMINCH US PACFLEET SERIAL 000179 (D) COMGEN HO 5th PHIBCORPS LETTER TO COMFIFTH FLEET SERIAL 000374B with ENCLOSURE HQ 5th MARINE DIVISION 496 CIC DETACH, SASEBO, KYUSHU, 13 OCT 45. MEMO FOR THE AC OF S. G-2. WITH ACCOMPANYING MAP AND SKETCH OF KAUI AND OAHU ISLANDS SHOWING THE LOCATIONS OF ATTACKING JAPANESE AIRCRAFT CARRIERS, AIRPLANES AND SUBMARINES)


ENTITLED "PRE-WAR ESPIONAGE IN THE HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, REPORT ON PRE-WAR HONOLULU COLDERCIAL BROADCASTS CONTAINING CODED INFORMATION FOR THE JAPANESE FLEET"

USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE "NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR" (Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460)

> (EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8 IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

627

Serial: 0004 TOP SECRET



14TH NAVAL DISTRICT OFFICE OF COMMANDANT c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California

10 November, 1945.

<u>3rd ENDORSEMENT</u> on HQ VPhibCorps Top Secret Ltr. 091/130, Serial 000374B dated 14 October 1945.

From: Commandant FOURTEENTH Naval District. To: Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Pre-War Espionage in Hawaiian Islands.

Enclosure: (A) Top Secret Memo for DIO 14MD from Lt. R.H. Peterson, USNR, dated 7 Nov. 1945, Subject: Pre-War Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet; Report of.

1. Forwarded.

2. Enclosure (A) is submitted in accordance with paragraph two of second endorsement on basic letter.

Sasaffinder:

Copy to: Com 5th Flt (3rd End. & Encl (A). ComGenVPhibCorps (3rd End. & Encl (A). CinCPac/POA (3rd End. & Encl (A).



#### Serial: 0004

TOP SECRET

10 November, 1945.

3rd ENDORSEMENT on HQ VPhibCorps Top Secret Ltr. 091/130, Serial 0003748 dated 14 October 1945.

From: Commandant FOURTEENTH Naval District. To: Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Pre-War Espionage in Hausiian Islands.

Enclosure: (A) Top Secret Mano for DIO 14ND from Lt. R.H. Peterson, USNR, dated 7 Nov. 1945, Subject: Pre-War Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet; Report of.

1. Forwarded.

2. Enclosure (A) is submitted in accordance with paragraph two of second endorsement on basic letter.

S.A. TAFFINDER.

Copy to: Com 5th Flt (3rd End. & Encl (A). ComGenVPhibCorps (3rd End. & Encl (A). CinCPac/POA (3rd End. & Encl (A).

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District Intelligence Office Fourteent's Navel District Sth Floor, Young Hatel, Honolulu, Hawah

1480/48-8 Serial 254 TOP SECRET

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TOP SEGRET

- 7 Hovenber 1945
- MEMO FOR: The District Intelligence Officer.

Subject : Pre-Mar Honolulu Conmercial Broadcasts Containing Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet: Report of.

Reference: (a) EQ, Fifth Marine Division, 406th GIG Detachment TOP SECRET Nemorandum for the AG of 5, G-2, dated 13 Oct. 1945, subject: Pre-War Espicaage in the Mawaiian Islands.

1. Reference (a) discloses that Yoshio MHIGA, Lt.Comdr., LJH, aviator who participated in the Japanese attack on Pearl Marbor on 7 December 1941, made the following statements, in substance, on 9 October 1945 to Robert H. Tait, Special Agent, GIO, at Omura, Kyushu, Japan:

- (a) That he believed quite strongly that information concerning all movements of ships into and out of Pearl Harbor was transmitted to the fleet through coded messages broadcast over a Honolulu commercial broadcasting station:
- That, in his opinion, the codes were many and varied but that if, for example, it was broadcast that the German attache lost one dog, it might mean that a (b) earrier left Pearl Marbor, and that if, for another example, the German attache wanted a cock or a houseboy, it might mean that a battleship or eruiser had entered the harbor:
- (.). That the (foregoing) information had been given to him by Lt. Gomdr. Shigeharu MURATA, IJN, Chief of the Air Squadron aboard the flagship AKAGI, on their return to Japan;
- (d) That the (foregoing) information was conveyed on radio programs just following the news broadcasts, which (SHIGA stated) were at 0630, 1200, 1900;
- (e) That the time following the 1900 breadcast was probably used, since the Japanese agents would then have had an eppertunity to convey information con-SECREI

S. E.

#### 14ND /48-2 TOP SECRET Serial 234

## TOP SECRET

Subject: Pre-War Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet; Report of. 

cerning a whole day's activities:

- That, on the first Saturday the force was at sea, reports were received that there were only one or (1) two carriers in Pearl Harbor:
- That, on 6 December 1941, sometime between 2000 and 2100 (Hawaiian time) news came to him regarding (g) numbers of ships in Pearl Harbor; other
- (h) That he could offer no Acads concerting the espio-nage conducted for the attack than that of the Honolulu Broadensting Station:
- (1) That, on 6 December 1941, the force was 800 miles due north of Hawaii, and that they then received, from the Japanese Navy Department, a wireless message "Climb Mt. Niitaka", which was the eignai for the attack.

2. On 30 October 1945, FSI-Honolulu and G-2(CID) Honolulu were furnished one copy each of reference (a) by the Acting District Intelligence Officer, 14ND. FBI-Honolulu, G-2(CID) Honolulu and DIO-14ND conducted checks of their respective files with negative results in locating transcriptions, continuity scripts, or outlines of programs which had smanated from stations KGMB and KGU for the period of 27 November through 6 December 1941.

 On 31 October and 1 November, 1945, reporting officer interviewed J. Howard WORRAL, Hanager of Station KGMB, Honolulu, who stated substantially as follows after checking the files and transcription library of KGHB:

There are no pre-war transcriptions, continuity scripts, or station logs for news, want-ads, or other local programs, including those which were given in the Japanese language, in our files or library. Transcriptions of the Japanese programs were made for many weeks prior to the war right up to 7 December 1941. All of these, with the exception of those for about 1 through 6 Decem-ber, were cleaned out of our files and destroyed about two were see following the discussion 1 bed with either two years ago following a discussion I had with sither the Army Intelligence or the FBI. I recall that it was

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#### TOP SECRET

Subject: Pre-War Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet; Report of.

conceded, I think by the FBI, that there was no reason why we should continue to keep old material in our library when we needed the space so badly. All of that material which the Army wanted had been picked up, and the pertion that was left, consisting of transcriptions of the Japanese programs, had been consored before it went out over the air. To my knowledge there was never any correspondence on the subject of cleaning out our files. We have kept no station logs over two years old; the FCC requires that we keep logs about two years before destroying them.

The transcriptions of Japanese programs for about 1 through 6 December 1941 were turned over to Major Henry G. Putnam of Army Intelligence a short while after the war started. I recall that Hugh Lyttel (phonetic) and (fnu) Albright (phonetic) of Army Intelligence were frequently up here early in the war assisting or working with Major Putnam.

George FUJITA (George Masuac FUJITA) was in charge of the Japanese programs and MAYASHIDA (Ariyoshi HAYASHIDA) went over the transcriptions prior to their being put on the air to make sure they contained nothing subversive or objectionable. HAYASHIDA was recommended to us by Nr. Shivers of FBI as being entirely responsible and trustworthy. Material gathered for the Japanese program as well as the Want-Ads program had no direct connection with newspaper ads; ade which went out over the radio could have appeared in the newspapers although radio.time was bought separately from newspaper space.

Our librarian prior to and during the early part of the war was Alan LISSER, in my opinion entirely reliable, trustworthy and loyal. LISSER is presently working in San Francisco for station KFRC and would probably recall the details of what we had and didn't have in the library during that period.

As a rule, no transcriptions were made of local news or Want-Ads programs; such broadcasts were prepared in note or continuity form and given direct to the "mike" by the

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# 14ND/A8-2 Berial 234

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Subject: Pre-War Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing Coded Information for the Japaness Fleet; Report of.

announder.

Our Hilo station, KHBC, was under a similar arrangement with respect to programs given in Japanese. A young woman, Miss Kazuho HIGUCHI, an American citizen of Japanese ancestry, supervised and censored all such programs before they went out over the air; she was also recommended to us by Mr. Shivers.

4. On 31 October 1945, reporting officer interviewed H. A. MULKONY, Manager of Station XGU, Honolulu, who stated substantially as follows after checking his files:

> I am sure that we do not have the continuity scripts or program outlines you are looking for. No transcriptions were made of programs given in Japaness during the pre-war period. We did make up continuity scripts for those programs during that period. Copies of these scripts were furnished to DIO-14ND, FRI-Honolulu, and Army Intelligence; the copies were translated and sent back, with comments, before the programs went on the air. As I recall, all of the scripts in our files were picked up shortly after the war started by Army Intelligence. I have the idea that some were sent to Washington; none were ever returned to KGU. I don't recall what person or persons picked up the scripts.

Up until several months before the war, FURUKAWA (Shigeo FURUKAWA) was in charge of the Japanese Sunday program; he was dishonest in his dealings with KGU. After he left this work, GOTO (Richard Hisashi GOTO) was in charge; Jack NAWATANI (Jack Iwasaburo NAWATANI) did the announcing on week days. Material gathered for the Japanese Sunday program came from subscribers contacted by FURUKAWA and GOTO; the material didn't come from the newspapers. Few, if any, of the programs originating locally, including news and Want-Ads, were transcribed before being put on the air. NAWATANI gathered material for the daily programs.

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#### TOP SECRET

Subject: Pre-War Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing Goded Information for the Japanese Fleet; Report of.

5. On 31 October 1946, reporting officer interviewed L. R. DAWSON, Supervisor of Federal Communications Commission, Honolulu, who stated substantially as follows:

FCC made no transcriptions of programs originating from Honolulu broadcasting stations prior to the war, except for the period of one week in July, 1941. At that time, lossi programs given in foreign languages over KGHB and KOU were transcribed at the specific request of FCC in Washington and were forwarded to Washington without being translated locally.

Commercial broadcasting stations are required to keep station logs for one year before destroying them.

Amateur radio stations continued operating right up to 7 December 1941. Except for specific cases which were checked by our aonitors, there were no records or transeriptions made of amateurs' transmissions in T.H. Pre-war reports of specific eases thesked by our monitors were forwarded long ago to FCC in Washington.

5. On 1 November 1945, reporting officer interviewed Lt.Gol. Wilson GADDIS, AUS, Public Relations Office, G2, Fort Shafter, Oahu, who stated substantially as follows:

I worked very closely with Major Henry C. Putnam in the Public Relations Office, G2, in the early part of the war. I do not recall that Major Putnam ever ploked up transcriptions of any Japanese programs from KGMB follow-ing the war. If he had, they would probably be in the files here or at G-2(CID) Honolulu. I feel certain that he has none of the transcriptions or continuity scripts with him at the present time.

After checking thoroughly in the files here, I can state that no such transcriptions or continuity scripts are here.

Major Putnam's present address is Mid-Pacifie Lisison Officer, Bureau of Public Relations, War Department, Washington 25, D. G. Najor Putnam will be back at Fort Shafter, Oahu, about 1 December 1945.

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#### TOP SECRET

Subject: Pre-War Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet; Report of.

7. On Sl October, 2 and 3 November 1945, files of the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, the Honolulu Advertiser, and the Archives of Hawaii were checked for information pertinent to code mentioned in reference (a). Nothing was found under Mant-Ads and other sections in either newspaper for the period of 27 November through 6 December 1941 regarding the German attache losing one dog or the German attache wanting a cook or houseboy.

8. Files of the Archives of Hawaii, Konolulu, checked on 3 November 1945, disclosed the following information relative to times of news, want-ads, Japanese programe, and other programs immediately following on stations KOMB and KGU for 5, 6, and (scheduled for) 7 December 1941:

<u>KOMB</u> - <u>Friday. 5 December 1941</u>; this schedule representative of other week days:

0715 News 0730 Wake Up and Live 0830 News 0835 Listen Ladies 0945 News and Want-Ads Program (Mrs. Nita BENEDICT) 1000 Around the Town With Gene Sawyer 1215 Neva 1225 Stock Quotations 1245 Japanese Program 1415 Columbia's School of the Air (CBB) 1500 News 1505 Plantation Melodies 1735 News 1740 Show Parade 1930 Neve 1945 John Nesbit's Passing Parade 2055 Streamlined Headlines 2100 Amos 'n' Andy 2125 News (CBS) 2130 Here's Morgan 2200 News 2215 Swing Nocturne

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#### 14ND/A8-2 Serial 234

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# TOP SECRET

Subject: Pre-War Honolulu Commercial Broadsasts Containing Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet; Report of.

Schedule for Saturday, 6 December 1941, same as the foregoing except for the following:

1415 Saturday News (following Japanese Program) 1420 Football Game Broadcast 1945 20th Century Serenade 2130 South American Way

# Schedule for Sunday, 7 December 1941:

0600 to 0830 - Japanese Program 0930 News 0945 Sports Reporter 1900 News 1915 Charioteers 2200 News 2215 Berenads in the Night

KGU - Friday. 5 December 1941; this schedule representative for other week days:

0600 Japanese Community Program 0645 Easy Tunes and Topics 0700 Shell Transradio News 0710 Persan's Footwear Parade 0800 Shoppers' Guide 0810 Sunshine Frogram (E. Dropman & Co.) **O815 Bulletin Board** 0830 Shoppe Serenade 0845 Walkiki on the Air 0950 Shell Transradio News 1000 Music School 1045 Japanese Program 1130 We The Abbotts 1215 Bhell Transradio News 1225 Oddities in the News 1900 Shell Transradio News 1915 Parker Family (NBC) 2255 Shell Transradio News 2300 Ending 6987th Day of Broadcast

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# 14ND/A8-2 Seriel 234 TOP SECRET

# TOP SECRET

Subject: Pre-War Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing Coded Information for the Japanese Fleet; Report of.

Schedule for Saturday, 6 December 1941, same as foregoing except for the following:

1000 Morning Matinee 1225 Interlude 1715 Beyond the News 1730 Ranch House Roundup 1915 Band Concert from A.& N. YMCA.

# Schedule for Sunday, 7 December 1941:

1300-1430 Japanese Program 1930 Shell Transradio News 1945 Red Skelton & Company

9. There is no record of transcriptions or continuity scripts of Japanese and other programs broadcast by stations KHBC, Hilo, Hawaii, and KTOH, Lihus, Kauai, during the period of 27 November through 6 December 1941 in the files of the three Honolulu investigative agencies or at stations KGMB and KGU.

10. While files of DIU-14ND do not contain transcriptions, continuity ecripts, or outlines of programs of broadcasts on KGNB and KGU for the period of 27 November through 6 December 1941, there is considerable highly classified information in the files pertinent to this general subject, as follows in substance:

- (a) Japanese programs on stations KGMB and KGU during the period of one to two weeks prior to 8 December 1941 were monitored by Lt.Condr. Yale Maxon, USNR, and Condr. Denzel Carr, USNR, of DIO-14HD. The cryptic phrases listened for by these officers were never heard on KGHB or KGU. Monitoring was accomplished by listening direct to the broadcasts; no transcriptions were made of said broadcasts.
- (b) One of the cryptic phrases listened for did appear several times during the source of a Tokyo broadcast some hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor took place. The cryptic phrase in question same over

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14ND/A8-2 Serial 234 TOP SECRET

# TOP SECRET

Subject: Pre-Mar Honolulu Conzercial Broadcasts Containing Goded Information for the Japanese Fleet; Report of.

station JZI program (from Tokyo), at some time later than 1145 8 December 1941, Japan time, frequency 9535 kos.

- (c) For many months prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. up through 6 December 1941, Magao KITA, Japanese Gensul-General, Honolulu, kept the Japanese Foreign Office supplied with detailed information concerning movements of U.S. Naval vessels by means of soded dispatches sent through commercial telegraph shannels. Of particular note is the message from LITA to Tokyo via R.C.A., under date of 6 December 1941, which gives disposition of ships, etc., in Pearl Harbor as of the evening of 5 December 1941.
- (d) Bernard Julius Otto KUEHN, with aliases, espionage agent, submitted a plan to the Japanese Consulate, Honolulu, on or about 2 December 1941, involving use of a code on the KGMB Want-Ads morning program (0945), as follows:
  - (1) A Chinese rug, etc., for sals- app Office Box 1475; indicates 3 or 6 etc., for sale- apply Post
  - (2) A complete chicken farm for sale: indicates 4 or 7
  - (3) Beauty parlor operator wanted; indicates 6 or 8.

Under date of 3 December 1941 (Honolulu time). this simplified sode system was transmitted by KITA to the Foreign Minister, Tokyo. A duplicate message was also addressed to Chief of Third Section, Naval General Staff, signed FUJII. Under date of 3 Decem-ber 1941 (Japan time), Foreign Minister TOGO tele-graphed to KITA that he wanted KITA to hold onto the list of code words (presumably an older, compli-cated code system), including those intended for use on the radio broadcast, right up until the last minute; further, that when the "break" same, KITA

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# TOP SEGRET

Subject: Fre-Mar Nonelulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing Goded Information for the Japanese Fleet; Report of.

was to burn the code immediately and wire TOGO that he had done so.

(e) FBI agents scaducted an investigation to determine whether or not there had been any advertisements regarding the Chinese rug, beauty operator, er chicken farm, etc. over radio station KGNB Want-Ads program subsequent to 1 December 1941; newspaper ads were also checked for the same information. Records of the KGMB Want-Ads morning programs (0945) for the period of 24 November to 8 December 1941 were scanined. No information was found, in the radio programs or newspapers, regarding the broadeast code system in question.

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11. Negative results were obtained in lossting transcriptions, continuity scripts, or outlings of programs which segmented from radio stations KOHB and KGU for the period of 27 November through 6 Desember 1941; therefore it has not been possible to verify or refute statements of Yoshie SHIGA, Lt. Gomdr., LJH, as contained in reference (a).

12. Japanese language programs on KOMB and KOU during the period of one to two weeks prior to the attack on Pearl Marbor were monitored by DIO-14ND. Although the purpose of this monitoring was to listen for certain phrases (which were not heard on KOMB or KOU), it does not appear likely that any phrases regarding the German attache would have been missed by the DIO-14ND monitors. There was a German Consul in Honolulu prior to 7 December 1941, but no attache; in the svent, however, that the word "attache" were correctly used, the implication is that the commercial broadcast emanated from Japan.

13. The KOMB Yant-Ads morning programs for 24 November to 8 December 1941 were shocked by FBL Honolulu with negative results in locating any coded phrases regarding a Chinese

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# 1410/A8-2 TOP SECRET

# TOP SEGRET

Subject: Pre-Nar Honolulu Commercial Broadcasts Containing Goded Information for the Japanese Fleet; Repert of.

rug, chicken farm, or beauty parlor operator. It appears unlikely that phrases regarding the German attache, had they appeared on this program during the period in question, would have gone unnoticed by the agency conducting that investigation.

14. It is pointed out that the Japanese Consulate-General successfully furnished detailed military information to the Japanese Foreign Office up to and including the 6th of December 1941 by means of coded dispatches sent through commercial telegraphic channels.

15. Inaszuch as SHIGA's information was reportedly given ito him by another officer aboard the AKAGI following the attack, its accuracy is subject to some doubt.

16. The accuracy of the statement of J. Howard WORREL, manager of KGNB, regarding transcriptions of Japanese programs for about 1 through 6 December 1941 being turned over to Hajor Putnam, is doubted in view of Lt.Col. Gaddis' statement, his search of the files at Fort Shafter, and G-2(CID) Nonolulu's search of their files.

> R. H. PETENSON Lieutenant, USNR

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Cincpac File

48-5

#### UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF

Serial: 00.000

S NOV 1945

2nd ENDORSEMENT on HQ VPhibCorps Top Secret Ltr. 091/130, Ser. 000374B dated 14 October 1945.

# TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

From:	Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet
	and Pacific Ocean Areas.
To:	Chief of Naval Operations.
Via:	Commandant FOURTEENTH Naval District.

Subject: Pre-War Espionage in Hawaiian Islands.

1. Forwarded.

2. Comment is requested from Commandant FOURTEENTH Naval District concerning broadcasts related in basic correspondence and on other material considered pertinent.

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C. H. McMORRIS Chief of Staff

Copy to: Com 5th Flt (2nd End only) ConGenVPhibCorps (2nd End only)

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COMMANDER FIFTH FLEET UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET FLAGSHIP OF THE COMMANDER

Serial: 000179



24 OCT 1945

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to Hq. V PhibCorps Top Secret ltr. 091/130, ser. 000374B dated 14 October 1945.

From: Commander FIFTH Fleet. To : Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Pre-war Espionage in Hawaiian Islands.

1. Forwarded.

D. C Ramsey

D. C. RAMSEY / Chief of Staff.

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# EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

14 October, 1945.

ANCEY

091/130 Ser.000374B HEADQUARTERS, V AMPHIBIOUS CORPS FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO

TOP SECRET

From: The Commending General. To : The Commander, Fifth Fleet.

Subject: Pre-war Espionage in Hawaiian Islands.

Enclosures: (A) 2 copies subject publication.

1. The attached progress report from the 496th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment is forwarded in duplicate for your information.

2. Additional progress reports of the subject will be forwarded you as they become available to this Headquarters.

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HEADQUARTERS FIFTH MARINE DIVISION 496th CIC DETACHMENT c/o FPO, San Francisco, California

TOP SECRET

Sasebo, Kyushu 13 October 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR THE AC OF S, G-2:

SUBJECT: PRE-WAR ESPIONAGE IN HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

E : Interview with Yoshio SHIGA, Lt Cmdr. IJN

On 9 October 1945, this agent interviewed Yoshio SHIGA, Lt Cmdr. IJN. at the Kinkiso Tea House, CMURA, Kyushu. Although difficult, this interview was conducted without an interpreter as SHIGA speaks some English. Informant is an aviator and participated in the Japanese attack on FEARL HARBOR on 7 December 1941. He lives at Itoyone, YAMAGUCHI CITY, Yemaguchi-Ken, Honshu. On about 15 October 1945, he is scheduled to fly a Japanese plane (escorted) from CMURA TO YOKDEUKA. Following this he plans to return to CMURA, by train, where he expects to be discharged from the Navy.

On about 1 April 1941, SHIGA said that he was directed to leave his assignment as instructor of pilots at OITA and report to SASEBO. Upon arrival he noted that the aircraft carrier "KAGA" was in port. Upon reporting at the base he was ordered, by Teigi YAMADA, Captain of the "KAGA", to go to YOKOSUKA with 23 other pilots and learn to fly "0's". From about 5 April until 19 April the group practiced flying these planes. On 20 April 1941 they went to SUZUKA, Honshu, and received new "0" planes.

The group practiced with these planes until the last of April when they were ordered to fly to KONOYE, Kyushu. En-route SHIGA noted that the carrier "KAGA" was anchored off KAGCSHINA CITY. Following their arrival at KCNOYE the group was ordered to practice landings aboard the "KAGA" as it steemed in and out of the bay. They did this until about 1 July 1941.

About 1 July, the carriers AKAGI, SORYU, and HIRYU arrived at SHIEUSHI BAY, a short distance from where the KAGA was anchored. All of the pilots from the carriers then went to KAGOSHIMA CITY. In practice the carriers alternated, three at SHIEUSHI BAY and one in FAGOSHIMA BAY. The fliers practiced carrier landings and dog-fighting. Teem work was the essential of this training period. Two planes fought three planes, then three against six, and then six against nine. The objective of 9 against 18 was not reached, however.

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On about 8 August 1941, all of the carriers were ordered to YOKOSUKA. On about 10 August, the carriers SORYU and HIRYU were suddenly ordered to SAIGON, Indo-China. SHIGA, along with the rest of the pilots, was ordered aboard the HIRYU. The Japanese Army met no opposition at SAIGON. After the carriers were there for about a week they left for Japan and arrived at SASEBO about 5 September 1942.

After two or three days the two carriers were ordered to SAHEKI, Kyushu, Upon arrival SHIGA noted the carriers SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU and the battleship YAMATO were in the harbor. He stated that he then became suspicious that "something big was going to happen". While there the pilots practiced navigation. dog-fighting, and carrier leadings.

"On 5 October 1941, a meeting was called of all officer pilots of the carriers, aboard the ArACI in SHIEUSHI EAY, by the Chief of Staff of the carriers, Rear Admiral Rynosuke KOSAKA. About 100 attended. They were told, very secretly, that on 8 December 1941 (Japan Time), a Japanese Naval air force would strike the American Fleet at HAWAII. Grend Admiral of the Japanese Navy, Isoraku YAMAMOTO, also addressed the group saying that although Japan never wanted to fight the United States they were forced to because they would be defeated regardless, if the United States continued its aid to Chine and its oil embargo. The U. S. fleet, he eaid, was Japan's strongest enemy, so if they could strike it unexpectedly at HAWAII it would be two or three months before it could manuever. By that time occupation of BCRNEO, the PHILLIPINES, SINCAPCRE, JAVA, and SUMATRA would be complete. "

SHIGA stated that the consensus of the pilots following this startling news was, that to get to HAWAII secretly, was impossible. Hence it was a suicide attack. Also that it would be best for the Japanese Navy to fight the American Navy at sea without this attack. All of the carrier pilots were then granted a 7 day leave. On their return they went to SAHEKI and again practiced until 17 November 1941. On that date the KAGA, with 24 fighter planes, 36 torpedo planes, and 24 hell divers went to HITOKAPFU HARBOR.

Upon arrival at HITCKAPPU HARBOR, SHIGA noted the carriers AKAGI, SCRYU, SHOGAKKU, ZUIKAKU, battleships KONGO, HIEI, heavy cruisers KUMANO, MIKUMA, SUZUYA, plus one other, about 1ć destroyers, and four or more large submarines were in that port. He believed that these submarines had midget submarines aboard. In the carrier force there were about 300 planes plus 9 seaplanes aboard the battleships and cruisers.

Frior to departure for HAWAII SHIGA said that they were briefed that FEARL HAREOR anchorages were: battleships on the east side of FORD ISLAND, carriers on the west side, destroyers were anchored in northeastern corner, and heavy cruisers on the HICKAM FIELD side. They were also told that the U.S.

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TOP SECRET

carriers were usually around LAHAINA ROADS, MAUI, during week days and entered FEARL HARBOR on Saturdays, where they stayed until Monday mornings SHIGA said that Rear Admiral OKADA, Captain of the FAGA, visited the flagship AKAGI / / / daily. Just DFIOT to departure GKADA told him that there were 6 darriers in Hawaiin waters, that the SARATOGA was on the U.S. west coast, and that the ENTERFAISE was two or three days cut of Hawaiin waters, en-route from the PHILLIPINES.

Subject believes the force left HITOMAFTU HARBOR between the 27 and 30 November and at cruising speed headed for HAWAII. They knew, he said, that U. S. air patrols went 800 miles south of DUTCH HARBOR and 600 miles north of MIDWAY. Their course was right between the patrolled areas during which time, he said, the weather was foggy. They were 800 miles use north of HAWAII on 6 December. They then received, from the Japanese Navy Department, a wireless message, "CLIDE MT. NITTAFA". (This information corresponds with that received from a Japanese Navy Vecomen captured during the SAIFAN operation) This was the signal for the attack and at 24 knots they sped southward to within 250 miles of CAHU. There the planes took off.

SHICA said that this information was given to him by Lt Cmdr MURATA, Shigeheru, Chief of the Air Squadron adoard the flagship AKACI, on their return to Japan when SHICA inquired of him "who was the heroic person responsible for getting the information concerning the ships in MEARL HARECR".

Journe state, SUPA: believes that the information was conveyed on radio programs just following the news broadcasts, which he stated were at 6:30 AM, 12 Noon, and 7 FM. He was prone to think that time following the 7 FM broadcast was used since the Japanese agents would then have had an opport lity to convey information concerning a whole day's activities. "

On the first Saturday when the force was at sea, (which means it had to leave prior to 29 November), SHIGA said that they received reports that there was only one or two carriers in FEARL HARBOR. Because of this the pilots were disappointed.

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SHICA said that on 6 December 1941, some time between about 8 and 9 FM (Hewaiian Time) news filtered to him that there were no carriers in FEARL HARMOR, but that 8 battleships, and 15 cruisers were in the harbor. No report was received concerning destroyers. There was no set way of his receiving news of this type so it was impossible to determine at what time the ANACI might have relayed it to the Captain of the FACA.

At the briefing, prior to the operation, each pilot was furnished with a photograph of a map of FEARL HARBOR. The names of the ships in FEARL HARBOR were not known and each pilot just made rough entries of courses and enchorage areas or missions.

Since it was felt that more could be gained if a person versed in the technical phases of aviation interrogated SHIGA, he was turned over to Lt W. H. FEDRICK, S-2, Marine Air Group 22, stationed at CMURA, to fully develop the attack phase. A copy of his report, however, will be forwarded to this headquarters.

The rough sketch map concerning the attack, accompanying this report, is preliminary, resulting from the first interview with SHIGA by this agent.

Concerning the espionage conducted for the attack, which is of great interest to the CIC, SHIGA could offer no other leads than that of the HCNOLULU Broadcasting Station. He said that at no time, to his know- M ledge, were visual land signals used from HAWAII.

The only person he could recall being alive from the AKAGI, who had participated in the FEARL HARBOR attack, was its commanding officer, Rear Admiral Rynosuke KOSAKA. He is presently Chief Liaison Officer at the KONOYE Naval Base.

This agent is presently under orders and awaiting transportation to KONOYE where he will interview KOSAKA in an effort to obtain additional information.

- 4 - Trent, CIC, USA

Robert N. Tait ROBERT N. TAIT Special Agent, CIC

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(There is a map accompanying the above report of ROBERT N. TAIT, Special Agent, CIC, which portrays by rough sketch the islands of Oahu and Kaui and the Kaui Channel, and has noted thereon information obtained with reference to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and other installations on 7 December 1941 as set forth in the report. This map is reproduced as Item No. <u>/9</u> in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee.)

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCULENT #13 (A NAVY STUDY) ENTITLED "SORTIES BY ENEMY SUB-CAPRIED PLANES and SUB CARRIER IDENTIFICATION" USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE "NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANTSE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR" (Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

> (EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8 IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

> > 1

# ENEMY LISSE SORTIES BY SUB-CARRIED PLANES (Lista)

New information on the enemy's use of submarine-borne aircraft for reconnaissance is furnished by a captured document (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 12,212), which lists a series of sorties covering nearly a year in time and extending from ZANZIBAR east to OREGON.

During that period, the plane-carrying subs lost 24% of the aircraft which took off--most of them in landing and recovery accidents.

All sorties listed were flown from ten subs of the "I" class--the I-7, I-8, I-9, I-10, I-19, I-21, I-25, I-29, I-30 and I-31. A total of 38 sorties were flown bebuween 30 November 1941, and 11 November 1942. This was t the most active period for enemy sub-borne aircraft. (Hence, no mention is made of the Jap sub which reportedly reconnoitered PEARL HARBOR in October 1943.

Many of the subs employed have probably been lost during the past two years. The only identifiable loss among the group listed above, however, is the I-7, sunk at TWIN ROCKS, KISKA on 21 June 1943. This was confirmed by salvage operations.

The first listed flight, flown eight days before the attack on PEARL HARBOR, was a night sortie over SUVA BAY. The document states succinctly that the plane "did not return". Also noted are flights over PEARL FARBOR on 17 December 1941, 5 January 1942, and 24 February 1942, and over the OREGON coast on the nights of 9 and 29 August 1942.

-2-

DATE	Name of Sub	Place	Time
30 Nov. '41	I-10	SUVA BAY	Night
17 Dec. '41	I-7	PEARL HARBOR	Dawn
5 Jan. '41	I-19	PEARL HARBOR	Night
7 Eeb. '42	I-25	SYDNEY	Dawn
24 Feb. '42	I-9	PEARL HARBOR	Night
26 Feb. '42	1-25	MELBOURNE	Darwin
1 Mar. '42	I-25	HOBART	Day
8 Mar. '42	I-25	WELLINGTON	Pre-dawn
13 Mar. '42	1-25	AUCKLAND	Pre-dawn
19 Mar. '42	I-25	SUVA	Dawn
Not known	I-10	DABAN(Comment: There is a DABANU on	
		WOODLARK or MURUA IS., between Eastern NEW GUINEA and NEW GEORGIA IS.)	
7 May. '42	I-30	ADEN	Dawn
8 May '42	I-30	JIBOUTI	Dawn
19 May '42	I-30	ZANZIBAR	Dawn
19 May '42	I-30	DAR-ES-SALAAM	Dawn
19 May '42	I-21	SUVA BAY	Dawn
23 May 142	I-29	SYDNEY	Dawn
24 May '42	I-21	AUCKLAND	Dawn
25 May '42	I-9	KISKA, AMCHITKA	
26 May '42	I-9	KISKA	
27 May '42	I-19	"While making preparations for a night	
		flight on the Northern side of BOGO	
		ISLAND (Comment: Probably BOGOSLOF	
		the ALEUTIANS) an enemy destroyed w	
07.14	7.05	and we submerged, badly damaging ou	
27 May '42	1-25	KODIAK	Day
29 May '42	1-21	SYDNEY DIDCO SUADEZ	Dawn
30 May '42	I-10 I-10	DIEGO SUAREZ DIÉGO SUAREZ	Night
31 May '42	I-10 I-10	Plane search off coast of DIEGO	
1 June '42	I <b>-1</b> 0	SUAREZ	Night
9 Aug. 142)	I-25	OREGON (State)	Night
29 Aug. 142)	1-20	OREGON (State)	Night
19 Aug. 142	I-29	SEYCHELLES IS. (SEISERU SHOTO)	Day
30 Aug. 142	I-19	SUDEKO TO	Day
13 Oct. '42	I=7	ESPIRITU SANTO IS.	Dawn
19 Oct. '42	I-19	NOUMEA	Dawii
30 Oct. 142	I-9	NOUMEA	Bawn
2 Nov. 142	I-8	EFATE IS.	"Moonlight
5 1000 15	10		from 0000
			0030"
4 Nov. 142	1-31	SUVA	0100
4 Nov. 142	I-9	NOUMEA	Dawn
11 Nov. '42	I-7	VANIKORO IS.	Dawn
11 Nov. '42	I-21	NOUMEA	Dawn
11 Nov. '42	I-9	ESPIRITU SANTO	Dusk
TT HOVE TO		-3-	

-3-

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Comment: No mention was made in the document of the I-17. When sunk off NEW CALEDONIA in August 1943, prisoners from this sub claimed that it had reconnoitered west coast areas by plane in February 1942.

#### JAP CARRIER IDENTIFICATION

A recently captured order (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 12, 253) presumed to have been issued by a Squadron CO of the 121st Air Group, describes identification markings which appear on flight decks of combatant carriers. The captured order indicates that markings are to consist of either the first two or the first and last Kana syllables of the ships' names. The Kana syllables "2U HO" were already noted in a photograph of the CVL ZUIHO, sunk on 25 October (see "Weekly Intelligence, Vo. 1, No. 18).

The order states that large white Kana symbols are to appear on the starboard side toward the stern. The first Kana is to be eight meters  $(26\frac{1}{4})$  feet) square, the second four meters square.

-4-

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #14 ENTITLED "JAPANESE BATTLE LESSONS ON SUPPLY IN THE GREATER EAST ASIA WAR SUPPLY BATTLE LESSON NO. 1" USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE "NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR" (Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

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This is a translation parallel to the translation stated in Source Document #15 post of the same captured Japanese Document.





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#10,678

SUPPLY BASES AND FUELING FLEET UNITS AT SEA dated 10 June 1943, captured on SA\ (AN.

43

EDITOR'S NOTE

This document comprises extracts taken from an official study of problems relating to supply compiled 10 June 1943. Recommendations are included for the enlargement of supply bases and depots at BARO. MIKAWA WAN and KURE. Examples are cited showing the difficulties experienced in fueling fleet units at sea during the first year and a half of the war; recommendations call for the installation of stern refeuling gear on all ships, an increase in the rate of supply per hour, and the strengthening of hoses used in fueling. It is stated that the maintenance of supply lines calls for the construction of two naval storeships of the IRAKO type. It is possible that keels for IRAKO type ships were laid before their usefulness as contemplated in this document was **Engatix** neutralized by the Allied advance.





#10,678

Military - Very Secret (GUNGOKUHI)

Committee on Investigation of Battle Lessons, Supply Section (BUNKAKAI) 10 June 1943

BATTLE LESSONS ON SUPPLY IN THE GREATER EAST ASIA WAR

SUPPLY BATTLE LESSON No. 1

Table of Contents

Page

I. Mandatar Enlargement of Facilities at Supply Bases

II. Fueling of Fleet Units at Sea.

III. Capacity, Performance, and Number of Supply Ships

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# I. Enlargement of Facilities at Supply Basas

 There has been a sudden increase in the operating efficiency of enstone-houses, piers, and government buildings being used by the YOKOSUKA Naval District in YOKOHOMA. (YOKOSUKA Civil Engr Dept).

 Facilities at Fuel Depot #3 must be enlarged to permit the mooring of two or three 10,000 ton AKs. (3rd Fuel Depot).

3. Loading and su, ply facilities at BAKO must be expanded. The capacity to supply fuel oil must be increased to 10,000 tons per 24 hours. (2nd Fldet).

4. Supply installations at MIKAWA WAN are insufficient and require enlargement. (1st Fabet).

5. The supply quart of the KURE Replacement Shop must be enlarged. It is frequently found too narrow for supply loading work and belay results... (lith Air Depot).

6. Planes completed at the lith Air Depot are operating on flights and as air transport after being transported by surface to the IWAKUNI Air Group; the loss in labor and time required for this is great. At least one runway of the KURE airfield must be lengthened and widened. (lith Air Depot).

7. There are numerous instances where the capacities of local Stores Departments have been insufficient and even a set meet the demands of operating forces. It is essential to expany installations and place experienced persons in charge so as to keep on hand arge amounts of stores and insure a rapid supply. (All depts concerned with naval store).

-1-

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8. In order to expedite supply to the various forces in the farflung combat areas, and also in consideration of such things as air raids, it is m necessary to establish branch offices of the local stores departments or branch supply depots with each from line force. (All Stores Depts).

9. Because of insufficient supply installations at local stores pepartments, heavy equipment such as DP guns and generators cannot be unleaded, and some things cannot be installed. The handling of torpedces and mines is also very difficult. Not only is there a great possibility of damage to delicate equipment but there are many instances when it is not suited to rapid supply. The installations of piers, cranes, cranes on cargo lighters, and trucks is absolutely necessary. (All Stores Depts).

10. Acceleration in fitting out Specially Established Naval Stores Departments is earnestly desired. The 4th Naval Stores Department legally is tactically assigned to the 4th Flost; however, it has a great deal of importance as a front line supply base even for ships of the Combined Flost. Therefore it is necessary to attempt the speedy completion of installations as already planned and to equip them with an eye toward our persistent firive to the south. (2nd Flost).

11. At RABAUL there is not a single sound pier installation, while great labor is being expended entirely on loading and unloading. No matter what other sacrifices are made, piere must be installed immediately. (108th Air Depot). <u>Conclusion Workford</u> In order that deficiency in supply installations will have no great effect on naval operations, it is necessary to determine at the central /activity/ the urgency of actual conditions in all areas and to formulate remedial measures.

- 2 -

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The states LL. SUITE DI DUIT AV SHITPS II. Fueling of Fl et Units at Sea.

There are many times in operational waters when fuel oil cannot be supplied unless refueling from astern is used.

The rate of oil received by ships per hour and the rate of supply to small ships from large ships is insufficient. (All Ships).

It is necessary in all cases to increase the rate of refueling to 300 metric tons per hour. (BatDiv 3).

The number of times refuelled and results during the year since BatDiv 3 commenced operations:

 KONGO
 HARUNA
 Average Amount

 From AO (2 hoses astern)
 8 times
 5 times
 160 m tons per hr

 from DD (from alongside)
 17 times
 22 times
 110 m tons per hr

 The ZUIKAKU (CV) similarly-loaded at 160 metric tons per hour, taking

 on 1942 m tons from the NICHITO MARU in 12 hours. An increase to 300 or 400

 tons is necessary.
 (ZUIKAKU (CV))

<u>Conclusion</u> (Apidida)/ It is urgently necessary from a military standpoint to put into effect the following measures for the supply of fuel oil at sea:

- 1. The installations of stern refueling gear on all shipe.
- A great increase in the rate of supply per hour in order to shorten the total time required.

- 3 -

# IN INFROMMENT OF NAVAL STORES FROM THE STANDFOINT OF SUPPLY OPERATIONS

1. More than ten hoses broke during magnetivers on the HAMAII Operation; and during the INDIAN OCBAN Operation the hoses of an oil tanker were damaged and supply was greatly delayed. (CarDiv 2).

2. Losses from cutting and leakage during towing and refueling are likely to occur. Also, since the hoses stretch about 10%, the part which bends is likely to become constricted and greatly reduces the capacity for supplying oil. The number of times accidents happened to hoses from the beginning of the war up to the end of 1942 is shown below: (BatDiv 3).

Astern from AO	Times Damaged 9 (TN: sic)	HARUNA Times Executed	
Alongside from DD	3	22	1

 If the inner surface of the hose breaks, the filter is likely to get clogged up. (KENTO MARU, ZUIHO (CVL)).

4. If the weak points of the 12 meter cellsphane (SENCTUAN) have were improved upon, it would be mitable for use on naval vessels. Ten haves might be made standard equipment for BBs, reducing the mamber of 4.5 meter haves now in use to have?

Conclusion (order) Collophane (SEROFUAN) hoses must be made tougher.

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Contract 10,678 OF STIPS HULLS MACHINERY, FITTUNGS AND EQUIPMENT V. IMPROVEMENT Gr. Battle Lesson (BAAA) 1100000

It is necessary to install equipment for refueling from astern.
 (All ships).

2. In the case of tankers which supply from both eides, if supply cannot be carried out from both sides at the same time, the transfer of fuel cannot be initiated. Improvements are necessary So that separate supplying can be carried out. (AKKEONO MARU, DesBon 4).

3. There are instances in which extraneous matter becomes mixed with the oil when refueling is being carried out from tankers. Refueling speed is reduced about one-third and inconvenience in loading results. It is necessary to equip tankers with changeable filters. (ISS (EB))

4. In view of the many instances in which hoses are burst descent of the pressure caused by faulty operation of the intake valves, it is necessary to install equipment which will prevent great pressure, such as automatic cut-off valves. (TORO MARU).

5. Oil intake fumnels should be installed on all fuel tanks. (MTOKO (CA)).

Condit:	lons or	the	HIOKO

No of funnels	No of auxiliary lines from each funnel	No of tank connection valves from each line	No of tanks
12	1	0	12
2	1	2	4
8	2	0	,16
2	2	4	8
6	3	0	18
2	3	4	10
2	Ĩ.	0	8
Ĩ,	5	0	20
		Mate 7	

6. The great length of the air outlet pipe on fuel tanks makes necessary the enlargement of the pipe line to facilitate the outlet of air.

Unless there is considerable pressure on the intake valve, loading is impossible. (CHOKAI (CA)2, MYOKO (CA)).

7. From the standpoint of rapid supply, it is necessary to reduce the number of fuel tanks and increase the capacity. (CHOKAI (CA)).

8. It is necessary to place the containers for the fuel intake valve, the intake gauge pipe and the hose in places convenient for loading operations. (CHOKAI (CA)).

9. When the YUBARI (CL) is about half filled with oil, the upper tanks cannot be filled unless the hatch is removed and the hose directly led in. Since capacity fueling from estern is difficult, and inconvenient from an operational standpoint, it is nemessary to equip each tank with a main intake pipe. Moreover, since funnel fueling of lower tanks requires time, it is necessary to convert to pressure fueling. (TUBARI (CL)).

10. Often, large amounts of oil collect in the tanker's hoses at the time of refueling and the result is delay in the work of connecting the bose (5 large buckets of oil have been collected from one hose (about 0.3 ton)). (HAMAKAZE (DD)).

11. By reason of the hindrance to rapid fueling occasioned by the length of time required to drain (1.5 hours), it is necessary to increase from 40 tons to 80 tons the capacity of the sequence drainage ejector in the compensating oil tank. (MAKIGUMO (DD)).

12. It is necessary to equip tankers with oil heating equipment throughout, In case of low temperatures, the effect on the speed of refueling is great.(BatDiv 3 - 2007- 6

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13. It is necessary to install equipment so that oil may be supplied at might. (KENTO WARU).

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14. It is helpful if the telephone can be used by both parties as a means of communication during refueling operations. For reasons of security, flare signals should not be used during refueling operations at night. (KENYO MARU).

15. It is necessary to provide aviation gas supply ships with supply horses (about 50 m). (Carbiv 4).

15. AXe must be fitted out with hatches and derricks, and the crews must be well instructed in their use. (MineLayerDiv 18)

Sometimes, two hours are necessary for the Launching of Large Landing barges. There are converted chartered vessels whose hatches are inconveniently placed for loading and unloading. (108th Air Depot).

 17. 2 Converted AKs are inconvenient for supplying lubricating oil. (NISSHO WARU).

Attention to ship's equipment is essential.

#### TRIXXIXXX BIRARABARPETCALADETS

<u>Conclusion</u> (Anticher). It is necessary to re-examine plans for the supply facilities of vessels so that supply capacities may be increased to the utmost.

1. 2.5. Bernin 10,678 III. Capacity, Performance, and Number of Supply Ships THE CADAGET I STATE The Battle Louisva Washest 6 Signal flags by which the type of supply ship can be recognized at a glance must be adopted. Amminition ships have been mishaken for storeships. 7 A Battle Lesson (Ana) It is necessary to equip AKs with 40 ton derricks fore and aft to make possible the loading of lighters, large landing barges and other heavy objects. (YOKOSUKA Regional Transportation Dept). Conclusion (Andrew) It is necessary to have a large number of AKs which are equipped with heavy derricks. 420 2. It is generally very profitable to use small, high-speed ships in southern areas. (MineLeverDiv 18, etc). 3. When accompanying a flost, the present speed of 15 knots is difficult; a speed of 20 kpots is necessary for fully loaded oil tanker. (EDETO MARU). Conclusion (Chiminal) Good, fast ships must be chosen as supply ships to accompany the fleet. Battle Lesson ( Matom) 1. Armament is weak; it must be strengthened. (MineLayerDiv 18). Communications equipment is very deficient; it is inconvenient in 2. directing maneuvers. (2nd Fleet). 3. It is necessary to add 2 MG. (Have at present one 7.7mm MG and 7 rifles). 2, pairs of 12cm binoculars are required. (Have at present 8cm). (KENTO MARU)--4-4

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 It is necessary to increase rifles by two DP guns and MD by 12 12mm or 25mm MGe. (KURE Havy Yard).

5. Three Sca binoculars, X twin mount 11 mm MG, and DP gun are required. Still another secondary frequency for radão transmission is required. (NICHIYO MARU).

6. There are numerous instances when requisitioned shipe are attached from the side opposite the gun. In view of actual circumstances they should be equipped with one gun forward and one aft. Shells must be increased from 20 to over 50 rounds per gun, and depth charges from 4 to 6. (TOKOSUKA Regional Transportation Dept).

#### Conclusion Konthien

1. In view of the fact that there are many times when skill in lookout and evasive action determine the fate of a ship, it is profitable to develop these capabilities to the utmost.

2. Although AA, ASW, and communications equipment have been greatly increased, we believe that the present standard is inadequate.

Battle Lesson [B4astal

In spite of the fact that there have been numerous opportunities for using sonverted airplane lighters, their number has been insufficient, as has been the number of large landing barges. (11th Air Fleet).

<u>Conclusion (Billibry</u> Two converted airplane lighters must be assigned each air fleet and they must be equipped with 4 large landing barges.

Battle Lesson Masbaly

Conditions are such that supply of fuel and lubricating oil in local
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areas is impossible and the terpedees supplied cannot be prepared for firing. This is gradually being taken care of by transferring small amounts from the supply of other ships. Since this is a great inconvenience, it must be made possible to get oil from ammunition ships or from sil tankers. (KINUCASA (CA))

2. The torpedoes supplied, once adjusted, go several months without examination and readjustment; there are many that are defective from having been in man storage a long time. If we were to participate in an operation imminist immidiately after the delivery of these torpedoes, not only would we find them not completely ready for firing, bu we would have some uncasinese regarding their accuracy. (KINUCASA (CA)).

#### Conclusion (04414m)

G

 Fuel oil and lubricating oil must be included with torpedoes supplied from ammunition ships. (This has been done).

 Torpedoes supplied must be inspected at suitable intervals and imperfect one readjusted.

At present, conditions are such that with every possible use of the WAMIYA (AF), and the IRAKO (AF), supply is barely being carried **ERK**: on.

Battle Lesson (Mador)

It is feared that in the event of an accident to these, supply lines would be thrown into disorder and the effect on morals and on operations would be great. Two naval storeships of the IRAKO type must be constructed and put into operation immediately /in order to supply fresh provisions/. (2nd Fleet).

At langt two the first man and define (Ind) the outgoing is and bottle enviloes) must be attached to the Continuit Flat. (and Flat) <u>Conclusion</u>. The number of neural stoneshing for fresh provisions such the important.

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CINC - The Interior (Maded)" **~**....

1. Fuel oil is generally supplied every eight days; but fresh provisions are senstimes needed for as long as twenty days. (Deston 2).

 Oil tankers must be equipped with refrigerators and thus be emploid to supply fresh previsions at sea at the same time that they supply eil. (2nd Floot).

<u>fonelucion</u> (**Second**) It would be well to plan for small eraft such as HDs to be supplied with freeh provisions at the same time and place that they are supplied with fuel eil.

(End)


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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON


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
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
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10678 (main ) 1 - Diam And paintinettes plo time in posing sufficient to 1 T -----ala dan Serainang Se Kipit di An Mala dan Sebaharang Se Kipit di An C Berlin 2 A PROPERTY as pulses to partic methods fail areas \$4 services in States and a line of a line in the summer, by house side and the second s 1 84 teritoria anticipati, interfer produces to a in the second alle de l'en part, l'aufraite et sons " replacing one said to write, when tern fürre mit n grunt ------ Anton and an annual of the Carrie 15 Nov. )

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






weighted indice and consequently are used anisity for temport work ( 2000) pairs ). Research the bricker are secured and may of the over are in decays of the stifting and there is no decays for decays in the except R is president as predicable to me time bein ships as decays.

( Ministernation 2.5 )

14678 Ballin Zantana Charles the forest and Taking in JUNE are toying in th It is measury to while obly manufa for supplies from a permits and to such drops an mile encyclers as they article -----the pulsting of respective particle indicating maker of lating in and persons transportation resp seder to fashifted the supply of the Deservation Rept. But because th nation) metericle between impes of is a look of no-specular, the result is satisfy and the places applied the present providence attacking which appelling pro loss as they a at the solitor long particle of the series dies population to ver day semantiment and much our site in ......... -----Optimize to patient implement it the had requested /the supplies/y inertiship here a dessibilizing offset as the of monthy personal. ( All implials ) The use of employedies selectals in The electrication of much sidpe to initiated in Socian 3, Survey of tion actorials to be With they Alexand and a d lat of 6 and of for operational perpasses by 2059, Universe, slave the beginning of the it was furning must be alarticipit. nor them has developed a method to to depart as mility as side militat monorale, there is also the prevale entiresy to deput upon Hered Stores Day







It is necessary to elimin to the first for getting the Hevy Minister's approved for the transfer of even one place to ane other ship, so that this can be if done with the approval of the CinC.

Ates Mir Pleet)


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When spare parts any searce as at present, we believe that under due head if they are archerest products, all as either meterial of similarent, wher conmong petition fortuness the various senote that will be eliminated. Moreover, if for is organed as mathered, is will not from the menessary to transfer as thomas if if follows in the simulation as Yorkas been that transferred to external of mercels of goods facilitated.

Bith Mir Sepot)

It must be clearly indicated that Tool Genteen goods membreary for all broop organizations is marking are to be handled as markl stores. Hencever, we believe that articles difficult to oftain or to murphy, once humed ander one head, mould be treated so that they have be mailward as baling applies (inclustificity) (milling above (inclustificity)) and, when nedesary,




Oristo for the surface of series

at be centrally controlled.

The hundling of canteen goods matcheric material souther which are indispensable to life in transareas must be tuproved so that supply is always maintained and so that security is not and super descript a loading standard for simps must be established.

part at the second -----1.000 under Mar Justinistical of 40% Mary Wildel Abuy and Milbelly for an Arabidet as of annuality dependences in their transport and angular. Does the passe of steel of sumsplay Los., this is a and the local sectors and the service of a service of mak a same post manage on Maliver that his best method is to ustablish a single (and desides and in the local the standingers Dept to be as b. 1271 Jp. 70 - den le The states of gives winder obviouslass is a and in state enters perme ever make much the second of the second of a to La and Plant (151-9 of 1 bot (and Floirs)



. حلولة يغترون إيحا ليا مناده and a second and the second s and the state the - Serie Spreament, Survey Spills en al constant de l'an any de Selana de lana a const -----(its hard matri)

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They and or Larrisian : (23) = static links land invest flores and the second of the second of in the al Dorres Department Logally Minde Man ath Flority housers; it has a and doub of importance as the trant most supply base for sides of the Conbined Fleet. Tearsfore it is memory to attempt the speety amplation of bes bemally there as anothic and to scalp 22 with an ove toward our surmiations drive to the south. (2nd Flent) (11) it ishani there is not a single would play installation, while greatlished is being interestraty on loading and unlooking. No matter what other emerifions are ande, piere must be installed (108th Lir Depot) impilately. (1) It is very unprofitable to have Alechart equipping out be loops an airoraft angular return to JAPAN in hand in on the us polatible at the for simula the Mpply of afforeft lovel dir Looks. equipment. All sir depote must be entritted with equipment and be made able to rediffer wanters flat, 11th, and 4th Air Fits, and Crubil ak wares (2) 40 tions are outh that it is impossible to penerate planes or to test Large TAPAR BOOK BAPAR or medium types. is also difficult and thus me million there is great mariety stimal flithte. Bathir 3.

- to be to - mount and for instances and the set of a dia non la compansión da paraista na secondaria transport an entrempt or press ( seeshed ( B) ) sandar ( B) XA (SX) Sta Constraition Babtali L BIT entrie forest strong and and and the bis Brow Porting Sta Star South and the Tread of the ball of bill bears with wither be DEVICE ISHICAL BUR STREET TO Malagere (C. C. C. Malad VALUE (CL) DECEMBER (17 34) - 65 40 Dend DRIVEL REARD, (BB) & HIE STREET CO. LAND WIND, Steam Lar 8 - 349.2 (;) it is multe too tee thet Fringeneous wild be and the sapr los La Mas r ata con ha civin al faith the d a idourtee bis

(A) ADDOUDS IS IN DEDURATION the product of all the endeeried bisplick ships, to is enteditably difficult to emply the reputed mount in the rea earled of the because of the move which at both periods summaries. formilies a limit suspet of motion nd 600 1000 a homistair la das most demond because as to be this to te utilite termenter black autor The paying papering 13 m 's or west lange Course, what the is really

n-vised 1: meneties storyper you- information, the summenet general rep to jobs of the members of instrong of the star of the test your of such a star i dumper of general sector jobs for your 2012

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It is essential that applieds in Jurah of subper for repair of mannel used an second the tooot, the i repairs on arrector juickly, no that supplies be aveguetes

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A State of the second sec	19 # 10678
TI SUPPLY OF POULLAS	Ben ALA ARCI
NUMBER CLIPPEN - LUCAL SWITT	
number Mattle Lesson (Reason)	Conclusion (Upinion)
Considerable efforts are being	& central agreement between the
made toward local self-sufficient in	areyand havy regarding the solicy of
trent provisions, Bonever, the alitab	local self-sufficiency in Some fresh
Forwardery and Agriculture ( = HE 241	provisions must be made and the the
and the soldier Pieberies ( thing ak	local authorities must be made to
() which are working to supply the	comply.
savy with from provisions at statist,	
under anthressation of west secret	
Frovisioning #120, both have their h	
bases and producing areas in the	
former mritish area sorth of TANAU	
and have therefore run into dif-	1
ficultize.	
102 scarple:	
In June of last year the SHIME	
- Lass ( the St ) ( I rose the altitude	
Fishing Lorp.) Luis	
ing versel to the BOBHEO	
rieveries, me prolibited from fishing	a she is the
in the former writish possession (the	
marth coast of summer).	Branche e et al
it is necessary to get fermination get	
to makes freak regetables from the	
allotted	
freeh provisions accept the Mavy supply 14 are bartsred for , and supply 14	
- udfruit -	
(101st real popot, TALLAS Breach)	and the strength

-+10678 C 20 Even it attau of this place /TARAKAN/ A greated number of storeships were to attempt self-sufficiency, is needed for the local supply of there would not be enough fresh prolocally mined provisions. dailons in ticks area. Fresh meat and mean vogetables especially must be supplied from some place like JAVA. but at present a store bin makes caly one or two trins every two months from the 102ad Ward Stores Dept (SCHABAJA). The momber of storeships for local Stores Deptie must be increased; at least two or three tripses worth must be made. For year information, the amounts acoded here and the auto of salfsupply are given in the following tabler Percentage 3616 by all govt offices & forces here (kg per day) ply 200,000 3,200 (5days 3 70 rash ri nh 68% 1,030 160,000 Fresh (10 days 1943 ment. 600,000 54.0% rash hlas (101st Fuel Depot, TARAIAN Branch) Machinery for the purveyance of Supply for personnel of the f 3 local products dust be established the Broth (during the first phase order the companyate for of the war totalling 100,000) is insufficient with the storeships used at present. (2nd Fleet)

687

10018 ----tenteneren er ungelandet nate (annenen, anderen u inter of the proto, theness, out, of West the matter to starting a stra The state of the states - along more that I wont every a faretality on es respected theating is relited Letter we and the state of the AND BERRE AND AND AND A my them is approximate 1. I an interest s - her of clock is so its of The product of the character of the second of a i les tradition de Subsection 2 the depth A LONG TO A

De DOCOD (P) subbulg lovens de De Long en Long dubes sees per Long dubes des per Long dubes dubes glace com ton 11 and 12 love dube glace com to the terment of com to plate lang de company. (2002/01/01/01/01

Spectra Cilled L a) ministrations and annual forecastle a non-1 of questions we below a 4 for an even and a series and a series given and adapt oblighters in 28 in difficult for our 1 monole, builded of heighter and a monole, builded of heighter, builder resultations in pictul addies, builder resultation and arbitrary and other to 1000 for distributing and other to 1000 for a series (11 form) for any of monol of marilies (2) magnetic bring to the series of the series and the other and the series of the series

triling, or instant is their seriester to are inperiant places and they very which go to the uset forward areas more much instant orall state as minimum and instant orall state as solve, forwarding subtacts angly align much be given by job at reputying there even with muchait and the farmer of the farmer o

#10678 Avertale. (3th Floot, WAIRING Boyd, See stal, many taval benettal, 5th d . . the Party (3) The accounts of Scepital ships are very limited; they warely to hate areas shore usail oraft are p (per) make trips o - Alie tyles a month and therefore their : and officers must be made responsible for the supply of modecal materials bathesen, ships. (7148, 70505054 645 SRLT) 2 When ships are point to a going to energy - p ly corfeen of the The transfer between ships of they are reas clothing) provisions, shatmas pools, by transferring as much of their supplies navy relief, goods, and special pointble to station reaching bootes. wartine site must be regulated at we are an ald in offerting the Ser out Floet Bg in order to incore an Larino Space (Estair 3) searcity of none and willing ..... NUMBER OF SUPPLY SHIPS AND THANK PERFORMANCE, AND 11.11 · · · Conclusion (Opinion) Battle Lesson(Reason) Showal rings which indicate Signal flags by much the type of sup-1 ply ship can be receiptized at a glappe must the type of supply ship shelld be miland at appropriate times. be adopted. Aurunition shape here been minisked for storeships, and thereby opp tumities to lost supplies have been (Demisor (1) Migh-speed, and the type shipe must Goodd fort older much by shown 2 e used in meringenterenses. ( hereinet) - -----LA SER HEREAR PARAME LA LOODERLEY. (2) It is generally very profitable to bles Disease. e small, high-spend ships in coulders 42 18, etc.) . (23 Part and a property of the de thealt.

rells leaded oil tanker, (MING 14.14) nt ike made, 10 meat be Monekayar Bry (2000 - 18)

to to motion of to

strengthaned. (See 18)

(2) so manie spicero all'a piere in

- definitant; it is indervice and in

( IT Is decession to set a Md De

( Kinin De Isterard )

(1) In view of the fact that many there was times when skill in lookout and evasive mersach deterising the fate of a ship,

crowsed from 20 to owner 50 rounds per gam, and derbh charges from 4 to 5. (rokosnika Regional Transportation Dapt)

VIS - - I Crosselled to 18

In spite of the Tact that there have been minerous opportunities for using converted airpline lighters, their number has been insufficient, as has been the number of large landing barges. (11bh Air Fleet.)

4

(1)Sociations are such that success of fuel and labricating oil in the area the is impossible and correctors supplied cannot be prepared for firing. This is producily being televitire of by irentsferring small assemble from the supply of annverted Twonairplans lighters must be essigned each sir fleet and they must be equiped with a Lerge Tanding burget.

(1) Puel cil and lubrication all much be included with terredose surplied be communitioned in. (Thus has been done.)

(2) Torpedaes supplied must

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attan atgan, alam the transf become atgan, to and be used perate (a ge of ) you mean this of the or transf throws, (ADA) and (A) (2) Yes to prove a manifest, and attants, or several cooks which is an attants, or several cooks which is attant of particulation involution, the several attants is a severable attant attants is a severable the several attants is a severable attant attants is a severable attant attants attants a severable attants attants attants a severable attants attants attants a severable attants 

(1) Territorial engand in the 2020operation and introductions of the billing area breach and introduce on the sector of billing areas, thereacter stay news billing areas to a benefit Date.

 (2) Committing in the life fill Build of users recovered (19) 12-bit mer 1912), and have recovered the shown and the model Energy and the paperticulation inter-11 target are for paperticulation interstinging and interthing are 14 in shifting).

Aligned along home have not 24 in efficient i to which forms happedial data for a supply almanual an automatical form a reason incompare are anoughout which a reason incompare are anoughout which is reason of contacting sourceded are to be income that the superior of the source the light of the Solidities of the light of the Solidities of the superior and the superstance of the superior of the (1) The number of acapt(1) white the beinsmann and the merculate of the stop on woodus and the mighly of sight when this facilitation.

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and famotost once read makes,

 (2) The capacity Monomotical analysis for applying medical meteridiv mast be increased.
 (3) Gamp Lighters to be used.

to assuming putients must be

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At present conditions are such that with every powellie use of the minimum (LP)and the Diamo(AP) supply is nearly being narried on.

It is fourned that is the sympt of at sociders to theme, supply lists reals the thread data disorder and the wirect an morals and as consentions mould be gread, two naves consentions mould be gread, two naves consentions and be constructed and put into operations isometically (is conders To intro operations

corritto al manuvers infrende ping es last three motion or more and the rapid meraly of large quantities of storage goods to forward srets is iscordible. Moreover, storage facilities for pro-minicus of forward samply benes are po-ALL TATOES and conditions are much that stationed in these areas ar-----pilod, Lise, because other parliment, eremition, and sideallaneout goods have cess loaded indiscripting taly on suppay silps of the Transportation Department system and the novements of these shire arve not been under the direct on wision of the Combined Slows, the status nî terneport fran Jibi dan been such to Che X.rapid, lange-scela cumply door operat fores, interestinger, watches courd to ated with their marying moments is inperciale,----At least no because for story

orisions (including control goods and

aufory theisthen for staring enveloped in torising areas cost in algorithm and many cost formal for any formal for mortal one added for all sug mortal one added to in the mortal one added to in the costney flows.

The summer of stormanips for fired

(2nd Place)

THE TRANSFORT

nothin mapping) cost be stipabed to the Combined Floot, ( 200 (lett)

(1) East is generally applied avery signt days out from provisions are constinue average forms long as twenty days.
 (2) Obtanious must be somipped with refrigerators and thus be somipped to supply from provisions at the same

time that they sapply all.

It would be walk to chain toamble walk events more as a to be supplied with frame provisions at the same time and place that they are supplied with ford oil.

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Battle Leason (Resson) (1) diace it is believed to be very profitable both in the supply and transfer of urgently needed opers parts, regnt transport planes should be detailed to all air depote for their exclusive ope. (1)th sir Depot, 1.8th dir Depot) (2) Fleets or Stores Depth in transfer attenue and every effort must be mode to provide a raid supply of adaly expend-

(JOKOSBK: Mart Stores Dept)

shie light squipmont.

 (3) In view of the great ansats of medical way lies requiring our in preservation, and argent goods such as blood vaccine and I-may film, it is necessary to meet the demand by increasing oir facilities-(NONE Many Yard, Seb-Smar 17 [it-in] (a) Shee it is difficult to supply operational contere by murface, anbulance Conclusion (Opinion) Propriet regulation and recomposite in fraction Air trunsportation or office for The trunsportation or office for The

planes ( providential method) must be used to the primeterial unperity model method in Derials (arrans, ranginal dressings, pic.; onl and pelicete mass. (anizono meral potential)

# STREET OF DESCRIPTION OF SAVA STORES FROM THE

Maktle Leasens (Seasers) Frank and a stand the stand and the In the State Proversition on Service the HERLIG Dealer Generation for the beginner wire well and and ty ma grobtly inlight. (Cards (2) James Stop mithing and backing derive having and refinit a are likely to m. Kiro, sines the bound strates speak las, an plet sideb sense is illedy to beowner momentation and grantly reduces the separate for employing oth. The master of Showing Association happing the balance from the basing of the mar op to him and of 191s. in three to long (อิสายการ)

> c(002) (Rb.) Hardona tanata casa tanan ta soluni danaged suited s o 9(TK) sto.) S 1 Δ7 3 -22

> > (HENYS HARY SET (HENYS HARY ZUHARK ZUHARK (1 100 - JUNE 1 1 100 -

an if and a militally for any a more

Canalysian (Velating) (セロフアン) Pallophum (ーーローー)

heart may be made brugher.

CINCPACICINGEDA Ham the

- Battle Laurent (Hennes) 1. (sect.) systemat for His, reducing the most

4.5 meter house nor in use by half.

Thusle and the like manot he lifted. Basy goods should be sitted milly, and it is noncentry, at the time with metal attachments for conof manufucture, to emply holes to be and variance in corrying and the in lifting heavy aptialas which are shipped weight of the goods should be IN THEY APR. plainty marked,

Page 25

there are may instances in which an ories have been demaged in pressit.

( LOSNE Adv Rapes )

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5.

Generally, the size and weight of the peopers must be limited as much as passes ential/pack articles surplay in this, Sizing articles of verying sizes and weight and size in the same ber. weights is a large box simply increases the Tas valght and size of the box rate of damage.

Partializers, since public been are minshed out af doors fur a fairly long time alsarly on the extende of the bor. In comment eress, it is important to make olear the necessity for ears in headling and presserving the contents.

( 100th Atr Depot )

Security of the reakness and inferior "meterials is boil hence per in use, there is not only damage to be ibs, Which summer easily, but the inconvenience in fandling In boundy full.

( 13th Lir Depot, 198th Air Depot ) 1), Dars are may employ of deteriorstics and decreased atristancy which come with segundan of output areas and bosicos of conditions of temperature and elimite which make special ortiples measury.

To prevent damage, it is onemost muit the systels /packed/. Presentions must be noted

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Femiliadia (Feinies)

It is mecessary to construct a framework for commission in hasiling built opticings and for prtling in and taking out houte.

In knowing with the expectation of combat urose, 15 is monopolary te conditer the tenyers bure and altests is once area and to make studies concerning improvements

Page 30

Vertices studies in this regard ers being and salepties of pildlary stores seminated, leasanth has already been appropriate to the surrist out concentry heat-prost dry coming pictorities in picking. intimies and positing for the prevention of soil dissings thread during tenter periation or storage. There is also a gradunl Approvement in barrack ogdynest, These problems should be studied in posts time so that maried advenuetances may be exped with. It do necessary to set up descent research semelas.

( TOROBELL PLOTES Dans )

 $\mathbf{c}$ 

2). Bushitty to high in terrid son and in these areas, many second amplied from Jilli are unsable then pereived. It goes without saying that the phoneruntion of these items is difficult.

( 101st Paul Deput, MARASAN Dramash ) 3). Dry plate photographic papers segur poper kept is storege is terrid comes for three norths because northly and came's he . . . here

( 108th Air Depet

A). To PARAST. BERNARD BALLAND sulpherination is great day to the me ains in the pros. As a result, the illusinsted dials of peaceting instruments corrallos bes minutes increased and soils are broken er danaget.

( 3.00% Air-Depet §

Baittle Logien (Bestein) Demobert on (Orderton) serves and o

CINCTAS CINCTOA INH # 10476

CINCPAC-CINCPOA Hem #

Page 31

Intile Legens (Second) 1), Defective parts are frequently frend to shonge as being in good shapt. ( TORONAL Stores Dept ) 2). Heny artialss here been port to an area should be sent only after re-inspection termitately arter baing tales from storage . increasing after arrival has revealed mer defects. 18 to record menter this is in/the true

( TERRITIKA Sieres Dept. )

5

It is emblable to use ships within the meriment for the dolivery of classified documents. In articlesition for difficulty the to /ddp's/ merements, it is personny to pask then in heavy paper or blad then with stript of slotts.

Perthemano, 10 sources with Military Arrairs mores Order \$650; Section 1, dealbeg with untions of disposal of its classified incommits when me langer of use, the cover bearing the name of the downerst(in dramings, these parts which hear the alapsification motion and place same) must be returned for filling, then proverling the spread of information and contributing to make security. ( TRACELA Minera Dapt ) -

Agundes for the distribution of supply of In order to simplify articles used as spare parts for a great may types spars poppy used in a grader great many high types of ears are being actup by area, such of cars, the principarts should be as suched in "A" area and TOIODA in "B" area, standardized to much as possible. Then unlie are transferred from one area to mother, 15 is mercenty 1 parts applied in the arden on that a application of public will not ready. & (YEROSUKA Stores Dept)

Gualantes (Opinios) Restaugt forwarded from to lagel areas and equiptent traumfarred from Stares Depts for supply purposes and adjustment.

16673

Then elsestied material is sunt additional attention and study much be devoted to the pasking.

Battle Leson (Reason) Conclusion(Upinion) Dam greatelly sale bit the Jureau &m part Dieren Der Les -based waits in for fermers arous, furniture requires the comin't arous similar be knot as the grant deal of alogds as possible. In the tort more and packing and atter. labor, tim and fredgirt within and ----in in expension in its transportation, d 26 10 damaged in transit and from th point of mpply sit-in ( TOKOSULA Stores (Papet )

They st

CINCTAC SCIENCEDA Item #

VIII, THE DEPOTIMENT OF SELPS' HELLS, MACHINER, PERTING IN PORPHENT FROM THE PERDEPOINT OF STEPPLY OFDATIONS.

1). It is necessary to install equipment It is necessary to refermine for refealing from asters. plans for the supply familitie

( All shdpe )

2). In the same of tankers which supply supplifies may be increased to from both sides, if supply somet be carried the stanut, out from both sides at the same time, the transfer of fuel samet be initiated. Improvements are assessing as that separate applying sam be survised out.

( AIDGROUD MARS, Deskan 1 )

3). There are instances in which extranoous matter because mixed with the oil when refueling is being extrined out from tenkers. Refueling speed is reduced about one-third and inconvenience in leading results. It is mesonably to equip tenkers with changeable filture.

# ( 192 (80) 1 )

4). In view of the many instances in which Man beens are burst due to <u>family opposition</u> extreme presence second by family sparsified

t It is measury to referencies plana for the supply familities of vessels so that supply segments supprities may be increased to led the stanet.

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=		CINCPAC CIFCPO	A feen # 10478
		Tage 33	
Ye.	Rettle Lessen (Retern)	1 C 1	nim(Dyinim)
1	of thes intells valves, it is ascessivy t	la	and the second se
6	Sectell equipment which will prevent gro	at )	
	pressure, such as actenatic ext-off will		
1 1	( 1000 0007 )		
	5), 011 intake femals should be instal	Ded	
15 - I	m all fuel teaks.		
	( 100000 (CA) )		
	Conditions on the KTOKO		
	Ho. of Ho. of muciliary lines Ho. fummals from each fummal wal	of tank connection	a for at basis
	12 1 1	0	.12
	2 1	2	4
	8 2	0	. 16
	2 2	- 4	
	6 3	0	28
	2 3	4	10
	2 4	Q	. P. (4)
	4 5	0	20
1.4.1			
	6), The great length of the sir outlat	pipe	
	on fund tanks makes measury the salary	· · · · ·	1.02
. *	most of the pipe line to familitate the	onte	
0.11	lot of air.		
1. 1	Dalass there is couniderable pressure of		16 1
	the intake valve, leading is impossible.		
	( GHORAT(CA.), MIGHO (CA.) )		1
	7). From the standpoint of repid suppl		
	La monitorry to reduce the maller of fun	1	
	lanks and igorouse the cepsoilty.		17.00
A 19	( GHORAI(CA) )		- 10 · · · [2]
1	8). It is accountry to place the contain	Sector Contraction	
	for the fuel Infolm valve, the Inteke ge		20.
	pips and the hose in plaque convenient for		
2	lesing operations. (CATAICA)	1 hours	

CINCPAC CINCPOA Hom # 104

Complete Lot (Contest and

There be

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON

SOURCE DOCUMENT #16 (U S NAVY WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN VOLUME 1 NO. 22, 8 DECEMBER 1944) ENTITLED "UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS, WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE" USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE "NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR" (Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

> (EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8 IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

CONFIDENTIAL Vol 1 No 22 8 DEC 1944

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS

# INTELLIGENCE

EEKLY

NEVADA AFIRE ON 7 DECEMBER 1941

(see story of PEARL HARBOR on page 1)

705

Any material appearing in "Weekly Intelligence" may be reproduced with or without credit, so long as proper classification is observed.

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"Weekly Intelligence" receives wide distribution among fleet units and key Navy, Marine and Army Commands. Any requests for additional distribution may be addressed to Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Area.

Note: Starting with the next issue, the regular publication date of CINC-PAC-CINCFOA "Meekly Intelligence" will be Wonday rather than Friday. Therefore, Vol. 1, No. 23 will be issued on 18 December.

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# PEARL HARBOR: THE PLANNING STAGE

When Jap planes struck clustered U.S. warships and aircraft at PEARL HARBOR on 7 December 1941, the energy was carrying into effect pin-pointed plans conceived months in advance and long cloaked in secrecy. Until recently, little has been known of the planning stage prior to the sneak raid on HAWAII.

The first concrete intimations of early energy intentions are revealed in the interrogation of a Japanese Chief Yeoman who worked closely with top-ranking Jap Navy personnel during critical months in mid-1941. The prisoner, who was captured on SAIPAN, had access to highly confidential documents as well as behind-the-scenes rumors while plans for PEARL HARBOR were being perfected.

The prisoner appears both exceptionally intelligent and cooperative. Testimony capeble of confirmation from other sources checked closely. Tactical information (as contained in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, Nos. 2 and 3) proved reliable.

Kost remarkable of the POW's assets is his memory of details, as indicated in his reconstruction of the historic Combined Fleet Secret OpOrder #1, of 1 November 1941. This document, reproduced entirely by memory, is believed to be fairly accurately transcribed, and will be printed in full later in this article.

As a yeoman attached to the Staff of CinC Combined Fleet (Admiral YAMAMOTO), the prisoner became familiar with Jap war games. Staffs of the various Japanese Fleets worked these out on a large game board. Games were held frequently, sometimes as often as twice a month.

Prior to late August (1941), war games were held at such anchorages as SUKUMO, SAEKI, KAGOSHIMA, and KANOYA. Close attention was devoted to current experimental data, which was incorporated in tactics employed. Although the prisoner insists that enemy countries were not specifically designated during these games, the identity of possible Jap foes could scarcely have been obscure.

During this period, the prisoner added, there was a constant interchange of personnel between CinC Combined Fleet and the Naval General Staff. Men on these staffs were reportedly "definitely much keener" than members of other Fleet staffs.

Final planning stages were presaged late in August, when CinC Combined Fleet ordered all Fleet Commanders and their key Staff members to TOKYO for further war games. Offices at the Naval General Staff at JAPAN's capital were found inadequate, and the games were thereafter held in the Naval Mar College. The POW claimed that security measures at the War College were woofully inadequate. Classes at the College continued as usual; "any man with a half-official air could easily have walked in".

On 2 September the final all-important "games" got underway, with an introductory speech to all officers taking part. Rooms were assigned to the "N" Team, the "A" Team, and the "E" Team (Mippon, America, and England) and to the umpires. The teams, composed of virtually every top-notch dap Naval officer, were made up

CONTINUED

CONFIDENTIAL as follows:

# UMPIRES

RANK	OFFICIAL DUTIES
Admiral	
Rear Admiral	Head of First Section (War Planes and Operations).
Captain	Member First Section.
	Head of Sub-Section, First Sect.
	Member " " " "
	19 EE HI EI EI
	и и и и
Commander	n <sup>n</sup> n n n
Captain Commander	Member of Kilitary Affairs Bureau.
	Admiral Rear Admiral Captain Commander Commander Commander Commander

	SHIKI, Tsuneo	Commander	п п п п п
,	TOIBATA, Kurie	Commander	" " Office of Military Supply
	FUJII; Shigeru	Commander	Private Secretary to Navy Minister (Admiral SHIWADA, Shigetaro).

# N- TEAM

COMBINED FLEET

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku	Admiral	CinC Combined Fleet.
ITO, Seiichi	Rear Admiral	Chief of Staff.
KURÓJIMA, Kameto	Captain	Deputy Chief of Staff.
GOTO, Shigeru	Commander	Staff Adjutant.
ISOBE, Taro	Commander	Staff Engineering Officer.
SUGI, Toma	Commander	Staff Gunnery Officer.
SASAKI, Akira	Commander	Staff Air Officer.
WADA, Yushiro	Commander	Staff Communication Officer.
NAGATA, Shigeru	Commander	Staff Navigation Officer.
WATANABE, Yasuji	Commander	Staff Operations and Plans Officer
ARIMA, Takayasu	Commander	Staff Torpedo Officer.
SEIMI, Ichiyoshi	Commander	Staff Supply Officer.
OTA, Kanai	Commander	Neteorologist attached to Staff.

# 1st COMBINED COMMUNICATIONS UNIT (RADIO INTELLIGENCE)

KAKIMOTO, Gonichiro	Rear Admiral	Commander.
ARISAWA, Naosada	Commander	Deputy Chief of Staff.

# E-TEAM

# SECOND FLEET

KONDO, Nobutake Admiral

Commander.

PAGE \_

YANAGIZAWA, OISHI, Tamo		Captain Commander	Deputy Chief of Staff Navigation	
POURTH FLEET				
INOUE, Semi		Vice Admiral	Commander.	
FIFTH FLEET				
HOSOGAYA, B	oshiro	Vice Admiral	Commander.	
ELEVENTH AIR F	Leet			
TSUKAHARA, KUSAKA, Jin		Vice Admiral Rear Admiral	Commander. Chief of Staff.	

# A-TEAM

THIRD FLEET (Amphibious Forces for Southern invasions)

TAKAHASHI, Ibo	Vice Admiral	Commander.
Ishihara, Hajime	Captain	Deputy Chief of Staff.
SIXTH FLEET		
SHIMIZU, Mitsumi	Vice Admiral	Commander.
KANOAKA, Tomojiro	Captain	Deputy Chief of Staff.
FIRST AIR FLEET (Carrier Fl	eet)	

NAGUMO, Chuichi	Vice Admiral	Commander.
KUSAKA, Ryunosuke	Rear Admiral	Chief of Staff.
GENDA, Minoru	Commander	Deputy Chief of Staff.

On 3 September, officers involved studied classified material. POW was assigned to "N" Team (CinC Combined Fleet). That afternoon, Commander WATANABE - Admiral YAMANOTO's hard-working, fact-finding Plans and Operations Officer - handed the POW an outline of conditions under which the games were to be held, and requested fifty copies. These terms, which set forth a working basis for the games, contained the heart of the forthcoming 1 November OpOrder #1. Extensive preliminary planning was indicated. The prisoner believed that these plans must have been under development for several months. This was the first time that the POW realized that something of unusual significance was in the air.

On 5 September, the POW was attached directly to Commander SASAKI, CinC Combined Fleet's Staff Air Officer. When he entered the smoke-filled room at about 1000, he found PEARL HARBOR plans under discussion. The Japs apparently expected to catch all major U.S. Fleet units in the Pacific in PEARL HARBOR as well as units believed recently transferred from the Atlantic. The prisoner was surprised to overhear that "N" Team expected to lose one-third of the units participating in the attack on HAWAII; one AKAGI Class CV and one SORYU Class CV were estimated as

### sunk.

On 6 and 7 September, the conference of "N" Team debated the best means of assaulting PEARL HARBOR. (The POW, who was adept at the abacus - calculating board was often used during these sessions to estimate fuel used by Fleet units at varying speeds). It was during this stage of planning that Captain KUROJIMA (Deputy Chief of Staff) and Rear Admiral ITO (Chief of Staff) differed as to the practicability of conducting an amphibious assault on HAMAII. The cool and precise ITO was (surprisingly) in favor of an early landing, and YAMAMOTO was inclined to agree, but the intuitive, tempermental KUROJIMA won the discussion by pointing out insuperable logistics problems. The POW believes that ITO's plan was a last-minute, improvised idea, and that - when KUROJIMA's argument succeeded - the basic plan continued as originally intended.

These early sessions, the POW said, seemed confined primarily to two general problems: first, the details for a successful surprise raid on PEARL HARBOR; and second, a carefully worked-out schedule for occupying MALAYA, BURMA, D.E.I., the PHILIPPINES, the SOLOMONS, and Central Pacific Islands - including (ultimately) HAWAII. Neither AUSTRALIA nor NEW ZEALAND was apparently considered as immediate military objectives; the Japs intended simply to cut them off from outside help. The POW heard INDIA mentioned only once, when some senior officer remarked "that's where friction with GERMANT will begin".

The conferences (and "games") were ended about 13 September. The prisoner helped carry the notes to KURE, and thence by launch to the NAGATO, IAMAMOTO's Flagship, which was anchored at HASHIRAJIMA. About half of the Staff were already on board.

On 15 September, all the Staff with four yeomen (not including POW) journeyed to the IWAKUNI Air Group to confer with the Army. The POW remembers TERAUCHI mentioned, but cannot recall other names. He insists, however, that TOJO - then still War Minister - was not present. It was widely rumored (but never confirmed by other evidence) that the Army conferees at this meeting had not previously learned of plans to attack PEARL HARBOR.

The NACATO remained at HASHIRAJIMA for about six more days. At the end of September, the main body of the Jap Fleet moved to SAEKI. There were four revisions of Combined Fleet OpOrder #1 while the Flagship was at SAEKI, though no major changes were made.

On 1 November, the final printing of the order was started, requiring almost three days to complete. Two copies were sent to the Army. Staff officers of other Fleet units at SAEKI called for copies in person. In all, 300 copies were distributed. OpOrders #2 and #3, designating Y-Day and X-Day, were issued on 5 and 10 November, respectively.

(Comment: The enemy naturally uses East Longitude Time in his OpOrder - i.e., the date of 8 December for the PEARL HARBOR attack is correct ELT.)

The prisoner once knew the OpOrder intimately. Over a period of weeks, he has labored to reproduce on paper as much of the Order as he could remember. This version is obviously incomplete and not to be compared with the original document, but in main outline is believed to be substantially as printed. Notes in parentheses were added by the editor.

> Flagship NAGATO, SAEKI WAN 1 November 1941

## COMBINED FLEET SECRET OPORD #1

The Japanese Empire will declare war on the UNITED STATES, GREAT BRITAIN and the NETHERLANDS.

War will be declared on X-Day.

This order will become effective on Y-Day.

### GENERAL SITUATION

(a) Policy toward the UNITED STATES.

In spite of the fact that the Empire has always maintained a friendly attitude toward the UNITED STATES, the UNITED STATES has interfered in all the measures which we have taken in self protection for the preservation of our interests in East ASIA. Recently, she has blocked our speedy settlement of the CHINA Incident by aiding the government of CHIANG Kaishek and has even resorted to the final outrage of breaking off economic relations. While senselessly prolonging Japanese-American negotiations, she has continued to strengthen her military preparations. She offers a threat to us in the form of a concentration of her Fleet in the PACIFIC OCEAN, thus attempting to exert on us both economic and military pressure.

(b) Policy toward GREAT BRITAIN.

BRITAIN is eiding the government of CHIANG Kai-shek and, acting in concert with her Allies and the UNITED STATES, in interfering with our program of construction in East ASIA. Recently she has been steadily building up the defenses of her bases in East ASIA in an attempt to threaten us.

(c) Policy toward the NETHERLANDS INDIES.

Although economic negotiations of a peaceful nature have been underway with us for a number of months, the NETHERLANDS INDIES has been led by BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES to reject flatly the continuance of mutually beneficial economic relations. Recently she has threatened the fortunes of Japanese which have been built up as a result of persevering work through long years.

(d) The ports and the vast fertile regions of the coast of CHINA have been occupied by us and most of her great cities captured. CHINA, however, CONTENT

supported by BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES, has not yet awakened from the deluding dream of "Fight the War and Save the Country" and is attempting total resistance to JAPAN in the form of a "scorched earth" policy for all CHINA.

While organized resistance is gradually becoming weaker, the prevalence of guerilla warfare has obliged us to commit large numbers of troops to permanent garrison duty there. If we are to secure decisive victory, BRITAIN and the UNITED STATES, the powers behind CHINA, must be destroyed.

(e) Policy toward the SOVIET UNION.

The strength of Soviet forces on the Soviet-Manchukuoan border is formidable.

The USSR is maintaining a vigilent alert, awaiting developments. However, if the Empire does not attack the SOVIET UNION, it is believed that the SOVIET UNION will not commence hostilities.

# OUR SITUATION

The Fourth Fleet has largely completed preparation in the Mandated Islands, as has the Eleventh Air Fleet (Naval shore-based air) at essential bases in CHINA, FRENCH INDO-CHINA and THAILAND. The state of repair of our ships and planes is generally excellent and the efficiency of their personnel has markedly improved.

# STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

To drive BRITAIN and AMERICA from Greater East ASIA, and to hasten the settlement of the CHINA Incident. In addition, it is expected that when BRITAIN and AMERICA have been driven from the NETHERLANDS INDIES and the FHILIPPINES, an independent self-supporting economic entity may be firmly established. The vast and far-reaching fundamental principle, the spiritual guide of our nation, (the "Eight Corners of the World Under One Roof - HAKKO ICHIU), may be demonstrated to the world. To this end we will use all the military strength necessary.

### STRATEGY

The strategy to be adopted against BRITAIN, the UNITED STATES and the NETHER-LANDS will be as directed in the Annexed Volume. X-Day and Y-Day will be announced later.

If before X-Day the enemy is believed to have been able to ascertain our plans, the execution of X-Day will be made the subject of a special order.

If before X-Day we should be attacked by the enemy, his attack will be crushed with all available strength. All commanding officers will act in conformance with "Strategy to be Adopted in the Case of an Enemy Attack".

In the case of the SOVIET UNION, every effort will be made to avoid provoking hostilities. At the same time, every effort will be made to insure the secrecy

of our plans. If the enemy should ascertain our plans, military operations will immediately be begun in accordance with "Measures to be Taken in the Case of an Attack by the SOVIET UNION".

Circulation of this order is limited to Fleet and Force Commanders. These Commanders will take every possible measure to prevent leakage of these plans prior to their being carried out.

Precaution: Disposal of this order.

This order must be burned when no longer of use. If there is any danger of its falling into enemy hands as the result of a ship sinking or some other untoward occurrence, the responsible Commander shall personally make immediate disposal of it.

# Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #1

### ANNEXED VOLUME

- Joint Army-Navy operations will be carried out in accordance with the "Army-Navy Central Headquarters Agreement".
- 2. A Striking Force (Carrier Task Force), having the 1st Air Fleet (Carriers and Escorts) as its main element, will depart its naval bases or operating areas about X-16 Day, and will set course, by way of TANKAN BAY (HITOKAPPU BAY, ETOROFU ISLAND, KURILES) for PEARL HARBOR, the base of the American PACIFIC Fleet, where it will deliver a surprise attack.

X-Day is expected to be during the early or middle part of December.

- Targets for attack are airfields; aircraft carriers; battleships, cruisers and other warships; merchant shipping; port facilities; and land installations, in that order.
- 4. From the time set by the Force Commander for the Striking Force to leave port in JAPAN, strickt radio silence will be observed. Communications will be via ordinary broadcast system. The code book to be used will be "(not certain)". The following communications abbreviations will be in effect: "Warm warehing in PEAPL MARPOR" \_\_\_\_ "The fate of the Empire"

"Many warships in Fix	AL HANDON".	-	"The race of the miptre".	
"No warships in PEARL	HARBOR".	-	"The cherry-blossoms are in all their glory".	
"The weather is clear good in the region. an attack".		y -	"Climb MT FUJI".	
"The time to commence is 0520".	the attack	-	"The depth of the most of HONNOJ] Temple is 0520".	i
"All forces attack".	et	.c.	"Climb MT NIITAKA!".	
	CONTIN	NED	PAGE	-

The course and the disposition of the attacking units will be determined by the Striking Force commander.

The Commander of the Striking Force will inform the proper authorities as soon as he determines on the course and disposition of the attacking units. Care must be taken to avoid ordinary merchant shipping routes and to keep the plans from disclosure under any circumstances whatever.

- 6. Procedure to be followed in case of discovery before the attack either by a ship of the nation against which war is to be declared, or by a ship of a neutral nation (including the SOVIET UNION).
  - (a) In case of discovery within 600 miles of the objective by a ship of a nation against which war is to be declared, make immediate preparation to attack and sink it.
  - (b) In case of discovery within 600 miles of the objective by a ship of a neutral nation, the ship should immediately be detained until it can do us no actual harm; strict surveillance should be kept of its radio transmission. In case it should make any transmissions which might prove harmful to us or give us reason to fear that our plans might be revealed, the ship will be seized by a destroyer which will make immediate attack preparations.
  - (c) In case of discovery by a foreign ship more than 600 miles from the objective, the ship will be detained and radio transmission forbidden. However, if it seems highly probable that our general intentions have been guessed, an attack should be made immediately, if between X-5 Day and X-Day. If before X-5 Day, the Striking Force commander will decide the disposition of the ship, depending on the circumstances. In the case of detention of an enemy ship, "B" method will be followed.
- 7. The Commander of be Surprise Attack Force (Submarine Force), having the óth Fleet (Submarine Fleet) as its main element, will have most of the submarines leave the western part of the INLAND SEA on X-20 Bay to attack PEARL HARBOR. Its entire strength will be disposed so as to command the harbor mouth. It will attack any enemy warship which may have escaped from the harbor. It will also carry out reconnaissance before the attack, and if the opportunity presents itself, will carry out surprise attacks on enemy warships with midget submarines. The time for such attacks will be after the flights of planee have attacked OAHU. Every possible means for recovery of midget submarines should be considered.
- 8. Joint Army-Navy operations should be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Central Headquarters Agreement. The disposition of forces will be determined by the Commander of the Advance Force (principally Second Fleet cruisers and destroyers). The Commander of the Advance Force will inform the proper authorities as soon as he decides on the course and disposition of the attacking units.

The point of departure for the ships of the MALAY and FRENCH INDO-CHINA Forces will be BAKO and the point of departure for the PHILIPPINES Occupa-

tion Force will probably be PALAU.

- 9. The capture of English and American troops and ships in CHINA will be arranged by the Commander-in-Chief of the CHINA Area Fleet. The occupation of HONG KONG will conform to the provisions of the Army-Navy Central Headquarters Agreement and is the responsibility of the Commander, 2nd CHINA Exceditionary Fleet.
- 10. English and American merchant ships which are in ports under Japanese sovereignty at the time of the outbreak of the war or which are in ports which may be taken are to be captured if possible.

SOVIET shipping is to be kept under surveillance after undergoing a rigid inspection.

It whould be so planned that none of our shipping will be in foreign ports when the war breaks out.

11 Beginning on Y-Day the Commander of the 1st Combined Communication Unit will send false messages to give the impression that the main strength of the fleet is in the western part of the INLAND SEA.

After Y-Day has been determined, the NYK passenger vessel TATSUTA MARU, which is scheduled to proceed to the west coast of AMERICA, will sail; arrangements will be made to have her return while en route. (This was done, and Allied passengers were interned; the same procedure would have been followed with any trans-Pacific liner scheduled to sail in this period).

When Y-Day has been determined, the Commandant of the YOKOSUKA Naval District will allow as many men of his command as possible to go ashore so that the number of men on liberty in TOKYO and YOKOHAMA will give a false impression. (Another POW confirms this).

12. The Commander-in-Chief of the 4th Fleet (Mandates Fleet) will expedite the attack and occupation of British, American and Dutch bases in the North and South PACIFIC, acting in close cooperation with forces of the 11th Air Fleet in the South PACIFIC. Enemy air power within our sphere of operations will be checked and communication between AUSTRALIA and the mainland of the UNITED STATES will finally be cut.

It is expected that in this manner AUSTRALIA will be isolated and dominated completely. The natural resources of all kinds which the bast continent of AUSTRALIA boasts will then fall to us.

(The dates for execution of assault and occupation of various British, U.S., Netherlands bases were then listed in this paragraph - a few of which follow:)

(1)	GUAM	about X	plus	2.

(2) WAKE about X plus 7.

CONTINUED

- (3) (The dates for the invasions of RABAUL and the islands from the SOLOMONS to the FIJIS, SAMOA, and SANTA CRUZ groups were all entered.)
- The date for the seizure of MIDWAY is set as late Spring of 1942. The date for the occupation of the HAWAIIAN ISLANDS is scheduled for October 1942.

Herewith are two of the above referenced documents

THE ARMY-NAVY CENTRAL HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT.

The object of Imperial Headquarters, Army Department and Imperial Headquarters, Navy Department in setting forth clearly the division of duties and command in joint operations was to promote a maximum display of efficiency. (According to POW, it was issued at the end of October 1941. A resume of the contents follows:)

- 1. The highest ranking Army officer for SUMATRA, BORNEO, the MALAY Peninsula, CELEBES, and the PHILIPPINES (including FRENCH INDO-CHINA and THAILAND) will be Field Marshal TERAUCHI, Hisaichi. His command will be called the Southern Army and ite headquarters will be in SAICON.
- Plans for escorting large Army convoys and the place, time and date for landings.
- 3. Agreements on Aerial Warfare Agreements on the places to be attacked by both Army and Navy planes and on the places, dates and times of attacks by Army or Navy planes acting independently. Agreements on the airfields to be uses, such as "XX Airfield will be used primarily by the Army and secondarily by the Navy."
- 4. Supply Plans.

Plans for the supply of Army landing forces to be effected by Army shipping and for the Navy's support of same.

- 5. Communications Plans.
- Agreement on occupied territories, cities, and resources such as, "The BANDJERMASIN Oil Refinery will be controlled by the Navy".

MEASURES TO BE TAKEN IN CASE OF A SOVIET ATTACK.

(POW does not remember the date exactly, but it was the end of October - and stated in effect:)

"It is believed likely that we shall not be attacked by the SOVIET UNION unless we attack first, but in case JAPAN is attacked first, the 5th Fleet (Northern Force) will counterattack with all its strength and maintain local supremacy."

YAMAMOTO, Isoroku Commanding, Combined Fleet

Flagehip AKAGI, SAEKI WAN 10 November 1941

### STRIKING FORCE OPORD #1

- 1. All ships will complete battle preparations by 20 November.
- The fleet will rendevous at TANKAN WAN. (HITOKAPPU BAY, ETOROFU Is. KURILES).
- 3. Inaamuch as the plans for the coming operation must be kept absolutely secret, strict security will be maintained in regard to them, up to the time they are explained to the crew after port of departure in JAPAN has been cleared.
- 4. Break-down of attack plane units.
  - The AKAGI 1st Attack Plane Unit Unit Commander: Lt. Comdr XX 1st Carrier Attack Unit Etc. (details not recalled by POW).
- 5. Fleet cruising formation (Including retiring formations)
- 6. All transmission of messages is strictly forbidden.

Transmission and reception will both use the TOKYO #1 broadcast communications system.

NAGUMO Chuichi Commanding Striking Force

Verbal explanation by the Chief of Staff, Combined Fleet of ambiguities in Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #1.

(Printed version of an explanation of details not covered in the order delivered to the High Commanders in an informal talk.)

1. That the coming declaration of war against ENGLAND and the UNITED STATES will usher in a great war of survival with the two leading naval powers of the world.

That this war is really one in which our existence is in question, one in which we have no choice but to strike with our military power.

 That our Navy, in engaging a worthy enemy, is about to realize an ambition which dates back to the foundation of the Imperial Navy many years ago.

PAGE II

- That the alliance with GERMANY was not desired by the Navy, but was a project favored by the Army which thought it would hold the SOVIET UNION in check. (1)
- 4. That the campaigns in the NETHERLAND INDIES and in the PHILIPPINES will be preceded by the securing of advanced bases in THAILAND and FRENCH INDO-CHINA. It is believed that these operations will come off in extremely smooth order.

The Navy will be able to secure sources of oil supply swiftly by means of these campaigns.

5. In connection with the attack on PEARL HARBOR, reports indicate that a gigantic fleet, which includes the ATLANTIC Fleet, has massed in FEARL HARBOR.

This Fleet will be utterly crushed with one blow at the very beginning of hostilities. It is planned to shift the balance of power and thereby confuse the enemy at the outset and deprive him of his fighting spirit.

Our objective, however, lies more than three thousand miles away. In attacking this large fleet concentration it is to be expected that countless difficulties will be encountered in preserving the absolute security of the plans. If these plane should fail at any stage, our Navy will suffer the wretched fate of never being able to rise again. The success of our surprise attack on PEARL HARBOR will prove to be the "WATERLOO" of the war to follow. For this reason the Imperial Navy is massing the cream of its strength in ships and planes to assure success.

All of the planes of CarDiv 1, CarDiv 2, and CarDiv 5 will be concentrated in the attack on OAHU. If there are any ships which escape, almost the entire submarine strength of the 6th Fleet will be in command of the harbor mouth and will concentrate torpedo attacks on them. In addition to these, the destroyer strength of (DesRon 1) will be deployed in a screen (mainly for night attacks) and the fast battleships of BatDiv 3 deployed in a fourth echelon. If the main force of the enemy fleet should escape from FEARL HARBOR and make for the open sea, it will be waylaid by the Main Body of our fleet.

- 6. The midget submarine unit has been studying and training at the KURE Navy Yard with the CHIYODA for a year and a half, but it is still too much to hope that it has reached a stage of perfection. In any case, the crew members are supremely confident. The 6th Fleet will attempt to use them in attacks within the harbor.
- 7. It is clear that even if AMERICA's enormous heavy industry productive power is immediately converted to the manufacture of ships, planes and other war materials, it will take at least several months

for her manpower to be mobilized against us. If we insure our strategic supremacy at the very outset of the conflict by attacking and seizing all key points at one blow while AMERICA is still unprepared, we can swing the scales of later operations in our favor.

8. Heaven will bear witness to the righteousness of our struggle. It is hoped that every man will exert his full efforts toward the realization of the objectives of this holy war by determinedly carrying out our original purpose, in the full realization of the unparalleled opportunity which this war offers.

Communications Plans. (FOW does not know about these: no details.)

Supply Plans. (outline)

The Naval bases of YOKOSUKA, KURE and SASEBO will be rear supply bases. BAKO, PALAU, TRUK and OMINATO will be forward supply bases. In addition to these, supply ships will be attached to each fleet.

5 November

Combined Fleet SECRET Opord #2

Y-Day will be 23 November.

10 November

Combined Fleet SECRET OpOrd #3

X-Day will be 8 December.

During the actual attack on PEARL HARBOR, the prisoner remained aboard the NAGATO in the Empire with the Flag of CinC Combined Fleet. Details of the Carrier Task Force which conducted the raid are known from other prisoners and from documents. See, for example, the chart of 1st Air Fleet movements as reproduced elsewhere in this issue.

The TF sortied from ETOROFU TO, in the KURILES, on or about 27 November (ELT), and headed eastward under a heavy front before turning south to the attack. The composition of the Force, which was commanded by the late Vice Admiral NAGUMO (CinC 1st air Fleet) is fairly well established. The enemy had eix carriers: KAGA, AKAGI (CarDiv 1) SORYU, HIRYU (CarDiv 2) SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU (CarDiv 5 less HOSHO); two BBs: HIYEI, KIRISHIMA (BatDiv 3, less KONGO and HARUNA); three cruisers: TONE, CHIKUMA (CruDiv 8), plus ABUKUMA; elements of DeaRon 1; and about twenty.subs.

### CONFIDENTIAL

(Comment: It is of interest to note that all six carriers and both battleships participating are now identified as sunk, plus the CA CHIKUMA; the majority of other units involved are also believed sunk or severely damaged, although definite identification is not yet possible).

One of the Japs' chief headaches during the sortie was the fueling problem. One well informed prisoner who was a CPO on fueling detail described emergency measures required to keep the speedy SORYU and HIRTU in fuel. These two ships were fueled daily, and drums carried as supercargo were unloaded by bucket-brigade when the fast dash to the plane-launching point was begun. At that, the SORYU arrived back at KURE with only 95 tons of oil in her tanks. AOs coming alongside the TF to fuel units had considerable trouble, and visibility was so bad that "towing spars" for position keeping were almost constantly in use.

At the time of the raid, considerable information was derived from documents taken from crashed planes and a beached midget sub.

Reproduced on the following page is a proposed track chart of a midget sub which had planned to transit FEARL HARBOR but apparently failed. This sub beached itself the following day on the opposite side of OAHU, and one of the two crew members was taken prisoner. Little was learned from the POW, but it is believed that the sub was damaged on a reef near the entrance of PEARL HARBOR, putting sound gear out of commission and forcing retirement. Subsequent examination of this sub's torpedo tubes indicated that an attempt had been made to fire torpedoes, but launching gear fouled.

The original chart, too frayed for reproduction, was evidently a U.S. Navy H.O. chart, with detailed navigational data carefully translated into Japanese. Rough notes were scribbled on the chart, in some cases too illegible to translate. On the reverse side were further notes on navigation, etc. The sub also carried a rough profile of the PEARL HARBOR skyline. The mission of the sub was both attack and reconnaissance. The KANA code as shown on the chart is similar to codes recovered from aircraft.

At least three Jap midget subs were lost by our counter-actions at this time. One sub actually entered the harbor; it suffered a direct five-inch shell hit, and was thereafter rammed and depth-charged beyond recognition. The Japs admitted the loss of five of these undersize subs.



Midget sub beached on OAHU.

### EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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Translation of code tables carried by Jap planes. Simple combinations of two KANA syllables served to report disposition and movements of U.S. Fleet.

CONTINUED



Photostat of a document from a crashed Jap plane after the PEARL HARBOR raid. Above, code designations are applied to ship anchorages near FORD ISLAND. Below, sectors from LAHAINA (on MAUI, HAWAIIAN ISLANDS) are indicated in code. Codes were presumably to be used for either woice or radio transmission. PAGE 18

# EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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Novel aid for Jap PEARL HARBOR raiders. Captured fragment above gives name, frequency, time of transmission and signal strength of two chief HONOLULU radio stations.





Chart of torpedo runs, recovered from crashed Jap plane. Broken lines indicate aircraft from CV KAGA. Solid lines denote planes from other carriers.

PAGE 19


•



A VAL has just scored a near miss

6 Decent

Captured Japanese photograph ISLAND under attack on 7



CONTINUED

PAGE 21

Above photograph is captioned in Japanese "the pitiful American Capital Fleet".

CONFIDENTIAL




Photographs of the FEARL HARBOR raid were widely distributed a personnel for morals purposes. Captured souvenir albums of is

and REPULSE studing off SDRM

often contain a set of these photos along with several shots of the FRINCE OF WALES and REPUISE sinking off S: photograph shows WHEELER FIELD during raid.

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One enemy submarine was definitely sunk near the Empire on the 29th.

Absence of sighting and contact reports between HAWAII and the Mainland indicate the probable return of that sub to the Empire.

# JAP SHIPS SUNK IN MANILA HARBOR, THROUGH 14 NOVEMBER 1944



It is estimated that more than 160,000 gross tons of Japanese merchant shipping have been sunk in MANILA Harbor as a result of air attacks by the Third Fleet. This estimated tonnage refers only to MANILA Harbor proper and does not include tonnage sunk in adjacent areas.

The 31 merchant ships noted to have been sunk consisted of two tankers, four of the new 6500 gross ton engine-aft cargo ships (see "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 21), and 25 freighters or freighter-transports ranging from 2000 to 9000 gross tons. Ships of less than 1800 gross tons were not considered in the above estimate.

In addition to the above merchant ships, two warships were sunk in MANIIA Harbor and have been identified as a light cruiser of the KUMA Class and a destroyer of either the TAKANAMI or new KIYOSHIMA Classes.


The sketch on the opposite page shows the approximate locations of the sunken ships, the names if identified, the tonnage and type. The symbol used to mark the location of each sunken ship also indicates the date of the photograph in which the ship was first observed to have been sunk.

Of particular interest in MANILA Harbor is a ship of the HOEISAN Maru Class, indicated by an arrow. The ship has a minimum of 10 gun positions and extra deck houses. The excessive AA plus the fact that the ship has remained in the same position throughout all photographic coverages suggest that it may be a flak ship.




MANILA Harbor photographed on 5 November by TICONDERAGA aircraft. Note concentration of destroyers.

# EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE




# MANILA STRIKE RESULTS



Results of Third Fleet aircraft strike on MANHLA Harbor 11-14 November 1944. Ship in foreground is a new type 6500 ton freighter, Sugar Baker (a), described in "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 21.

\_\_\_\_\_

Two freighters on the bottom near the breakwater give testimony to the effectiveness of the strike.





Burning ships and shore installations at MANILA Harbor.

·\_\_\_\_\_

Pier Seven and other installations showing damage from Third Fleet bombs, 11-14 November 1944.




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CONFIDENTIAL

# PROBABLE CONVERSION OF JAP HOSPITAL SHIP

Photographed below in MANILA on 21 September is a ship apparently identical to the BAIKAL MARU, an AH. Still officially listed as a hospital ship, this vessel has no known sister ship. It was not painted with the prescribed markings for hospital ships and has apparently been reconverted to a merchantman to ease the current severe Jap shipping shortage. Two gun platforms are noted forward and one aft.


Although positive identification of this vessel as the BAIKAL MARU must await further confirmation, it is logical to expect the enemy to reconvert his AHs for more practical if less humane purposes. More than 20 sizeable Japanese vessels are still officially on the books as hospital ships - a disproportionate allotment in view of his general ehipping situation.



# EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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# INCREASED AA ARMAMENT ON JAP FREIGHTER-TRANSPORT



Photographed by planes of the 13th Bomber Command on 11 November in ORMOC Bay, the Japanese freighter-transport seen above is more heavily armed with AA than any other ship of this type previously observed.

The unusually large AA platform in the bow mounts four three-inch AA guns. In addition, there is one 25-mm in the gun tub forward, and six additional light AA - probably single-mount 25-mm - mounted three on each end of the bridge. This armament is in sharp contrast to the standard one or two AA guns usually observed on such vessels.

The enemy may be expected to bolster his AA defense aboard all types of merchantmen when armament is available, in a further move to counter increasingly heavy Allied shipping strikes.

# 734 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONFIDENTIAL

# MANILA, PHILIF

This striking photograph of MANILA Harbor and environs was taken by planes from the USS HANCOCK on 25 November. Most of the ships seen, including a KUMA Class light cruiser, are resting on the bottom. PAGE 30



# PRE ISLANDS

CONFIDENTIAL



The white governmental buildings are seen in the right foreground. The largest pier (number Seven) has a sunken freighter alongside. The PASIG River winds through the city and enters the sea just outside the breakwater.

PAGE 31

6

736 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONFIDENTIAL

KUMA-NATORI CLASS CL

Effectiveness of Allied aircraft against Jap warehips has prompted a continuous increase in AA armament. Recent photographs of KUMA-NATORI Class light cruisers offer added documentation of this trend.

On the facing page are reproduced revised measured drawings. The refitted cruisers are now believed armed as follows:

Two 5-inch AA in twin shielded mounts (these replace the No. 7 5.5-inch guns of the original armament). Five 5.5-inch guns of the original armament. Four 25-mm single mount guns. Ten 25-mm in dual mounts Three 25-mm in a triple mount. Two 13-mm in a dual mount.

Available photographs do not offer a clear view of the well aft of the bridge, and it is not possible to determine whether the two twin torpedo tubes mounted there have been removed to make room for additional AA. Although possible, this change is balieved unlikely.

The catapult and the crane on the mainmast have been removed. A raised AA platform now occupying the former catapult base is believed to contain a triplemount AA gun.

The old 5.5-inch No. 5 gun has been removed, and twin 25-mm added on each side of its former location.

A launch and whaleboat are now carried athwartship of the No. 1 and 2 stacks.

# LONG DELAY BOMB FUSE


A captured document, (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 8309) disclosed that the Japanese have developed a new long delay bomb fuse. It is designated as Experimental Type 1 Special Nose Fuse, and is to be used in the Model 3 No. 6 Mark 23 bomb, Model 1. This bomb is the Japanese 132-1b. delay-type generally used against airfields.

Nothing is known of the time delay incorporated in this new fuse, but the only other Japanese time delay fuse known has three settings, 5, 36 or 72 hours. In construction this new fuse is an improvement over the old one.

ERRATUM: In "Weekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 17, it was erroneously stated both in the text and on the charts of the Second Battle of the PHILIPPINES Sea that Third Fleet BBs sank a crippled cruiser on the afternoon of 25 October. Actually, U.S. light cruisers sank this Jap warship.


30

# EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE



# FLOATING MINES IN THE JAPAN SEA

Data on the chart on the opposite page was taken from a recently recovered enemy document (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 12,,10). Although dated well over a year ago, the information plotted offers a revealing glimpse of the extensive Japanese mining activity in the strategic waters of the JAPAN Sea. Floating mines reported to Jap hydrographers along the southwest coast of HONSHU wore very possibly brought north by ocean currents from the heavily-mined CHOSEN Strait. The cluster of mines reported south of VIADIVOSTOK reflects the use of mines by RUSSIA to protect her greatest Pacific port area. The total number of mines reported during the brief two-month period indicates one of the strongest threats to U.S. subs operating in these Jap-controlled waters.



# NEW JAP RIFLE GRENADE

A new type of Japanese high explosive rifle grenade, embodying several features not previously encountered, was captured during a recent operation. This grenade is designed to be fired by a wooden bullet from the Type 38 and Type 99 rifles. Since these rifles are standard combat issue, it is believed this grenade was produced for universal use.

Carrying a main charge of three ounces of cast TNT and an instantaneous fuse, this grenade has four fins of light metal attached to the stabilizer to guide it in flight.

Upon impact, an inertia block is forced into the fuse body, breaking a brass shear wire and driving the steel striker into the percussion cap. The cap ignites a black powder relay which sets off a cyclonite primer. Then, in succession, the tetryl booster and the main TNT charge are ignited.


The heavy construction of the inertia weight shear pin indicates that contact with a soft object might not be sufficient to fire the fuse. However, a notation attached to the captured grenade warns against dropping or striking the nose of the projectile. A safety fork, which must be removed before firing, supposedly prevents accidental detonation.

A complete round of this new grenade has been examined by Mobile Explosives Investigation Unit  $\#_4$ , but its effectiveness has not been determined. The explosive charge was reported comparable to the KISKA-type hand grenade. Page 34



# EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE





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# GENYO CLASS TANKER VICTIM OF PB4Y



On 31 October, a FB4Y of the 115th Bombing Squadron observed and photographed a 10,000-ton GENYO Class Jap tanker off KUDAT airdrome in MARUDU Bay (North BORNEO). The Allied plane attacked and apparently sank the AO with a single 250pound GP hit, which ripped an eight-foot hole in the starboard bow. A 4-5-second delay fuse was used. Photo below shows the wictim on the next day.



On 1 November another PB47 observed the same ship lying on its side in this same location. On the following day it was observed on the bottom in 10-15 fathoms.

# JAP AERIAL ANTI-SUB DOCTRINE

A detailed explanation of the Japanese Navy's aerial anti-submarine doctrine is contained in an unusually lucid and analytical captured document.

This document was somewhat mutilated and its date of publication and issuing authority are missing. Its relatively recent origin, however, is established by the fact that episodes as late as February 1944 are mentioned, and its general tone indicates that it may be one of the series of tactical research studies published by the authoritative YOKOSUKA Naval Air Group.

Of special interest are notations referring to the use of radar and magnetic detectors. The tactical doctrine for these devices appears to be still in a state of development, but their use may be expected to grow. Previous documentary evidence has established the installation of magnetic detectors on JAKEs early last summer and it is probable that other planea may be so equipped now.

The document, which will be published in full as (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 9979), shows a full appreciation of the alertness and perseverance necessary in effective aerial anti-submarine warfare. It contains many combat examples which are not reproduced in this article.

Aerial anti-sub tactics, says the document in its introduction, must be based on the rapid employment of large numbers of aircraft, even if it is necessary to make some sacrifice in quality.

"The commanding officer must stand at the head of his troops", it states.

"The present combat conditions, if compared to land warfare, represent not a battle of confrontation with the commander back of the center, but a final charge led by the commander. In forces having detachments, the commander should shift frequently to the various detachments, and direct activities on the spot.

"Fatrol duty requires especial attention to promotion of morals because of the tediousness of the topography. A patrol which has been lacking in alertness is nothing but throwing away fuel."

### Aggressiveness is stressed.

"It is necessary to attach importance to persistent and thorough sweep attacks. If we concentrate on defense alone in combat, the enemy gradually counters with increased threats. When we strike a strong blow against them, they inmediately cease their pressure. This is shown by the fact that after the CAMRANH Bay Force (BUTAI), KUSHIMOTO Force (BUTAI), and TATEXAMA Air Group YAMADA Detachment had achieved considerable success in combat, the enemy subs in that area lay low for a while."

Patience and imagination are essential.

"Even though our efforts are not rewarded and success in battle is not attained, cowTMMED PAGE 37

we must not become impatient and do anything rash.

"Such things as new tactics should be tried out as much as conditions permit. In anti-submarine patrol nothing as yet exists which can be called fixed rules. This is especially true under conditions where definite superiority cannot be determined."

### In regard to night operations.

"Night training in many cases is not carried out due to the pressure of work or liberty or the like. However, there is great need for an increase of ability in night operations, and it is essential to carry this out strictly because of its special need in reference to the use of radar."

### Lack of proper preparation may spoil an attack.

"In the fall of 1943 the CHUYO, about 300 nautical miles southeast of SUNOSAKI was hit by a torpedo and sank, but a medium attack plane of the TATNIAKA AIR Group patrolling in the area immediately after this sighted a surfaced enemy submarine and headed for it. The plane was shortly picked up by the radar and when it reached the spot, only the wake was to be seen. A bombing attack was made and the first bomb fell with a right-left deviation of 0, seventy meters ahead of the target, but the second bomb of the run did not drop because of failure of the release. Although they stacked again after repairing this, the bomb fell short and no results were obtained. If the second bomb had dropped on the first run, success would have been assured, but because of poor preparations the opportunity was missed and they could get no revenge."

### Planes must be ready for instant operations.

"It is necessary to send out attack units immediately after receiving warning reports. The sea area requiring patrol increases proportionately to the square of the time elapsed from the sighting of the enemy to the arrival on the scene of the attack units. However, since the arrival on the spot of attacking vessels is usually markedly late, it is essential that the air forces consider this matter so as to remedy the deficiency."

### Bad weather must be turned to account.

"At such times there are chances for catching the enemy. When the visibility on the surface is bad, it is generally the plane that makes the sighting before the submarine does. Instrument flying training should be carried out so that it is at least possible to fly with safety in bad weather. If necessary it should be carried out while on patrol at times when vigilance may be relaxed, even if it means sacrificing observation by the pilot. However, assigning unreasonable operations to untrained personnel and suffering useless losses is condemned. Hence, in weather in which the ability of the flying crew is not to be trusted, it is best to return to base without loss of time."

### U.S. submarine tactics.

"By always carefully observing the condition of the enemy and knowing his  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{page}}$  30

present tactics, strike the first blow, and realizing that the tactics in present use will finally become historical old tactics, prepare for future combat."

"At present the enemy makes the utmost use of radar and sonar to catch his prey, and then carries out accurate firing by exposing the periscope. However, a shift to completely submerged firing is being planned for the near future. Counter-measures must be studied.

"Surfaced submarines sometimes use camouflage and deceptive measures. When a strange boat has been sighted, she must be reconnoitered in detail. These subs change their sppearance to that of a fishing boat by the use of sails or nets, or put up false smokestacks, and the like, and disguise themselves as boats of other types.

### Tactics for anti-sub patrol.

"When there are large and small planes at the same base, the large planes will chiefly carry out day and night long range patrols around convoy routes and make it impossible for enemy submarines to operate on the surface. In addition to making it difficult for them to approach our strategic places and convoys, these planes will carry out surprise attacks, taking advantage of the relaxing of the enemy's guard. The small type planes will have as their chief duty the thorough patrolling of areas near strategic points and direct escort of convoys. The large type planes, even though slow of movement, can still obtain favorable combat results.

"Fatrol must be maintained day and night with as many planes as possible.

"Continuous neutralizing sweeps only show results when there is no let-up during the night. No matter how severely subs may be suppressed during the day, if there are weak points at night it is very easy for enemy subs to flee on the surface."

### Tactics for planes directly escorting convoys.

"When direct escort planes sight torpedoes, they will bomb the spot from which the torpedo tracks originate and strafe the torpedoes. Depending on conditions (distance from the ships, number of bombs carried, etc.), the torpedoes may be bombed and a report of this made to the unit under direct escort (escorting vessels).

### Patrol altitudes and security.

"Determine the altitude, considering foremost ease in sighting, and secondarily the ease of carrying out bombing and/the possibility of/complications.

- "(1). When primarily for visual contact.
  - "a. Usually 400-800 meters will be suitable.
  - "b. In darkness it is best/to fly at/about 200 meters.
  - "c. For confirming/sightings, etc./it is best to fly at about 300 meters
- "(2). When using magnetic detector "Daytime - under 80 meters is best.

CONTINUED

### "Night time - 80-100 meters is best.

"When an important escorted convoy is passing it is necessary to report its movements to the forces responsible for the next sector and make sure that there are no gaps in the escort protection.

"In carrying this out, care must be taken that the enemy is not informed of the movements of the convoy.

### The lookout.

"The first step which determines the success or failure of attacks on enemy subs is the lockout.

"It is necessary that before boarding/the plane/the sectors of responsibility be determined, and that there be the will to sight the enemy without fail within the field of visibility by an alert lookout at all times.

"Enemy submarines do not give up just because of the presence of a plane overhead. If there is neglect in the lookout, aimless flying or the like, serious results will certainly follow. In all the combat examples relating to the sighting of enemy submarines, one cannot but wonder whether the flight crews put forth serious efforts.

"It is necessary to maintain a strict visual lookout even when using radar, magnetic detectors and the like.

"The magnetic detector is employed especially in cases when the potential submarine area is small, as in the early stages after a sighting, and the like, and the radar is employed especially at night in search of surfaced enemy submarines.

"When it is feared that an enemy submarine has gotten away, it is necessary to intensify direct escort in the area in which it is most probable that the sub is operating or lying submerged, and the area must also be swept. Generally when patrol, direct escort, and attack are incompatible, put emphasis on the attack; and when afraid the enemy has been lost, the emphasis must be shifted to direct escort without loss of time.

### Principles of the attack.

"When an enemy sub has been sighted, take care that it is not bombed inaccurately in confusion, and make it a principle not to have to make a second try. When the aim is found correct, all bombs must be dropped in one pass. If they are not, the second attack generally has lost its target due to the sub's diving or there may be no results on single dropping due to fuse failure. When it is clearly recognized that there has been no result, a second attack must be planned.

"However, if circumstances warrant, it may be all right to drop single bombs as signals.

"The results of submarine attacks, even when the bomb lands well, being uncertain PAGE  $^{\rm 40}$ 

due to frequently having a bad underwater trajectory or exploding at the wrong depth, it is necessary to attack with as many bombs as possible. The underwater trajectory of a bomb is generally uniform to a depth of about 20 meters, but beyond that varies greatly. When there is any suspicion of an enemy sub, unless there is fear of attacking friendly forces, attack and do not spare the bombs.

"Intimidation attacks should be made when the positional error of the enemy sub is within 6000 meters and there is necessity for preventing its raising its periscope and making another attack.

### Guiding other planes to the attack.

"The plane which has sighted an enemy submarine will drop target marker bombs so that it does not lose track of it, and guiding other planes by radio, it points the direction of the enemy sub with a small blue flag after bringing them to the position of the enemy sub. Moreover, if necessary, it drops more target marker bombs and carries out bombing operations. It flies, banking toward the true bearing of the enemy sub's position from the bombing splashes and target markers, or reports the bearing and distance by radio.

"The planes being guided will focus their attention on the direction indicated. Then the position of enemy sighting or the point of the said direction and distance is an unknown distance, they will bomb a point 50 meters in that direction. If the planes being led do know the position of the enemy sub, when necessary they will approach the guide plane, show a small blue flag and bank.

"Then two or more planes have gone into bombing runs at the same time, the one having the higher altitude will give way and begin over again. When the altitude is the same, the one having the companion plane on its right will break off and make a second run.

### Cooperation of magnetic detector planes.

To cooperate with magnetic detector planes, the bomber should follow the vectoring bombless plane - but at the same time, the bomber should keep a close visual lookout. (Comment: sic!)

"Method of dropping target bombs.

Number next to circles indicate the order of dropping.

White are dropped according to detector signal. Green are dropped when the Darea is reached.

CONTINUED

A Build Reside 
"When the position of an enemy sub is deduced, drop a smoke bomb as near as possible to that point. Especially are these always to be used when guiding surface craft.

"The attacking planes will watch the above conditions, infer the movements of the enemy, and attack.

### Cooperation with surface craft.

"The secret of cooperation is based on mutual understanding. Therefore, we must work for perfection of communications, both visual and wireless, since they are a most important means of establishing understanding.

"In establishing a thorough-going, unobstructed understanding, radio communications must by all means be put to practical use. Even under present conditions, this is never impossible; and, as the actual experience of the YOKOSUKA Air Group clearly shows, if both parties have the proper determination, the desired understanding can be realized.

"Still, when the nature of the present surface craft anti-submarine staff is considered, present development primarily is awaiting vigorous leadership from the aircraft section.

In directing surface craft, remember that they are often not furnished with sonic gear, that their sighting level is restrictive, and that they are slow. Treat them as if blind.

### Ordnance and equipment.

"New weapons should be quickly mastered. Before new equipment is received, as much research as possible should be carried out beforehand. Radar, in particular, has revolutionized warfare, and as it is said of old, "Without a rifle, no infantry", so without radar, no war planes. In this our country, since it is in the unfortunate position of having started late in this field, requires the utmost endeavor.

"The No. 6 (132 lb.) bomb has little power, and so if it does not hit directly, it can not cause great damage to the enemy. It is best to use the No. 25 (550 lb.) bomb as much as possible.

"The fuse must be set properly. The depth of explosion of anti-submarine bombs is better deeper, rather than shallower than the enemy's depth. Depending on transparency of the water in the patrol area, the type bomb used, and so on, a suitable fuse timing must be used. Usually the first bomb will be set shallow, and the second and succeeding ones should be set for a deep depth to cope with evasive tactics."

(Comment: The Japanese use time, rather than hydrostatic fuses for anti-sub bombs.)

"Aggressive use of machine guns must be planned, fitting it to the conditions at the time. Although the results of strafing submarines cannot be expected to be PAGE 42

outstanding, by casualties to the officers and other annoyances it can make diving impossible. And it can make the submarine show its position by oil leakage, so the aggressive use of strafing must be kept in mind.

### L'aintenance.

"The maintenance of aircraft, due to the inadequacies in the supply of materiel, depends in great part on the efforts of the Air Group maintenance crews. For this reason the diligent endeavors of maintenance squad leaders are required."

### Confirmation evidence.

"The confirmation of combat results is extremaly important for the planning of future attacks.

"Furthermore, since it is not easy because of the peculiar characteristics of submarines and additionally because enemy subs are pulling various sorts of decentive tricks/confirmation/is becoming more and more difficult.

"Usually, either because the pilot is personally satisfied of the results or dislikes the trouble of continuing, the attack is broken off prematurely. It is easy to let the energy elip away in the last five minutes so care is necessary.

"When the following phenomena have been noted, consider the sinking confirmed.

- "l. Large amounts of oil leakage and leakage of air bubbles for over 10 minutes, or, although the period of leakage of air is short, when a large amount of air is released due to the damage to the inner shell of the hull.
- "2. When oil leakage continues over a fortnight.
- "3. When parts which are inside the inner shell of the enemy sub which has been destroyed, come to the surface."

# LONG-SHAFTED ENGINE USED ON JACK


The smoothly streamlined cowling of the new Jap Navy interceptor, JACK, is made possible by the installation of an unusually constructed engine, the long-shafted Kasei 23.

Information on the appearance of this new powerplant is gained from a recently recovered document (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 12,608). Data on its performance has appeared in "Neekly Intelligence", Vol. 1, No. 4 and in other publications. Maximum horsepower is 1820 at takeoff.

The extended, Farman-type reduction gearing permits the installation of a highly streamlined cowling and results in a relatively small frontal anea. The cooling problem is overcome by the addition of an auxiliary fan, geared to the propeller shaft and turning in the same direction at an increase ratio of 3.16 to 1.

The Kasei 23 engine is the 20-series parallel of the older Kasei 13, which also has a Farman transmission and is similar in appearance but lacking the fam. The 13 does not appear on any currently operational plane, but served its purpose as an experimental fore-runner of the 23.

The Kasei 23 displays several features of German design influence. The cooling fan is similar to that employed on the FM190; in place of a carburetor, it has a wobble-plate fuel injection system with individual injectors for each of its



Kasei 23 engine, used in JACK. Photo from captured document. PAGE 44

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14 cylinders, a development similar to that used on the German BMW801. The same device is used on the Ha 112, Model 2 engine installed in DINAH 3.

This type of fuel system plus the fact that the engine uses 91 octane aviation gas as well as water methanol makes its performance different from that of the Kasei 21. The dry weight of the engine, fully equipped, is 1895.95 lbs.

Of special interest is the duraluminum cooling fan which is mounted on a splined sleeve on the propeller shaft. The fan gearing consists of a set of planets mounted on a plate which is splined to the propeller shaft. These planets mesh with a fixed internal spur gear and rotate the sun gear which turns the cooling fan in the same direction as the propeller.

The sun gear rotates on a sleeve around the propeller shaft in a lead-bronze bearing. It is lubricated by oil under pressure from the propeller shaft. This oil is thrown out from the sun gear and lubricates the entire assembly. The propeller shaft has been lengthened 13.78 inches and the extended reduction gear housing is constructed of a lightweight magnesium alloy.


# NEW ARMY AIR DIVISION

The existence of an llth Army Air Division is revealed in a Jap address book taken from an Army twin-engined bomber SALLY shot down over SATPAN on 3 November (CINCPAC-CINCPOA Item No. 12,300). The location of this unit is given as OSAKA, which is also the headquarters of the Central District Army. This association might indicate that the llth Air Division has been established to control the air defense of the industrial KOEE-OSAKA-NAGOYA area. The date of organization of the llth Air Division is not given, although the 10th is known from transfer lists to have been organized in JAPAN last Warch.

An Air Division in the Japanese Army Air Force is a high tactical and administrative command, subordinate only to an Air Army. The llth Air Division therefore is presumably subordinate to the 1st Air Army at TOKYO, which is the top Army Air Command for the Empire. An Air Division theoretically commands at least two Air Brigades of three Air Regiments each, or about 200 airplanes. However, in practice the strength of Air Divisions has varied widely.

# JAP AIRFIELD CAMOUFLAGE

Jap use of trees and shrubbery to camouflage planes on the ground is illustrated by photographe of LIPA WEST FIELD on LUZON. Methods used are regarded as fairly successful, since planes are not easily visible from medium altitudes. Note that, contrary to usual Jap practice. netting is not used.



LIPA WEST FIELD's paved runway and trunk taxiways are not successfully toned down and stand out clearly. Smaller loop taxiways, extending 650 yards from the runway, are dirt surfaced and do not stand out as sharply. Revetments, also made of earth, have shrubs growing on them and some have trees within their walls. This prevents sharp contrasts in color or tone in the dispersal areas. PAGE 46



Planes in this and the preceding photo are camouflaged by hiding under trees and by tying palm fronds and other foliage to the wings and foliage. In most instances the tail assembly of the plane has been placed between two palms and the plane has been pushed under as far as possible. Protruding engines and noses are well covered with foliage. In a few cases one or two palms have been removed, leaving enough space to push the plane clear under cover. Even when this is done, foliage has been thrown over the plane to prevent its disclosure by outline or reflection.

Planes camouflaged in this way are necessarily located within one plane-length of the edge of the taxiway. In some cases, the best indication of a hidden plane is the shadow of revetment walls showing between the trees.

There are no dummy planes on the field, but dud planes are left in plain view even where they partially block taxiways. No damaged planes appear to be camouflaged, but several apparently operational planes are left in treeless areas, both with and without foliage covering.

(Photographs and interpretation by Second Carrier Task Force).

# THUMBNAIL BIOGRAPHIES OF JAPANESE AIRCRAFT

HELEN


(Fourteenth in a series outlining the background of important Japanese Aircraft).

HELEN, the Japanese Army's Type 100 Bomber, has failed to prove in combat the extravagant claims which were made for it at the time of its introduction, but new developments may make it much more formidable.

This aircraft, made by Nakajima, is known to the Japanese as "The Dragon", and was hailed at one time as the plane which would bring the Pacific war to a quick end. However, it has not appeared in substantial quantities and its performance to date has not been outstanding, even though it is among the most heavily armed and armored of Jap bombers.

The original HELEN, Model 1, was powered with 1250 h.p. engines. It was replaced in mid-1943 by a Model 2, with engines of 1450 h.p. Both models are similar in appearance, being distinguished by a built-up wing section between fuselage and nacelles similar to that of the British Mosquito.

There are indications that a Model 3, equipped with engines of more than 2000 h.p. and with greatly improved performance, is under development, but this version has not been definitely identified.



Heavily camouflaged HELEN, under Allied strafing attacks. Photo from AAF, SWPA.

# PROVISIONAL SKETCH OF GEORGE


Reproduced below are provisional sketches of GEORGE, new Jap Navy interceptor.

This drawing has been synthesized from documentary evidence, POW statements and sketches, and two rough and incomplete drawings found in a captured mimeographed manual.

No positively identifiable pictures of GEORGE are available, and no specimen has been examined in the field. The accompanying sketch is provisional and will be superseded when better information is at hand.

Characteristics on which available information agrees and which are believed quite reliable include the squarish wing and tail tips, blister canopy, airscoop at five o'clock and large spinner.

Both reported variations of armament and wing position are shown.



# SIDELIGHT ON SUICIDES

A JUDY pilot interrogated by Third Fleet after being shot down in an attack off the PHILIPPINES provides a sidelight on the nature of the so-called "KAMIKAZE Special Assault Force" of suicide divers.

This pilot was a member of 502 Naval Air Group, which he said had been joined with several other groups for operations in the PHILIPPINES. His information is open to question, but he appeared reliable on matters which could be checked.

Quoting the interrogation report:

"POW stated that his unit had become a "suicide" squadron on the 27th of October. The designation as a suicide squad came as a result of the group's commanding officer's request for such designation having been granted by higher authority. The prisoner stated that pilots and other personnel of the group were not questioned as to their desire to become members of a suicide squad.

"He felt that the order to dive on carriers to one's self-destruction was absurd (Bakarashii), but since it was an order he fully intended to carry it out. He did feel that there had been a needless expenditure of life with very little visible success to date. The pilot claimed that he had been given no instruction on the best way to carry out suicidal attacks on carriers; however, he did feel that he would attempt to hit an elevator in that elevators on a carrier were "weak points". At the time he left MARALACAT (his base) there were still 50 members of the suicide squadron alive but very few flyable aircraft were available. (Subsequent strikes on LUZON by our carriers may have cut down this number).

"POW was of the opinion that his unit was the only dive-bomber squadron in the Japanese Navy that had been designated as a suicide squadron; however, he felt that in the event of carrier attacks being launched on JAPAN proper, suicidal attacks in large numbers should be anticipated. POW did not believe green and yellow silk flight clothing reported as having been recovered from the body of a Jap pilot who had made a suicide attack on a U.S. carrier had any special significance.

"POW stated that the lack of aviation gasoline had caused the Japs to cut down on the extent of training, but he had heard of no instances in which offensive missions could not be flown as a result of a lack of AvCas."

POW's belief that his unit was the only one designated as a whole for suicide work coincides with other available evidence. From recent Japanese propaganda broadcasts, it appears that most of the so-called "KAIIKAZE" units are made up more or less extemporaneously of volunteers from various groups acting independently. The "KAM-IKAZE" designation appears to be a special mark of distinction applied to any such volunteers, rather than the name of a formal organization.

If true, however, the designation of an entire air group as a suicide unit may mark a significant change in the development of this tactic.

# JAPS DEVELOP INDO-CHINA

The strategic importance of INDO-CHINA to JAPAN has increased as the position of JAPAN in the FHILIPPINES and her supply line to the EAST INDIES have become more precarious. The limited railroad facilities of the country are being utilized to their fullest extent in an endeavor to find safe supply lines. Her ports, particularly SAIGON and CAM RANN BAY are used for the protection of convoys and as staging points for military operations. As JAPAN's sources of supply on the periphery of her empire are cut off it is to be anticipated that the resources of INDO-CHINA will be increasingly developed.

It is estimated that there are at present no more than 35,000 ground troops permanently stationed in the country, plus approximately 2,000 special Navy Landing Force troops.

There are 64 airfields, ranging from emergency fighter strips to major airports capable of handling Jap bombers. The larger fields, such as those at SAIGON, CAPE ST. JACQUES, TOURANE, CAT BAI and HAIPHONG, function not only as combat and transport plane bases, but also as training centers.

Of the ten seaplane anchorages, the best equipped ones are in the HAIPHONC-HON GAY area, at TCURANE, CAM RANN BAY, and CAPE ST. JACQUES. The air force in INDO-CHINA is believed to consist mainly of float planes and flying boats for convoy coverage and anti-submarine parcol.



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CAT BAI A/F, located 3 miles SE of HAIPHONG, has two intersecting hard surfaced runways and is reported to be a first-class military installation. Included in the facilities are a radio station, repair shops and AA positions. Revetment areas are being extended and an attempt is being made to camouflage the taxiways. Page 52

# CAT BAI AIRFIELD



HON GAY - the chief coaling port of FRENCH INDO-CHINA, located on the north shore of the Gulf of TONKIN. Facilities include a coal treating plant with steam and electric loading devices, concrete piers and extensive railroad yards. Page 53



CAN EANH BAY - one of the finest fleet anchorages in the ORIENT. Affording com-plete typhoon protection, it was a staging point for Jap troops enroute for the con-quest of MALAYA and NETHERIANDS EAST INDIES. Page 54

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### CAM RANH BAY

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#### JAP ORDNANCE VS ALLIED AIRCRAFT

Improvisation in Japanese ordnance to combat strafing Allied planes continues. The latest development - the use of implanted bombs - is described in a report from the Central Pacific dated 23 September 1944 and forwarded by BuOrd.

Selecting the logical paths of approach of low-flying Allied planes on strafing missions, the Japanese had buried the bombs in definite patterns on all sides of the air strip. Particular attention was given to the approaches of revetments and the main parking areas on the field.

Examination of the bombs revealed they were rigged in the following manner.

- a). The nose cavity of each bomb was filled with either Composition C or dynamite. About one fourth of the bomb noses were filled with the plastic explosive and the remaining three fourths were filled with dynamite.
- b). The explosive was tamped into the nose cavity and electric blasting caps inserted into the explosive.
- c). The electric blasting caps were wired in series and had 2 leads running to a dugout. The observer, hidden in the dugout, could detonate the bombs when the strafing planes were immediately over the mined area. Each of the five areas had lead wires running to a separate dugout. The bombs were buried and well concealed with either sod or coconut leaves and would not be visible from the air.

It is interesting to note that the Japs employed no particular type or size bomb for this purpose. Over 150 bombs rigged with electrical detonators and ranging in size from 32 kg. to 250 kg. were rendered safe.

Other instances of Japanese ingenuity in organizing and planning defenses against low-flying aircraft are reported in Weekly Intelligence Summary No. 40, Air Command, Southeast Asia. A brief resume of unorthodox and impromptu defenses encountered by airmen in this theatre includes small arms fire by ground troops, multi-barrelled MG's mounted on trucks and anti-aircraft guns mounted on freight cars.

Among the more ingenious devices employed in the Southwestern Pacific area, was a BETTY (medium bomber) conveniently parked at the end of a runway offering an unusually easy target. Unfortunately machine gun pits containing 20 mm guns had been dug in the shadow of the winge. The attacking fighters received a very warm reception. In other cases of this type, trucks, tanks, huts and barges have been substituted for the BETTY as bait.

Another type of defense against strafing is the use of wires, strung across narrow valleys, between large trees and between small hills on either side of the river. Bridges, railroads and landing strips have been reported as having possible trip-wires either over them or guarding the open approaches.

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
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Other areas have reported the use of a type of 70-mm mortar. The projectile is reported to burst between 1500 and 2000 feet, ejecting 7 canisters which in turn release parachute-suspended bomb tubes. These take two or three minutes to float to the ground and constitute a definite hazard as they are difficult to see. If contact is made with one of the suspending cords, it causes the bomb to explode with a detonation described as about twice that of a 20-mm shell.

#### JAP ANTI-SUBMARINE BOMB

The enemy is having trouble because his anti-submarine bombs ricochet. In the case of their 300-kg. bomb (Type 1, No. 25 bomb, Mark 2, Model 1, Modification 1) the Japs have attempted to correct this with an anti-ricochet nose attachment. Photographs of an altered bomb captured on GUAM and examined by MEIU No. 4 show the steel cylinder which is secured to the nose of the bomb by welding. This type of alteration should prove reasonably effective.



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#### · WREELT COVERAOS SEPORT

Photow ressived at CinCPac-CinCPOA during pariod from 24 Hovember 1944 to and including 1 December 1944

PRINTS ORLY MECHIVED
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Splits         2.4"         20,000*         ΔL3.3-2.01 (Calabarati to S01.43-2.09         92.4-3.28         4/k=- 93.14           Splits         2.4"         20,000*         ΔL3.3-2.01 (Calabarati to S01.43-2.09         93.1-2.20         4/k=- 93.1-2.20         4/k=- 93.1-2.20         4/k=- 93.1-2.20         93.1-2.20         93.1-2.20         4/k=- 93.1-2.20         93.1-2.20         93.1-2.20         93.1-2.20         8/k=- 93.1-2.20         93.1-2.20         93.1-2.20         8/k=- 93.1-2.20         73.2-2.20         73.2-2.20         73.2-2.20         73.2-2.20         73.2-2.20         73.2-2.20         73.2-2.20         73.2-2.20         73.	Vert.	24*		(W. of Chelin)	9212-227	
Solit 5         24*         20,000*         Luk >2.2π         (Chinkanoli to 95)279         #(β**           Solit 74*.         950-279         953-279         953-279         #(β**           Solit 74*.         950-279         953-279         953-279         #(β**           Solit 74*.         950-279         953-279         952-279         952-279         952-279         952-279         952-279         952-279         952-279         952-279         952-279         952-279         952-279         952-279         752-279         752-279         752-279         752-279         752-279         752-279         752-279         752-279         752-279         752-279         752-279         752-279         752-279         752-279         752-279         752-279         752-279         752-279         752-279 <t< td=""><td>Split</td><td>24*</td><td>20,000*</td><td>4MA3-24CM (Linywong to</td><td>9249-228</td><td>8/8==</td></t<>	Split	24*	20,000*	4MA3-24CM (Linywong to	9249-228	8/8==
Split         24"         20,000         243-228         923-229         9/1-229           Tert.         24"         20,000         243-228         (Compting to 222-23)         9/1-230           Split         24"         20,000         243-228         (Compting to 222-23)         9/2-230           Split         24"         20,000         243-228         (Compting to 222-23)         9/2-230           Split         24"         7,000         21F-48001         925-230         9/2-23           Y         24"         7,000         21F-48001         925-230         9/2-23           Y         24"         7,000         21F-48001         925-230         9/2-24           Y         24"         9,000         21F-48001         925-230         9/2-24           Split         24"         20,000         22F-48001         10000         925-275         7/2-75           Split         24"         20,000         22F-48001         10000         925-275         7/2-75           Split         24"         20,000         22F-4800         10000         925-275         7/2-75           Split         24"         20,000         22F-4800         100000         925-277		24*	20,000		9251-229	8/8++
9256-230           9256-230           9256-230           9256-230           9266-231           9266-231           9266-231           9266-231           9266-231           9266-231           9266-231           9266-231           9266-231           9266-231           9266-231           9266-231           9266-231           9266-231           9266-231           9266-231           9266-231           9266-231           9216-286101 (Tanglankian)           9216-2861 (Parkian to 9216-2861           9216-286           9216-286           9216-286           9216-286           9216-286           9216-286           9216-286           9216-286           9216-286           9216-286           9216-286	Vert.			Sanlui Vic.)	9253-229 9254-229	
9256-230           9256-230           9256-230           9256-230           9266-231           9266-231           9266-231           9266-231           9266-231           9266-231           9266-231           9266-231           9266-231           9266-231           9266-231           9266-231           9266-231           9266-231           9266-231           9266-231           9266-231           9266-231           9216-286101 (Tanglankian)           9216-2861 (Parkian to 9216-2861           9216-286           9216-286           9216-286           9216-286           9216-286           9216-286           9216-286           9216-286           9216-286           9216-286           9216-286		24*	20,000'	AMA3-24CH (Chunghang to S. of Paotai)	9255-230 9256-230 9257-230	8/8==
"98.14-311           98.14-311           98.14-311           1.2001 2178-40201 (Sanchister - Benling:           1.2001 2178-40201 (Sanchister - Benling:           1.2001 2178-40201 (Sanchister - Benling:           9.0001 2078-40201 (Sanchister - Benling:           Sanchister - Benling:           9.0001 2078-4010 (Sanchister - Benling:           Participation Sanchister - Benling:           9.0001 2078-401 (Sanchister - Benling:           Participation Sanchister - Benling:           9.0001 2078-401 (Sanchister - Benling:           9.0001 2078-401 (Sanchister - Benling:           9.0001 2078-401 (Sanchister - Benling:           9.0011 2078-401 (Sanchister - Benling:           9.0012 2078-401					9258-230	
γ         24*         7,50°         2/8*         965+32         97/12*           Line Armaj         Interlang         965+32         97/12*           V         2/4*         9,00°         2/8*         9/12*           Split         2/4*         0,00°         2/8*         9/12*           Split         2/4*         20,00°         2/8*         9/12*           Split         2/4*         20,00°         2/8*         9/12*           Split         2/4*         20,00°         2/8*         9/12*           Split         2/8*         20,00°         2/8*         9/12*         7/2*           Split         2/8*         20,00°         2/8*         9/16*         9/17*         7/2*           Split         2/8*         20,00°         2/8*         1/8         9/2*         7/2*           Split         2/8*         20,00°         2/8*         1/8         9/2*         7/2*           Split         2/8*         20,00°         2/8*         1/8         9/2*         7/2*           Split         2/8*         20,00°         2/2*         1/8         9/2*         7/2*           Split         2/8*         20,00°	Split Vert.	24*	20,000'	AMA3-24CH (Swatow to Amoy Vic.)	9259-231 9260-231 9261-231	8/8**
γ         2.4°         9,000°         2.1%-4.000°         (Emphandram)         9666-233         9/21=           3.5         2.4°         20,000°         2.0%-4.000°         (Emphandram)         9656-233         9/21=           3.5         2.4°         20,000°         2.0%-4.000°         (Emphandram)         9031-255         7/21=           3.014         2.4°         20,000°         2.0%-4.000°         (Emphandram)         9031-255         7/21=           3.014         2.4°         20,000°         2.0%-4.000°         (Emphandram)         9031-255         7/21=           Vert.         2.0%         2.0%-00°         2.0%-4.000°         (Emphandram)         9031-277         7/22=           Vert.         2.0%         2.0%-00°         2.0%-4.010°         (Emphandram)         9032-277         7/22=           Vert.         2.0%         2.0%-00°         2.0%-4.010°         (Emphandram)         9232-297         7/22=           Vert.         2.0%         2.0%-4.010°         (Emphandram)         9232-237         7/25=           Split         2.4°         20,000°         2.0%-4.010°         (Emphandram)         9232-237         7/25=           Split         2.4°         20,000°         2.0%-4.010° </td <td>Ŧ</td> <td>24°</td> <td>7,300*</td> <td>(Sanchiosse ~ Bmilung</td> <td>9265-232 9265-232</td> <td>9/2100</td>	Ŧ	24°	7,300*	(Sanchiosse ~ Bmilung	9265-232 9265-232	9/2100
Split         2.4"         20,000°         2.2.3"-LLL (Tartine to Fill-2):         7/2.5"           Split         2.4"         20,000°         2.2.3"-LLL (Tartine to Fill-2):         7/2.5"           Split         2.4"         20,000°         2.2.4"-LLL (Tartine to Fill-2):         7/2.5"           Split         2.4"         20,000°         2.2.4"-LLL (Tartine to Fill-2):         7/2.5"           Split         2.4"         20,000°         2.2.5"-LLL (Tartine to Fill to Fill-2):         7/2.5"           Split         2.4"         20,000°         2.2.5"-LLL (Tartine to Fill to Fill-2):         7/2.5"           Split         2.4"         2.000°         2.2.5"-LLL (Tartine to Fill to Fill-2):         7/2.5"           Split         2.4"         2.000° <td>T T</td> <td>24° 24°</td> <td>9,000' 14,000'</td> <td>21PR-408201 (Tanganhsian) 21PR-408201 (Chiting)</td> <td>9266-233 9267-234</td> <td>9/2100 9/2100</td>	T T	24° 24°	9,000' 14,000'	21PR-408201 (Tanganhsian) 21PR-408201 (Chiting)	9266-233 9267-234	9/2100 9/2100
Wort, Split         Computation (24)         EmanyIsting)         9917-256         9917-256           Vert, Vert, Split         2,00         Conc.unit (Winsham         9917-256         7/269           Vert, Split         2,00         Conc.unit (Winsham         9917-256         7/269           Vert, Split         2,40         20,000         2,222-241         9917-256         7/269           Split         2,47         20,000         2,222-241         9917-256         7/269           Split         2,47         20,000         2,222-241         9917-256         7/269           Split         2,47         20,000         2,223-241         7/269         972-220         7/269           Split         2,47         20,000         2,228-241         7/269         972-220         7/269           Split         2,48         20,000         2,228-241         1/269         972-221         7/269           Split         2,48         20,000         2,228-241         1/269         972-221         7/269           Split         2,48         20,000         2,228-241         1/269         972-221         7/269           Vert,         35,000         2,228-241         1/269         972-221	Sple Vert.	24 <sup>e</sup>	20,000'	2403-4361 (Simps to Satking)	9314-235 9325-235	7/2700
Splifs         24*         20,000         22,054-QBL (187)         77,057           Splifs         24*         20,000         22,054-QBL (187)         93,05-238         77,057           Splifs         24*         20,000         22,054-QBL (187)         95,05-238         77,057           Splifs         24*         20,000         22,054-QBL (187)         95,05-238         77,057           Splifs         24*         20,000         22,05-4QBL (187)         95,05-238         77,057           Splifs         24*         20,000         22,05-4QBL (187)         95,05-238         77,057           Splifs         24*         20,000         22,05-4QBL (187)         95,05-228         77,057           Splifs         24*         20,000         22,05-4QBL (186)         95,05-224         77,057           Vert.         20,000         22,000		24*	20,000*	24CH-4Hil (Textion to	9316-236 9317-236	7/2700
Split         24*         20,000*         2/24=4241 (141% to 3 of 9 932-239         7/28*           Split         24*         20,000*         2/24=4241 (15 PostBer to 9 932-240         7/28*           Split         24*         20,000*         2/24=4241 (15 PostBer to 9 932-240         7/28*           Sprit         24*         20,000*         2/24=4241 (15 PostBer to 9 932-241         7/28*           Sprit         24*         20,000*         2/24=4241 (15 Ber to 9 932-241         7/28*           Sprit         24*         20,000*         2/24=4241 (15 Ber to 9 932-242         7/25*           Sprit         24*         20,000*         2/24=421 (15 Ber to 9 935-242         7/25*           Sprit         15,000*         2/24=421 (15 Ber to 9 31* 947-242         7/25*           Vert.         15,000*         2/24=421 (15 Ber to 9 31* 947-242         7/25*           Vert.         15,000*         2/24=421 (15 Ber to 9 31* 947-242         9/35*242         9/35*           Split         24*         15,000*         2/26=426 (15 Ber to 9 31* 947-242         9/35*           Split         24*         15,000*         2/26=426 (15 Ber to 9 35* 245         9/35* 245           Split         24*         15,000*         2/26=426 (16 Ber to 15 Steon 900* 200* 200* 200* 200*	Split Vert.	24 <sup>8</sup>	20,000'	24CH-4Mil (SW Hanshan W Pington)	9318-237 9329-237	7/28==
Split         24*         20,000*         2/24=4241 (141% to 3 of 9 932-239         7/28*           Split         24*         20,000*         2/24=4241 (15 PostBer to 9 932-240         7/28*           Split         24*         20,000*         2/24=4241 (15 PostBer to 9 932-240         7/28*           Sprit         24*         20,000*         2/24=4241 (15 PostBer to 9 932-241         7/28*           Sprit         24*         20,000*         2/24=4241 (15 Ber to 9 932-241         7/28*           Sprit         24*         20,000*         2/24=4241 (15 Ber to 9 932-242         7/25*           Sprit         24*         20,000*         2/24=421 (15 Ber to 9 935-242         7/25*           Sprit         15,000*         2/24=421 (15 Ber to 9 31* 947-242         7/25*           Vert.         15,000*         2/24=421 (15 Ber to 9 31* 947-242         7/25*           Vert.         15,000*         2/24=421 (15 Ber to 9 31* 947-242         9/35*242         9/35*           Split         24*         15,000*         2/26=426 (15 Ber to 9 31* 947-242         9/35*           Split         24*         15,000*         2/26=426 (15 Ber to 9 35* 245         9/35* 245           Split         24*         15,000*         2/26=426 (16 Ber to 15 Steon 900* 200* 200* 200* 200*	Vort.	24*	-	24CH-4Mal (S Fington to SE Santo to Linte)		7/2800
Split         24%         20,000*         22,0	Bert.	24*	20,000	24CH-4MA1 (Linte to 3 of		7/28**
Vert.         isilatorsiming)         937-241           Split 24"         20,000" 240-241 (lathous to 935-242         7/5%           Vert.         20,000" 240-241 (lathous to 935-242         7/5%           Vert.         15,000 240-242         8/5%           Vert.         20,000" 240-242         8/5%           Vert.         15,000 240-242         8/5%           Vert.         15,000 240-242         8/5%           Vert.         16,500 240-242         6/7**           Vert.         500 240-242         6/7**           Split 24"         16,500" 240-242         6/7**           Vert.         16,500" 240-242         6/7**           Split 24"         16,500" 240-242         16/7**           Split 24"         16,500" 240-242         16/7**           Split 24"         16,500" 240-242         17/5**           Split 24"         16,500" 240-242         16/7**           Split 24"         16,500" 240-242         16/7**           Split 24"         16,500" 240-242         16/7**	Split Vert.	24*	20,0001	24CH-4MA1 (S Poochew to # Eingwa)	9321-240 9325-240	7/2800
Tert.         Desilis         939-242           Split 24*         J5,00*         242-243           Tert.         Bangki 108         934-233           Tert.         Bangki 108         934-233           Tert.         Bangki 108         934-243           Tert.         Bangki 108         933-244           Tert.         Bangki 108         933-244           Split 24*         15,00*         2458-444           Split 24*         16,00*         2458-444	Split Vert.	24*	20,000	24CH-4MA1 (F Hingwa to Holchowshong)	9326-241 9327-241	7/28**
Split         24°         15,500°         242s-Latz         (11,500°         242s-Latz         (11,500°         243s-Latz         (11,500°         (11	Vert.	2.4*	20,000'	24CH-4HAI (Linchow to Eveniin)	9329-212	7/2500
Split         24"         16,500"         2422-400         106,500"         2432-400         9335-244         9332-244         9332-244         9332-244         9332-244         9332-244         9332-244         9332-244         9332-244         9332-244         9332-244         9332-245         8/7ee           Fact.         18,500"         2428-4004         110,000"         2428-4004         100,000	3plit Vert.	24 <sup>8</sup>	18,500'	24/28-4842 (Eitung to S H	9347-243	8/7++
9355-245 9356-245 3014: 249 18.500* 240%-4842 (6.81.8.514-00) 9350-245		24*	18, 500*	2428-4862 (S M S Sunghi to Eunotow)	9349-244 9350-244 9352-244 9352-244	8/7++
3plit 24 18.500 2408-4842 (6 Mt 8 Starm 9357-246 8/7ee	Split Vert.	24 <sup>8</sup>	18,500'	24CH-4MA2 (Linyung to Paishih)		8/700
		24*	18, 500*	24CH-4MA2 (6 M1 S Siscen to 10 M1 SE Engotow - 10 M1 W Engotow to Hapetoshal	9357-216	8/7++
Split 24" 18,500' 24.02-4842 (8 H1 99 Julan 9.359-24.7 8/7** Fort. to Changeng) 9360-24.7	Split.	24*	18,500	21CH-1842 (8 M1 SW Julan		8/7++
Split 24" 18,500' 2403-4442 (Pengwei to 9361-248 8/7** Wert. Hmory) 9362-248	Split	24*	18,500	24CH-4H12 (Pengeel to		8/7+=
T 24" 16,500' 2403-4882 (Amoy to 9363-249 8/7**		24*	18,500.	24CH-4MA2 (Amoy to		8/7++
Palshutying)         Palshutying)         Palshutying)           Split         24,0         20,000         24,05         24,05         9,935-250         9,15+           Yert,         117'         57'         8 to 26'         50'         N, 9395-250         9,15+           119'         24'         8)         119'         24'         8)	Split Vert.	24*	20 <b>,000'</b>	2405-489-624 (26° 50' N, 117° 57' 8 to 26° 50' N, 119° 24' 8)	9395-250 9396-250	9/16**
Split         24*         20,000*         24,06*         240         60*         8,9397-251         9/17**           Tert.         118*         10*         % to 25*         42*         N,         9396-251         9/17**           118*         10*         % to 25*         42*         N,         9396-251         9/17**	Vert.	24*	20,000'	24085-489-214 (24° 50° 8, 118° 10' 8 to 25° 42' 8, 118° 53' 8)	9397-251 9398-251	9/17**
	Split Vert.	24*	20,000'	240MS-4M9-218 (299 48 B.	9 <i>3</i> 99-252 9400-252	9/17**

				CONF	DENTIAL
¥	248	30,000*	21PR-4MR21 (Canton, White	9493-277	3/13**
Ŧ	24° 24	30,000' 30,000'	21FB-44821 (Centen, White Cloud & Timps A/De) 21FE-48521 (Ebumpon Doebs) 21FB-48521 (Ebumpon Doebs)	9494-278 9495-279	3/1300
		Banpo Naoto	(lionghong)		
FORTH ON					
Chichi	Jimp:	Good vertical damage.	and oblique partial covers,	ge showing b	dao
	2.08	17 0001	C-840-2683-4-11-65 B-933-2685-4-11-65 &-002-2685-4-11-65 &-974-3685-4830-71 8-973-3685-4830-71 C-617-3685-4830-71 C-617-3685-4830-71	9401-184	11/2300
	24 24 12	17,000* 17,000* 17,000* 18,500* 18,500*	B-933-2608-4-11-65	9402=185	11/2300 11/2300
v v v	12*	17,000	8-002-2685-4-11-65	9403-186 9404-187	11/23**
		18,500	4-974-3883-4830-71	9404-187	11/24++
Ŧ	24	18,500	8-973-3828-4830-71	9405-188	11/2400
	6 3/20	19,450		9406-189	13 /1700
ă	6 3/8	2001	B-662-42BS	9408-191	11/17** 11/17
ō	6 3/8	200*	C-327-4288	9409-192	11/17
v	24" 20" 6 3/8" 6 3/8" 6 3/8" 24"	18,900*	4-526-51985-4830-71	9454-193	11/24
1	24*	18,900 17,500 17,500	C-674-81982-4830-71 D-627-81985-/#30-71	9455-194 9456-195	11/24
÷.	24"	16,000	4-873-9885-11-65-7BC	9457-196 9458-197	11/2300
ŵ.	12*	16,000 17,000 17,000 200	B-876-9683-11-65-78C	9458-197	11/23** 11/23** 11/23**
v	240	17,000*	C-951-9685-11-65-78C	9459-198 9474-199	11/23++
0 0 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7	12° 40°	2001	8-010-63185-6-11-04 TD5-18		
w la	40*	20,000* 20,000* 20,000*	V05-1C		11/2500 11/2500 11/2500 11/2500
ý l	400	20,000	VD5-10	9477-202	11/2500
¥.	40° 24°	20,000	VD5-18	9477-202 9478-203 9479-204	11/2500
Ŧ	2/8	20,000 20,000 20,000	VD5-10	9479-204 9480-205	11/2500
Ŧ	24.	20,000*	9-462-4735 (-527-4255 4-528-61969-410-071 -637-41989-410-071 0-527-41983-410-071 0-527-41983-410-6770 0-911-9683-11-65-770 0-911-96-75-75-75-75 0-911-96-75-75-75-75 0-911-96-75-75-75-75 0-911-96-75-75-75-75 0-911-96-75-75-75-75-75-75-75-75-75-75-75-75-75-	7400-003	
Baba J	100.0	Good vertical	and oblique partial covers	ge showing b	dato
			and the second		/-
Y	12*	11,720' 12,725' 12,750' 13,000' 16,500'	A-948-3985-4830-55 A-491-9885-796 B-951-9885-786 A-153-43185-47 A-661-81985-4830-53	9193-71 9194-72 9195-73	11/800
0	12	12,725	8-691-9885-78G	9194-72	11/900
	24ª 12ª	11,000	A=153=43185=47	9196-74	11/9** 11/9** 11/9**
0 7 7 7 0 0 7 7 0 0 7	2/8	16, 500*	4-661-81985-4830-53	9197-75	11/6
0	6 3/8P 12"			9198-76	12 62-0
0	12*	200*	4-016-43198-4-11-64	9472-77	11/2300
÷	24° 12°	14,500	5-463-61085-4830-71	9473-79	11/24+*
÷	120	14.000*	1-016-43186-4-11-64 5-223-43185-4-11-61 8-683-81985-4830-71 1-016-43185-4-11-64	9470-80	11/23++
*	400	20,0001	FD5_24	94(11-61	11/2500
÷	240	200' 14,500' 11,400' 14,000' 20,000' 20,000'	VD5-24 VD5-28	9482-82	11/23** 11/21** 11/24** 11/23** 11/25** 11/25**
۲	240				11/2500
۲	24°		VD5-28		11/2500
v <u>Richi</u> s		Distant obl	ique partial coverage.	9482-82	
v <u>Rishis</u> O	6 3/8	) Distant obl Var			11/2500
v <u>Rishis</u> O	6 3/8	Distant obl	ique partial coverage.	9482-82	
v <u>Rishis</u> O	6 3/8*	) Distant obl Var Manpo Shoto	ique partial coverage.	9482-82 9216-6	
V Bichin O Lollor OI Ivo Ji	6 3/8*	Distant ohl Var Manpo Shoto Good vertical	ique partial coverage. VB102-18 pertial coverage of island	9482-82 9216-6 i in color.	11/700
T Diebin O Edite (H Two JJ	6 3/8*	Distant ohl Var Manpo Shoto Good vertical	ique partial coverage. VB102-18 pertial coverage of island	9482-82 9216-6	11/700
T Diebin O Edite (H Two JJ	6 3/8* 1009 -	Distant ohl Var Manpo Shoto Good vertical	ique partial coverage. VB102-16 partial coverage of island VD1-97 TD1-97	9482-82 9216-6 i in color. 9219-261 9220-262 9221-263	11/7+++
V Bichin O Lollor OI Ivo Ji	6 3/8*	Distant ohl Var Manpo Shoto Good vertical	ique partial coverage. VELC2-16	9482-82 9216-6 i in color.	11/700
V Bishis O Kalas Qi Ivo Ji V V V V	6 3/8" CUP - 24" 24" 24"	E Distant ohl Var Hempo Shoto Good vertical 20,000' 20,000' 20,000'	ique partial coverage. WR102-18 partial coverage of island WDL-97 WDL-97 WDL-97 WDL-97 WDL-97	9216-6 9216-6 9219-261 9220-262 9220-263 9221-263 922 -254	11/7+++
V Bishin O Katali Qi Ivo Ji V V V V V V	6 3/8* CUP - 24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 24*	Distant obl Var Hempo Shoto Good vertical 20,000' 20,000' 20,000' 20,000' 0 Shoto - Go	into partial coverage. WE102-16 partial coverage of island WDL-97 WDL-97 WDL-97 WDL-97 WDL-97 Couple to vertical coverage	9482-82 9216-6 1 in color. 9219-261 9220-262 9221-263 922264 922264	11/7++ 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/19
V Bishin O Batan Qi Iwo Ji V V V V V V V V V V	6 3/8* 100P - 24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 24*	Distant obl Var Hempo Shoto Good vertical 20,000' 20,000' 20,000' 20,000' 0 Shoto - Go	into partial coverage. WE102-16 partial coverage of island WDL-97 WDL-97 WDL-97 WDL-97 WDL-97 Couple to vertical coverage	9482-82 9216-6 1 in color. 9219-261 9220-262 9221-263 922264 922264	11/7+++
V Bishin O Katali Qi Ivo Ji V V V V V V	6 3/8* CUP - 24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 24*	Distant obl Var Hempo Shoto Good vertical 20,000' 20,000' 20,000' 20,000' 0 Shoto - Go	ique partial coverage. WR102-18 partial coverage of island WDL-97 WDL-97 WDL-97 WDL-97 WDL-97	9216-6 9216-6 9219-261 9220-262 9220-263 9221-263 922 -254	11/7++ 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/19
V <u>Bishin</u> O <u>Latan</u> Ol <u>Two</u> Ji V V V V V V V V V V V V V	6 3/8* 1000 - 24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 24*	I Distant obl Var Henpo Shoto Good vertical 20,000' 20,000' 20,000' 20,000' 20,000' 0 Shoto - 0o 17,000' 13,500' 15,000'	into partial coverage. WE102-16 partial coverage of island WDL-97 WDL-97 WDL-97 WDL-97 WDL-97 Couple to vertical coverage	9482-82 9216-6 1 in color. 9219-261 9220-262 9221-263 922264 922264	11/7++ 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/19
V Disking of Lating of Two Ji V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V	6 3/8* 1000 - 24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 24*	Distant obl Var     Henpo Shoto     Good wertlanl     20,000'     20,000'     20,000'     20,000'     0 Shoto - 0o     17,000'     13,000'     15,000'     10,000'     15,000'	ine partial coverage. TRIGO-LM partial coverage of island TRL-77 TRL-77 TRL-77 Coverage of island true.77 Coverage of island true.77 TRL-77 Coverage of island true.77 TRL-77 TRL-77 Coverage of island true.77 TRL-77 Coverage of island true.77 TRL-77 Coverage of island true.77 TRL-77 Coverage of island true.77 TRL-77 TRL-77 Coverage of island true.77 Coverage of	9482-82 9216-6 1 in color. 9219-261 9220-262 9221-263 922264 922264	11/7++ 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/19
V Disking Off Dec 23 V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V	6 3/8 - 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24°	Distant obl Var     Henpo Shoto     Good wertlanl     20,000'     20,000'     20,000'     20,000'     0 Shoto - 0o     17,000'     15,000'     15,000'     15,000'     100     100'	igns partial coverage. TRICC-16 Partial coverage of island TRL-97	9482-52 9216-6 1 in color. 9219-261 9221-262 9221-263 9221-263 9221-264 9221-269 9221-264 9221-264 9221-264	11/7== 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/7== 11/7== 11/7==
V Biskin Of So So So V V V V V V V V V V V V V	6 3/8* 1000 - 24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 24*	Distant obl Var     Henpo Shoto     Good wertlanl     20,000'     20,000'     20,000'     20,000'     0 Shoto - 0o     17,000'     13,000'     15,000'     10,000'     15,000'	igns partial coverage. TRICC-16 Partial coverage of island TRL-97	9482-52 9216-6 1 in color. 9219-261 9221-262 9221-263 9221-263 9221-264 9221-269 9221-264 9221-264 9221-264	11/7++ 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/19
V Disking Off Dec 23 V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V V	6 3/8 - 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24°	Distant obl Var     Henpo Shoto     Good wertlanl     20,000'     20,000'     20,000'     20,000'     0 Shoto - 0o     17,000'     15,000'     15,000'     15,000'     100     100'	igns partial coverage. TRICC-16 Partial coverage of island TRL-97	9482-52 9216-6 1 in color. 9219-261 9221-262 9221-263 9221-263 9221-264 9221-269 9221-264 9221-264 9221-264	11/7== 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/7== 11/7== 11/7==
V Biskin Of So So So V V V V V V V V V V V V V	6 3/8 - 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24°	<ul> <li>Distant obl Var</li> <li>Wanpo Shote</li> <li>Good vertical</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>30,000°</li> <li>17,000°</li> <li>13,00°</li> <li>100°</li> <li>100</li></ul>	ign partial coverage of island ThiG-15 pertial coverage of island ThiG-77 Thi-77	9482-82 9216-6 1 in color. 9219-261 9220-262 9221-263 922264 922264	11/7== 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/7== 11/7== 11/7==
V Biskin Of So So So V V V V V V V V V V V V V	6 3/# 124° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 12° 24° 12° 24° 12° 24° 12° 24° 12° 24° 12° 24° 12° 24° 12° 24° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12	<ul> <li>Distant obl Var</li> <li>Wanpo Shote</li> <li>Good vertical</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>30,000°</li> <li>17,000°</li> <li>13,00°</li> <li>100°</li> <li>100</li></ul>	igns partial coverage. TRICC-16 Partial coverage of island TRL-97	9482-52 9216-6 1 in color. 9219-261 9221-262 9221-263 9221-263 9221-264 9221-269 9221-264 9221-264 9221-264	11/7== 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/7== 11/7== 11/7==
V Eiskie Gi Imo Ji V V V V V V V V V V V V V	6 3/8	Distant obl Var Sampo Shote Good vertical 20,000°	igns partial coverage. THIG2-16 Partial coverage of island THIG2-17 THI-77	9182-52 9216-6 9219-261 9220-262 9221-263 9221-263 9220-36 9220-37 9220-37 9220-37 9220-37	11/7== 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/7== 11/7== 11/7== 11/7== 11/7== 11/7== 11/19 1/
V Eiskin O Source of the second sec	6 3/# 124° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 12° 24° 12° 24° 12° 24° 12° 24° 12° 24° 12° 24° 12° 24° 12° 24° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12	<ul> <li>Distant obl Var</li> <li>Wanpo Shote</li> <li>Good vertical</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>30,000°</li> <li>17,000°</li> <li>13,00°</li> <li>100°</li> <li>100</li></ul>	igns partial coverage. THIG2-16 Partial coverage of island THIG2-17 THI-77	9182-52 9216-6 9219-261 9220-262 9221-263 9221-263 9220-36 9220-37 9220-37 9220-37 9220-37	11/7== 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/7== 11/7== 11/7==
V Eiskie Gi Imo Ji V V V V V V V V V V V V V	6 3/8	Distant obl Var Sampo Shote Good vertical 20,000°	igns partial coverage. THIG2-16 Partial coverage of island THIG2-17 THI-77	9482-52 9216-6 1 in color. 9219-261 9221-262 9221-263 9221-263 9221-264 9221-269 9221-264 9221-264 9221-264	11/7== 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/7== 11/7== 11/7== 11/7== 11/7== 11/7== 11/19 1/
V Eichig O Eatle Of IPro 23 V V V V V V V V V V V V V	6 3/8° 1000 - 24° 24° 24° 24° 12° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 2	<ul> <li>Distant oblights</li> <li>War</li> <li>Wanyo Shots</li> <li>Good writen</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>10,000°</li> <li>10,0</li></ul>	ique partial coverage. FUELOS-JS PUTLAS PUT	9182-82 9216-6 9216-241 9219-241 9221-251 9221-251 9221-251 9221-251 9221-251 9221-451 9211-451 9212-451	11/700 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/79 11/700 1/
V Eiskin O Source of the second sec	6 3/8° 1000 - 24° 24° 24° 24° 12° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 2	<ul> <li>Distant oblights</li> <li>War</li> <li>Wanyo Shots</li> <li>Good writen</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>10,000°</li> <li>10,0</li></ul>	igns partial coverage. THIG2-16 Partial coverage of island THIG2-17 THI-77	9182-82 9216-6 9216-241 9219-241 9221-251 9221-251 9221-251 9221-251 9221-251 9221-451 9211-451 9212-451	11/700 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/79 11/700 1/
V Eichin O Litai O Irec J V V V V V V V V V V V V V	6 3/6" - 124° - 124° - 24° - 24° - 124° - 124	Distant obli Var Empo Shote Good verilant 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 20,000 10,000 17,000 16,000 10,0000 10,000 10,0000 10,000 10,0000 10,0000	ign partial coverage of island THLG2-LM pertial coverage of island THL-77 THL-77 THL-77 THL-77 THL-77 Coverage of island THL-77 Coverage of island thus the island coverage of island thus the island coverage of is	9216-6 9216-6 9216-2 9219-22 9220-22 9220-22 9220-22 9220-29 9220-39 9221-63 9215-63 9215-63 9212-65 9212-65 9212-65 9212-65 9212-65 9212-65 9212-65	11/700 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/79 11/700 1/
V Eichin O Litai O Irec J V V V V V V V V V V V V V	6 3/8° 1000 - 24° 24° 24° 24° 12° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 2	<ul> <li>Distant oblights</li> <li>War</li> <li>Wanyo Shots</li> <li>Good writen</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>10,000°</li> <li>10,0</li></ul>	igns partial coverage. Partial coverage of island THIN-77 THL-77 THL-77 THL-77 THL-77 THL-77 THL-77 THL-77 Coverage of island coverage	9182-82 9216-6 9216-241 9219-241 9221-251 9221-251 9221-251 9221-251 9221-251 9221-451 9211-451 9212-451	11/7== 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/7= 11/7= 11/7= 9/13== 9/13== sti ested.
V Eichig Of Even 25 V V V V V V V V V V V V V	6 3/6° 1000 - 24° 24° 24° 24° 10° 24° 6° 6° 24° 24° 6°	Distant obli Var Banjo Shote Good verilant 20,000 30,500 40,500	igns partial coverage. Partial coverage of island THIN-77 THL-77 THL-77 THL-77 THL-77 THL-77 THL-77 THL-77 Coverage of island coverage	9125-52 9216-6 in color. 9270-843 9270-843 9270-843 9270-945 9270-945 9212-63 9212-63 9212-63 9212-65 9212-6	11/7== 11/7= 11/7= 11/7= 11/7= 11/7== 11/7== 11/7== 9/13== 9/13== sdicated. 11/5==
V Eichin O Lithin Ol V V V V V V V V V V V V V	6 3/6° 1000 - 24° 24° 24° 24° 10° 24° 6° 6° 24° 24° 6°	<ul> <li>Distant oblig</li> <li>Var</li> <li>Wango Bibele</li> <li>Good vertial</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>20,000°</li> <li>Bibele - Go</li> <li>17,000°</li> <li>17,000°</li> <li>17,000°</li> <li>17,000°</li> <li>17,000°</li> <li>17,000°</li> <li>17,000°</li> <li>17,000°</li> <li>10,000°</li> <li>10,000°</li> <li>10,500°</li> <li>Good triastro</li> <li>13,500°</li> <li>Good criastro</li> <li>13,500°</li> <li>Good splitewa</li> <li>Var</li> <li>Var</li> </ul>	igns partial coverage. Partial coverage of island THIN-77 THL-77 THL-77 THL-77 THL-77 THL-77 THL-77 THL-77 Coverage of island coverage	9125-52 9216-6 in color. 9270-843 9270-843 9270-843 9270-945 9270-945 9212-63 9212-63 9212-63 9212-65 9212-6	11/7== 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/7= 11/7== 11/7== 9/13== 9/13== 9/13== 9/13== 11/5==
V Eichin O Lithin Ol V V V V V V V V V V V V V	6 3/6° 1000 - 24° 24° 24° 24° 10° 24° 6° 6° 24° 24° 6°	Distant oblight     Var	igns partial coverage. Partial coverage of island THIN-77 THL-77 THL-77 THL-77 THL-77 THL-77 THL-77 THL-77 Coverage of island coverage	9125-52 9216-6 in color. 9270-843 9270-843 9270-843 9270-945 9270-945 9212-63 9212-63 9212-63 9212-65 9212-6	11/7== 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/19 9/13== 9/13== 9/13== 11/5== 11/5== 11/5== 11/5==
V Eichis O Ino 21 V V V V V V V V V V V V V	6 3/6° 1000 - 24° 24° 24° 24° 10° 24° 6° 6° 24° 24° 6°	<ul> <li>Distant oblig</li> <li>Var</li> <li>Var</li> <li>Var</li> <li>Var</li> <li>Var</li> <li>Cool</li> <li>Var</li> <li>20,000</li> <li>Solition</li> /ul>	igns partial coverage. Partial coverage of island THL-77 TH	9125-52 9216-6 in color. 9270-843 9270-843 9270-843 9270-945 9270-945 9212-63 9212-63 9212-63 9212-65 9212-6	11/7=0 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/7=0 11/
V Eishis O Little Of Tro 25 V V V V V V V V V V V V V	6 3/6" 6 3/6" 6 3/6" 6 3/6" 6 3/6" 6 3/6" 6 3/6" 6 3/6" 6 3/6"	Distant oblight     Var     Var     Manyo Bibelo     Good vertial     Cood vertial     Cood vertial     Cood vertial     Cood     Vigo     Vig	igns partial coverage. Partial coverage of island THL-77 TH	9216-6 9216-6 9216-6 921-62 9220-322 9220-322 9220-323 9220-32 9200-32 9220-32 9200-32 92	11/7=0 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/7=0 11/7=0 11/7=0 11/7=0 11/7=0 11/7=0 11/5=0 11/7=0 1
V Eishis O Little Of Tro 25 V V V V V V V V V V V V V	6 3/6° 5 3/6° 5 3/6° 5 3/6° 5 3/6° 6 3/6° 6 3/6° 6 3/6° 6 3/6° 6 3/6°	<ul> <li>Distant oblig</li> <li>Var</li> <li>Var</li> <li>Var</li> <li>Var</li> <li>Var</li> <li>Cool</li> <li>Var</li> <li>20,000</li> <li>Solition</li> /ul>	igns partial coverage. Partial coverage of island THL-77 TH	9216-6 9216-6 9216-6 9216-2211 9271-2211 9271-2211 9271-221 9271-2	11/7=== 11/3= 11/3= 11/3= 11/3= 11/7== 11/7== 11/7== 11/7== 11/7== 11/7== 11/7== 11/7== 11/7== 11/7== 11/7== 11/7== 11/7== 11/7= 1
V Eishis O Little Of Tro 25 V V V V V V V V V V V V V	6 3/6" 500	Distant oblight     Var     Var     Kapp Block     Good vertial     Cood vertial     Cood vertial     Cood     Var     Cood     Var     V	igns partial coverage. Partial coverage of island THL-77 TH	9216-6 9216-6 9216-6 921-62 922-32 92	11/7=== 11/19 11/19 11/7== 11/7== 11/7== 11/7== 9/13== 9/13== 9/13== 9/13== 11/5== 11/5== 11/5== 11/5== 11/5= 11
Υ         Παλά 0           0         Δ           Δ         Δ </th <th>6 3/6<sup>o</sup> 5 3/6<sup>o</sup> 6 3/6<sup>o</sup> - Banp 24<sup>o</sup> 24<sup>o</sup> 24<sup>o</sup> 24<sup>o</sup> 24<sup>o</sup> 24<sup>o</sup> 6<sup>o</sup> 6<sup>o</sup> 3/6<sup>o</sup> 6<sup>o</sup> 6<sup>o</sup> 3/6<sup>o</sup> 6<sup>o</sup> 6<sup>o</sup> 3/6<sup>o</sup> 6<sup>o</sup> 6<sup>o</sup> 6<sup>o</sup> 6<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup> 8<sup>o</sup></th> <th>Distant oblight     Var     Var     Var     Var     Var     Var     Var     Var     20,000</th> <th>igns partial coverage. Partial coverage of island THL-77 TH</th> <th>9216-6 9216-6 9216-6 9210-2811 9221-2811 9221-2811 9221-2811 9221-281 9221-</th> <th>11/7=0 11/29 11/29 11/29 11/29 11/29 11/29 11/29 9/13=0 9/13=0 9/13=0 11/5=</th>	6 3/6 <sup>o</sup> 5 3/6 <sup>o</sup> 6 3/6 <sup>o</sup> - Banp 24 <sup>o</sup> 24 <sup>o</sup> 24 <sup>o</sup> 24 <sup>o</sup> 24 <sup>o</sup> 24 <sup>o</sup> 6 <sup>o</sup> 6 <sup>o</sup> 3/6 <sup>o</sup> 6 <sup>o</sup> 6 <sup>o</sup> 3/6 <sup>o</sup> 6 <sup>o</sup> 6 <sup>o</sup> 3/6 <sup>o</sup> 6 <sup>o</sup> 6 <sup>o</sup> 6 <sup>o</sup> 6 <sup>o</sup> 8 <sup>o</sup>	Distant oblight     Var     Var     Var     Var     Var     Var     Var     Var     20,000	igns partial coverage. Partial coverage of island THL-77 TH	9216-6 9216-6 9216-6 9210-2811 9221-2811 9221-2811 9221-2811 9221-281 9221-	11/7=0 11/29 11/29 11/29 11/29 11/29 11/29 11/29 9/13=0 9/13=0 9/13=0 11/5=
γ           Πελλά 01           Ν           Δ           Ν	6 3/6° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24	Distant oblight     Var     Var	igns partial coverage. Partial coverage of island THL-77 TH	9216-6 9216-6 9216-6 921-84 9221-84 9221-84 9221-85 9221-85 9221-85 9221-65 9221-65 9221-65 9214-65 9277-100 9277-100 9277-100 9214-65 9277-100 92777-100 92777-100 9277-100 9277-100 927777-100 92777-100 9277777777777777777777777777777777777	11/7=== 11/19 11/19 11/19 11/7== 11/7== 11/7== 11/7== 9/13== 9/13== 9/13== 11/5== 11/5== 11/5== 11/5== 11/5== 11/5== 11/5= 1
Υ         Παλά 0           0         Δ           Δ         Δ </th <th>6 3/6" 500</th> <th>Distant oblight     Var     Var     Var     Var     Var     Var     Var     Var     20,000</th> <th>igns partial coverage. Partial coverage of island THIN-77 THL-77 THL-77 THL-77 THL-77 THL-77 THL-77 THL-77 Coverage of island coverage /th> <th>9216-6 9216-6 9216-6 9210-2811 9221-2811 9221-2811 9221-2811 9221-281 9221-</th> <th>11/7=0 11/29 11/29 11/29 11/29 11/29 11/29 11/29 9/13=0 9/13=0 9/13=0 11/5=</th>	6 3/6" 500	Distant oblight     Var     Var     Var     Var     Var     Var     Var     Var     20,000	igns partial coverage. Partial coverage of island THIN-77 THL-77 THL-77 THL-77 THL-77 THL-77 THL-77 THL-77 Coverage of island coverage	9216-6 9216-6 9216-6 9210-2811 9221-2811 9221-2811 9221-2811 9221-281 9221-	11/7=0 11/29 11/29 11/29 11/29 11/29 11/29 11/29 9/13=0 9/13=0 9/13=0 11/5=

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CONFIDENTIAL

0	4 3/00	Var	(W1) 126 (Reads Ma)	9790-1/5	10/18** 10/18** 10/18** 10/18** 10/18** 10/18** 10/18** 10/18** 10/18** 11/6**
õ	6 3/8	VAL	CV11-125 (Forth Tip) CV11-111 (North Tip)	9281-146	10/1800
õ	6 3/8"	Var	(Will-1 (Yorth Pin)	9280-145 9281-146 9282-147	10/1800
ě		Var	CV11-114 (North Tip)	9283-148	10/18 00
0	6 3/8	Var	CW11-126 (North Tip)	9284-149	10/1800
	6 3/8	Var	(Will-113 (North fin)	9285-150	10/18==
ň	6 3/8* 6 3/8*	Ver	CW11-107 (Horth Tip)	9286-151	10/18++
0000	6 3/8"	Var	CV11-107 (North Tip) CV11-112 (North Tip)	9285=150 9286=151 9287=152	10/18+*
ō	6 3/8"	Var	Frank-149 (Manils Bay)		10/18**
00000	6 3/8	Ver	CVL27-201 (Manila Bay)	9289-154 9290-155	11/600
o		Var	CVL27-196 (Manila Bay)	9290-155	11/500
0		Var	CV127-198 (Manila Bay)	9291-156 9292-157	11/500
0		Var	CV127-202 (Manils Bay)	9292-157	11/600
0	6 3/8*	Var		9293-158	11/500
0	6 3/8	Ver	CVL27-199 (Manila Bay)	9294-159	11/500
0	6 3/8ª	Var	CV127-202 (Manila Bay) CV127-197 (Manila Bay) CV127-197 (Manila Bay) CV167-2649 (Manila Bay) CV16-2651 (Manila Bay)	9295-160	11/500
0	6 3/5 6 3/8	Var		9296-161	11/300
0	6 3/8	Var Var	000 - 100	9297-162	10/18-4
ő	6 3/8	Var	8100-366 1000-367 1000-368	9296-161 9297-162 9298-163 9299-164	10/18++ 10/18++ 10/18++
	0 3/0	10.2	000000000	24.77-144	207 20
TOTAL	. Good spl:	t-vertical	l coverage of areas indicate	d.	
Split	24	30,000*	21JH~(MB163 (Takmo A/D & Doeks)	9243-339 9244-339	9/12++
Vart.			f Doeks)	9244-339	
Split	24*	29,800*	21FR-418163 (Silmano A/P)	9245-340	9/12++
Vert.				9245-340 9246-340	
Split	24*	20 6001	2100-/ME162 (Totto - M)		9/12++
Vert.	-4-	29,500	21PR-4ME163 (Taito A/D)	9247-341 9248-341	7/12/00
Tere.				140-34-	
MALAT C	TATES Com	i metterl	coverage of Singapore.		
HALAT S	1000	. Herezolat		1.0	
T	24*	22,070	(444BG)(44B15)(444-4C352)	9340-2	11/500
÷.	6* 12*	21. 500*	(462BG) (40015) (462-10/25)	9341-3	11/500
Ť.	120	21,500 22,900	(444BG) (41815) (444-46492)	9341-3 9342-6	11/500
T	120		(444BC)(4MB15)(444-AC411)	9343-5	11/500
	24*	22,000*	(444BC)(48815)(444-4C584)	9346-6	11/500
T.	24*		(LLLOG) (LLG915) (LLL-ACL85)	9345-7	11/500
1	24*		(444BG) (48815) (444-86352) (4625G) (48815) (445-86275) (444BG) (48815) (444-86284) (444BG) (48815) (444-86284) (444BC) (48815) (444-86284) (444BG) (48815) (444-86284) (442BG) (48815) (442-86282) (462BG) (48815) (452-86283)	9346-8	11/500
T	24	21,300	(462BC)(40015)(462-4C382)	9364-9	11/500
	24	21,300	(462BG)(4MB15)(462-AC581)	9365-10	11/5**
B.ITEMA .	<b>A</b>				
BURBLAS	000	a vertical	coverage of areas indicated		
			(Rangoon) (462BC)(44814)(462-40-581) (462BC)(44814)(462-40739) (462BC)(44814)(462-40479) (462BC)(44815)(462-40479) (462BC)(44815)(462-40479) (462BC)(44813)(462-4044)		
T	24*	24,0001	(462BC)(4MB14)(462-4C-581)	9366-3	11/300
<b>T</b>			(462BC)(4MB24)(462-4C329)	9367-4	11/300
Ŧ			(462BC)(4MB14)(462-4C479)	9368-5	11/300
Ţ	12*	21,400' 23,500	(462BC)(4MB15)(462-AC479)	9369-6	11/500
¥.	40°	23,500	(462BC)(4MB13)(462-ACLLL)	9370-7	11/3**
				9767-8	
÷	24*	23,500*	(462BC)(44814)(462-4C475) (462BC)(44874)(462-4C475)	9364-8	11/300
Ť	24° 24°	23,500	(46/2BC)(40814)(462-40475) (46/2BC)(40814)(462-40463) (46/2BC)(40814)(462-40463)	9364-8 9371-9 9372-10	11/300 11/300 11/300
T T	24° 24° 24°	22,000'	(462BC)(48B14)(462-4C475) (462BC)(48B14)(462-4C463) (462BC)(48B14)(462-4C463) (462BC)(48B14)(462-4C461) (462BC)(48B14)(462-4C506)	9364-8 9371-9 9372-10	11/3=+
T T T	240	22,000'	(452BC)(4MB14)(452-4C475) (452BC)(4MB14)(452-4C463) (452BC)(4MB14)(452-4C463) (452BC)(4MB14)(452-4C505) (4443B)(4MB14)(444-4C45)	9364-8 9371-9 9372-10	11/3== 11/3== 11/3==
T T T	24	22,000'	(462BC)(44814)(452-45475) (462BC)(44814)(452-45465) (452BC)(44814)(452-45463) (452BC)(44814)(452-4556) (44430)(44814)(444-4545) (44430)(44814)(444-4545)	9364-8 9371-9 9372-10 9373-11 9374-12 9375-13	11/3== 11/3== 11/3==
* * *	24° 24°	22,000'	(462BC)(44814)(462-aC475) (462BC)(44814)(462-aC65) (462BC)(44814)(462-aC65) (462BC)(44814)(462-aC65) (4453C)(44814)(462-aC55) (444BC)(44814)(444-aC45) (444BC)(44814)(444-aC580)	9364-8 9371-9 9372-10 9373-11 9374-12 9375-13	11/3== 11/3== 11/3==
***	24	22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000*	(463BC) (48B14) (462-402475) (463BC) (48B14) (462-402461) (463BC) (48B14) (462-402461) (463BC) (48B14) (462-405461) (4443B2) (48B14) (444-40249) (4443B2) (48B14) (444-40249) (4443B2) (48B14) (444-40548)	9364-8 9371-9 9372-10 9373-11 9374-12 9375-13 9376-14	11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3**
	24° 24° 40°	22,000 <sup>+</sup> 22,000 <sup>+</sup> 22,000 <sup>+</sup> 22,000 <sup>+</sup> 22,000 <sup>+</sup> 22,000 <sup>+</sup>	(46305) (48014) (462-406475) (46305) (48014) (462-40645) (46305) (48014) (462-40645) (46305) (48014) (462-40506) (46305) (48014) (462-40506) (44406) (48014) (444-40529) (44406) (48014) (444-40524) (44406) (48014) (444-40524)	9364-8 9371-9 9372-10 9373-11 9374-12 9375-13 9376-14	11/3== 11/3== 11/3==
	24° 24° 40°	22,000 <sup>+</sup> 22,000 <sup>+</sup> 22,000 <sup>+</sup> 22,000 <sup>+</sup> 22,000 <sup>+</sup> 22,000 <sup>+</sup>	(4626)(4814)(462-46275) (4626)(4814)(462-4666) (4626)(4814)(462-4666) (4626)(4814)(462-4666) (4426)(4814)(462-4666) (4446)(4814)(444-4628) (4446)(4814)(444-4628) (4446)(4814)(444-4628) (4446)(4814)(444-4628) (4446)(4814)(444-4628) (4446)(4814)(444-4628) (4446)(4814)(444-4628)	9304-6 9371-9 9372-10 9373-11 9374-12 9375-13 9376-14 9377-15 9378-16	
* * * * * * * * * *	24° 24° 40° 24° 24° 24°	22,000 <sup>+</sup> 22,000 <sup>+</sup> 22,000 <sup>+</sup> 22,000 <sup>+</sup> 22,000 <sup>+</sup> 22,000 <sup>+</sup>	(4630)(4881)(462-46275) (4620)(4881)(462-4626) (4620)(4881)(462-4626) (4630)(4881)(462-4626) (4630)(4881)(462-4626) (4630)(4881)(462-4626) (4640)(4881)(462-4626) (4640)(4881)(462-4626) (4640)(4881)(462-4626) (4640)(4881)(462-4626) (4640)(4881)(462-4626) (4640)(4881)(462-4626) (4640)(4881)(462-4626) (4640)(4881)(462-4626) (4640)(4881)(462-4626) (4640)(4881)(462-4626) (4640)(4881)(462-4626)	9304-6 9371-9 9372-10 9373-11 9374-12 9375-13 9376-14 9377-15 9378-16	
* * * * * * * * * *	24° 24° 40° 24° 24° 12°	22,000 <sup>+</sup> 22,000 <sup>+</sup> 22,000 <sup>+</sup> 22,000 <sup>+</sup> 22,000 <sup>+</sup> 22,000 <sup>+</sup>	(4536)(4834)(453-4647) (4536)(4831)(453-4645) (4536)(4831)(453-4645) (4536)(4831)(453-4645) (4536)(4831)(453-4656) (4446)(4831)(454-4656) (4446)(4831)(454-4656) (4446)(4831)(454-4656) (4446)(4831)(454-4656) (4446)(4831)(454-4656) (4446)(4831)(454-4656) (4446)(4831)(454-4656) (4446)(4831)(454-4656) (4446)(4831)(454-4656) (4446)(4831)(454-4656) (446)(4531)(456-4656)	9364-6 9371-9 9372-10 9373-11 9374-12 9375-13 9376-14 9377-15 9378-16 9379-17 9380-18 9381-19	1/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3**
* * * * * * * * * * *	24° 24° 40° 24° 24° 12°	22,000 <sup>+</sup> 22,000 <sup>+</sup> 22,000 <sup>+</sup> 22,000 <sup>+</sup> 22,000 <sup>+</sup> 22,000 <sup>+</sup>	(4638)()(4883,4)(463-486,7) (4638)()(4813,4)(463-486,7) (4638)()(4813,4)(463-486,8) (4638)()(4813,4)(463-463,8) (4648)()(463-463,8) (4648)()(463-463,8)\\(4638)()(463-463,8)\\(4638)()(4638,8)\\(4638)()(4638,8)\\(4638)()(4638,8)\\(4638,8)()(4638,8)\\(4638,8)\\(4638,8)((4638,8))\\(4638,8)((4638,8))\\(4638,8)((4638,8))\\(4638,8)((4638,8))\\(4638,8)((4638,8))\\(4638,8)((4638,8))\\(4638,8)((4638,8))\\(4638,8)((4638,8))\\(4638,8	9364-8 9371-9 9372-11 9373-11 9373-11 9375-13 9376-13 9376-14 9377-15 9378-16 9379-17 9380-18 9381-19 9381-19	
	24° 24° 40° 24° 24° 12°	22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 21,000* 21,400* 21,400* 21,500* 21,500* 21,500* 21,500*	(4636)(14884)(462-466.75) (4636)(4884)(462-466.75) (4636)(4884)(462-466.75) (4636)(4884)(462-466.75) (4636)(4884)(462-466.75) (4446)(4884)(442-462.75) (4446)(4884)(442-462.75) (4446)(4884)(442-462.75) (4446)(4884)(442-462.75) (4446)(4884)(442-462.75) (4446)(4884)(442-462.75) (4447)(4884)(442-462.75) (447)(4884)(462-462.75) (447)(4884)(462-465.75) (1177)(4884)(462-465.75) (1177)(4884)(462-465.75)	9364-8 9371-9 9372-11 9373-11 9373-11 9375-13 9376-13 9376-14 9377-15 9378-16 9379-17 9380-18 9381-19 9381-19	1/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3**
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	24° 24° 40° 24° 12° 45° 24° 12° 12°	22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 21,000* 21,000* 21,500* 21,500* 21,500* 21,500* 21,500* 21,000* 20,500* 21,000*	44586 (14814) (45 - 41275) (45786 (14814) (45 - 41275) (45786 (14814) (45 - 41275) (45786 (14814) (45 - 41256) (44486 (14814) (44 - 41256) (4448 (148 - 41256) (4448 - 41256) (4448 (148 - 41256)) (4448 (148 - 41256)) (4448 (148 - 41256)) (44	9304-6 9371-9 9372-10 9373-11 9373-11 9373-12 9375-13 9376-14 9377-15 9378-16 9378-16 9379-17 9380-18 9381-19 9382-20 9383-21 9385-23 9386-24	1/3* 11/3* 11/3* 11/3* 11/3* 11/3* 11/3* 11/3* 11/3* 11/3* 11/3* 11/3*
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Y Y	24° 24° 40° 24° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12°	22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 21,000* 21,000* 21,000* 21,000* 21,000* 20,500* 16,500* 16,500*	(425)(421)(425-427) (425)(421)(425-425) (425)(421)(425-425) (425)(421)(425-425) (425)(421)(425-425) (425)(421)(425-425) (425)(425)(425)(425-425) (425)(425)(425)(425-425) (425)(425)(425)(425-425) (425)(425)(425-425) (425)(425)(425-425) (425)(425)(425-425) (425)(425)(425-425) (425)(425)(425-425) (425)(425)(425-425) (425)(425)(425-425) (425-425)(425-425) (425-425)(425-425) (425-425)(425-425) (425-425)(425-425) (425-425)(425-425)(425-425) (425-425)(425-425-42)(425-	9364-6 9371-9 9372-10 9372-10 9375-11 9375-13 9375-13 9376-14 9377-15 9378-16 9378-16 9378-16 9382-20 9383-21 9385-23 9386-24	11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3**
Y Y	24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24°	22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 21,000* 20,500* 10,00* 20,00*	(12)(12)(12)(12)(12)(12)(12)(12)(12)(12)	9304-6 9371-9 9372-10 9373-11 9373-11 9373-12 9375-13 9376-14 9377-15 9378-16 9378-16 9378-17 9380-18 9381-19 9382-20 9383-21 9385-23 9386-24	1/3* 11/3* 11/3* 11/3* 11/3* 11/3* 11/3* 11/3* 11/3* 11/3* 11/3* 11/3*
Y Y	24° 24° 40° 24° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12°	22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 21,000* 21,000* 21,000* 21,000* 21,000* 20,500* 16,500* 16,500*	(425)(421)(425-427) (425)(421)(425-425) (425)(421)(425-425) (425)(421)(425-425) (425)(421)(425-425) (425)(421)(425-425) (425)(425)(425)(425-425) (425)(425)(425)(425-425) (425)(425)(425)(425-425) (425)(425)(425-425) (425)(425)(425-425) (425)(425)(425-425) (425)(425)(425-425) (425)(425)(425-425) (425)(425)(425-425) (425)(425)(425-425) (425-425)(425-425) (425-425)(425-425) (425-425)(425-425) (425-425)(425-425) (425-425)(425-425)(425-425) (425-425)(425-425-42)(425-	9364-6 9371-9 9372-10 9372-10 9375-11 9375-13 9375-13 9376-14 9377-15 9378-16 9378-16 9378-16 9382-20 9383-21 9385-23 9386-24	11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3**
V V <u>SUMATRA</u> V	24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24°	22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 21,000* 21,000* 21,000* 21,000* 21,000* 20,500* 16,500* 16,500*	(12)(12)(12)(12)(12)(12)(12)(12)(12)(12)	9364-6 9371-9 9372-10 9372-10 9375-11 9375-13 9375-13 9376-14 9377-15 9378-16 9378-16 9378-16 9382-20 9383-21 9385-23 9386-24	11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3**
V V <u>SUMATRA</u> V	24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 12* 12* 12* 12* 12* 12* 12* 12* 12* 12	22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 21,	(44-55) (4411) (42-447) (44-55) (4411) (42-447) (44-55) (4411) (42-447) (44-55) (4411) (42-445) (44-55) (4411) (42-445) (4445) (4411) (42-45) (4445) (4411) (42-45) (4445) (4411) (42-45) (4445) (4411) (42-45) (4415) (4411) (44-45) (4415) (4411) (44-45) (44-45) (4415) (4411) (44-45) (44-45) (44-45) (44-45) (44-45) (44-45) (44-45) (44-45) (44-45) (44-45) (44-45) (44-45) (44-45) (44-45) (44-45) (4	9364-8 9371-9 9377-10 9377-10 9377-11 9377-12 9377-13 9377-13 9377-13 9377-14 9377-17 9377-17 9377-17 9377-17 9377-17 9377-17 9382-20 9382-21 9385-21 9385-21	11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3**
Y SUMATRA Y GAROLIN	24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 12* 12* 12* 12* 12* 12* 12* 12* 12* 12	22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 21,	(44-55) (4411) (42-447) (44-55) (4411) (42-447) (44-55) (4411) (42-447) (44-55) (4411) (42-445) (44-55) (4411) (42-445) (4445) (4411) (42-45) (4445) (4411) (42-45) (4445) (4411) (42-45) (4445) (4411) (42-45) (4415) (4411) (44-45) (4415) (4411) (44-45) (44-45) (4415) (4411) (44-45) (44-45) (44-45) (44-45) (44-45) (44-45) (44-45) (44-45) (44-45) (44-45) (44-45) (44-45) (44-45) (44-45) (44-45) (4	9364-8 9371-9 9377-10 9377-10 9377-11 9377-12 9377-13 9377-13 9377-13 9377-14 9377-17 9377-17 9377-17 9377-17 9377-17 9377-17 9382-20 9382-21 9385-21 9385-21	11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3**
V SUMATRA V GAROLIN Palay	24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 22* 12* 12* 12* 12* 12* 12* 12* 12* 12	22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 21,	(425)(1011)(125-4273) (425)(1011)(125-4253) (425)(1011)(125-4253) (425)(1011)(125-4253) (425)(1011)(125-4253) (425)(1011)(125-4253) (127)(125-4253)(125-4253) (127)(125-4253)(125-4253) (127)(125-4253)(12	9364-8 9372-9 9377-10 9377-10 9373-11 9373-12 9375-13 9375-13 9375-14 9375-14 9375-14 9375-14 9375-14 9375-14 9375-12 9375-12 9375-12 9375-12 9382-12 9382-23 9385-24 9385-24 9385-25 9385-24	11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3**
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V SUMATRA V GAROLIN Palay	24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12	22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 21,	(425)(1011)(125-4273) (425)(1011)(125-4253) (425)(1011)(125-4253) (425)(1011)(125-4253) (425)(1011)(125-4253) (425)(1011)(125-4253) (127)(125-4253)(125-4253) (127)(125-4253)(125-4253) (127)(125-4253)(12	9364-8 9372-9 9377-10 9377-10 9373-11 9373-12 9375-13 9375-13 9375-14 9375-14 9375-14 9375-14 9375-14 9375-14 9375-12 9375-12 9375-12 9375-12 9382-12 9382-23 9385-24 9385-24 9385-25 9385-24	11/300 11/300
V SUMATRA V GAROLIN Palay	24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 12* 12* 12* 12* 12* 12* 12* 12* 12* 12	22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 21,	(425)(1011)(125-4273) (425)(1011)(125-4253) (425)(1011)(125-4253) (425)(1011)(125-4253) (425)(1011)(125-4253) (425)(1011)(125-4253) (127)(125-4253)(125-4253) (127)(125-4253)(125-4253) (127)(125-4253)(12	9364-8 9372-9 9377-10 9377-10 9373-11 9373-12 9375-13 9375-13 9375-14 9375-14 9375-14 9375-14 9375-14 9375-14 9375-12 9375-12 9375-12 9375-12 9382-12 9382-23 9385-24 9385-24 9385-25 9385-24	11/3*** 11/3**
V SUMATRA V GAROLIN Palay	24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12	22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 21,	(1400)(1401)(140-14/17) (1400)	9364-8 9372-9 9377-10 9377-10 9373-11 9373-12 9375-13 9375-13 9375-14 9375-14 9375-14 9375-14 9375-14 9375-14 9375-12 9375-12 9375-12 9375-12 9382-12 9382-23 9385-24 9385-24 9385-25 9385-24	11/300 11/300
Y Y SUMATRA Y CAROLIN Zalay Y Y	24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 22° 22°	22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 21,000* 21,000* 21,000* 21,000* 21,000* 21,000* 21,000* 21,000* 21,000* 21,000* 16,500* 16,500* 16,500* 16,500* 12,000* 12,	(dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(1000	9 384-8 9 371-9 9 777-11 9 777-12 9 777-13 9 777-13 9 777-15 9 777-15 9 777-15 9 777-15 9 778-17 9 778-17 9 788-14 9 788-24 9 798-22 9 798-24 9 79 422-2477 9 422-2477 9 422-2477	
Y Y SUBATRA Y CAROLIN Palass Y Y Y	24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12	22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 21,000* 21,000* 21,000* 21,000* 21,000* 21,000* 21,000* 21,000* 21,000* 21,000* 16,500* 16,500* 16,500* 16,500* 12,000* 12,	(dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(1000	9 384-8 9 371-9 9 777-11 9 777-12 9 777-13 9 777-13 9 777-15 9 777-15 9 777-15 9 777-15 9 778-17 9 778-17 9 788-14 9 788-24 9 798-22 9 798-24 9 79 422-2477 9 422-2477 9 422-2477	
Y Y SUBATRA Y CAROLIE Palay Y Y Y	24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 21° 22° 22° 22° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12	22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 22,000* 21,000* 21,000* 21,000* 21,000* 21,000* 21,000* 21,000* 21,000* 21,000* 21,000* 16,500* 16,500* 16,500* 16,500* 12,000* 12,	(1400)(1411)(140-1477) (1400)(1411)(140-1477) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1401)(1401)(140-1470)(140-1470) (1401)(1401)(140-1470)(140-1470) (1401)(1401)(140-1470	9364-8 9371-9 9777-11 9777-12 9777-13 9776-25 9786-24 9785-25 9775-25 9775-	11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3** 11/3**
Y Y SUMATRA Y CAROLIN Palay Y Y	24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 22° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12	22,000' 22,000' 22,000' 22,000' 22,000' 21,000' 20,500' 21,000' 20,500' 21,000' 20,500' 21,000' 20,500' 21,000' 20,500' 21,000' 20,500' 21,000' 20,500' 21,000' 20,500' 21,000' 2,50	(1400)(1411)(140-1477) (1400)(1411)(140-1477) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1401)(1401)(140-1470)(140-1470) (1401)(1401)(140-1470)(140-1470) (1401)(1401)(140-1470	9364-8 9371-9 9777-11 9777-12 9777-13 9776-25 9786-24 9785-25 9775-25 9775-	11/3** 11/3**
Y SUBATRA Y CAROLUS Falas	24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 24° 22° 24° 22° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12	22,000' 22,000' 22,000' 20,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 22,000' 16,500' 16,500' 12,000' 16,500' 16,500' 12,000' 16,500' 15,000' 15,	(1400)(1411)(140-1477) (1400)(1411)(140-1477) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1401)(1401)(140-1470)(140-1470) (1401)(1401)(140-1470)(140-1470) (1401)(1401)(140-1470	9364-8 9371-9 9777-11 9777-12 9777-13 9776-25 9786-24 9785-25 9775-25 9775-	11/3** 11/3**
Y SUBATRA Y CAROLUS Falas	24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 22* 12* 12* 12* 12* 12* 12* 12* 12* 12	22,000' 22,000' 22,000' 20,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 22,000' 16,500' 16,500' 12,000' 16,500' 16,500' 12,000' 16,500' 15,000' 15,	(1400)(1411)(140-1477) (1400)(1411)(140-1477) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1401)(1401)(140-1470)(140-1470) (1401)(1401)(140-1470)(140-1470) (1401)(1401)(140-1470	9364-8 9371-9 9777-11 9777-12 9777-13 9776-25 9786-24 9785-25 9775-25 9775-	11/3** 11/3**
Y SUBATRA Y CAROLUS Falas	24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 22* 12* 12* 12* 12* 12* 12* 12* 12* 12	22,000' 22,000' 22,000' 20,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 22,000' 16,500' 16,500' 12,000' 16,500' 16,500' 12,000' 16,500' 15,000' 15,	(1400)(1411)(140-1477) (1400)(1411)(140-1477) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1401)(1401)(140-1470)(140-1470) (1401)(1401)(140-1470)(140-1470) (1401)(1401)(140-1470	9364-8 9371-9 9777-11 9777-12 9777-13 9776-25 9786-24 9785-25 9775-25 9775-	11/3** 11/3**
Y SUBATRA Y GAROLIE Zalas Y Y Y Y Y	244 244 407 244 107 244 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128 128	22,000 22,000 22,000 22,000 22,000 22,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 20,500 21,000 20,500 21,000 20,600 21,000 20,000 21,000 21,000 20,000 21,000 20,000 21,000 21,000 20,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 20,000 21,000 21,000 20,000 21,000 20,000	(1400)(1411)(140-1477) (1400)(1411)(140-1477) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1400)(1401)(140-1470) (1401)(1401)(140-1470)(140-1470) (1401)(1401)(140-1470)(140-1470) (1401)(1401)(140-1470	9364-8 9371-9 9777-11 9777-12 9777-13 9776-25 9786-24 9785-25 9775-25 9775-	
Y SUBATRA GABOLIE Polas Y Y Y Y Y Y O O	244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 124 12	22,000 22,000 22,000 22,000 22,000 22,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 20,500 21,000 20,500 21,000 20,600 21,000 20,000 21,000 21,000 20,000 21,000 20,000 21,000 21,000 20,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 20,000 21,000 21,000 20,000 21,000 20,000	(142)(142)(142)(142)(142)(142)(142)(142)	9364-8 9371-9 9777-11 9777-12 9777-13 9776-25 9786-24 9785-25 9775-25 9775-	
Y SUBATRA Y GAROLIE Zalas Y Y Y Y Y	24° 24° 40° 24° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12° 12	22,000' 22,000' 22,000' 22,000' 22,000' 22,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 20,000' 21,000' 21,000' 21,000' 20,000' 21,000' 20,000' 21,000' 20,000' 21,000' 20,	(dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(100-0007) (dec)(1000)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(10007)(10007) (dec)(10007)(1000	9 301-9 9 777-10 9 777-11 9 77	
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Y SUBATRA GABOLIE Polas Y Y Y Y Y Y O O	24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 24* 24*	22,000 22,000 22,000 22,000 22,000 22,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 21,000 20,500 21,000 20,000	(4000)(1011)(102-417) (4000)(1011)(102-417) (4000)(1011)(102-417) (4000)(1011)(102-417) (4000)(1011)(102-417) (4000)(1011)(102-417) (4000)(1011)(102-417) (4000)(1011)(102-417) (4000)(1011)(102-417) (4000)(1011)(102-417) (1011)(1021)(102-417)(102-417) (1011)(1021)(102-417	9 301-9 9 777-10 9 777-11 9 77	
Y SUMATEA Y GAROLIS Delay Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y	244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 124 12	22,000' 22,000' 22,000' 22,000' 22,000' 21,000' 21,200' 21,200' 21,200' 21,500' 21,500' 21,500' 20,600' 20,600' 21,500' 14,600' 14,600' 15,000' 14,600' 15,000' 14,600' 15,000' 14,600' 15,000' 14,600' 15,000' 14,600' 15,000' 14,600' 15,000' 14,600' 15,000' 14,600' 15,000' 15,000' 15,000' 16,500' 11,600' 10,500' 10,	(4650)(4811)(425-4173) (4657)(4811)(425-4173) (4657)(4811)(425-4154) (4657)(4811)(425-4154) (4657)(4811)(425-4154) (4457)(4811)(425-4154) (4457)(4811)(425-4154) (4457)(4811)(425-4154) (4457)(4811)(425-4154) (417)(4811)(425-4154) (117)(4811)(4	9 301-8 9 377-10 9777-10 9777-11 9777-12 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9782-20 9782-	
Y SUBATRA SUBATRA Y CARCLES Enlay Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y	244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 124 12	22,000' 22,000' 22,000' 22,000' 22,000' 21,000	(4000)(4011)(400-4073) (4000)(4011)(400-4073) (4000)(4011)(400-4053) (4000)(4011)(400-4053) (4000)(4011)(400-4053) (4000)(4011)(400-4053) (4000)(4011)(400-4053) (4000)(4011)(400-4053) (4000)(4011)(400-4053) (4000)(4011)(400-4053) (4000)(4011)(400-4053) (4000)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (4000)(4013)(400-4053) (4000)(400-400-400) (4000)(400-400-400) (4000)(4	9 301-8 9 377-10 9777-10 9777-11 9777-12 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9782-20 9782-	
Y SUMATEA Y CANOLIX Palay Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y	244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 124 12	22,000' 22,000' 22,000' 22,000' 22,000' 21,000	(4000)(4011)(400-4073) (4000)(4011)(400-4073) (4000)(4011)(400-4053) (4000)(4011)(400-4053) (4000)(4011)(400-4053) (4000)(4011)(400-4053) (4000)(4011)(400-4053) (4000)(4011)(400-4053) (4000)(4011)(400-4053) (4000)(4011)(400-4053) (4000)(4011)(400-4053) (4000)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (4000)(4013)(400-4053) (4000)(400-400-400) (4000)(400-400-400) (4000)(4	9 301-8 9 377-10 9777-10 9777-11 9777-12 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9782-20 9782-	
Y SUBATRA SUBATRA Y CARCLES Enlay Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y	244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 124 12	22,000 22,000 22,000 22,000 22,000 22,000 22,000 22,000 22,000 22,000 22,000 21,000	(dec)(del)((det-dec)) (dec)(del)((det-dec)) (dec)(del)((det-dec)) (dec)(del)((det-dec)) (dec)(del)((det-dec)) (dec)(del)((det-dec)) (dec)(del)((det-dec)) (dec)(del)((det-dec)) (dec)(del)((det-dec)) (dec)(del)((det-dec)) (dec)(del)((det-dec)) (dec)(del)((det-dec)) (dec)(del)((det-dec)) (dec)(del)((det-dec)) (dec)(del)((det-dec)) (dec)(del)((det-dec)) (dec)(del)((det-dec)) (dec)(del)((det-dec)) (dec)(dec)(dec)) (dec)(dec)(dec)) (dec)(dec)(dec)) (dec)(dec)(dec)) (dec)(dec)(dec)) (dec)(dec)(dec)) (dec)(dec)(dec)) (dec)(dec)(dec)) (dec)(dec)(dec)) (dec)(dec)(dec)) (dec)(dec)(dec)) (dec)(dec)) (dec)(dec)(dec)) (dec)(dec)) (dec)(dec)(dec)) (dec)(dec)) (dec)(dec)(dec)) (dec)(dec)(dec)) (dec)(dec)(dec)) (dec)(dec)(dec)) (dec)(dec)(dec)) (dec)(dec)(dec)) (dec)(dec)(dec)) (dec)(dec)(dec)(dec)) (dec)(dec)(dec)(dec)) (dec)(dec)(dec)(dec)) (dec)(dec)(dec)(dec)) (dec)(dec)(dec)(dec)(dec)) (dec)(dec)(dec)(dec)(dec)(dec)(dec)) (dec)(dec)(dec)(dec)(dec)(dec)(dec)(dec)	9 301-3 9 301-3 9 777-10 9 777-10 9 777-10 9 777-10 9 777-10 9 777-10 9 777-10 9 777-10 9 777-10 9 7777-10 9 77777777-10 9 7777-10 9 7777-10 9 7777-10 9 7777-10	
Y SUMATEA Y CANOLIX Palay Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y	244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 244 124 12	22,000' 22,000' 22,000' 22,000' 22,000' 21,000	(4000)(4011)(400-4073) (4000)(4011)(400-4073) (4000)(4011)(400-4053) (4000)(4011)(400-4053) (4000)(4011)(400-4053) (4000)(4011)(400-4053) (4000)(4011)(400-4053) (4000)(4011)(400-4053) (4000)(4011)(400-4053) (4000)(4011)(400-4053) (4000)(4011)(400-4053) (4000)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (1011)(4011)(400-4053) (4000)(4013)(400-4053) (4000)(400-400-400) (4000)(400-400-400) (4000)(4	9 301-8 9 377-10 9777-10 9777-11 9777-12 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9777-13 9782-20 9782-	

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1910	Allen Good	vertical p	artial coverage.		
٧	409	5,0001	28PR48870-1	9235-6	10/30
Some	erol Good	vertical e	nd oblique partial coverage	•	
	40*	5,000 *	267241870-1	9228-3	10/30**
Ó	12*		28 MAR 70-3	9229-6	10/3000
Drak			und oblique partial coverage	showing box	ib di
	dena	e in sirfi	eld areas.		
v	12*	19,3001	4-236-2788-4830-70	9445-596	
v	12*	19,400	8-151-2786-4830-70	9446-597	11/22
T I	12*	18,200*	C-935-2788-4830-70	9447-598	11/22
0	6 3/8	18,800	D-633-2785-4830-70	9448-999	11/22
0	6 3/8	17,000*		9449-600	
T I	240	18,000*	A-425-39285-4830-70	9450-601	11/22
v	24	18,200*	8-838-39286-4830-70	9451-602	11/22
¥.	12*	17,600	C-358-39285-/JI30-70	9452-603	11/22
0	6 3/8	17,600*	D-358-39288-4830-70	9453-604	11/22
MARIAN	1.5				
Arat	Jan: Good	oblique pa	rtial coverage.		
0	6 3/8	Var	WB117-23	9218-30	11/1500
Para	llon De Hedi	Goo	d complete vertical coverage	••	
Y Y	llon Du Medin 24.º		d complete vertical coverage 8-832-2685	9469-6	11/
	24.*	13,000'		-	11/
7	24.*	13,000'	8-832-2685	-	11/14-+
Y Qaaca	24" Bali Good 24"	13,000' emplete v 10,000'	B-832-2685 ertical coverage.	9469-6	11/10
V Godes V Zhan	24* 5000 24* 21 Good	13,000' complete v 10,000' oblique pa	8-632-2685 ertical coverage. 287448C166-1 utial coverage.	9469-6 9223-6	
7 9 7 2040 0	24" Bali Good 24" Good 6 3/8"	13,000' complete v 10,000' oblique pa Var	8-632-2685 ertical coverage. 2579486766-1 urtial coverage. VB117-224	9469-6 9223-6 9227-134	
V Godes V Zhan	24" Bali Good 24" Good 6 3/8"	13,000' complete v 10,000' oblique pa Var	8-632-2685 ertical coverage. 287448C166-1 utial coverage.	9469-6 9223-6 9227-134	
7 9 7 2040 0	24" Bali Good 24" Good 6 3/8"	13,000' emplete v 10,000' ohlique pe Var vertical s	8-632-2685 mrtical coverage. 2594LBC166-1 urtial coverage. VB117-224 md oblique partial coverage.	9469-6 9223-6 9227-134	11/14
V Gase V Zhata O Rote	24" 24" 24" 6 3/9" 1 Good	13,000' complete v 10,000' oblique pa Var vertical a 3,000' 50'	8-632-2685 mrtical coverage. 2594LBC166-1 urtial coverage. VB117-224 md oblique partial coverage.	9469-6 9223-6 9227-134 9236-185	11/14
V Gase V Zhata O Rote	24" 24" 24" 6 3/5" 1 Good 6 3/5" 12"	13,000' complete v 10,000' oblique pa Var vertical a 3,000' 50'	8-632-2685 ertical coverage. 287446/266-1 trial coverage. 78117-224 do oblique partial coverage. 2874446/267-1	9469-6 9223-6 9227-134	11/14
V <u>Granu</u> V <u>Press</u> 0 <u>Rote</u> V 0	24" 24" 24" 6 3/# 6 3/# 6 Good 12" 12" 12"	13,000' example to to 10,000' oblique pa Var vertical a 3,000' 50' 75'	8-632-2685 srtial coverage. 2874462166-1 urtial coverage. VB117-224 0 oblique partial coverage. 2874462167-1 2874462170-1	9469-6 9223-6 9227-134 9236-185 9238-186	11/14 11/14===
V <u>Granu</u> V <u>Press</u> 0 <u>Rote</u> V 0	24" 24" 24" 6 3/8" 10 Good 12" 12" 12" 12" 12" 12" 12" 12"	13,000' example to to 10,000' oblique pa Var vertical a 3,000' 50' 75'	8-632-2685 martical coverage. 2574UAC166-1 rtial coverage. 70117-224 md oblique partial coverage. 2574UAC169-1 2574UAC169-1	9469-6 9223-6 9227-134 9236-185 9238-186	11/14 11/14===
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T Carte C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C	24" Sai Good 24" an Good 6 3/0" 12" 12" 12" 2" Cood 6 3/0"	l3,000' emplete v l0,000' oblique pe Var yortical e 3,000' 75' oblique pe Var Qood obli	8-45-2665 srtial array. 287440164-1 (rial arrays. 17117-224 an obligue partial arrays. 287440170-1 rial arrays. 17117-22	9469-6 9223-6 9227-134 9227-134 9236-185 9236-185 9236-187	11/14** 11/14** 11/16**

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#### CONFIDENTIAL

### LUZON AIRFIELDS

These photos, taken by carrier-based planes, are representative of the Japheld airfields encountered by our aircraft on recent strikes against LUZON.




An example of the concentration of Jap fields in the vicinity of MANILA. Five of the six CLARK landing grounds are visible; the sixth is hidden by the cloud in upper right. Center - the four ANGELES airfields.

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CONFIDENTIAL



GRACE PARK Airfield, located in the northern part of MANILA, is a fighter field. The new runway is concrete, however, the old runways outlined above are not paved and are believed unserviceable. Page 60



LEGASPI Airfield, situated 12 miles north of LEGASPI Town, is a medium bomber field with an improved runway. Note bomb crater, fallen trees and debris in foreground - the result of one of our recent strikes.

Page 61

CONFIDENTIAL



Fort STOTSENBURG, former American Army Headquarters, now believed to be a Japanese Garrison Headquarters at least partly responsible for the defense of the many airfields in this area.

Page 62


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
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
SOURCE DOCUMENT #17 (PHOTOSTATIC COPY OF ORIGINAL JAPANESE DOCUMENT CAPTUTED BY U S MARINES AT SAIPAN DURING JUNE 1944 CONTAINING MATERIAL PERTINENT TO THE JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR CONSISTING OF NOTES ON FUELING AT SEA /FUELING AT SEA OF PEARL HARBOR STRIKING FORCE/) ENTITLED "BATTLE LESSONS ON SUPPLY IN THE GREATER EAST ASIA WAR" USED BY THE NAVY IN COMPILING THE "NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAPANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR" (Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).


> (EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8 IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)


The pertinent material in this SOURCE DOCUMENT is embraced in the translations stated in SOURCE DOCUMENTS Nos. 11, and 15 (supra), which were used by the Navy in compiling said Navy Summary of the "Japanese Plan for the Attack on Pearl Harbor."

























































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


































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





















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

















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























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SOURCE DOCUMENT #18 (PHOTOSTATIC COPY OF ORIGINAL JAPANESE DOCUMENT CAPTURED BY U S NAVY AT MANILA FROM THE JAPANESE CRUISER NACHI ON 1 APRIL 1945 CONTAINING ON PAGES 2-1 THROUGH 2-152 ONLY MATERIAL PERTINENT (OTHER PAGES NOT BEING PERTINENT) TO THE JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR CONSISTING OF PLANS AND ORDERS FOR COMMENCEMENT OF THE WAR WITH THE UNITED STATES ENTITLED "TOP SECRET COMBINED FLEET OPERATION ORDER #1 and TOP SECRET COMBINED FLEET OPERATION ORDER #2"

"NAVY SUMMARY OF THE JAP ANESE PLAN FOR THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR" (Record of Proceedings, pages 432-460).

> (EXTENDED AS A PART OF EXHIBIT #8 IN THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR)

The material in this SOURCE DOCUMENT is embraced in the translations stated in SOURCE DOCUMENTS Nos. 1 and 2 (supra), which were used by the Navy in compiling said Navy Summary of the "Japanese Plan for the Attack on Pearl Harbor."

### TOP SECRET

# TOP SECRET DOCUMENT NO. 2


## DOCUMENT NO. 2

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1 杜 本件へ事情、貴権長祭上自ク取扱アヨト 13 AC K 「豊富な、地震なく強く地々地学って建す」 KK Zn -3-A +##+! «Ma 

100 「こ前合盤等命令作第一號 12.12十六年十一月五日在伯外旗號 部合题家司令長官山本五+六 輸合儘管命令 外末 英蘭影言をおきい胸合盤隊・休戦い 別州三依リシラ實施不了 (ster 堂家就令题外命令任某一號到料 去米 笑 前数 ヨー たこれを 御家 人 成成 1.1 1.1 第一部 彭文派教中采國、装岡及前國一部 戦く心思る、離る艦隊作戦 完善 "联要调 第二年 创联建省人创议 学一部 開新生活 第二節、胡殺又開戦前、武力 第三章 第一股作数

第二部 作成方針 第二節 對人聽隊作戰要領 第三部 南方作数学领 第四部 作歌剧划 第五部 兵力部署 第四章 第二段作戰 第一部 作联方计 第二部 台領地威中防衛人主重要心影 及前進侵策也 第三部 我,白與又,破壞緊定地感 等四節 兵力部署 第五章 海上交通保護散海上交通服装及 成雷联 第一部 海上交通保護作戰 第二前 海上交通破壞作戰 第二節 酸雷戰 第六章 通信 第七章 補 轮 等入章 難合離除以外,作戰 第一部 各種牛府要港部



い各趣管部隊、持令+1000万第一段作成第一, 11-47、各部隊、行令+100万第一段作成第一

合、関戰機定期日(ア日)トチニ第(関数軍備シ諸殿・保戰準備・完成スルニ決シアル

一帝国、米國英國及關國、對シ開戦を陳明、

等一部 省联准備

第二章 制戰準備及開戰

「六戰果→擴大之敵・戰意→奪」王敵兵力→遇撃警徴ス

態勢う確保ス

- 四要把,改婚旗人防衛,後化之子持久住戰,大三前原地,後得又
- 三在東洋蔵兵力を撃減、具ノ作戦隊既う奪う東洋、教え小作戦線、補給線及「ビルマル」の通断ス
- 二西方三對ミア英項高東方面ヲ收略シ英甸・スル米国・休戦線及補給線ヲ逐断ス
- 一東方"對"、米國聽隊"舉城之且東洋"對深一尊,你戰要

閒戰不竭合,解合艦隊休戰第一編,對支你戰下米國英國及蘭國-

~各部小問運管部定,依非行期又 ~ 三書見をしなり部分をは足るをが要く閉惑する う行いことを借款こと愛しいりと聞合に「男」 問報準備」ヨリア第一関係事備」」復帰きるなるアリ 

2周添、28家、問該約頭、配備、速ないの前進空力送、水り通時保敷通可見進發で前送、水り通時保敷通可見進發で前途が後、前途が大力学部隊、局で省水部隊、分部かも進行水、波動部隊、通高吸環隊、前を

各部隊、五・次川に勤くなるをがしていたろう

三、致實證を要した發行水を受照每月 王


- \*、後軍長該で問かえ、「後軍兵軍」、後軍兵部、防衛が通っ、後部、後部、長年道時南洋鮮の一次、「後援」、二、等地スクトキア
- 「各部小村選」、小野土特」の要キが国家」
- のをかい、大部長を見て関国軍に書いたたを始し、法政での、法政也な二進出行数と


9. 5. 考发出会,重名考衷。 整人各部:繁措擅官新定, 依!通時從較開始於戰任力部等, 你,编制十十一戰備,

Z at

2-10

22 テ二部 田武及相戦前、武力学史 · 見入行家、大かし、小川秋日(×日)(秋日) オントー 「「」、、、、、、 100000 still the top 1 - to to the it 24 1 104 + 2-32 - 27 - 27 - 2 モノイスもし こうぶっ ころの マイレセン 利心を - ショーマン 日日 ころう - のうちょう いしいます でんちょう ひとち いいかくなる えん いろうえ こころをかんであるとと見てていたとう too have a set a set them when the B I D tel brill all a le an att a stor a star a star + 前致状態、人=作致、何始え ·×日發令以前"たき、大命"依り問戰又 三第二関戦準備」下今後、己ムラ得サル関令 なこなり武力を行使えいろとう得 小米團、英國又:前到一體铅就空微、發身 明正二近接之気、行動茂きを食しるられ 「いろし」を入 田衣製海前近八小きたをきちて、新家衣を 危後ナイシムルガヤ・前間高軍ノ費林 - 13





.



小法二上陸センノ同島ラ攻略ス

~過待随面 " 許之作戰 ~

、矢力ノ大部に襲撃止該、當着地ス

方面二該ケル敵海上交通ヲ破壊人

魚シ人教ノ對支術給路遙断ノ目的ラ以四新嘉根攻略後北部「スマトラ」ノ軍域ラセ

三輪陸到這難除すい、之、質施を法戦三米國難除きれる場合、一時南方你数、弟

四難合聽除人一部人们成宜大平洋及印度洋

五秦朝父佛與印是之形三許して、極力渡人数

- 15

- 16

00.63 意う比較なかいいっこな作数」通数センレルニ 第ここを見、放好行動を説ノタルも合なか う以きば致くきます林余ス 第二約一於木雷艦家事代要領 新米湖趣家官致堂に反住戦要領在一道定と 各部家:指示作戦種別 慮えやり 作数、 EF St Han . 第一部大学教士、書達到後、永岡融化を経到前等次報大 御季季を 二級勤部隊、米國難隊、備了、「「成割」、大部軍を加支援、 しってっ インーン 第一航空基地支援主 一花をかく、味いり冬春年の水じからかい 米司御歌致百般 米司成的部分を行いてよ成人 二王力部第八所要を慶したる支援ス 家物湯を来三家 三情况を化り第二轮空離隊」部う一時東方 三秋田 スルコトアー "聖影子部書~+-之達記学 致好的学 有 米團輕裝計水劑心 年日本にお来、王力的家、米司施林王 おこで、うちろかなす、次戦兵か、迷こ 佳次スル家家教 第四法 三南方作戰、第三難隊、南選無隊、第三部 F6 空般な、数開城等を以う之う焼行く 第二部 有方下联要領

· -

3

テー段休戦 下 たう部署ち	二通定以	
一第一期你戰兵力部署	「まな」	
二等二期保険兵力部署	别表第二	0
三第三期休戰兵力部署	三年二年	2-20
四連弊保戰兵力部署	制表第四	
-	*	

等五部 兵力部署

第二朝作戟後111前印攻略作数1使落廷二第二期作戰

軍主力上陸完了送,休戰 - 10

第一即你戰後三日都不英領馬來攻略選二第二期作戰

急下这,你戰問戰== 概未菲律賓攻略陸軍主力上陸一第一期你戰

第一段休歌子在一通盖分之其一變換、時令又等四前 竹 男 邦 男

第四部 小戰期制

ノ外有方部喉睛軍言之,實施又方軍總司令官間揭定二基を持令えそう除り南方作戰、詐戰方針及解合雖体司今長官南

61 -

19 米蘭之定副艦隊袭攻之所總人預产占メ各軍、京原市理保之為上交通,保護人 軍官制等高内敵兵力反攻略要地,隊撤,擁 一米國及英國,更洋一對スル仆戰線反補給 配定部隊等;以,攻擊支 監視音鏡;續行之好換基地配定部隊中驅 正於司及策到艦隊一對之先還部隊等;以一

第二節 台领地域甲防衛又八千重要王彭法國、策國浙上交通旅速作數了強化又

「「二」

11と須也成。たこい前進根據地在~通陳茂を

「たいキン」「ドナハ」「アンチン

馬尼利、新着坡「スラバヤ」

3

第三部 我,右领人,破壞家定也或 下戦情況許又受り速こち領又、破壊せどちん 신했다- 엄니 174-2-16, White The Kows, Frich-FEUR A E 23 ディアー・ーシアン、「シンドトカルト、方面 1 ミアンシャン 留島方面 日本小方面要地 等四部 兵力部 署 まった不能にうが 要部家家五 通空な -+-1 は、芝尊小戦兵力部署、別及第四、陳し

48-

7 ~ ガーを通信ないなな」といれる 大进出院 · the in the state of the 经正成通信税 化 人名加加加加加加加西南原 送十司,東下之軍 大海軍前川之二人り之ノ前地ス 又相机化证 以 王要所要事項 こう うちまち きんちょうしょう 一陸を正人内心的行動、管制 50 一年一之人以前 一般医医院的神秘夜前一侧 事 id a det an alter dans et 张你以来(四四三八个) 一件紙,道并且,前通道 的 本 关行"不不是 化高小加入 一節住還或内靴行解相通信管制 ティンスロート 一門汪正成內,今桂茂令人部余 14 1 ..... 有一百 日本 二 一世代以上 二 御后一,四是张大雨、白面 等 水林等 乙烷水市 任二次り協力ス 一冬休秋正成これと、水平の 1-1-す.せ. たんていた 1 40 57 55 5 2-24 二二- 三間後提前情况是小 二世 ざ (下) · tre うきをあり 半三部 这上文儿之意不成 1 18 ...

へんちはん いい ひと 之田田家族を奏 1 1-21 とうちゃう 日にもまましたのかで、 あった ふしょう 日本町・日をませ 林・氏 高 7 1/2 3 4 2 W 4 2 日代日 水田 二部一个小市 ノーキン カイアズレ生化のないまであったこ , 生民, 2.2.2.2.2.1 小学, 2.2.1 小, 2.2.1 今, 了到過 三拿雨榜住匠成: 越不等一節因 in the set of set when a set a これかいにも 日川之一に、武正部の、三百 花をおい し前にたいたか街の三部水田学 青言の 人, 中, 京创生年门外间及印题, 小方面, 進出城 an el frie Mar "无过部家、下谈"且即找到一座、王正武、正 the product of the destand it. to the state to the state of the state 三代武は、ここ、十年三年に大田部次、低道年~ 及万年今眠, 医町三部, ·第一清五并大流水照瓜 年一八年一部一部

~~ ZX ふる方は、一件、 えん町、ホー一部、ヤ 二十年人 ラート 生成的四計生三次を支える of all a set and a find a set a product of the イベールをしかってもことを見たい でん The destand the state and and 有人なる人生化シル上に接近化室城入 . 99 1. 4日日 二日二、丁、 + . F 1 10 5 トット・イーベーン へを知るにもにする」 1. North Frid 一一百日二十二十 新大子一十 していしんからし ちまくし 成とれん(をキー) to a stand = - 1 "你不是这个时间,有是 田子等于通 The set of the for the for the same - 30 第四起小功備計画を振ってし前手を止んで、 出版、前江部改將陳富、定ち町、水、 100 E.

1:4 °C 一谷部水脂肪管、残菌の放後二人、二人将軍方し 浙、井、部茂教設位置犯行可能至成50万所要,向, 秋寺直北、 The state of the state 三年 九 前式を図して、王前し) 弊令症火」令 -31. おうか えいしょ大水ないふうけい キボ - - - - I 南六行與方面、節機當與實施標十 一年一次第一川小戰 「こう」うサポール (そ)サック回日第一人とも前一時、使用ななの一時、現一化田本の山間大な一部 ce e The stand KENSTIME + + + OIS IN DA 

Falantopi メキャロメイレンパク 135 1+ ন্ত +2-==== B att gala - - I . A 27 =11 12.5 Letal 1 4 . えき いなのない -1- 11-1 「一日、日 之后永望,四日 5 2 2 ( 13) al 140 33 三十年十二日 to 2 126 +10 3 デキショー 10 2 1 4.11 i - × ここ(二) テキオ・町 5-11. 2 ·11 ĸ (++) 12 T 一年一次第二明作れ je l 使州谷内 機當較社根 F 法法法堂 int metre 1 而行印刷 10 17 5. the a 37 15 「読んをけるトス 1天-可可到日4 1×14 141 日本は小 34 1年1月でう \* d as to 12 .A -17 北京市山 \* FACR H. 三第一該第三期作戰人大小以後

1. 19 5 e tand at 12 100 1 50 1 + 15 500 1 . . . . 3. 4 2. 2. 1. 1. 3 21 131 う時ま(+ 秋地をした(をし) 秋观所 法提出方 秋春秋文秋 历史 相比 4:22 the sy sol . for · 8 -97 e ·7:-12 KH I The To --2 0 T. 2 ca <u>m</u> EFER とくって 15-

1.14 2-10 ~ 1 11 -R 11 1631 1 1 2 2 11 13% 5 67 -37 E 4 E K 2 . 2 E 4 E 二日 た の 二 ্ৰা 「花花 永人」 北部は 第一一一日 大山西山山 面に 511 . Dan B 田长永三 後有人以許可將令之之 きらしき 5 5 14 3 8 h 10.6 10


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时来不可 、 有方川政一大年後の於こ後常垣数国要領 南方作び一八百と八任、後前近の後にこ前之即海 · Her in State to an inter ヨンギード キン キン 50 【秋秋夜前、秋秋秋一後田之方一之 .... いたい とんしゃいの日 「ちょう」また、かいい商のかいい in to the KKER WIK NO EN ストム キモード マンさ 第一次はないないない ちろいれ 海北、「うち何、 1.3 11. 1 -50

Let Mr. 1 Mar . . . send and in sugger the stand of all site and and and the state from and the ton line - 62 14, 1 m X 20 - 12 m 13 14 28 05/ -00) 「見にない、「通きできん」で」ます ころ ころ ころ 小学 一時後後は、日間ご肥満 うちょう 近し背外臨道信 配至常生 ちょうう 金额前体持速暂断要 一座四点。 1 m - Hob my Mil m sit in a 二日本 一日 一日 一日 二日 二 10 小水学家 The att the star 5-2 時人にと麗記り . Kit a K 3


N 24 12 .... 74 75 4 え。云、文朝日八前は龍備、龍ノき必ち、 備、又必殺除いきを約前後等準定をかり所日 きえ、大計算、前、殺き(角(後)を みに時ないろ (時間楽・散地学をする) K2 H- I - 43 第三部 通 管 客 起 一派之前幾月夏言、致民争主用ス はこう、第1-二張 宮を 引出、れ+時合文時 こをやうととを使きしますのふ \* \* やってやたいや 《各一版:沿班前行之一,低了最早到高峰。 いはまですのかいでもうなかり In - why and relate \*\*\* (一切 ( 建磷酸怒人事具也你就上帮了要是 七通道に書きておうるでも派し 他を機動部隊通前、水水等時前に落、 高速距離、行動しか後へは戦臣直也なる 以降素連タ料子+~~時足通信系。入心

こうちょう ちょう ちょう 1.5 17 200 10 12 - in a set of the state of I as and I than . a 1 5 had beer a g - ヨード とうす 朝 マント 派 可自然展示 等。 17 41 - 10 H With the thing of the the the " I was first " いいしてき あってい しゃいい 二丁 ないのの 1 2 22 22 5 4 4 1 15- in the in the weather the and the in the second and the A 1 15 11. 5. 1 6 . 2 こうかん ちょうか かいかかい m lost ñ 1.18 Sha me me state of 3-12) 4 × × · · · ショー シー シンティー いいちょうころ 予えな \* 1 - 1 - 1 - 2 + 1 - + + it is getter a t



- fair server - a へ、後時約、町等、通び高該す面水熟所像 内東自 - 「「「「「」」」」」」」」」 ~~~~~~~冬日各通防禄,於三連正要更大ス とうけき、りかいなメガター うこう 換きとししえ a is a draw I that and he had to be ここにも、ころにますの、え、ころ、うしょうないのですのないろの a set the fact of the set in 1 1 1 may the I and the of a serie of the state of the the 11 -1 the the set in the 19 1 2 1 - 44 お前の虚成な 今年、ことろで、 ちょうな a secret will the sum I show the state (I st and the state The the the second at the second and G, 軍家部分道にきたみ これ(我時間な無味なえり) 「高期合意味的之事」、「見ど一般時支」、「「ほ」」 死影部分遵後なななってしろ (強な強ななながから)

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
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Perding mind & the 1 9 61 ment of Meter E. 1+5. 0 and a the state of the state きく ころしたかいそうれたすをみぬ キアマーマ rds ...... 1 ...... A jun in spin 134 11 mikes at and it is and and a start of the second the the still have S 4 . 5.6 1 - State ( -) - the main in the share the same the share 02 the second and the second second 0 0 All the at the and the 121 等之前 数信利用好害 一次意言用 「冬盤陳 馬言敢信犯: 常該聽味司令長官好 える来り設信,明用り行っ 可通信陳於廣飲信從,在"休"敢信利用"臣不 AT A BE ST TH TTY: 5 「「「大大な」、「「」、「」、「」、 静原知うけとますろうがあみろ the prime the faith and - A I - MA 注明第一部令司信派司令官外之 「ましころをましたとした、ま、第一階 疑話這麼,動静了與初天


m " miles 1 m File lover File 1. 11 3 . e. and a set of a part of the - I share the in the The state of a state of the . . · · · · · · ····· to all and - 12" - 2 M . 55 こう いろ ひをが成者はちかえ ういろい いまう あいまし 部 な 年(きない こうへきま) しまいろう ~ 院之所在通行隊 (到下通信 ひょう 本のもち ..... My an and 1) - when 210


1 11-it's . and the state of the · sul u the market of the 5 1 and the is a st is the set of a state of all and - - ----whet a the standard . 「、上日トマ いていて、ないないない The retire the the and halfe day is a methic the attack 1 sta ローーまれる そこをからい いろう ごんー 12 le - N The go and the states of the set 1-54 and the state of t 

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
= ~ ++/ . 05 24 start it ... · . . . . . F 11 20 N - 11-22 E 2. the state in 三世でキャンドで (九、一利後就備、講換又失 E # # = ~ ~ ~ / man the want white the the total a 41 13 ~ • 「ちの心、からいなどのは、するもとも、小 「こうちょう こう いろう ちょう 五張備意赏 5325(124) 5325(124) 5225 (4.13) (11)226 (11)226 (12)26 8410 2813 5160(26) the (843)0:11 2360144 1 10





the second the second of the second s こうか むたいはないか 等になん これの In and in all allender the + + + 1, 1, 2 - 4" 快い ちま ふしう人、 推過質 ほんれ 17 14 14 H 「「「「「」」 formed in 二日前也 唐武之人之之之 二 -10- 2 526 - 2 5d 医前部分 聽起往往時人口有約到 ちゃない そうれののもうでしい ひ 大学的法 " 大寺だい シャンナ 南江ボン・シートキャ 1. 林裕县此前各部一部,四天之間於所一、

1. 1 Strate and 2-65 5 1 - 1 - N 化大部長 清冷 肥质外分配的 爱有了 并编成基本 化外路 经资料 化合化子子化 出意 こう 二十二 時一日 かれん でき 2-69 と、人物のうちののなるのに、 准备 下方 う 松澤城市、管理水市小江、日田福水之二路 5 %




1 hours de san - the second second second 三部子就也有一百人有之所分也, 我一名 之后至 in a section of the section of a set Real States 5-こんない、 ほん こん ふる とうない 一分の しこう うたちにある 使けに数重きけるの間違 - やんこうにんとう しょうしん してのころ 公司 百年 人名日本人名美国人名英格兰姓氏里 10 一各部各首軍(后)福公司令民官)捕魚起取,雨克 文 出配了要之为合 建二大本管人综合能体 To land the adda w 九各部外前軍官(難於司令其官)前三浦克又: 智能已了了来的处理。这些了 部分 医气 自己也 1のまた死を、用金龍谷、船原 谷敷下す おおく理り 61the wat the state of the seatt 第四部 浙谷魁船大南城民地 手長

はんれた 御き 読み、ため、同一・クレットル 如二丁的 第三之支人来的此前给地。你了 The set a storm of ほかふうとう ひょう たち たちょう Arthur . . . 46 he have the state of the 1. . . . ¥ ... 大王市 南小道的 金衣 金部水洗味管 指人司令教官一样的通知 了她 しここうう ふうしと読みの情えと進命がな stade - ist i de tit Le danse due a tor an an fait. 2 5 2 3


met. june in lender farmer \$ 26 7 .. 3.4 20 2 × 4 11 . 22. Level Level Land Oaks girdan · i tes i tes Esslilis and die igos laty 180 Was No. V. K43 1 . . the 120 -· 1 . 2 . 4 . 144 0 most an. the dear Ederithan - indettand -Han itis in an apris has yes . " - - - - ace to all all a filled the second a second a second a second 505 \$350 Kisso Bara 100 1 do time affers form figure YOUN CLU 「ここの」のこのなるない、ないないない、 しょうち いんでき ひょうちょう 100 . 502 The for a state for a th どんにてのごと ~~ IX Children is marker of the state of the server このは、まは、しんにいれ、 こ、ちょうのをあるをはないで、常 All way in the stand of the state the state the state the state of the (in a manual man in 1/2 an item for de a filmer and an 

", " with man of . ~ らう心之時設明然之前及免留成, 「ちちちちん」をしていたいないないないないないのではないで ly brow el 200 .2 5. 5. 5. 1. 57 5 5 m 3-2-1 10. 1 1 · · ····· 5.00 4 0 L the groot is a 1: 0 12-52.52 -1 at ers e" y -50.1400 y = 0 1 mm 1 = 0 1 aniant interesting in the sec the down is and in and down is 1 ... - 1 mm A TEL STATES LASS ( SO'S BLOCK BASS Smy 18 11-2 geardon first. 4. 9 2 1 ···· 2 3Kos 20 40; 1000 Revises - - to see the a finger less 15 . 20 - -· . . ---- 1.000 1023 ----1.0.00 Bar Hars With mar set -550 + : > > tas, tas, nui uu 6 3 7 8 1000 2 41 0 x'n x ..... 1.40 11. 320 -Actes 1.20 . 5 . . 0 . 0° . . . anter Starter 2 - X Keres some " . . . The second second second second second second the win 「雪菜」やまってのこれ、「「「湯」、」、「「ちまい」、「いいはない gen en 要求していたのち こうかい きのう えをいれ へうか へ こちして、「常時 、、、とうで、、のま ふまたのに あくの、前かれこを使く事気と雪をる、ほどもでいうろう

こ 、 「 かない ちち ちょう いい ひ あくしてきえ こうこう しゃ しっかいろう こうち こけ あのあのので 3. 2. 400 -1 Inforger . E star marine and a start iter i a marine a game i mass an information me an an and w Port and the State Same do and all いういいいである でいれいころのをなけている 満ちてますり




· - 1 4.1 7 125 eva. 14 at a rat 14 50 T E.l. 241 22A 1 the los シャット しまましいろ 4 85 12. 276 14 1:122 11: 542.50 11 4 5 Tin C' wit ? 6.20 JOTK! 124 4 52 1 - 15 W 北京記録なのうかの 二輪 焼き かろうび 茶礼 しべれ 五張れ は みの マケテル 唐月れ 七洋化 新闻化学生化 たけれ 別山れ ふちの のほうな きぶれったぼうれ 考察の あちのん いなれ、本書かい うかっていしいない しまなのしれ 考えれ 1 2 ... d Ase ` 241 - 2012 - -1 12 1. 10 . . . A See 100 80 6 2 39 1 33205 ふし ふ 別にまから しまえ 保険の きゆの ELF'E 5: A 1 74 6 1 2 111 (6:24. ŝ




mini and the fit 41 0 c · 43 . £ 3 = 12 is they 114 11/0 1 Sec. 2. -T 50 4.05 martin the 1.00 442 :-. Sight the 2 10 \* 5-6 x 2 15 1 m/20 223 3 ant. ÷ 1. 5 るなーニー 1. 1 1 10 2 ... 403.05 23 150 -A. 50 - 2 -1.24 -145 N'a \*125 M - -- -- -- +- ++ P. - 74.5 SEM . History -50 30 2

m.t 27 2 5- 2-12 0, Se'i Gen in u 2-89 20 The set in the set of the " Broken in St. 14 1 . . My 8 等例来 育計 1 50 2 when the participation is a first in the start of the 1 × 1 1 10 VE # 1 11-1 the state in the 4. 9 15. × 12:00 " - - - - - - - -送月餐堂山田都 所是當奸 法 a the second and the second 398 a strate to be the set of the set the way we we have be no and the the star with A to the start the start of the P. A. 40 is an a the second · the is the man and it is a " T" ta 6 34 t -



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


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《×初、释致诸	ふちょうかに	逐些浅 ~=	- 1. C. A.	1-4-14		
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いいか、着きぬとき時にあるたいうなえんですり ふく、此大怒は (生肉、なま、花を怒は)のなるとけ知用なる 周辺るの前ろん 大地をかけるもしに、うちてあっちって、雨下のあいのはの from the de to solar 大きんをきるうでに カムシントロックモビーン大:00 をかして 、酸素の、肉本之 - 94




化二甲 打不及前足及我半落倒,開我已落今 AT / A ........ the second and 10 人名克勒人满意言 一十年 起一年一年 the stand he start 2 読みはたくのでので かったみ ころにはたいないのでん 「上して并立医水化与乳部取入以う死ノ子 你,死-长师之年,臣要臣上又通,守徒 きょう たいかくろ よく 「有火下方下後又計入起水下数、竹江三ノ、 許人沒了走、察太部水水的空部水、一部一件 来作校、時前、前頭下致、随心を 3 キーインモー しのがまたいいでん 第五部水 人甲氏腔使到水二甲、斜层小或,精 日二年,記天,家田四次,祭成了極水落傾 やキャリーモーモーないこうできけん 馬林王川方正誠化三年の、賢诚之大清道年 也祖東蒙領要也人文称人


第二十 十八明第 制水洋大一点进一 第三年 能会能办过小下我 第一部 該午前委告部部大小機 一條項質與 在二年 舞蹈、各個并前站,大來 與後 秋照,每要老部部水,件一条或带水题,能呈成1, 。 村二部成了張三隆任正成付上の本記ところを 2. 小我却成熟趣之我又實施之尚令:能空部取其 ~近行をなた、市里込をこの初年生」は、小人、協力ス 第二前 及前方面監水、下城 主とう第一連又能成出る并三連之後なしたかいこうか ういと中止又方面のり時用の」を軍部水、徹底、地境、山 年,每二路近,後前又21年,黄宜成你,怒罪又 朱三年 九 丁 第一章 夜间的 101 牛头你中的-~ 法二年 北田市司 は川安国 (共要地船圖):たっかい


(冬里山永樹) 印 近(使用船所) 关于军(图音)三. いいてきた 均准与要的小 1Em 西本方面。使用き二股外或用して、別一定一 201-1 第二年 武水大湖制 故水方衙则:前令罪令我策所定,你二个在"夜! 海軍艦鄉下日本將相(輸送船久陸軍所屬船舶人会1) 人陸委年後一約進致(林力」合二间,朱方斌別:戦 時具的御水方数別医御見死、三低」 (de) Q.


Tax. sil " The st new and designation is an i stall がほうちょう F. -2-IT our 14 24 55 1 an in the fact of the to the strad 5-79 12 in the lost that it is 4 ~ · 4 日本 日本 二日本 2 teres. 2.9. N 24 Į. 17.4 42 14 - 4.5 これ大型伝法(して、これ、この、 が法 「致多よはあ で 30 25 2 X 2X · 通言 香、注意1月、 后山 Carl Carl ~ 572 よそこの天野村 あのも 1. . ... 14-9-345-6 ·ol. 3122 1 1 state the there and 4. Kole and the それ後-ほれったいて ÷. 1-4 . ..... \*\*\*\* + 44 ا کو .5.' \* 4 -「和北方日本田」を 1. have in application のが見たろうでは、ちょうとうで . Y. いたいのでものでにいういろいる 1 1.6 4 16 4.3 w  $\overline{\mathbb{C}}$ for sin ut stand 2- 2- 25-就かびきが、大学していないの K. 2 2 2 2 - 5 Lever arend ? 1 2 京日本-197 からうごかに近日では して、かいべき、市中東に して、は代替のようか。 ここ、は代替の。 ap the set of the × 46 12" 一般のない 123 20 -


-	4 403 		*			
	准定	松田	2. v é.		前後、四ろント 城市のありを、「小子、下水」の子、一部子、一部上、一部上、「小子、「小子」、「小子」、「小子」、「小子」、「小子」、「小子」、「小子」、	*
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	Rein	第一百天小	45 7121 54	山、文成、山山、大大、	明束于面触被空哭户被抽,以一些一部,面上面一些"那些",可不是了,又不是了,这个人们,可不是,你不是不能。" 医中子 网络小子子子子 医小李二氏 计中间 经限代联并工业。	
	方 部 南 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	「 」 「「「」」	5:10 11/10 15 18 44 45 1	11比島政略部隊・	之,(名,)?(小, Cron)(r+r))。 「西東京村水二統施務等。引「西東京村大山機大力の東道、台北部大力。東道一、各地域、加州山市市、各地域、大山、各地域、大山、各地域、大田、市林、大田、市大社	2
•	天 部 馬 陳 部 時 計 ()	今到除	And a state of the	街上蘸谷道 29 印教/香首加度 20 第纪文学用 20 第纪文学用 20 美观当天(24)2 20 美闻的(基地)	印度語 英的"出生不可要吧	11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
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trace areas	(1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1)	<b>大 司殿</b>	1 199 1 199	*****		<u><u>X</u><sup>M</sup>EI</u>














体部遗光 **航航日** 深相详 う 北 "." 北 就小社 一洋 10.1 1.10 1 本司端 游五年 京長今日 5 14 it は問題 エアン 140-一部一部件 「小山 今年人 127 「玉に記 花草一波 かいういろ 元年 相信 小いうふ ŝ är 彩 to d'-1 463 2) シアん 「夜後 「小道 部長丁敬福 い言 礼信 利 いない読んで F 13 小学 北季同致 オースや 「山田湯 令 オる 教うこう THE â 1.4 6F ŝ 455 (金) ĸ ニッかや おいいかんろう、 、山見大 ち味む 降っ 监視論 北大秋一ス 和ふい散 找 jn. 主力訓練,祭亦発 12 、協力、前近部 1 、野部 4 町~ たい大 7 1: いれ今天の 別の日二日 ないれらう 力图 かうおう ł 1 12 개. Tk 3 IA -15 -6 (不主) 十朝沢武面三岳へい の年に行きが考え 弊、知 最能字部落 早~学友福隆,我 見まむいあり がたし 版長把航空都得 以不值 、深の人 カエン もかちい ふか、一部一時水 司 シャシ いきまた 1 新二日 5% 1 THE A \* ... 家儿 注

家都空形之来 1ª HEA 深有方面 误 書 堂 ▲◆雅-+秋田-→半 古◆日瑞和宮今月得 int int それた Il sto the とうち こうい 读人到房登堂龍-+第 官長令司隊 日本 作野近次 四次 A15 is. ました の日本にな A 1 1 31 六 計 花 IFig IAF 243 - + 2.) £ 北南,明武人 領、伝し ふこう通城電作致 同方作戦賃行 fr. 時春き 記ちろうれ 一段方表也就主部 えま 協力と やうながらい 持た 第うろしト i. 读 送法行前 今日制 2 ま 澈 9.20 用秋 10 第一次 11AF (-wy) 1903 245 2 西方作い 青山 手和晋同 隊人交發和 いいろうない い行わうほけん、 头 戰軍清通之刻 「彩幕雨 ¥3. 能行 時なた いこれな 乱 10 「行金子」 「二 ベスタ ムデ ILAF 1147 1Gcg 225 (一邦之) 南方江戰續行 汗 年が町のご 一般院子次教をほど The 朝 散果也能 福礼 今夜可取ってなっ 二利 いたい いたくのたい Stere IT 這わらこの 二部 3 とうは行き ドランシン ü

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9 Ŧ 右以外,都体、関シテ、特令ス、都等、同い 第一段作戰中太 本也社堂出 日 三日 二日 民間方面た 東上海 終丁 10. F 亦行民族 急速移動後一個之戰王 張作 下する 以外展開要領 1 23 小部署 移。湯会機動部隊、政論、祥令、依上 「「「 方重 又成 いま 一部一南馬島一九山大派之法 、うち、お 部し、南島島テインドラシーで到 2- 117 ドラ、レマーンていう 「「「小小子」同い 2 Ţ 1: いえい -4 丁臣州又 有一同シ . E


יו בביר אד פט 第二後派戰兵力部署(南京戰)後落以後) A REAR NO W きも間間です。 HA 154 IFAX MI 生力部院部 35 金化机文援 Statistica Si 15:3 前途部隊 Lo solo des 「北京司法前す部隊ー A Band in 大学に (14日) 二秋夜初部隊・弊渡 日職記を行か ======= 第一致作就常行 -1 . Fhiduel -0 11 25 - ANAX 所要充面自我其地能要 +101, 1, 1mil Fine e! 116 3. 5 42. JF 3111. A.P. 3111. A.P. 3111. A.P. 311. A.P. 3 二日焼車成りれ般福湯、ほ Here. -夏入班上皇明,所属、奉史 4 1 " they and the det and they want 南京都家 三時况,林-濠州化朝敏越堂,张江上走道取儀 10 1145 2 3 114 e we far -15 美地北北 「の注ち面、可な防備強化 大学家からい ~ 領 章光·维林中備 るそうない なあっていたねっとよしちまち 21 110 25 いちる 白天所の話に at milles to for any ~いいのみの ひろう むないに r et 1 4 2 . Chines I of the work . « 通信部以 小法保護之間 -----は、家田市市 1 sv. -お手 the 補給機能,配属、利、足、




2 「小小小」を見して 附会趣味到百 我能能入这些行人的一些十五人的部分也 - 120 "罰麦第一及同等一次行政隊、今万編々しまま、行す (四きない行す)(2145) トー言語通話」。 御人法、感報一日加入 いいいろんち 小司長を、 れる部本 六月情子 ふうい 大臣こよう成例報 了追加天 (%) v90 \*\* 形水イ大年十一月十七日休伯湾長門 ~ 谁放到官 き会就分離隊命-令依第一號 中左-通町正 这二部第二章字 節罪為前印部隊相任正城。 1-121 予, 长清秋雨-徐, 常祥的蘇祖は益政。③、所備境南了加了 第三部第三章 法令数别本行生 林を御刻信龍樹麗、 トーンろ 从入激别信號規握(日) 特徵月第一支 送天林二秋 (3)

公法第一號正誤丧(二) -1.1 - 1 - - + for in + / -201 122 1 13.979 30/06 22201 Celi. Wil and the 11. 1 6 ch 31 0 1 4 5 T W (11) 61 وله ترجيه محالية مراجع من تردها ور - والمعالم - وحرقه المتريخ محالية - والمعالم - وحرقه المتريخ محالية · Terrating たってい そうい 生活の生き per anti the participant The Hatter of nit' nid いんかうに手をのいではう えるといれています WX WY the Lat Tout H. S. Hail Mail Re / DRED The state of the sould a go E. I with in the 2 4.42. E = 2 のたちからかのこのです i. and 12-212-49-2017-い、1的をまいきしゃ、花月 attante anto the way have .I.c. of 「ないいいない」」 . .

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hand har the . . . 1 - 2 - 4 1 - 4 st. to = 11 1- 129 然於價 要又并許以言 1 1 = 1 + 1+ ++ 有方学成 馬鼠者性 医合体失罪 可以 非差法意 機道服人意及私,所通 6 M 三川大学に見りこうであるに、そうし、 二十分成化化学情的文明的 六 The the the state of the as St. I 1. eim 前今年四八八十八日,以便至實就附奉奉

· ------化して入り合い(日代) ニーレ 御礼をを奉一 二人二月を下部水子 Jun mar 1 Alle A ge a 121 1 nd m 1 - - - - 1 KASA 2 2. 12 2 7 - 1 ムを部水、前谷、配原所合配和"本-約~~建音-~: 大御於及之日, 三川城,能空城,小照北,外出来 対応しふうけいことして 特二南公園町、補與 ことしたりになったので、 とう明地區、進力に 可小、計三部論 「高品、隆 私注秋街、秋根之等にないの、前在町後之、御 F x , er

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- 高招郎官旗令照序、に次ス入多数部派前時一備派ノ實施充場合、所在最
- 九浦各難時 三十 百太 日二
- 付奉祭》: + 聯合與成訂完准內觀許 序 関于正义周援,行動

外诸势倒三张乱先数变天容受永滑之违势害。。 一角人物小洋水司满荆外来常吃吃 聯合離會部分 中小 网络 受 疥

官之之之:一一百分司成(船次)捕除前前引,各司成(船次)指揮

各難以痛令可若求原肥補給肥之逃路,當此各部以(能八)前為可許各部以(能八)前為前,各部以(能八)前為前,各部以(能八)前為这部

- 今天还有下一百般了一百般了一方局瓜前有項項項指軍官人補一一不通瓜(下一天言或用外離形所有指軍官人補一四部底(難以)所有用為難形又,補給及此了前務
- 今福秋日本を下 たって 人上三、天下之后祥官大部 。 切びか見せたし ふうも 人上三、天下之后祥官大部 。 切びかれから見達相
- 頗。喪吏,至又,送,之,送,之,大本营人報合配又各并外礼非官、前人 或且人行致補命処初度充實

\*

太司令还有,夜好之夜命以同常 自己通快不 十二日日間ノン いいひょうい 三部今後也的月二之時、二部合四一長、第一配在書 ed - ner - 133 リンドイントー シントレント 一日本日本の ここ ふりうちをうほり及数重うに示う補順 ~ でえ、ちゃかめ、しれていいうな、町有期日 行行下午年二日川之武室之派的也行至 2010年 not a こかいふちもん(れいうかれに)神みかい、うえ 之,四配人要之尚令 建二大水等人能合能以 Tola de la la v 九谷部冰浩祥 臣(船公司入送軍一部三衛之又: 第三日、三十七年今日、新八四人,月日 1日をやいく 内合能に 肥湯 落代で あみったり 34 大部分 し 川等下り、大中之前報 第二年市 不口詩 那份题和人前给春也, 補壞

一補外経的、補強と見ない時間の前一部ステレル 「かうはいい、實施し还又充成也、補養化」、かっ F II in the s 田子是 二年 这些人民 十二年月一天天天 which a gran liter of the total 132 1 R A . have " かんかなのとかの地をりというである in so the the set of the set the set of the fore the set of th + is the tails 1 Martin to the martine and the " 36 d

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
to " with such -一き也又将没有合心的麦充富、飯 inter " 1. 2 1 " - 2 こうち いいたいい 焼きがすける の -25% 100 · . : . Note . 1 . . . 1 the 24 ap . 314 672 4 cos --14 00 the the 0 620 14 23 CHORE . 37 d c - a -1 6.0 ---n er had 10 4 0 2 0 2 20 000 A === : = . 1. 0 . . M . . . 4 a . . 4422 1153 0 18 2 · C · SH-2 5 . . . 3. .......... al" 50 Eat .... 1 402 14.2 . 200 . . . . 2.7 1 11 17 VE1 Y WEER . 1 12 1 2 . X X 3 263 1.20 12. . ..... 138 . · · · · 2.20 the sim for white a series a ite - ~ See. 1 175-051 . 15 5 so the service service and the service my righting the ·\*/ 25 云文的、現物地を手後又准案、 ちゃう

「ハーガン」であった、ションマン、「ハーベン」、「ションは、「ハーズン」」で、「ハーベンター」がないので、「ハーベンター」のない、「ハンシンター」、「ハース」、「ハース」、「ハース」、「ハース」、「ハース」


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
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



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~~ いい、なる」のころをでいるかで、なんとうよう モンれたなは、とうなるで、ほど思好、同常ない行動用事の いるこうなると 大化をなけるかえが、ハシャ とのしろうの あてのあとのはの 1. 1m 100. 10 20 100 12-1 The time in the contraction is a series of the los man and the states of 541 - 22 54

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