Given By

Mrs R. E. Wells
PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
Pursuant to
S. Con. Res. 27
(As extended by S. Con. Res. 54, 79th Congress)
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 18
JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 129 THROUGH 156

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
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UNITED STATES
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WASHINGTON: 1946
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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SCOTT W. LUCAS, Senator from Illinois
OWEN BREWSTER, Senator from Maine
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JOHN E. MASTEN, Assistant Counsel
EDWARD P. MORGAN, Assistant Counsel
LOGAN J. LANE, Assistant Counsel
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<tr>
<td>3353</td>
<td>Memorandum dated June 21, 1941, prepared by Col. Moses W. Pettigrew concerning &quot;Final Reconnaissance of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>3353</td>
<td>Memorandum dated June 21, 1941, prepared by the Joint Committee of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry, and Hawaii's Inquiry, with endorsements. (See Part No. 39.)</td>
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<td>158</td>
<td>5201 4-11-46</td>
<td>3441</td>
<td>Compilation of selected documents obtained from State Department files relating to United States-British Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>159</td>
<td>5201 4-11-46</td>
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<td>Compilation of selected material obtained from State Department files relating to United States-Chinese Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)</td>
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<td>160</td>
<td>5240 4-11-46</td>
<td>3502</td>
<td>Transcript of remarks of the President on the occasion of the meeting of his cabinet at 8:30 (p. m.) and continuing at 9 o'clock with legislative leaders, on Dec. 7, 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161</td>
<td>5241 4-11-46</td>
<td>3508</td>
<td>Drafts of Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson of a proposed message for the President to deliver to Congress on the state of relations with the Japanese Government. (See Joint Committee Exhibit No. 19 for final draft by Secretary Hull.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161-A</td>
<td>5464 5-23-46</td>
<td>3520</td>
<td>Draft of a proposed message to Congress as prepared in the State Department, which contains suggestions made in the memoranda by Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox, as shown in exhibit No. 161.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>162</td>
<td>5269 4-11-46</td>
<td>3534</td>
<td>Log of the Watch Officer, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, from 1145, Dec. 6, 1941, to 2000, Dec. 7, 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>162-A</td>
<td>5464 5-23-46</td>
<td>3543</td>
<td>Naval communications referred to by serial numbers in Log of the Watch Officer, as shown in exhibit No. 162.</td>
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<tr>
<td>163</td>
<td>5292 4-11-46</td>
<td>3557</td>
<td>Log of the U. S. S. Helena from Nov. 26 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive.</td>
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<td>164</td>
<td>5292 4-11-46</td>
<td>3593</td>
<td>Reports made by Gen. W. C. Short and his subordinate officers to the War Department concerning the attack on Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941.</td>
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<tr>
<td>165</td>
<td>5292 4-11-46</td>
<td>3643</td>
<td>Copy of a partial translation of a document relating to Feb. 23, 1941, conference between German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and Japanese Ambassador Oshima.</td>
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<td>166</td>
<td>5468 5-23-46</td>
<td>3648</td>
<td>State Department dispatch No. 5682 dated Dec. 5, 1941, to the American Embassy in London. (This dispatch is mentioned in American Embassy, London, dispatch No. 5923 dated Dec. 6, 1941, to State Department, which appears in exhibit No. 21.)</td>
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<td>178</td>
<td>5470 5-23-46</td>
<td>4209</td>
<td>Compilation of documents from Ambassador Joseph C. Grew to the President and the State Department, and attached memoranda. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)</td>
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<td>179</td>
<td>5470 5-23-46</td>
<td>4241</td>
<td>Miscellaneous documents from the files of the late President F. D. Roosevelt, as furnished to the Committee, concerning Far East matters.</td>
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<tr>
<td>180</td>
<td>5471 5-23-46</td>
<td>4551</td>
<td>Organization charts of the Army and Navy at Washington, D. C., and Hawaii, as of Dec. 7, 1941.</td>
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<td>181</td>
<td>5520 5-23-46</td>
<td>4565</td>
<td>The United States News, extra number, Sept. 1, 1945, publishing reports of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the Navy Court of Inquiry, and related documents.</td>
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<td>182</td>
<td>5537 5-23-46</td>
<td>4702</td>
<td>Compilation of military intelligence estimates, prepared by G-2, War Department, for period Jan. 1 to July 1, 1941.</td>
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<td>183</td>
<td>5468 5-23-46</td>
<td>4766</td>
<td>Material compiled at request of Senator Ferguson by letter dated May 20, 1946, to Committee counsel (p. 5464), including data concerning the test bombing of the Utah by the Army Air Corps in 1937, and data concerning the program of the Army Air Corps for 1940-45 production of B-17 4-engine bombers.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
EXHIBIT NO. 129
Op–12B–5–McC
(SC)A16(R–5)
Serial 060512

From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Distribution List for WPL–46.
Subject: Promulgation of Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (WPL–46).

Enclosures:
(A) Pages for WPL–46, Registered No. 92, including List of Effective Pages.
(B) Receipt form in duplicate.

1. Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (WPL–46) is promulgated herewith.
2. Report receipt, and check of contents, on the form provided as enclosure (B).
3. The highest priority in the preparation of war plans is assigned to plans required by WPL–46.
4. It is desired that the preparation and distribution of these plans be accomplished with the least possible delay. To this end, all planning based upon the directives of WPL–13, WPL–14, WPL–42, and WPL–44 will be discontinued until plans based upon WPL–46 are completed.
5. Appendix II, Chapter IX, prescribing the composition of the Naval Transportation Service will be issued as a change to this plan. If this plan is executed prior to the issue of Chapter IX, specific directives will be issued to provide for the initial sea transportation requirements of the plan.
6. The extreme importance of the security of this Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5, cannot be over-emphasized. In this respect, attention is invited to the instructions contained in “The System of War Planning”, and in the “Registered Publication Manual”.
7. Plans and estimates of requirements for the preparation for war service of vessels to be taken over from private sources, as indicated in the tables of Appendix II, will be classified as confidential. Attention is invited to paragraph 1105 of WPL–8.

8. This plan shall not be carried in aircraft except by authority of the Chief of Naval Operations, and when not in use shall be kept in Class “A” stowage as prescribed in the “Registered Publication Manual”.

9. IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE EXTRACTS FROM OR COPY PORTIONS OF THIS PUBLICATION WITHOUT SPECIFIC AUTHORITY FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS. EXCEPT IN SUBORDINATE PLANS BASED UPON THIS PUBLICATION.

H. R. STARK.

Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5.

LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES

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1 Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.
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1 Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

TABLE OF CORRECTIONS

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<td>26-7-44</td>
<td>Marion L. Monsen Ens. U. S. N. R.</td>
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Navy Department,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, June 3, 1941.

Op-12B-5- McC
(SC) A16(R-5)
Serial 064112
Secret
From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Distribution List for WPL-46.
Subject: Change No. 1, WPI-46.

1. Make the following pen and ink corrections to WPL-46:
(a) On Page 45
   Paragraph 3511.1.a.2.(f), first line—Change 13,400 to 6,400.
   Paragraph 3511.1.a.2.(g), first line—Change 23,600 to 12,600.
   Paragraph 3511.1.a.2.(i), first line—Change 44,000 to 23,000.
(b) On Page 80
   Paragraph 4601, first line,—after “will be” insert “prepared as”.
(c) On Page 30 of Appendix I
   Paragraph 51.a.(13), first line—Change 13,400 to 6,400.
   Paragraph 51.a.(14), first line—Change 23,600 to 12,600.
(d) On Page 31 of Appendix I
   Paragraph 51.a.(16), first line—Change 44,000 to 23,000.

2. Insert this letter in the front of WPL-46.

3. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressees in time by the next available officer courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

R. E. Ingersoll, Acting.
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<th>Official to whom issued</th>
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1 Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.
0101. This Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 was prepared under the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations.

0102. It is based upon the Report of the United States-British Staff Conversations (Short Title ABC—1), the Joint Canada-United States Defense Plan (Short Title ABC—22), and the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5.

0103. The United States-British Staff Conversations (ABC—1) and the Joint Canada-United States Defense Plan (ABC—22) will be given only a limited distribution to holders of this plan. These documents are referred to in this plan by their short titles. Their essential features, so far as concerns war operations, are incorporated in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5, which is included in this plan as Appendix I.

0104. This plan provides for the initial organization, composition of forces and tasks for the Naval Establishment in a Rainbow No. 5 War.

0105. After the execution of this plan has been directed, no attempt will be made to maintain the tables of Appendix II corrected up to date. Changes in the composition of forces will be made by direction of the Chief of Naval Operations and shown subsequently in the "Assignment of Units in the Organization of the Seagoing Forces of the U. S. Navy," and in the "Assignment of Units to Naval Districts and Naval Stations."

CHAPTER II. EXECUTION OF THIS PLAN

Section 1. EXECUTION OF THE ENTIRE PLAN

0211. a. Upon the receipt of the following ALNAV despatch, the Naval Establishment will proceed with the execution of this plan in its entirety, including acts of war: "EXECUTE NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN RAINBOW No. 5."

b. The date of the above despatch will be M-day unless it has been otherwise designated.

Section 2. EXECUTION OF A PART OF THIS PLAN

0221. A preliminary period of strained relations of uncertain duration is anticipated, during which time certain preliminary steps provided for in this plan may be directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

0222. Mobilization may be directed prior to directing the execution of this plan or any part thereof. The order to mobilize does not authorize acts of war.

0223. This plan may be executed in part by a despatch indicating the nations to be considered enemy, the tasks to be executed, or excepted, and the preliminary measures to be taken in preparation for the execution of the entire plan or additional tasks thereof.

CHAPTER III. AGREEMENTS WITH ASSOCIATED POWERS OTHER THAN THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

0301. The substance of agreements reached with Associated Powers other than those with the British Commonwealth, including Canada, insofar as they relate to the operation of naval forces, will be made available to the holders of this plan, as soon as made, by revision of this Chapter III of the Introduction.

0302. Brazil, for the purposes of defense of the Western Hemisphere, has agreed to permit United States naval forces to use the ports of RECIFE and BAHIA.

a. There is at present no time limit on the duration of stay in these ports.

b. They are available for refreshment and upkeep, and for the purchase and delivery of fuel, consumable supplies and fresh provisions within the limited capacities of the ports.

c. A United States Naval Observer is stationed at each port.

d. On first entry, two days confidential advance notice of arrival should be given to the United States Naval Observer at the port via the United States Naval Attache, Rio de Janeiro. This notice should include information in regard to communicable diseases and last port visited. Pratique and customs clearance are not required.

e. For repeated entry, incident to extended operations in the vicinity, local arrangements as to notice may be made with the Brazilian Captain of the Port, through the United States Naval Observer.
Part I. Task Organization. Information and Assumptions

Chapter I. Task Organization

1101. The task organization, by which this Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 will be executed, under the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations, is prescribed below:

a. THE OPERATING FORCES, under command of the Chief of Naval Operations.
   1. THE UNITED STATES ATLANTIC FLEET, under command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.
   2. THE UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET, under command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.
   3. THE UNITED STATES SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, under command of the Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE.
   4. THE UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET, under command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.
   5. THE UNITED STATES NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, under command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE.
   6. THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES, under the command of the Commanders, NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS, consisting of:
      (a) THE NAVAL COASTAL FORCES;
      (b) THE NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCES.

b. THE SERVICES, under command of the Chief of Naval Operations.
   1. THE NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE.
   2. THE NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE.
   3. THE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE.

c. THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT, under the direction of the appropriate Chiefs of Bureaus, and Heads of Offices of the Navy Department.

1102. Major areas of command and instructions concerning responsibility for the strategic direction of military forces therein are set forth in Appendix I, "Section V." In paragraph 3222 of this plan is defined an additional subarea, designated as the "SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB-AREA." In Annex I, of Appendix I, are the sub-areas which are included in the Naval Coastal Frontiers.

1103. Command over naval forces in the areas and sub-areas for which the United States has accepted responsibility for the strategic direction of operations will be exercised by the appropriate United States naval commanders listed in paragraph 1101 a. of this plan, subject to the special conditions set forth in Appendix I, "Section V."
SECRET

CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CHAPTER II. INFORMATION AND ASSUMPTIONS

1201. Assumptions are as stated in Appendix I, "Section III."

PART II. OUTLINE OF TASKS

CHAPTER I. CONCEPT OF THE WAR

2101. The Concept of the War is as stated in Appendix I, "Section IV."

CHAPTER II. THE GENERAL TASK

2201. The Joint Army and Navy General Task is set forth in paragraph 24 of Appendix I.

2202. The Navy General Task is as follows:

a. The Naval Establishment, in cooperation with the Army and the forces of the other Associated Powers, will:
   1. Destroy Axis sea communications in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, in the PACIFIC AREA east of 180°, and through the MALAY BARRIER in the FAR EAST AREA;
   2. Raid Axis forces and sea communications in the PACIFIC and FAR EAST AREAS, and in the EASTERN ATLANTIC and the WESTERN MEDITERRANEAN;
   3. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers in United States Areas, and support the defense of sea communications in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA, in the FAR EAST AREA, and to the eastward of AUSTRALIA;
   4. Prevent the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic military power, and support the defense of the territory of the Associated Powers in the FAR EAST AREA; and
   5. Prepare to capture the AZORES, CAPE VERDE, MARSHALL, and CAROLINE ISLANDS.

PART III. ASSIGNMENT OF TASKS

CHAPTER I. FORCES IN THE WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA

Section 1. THE U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET

3111. The U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET (Chapter II, Appendix II) will initially be organized into task forces as follows:

a. OCEAN ESCORT;
b. STRIKING FORCE;
c. SOUTHERN PATROL FORCE;
d. SUBMARINE FORCE ONE;
e. SUBMARINE FORCE TWO;
f. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE;
g. NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE;
h. U. S. NAVAL OPERATING BASE, BERMUDA;
i. ADDITIONAL TASK FORCES AS DIRECTED BY THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.

3112. The U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET is assigned the following tasks within the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA:

a. TASK
   PROTECT THE SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, AND PATROLLING, AS REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY RAIDING FORCES (see Part III, Chapter V, Section 1);

b. TASK
   DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING OR DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH THE ENEMY;

c. TASK
   PROTECT THE TERRITORY OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS AND PREVENT THE EXTENSION OF ENEMY MILITARY POWER INTO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, BY DESTROYING HOSTILE EXPEDITIONARY FORCES AND BY SUPPORTING LAND AND
AIR FORCES IN DENYING THE ENEMY THE USE OF LAND POSITIONS IN THAT HEMISPHERE;

d. **TASK**
   IN COOPERATION WITH BRITISH FORCES AND THE U. S. ARMY, DEFEND BERMUDA IN CATEGORY "C";

e. **TASK**
   COVER THE OPERATIONS OF THE U. S. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES;

f. **TASK**
   PREPARE TO OCCUPY THE AZORES AND THE CAPE VERDE ISLANDS.

3113. a. So far as practicable, the naval forces in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA will be covered and supported against attack by superior enemy surface forces, by the naval forces of the Associated Powers which are operating from bases in the UNITED KINGDOM and the EASTERN ATLANTIC.

b. Forces operating normally in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA, the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, and the SOUTH ATLANTIC AREA, which move temporarily into the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA in pursuance of their assigned tasks, will remain under the strategic direction of the United Kingdom Chief of Naval Staff. They will be supported by the naval forces in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA as necessary and practicable.

3114. a. **SUBMARINE FORCE TWO** will operate under the strategic direction of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, until its arrival in the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA.

[17] b. This force will be assigned the following task by the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET:

1. **TASK**

   PROCEED FROM BASES IN THE UNITED STATES TO GIBRALTAR, WHEN SO DIRECTED BY THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

c. After arrival of **SUBMARINE FORCE TWO** in the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA this force will execute the following task:

1. **TASK**

   RAID ENEMY SHIPPING IN THE MEDITERRANEAN UNDER THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE BRITISH COMMANDER IN CHIEF, MEDITERRANEAN, ACTING THROUGH THE BRITISH (OR UNITED STATES) FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING NORTH ATLANTIC.

d. **SUBMARINE FORCE TWO** will remain a part of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET for administrative purposes.

3115. a. **THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE** and **SUBMARINE FORCE THREE** will operate under the strategic direction of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, until their arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA.

b. These forces will each be assigned the following task by the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET:

1. **TASK**

   PROCEED FROM BASES IN THE UNITED STATES TO BASES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA, WHEN SO DIRECTED BY THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

[18] c. Upon arrival in UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA, the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE and SUBMARINE FORCE THREE will be detached from the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET and be assigned to U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE. Their tasks thereafter are to be found in Part III, Chapter IV, Section 1.

3116. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will arrange for the logistic support for the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET (see Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2) operating in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA from sources designated by the Shore Establishment in the continental United States and outlying possessions and bases in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, and from United States and foreign (outside the British Isles) commercial sources. For
this purpose he will employ the transportation facilities of the U.S. ATLANTIC FLEET, which will be supplemented, as required, by those of the Naval Transportation Service.

b. Logistic support for SUBMARINE FORCE TWO, and other United States forces operating in the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, will be arranged as indicated herein. Transportation will be provided by the Naval Transportation Service.

1. Fuel and subsistence stores from United States naval auxiliaries, supplemented as may be practicable from British sources available in the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA.

2. Personnel, technical supplies, and ammunition from United States sources.

3. Repair and upkeep facilities from tender and cargo vessels, and temporary shore facilities erected by the United States, supplemented by use of available British facilities.

4. Replacement of British fuel and subsistence stores from United States sources.

[19] c. In emergency circumstances where the transportation facilities of the Naval Transportation Service are inadequate for the logistic support of SUBMARINE FORCE TWO, or of other U.S. Naval forces operating in the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, the Senior U.S. Naval Officer of forces based in that area is authorized to charter, on a time charter basis, vessels immediately obtainable by him for the purpose of providing his forces with urgent logistic deficiencies. Vessels of United States registry will be employed, if available.

d. The Commander in Chief, U.S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will establish in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations an officer of the staff of the Commander, TRAIN, U.S. ATLANTIC FLEET, who will have liaison duties with respect to the quantities and the transportation of logistic requirements, including personnel, for the U.S. ATLANTIC FLEET.

e. Logistic support for the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE and SUBMARINE FORCE THREE, after transfer to the U.S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, will be provided as directed in Part III, Chapter IV, Section 1.

3117. a. The Commander in Chief, U.S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will require the preparation of the following plans:

1. U.S. ATLANTIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5 (Navy Plan 0-3, RAINBOW No. 5);

2. NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE MOVEMENT PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5 (Navy Plan 0-3-A, RAINBOW No. 5), covering the movement of this force and the first movement of Army troops to ENGLAND, SCOTLAND, and NORTH IRELAND (See paragraph 3511 a. 2. (b));

3. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE MOVEMENT PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5 (Navy Plan 0-3-B, RAINBOW No. 5) covering the movement of this force to the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA;

4. Such other subordinate task force operating plans as the Commander in Chief, U.S. ATLANTIC FLEET, may direct, including the movement plan for SUBMARINE FORCE TWO. No operating plan for SUBMARINE FORCE TWO, for operations after arrival in the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA, need be prepared.

b. 1. Plans listed under a. 1, 2, 3, and 4, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance.

[21] Section 2. THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES

3121. a. The organization of NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES is prescribed in General Order No. 143.

b. The boundaries of Coastal Frontiers, Naval Coastal Frontiers, Coastal Zones, Sectors, and Subsectors, are defined in "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935", as modified by Annex I of Appendix 1.

3122. The Naval Coastal Frontiers in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA are:

a. THE NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER;

b. THE SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER;

c. THE CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER;

d. THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.

1. All tasks assigned to the PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER are contained in this Section, including those for the PACIFIC SECTOR.
3123. The NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES (Chapter VIII, Appendix II) in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA are assigned the following tasks:

a. TASK
DEFEND THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER IN CATEGORIES INDICATED BELOW:

CATEGORY B—THE NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.

—THE SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.

CATEGORY D—THE CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.

—THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.

b. TASK
PROTECT AND ROUTE SHIPPING IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN PART III, CHAPTER VII, SECTION 3;

c. TASK
SUPPORT THE U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET;

d. TASK
SUPPORT ARMY AND ASSOCIATED FORCES WITHIN THE COASTAL FRONTIER.

e. In addition, the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES of the PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER are assigned the following task:

1. TASK
   SUPPORT THE U. S. SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE.

3124. a. The following plans will be prepared:

1. Local Joint Plans as prescribed in Appendix I, paragraph 48, of this plan;

2. By the Commanders, NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER:
   (a) Naval Coastal Frontier Operating Plans—RAINBOW No. 5, including an annex covering the operating plans of the Naval Coastal Force. (Naval Coastal Frontier Plans 0-4, RAINBOW No. 5);

3. By Commanders, CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and by Commandants, FIRST, THIRD, FOURTH, FIFTH, SIXTH, SEVENTH, AND EIGHTH NAVAL DISTRICTS:
   (a) Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans—RAINBOW No. 5 (Naval District Plans 0-5, RAINBOW No. 5);

4. Additional subordinate task force operating plans as directed by Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, and Commandants of Naval Districts.

b. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans, and other plans prepared by the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. Operating Plans prepared by the Commandants of Naval Districts will be reviewed by the respective Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers.

3. Subordinate Task Force Operating Plans will be reviewed by the respective Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, or Commandants of Naval Districts.

4. (a) Naval Coastal Frontier Force Operating Plans for the NORTH ATLANTIC and SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS, and Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans for the CARIBBEAN and PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS will be forwarded to the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET for comment, prior to their review by the Chief of Naval Operations, with a view to their coordination with the Operating Plans of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET.

(b) Such portions of Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans and Naval District Contributory Plans, as relate to the protection of fleet anchorages and to services to the U. S. [24] ATLANTIC FLEET, will be referred to the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET for comment, if he so requests.

5. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance.

[25] Section 3. COMMAND RELATIONS

3131. In order to provide for unity of command of task groups of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET and the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES, in
the execution of tasks requiring mutual support, the following provisions shall apply:

a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander, NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, the SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, the CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and the Commander, PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER so far as regards operations in the ATLANTIC SECTOR, are assigned a dual status as follows:

1. As commanders of their respective Naval Coastal Frontier Forces operating under the orders of the Chief of Naval Operations;

2. As officers of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, operating under the orders of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, in command of task groups of that fleet, when and as directed by the Commander in Chief thereof.

b. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, may thereafter require the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers to place under his command, temporarily and for particular purposes, task groups of their Naval Coastal Frontier Forces. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will, when taking temporary command of such task forces, have due regard to the tasks assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations.

3132. The NAVAL OPERATING BASE, BERMUDA, by this plan is assigned as a unit of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, both for administrative and task purposes.

3133. In addition to having general authority over the operation of the Naval Local Defense Forces, the Commander, NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER and the Commander, SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER have authority to coordinate the activities of the Commandants of the Naval Districts within their respective Naval Coastal Frontiers, in matters that concern the Naval Communication Service, the Naval Intelligence Service, and the Naval Transportation Service. Due consideration will be given to the requirements of the tasks assigned to these services by the Chief of Naval Operations.

3134. a. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers may reassign temporarily to the Naval Local Defense Forces under their command, vessels and aircraft assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Naval Coastal Force.

b. Except as provided for in the preceding sub-paragraph, Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers will not change the assignment of vessels made by the Chief of Naval Operations to Naval Coastal Forces and Naval Local Defense Forces except in emergency or upon the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations.

3135. Command relations between United States and Canadian Forces will be set forth in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5, Appendix I, after ABC-22 has been approved.

[27] CHAPTER II. FORCES IN THE PACIFIC AREA

Section 1. THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

3211. The U. S. PACIFIC FLEET (Chapter III, Appendix II) will be organized into task forces as follows:

a. Task forces as directed by the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET;

b. NAVAL STATION, SAMOA;

c. NAVAL STATION, GUAM.

3212. The U. S. PACIFIC FLEET is assigned the following tasks within the PACIFIC AREA:

a. TASK

SUPPORT THE FORCES OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS IN THE FAR EAST BY DIVERTING ENEMY STRENGTH AWAY FROM THE MALAY BARRIER, THROUGH THE DENIAL AND CAPTURE OF POSITIONS IN THE MARSHALLS, AND THROUGH RAIDS ON ENEMY SEA COMMUNICATIONS AND POSITIONS;
b. TASK
PREPARE TO CAPTURE AND ESTABLISH CONTROL OVER THE CAROLINE AND MARSHALL ISLAND AREA, AND TO ESTABLISH AN ADVANCED FLEET BASE IN TRUK;

c. TASK
DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING OR DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH THE ENEMY;

d. TASK
SUPPORT BRITISH NAVAL FORCES IN THE AREA SOUTH OF THE EQUATOR AS FAR WEST AS LONGITUDE 153° EAST;

[28] e. TASK
DEFEND SAMOA IN CATEGORY "D";

f. TASK
DEFEND GUAM IN CATEGORY "F";

g. TASK
PROTECT THE SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS IN THE PACIFIC AREA AND PREVENT THE EXTENSION OF ENEMY MILITARY POWER INTO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE BY DESTROYING HOSTILE EXPEDITIONS AND BY SUPPORTING LAND AND AIR FORCES IN DENYING THE ENEMY THE USE OF LAND POSITIONS IN THAT HEMISPHERE;

h. TASK
PROTECT THE TERRITORY OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS IN THE PACIFIC AREA AND PREVENT THE EXTENSION OF ENEMY MILITARY POWER INTO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE BY DESTROYING HOSTILE EXPEDITIONS AND BY SUPPORTING LAND AND AIR FORCES IN DENYING THE ENEMY THE USE OF LAND POSITIONS IN THAT HEMISPHERE;

i. TASK
COVER THE OPERATIONS OF THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES;

j. TASK
ESTABLISH FLEET CONTROL ZONES, DEFINING THEIR LIMITS FROM TIME TO TIME AS CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE;

k. TASK
ROUTE SHIPPING OF ASSOCIATED POWERS WITHIN THE FLEET CONTROL ZONES.

[29] 3213. a. Units assigned to the ATLANTIC REENFORCEMENT in Chapter III, Appendix II, will be transferred from the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, to the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, when directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

b. The SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE (Chapter IV, Appendix II), will be established under the immediate command of the Chief of Naval Operations, when so directed by that officer.

c. Until detached, the units assigned to the ATLANTIC REENFORCEMENT and the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE will be under the command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and may be employed as desired by him, so long as they remain in the PACIFIC AREA. They shall not be sent to such distances from PEARL HARBOR as would prevent their arrival in the CANAL ZONE twenty-one days after the Chief of Naval Operations directs their transfer from the PACIFIC AREA.

3214. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will arrange for the logistic support of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET from sources in continental United States and in the FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT designated by the Shore Establishment, and from United States and foreign commercial sources. (See Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2.) For this purpose he will employ the transportation facilities of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, which will be supplemented as required by those of the Naval Transportation Service.

b. To the extent practicable, the services of the Naval Transportation Service will be restricted to supplementing the movement of logistic supplies, including personnel, between the continental United States and OAHU.

c. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will establish in the Office of the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, an officer of the staff of the Commander, BASE FORCE, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, who will have liaison duties with respect to the quantities and transportation of logistic requirements, including personnel, to be delivered into the Fleet Control Zones. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, may,
at his discretion, establish similar liaison officers in the offices of the Commanders of other Naval Coastal Frontiers.

[30] 3215. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will require the following plans to be prepared:

1. **THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5** (Navy Plan O–1, RAINBOW No. 5);
2. A plan for the execution of TASK b. of paragraph 3212, assuming the availability of approximately 30,000 Army troops in addition to forces of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and assuming that the task will be executed on 180M;
3. **NAVAL STATION, SAMOA, NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5** (Naval Station Samoa Plan O–5, RAINBOW No. 5);
4. Such other subordinate task force operating plans as the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, may direct.

b. 1. Plans listed under a. 1. and 2. will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval Operations.
2. The NAVAL STATION GUAM Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plan—RAINBOW No. 3 will be applicable, and no additional plan need be prepared.

**NOTE:** The Commandant, Naval Station, GUAM, is not included in the distribution of this Navy Basic War Plan—RAINBOW No. 5.

[31] **Section 2. THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE**

3221. The SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE (Chapter IV, Appendix II) will be established under the immediate command of the Chief of Naval Operations upon its arrival in the CANAL ZONE.

3222. This force will base on the Naval Operating Base, BALBOA, or in SOUTH AMERICAN ports as may later be directed, and will operate in the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB-AREA, delimited as that part of the PACIFIC AREA south of the PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and between the west coast of South America and approximately Longitude 95° West.

3223. The SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE is assigned the following tasks:

a. **TASK**

DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING OR DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH THE ENEMY;

b. **TASK**

PROTECT SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, OR PATROLLING AS REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY RAIDING FORCES;

c. **TASK**

SUPPORT THE OPERATIONS OF THE PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES IN THE PACIFIC SECTOR;

d. **TASK**

PROMOTE THE INTERESTS OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS IN THE NATIONS ON THE WEST COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA.

[32] 3224. a. The Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, will arrange for the logistic support of the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE from Shore Establishment sources in the FIFTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, and from foreign commercial sources (See Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2). Transportation will be provided by the Naval Transportation Service.

b. In circumstances where transportation facilities provided by the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE are inadequate, the Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, is authorized to charter on a time charter basis, vessels immediately obtainable by him, for the purpose of providing his forces with urgent logistic deficiencies. Vessels of United States registry will be employed, if available.

3225. a. The Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, will require the preparation of the following plans:

1. **U. S. SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5** (Navy Plan O–3–C, RAINBOW No. 5);
2. Such subordinate task force operating plans as the Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, may direct.
b. 1. The plan listed under a. 1. will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance.

[33] Section 3. THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES

3231. a. The organization of the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES is prescribed in General Order No. 143.
b. The boundaries of Coastal Frontiers, Naval Coastal Frontiers, Coastal Zones, Sectors, and Subsectors, are defined in "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935," as modified by Annex I of Appendix I.

3232. The Naval Coastal Frontiers in the PACIFIC AREA are:
a. PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER;
b. PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER;
c. HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.

3233. The NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES (Chapter VIII, Appendix II) in the PACIFIC AREA are assigned the following tasks:

a. TASK

DEFEND THE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS IN CATEGORIES INDICATED BELOW:

CATEGORY B—THE PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER.

—THE PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, EXCEPT THE ALASKAN SECTOR.

CATEGORY C—THE ALASKAN SECTOR OF THE PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, EXCEPT UNALASKA.

CATEGORY D—UNALASKA—THE HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER;

[34] b. TASK

PROTECT AND ROUTE SHIPPING IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN PART III, CHAPTER VII, SECTION 3;
c. TASK

SUPPORT THE U. S. PACIFIC FLEET;
d. TASK

SUPPORT THE ARMY AND ASSOCIATED FORCES WITHIN THE COASTAL FRONTIERS.

3234. a. The following plans will be prepared:

1. Local Joint Plans as prescribed in Appendix I, paragraph 48;

2. By the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER:

(a) Naval Coastal Frontier Operating Plan—RAINBOW No. 5, including an annex covering the operating plan of the Naval Coastal Force (Naval Coastal Frontier Plan 0-4, RAINBOW No. 5);

3. By Commanders, PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and by the Commandant, ELEVENTH and TWELFTH NAVAL DISTRICTS:

(a) Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans—RAINBOW No. 5 (Naval District Plans 0-5, RAINBOW No. 5);

(b) Joint Embarkation Plans as required in Appendix I, paragraph 48;

[35] 4. Additional subordinate task force operating plans as directed by Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, and Commandants of Naval Districts.

b. 1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans and other plans prepared by Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. Operating plans prepared by Commandants of Naval Districts will be reviewed by the respective Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers.
3. (a) Naval Coastal Frontier Operating Plans for the PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans for the HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER will be forwarded to the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET for comment, prior to their review by the Chief of Naval Operations, with a view to their coordination with the Operating Plans of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.

(b) Such portions of Naval Local Defense Force Operating Plans and Naval District Contributory Plans as relate to the protection of fleet anchorages and to services to the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will be referred to the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET for comment, if he so requests.

4. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance.

Section 4. COMMAND RELATIONS

3241. In order to provide for unity of command of task groups of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET and of the PACIFIC NORTHERN and PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIERS, in the execution of tasks requiring mutual support, the following provisions shall apply (see paragraph 3242):

a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commanders, PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER and PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER will be assigned a dual status as follows:

1. As commanders of their respective Naval Coastal Frontier Forces operating under the orders of the Chief of Naval Operations.

2. As officers of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET operating under the orders of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, in command of task groups of that fleet when and as directed by the Commander in Chief thereof.

b. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, may thereafter require the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers to place under his command, temporarily and for particular purposes, task groups of their Naval Coastal Frontier Forces. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, when taking temporary command of such task forces, will have due regard for the tasks assigned in this plan to the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers by the Chief of Naval Operations.

1. The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will not require task groups of the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces to leave the limits of their respective Coastal Zones, except in emergency, or upon authority of the Chief of Naval Operations.

c. Conflicting provisions of General Order No. 142 are suspended while the provisions of this paragraph are in effect.

3242. The provisions of paragraph 3241 above, apply to the command relations of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and the Commander, HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, except that the circumstances under which its provisions are applicable are not restricted to the execution of tasks requiring mutual support, but apply in all circumstances.

3243. The Chief of Naval Operations will direct the Commander, SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, to operate under the strategic direction of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, if coordinated action of that force and the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET becomes necessary. The Chief of Naval Operations will be informed by the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, if this situation arises.

3244. In addition to having general authority over the operation of the Naval Local Defense Forces, the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, has authority to coordinate the activities of the Commandants of the Naval Districts within his respective Naval Coastal Frontier in matters that concern the Naval Communication Service, the Naval Intelligence Service, and the Naval Transportation Service. Due consideration will be given to the requirements of the tasks assigned to these services by the Chief of Naval Operations.

3245. a. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers may reassign, temporarily, to the Naval Local Defense Forces under their command, vessels and aircraft assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations to the Naval Coastal Force.
b. Except as provided for in the preceding sub-paragraph, Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers will not change the assignment of vessels made by the Chief of Naval Operations to Naval Coastal Forces and Naval Local Defense Forces except in emergency or upon the authority of the Chief of Naval Operations.

3246. Command relations between United States and Canadian Forces will be set forth in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5, Appendix I, after ABC–22 has been approved.

[83]  
CHAPTER III. FORCES IN THE FAR EAST AREA

Section 1. THE U. S. ASIATIC FLEET AND THE PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER

3311. The following is quoted from Appendix I, paragraph 16.b.:

"Far East Area"

"Coordination in the planning and execution of operations by Military forces of the United States, British Commonwealth, and Netherlands East Indies, in the FAR EAST AREA will, subject to the approval of the Dutch authorities, be effected as follows:

"(1) The commanders of the Military forces of the Associated Powers will collaborate in the formulation of strategic plans for operations in that area.

"(2) The defense of the territories of the Associated Powers will be the responsibility of the respective commanders of the Military forces concerned. These commanders will make such arrangements for mutual support as may be practicable and appropriate.

"(3) The responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the PHILIPPINES, will be assumed by the British Naval Commander in Chief, CHINA. The Commander in Chief, UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET, will be responsible for the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the PHILIPPINES."

3312. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, is the immediate superior in command of the Commandant, SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, who is also designated as the Commander, PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER (see Chapter V, Appendix II).

b. The organization of Naval Coastal Frontiers is prescribed in General Order No. 143.

[89] c. The boundaries of the PHILIPPINE COASTAL FRONTIER, and the extent of the PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, are defined in "Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935", as modified by Annex I of Appendix I.

d. The Commander, PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER will employ the Naval Local Defense Force in the execution of tasks assigned by the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategic employment in cooperation with the Army, under the direction of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.

3313. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET is assigned the following tasks:

a. TASK

RAID JAPANESE SEA COMMUNICATIONS AND DESTROY AXIS FORCES;

b. TASK

SUPPORT THE LAND AND AIR FORCES IN THE DEFENSE OF THE TERRITORIES OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS, (THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, UNITED STATES ASIATIC FLEET, FOR SUPPORTING THE DEFENSE OF THE PHILIPPINES REMAINS SO LONG AS THAT DEFENSE CONTINUES.);

c. TASK

DESTROY AXIS SEA COMMUNICATIONS BY CAPTURING OR DESTROYING VESSELS TRADING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH THE ENEMY;
d. **TASK**

PROTECT SEA COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ASSOCIATED POWERS BY ESCORTING, COVERING, AND PATROLLING, AS REQUIRED BY CIRCUMSTANCES, AND BY DESTROYING ENEMY RAIDING FORCES;

[40] e. **TASK**

IN COOPERATION WITH THE ARMY DEFEND THE PHILIPPINE COASTAL FRONTIER—CATEGORY OF DEFENSE "E";

f. **TASK**

ROUTE UNITED STATES FLAG SHIPING IN ACCORDANCE WITH AGREEMENTS REACHED WITH THE OTHER ASSOCIATED POWERS IN THE FAR EAST AREA.

3314. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, will shift base to BRITISH or DUTCH ports at discretion.

3315. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, will arrange for the logistic support of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET from sources in the SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, and in continental United States; from commercial sources in the PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; and from British and Dutch governmental and commercial sources (See Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2.).

b. Logistic requirements other than personnel, ammunition, and technical materials, will be obtained from sources in the FAR EAST AREA or from sources in the adjacent BRITISH AREAS.

c. Personnel, ammunition, and technical materials will be obtained from sources in the United States.

d. Transportation facilities available to the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET will be employed so far as practicable for the movement of logistic supplies. The Naval Transportation Service will provide transportation for shipments from the United States. The first two of these vessels to arrive in the FAR EAST AREA may be retained by the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, for use in that Area.

[41] e. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, may acquire through the Commandant, SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, and in accordance with the provisions of existing law, any vessels of United States' or Philippine registry by requisition, time charter, or bare boat charter, to supplement the transportation facilities of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.

f. In circumstances where the transportation facilities of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, supplemented as provided for in paragraphs d. and e., are inadequate, the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, is authorized to charter on a time charter basis, vessels immediately obtainable by him for the purpose of providing his forces with urgent logistic deficiencies. Vessels of United States registry will be employed if available.

3316. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, will require the following plans to be prepared:

1. **THE U. S. ASIATIC FLEET OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5** (Navy Plan O–2, RAINBOW No. 5);
2. Local Joint Plans required by Appendix I, Paragraph 48;
3. **SIXTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE OPERATING PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5**. (Sixteenth Naval District Plan O–5, RAINBOW No. 5);
4. Such subordinate task force operating plans as the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, may direct.

b. 1. The plan listed under a. 1, will be reviewed by the Chief of Naval Operations.
2. Plans may be distributed before review and acceptance.

[42] **CHAPTER IV. FORCES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA**

**Section 1. THE U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE**

3411. a. The Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, is also the naval member of the United States Military Mission in London.
b. The U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, will come under the administrative command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, upon the arrival of these forces in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA.

3412. a. The U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE (Chapter VI, Appendix II) will be organized into task forces as follows:

1. THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE;
2. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE.

b. These task forces will operate under the command of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, until their arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA.

3413. After their arrival in the UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA, the task forces of the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, are assigned the following tasks:

a. THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE

1. TASK
   ESCORT CONVOYS IN THE NORTHWEST APPROACHES, ACTING UNDER THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE BRITISH COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE WESTERN APPROACHES;

b. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE

1. TASK
   RAID ENEMY SHIPPING IN AN AREA TO BE DESIGNATED, UNDER THE STRATEGIC DIRECTION OF THE BRITISH VICE ADMIRAL, SUBMARINES.

[43] 3414. Logistic support for the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, will be arranged as indicated herein (see Part IV, Chapter III, Section 2). Transportation will be provided by the Naval Transportation Service, or from vessels assigned to the task forces.

a. Fuel from United States and British sources.

b. Personnel, technical supplies, ammunition, and subsistence supplies from United States sources.

c. Repair and upkeep facilities from tender and cargo vessels and shore facilities assigned to this force, supplemented by a limited use of British facilities.

d. Replacement of fuel to British storage from United States sources.

e. In circumstances where the transportation facilities of the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, and those provided by the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE are inadequate, the Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, is authorized to charter on a time charter basis, or a bare boat basis, vessels immediately obtainable by him for the purpose of providing his forces with urgent logistic deficiencies. Vessels of United States registry will be employed, if available.

3415. a. Outline operating plans for the employment of the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, will be prepared by the prospective Commander of the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE, and submitted to the prospective Commander in Chief, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, for review by the British Commander in Chief, WESTERN APPROACHES. After review and acceptance, copies of this plan will be furnished the Chief of Naval Operations.

[44] CHAPTER V. THE SERVICES

Section 1. THE NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE

3511. The NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE (Chapter IX, Appendix II) is assigned the following task:

a. TASK
   PROVIDE SEA TRANSPORTATION FOR THE INITIAL MOVEMENT AND THE CONTINUED SUPPORT OF ARMY AND NAVY FORCES OVERSEAS, OTHER THAN THOSE WHICH ARE TO BE TRANSPORTED BY THE OPERATING FORCES. MAN AND OPERATE THE ARMY TRANSPORT SERVICE.
1. Deliveries may be made by commercial transportation or by vessels of the Naval Transportation Service as circumstances require.

2. The initial movements of U. S. Army troops under this task are as indicated in this paragraph. Larger movements may be made eventually, as indicated in Appendix I, paragraph 51, but the Navy will make no plans for these later movements until so directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.

   (a) NEW YORK to ICELAND, 26,500 troops, 73 aircraft. First contingent—10,500 troops embark on 24M. Second contingent—16,000 troops embark on 57M. These two movements will be made by British transports if arrangements can be effected. If not, this plan contemplates use of United States transports.

   (b) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 7,000 troops embark on 10M.

   (c) NEW YORK to IRELAND, 8,000 troops embark on 10M.

   (d) These two forces will move in one convoy.

   (e) NEW YORK to BERMUDA, 3,700 troops, 38 aircraft, embark on 18M. Eight aircraft will fly to destination, 30 aircraft will be [45] transported. Part of this force may be moved before M-day.

   (f) GALVESTON to CURACAO-ARUBA, 6,000 troops, embark on 15M.

   (g) GALVESTON to TRINIDAD, 12,500 troops embark on 15M.

   (h) GALVESTON to PANAMA, 6,400 troops, of which 3,300 embark on 20M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part of this force may be moved before M-day.

   (i) GALVESTON to PUERTO RICO, 12,600 troops, of 4,000 embark 20M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part of this force may be moved before M-day.

   (j) SEATTLE to ALASKA, 23,000 troops, of which 1,100 embark on 10M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part of these troops may be moved before M-day.

   (k) SAN FRANCISCO to HAWAII, 23,000 troops, of which 15,000 embark on 10M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part of these troops may be moved before M-day.

3. The supply levels for the support of overseas forces which are to be transported by the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE, are indicated in Appendix I, paragraph 57.

3512. Shipping will be routed by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commanders of the Operating Forces in accordance with instructions contained in Part III, Chapter VII, Section 3.

3513. The Director, Naval Transportation Service, will prepare the Principal Naval Transportation Service Operating Plan—Rainbow No. 5, and will prescribe therein, the Naval Transportation Service Operating Plans—Rainbow No. 5, which are to be prepared by the Naval Districts, Outlying Naval Stations, and Activities or Task Groups not under the command of the Commandants of Naval Districts.

(47) Section 2. THE NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE

3521. The NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE is assigned the following tasks:

   a. Task
      INSURE THE AVAILABILITY OF COMMUNICATION FACILITIES AND A SYSTEM FOR THEIR EMPLOYMENT ADEQUATE TO THE NEEDS OF THE NAVAL ESTABLISHMENT IN THE EXECUTION OF THIS PLAN;

   b. Task
      IN COOPERATION, WHERE NECESSARY, WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND INDEPENDENT OFFICES, AND SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF PERTINENT LEGISLATION, PROCLAMATIONS, AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS, PROVIDE FOR THE OPERATION OR SUPPRESSION, CONTROL, OR SUPERVISION, AS NECESSARY, OF NON-MILITARY COMMUNICATION STATIONS IN AREAS UNDER UNITED STATES' CONTROL.
3522. This Service, operating directly under the Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Communications) comprises the following:
   a. Office of the Director, Naval Communications, Navy Department;
   b. The Communication Organization under the command of the Commandants of Naval Districts and Outlying Naval Stations; and under command of commanders of forces afloat, including aircraft.

3523. The Director, Naval Communication Service, will prepare the Principal Naval Communication Service Operating Plan—Rainbow No. 5, and will prescribe therein, the Naval Communication Service Operating Plans—Rainbow No. 5 which are to be prepared by the Naval Districts, Outlying Naval Stations, and Activities or Task Groups not under the command of the Commandants of Naval Districts.

[48] Section 3. THE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

3531. The NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE is assigned the following tasks:
   a. TASK IN COOPERATION WITH THE ARMY AND ASSOCIATED POWERS, SECURE, AND DISSEMINATE AS ADVISABLE, SUCH INFORMATION, PARTICULARLY CONCERNING THE ENEMY, ENEMY AGENTS AND SYMPATHIZERS, AS WILL ASSIST AND FACILITATE THE EXECUTION OF NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN—RAINBOW No. 5 AND THE PROTECTION OF THE NAVAL ESTABLISHMENT;
   b. TASK IN COOPERATION WITH OTHER GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS, PREVENT THE TRANSMISSION OF INFORMATION OF MILITARY OR ECONOMIC VALUE TO THE ENEMY.

3532. This Service, operating directly under the Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Intelligence), comprises the following:
   a. Office of the Director of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department, including naval attaches, naval observers, and other personnel directly under the Director of Naval Intelligence;
   b. The Naval Intelligence organization under the command of the Commandants of Naval Districts, the Navy Yard, Washington, D. C., and Outlying Naval Stations, including the field units of the respective subordinate activities.

3533. The Director, Naval Intelligence Service, will prepare the Principal Naval Intelligence Service Operating Plan—Rainbow No. 5, and will prescribe therein the Naval Intelligence Service Operating Plans—Rainbow No. 5, which are to be prepared by the Naval Districts, Outlying Naval Stations, and Activities or Task Groups not under the command of the Commandants of Naval Districts.

[49] CHAPTER VI. THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT

3601. The task of the SHORE ESTABLISHMENT is prescribed in Part IV

[60] CHAPTER VII. INSTRUCTIONS JOINTLY APPLICABLE TO TASK FORCES

Section 1. FORMING THE TASK FORCES

3711. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces will be formed on M-day or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.
   a. Units of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, and U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, designated for assignment to NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES, when directed by the respective Commanders in Chief of the Fleets, will report to the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, to which assigned.
   b. Vessels of NAVAL DISTRICT CRAFT (See General Order No. 143), designated for assignment to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, when directed by the Commandants of the Naval Districts, will report to the commanders of task organizations to which assigned.
   c. Vessels to be mobilized, upon completion of mobilization, and when directed by the Commandants of Naval Districts in which they mobilize, will report to the commanders of task organizations to which assigned.

3712. The Chief of Naval Operations will issue special instructions to vessels of the Naval Transportation Service and to vessels operating directly under the Chief of Naval Operations as circumstances require.
3713. a. Coast Guard Districts, including vessels, aircraft and shore establishments within the Districts, upon M-day or sooner if directed by the President, will automatically come under the control of Naval Districts in the manner set forth in the "United States Coast Guard District Manual, 1940."
b. The Commandants of Naval Districts will direct the Coast Guard units coming under their command to report to the commanders of the task organizations as indicated in Appendix II of this plan.

3721. a. Mobilization comprises two steps, viz:
   1. Timely assembly at assigned Mobilization Districts of the forces to be mobilized preparatory to 2;
   2. Preparation for war service. This is a function of the Shore Establishment assisted to the extent practicable by the forces being mobilized, and is provided for in Part IV of this plan.
b. Under this plan the term "mobilization" is applied only to the Operating Forces and the Services, including their units ashore. The Shore Establishment does not mobilize, but, as stipulated in Part IV, increases its personnel and facilities as required to perform its assigned task.
c. Mobilization is thus not a process confined exclusively to the initial days of the war but continues as long as there are additional forces to be mobilized. During and subsequent to mobilization, vessels and units are supported through the operation of the maintenance provisions of Part IV.

3722. Most of the Naval Forces listed in the current Operating Force Plan have already been mobilized at the time of issue of this plan. Vessels so listed, even if not completely mobilized on M-day, will be considered available for immediate war service within the limits of their capabilities. They will complete their mobilization progressively as opportunity permits, and as directed by their superiors in command. Exceptions may be made by direction of the Chief of Naval Operations.

3723. In view of the provisions of paragraph 3722, mobilization in this plan applies principally to vessels assigned to the Naval Transportation Service, to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, and to Naval District Craft which are to be taken over from private sources or other government departments.

3724. Instructions for the assembly at Mobilization Districts of vessels assigned to the Naval Transportation Service will be issued by the Chief of Naval Operations.

3725. Instructions for the assembly at Mobilization Districts of vessels assigned to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces are contained in Chapter VIII, Appendix II.

3731. The following is quoted from Appendix I, "Section V";
a. "20. The British authorities will issue directions for the control and protection of shipping of the Associated Powers within the areas in which British authorities assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Military Forces. United States authorities will issue directions for the control and protection of shipping of the Associated Powers within the areas in which the United States authorities assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces.

   "21. United States and British shipping scheduled to pass from an area assigned to one Power into an area assigned to the other Power, will be controlled and protected by agreement between the respective naval authorities. The British Admiralty is the supreme authority in the control of shipping in the North Atlantic bound to and from the United Kingdom.

   "22. The British Naval Control Service Organization will continue in the exercise of its present functions and methods in all regions pending establishment of effective United States Agencies in United States areas. The Chief of Naval Operations, immediately on entry of the United States into the war, will arrange for the control and protection of shipping of United States registry or charter within United States areas. Requests from the British Naval Control Service Organization for protection by United States forces within United States areas will be made to the Chief of Naval Operations."
b. The term "control of shipping" as used in Appendix I, "Section V", includes all matters relating to the movement of non-combatant vessels on the high seas, except protection.
Definitions

3732. a. ROUTING. The term "routing of shipping" as employed in this plan relates to the sea routes to be followed; the time of departure from port; whether or not ships will move singly or in convoy; the timing at meeting points (rendezvous) and along the sea route; and the delivery of instructions for routing. Instructions in regard to the assembly of vessels for convoys, the scheduling of ports of call or destination, and loading are not considered as a part of routing.

b. INTRA-DISTRICT SHIPPING. That shipping of the Associated Powers proceeding from one port to another within the limits of a Naval District.

c. INTRA-FRONTIER SHIPPING. That shipping of the Associated Powers proceeding from one Naval District to another within the same Naval Coastal Frontier.

d. INTER-FRONTIER SHIPPING. That shipping of the Associated Powers, not overseas shipping, proceeding from a port in one Naval Coastal Frontier to, or through the waters of, another Naval Coastal Frontier.

e. FLEET CONTROL ZONE SHIPPING. All shipping of the Associated Powers while within the Fleet Control Zone.

f. OVERSEAS SHIPPING is that shipping of the Associated Powers whose route, in whole or in part, lies outside the coastal zone of a Naval Coastal Frontier; except that shipping passing between the CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER and the ATLANTIC COAST ports of the United States or Canada is considered INTER-FRONTIER SHIPPING.

Instructions for routing shipping

3733. INTRA-DISTRICT INTRA-FRONTIER, and INTER-FRONTIER SHIPPING.

a. The Chief of Naval Operations will issue general instructions to Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders for the routing of Intra-District, Intra-Frontier, and Inter-Frontier Shipping. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers and Commandants of Naval Districts will keep the Chief of Naval Operations and interested Commanders in Chief informed as to routing instructions issued by them.

b. Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers will route Intra-Frontier and Inter-Frontier Shipping.

c. Intra-District shipping will be routed by the Commandant of the Naval District under the general direction of the Commander, Naval Coastal Frontier.

3734. OVERSEAS SHIPPING.

a. Overseas shipping is divided into two categories, referred to hereafter as Class A and Class B Overseas Shipping:

1. CLASS A. Overseas shipping between two points in the areas of strategic responsibility of the United States;

2. CLASS B. Overseas shipping between one point in the areas of strategic responsibility of the United States, and one point in the areas of strategic responsibility of the United Kingdom.

b. WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA.

1. The Chief of Naval Operations, in consultation with the United Kingdom Chief of Naval Staff, will arrange the routing details of Class B Overseas Shipping which passes between the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA and UNITED KINGDOM AREAS to the east or south.

2. The Chief of Naval Operations will route all Class A and Class B Overseas Shipping while it is within the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA. In the case of overseas shipping moving in convoy, he will issue the routing instructions to the convoy commanders, via the Commandants of the Districts in which are the ports of assembly of the convoys, with copies to the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, appropriate Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders, and Commandants of other Naval Districts affected. In the case of overseas shipping moving singly, the Chief of Naval Operations will issue general routing instructions to the Naval Coastal Frontier Commanders, with copies to the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, and to Commandants of Naval Districts affected. Under the general supervision of the Commanders of Naval Coastal Frontiers, Commandants of Naval Districts will issue routing instructions to commanders of vessels.
c. PACIFIC AREA.

1. Under the general direction of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander of the PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER will perform, in the PACIFIC AREA, all the routing duties performed by the Chief of Naval Operations in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, with the following exceptions:

   (a) The Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will route shipping in the PACIFIC FLEET CONTROL ZONES;

   (b) The Commander, PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, will route shipping in the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC SUB-AREA;

   (c) Routing details of overseas shipping bound to or from the AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND AREA will be arranged directly between the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, and the Chief of the Australian Naval Staff. The Chief of Naval Operations will make arrangements with the United Kingdom Chief of Naval Staff in case action is required by that officer.

Instructions for the protection of shipping

3735. a. Tasks providing for the protection of shipping are assigned to the Operating Forces.

   [57] b. Protection of shipping may be provided by sea or air escort, by covering operations, by patrol, by dispersal, by shifting of routes, or by a combination of these methods.

   c. The shipping of the Associated Powers operating in the areas of strategic responsibility of the United States will be protected by the responsible Commanders in Chief, Commanders of Sub-Areas, and Naval Coastal Frontiers, and by the Commandants of Naval Districts, to the extent required by the existing situation, and as may be practicable by the use of available forces. These officers will keep each other informed, as may be appropriate, as to the strength of naval forces, and the methods being employed, in the protection of shipping.

   d. The protection of embarked military personnel and valuable cargoes will be viewed as having an especial importance.

   [58] Section 4. RULES OF WARFARE

3741. In the conduct of the war the Naval Establishment will be guided by the current “Instructions for the Navy of the United States Governing Maritime Warfare”.

3742. Except under extraordinary circumstances (as when no prize crews are available or great distances are involved, and it is impracticable for the capturing ship to leave her station), prizes should be sent promptly to a port within the jurisdiction of the United States, or to an allied port in which a United States prize court is sitting, or to an allied port where arrangements have previously been made by the commander in the Area for prizes captured by the United States to be received into custody of local officials until an opportunity presents itself of sending them to United States prize courts. When the State Department shall have made arrangements with other Associated Powers to permit United States prize courts within their jurisdiction, the forces afloat will be promptly notified.

3743. Do not use poison gas except in retaliation for similar use by the enemy.

3744. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, within the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, and the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, within the PACIFIC AREA, are authorized to declare such “Strategical Areas” as in their opinion are vital. They must give wide publicity to the exact boundaries of the areas involved and, at the earliest opportunity, notify the Chief of Naval Operations of these actions. A “Strategical Area”, as here used, means an area from which it is necessary to exclude merchant ships and merchant aircraft to prevent damage to such ships or aircraft, or to prevent such ships or aircraft from obtaining information, which, if transmitted to the enemy, would be detrimental to our own forces.

3745. Should the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, or the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, desire to lay mines outside the territorial waters of the enemy, or of the United States or other Associated Powers, or outside of proclaimed Strategical Areas, they should make recom-
mendations to the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the areas proposed to be mined and the time when the mines are to be laid. The Chief of Naval Operations will take the necessary steps to declare the mined areas and to notify shipping and foreign governments. In an emergency, mines may be so laid, before communicating with the Chief of Naval Operations, but in such cases appropriate local notification should be made by the Commander in Chief concerned, and the Chief of Naval Operations should be informed.

Section 5. INTELLIGENCE LiaISON BETWEEN COMMANDERS OF ASSOCIATED FORCES IN THE FIELD

3751. The commanders of the Operating Forces and their subordinate task force commanders will, on their own initiative, exchange liaison officers with task force commanders of the Associated Powers for the purpose of coordinating matters which directly affect their operations. (See Appendix I, paragraph 17 f.).

Part IV. Logistics

CHAPTER I. THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT

4101. The SHORE ESTABLISHMENT is assigned the following tasks:
  a. TASK
     PREPARE FOR WAR SERVICE, MAINTAIN, AND AUGMENT THE OPERATING FORCES AND THE SERVICES;
  b. TASK
     PROVIDE PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL REQUIRED FOR ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING ADVANCED BASES;
  c. TASK
     PROVIDE SALVAGE SERVICE IN THE ATLANTIC AND PACIFIC OCEANS, THE GULF OF MEXICO, AND THE CARIBBEAN SEA, WITHIN APPROXIMATELY 500 MILES OF CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES, ALASKA, PANAMA CANAL ZONE, AND OF OUTLYING UNITED STATES POSSESSIONS AND LEASED TERRITORY IN THE ATLANTIC OCEAN AND THE CARIBBEAN SEA.

4102. Each Chief of Bureau or Head of an Office of the Navy Department, and each Commandant of a Naval District or an Outlying Naval Station will execute such parts of the tasks assigned to the Shore Establishment as fall under his cognizance by law or regulation, unless otherwise stipulated in Part IV.

CHAPTER II. GENERAL DIRECTIVES

Section 1. PERSONNEL

4211. The Shore Establishment will supply the trained personnel required for:
  a. Preparing for war service, maintaining, and augmenting the Operating Forces and the Services;
  b. Augmenting and maintaining the Shore Establishment Activities;
  c. Establishing and maintaining Advanced Bases;
  d. Augmenting and maintaining Salvage Service.

4212. The following is quoted from Appendix I, paragraph 54.

“The Army and Navy requirements for increased personnel will be met by the operation of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940”.

4213. a. Personnel will be supplied in accordance with the Basic Priorities established in Section 6 (paragraph 4261).
   b. Where the requirements for personnel for the Operating Forces and the Services cannot be supplied from other sources, naval personnel assigned to Naval District Craft (see General Order No. 143) will be replaced with civilian personnel for such period of time as found to be necessary.

Section 2. MATERIAL

4221. The Shore Establishment will supply material required for:
  a. Preparing for war service, maintaining, and augmenting the Operating Forces and the Services;
  b. Augmenting and maintaining the Shore Establishment Activities;
  c. Establishing and maintaining Advanced Bases;
  d. Augmenting and maintaining Salvage Service.
4222. The material to support this Plan will come from existing reserves of the Navy and from production sources developed under the approved Industrial Mobilization Plan, and Navy Procurement Plans. The procurement of material will be regulated and controlled by existing laws and regulations, Executive Orders, and in accordance with the instructions contained in the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—RAINBOW No. 5 (Appendix I, paragraphs 56 and 58).

4223. Bureaus having technical cognizance of material being procured for the Navy will take appropriate measures to insure that contractors safeguard such material from exposure to sabotage and from damage by sabotage or other means.

4224. Material will be supplied in accordance with the Basic Priorities established in Section 6 (paragraph 4261).

[64] Section 3. TRANSPORTATION

4231. a. Sea transportation will be provided by:
   1. THE OPERATING FORCES;
   2. THE NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE.
   b. The Naval Transportation Service will arrange for delivery of personnel and material by commercial transportation facilities wherever practicable.

4232. a. Bureaus will provide material at loading ports ready for loading.
   b. The Shore Establishment will furnish the Chief of Naval Operations and the District Commandants concerned with the necessary information regarding material and personnel to be loaded at loading ports in order that sea transportation may be provided.
   c. The Shore Establishment will load material and embark personnel in vessels designated by the Chief of Naval Operations.

4233. a. The Army will furnish to the Chief of Naval Operations, or the District Commandants, information regarding the numbers of troops and quantities of material to be transported overseas (see Appendix I, paragraphs 51 and 57).
   b. The Army will move Army material and troops to ports of embarkation, and load Army material and embark Army troops in vessels designated by the Chief of Naval Operations, subject to supervision by the Navy in matters regarding the safety of vessels.
   c. The Navy will furnish subsistence and medical supplies for Army personnel while embarked on transports operated by the Navy (including time-chartered vessels); the Army will provide subsistence and medical supplies for all animals embarked on such transports. Army medical and Army commissary personnel embarked will be available to perform their normal duties in relation to Army personnel.

[65] 4234. The Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will establish in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, will establish in the Office of the Commander, PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER, officers having liaison duties in regard to coordinating the transportation of material and personnel by fleet transportation facilities and the Naval Transportation Service.

[66] Section 4. LEGAL SERVICES

4241. The Shore Establishment (Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy) will provide the legal services, charged to it by law and regulation, necessary for the execution of this plan by the Naval Establishment.

4242. These services will include:
   a. The supervision of the administration of law throughout the Naval Establishment;
   b. Securing the enactment of such legislation and the promulgation of such Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders as may be required by the Naval Establishment in the execution of this plan;
   c. In conjunction with the War Department, securing the enactment of legislation and the promulgation of such Presidential Proclamations and Executive Orders affecting both the Army and the Navy as are deemed necessary for the execution of the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—RAINBOW No. 5 (Appendix I, paragraph 59).

[67] Section 5. AUGMENTATION AND MAINTENANCE OF THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT

4251. The Shore Establishment will augment and maintain its activities by providing personnel and material necessary for the accomplishment of its assigned tasks.
4252. Requirements for Naval District Craft (see General Order No. 143) in excess of those provided for in the current Operating Force Plan, will be met locally by the Commandants of Naval Districts. This may be done by taking over suitable craft from private owners, or by contracting with private owners for the operation of such craft in a pool under navy control, to meet both government and private requirements.

[68] Section 6. PRIORITIES

4261. Priority in matters of supply, delivery, and services will be in accordance with the basic priorities stipulated below. All supporting efforts of the SERVICES and the SHORE ESTABLISHMENT will fall respectively under the priorities established by this general formula. For planning purposes, the several items listed under the same basic priority shall be considered of equal importance.

a. PRIORITY ONE
1. The transportation of Army troops and material in the initial movements to the UNITED KINGDOM, BERMUDA, CURACAO-ARUBA, TRINIDAD, PANAMA, PUERTO RICO, ALASKA, and HAWAII.
2. The requirements of the NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, and SUBMARINE FORCE THREE, U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE.
3. The requirements of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.

b. PRIORITY TWO
1. Initial movements to ICELAND.
2. The requirements of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET and the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.
3. The requirements of the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE not specified under PRIORITY ONE.

c. PRIORITY THREE
1. The requirements of the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES.
2. The transportation of Army troops and material not specified under PRIORITIES ONE and TWO.

d. PRIORITY FOUR
1. New Construction.

[69] CHAPTER III. THE OPERATING FORCES AND SERVICES

Section 1. PREPARATION FOR WAR SERVICE

4311. Commencing on M-day, and before if directed, the SHORE ESTABLISHMENT will prepare for war services those vessels and units of the OPERATING FORCES and SERVICES listed in Appendix II, which are not then in condition of readiness for war service, by placing them in material condition and providing personnel to perform their war tasks.

4312. The desired condition of readiness for war service as regards personnel, repairs and alterations, and supplies, is the STANDARD CONDITION prescribed by the Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department concerned and approved by the Chief of Naval Operations.

4313. Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces and the Services listed in the current Operating Force Plan.

a. Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces and the Services appearing in the current Operating Force Plan are not assigned to Mobilization Districts, as most of those vessels have already been mobilized at the time of issue of this plan. Vessels not completely mobilized on M-day will be considered available for immediate war service within the limitations of their capabilities. They will complete their mobilization progressively as opportunity permits, and as directed by their superiors in command. Exceptions may be made by direction of the Chief of Naval Operations.

4314. Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces and the Services NOT listed in the current Operating Force Plan.

a. Vessels not appearing in the current Operating Force Plan, assigned in Appendix II to the Operating Forces and the Services, are assigned to Mobilization Districts for preparation for war service (mobilization). Commandants are responsible for preparing for war service all vessels assigned to their districts for mobilization.

b. In cases where Appendix II indicates the day of arrival at the Mobilization District and the day required to be ready for service, the Commandant will employ the intervening period in the preparation of the vessel for war service.
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[70] If essential items of conversion can not be completed by the "Day Ready" indicated in Appendix II, the Commandant will inform the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander of the Operating Force concerned, as far in advance as practicable.

c. In cases where the day of arrival at the Mobilization District and the "Day Ready" are not indicated in Appendix II, the Commandant will complete the mobilization as promptly as possible in accordance with the priorities established and other related instructions.

d. Vessels assigned to the Operating Forces, other than those assigned to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces, will be degaussed, armed, and manned with navy personnel before being considered ready for war service.

e. Vessels assigned to Naval Coastal Frontier Forces will be placed in STANDARD CONDITION before being considered ready for war service, unless the Commanders, Naval Coastal Frontiers, direct otherwise, in which case placing them in STANDARD CONDITION will be deferred until opportunity permits.

f. Vessels assigned to the Naval Transportation Service will be placed in STANDARD CONDITION before being considered ready for war service, except as follows:

1. Transports to be commissioned in the Navy will be considered ready for war service when degaussed, provided with fresh water, commissary, sanitary, medical, berthing, and other facilities essential for the initial scheduled voyage;

2. Transports to be operated on a time charter basis will be considered ready for war service when provided with fresh water, commissary, sanitary, medical, berthing, and other facilities essential for the initial scheduled voyage, and provided with a liaison group consisting of a communication group and such additional personnel (supply and medical) as may be required;

[71] 3. All other classes commissioned in the Navy scheduled for voyages outside of the WESTERN HEMISPHERE will be considered ready for war service when degaussed and prepared for the particular service for which scheduled;

4. All other classes operated on a time charter basis will be considered ready for war service when degaussed and prepared for the particular service for which scheduled, and provided with a liaison group consisting of a communication group and such additional personnel (supply and medical) as may be required;

5. Vessels of the Naval Transportation Service will not be delayed for the installation of batteries and magazines.

g. Time chartered merchant vessels of the Naval Transportation Service to be taken over and commissioned will be placed in STANDARD CONDITION after their initial voyage, and when opportunity permits.

h. Instructions for the mobilization of vessels assigned to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces are contained in Chapter VIII, Appendix II.

4315. a. The crews of all combat loaded transports and other vessels scheduled to unload at a destination having no stevedores available, will include competent stevedore personnel. These may be supplied from trained naval personnel, or by contract if suitable naval personnel is not available. This provision applies to vessels commissioned in the Navy and to time chartered vessels.

b. Provision will be made for furnishing prize crews consisting of a suitable number of officers and men as follows:

1. To the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET ........................................... 6;

2. To the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET ........................................... 8;

3. To the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE ...................................... 8;

4. To the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET ........................................... 6.

[72] Section 2. MAINTENANCE

4321. The Shore Establishment will maintain the Operating Forces and the Services in condition of readiness for war by:

a. Replacement of personnel and material;

b. Repairs to units made available at Shore Establishment activities;

c. Hospitalization of personnel;

d. Provisions of facilities at Shore Establishment activities for recreation and welfare of personnel.
Replacements

4322. a. In order to provide for replacements of personnel and material for the Operating Forces and the Services, the Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department concerned will establish standard monthly replacement rates based upon estimated expenditures, plus a small excess for building up a reserve. These rates will be used by the Shore Establishment as a basis for procuring personnel and material to meet the replacement requirements of the Operating Forces and the Services. The estimates should be based on probable operations of each type of the Task Organization in each of the Areas and Sub-Areas listed in paragraph 1102 of this plan.

b. These standard monthly replacement rates will be revised from time to time so as to accord with the requirements of the Operating Forces and the Services, as determined by war experience.

c. In procuring personnel and material at the standard monthly replacement rates, no deduction will be made for probable losses in the forces to be supplied. A 10% surplus over the standard monthly replacements will be maintained available for shipment to provide for probable losses during sea transportation to destination.

d. Should the established monthly replacement rates prove to be inadequate to supply the requirements, personnel [74] and material allotted to low priority units will be reassigned to higher priority units, as required, until deficiencies can be replaced under revised replacement rates.

e. The Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Department who provide replacements of personnel and material will designate the activities of the Shore Establishment to which the Operating Forces and the Units of the Naval Transportation Service will submit their requests for replacements.

f. The rate of flow of replacements will be controlled by the timely submission of requests for replacements, stating the desired time and place of delivery.

g. Requests for replacements will be submitted as follows:

1. For the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET, and SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE, and U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE by the commanders thereof, or by officers designated by them;

2. For the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES, by the Commandants of Naval Districts upon which the forces are based;

3. For units of the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE by the commanders thereof, through the appropriate local naval authorities where delivery is desired;

4. For units ashore by the commanders thereof, through the Commandants of Naval Districts or Commanders of Outlying Naval Stations in which these units are established.

h. Where Shore Establishment facilities are not readily available, units of the Operating Forces and of the Naval Transportation Service will obtain material replacements from local sources. (See par. 3116, 3214, 3224, 3315, 3414.) Replacements obtained in this manner will not be included in requests for replacements made to Shore Establishment activities.

[75] 4323. Delivery of replacements to the Operating Forces the the Services will be effected, insofar as practicable, at the times and places requested.

Repairs

4324. a. The Shore Establishment will repair such units of the Operating Forces and Services as may be made available therefor at Shore Establishment activities.

b. The assignment of availability of such units to an activity of the Shore Establishment for overhaul and repairs will be governed by the following:

1. The geographic disposition of the various forces;

2. The facilities available at certain activities for accomplishing the work required;

3. The degree of urgency of the work required;

4. The distribution of the work load among the various activities;

5. The needs for repairs by units of the Associated Powers.

4325. The Chief of Naval Operations will designate the shore activity to which a vessel will be assigned for overhaul and repairs and will fix the availability dates.
Hospitalization and evacuation

4326. a. The Operating Forces will provide hospitalization for sick and wounded personnel within the capacity of the hospital facilities available in hospital ships, in Advanced Base Hospitals, and in Mobile Medical Units.

b. The Shore Establishment will provide hospitalization for sick or wounded naval and marine corps personnel which may be evacuated to Shore Establishment activities.

4327. The sick and wounded personnel evacuated to Shore Establishment activities will be transported in evacuation transports, hospital ships, and other available vessels having adequate medical facilities.

4328. a. Army forces overseas will provide their own hospitalization, but will be evacuated to home territory in the same manner as naval personnel.

b. Army forces embarked on naval vessels will be provided hospitalization by the Navy until such time as the sick and wounded can be evacuated to Army hospitals or field medical units.

Recreation and welfare

4329. a. The Shore Establishment will provide and maintain recreation and welfare facilities at Shore Establishment activities for naval and marine corps personnel.

b. Provisions for these activities will include:
   1. Augmentation and maintenance of recreational facilities at Shore Establishment activities where units of the Operating Forces and Services are concentrated, and at Training Stations;
   2. Augmentation and maintenance of religious and welfare facilities at the above activities, including cooperation with national and local welfare agencies and religious groups, operating for the welfare of naval personnel.

Section 3. AUGMENTATION

4331. The Shore Establishment will augment the Operating Forces and the Services by:
   a. New construction of vessels and aircraft;
   b. Acquisition from the Maritime Commission and from private owners of vessels and aircraft designated by the Chief of Naval Operations (Naval Supply and Transportation Service Section), and by their preparation for war service;
   c. Preparation for war service of vessels and aircraft transferred to the Navy from other Government Departments;
   d. Acquisition of material.

4332. In preparing plans for the acquisition of small vessels, Commandants of Naval Districts will provide for consultation and cooperation between local representatives of the Army, Navy, and Maritime Commission.

CHAPTER IV. ADVANCED BASES

4401. The Shore Establishment will provide personnel and material required for establishing and maintaining ADVANCED BASES in accordance with instructions issued in separate directives.

CHAPTER V. SALVAGE

4501. a. The Shore Establishment will provide salvage units and render salvage service to vessels, both private and public, of all nationalities, in the areas prescribed in paragraph 4101.c.

b. The Operating Forces, assisted by such facilities as can be made available by the Shore Establishment, will render salvage service to vessels of their own forces and to other vessels where practicable, in the waters of the outlying United States possessions in the Pacific Ocean, of the Philippine Islands and of Advanced Bases, and in the open sea outside of the areas mentioned in paragraph 4101.c.

4502. The Shore Establishment will cooperate with and assist the Army or other agencies responsible for clearing harbor channels of stranded vessels within the waters of the United States.
4503. a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the President, the Navy will acquire the following vessels to be converted and equipped as salvage vessels:

1. From the COAST AND GEODETIC SURVEY
   PIONEER,
   GUIDE,
   DISCOVER;

2. From the COAST GUARD
   REDWING.

b. These vessels will be manned and operated as directed by the Bureau of Ships, and two will be stationed on the Atlantic Coast of the United States and two on the Pacific Coast of the United States.

[80] CHAPTER VI. PLANS TO BE PREPARED BY THE SHORE ESTABLISHMENT

4601. Contributory Plans, Rainbow No. 5, will be prepared as prescribed in Part V, WPL-8, with particular reference to paragraphs 5126, 5127, and 5128.

4602. The Principal Contributory Plans, Rainbow No. 5, will prescribe the estimates of requirements, if any, to be made by the subordinate planning agencies.

[81] PART V. SPECIAL PROVISIONS

CHAPTER I. EXERTION OF FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE

5101. The following is quoted from Appendix I, paragraph 60:

"The Administrator of Export Control, jointly with the War and Navy Departments, is to prepare plans and programs for the application of economic pressure such as may be obtained through control of commodities, transportation, communication, financial relationships, and all related means."


[82] CHAPTER II. JOINT PLANS COVERING INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, CENSORSHIP AND PUBLICITY, AND MOBILIZATION OF RESOURCES

5201. The following is quoted from Appendix I, paragraph 61:

"Cooperation of Other Departments of the Government

"The War and Navy Departments, jointly with other departments of the Government, shall have prepared plans or programs covering the following subjects:

a. Intelligence Service;

b. Censorship and Publicity;

c. Mobilization of Resources."

5202. a. The Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Intelligence) will act for the Navy Department in the preparation of joint plans or programs for the Intelligence Service.

b. The Secretary of the Navy (Director of the Office of Public Relations) and the Chief of Naval Operations (Director of Naval Intelligence) will jointly act for the Navy Department in the preparation of joint plans or programs for Censorship and Publicity.

c. The Under Secretary of the Navy, acting through the Navy Members of the Joint Army and Navy Munitions Board, will represent the Navy Department in the preparation of joint plans or programs for the Mobilization of Resources.


[2] SECTION 1. DIRECTIVE

1. The directive for Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—RAINBOW No. 5, contained in J. P. 325 (Serial 642-1), Section 1, paragraph 3e, approved October 14, 1939, and revised April 10, 1940, is superseded by the directive contained in paragraph 2 of this paper.

2. The Joint Board directs The Joint Planning Committee to submit Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—RAINBOW No. 5 based upon the Report of
United States-British Staff Conversations, dated March 27, 1941 (ABC–1), and upon Joint United States-Canada War Plan No. 2 (ABC–22), now in process of drafting.

SECTION II. DEFINITIONS

3. The term "Associated Powers" means the United States and the British Commonwealth, and, when appropriate, includes the Associates and Allies of either Power.

4. The term "Axis Powers" means Germany and Italy, and, if Japan and other Powers are at war against the Associated Powers, is to be understood as including all such Powers.

5. "Malaysia" includes the Philippines, the Malay States, the Straits Settlements, Bornéo, and the Netherlands East Indies. The "Malay Barrier" includes the Malay Peninsula, Sumatra, Java, and the chain of islands extending in an easterly direction from Java to Bathurst Island, Australia.

6. The term "United States naval forces" as used herein will be construed as including United States naval aviation. The term "air forces" will be construed as including only the United States Army Air Corps and the Royal Air Force.

SECTION III. GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS

7. That the Associated Powers, comprising initially the United States, the British Commonwealth (less Eire), the Netherlands East Indies, Greece, Yugoslavia, the Governments in Exile, China, and the "Free French" are at war against the Axis Powers, comprising either:
   a. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or
   b. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Thailand.

8. That the Associated Powers will conduct the war in accord with ABC–1 and ABC–22.

9. That even if Japan and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility of their intervention must be taken into account.

10. That United States forces which might base in the Far East Area will be able to fulfill logistic requirements, other than personnel, ammunition, and technical materials, from sources in that general region.

11. That Latin American Republics will take measures to control subversive elements, but will remain in a non-belligerent status unless subjected to direct attack; in general, the territorial waters and land bases of these Republics will be available for use by United States forces for purposes of Hemisphere Defense.

SECTION IV. CONCEPT OF THE WAR

12. The Concept of the War as set forth in paragraphs 10, 11, 12, and 13 of ABC–1 is quoted below, except that paragraph 13 (h) is quoted as modified by the Chief of Naval Operations' and the Chief of Staff's secret letter Serial 039412 of April 5, 1941.

"10. The broad strategic objectives of the Associated Powers will be the defeat of Germany and her Allies.

"11. The principles of United States and British national strategic defense policies of which the military forces of the Associated Powers must take account are:

(a) United States

The paramount territorial interests of the United States are in the Western Hemisphere. The United States must, in all eventualities, maintain such dispositions as will prevent the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic political or Military power.

(b) British Commonwealth

The security of the United Kingdom must be maintained in all circumstances. Similarly, the United Kingdom, the Dominions, and India must maintain dispositions which, in all eventualities, will provide for the ultimate security of the British Commonwealth of Nations. A cardinal feature of British strategic policy is the retention of a position in the Far East such as will ensure the cohesion and security of the British Commonwealth and the maintenance of its war effort.

(c) Sea Communications

The security of the sea communications of the Associated Powers is essential to the continuance of their war effort.
"12. The strategic concept includes the following as the principal offensive policies against the Axis Powers:
   (a) Application of economic pressure by naval, land, and air forces and all other means, including the control of commodities at their source by diplomatic and financial measures.
   (b) A sustained air offensive against German Military power, supplemented by air offensives against other regions under enemy control which contribute to that power.
   (c) The early elimination of Italy as an active partner in the Axis.
   (d) The employment of the air, land, and naval forces of the Associated Powers, at every opportunity, in raids and minor offensives against Axis Military strength.
   (e) The support of neutrals, and of Allies of the United Kingdom, Associates of the United States, and populations in Axis-occupied territory in resistance to the Axis Powers.
   (f) The building up of the necessary forces for an eventual offensive against Germany.
   (g) The capture of positions from which to launch the eventual offensive.

"13. Plans for the Military operations of the Associated Powers will likewise be governed by the following:

[7] (a) Since Germany is the predominant member of the Axis Powers, the Atlantic and European area is considered to be the decisive theatre. The principal United States Military effort will be exerted in that theatre, and operations of United States forces in other theatres will be conducted in such a manner as to facilitate that effort.

(b) Owing to the threat to the sea communications of the United Kingdom, the principal task of the United States naval forces in the Atlantic will be the protection of shipping of the Associated Powers, the center of gravity of the United States effort being concentrated in the Northwestern approaches to the United Kingdom. Under this conception, the United States naval effort in the Mediterranean will initially be considered of secondary importance.

(c) It will be of great importance to maintain the present British and Allied Military position in and near the Mediterranean basins, and to prevent the spread of Axis control in North Africa.

(d) Even if Japan were not initially to enter the war on the side of the Axis Powers, it would still be necessary for the Associated Powers to deploy their forces in a manner to guard against Japanese intervention. If Japan does enter the war, the Military strategy in the Far East will be defensive. The United States does not intend to add to its present Military strength in the Far East but will employ the United States Pacific Fleet offensively in the manner best calculated to weaken Japanese economic power, and to support the defense of the Malay barrier by diverting Japanese strength away from Malaysia. The United States intends so to augment its forces in the Atlantic and Mediterranean areas that the British Commonwealth will be in a position to release the necessary forces for the Far East.

[8] (e) The details of the deployment of the forces of the Associated Powers at any one time will be decided with regard to the Military situation in all theatres.

(f) The principal defensive roles of the land forces of the Associated Powers will be to hold the British Isles against invasion; to defend the Western Hemisphere; and to protect outlying Military base areas and islands of strategic importance against land, air, or sea-borne attack.

(g) United States land forces will support United States naval and air forces maintaining the security of the Western Hemisphere or operating in the areas bordering on the Atlantic. Subject to the availability of trained and equipped organizations, United States land forces will, as a general rule, provide ground and anti-aircraft defenses of naval and air bases used primarily by United States forces.

(h) Subject to the requirements of the security of the United States, the British Isles and their sea communications, the air policy of the Associated Powers will require that associated effort in the air will be directed toward providing the necessary naval and land air components for the accomplishment of naval tasks, for the support of land operations, and for independent air operations against the sources of Axis military power."
(i) United States Army Air Forces will support the United States land and naval forces maintaining the security of the Western Hemisphere or operating in the areas bordering on the Atlantic. Subject to the availability of trained and equipped organizations, they will undertake the air defense of those general areas in which naval bases used primarily by United States forces are located, and subsequently, [9] of such other areas as may be agreed upon. United States Army air bombardment units will operate offensively in collaboration with the Royal Air Force, primarily against German Military power at its source.

(j) United States forces will, so far as practicable, draw their logistic support (supply and maintenance) from sources outside the British Isles. Subject to this principle, however, the military bases, repair facilities, and supplies of either nation will be at the disposal of the Military forces of the other as required for the successful prosecution of the war."

13. In addition, plans for the Military operations of United States forces will be governed by the following:
   (a) Under this War Plan the scale of hostile attack to be expected within the Western Atlantic Area is limited to raids by air forces and naval surface and submarine forces.
   (b) The building up of large land and air forces for major offensive operations against the Axis Powers will be the primary immediate effort of the United States Army. The initial tasks of United States land and air forces will be limited to such operations as will not materially delay this effort.

[10] SECTION V. TERMS OF AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED KINGDOM RELATING TO WAR OPERATIONS

14. Agreements have been reached between the United States and the United Kingdom relating to war operations. In this Section certain of these agreements are set forth (See ABC-1 and ABC-22).

   a. As a general rule, the forces of the United States and those of the United Kingdom should operate under their own commanders in the areas of responsibility of their own Power.
   b. The assignment of an area to one Power shall not be construed as restricting the forces of the other Power from temporarily extending appropriate operations into that area, as may be required by particular circumstances.
   c. The forces of either Power which are employed normally under the strategic direction of an established commander of the other, will, with due regard to their type, be employed as task (organized) forces charged with the execution of specific strategic tasks. These task (organized) forces will operate under their own commanders and will not be distributed into small bodies attached to the forces of the other Power. Only exceptional Military circumstances will justify the temporary suspension of the normal strategic tasks.
   d. When units of both Powers cooperate tactically, command will be exercised by that officer of either Power who is the senior in rank, or if of equal rank, of time in grade.
   e. United States naval aviation forces employed in British Areas will operate under United States naval command, and will remain an integral part of United States naval task forces. Arrangements will be made for coordination of their operations with those of the appropriate Coastal Command groups.
   f. Special command relationships pertaining to particular areas are set forth in paragraph 16.

[11] 16. Responsibility for the Strategic Direction of Military Forces. a. United States Areas. Upon entering the war, the United States will assume responsibility for the strategic direction of its own and British Military forces in the following areas:

   (1) The Atlantic Ocean Area, together with islands and contiguous continental land areas, north of Latitude 25° South and west of Longitude 30° West, except:
      (a) The area between Latitude 20° North and Latitude 43° North which lies east of Longitude 40° West;
      (b) The waters and territories in which Canada assumes responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces, as may be defined in United States-Canada Joint Agreements.
(2) The Pacific Ocean Area, together with islands and contiguous continental land areas, as follows:
(a) North of Latitude 30° North and west of Longitude 140° East;
(b) North of the equator and east of Longitude 140° East;
(c) South of the equator and east of Longitude 180° to the South American coast and Longitude 74° West; except for the waters and territories in which Canada assumes responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces, as may be defined in United States-Canada Joint Agreements. The United States will afford support to British naval forces in the regions south of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East.

[12] b. The Far East Area. Coordination in the planning and execution of operations by Military forces of the United States, British Commonwealth, and Netherlands East Indies in the Far East Area will, subject to the approval of the Dutch authorities, be effected as follows:
(1) The commanders of the Military forces of the Associated Powers will collaborate in the formulation of strategic plans for operations in that area.
(2) The defense of the territories of the Associated Powers will be the responsibility of the respective commanders of the Military forces concerned. These commanders will make such arrangements for mutual support as may be practicable and appropriate.
(3) The responsibility for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers, except of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the Philippines, will be assumed by the British naval Commander-in-Chief, China. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, will be responsible for the direction of naval forces engaged in supporting the defense of the Philippines.
(4) For the above purposes, the Far East Area is defined as the area from the coast of China in Latitude 30° North, east to Longitude 140° East, thence south to the equator, thence east to Longitude 141° East, thence south to the boundary of Dutch New Guinea on the south coast, thence westward to Latitude 11° South, Longitude 120° East, thence south to Latitude 13° South, thence west to Longitude 92° East, thence north to Latitude 20° North, thence to the boundary between India and Burma.

[13] c. Joint Land Offensives. Responsibility for the strategic direction of the Military forces engaged in joint offensive action on land will be in accordance with joint agreements to be entered upon at the proper time. In these circumstances unity of command in the theatre of operations should be established.

d. British Commonwealth Areas. The British Commonwealth will assume responsibility for the strategic direction of associated Military forces in all other areas not described in sub-paragraphs a, b, and c next above. These areas as initially delimited are:
(1) The AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND AREA comprises the Australian and New Zealand British Naval Stations west of Longitude 180° and south of the equator. The British Naval Commander-in-Chief, China, is responsible for the strategic direction of the naval forces of the Associated Powers operating in the Australian and New Zealand Area.
(2) The UNITED KINGDOM AND BRITISH HOME WATERS AREA comprises the waters to the eastward of Longitude 30° West and to the Northward of Latitude 43° North and the land areas bordering on, and the islands in, the above ocean area. Administrative command of all United States land and air forces stationed in the British Isles and Iceland will be exercised by the Commander, United States Army Forces in Great Britain. This officer will have authority to arrange details concerning the organization and location of task forces (organization of units in appropriate formation) and operational control with the War Office and the Air Ministry.
(3) The NORTH ATLANTIC AREA:
(a) Northern boundary, Latitude 43° North,
(b) Southern boundary, Latitude 20° North,
(c) Western boundary, Longitude 40° West,
(d) Eastern boundary, the coasts of Spain, Portugal, and Africa, and Longitude 5° West, together with the islands and land areas contiguous thereto.
(e) Strategic direction of a United States naval force basing on Gibraltar will be exercised by the United Kingdom Chief of Naval Staff except when he specifically delegates it for a stated period as follows:
To the British Naval Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, for operations in the Western Mediterranean.
To the Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet, for operations in the Central Atlantic.
(5) The Commander of United States naval forces basing in Gibraltar will be responsible for administrative matters to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.
(4) The **SOUTH ATLANTIC AREA** comprises:
(a) The area between Latitudes 20° North and 25° South, bounded on the west by Longitude 30° West and on the east by the African Coast.
(b) The South Atlantic Ocean, south of Latitude 25° South, between Longitudes 74° West and 33° East, together with the islands and land areas contiguous thereto.
(5) The **MEDITERRANEAN AND MIDDLE EAST AREAS** comprise the Mediterranean Sea east of Longitude 5° West, the Suez Canal, and the islands and countries adjoining them, including the present theatres of operations in North and East Africa. The Black Sea, Iraq, and Aden are also included in this area.
[15] (6) The **INDIA AND EAST INDIES AREA** comprises:
(a) India.
(b) Indian Ocean, including the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, bounded on the West by the coasts of Africa and Longitude 33° East, and on the East by the western boundaries of the Far East Area and the Australian Station.
(c) The islands in the above ocean area.
17. **Collaboration in Planning.** a. The High Commands of the United States and United Kingdom will collaborate continuously in the formulation and execution of strategic policies and plans which shall govern the conduct of the war. They and their respective commanders in the field, as may be appropriate, will similarly collaborate in the planning and execution of such operations as may be undertaken jointly by United States and British forces. This arrangement will apply also to such plans and operations as may be undertaken separately, the extent of collaboration required in each particular plan or operation being agreed mutually when the general policy has been decided.

b. To effect the collaboration outlined in the preceding sub-paragraph, and to ensure the coordination of administrative action and command between the United States and British Military Services, the United States and United Kingdom will exchange Military Missions. These Missions will comprise one senior officer of each of the Military Services, with their appropriate staffs. The functions of these Missions will be as follows:

(1) To represent jointly, as a corporate body, their own Chiefs of Staff (the Chief of Naval Operations being considered as such), vis-a-vis the group of Chiefs of Staff of the Power to which they are accredited, for the purpose of collaboration in the [16] formulation of Military policies and plans governing the conduct of the war in areas in which that Power assumes responsibility for strategic direction.

(2) In their individual capacity to represent their own individual Military Services vis-a-vis the appropriate Military Services of the Power to which they are accredited, in matters of mutual concern in the areas in which that Power assumes responsibility for strategic direction.

c. The personnel of either Mission shall not become members of any regularly constituted body of the government of the Power to which they are accredited. Their staffs will, however, work in direct cooperation with the appropriate branches and committees of the staff of the Power to which they are accredited.

d. The United States, as may be necessary, will exchange Liaison officers with Canada, Australia, and New Zealand for effectuating direct cooperation between United States and Dominion forces.

e. To promote adequate collaboration and prompt decision, a military transportation service will be established between England and the United States. Ships and airplanes will be assigned to this service by the United States and the United Kingdom as may be found necessary.

f. Existing Military intelligence organizations of the two powers will operate as independent intelligence agencies, but will maintain close liaison with each other in order to ensure the full and prompt exchange of pertinent information
concerning war operations. Intelligence liaison will be established not only through the Military Missions but also between all echelons of command in the field with respect to matters which affect their operations.

17. Communications

18. The United States and the United Kingdom will establish in London the "Associated Communication Committee" which is to be constituted as follows:
   a. A representative of the United States Army and a representative of the United States Navy, who are members of the staff of the United States Military Mission in London.
   b. Representatives of the British Combined Signals Board in the United Kingdom.

19. The Associated Communications Committee will be the supreme controlling body with relation to intercommunications by radio (W/T), wire, visual, and sound affecting the armed services and the merchant marines of the two nations.

Control and Protection of Shipping

20. The British authorities will issue directions for the control and protection of shipping of the Associated Powers within the areas in which British authorities assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces. United States authorities will issue directions for the control and protection of shipping of the Associated Powers within the areas in which the United States authorities assume responsibility for the strategic direction of Military forces.

21. United States and British shipping scheduled to pass from an area assigned to one Power into an area assigned to the other Power, will be controlled and protected by agreement between the respective naval authorities. The British Admiralty is the supreme authority in the control of shipping in the North Atlantic bound to and from the United Kingdom.

22. The British Naval Control Service Organization will continue in the exercise of its present functions and methods in all regions pending establishment of effective United States Agencies in United States Areas. The Chief of Naval Operations, immediately on entry of the United States into the war, will arrange for the control and protection of shipping of United States registry or charter within United States Areas. Requests from the British Naval Control Service Organization for protection by United States forces within United States areas will be made to the Chief of Naval Operations.

23. Special Relationship between Canada and the United States. Joint Agreements are being drawn up by the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, United States-Canada, regarding the cooperation of the Armed forces of the United States and Canada in the areas in which the United States has strategic direction. When completed, the substance of these agreements, (Short Title ABC-22), will be incorporated in this plan.

SECTION VI. GENERAL TASKS

24. Joint General Task. In cooperation with the other Associated Powers, defeat the Axis Powers, and guard United States national interests, by:
   a. Reducing Axis economic power to wage war, by blockade, raids, and a sustained air offensive;
   b. Destroying Axis military power by raids and an eventual land, naval, and air offensive;
   c. Protecting the sea communications of the Associated Powers;
   d. Preventing the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic military power; and by
   e. Protecting outlying Military base areas and islands of strategic importance against land, air, or sea-borne attack.

SECTION VII. TASKS

25. The tasks of the Army and Navy, as set forth in this section, are those listed in, or derived from, the tasks of ABC-1, Annex III.

26. These tasks as stated do not include the assistance which may be furnished by the Armed Forces of Latin-American Republics. Such assistance may reduce the total of forces required but will not change the character of the operations.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

The Western Atlantic Area

27. Definition. The Atlantic Ocean Area, together with Islands and contiguous continental land areas north of latitude 25° South, and west of Longitude 30° West except the area between Latitudes 20° North and 43° North which lies east of Longitude 40° West.

28. Army Tasks. a. In conjunction with Naval forces, protect the territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of Axis military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying enemy expeditionary forces and by denying use to the enemy of existing or potential air, land, and Naval bases in that Hemisphere.
   b. In conjunction with naval forces, support Latin American Republics against invasion or political domination by the Axis Powers by defeating or expelling enemy forces or forces supporting the enemy in the Western Hemisphere.
   c. Support the naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases.
   d. Relieve British forces in Curacao and Aruba.
   e. Provide defensive garrisons for Newfoundland, Bermuda, Jamaica, Trinidad, St. Lucia, Antigua, and British Guiana.

[24] f. In cooperation with the Navy defend Coastal Frontiers, Defense Command Areas and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.

29. Army Forces. a. 1941 Troop basis plus all augmentations, less detachments.
   b. Local defense forces.
   c. One reinforced Corps of three divisions, including appropriate Air forces maintained in the United States as a reserve for the support of overseas garrisons and Latin American Republics.

Note: For overseas movements see paragraph 51.

30. Navy Tasks. a. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.
   b. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.
   c. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere, by destroying hostile expeditionary forces and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere.
   d. In cooperation with the Army defend Coastal Frontiers and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.

[22] e. Protect and route shipping in the Coastal Zones.
   f. Prepare to occupy the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands.

   b. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces.

The Pacific Area.

32) Definition. The Pacific Ocean Area, together with Islands and contiguous continental land areas, is as follows:
   a. North of Latitude 30° North and west of Longitude 140° East.
   b. North of the equator and east of Longitude 140° East.
   c. South of the equator and east of Longitude 180° to South American coast and Longitude 74° West.

33. Army Tasks. a. In conjunction with naval forces, protect the territory of the Associated Powers and prevent the extension of Axis military power into the Western Hemisphere by destroying enemy expeditionary forces and by denying use to the enemy of existing or potential air, land, and Naval bases in that Hemisphere.
   b. In conjunction with naval forces, support Latin American Republics against invasion or political domination by the Axis Powers by defeating or expelling enemy forces or forces supporting the enemy in the Western Hemisphere.
c. Support the naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within tactical operating radius of occupied air bases.

d. In cooperation with the Navy defend Coastal Frontiers, Defense Command Areas and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.

34. Army Forces. a. Local defense forces.

b. One reinforced Division, including appropriate air forces maintained in the United States as a reserve for the support of Latin American Republics on the West Coast of South America.

Note: For overseas movements see paragraph 51.

35. Navy Tasks. a. Support the forces of the Associated Powers in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions.

b. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

c. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers within the Pacific Area.

d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East.

e. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers within the Pacific area, and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere, by destroying [24] hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that Hemisphere.

f. Prepare to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Island area.

g. Defend Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa and Guam.

h. In cooperation with the Army defend Coastal Frontiers and specified localities in categories of defense prescribed in paragraph 47.

i. Route shipping in the Pacific Area.


b. Naval Coastal Frontier Forces.

The Far East Area

37. Army Tasks. In cooperation with the Navy defend the Philippine Coastal Frontier—Category of Defense “F”.

38. Army Forces. Local Defense Forces, augmented only by such personnel and facilities as are available locally.


b. Support the land and air forces in the defense of the territories of the Associated Powers. (The responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, for supporting the defense of the Philippines remains so long as that defense continues.)

[25] c. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

d. Protect sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.

e. In cooperation with the Army defend the Philippine Coastal Frontier—Category of Defense “F”.


United Kingdom and British Home Waters

41. Definition. a. Waters to the eastward of Longitude 30° West and to the Northward of Latitude 43° North.

b. Land areas bordering on, and islands in the above ocean area.

42. Army Tasks. a. In cooperation with the Royal Air Force conduct offensive air operations primarily against objectives in Germany, and against attempted invasion or blockade as demanded by the situation.

b. Provide for the ground defense of occupied bases and air defense of those general areas in the British Isles in which bases used primarily by United States Naval forces are located, and subsequently of such other areas as may be agreed upon.

c. Provide a token force for the defense of the British Isles.
d. Relieve, as soon as practicable, the British garrison in Iceland and in cooperation with the Navy defend that island—Category of Defense "D".

43. Army Forces. Subject to the availability of trained and equipped forces:
   a. British Isles.
      3 Heavy Bombardment Groups
      2 Medium Bombardment Groups
      3 Pursuit Groups
      Approximately 10 Anti-aircraft Regiments
      Approximately 10 Infantry Battalions (Bases)
      One reinforced Regiment (Token Force)
   b. Iceland.
      One reinforced Division.
   Note: For overseas movements see paragraphs 51.

   Task. Escort Convoys in the Northwest Approaches, acting under the strategic direction of the British Commander-in-Chief of the Western Approaches.
   b. Submarine Force Three.
   Task. Raid enemy shipping in an area to be designated later, acting under the strategic direction of the British Vice Admiral, Submarines.

North Atlantic Area

45. Definition. The North Atlantic Area is defined as follows:
   a. Northern boundary, Latitude 43° North.
   b. Southern boundary, Latitude 20° North.
   c. Western boundary, Longitude 40° West.
   d. Eastern boundary, the Coasts of Spain, Portugal, and Africa, and Longitude 5° West.

   Task. Raid enemy shipping in the Mediterranean under the strategic direction of the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, acting through the Flag Officer Commanding North Atlantic.
   Note: As soon as the situation in the Pacific permits their transfer to the Atlantic, United States naval forces may be assigned the following tasks in this area, unless the strategic situation in the Atlantic at that time dictates a different decision.
   b. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers by escorting, covering, and patrolling, and by destroying enemy raiding forces.
   c. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.
   d. Raid Axis sea communications, territories and forces in the Western Mediterranean.

47. Categories of Defense. The Categories of Defense listed in this paragraph apply to all Defense Command Areas, Coastal Frontiers, Naval Coastal Frontiers and isolated positions.

Northeast Defense Command and North Atlantic Coastal Frontier,
except United States Bases in Newfoundland ............................................. Category B
United States Bases in Newfoundland .................................................... Category C
Southern Defense Command and Southern Coastal Frontier ......................... Category B
Caribbean Defense Command and Panama and Caribbean Coastal Frontiers .......... Category D
Western Defense Command and Pacific Coastal Frontier, except Alaska ........ Category B
   Alaska, Less Unalaska ............................................................... Category C
   Unalaska ........................................................................... Category D
   Hawaiian Coastal Frontier ......................................................... Category D
   Philippine Coastal Frontier ......................................................... Category E
   Note: No Army reinforcements will be sent to the Philippine Coastal Frontier.
   Bermuda ................................................................. Category C
   Iceland ................................................................. Category D
   Midway, Johnston, Palmyra .................................................... Category D
   Guam ................................................................. Category F
48. Joint Plans to be prepared. The provisions of paragraph 42 e. "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy" in conflict with the provisions of this paragraph will be disregarded.

c. Joint Subsector Defense Plans and Defensive Coastal Area Plans as directed by the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plans.
d. Joint Embarkation Plans for the embarkation of the Army units, specified in paragraph 51 a, to be prepared by the Commanding Generals, Army Ports of Embarkation and the Commandants of the Naval Districts in which these ports are located.

SECTION VIII. OVERSEAS MOVEMENTS

49. Army Tasks. Move troops to ports of embarkation as required.

50. Navy Tasks. Provide sea transportation for the initial movement and the continued support of Army and Navy forces overseas. Man and operate the Army Transport Service.

51. Overseas Movements of Army Troops. The plan in this paragraph 51 is based on the assumption that M-day will occur prior to September 1, 1941. Movements on the dates given in certain sub-paragraphs will not be made unless M-day has occurred before such date.

a. The Navy will assemble material and make specific plans for the troop movements specified in this subparagraph a.

(1) NEW YORK to ICELAND, 26,500 troops, 73 aircraft.
    First contingent—10,500 troops embark on 24-M.
    Second contingent—16,000 troops embark on 57-M.
    These two movements will be made by British transports if arrangements can be effected. If not, this plan contemplates use of United States transports.

(2) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 7,000 troops, embark on 10-M.

(3) NEW YORK to IRELAND, 8,000 troops, embark on 10-M.
    These two forces, sub-paragraphs (2) and (3), will move in one convoy. The Northwest Escort Force will move with this convoy.

(4) NEW YORK to BERMUDA, 3,700 troops, 41 aircraft, embark on 18-M. Eight aircraft will fly to destination, 33 aircraft will be transported. Part of this force may be moved before M-day.

(5) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 8,000 troops, 73 aircraft, embark September 1, 1941. 16 aircraft will be transported, 57 aircraft will fly to destination.

(6) NEW YORK to IRELAND, 7,000 troops, 105 aircraft, embark October 1, 1941. Aircraft will be transported.

(7) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 6,600 troops, 60 aircraft, embark October 1, 1941. 57 aircraft will fly to destination, three aircraft will be transported.
    These two forces, sub-paragraphs (6) and (7), will move in one convoy.

(8) NEW YORK to IRELAND, 11,600 troops, 200 aircraft embark November 1, 1941. Aircraft will be transported.

(9) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 7,000 troops, 38 aircraft, embark January 1, 1942. 35 aircraft will fly to destination, 3 aircraft will be transported.

(10) NEW YORK to ENGLAND, 13,000 troops, 76 aircraft, embark on February 1, 1942. 70 Aircraft will fly to destination, six aircraft will be transported.

(11) GALVESTON to CURACAO-ARUBA, 6,000 troops, embark on 15-M.

(12) GALVESTON to TRINIDAD, 12,500 troops embark on 15-M.

(13) GALVESTON to PANAMA, 6,400 troops, of which 3,300 embark on 20-M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part of this force may be moved before M-day.
(14) GALVESTON to PUERTO RICO, 12,600 troops, of which 4,000 embark 20–M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part of this force may be moved before M-day.

(15) SEATTLE to ALASKA, 23,000 troops, of which 1,100 embark on 10–M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part or all of these troops may be moved before M-day.

(16) SAN FRANCISCO to HAWAII, 23,000 troops, of which 15,000 embark on 10–M. The remainder will be transported progressively as ships become available. Part of these troops may be moved before M-day.

b. The movements of the troops in this sub-paragraph b are contingent upon unpredictable eventualities. The Navy will not prepare material nor make specific plans for these movements in advance of M-day.

(1) GALVESTON to WEST COAST OF SOUTH AMERICA, 24,000 troops, 80 aircraft will prepare to embark at Galveston on 45–M. If the Panama Canal is not open, these troops will embark at San Francisco.

(2) NEW YORK and GALVESTON to EAST COAST of LATIN AMERICA, 86,000 troops, 56 aircraft, will prepare to embark 90–M. The 56 aircraft may be flown to destination.

(3) NEW YORK and GALVESTON to TRANSATLANTIC DESTинаTIONS, 83,000 troops will be prepared to embark 20–M; desired minimum rate of movement 60,000 troops per month.

(4) EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, One Army, two Corps, ten Divisions, will be prepared to embark at East Coast and Gulf ports beginning 180–M.

SECTION IX. SUPPORTING MEASURES

52. Theaters of Operation. The designation and delimitation of additional land and sea theaters of operations to meet the developments of the situation covered by this Plan will be announced when the Plan is put into effect.

53. Time of Execution. M-Day is the time origin for the execution of this Plan. M-Day may precede a declaration of war or the occurrence of hostile acts. As a precautionary measure, the War and Navy Departments may initiate or put into effect certain features of this Plan prior to M-Day.

54. Personnel. The Army and Navy requirements for increased personnel will be met by the operation of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.

55. Ports of Embarkation. The Army will establish, when required, additional ports of embarkation at:

- New Orleans, La.
- Galveston, Texas
- Boston, Mass.
- Charleston, S. C.

56. Material. The United States will continue to furnish material aid to the United Kingdom, but for the use of itself and its other associates, will retain material in such quantities as to provide for security and best to effectuate United States-British joint plans for defeating Germany and her Allies. Subject to the foregoing, the material to fill the requirements of the Army and Navy under this plan will come from existing reserves of the respective services and from production sources developed under Army and Navy Procurement Plans. In all cases where surveys indicate that reserves and existing production will not meet requirements, the War and Navy Departments will each be responsible for providing the additional production necessary to meet deficiencies of their respective services, except in cases where one Department furnishes the other with the material involved.

57. Supply Levels. Supply levels will be maintained for forces operating in the areas or positions as indicated by the tentative figures given in this paragraph. Final figures pertaining to building up initial levels will be established after a detailed joint examination of the problems involved.
a. Supplies other than ammunition.

(1) Iceland.................. 30 days, build up to 60 days within six months.
(2) British Isles.................. Except pursuit aircraft, 30 days, build up to 60 days within six months.

Pursuit Aircraft
60 days, build up to 120 days within six months.

(3) Panama and Caribbean Coastal Frontiers.

(4) Newfoundland and Alaska
(Less Unalaska).

(5) Unalaska.................. 60 days, build up to 90 days within six months.
(6) Bermuda.................. Maintain at 30 days.
(7) Hawaii.................. Maintain at 70 days.
[34] (8) Philippines.................. As the situation may permit, the desirable standard being the maintenance of stocks at 90 days' supply.

b. Ammunition for places listed under 57 a:

(1) For all troops included in a project; complete the project and then maintain at that level.
(2) - For ground troops not included in a project; establish and then maintain five times the mobilization allowance.
(3) For Air Corps troops not included in a project (less pursuit aviation in British Isles): Ammunition for 30 days' operation; build up to 60 days within six months.
(4) Pursuit aviation in the British Isles: Ammunition for 60 days' operations; build up to 120 days within six months.

58. Industrial Planning. For Industrial planning purposes, and with due regard to decisions that may be made with respect to supplies to other Associated Powers, the industrial capacity of the nation will be allocated in conformity with the following general policy:

a. The Army and the Navy shall each continue to plan for maximum industrial needs.

b. When the available capacity of the nation to produce does not meet the requirements of the Army, Navy, and Associated Powers, such priorities as necessary to support the strategic situation will be established by The Joint Board and administered by the Army and Navy Munitions Board, in keeping with national policy.

[35] c. When plans contemplate that one Service procure for and deliver material to the other Service, the manufacturing facilities needed to produce such material shall be taken into consideration when a division of capacity is made. Under this provision, all ship-building plants will be allocated to the Navy, and the Navy will furnish the Army with such overseas transportation as the Army may require, consistent with national strategic needs as a whole.

59. Supporting Legislative Program. The War and Navy Departments jointly shall have prepared by appropriate agencies, such drafts of legislation, Presidential Proclamations, and Executive Orders affecting both the Army and the Navy as are deemed necessary for the execution of this Joint Plan.

60. Exertion of Financial and Economic Pressure. The Administrator of Export Control, jointly with the War and Navy Departments is to prepare plans and programs for the application of economic pressure such as may be obtained through control of commodities, transportation, communication, financial relationships and all related means.

61. Cooperation with Other Departments of the Government. The War and Navy Departments, jointly with other departments or agencies of the Government, shall have prepared plans or programs covering the following subjects:

a. Intelligence Service.

b. Censorship and Publicity.

c. Mobilization of Resources.

SECTION X. DIPLOMATIC MEASURES

[36] 62. With respect to Latin American Republics, confirmation should be sought that each State will make available to the armed forces of the United
States, immediately as the necessity arises in carrying out operations for Hemisphere Defense, or in behalf of any State, the use of its available sea, air, and land bases.

63. A special agreement should be sought with Brazil to the effect that the defense of the Western Hemisphere and the protection of its sea communications may require use by the United States of Brazilian sea, air and land bases and commercial port facilities for the projection of naval, land or air operations to the African continent. The most important areas in this respect are the coastal zones and territorial waters extending from Belem to Bahia and including the Island of Ferando do Noronha.

64. Diplomatic and economic pressure should be directed towards securing the acquiescence of the powers concerned for the protective occupation when necessary of Eire, the Azores, the Cape Verde Islands, and French North Africa.

65. Diplomatic and economic support should be given to Governments in exile, to China, to neutrals and to populations in occupied territory in order to encourage opposition to the Axis Powers.

66. Acquiescence of the Netherlands Government in London for protective occupation of Curacao and Aruba will be secured by the British Government.

[37]

ANNEX I. COASTAL FRONTIERS

Reference: (a) Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935.

1. For purposes of this Plan, this ANNEX I to Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan—RAINBOW No. 5 temporarily amends Section IV of reference (a), as indicated herein.

2. Change paragraph 33 of reference (a) to read:

"33. Joint organization and command.

a. Coastal divisions with geographical coterminous boundaries within which an Army officer and a Naval officer will exercise command over the Army forces and the Navy forces, respectively, assigned for the defense of these divisions, have been established in order to provide a joint organization and to ensure the effective coordination of Army and Navy forces employed in coastal frontier defense. These coastal divisions comprise coastal frontiers, sectors, and subsectors. The system of coastal frontiers includes certain outlying land, island and sea areas, as well as the coasts of continental United States. The joint organization, together with the commanders responsible for the execution of security measures on and after M—day and the necessary peacetime planning therefor, are as stated below.

NOTE: The preceding sub-paragraph, for purposes of this plan, modifies Chapter V, paragraph 26 a, Section I, of reference (a).

b. A Defense Command is a geographical area within which an Army officer is responsible for the coordination or preparation, and for the execution of all plans for the employment of Army forces and installations lying within the command boundaries; where pertinent, a Defense Command includes one or more coastal frontiers and may include isolated localities. (See map attached showing defense commands in continental United States.)

c. Normally a naval coastal frontier includes the coastal zone adjacent to the coastal frontier. In certain cases, two naval coastal frontiers may be included in a coastal frontier; in other cases the naval coastal frontier includes waters which extend beyond the limits of the coastal frontier.

[38] d. The provisions of ABC-22 may prescribe the extension of the North Atlantic coastal frontier and the Pacific coastal frontier to include part of the territory and coastal waters of Canada.

e. Coordination between Army and Navy forces in coastal frontier operations shall be by the method of mutual cooperation, subject to the provisions of paragraph 9 b."

3. Change paragraph 34 of reference (a) to read as follows:

"34. North Atlantic coastal frontier.

a. Boundaries.

Northern.—Northern boundary of the United States, but including United States bases in Newfoundland. This may later be modified by ABC—22.

Southern.—Diamond Shoals Lightship, Hatteras Inlet inclusive, southern and western boundary of Dare County (N. C.), Albemarle Sound, Chowan River, Virginia—North Carolina boundary to the west, all inclusive.
"b. Commanders.
Army.—The Commanding General, Northeast Defense Command, or an officer, designated by him.
Navy.—The Commandant, Third Naval District, who is designated as the Commander North Atlantic naval coastal frontier. This officer also commands the naval coastal frontier force, composed of the naval coastal force under his immediate command, and the naval local defense forces of the First, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Naval Districts under the command of the commandants of the naval districts concerned. The officers named will arrange for the joint tactical employment in cooperation with the Army, of the naval forces assigned to their respective commands.

[39] "c. Sectors.—The North Atlantic coastal frontier is divided into the following defense sectors:

1. Newfoundland sector.
   (a) Boundaries: These may later be established by ABC-22.
   The sector now consists of the United States bases in Newfoundland.
   (b) Commanders.
      Army.—As designated by the Commanding General, Northeast Defense Command.
      Navy.—Commander, Naval Operating Base, Newfoundland.

   (a) Boundaries.
      Northern.—Northern boundary of the United States.
      Southern.—Nantucket Shoals Lightship, exclusive; Block Island, inclusive; Rhode Island-Connecticut boundary.
   (b) Commanders.
      Army.—As designated by Commanding General, Northeast Defense Command.
      Navy.—The Commandant, First Naval District.
   (c) This sector is subdivided into the Portland, Boston, and Newport subsectors, with boundaries as follows:

   [40] 1. Between the Portland and the Boston subsectors: Northern boundary of Massachusetts.
   2. Between the Boston and the Newport subsectors: Pollock Rip Lightship, Monomy Light, Bishop and Clerk’s Light, Cotuit Bay, Bourne, Taunton, northern boundary of Rhode Island, all to Boston subsector.

   (a) Boundaries.
      Northern.—Nantucket Shoals Lightship, inclusive; Block Island, exclusive; Rhode Island-Connecticut boundary.
      Southern.—Point Pleasant, Bordentown, both exclusive; Trenton, inclusive.
   (b) Commanders.
      Army.—As designated by the Commanding General, Northeast Defense Command.
      Navy.—Commandant, Third Naval District.
   (c) This sector is subdivided into the Long Island and New Jersey subsectors with boundary as follows:
      Between subsectors: The Sandy Hook Peninsula and lower New York Bay to the Long Island subsector.

4. Delaware-Chesapeake sector.
   (a) Boundaries.
      Northern.—Point Pleasant, Bordentown, both inclusive; Trenton exclusive.
      Southern.—Diamond Shoal Lightship, Hatteras Inlet, exclusive; southern and western boundary of Dare County (N. C.), Albemarle Sound, Chowan River; Virginia-North Carolina boundary to the west, all inclusive. This sector will be subdivided into the Delaware and the Chesapeake subsectors, with the boundary as Winter Quarter Shoal Lightship (to Delaware subsector), southern and western boundary of Delaware.
4. Change paragraph 35 of reference (a) to read as follows:

"35. Southern coastal frontier.

a. Boundaries.

Northern.—Diamond Shoal Lightship, Hatteras Inlet, exclusive; southern and western boundary of Dare County (N. C.); Albemarle Sound, Chowan River; Virginia-North Carolina boundary to the west, all exclusive.

Southern.—The Rio Grande. The coastal zone extends southeastward and southward to the northwestern boundary of the Caribbean naval coastal frontier, so as to include the Gulf of Mexico and such parts of Bahaman waters and the Caribbean Sea as to lie to the northward of that boundary.

b. Commanders.

Army.—The Commanding General, Southern Defense Command, or an officer designated by him.

Navy.—The Commandant, Sixth Naval District, who is designated as the Commander Southern naval coastal frontier. This officer exercises command over the naval coastal frontier force, composed of the naval coastal force under his immediate command, and the naval local defense forces of the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Naval Districts under the immediate command of the commandants of the naval districts concerned. The officers named will arrange for the joint tactical employment, in cooperation with the Army, of the naval forces assigned to their respective commands.

c. Sectors.—This frontier will be subdivided into defense sectors of Carolina, Florida, and Gulf, corresponding territorially to the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Naval Districts, respectively."

5. Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraphs:

"35A. Caribbean coastal frontier.

a. Boundaries.

All United States territories and possessions, and United States military and naval reservations and activities on shore located within an area bounded as follows:

Beginning at latitude 18°05' North, longitude 87°32' West thence by a line bearing 63° true to the 25th parallel of latitude, thence by the 25th parallel of latitude to the 65th meridian of longitude, thence by a line direct to latitude 2° North, longitude 49° West, thence by a line direct to the place beginning. The coastal zone includes all of the waters within these boundaries, as well as the sea lanes and focal points beyond, but near, the eastern boundary.

b. Commanders.

Army.—The Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command, or an officer designated by him.

Navy.—The Commandant, Tenth Naval District, who is designated as the Commander, Caribbean naval coastal frontier. This officer also commands the naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army.

c. Sectors.—The Caribbean coastal frontier is divided into the following defense sectors:

(1) Guantanamo sector.

a) Boundaries.—The area within the Caribbean coastal frontier lying westward of a line passing through Cape Isabella and Beata Point, Hispaniola, extended to cut the northern and the southwestern coastal frontier boundaries.
(b) Commanders.
   Army.—As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean
   Defense Command.
   Navy.—Commander, Naval Operating Base, Guantanamo, Cuba.
(2) Puerto Rico sector.
   (a) Boundaries.—The area within the Caribbean coastal frontier
   lying eastward of the eastern boundary of the Guantanamo sector, and
   northward of the 15th parallel of north latitude.
   (b) Commanders.
   Army.—As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean
   Defense Command.
   Navy.—The Commandant, Tenth Naval District.
(3) Trinidad sector.
   (a) Boundaries.—The area within the Caribbean coastal frontier
   lying eastward of the eastern boundary of the Guantanamo sector, and
   southward of the 15th parallel of north latitude.
   (b) Commanders.
   Army.—As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean
   Defense Command.
   Navy.—The Commander, Naval Operating Base, Trinidad.”
6. Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraph:
“35B. Panama coastal frontier.
   (a) Boundaries.
   All United States territories and possessions, and United States
   military and naval reservations and activities on shore located within
   the following area: British Honduras, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador,
   Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, and Ecuador; all land
   areas between the southwestern boundary of the Caribbean coastal
   frontier and the coasts of Central and South America; and all land areas
   between the coasts of Central and South America and a broken line drawn
   from the Mexico-Guatemala border to a point in latitude 5° South,
   longitude 95° West, and thence to Peru-Ecuador border. The coastal
   zone includes all the waters within these boundaries, as well as the sea
   lanes beyond, but near, the western and southern boundaries.
   Army.—The Commanding General, Caribbean Defense Command,
   or an officer designated by him.
   Navy.—The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District, who is designated
   as the Commander, Panama naval coastal frontier. This officer
   also commands the naval local defense force, and will arrange for its
   joint tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army.
   “c. Sectors.
   The Panama coastal frontier is divided into the following defense
   sectors:
   (1) Atlantic sector.
   (a) Boundaries.—The area within the Panama coastal frontier
   lying between the northeastern boundary and the continental
   divide.
   (b) Commanders.
   Army.—As designated by Commanding General Caribbean
   Defense Command.
   Navy.—The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District.
   (2) Pacific sector.
   (a) Boundaries.—The area within the Panama coastal frontier lying
   between the continental divide and the western and southern boundaries.
   (b) Commanders.
   Army.—As designated by the Commanding General, Caribbean
   Defense Command.
   Navy.—The Commandant, Fifteenth Naval District.”
7. Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraph:
“35C. The Caribbean defense command includes all the land and water areas
lying within the boundaries of the Caribbean coastal frontier and the Panama
coastal frontier.”
8. Change paragraph 36 of reference (a) to read:

"36. Pacific coastal frontier.

a. Boundaries.

Northern.—Northern boundary of Washington except that Alaska is part of the Pacific coastal frontier. This frontier may later be changed as required by ABC-22.

Southern.—Southern boundary of the United States. The coastal zone extends southeastward to abreast the southern boundary of Mexico.

1. Pacific naval coastal frontiers.—The Pacific coastal frontier is divided into two naval coastal frontiers, i.e., the Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier, and the Pacific Northern naval coastal frontier. The boundary between the two naval coastal frontiers is the northern boundary of California.

b. Commanders.

Army.—The Commanding General, Western Defense Command, or an officer designated by him.

Navy.—

1. The Commandant, Twelfth Naval District, who is also designated as the Commander, Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier.

2. The Commander, Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier, also commands the Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier force, composed of the naval coastal force under his immediate command and the naval local defense forces of the Eleventh and Twelfth Naval Districts under the command of the commandants of the naval districts concerned.

3. The Commander, Pacific Northern naval coastal frontier, is the Commandant, Thirteenth Naval District. This officer also commands the naval local defense force assigned to his district.

4. The Commander, Pacific Southern naval coastal frontier, and the Commander, Pacific Northern naval coastal frontier, will arrange for the joint tactical employment, in cooperation with the Army, of the naval forces assigned to their respective commands.

[48] c. Sectors.—This frontier is subdivided into the Southern California, Northern California, Northwestern, and Alaskan sectors, as follows:

1. Boundary between the Southern California and Northern California sectors, Santa Maria River.

2. Boundary between the Northern California and the Northwestern sector is the northern boundary of California.

3. Northern boundary of the Northwestern sector is the northern boundary of Washington.

4. The boundaries of Alaska define the Alaskan sector.

d. Sectors of this frontier are further subdivided into subsectors with boundaries as follows:

1. San Diego subsector: Mexican boundary to San Mateo Point, inclusive.

2. San Pedro subsector: San Mateo Point, exclusive, to Santa Maria River, exclusive.

3. Monterey subsectors: Santa Maria River, inclusive, to Pigeon Point, inclusive.

4. San Francisco subsector: Pigeon Point, exclusive, to northern boundary of California.


[49] 7. Sitka naval subsector: Alaska east of longitude 141\° West.

8. Kodiak naval subsector: Alaska west of longitude 141\° West.

9. Insert in reference (a) the following new paragraphs:

"36A. Hawaiian coastal frontier.

a. Boundaries.

The Hawaiian coastal frontier consists of Oahu, and all of the land and sea areas required for the defense of Oahu. The coastal zone extends to a distance of 500 miles from all the Hawaiian Islands, including Johnston and Palmyra Islands and Kingman Reef.
"b. Commanders.
Army.—The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
Navy.—The Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, who is designated as the Commander, Hawaiian naval coastal frontier. This officer also commands the assigned naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment, in cooperation with the Army.

"36B. Philippine coastal frontier.

"a. Boundaries.
The Philippine coastal frontier consists of Luzon, and all of the land and sea areas required for the defense of Luzon. The coastal zone includes all of the sea approaches to the coastal frontier.

[b. Commanders.
Army.—The Commanding General, Philippine Department.
Navy.—The Commandant, Sixteenth Naval District, who is designated as the Commander, Philippine naval coastal frontier. This officer also commands the assigned naval local defense force, and will arrange for its joint tactical and strategical employment in cooperation with the Army.
APPENDIX II TO WPL-46, COMPOSITION OF FORCES

CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

2-101. APPENDIX II prescribes the initial composition of the Operating Forces and of the Naval Transportation Service.

2-102. a. Naval vessels and aircraft are listed by organization unit or number.
  b. Coast Guard vessels are listed by name.
  c. Units not listed in the current Operating Force Plan which are to be taken over by the Navy either temporarily or permanently are, for war planning purposes, designated in this Appendix II as "X" vessels in accordance with the system defined in WPL-10 (XAR 5, XAK 17, XPYc 20, etc.).
  d. When the Coast Guard becomes a part of the Navy, Coast Guard vessels will continue to be designated by their Coast Guard names.

2-104. Units appearing in the current Operating Force Plan are not assigned to Mobilization Districts, as most of these vessels have already been mobilized at the time of issue of this plan.

2-105. In the Tables of Appendix II, where capital letters appear under the heading "Sub-Group", these letters indicate the categories to which vessels and aircraft belong, as follows:
   A—Navy vessels and aircraft in commission on M-day;
   B—Navy vessels not in commission on M-day, including those under construction;
   C—Vessels and aircraft belonging to other Departments of the Government to be commissioned in the Navy;
   D—Merchant vessels to be commissioned in the Navy, either Navy-owned or on a bare-boat charter basis;
   E—Merchant vessels to be chartered on a time charter basis;
   CG—Coast Guard vessels.

CHAPTER II. THE U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET

2-201. Table ATF-1 shows the initial composition of the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET as of July 1, 1941.

2-202. a. SUBMARINE FORCE ONE will be composed of submarines, submarine tenders and submarine bases, not assigned to SUBMARINE FORCE TWO. Not less than five submarines must remain based on the SUBMARINE BASE, COCO SOLO.
  b. SUBMARINE FORCE TWO will be composed of submarines destined for the NORTH ATLANTIC AREA.

2-203. When the units included in the ATLANTIC REENFORCEMENT, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, arrive in the WESTERN ATLANTIC AREA, the Chief of Naval Operations will assign them to such existing or new task forces as may then be dictated by the existing strategic situation.

2-204. a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET, will assign for task duty, patrol planes, and patrol plane tenders required for their support, to the Task Forces indicated herein:
   1. To the NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE. 18 VPB and necessary tenders;
   2. To the CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE 12 VPB and necessary tenders;
   3. To the PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE 12 VPB and necessary tenders.

b. The aircraft units assigned as prescribed in the preceding sub-paragraph will remain under the administration of the Commander in Chief, U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET. Rotation of units may be made periodically at the discretion of the Commander in Chief.
2-205. TRANSPORT DIVISION ONE will be assigned temporarily to the Naval Transportation Service, as directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, for the transportation of Army troops.

2-206. Destroyers assigned to experimental work and sound school, and submarines assigned to submarine school and sound school will normally continue in these assignments and will be withdrawn for other duties only under exceptional circumstances.

**TABLE ATF-1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit—Vessel</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<td>INGHAM (CG)</td>
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<td>CAMPBELL (CG)</td>
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<td>SPENCER (CG)</td>
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<td>NORTHLAND (CG)</td>
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NAVAL OPERATING BASE, BERMUDA

MOBILE BAY HOSPITAL No. 1

MARINE CORPS FORCES
First Marine Division
First Marine Aircraft Group
Fifth Defense Battalion


2-301. a. Table PAF-1 shows the initial composition of the U. S. PACIFIC FLEET as of July 1, 1941.

b. Table PAF-2 shows the initial composition of the ATLANTIC REINFORCEMENT, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.

2-302. a. On M-day, or sooner if directed by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET will assign for task duty, patrol planes and submarines, and tenders required for their support, to the Task Forces indicated herein:

1. To the PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE
   12 VPB and necessary tenders,
   2 SS and necessary tenders (for ALASKAN SECTOR);

2. To the PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCE
   12 VPB and necessary tenders.

b. The units assigned as prescribed in the preceding sub-paragraph will remain under the administration of the Commander in Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET. Rotation of units may be made periodically at the discretion of the Commander in Chief.

2-303. Destroyers and submarines assigned to sound school will normally continue in these assignments and will be withdrawn for other duties only under exceptional circumstances.

TABLE PAF-1

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To be formed about October 1, 1941.

Includes SM 1.

To be assigned in August, 1941.

EXAD 13.
TABLE PAF-2. THE ATLANTIC REENFORCEMENT

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CHAPTER IV. THE SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE

2–401. Table SEP-1 shows the initial composition of the SOUTHEAST PACIFIC FORCE as of July 1, 1941.

TABLE SEP-1

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<th>Symbol</th>
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CHAPTER V. THE U. S. ASIATIC FLEET

2–501. The Table ASF-1 shows the composition of the U. S. ASIATIC FLEET. 2–502. One stores ship (AF) and one cargo ship (AK) of the NAVAL TRANSPORTATION SERVICE, upon arrival in the FAR EAST AREA may be retained by the Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.

TABLE ASF-1

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<td>VP 101.</td>
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<td>AVP 2.</td>
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<td>PR</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mindiv 9.</td>
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<td>MARINE CORPS FORCES</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine detachments</td>
<td>Fourth Marines (Shanghai)</td>
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<td>Marine detachments</td>
<td>(North China)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marine detachments</td>
<td>(Philippines)</td>
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CHAPTER VI. U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE

2–601. The Tables for the U. S. NAVAL FORCES, NORTH EUROPE, show the initial composition as of July 1, 1941.

a. THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE—TABLE NE-1.

1. Units of this table not prepared for overseas service will be temporarily assigned to the U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET for training and material preparation.

b. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE—TABLE NE-2.

### TABLE NE-1. THE NORTHWEST ESCORT FORCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Symbol</th>
<th>No.</th>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>AD 15</td>
<td>AD</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desron 7</td>
<td>DD</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desrons 30, 31</td>
<td>ODD</td>
<td>18</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD 341, Div 53</td>
<td>ODD</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Div 21</td>
<td>DD</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Destroyer Repair Units 1, 2</td>
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**AIRCRAFT**

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<tr>
<td>Patwing 8</td>
<td>VPB</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patwing 9</td>
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<td>Mobile Aircraft Repair Units 1, 2</td>
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**AIN VESSELS**

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<td>AMc 36, 42, 43, 46, 47, 50</td>
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**MARINE CORPS FORCES**

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<tr>
<td>Eleventh Provisional Marine Company</td>
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### TABLE NE-2. SUBMARINE FORCE THREE

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<td>AS 13</td>
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<td>OSS</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Subdiv 52</td>
<td>OSS</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subdiv 53</td>
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<td>Mobile Submarine Repair Unit No. 3</td>
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CHAPTER VII. VESSELS OPERATING UNDER THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

2–701. The Table CNO–1 shows the vessels assigned to special duty under the Chief of Naval Operations.
TABLE CNO-I.

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<th>Unit—Vessel</th>
<th>Symbol</th>
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<td>AG</td>
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<td>See Nav Yacht</td>
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<tr>
<td>AG 22</td>
<td>AG</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>President’s Yacht and tender</td>
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<tr>
<td>AG 25, 26</td>
<td>AG</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Survey vessels</td>
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<tr>
<td>AG 30, 32</td>
<td>AG</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>BuOrd duty</td>
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<td>AM 40</td>
<td>AM</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Tender for PT’s and PTC’s</td>
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<td>PG</td>
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<td>PT</td>
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<td>MTB Squadron 2</td>
<td>PT</td>
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<td>Greenland Patrol</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subchaser Squadron 1</td>
<td>PTC</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Greenland Patrol</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMANCHE (CG)</td>
<td>XPY</td>
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<td>Greenland Patrol</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALGONQUIN (CG)</td>
<td>XPY</td>
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<td>MODOC (CG)</td>
<td>XPG</td>
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<tr>
<td>RARITAN (CG)</td>
<td>XYL</td>
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<td>Greenland Patrol</td>
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<tr>
<td>IX 50</td>
<td>IX</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>In commission or to be commi-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS 206 to 211 incl.</td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>ssioned and to operate either un-</td>
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<td></td>
<td>der the CNO or CINClant for</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>temporary duty. To be assigned</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>to U.S. PACIFIC FLEET.</td>
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CHAPTER VIII. NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES

2–801. The tables in this Chapter VIII show the assignments to the NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER FORCES.

2–802. Units that are not listed in these tables but which have otherwise been assigned by the Chief of Naval Operations to Naval Districts, outlying Naval Stations, or to activities excluded from Naval Districts, will continue in such commands. Commandants of Naval Districts and outlying Naval Stations will assign such units under their commands to Naval Local Defense Forces or to Naval District Craft (see General Order No. 143) in accordance with the following general rules:

a. TO THE NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCES
   1. Units other than auxiliary type (see “Standard Nomenclature, Ships’ Data, U. S. Naval Vessels”).
   2. Units of the Auxiliary Type required for execution of the tasks of Naval Local Defense Forces.
   3. District Craft (see “Standard Nomenclature, Ships’ Data, U. S. Naval Vessels”), as follows: YN, YNg, YMS, YP; those YT assigned for net and boom services; and other classes at the discretion of the Commandant.

b. TO NAVAL DISTRICT CRAFT
   1. Units not assigned to the Naval Local Defense Force.
   c. 1. Units of the Naval Local Defense Force and of the Naval District Craft will be placed in the status “in service not in commission”, or in the status “in commission” as prescribed by article 636 (1), (2), U. S. Navy Regulations, in accordance with the current Operating Force Plan in effect, or in specific cases as directed by the Chief of Naval Operations.
   2. Units taken over from private sources will be placed “in service not in commission”, or “in commission”, depending upon the status in which units of the same classification appearing in the current Operating Force Plan, are operating.

[9] 2–803. a. Units of the Coast Guard not otherwise assigned in succeeding paragraphs or in the tables of Appendix II, will be employed in the Naval Local Defense Forces of the Naval Districts in which they are based at the time the Coast Guard is transferred to the Navy, in the manner prescribed in the “United States Coast Guard District Manual, 1940.” Commandants of Naval Districts will understand that, on assuming command of Coast Guard units, they also assume responsibility for the discharge of essential Coast Guard functions. Prior to M-day, Commandants of Naval Districts, in cooperation with local Coast Guard commanders, will plan the war operations of the Coast Guard.

b. Lighthouse tenders will normally be employed in their peace-time duties, as modified by war requirements of the Army and Navy.

2–804. a. The tables show the assignments to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces in tabular form.

1. Unit (vessel, aircraft, or organization unit) Column (1).
2. Sub-group

3. From (indicating the fleet from which the unit is to be detached, the Naval District in which a private vessel is to be taken over, or that the assignment will be made by the Chief of Naval Operations)

4. Mobilization District (indicating the Naval District in which the vessel is to be mobilized)

b. The symbol XAGs indicates a station ship.

2-805. Units to be taken over will be manned by Navy crews in the Naval Districts indicated in Column (3) of the tables, and moved under the direction of the Commandant of that Naval District to the Mobilization District indicated in Column (4), where mobilization will take place.

2-806. It is undesirable to take over for use in Naval Coastal Frontier Forces vessels that will remain idle for a long period on account of inability to convert, equip, or man them. Commandants of Naval Districts in which units are taken over (Column (3)) will, therefore, arrange to do so after consideration of the following:

a. Personnel available to take over and man the unit for movement to the Mobilization;

b. Conversion yards available and readiness to start conversion;

c. Equipment available;

d. Personnel available to man the unit upon completion of conversion;

e. The desirability of placing the unit in immediate service with little or no conversion.

2-807. Commandants charged with taking over and mobilizing Naval Coastal Frontier Forces will give the same priority to units assigned to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces of other Districts as they give to units assigned to the Naval Coastal Frontier Forces within their own Districts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE NACF.—NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unit—Vessel</strong></td>
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<td>Navy Vessels</td>
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<td>PY 12, 13, 15, 16</td>
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<td>PG 17, 18, 54</td>
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<tr>
<td>VPB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AV or AVD or AVP number as required</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coast Guard Aircraft based at:</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air Station, Salem, Mass</td>
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<td>Air Station, New York, N. Y</td>
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<td>Air Station, Elizabeth City, N. C</td>
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<td>XPG 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coast Guard Vessels</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Vessels from Other Sources</td>
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<td>XAM 1 to 4 incl</td>
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<td>XAM b 1 to 9 incl</td>
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### TABLE NACF—NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER—Continued

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<td><strong>Coast Guard Vessels</strong></td>
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<td>D</td>
<td>I ND</td>
<td>I</td>
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<td>Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier.</td>
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<td>I</td>
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<td>D</td>
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<tr>
<td>Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, North Atlantic Naval Coastal Frontier.</td>
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<td><strong>Coast Guard Vessels</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>XCMc 2</td>
<td>1 XCMc</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>V ND</td>
<td>V</td>
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<tr>
<td>XYP 32 to 38 incl.</td>
<td>7 XYP</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>V ND</td>
<td>V</td>
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<tr>
<td>XAGs 4</td>
<td>1 XAGs</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>V ND</td>
<td>V</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XAM 22 to 23 incl.</td>
<td>2 XAM</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>I ND</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XAMe 21 to 31 incl.</td>
<td>11 XAMe</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>V ND</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Units Ashore</strong></td>
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<td>Mob. Dist. (4)</td>
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<td>IV, ND</td>
<td>VI</td>
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<td></td>
<td>MOHAWK 165' 1 XPY</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Air Station, St. Petersburg, Fla.</td>
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<td>Air Station, Biloxi, Miss.</td>
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<td><strong>Vessels from Other Sources</strong></td>
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<td>D</td>
<td>CNO</td>
<td>VI</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>XPY 1 to 4 incl. 4 XPY</td>
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<td>III, ND</td>
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<td>Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.</td>
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<td>III</td>
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<td>III, ND</td>
<td>III</td>
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<tr>
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<td>XYP 39 to 44 incl. 6 XYP</td>
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<td>VI, ND</td>
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<tr>
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<td>XAM 24 to 27 incl. 4 XAM</td>
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<td>I, ND</td>
<td>I</td>
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<td>XAMb 25 to 31 incl. 7 XAMb</td>
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<td>XAMb 32 to 34 incl. 3 XAMb</td>
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<td>VI</td>
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<td>As indicated in VI, ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW No. 5.</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coast Guard Vessels</td>
<td>Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Vessels from Other Sources</strong></td>
<td>XPYe 7, 8 2 XPYe</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>I, ND</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>XPYe 9, 10 2 XPYe</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>III, ND</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>XAGs 7, 8 2 XAGs</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>VII, ND</td>
<td>VII</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>XAM 28, 29 2 XAM</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>I, ND</td>
<td>I</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>XAMb 35, 36 2 XAMb</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>I, ND</td>
<td>I</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>XMC 32 to 35 incl. 4 XAMc</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>I, ND</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Units Ashore</strong></td>
<td>As indicated in VII, ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW No. 5.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marine Corps Forces</td>
<td>Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—EIGHTH NAVAL DISTRICT</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Navy Vessels</td>
<td>Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast Guard Vessels</td>
<td>Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II.</td>
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### TABLE SCF.—SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER—Continued

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<tr>
<th>Unit—Vessel (1)</th>
<th>Sub-group (2)</th>
<th>From (3)</th>
<th>Mob. Dist. (4)</th>
<th>Notes (5)</th>
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<td><strong>NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—EIGHTH NAVAL DISTRICT—Continued</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Vessels from Other Sources</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>XCMc 4</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>III ND</td>
<td>III</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XPM 4</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>IX ND</td>
<td>VIII</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>XYP 45 to 50 inc.</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>VIII ND</td>
<td>VIII</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XYP 51 to 55 inc.</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>V ND</td>
<td>V</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XAGs 9 to 11 inc.</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>VIII ND</td>
<td>VIII</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XAM 36 to 40 inc.</td>
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<td>I ND</td>
<td>I</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>XAMc 41 to 43 inc.</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>VI ND</td>
<td>VI</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Units Ashore</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>As indicated in VIII ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW No. 5.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Marine Corps Forces</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE CACF.—CARIBBEAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER

| **NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE** |
| **Navy Vessels** |
| Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II. |
| ODD Desron 33 less DesDiv 67 | 5 ODD |
| PY 18 | 1 PY |
| VPB | 12 VPB |
| AV or AVP or AVD | number as required |
| Administration in U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET. |
| **Coast Guard Vessels** |
| Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II. |
| **Vessels from Other Sources** |
| XPG 6, 7 | 2 XPG |
| XPC 2, 3, 4 | 3 XPC |
| XPY 8 | 1 XPY |
| XPY 9, 10 | 2 XPY |
| XPYc 24 to 27 incl. | 4 XPYc |
| XPYc & 26 to 31 incl. | 4 XPYc |
| XYP 128 to 131 incl. | 4 XYP |
| XAM 42 to 47 incl. | 6 XAM |
| XAM 61 to 66 incl. | 6 XAM |
| XAM 67 to 70 incl. | 4 XAM |
| XAMc 93 to 102 incl. | 10 XAMc |
| **Units Ashore** |
| As indicated in X ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW No. 5. |
| **Marine Corps Forces** |
| Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5. |
| Fourth Defense Battalion, Naval Operating Base, Guantanamo, Cuba. |

### TABLE PACF.—PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER

| **NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE** |
| **Navy Vessels** |
| Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II. |
| ODD Desron 67 | 4 ODD |
| PG 50 | 1 PG |
| VPB | 12 VPB |
| AV or AVP or AVD | number as required |
| Administration in U. S. ATLANTIC FLEET. |
| **Coast Guard Vessels** |
| Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-803, Appendix II. |
| **Vessels from Other Sources** |
| XCMc 6 | 1 XCMc |
| XPC 5 | 2 XPC |
| XPY 11 to 14 incl. | 4 XPY |
| XPYc 32 to 43 incl. | 12 XPYc |
| XPYc 44 to 46 incl. | 3 XPYc |
### TABLE PACF.—PANAMA NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit—Vessel (1)</th>
<th>Subgroup (2)</th>
<th>From (3)</th>
<th>Moh. Dist. (4)</th>
<th>Notes (5)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—Continued**
| Vessels from Other Sources—Continued |
| XPYe 47 | 1 XPYe | D | VI ND | VI |
| XYP 132 to 141 | 10 XYP | D | IV ND | IV |
| XAGs 17 | 2 XAGs | D | VIII ND | VIII |
| XAM 48 to 50 incl. | 3 XAM | D | I ND | I |
| XAMB 71, 72 | 2 XAMB | D | V ND | V |
| XAMC 103 to 116 incl. | 14 XAMC | D | V ND | V |

**Units Aboard**

As indicated in XV ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW No. 5.

**Marine Corps Forces**

Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.

### TABLE PSCF.—PACIFIC SOUTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER

| **NAVAL COASTAL FORCE**
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<th>Navy Vessels</th>
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<tr>
<td>ODD Desdiv 70, 83</td>
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<td>PE 32, 38</td>
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<tr>
<td>PY 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VPB</td>
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</table>

Coast Guard Vessels

| TANEY | 32' 1 XPG | CG | IXV ND | XI |
| SHAWNEE | Misc. 1 XPY | CG | XII ND | XII |

Coast Guard Aircraft based at:

Air Station, San Francisco, Calif.
Air Station, San Diego, Calif.

**NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—ELEVENTH NAVAL DISTRICT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Navy Vessels</th>
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<tr>
<td>Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.</td>
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**Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coast Guard Vessels</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Vessels from Other Sources:**

| XMCo 5 | 1 XMCo | D | III ND | III |
| XPC 1 | 1 XPC | D | XI ND | XI |
| XYP 93 to 97 incl. | 5 XYP | D | XI ND | XI |
| XAGs 14 | 1 XAGs | D | XI ND | XI |
| XAM 39 to 41 incl. | 3 XAM | D | XI ND | XI |
| XAMB 51 to 60 incl. | 10 XAMB | D | XI ND | XI |
| XAMC 63 to 86 incl. | 22 XAMC | D | XI ND | XI |

**Units Aboard:**

As indicated in XI ND Plan 0-5, RAINBOW No. 5.

**Marine Corps Forces**

Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.

### NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—TWELFTH NAVAL DISTRICT

**Navy Vessels**

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.

**Units of the Naval Coastal Force which may be assigned by the Commander, Pacific Southern Naval Coastal Frontier.**

**Coast Guard Vessels**

Units assigned in accordance with paragraph 2-802, Appendix II.

**Vessels from Other Sources**

<p>| XYP 98 to 127 incl. | 30 XYP | D | XII ND | XII |
| XAGs 15 | 1 XAGs | D | XII ND | XII |
| XAMC 87 to 92 incl. | 6 XAMC | D | XII ND | XII |</p>
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<th>TABLE NACF.—NORTH ATLANTIC NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER—Continued</th>
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<td>Units Ashore</td>
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<td>Marine Corps Forces</td>
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<th>TABLE PNCF.—PACIFIC NORTHERN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER</th>
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<td>NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE—THIRTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT</td>
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<td>ODD Desdiv 82</td>
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<td>PG 51</td>
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<td>PE 57</td>
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<td>SS</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASR</td>
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<tr>
<td>VPB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AV or AVD or AVP number as required</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coast Guard Vessels</td>
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<tr>
<td>AURORA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coast Guard Aircraft based at: Air Station, Port Angeles, Wash.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vessels from Other Sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XPY 19 to 23 incl.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XYP 56 to 92 incl.</td>
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<tr>
<td>XAGs 12, 13</td>
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<tr>
<td>XAM 30 to 38 incl.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XAMb 41 to 50 incl.</td>
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<tr>
<td>XAMc 44 to 64 incl.</td>
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<td>XAOb 1, 2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Units Ashore</td>
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<td>Marine Corps Forces</td>
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<thead>
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<th>TABLE HCF.—HAWAIIAN NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER</th>
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<td><strong>Unit—Vessel (1)</strong></td>
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<td>NAVAL LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE</td>
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<td>Navy Vessels</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODD Desdiv 80</td>
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<td>Vessels from Other Sources</td>
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<tr>
<td>XCMc 7</td>
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<td>XYP 142 to 167 incl.</td>
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<td>XAM 51 to 55 incl.</td>
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<td>XAM 56</td>
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<td>XAMc 117 to 119 incl.</td>
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<td>Units Ashore</td>
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<td>Marine Corps Forces</td>
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<td>First Defense Battalion</td>
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<td>Third Defense Battalion</td>
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TABLE PhCF.—PHILIPPINE NAVAL COASTAL FRONTIER

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<tr>
<th>Unit—Vessel (1)</th>
<th>Sub-group (2)</th>
<th>From (3)</th>
<th>Mob. Dist. (4)</th>
<th>Notes (5)</th>
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<tr>
<td>Such suitable vessels as are locally available and additional vessels and aircraft as assigned by Commander in Chief, U. S. ASIATIC FLEET.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Units Ashore</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>As indicated in XVI ND Plan O-5, RAINBOW No. 5.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Marine Corps Forces</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garrisons as assigned in Marine Corps Plan C-2, RAINBOW No. 5.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


2–901. The Sections and Tables prescribing the composition of forces of the Naval Transportation Service will be issued as a change to this plan.

EXHIBIT NO. 130

Confidential

PARAPHRASE OF CODE RADIOGRAM RECEIVED AT THE WAR DEPARTMENT AT 22:55, OCTOBER 27, 1941

MANILA, October 27, 1941.

British sources report 2 Japanese aircraft carriers, one of which is the Kage, operating in Mandated islands. Following planes reported there:

- Wotje—8 flying boats
- Jaluit—8 flying boats, 12 fighters
- Truk—6 fighters, 6 heavy bombers
- Saipan—8 fighters, 6 heavy bombers
- Palau—8 flying boats

General southward movement of Japanese shipping in Western Pacific reported by British.

BRINK

IB #2 10/28/41.

Distribution:

- Mr. Lauchlin Currie
- Assistant Secretary of War
- Assistant Secretary of War for Air
- Chief of the Army Air Forces
- Chief of the Air Corps
- Assistant Chief of Staff, WPD
- G. H. Q.
- State Department
- Director of Naval Intelligence
- Situation Section
- Far Eastern Section

Department of State. Received Nov. 29, 1941. Division of Communications and Records.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Paraphrase

NOVEMBER 21, 1941.

The following was received from the Naval Observer at Wellington November 19, 1941:

"Source New Zealand Naval Intelligence: On November 16 and 17 planes, apparently Japanese, were sighted over Gibrants. One day twin engined monoplane next flying boat, course generally north and south with speed 125. Indi-
cates daily patrol from Jaluit over Gilberts to area south near shipping routes. Several unknown ships reported last 10 days near Gilbert and Ellice Jap liners reported carrying troops or laborers to Mandates, Truk and Saigon each recently reinforced by ½ squadron fighters and ½ squadron bombers."

Department of State. Received Nov. 30, 1941. Division of Communications and Records. Strictly confidential

Paraphrase

November 24, 1941.

The following was received from the Naval Attache Singapore November 23 1941:

"DEPENDABLE REPORTS HERE OF RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS OVER GILBERT ISLANDS ON NOVEMBER 15 BY MONOPLANE WITH TAPERED WINGS, SINGLE TAILFIN, TWIN ENGINES. NEXT DAY REPEATED BY MONOPLANE FLYING BOAT SILVER COLOR NUMBER OF ENGINES UN-OBSERVED."

CC: Mr. Hamilton
Mr. Hornbeck.

Telegram received

HRL
From: Tokyo
Dated: November 29, 1941
Rec'd 3:11 p.m.
SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

1868, November 29, 6 p.m.

The Embassy has received Foreign Office note no. 129 American 1 dated November 27 which is translated as follows.

"EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to state that according to a report from the Japanese Naval authorities, an American airplane flew over Garanbi on the southernmost tip of Taiwan Island at 12:30 p.m. November 20, 1941 and after circling at an altitude of 2,000 meters flew away southward at 12:45 p.m. the same day.

"It is believed that the Japanese Government cannot overlook such a violation of Japanese territory by an airplane and it is therefore requested that the matter be brought to the attention of the United States authorities concerned. Also I particularly bespeak Your Excellency's solicitude particularly the recurrence of such incidents at this time when the international situation is tense and the untoward events to which they might give rise are unpredictable. I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance's of my highest consideration. Shigenori Togo, Minister for Foreign Affairs." Sent to the Department only.

Grew.

JRL

Secret

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, December 2, 1941.

The following information has been received from the Commander in Chief Asiatic Fleet.

"At a hearing from Saigon of 070 and a distance of 180 miles three type 1-61 submarines were observed on December 2nd in cruising formation headed south at a speed of 15 knots. Also at Camarahan six planes patrolled overhead while 21 transports anchored.

"In Lat. 15-10N, Long 110-00 at 0230 Greenwich December 2nd a patrol plane observed 9 submarines headed south at a speed of 10 knots, [apparently headed for Camranh Bay.]"

/s/ R. E. SCHUIRMANN.
Strictly confidential

Paraphrase

December 4, 1941.

The following message was received from the Governor of Guam November 24, 1941:

"At 1217 local time today unidentified two-engined plane sighted, circling southern end of island. Altitude approximately 15,000 feet. At 1226 local time plane passed out of sight to southwest."

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Telegram sent

Department of State,

December 6, 1941.

AMEMBASSY
Tokyo (Japan).

Your 1868, November 29, 6 p.m.

The Foreign Office note has been brought to the attention of the appropriate authorities of this Government.

In connection with this question, you may be interested to know that the Navy Department has been informed by the Governor of Guam that about noon on November 24 an unidentified two-motored airplane circled the southern extremity of Guam for about ten minutes flying at an altitude of approximately 15,000 feet.

/s/ Hull,

/s/ S W

EXHIBIT NO. 131

(This exhibit was originally designed to incorporate the prior testimony of Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel before (1) the Roberts Commission, (2) the Navy Court of Inquiry and (3) the Army Pearl Harbor Board. Inasmuch as the entire transcript of testimony taken incident to each of these proceedings has been set forth as exhibits to the Joint Committee record, the prior testimony of Admiral Kimmel is not being printed at this point pursuant to direction of the Committee. For reference thereto, see index.)

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EXHIBIT NO. 132

Report on Conference Between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the American Ambassador 7:30 A.M. Dec 8, 1941

1. I stated, "After my conference with you last night I succeeded in obtaining an answer from the Emperor to the personal telegram from President Roosevelt to the Emperor which you presented at that conference. Thus, His Imperial Majesty orders me to convey the following message to President Roosevelt through you:

"We have heretofore commanded the Japanese Government to reply to the query of the President of the United States respecting the assembling of Japanese troops in French Indo China. Further, the withdrawal from French Indo China was one of the matters discussed in the Japanese-American negotiations and we have already had the Japanese Government state its opinions on the matter. Therefore, please consult these statements to understand our position. We believe the President must be fully aware of the fact that the object of our wishes is the establishment of peace in the Pacific and throughout the world, and that, in accordance with our desires, the Japanese Government has up to the present time striven to attain that goal."

The Ambassador listened to the Emperor's note with respectful attention and replied that he would transmit it to the President immediately. He then said that he had been instructed to request an audience of the Emperor to present
the President’s telegram personally, and since the relations between our two nations were now facing a grave crisis he requested that I take special pains to arrange for an audience. I answered that if his sole object in requesting an audience was to present the President’s telegram, I doubted, considering the nature of the Emperor’s note, that an audience was necessary. I pointed out, however, that I had no intention of standing in his way and if he had any further statement to make, in addition to the telegram, I would of course do everything I could to arrange for one. The Ambassador seemed very pleased and expressed his gratitude. (At his request, I have submitted a provisional translation of the English text of his application [for an audience] (as Supplement A)).

2. Next I handed the Ambassador a copy of the note to the United States and said that, as he knew, the Imperial Government had done everything in its power to bring the Japanese-American negotiations to a successful conclusion and that I myself had worked earnestly to that end.

“However,”

I continued,

“we have come to the conclusion that the attitude of the American Government unfortunately precludes any prospect of reaching an agreement even though the negotiations should be further continued, and we have therefore ordered this note to be presented to the Government of the United States on the afternoon of December 7, Washington time. I am very sorry that things have worked out this way.”

[9] The Ambassador said that he would return to the Embassy to read the document and would refrain from making any statement at this time, whereupon he withdrew.

3.* The conference lasted about half an hour, but at that time Ambassador Grew stated that President Roosevelt had sent a personal telegram to the Emperor and that he had been instructed to present it to the Emperor himself, and therefore he requested the Foreign Minister’s help in arranging for an audience. The Foreign Minister answered that it was now late at night and steps for arranging an audience could not be taken before the next morning. He suggested that the Ambassador’s chances for getting an audience would probably depend on the contents of the President’s telegram. Ambassador Grew informally handed the Foreign Minister a copy of the telegram which he had with him (Supplement A), again requested that the Foreign Minister do everything possible to arrange for an audience in view of the gravity of the situation, and withdrew after arranging for another interview.

4. The Foreign Minister proceeded to the Premier’s official residence with a summary translation of the President’s telegram, and there, at an emergency conference with the Premier and the rest of the cabinet, determined in general the line of action to be taken on this matter. [Two lines illegible.]

5. At about 3 A.M. the Foreign Minister returned to his residence. He waited as directed, until 6 o’clock on the morning of the 8th to notify the English and American Ambassadors of the rupture of Anglo-American negotiations. At this time he handed the following statement to Ambassador Grew as the Emperor’s answer to President Roosevelt’s wire:

[Here follows the text of the Emperor’s note as given above.]

GIST OF CONFERENCE BETWEEN FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTER TOGO AND THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR 8:00 A.M. DEC. 8, 1941

Following my interview with the American Ambassador, I called the British Ambassador to an interview. I told him directly as I had the American Ambassador that it had become unavoidably necessary to break off Japanese-American negotiations, and handed him a copy of the note addressed to the United States. At the same time I said “Although this is only the copy of a note to the United States, please understand that the Imperial Government, realizing Great Britain’s great interest in these negotiations and that the interests of Great Britain and the United States are inseparably connected, has included in the note its opinions on all problems currently pending between Japan and Great Britain.” The Ambassador thereupon remarked that he regretted the rupture of negotiations as deeply as I did. He went on to say that there were reports to the effect that Japanese vessels with a large number of troops aboard were proceeding westward

* From this point on this would seem to be a totally different document, referring to what preceded the conference of the morning of the 8th.
through the Gulf of Siam and that it would seem that possibly part of them were headed for Thailand and part for the Malay Peninsula. The invasion of these areas by the Japanese Army would produce a most serious situation. As he had stated a little while ago (here he referred to the interview with me on the 6th), Great Britain had no intention of violating Thai independence and territorial integrity provided that other nations respected them. Therefore he hoped that the Japanese Government would restrain its Military.

I answered that I was by no means certain of the situation since last evening. However, just this morning I had heard a report to the effect that the English had assembled Indian troops on the Thai border. I thought it probable that our vessels were cruising the waters adjacent to that area to be ready for anything that might come up in a situation which was plainly not normal. I had just ordered our ambassador to Thailand to report on the situation, and as soon as that report arrived, would consider this matter in a general study of the situation. Whereupon the British Ambassador advised me to be wary of reports fabricated by elements seeking to disturb the peace, and withdrew.

ON THE DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN
MEETING OF PRIVY COUNCIL DEC. 8, 1941

Written by Matsumoto—Head of Treaty Bureau

In the 11th item of Article 6 of the Internal Orders decided upon at the time of the Reorganization of the Privy Council in December 1938, was included a section on "The Declaration of War." It was unclear whether this gave the Privy Council the right to advise the decision to engage in war, or just the authority for advising the formal declaration of war. However, when war was declared against the United States and Great Britain, the decision to engage in war had already been made at the previous conference of Dec. 1, 1941, so the Privy Council was only to consider an address to the throne stating "We declare war against the United States and Great Britain." A draft of an Imperial Rescript declaring war was attached to the Address to the Throne for advisement. (The Address to the Throne and the draft of the Imperial Rescript were drawn up by the Cabinet.)

Meeting of Committee of Advisement
Dec. 8—7:40 A. M.
In the Imperial Palace

Tozo Room
Those Present
All members of the Advisory Council [Komonkan]
All Cabinet ministers (Minister of Foreign Affairs, Togo, was absent, because he was holding interviews with the United States and British Ambassadors).

Head of the Legal Bureau—Moriyama
Foreign Affairs Officials:
Yamamoto, Head of the American Bureau
Sakamoto, Head of the Europe-Asia Bureau
Matsumoto, Head of the Treaty Bureau
Army Officials:
Muto, Head of Military Affairs Bureau
Navy Officials:
Muto, Head of Military Affairs Bureau

First, the Navy Minister reported on the military action against American and British Troops which had been in progress since this morning in the Malayan, Hongkong, and Hawaiian areas.

1st President of the Council—I propose that a Committee of Advisement headed by the Vice-President of the Council, and constituted of all the members of the Advisory Council, meet immediately and consider this matter.

Premier Tojo—explained the reasons for declaring war.

Advisor Ishii—At what time will war be declared? It is necessary to make sure that America and Britain don’t saddle us with the responsibility.

Premier—We hope for an immediate declaration.

Premier—At the conference of Dec. 1 they determined to commence hostilities against England, America, and the Netherlands.

Advisor Shimizu—What is the attitude of Thailand?

Premier—It is not yet clear, but negotiations are in progress for a policy of Mutual Defense.

Advisor Shimizu—Aren't we going to declare war on Holland?

Premier—We are not declaring war against Holland because of military expediency.

Advisor Minami—What is Germany's attitude?

Premier—German entrance into the war in our support is almost certain, and negotiations to that effect are now in progress.

Advisor Nara—What is the attitude of the Soviet Union?

Premier—The attitude of the Soviet Union is one of circumspection.

Advisors Sugawara and Fukui submitted questions on the expenditure of war funds, matters of material, etc., which were answered by the Minister of Finance and the Premier.

Advisor Sutakarai—Is it the question of whether or not we should declare war that you want us to consider? I mean, has an Imperial Rescript already been issued on the beginning of the war?

Premier—Yes.

(Foreign Minister Togo enters and takes his place.)

Advisors Futakami and (?) pointed out that the use of the word "America," [BEIKOKU] in the suggested draft of the Imperial Rescript which had been appended for advisement, might be misunderstood to apply to all the Americans, and recommended a revision, but the Premier and the Head of the Treaty Bureau explained that no such misunderstanding was possible.

Last of all, Foreign Affairs Minister Togo reported on the diplomatic situation which had preceded the commencement of war.

[3] The documents under discussion were approved by a unanimous vote.

Full session, 10 A. M. Dec 8, Imperial Palace, Higashidame Room

His Imperial Majesty was present.

The rest of the attendance was the same as at the meeting of the Committee of Advisement.

Committee President Suzuki presented his advisement report which was unanimously approved.

EXHIBIT NO. 132A

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
30 September 1941
Msg. #881

Part 2 (*) — (conclusion of the message)

Said Admiral is a man who thinks that war between Japan and America would bring about no advantageous results for either country and that it is impossible to solve economic problems by means of arms. He was cordial in his attitude toward me from beginning to end. So I told him how much I regretted that, since my arrival to take up my post, I had not been able to accomplish anything at all, to which he said, "All the people who know your Excellency deeply appreciate your efforts", and pointing out the apprehensions expressed in the Business Conditions Weekly (*) regarding Far-Eastern problems (the gist of the article is to the effect that, while a showdown (*) between Japan and America is imminent, war between these two countries is unnecessary and that if Japan is able to change and readjust her policy, America will be mindful of her prosperity), he urged me to read the article and said that he would put forth due efforts in the matter.

I would request that the above information be conveyed to the Navy Minister.

Finis)

* Part 1 appears under SIS—22987.
* Expressed by the English words.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

From: Tokyo
To: Germany, Brazil, Canada, England, Australia, Russia
Date: 8 November 1941
Msg No. Circular 2288

With regard to the present stage in the Japanese-American negotiations: (Office Chief's Code)

1. The government, since the formation of the cabinet, has held daily conferences with Imperial Headquarters and has given consideration to the fundamental aim in our national policy so as to meet the present grave crisis. We came to a decision on the matter at the conference held in the Emperor's presence on the 5th inst. together with a determination of fundamental plans relating to diplomatic adjustments between Japan and America.

2. With regard to Japanese-American negotiations we decided to continue negotiating for diplomatic adjustments and Ambassador NOMURA has already begun conversations in compliance with our new policy. However, although we on our part still have the same strong desire to come to an agreement in the negotiations, we are also determined to persist in our demands in so far as they pertain to the existence and authority of our Empire. However, in view of the way in which these negotiations have progressed in the past, there will be a great deal of divergency of opinion between us and them. On the other hand, since the situation indicates imminent tension, the outlook does not permit optimism. In case of a rupture in the negotiations, the situation throughout our Empire may be expected to undergo a sudden change.

3. At present the government will endeavor to save the situation by peaceful means. It expects to expedite the negotiations by urging the American government to reconsider its attitude. So exhausting every possible method to accomplish this, and because we think it appropriate, we have decided with this in view to despatch Ambassador KURUSU to America (he is scheduled to arrive in Washington about the 13th), so that he might himself inform Ambassador NOMURA of our decision, and aiding said ambassador in the final stages of the negotiations, bring about a new turn in the critical situation.

4. In this way our government, while persistently adhering to our position, is trying in every possible way to prevent a break in Japanese-American relations, and by devoting its utmost efforts, is endeavoring to bring about a rapid and new turn in the critical situation. The above is for your information alone.

This message is addressed to GERMANY, BRAZIL, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, ENGLAND and RUSSIA. Will you please relay it to ITALY from GERMANY, and to the ambassadors and ministers in South America and MEXICO from BRAZIL.

From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Peking, Nanking, Manchuria, Shanghai, Hongkong, Hanoi, Batavia, Thailand, San Francisco, Manila.
Date: 12 November 1941
Circular 2313

With regard to the present stage in the Japanese-American negotiations: (Office Chief's Code. Urgent).

1. The government, since the formation of the Cabinet, has held daily conferences with Imperial Headquarters and has given consideration to the fundamental aim of our national policy so as to meet the present grave crisis. We came to a decision on this matter on the 5th inst. together with a determination of our fundamental plans relating to diplomatic adjustments between Japan and America.

2. With regard to Japanese-American negotiations we decided to continue negotiations on diplomatic adjustments on an equitable basis. And no sooner had conversations begun on the 7th than considerable divergence of opinion appeared. In view of the way in which the negotiations have moved in the past, it is doubtful whether an agreement will be reached in the negotiations, and while on our part we will try to put forth our utmost efforts to bring about an agreement, the situation is such that we shall not be able to make any further concessions, so that the outlook does not permit any optimism. In case of a rupture in the negotiations it is expected that the situation throughout our Empire will undergo a sudden change.

This message is sent to: Peking, Nanking, Manchuria, Shanghai, Hongkong, Hanoi, Batavia, Thailand, Manila and San Francisco. Will Hongkong please
relay it to Singapore and the Dutch East Indies, and will San Francisco relay it to the various Consuls in America, to Chicago, Honolulu and Vancouver.

From: Tokyo
To: Canada and Brazil
Date: 10 November 1941
Msg No. Circular 2193

(Very Urgent. Office Chief's Code).

The reason for the resignation of the entire Cabinet, as the Information Bureau has already announced, was that recently no unanimity of opinion within the Cabinet could be found. However, no matter what kind of a Cabinet will henceforth be formed, the intention is to give very careful thought to meeting the present crisis, and to continue the negotiations between Japan and America as well. This is for your information alone.

This wire is addressed to Canada and Central and South American countries. Will Brazil please relay it to Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Panama, Peru, and Colombia.

MINUTES OF AN INTERVIEW HELD ON 19 AUGUST 1941 BETWEEN VICE-MINISTER AMAU AND AMBASSADOR OTT

On the 19th August the German Ambassador Ott called upon the Vice-Minister and, after an exchange of courtesies and after a presentation of the war situation in Europe, advanced the idea (1) that it would be to the advantage of Japan also if at this time she attacked Russia from the east, and (2) stating that intelligence had been received to the effect that America was going to provide oil to Vladivostok by means of transport vessels, that the first of these ships had already sailed, and that after that they would sail in rapid succession, he remarked that this oil would doubtless be used for an attack upon Japan too, and this would have a very important bearing on Japan. Thus, he tried to find out what Japan's attitude was regarding these matters. (3) He also tried to sound out Japan's attitude on the problem of American vessels stopping at Japanese ports (the problem of the President Coolidge). And (4) referring to Japan's attitude toward Thailand, he asked whether Japan was planning merely for the economic development of that country or whether she was thinking of a political or military penetration. He asked various questions in order to obtain intelligence of this kind.

To this the Vice-Minister replied: "For Japan to do a thing like attacking Russia would be a very serious question and would require profound reflection. As for the problem of American oil we are giving the matter very careful attention. And while we do not consider such a matter as American vessels stopping at our ports to be of such importance as to cause the world to get excited, we have not yet had time to investigate the facts in the case. (At this point Ambassador Ott interjected the remark that at the interview with the news reporters held today at the Information Bureau there were many questions and answers relating to the matter). Then with regard to Thailand, Great Britain, in view of the fact that Thailand (bears such a close relation?) to the defense of the British Empire, attaches very great importance to that country and Japan's attitude will therefore have to be decided by giving consideration also to the attitude of England and America."

In the course of the above interchange of questions and answers Ambassador Ott stated that the Russo-German war was at present making progress in the southern sectors, that southern Russia would soon fall into the hands of Germany, that Moscow would fall perhaps during the first part of September, but in that case whether or not the Stalin regime would fall or not could not be affirmed.

[1] GIST OF A CONSULTATION HELD BETWEEN THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR OTT AND VICE-MINISTER AMAU ON 29TH AUGUST, 1941

At 6 p.m. on 29th August Ambassador Ott called and had the following interview with Vice-Minister Amau:

The Ambassador: "According to a communiqué issued by the Japanese government this afternoon, Ambassador Nomura handed a message from Premier

* Jōhō Kyoku.
Konoye to President Roosevelt. Is that correct? In fact, I had requested an interview with the Foreign Minister about this problem, but I have now come to you because I consider it my duty to get a detailed explanation on the question as to whether the issue would be an objection for us to understand that today's message does not depart from the policy which was determined at a conference held in the Imperial presence on 2nd July, at which time confidential information relating to the policy of the Japanese government in regard to the Axis was given to us, as well as on the question as to whether the present Cabinet is contemplating any change with regard to this point."

The Vice-Minister: "I regret that the Foreign Minister could not see you because of a previous engagement, but I will reply to your questions to the limit of my knowledge. It is true that Ambassador Nomura conveyed a message from Premier Konoye to President Roosevelt. But that does not mean that there has been a change in Japan's policy, nor that we are contemplating any change in our relations with the Axis. As you know, when Matsuoka was Foreign Minister, negotiations were carried on between Japan and America with regard to various problems, and at that time we sent confidential reports regarding the negotiations to your country. However, because of the Japanese Army's advance into French Indo-China a temporary rupture in these negotiations took place. And meanwhile in China, as well as in Japan and America, various questions arose between Japan and America, causing Japanese-American relations, contrary to our wishes, to become strained, so that in fact communications between Japan and America have at present come to a standstill, and the situation is such that even economic relations have been broken off. It is natural that no country would desire such a situation to persist for any length of time. It seems that America too desires a break in the deadlock, and the same thing is true of Japan. I understand that the reason for sending the message was to clarify the atmosphere in the Pacific."

The Ambassador: "Although I am aware that negotiations had been carried on between Japan and America, these negotiations had been discontinued, and that since then various incidents have come, do the proposed negotiations between Japan and America involve only matters that have fallen into a standstill, or do they concern entirely new problems?"

The Vice-Minister: "As I have just said, the idea behind the message which was sent from Premier Konoye to President Roosevelt was merely an attempt to start conversations between the two parties. It was not concerned with any concrete problem such as to what questions would be talked about. Furthermore we have not yet received any reply to the message from the President."

The Ambassador: "How you received any notification from the American authorities that they are prepared to consent to negotiations?"

The Vice-Minister: "We have not received any such particular notification from the American authorities, but as I have just said, we have received the impression that the American authorities are prepared to enter into negotiations in order to break the deadlock."

The Ambassador: "As usual, America will try to gain time by beginning negotiations with Japan, and meanwhile will put forth still greater efforts to carry out her objectives. Therefore, I think that precautions must be taken against America's scheme to prolong these negotiations, so that this might work to her advantage."

The Vice-Minister: "We have given those points full consideration. And we have also given the matter careful thought so that the carrying on of negotiations by Japan with America might not have any disadvantageous consequences upon Germany and Italy. As you are aware from the Imperial edict and other proclamations issued by government authorities at the time, the original purpose of the Tripartite Alliance was the quelling of disturbances and the restoration of peace. So even if we begin negotiations between Japan and America, the objective will always be to maintain peace, and therefore this will not conflict with the spirit of Axis diplomacy.

Moreover, if next I may express my own personal opinions, our aim at the time when Matsuoka was Foreign Minister was to keep America from participating in the war, and for this reason we took a firm attitude toward America. In order to prevent her from joining in the war, we considered it necessary to get her to reflect upon her attitude, and, judging from the situation at the time, it was no mistake at all for us to think that it was quite proper for us to take a firm attitude toward her. Nevertheless the results proved to be just the opposite, and..."
we can not deny that American public opinion has grown stronger and stronger, speeding up American preparations for war. Meanwhile Germany took a very mild attitude toward America. That is, America in all kinds of ways gave aid to England, instituted a system of convoy, and invaded Iceland, on the other hand freezing German funds in America and even closing German Consulates, while Germany took a very gentle attitude. Even at present Japan's policy of preventing America from participating in the war remains unchanged, and our aim is to keep her from joining in the war. Even now there is no change whatever in that objective. However it will be necessary for us to consider a policy that is adequate for the attainment of said objective, depending upon the time and occasion. In the present situation, America being a country of wide expance and plentiful raw materials, we might possibly think it preferable, just at this time when the hostile feeling of the people toward the situation is on the point of becoming violent, to appease them and bring about a domestic disintegration, rather than to excite and unify them.

The Ambassador: "Negotiations between Japan and America may prove to be quite troublesome. For instance, when we think of the China problem, since the sending of aid to Chiang Kaishek is one of the fundamental policies of America, she will not readily give this up. And I think that it may be very difficult to come to an agreement with regard to various other problems. At any rate, since the contents of this message is considered to be of tremendously great importance to Germany also, even though I have not received any instructions from my government, would it not be possible for me to receive a secret report of its contents since I will have to send a report about it to the government?"

The Vice-Minister: "As I have just said, the message conveys a statement from Premier Konoye to the American President, and we have not received a reply from the President as yet, but I will convey the substance of your desire to the Foreign Minister."

The Ambassador: "If that is the case, then will it be all right for the present for me to send a report to my government to the effect that the content of the message signifies that for the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, negotiations are to be carried on between Japan and America on the basis of the Tripartite Alliance?"

The Vice-Minister: "As I have just said, the object of beginning parleys between Japan and America is to clarify the atmosphere in the Pacific. And while there is no objection to the use of the words 'for the maintenance of peace', we think that it would be permissible to suppose that nothing like a concrete problem, such as, for instance, the concluding of a non-aggression pact, is mentioned in the message."

The Ambassador: "If so, do you have any idea of sending a special mission to America to carry on these negotiations?"

[4] The Vice-Minister: "As I have just said, it has not yet been settled as to whether or not negotiations will be begun, and preliminary arrangements regarding concrete problems have not yet been completed. So I understand that no decision has yet been reached as to such a problem as sending a mission."

The Ambassador: "Is this problem to be worked out through Ambassador Grew?"

The Vice-Minister: (Hesitated to say anything for a moment).

The Ambassador: "Is Ambassador Nomura to do it?"

The Vice-Minister: (Nodded assent).

The Ambassador: "Again may I ask you to tell the Foreign Minister that I would like to have a confidential report of the contents of the message. In fact, it has also some bearing upon instructions which I recently received from my home government regarding the Russo-German war. Will you please make arrangements so that I might by all means have an interview with the Foreign Minister tomorrow?"

The Vice-Minister: "I will tell the Minister."

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The Gist of an Interview Held Between Foreign Minister Toyoda and Ambassador Ott on 30th August 1941, at 3:00 p.m. in the Official Residence (Administrative Official Yoshiuchi Acting as Interpreter)

After Ambassador Ott made a statement relating to the situation in the Russo-German War, the conversation proceeded as follows: (Ambassador Ott is to be designated by "O" and the Minister by "Toyo" in the following account).
"O": "In the notice sent to the German government on the 2nd July, the statement is made that Japan is making preparations for every possible eventuality in her relations with Russia and America, but are the intentions of the Japanese government still the same today? Is there any possibility that Japan may participate in the Russo-German war?

"Toyo": "Japan's preparations are now making headway, and it will take more time for their completion."

"O": "Are the intentions of Japan as given in the notice of 2nd July still the same?"

"Toyo": "There is no change in our intentions, which are, to make preparations in order to avail ourselves of any new development that may take place in the situation henceforth."

"O": "I learned of the message which Premier Konoye sent to President Roosevelt for the first time through the newspapers, and later according to Domi (in response to a question from the Minister Ott replied that this Dömei dispatch was one that was "carried" by DNB on the evening of the 29th as Dömei report). I learned that this message mentions the disposal of the China problem and the establishment of a Greater East Asia Prosperity Sphere as the ultimate aims of Japan's national policy, and refers to the fact that as a result of the Russo-German War Japanese-American relations have become delicate. So far as the problems referred to in the message are concerned, from the viewpoint of the Tripartite Pact Germany has very grave apprehensions, and since a detailed report will have to be sent to my government, in disregard of propriety I must once more make inquiry about this matter. Yesterday Vice-Minister Amanu gave me an explanation as to the contents of this message, but if you have anything beyond that to add, will you please state it."

[2] "Toyo": "The situation being what it is, all kinds of reports are bound to arise, but what I would like to tell you explicitly is that the report about problems concerning which I have just now heard for the first time, is absolutely false. Vice-Minister Amanu gave you the right explanation of the message."

"O": "If so, then the message does not concern any concrete matters?"

"Toyo": "It is just as Vice-Minister Amanu explained."

"O": "I would like to inquire what your impression is as to how the message was received by them [the Americans]. Even if it does not deal with any concrete matters, I would like to ask whether it was received in a friendly spirit, or whether their attitude was one of disapproval."

"Toyo": "I can't tell you, because I have as yet received no report whatsoever about the matter."

"O": "In Foreign Minister Matsuoka's time the Japanese government authorities thought that what America was planning to do was to get Japan to take an attitude in conflict with the Tripartite Pact, that is, to give up taking any positive action in the Pacific area no matter what occasion might arise, and Germany is very grateful that at the time the Japanese government resolutely resisted these American designs, and we hope that it will continue to take that 'line'. I would like to ask what Your Excellency's views are concerning this point."

"Toyo": "In a word I may say that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact is to prevent American participation in the war, and that this view is the same as in the past; nor will it change in the future."

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BASIC CONDITIONS FOR A PEACE SETTLEMENT BETWEEN JAPAN AND CHINA

(Agenda for a conference with the Army and Navy Military Affairs Bureau Chiefs held at the Foreign Minister's Official Residence at 2:00 p. m. on the 6th September, 1941)

The Chungking regime accepts the basic treaty concluded between Japan and the Nanking government together with the agreements attached thereto, as well as the fact that the joint declaration issued by Japan, Manchoukuo, and China is based upon the following principles, and will join up with the Nanking government.

1. The merging of the Chungking and Nanking regimes.
2. Neighborly friendliness.
3. Respect for sovereignty and territory.
4. Joint defense (the maintenance of public order, the protection of rights and interests, and cooperation in defence of things jeopardizing the same). The
stationing of Japanese army units particularly in prescribed areas in Meng-
chiang and North China as well as in Amoy and Hainan Island for this purpose.
5. Withdrawal of troops. The Japanese army units which have been sent to
China because of the incident are to be withdrawn attendant upon the settle-
ment of the incident in accordance with a Sino-Japanese agreement.
are not to be restricted so long as they are conducted on an equitable basis.
7. Non-annexation.*
8. No indemnities.

Basic Conditions for a Sino-Japanese Peace

Decisions reached at a liaison conference held on the 13th September, 1941.
1. Neighborly friendliness.
2. Respect for sovereignty and territory.
Sino-Japanese cooperation to preserve public order and to check communistic
and other movements of a subversive nature which threaten the security of
Japan and China.
The stationing of Japanese army units for a necessary period in prescribed
areas in Inner Mongolia and North China for the above purpose, as well as the
placing of Japanese warships and units for a necessary period in Hainan
Island, Amoy, and other localities on the basis of previous agreements and
practices.
4. Withdrawal of troops. The Army units which have been sent to China for
the prosecution of the China Incident shall, with the exception of those men-
tioned in the preceding item, be withdrawn attendant upon the settlement of the
incident.
5. Economic Coalition.
(a) A Sino-Japanese economic coalition shall be put in operation, the main
object of which shall be the development and use of important raw materials
for national defense in China.
(b) The economic activities of third powers in China shall not be restricted if
conducted on an equitable basis.
7. Non-annexation.
8. No indemnities.

26 November, 1941.

The last time I gave you the details up to the 18th November, but I will now
inform you of developments since then.
Ambassadors Nomura and Kurusu called upon Secretary Hull on the 20th and
presented our new proposal, stating that they were making this proposal with a
view to bringing about a speedy settlement. But Secretary Hull without saying
anything in particular about it, manifested great disapproval of that clause in
the proposal which states that "America shall cease any activities that might
interfere with the peace efforts between Japan and China", and replied that,
unless Japan clarifies the meaning of the Tripartite Pact and positively asserts
that she will pursue a peaceful policy, it will be difficult to cut off aid to Chiang
Kai-shek, and that the statement too to the effect that the President was to act
as intermediary in a Sino-Japanese peace would necessarily be conditioned by
Japan's adoption of a peaceful policy. But he did promise that after a study of
the new proposal, he would have further consultations.
On the next day, the 21st, when Ambassador Kurusu had a private interview
with Secretary Hull, the latter stated that he had no objection to Japan and
America holding leading positions through peaceful measures in East Asia and
in the Western Hemisphere respectively, and that he hoped that both countries
could conclude a Pacific agreement in a friendly spirit, the Japanese authorities to

* Doubtless refers to non-annexation of China by Japan.
see to it that the Tripartite Pact did not interfere with the execution of such a treaty.

On the 22nd Secretary Hull, before he had an interview with Ambassadors Nomura and Kuru, held a conference with the Ambassadors and Ministers of England, Holland and Australia with regard to those parts of the proposal for a Japanese-American understanding which deal with matters in which these countries are concerned, and these Ambassadors and Ministers said that they would send in a request to their home governments and would be able to reply to the American government by Monday (the 24th).

On the same day at the interview held between Ambassadors Nomura and Kuru and Secretary Hull, the former asked for America's own reply to our proposal, but the Secretary avoided a definite reply to this. However, he said that what England, Holland and Australia desired was that the serious situation in the South Pacific areas might be alleviated at once, that the movement of the Japanese army units stationed in southern French Indo-China to the northern part of the country was not deemed sufficient, and further, that, while gradual progress in the restoration of trade conditions was desirable, when Japan once made clear her peaceful intentions, we could look for a sudden change within a few days. He also made the remark with regard to the cutting off of aid to Chiang Kai-shek by America, that he would like to have us acknowledge the fact that in such a matter America could not be an impartial intermediary.

[2] With regard to the cutting off of American aid to Chiang Kai-shek, we issued orders to Ambassador Nomura on the 22nd to the effect that, since our Empire simultaneously with the conclusion of a treaty, in accord with our new proposal, would like through the good offices of America to get China to express her friendship toward Japan in line with a suggestion made by America on the 12th inst., and to begin direct peace negotiations between Japan and China, he should make a representation to the American authorities to the effect that it would be natural to expect the American authorities to stop any activities that might obstruct these negotiations.

Furthermore, in Tokyo I, the Foreign Minister, asked the American Ambassador in Tokyo to call on the 23rd, and I made it clear to him that, while it seems that England, Holland and Australia as well as America are not satisfied with merely the movement of the Japanese forces stationed in Southern French Indo-China to the northern part of that country, neither do we consider it sufficient merely to restore conditions as they were previous to the putting into effect of the freezing order, a thing which we with reluctance dared to propose and which we anticipate, and that it will be impossible to reach a settlement so long as no understanding with America is reached also with regard to the cessation of aid to Chiang Kai-shek and with regard to the securing of raw materials from the Dutch East Indies.

* The word here used is Hondalijn, indicating that this message is a report sent out by Tokyo and made up in the main of information received from Washington.

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**EXHIBIT NO. 133**

[SECRET]

[a] STATEMENT BY MAJOR GENERAL WALTER C. SHORT OF EVENTS AND CONDITIONS LEADING UP TO THE JAPANESE ATTACK, DECEMBER 7, 1941

[a]

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[1] STATEMENT BY MAJOR GENERAL WALTER C. SHORT OF EVENTS AND CONDITIONS LEADING UP TO THE JAPANESE ATTACK, DECEMBER 7, 1941

The following radiogram from the Chief of Staff was received October 16, 1941—Exhibit "A":

Note for commanding general Hawaiian department:
The following is a paraphrase of a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations which I have been directed to pass to you quote:

Japanese cabinet resignation creates a grave situation x if a new cabinet is formed it probably will be anti-American and strongly nationalistic x if the Konoye cabinet remains it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the United States x either way hostilities between Japan and Russia are strongly possible x since Britain and the US are held responsible by Japan for her present situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers x view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan x.

The following radiogram from the Chief of Staff was received 2:22 P. M., November 27th—Exhibit "B":

"Hawn Dept, Ft. Shafter, TH:
472 27th negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue stop Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment stop If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act stop This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense stop Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm civil population or disclose intent stop Report measures taken stop Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned the Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan Stop Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

MARSHALL,
116P/27.

[2] Upon receipt of the above radiogram, I gave consideration to the type of an alert which I should order, and, after talking the matter over with the Chief of Staff, Alert #1 was ordered by telephone and put into effect at once. Standing Operation Procedure, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, 5 November 1941.—Exhibit "C":

"SECTION II—ALERTS

13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3) Alerts as indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a Department order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack. See paragraph f (8) below.

14. ALERT NO. 1. a. This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands, with no threat from without.
b. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, all General and Special Staff Sections will continue with their usual duties at their present stations, pending further orders.
c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will carry on their normal training, pending instructions from this Headquarters.
d. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will:
   (1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector.
   (2) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.
(3) Protect the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS reservation and all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations), in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard. The following are among the important ones:

- Police District No. 1, see paragraph 14 h (2) below.
- Command and Fire Control System.
- Railway and Highway Bridges.
- Water supply for SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.
- Radio Station at PUU MANAWAHUA.
- WAI'AU Generating Plant.
- Telephone Exchanges at WAIPAHU, WAHIAWA, WAILALUA (in HALE-IWA), LAIE and KANE'OHE.
- Electric sub-stations at WAHIAWA, WAILALUA, KAHUKU KAILUA, WAIPIO AND EWA, and electric power lines from WAIPIO, WAHIAWA, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, inclusive, and to FORT BARRETT, exclusive, from KOOKAU switch station BELLOWS FIELD.
- Cold Storage Plant in WAHIAWA.
- Pumping Stations at MOANALUA and KAPAHULU.

(4) The 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the pumping stations at AIEA and HALAWA.

c. The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND will:

- Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense.
- Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command.
- Protect the Radio Beacon on Sand Island.
- Provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.

f. The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will:

- Protect all vital installations on posts of OAHU garrisoned by air forces.
- Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders.

h. The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, in addition to his normal duties, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, will:

- Regulate traffic on OAHU.
- Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations.
- Establish liaison with the local police force.

i. The STATION COMPLEMENTS OF HICKAM, WHEELER and BELLOWS FIELDS, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the protection of all vital installations on their respective posts.

j. TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD. Upon the formation of the Territorial Home Guard, recently authorized by the TERRITORIAL Legislature, it is anticipated that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the District Commanders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, except the Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations aton Army and Navy Reservations.

[4] 15. ALERT NO. 2. a. This alert is applicable to a more serious condition than Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile sub-surface, surface, and aircraft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided.

b. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, only the G-2 and G-3 Sections will be required to operate on a 24-hour basis. All other sections of the General and Special Staffs will continue with their normal schedule.

c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will carry on their normal training, pending instructions from this Headquarters.

d. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will:

- Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector.
- Maintain available all units at fifty percent (50%) of their present strength, except those required under (3), (4) and (5) below.
- Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.
(4) Protect the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Reservation and all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard. The following are among the important ones:
- Police District No. 1.
- Command and Fire Control Cable System.
- Railway and Highway Bridges.
- Water supply for SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.
- Radio Station at PUU MANAWAHUA.
- WAIAU Generating Plant.
- Telephone exchanges at WAIPAHU, WAHIAWA, WAIALUA (in HALE-IWA), LAIE and KANEHOE.
- Electric sub-stations at WAHIAWA, WAIALUA, KAHUKU, KAILUA, WAPIO and EWA, and electric power lines from WAPIO, WAHIAWA, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, inclusive, and to FORT BARRETTE, exclusive, from KOOKALA switch station BELLOWS FIELD.
- Cold Storage Plant in WAHIAWA.
- Pumping Stations at MOANALUA and KAPAHLULU.

(5) The 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the Pumping Stations at AIEA and HALAWA.

(6) Place 240 mm howitzers in position, establish the necessary guards and; when directed, place ammunition at positions.

(7) Release Field Artillery units manning seacoast armament (155 mm guns) to Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command.

(8) See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 15 l below.

(9) The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND, and attached Field Artillery, will:
- Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft defense positions, except that railway batteries will remain at FORT KAMEHAMEHA or where emplaced.
- Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for operational control.
- Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense.

(4) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command, except FORT SHAFTER. For FORT SHAFTER, see paragraph 15 k (1) below.

(5) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament.

(6) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels.

(7) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies.

(8) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol.

(9) Protect the Radio Beacon on Sand Island.

(10) Provide Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post.

f. The Hawaiian Air Force will:
- Maintain aircraft and crews in condition of readiness as directed by this headquarters.
- Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command.
- Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival thereat, disperse on fields.
- Disperse bombers with crews.
- Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.
- Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 15 g below.

(8) In case of surprise hostile attack:

(9) (a) Release to Navy for operational control all bombers in condition of readiness "A." The bomber commander will report to the Commander of Patrol Wing X TWO.

(b) Receive all available shore based Naval and Marine Corps fighter planes in appropriate condition of readiness and release them to the Interceptor Command for operational control.

(10) The DISTRICT COMMANDERS, assisted by the air corps detachments within the districts, will:
- Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and maintain order in the civil community.
h. The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, in addition to his normal duties, will:

1. Regulate traffic on OAHU.
2. Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations.
3. Establish liaison with the local police force.
4. Be prepared to assist civilian authorities in all Air Raid Precautions including blackout, radio silence and evacuation of civilians from dangerous areas.
5. Be prepared to establish facilities for gathering and caring for refugees.
6. Protect FORT SHAFTER. See paragraph 15 k (1).

i. The DEPARTMENT SIGNAL OFFICER will:
1. Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service and then release it to the Interceptor Command.
2. Insure that joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for immediate employment.

j. The INTERCEPTOR COMMAND will:
Coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including available Naval and Marine Corps AA Artillery), the Aircraft Warning Service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of antiaircraft measures of units not under military control, to include:
1. Arrival and departure of all friendly aircraft.
2. The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in PEARL and/or HONOLULU HARBORES.
3. Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.

k. STATION COMPLEMENTS:
1. The FORT SHAFTER Complement, under the supervision of the Department Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on FORT SHAFTER and, in addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.
2. The HICKAM, WHEELER and BELLOWS FIELDS Complements, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the defense of their respective posts against sabotage, air and ground attacks.

l. TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD. Upon the formation of the Territorial Home Guard, recently authorized by the Territorial Legislature, it is anticipated that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the District Commanders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, except the Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations on Army and Navy Reservations. See paragraph 15 d (4) and g above.

16. ALERT NO. 3. a. This alert requires the occupation of all field positions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of OAHU and the Army installations on outlying islands.

b. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS:
1. All sections of the forward echelon will occupy their stations at forward command post, prepared to operate on a 24-hour basis.
2. All sections of the rear echelon will continue their usual duties at their present stations. Blackout instructions will be complied with.

b. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will remain in condition of mobile readiness at their permanent stations, pending instructions from this headquarters.

c. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will:
1. Defend its assigned sector on OAHU.
2. Protect all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard.
3. Release all available Bands to the Commanding Officer, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.
4. The 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the pumping stations at AIEA and HALAWA.
5. Place 240 mm howitzers in position.
6. Release Field Artillery units manning seacoast armament (155 mm guns) to Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. See paragraph 16 e below.

7. See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 16 m below.

c. The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND, and attacked Detachment Field [8] Artillery, will:
1. Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft positions.
2. Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament.
3. Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels.
4. Support the Infantry Divisions.
5. Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies.
6. Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol.
7. Provide the Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post.
8. Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for operational control.
9. Protect all vital installations on post and reservations of the command, except FORT SHAFTER. For FORT SHAFTER, see paragraph 16 l (2) below.
10. Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense.

f. The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will:
(1) Destroy enemy aircraft.
(2) Carry out bombing missions as directed.
(3) Cooperate with Naval air forces.
(4) On OAHU, defend all posts garrisoned by air forces against sabotage, air and ground attacks.
(5) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 16 h below.
(6) Arm all planes, except that normally bombs will not be loaded on ships dispatched to outlying islands.
(7) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival thereat, disperse on fields.
(8) Disperse bombers with crews.
(9) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.
(10) Perform observation, command and photographic missions.
(11) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command.

g. G–5 will be prepared to establish the following:
(1) Food administration.
(2) A Labor Procurement Service.

h. The DISTRICT COMMANDERS OF HAWAI'I, MAUI (includes MOLOKAI) and KA'UAI Districts, assisted by the air corps detachments present within the districts, will:
Defend the air fields against acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and maintain order in the civil community.

i. The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, in addition to his normal duties, will:
(1) Regulate traffic on OAHU.
(2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations.
(3) Establish liaison with the local police force.
(4) Be prepared to assist civilian authorities in all Air Raid Precautions including blackout, radio silence and evacuation of civilians from dangerous areas.
(5) Be prepared to establish facilities for gathering and caring for refugees.
(6) Protect FORT SHAFTER. See paragraph 16 l (2) below.

j. The INTERCEPTOR COMMAND will coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including available Naval and Marine Corps AA Artillery), the aircraft warning service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of antiaircraft measures of units not under military control to include:
(1) Arrival and departure of all friendly aircraft.
(2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in PEARL and/or HONOLULU HARBORS.
(3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.

k. The DEPARTMENT SIGNAL OFFICER will:
(1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service and then release it to the Interceptor Command.
(2) Insure the joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for immediate employment.
(3) Be prepared to assume control over essential civilian communications.

l. STATION COMPLEMENTS:
(1) The SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Complement will protect all vital installations on the SCHOFIELD Reservation.
(2) The FORT SHAFTER Complement, under the supervision of the Department Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on FORT SHAFTER and, in addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and [10] Tripler General Hospital.
(3) The HICKAM, WHEELER and BELLOWS FIELD Complements, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the defense of their respective posts against sabotage, air and ground attacks.
m. TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD.—Upon the formation of the Territorial Home Guard, recently authorized by the Territorial Legislature, it is anticipated that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the District Commanders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, except the Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations on Army and Navy Reservations. See paragraph 16 d (2) and h above."

Alert #1 is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprising within the islands without threat from without. In addition to the duties prescribed in Alert #1, the Aircraft Warning Service was directed to operate all mobile aircraft warning stations from two hours before dawn to one hour after dawn.

My reasons for ordering Alert #1 rather than Alert #2, which is applicable to a condition more serious than Alert #1, security against attacks from hostile subsurface, surface and aircraft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprising, were as follows:
1. There was a strong probability of sabotage by the Japanese population in Hawaii.
2. I had no information to indicate the probability of an attack.
3. Alert #2 or Alert #3, which provides for the maximum defense of OAHU and of army installations on outlying islands, interfere very seriously with training.

These three reasons will be discussed in detail:

1. Defense against sabotage can be carried out better where there is not too much dispersion of the command. Where the defense is against sabotage only the planes are grouped on the landing mats and the apron, while in a defense against air attack the pursuit planes would be dispersed in their bunkers and the bombardment planes would be sent to landing fields on outlying islands or placed in the air if time were available. If time were not available, they would remain in their bunkers. From this can be seen that the action for the two different types of defense is quite different. Since sabotage was considered far more probable [1/1] than air attack, the planes were dispersed to all of the landing fields on the island of OAHU, but were not placed in bunkers. This was especially desirable as man-proof fencing and flood-lights had not as yet been provided for the fields. $240,000.00 for this purpose was requested on May 15, 1941, and the authorization of $102,000.00 was made on July 11th and $91,975.00 on August 12, 1941. Orders for the material had to be placed in the mainland as it was not available in the Hawaiian Islands. Owing to the difficulties of obtaining priorities, both for material and for shipping, the District Engineer has not yet received the material. The Constructing Quartermaster was allotted funds for fencing of other than air fields, and a small amount of the material had been received and installed prior to December 7th.

2. The Hawaiian Department is provided with no means of collecting information as to the location of Japanese or other ships throughout the world and is not responsible for distant reconnaissance. The "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, Hawaiian Department and Fourteenth Naval District"—Section I, par. 3, 18 and 21, definitely place the responsibility for such reconnaissance upon the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. The following quotation makes this evident:

EXTRACT from "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan"—Exhibit "D":

"3. METHOD OF COORDINATION. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District have determined that in this joint plan the method of coordination will be by mutual cooperation and that this method will apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy operate in coordination, until and if the method of unity of command is invoked, as prescribed in Joint Action of the Army and Navy, 1935, Chapter 2, paragraph 9 b.

18. NAVY. The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall provide for:

i. Distant reconnaissance.

21. This agreement to take effect at once and to remain effective until notice in writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or until disapproved in part or in whole by either the War or the Navy Department. This HCF-41 (JCD-42) supercedes HCF-39 (JCD-13) except that the annexes, Nos.
1 to VII of latter remain effective and constitute annexes 1 to VII inclusive, of this plan."

[12] Annex #7 to the "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan" provides as follows—Exhibit "E":

"When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Officer, (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans:

1. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, until completion of the mission, when it will revert to Army control.

2. Defensive Air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for maintenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situation, it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer and reverts to Navy control.

3. When Naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.

4. In the special instance in which army pursuit protection is requested for the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this situation will pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission."

These documents make it clearly evident that the Hawaiian Department had no responsibility for distant reconnaissance, and that when army bombardment planes are actually placed under the command of the Navy whenever they operate upon distant reconnaissance missions, they receive their mission and all instructions from the [13] Naval Commander, and report to him upon the completion of their mission. This method of procedure has been followed strictly since March 21, 1941, including the period since December 7th.

3. If upon consideration of the available facts the calling of Alert No. 1 would be sufficient to handle the situation Alert No. 2 or No. 3 should not be called because to do so would seriously interfere with the training of the command. When the troops are in battle positions it is practically impossible to carry on any orderly training. With the number of new man in the command it is highly important to conduct their training regularly. This was particularly true of the Hawaiian Air Force on November 27th due to the fact that they had been given the mission of training combat crews and ferrying B-17 planes from the mainland to the Philippine Islands. September 8th the Hawaiian Air Force sent nine (9) trained combat teams to the Philippine Islands. Previous to November 27th eighteen (18) trained combat teams had been sent to the mainland, and seventeen (17) more combat teams were ready to go to the mainland for ferrying purposes. In addition, twelve (12) combat crews had to be trained for planes that were expected at an early date in this Department. With only six (6) B—17 planes available for training combat teams, it was imperative that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force make the maximum use of these planes for training, and any order that would take them out of training for any considerable period would prevent them from carrying out the ferrying mission that had been assigned to him.
I replied as follows to the radiogram from the Chief of Staff of November 27th—Exhibit "F":

"CHIEF OF STAFF,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.:

Reurad four seven two twenty seventh report department alerted to prevent sabotage period liaison with navy

Short".

Upon receipt of my radiogram of November 28th, I received the following reply from The Adjutant General—Exhibit "G":

"Hawn Dept., Ft. Shafter, TH:

482 28th critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War Department. Paren. See paragraph three MID SC thirty dash forty five End paren. Stop Also desired that you initiate forthwith additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments, comma, property, comma, and equipment against sabotage. comma, protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage. Stop This does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized. Stop Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm. Stop To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions.

Adams".

This par. of MID SC 30-45 referred to in the above mentioned radiogram is attached as Exhibit "H", and this paragraph refers wholly to subversive activities.

Careful consideration of the radiograms of October 16th, November 27th and November 28th discloses that the War Department emphasizes that action taken would not alarm the civil population, would not disclose strategic intention, constitute provocative actions against Japan, and would avoid unnecessary publicity. Alert #2 or #3 would have disclosed tactical positions and given more publicity to preparations and might have alarmed the civil population.

If the War Department at that time had considered it necessary to alert the Hawaiian Department against air and ground attack, it undoubtedly would have so directed instead of sending a long radiogram outlining the various steps that should be taken in connection with sabotage and subversive activities.

In my radiogram of November 29th I replied to the radiogram of the War Department of November 28th, and explained in detail the steps I was taking to prevent sabotage and subversive activities, and of the authority that I had obtained from the Governor of Hawaii and of the Mayor of the City and County of Honolulu to legalize all the steps which I had taken—Exhibit "F":

"THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.:

Re your secret radio four eight two twenty eighth comma. Full precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of War Department. Paren. Paragraph three MID SC thirty dash forty five. End paren. And military establishments including personnel and equipment. Stop As regards protection comma of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power plants comma, Telephone exchanges and highway bridges comma. This headquarters by confidential letter dated June nineteen nineteen forty one requested the Governor of the Territory to use the broad powers vested in him by section sixty seven of the organic act which provides comma. In effect comma. That the Governor may call upon the commanders of military and naval forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence comma. Invasion comma. Insurrection etc. Stop Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand of this headquarters to furnish and continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage. comma. And lawless violence in connection therewith.
Comma Being committed against vital installations and structures in the Territory Stop Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is now being afforded vital civilian installations Stop In this connection Comma At the instigation of this headquarters the city and county of Honolulu on June thirtieth nineteen forty one enacted an ordinance which permits the commanding general Hawaiian Department Comma to close Comma Or restrict the use of and travel upon Comma Any highway within the city and county of Honolulu Comma whenever the commanding general deems such action necessary in the interest of national defense Stop The authority thus given has not yet been exercised Stop Relations with FBI and all other Federal and Territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters.

**SHORT**

**EVENTS TRANSPIRING FROM NOVEMBER 27TH TO DECEMBER 6TH**

From November 27th to December 6th the troops remained on the Alert for sabotage, and carried on routine training with the men not required to be on duty during this Alert. The Aircraft Warning Service operated daily from two hours before daylight until one hour after daylight. It also carried out this usual practice, closing the information center at 7:00 A.M., December 7th. Routine training was also carried out by this Detachment from 7:00 to 11:00 A.M. except on Sunday. Memorandum of the Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, states as follows—Exhibit "J":

Subject: Detector Operation.

To: Department Signal Officer.

1. On November 27, 1941, after conference with Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, and receiving instructions to operate all mobile detectors from two hours before dawn until one hour after dawn, I, as Acting Department Signal Officer, gave immediate instructions [16] to Captain TETLEY, Commanding Officer of the Aircraft Warning Company, to initiate the above detector operation so long Alert No. 1 was in force.

2. The detectors in question operated daily thereafter during the prescribed period except when having occasional operational trouble. In addition, the six detector stations operated daily except Sundays from 7:00 A.M. to 11:00 A.M. for routine training. Daily except Saturday and Sunday, to hours 12:00 noon until 4:00 P.M. were devoted to training and maintenance work.

(Signed) W. H. Murphy,
W. H. Murphy,
Lt. Col., Sig. C.

During the period November 27th to December 6th I had conferences with the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District as follows:

November 27th: Conference on the reinforcement of the marine garrisons at Midway and Wake Islands by squadrons of army pursuit planes. I was accompanied on this conference by Major General Frederick L. Martin, Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force, and Lt. Colonel James A. Mollison, Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Air Force.

December 1st: Conference relative to the relief of the marine garrisons on the islands of Midway and Wake, and the taking over of the defense of Canton Island by the army.

December 2nd: Conference with the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet with reference to a letter that he was sending to the Chief of Naval Operations relative to the relief of the marines at Midway and Wake by the army.

December 3rd: Conference with reference to a radiogram I was sending to the War Department relative to the relief of the marines at Midway and Wake by the army.

December 4th: Major Fleming, of my staff, conferred with Col. Pfeiffer, Fleet, Marine Officer on the Staff of the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet relative to the use of marine 5" guns at Canton Island.

At these conferences the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District had ample opportunity to acquaint me with information of the location of Japanese carriers, which would
render possible an attack on the island of OAHU. If they believed carriers so located, they unquestionably [17] would have discussed the possible danger to any troops attempting to effect a relief at Midway and Wake. There is at least a strong inference that they had no such knowledge of the location of the Japanese carriers which would have rendered an attack possible. The fact that the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District did not request the employment under naval command of army bombardment planes for distant reconnaissance, as provided for by the "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan" indicates that they were satisfied with their information with reference to Japanese carriers, and there was nothing new in the situation to cause me to change from an Alert for sabotage to an Alert for defense against an air attack. The following certificate shows that no request was made by the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District to the Hawaiian Air Force for long range aerial reconnaissance—Exhibit "K":

HICKAM FIELD, T. H., 20 December 1941.

I, JAMES A. MOLLISON, certify that during the period of 27 November 1941 to 7 December 1941 the Navy made no requests to the Hawaiian Air Force for in shore or long range aerial reconnaissances.

(Signed) Jas. A. Mollison,
JAS. A. MOLLISON,
Lt. Col., A. C.,
H. A. F. C/S.

To what extent such reconnaissance was made by the Navy planes is not known.

At the conference on November 27th, a staff officer of the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet made a statement about the improbability of a Japanese air attack in the presence of the Commander-in-Chief. This statement is covered by certificate of Lt. Col. James A. Mollison, as follows—Exhibit "L":

"I certify that on November 27, 1941, I accompanied General Short and General Martin to Admiral Kimmel's office for conference relative to sending Army pursuits planes to Midway and Wake. As this would unquestionably weaken the defenses of Oahu, Admiral Kimmel asked a question of Captain McMorris, his War Plans Officer, which was substantially as follows:

Admiral Kimmel: McMorris, what is your idea of the chances of a surprise raid on Oahu?

Captain McMorris: I should say none Admiral—-

(Signed) JAMES A. MOLLISON,
Lt. Col., A. C.

[18] December 5th one B-24 plane arrived at Hickam Field from the mainland. This plane had insufficient armament for combat, only one .30 caliber and two .50 caliber guns in the tail, and was without ammunition for the guns that were installed. In spite of the fact that this plane arrived without being in condition to fire, the following radiogram was received from the War Department—Exhibit "M":

"COMMANDING GENERAL, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Pt. Shafter, TH.:"

Four six five twenty sixth.

Reference two B dash twenty four airplanes for special photo mission Stop It is desired that the pilots be instructed to photographic Truk Island in the Caroline group Jaluit in the Marshall group Stop Visual reconnaissance should be made simultaneously Stop Information desired as to the number and location of naval vessels including submarines comma airfields comma aircraft comma guns comma barracks and camps Stop Pilots should be warned islands strongly fortified and manned Stop Photography and reconnaissance must be accomplished at high altitude and there must be no circling or remaining in the vicinity Stop Avoid orange aircraft by utilizing maximum altitude and speed Stop Instruct crews if attacked by planes to use all means in their power for self preservation Stop The two pilots and copilots should be instructed to confer with Admiral Kimmel upon arrival at Honolulu to obtain his advice Stop If distance from Wake and Jaluit to Moresby is too great comma suggest one B dash twenty four proceed from Wake to Jaluit and back to Wake comma then Philippines by usual route photographing Ponape while enroute Moresby Stop Advise
pilots best time of day for photographic Truk and Jaluit. Stop Upon arrival in Philippines two copies each of any photographs taken will be sent to General MacArthur comma Admiral Hart comma Admiral Kimmel comma the Chief of Naval Operations comma and the War Department. Stop Insure that both B dash twenty four airplanes are fully equipped with gun ammunition upon departure from Honolulu.

Adams.

The combination of the arrival of the plane in this condition and of the instructions for it to be placed in instant readiness for firing during the remainder of the journey plainly indicates that the War Department considered Honolulu not the subject of a probably attack, and that flying from the mainland to Honolulu the hazard of carrying the extra weight of ammunition was greater than the possibility of being attacked by the Japanese.

After the receipt of radiogram 46526, quoted above, the following radiogram was sent—Exhibit "N":

Chief of the Army Air Forces,
Washington, D. C.:

Reference secret photographic mission of two B twenty fours. Stop One of B twenty fours [19] Lieutenant Faulkner which landed Hickam this date short following equipment considered essential to safety and success of mission colon fifty caliber machine guns comma mounts comma adapters and accessories for upper hemisphere semicolon fifty caliber tunnel gun comma adapter and accessories semicolon fifty caliber guns comma adapters comma mounts and accessories for starboard and port sides semicolon second thirty caliber nose gun comma adapter and accessories. Stop Guns can be removed from our equipment and ammunition is available. Stop Strongly recommend that second B twenty four bring necessary equipment from mainland for installation on both planes prior their departure from Hickam field. Stop Plane being held here until satisfactorily armed. Stop Subject plane has no armor plate installation. Stop Except for removal of passenger seats plane equipped as for ferry service North Atlantic. Signed Martin HAF 141.

Short

In spite of radiogram quoted above, airplanes continued to be dispatched from the mainland without ammunition and with guns not in condition to fire. Twelve B-17 airplanes, under orders from the War Department, left the mainland in two squadrons at 9:30 P. M., Dec. 6th, Pacific time (12:30 A. M., Dec. 7th, Eastern time) and 10:30 P. M., Dec. 6th, Pacific time (1:30 A. M., Dec. 7th, Eastern time). None of these guns were equipped with ammunition for the defensive armament. Machine guns were still cosmolined and had not been bore-sighted. Ferry crews were skeletonized, consisting of pilot, co-pilot, navigator, engineer and radio operator. Such crews were incapable of manning gun positions, even if the guns had been properly prepared for combat and supplied with ammunition. (Exhibit "O"). The inference is plain that up to 1:30 A. M., December 7th, the War Department felt that the hazard of carrying the extra weight in ammunition was greater than the danger of an attack by the Japanese. These planes actually arrived at Hickam Field in the midst of the first attack. Four of the twelve planes were destroyed by the Japanese without being able to fight. Had the War Department considered an attack by the Japanese probable, these planes would not have been permitted to leave the mainland without ammunition, and without guns in condition to be fired. Up to that moment the War Department had given me no indication of a crisis in the American-Japanese relations.

Later in the morning of December 7th apparently alarming news was received and the Chief of Staff sent the following message to me by commercial radio—Exhibit "P":

[20] "Hawn Dept.,
Ft. Shafter, T. H.:

529 7th Japanese are presenting at one PM eastern standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately. Stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly Stop Inform naval authorities of this communication

Marshall".

The message was filed at 12:18 P. M., December 7th, Eastern time (6:48 A. M., December 7th, Honolulu time). It was received by the R. C. A. in Honolulu at 7:33 A. M., December 7th, and delivered to the Signal Office, Fort Shafter, at 11:45 A. M. (Delivery probably delayed by the Japanese attack). The deciphered message was delivered to the Adjutant General, Hawaiian Department, at 2:58 P. M., December 7th. Thus this important message was received seven hours after the attack. If the message had been telephoned by secret telephone direct to me as an urgent message in the clear without loss of time for encoding there would have been time to warm up the planes and put them in the air, thus, in all probability, avoiding a large loss of planes in the initial attack at 8:00 A. M. The fact that the War Department sent this message by radio in code instead of telephoning it in the clear and putting it through in the minimum amount of time indicates that the War Department, even as late as 6:48 A. M., December 7th, Honolulu time, did not consider an attack on Honolulu as very probable.

When the Chief of Staff, War Department, was informed by the Chief of Staff, Hawaiian Department, by secret commercial telephone of the first attack, he inquired if the message with regard to the Japanese ultimatum had been received prior to the attack. He was informed that it had not been received up to the time of that conversation.

On December 9th the following radiogram was received from the War Department—Exhibit "Q":

"Hawn Dept., Ft. Shafter, T. H.:
Five four nine ninth please advise immediately exact time of receipt of our number five two nine repeat five two nine December seven at Honolulu exact time deciphered message transmitted by Signal Corps to staff and by what staff officer received.

COTTON, Acting”.

The following reply was made by this Headquarters—Exhibit "R":

[27] "Re your five four nine radio five two nine delivered Honolulu via RCA seven thirty three morning seventh Stop Received signal office Fort Shafter eleven forty five morning seventh paren this time approximate but within five minutes paren Stop Deciphered message received by adjutant general HQ Hawn Dept two fifty eight afternoon seventh

SHORT.

Two instances occurred early on the morning of December 7th, which, if interpreted differently at the time, might have had a very great result upon the action that followed.

About 7:15 A. M., a two-man submarine entered Pearl Harbor and was destroyed by ships on duty. Had the Naval authorities foreseen this as a possible forerunner of an air attack and notified the army, time would have been available for the dispersion of the planes. However, the naval authorities did not connect this submarine attack with a possible general attack. The army was not notified until after the attack at 8:00.

After the Air Craft Warning Service Information Center was closed at 7:00 A. M., December 7th, the OPANA station remained in operation for further practice. At 7:20 A. M. a very significant event occurred, as shown by the following affidavits—

Exhibit "S":

"FORT SHAFTER, T. H.
TERRITORY OF HAWAI'I,

Personally appeared before me, the undersigned, authority for administering oaths of this nature, one Grover C. White, Jr., O-396182, 2nd Lieut., Signal Corps. Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii, who after being duly sworn according to law deposes and sayeth:

1. At the request of the Control Officer and Naval Liaison Officer the AWS agreed to operate its detectors beyond the daily period of two hours before until one hour after dawn. The first schedule required operation of all stations from 4 A. M. to 6 P. M. This schedule was modified to the hours of 4 A. M. to 4 P. M. A temporary schedule was next devised which required all stations to operate from 4 A. M. to 11 A. M. and to have "staggered" operation, i. e., 3 stations from 11 A. M. to 1 P. M., the remaining 3 stations from 1 P. M. to 4 P. M. On Saturday, December 6, 1941, I contacted the Control Officer to request authority to have all
stations operate from 4 A. M. to 7 A. M. only on Sunday, December 7, 1941; this was agreed to by the Control Officer.

2. Staff Sergeant Stanley J. Wichas, SCAWH, acting RDF Officer, reports that he saw nothing that could be construed as suspicious in the information received [22] by the AWS Information Center from 4 A. M. to Sunday, December 7, 1941. This is verified by Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, Air Corps, who was the only officer in the Information Center from 4 A. M. to 7 A. M.

3. At approximately 7:20 A. M. a report was received from a Detector station at Opena that a large number of planes was approaching Oahu on a course North 3 degrees East at a distance of approximately 192 miles. This information was immediately transmitted by the switchboard operator, Pfc. Joseph McDonald to Lt. Tyler, who talked to Opena about the flight. The statement of Pfc. Joseph McDonald, SCAWH, the switchboard operator is attached.

4. The Navy Liaison Officer’s position within the Information Center was not manned when I reached the Information Center at about 8:30 A. M. This position was manned shortly thereafter by Technical Sergeant Merle E. Stouffer, SCAWH, who remained on the position until approximately 4:30 P. M. when the position was taken over by Naval Officers.

Further the deponent sayeth not.

(Signed) Grover C. White, Jr.
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps, Signal
Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of Dec. AD 1941, at Fort Shafter, T. H.

(Signed) Adam R. Huggins,
2nd Lt., Signal Corps, Summary Court.

"Fort Shafter, T. H.,

Territory of Hawaii,

Personally appeared before me, the undersigned authority for administering oaths of this nature, one Joseph P. McDonald, 13006145, Pvt. 1st, Signal Company Aircraft Warning, Hawaii, who after being duly sworn according to law deposes and sayeth:

I was on duty as telephone operator at the AWS Information Center on Sunday morning, December 7, 1941. I received a telephone call from Opena at 7:20 A. M. stating that a large number of planes were heading towards Oahu from North 3 points East. I gave the information to Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, Air Corps, 78th Pursuit Squadron, Wheeler Field, T. H., and the Lieutenant talked with private Lockhard at the Opena station. Lt. Tyler said that it wasn’t anything of importance. At that time the planes were 132 miles out. I asked if we shouldn’t advise Corporal Beatty and have the plotters come back. The Opena Unit stressed the fact that it was a very large number of planes and they seemed excited. Lt. Tyler [23] said that it was not necessary to call the plotters or get in touch with anyone. Further the deponent sayeth not.

(Signed) Joseph P. McDonald,
Joseph P. McDonald,
Sig. Co., Aircraft Warning, Hawaii.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of December A. D. 1941 at Fort Shafter, T. H.

(Signed) Adam R. Huggins,
Adam R. Huggins,
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps, Summary Court.

STATEMENT OF LIEUT. KERMIT A. TYLER

20 December 1941.

On Wednesday, 3 December 1941, I was first detailed to learn the operation of the plotting board in the Interception Control Center. I reported for duty at 1210, just as the crew on duty was leaving. I spoke with Lt. White, Signal Corps, a few minutes and he showed me the operating positions for Navy, Bombardment, Antiaircraft, Controller’s position and Aircraft Warning Service. I remained on duty until 1600. Only a telephone operator was on duty with me.

On Sunday, 7 December 1941, I was on duty from 0400 to 0800 as Pursuit Officer at the Interceptor Control Center. From 0400 until approximately 0610
there were no plots indicated on the interception board. From that time until 0700 a number of plots appeared on the control board at various points surrounding the Island of Oahu. I particularly remember at least one plot South of Kauai and I believe there was one South of Molokai. There were two plots at some distance north of Oahu and which I remember seeing on the historical record. At the time, I questioned the plotter of the historical record who stated that he makes a record of all plots as they come in. There were a number of plots over and around the Island of Oahu. Having seen the plotters work once before with about the same general layout, this did not seem irregular to me. At 0700 all of the men except the telephone operator folded up their equipment and left. At about 0700 the operator at the OPANA RDF Station called me and said that the instrument indicated a large number of planes at 132 miles to the North. Thinking it must be a returning naval patrol, a flight of Hickam bombing planes, or possibly a flight of B-17 planes from the coast, I dismissed it as nothing unusual. (It is common knowledge that when Honolulu radio stations are testing by playing Hawaiian music throughout the night that coincidentally B-17s are apt to come in using the station [24] for radio direction finding. The radio station was testing on the morning of 7 December, 0230–0400). At about 0750 I heard some airplanes outside and looking toward Pearl Harbor saw what I thought to be the navy practicing dive bombing runs. At a little after 0800, Sergeant Eugene Starry, A. C., Wheeler Field, called me to tell me that Wheeler Field had been attacked. I immediately had the telephone operator call all men back to duty. Most of the men had returned to duty by 0820 when Major L. N. Tindal arrived and took charge of the Control Center. I remained on duty assisting Major K. P. Bergquist and Major L. N. Tindal as Pursuit Control Officer until about 1615, 8 December 1941, with the exception of rest periods from 2000 to 2400, 7 December, and 0600 to 1000, 8 December.

(Signed) Kermit A. Tyler,
Kermit A. Tyler,
1st Lieut., Air Corps.

Had Lieut. Tyler alerted the Hawaiian Air Force instead of deciding that the planes were friendly, there would have been time to disperse the planes but not to get them in the air as they were not warmed up. Dispersion, in all probability, would have decreased the loss in planes, but would not have prevented the attack on Pearl Harbor.

ACTION AT TIME OF ATTACK

At 7:55 A. M., December 7th, the enemy planes attacked Hickam Field, Pearl Harbor and Wheeler Field. At 9:00 a second attack was made, and a third about 11:00 A. M., each lasting approximately fifteen minutes. At 8:03 A. M. the Chief of Staff reported the attack, and by 8:10 order had been given to all units (major echelons) by telephone to put Alert #3 in effect.

Antiaircraft Artillery: All antiaircraft batteries had skeleton crews guarding them. All units had in their possession ammunition for rifles, pistols, automatic rifles and machine guns. 3" ammunition had been placed in positions accessible to all batteries except four batteries of the 64th C. A. C. (AA). The first of these batteries began drawing ammunition at the Aliamanu Crater at 8:15 A. M. At 10:15 all these batteries had drawn the initial unit of fire.

The automatic weapon batteries at Fort Kamehameha, Pearl Harbor and Camp Malakole took the enemy planes under firing during the eight o’clock raid. The first 3" gun fire was opened at 8:30, and all batteries of the south group were in action by 10:00 A. M. East group opened fire between 11:00 A. M. and 12:00 noon. (For detailed firing of batteries, see Exhibit "S").

[25] Hawaiian Air Force: During the first attack men started pulling planes out of the fire, and at 8:50 the serviceable pursuit planes took off. At 11:40 A. M. the serviceable bombers took off on a mission under naval control.

Before the attack December 7th status of planes in Hawaiian Department was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aircraft Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pursuit planes in commission</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pursuit planes out of commission</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance planes in commission</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance planes out of commission</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombers in commission</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombers out of commission</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Damaged in Raid:
- Pursuit planes ................................................. 88
- Reconnaissance planes ........................................ 6
- Bombers .................................................................. 34

Status as of December 20th, 1941:
- Pursuit planes ................................................. 61
- Reconnaissance .................................................. 6
- Bombers ............................................................ 50

\[1\] Includes 29 bombers from mainland.

Exhibit "T"
A comprehensive study of the losses inflicted on the enemy by the army places the number of enemy planes brought down by aviation and antiaircraft fire at twenty-nine (29).

Exhibit "U"
24th Division: Troops of the 24th Division at Schofield were attacked at 8:10 A.M. Men with automatic rifles returned the enemy's fire. At 8:30 A.M. the Division started moving to its battle positions, and all units were in position by 5:00 P.M. and had one unit of ammunition on the position. The second unit of fire was issued during the night.

25th Division: The 25th Division opened antiaircraft fire at 8:30 A.M. It also started to move to battle positions at 8:30 A.M., and completed movement to position by 4:00 P.M. and had issued one unit of fire. The second unit of fire was issued during the night.

All movement and action of troops was carried out as prescribed in [26] standing operating procedure (See Exhibit "B") without confusion. The value of planning and training with everyone made familiar with the plans was brought out very clearly.

At 9:00 A.M. the first civilian surgical teams began reporting at Tripler General Hospital.

At 12:00 noon the Civilian Relief Committee began the evacuation of Hickam Field, Wheeler Field and Schofield, and continued throughout the afternoon and part of the evening. Most of the women and children were moved to school buildings, although a few from these posts and all of the women and children from Shafter, Tripler, Ordnance Depot and Signal Depot were sheltered in the incomplete underground Interceptor Command Post.

During December 7th the foreign agents previously listed by F. B. I. and G-2 were arrested and confined at the Immigration and Quarantine Stations as follows:

- Japanese ........................................................... 370
- Germans ............................................................ 98
- Italians .............................................................. 14

Total ........................................................................ 482

The 804th Engineers began clearing the runways at Hickam Field and Wheeler Field as soon as the first attack was over. The fire fighters, while still fighting fire, assisted in moving the debris. During the evening of the 7th the District Engineer began repairing broken water pipes and other utilities at Hickam Field.

Governor Poindexter put the M-Day Bill in effect on December 7th, and on December 8th declared martial law and requested the Department Commander to assume the responsibility as Military Governor.

December 8th the District Engineer took over all building materials, supplies and equipment, called all construction companies into service and started the construction of bunkers and the extension of runways at the air fields. On the 9th he started construction of evacuation camps for army dependents and civilians. December 8th the Department Engineer distributed material to the troops and got field fortifications under way. December 9th he started construction of slit trenches on posts and in the vicinity of school buildings and parks in the city, and started plans for construction of shelters throughout the city.

Martial law was placed in effect on December 8th, and the following action was taken:

1. Courts were closed.
2. All civilian officials were asked to remain in their positions and carry on the work of their offices.
EFFORTS TO IMPROVE DEFENSES OF HAWAIIAN ISLANDS

My efforts to improve the defenses of the Hawaiian Islands has a bearing upon all work under me since assuming command of the Hawaiian Department, February 7, 1941. The following are some of the most important items taken up and the action taken by the War Department. Each item is supported by exhibits.

1. The need for additional facilities and troops in this Department became evident very soon after arrival. On February 19th a letter was transmitted to the Chief of Staff of the Army outlining some of the deficiencies discovered and recommending action which should be taken to correct them. Among these points were:

(1) Cooperation with the Navy,
(2) Dispersion and protection of aircraft and repair, maintenance and servicing of aircraft,
(3) Improvement of anti-aircraft defense,
(4) Improvement of the harbor defense artillery,
(5) Improvement of the situation regarding searchlights,
(6) Roads and trails,
(7) Necessary bombproof construction,
(8) Increase in the number of engineer troops.

A copy of this letter is attached as Exhibit "V".

2. On February 19, 1941, a secret letter was submitted to the War Department, subject: "Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft", file Engr. 452. This letter explains the urgent necessity of providing protective bunkers for bombardment and pursuit aviation in this Department and recommended that funds in the amount of $1,503,000.00 be allotted for this purpose. This cost included the costs of the necessary taxiways and hard standings to permit the dispersion of planes at Hickam Field. A large part of the ground surrounding the landing mat at Hickam Field is made up of a soft fill and it is not possible to disperse planes onto this ground without the provision of taxiways and hard standings. This correspondence was indorsed back to this Department by the 6th Ind., AG 600.12 (2-19-41) MC-G, September 12, 1941, which stated that the plans for revetments had been approved and that funds in the amount of $1,358,000.00 would be available about January 1, 1942. At the time of the attack on December 7th, no money had been received for this project and it was impossible to adequately disperse the planes at Hickam Field. Construction of these bunkers was initiated immediately after the attack under the Emergency Authority granted.—Exhibit "W".

3. It was apparent that the facilities of the Hawaiian Air Depot which had been constructed in a very concentrated area at Hickam Field would be extremely vulnerable to an attack. As a result, a letter was submitted to the War Department on September 10, 1941, file Engr. 600.96, subject: "Underground Repair Facilities Hawaiian Air Depot", which strongly recommended the approval of bombproof facilities for the repair of aircraft in this Department, and requested funds in the amount of $3,480,650.00. This correspondence was indorsed back by 1st Ind., file AG 600.12 (9-10-41) MC-G, Adjutant General's Office, October 27, 1941, stating that due to the cost of providing bombproof facilities that it was the War Department's policy not to provide them, and suggesting that splinterproof installations be provided. During the attack of December 7th, the Air Depot was one of the main targets and suffered tremendous damage. Construction of an underground bombproof facility was started under the Emergency Authority subsequent to the attack. Steps have also been taken to decentralize the Hawaiian Air Depot to several smaller shops around the island.—Exhibit "X".

4. Fortifications and Camouflage Funds.—A letter was submitted to the War Department on July 28th, file AG 121.2, subject: "Reallocation of Special Field Exercise Funds", requesting that these funds be made available for purchase of fortification and camouflage equipment. This letter was answered by confidential radiogram No. 31, August 12, 1941, stating these special field exercise funds could not be made available for this purpose. This radiogram was followed by letter dated August 13, 1941, file AG 353 (7-28-41) MC-D, subject: "Realloca-
tion of Special Field Exercise Funds for Field Fortification and Camouflage Projects”, in which it was stated that the interest of the Hawaiian Department in providing field fortifications was appreciated by the War Department, but that funds could not be allotted for this purpose. This letter was returned by 1st Ind. this headquarters, file AG 353 (7–28–41) MC–D, September 14, 1941, again recommending an immediate allotment of $125,000.00 for field fortification and camouflage purposes. In 2nd Ind. to [30] the same correspondence September 26, 1941, the Adjutant General stated that the allotment could not be made. Also on this same subject, this headquarters submitted to the War Department a clipper letter on October 28, 1941, file Engr. 400.312, subject: “Funds for Field Fortification and Camouflage Material”, which recapitulated the previous correspondence on this subject, and requested an allotment of $1,445,542.00 be made available immediately for the purpose of fortification and camouflage materials. No funds had been received for this purpose at the time of the attack.—Exhibit “Y”.

5. Camouflage: The necessity of camouflaging treatment of all airfields in this Department was brought to the War Department’s attention in letter File Engr. 000.91, July 15, 1941, subject: “Request for Funds for Camouflage of Wheeler Field”. This letter stated, “There is definite need for camouflage treatment on all airfields in the Hawaiian Department. Up to this time no camouflage treatment had been undertaken at any airfield in this Department.” This proposal was finally approved in 3rd Ind., file AG 007.5 (7–12–41) MC–G from the Adjutant General’s Office to the Chief of Engineers which directed that funds in the amount of $56,210.00 be included in the next budget estimate for Wheeler Field. At the time of the attack on December 7th, no funds had been received for this purpose. The question of camouflage was also submitted to the War Department by letter this headquarters February 27, 1941, file Engr. 000.91, subjects “Camouflage of Defense Installations”. This project was approved by 4th Ind., AG 007.5 (2–27–41) MC–E, Adjutant General’s Office June 27, 1941. At the time of the attack, no funds for this purpose had been received, and although considerable work had been done by troop labor to camouflage these installations, its effectiveness was limited by our inability to buy the necessary materials.—Exhibit “Z”.

6. The revised Roads and Trails Project was submitted by letter this headquarters, file Engr. 611, February 19, 1941, which recommended that funds in the amount of $370,000.00 be allotted for construction of the military roads, railroads and trails in this Department. At the time of the attack, only $350,000.00 had been allotted for this purpose.—Exhibit “1A”.

7. The need for additional airports was brought to the War Department’s attention in letters file Engr. 600.12, according to the following [37] schedule:

1. Bellows Field .......................... April 5, 1941
2. Barking Sands .......................... May 2, 1941
3. Hilo Airport ............................. May 2, 1941
4. Homestead Field ........................ May 2, 1941
5. Morse Field ............................. May 2, 1941
6. Haleiwa ................................. May 22, 1941
7. Burns Field ............................. May 22, 1941
8. Lanai .......................... May 22, 1941
9. Parker Ranch ........................... June 2, 1941
10. Kipapa ............................. May 14, 1941

At the time of the attack no funds had been allotted specifically for construction at these airfields. The War Department disapproved the proposed site at Kipapa and directed construction at Kahuku. This relocation required protracted negotiations with the Fourteenth Naval District which had a bombing range on the Kahuku site. These negotiations were completed only a short time before the attack, but as no funds had been received, no construction had been started. In this connection, several expedients had to be adopted due to the non-availability of funds. Construction work at Molokai, Burns, Morse and Barking Sands was actually done by troop labor using materials provided by the WPA. The need of an additional airfield on Oahu was recognized as acute. The only possibility for immediate development was in improving the field at Bellows, and the only funds which had been made available for construction work at Bellows Field applied to housing only. The project letter on Bellows Field included a request for funds for improvement of runways, installation of gasoline storage and other facilities to make this a first class operating base. As stated, no funds had been allotted for these improvements. Since the need for these vital facilities was
acute, this Department authorized the District Engineer to proceed with their construction, utilizing any funds which might be available to his office. At the time of the attack, provision had been made for gasoline storage at Bellows and a 5000’ runway was about half done, and the District Engineer was able to complete this runway by Thursday night following the attack. Bellows Field is now a useable base, but all construction which has been done to make this an operating base has been done without any funds being allotted by the War Department. The improvement of other airdromes on Oahu at either the Kipapa or Kahuku area or at Haleiwa had not been undertaken at the time of the attack because no funds had ever been allotted for this purpose.—Exhibit “1B”.

8. Kaneohe Bay Defenses: It was recognized that the preceding arrangement under which the Army disclaimed any responsibility for the defense of the new Naval Air Station at Kaneohe Bay was a mistake. A letter was prepared and transmitted to the War Department on the 18th of February 1941, subject: “Defense of Naval Air Station Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H.” file 381. This letter informed the War Department that this Department had assumed responsibility for the defense of this area. This subject was again covered in letter this headquarters, file Engr. 600.96, dated April 14, 1941, subject: “Protection of Seacoast Defense Batteries” to the Adjutant General, and recommendation was made that a 12-inch gun battery similar to Battery Closson be obtained and shipped to this Department for installation in the Kaneohe Bay area. The War Department recognized the need of this protection for Kaneohe Bay, but was unable to supply a 12-inch gun battery for this. The project for the permanent defenses at Kaneohe Bay was submitted by letter of this headquarters 31 July 1941, file AG 381/20 Kaneohe Bay project, subject: “Coast Artillery Armament for Naval Air Station Kaneohe Bay”, which recommended both additional personnel and additional armament required. This was answered by 3rd Ind. Adjutant General’s Office, file AG 381 (7-31-41) MC-D, October 30, 1941, which approved the temporary utilization of armament now on hand in this Department. This endorsement also stated that the reinforcements of peace or war garrison of the Hawaiian Department for the beach and land defense of this area was not contemplated. The project for the utilization of temporary armament was submitted on the 18th of September 1941, file Engr 662/4 x 662/7 which recommended the provision of funds for the construction of Panama mounts for three 155-mm batteries and a railroad gun emplacement, and requested that funds in the amount of $215,265.00 be allotted for the construction of these positions. This matter was also followed up in radiogram No. 320 this headquarters, September 18, 1941, which recommended that funds in the amount of $215,265.00 be made available for the construction at Kaneohe Bay and also that $117,256.00 be made available for the completion of the project for construction of railroad gun positions. At the time of the attack no funds had been allotted for this construction. Exhibit “1C”.

9. The necessity of improvement of the landing strips at Wheeler Field was brought to the War Department’s attention by letter this headquarters, file Engr. 686/d, 21 June, 1941. In 2nd Ind. on this correspondence, from the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps, August 25, 1941, question was raised as to the adequacy of the second proposed north-south runway, and the statement was made that no funds were available at that time for the construction and improvements recommended. In 2nd Ind. Chief of the Air Corps, Washington, D. C., September 2, 1941, to this Department, statement was made that $25,000.00 had been requested for the leveling of the main runway at Wheeler Field. At the time of the attack, however, no funds had been received for the improvement of this landing strip. Some improvements had been made utilizing troop labor of the 804th Engineers; however, due to the lack of funds these improvements were limited and did not adequately solve the problem.—Exhibit “1D”.

10. The Aircraft Warning Service is probably the most important single project for the defense of Oahu. At the time of the attack, however, none of the three fixed stations in the original project had been completed due to the impossibility of securing materials under the priorities system. The Kaals station, for example, depended for its construction on construction of the cableway approach. In radiogram 3009 on June 10th, this headquarters reported to the War Department that this cableway material could not be delivered unless a higher priority rating was received, and in War Department radio 904, June 26th, the Adjutant General reported that this priority rating had been advanced to an A-1-c rating. With this rating it was not possible to secure the material to install this installation and the others expeditiously. Revised estimates for engineer construction of the superseding project of six fixed stations and six mobile
stations and preliminary estimates for the cost of the signal communications involved in this revised project, were submitted by letter this headquarters September 29, 1941, file Sig 676.3. Pending the allotment of these additional funds, this Department authorized the District Engineer to proceed with construction of AWS stations with any funds available to his office. At the time of the attack, however, due to this priority difficulty, none of the three original fixed stations were in operation.—Exhibit “1E”.

11. The entire construction program in this Department has been delayed due to the situation regarding priorities. It was extremely difficult to secure materials for the construction program, not only those which were ordered specifically for a defense project, but particularly those materials which are ordinarily purchased as an “over the counter” transaction. From a study of the priorities situation, and also of the shipping situation, it became evident in June that the local dealers who ordinarily maintain stocks and materials necessary for defense projects would not be able to secure delivery from the mainland until after a purchase order from a Government agency had been placed. This meant that after the priority was placed, if the item was not available in local stock that there would be a delay of from six weeks to two months even under the most favorable conditions before mainland delivery could be effected. To remedy this situation a letter was sent to the War Department by clipper airmail, file Engr. 523.07, subject: “Priorities and Preference Ratings,” July 3, 1941. This letter presented the problem in detail and recommended to the War Department that action be taken to correct this situation. The letter was followed up by radio on the 14th of August, and was answered by 1st and 2nd Inds. from the Priorities Committee dated August 18, 1941, and the Adjutant General dated August 26, 1941. The problem was again presented to the War Department by letter dated October 23, 1941, file Engr. 523.07, which recommended that the Office of Production Management be opened in Honolulu. In 2nd Ind. on this correspondence, the Priorities Committee advised that the Office of Production Management had been requested to establish a field office in Hawaii. This field office had not been established at the time of the attack and due to this difficulty in securing materials, many of our projects were not completed at the time of the attack.—Exhibit “1F”.

12. Another effort was made to solve this supply problem by securing funds for the advance procurement of certain essential materials. It was originally requested in clipper airmail letter this headquarters July 28, 1941, file Engr. 600.12, which recommended that a revolving fund of $1,000,000.00 be set up to permit the advance procurement of essential materials before the specific allotments had been made for individual projects. This letter had not [35] been answered on the 13th of September when a follow-up radiogram was sent to the War Department, and on the same day the matter was brought to the personal attention of the Deputy Chief of Staff in the War Department, who very quickly secured a solution of the problem by the allotment of $500,000.00 for the advance purchase of essential materials. Before these materials could be secured, however, the $500,000.00 was diverted by the War Department for the construction of housing at Kaneohe Bay, with the result that on the day of the attack, no reserve supplies of materials other than lumber had been accumulated.—Exhibit “1G”.

13. The following letter shows appreciation by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air of the difficulties in the carrying out of the project for the creation of air fields to permit ferrying of planes to the Philippine Islands, and of the rapidity with which the arrangements were completed.—Exhibit “1H”.

Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, U. S. A.,
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

Dear Short: The copy of your report on the additional air routes has been received. The quantity of details requiring coordination, and the distances involved in the projects make the short time consumed in getting rolling almost unbelievably short.

I extend you my personal thanks for the effort you have expended on this job and the results you are getting.

The way things are working out now, it looks as if we will be using trans-Pacific airways almost continuously from now on. Our plans are O. K. for 4-engine
bombers, but what are the prospects for medium bombers? Do you think we should even study that phase of trans-Pacific operations?

Best regards,

Sincerely,

/s/ H. H. Arnold,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Deputy Chief of Staff for Air.

[36] 14. Increase in Engineer Troops:

February 10, 1941.—TAG sent 3d Ind., file AG 320.2 (11-1-40) M-C saying that 3d Engineer Regiment was to be increased. Regular Army personnel not available to further increase Engineer Regiment. Selectees prohibited from being sent and it was not possible to fill in creating Engineer Battalion here as requested. On 19 Feb, 1941, letter to TAG file Engr. 322.03 requested that War Department send an Eng. Regiment (Aviation) and an Eng. Regiment (General Service) here. 1st Ind., May 15th, A. G. 320.2 (2-19-41) MC-C-M; TAG, stated that 34th Eng. Regiment (C) would be activated and that the personnel would probably arrive in June. This Regiment was to take the place of the Regiment (General Service) requested. On June 18th, letter AG 320.2 (6-5-41) MR-MC, the War Department issued orders expanding 804 Eng. Company to the 804th Eng. Battalion. The troops for the 304th Eng. Battalion arrived in this Department 21 July 1941. Previous instructions concerning the activation of the 34th Eng. Battalion had been rescinded with the result that the unit was not activated until 17 October 1941. It had not been completely trained and lacked many items of equipment at the time of the attack. See Exhibit "11".

15. Increase in Coast Artillery Troops:

February 18, 1941.—Letter written to TAG urgently requesting two (2) Regiments CA Mobile; 1 Battalion CA (AA) gun, Mobile (less searchlight battery); one Regiment CA (TD) 155 mm. gun; AA filler replacements (90 officers and 2064 enlisted men); Harbor Defense Artillery reinforcements (150 officers and 2700 enlisted men). TAG replied by first indorsement May 10, 1941, file AG 320.2 (2-18-41) (56) that the Hawaiian Department CA Garrison would be augmented with a total of 276 officers and 5734 enlisted men between June 1941 and March 1942, as follows: (See Exhibit "11")

June 1941:
(1) AA fillers, 60 officers, 1337 enlisted men.
(2) 98 CA 62 officers, 1329 enlisted men
(3) Second Battalion, 97 CA less Battery H (Gun) Battery E (SL) (17 officers, 359 enlisted men)

November 1941:
(1) 97 CA less 2 Battalion, 3 Battalion—(48 officers, 885 enlisted men).
(2) Battery H, 97 CA (4 officers, 134 enlisted men).
(3) Medical Personnel, 98 CA (7 officers, 49 enlisted men).

March 1941:
(1) AA fillers (24 officers, 661 enlisted men).
(2) 3 Battalion, 97 CA (37 mm. gun) less Battery H, 3 Battalion, 98 CA (37 mm. gun) less Battery M (54 officers, 980 enlisted men).

February 25th, 1941.—Letter written to TAG, file AG 320.2/57 (Exhibit requesting increase in enlisted men in 251st C. A. Regiment NG from 1181 to 1450. Disapproved by TAG March 8, 1941 (Exhibit 1J) 1st indorsement, file 320.2/57.

February 25th, 1941.—Letter written to TAG, file 320.2/58 (Exhibit 1J) requesting following reinforcements of Hawaiian Department:
(1) That CAC requested February 18th (Exhibit 1J) be given priority.
(2) That 11th F. A. be organized under T/O dated November 1, 1940.
(3) One Tank Battalion.
(4) Two (2) M. P. Companies for guarding air fields.
(5) Reinforcements of Inf. Regiments so as to be organized under T/O November 1, 1940.
(6) That 11th F. A. Brig. (less 11 F. A.) be reinforced and organized under T/O November 1, 1940.

TAG replied by first indorsement, file 320.2 (2-25-41) (53) (Exhibit 1J) that CAC and Engineering increases would be considered separately; that reinforcements for F. A. and Inf. Regiments were not considered urgent; that Tank Battalion and 2 M. P. Companies for Hawaiian Department were disapproved; and that any reorganization of units was to be accomplished by reducing size
of existing units and by carrying others as inactive. On May 28th, orders for the shipment of CAC increases were rescinded file 320.2/70. On July 15, letter from TAG, file 320.2/82m (Exhibit 1J) activated the following units:

97th CA Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 2 Battalions, and Batteries F and G.

98th CA Regimental Headquarters Battery (less band), Headquarters and Headquarters Battery 1st and 2nd Battalions, and Batteries A, B, C, D, F, G and H.

16. Increase in Air Corps Strength:

April 9th, 1941.—Letter from TAG, file 320.2 (3-5-41) (61) (Exhibit 1K) directing that Air Defense Command be set up. First indorsement, May 3, 1941 (Exhibit 1K) to TAG called attention to the fact that the plan was presented to War Department in letter of April 25th, 1941, Paragraph 7 “Reorganization of Forces in Hawaiian Department” (Exhibit 1K).

April 24th, 1941.—Letter written to TAG from COHAF (thru channels) file 320.2/94 (Exhibit 1K) subject “Air Base Group” requesting:

(1) Bellows Field as permanent Air Corps Station
(2) Permanent Station 15 Pursuit Group
(3) A redistribution of Air Base Groups
(4) That two Air Base Groups be authorized.

By second indorsement TAG to COHD dated June 26th, 1941, file 320.2 (4-24-41) (94) (Exhibit 1K):

(1) War Department stated that Troop Unit Basis FY 1942 provided for two additional material squadrons for HAF. This is believed to provide sufficient air base units to care for Bellows Field.

(2) Organization of Air Base Unit for 15th Pursuit Group held in obevance pending decision on new station. By third indorsement CGHD to TAG, file 320.2/94 (Exhibit 1K) request was made for two additional material squadrons to be stationed at Bellows Field. On August 7th, 1941, radio, file 320.2/100 (Exhibit 1K) was sent to Chief of Air Corps requesting Headquarters Detachment in absence of Air Base Group. On August 15th Radio No. 380 (Exhibit 1K) was sent to TAG requesting information of status of Air Base Groups for Bellows Field. Administrative situation there very difficult. In answer, Chief of Air Corps sent radio no. 172, file 320.2/108c (Exhibit 1K) stating [59] not favorably considered because it would exceed the 59,000 allotted and also that TAG had been requested to activate Headquarters Detachment. On September 27th, 1941, by letter (exhibit 1K) from TAG, file 320.2/108d, subject "Activation of Air Corps Unit" a Headquarters Detachment was authorized at Bellows Field but personnel had to be furnished by the Department.

On August 30, 1941, Radio No. 779, file 320.2/108 (Exhibit 1K) was received asking:

(1) What are total AC personnel requirements.
(2) Total requirements for personnel for arms and services with AC.
(3) Number AB groups needed and their locations.

On September 9, 1941, Radio No. 272 to TAG, file 320.2/108a (Exhibit 1K) answering Radio No. 779 requesting the following:

(1) Two AB Groups (one for Bellows, one for Kahuku)
(2) Air Corps enlisted men now in Department sufficient to organize these groups.
(3) One Squadron (HB) (Exhibit 1K) consisting of 27 officers, 220 enlisted men to replace 14th Bombardment Squadron transferred to Philippine Islands.
(4) Personnel for Bellows. Medical Department (1 officer, 7 enlisted men) Dental Corps (1 officer) Quartermaster (1 officer, 30 men) Ordnance Dept. (1 A. B. Co. of 4 officers and 60 enlisted men).
(5) Personnel for Kahuku Point. Medical Department (3 officers, 12 enlisted men) Dental Corps (1 officer) Quartermaster (1 officer, 30 enlisted men) Signal Corps (10 enlisted men specialists)
(6) Following personnel needed: Air Corps (3871 enlisted men) Medical Corps (6 officers, 36 enlisted men); Dental Corps (1); Quartermaster (4 officers, 70 enlisted men). 3 AB Squadrons one each at Barking Sands, Kauai; Morse Field; Hilo, Hawaii.
(7) Near Future. Two (2) additional AB Squadrons—(1) Lanai (under construction) (2) Parker Ranch (project to be submitted).

On November 8th Radio no. 786 was sent to TAG, file 320.2/126 (exhibit 1K) requesting immediate assignment.
(1) Three airdepot Groups to HAF
(2) Procurement of civilian employees impossible and discharge of enlisted men for employment does not help.

(3) 30% tactical planes grounded due to shortage in depot maintenance. Becoming acute.
(4) Must have personnel and material at once. No personnel available here for activation of units.

On November 15th Radio no. 402, file 320.2/126a, (exhibit 1K) from TAG stating that three Air Depot Groups were under advisement but that groups not available now. If and when available, will it come within strength of war garrison?

On November 19th Radio no. 889, file 320.2/126b (exhibit 1K) to TAG—Increase of three Air Depot Groups will not come within authorized war garrison but should be furnished as soon as possible due to shortage in personnel. War garrison must be increased to accommodate Air Base Groups.

On November 18th the War Department activated Seventh Airways Squadron from existing personnel in Department, file 320.2/127 (exhibit 1K). On November 18th Radio no. 873, file 320.2/128 (exhibit no. 1K) was sent to TAG requesting Station Complements at Hickam, Wheeler, Morse Field and Barking Sands. Urgently requested. On November 25th 1941 Radio no. 455, file 320.2/128a (exhibit 1K) from TAG stated that until war garrison limitation was lifted, no additional personnel could be sent to the Hawaiian Department.

17. Reorganization Hawaiian Division & Increase in War Garrison April 25th, 1941. Letter written to TAG, file 220.3/37, (exhibit 1L) requesting that two triangular divisions be organized from the Hawaiian Division (Square) and the organization of station complements be made at Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter—also Air Defense Command is to be created. By first indorsement dated July 29, 1941, file 320.3 (4-25-41) (37) (exhibit 1L) TAG returned this letter without action.

May 29th, 1941. TAG sent radio no. 837, file 320.3/37a (exhibit 1L) stating that the initial war garrison would be reduced to 58,000. Reductions would come from troops other than Air Corps, Anti aircraft, and Aircraft Warning Service.

June 5th, 1941.—Letter was written to TAG, file 320.3/37b (Exhibit 1L) subject “War Garrison for Initial War Operations” stating

(1) That Table I, (Exhibit 1L) shows forces recommending totaling 59,425.
(2) Statement that proper defense of Kaneho Bay, Airfields, beaches and provisions for mobile reserve cannot be successful with only 59,000 troops.
(3) Statement of minimum increase for Kaneho Bay as follows: 1 Regiment Inf; 1 Regiment Field Artillery, 155 How (T. D.); 1 Battalion C. A. 155 guns plus one additional battery; 1 Regiment C. A. (AA); 1 Battery C. A. 12” Barbette guns.
(4) Urgently requested that strength be increased from 58,000 to approximately 71,500 as follows: 2 Inf. Regiments; 1 Regiment Field Artillery, 155 How I Regiment CA (AA) SM; 1 Battalion CA 155 guns; 1 Battery CA 12” Barbette guns . . . total 11,279.
(5) Again recommended that station complements for Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter be organized. This would give an increase of 731 officers and men for Schofield Barracks and 131 officers and men for Fort Shafter.
(6) Plans are to be submitted in the near future for garrisons each of outlying islands with a force consisting of approximately 1 regiment of Infantry and a composite battalion of Field Artillery, all of which will not be within war garrison strength.

On July 22, 1941, 1st indorsement to exhibit IL file 320.3/37b (Exhibit 1L) TAG said

(1) War Garrison of 59,425 recommended by CGHD is reduced to 57,429 and augmented by following units: 1 Regiment CA (AA) SM (less 1 gun battalion, band, basics), 1 Battalion CA 155 M guns with 1 additional Battery, 1 Battery CA.
(2) Recommendation of war garrison for 71,500 officers and men is disapproved.

(3) Troops in excess of 59,690 authorized will be sent to Hawaii only in case the situation develops a need and if such troops are available.

18. May 2nd, 1941.—Letter written to TAG, file 320.3/38 (Exhibit 1M) subject “Organization of Anti Aircraft Artillery Brigade” requesting authority to activate the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery 53 CA Brig. and the Intelligence Battery, 53rd CA Brig. about June 1, 1941.
June 12, 1941.—First indorsement from TAG to CGHD, file 320.2 (5/2/41)
(38) (exhibit 1M) gives authority to activate.
19. November 6, 1941.—Radio No. 759 to Chief Ordnance, file 320.2/121
(exhibit 1N) stated that 6–37 mm. batteries now in Hawaiian Department. Plans
made for six more by March, 1942, but only twenty (20) guns on hand. When
and in what quantities will the one hundred (100) 37 mm. guns listed under 1941
funds be sent? Reply not yet received.

20. STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE. Before February 7, 1941,
Field Orders No. 1 (Landing Operations) No. 1W (Sabotage) and 1 NS (Naval
Security) had been prepared. It was found during Maneuvers, May 1941, that
these field orders were too cumbersome. On July 14th, 1941, a tentative Standing
Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department was issued to each officer in the
Department with instructions that any suggested changes were to be reported to
Department Headquarters by August 15, 1941. During the preparation of the
final form of the Standing Operating Procedure, the tentative S. O. P. was in
effect. The final form was issued on November 5, 1941. Each unit knew its
mission in the event Alert No. 1, 2 or 3 was put into effect. Due to this planning
(the S. O. P.) each unit was able to act quickly and promptly when the air raid
took place on December 7, 1941.

EFFECTS TO BETTER PREPARE THE CIVILIAN COMMUNITY FOR DEFENSE

[43] Soon after taking command of the Hawaiian Department I made a
survey with reference to possible defense measures to enable the civilian popula-
tion to meet any emergency which might arise. I had been asked to speak to the
Chamber of Commerce on Army Day, April 6th, and decided that this day was
the best opportunity to obtain publicity, as practically all the important business
men of Oahu were present on this occasion. I proposed the following items of
prime importance:
1. Production and storage of food.
2. Organization of doctors and nurses for care of injured and wounded.
3. Organization of an auxiliary to the police force to guard utilities and prevent
sabotage.
4. Preparation of plans and provision for evacuation of women and children
and preparation of shelters for workers in the vicinity of central industries.
(For complete remarks on this occasion, see Exhibit “1O”.

Production and storage of food: As a result of my talk and support by the papers
and certain men of importance in the community, the storage of food in the pantry
of the home was put into effect at once, and the purchases from the retailers
increased about 20% during the first month.

For some years a study had been made of food production required and possible
in the islands. A committee completed this work, and made definite assignment of
acreage and crops to all plantations on the Islands. Plantation managers
and the five big companies which act as factors for the various plantations all
agreed to this plan. Necessary implements for changing from cane and pine-
apples to truck gardening were listed for each plantation. Orders for seed for
planting the first crop were placed with firms in the mainland, orders to be filled
upon telegraphic advice.—Exhibit “1P”.

On December 10th, after completion of the inventory of food on hand, a meet-
ing was held with the Presidents of the five big companies and of the Governor’s
Food Committee. The District Engineer was directed to purchase the seed and
equipment at once, as it was believed the matter could be handled in less time in
this [44] manner instead of having each plantation make purchases.

The committee on storage of food determined the articles and tonnage of the
essential elements of diet necessary to provide for the civil population for six
months. The cost of these items was estimated to be $2,500,000 for human con-
sumption and $900,000 for feed for dairy cattle and poultry. This matter was
taken up with the War Department.

Governor Poindexter and Delegate Sam King gave the storage of food their
full support. However, the item was eliminated by the Bureau of the Budget
and no action was gotten through Congress. The purchase of this emergency
food reserve by the Department of Agriculture and the allocation of shipping
therefor was authorized December 17th. Recent press dispatches indicate that
the President has made an allotment for food production.

Organization of Doctors and Nurses for care of injured and wounded: The Medical
Society of Honolulu got squarely behind my effort to prepare the doctors and
nurses for an emergency. Twenty (20) civilian-aid station groups were organized and have had considerable practice in setting up their stations. They actually functioned efficiently on December 7th. Sixteen (16) surgical teams were organized. They started reporting at 9:00 A.M. December 7th, and by 9:30 all were employed. They are representative of the leading surgeons, anesthetists, etc., in the city. The regular operating staff at Tripler General Hospital was operating at 8:45 A.M.

After several conferences the Red Cross agreed to purchase and store in Honolulu $200,000.00 worth of medicines and surgical supplies and equipment. Much of the equipment and supplies had been received prior to December 7th.

Buildings suitable for hospitals were surveyed, and many of these have actually been equipped and operated since December 7th.

Organization of auxiliary police force: The organization of an auxiliary police force was effected and placed under the command of Major Douglas King by the Mayor of Honolulu. This force was given some training in taking over leading utilities and the use of firearms. It proved to be a very efficient force immediately after the raid.

Auxiliary fire fighters and fire wardens have been organized. Requests for fire-fighting equipment have been made to the Office of Civilian Defense, and also sent direct by the Governor to the same organization.

Evacuation and shelters: Detailed plans were drawn for evacuation camps, for trenches in parks, schools, etc., and for splinter-proof shelters in the vicinity of public utilities. A request for $2,800,000 for construction of these camps and shelters was made through the War Department and also direct by Governor Poindexter. The funds were not provided until after the attack December 7th. Since that date the President has made funds available to the Governor of the Territory of Hawaii for this purpose.—Exhibit "1Q"

M-DAY BILL

At the request of the Senate of the Territory of Hawaii I appeared before that body and explained the value and the necessity for the passage of the M-Day bill. The passage was effected in the next few days and the measure was signed by the Governor. The bill enabled the Governor to organize emergency committees and carry out many things of great benefit in the medical work, evacuation and police work immediately following the attack on December 7th.

LETTERS FROM CIVILIANS WITH REFERENCE TO MY EFFORTS TO IMPROVE CIVILIAN DEFENSE

The following copies of letters have been received: Exhibit "1R"

HONOLULU, T. H., December 22, 1941.

Sr: We, the undersigned, representing substantial business and social organizations in Hawaii, and having had for many years in many ways a vital interest in the armed forces stationed in Hawaii, do hereby wish to express our sincere appreciation of the services rendered to this Territory and to our Nation by Lieutenant General Walter C. Short.

We have found him at all times to be most cooperative and furthermore he has exercised a vigorous leadership in causing this community to prepare for an emergency such as exists at present. Almost a year ago he laid out a plan for this purpose and has taken all steps practicable toward carrying out such plan.

General Short's thorough foresight and his forceful presentation of his ideas to our "Territorial Legislature, to our local officials, and to our community in general have been very largely responsible for (a) the enactment of a sound "M-Day" Bill; (b) for the provision of a Territorial Guard; (c) for the de-

[46] cision to increase stored food and to produce food; and (d) for the prevention of sabotage. He has shown a correct and sympathetic attitude toward the problems of the civil community in assuring cooperation of civilians.

He has maintained a high morale in his Command and has conducted "alerts" from time to time. He has proceeded with preparing the troops and with plans,
now looking for financing from federal funds, for adequate and safe storage of sufficient supplies and equipment of all sorts for their use in a probable emergency. We are encouraged by the fact that a committee has been appointed to go into various phases of the entire case, believing that the excellent men you have selected will render a just report, fair to all concerned.

Meanwhile, we wish to express to yourself and to all concerned our high esteem and our full confidence in the character and ability of General Walter C. Short as a citizen and as an officer, whatever his assignment may be.

This letter is prepared without the knowledge or consent of General Short or any other officials, merely in our hope that no unwarranted discredit may accrue to the record of such a conscientious and able officer, through adverse publicity or otherwise. This concern is in no way lessened by our vital interest in the adequate defense of Hawaii and our Nation.

With very best respects and wishes, we are

Yours very truly,


C. C. to General Walter C. Short.

[47]  

MAJOR DISASTER COUNCIL

CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU

Office of the Director, Island of Oahu

HONOLULU, HAWAII, December 20, 1941.

Lt. General Walter C. Short,

Fort Shafter.

Dear General Short: Please allow me to express my sincere regret that our contact through Civilian Defense Plans has terminated. It was greatly due to your help and backing that our Civilian Organizations were so far advanced that they were able to function so splendidly during the attack.

You will always be able to recollect that your determination to have our Civilian Groups Prepared saved many lives of our Sailors and Soldiers through the organized effort of our Civilian Defense Medical committee and the many trucks that we had ready to be turned into ambulances at a minute’s notice.

Please be assured that you will carry the sincere thanks and Aloha of your many friends here who realize the distress you saved by urging and helping us to be prepared.

Yours very sincerely,

(s) T. G. S. Walker,

Director, Civilian Defense, Island of Oahu.
Lieutenant General Walter C. Short,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

My Dear General Short: Having noted in the public press that an investigation is being made as to the military preparedness of the Army and Navy in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, I believe it appropriate that I make to you a statement as to the state of preparedness of the civil communities of these Islands for war when they were so insidiously and treacherously attacked on December 7, 1941.

The citizens of the Hawaiian Islands have always appreciated that these Islands were important to National Defense from a military standpoint, but it has been only since your arrival in these Islands on February 5, 1941 that it has been brought home to the civilian population the importance of the part it would play in the event of a war in the Pacific. On December 7th, the citizens of these Islands met the hour of their test in such a manner as to make me proud to be the Chief Executive of these Islands. Your foresight in urging the population to prepare to meet the possible vicissitudes of war and the joint efforts of the Army and civil population in planning and preparing for this emergency was magnificently rewarded.

It may be of interest to point out in detail some of the plans and preparations which bore fruit on December 7, 1941:

(1) The enactment of the Hawaiian Defense Act by a special session of Legislation called for that purpose. This legislation permits a mobilization of the entire civil economy of the Islands in the interest of National Defense or in the event of disaster. By virtue of this act, civilian defense was planned and many of its phases were brought to such a point of preparation that they were able to go into action immediately and to function effectively on December 7, 1941.

(2) The production and conservation of food: Householders were persistently urged to stock their shelves in canned food. It is estimated that this resulted in increasing the available food supply of the Hawaiian Islands by more than twenty percent. Federal appropriation was requested for procurement and storage for food reserve. This appropriation has, since December 7, 1941, been authorized. By agreement with plantation owners, plans were made for the procurement and storage of seed and the planting of certain large areas with quick growing food crops. Agreements were also made for the growing, in normal times, of these crops not usually grown in marketable quantities. In furtherance of this plan, the War Department was induced to permit the purchase of Island grown potatoes for the use of the Army although the price was above that of mainland potatoes. In anticipation of the receipt of reserve supplies of food asked for in the emergency, the Army supported a certificate of necessity for building an adequate warehouse to meet these needs. This warehouse is now available for the storage of food supply when it arrives.

(3) The medical facilities for the care of the injured and wounded during any disaster was one of the first things accomplished by the civilians of these Islands for an emergency. This resulted in mobilizing the entire medical profession of the Islands with all its medical facilities. Approximately three thousand persons were given training and instruction in First-Aid as required by the Red Cross. The persons thus trained assisted in carrying out the arduous tasks of evacuation. Twenty First-Aid units were organized, each unit consisting of personnel of about one hundred and twenty. An ambulance corps of one hundred and forty improvised ambulances were organized. The performance of their tasks by these groups was one of the highlights of the civil defense efforts on December 7, 1941.

(4) Plans for the evacuation of women and children and the preparation of shelters for workers in essential industries had reached a high state of perfection on December 7, 1941, and the evacuation of women and children from areas attacked was accomplished in a most admirable manner.

(5) An auxiliary police force to guard utilities and to prevent sabotage was organized at an early date in our preparation and it was able to function instantly when called upon to do so on the morning of December 7th. Their work of this force was exceptional and excellent.
(6) Legislation authorizing a home guard was enacted at the special session of the Territorial Legislature. It was well planned and so organized that 1400 of such home guardsmen could and were placed on duty thereby relieving members of the Army for other military duty.

(7) There were many other matters too numerous to detail here which were planned and accomplished at your instigation. Important among these was the bringing home to the public the urgent necessity for cooperation and public service in times of emergency.

All of the foregoing required tremendous effort on the part of the local authorities, the citizenry and military authorities. All such efforts have been rewarded since December 7, 1941, in that Territorial and City Governments and all phases of the public welfare have overcome all obstacles and have operated smoothly as a direct result of prior planning and training.

It is my belief that the public has confidence in the military and civil authorities. The fact that the Japanese Government has seen fit to inflict a treacherous attack has not in any way diminished the faith of this community in your demonstrated abilities. I wish to state that the magnificent way in which the Territory of Hawaii met its problem in its crucial hour was in a large measure due to your foresight. I am deeply grateful for your efforts on behalf of the Territory.

You are at liberty to use this letter in any way which you see fit. THIS IS A TRUE COPY.

Very sincerely yours,

L. W. Truman,
Captain, Infantry.

[48] I have presented many of my actions, both with reference to the military defense of the islands and the preparations of the civil community for defense, to show that I have taken both a very active and an intelligent part in this work from the time of my arrival in the Hawaiian Department.

I should be very glad if this Committee would see fit to call before it a number of officers of my command, preferably from officers of high enough rank to know what I have accomplished, and from staff officers who are familiar with the work that has been carried out during the past ten months. I would also like very much to have the Governor and some of the leading business men called before the Commission to tell what the civil community thinks of the work that I have done over the past ten months.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The radiogram from the War Department thru CINCUS fleet UCS of October 16th emphasized that measures taken by me during the grave situation of the Japanese negotiations should not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan.

The radiogram of November 27th reiterated that action should be carried out so as "not repeat not to disclose intent", not alarm civil population, and avoid unnecessary publicity.

When the War Department was notified that the Hawaiian Department was alerted against sabotage it not only did not indicate that the command should be alerted against a hostile surface, sub-surface, ground or air attack, but replied emphasizing the necessity for protection against sabotage and subversive measures. This, taken in connection with the two previous radiograms mentioned, indicated to me a tacit consent to the alert against sabotage ordered by the Hawaiian Department.

2. The Hawaiian Department is not provided with an agency for locating enemy ships in various parts of the world. Such information as it may acquire on this subject must be obtained from the Fourteenth Naval District or from the War Department.

The "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier" places upon the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District the responsibility for distant reconnaissance. Annex # 7 to the "Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan" provides that when naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations and army aircraft are made available, these will be under the tactical control of the naval command during search operations. That means that the army planes receive their missions and all instructions from the naval commander and carry out the search as he deems necessary in order to carry out his responsibility for distant reconnaissance.
During the period November 27th to December 6th, the Navy made no request for army planes to participate in distance reconnaissance. To me this meant that they had definite information of the location of enemy carriers or that the number unaccounted for was such that naval planes could make the necessary reconnaissance without the assistance from the army. During this period I was in frequent conferences with the Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet and the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and at no time was anything said to indicate that they feared the possibility of an attack by the Japanese by air. In fact, the sentiment was expressed by a naval staff officer that there was no probability of such an attack. With a large part of the United States Navy in Hawaiian waters and with their sources of information, I was convinced that the Navy would be able either to intercept any carrier attempting to approach Oahu or at least to obtain such information from task forces or by reconnaissance as to make them aware of the presence of carriers in the Hawaiian waters and of the possibility of an air attack.

3. Action of the War Department on December 5th and as late as 1:30 A. M., Eastern standard time, December 7th, in dispatching planes from the mainland to Honolulu without ammunition indicated that the War Department did not believe in the probability of an early Japanese attack upon Honolulu.

I felt that I had a right to expect the War Department to furnish me by the most rapid means possible information should a real crisis arise in Japanese relations. I did not expect that when the crisis arose the desire for secrecy would be considered more important than the element of time. Had the message in regard to the Japanese ultimatum and the burning of their code machines been given me by telephone as an urgent message in the clear without loss of time for encoding and decoding, etc., I, in all probability, would have had approximately two hours in which to make detailed preparations to meet an immediate attack.

4. I feel that my work in the Hawaiian Department should be judged by my activities throughout the complete period from the assumption of command on February 7, until my relief upon December 16th. I believe that any careful examination of my work during that period will prove that I have worked very seriously at the job and have accomplished measures of very considerable importance. I do not see how I could better have carried out what appeared to be the desires of the War Department unless I was supposed to know more than the War Department about the danger of Japanese attack and more than the Navy Department about the location of the Japanese carriers. To have taken more steps in preparation against a Japanese attack than I did would have alarmed the civil population and caused publicity contrary [50] to War Department instructions. I do not believe that I should be found guilty even of an error in judgment because I did not have the vision to foresee that the War Department would not notify me of a crisis in the least possible time and that the Navy with its large fleet in Hawaiian waters would not be able to carry out its mission of intercepting Japanese carriers, or at least detecting their presence in Hawaiian waters and informing me of the fact.

[57a] [Exhibit A]
[57] copy
[secret]

U. S. NAVAL COMMUNICATION SERVICE
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET

[Paraphrase]

NOTE FOR COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT:
THE FOLLOWING IS A PARAPHRASE OF A Dispatch FROM THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS WHICH I HAVE BEEN DIRECTED TO PASS TO YOU Quote:

Japanese cabinet resignation creates a grave situation x if a new cabinet is formed it probably will be anti-American and strongly nationalistic x if the Konoye cabinet remains it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the United States x either' way hostilities between Japan and Russia are strongly possible x since Britain and the US are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility Japan may attack these two powers x view of these possibilities you will take due pre-
cautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intension nor constitute provocative actions against Japan

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A True Copy:
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[Exhibit B]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

PI WAR PRTY

Wash DC 611 PM Nov 27 1941

C G

Hawn Dept Ft Shafter T. H.

472 27th negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue stop Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment stop if hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act stop this policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense stop prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm civil population or disclose intent stop report measures taken stop should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in rainbow five so far as they pertain to Japan stop limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers

True copy
O. M. Cutler
O. M. Cutler
Lt Col Infantry

[Exhibit C]

[RESTRICTED]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
FORT SHAFTER, T. H., 5 November 1941.

Subject: Standing Operating Procedure
To: Distribution "B", "L", and "G" less 1, 2, 3 and 5

1. Attention is directed to attached Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, which supersedes Tentative Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, 14 July 1941.

2. Issuing headquarters will collect and destroy all copies of Tentative Standing Operating Procedure in the possession of units and officers.

3. Department General and Special Staff Sections and Commanders of major echelons, districts, department troops and station complements directly under this headquarters will submit, for approval of this headquarters, Standing Operating Procedures, Movement and Loading Tables. Chiefs of Special Staff Sections, HHD, will include in their SOP HD all installations under their supervision.

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

Robert H. Dunlop
ROBERT H. DUNLOP,
Colonel, A. G. D.,
Adjutant General.

1 Inclosure: SOP HD
Subject: Standing Operating Procedure  

To: Distribution "B", "L", and "G" less 1, 2, 3 and 5

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By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

Robert H. Dunlop,

Robert H. Dunlop,

Colonel, A. G. D.,

Adjutant General.

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1 Inclosure: SOP HD

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STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURE  
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

SECTION I—GENERAL

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1 Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.
SECTION I—GENERAL

1. PURPOSE.—The purpose of a "Standing Operating Procedure" is stated in paragraph 159, FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations, and paragraph 56, FM 101-5, Staff Officers' Field Manual.

2. UNIT PROCEDURES.—Conforming to the Department Procedure, subordinate units and staff sections will develop appropriate Standing Operating Procedures.

3. SHORT TITLE.—"SOP HD" will signify this Standing Operating Procedure.

4. DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS.—Department Headquarters may operate either as a whole or in two groups. When divided, the headquarters will consist of a forward and a rear echelon, the composition of which ordinarily will be as follows:
   a. FORWARD ECHELON.—
      Commanding General and Aides
      General Staff (less G-1 and G-5)
      Secretary to General Staff
      Engineer Officer
      Signal Officer
      Chemical Officer
      Ordnance Officer
      Surgeon
      Headquarters Commandant
      Provost Marshal.
   b. REAR ECHELON.—
      G-1
      G-5
      Special Staff (less those in forward echelon).

5. TACTICAL PRINCIPLES.—See FM 31-10, Coast Defense. The chief tactical principles applicable to the problem of the defense of OAHU and the air fields on the outlying islands are as follows:
   a. Complete organization of the ground
   b. Position to be held lightly
   c. Large reserves, held mobile, with motor transportation sufficient to transport them
   d. Automatic counter-attack.

6. SECURITY.—Every unit is responsible for its security at all times from hostile ground or air forces. See paragraphs 233 to 273, inclusive, FM 100-5.

7. LIAISON.—a. OFFICERS.—During all operations and alerts, a liaison officer with motor transportation will be sent from each of the following units to Department Headquarters and will remain thereat except when on a mission to their own headquarters:
      24th Infantry Division
      25th Infantry Division
      Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command
      Hawaiian Air Force
      86th Observation Squadron
      Each Department Reserve Unit.

   b. UNITS.—Both lateral and vertical liaison are mandatory. The responsibility therefor is from right to left and from front to rear. Combat teams operating in areas where coast artillery group stations are in operation will establish liaison with those stations.

8. ORDERS.—a. The Department Commander will issue orders covering the action of the Infantry Divisions, the Hawaiian Air Force, the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, Department Reserve units and all attached troops.
   b. Orders issued by the Department (except as in c above) will be brief written field orders with an operation map. Circumstances may require the issuance of an oral order, but this will be confirmed later in writing.

1 Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.
c. Fragmentary orders, oral or written, may be issued when appropriate. Copies of the Department Commander's decision or directives, together with a roughly sketched operation map, will be sent by staff officers to lower units as soon as issued in order that plans may be initiated prior to receipt of the field order from the Department.

d. To expedite issue and to conserve time, unit commanders and staff officers will dictate their decisions, directives, plans and orders. All commanders and staff officers will perfect themselves in the dictation of orders. Competent stenographer-clerks and draftsmen will be trained within each headquarters.

9. MOVEMENT.—a. In general, all troops will be moved by motor. The maximum space in trucks will be utilized for the troops (standing if necessary) since all movements are necessarily for short distances.

b. Trucks will not close up and every effort will be made to avoid halting in the open. Maximum use will be taken of overhead cover, and vehicles either in bivouac or assembly areas will always be dispersed when in the open, and will be dispersed to the maximum extent practicable when in concealed positions.

c. In tactical movements, vehicles will be maintained at maximum speed authorized by law, consistent with safety. (This may be satisfactorily accomplished by restricting the leading vehicle to 10 miles per hour less than the maximum authorized; the others, not exceeding the maximum authorized speed).

d. All tactical movements in daylight will be by infiltration, FM 25–10, the distance between vehicles being not less than 300 yards. Administrative marches will be made with not less than safe driving distance between vehicles, or any distance greater than safe driving distance which will facilitate the movement (paragraph 31, FM 25–10). When necessary, officers' control points and route markers (paragraph 94, FM 25–10) will be utilized.

e. All movements under Alert No. 1 will be administrative.

f. Motor vehicles operating at night, at the discretion of local commanders, will be (1) in convoy with standard blackout or blue lights with a shielded tail light on all vehicles, or (2) in the case of convoys traveling closed up, with standard blackout or blue lights on leading vehicle and a shielded tail light on the rear vehicle, and no lights on the others, or (3) no lights when operating on one-way secondary roads, and cross-country, on military reservations and leased lands. On two-way roads the distance between vehicles and/or serials will be sufficient to permit the unimpeded flow of traffic.

[1] g. Trucks attached to a unit for a specific mission will revert to control of the parent unit when the specific mission has been accomplished.

10. ANTI AIRCRAFT DEFENSE.—a. Antiaircraft defense is a responsibility of every unit. See paragraphs 261–273, FM 100–5.

b. All Infantry units not occupying front line positions will have their automatic weapons habitually in readiness for antiaircraft defense, and all other units will be prepared likewise to engage hostile aircraft.

c. On marches, all small arms suitable for use against aircraft will be in readiness for action. When enemy air action is imminent trucks normally will halt, troops will detruck, disperse and fire on enemy planes.

d. All unit commanders will be held responsible for the following:

(1) Maintenance of air guards to give timely warning of the approach of hostile aviation.

(2) Adoption of necessary measures to prevent hostile observation and aerial photography through advantageous use of terrain, utilization of cover, and use of camouflage.

(3) Reduction of vulnerability to air attack and observation by dispersion of personnel and materiel when in bivouac or in position and by increased speed during movement.

11. INSTALLATIONS AND ALARM SYSTEM.—All important installations not protected by the Territorial Home Guard will be guarded by troops. An adequate alarm system will be established in connection therewith.

12. GUIDES.—a. In case of a relief, guides from the relieved organization will meet the incoming unit and remain with it until ordered back to their organization by the commander of the incoming unit.

b. Whenever units are ordered to another sector for support or attachment, the sector commander will provide the necessary guides to assist the supporting or attached units.
SECTION II—ALERTS

13. All defense measures are classified under one of the three (3) Alerts as indicated below. Operations under any Alert will be initiated by a Department order, except in case of a surprise hostile attack. See paragraph 15 f (8) below.

14. ALERT NO. 1.—a. This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands, with no threat from without.

b. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, all General and Special Staff Sections will continue with their usual duties at their present stations, pending further orders.

c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will carry on their normal training, pending instructions from this Headquarters.

d. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will:

(1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector.

(2) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.

(3) Protect the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Reservation and all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard. The following are among the important ones:

- Police District No. 1, see paragraph 14 h (2) below
- Command and Fire Control Cable System, see inclosure No. 1
- Railway and Highway Bridges, see inclosure No. 2
- Water supply for SCHOFIELD BARRACKS
- Radio Station at PUU MANAWAHUA
- WAIKALUA Generating Plant
- Telephone Exchanges at WAIPAHU, WAHIAWA, WAIKALUA (in HALEIWA), LAIE and KANEHOE
- Electric sub-stations at WAHIAWA, WAIKALUA, KAHUKU, KAILUA, WAIPIO and EWA, and electric power lines from WAIPIO-WAHIAWA-SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, inclusive, and to FORT BARRETTE, exclusive, from KOOHALA switch station—BELLOWS FIELD, see inclosure No. 3.
- Cold Storage Plant in WAHIAWA
- Pumping Stations at MOANALUA and KAPAHULU.

(4) The 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the pumping stations at AIEA and HALAWA.

(5) See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 14 j below.

e. The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND will:

(1) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense.

(2) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command.

(3) Protect the Radio Beacon on Sand Island.

(4) Provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.

f. The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will:

(1) Protect all vital installations on posts on OAHU garrisoned by air forces

(2) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 14 g below.

g. The DISTRICT COMMANDERS, assisted by the air corps detachments within the districts, will:

Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, and maintain order in the civil community.

h. The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, in addition to his normal duties, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, will:

(1) Regulate traffic on OAHU.

(2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations.

(3) Establish liaison with the local police force.

i. The STATION COMPLMENTS of HICKAM, WHEELER and BELLOWS FIELDS, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the protection of all vital installations on their respective posts.

j. TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD.—Upon the formation of the Territorial Home Guard, recently authorized by the Territorial Legislature, it is anticipated that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the District Com-
manders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, except the Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations on Army and Navy Reservations. See paragraph 14 d (3) and g above. Instructions will be issued.

15. **ALERT NO. 2.** —a. This alert is applicable to a condition more serious than Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile sub-surface, surface, and air-craft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided.

b. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS, only the G-2 and G-3 Sections will be required to operate on a 24-hour basis. All other sections of the General and Special Staffs will continue with their normal schedule.

c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will carry on their normal training, pending instructions from this Headquarters.

d. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will:

   (1) Suppress all civil disorders, including sabotage, in its assigned sector.

   (2) Maintain available all units at fifty percent (50%) of their present strength, except those required under (3), (4) and (5) below.

   (3) Maintain one (1) infantry battalion with motor transportation sufficient to transport it, prepared to move on one (1) hour's notice.

   (4) Protect the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Reservation and all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard. The following are among the important ones:

   Police District No. 1, see paragraph 15 h (2) below

   Command and Fire Control Cable System, see inclosure No. 1

   Railway and Highway Bridges, see inclosure No. 2

   Water supply for SCHOFIELD BARRACKS

   Radio Station at PUU MANAWAHUA

   WAIAU Generating Plant

   Telephone exchanges at WAIPAHU, WAHIAWA, WAIALUA (in HALEIWA), LAIE and KANEHOE

   Electric sub-stations at WAHIAWA, WAIALUA, KAHUKU, KAILUA, WAIPIO and EWA, and electric power lines from WAIPIO-WAHIWA—SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, inclusive, and to FORT BARRETTE, exclusive, from KOOLAU switch station—BELLOWS FIELD, see inclosure No. 3

   Cold Storage Plant in WAHIAWA

   Pumping Stations at MOANALUA and KAPAHALU.

   (5) The 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the pumping stations at AIEA and HALAWA.

6. (6) Place 240mm howitzers in position, establish the necessary guards and, when directed, place ammunition at positions.

7. Release Field Artillery units manning seacoast armament (155mm guns) to Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. See paragraph 15 e below.

8. See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 15 f below.

9. The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND, and attached Field Artillery, will:

   (1) Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft defense positions, except that railway batteries will remain at FORT KAMEHAMEHA or where emplaced.

   (2) Release the 53d AA Brigade to the Interceptor Command for operational control.

   (3) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense.

   (4) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command, except FORT SHAFTER. For FORT SHAFTER, see paragraph 15 k (1) below.

   (5) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament.

   (6) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels.

   (7) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies.

   (8) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol.

   (9) Protect the Radio Beacon on Sand Island.

10. Provide Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post.

f. The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will:

   (1) Maintain aircraft and crews in condition of readiness as directed by this headquarters. See paragraph 17.
(2) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command.
(3) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival thereat, disperse on fields.
(4) Disperse bombers with crews.
(5) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.
(6) Protect all vital installations on posts on OAHU garrisoned by air forces.
(7) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 15 g below.
(8) In case of surprise hostile attack:
(a) Release to Navy for operational control all bombers in condition of readiness "A". The bomber commander will report to the Commander of Patrol Wing TWO.

(b) Receive all available shore based Naval and Marine Corps fighter planes in appropriate condition of readiness and release them to the Interceptor Command for operational control.

7. The DISTRICT COMMANDERS, assisted by the air corps detachments within the districts, will:
Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and maintain order in the civil community.

8. The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, in addition to his normal duties, will:
(1) Regulate traffic on OAHU.
(2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations.
(3) Establish liaison with the local police force.
(4) Be prepared to assist civilian authorities in all Air Raid Precautions including blackout, radio silence and evacuation of civilians from dangerous areas.
(5) Be prepared to establish facilities for gathering and caring for refugees.
(6) Protect FORT SHAFTER. See paragraph 15 k (1).

i. The DEPARTMENT SIGNAL OFFICER will:
(1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service and then release it to the Interceptor Command.
(2) Insure that joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for immediate employment.

j. The INTERCEPTOR COMMAND will:
Coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including available Naval and Marine Corps AA Artillery), the Aircraft Warning Service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of antiaircraft measures of units not under military control, to include:
(1) Arrival and departure of all friendly aircraft.
(2) The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in PEARL and/or HONOLULU HARBORS.
(3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.

k. STATION COMPLEMENTS:
(1) The FORT SHAFTER Complement, under the supervision of the Department Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on FORT SHAFTER and, in addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.
(2) The HICKAM, WHEELER and BELLOWS FIELDS Complements, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the defense of their respective posts against sabotage, air and ground attacks.

l. TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD.—Upon the formation of the Territorial Home Guard, recently authorized by the Territorial Legislature, it is anticipated that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the District Commanders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, except the Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations on Army and Navy Reservations. See paragraph 15 d (4) and g above. Instructions will be issued.

15. ALERT NO. 3.—a. This alert requires the occupation of all field positions by all units, prepared for maximum defense of OAHU and the Army installations on outlying islands.

b. At DEPARTMENT HEADQUARTERS:
(1) All sections of the forward echelon (see paragraph 4 a) will occupy their stations at forward command post, prepared to operate on a 24-hour basis.
(2) All sections of the rear echelon (see paragraph 4 b) will continue their usual duties at their present stations. Blackout instructions will be complied with.
c. DEPARTMENT TROOPS will remain in condition of mobile readiness at their permanent stations, pending instructions from this headquarters.

d. Each INFANTRY DIVISION will:
   (1) Defend its assigned sector on OAHU.
   (2) Protect all vital installations (except those on garrisoned Army and Navy Reservations) in its assigned sector, not protected by the Territorial Home Guard.
   (3) Release all available Bands to the Commanding Officer, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.
   (4) The 25th Infantry Division will assist the Navy in guarding the pumping stations at AIEA and HALAWA.
   (5) Place 240mm howitzers in position.
   (6) Release Field Artillery units manning seacoast armament (155mm guns) to Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. See paragraph 16 e below.
   (7) See Territorial Home Guard, paragraph 16 m below.

e. The HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND, and attached Detachment Field Artillery, will:
   (1) Occupy initial seacoast and antiaircraft positions.
   (2) Support Naval forces within range of seacoast armament.
   (3) Prevent approach of and landing from hostile vessels.
   (4) Support the Infantry Divisions.
   (5) Coordinate all seacoast intelligence agencies.
   (6) Coordinate seacoast defense with the Inshore Patrol.
   (7) Provide the Army personnel required to operate the Harbor Control Post.
   (9) Protect all vital installations on posts and reservations of the command, except FORT SHAFTER. For FORT SHAFTER, see paragraph 16 l (2) below.
   (10) Protect all seacoast and antiaircraft armament, searchlights, observation and fire control installations, and other elements of the seacoast and antiaircraft defense.

f. The HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE will:
   (1) Destory enemy aircraft.
   (2) Carry out bombing missions as directed.
   (3) Cooperate with Naval air forces.
   (4) On OAHU, defend all posts garrisoned by air forces against sabotage, air and ground attacks.
   (5) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 16 h below.
   (6) Arm all planes, except that normally bombs will not be loaded on ships dispatched to outlying islands. See paragraph 25 e (8).
   (7) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival therefrom, disperse on fields.
   (8) Disperse bombers with crews.
   (9) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.
   (10) Perform observation, command and photographic missions.
   (11) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command.

g. G-5 will be prepared to establish the following:
   (1) A Food Administration.
   (2) A Labor Procurement Service.

h. The DISTRICT COMMANDERS of HAWAII, MAUI (includes MOLOKAI) and KAUAI Districts, assisted by the air corps detachments present within the districts, will:
   Defend the air fields against acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and maintain order in the civil community.

i. The DEPARTMENT PROVOST MARSHAL, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, in addition to his normal duties, will:
   (1) Regulate traffic on OAHU.
   (2) Assist the 25th Infantry Division in posting guards on vital installations.
   (3) Establish liaison with the local police force.
   (4) Be prepared to assist civilian authorities in all Air Raid Precautions including blackouts, radio silence and evacuation of civilians from dangerous areas.
   (5) Be prepared to establish facilities for gathering and caring for refugees.

j. The INTERCEPTOR COMMAND will coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, antiaircraft artillery (including available Naval and
Marine Corps AA Artillery), the aircraft warning service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of antiaircraft measures of units not under military control to include:

1. Arrival and departure of all friendly aircraft.
2. The coordination of the antiaircraft fire of Naval ships in PEARL and/or HONOLULU HARBORS.

k. The DEPARTMENT SIGNAL OFFICER will:
(1) Insure occupation of all battle stations by the Aircraft Warning Service and then release it to the Interceptor Command.
(2) Insure that joint Army-Navy communications are in readiness for immediate employment.
(3) Be prepared to assume control over essential civilian communications.

l. STATION COMPLEMENTS.—
(1) The SCHOFIELD BARRACKS Complement will protect all vital installations on the Schofield Reservation.
(2) The FORT SHAFTER Complement, under the supervision of the Department Provost Marshal, will protect all vital installations on FORT SHAFTER and, in addition thereto, will provide a guard for the rear echelon of Department Headquarters and Tripler General Hospital.
(3) The HICKAM, WHEELER and BELLOWS FIELDS Complements, under command of the Hawaiian Air Force, will assist in the defense of their respective posts against sabotage, air and ground attacks.

m. TERRITORIAL HOME GUARD.—Upon the formation of the Territorial Home Guard, recently authorized by the Territorial Legislature, it is anticipated that this organization will relieve the Infantry Divisions and the District Commanders of responsibility for the protection of all vital installations, except the Command and Fire Control Cable System and those installations on Army and Navy Reservations. See paragraph 16 a (2) and b above. Instructions will be issued.

SECTION III—CONDITION OF READINESS FOR AIRCRAFT

17. Condition of readiness for aircraft will be prescribed by a combination of a letter and a number as indicated in paragraphs a and b below. The letter indicating the part of a unit in a condition of material readiness for its assigned task and the number indicating the degree of operational readiness prescribed for that part.

a. MATERIAL READINESS.—
   A—All assigned operating aircraft available and ready for a task.
   B—One-half of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.
   C—Approximately one-quarter of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.
   D—Approximately one-eighth of all aircraft of each functional type available and ready for a task.
   E—All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan.

b. DEGREE OF OPERATIONAL READINESS.—
   All times listed in this table are the maximums allowed for the first plane of a unit to be in the air armed and prepared to carry out the assigned task.
   1—For pursuit and VF types: Four minutes. Types other than fighters: Fifteen minutes.
   2—All types: 30 minutes.
   3—All types: One hour.
   4—All types: Two hours.
   5—All types: Four hours.

SECTION IV—INTELLIGENCE

18. The Intelligence Standing Operating Procedure indicated below will be followed generally where applicable.

19. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF ENEMY INFORMATION.—
   a. Will the enemy attempt to destroy or neutralize NAVAL BASES at PEARL HARBOR, at KANEOHE BAY, and air fields on OAHU with the object of denying their use to the UNITED STATES without occupation? If so, will
his air attacks be accompanied by Naval bombardment and blockading operations?

b. Will the enemy attempt to capture OAHU by expeditionary forces with the object of utilizing the NAVAL BASES at PEARL HARBOR, at KANEHOE BAY, and air fields thereon? If so, when, where, and with what strength will he make his main attack?

c. Will the enemy attempt to capture any other of the principal islands of the Hawaiian Group with the object of utilizing the air fields and establish bases thereon?

d. Will the enemy military operations be accompanied by acts of sabotage and terrorism on the part of resident sympathizers?

e. Will the enemy utilize local foreign population, local aliens or nationals of foreign origin for sabotage operations, raids to assist landing operations, or other acts of assistance?

20. MEASURES TO OBTAIN INFORMATION.—

a. NAVY.—

(1) Transmit, through the Joint Intelligence Loop, information received from the Offshore and Inshore PatROLS, from any escort or attack forces formed, and from any other Naval Ships relative to:

(2) [Location, composition, course, and speed of enemy units encountered, with particular reference to location of aircraft carriers and transports.]

(b) Indications of landings on any island of the main Hawaiian Group, with particular attention to the number and type of landing boats, and the composition of supporting Naval units.

c. Indications of attempts to block HONOLULU and/or PEARL HARBORS.

d. Indications of any hostile aerial activity in strength.

e. Report damage inflicted on hostile vessels, troops and installations. Damage to aircraft carriers, transports, capital ships, and other important damage immediately.

(f) Report damage by hostile Naval and air bombardment, incurred or observed. Important damage, including damage to landing fields, and use of chemicals, immediately.

(g) See paragraph 20 c below.

b. ARMY.—

(1) Hawaiian Air Force.—

(a) Observe all waters within an area bounded as follows:

By arcs of twenty (20) miles radii with centers at OPANA POINT, MAUI; KAUIKI HEAD LIGHT, MAUI; LAUPAHOEHOE LIGHT, HAWAII; CAPE KUMUKAHI LIGHT, HAWAII; KALAE LIGHT, HAWAII; SOUTH-WEST HEADLAND, KAHOOLawe; LEahi POINT, NIiHAU; LEhua ISLAND, NIiHAU; KAILIU POINT, KAUAi; and are of thirty (30) miles radius with its center at KAHUkU POINT, OAHU, and the tangents connecting these arcs in the order named.

Report location, composition, course and speed of enemy units encountered. Maintain continuous contact with major subdivisions of enemy units. Particular attention to location of aircraft carriers and transports. First contact, material changes of direction, and definite location of aircraft carriers to be reported immediately by Joint Intelligence Loop; thereafter on the hour by department Intelligence Loop.

(b) Report indications of landing on any island, giving location, number, type and formation of landing boats and composition of supporting Naval group. Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop.

c. Report damage inflicted on hostile vessels, troops, and installations. Damage to aircraft carriers, transports, capital ships, and other important damage immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop.

(d) Report damage by hostile naval and air bombardment, incurred or observed by their operations. Important damage, including damage to landing fields, and use of chemicals, immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop; other damage at 1815 by Department Intelligence Loop.

e. Report any hostile aerial activity in strength, including number, type, direction and area of attack or observation, by Joint Intelligence Loop.

(2) 86th Observation Squadron.—

(a) Same as for "HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE"—see 20 b (1) above.

(13) (b) Be prepared to provide, on call, observation for the control of long-range artillery fire.

(3) Interceptor Command.—

(a) Report immediately any and all information of hostile air force or surface vessel.
(b) Report, upon completion of action by or with enemy air force, composition of enemy forces, direction of approach, time of action, area attacked, and damage to enemy airplanes.

(4) Each Infantry Division.—

(a) Report location, number, type and formation of transports and landing boats and composition of supporting naval group. Report when observed thereafter hourly, on the hour, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(b) Report enemy front lines and boundaries between units. Report immediately any significant change. Otherwise report every two hours, on the even hour, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(c) Report location of own front lines. Report every two hours, on the even hour, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(d) Report all identifications. Infantry identifications are most important. Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(e) Report indications of landing of artillery, including caliber of same, and tanks. Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(f) Report damage by hostile naval and air bombardment. Important damage immediately; other damage at 1830, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(g) Report time, place, kinds and method of employment of chemicals. Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(h) Report weather and surf conditions on all favorable landing beaches. Report at 0300, 0700, 1200 and 1700 and 2200, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(i) The 25th Division will assign G-2 personnel to assist the Provost Marshal in the examination and questioning of enemy documents and personnel in South Sector.

(5) Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command.—

(a) Report immediately, by Department Intelligence Loop, initial contact with enemy units, giving location, composition and course of formation.

(b) Report immediately, by Department Intelligence Loop, when an action is begun by hostile vessels or by the seacoast artillery, giving location of naval vessels, locality being attacked, and units engaged.

(c) Report damage inflicted on hostile vessels, troops, and installations. Damage to aircraft carriers, transports, capital ships, and other important damage immediately, by Joint Intelligence Loop.

(d) Report upon completion of any action, by Department Intelligence Loop, important damage from hostile naval and air bombardment, and report the use of chemicals immediately. Other damage at 1900 by Department Intelligence Loop.

(e) Report, when observed, by Department Intelligence Loop, location, number, type, and formation of landing boats and composition of supporting naval force.

(f) Report, when observed, by Joint Intelligence Loop, indications of attempts to block HONOLULU HARBOR, PEARL HARBOR, or KANEHOHE BAY.

(g) Report as soon as practicable important damage to ground installations, including damage to use of chemical agents.

(h) Report visibility at 0400, 0700, 1200, 1700 and 2200, by Department Intelligence Loop.

(i) Any of the above reports may be transmitted by telephone when necessary to avoid delay.

(6) District Commanders of HAWAI, MAUI and KAUAI Districts.—Report when observed, by radio to Hawaiian Air Force, thence by Department Intelligence Loop:

(a) Nature of hostile activity, including number, type, direction and area of attack or observation.

(b) Damage by hostile naval and air bombardment.

(c) Location, number, type and formation of landing boats and composition of supporting naval group.

(d) Enemy front lines and boundaries between units.

(e) All identifications. Infantry identifications are most important.

(f) Time, place, kinds and method of employment of chemicals.

(7) Department Signal Office.—

Radio intercept and goniometric service. Report when obtained.

c. ALL ELEMENTS OF HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT.—

(1) Report presence of parachute troops and assemblies of enemy nationals or sympathizers and overt acts of sabotage or terrorism, giving location, time, numbers involved, and probable intentions or damage accomplished.
(2) Report of location of floating or stranded mines, in order that this information may be relayed to the Navy. No other action, i.e., attempts at destruction, than to report location immediately, should be taken.

d. MISCELLANEOUS.—

(1) Transmission of G-2 Information.—

In the absence of specific instructions as to transmission, or in the event of failure or overload of specified channels, G-2 information will be transmitted by direct line, where available, or by the most expeditious routing over the circuits set forth in current Signal Operations Instructions. [15] If wire and radio signal communication are out, important intelligence information will be sent back by any means at hand: Wire circuits of near-by units, motor messenger, commandeered vehicle, any means necessary commensurate with the value of the information.

21. MEASURES FOR HANDLING.—

a. PRISONERS: Examination stations will be located at all Prisoner of War collection points.

b. DOCUMENTS AND CAPTURED MATERIAL.—

(1) Documents will be sent to G-2's of Department or Divisions, with the minimum of delay, by regularly scheduled messenger service.

(2) Reports of captured material will be sent to the same stations by the same means.

(3) Documents and material identifying organizations or indicating the use of chemicals are of major importance. They will be given special priority in shipment to examination stations and will be reported to Department G-2 by the most expeditious means.

(4) Liaison officers from the office of G-2, H. H. D., will be assigned to all Examination Stations, and will assist the Provost Marshal in examining enemy personnel, materiel and documents, and in determining destination of reports.

c. MAPS.—Maps will be supplied initially by the Department Engineer.

22. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTION.—

Distribution of reports from Department Headquarters: Summaries of Intelligence at 0800, 1300, 1800 and 2300.

23. THE DEPARTMENT G-2 will:

a. Keep the Commanding General and all interested staff officers informed regarding the enemy situation and of his deductions concerning it.

b. Insure that counterintelligence measures are adequately provided for and adhered to.

c. Establish a counter-espionage service that will not only guard against the subversive activities of the external enemy, but will also enable the Department G-2 to keep the Department Commander constantly advised as to the attitude, trend of thought, and probable course of action of the civil population, particularly that of alien extraction. This service will maintain close liaison with the Department Provost Marshal, with a view to:

(1) Furnishing the Department Provost Marshal with all information gained, through the counter-espionage service of value in the prevention of civil disorders, sabotage and incipient uprisings.

(2) Receiving and evaluating information relative to the internal situation collected by the Department Provost Marshal through his agencies set up for the actual control of the civil population.

d. Collect, evaluate, and disseminate information relative to assemblies of enemy nationals or sympathizers, and overt acts of sabotage and terrorism.

[16] e. Prepare propaganda and publicity for the encouragement of the loyalty and support of the civil population, particularly that of alien extraction.

24. G-2 FORMS.—

a. Estimate of the Enemy Situation, see Inclosure No. 4.

b. Periodic Reports, see page 1, Inclosure No. 5. For combat Air Force see page 2, Inclosure No. 5.

SECTION V—ADMINISTRATION

25. SUPPLY (See paragraphs 75–80, FM 100–10).—

a. SUPPLY AREAS.—

(1) Schofield Supply area includes the area of OAHU north and west of a general line extending LAE O KAOIO—PUU KAAUMAKUA—KIPAPA STREAM—KAMEHAMEHA HIGHWAY at (97.9–91.0)—KAMEHAMEHA HIGHWAY—PEARL CITY JUNCTION—PEARL HARBOR ENTRANCE.
(2) The Honolulu Supply area includes the remainder of OAHU and outlying islands.
   b. CLASS I SUPPLIES (rations); including QMC class II and IVS: Schofield Supply Area—Quartermaster, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

Honolulu Supply Area—Hawaiian Quartermaster Depot, HONULULU.
(1) Supplies, for a small unit of an organization, when moved nearby into a different supply area from the parent organization, may be continued thru the parent organization or may be obtained separately from the D. P. for the new supply area as warranted by the situation.
(2) Distribution will be based on consolidated daily strength reports submitted by organizations to the Depot or Quartermaster supplying the area in which the organization is stationed (copy to Dept. QM) by 0800 daily.
(3) Schedules of distribution will be arranged by issuing quartermasters by direct agreement with unit commanders supplied. Distribution schedules will be set up and copies furnished Dept. QM and G-4, H. H. D.
(4) A standard menu ration is established for Alert No. 3.
   c. CLASS III SUPPLIES—
      (1) All units leaving their normal posts under any alert will take with them the authorized allowance of gasoline containers filled. Replenishment will be made in the following manner:
      (a) Commanding Officer, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS will establish DPs at SCHOFIELD BARRACKS for all units operating in the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS area.
      (b) Commanding officers of each post in the Honolulu Supply Area, except MALAKOLE, BELLOWS FIELD and KANEHOI, will establish DPs at their posts for the supply of all units operating in this area. MALAKOLE, BELLOWS FIELD and KANEHOI will establish a DP at their respective posts for the supply [17] of their own units operating in the immediate vicinity of their own post.
      (c) In the event units are moved, placing them in another supply area, gasoline will be supplied from the DP nearest the unit, regardless of supply area.
      (d) Normally, the supply of gasoline from DPs will be by 5 and 10 gallon drums, rather than filling individual trucks.
      (e) Units will furnish personnel for refilling of their containers at the DP. Post Commanders will provide suitable equipment for refilling containers.
      (f) 11th Tank Company will draw aviation gasoline from the nearest Air Corps Station.
      (g) Replenishment of stocks at posts will be accomplished in the normal manner. Following the period of the maneuvers, necessary monetary adjustments will be made through Department Headquarters.
      (h) Class III supplies on outlying islands will be the responsibility of the District Commanders.
   d. CLASS II & IV SUPPLIES (except Quartermaster Corps)—
      (1) Medical Supply: Schofield Supply Area—Schofield Branch, Hawaiian Medical Depot, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.
       Honolulu Supply Area—Hawaiian Medical Depot, FORT SHAFTER.
      (2) Signal Supply (except Signal Corps aircraft radio): Schofield and Honolulu Supply areas—Hawaiian Signal Depot, FORT SHAFTER.
      (3) Signal Supply—aircraft radio only: Schofield and Honolulu Supply areas—Hawaiian Air Depot, HICKAM FIELD.
      (4) Chemical Supplies—all supply areas—Hawaiian Chemical Depot, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.
      (5) Engineer Supplies—all supply areas—Hawaiian Engineer Depot, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, T. H. Distributing points for class IV supplies will include SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, FORT RUGER, FORT KAMEHAMEHA, FORT BARRETTE and North Shore in vicinity of (86.9-04.2). Credits at DP’s to major echelon commanders will be announced separately to commanders concerned.
      (6) Water Supply: Will be secured locally and will be inspected by a medical officer before use except from post and CITY of HONOLULU water systems.
      (7) Air Corps Supply: All supply areas—Hawaiian Air Depot, HICKAM FIELD and WHEELER FIELD Branch, when so designated, for types of services announced by Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force.
(8) Ordnance Supply (other than ammunition Class V).—
Schofield Supply area—Schofield Branch, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.
Honolulu Supply area—(General Storage and Shop) Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, HONOLULU.

[18] e. CLASS V SUPPLIES:
(1) Schofield Supply Area—all types—Schofield Branch, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS (See (3) below).
(2) Honolulu Supply Area—all types—Ammunition Storage Area, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot. (See (3) below.)
(3) Aircraft pyrotechnics and bombs, 8-inch railway and 240mm ammunition and chemical ammunition (other than grenades)—Ammunition Storage Area, Hawaiian Ordnance Depot—all supply areas.
(4) Credits of an “initial issue” and of one “unit of fire” are automatically placed at the disposal and under the control of all major echelon commanders whenever an Alert is ordered. Quantities of various types of ammunition included in the “initial issue” and in a “unit of fire” are shown in Inclosures Nos. 6 and 7 herewith. Load of Aircraft Ammunition per airplane is indicated in Inclosure No. 8.
(5) At the time Alert No. 2 or No. 3 is ordered, all units will draw such of their “initial issue” as has not already been drawn, except that for Alert No. 2 the Infantry Divisions will draw initially only 1/5 of the “initial issue” and the balance thereof will be drawn after occupation of positions with their organic and/or sector weapons. Whenever issues cannot be made simultaneously, they will be made according to the following order of priority and according to a schedule to be mutually arranged between the Unit Supply Officer and the Supply Point concerned.
Aircraft bombs and ammunition for aircraft weapons,
Anti-aircraft 3"., 37mm and Machine Gun ammunition,
Ground machine gun ammunition—all types,
Other small arms ammunition,
All artillery ammunition, less antiaircraft.
(6) At the time Alert No. 1 is ordered, only small arms ammunition included in the “initial issue” will be drawn.
(7) Aircraft bombs will not be issued in “initial issue” but will be held available in bomb storage areas.
(8) Two “units of fire” of bombs and machine gun ammunition will be maintained on outlying islands for each airplane operating therefrom.

f. Dumps and Ammunition Distributing Points will be established as directed by this headquarters.

26. EVACUATION.—
a. PERSONNEL:
(1) North Sector Division by 24 Medical Bn. to Station Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.
(2) South Sector Division by 25 Medical Bn. to Tripler General Hospital except for troops in the area west of the line: PEARL HARBOR CHANNEL—EWA JUNCTION. The latter will be evacuated to Station Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS.

(3) Hawaiian Air Force.—
(a) HICKAM FIELD, by the Surgeon, HICKAM FIELD to Station Hospital, HICKAM FIELD or Tripler General Hospital. Additional ambulances, with drivers and orderlies, will be attached as needed.
(b) WHEELER FIELD and HALEIWA Landing Field, by Surgeon WHEELER FIELD to Station Hospital Schofield. Additional ambulances, with drivers and orderlies will be attached as needed.
(c) BELLOWS FIELD, by Surgeon, BELLOWS FIELD to Tripler General Hospital. Additional ambulances, with drivers and orderlies, as needed.
(d) Air fields on outlying islands, by vehicle to local hospital or by air to Tripler General Hospital or Station Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS. Collection by respective medical detachment. Details of evacuation to be arranged by the responsible commanders for each field.
(e) HCAC, by the Surgeon, HCAC (collection by respective medical detachments, reinforced if necessary). One ambulance company to be attached to the command prior to combat. Evacuation from the area north and west of the line: PEARL HARBOR Channel—EWA Junction—LAE O KAOIO Point to Station Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS. Evacuation from the area south and east of this line to Tripler General Hospital.
(f) KAUI District, MAUI District and HAWAII District to local hospitals as directed by District Commanders under provisions of letter, this headquarters to each District Commander, dated 31 July 1941, subject: "Medical Service."

(g) Elements not included elsewhere: North Sector by 24th Medical Bn., on call; South Sector by 25th Medical Bn., on call.

b. ANIMALS:

(1) North Sector to Veterinary Station Hospital, SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, by provisional Veterinary Detachment attached to Hawaiian Pack Train.

(2) South Sector to Veterinary General Hospital, FORT SHAFTER, by provisional Veterinary Detachment, attached to units having animals.

c. SALVAGE: To supply points designated in paragraph 25 above for services indicated.

d. PRISONERS OF WAR.—

(1) Collecting Points—SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, FORT SHAFTER, FORT RUGER, KANEHOE BAY. To be established and operated by Department Provost Marshal, assisted by Provost Marshals, Infantry Divisions.

(2) Prisoner of War Inclosures—Establishment and operation by Department Provost Marshal, as directed by this headquarters.

27. TRAFFIC.—

The Department Provost Marshal, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, will regulate traffic on OAHU.

28. MOTOR TRANSPORTATION.—

a. Motor pools will be established by the Infantry Divisions and the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command. These pools will [20] consist of all available tactical vehicles and administrative vehicles, the latter obtained by reducing to a minimum administrative requirements.

b. The assignment of motor vehicles for one specific purpose will be the exception. All motors will be used to the maximum for all purposes.

c. Current movement and loading tables will be maintained by the Infantry Divisions and the Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command as follows:

(1) Number of vehicles, tactical and administrative in the pool, showing the number of men and amount of impedimenta that can be moved initially into position. See paragraph 9 above.

(2) Number of vehicles, tactical and administrative, subsequent to move into position which are available for movement of reserves, and the number of men which can be moved.

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

Walter C. Phillips,
WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
Lt. Col., G. S. C., Chief of Staff.

Official:

Wm. E. Donegan,
WM. E. DONEGAN,

Inclosures:

No. 1—Map, Communications Installations.
No. 2—Map, Bridges and Police Districts.
No. 3—Map, Electric Installations.
No. 4—Estimate of Enemy Situation.
No. 5—Periodic Intelligence Report Forms.
No. 6—Allowances of Ammunition.
No. 7—Unit of Fire.
No. 8—Load of Aircraft Ammunition.

Inclosure No. 1

(Inclosure No. 1 is a map of Communications Installations on the Island of Oahu, T. H. as of 7 July 1941. This map is reproduced as Item No. 34 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee.)

Inclosure No. 2

(Inclosure No. 2 is a map of the Island of Oahu, T. H., showing Police Districts, Railroad Bridges and Highway Bridges. This map is reproduced as Item No. 35 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee.)
### RAILROAD BRIDGES

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### HIGHWAY BRIDGES—PRIORITY

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EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Inclosure No. 3

(Inclosure No. 3 is a map of the Island of Oahu, T. H., showing Electric Installations and Generating Plants. This map is reproduced as Item No. 36 in EXHIBITS-ILLUSTRATIONS to Proceedings of Joint Committee.)

Inclosure No. 4

ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY SITUATION

1. SUMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION.
   a. Enemy Naval Operations.—Movements (by fleet or groups).
   b. Enemy land operations.
      (1) Enemy activities in forward areas and new identifications.
      (2) Movements, concentrations and establishments in rear areas.
      (3) Sabotage.
      (4) Terrain, weather, visibility and surf as they affect the enemy.

2. CONCLUSIONS.
   a. Enemy capabilities.—An enumeration of lines of action open to the enemy which may affect accomplishment of the mission of the command.
      (1) A statement of the relative probability of adoption of the foregoing lines of action when such statement can be justified.
      (2) Reasons justifying any statement made in (1) above.

Inclosure No. 5

PERIODIC REPORTS

No. ————
Maps. (Those needed for an understanding of the report.)

1. ENEMY SITUATION AT END OF PERIOD.
   a. Enemy front line (or nearest elements).—Location and nature.
   b. Defensive organization.—Trenches, emplacements, observation posts, command posts, obstacles, etc.
   c. Units in contact.—Composition of units, with identifications if known; location of their flanks, estimated combat efficiency (strength, training, physical condition, morale, and other pertinent factors).
   d. Artillery.—Location and calibers.
   e. Reserves and other forces capable of intervention.—Location, strength, composition, dispositions, estimated combat efficiency, and where and when they probably can be employed.
   f. Supply and evacuation establishments.—Location and nature.

2. ENEMY OPERATIONS DURING PERIOD.
   a. General summary—action of enemy forces as a whole.
   b. Operations of component elements.
      (1) Enemy Naval Operations.—Movements (by fleet or groups).
      (2) Enemy Land Operations.
         (a) Landings. (By areas. Each entry to show, for that area, the front lines and identifications).
         (b) Operations of Land Components.
            1. Antiaircraft artillery.
            2. Antitank units.
            3. Armored forces.
            4. Artillery.
            5. Aviation, combat.
            6. Aviation, observation.
            7. Parachute Troops.
            8. Cavalry.
10. Engineers.
11. Infantry.
12. Tanks.
c. Sabotage.
d. Miscellaneous.—Such enemy activities, movements or changes since last report as are not conveniently included in b above.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.
a. Estimated enemy casualties, including prisoners.
b. Morale.
c. Supply and equipment.
d. Terrain not under our control.
e. Enemy’s probable knowledge of our situation—observation, reconnaissance, prisoners and documents lost by us, inhabitants, etc.
f. Weather, visibility and surf, by areas.
g. Any enemy intelligence not specifically covered by headings of this report.

4. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.—A discussion of each of the lines of action open to the enemy which may affect the accomplishment of our mission, in the order of their possible imminence. For each capability, the effect of time, space, terrain, present known dispositions, and other factors in the situation should be evaluated. The earliest estimated time at which the enemy can put each into effect should be stated. When applicable, the possible result of the adoption by the enemy of any capability should be included.

AC of S, G-2.

INTELLIGENCE PROCEDURE IN AVIATION UNITS

Form G

A form for
Periodic Intelligence Report
for
Air Combat Units
(Adapted to telegraph printer transmission)

Periodic Intelligence Report

From: (Date and hour)
To: (Date and hour)
Issuing unit
Place of issue
Date and hour of issue

1. ENEMY ACTIVITIES AIR.—(Appropriate resume.)
2. ENEMY ACTIVITIES GROUND.—(Appropriate resume.)
3. ENEMY ACTIVITIES NAVAL.—(Appropriate resume.)
4. OBJECTIVE FOLDERS DATA.—(Additions or changes giving serial number of folder in each case.)
5. IDENTIFICATIONS.—(Additions or changes in enemy units.)
6. ENEMY KNOWLEDGE OF OUR SITUATION.—(Brief estimate.)
7. ENEMY CAPABILITIES.—(List in priority of their probable adoption or, if no priority, so state.)
8. MISCELLANEOUS.—(Any items not covered by above.)

Note.—Information contained in previous intelligence reports will not be repeated; only changes or additions thereto. If no change has occurred under a given heading, the number of the paragraph only will be transmitted.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Arm or service</th>
<th>No. of rds. per weapon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>AP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle, cal. .30, M1903</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eng</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FA</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inf</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Rifle Plat.) Inf. (except Rifle Plat.)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>QM</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Eng</td>
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<td>Inf.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ord</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MP</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>CWS</td>
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<td>CA</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FA</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ord</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>QM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eng.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Inf.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tanks or Armd. Cars.</td>
<td>4,800</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CA</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(AW Bn.) CA (except AW Bn.)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Sig. (motorcycles)</td>
<td>750</td>
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<td>Sig. (other than motorcycles)</td>
<td>440</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>5,760</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(AW Bn.) CA (except AW Bn.)</td>
<td>2,880</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2,880</td>
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<td></td>
<td>FA</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inf.</td>
<td>960</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tanks or Armd. Cars.</td>
<td>1,568</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inf.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (Avn. or Wg. Co.)</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sig. (Opm. or Tri. Div. Co.)</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lights, Very signal (assorted)</td>
<td>All</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37mm gun, M1916</td>
<td>FA</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37mm gun, Antitank (M3)</td>
<td>Inf.</td>
<td>180</td>
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<tr>
<td>37mm gun, Antiaircraft</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>180</td>
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<tr>
<td>60mm Mortar</td>
<td>Inf.</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81mm, or 3&quot; Trench Mortar</td>
<td>Inf. Light</td>
<td>132</td>
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<tr>
<td>75mm gun, Truck-D</td>
<td>All</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75mm gun, Antitank</td>
<td>FA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105mm How</td>
<td>FA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155mm How</td>
<td>FA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3&quot; AA mobile</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90mm AA mobile</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>3&quot; AA fixed</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>106</td>
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<tr>
<td>155mm gun, M1918 M1</td>
<td>All</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20mm How, M1918</td>
<td>FA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8&quot; Ry. Gun</td>
<td>CA</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
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</table>
### Inclosure No. 6—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>Arm or service</th>
<th>No. of rds. per weapon</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>AP</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>FIXED SEACOAST ARTILLERY</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3&quot; gun, M1903</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6&quot; gun</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8&quot; gun</td>
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<td>350</td>
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<tr>
<td>12&quot; gun (Barbette Carriage)</td>
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<td>335</td>
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<tr>
<td>12&quot; gun (Disappearing Carriage)</td>
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<td>275</td>
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<tr>
<td>12&quot; Mortar</td>
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<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14&quot; gun</td>
<td></td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16&quot; gun</td>
<td></td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Reduced quantities will be issued when ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept. Whenever any type of ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept. in sufficient quantities, substitution of other types suitable for the weapon will be made.

3 Proportions of types (Shrapnel, reduced charge HE, and normal charge HE) will be shown on requisitions kept on file at the designated supply points.

### Inclosure No. 7

**UNIT OF FIRE (OTHER THAN AIRCRAFT)—HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon</th>
<th>No. rds. for one (1) unit of fire</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle, cal. .30, M1 or M1903</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle, automatic, cal. .30</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine gun, cal. .30, HB (M1919A4) (other than combat vehicle)</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine gun, cal. .30, HB (M1919A2 or A4) (combat vehicle)</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine gun, cal. .30 (M1917-17A1)</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistol, cal. .45</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submachine gun, cal. .45</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine gun, cal. .50, HB</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine gun, cal. .50, AA, WC (except in Gun Batteries)</td>
<td>1,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine gun, cal. .50, AA, WC (in Gun Batteries)</td>
<td>960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grenades, hand, frag. (per Rifle Co.)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projector, signal ground (assorted)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistol, Very, MKIII</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37mm gun, M1916</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37mm gun, antitank, M3</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37mm gun, antiaircraft</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60mm Mortar</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>81mm Mortar</td>
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<tr>
<td>8&quot; Trench Mortar</td>
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<tr>
<td>75mm Field Gun</td>
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<tr>
<td>75mm gun, antitank</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105mm How</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155mm How, M1918</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3&quot; AA gun, mobile</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3&quot; AA gun, fixed</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155mm gun, M1918 MI</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>240mm How, M1918</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4&quot; Chemical Mortar</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Reduced quantities will be issued when ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept. Whenever any type of ammunition is not available in Haw. Dept. in sufficient quantities, substitution of other types suitable for the weapon will be made.
### EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

#### Inclosure No. 8

**LOAD OF AIRCRAFT AMMUNITION PER AIRPLANE**

| Type airplane | Bombers | | | | | OBS. (C&D) |
|---------------|---------|--------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|
|               | Hv. (B17D) | Med. (B-18) | Lt. (A20A) | (P-40) | (P36A) | (P-26) | 1-engine (O-47) |
| Ctg. AP Cal 30... | 480 | 1,280 | 1,920 | 1,600 | 400 | 800 | 640 |
| Ctg. ball Cal 30... | 120 | 320 | 480 | 400 | 100 | 200 | 160 |
| Ctg. tr Cal 30... | 600 | 1,600 | 2,400 | 2,000 | 500 | 1,000 | 800 |
| Total Cal 30# | 600 | 1,600 | 2,400 | 2,000 | 500 | 1,000 | 800 |
| Ctg. AP Cal 50... | 60 | 20 | 10 | | | | |
| Ctg. ball Cal 50... | 900 | 300 | 150 | | | | |
| Ctg. tr Cal 50... | 240 | 80 | 40 | | | | |
| Total Cal 50# | 1,200 | 400 | 200 | | | | |
| BOMBS | | | | | | |
| Bomb frag. 30# and... | 20 | 32 | 12 | | | 10 | |
| Bomb Demo. 100# or... | 14 | 14 | 4 | | | | |
| Bomb Demo. 300# or... | 8 | 6 | 2 | | | | |
| Bomb Demo. 500-600# or... | 6 | 4 | 1 | | | | |
| Bomb Demo. 1,000# or... | 4 | 2 | | | | | |
| Bomb Demo. 2,000# | | | | | | | |
| PYROTECHNICS | | | | | | |
| Bomb Photoflash | 14 | 14 | | | | | |
| Flare M26 | 3 | 3 | 1 | | 1 | |
| Flare M9 | 6 | 6 | 6 | | 5 | |
| Sig. AC Asstd | 20 | 20 | 20 | | | | |
| Sig. Drift | 10 | 7 | | | | | |

1 For Reconnaissance squadrons only.
2 Flare MSAI used as temporary substitute on the basis of 2-M8 or MSAI flares per M26 flare.

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**[CORRECTED COPY]**

**HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,**

**Fort Shafter, T. H., 10 December 1941**

Subject: Coordination of Traffic Control. (Paragraph 9h (TENTATIVE) added to SOP HD.)

To: Distribution: Special, and Chief of Police, Honolulu, T. H.

1. The attention of all commanders is directed to provisions of Paragraphs 27 and 9f, SOP HD, 5 November 1941, repeated below:

"27. Traffic: The Department Provost Marshal, assisted by the Division Provost Marshals, will regulate traffic on OAHU.

"9. f. Motor vehicles operating at night, at the discretion of local commanders, will be (1) in convoy with standard blackout or blue lights with a shielded tail light on all vehicles, or (2) in the case of convoys traveling closed up, with standard blackout or blue lights on leading vehicle and a shielded tail light on the rear vehicle, and no lights on the others. Standard blackout light or approved modifications are authorized for use at all times and all places during hours of darkness on vehicles carrying military personnel on a military mission. On two-way roads the distance between vehicles and/or serials will be sufficient to permit the unimpeded flow of traffic."

2. The following additional instructions are published for the strict compliance of all troops in this Department:

Paragraph 9h (TENTATIVE), SOP HD.

(1) The civil police (special and regular) and the Military Police will have COMPLETE and EXCLUSIVE control of traffic on the island of OAHU with the following exceptions:

a. Guards on entrances to vital installations operating under special instructions.

b. In case of accidents or other emergencies.
(2) Route markers are authorized for tactical or convoy movements.
(3) Except in case of military necessity and except as otherwise hereinafter provided, the present civil regulations relating to traffic shall remain in force.
(4) Only such military and civilian personnel as are actually needed on defense work, public utilities, and conducting emergency work or on a military mission will be authorized to operate motor vehicles on the highways between 1800 and 0600 (6:00 P. M. and 6:00 A. M.), tactical movements excepted. In this connection, contractors' trucks working on 24 hour basis on approved defense projects will not be delayed. All cars authorized to operate between the above hours (6:00 P. M. to 6:00 A. M.) shall have standard blackout, or blue lights using Moss Blackout Blue Paint (quick-drying) or its equivalent.
(5) All modified lights must conform to a standard pattern and be visible for a distance of not to exceed 100 feet.
(6) The Military Police assisted by the civil police, will approve and check modified blackout lights and will not permit modified lights to be used that do not conform to the standard of blackout lighting equipment, as pertains to visibility from the air. Special instructions and detailed specifications will be issued later by the Provost Marshal.
(7) Persons operating vehicles at night without approved blackout lights will be arrested promptly.
(8) Parking is prohibited on the following streets in Honolulu:

- School Street
- Lusitania Street
- Beretania Street
- King Street
- Waialae Street
- Dillingham Boulevard
- Middle Street
- Nuuanu Avenue
- Alapai Street between Lusitania and Beretania
- Iwilei Road between King and railroad tracks
- Queen Street on mauka side between Iwilei Road and Fort Street

(9) During air raids all vehicles are prohibited from operating, except the following:
   b. Civilian police cars.
   c. Certain civilian vehicles specifically authorized by the Provost Marshal. All other operators will halt their vehicles off the main roads or streets where they will remain until authorized to be moved by the police (civil or military) or until ALL CLEAR is given.
(10) Immediate action will be taken by all commanders to insure that their personnel are informed of the above contents.
(11) The cooperation of all personnel, civil and military, is directed.

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

Walter C. Phillips,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.

Official:

William E. Donegan,
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION: Special, plus 100 to Chief of Police, Honolulu, T. H., plus 500 for file w/SOP.

[CORRECTED COPY]

(Please destroy all previous copies)

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Forward Echelon,
0500 17 December 1941.

Subject: Coordination of Traffic Control (Corrections to Par 9 f and 9 h (tentative) SOP–HD)
To: Distribution, Special, plus one to each holder of SOP–HD and Chief of Police, Honolulu, T. H.

1. Reference letter, HH-D, Corrected copy, subject "Coordination of traffic control", dated 10 December 1941, SOP–HD is further corrected as follows:
   a. "9 f. Motor vehicles operating at night at the discretion of local commanders, will be:
"(1) in convoy with Standard Blackout lights or approved modifications with tail light shielded or painted all blue, on all vehicles, or,
"(2) in the case of convoys traveling closed up, with standard blackout lights or approved modifications on the leading vehicle and a tail light shielded or painted all blue on the rear vehicle, and no lights on the others.
"(3) Standard blackout lights or approved modifications are authorized for use at all times and all places during hours of darkness on vehicles carrying military personnel on a military mission.
"(4) On two-way roads the distance between vehicles and/orserials will be sufficient to permit the unimpeded flow of traffic.
"(5) All motor vehicles not having standard blackout lighting equipment shall have modified lights conforming to the following specifications:
"Headlights to be painted all black with the exception of a two and one-half inch circle, slightly below the center of the headlight lens. This circle will be painted with Moss Blackout Blue paint (quick-drying) or equivalent. Tail lights will be shielded or painted all blue. Sufficient coats of the Blackout Blue paint will be used to insure that the "modified lights" conform to the standard of blackout lighting equipment, as pertains to visibility from the air."

b. Par 9 h (tentative), sup-par 4, changed to read as follows:
"(4) only such military and civilian personnel as are actually needed on defense work, public utilities, and conducting emergency work or on a military mission will be authorized to operate motor vehicles on the highways between 1800 and 0600 (6:00 PM and 6:00 AM), tactical movements except. In this connection, contractors' trucks working on 24 hour basis on approved defense projects will not be delayed. All cars authorized to operate between the above hours (6:00 PM to 6:00 AM) shall have standard blackout lights or "approved modifications" using Moss Blackout Blue paint (quick-drying) or its equivalent and with tail light shielded or painted all blue."

c. Par 9 h (tentative) sub-paragraph (5) deleted.

d. Par 9 h (tentative) sub-paragraph (6) delete the last sentence which reads as follows: "Special instruction and detailed specifications will be issued later by the Provost Marshal."  

2. The above corrections will be made on all copies of the corrected SOP-HD (see corrected copy of letter, same subject, HHD, dated 10 Dec 1941).

By command of Lieutenant General EMMONS:

J. LAWTON COLLINS,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:
Wm. Donegan
WILLIAM E. DONEGAN,
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 10 December 1941.

Subject: Air Raid Alarm Instructions. (Paragraph 11 b, c, d, e and f (TENTATIVE) added to SOP HD.)

To: Distribution Special, Plus 90 to Navy and 100 to Chief of Police, Honolulu, T. H.

1. Paragraph 11, SOP HD, is repeated below and changed by inserting paragraph a and adding paragraphs b, c, d, e and f.

"11. Installations and Alarm System.—a. All important installations not protected by the Territorial Home Guard will be guarded by troops. An adequate alarm system will be established in connection therewith."

b. (1) A general Air Raid Alarm will be started by sounding a long blast on the siren in the Aloha Tower. Orders for such Air Raid Alarm will be given only by the Air Corps Warning Service Information Center by direct communication with the Navy Detail at the Aloha Tower.

(2) This alarm will immediately be taken up by units, small groups, patrols and individuals who will immediately sound the alarm by a continuous blast on their alarm equipment until it is picked up and relayed by adjacent groups. Usually one (1) minute duration should be sufficient.
(3) Alarm equipment is listed below and will be used for no other purpose except in connection with Air Raid Alarm and recall therefrom or All Clear Signals.

(a) Siren on Aloha Tower.
(b) Stewart type Klaxon Horn.
(c) Ambulance sirens.
(d) Fire truck sirens.
(e) Police sirens.
(f) All other sirens not covered above.

c. The “Recall from Air Raid Alarm” or “All Clear Signal” will be relayed by the alarm equipment indicated above, starting with the siren on the Aloha Tower, on instructions from the Air Corps Warning Service Information Center. The signal will be “broken short blasts” repeated until relayed by adjacent units.

d. In addition to the above signals, Air Raid Alarms and “All Clear” instructions will be announced over teletype networks, relayed over tactical communication nets, and announced over KGNB and KGU.

e. The above Air Raid Alarm signals will not be given except as indicated above unless units are actually attacked by enemy aircraft.

f. The above Air Raid Alarms and All Clear Signals will be relayed to the District Commanders of the outlying islands by the Department Signal Officer.

By command of Lieutenant General SHORT:

WALTER C. PHILLIPS,
Colonel, General Staff Corps,
Chief of Staff.

Official:
Wm. Donegan,
William E. Donegan,
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

DISTRIBUTION: Special, plus 90 to Navy and 100 to Chief of Police, Honolulu, T. H., 500 for file w/SOP.

HEADQUARTERS
HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Fort Shafter, T. H.
11 April 1941

HEADQUARTERS
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, T. H.
11 April 1941

[Exhibit D]

[SECRET]

JOINT COASTAL FRONTIER DEFENSE PLAN, HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT AND FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

SECTION I—DIRECTIVES

[Extract]

3. Method of coordination. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District have determined that in this joint plan the method of coordination will be by mutual cooperation and that this method will apply to all activities wherein the Army and the Navy operate in coordination, until and if the method of unity of command is invoked, as prescribed in Joint Action of the Army and the Navy, 1935, Chapter 2, paragraph 96.

18. Navy. The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall provide for:

i. Distant reconnaissance.

21. This agreement to take effect at once and to remain effective until notice in writing by either party of its renouncement, in part or in whole, or until disapproved in part or in whole by either the War or the Navy Department. This HCF-41 (JCD-42) supercedes HCE-39 (JCD-13) except that the Annexes Nos.
I to VII of latter remain effective and constitute Annexes I to VII, inclusive, of this plan.

(Signed) Walter C. Short  
WALTER C. SHORT  
Lieut. General, U. S. Army, Commanding,  
Hawaiian Department.

True Extract Copy:  
O. M. Cutler  
O. M. Cutler  
Lt. Col., Infantry

(Signed) C. C. Bloch  
C. C. BLOCH  
Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy, Commandant,  
Fourteenth Naval District

[Exhibit E]  
CONFIDENTIAL  
HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT;  
Fort Shafter, T. II.; 20 March 1941.


When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer, (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that the threat of a hostile raid or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans:

1. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of bombardment airplanes released to Navy control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks, if required, until completion of the mission, when it will revert to Army control.

2. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The Naval Base Defense Officer will determine the Navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat or for maintenance of the required alert status until, due to a change in the tactical situation, it is withdrawn by the Naval Base Defense Officer and reverts to Navy control.

3. When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, and Army aircraft are made available, these aircraft will be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing the search operations.

4. In the special instance in which Army pursuit protection is requested for the protection of friendly surface ships, the force assigned for this mission will pass to the tactical control of the Navy until completion of the mission.

Approved: 21 March, 1941  
(sgd) C. C. Bloch  
C. C. BLOCH  
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy Commandant  
Fourteenth Naval District

True Copy:  
O. M. Cutler  
O. M. Cutler  
Lt. Col., Infantry
[Exhibit F]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

CHIEF OF STAFF
War Department, Washington DC

Reurad four seven two twenty seventh report department alerted to prevent sabotage period liaison with Navy

Enc sec by
Lt Jos Engelbertz SC
5:40 P 27 Nov 41

True copy
O. M. Cutler
O M CUTLER,
Lt Col Infantry

[Exhibit G]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

114 War Kr 189 WD PRTY
C G
Hawn Dept., Ft. Shafter, T. H.

482 28th critical situation demands that all precaution be taken immediately against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War Department paren see paragraph three mid sec thirty dash forty five end paren stop Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments comma property comma and equipment against sabotage comma protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage stop This does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm stop To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions

True copy
O. M. Cutler
O M CUTLER,
Lt col Infantry

[Exhibit H]

[CONFIDENTIAL]

[Extract—MID-SR 30-45]

3. DELINEATION OF RESPONSIBILITY. a. (1) By direction of the President, investigation of all espionage, counterespionage, and sabotage matters are controlled and handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, and the Office of the Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department. In accordance with this directive, the War Department assumes responsibility for the investigation of officers, enlisted men, and civilians employed on military reservations or under military control. Similar personnel of the naval establishment is covered by Naval Intelligence. The investigation of other civilians suspected of subversive activities, except in certain overseas possessions, is the responsibility of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, hereinafter referred to as the F. B. I.

(2) Cooperation with the agencies of Naval Intelligence and the F. B. I. will be effected by appropriate echelons of our CS system, to the end that full protection may be obtained without duplication of effort.
b. Corps Area and Department Commanders are charged with the supervision of countersubversive operations, in accordance commands, including those of exempted stations and tactical units temporarily present, except the activities coordinated by the Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff.

True Extract Copy
O. M. Cutler
O. M. Cutler, 
Lt. Col., Infantry

[Exhibit I]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT ADJUTANT GENERAL:

(date)

Request that the following Secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is Priority

/sgd/Thomas H. Green,
Thomas H. Green,
Lt. Col. J. A. G. D.,
Department Judge Advocate.

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

Re your secret radio four eight two twenty eighth comma full precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of war department paren paragraph three mid SC thirty dash forty five end paren and military establishments including personnel and equipment stop as regards protection of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power plants comma telephone exchanges and highway bridges comma this headquarters by confidential letter dated June nineteen nineteen forty one requested the Governor of the territory to use the broad powers vested in him by section sixty seven of the organic act which provides comma in effect comma that the Governor may call upon the commanders of military and naval forces of the United States in the territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence comma invasion comma insurrection etc stop pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand on this headquarters to furnish and continued to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage comma and lawless violence in connection therewith comma being committed against vital installations and structures in the territory stop pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is now being afforded vital civilian installations stop in this connection comma at the instigation of this Headquarters the City and County of Honolulu on June T hirtieth Nineteen Forty One enacted an ordnance which permits The Commanding General Hawaiian Department comma to close comma or restrict the use of and travel upon comma any highway within the city and County of Honolulu comma whenever the Commanding General deems such action necessary in the interest of National Defense stop the authority thus given has not yet been exercised stop relations with F B I and all other Federal and Territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters

Enc Sec by
LT JOS ENGBERTZ SC
Lt Jos Engelbertz SC
2:45 P 29 Nov 41
True copy

O. M. Cutler,
O. M. Cutler,
Lt Col Infantry
In reply refer to:

Sig.

Subject: Detector Operation.

To: Department Signal Officer.

1. On November 27, 1941, after conference with Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, and receiving instructions to operate all mobile detectors from two hours before dawn until one hour after dawn, I, as Acting Department Signal Officer, gave immediate instructions to Captain TETLEY, Commanding Officer of the Aircraft Warning Company, to initiate the above detector operation so long as Alert No. 1 was in force.

2. The detectors in question operated daily thereafter during the prescribed period except when having occasional operational trouble. In addition, the six detector stations operated daily except Sundays from 7:00 A. M. until 11:00 A. M. for routine training. Daily except Saturday and Sunday, the hours 12:00 noon until 4:00 P. M. were devoted to training and maintenance work.

W. H. MURPHY,
Lt. Col., Sig C.

[Exhibit K]

SECRET

AFFIDAVIT

I, JAMES A MOLLISON, certify that during the period 27 November 1941 to 7 December 1941 the Navy made no requests to the Hawaiian Air Force for in shore or long range aerial reconnaissances.

JAS. A. MOLLISON,
Lt. Col., A. C.,
H. A. F. C/S.

[Exhibit L]

CERTIFICATE

I certify that on November 27, 1941, I accompanied General Short and General Martin to Admiral Kimmel’s office for conference relative to sending Army pursuit planes to Midway and Wake. As this would unquestionably weaken the defenses of Oahu, Admiral Kimmel asked a question of Captain McMorris, his War Plans Officer, which was substantially as follows:

Admiral Kimmel: McMorris what is your idea of the chances of a surprise raid on Oahu.

Captain McMorris: I should say none Admiral.

JAMES A. MOLLISON,
Lieut. Colonel, A. C.
Reference two B Dash Twenty four airplanes for special photo mission Stop It is desired that the pilots be instructed to photograph Truk Island in the Caroline Group Jaluit in the Marshall Group Stop Visual reconnaissance should be made simultaneously Stop Information desired as to the number and location of naval vessels including submarines Comma airfields Comma aircraft Comma guns Comma barracks and camps Stop Pilots should be warned islands strongly fortified and manned Stop Photography and reconnaissance must be accomplished at high altitude and there must be no circling or remaining in the vicinity Stop Avoid orange aircraft by utilizing maximum altitude and speed Stop Instruct crews if attacked by planes to use all means in their power for self preservation Stop The two pilots and copilots should be instructed to confer with Admiral Kimmel upon arrival at Honolulu to obtain his advice Stop If distance from Wake and Jaluit to Moresby is too great Comma suggest one B dash twenty four proceed from Wake to Jaluit and back to Wake Comma Then Philippines by usual route photographing Ponape while enroute Moresby Stop Advise pilots best time of day for photographic Truk and Jaluit Stop Upon arrival in Philippines two copies each of any photographs taken will be sent to General MacArthur Comma Admiral Hart Comma Admiral Kimmel Comma the chief of naval operations Comma and the War Department Stop Insure that both B dash twenty four airplanes are fully equipped with gun ammunition upon departure from Honolulu.

Decoded by: Lt. G E Haven SC, 147A November 27, 1941.

True copy:
O. M. Cutler
O. M. Cutler,
Lt. Col., Infantry.

Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 465—26th"

[Exhibit N]

(Copy)

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Request that the following Secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is Priority.

/s/ Cheney L. Bertholf,
Lt. Col., A. G. D.

Adjutant General.

Approved for Transmission:

/s/ O. M. McDole,
Major A. G. D.,
Asst. Adjutant General.

CHIEF OF THE ARMY AIR FORCES,
Washington, D. C.

Reference secret photographic mission of two B twenty fours stop One of B twenty fours Lieutenant Faulkner which landed Hickam Field this date short following equipment considered essential to safety and success of mission colon

79716 0—46—pt. 18——11
fifty caliber machine guns comma mounts comma adapters and accessories for upper hemisphere semicolon fifty caliber tunnel gun comma adapter and accessories semicolon for starboard and port sides semicolon second thirty caliber nose gun comma adapter and accessories stop Guns can be removed from our equipment and ammunition is available stop Strongly recommend that second B twenty four bring necessary equipment from mainland for installation on both planes prior their departure from Hickam Field stop Plane being held here until satisfactorily armed subject plane has no armor plate installation stop Except for removal of passenger seats plane equipped as for ferry service North Atlantic signed Martin HAF 141 C

Ene see by Lt. G. E. Haven, S. C. 225P 5 Dec/41
A True Copy
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2d Lt. P. A.

[Exhibit O] 20 December 1941.

CERTIFICATE

On the morning of 7 December, 1941, the 18th Wing had 6 B-17s in commission, with 6 B-17s out of commission for maintenance. Of the 8 B-17s destroyed during the attack, 4 were from those stationed at Hickam Field, 2 from those in commission and 2 from those out of commission. The other 4 were lost while attempting to land upon arrival from the Mainland. These B-17s arrived at Hickam Field between 8:00 A. M. and 8:20 A. M., 7 December, 1941. These planes took off from Hamilton Field, California in two squadrons, one at 9:30 P. M. December 6, Pacific time (12:30 A. M. December 7, Eastern time) and the other at 10:30 P. M. December 6, Pacific time (1:30 A. M. Eastern time).

Of the 8 B-17s which arrived safely from the mainland, none had sufficient gasoline to permit dispatching them on missions, nor were they equipped with ammunition for these defensive armament. Machine guns were still cosmolined and had not been bore sighted. Ferry crews were skeletonized, consisting of pilot, copilot, navigator, engineer and radio operator. Such crews were incapable of manning all gun positions even if the guns had been properly prepared for combat and supplied with ammunition.

The B-24 which arrived at Hickam Field on 5th December, 1941, previous to the attack, had insufficient armament for combat, only 1 .30 cal. and twin .50 cal. guns in the tail, and was without ammunition for the guns that were installed.

JAMES A. MOLLISON,
Lieut. Colonel, A. C.

True Copy
O. M. Cutler,
O. M. CUTLER,
Lt. Col. Infantry.

[Exhibit P]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

1549ws Washington D C 74/73 RCA USG ETAT 7 1218P CG

HAWAII DEPT FT SHAFTER TH

529 7th Japanese are presenting at one pm eastern standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately stop just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop inform naval authorities of this communication

MARRAHALL

Decoded by: Lt. J. H. Babcock 251P Dec. 7, 1941
Code Message No. 529 7th
True Copy
O. M. Cutler,
O. M. CUTLER,
Lt. Col. Infantry.
[Exhibit Q]

Headquarters Hawaiian Department
Fort Shafter, T. H.

P 4 war L 54 WD 1 Extra Urgent

Washington DC 219P Dec 9 1941.

C G

Hawn Dept Ft Shafter TH

Five four nine ninth Please advise immediately exact time of receipt of our number five two nine repeat five two nine December seven at Honolulu exact time deciphered message transmitted by Signal Corps to staff and by what staff office received

Colton
Acting.

Decoded by: Lt L G Forbes SC 910AM Dec 9 1941
True Copy
O M Cutler
O M Cutler
Lt Col Infantry.

[Exhibit R]

Headquarters Hawaiian Department
Fort Shafter, T. H.

Chief Signal Officer,
Washington, D. C.

Re your five four nine radio five two nine delivered Honolulu via RCA seven thirty three morning seventh stop Received signal office Fort Shafter eleven forty five morning seventh paren this time approximate but within five minutes paren stop Deciphered message received by Adjutant General HQ HAW dept two fifty eight afternoon seventh

Short

A true copy:
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.

Note: This form to be used only for Radiograms and Cablegrams. One copy only to be submitted. The making of an exact copy of Secret or Confidential Radiograms is forbidden. Only such extracts as are absolutely necessary will be made and marked secret or confidential as the case may be. This copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care and when no longer required will be returned to the Records Division, Adjutant General’s Office, without delay. (AR 380-5).

Form H. D. No. 1173 (Revised)—2892 Honolulu 10-31-41 10M.

[Exhibit S]

Copy
Fort Shafter, T. H.

Territory of Hawaii, ss:

Personally appeared before me, the undersigned, authority for administering oaths of this nature, one Grover C. White, Jr. O-396182, 2nd Lieut., Signal Corps, Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii who after being duly sworn according to law deposes and sayeth:

1. At the request of the Control Officer and Naval Liaison Officer the AWS agreed to operate its detectors beyond the daily period of two hours before until one hour after dawn. The first schedule required operation of all stations from 4 A. M. to 6 P. M. This schedule was modified to the hours of 4 A. M. to 4 P. M. A temporary schedule was next devised which required all stations to operate from 4 A. M. to 11 A. M. and to have “staggered” operation, i.e., 3 stations from 11 A. M. to 1 P. M., the remaining 3 stations from 1 P. M. to 4 P. M. On Saturday, December 6, 1941, I contacted the Control Officer to request authority to have all stations operate from 4 a.m. to 7 a.m. only on Sunday, December 7, 1941; this was agreed to by the Control Officer.

2. Staff Sergeant Stanley J. Wichas, SCAWH, acting RDF Officer, reports that he saw nothing that could be construed as suspicious in the information
received by the AWS Information Center from 4 A. M. to 7 A. M. Sunday, December 7, 1941. This is verified by Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, Air Corps, who was the only officer in the Information Center from 4 A. M. to 7 A. M.

3. At approximately 7:20 A. M. a report was received from a Detector station at Opana that a large number of planes was approaching Oahu on a course North 3 degrees East at a distance of approximately 132 miles. This information was immediately transmitted by the switchboard operator, Pfc. Joseph McDonald to Lt. Tyler, who talked to Opana about the flight. The statement of Pfc. Joseph McDonald, SCWWH, the switchboard operator is attached.

4. The Navy Liaison Officer's position within the Information Center was not manned when I reached the Information Center at about 8:20 A. M. This position was manned short thereafter by Technical Sergeant Merle E. Stouffer, SCWWH, who remained on the position until approximately 4:30 P. M. when the position was taken over by Naval Officers.

Further the deponent sayeth not.

/s/ Grover C. White, Jr.,
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps,
Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of Dec. A. D. 1941 at Fort Shafter, T. H.

/s/ Adam R. Huggins,
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps,
Summary Court.

A true copy:

Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.

Fort Shafter, T. H.

Territory of Hawaii, ss:

Personally appeared before me, the undersigned authority for administering oaths of this nature, one Joseph P. McDonald, 13006145, Pvt. 1cl, Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii, who after being duly sworn according to law deposes and sayeth:

I was on duty as telephone operator at the AWS Information Center on Sunday morning, December 7, 1941. I received a telephone call from Opana at 7:20 A. M. stating that a large number of planes were heading towards Oahu from North 3 points east. I gave the information to Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, Air Corps, 78th Pursuit Squadron, Wheeler Field, T. H. and the Lieutenant talked with private Lockard at the Opana Station. Lt. Tyler said that it wasn't anything of importance. At that time the planes were 132 miles out. I asked if we shouldn't advise Corporal Beatty and have the plotters come back. The Opana Unit stressed the fact that it was a very large number of planes and they seemed excited. Lt. Tyler said that it was not necessary to call the plotters or get in touch with anyone.

Further the deponent sayeth not.

Joseph P. McDonald,
Sig. Co., Aircraft Warning, Hawaii.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of December A. D. 1941 at Fort Shafter, T. H.

/s/ Adam R. Huggins,
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps,
Summary Court.

True copy:

O. M. Cutler,
O. M. Cutler,
Lt. Col., Infantry.
On Wednesday, 3 December 1941, I was first detailed to learn the operation of the plotting board in the Interception Control Center. I reported for duty at 1210, just as the crew on duty was leaving. I spoke with Lt. White, Signal Corps, a few minutes and he showed me the operating positions for Navy, Bombardment, Antiaircraft, Controller's position and Aircraft Warning Service. I remained on duty until 1600. Only a telephone operator was on duty with me.

On Sunday, 7 December 1941, I was on duty from 0400 to 0800 as Pursuit Officer at the Interception Control Center. From 0400 until approximately 0610 there were no plots indicated on the interception board. From that time until 0700 a number of plots appeared on the control board at various points surrounding the Island of Oahu. I particularly remember at least one plot South of Kauai and I believe there was on South of Molokai. There were two plots at some distance North of Oahu and which I remember seeing on the historical record. At the time, I questioned the plotter of the historical record who stated that he makes a record of all plots as they come in. There were a number of plots over and around the Island of Oahu. Having seen the plotter work once before with about the same general layout, this did not seem irregular to me. At 0700 all of the men except the telephone operator folded up their equipment and left. At about 0720 the operator at the Opana RDF Station called me and said that the instrument indicated a large number of planes at 132 miles to the North. Thinking it must be a returning naval patrol, a flight of Hickam Field Bombing planes, or possibly a flight of B-17 planes from the coast, I dismissed it as nothing unusual. (It is common knowledge that when Honolulu radio stations are testing by playing Hawaiian Music throughout the night that coincidentally B-17s are apt to come in using the station for radio-direction finding. The radio station was testing on the morning of 7 December, 0230–0400). At about 0750 I heard some airplanes outside and looking toward Pearl Harbor saw what I thought to be a navy practicing dive bombing runs. At a little after 0800, Sergeant Eugene Starry, A. C. Wheeler Field, called me to tell me that Wheeler Field had been attacked. I immediately had the telephone operator call all men back to duty. Most of the men had returned to duty by 0820 when Major L. N. Tindal arrived and took charge of the Control Center. I remained on duty assisting Major K. P. Bergquist and Major L. N. Tindal as Pursuit Control Officer until about 1615, 8 December 1941, with the exception of rest periods from 2000 to 2400, 7 December, and 0600 to 1000, 8 December.

Kermit A. Tyler, 1st Lieut., Air Corps.

True copy:
O. M. Cutler,
O. M. CUTLER,
Lt. Col. Infantry.

HEADQUARTERS 53RD COAST ARTILLERY BRIGADE (AA),
OFFICE OF THE BRIGADE COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 20 December 1941.

Subject: Report on action by 53d C. A. Brigade (AA) from 0755 to 2400, 7 December 1941.

To: General Short.

1. At the beginning of the attack on Oahu 7 December 1941, the 53d Coast Artillery Brigade (AA) was operating under the conditions of Alert No. 1, S. O. P., N. C. A. C., 26 November 1941. The 97th C. A. and the AA Detachments of the East Group had anti-sabotage guards at their fixed 3-inch gun Batteries. All anti-aircraft equipment was being guarded.
   Alerted 0810
   Ready to fire 0813
   Engaged enemy at 0814
   Amm. fired: 407—.30 Cal. ball.
   117—.30 Cal. A. P.
   53—.30 Cal. Tracer.
   12—Pistol.

South Group Command Post detail at stations at 0810. NO repeat NO interruption in communications in South Group during this period. There was rifle and automatic rifle fire on low flying enemy planes by officers and men.

Battery G 97th, were in camp at Fort Weaver. Its battle position is at fixed battery at Fort Weaver.
   Alerted at 0810
   Ready to fire 0830
   Engaged enemy 0830
   Fired 30 rds—3" A. A. Shrapnel. Approximately 200 rds of .30 Cal. ball
   Amm. One .50 Cal. Machine Gun was in action at approximately 8:40 A. M. During this firing Private YORK gunner was wounded while engaging the enemy, he stayed at his post although ordered to take cover. Lieutenant KING states that the battery fire broke up and definitely turned back one formation of 15 enemy planes. Casualties—One (1) Officer dead - Killed while proceeding through Hickam Field to his battle position. Four (4) enlisted men wounded.
   (Basic: Ltr., Hq, 53d C. A. Brigade (AA), dated 20 December 1941. Subject: "Report on action by 53d C. A. Brigade (AA) from 0755 to 2400, 7 Dec. 1941").

Battery F 97th, was camped at Fort Weaver. Its battle position at Fixed Battery Closson, Fort Kamehameha, T. H.
   Alerted 0755, and moved to Battery position across Pearl Harbor Entrance.
   Ready to fire 0855
   Engaged Enemy 0900 to 0920
   Approximately 400 rds .30 Cal. ball.
   Approximately 150 rds .30 Cal. A. P.

Battery G 64th, was in barracks at Fort Shafter, battle position at Ahua Point.
   Alerted approximately 0815, and moved to battery position at Fort Kamehameha.
   Ready to fire 1030
   Engaged Enemy with .30 Cal. M. G. at 1030
   Amm. Fired: Approximately 50 rds of .30 Cal. ball.

Battery H 64th, was in barracks at Fort Shafter. Its battle position is at Fort Weaver.
   Alerted 0830
   Ready to fire 1145
   Engaged Enemy 2100
   Amm. fired: 40 rds—.50 Cal. ball.
   40 rds—.50 Cal. A. P.
   30 rds—.50 Cal. Tracer

Marine detachment: The Fleet Machine Gun School at Fort Weaver. Operations were in cooperation with South Group although not tactically assigned.
   Alerted 0800
   Ready to fire 0810
   Engaged Enemy 0810
   Amm. fired: Approximately 8000 rds of .50 Cal. A. P. ball and tracer.
   Approximately 450 rds of 20 mm A. A.

This Detachment shot down 4 enemy planes and saved a 4 engined bomber by causing enemy plane firing on it's tail to pull out and cease it's attack. Much shrapnel and some small arms bullets fell about Fleet M. G. School. There was excellent cooperation from Fort Weaver personnel in the liaison, phone, etc.

b. 98th Coast Artillery, Schofield Barracks.
   Alerted at 0860

The communications section at the Command Post, Wahiawa, shot down one enemy plane flying at less than 100 feet, with their automatic rifles at 0855.
1st Battalion 98th C. A. (AA), was in position and ready for action at the following time:
B—98: 0955
D—98: 1000
C—98: 1030

Battery M 64th, stationed at Fort Shafter, was alerted at 0815, moved to Wheeler Field, and was ready for action at 1155.

2nd Battalion 98th C. A. (AA). This Battalion has two batteries at Kaneohe and one at Waipahu School. They were in position and ready for action at the following times:
F—98: 1315
G—98: 1315
H—98: 1330

C. Camp Malakole 251st C. A. (AA). All units were alerted at 0805 when fired upon by a single enemy plane. All units returned the fire with small arms and the plane was shot down.

1st Battalion 251st C. A. (AA), was in position and ready for action as follows:
B—251: at West Loch, 1145
C—251: Ewa Beach, 1145
D—251: South of Ewa, 1145

2nd Battalion 251st C. A. (AA), was in position as follows:
E—251: Navy Yard
F—251: Navy Recreation Area
G—251: Tank Farm
H—251: Navy Yard

At 1120 and again at 1122, E, 251st fired on enemy planes, shooting down one plane. 100 rds of .50 Cal. were fired on the first plane and 200 rds of .50 Cal. were fired on the second plane.


c. Sand Island. The AA Detachment of Battery F, 55th C. A., present at Sand Island when the attack started was ready for action at 0815. This battery fired 89 rds of 3" AA and shot down two (2) enemy planes at 0815.

f. Fort Shafter.

(1) Three (3) enemy dive bombers were fired on by the Headquarters Battery and the Intelligence Battery of this Brigade and by Battery E, 64th C. A. (AA). Ammunition Expended—3,000 .30 Cal.

(2) Enemy planes were fired on at 0900 and 1000 by Battery A, 64th C. A. (AA). Ammunition Expended—1000 .30 Cal.

(3) All 3" gun batteries and Automatic Weapons batteries of the 64th C. A. (AA) were alerted at 0815 and were in position as follows:
B—64: at Aiea, 1000
C—64: at Aliamanu, 1030
D—64: South of Aliamanu, 1100
F—64: at Pearl City, 1105
I—64: at Aliamanu
K—64: at Hickam Field
L—64: at Hickam Field
M—64: See Par. 2 b, above.

All of these units except M, 64th fired during the second attack from 1000 to 1145. Ammunition expended as follows:
3", 23 rds.
.50 Cal., 2361 rds.
.30 Cal., 2821 rds.

g. Fort Barrette. Battery H, 97 C. A. (AA), was stationed at Fort Weaver. The battery was alerted at 0755, moved out of Fort Weaver at 0830, and arrived at Fort Barrette at 0910. Enemy planes were engaged by small arms fire at Fort Weaver, while enroute, and at Fort Barrette. The detachment on guard at Fort Barrette shot down one enemy plane at 0910 by small arms fire.

3. Three (3) Marine AA Batteries were attached to the Brigade at 2245.

4. Ammunition. Status at 0730, 7 December 1941. All units of the Brigade had in their possession, the initial issue of small arms ammunition. This included ammunition for rifles, pistols, automatic rifles and machine guns. In addition,
the 3-inch ammunition was so positioned that it was readily accessible to all units of the Brigade except four (4) batteries for which ammunition was at Aliamanu Crater. These batteries completed drawing their initial allowance, 1200 rounds per battery, by 1015.

C. K. Wing
C. K. Wing,
Colonel, 53d C. A. Brigade (AA), Commanding.

[Exhibit T]

Status of aircraft of 7 December 1941 before attack—Continued

HICKAM FIELD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Out</th>
<th>In</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A-20 A</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-17 D</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-18</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-12 A</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-47 B</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BT-2 BR</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BT-2 CR</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-33</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-26 A</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-26 B</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-24</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>72</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BELLOWS FIELD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Out</th>
<th>In</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>O-47 B</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-49</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

WHEELER FIELD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Damaged in raid</th>
<th>Percent of damage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P-40 C</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-40 B</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-30 A</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-26 A</td>
<td>8-14</td>
<td>1-4</td>
<td>7-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-26 B</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT 6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OA 9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-47 B</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-12 A</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O-49</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VT 2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

James A. Mollison
Lt. Col. A. C.

A true copy
Edward von Geldern
Edward von Geldern
2nd Lt. F. A.
**EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE**

**Aircraft status as of 1800, 20 December 1941**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>In Commission</th>
<th>B-17</th>
<th>B-18</th>
<th>A-20</th>
<th>P-40</th>
<th>P-36</th>
<th>O-47</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Echelon</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Echelon</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Echelon</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>39</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12 B-17 on hand Hickam 0600-7 Dec.
1 29 B-17s arrived from the Mainland from 7 Dec. to 20 Dec. inclusive.

**James A. Mollison, Lt. Col. A. C.**

A true copy

Edward von Geldern

Edward von Geldern
2nd Lt. F. A.

[Exhibit U]

**HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,**

**FORWARD SHAFTER, T. H.,**

**Forward Echelon, 21 December 1941.**

**MEMORANDUM TO LIEUT COL. KENDALL J. FIELDER.**

The following report of planes shot down, crashing or otherwise destroyed in the attack on Oahu, 7 December 1941, is submitted for your information. All of these losses have as yet not been verified, and it is very likely that some of the reports from different sources will be in reference to the same plane. Verifications are being received daily:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Details</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0800-1000</td>
<td>6 officers from emergency</td>
<td>Accounted for 10 planes</td>
<td>Some of these may</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>landing field at Halsewa.</td>
<td></td>
<td>appear in other reports.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CO Mil District of Kanai.</td>
<td>1 plane crashed off North shore, 1 wrecked on Niihau.</td>
<td>Verified</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civilian report.</td>
<td>1 plane crashed in Gulch, rear Aea Hgts.</td>
<td>Verified</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Group of officers on fishing</td>
<td>3 planes crashing in Honolulu Harbor.</td>
<td>Verified</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>trip.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0640</td>
<td>Capt. Ebby, “B” Btry 35th C. A. C.</td>
<td>2 planes destroyed by machine gun fire.</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0622-1130</td>
<td>Btry “F”, 55 CAC.</td>
<td></td>
<td>0922 report not verified, 1130 rpt verfd.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0605</td>
<td>23rd C. A. C.</td>
<td>1 plane, 200 yds. off Malakolani</td>
<td>Verified</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1020</td>
<td>Btry “H” 97th CAC.</td>
<td>1 plane crashed flaming 2 mi. SW Ft. Barrette.</td>
<td>Verified</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0855</td>
<td>88th C. A. C.</td>
<td>1 plane shot down near Wahiawa</td>
<td>Verified</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0830</td>
<td>Hq. Btry 15th CAC.</td>
<td>1 plane crashed in Ord shops at Ft. Kan.</td>
<td>Verified</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1100</td>
<td>35th Infantry</td>
<td>Observed 1 plane crash in sea SW Barbers Pt.</td>
<td>Verified</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27th Infantry</td>
<td>Observed 1 plane crash in cane field nr Aea.</td>
<td>Not verf.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29th Inf.</td>
<td>1 plane shot down over Bellows Fld. fell in sea.</td>
<td>Verified</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24th Division</td>
<td>1 plane down at Brody Camp #41 nr Kaawa.</td>
<td>Verified</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haw. Air Force</td>
<td>1 plane at Ft Weaver 1at Wheeler Field, 1 at Hickam Field, 1 at Pearl Harbor, 1 at Ft Barrette, 1 at Ewa. Witnessed 1 shot down back of Naval Hospital.</td>
<td>2 doubtful.</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>1 plane by AA at Beekoning Pt, 1 on deck of a ship.</td>
<td>Verified</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Navy reports are not available.

**T. H. Davies,**

REMARKS: While some of the planes enumerated are undoubtedly duplica-
tions it is believed that a minimum of at least 29 enemy planes were shot down.

Kendall J. Fielder,

[Exhibit V]

SECRET

A true copy
Edward Von Geldern
EDWARD VON GELDERN
2nd Lt. F. A.

[1] Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 19 February 1941

In reply refer to
Engr. 660
General George C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff of the Army, War Department, Washington, D. C.

Dear General Marshall: I was very glad indeed to have your letter of Feb-
uary 7th as it gave us some very definite information on aircraft we did not have.
Since assuming command I have had two conferences with Admiral Kimmel
and two with Admiral Bloch. I have found them both most approachable
and cooperative in every way. I have told them that from my point of view there
will be no hair splitting, but that the one thing that would affect any decision
where there is an apparent conflict between the Army and the Navy in the use
of facilities would be the question of what could produce the greatest combined
effort of the two forces. They have assured me that they will take exactly the
same view. From my brief intercourse with them I feel that our relations should
be extremely cordial.

As a result of my short study of conditions here I believe that the following
are of great importance and I am taking steps to carry out the necessary changes:

1. Cooperation with the Navy.

2. Dispersion and protection of aircraft and of the repair, maintenance
   and servicing of aircraft.

3. Improvement of the Anti-aircraft defense.


5. Improvement of the situation with reference to searchlights.

6. Provision for more rapid movement of supplies and reserves by improve-
   ment in roads and trails.

7. Bombproofing of vital installations such as Command Posts and com-
   munication centers.

8. Increase in the number of Engineer troops.

Cooperation with the Navy. A series of joint committees consisting of Army
and Navy officers has been appointed with a view to the study of cooperation of
the Army and Navy especially with reference to employment of air and Aircraft.
These committees have been directed to report on March 1st. Copy of the
letter creating these committees is attached hereto as well as copy of

[2]

instructions to the echelon commanders concerning cooperation with
the Navy.

Dispersion and protection of aircraft and of the repair, maintenance and servicing
of aircraft. Provision has been made for a number of emergency fields upon
the various islands but no provision has been made for dispersion of the planes in the
vicinity of fields and other protection by either camouflage or by bunkers. The
emergency fields on other islands will be valueless for pursuit aviation except
possibly on the Island of Molokai. The pursuit aviation is capable of only
approximately one hour's flying with the throttle wide open. This means that
the dispersion of pursuit aviation must take place upon the Island of Oahu if it is
to be able to meet an attack from any direction. The dispersion and bunkers
for the greater part of the pursuit aviation can be made in the immediate vicinity
of Wheeler Field by the use of ravines and bunkers. The maintenance and repair
facilities can be placed in ravines under ground without an exorbitant cost in
time or money. Tanks are now available for the distribution of gas and we are
asking for money to install tanks.
The bombers can make use of the landing fields on other islands but it will be necessary to make provisions for their dispersion in the vicinity of those fields and also on the Island of Oahu. Their dispersion is more difficult than that of the pursuit. The repair and maintenance facilities require so much space that it will be necessary, at least temporarily, to place them above ground protected by hills. At present the only repair facilities for the bombers are in buildings on Hickam Field which would undoubtedly be attacked by any surprise raid. Up to the time that we make runways for dispersion of planes on all the fields surprise enemy raids would be extremely serious.

**Improvement of the Anti-aircraft Defense.** The major shortages in Anti-aircraft artillery armament are sixteen 3-inch or 90 m.m. anti-aircraft guns (six enroute) 135 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, 236 .50 caliber machine guns and 30 sound locators. The locators are expected in June. The shortage of personnel, however, is much more serious than the shortage in materiel. Practically all the coast artillery units have dual roles. If they man anti-aircraft artillery the Harbor Defense Artillery will not be manned, and vice versa. To man the entire anti-aircraft artillery defense project avoiding dual assignments to all but four Harbor Defense batteries requires an increase in the existing anti-aircraft personnel as follows:

- Two regiments of Coast Artillery Anti-aircraft (Mobile) T-O 4–11.
- One Battalion Gun Coast Artillery Anti-aircraft (Mobile (less searchlight battery) T-O 4–15.

Approximately 90 officers and 2,000 enlisted replacements to activate three gun batteries and three 37-mm batteries of the 64th Coast Artillery Anti-aircraft, now inactive. With the increasing critical international situation at this time it is urgently recommended that all reinforcements of Anti-aircraft Artillery personnel, both unit and individual reinforcements mentioned above, together with the shortage in anti-aircraft artillery matériel, be furnished to this department with the least practicable delay.

These reinforcements to the anti-aircraft artillery garrison, as well as those for the Harbor Defense Artillery listed below, are required to complete the approved defense project. No provision of the defense of the Kaneohe Naval Air Station has been made in the defense project. This problem has been made the subject of a separate letter, copy attached as Inclosure No. 4.

**Improvement of the Harbor Defense Artillery.** There are no major shortages of equipment for Harbor Defense Artillery. However, about 150 officers and 2,700 enlisted men as individual reinforcements and one regiment, Coast Artillery (T. D.) T. O. 4–31W are required to fully man the Harbor Defense Artillery, not including the three obsolescent seacoast mortar batteries. It is urgently requested that these replacements and reinforcements be furnished at the earliest practicable moment.

As an accessory to the Harbor Defense Artillery, the north shore Railroad connection is extremely important to give access to railway gun positions on the north shore.

**Improvement of the situation with reference to searchlights.** The only serious shortage is in beach defense searchlights. A 24-inch carbon-arc light is under development; but the receipt of these lights here may be unduly delayed. This shortage can be overcome immediately by supplying power units for 42 Mack 36-inch projectors which are now on hand. The trucks and power units for these lights are unserviceable but the projectors are in fair to good shape.

There is a shortage throughout of spare parts for 60-inch searchlights, which were requisitioned some months ago. These would be required for any prolonged action. Information from the Chief of Engineers indicates that they will probably be furnished in the near future.

**Provision for more rapid movements of supplies and reserves by improvement in roads and trails.** With the increase in the number of motors available in the department it is most necessary that roads be provided to make the maximum possible use of the motors in the movement of reserves and supplies. The Engineers have made a very careful study of the roads and trails which are necessary or the defense of the island.

There are numerous bottlenecks in the islands where it is not practicable to construct alternate roads. If these roads are damaged by shelling or bombing it is most important that they be repaired in the minimum of time. To provide for this stores of repair material should be placed in close proximity to the vital points. It is believed that the Territorial government will cooperate with the Army in this matter, thus reducing expenses to be charged to National Defense.
Bombproofing of vital installations such as Command Posts and communication centers. Command Posts, communication centers and items of critical supply should be bombproofed. This protection of Command Posts particularly should be done immediately in order that these installations can be trained to function in these locations before hostilities start.

Increase in the number of Engineer Troops. The protection of aircraft and the construction of air fields will keep one regiment of engineers employed constantly. The work on roads and trails would be such as to employ one General Service Regiment constantly. The combat Engineer regiment of the Hawaiian Division should be left available for bombproofing of Headquarter and communication centers and other tactical work.

Previous recommendations for a regiment of Aviation Engineers, less 1 battalion, and an increase in enlisted strength of Third Engineers were based on assumption that some civilian labor would be available. The situation on civilian labor has become acute, and while it has been necessary to import skilled labor, the recent increase in defense work is going to necessitate importing unskilled labor as well. The only alternative would be to curtail activities of the plantations and much of our defense work should not be postponed until that is done.

Communications covering all the above recommendations are being or have been submitted to The Adjutant General. The following are the titles and dates of letters covering these subjects:

Cooperation with the Navy.

Joint letter, HHD 14th Naval District, 14 February 1941, subject: “Army and Navy Aircraft in Hawaiian Area,” copy attached, Inclosure No. 1 AG 354.2/JAX--(pencil)

Lettet, HHD to major echelon commanders, 17 February 1941, subject: “Maximum Readiness of Aircraft in Hawaiian Area,” file 354.2/JAX, copy attached, Inclosure No. 2.


Letter, HHD to TAG, 18 February 1941, subject: “Defense of Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H.” file 381, copy attached, Inclosure No. 5.


Improvement of situation with reference to searchlights. a. Beach defense Lights: Letter, Engr. 470.3/6 x 470.3/10, 29 January 1940 with 11 Indorsements, 11th Indorsement AG 470.3 (1-29-40) M-D, 26 August 1940. 12th Indorsement, HHD dated 18 February 1941, to TAG being transmitted, copy inclosed, Inclosure No. 7.

b. Searchlight Parts. Letter, Engr. 470.3/8, 2 November 1940, to the Chief of Engineers, subject: “Priority Items, Engineer Status Report, Revision 1940.” 1st Indorsement, O., C. of E., (381.4) (Hawaii) 101, 28 January 1941, states: “Reference Par 1 c, the requisition for spare parts for searchlights was concurred in by this office. The requisition now is undergoing review by G-4 and action is expected shortly. You will be promptly informed of the action taken.” Copy of 1st Indorsement inclosed, Inclosure No. 8.

Provision for more rapid movement of supplies and reserves by improvement in Roads and Trails.


Bombproofing of vital installations. Letters, Engr. 800.96, following subjects and dates. (Copies attached)

2. Bombproof Protection, Command Posts, Hawaiian Division, 4 February 1941, Inclosure No. 11.
7. Bombproof Protection for Signal Installations, Hawaiian Department, 6 February 1941, Inclosure No. 16.
9. Department Command Post, Aliamanu Crater, last correspondence 660.9 (S), copy attached, Inclosure No. 18.

Increase in number of Engineer Troops.—Letter Engr. 322.03, 19 February 1941, subject "Additional Engineer Troops", copy inclosed, Inclosure No. 19.

Enclosures herewith are made for your ready reference and information.

Sincerely yours,

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, Commanding.

19 Incds.

[Exhibit W]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 19 February 1941.

In reply refer to:
Engineer 452.
SECRET.

Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft.
To: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.

1. With the present set-up of existing facilities in this Department the pursuit ships are forced to operate to a large extent from Wheeler Field and similarly the bombardment ships are forced to operate from Hickam Field. In times of actual operation some of the bombardment ships will be operating from bases on the outlying islands, but to a large extent the pursuit ships will continue to operate from Oahu due to the limited time and radius of operation without refueling.

2. The concentration of these airplanes at Wheeler Field and at Hickam Field presents a very serious problem in their protection against hostile aviation. Wheeler Field is too small for the operation of the number of pursuit ships to be furnished to this Department and it will be necessary to develop another base for at least one group of pursuit aviation. A site in the vicinity of Barbers Point has been tentatively selected and is now being discussed with the Navy Department in connection with that Departments activities on its new air base in the Ewa Plain Area. The new Army air base will be the subject of a subsequent letter.

3. While this new base will provide some opportunity for dispersion of the pursuit ships this dispersion cannot be counted upon to give adequate protection and it will be necessary to provide protection by means of bunkers in the vicinity of existing fields for both pursuit and bombardment aviation. I have asked the District Engineer of Honolulu to study this problem and to submit cost estimates on the most economical satisfactory means of providing this protection. The District Engineer has recommended that the protection be provided by a rolled fill embankment of dirt and has estimated the cost at $1,200.00 each for pursuit planes, $8,000.00 each for two engine bombardment planes and $15,000.00 each for four engine bombardment planes. In arriving at these figures he has given consideration not only to present unit costs, but has included funds to cover increasing cost of both labor and non-labor items in this Department; the figures shown include both direct and indirect costs. This bunkering protection will cost about the same regardless of its location; the unit price includes cost of taxi strips and accessories.

4. This protection should be provided for 124 single engine pursuit ships and 121 double engine pursuit ships and for 25 two engine bombers and 70 four engine bombers. Using the unit costs quoted above the total for pursuit planes is $315,600.00 and the total for bombing planes is $1,250,000.00. The total for
the two types is $1,565,600.00. It is recommended that funds in this amount be allotted to this Department as soon as possible to initiate the installation of this protection.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

A true copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lieut. F. A.

[SECRET]
Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft.
AG 600.12 (2-19-41) M 1st Ind ACW/mme
WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., March 3, 1941. To the Chief of the Air Corps and Chief of Engineers, IN TLRN.
For remark and recommendation.
By order of the Secretary of War:

Adjutant General.

Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft.

2nd Ind
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Office, Chief of Air Corps,
Washington, D. C., March 5, 1941.

To Chief of Engineers.

This office concurs in the recommendations as contained in basic communication. It is recommended that action be taken to provide funds for this project in the next supplemental bill.

For the Chief of the Air Corps:

WALTER J. REED,
Lt. Colonel, Air Corps,
Executive, Building, & Grounds Div.

A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lieut. F. A.

600.1 (Haw. Dept. Airfields)—38
Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft.

3rd Ind.

Office, C. of E., April 1, 1942.
To the Adjutant General.

1. Attention is invited to paragraph 3 of basis letter which gives unit prices for rolled fill bunkers for pursuit planes, two-engine and four-engine bombardment planes. It is noted that the unit prices given include funds to cover increasing cost of both labor and non-labor items and direct and indirect costs. It is also noted that the unit prices include the cost of taxi strips and accessories.

2. For the reason that the basic letter gave no basis on which this office could check the estimate of cost, a radiogram was sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, March 25, 1941, requesting detailed information sufficient for checking. A copy of this radiogram is inclosed. A reply was received thereto by radiogram from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated March 29, 1941, copy of which is inclosed.
3. It is recommended that approval in principle of the proposed protective arrangements be granted and that an initial allotment of $1,000,000 be made at this time, authorizing the preparation of complete plans and initiation of construction with a view to providing necessary balances when costs are more fully determined.

For the Chief of Engineers:

William F. Tompkins,
Lieut Col., Corps of Engineers,
Executive Assistant.

2 Incls:
Copy of Radiogram dated 3/25/41;
Copy of Radiogram dated 3/29/41.

A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern
2nd Lieut F. A.

Via Air Mail
Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft.
AG 600.12 (2–19–41) MC–E
ESA
WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., May 31, 1941.

To Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Authority is granted for the construction of revetments in the Hawaiian Department for 70 four-engine bombardment, 13 light bombardment and 170 pursuit planes. This is the total number of airplanes which at present are visualized as an obtainable objective in Hawaii within a reasonable time.

2. In locating these revetments, “battle stations” of airplanes should be visualized in view of present and projected airfields in the Hawaiian Islands. Revetments should be dispersed over the widest practicable area around and adjacent to airfields.

3. In the designs of revetments for use in the present war in the British Isles, provision is made for a splinter-proof shelter for airplanes crews and maintenance personnel who may be caught in the revetments during an air attack. In the British design, this splinter-proof, shelter is placed in the rear wall or back of the revetment. In the construction of the revetments proposed for the Hawaiian Department, it is believed that this feature should be incorporated.

4. It is desired that you submit revised estimates covering the construction of the revetments approved in paragraph 1 above incorporating splinter-proof shelters for plane crews.

5. Funds, in the amount of $1,358,000 for the completion of this project as finally approved after receipt of your revised estimates, are being included in estimates for funds now being prepared.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Major General, The Adjutant General.

Incls. w/d
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lieut, F. A.

Engr. 452

HEADQUARTERS, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT, Fort Shafter, T. H., 31 July 1941.
The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Provisions in plans have been made for splinter-proof shelters for airplane screws and maintenance personnel.

2. Revised estimates based on obtainable objectives are as follows:

a. Personnel shelters 5' x 9' @ $635.00 each for 85 pursuit planes, bunkers having already been built on Wheeler Field by troop labor ........................................ $53,975.00
b. 85 Pursuit Bunkers @ $1,200.00 and 85 personnel shelters, 5' x 9' @ $635.00 to be constructed at locations other than Wheeler. $155,975.00
13 Lt. Bombardment bunkers @ $8,000 and 8 personnel shelters 5' x 13' @ $800.00 $114,400.00
d. 70 four-engine bombardment bunkers @ $15,000 and 70 personnel shelters 5' x 17' @ $925.00 $1,050,000.00

Total $1,374,350.00

3. The bunkers for pursuit planes will be built at the new pursuit field and at Bellows Field. These for A-20-A planes will be at Bellows Field and for the 4-engine bombardment planes will be started at Hickam Field. It is not planned at this time to construct any bunker for these 4-engine planes on the outlying airports, but it is possible that when these airports are completed, the installation of some bunkers at these airports with the majority at Hickam may be desirable. This question has been discussed with the District Engineer, Honolulu, who states that the costs at these field will be about the same as his estimate for Hickam.

4. Since the figure of $1,374,350.00 is so close to the figure of $1,358,000.00 mentioned in 4th Indorsement, it is recommended that the latter figure included in the estimates be adopted and that funds in this amount be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, for this purpose.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern
2nd Lieut., F. A.

Subject: Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft, Hawaiian Department.
A-G 600.12 (2-19-41) MC-G 6th Ind.

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., September 22, 1941.

To Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Plans for revetments proposed in the preceding correspondence are approved.
2. Funds in the amount of $1,358,000 for the completion of revetments in the Hawaiian Department have been included in Project C-21, preliminary estimates 1943. It is expected that they will become available about January 1, 1942.
3. Final design of the revetments is being prepared by the Fortification Division, Corps of Engineers, and will be coordinated with the Chief of the Army Air Forces, upon completion.
4. When available, funds will be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, for the construction of the required revetments.

By order of the Secretary of War:

A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern
2nd Lieut., F. A.

[Exhibit X]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., Sept. 10, 1941.

In reply refer to:
Engr. 600.96 SECRET
Subject: Underground Repair Facilities, Hawaiian Air Depot.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. The provision of bombproof facilities for the repair of aircraft by the Hawaiian Air Depot is vital to the continued functioning of the Hawaiian Air Force during an attack on Oahu.
2. At present, all shop and repair facilities of the Hawaiian Air Depot are
crowded into a small area at Hickam Field. This area is located close to the
entrance channel of Pearl Harbor which is a perfect landmark even during black-
outs. Concealment or confusion as to the purpose of this installation by camou-
flage is impracticable by any means known to this headquarters. In any attack
or raid on this island, it is not only probable, but almost unavoidable that the
Depot would be put out of action.

3. Considerable study has been made of the problem of insuring continued main-
tenance facilities for the Air Force and the only logical solution is to provide bomb-
proof shelter for part of the existing maintenance facilities. Provision of bomb-
proofed protection for all of these facilities is manifestly impracticable due to the
tremendous cost. It is believed that bombproofed space for one complete B-17
type airplane and for two B-17's without wing and tail assemblies, together with
required space for all subassembly overhaul and repair represents the minimum space
required. The District Engineer, Honolulu, has prepared a preliminary design of this
structure and estimates its cost at $3,480,650.00. Copies of the design drawings and
his estimate are inclosed as Inclosures 1 and 2. Proposed location of this repair
depot is shown on print, inclosure No. 3. This location has been selected because
it is at a considerable distance from any other probable target, because the terrain
is adapted to camouflage and because the soil will offer no construction difficulties.
Location adjacent to the present facilities of the Hawaiian Air Depot at Hickam
Field is impracticable; rock and ground water are reached only a few feet under-
ground and this location is close to other primary targets of an air attack.

4. It is recommended that one underground repair depot of the type shown on
inclosed plans be approved for construction at Wheeler Field and that funds in
the amount of $3,480,650.00 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, for
this construction.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

3 Incls: #1 Design Dwgs. (3 sheets)
2 Estimate
3 Location Drawing

A True Copy:
Edward von Geldern
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lieut., F. A.

Subject: Underground Repair Facilities, Hawaiian Air Depot.
AG 600.12 (9-10-41) NC-G

1st Ind.

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., October 27, 1941.

To Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. The cost of providing bombproof underground repair facilities compared
with the advantages to be gained is so great, that it is a policy that such facilities
will not be provided.

2. Although the advantages of greater security which could be achieved by the
provision of bombproof underground repair facilities must be recognized, the
additional cost involved makes it necessary for air base installations exposed to
possible bombardment attacks to assume this risk.

3. One hangar being built for our Atlantic base is to provide sidewalls of bomb-
splinter proof construction. If you desire installations of this type, due consider-
enation will be given your request, considering funds are available, and the needs
of other bases similarly exposed to danger of air attack.

By order of the Secretary of War:

E. S. ADAMS,
Major General, The Adjutant General.

3 Incls n/c
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lieut., F. A.
In reply refer to:
Engr. 400.312
Via "Clipper" Air Mail
Subject: Funds for Field Fortification and Camouflage Materials.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to the following project letters from this headquarters:
   a. Letter to The Adjutant General, Engr. 600.94, 4 February 1941, subject: "Splinterproof Protection for Antiaircraft and Mobile Seacoast Batteries," recommending that $306,000 be allotted to initiate protective shelters for personnel and propellants at antiaircraft and mobile seacoast batteries. In 4th Indorsement, AG 662.1 (2-4-41) M–WPD, 31 March 1941, this headquarters advised that the recommendation was not favorably considered, and that "protective installations of this type should be improvised by ordinary field fortification methods."
   b. Letter to The Adjutant General, Engr. 000.91, 7 July 1941, subject: "Request for funds for Camouflage of Wheeler Field," recommending that an allotment of $50,210.00 be made for the purpose of camouflaging bunkers, landing field, hangers and warming apron at Wheeler Field.
   c. Letter to the Adjutant General, Engr. 000.91, 27 February 1941, subject: "Camouflage of Defense Installations," recommending that $29,000 be allotted for camouflage of batteries at Fort DeRussy, Fort Kamehameha, Fort Ruger, and Fort Barrette. 4th Indorsement, AG 007.5 (2-27-41) MC–E, 27 June 1941, approved the project and stated that funds for this purpose would be included in the next estimates and would be made available at the earliest practicable date.
   d. Letter from the Chief of Engineer on 10 October 1941 advises that $29,000 for camouflage of coast artillery batteries had been disapproved by the Budget Advisory Committee.

2. Letter from the Chief of Engineers, Engr. 121.2, 17 May 1941, subject: "Annual Estimates, Fiscal Years 1942 and 1943," and supporting data under Project 5, which requested $50,000 each for fiscal year 1942 and 1943 for local purchase of supplies for units of the Hawaiian Garrison other than Engineer troops, these supplies to be used in the construction of fortified works other than command posts for major echelons and camouflage measures, letter, Office, Chief of Engineers, to Department Engineer, 1 July 1941, subject: "Allotment of Engineer Service, Army Funds, Fiscal Year 1942," advised that only $5,000 was being allotted. It further stated "It is believed the amount of $50,000 requested for this purpose is greatly excessive. Field fortifications or camouflage to this extent goes beyond the training stage and reaches the status of a construc-
tion project. It is suggested that such requirements for the defenses of Hawaii be obtained from construction funds, which should be estimated and appropriated for this purpose."

[3] 2. The field fortification and camouflage works that will be required to insure the adequate defense of this island are of such magnitude that their accomplishment after the outbreak of hostilities is entirely out of the question. All installations located on Government owned or leased land should be constructed at the present time eliminating those tasks from the work that cannot be done until after complete mobilization when it will be possible to enter on and organize private land.

3. The program for immediate construction contemplates semi-permanent emplacements for all coast artillery weapons in the present defense project. These weapons are sited in their most advantageous positions covering all approaches to the island and fixed Naval installations and their movement is not contemplated under any change of situation. Protection for infantry units is based on lightly held beach positions with a strong and highly mobile reserve in accordance with latest tactical principles. Dispersed and camouflaged bunker protection must be provided for aircraft and airfield installations must be protected by machine gun emplacements and fencing.

4. The peculiar topographic and geologic conditions and the nature of the vegetation of the Hawaiian Islands require a greater expenditure of materials for field fortification than would normally be anticipated. In their maneuvers and field training, troops have constructed many field fortification works. Salvage and local materials have been used to the utmost and many methods have been improvised to take into consideration the coral and lava rock, sand, and peculiar volcanic soil of the islands. This effort has been largely wasted because of the rapid deterioration of the local materials used. Sand bags and local timbers have a maximum life of about six months in this locality.

5. The War Department has repeatedly directed this Headquarters to construct certain works by Field Fortification methods but neither materials nor funds have been supplied. This letter presents a new computation of all material requirements for field fortification works and camouflage which should be constructed at once. This tabulation does not include those materials which must be used to complete the field fortification works after the outbreak of hostilities. These requirements may be divided into three groups as follows:

a. The Air Corps requirements. The airfields in the Hawaiian Islands are limited in number and there are very few places aside from regular airfields where enemy planes might land. Consequently, it is expected that determined efforts would be made to capture existing airfields. To prevent this, protected machine gun positions must be placed to guard the sensitive points on each airfield, and mobile forces provided for counter-attacks on enemy air-borne or sea-borne troops who are attempting a landing or who have landed. Airplanes on the ground must also be hidden and dispersed, to prevent their loss in surprise air attacks, hence camouflage is needed to conceal them. For this purpose, the local vegetation must be augmented by additional planting. In case an airfield on the outlying islands must be abandoned, its runways and other essential features should be destroyed, hence demolition chambers should be installed in advance. These matters cannot be deferred because of the time required for vegetation to grow and the time required to install protection and demolition works.

b. Coast Artillery requirements. The Coast Artillery includes permanent fixed defenses, mobile guns in positions prepared in time of peace, and antiaircraft guns protecting fixed Naval or military installations. The Coast Artillery cannot maneuver; the mobile elements, including antiaircraft, are held in fixed positions to defend fixed installations or to cover intervals in the permanent defenses, and the best positions have been prepared. Since these positions are known to the general public, the enemy also knows them. The operating personnel must have shelters to protect them and their ammunition during air attack, and the positions must be camouflaged to prevent accurate aim by enemy bombers. Coast Artillery troops must be constantly on the alert during active operations, and can then spare no men for fortification work after hostilities have begun.

c. Infantry requirements. The Infantry divisions will occupy beach positions very lightly held, and will have highly mobile motorized reserves. The beach positions have additional weapons, beyond table of organization allowances. Emplacements, trench shelters, observation and command posts for the beach positions must be ready when the enemy appears offshore, and field works should
be used to develop the maximum efficiency of automatic and heavy weapons and release as many men as possible to the reserve. There will be neither time nor men available to construct beach positions after the enemy arrives; fields of fire must be cleared, barbed wire, road blocks, anti-tank mines, and other obstacles must be installed at that time because these defenses will be placed on private property or will unduly interfere with civilian enterprise if set up in advance.

6. Inclosed are tabulations showing the material requirements of the Air Force, the Coast Artillery Command and the two Infantry divisions.

[5] 7. It is recommended that an allotment of $1,455,542 be made immediately available for the purchase of fortification and camouflage materials so that the work can be initiated and carried along concurrently with normal training activities.

8. The only alternative for having these positions prepared in advance is to have a large increase in the garrison authorized for the defense of the islands.

WALTER C. SHORT, 
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

1 Incl: in six sheets (in dupl.)
A True Copy:
Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd. Lt., F. A.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT ADJUTANT GENERAL:
10 WAR TG 61 WD

WASHN, D. C., 252P Aug. 12, 1941.

CG
Haw Dept, Ft. Shafter, T. H.
31 12th

AGMC reurnet July twenty eighth AG one two one point two subject reallocation of special field exercise funds for field fortification and camouflage projects stop special field exercise funds are not available for purpose requested further information follows by mail

ADAMS 1017A

A True Copy
Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[Exhibit Z]

[1] HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., July 15, 1941.

In reply refer to:
Engr. 000.91

Subject: Request for Funds for Camouflage of Wheeler Field.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. There is definite need for camouflage treatment of Air Fields in the Hawaiian Department. Up to this time no camouflage treatment has been undertaken at any air field in this department.

2. Attached is a plan for camouflage of Wheeler Field prepared by the 804th Engineer Company Aviation (Separate). The plan includes photographs of the type of camouflage to be applied to the bunkers, together with itemized estimates of costs and recommendations.

3. In reporting on this proposed plan, Major J. F. Ohmer, Jr., Corps of Engineers, Camouflage Officer, has commented as follows:

"The place for camouflage of Wheeler Field as prepared by the 804th Engineer Company Aviation (separate) is a good treatment for the field and the bunkers. The plan generally calls for 'blending' the buildings of Wheeler Field into the Schofield Barracks building area and endeavoring to restore the air field proper to the original condition as shown by the present earth scars, such as the old
Kamehameha Road, the gully through the field and the pineapple fields, roads and irrigation ditches."

"The plan is practicable and can be readily accomplished by the 804th Engineer Company Aviation."

"The Commanding General, Wheeler Field, has approved the plan and urged that the work be expedited."

"While the air photographs of the two planes in the camouflaged bunkers show the wing tips and the harsh straight shadows of the deciding line between the upper and lower nets, this can be blended by additional garnishing and small nets tying the lower nets under the upper terrace. This work is now being completed."

"It is recommended that the camouflage plans for Wheeler Field be approved."

4. It is recommended that an allotment of funds be made to this office in the amount of $56,210.00 for the purpose of camouflaging bunkers, landing field, hangars, and warning apron at Wheeler Field, the work to be done by the 804th Engineer Company Aviation (Separate). An itemized estimate is incorporated as a part of the plan substantiating the amount requested.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

1 Incl: Plan
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.


AG 007.5 (7-12-41) MC 1st Ind. RPM/gt-1712.
War Department, A. G. C., July 29, 1941.

To Chief of Engineers and Chief of the Army Air Force, IN TURN.

For remark and recommendation.
By order of the Secretary of War:
/s/ Carl Robinson.
Adjudant General.

1 Incl. n/c.
A true copy
Edward von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern
2nd Lt., F. A.


600.1 (Wheeler Fld) 71 2nd Ind. 6-C

War Department,
Office, Chief of Engineers,
Washington, D. C., September 16, 1941.

To: The Chief, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.

1. The proposed plan for the camouflage of Wheeler Field, Hawaii, has received careful consideration by The Engineer Board. As camouflage is essentially a local problem long range criticism may be entirely in error. Consequently, the following comments are offered only to supplement and should not invalidate decisions made on the spot by officers with intimate knowledge of local conditions.

2. Specific comments on Part I:

a. Bunkers.—The bunkers do not appear in the best arrangement to give maximum protection and to afford natural concealment. Their regular curving alignment throws a great burden on the artificial camouflage measures. The outer berm of the bunkers should be more irregular at the toe of the slope and should not be permitted to appear as a series of parallel lines as seen in photograph (V-112.101). Portions of the light colored pattern which show on the photograph could be continued over the revetment by sand or the native soil and over the net by weaving in appropriately colored garnishing. Extensive planting in native patterns will assist in this blending, and it is suggested that vines could be planted in the bunker tops and trained to grow into the nets to aid in defeating disclosure by means of infra-red photography. If additional dispersal pens are constructed, they should be spaced further apart, be more irregularly arranged, and the outer surface of the earth walls should be more irregular, especially at the toe of the slope.
b. Landing Field.—The division of the field boldly into three sections by natural boundaries as described is excellent, and, if carried out as indicated, should be very successful. The following detail criticisms may aid in the execution, but are not arbitrary. The field roads might be made a little more conspicuous by sprinkling a light colored earth, gravel or lava on the stripped surface as noted by contrast in the field roads in lower left corner of photograph (V-109-916-N-18). The same technique may be useful in the reproduction of the old Kamohameha road. If the fertilizer method does not produce dark enough contrasts it may be necessary to use black emulsified asphalts or a mixture of iron sulphate and tannin. The dark areas of the reproduced guily should not be used for taxiing and warming up any more than absolutely necessary, as this will destroy the desired effect.


(1) The effort to make the buildings of Wheeler Field appear as a more homogeneous portion of Schofield Barracks might be more effective if more roads, dummy or real, were built between the two areas.

(2) The athletic track is a dangerous subterfuge, because of its characteristic outline and east-west orientation, and is not generally recommended as it becomes a reference point when detected.

(3) The painting of buildings on the aprons appears satisfactory; maintenance will be required and should not be neglected.

(4) The hangar painting presents a fine appearance. More disruption might be achieved by a larger and bolder plan of painting. The roads which terminate at hangars might be carried over the building successfully and the buildings painted on the roof tops might be connected with painted walks and service roads to help create the illusion of a reduced scale of construction. The general trace of the shadows of buildings should be studied and wherever possible, there should be painted, or preferably planted, trees and shrubs to break up their characteristic outline. Planting, which may appear relatively ineffective in vertical views, may help materially against the bombers' approach.

(5) Inasmuch as the concrete hangar line apron is of brighter material and more reflective than other roadways in the area, it should be generally toned down with a thin solution of tar or asphalt in kerosene, in addition to the other treatment suggested.

3. Specific comments on Part II.

a. It is suggested an asphalt emulsion for roofs would be cheaper and more suitable. In general, the type of paint should be selected with regard to the material to be coated, instead of the classification by roofs, walls, etc. Under "Concrete" it is assumed that aprons are included. The American Betumuls Company, which maintains a branch in Hawaii, should be able to furnish asphalt emulsion paints and adhesives more advantageously than Rejuvo. The matter of granules to cover surfaces should be investigated carefully to see whether local materials of indigenous colors or of a nature which will absorb bituminous colors, such as lava, are not more easily procurable.

[6] 4. It is recommended that:

a. That the plan of camouflage be approved.

b. That the camouflage office, Hawaiian Department, or the Commanding Officer of the 804th Engineer Battalion (Avn.) (Sep.) be granted permission to communicate directly with the Engineer Board on matters of materials and technical details to expedite the work.

c. That the Engineer Board be furnished a report to be made upon completion of the work, including photographs of intermediate the final stages. It is suggested that oblique photographs be furnished as well as vertical. The oblique photographs should be taken at 10,000 feet and three to four miles from Wheeler Field from four directions.

d. That the amount of $56,210.00 be allotted to the Department Commander, Hawaiian Department, for the purpose of camouflaging bunkers, landing field, hangars and warming aprons at Wheeler Field, the work to be done by the 804th Engineer Company.

For the Acting Chief of Engineers:

[8] Homer Saint-Gaudens,  
Lt. Co., Corps of Engineer,  
Acting Chief, Operations and Training Section.
Subject: Request for Funds for Camouflage of Wheeler Field.

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., October 28, 1941.

To Chief of Engineers.

1. The camouflage treatment of Wheeler Field as outlined in basic correspondence is authorized when funds become available for this construction.

2. It is desired that you take the necessary action to include the sum of $56,210 in the next available budget estimate for camouflage treatment of Wheeler Field.

By order of the Secretary of War:

D. R. Van Sickler,
Adjoint General.

1 Incl. n/c/

Copy to:
Chief of Air Corps w/cy of basic com., 1st Ind., 2nd Ind.
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department ref. his basic ltr. 7-12-41, together w/cy of 1st Ind., and 2nd Ind.

A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldebrn,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[SECRET]

Engr. 000.91

Subject: Camouflage of Defense Installations.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Investigations conducted by this headquarters have demonstrated that effective measures can and should be taken to reduce the visibility of exposed defense installations to hostile aerial observation. Admittedly these installations cannot be concealed to such an extent that they will be invisible on aerial photographs; at the same time, however, any camouflage which will render visual observation more difficult and will decrease the effectiveness of enemy bombardment is of the utmost importance.

2. Time has not permitted the submission of a comprehensive program for the camouflage of all defense installations in this department which require some degree of concealment; this matter is undergoing continuous study. Fixed seacoast batteries have received first attention and plans of procedure and cost estimates have been prepared. The following table shows the various installations on which camouflage work should be undertaken immediately with the tentative costs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Installation</th>
<th>Armament</th>
<th>Inclosure No.</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ft. DERUSSY:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery Randolph</td>
<td>2-14&quot; (Disappearing)</td>
<td>Incl. No. 1</td>
<td>$6,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery Dudley</td>
<td>2-6&quot; (Disappearing)</td>
<td>Incl. No. 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ft. KAMEHAMEHA:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery Clossen</td>
<td>2-12&quot; (Barbette)</td>
<td>Incl. No. 2</td>
<td>6,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery Sellridge</td>
<td>2-12&quot; (Disappearing)</td>
<td>Incl. No. 3</td>
<td>5,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery Jackson</td>
<td>2-6&quot; (Disappearing)</td>
<td>Incl. No. 3</td>
<td>1,500.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ft. RUGER:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery Adams</td>
<td>2-8&quot; (Barbette)</td>
<td>Incl. No. 4</td>
<td>2,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery Hatch</td>
<td>2-10&quot; (Barbette)</td>
<td>Incl. No. 5</td>
<td>8,500.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cost.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$29,000.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The measures contemplated include construction of various types of overhead cover, dummy positions, extension of roads, painting and the transplantation of trees and shrubbery.

3. Experience in the present World War has shown the very considerable success of the Germans in concealing by camouflage, their long range guns on the channel coasts. The several millions of dollars invested in the installations enumerated in paragraph 2 above and their general value in the defense of this island justify expenditure which will render them less vulnerable to enemy
attack. It is therefore recommended that the sum of $29,000.00 be allotted this department as soon as practicable to permit initiation of this camouflage work.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, Commanding.

Incls. 1–5: Aerial Photos
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.

Subject: Camouflage of Defense Installations.
AG 007.5 (2-27-41) M 1st Ind. ACW/lf

War Department, A. G. O.,
March 18, 1941.

To: The Chief of Engineers.
For remark and recommendation.
By order of the Secretary of War:

Adjudant General.

5 Incls. n/c
C. of E. 618.33 (Oahu) 3 2nd Ind. 6–E

Office, C. of E., May 28, 1941.

To: The Adjutant General, THROUGH THE CHIEF OF COAST ARTILLERY.

1. This paper was held in this office to permit direct inspection of the installations by a representative of this office who visited Hawaii on this and other fortification matters. Reference is made to Hawaii on this and other fortification matters. Reference is made to memorandum of March 22, 1941, to The Adjutant General, in this connection.

2. The importance of protective concealment for existing seacoast batteries is recognized by this office and a directive bulletin is now being prepared for issue to the field showing methods of such concealment for different type batteries.

3. The estimate submitted is considered an absolute minimum that will be required even omitting from consideration at this time Batteries Hatch and Closson which are to be casemated and more funds will probably be required at a later date. It is recommended that the project be approved and funds be made available at the earliest practicable date.

For the Chief of Engineers:

GEORGE MAYO,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
Chief, Fortification Section.

5 Incls.—n/c
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.

Subject: Camouflage of Defense Installations.

618.3/45-B 3rd Ind. 5

War Department, Office, Chief of Coast Artillery,
June 12, 1941.

To: The Adjutant General.

1. The need for camouflaging the seacoast Batteries listed in paragraph 2 of the basic letter is evident from inspection of the inclosures, Nos. 1 to 5, inclusive. The program as outlined in paragraph 2 of the basic letter, is concurred in, subject to the proviso that the protective concealment of Batteries Hatch and Closson will be coordinated, both in time and character, with the casemating of these batteries.

2. No Seacoast Defense funds are available, at this time, for application to camouflage projects and none are included in current estimates.
3. It is recommended that the camouflage project, described in paragraph 2 of the basic letter, be approved for inclusion in the Hawaiian Department Defense Project.

For the Chief of Coast Artillery:

Joe D. Moss,
Major, C. A. C.,
Acting Executive.

5 Incls—No change.
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.

Subject: Camouflage of Defense Installations, Hawaiian Department.

AG 007.5 (2-27-41) MC-E

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,
June 27, 1941.

To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. The program for the camouflaging of Batteries Randolph, Dudley, Clossen, Selfridge, Jackson, Adams and Hatch, as proposed in paragraph 2 of the basic letter, is approved for inclusion in the Hawaiian Defense Project.

2. Funds to the amount of $29,000 for this purpose will be included in the next estimates to be submitted and will be made available at the earliest practicable date.

By order of the Secretary of War:

E. S. Adams,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

5 Incls. w/d.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
FT. SHAFTER, T. H.,
July 24, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, Ft. DeRussey, T. H.

1. To note and return to this headquarters.

2. The Department Engineer will be directed to include this project in the next revision of the Hawaiian Defense Project and to prepare plans for the execution of this work when funds are received.

By command of Lieutenant General Short:

O. M. McDole,
Major, A. G. G.,
Assistant Adjutant General.

A true copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.

(Basic: Ltr., HHD, Engr. 000.91, 27 February 1941, subject: “Camouflage of Defense Installations.”)


Noted.

Fulton Q. C. Gardner,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.
Subject: Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, Engr. 611, this headquarters, 8 November 1940, covering the recommendations for the revision of the military roads and trails program. As indicated in paragraphs 5 and 8 of that letter, the revised program was not complete and additional roads and trails were under consideration.

2. A detailed study made by this headquarters indicates that the following additional improvements are necessary:

   a. Wiliwilinui road and trail improvement, estimated cost $33,550.00. Construction covering improvement of the existing 15,000 lineal feet of road at Wiliwilinui Ridge, eliminating sharp curves and providing adequate turnouts. It also covers construction of a 6-foot pack trail extending from the end of the existing road to the main crest of Koolauloko Ridge area.

   b. Improvement of Pupukea-Kahuku trail estimated at $12,720.00. This project consists of the general widening of the existing trail from 3 to 6 feet along its 13,000-foot alignment. This improvement will provide desirable communication between the northeasterly section of the Island and northern end of Wahiawa-Pupukea trail.

   c. Coincidental with the improvement of the Koolau Ridge trail, feeder trails to the ridge should be developed and improved. As a part of its reforestation program, the CCC has constructed several trails from forest reserve boundaries to the main ridge of the Koolaua along the lateral ridges. These trails, shown in the following list, should be partially relocated and improved as 6-foot pack trails:

   (1) Poamono trail, 22,800 feet, estimated cost $35,100.00
   (2) Kawailoa trail, 24,000 feet $22,750.00
   (3) Schofield-Waikane, 33,000 feet $45,750.00
   (4) Waiawa trail, 30,000 feet $28,650.00

   d. A road to Fuu Palailai. This project (copy illegible) of a 10' class "B" supply road extending from the main government road to Fuu Palailai. This road is desired to improve access to a group of fire control stations manned by a detail of from 50 to 100 men. The approximate length of this road is 8,700 feet and estimated cost $10,000.00.

   e. Iunia-Palehua road. This project will connect an existing plantation road with the Palehua spur via the Mauna Kapu and the Honouliuli trails. The need for an alternate route to the Manauahua Defense Area is extremely important, particularly in view of the exposed condition of the Palehua road to hostile observation. This project calls for the construction of 24,000 lineal feet of a 10-foot class "B" road at an estimated cost of $136,500.00.

   f. Radial Ridge roads, Manauahua area. This project calls for the construction of three roads along the ridges, south and west of Fuu Nanauahua as shown on the attached map. These roads serve vital defense areas which must be made accessible to truck transportation. The total length of these ten-foot roads is approximately 20,000 feet and the estimated cost of construction is $84,900.00.

3. These additional roads and trails have been combined with the 19 items listed in paragraph 7 of letter, this headquarters, file Engr. 611, 8 November 1940, and are shown in the table below in order of their relative priority. The location of each item is shown on the map, scale 1/125,000, Inclusion No. 1 hereto.

   1. Fort Weaver 155-mm position Road 10' Class B $8,900
   2. Fort Roger Roads 10' Class B 4,600
   3. Barbors Point East 3L Pos. Trail 3L Trail 1,000
   4. Maili Marker 3L Position Trail 3L Trail 6,000
   5. Maililu 3L Position Trail 3L Trail 1,400
   6. Ewaena Point 3L Position Trail 3L Trail 1,000
   7. Wai'anae 3L Position Trail 3L Trail 1,000
   8. Completion of Barbors Point Road Net Class A 133,000
   9. North Shore RR Connection K. R. 290,000
   10. Improvement Wai'anae Pupukea Road 10' Class A & B 216,000
11. Waimoa-Pupukea Road, 10' Class B ........................................ $35,000
12. Alternate RR Schofield-Wahianu Bypass R. R. .................. 70,000
13. Connection-Leihihua Spur to Oahu Sugar Co. tracks (rail only) R. R. . 48,600
14. Ordnance Magazine Area, Schofield 25' Class A ................ 33,000
15. Feeder Roads Wahianu Pupukea Road, Improvement .......... 111,800
16. Eahuku 155-mm Position Road, 10' Class B .................. 15,650
17. Eahuku CP Trail, CP Trail ........................................ 2,100
18. Keuphi CP Trail, CP Trail ........................................ 8,000
19. Koohan Ridge Trail, 6' Pack Trail .................................. 20,000
20. Williwima Road, Improvement ...................................... 17,900
21. Williwima Trail, 6' Pack Trail ...................................... 15,650
22. Poamoho Trail, 6' Pack Trail ....................................... 35,100
23. Pupukea-Mahuhu Trail, 6' Pack Trail............................... 12,720
24. Hawaiian Trail, 6' Pack Trail ...................................... 22,750
25. Schofield-Wahianu Trail, 6' Pack Trail ...................... 15,750
26. Waian Trail, 6' Pack Trail ........................................ 28,650
27. Pau Palalai CP Road, 10' Class B .................................. 10,000
28. Kunia-Palahua Road, 10' Class B .................................. 136,500
29. Ridge Roads, Manamam Area, 10' Class B .................... 34,900
30. Over All Projects .................................................. 1,370,020

4. It is recommended that the roads and trails program shown in the table above be approved in lieu of the present program approved in 4th Indorsement (AG 611 Hawaii (3-31-38 (Misc.) (X) dated 23 May 1939), on War Department letter (AG 611 Hawaii (3-28-38) Misc. WPD) dated 31 March 1938, subject: “Military Priority Highways in the Hawaiian Department”. It is further recommended that the sum of $1,370,020.00 be allotted to this department as soon as possible to permit early completion of this program.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General,
Commanding.

1 Incl: Map
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

Subject: Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department.
AG 611 Hawaii (2-19-41) M 1st Ind. AGW/ric

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,
February 27, 1941.

To: Chief of Engineers and Chief of Coast Artillery, IN TURN.

For remark and recommendation, reference being made to files C. of E. 611
(Haw) 10 and OCGA 611/45 A 7.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Adjutant General.

1 Incl. a/c
C. of E., March 12, 1941.

To: The Chief of Coast Artillery.

1. Items 1 to 19, inclusive, in this program were approved for inclusion in the Hawaiian Defense Project in 3rd Indorsement dated February 18, 1941, AG 611 Hawaiian Department (11-8-40) M-WPD; OCGA 611/45 A 7; C. of E. 611 (Hawaii) 10. It was further directed that the Commanding General confer with Mr. Moskowitz, the representative of the Commissioner of Public Roads in Hawaii, with a view to securing the maximum aid permissible from the Public Roads Administration for the accomplishment of the construction authorized Federal Highway Act of 1940. It was also directed that a revised estimate be submitted covering items 9, 12 and 13. The above action was not available to the Commanding General at the time of preparation of basic paper.

2. Items 20 to 29, inclusive, are new items of work. The estimated cost appears reasonable, and their inclusion in the program is recommended.

3. Attention is invited to letter from the Commanding General Hawaiian Department dated February 19, 1941, subject: “Construction of North Shore Railroad Connection” file Engr. 611; AG 112.05 (2-19-41) M; C. of E. 611 (Hawaii) 11 in which it was recommended that funds in the amount of $230,000
be allotted as soon as possible to initiate construction. The item referred to is included in this paper as item 9.

For the Chief of Engineers:

[S] George Mayo,
 GEORGE MAYO,
Lt. Col. Corps of Engineers,
Chief, Fortification Section.

1 Inclosure n/c.
611/45A–10
3rd Ind.
OFFICE, CHIEF OF COAST ARTILLERY,
WAR DEPARTMENT,
March 15, 1941.

To: The Adjutant General.

1. The remarks and recommendations of the Chief of Engineers appearing in the 2nd indorsement are concurred in.
2. In addition to the funds referred to in paragraph 1, 2nd indorsement, $300,000 is included in current Seacoast Defense estimates for application on items Nos. 9, 12 and 13 (railroad construction projects).

For the Chief of Coast Artillery:

[S] E. T. Blood,
Colonel, C. A. C., Executive.

1 Incl. n/c
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt. F. A.

Subject: Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department.
AG 611 Hawaii (2–19–41) M–WP D 4th Ind.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Attention is invited to the preceding 2d and 3d Indorsements.
2. The program for road, trail and railroad construction contained in paragraph 3, basic communication, is approved for inclusion in the Hawaiian Defense Project in place of the road, trail and railroad program approved by 3d Indorsement, February 18, 1941, to the letter, subject: “Military Road and Trail Program, Hawaiian Department”, AG 611 Haw. Dept. (11–8–40) H–WP D.
3. It is desired that you submit a breakdown of the items contained in the road and trail program approved herein to show the expenditures contemplated for augmentation and for maintenance. In this connection, attention is invited to your 1st Indorsement, January 16, 1941, to the letter, subject: “Maintenance and repairs of Fortifications, Estimate of Funds for FY 1943” (Engr. 121.2, Forts), in which you request funds for the maintenance of roads. The breakdown requested is necessary to insure that no duplication will be encountered in the defense of estimates to be submitted for the completion of this program.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Incl. w/d
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt. F. A.
## Proposed program, tactical items

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<th>Priority</th>
<th>Old Rec.</th>
<th>Type</th>
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A True Copy:
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt. F. A.


HEADQUARTERS, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 26 May 1941.

To: The adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to the following correspondences:
   a. AG 611, Haw. Dept. (11-8-40) M-WPD; Military Road and Trail Program, Hawaii Department.
   b. AG 660 (4-19-41) M; Expenditure Program, Seacoast Defense Fund, Fiscal Year 1942
   c. Eng. 121.2 (Forts); Maintenance and Repair of Fortifications, Estimate of Funds for Fiscal Year 1943, (cited in Paragraph 3, 3rd Indorsement above).

2. a. Road, trail and railroad program submitted in reference a was approved by War Department 3rd Indorsement, February 18, 1941, subject to the following:
   (1) That Mr. Moskowitz be contacted to secure a maximum of the unobligated portion of $446,000.00, previously allotted the PRA for Hawaii, for the construction of the road and trail items in the approved program.
   (2) That revised estimates be submitted for the railroad items in the approved program.
b. 4th Indorsement, this headquarters, April 4, 1941, submitted the following:

(1) Recommendation that $446,000.00 available to the PRA be not diverted from the purpose for which originally allotted, namely, construction of the Wahiana cut-off and the Kolokolo-Waiamoa Road.

(2) Revised estimates for the railroad items and reduced estimates for the road and trails portions of the program by the $70,400.00 made available on December 7, 1940.

(3) Cross-referenced the originally approved program, items 1-19 inclusive, with the additional items, 20-29 inclusive, approved herein and submitted revised estimates in the amount of $951,020.00 for the road and trail items and $298,000.00 for the railroad items. The total cost, $1,249,620.00 supersedes estimate of $1,370,020.00 reported in basic letter herewith.

[8] 3. Reference b informed this headquarters that regular estimates for Seacoast Defense funds, FY 1942 include $300,000.00 for the construction of the railroad items and $50,000.00 for road and trail items. Release of these funds will cover the construction of the railroads $298,600.00 and will reduce the required funds for the completion of the roads and trails to $901,020.00.

4. a. Reference c submitted estimates in the amount of $286,000.00 for the upkeep of military roads and trails during FY 1943. These estimates were based upon the maintenance of these roads and trails already constructed in this department, since at the time of submission, the augmentation program did not have War Department approval. The great increase in FY 1943 estimates over those of previous years has been due primarily first, to the necessity of procuring new plant and equipment as replacements for outworn units and second, to the necessity supplanting WPA employees with hired labor as a result of the increasing non-availability of the former.

b. The breakdown of the $286,000.00 estimate showed the proportional amounts of the total which would be expended on existing roads and trails. In view of the approval by 4th Indorsement of the revised road, railroad, and trail program, which contains funds for the improvement of certain existing roads, the original breakdown of FY 1943 maintenance estimates is no longer applicable. Specifically, maintenance funds for the Wahiana-Purukea Road and Barbers Point Road net can be reduced considerably; at the same time, however, the construction of new roads and trails during FY 1943 and ensuing years. Attached as enclosure No. 1 is a revised tabulation of maintenance funds required during FY 1943 for all existing roads and trails and those to be constructed under the approved program. This breakdown shows specifically the purposes for which these funds will be expended. Revised estimates decrease the funds originally requested by $34,000.00.

c. 1st Indorsement, January 16, 1941, which forwarded the estimates cited in paragraph 5a, recommended immediate release of $100,000.00 of the $286,000.00. This $100,000.00 is necessary for the purchase of materials and additional plant and the hiring of labor for the maintenance of long neglected existing roads and trails, funds for the improvement of which have not been included in the approved augmentation program.

[9] 5. As explained in the foregoing paragraphs, there is no duplication in the funds still required for the construction of the approved augmentation program, $1,249,620.00 or $901,020.00 if the $350,000.00 in FY 1942 estimates is made available and the funds, totaling $252,000.00, required for maintenance: the $1,249,620.00 construction estimate includes no funds for maintenance and the $252,000.00 maintenance estimate includes no funds for new construction.

6. It is recommended:

a. That in accordance with the revised estimates cited in paragraphs 3b (3) and 4, above, funds in the amount of $901,020.00 for the completion of the approved road, trail and railroad program be included in FY 1942 estimates to supplement the $350,000 expected to be released.
(b) That the revised estimates in the amount of $252,000.00 be substituted for the $236,000.00 now included in FY 1943 estimates for the maintenance and repair of military roads and trails and that $100,000.00 of this amount be released to this department during FY 1942.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

1 Incl: Revised estimate.
A true copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.

AG 611 Hawaii (2-19-41) MC 6th Ind. 21-H/agb-1712
WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., June 9, 1941.
To: Chief of Coast Artillery and Chief of Engineers, In Turn:

For remark and recommendation.
By order of the Secretary of War:

1 Incl, n/o
611/45-A-10 7th Ind. Adjutant General
WAR DEPARTMENT, Office, Chief of Coast Artillery,
June 12, 1941.

To: Chief of Engineers.

1. The records of this office indicate that the necessary action has been taken with a view to accomplishing the recommendations appearing in paragraph 6 a of 5th Indorsement, assuming that that portion of the recommendation reading “FY 1943” was intended to read “Fy 1943.”

2. With respect to the recommendation appearing in paragraph 6 b of 5th indorsement, preliminary estimates for Fy 1943 do not now include a specific item for maintenance and repair of military roads and trails. The total sum now appearing in the preliminary estimates FY 1943 under Project 11—Alteration, maintenance and repair of fortifications—is $225,000. Fy 1942 estimates for Project 11 total $173,710. The portion of these funds to be applied to maintenance of roads and to strictly fortification works appears to be discretionary with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. However, the basis for estimating these funds for FY 1941 included specifically $59,000 as applicable to road maintenance.

For the Chief of Coast Artillery:

LEONARD L. DAVIS,
Lt. Col., C. A. C., Assistant.

1 Inclosure
(Dup. w/d).
A true copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.

Subject: Military Roads and Trails Program, Hawaiian Department.

8th Ind. Office C. of E.,
6-E July 1, 1941.

To: The Adjutant General.

1. Reference paragraph 6 a of 5th Indorsement and paragraph 1 of preceding Indorsement, it is recommended that authority be granted to include the $901,000 required for the completion of the approved road, trail and railroad program in the supplemental estimates for Fiscal Year 1943 at the first opportunity.
2. The remarks of the Chief of Coast Artillery in paragraph 2 of 7th Indorsement are concurred in.

For the Chief of Engineers:

GEORGE MAYO,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
Chief, Fortification Section.

1 Inclosure n/c.
CG of OCCA
A True Copy:
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.

AG 611 (2-10-41) MC-K
EGA

9th Ind.

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., July 18, 1941.
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Funds in the amount of $300,000 for railroads and $50,000 for roads and trails are now available from FY 1942 appropriations for construction contained in the approved Road, Trail, and Railroad Program. These funds will soon be released to the District Engineer. Additional funds in the amount of $900,000 have been included in tentative estimates, FY 1943 for the completion of the approved Road and Trail Program. This latter amount will be requested at an earlier time in the event that further supplemental FY 1942 estimates are prepared.

2. General maintenance funds to the amount of $173,710 are now available from FY 1942 appropriations and a substantial amount thereof has been released to the District Engineer, Honolulu. The portion of these funds to be applied to the maintenance of roads is discretionary with you. Additional general maintenance funds to the amount of $223,000 have been included in preliminary estimates, FY 1943.

3. An additional amount of $140,000 will be included at the first opportunity in estimates to be submitted to provide further funds for maintenance of roads and trails in your department.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Major General,
The Adjutant General.

Incl. w/d
A true copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[Exhibit 1B]
Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 5 April '41

[EXTRACT]

Subject: Construction at Bellows Field, T. H.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to 1st Indorsement. The Adjutant General's office, file AG 370.5 (2-15-41) M-D, dated 5 March 1941 which authorized the permanent assignment of the 86th Observation Squadron and the 58th Bombardment Squadron at Bellows Field.

5. The improvement of the runways consist in lengthening the present runway from about 2800' to 3400' and widening from 150' to 300'. The new runway is 5000' long and 300' wide. Cross-connection the existing and the new runway is a paved taxi strip and parking strip 300' wide and 2200' long with a servicing mat 300' x 600' adjacent to the taxi strip. All runways, servicing mats and taxi strips will be asphaltic concrete. Other installations required are an airdrome control tower and an aqua-gasoline system of 600,000 gallon capacity. The necessary
tanks for this gasoline system are on hand. A complete system of airport lighting and sewer, water, and power utilities will be necessary. Miscellaneous installations include man-proof fences around vital installations, improvement of the drainage of the camp area, pistol and 1000" machine gun ranges, and roads and sidewalks.

7. The improvements recommended are all necessary. Funds for improving the runways in particular should be expedited. The District Engineer has informed me that it is possible at this time to secure on the mainland the necessary plant and equipment for this paving but that unless contracted for in the very near future, it will not be much longer available.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

3 Incls:
No. 1 Tabulation of Housing Needs
2 Layout Map*
3 Tabulation of Cost Estimates
*(Filed in Drafting Room; Bellows Field #1)
No R/S was prepared. Verbal approval of C/S and signature secured by Major Fleming, 5 April 1941.
Copy to Hawaiian Air Corps 4/8/41
Copy to District Engineer 4/17/41
A true copy:
Edward von Geldern
EDWARD VON GELDERN
2nd Lt., F. A.

Subject: Additional funds for Completion of Authorized Mobilization Housing Project, Hawaiian Department

2nd Ind.  
WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE, CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS,
Washington, D. C., June 28, 1941

To: The Quartermaster General.

1. Reference is made to Paragraph 1.e. of basic communication which indicates that funds in the amount of $990,769 will be included in future estimates for the projects at Wheeler, Hickam, and Bellows Fields, as requested in Paragraph 2.a,b, and c of basic communication.

For the Chief of the Air Corps

FRANK M. KENNEDY
Colonel, Air Corps
Chief, Buildings and Grounds Division

Copied from Project Letter B-1
A true copy:
Edward von Geldern
EDWARD VON GELDERN
2nd Lt., F. A.

[1] HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 2 May 1941.

Engr. 600.12
Subject: Construction at Barking Sands Field, Kauai, T. II.

1. Reference is made to letter, The Adjutant General's Office, file AG 580 (3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective." At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The
Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing need.

2. It is recommended that Barking Sands Field on Kauai be developed into an outlying field with a rotating garrison as follows: 1 air base detachment of 6 officers and 107 men, and 1 National Guard company to provide local security of 4 officers and 116 men, total 10 officers and 223 men. In addition to this permanent garrison, two heavy bombardment squadrons of 37 officers and 206 men each from Hickam Field will be sent to Barking Sands for training. While these bombardment squadrons will change, two will be temporarily stationed at all times at this field. The total garrison at Barking Sands including temporary and permanent troops will be 84 officers and 635 men.

3. Some buildings have been and are being erected at this field by the WPA. Additional buildings will be necessary and the WPA Administrator has informed me that neither his material funds nor his available labor will be sufficient to complete the required program. There is inclosed as Inclosure No. 1 a tabulation showing the buildings, built and building by the WPA and the additional buildings required which include administration buildings, shops, warehouses, recreation buildings, mess halls, officers’ quarters and other structures. Complete utility system should be provided for this camp. All buildings to be mobilization type.

4. Other construction recommended consists in improvement of flying conditions by the grading of two runways 5000’ by 300’ and the paving of a 2000-strip on each runway for a length of 5000’, the construction of a servicing mat and the installation of a complete airport lighting system. Storage for 450,000 gallons of gasoline will soon be installed by the District Engineer with funds now available to him; in this storage none of the eighty [2] 50,000-gallon tanks now on hand will be utilized. These tanks are now designed for the aqua system; at this time, however, the tanks are being installed for storage only and if at a later date the necessity develops, this storage system can be readily converted into the aqua system. Also included in the cost estimates are miscellaneous items such as an airdrome control tower, pistol and 1000’ ranges and man-proof fencing around vital installations. Roads within the camp area have also been included in the cost estimates; an improvement to the access road to this military reservation from the nearest point on the Kauai belt road has been the subject of discussion with the local public roads administration under the provision of Section 18 of the Federal Highway Act of 1940. Surveys of this road are now being made by the Territorial Highway Department; these surveys have not been completed. The local Public Roads Administration officials, based on a reconnaissance, estimate that this access road will cost about $150,000. As it is doubtful whether either territorial or Federal Highway funds will be available for construction on this amount has also been included in the estimates. Telephone costs have been estimated at 2½% of building costs as directed in Chief Signal officer’s radio of 11 March 1941. In determining the building costs a constructive evaluation of the work already done by the WPA based upon costs of the new buildings recommended in this letter was used to arrive at the total costs.

5. There are inclosed as Inclosures Nos. 2 and 3, a layout drawing of this field and a tabulation of cost estimates of the buildings and other improvements required. These cost estimates were prepared by the District Engineer, Honolulu, and include not only direct but also the indirect costs of the job. The total required to complete the installation is $1,772,220.
6. It is recommended that the improvement of Barking Sands be authorized and that funds in amount of $1,772,220.00 be released to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to initiate this construction.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

3 Incls: #1—Bldg tabulation
#2—Layout drawing
#3—Cost Estimate
A true copy:
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.

In reply refer to:
Via "Clipper" Air Mail
Engr. 600.12

Subject: Construction at Hilo Airport.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, The Adjutant General's office, file AG 580 (3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective." At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing need.

2. It is recommended that Hilo airport be developed into an outlying field with a rotating garrison as follows: 1 air base detachment of 4 officers and 50 men, and 2 National Guard companies to provide local security of 4 officers and 116 men each, total 12 officers and 382 men. In addition to this permanent garrison, one heavy bombardment squadron of 37 officers and 206 men from Hickam Field will be sent to this field for training. While this squadron will change, at least one will be temporarily stationed at this field a large part of the time. The total garrison at Hilo therefore will be 49 officers and 588 men.

3. Some buildings are now being erected at this field by the WPA. Additional buildings are needed and the WPA Administrator has informed me that neither his material funds nor his available labor will be sufficient to complete the required program. The buildings now being built and the additional ones required are tabulated in the cost estimates. A complete utility system is recommended. Buildings will be mobilization type.

4. The runways at the Hilo airport will be improved through a CAA contract under supervision of the District Engineer, Honolulu. Additional improvements needed are the installation of storage for 450,000 gallons of gasoline; for this 9 of the 80 50,000-gallon tanks now on hand will be utilized. These tanks were designed for the aqwa system, but simple storage only is recommended at this time. If the need later develops, this storage can readily be converted to the aqua system as all fittings will be available on the tanks.

[2] 5. There are inclosed as Inclosure No. 1 a tabulation of cost estimates, and as Inclosure No. 2 a layout map of the field. In addition to the items already mentioned, these estimates include miscellaneous items such as roads, airdrome control tower, pistol and 1000 inch ranges and telephone installations. These telephone costs have been estimated at 2½ per cent of the building costs as directed in Chief Signal Officer's radio of 11 March 1941. In determining the total building costs a constructive evaluation of the work now being done by the WPA was combined with the estimated costs of construction recommended in this letter. The estimates in the tabulation were prepared by the District Engineer, Honolulu, and include indirect as well as direct costs of the job.
6. It is recommended that this construction on the present military reservation at the Hilo airport be authorized and that funds in the amount of $670,140 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to complete the installation.

2 Incls: #1 Cost Estimates
   #2 Layout map

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

A true copy:
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern.
2nd Lt., F. A.

[1]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 2 May 1941

In reply refer to:
Via “Clipper” Air Mail
Subject: Construction at Homestead Field, Molokai, T. H.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, The Adjutant General’s Office, file AG 560 (3-7-41) M-G-M, 14 March 1941, Subject: “Army’s Second Aviation Objective.” At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing need.

2. It is recommended that Homestead Field, Molokai, T. H., be developed into an outlying field with a rotating garrison as follows: 1 air base detachment of 4 officers and 50 men, and 1 National Guard Company to provide local security of 4 officers and 116 men, total 8 officers and 166 men. In addition to this permanent garrison, one pursuit squadron of 33 officers and 157 men from Wheeler Field will be sent to this field for training. While this squadron will change, at least one will be temporarily stationed at this field a large part of the time. The total garrison at Homestead Field therefore will be 41 officers and 323 men.

3. Some buildings have been and are being built at this field by the WPA. Additional buildings are needed and the WPA Administrator has informed me that neither his material funds nor his available labor will be sufficient to complete the required program. The buildings now being built and the additional ones required are tabulated in the cost estimates. A complete utility system is recommended. Buildings will be mobilization type.

4. The runways at the Homestead Field will be improved through a CAA contract under supervision of the District Engineer, Honolulu. Additional improvements needed are the installation of storage for 350,000 gallons of gasoline: for this 7 of the 30 50,000-gallon tanks now on hand will be utilized. These tanks were designed for the aqua system, but simple storage only is recommended at this time. If the need later develops, this storage can readily be converted to the aqua system as all fittings will be available on the tanks.

A true copy:
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern.
2nd Lt. F. A.

[2] 5. There is enclosed a tabulation of cost estimates. In addition to the items already mentioned, these estimates include miscellaneous items such as roads, airdrome control tower, pistol and 1000 inch ranges and telephone installations. These telephone costs have been estimated at 2½ per cent of the building costs as directed in Chief Signal Officer’s radio of 11 March 1941. In determining the total building costs a constructive evaluation of the work now being done by the WPA was combined with the estimated costs of construction recommended in this letter. The estimates in the tabulation were prepared by the District Engineer, Honolulu, and include indirect as well as direct costs of the job.
6. It is recommended that this construction on the present military reservation at Homestead Field be authorized and that funds in the amount of $407,600.00 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to complete the installation.

1. Incl: Cost Estimates.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

A true copy:
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt. F. A.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., May 2, 1941.

Engr. 600.12.
Via “Clipper” Air Mail
Subject: Construction at Morse Field, Hawaii
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, The Adjutant General’s office, file AG 580 (3-7-41) M–C–M, 14 March 1941, subject: “Army’s Second Aviation Objective.” At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating condition. The Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing need.

2. It is recommended that Morse Field on Hawaii be developed into an outlying field with a rotating garrison as follows: 1 air base detachment of 6 officers and 107 men, and 1 National Guard company to provide local security of 4 officers and 116 men, total 10 officers and 223 men. In addition to this permanent garrison, two heavy bombardment squadrons of 37 officers and 206 men each from Hickam Field will be sent to Morse Field for training. While these bombardment squadrons will change, two will be temporarily stationed a large part of the time at this field. The total garrison at Morse Field including temporary and permanent troops will be 84 officers and 635 men.

3. Some buildings have been built at this station by troop labor. Other buildings have been and are being built by the WPA. Additional buildings and improvements are necessary; I believe that the requirements of training preclude any extensive use of troop labor and the WPA Administrator has informed me that neither his material money nor his available labor will be sufficient to complete the required program. These additional buildings will all be of mobilization type construction for use as operations buildings, shops, administrative and supply buildings, barracks, mess halls, magazines, etc. A complete system of utilities should be provided.

4. Other construction recommended consists in improvement of flying facilities by the paving of a main runway 3400 feet long and 300 feet wide, and its extension by grading, leveling and light paving to a length of 4150 feet and width of 400 feet. Because of prevailing wind conditions, only one paved runway is considered necessary by the Commanding General, [2] Hawaiian Air Force. Necessary taxi mats, service mats and warming up aprons will be graded and paved. A complete airport lighting system will be installed. Gasoline storage for 450,000 gallons utilizing nine of the eighty 50,000-gallon tanks now on hand will be installed; because of the shortage of water at this field, this will be plain storage and not the aqua system. There is inclosed as Inclosure No. 1, a layout map of this field. It will be noted that considerable areas in the vicinity of the runway are shown for light paving. This is necessary; the soil at this field is very fine and with the prevailing high velocity wind there is a serious dust problem as this dust affects the engines of the planes. The shortage of water makes stabilization by sodding or vegetation impracticable, and the most practical way that this problem can be solved is to stabilize by light paving.
5. There is inclosed as Inclosure No. 2 a tabulation of cost estimates of the buildings and other improvements required. In addition to the items already mentioned, miscellaneous items such as roads, pistol and 1,000 inch ranges, an Airdrome Control tower, and telephone installations have been included. These telephone costs have been estimated at 21/2 percent of building costs as directed in Chief Signal Officer's radio of 11 March 1941. In determining the building costs a constructive evaluation of the work already done by troop labor and the WPA based upon costs of the new buildings recommended in this letter was used to arrive at the total costs. The estimates in the tabulation were prepared by the District Engineer, Honolulu, and include the indirect as well as the direct costs of the job.

6. It is recommended that the improvement of Morse Field be authorized and that funds in the amount of $1,687,530 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to complete the installation.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

2. Incls: #1—Layout Map
#2—Cost Estimates
A true-copy

EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt. F. A.

[CONFIDENTIAL]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Ft. SHAFTER, T. H.

Engr. 600.12
Subject: Improvement of Airfield at Haleiwa, Oahu, T. H.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, The Adjutant General's office, file AG 580 (3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective." At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing need.

2. At present the Hawaiian Air Force has under lease an unimproved landing field located at Haleiwa, on the north shore of Oahu, about ten miles airline distance from Wheeler Field. There are no paved runways, and no installations other than boundary marking lights. No permanent detachment is quartered there. The field is used for practice landings, etc. by the pursuit aviation at Wheeler Field.

3. It is proposed that this field be improved by the grading and paving of one runway 4000' by 300' and by the installation of other facilities for flying operations. These will include an operations building and airdrome control tower and storage for 100,000 gallons of gasoline using two of the eighty 50,000 gallon tanks now on hand. This storage will utilize the aqua system. A small galvanized warehouse for oil storage will be provided.

4. The only garrison at this field will consist of a small permanent detachment to refuel and handle planes on the ground and to operate radio and control installations. For this detachment a combined barracks and mess hall will be provided.

5. It is recommended that the improvement of Haleiwa Airport be authorized
as outlined above and that funds in the amount of $450,000 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu for this construction.

1 Incl: Cost Estimate

A true copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern,
2d Lt. F. A.

Subject: Improvement of Airfield at Haleiwa, Oahu, T. H.
AG 580 (5-22-41) MC

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., May 27, 1941.
To: Chief of the Air Corps and Chief of Engineers, IN TURN:
For remark and recommendation.
By order of the Secretary of War:

1 Incl. n/c

2nd Ind.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Office, Chief of the Air Corps,

To: Chief of Engineers.
Approval recommended.
For the Chief of the Air Corps:

1 Incl. n/c

A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.

600.1 (Haleiwa Airfield, T. H.) 1
Subject: Improvement of Airfield at Haleiwa, Oahu, T. H. (Let. from Hawaiian Dept. H" to AGO, 5/22/41)

Office, C. of E., June 10, 1941.
To the Adjutant General.

1. Approval recommended.
2. It is assumed that the District Engineer at Honolulu collaborated with the Hawaiian Department Commander in preparation of the estimate inclosed with the basic communication. Further delay in verification of this estimate is not considered advisable inasmuch as the funds required can be rectified if necessary in the future.
3. Funds for this construction at Haleiwa, Oahu, T. H. are available in this office under the Miscellaneous Construction Reserve provided this construction is of a high priority, the urgency for which is not known in this office.
4. If authorized it is requested that the amount of $450,000 be approved for allotment from funds reserved under the Miscellaneous Construction Reserve for construction of the buildings, gasoline storage and runways as specified in the inclosed estimate.

For the Chief of Engineers:

Inclosure: Sub 1
A True Copy:

EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

Subject: Improvement of Airfield at Haleiwa, Oahu, T. H.
AG 580 (5-22-41) MC-D 4th Ind. RPM/agb-1712

War Department, A. G. O., June 25, 1941.

To: Chief of Air Corps.
1. You are authorized to proceed with plans for construction of an airfield at Haleiwa, on the island of Oahu, as indicated in basic communication.
2. You are authorized to include in the next available estimates, funds for the accomplishment of this project, in the amount of $450,000, as recommended in basic communication.
3. The allotment of Miscellaneous Construction Reserve Funds for this project, as recommended in paragraph 3, 3rd Indorsement, is not favorably considered as these funds are required for other purposes.

By order of the Secretary of War:

D. R. VAN SICKLER,
Adjutant General.

1 Incl.—n/c
Copies to:
Chief of Engrs. Ref. his 3rd Ind., 600.1 (Haleiwa Airfield, T. H.) 1. 6-10-41, to TAG.
Commanding General, Haw. Dept. Ref. his basic ltr., Engr. 600.12, 5-22-41, to TAG, w/cys. of 1, 2, & 3 Inds.
A true copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[1] [CONFIDENTIAL]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Department Commander,
22 May 1941.

In reply refer to:
Via "Clipper" Air Mail Engr. 600.12
Subject: Construction at Burns Field, Kauai, T. H.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, The Adjutant General's office, file AG 580 (3-7-41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: "Army's Second Aviation Objective." At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing need.

2. It is recommended that Burns Field be developed into an outlying field with a rotating garrison as follows: 1 air base detachment of 4 officers and 50 men, 1 National Guard company to provide local security of 4 officers and 116 men, total 8 officers and 166 enlisted men. In addition to this garrison, one heavy reconnaissance squadron of 43 officers and 233 men will be sent to this field for training. Either this squadron or a heavy bombardment squadron will be stationed at this field a large part of the time. The total garrison at the field will therefore consist of 51 officers and 399 men.
3. Some buildings have been erected at this field by soldier labor. Other buildings are necessary and soldier labor is not available for their construction. These buildings have been tabulated in the cost estimates, Inclosure No. 1. All buildings will be of mobilization type construction. The installation of a complete system of utilities is recommended.

4. The runways at Burns Field are authorized for improvement by a CAA project. Additional improvements needed are the installation of storage for 200,000 gallons of gasoline; for this four of the eighty 50,000-gallon tanks now on hand will be utilized. These tanks were designed for the aqua system, but simple storage only is recommended at this time. If the need later develops, this storage can be readily converted to the aqua system as all fittings will be available on the tanks.

5. There is inclosed as Inclosure No. 1 a tabulation of cost estimates. In addition to the items already mentioned, these estimates include miscellaneous items such as roads, airdrome control tower, pistol and 1000-inch range and telephone installations. These telephone costs have been estimated at 21/2% of the building costs as directed by the Chief Signal Officer’s radio of 11 March 1941. The estimates include direct as well as indirect costs of the job.

6. It is recommended that this construction be authorized on the present military reservation at Burns Field and that funds in the amount of $636,163.00 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to complete the installation.

WALTER C. SHORT,  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,  
Office of the Department Commander,  
Fort Shafter, T. H.

Via “Clipper” Air Mail  
Engr. 600.12  
Subject: Proposed Airfield on the Island of Lanai.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, the Adjutant General’s office, file AG 580 (3–7–41) M–C–M, 14 March 1941, subject: “Army’s Second Aviation Objective.” At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing need.

2. Included in the plan for dispersion of facilities is a proposed airport on the Island of Lanai. A location has been selected and preliminary negotiations for leasing have been made. The land is owned by the Hawaiian Pineapple Company which is willing to lease it to the government on a twenty-five (25) year lease in return for one dollar a year rental and the use of the flying field. The location of the field, barracks area, and a proposed bombing range are shown on map, scale 1/62,500 inclosed as Inclosure No. 1. Project letter for the bombing range has already been submitted by letter to The Adjutant General, subject: “Construction of Night Bombing Range, Island of Lanai” file Engr. 686 dated 16 May 1941.

3. It is proposed to improve this field by the grading and paving of two 5,000’ runways 300’ wide and by the installation of facilities for flying operations. These will include the necessary operations buildings and shops, airdrome control tower and storage for 200,000 gallons of gasoline using four of the eighty 50,000 gallon tanks now on hand. Although these tanks were designed for the aqua system, only simple storage is proposed, although all the necessary fittings for later conversion to the aqua system will be installed.

4. The rotating garrison at this field will consist of an air base detachment of 4 officers and 50 men and a National Guard company for local security of 4 officers and 116 men, total 8 officers and 166 men. In addition to this garrison, a pur-
suit squadron of 33 officers and 157 men will be temporarily stationed at this field for training. While this squadron will change at least one will be temporarily stationed at this field a large part of the time. The total garrison, therefore, will be 41 officers and 323 men.

5. There is attached as Inclosure No. 2 a tabulation showing in detail the buildings and other construction proposed with estimated costs. These costs include not only direct but also indirect costs of the job. The total cost shown on this tabulation is $1,990,000.00.

6. The following is recommended:
   a. That this headquarters be authorized to proceed with negotiations for the lease of this site.
   b. That construction and improvements outlined in Inclosure No. 2 be authorized.
   c. That funds in the amount of $1,990,000.00 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to complete this installation.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

2 Incls: #1 Map; #2 Cost Estimates.
A True Copy.
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lieut. F. A.

Subject: Proposed Airfield on the Island of Lanai.

AG 580 (5–22–41) MC
1st Ind.

RPM/agb–1712

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., May 27, 1941.

To: Chief of the Air Corps and Chief of Engineers, IN TURN:
For remark and recommendation.

By order of the Secretary of War:

2 Incls. n/c

2nd Ind.

Adjutant General.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Office, Chief of the Air Corps,
Washington, D. C. June 2, 1941.

To: Chief of Engineers.

Approval recommended. Attention is invited to the Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, (WPD 2550–22), 6–10–41, Subject: Estimates for the Construction of Airports for Hawaiian Air Force.

For the Chief of the Air Corps:

Edward P. Curtis,
Major, Air Corps, Executive, Plans Division.

2 Incls. n/c

A true copy.
Edward von Geldern
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lieut. F. A.

600.1 (Hawaiian Dept. Airfields) 83
Subject: Proposed Airfield on the Island of Lanai.

3d Ind.

Office, C. of E., June 16, 1941.

To the Adjutant General.
1. Approval recommended.
2. The estimate of cost as given in the basic communication was prepared by the District Engineer at Honolulu, T. H.
3. If authorized, it is requested that the amount of $1,990,000 be approved for allotment to the District Engineer at Honolulu for the construction of buildings, utilities, runways, and other installations on the Island of Lanai, as recommended
in the basic communication and inclosure thereto, from funds reserved under the Fifth Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act (Pilot Training Schools Reserve), approved April 5, 1941.

For the Chief of Engineers:

| JOHN R. HARDIN, |
| --- | |
| Major, Corps of Engineers, |
| Chief, Construction Section. |

Inclosures: Subs 1–2
A true C·py:
Edward Von Geldern
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lieut. F. A.

Subject: Construction of Airfield at Lanai, T. H.
AG 580 (5–22–41) MC–G

4th Ind.

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., August 8, 1941.

To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. You are authorized to proceed with negotiations for the lease of the site referred to in basic communication.
2. The construction as recommended by you is authorized except that “Theatre Operations Type of Construction” be substituted for the “mobilization type” requested.
3. It is desired that funds required be included in the next budget estimates.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Major General,
The Adjutant General.

[1] [CONFIDENTIAL]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 2 May 1941.

Via “Clipper” Air Mail
Engr. 600.12

Subject: Construction at Proposed Airport, Parker Ranch Area, Hawaii, T. H.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, The Adjutant General’s office, file AG 580 (8–7–41) M-C-M, 14 March 1941, subject: “Army’s Second Aviation Objective.” At the present time the existing units of the Hawaiian Air Force are overcrowded with the facilities available on Oahu. Additional first-class airports are urgently needed for present units and those immediately contemplated for reasons of training and operations in time of peace; in addition to this peacetime need more fields are required for purposes of dispersion under operating conditions. The Second Aviation Objective outlined in the letter cited will increase this existing need.

2. There has been for some time a realization that an additional field was necessary on the Island of Hawaii, and extensive studies have been made on its location. The best location found was about four miles from the town of Waimea on land owned by the Territory of Hawaii, and at present under lease to private cattle interests. The site consists of about 1,360 acres, and it is believed that the land can be transferred to the Federal government under Section 91 of the Organic Act. Preliminary negotiations to this end have been opened with the Territory. The location of the field is shown on map, scale 1/62,500, inclosed as Inclosure No. 1.

3. It is proposed that this field be improved by the grading and paving of three 5000-foot runways and by the installation of facilities for flying operations.
These will include the necessary operations buildings, and shops, airdrome control tower, and storage for 300,000 gallons of gasoline, using 6 of the eighty 50,000-gallon tanks now on hand. Although these tanks were designed for the aqua system, only simple storage is proposed, as the shortage of water will preclude use of the aqua system. There is inclosed as Inclosure No. 2 a print of Department Engineer Map No. 11-1-25D41 which shows the boundary of the land and the location of the three 5000-foot runways.

4. The rotating garrison at this field will consist of an air base detachment of 4 officers and 50 men and a National Guard company for local security of 4 officers and 116 men, total 8 officers and 166 men. In addition to this permanent garrison, a heavy bombardment squadron of 37 officers and [2] 206 men will be temporarily stationed at this field for training. While these squadrons will change at least one will be temporarily stationed at this field a large part of the time. The total garrison therefore will be 45 officers and 372 men.

5. There is attached as Inclosure No. 3 a tabulation showing in detail the buildings and other construction proposed with estimated costs. These costs include not only direct but also indirect costs of the job. The total cost shown on this tabulation is $1,992,600.00.

6. The following is recommended:
   a. That this headquarters be authorized to proceed with negotiations for the acquisition of this site.
   b. That construction and improvements outlined in Inclosure No. 3 be authorized.
   c. That funds in amount of $1,992,600.00 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to complete this installation.

   WALTER C. SHORT,
   Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
   Commanding.

3 IncIs:
   #1 Map
   #2 Print, Map No. 11-1-25D41
   #3 Estimated Costs

A True Copy
Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lieut. F. A.

[1]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., April 14, 1941.

In reply refer to:
Via "Clipper" Air Mail
Engr. 600.12
Subject: Additional Airdrome, Hawaiian Department
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.
1. The recent and anticipated increases in the Pursuit Wing of the Hawaiian Air Force have emphasized the need of an airdrome to supplement the existing facilities at Wheeler Field. The latter field is now badly overcrowded with the planes stationed there.

2. A very thorough study has been made of the location of this additional air field by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Department Engineer and the District Engineer. At least five separate locations were given serious consideration; one of these in the Barbers Point area was discarded first because of its proximity to the beach and second, because of objections by the Navy to interference with the new carrier aviation base in the Ewa plane area. Another location at Kahuku was discarded because of its proximity to the beach. A third on the flat ground about three miles north of Wahiawa was discarded by the Hawaiian Air Force because of bad flying conditions from turbulent air conditions. A fourth location in the general area to the east of the crossing over Kipapa Gulch by the Kamehameha Highway was discarded for similar flying reasons. The area finally selected between the Kipapa and Waikakalua Gulches and west of the Kamehameha Highway is believed to be the best possible location of this airdrome on the island of Oahu. There is inclosed a map on the scale of 1/20,000 showing the location of this field.
3. The garrison to be stationed at this field will consist of the 15th Pursuit Group of 84 officers and 729 enlisted men, an air base group (single) 28 officers and 490 men, and miscellaneous detachments of 5 officers and 75 men. Total strength 117 officers and 1,294 men. Complete construction with mobilization type facilities must be provided for the housing of this garrison. The present construction authorized for Hickam, Wheeler and Bellows Fields is insufficient or the needs of those three stations and it will be impossible to transfer any of the existing authorization to this new field.

4. It is estimated that at least 75% or 88 of the officers will be married and of this number 10% or 9 will be senior officers. Since there are no locations in this vicinity where these officers can be placed upon commutation and live in private quarters and also because of the tremendous housing shortage on Oahu, it is believed that Government quarters should be provided for these married officers. Recognizing that this [2] field must be constructed under emergency appropriations, it is proposed that these quarters not be as elaborate as usually constructed on Army Posts. With the unit costs estimated, houses similar in construction to the average in Honolulu can be provided. In addition it is also estimated that there will be 135 married noncommissioned officers in this garrison. Adequate quarters will also be provided for these married enlisted men and it is recommended that the War Department secure from the Federal Building Administration authorization for the construction of 135 low cost housing units at this field.

5. The improvement for flying operations consists of the installation of three runways each 5,000 feet long with a graded width of 400 feet and a paved width of 200 feet; the paving of taxi strip 200' x 5,000' and a servicing apron 300' x 600'. A complete installation of airport lighting is proposed. Bunkers for the protection of airplanes against hostile bombardment will be installed as part of the airport and the cost of these bunkers and necessary approaches are included in the cost estimates. It is also proposed to install storage for 900,000 gallons of gasoline with the aqua system. In this storage 18 of the 80 50,000 gallon tanks now on hand will be utilized.

6. The housing proposed will be mobilization type construction. It will include barracks, mess halls, and recreation facilities for the men, buildings for flying operations such as an airdrome control tower, Air Corps technical schools, supply rooms, and housing for maintenance facilities. In addition mobilization type construction is proposed for the necessary post overhead, buildings such as a fire station, a guard house and an infirmary and warehouses for commissaries, etc. A complete system of utilities is covered in the estimates. In designing the water supply and sewage disposal systems provision has been made for the eventual expansion of the garrison to 4,000 men. This increase in capacity is proposed to take care of the possibility of assigning an antiaircraft regiment as part of this garrison. Shown on the map accompanying this letter are two areas shaded in blue. The area near the runway will be used for the construction of the service buildings incidental to flying operations. The 40 acre tract shown to the north of the runways will be utilized for construction of housing facilities for both officers, married noncoms, and enlisted men. The land where the runways and the adjacent blue area are located is now cultivated cane land. The area of the 40 acre tract is cultivated pineapple land; the cane land involved is about 250 acres minimum. If these sites are secured by lease it is estimated that the cane land will cost $30.00 per acre per year and the pineapple land $25.00 per acre per year, or a total annual rental of $8,500. If this land is purchased the cane land will cost about $1,000 and the pineapple land about $500.00 per acre; a total cost of about $270,000.

7. There is inclosed a tabulation showing the buildings which should be constructed with cost figures and cost estimates on runways and other flying facilities and on utility systems. These estimates show a total estimated cost of $4,668,950 not including cost of land. As stated shows if the land is leased there will be a yearly rental of $8,500. If the land is purchased the total cost is estimated at $4,938,950.
8. It is recommended that the proposed location of this new field be approved and that funds in the amount of $4,668,950 be allotted for construction if the War Department decides that securing the land on a lease basis is satisfactory. It is further recommended that if the War Department decides that this land should be purchased, additional funds in the amount of $270,000 be made available.

(s) \textit{Walter C. Short,}  
\textit{Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,}  
\textit{Commanding.}

2 Incis:  
\#1 Map  
\#2 Tabulation  
A true copy:  
Edward von Geldern,  
Edward von Geldern,  
\textit{2nd Lt., F. A.}

\textbf{[Confidential]}

\textbf{Paraphrase of Radio From T A G:}  
Fifteenth Pursuit airbase at Kipapa is disapproved. Stop. Base is to be located at Kahuku. Stop. Personal letter twenty one July (?) from General Marshall to General Short covers this subject.

True copy:  
Edward Von Geldern,  
Edward Von Geldern,  
\textit{2nd Lt., F. A.}

\textbf{[Exhibit 1C]}

\textbf{[Secret]}

\textbf{Headquarters Hawaiian Department,}  
\textit{Office of the Department Commander,}  
\textit{Fort Shafter, T. H., April 14, 1941.}

In reply refer to: Engr. 600.96  
Subject: Protection of Seacoast Defense Batteries.  
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to your secret radiogram No. 708, 4 April 1941, which was on the subject of protection for the seacoast defense batteries in this department and which suggested a conference with Mr. J. C. Letts of the Office of the Chief of Engineers during his recent visit in this department.

2. This radiogram stated that a letter covering this construction was being forwarded by mail. This letter has not as yet been received in this department. In order to save time, however, we’re submitting recommendations without waiting for the arrival of this letter as its subject matter was explained in general by Mr. Letts.

3. There are three batteries involved in this protection; these are the two 16-inch gun batteries, Battery Hatch at Fort Barrette and Battery Williston at Fort Weaver and a 12-inch barbette gun battery, Battery Closson at Fort Kamehameha. A study of this problem has been made jointly by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, the District Engineer and Mr. Letts. They recommend the casemating of Battery Hatch and Battery Closson and provision of a tunnel type shield for Battery Williston. There is inclosed a chart showing the fields of fire of these batteries after the protection is installed. From this chart it will be seen that Battery Hatch has a field of fire from azimuth 295 to azimuth 80; and Battery Williston, a 360° field of fire. The red shading on this chart indicates the area in which the fire of four 16-inch guns can be placed. The yellow shading shows the additional area which can be covered by the fire of two 16-inch guns at Fort Weaver. The existing range circle of Battery Hatch is shown by the red line and Battery Williston by the black line. The chart indicates that there is an area about 5,000 yards in range west of Oahu which is now covered by the fire of Battery Hatch and which is not covered by the fire of Battery Williston. On the east side of the island the area now covered by fire from Battery Hatch, which is sacrificed by the casemating is well in the field covered by Battery Williston. The only loss in coverage is in the 5,000 yards to
the west of the island and in the fact that the general area is now covered by the fire of only two 16-inch guns while under present arrangement this area is in part covered by the fire of four 16-inch guns.

4. I do not believe that this loss in coverage is at all important when compared to the necessity of providing protection for Battery Hatch in particular, and therefore concur in the recommendations of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade.

5. Your radio also referred to our letter, subject: "Bombproof Construction for Magazines at Fort Barrette and Fort Weaver," dated 4 February 1941. The recommendations contained in this letter are reiterated. Since the recommendation is made that Battery Williston should have tunnel type shield protection which does not provide any protection for ammunition, a bombproof magazine for at least one-half of the propelling charges should be provided at that battery. Also due to the exposed position of Battery Hatch and the impossibility of camouflaging the existing magazines, it is believed that a bombproof magazine for one-half of the propelling charges should be provided at that battery in addition to the bombproof storage for 50 complete rounds in each casemate.

6. Reference is now made to letter, this headquarters, subject: "Defense of Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H." dated 18 February 1941, file 381, in which the War Department was advised that this department was assuming responsibility for the defense of the Kaneohe Bay Area. It is believed that the growing military and naval importance of Kaneohe Bay area makes it essential that a major caliber seacoast battery be installed for its protection. The need for this battery is urgent and its installation should not wait upon the manufacture of the armament. It is understood that there are some 12-inch long range gun batteries similar to Battery Closson on the mainland where the need for them no longer exists and it is recommended that the armament of one of these batteries be shipped to this department and funds provided for its emplacement in the Kaneohe Bay area.

7. The following is therefore recommended:

a. That protection be provided for Battery Hatch by the construction of casemates and overhead cover, at Battery Closson by the construction of overhead cover, and at Battery Williston by the installation of tunnel type shields.

b. That a bombproof magazine for one-half of the propelling charges be authorized for Battery Williston and a similar magazine be authorized for Battery Hatch in addition to the storage of 50 rounds in each of the casemates.

c. That the armament of a 12-inch gun battery similar to Battery Closson to be obtained from a location on the mainland where it is no longer needed and shipped to this department and installed to cover the Kaneohe Bay area.

(s) Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

1 Incl! Chart (Orig of Incl No. 1 is on file at H S C A B)
A True Copy:
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[7] HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 31 July 1941.

In reply refer to:
AG 381/20
Kaneohe Bay Project.
Secret
Subject: Coast Artillery Armament for Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. References:

A Secret letter HHD to TAG, 14 April 1941, subject: "Protection of Seacoast Defense Batteries" file AG 662.1 (4-14-41)MC-E, HD Engr 600. 96, with 4 indorsements.

B Secret letter TAG to HHD, 8 April 1941, Subject: "Defense of Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H." file AG 381 (3-13-41) M-WPD, with 1st Indorsement HHD to TAG dated 16 June 1941.
2. The attached study was prepared by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade in accordance with the directive contained in the 4th indorsement to reference A. In considering this study, reference should be made to a similar study which was submitted as on enclosure to 1st indorsement, reference B.

3. The recommendations contained in paragraph 6 of the attached study of the seacoast and antiaircraft defenses required for the protection of the Kaneohe Bay Naval Base (incl. #1) are approved with the following exceptions:

   a. It is believed a large proportion of the 15 AA searchlights recommended in paragraph 6a. should be equipped with SCR 268 sets instead of the M2 sound locators. The severe limitations imposed by the terrain and normal atmospheric conditions present in this area make mandatory the early detection of hostile aerial targets.

   b. In order that personnel may be available to establish a headquarters for the Harbor Defenses of Kaneohe Bay, it is believed that instead of augmenting the seacoast personnel, as recommended in paragraph 6d. (2) by one battalion (TD) and three separate batteries (HD), that the increase should consist of one Coast Artillery regiment (HD), type B, (T/O 4–71, Nov 1/40), less band and one battalion. This organization will provide the necessary command and staff and attached medical personnel to permit the proper tactical organization of the defenses. The 155mm battalion can take the place of the second battalion of the Harbor Defense Regiment.

[2] 4. It is recommended:

   a. That the eventual project for defense of the Kaneohe Bay Naval Air Station and Bellows Field, based on the installation of fixed armament, be as follows:

      (1) Armament:

         (a) Seacoast:

         1 155 mm Gun Batteries (latest type).
         2 6" Fixed Gun Batteries (2 guns each).
         1 16" Long Range Cased Gun Battery of 2 guns on Barbelette Carriages.

         (b) Antiaircraft:

         3 90 mm AA Gun Batteries.
         3 37 mm AA Gun Batteries to consist of 10 guns each.
         48 Caliber .50 AA Machine Guns.
         15 AA searchlights together with a minimum of 6 SCR 268 sets and 9 M2 sound locators.

      (2) Personnel:

         (a) Seacoast Artillery:

         1 Battalion Coast Artillery (TD), 155 mm guns, (T/O 4–35, Nov 1/40).
         1 Regiment Coast Artillery (HD), type B, less band and one battalion, (T/O 4–71, Nov 1/40).

         (b) Antiaircraft Artillery:

         1 Regiment Coast Artillery (AA), semi-mobile, less one gun battalion, (T/O 4–111, Nov 1/40).

   b. That initially based on armament now available in the Hawaiian Department, the defense be constituted as shown below. The seacoast armament and personnel to be used in this defense must be moved from previously assigned positions in other parts of the island, thereby weakening the defense in other areas.

      (1) Considering only personnel now present and available:

         1 155 mm Gun Battery.
         1 155 mm Gun Battery with additional assignment of five antiaircraft searchlights.
         1 8" Railway Gun Battery.
         2 3" Antiaircraft Gun Batteries.
         1 Seacoast Searchlight Battery.

      (2) Assuming that personnel under paragraph 4 a (2) (a) above will be made available at an early date and using armament now available in War Reserve, the defense can be organized as shown below. Under this plan no movement of armament from present assigned positions is required:

         2 155 mm Gun Batteries
         1 155 mm Gun Battery with additional assignment of five antiaircraft searchlights.
         1 8" Railway Gun Battery.
         2 3" Antiaircraft Gun Batteries.
         1 Seacoast Searchlight Battery.
[3] e. That the increase in personnel and in major items of armament recommended in paragraphs 6 a and b, reference B, insofar as they relate to the Coast Artillery be amended to conform to paragraph 4 a, above.

WALTER C. SHORT,  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army.  
Commanding.

1—Incl: Revised Study on Seacoast and Antiaircraft Artillery Defense of the Kaneohe Naval Air Station (Secret) in trip.

A True Copy:  
Edward Von Geldern,  
Edward Von Geldern.  
2nd Lt., F. A.

[SECRET]

[1] Subject: Coast Artillery Armament for Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Hawaiian Department.

AG 381 (7–31–41) MC–E  
3rd Ind.  
War Department, A. G. O., October 30, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Reference is made to:
   a. Letter, this office, April 8, 1941, AG 381 (3–13–41) N–WPD, subject: Defense of Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H.
   b. Radio No. 320, your headquarters, September 13, 1941.
   c. Letter, your headquarters, September 18, 1941, Engr. 662/4 x 662/7, subject: Provision of three (3) Panama mount 155-mm Battery Positions and one (1) 8-inch Railway Gun Battery Position for the defense of Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H.

2. The following temporary measures for the defense of the Kaneohe Bay area are approved:
   a. Movement of one battery of 8" railway guns now in storage at Fort Kamahameha to Mokapu Peninsula and temporary installation at site designated by you in reference c subject to local coordination of site with the Navy.
   b. Installation of two batteries 155-mm guns on Panama mounts at sites to be selected by you.

3. Immediate personnel and armament requirements will be set:
   a. By the transfer to the Hawaiian Department of the following units at their allotted strengths:
      (1) One battalion, 57th Coast Artillery, TD, with battalion section, supply platoon (T/O 4–32) and battalion section, Medical detachment (T/O 4–31), attached, less guns and fire control equipment.
      (2) 95th Coast Artillery (AA), Semimobile (less one gun battalion), with armament and equipment on hand. Authority is granted for the reorganization of the 37-mm gun battalion of this regiment into three 37 mm gun batteries (8 guns each) and one (1) Caliber .50 MO battery (AA) (12 guns).
   b. By the local activation of one 8" railway battery (R/O 4–47) from personnel available in the Hawaiian Department.

4. Guns and fire control equipment for the battalion of 155 mm guns and the 8" railway battery will be furnished from defense reserves on hand in the Hawaiian Department. Shortages will be filled in accordance with approved War Department priorities.

5. Personnel and equipment mentioned in Paragraph 3 a, above will be dispatched to the Hawaiian Department by first available shipping. It is estimated that troops will begin to arrive in your department about December 1, 1941. The shipment of the major items of organizational equipment and armament for reinforcing units is dependent upon the availability of bottoms of which no accurate forecast can be made at this time.

6. Theater of operations type housing is authorized for the personnel listed in paragraph 3 above. It is desired that estimates covering housing for this increased garrison be made the subject of separate correspondence.

7. Ultimate approval of one 8" seacoast battery (fixed) in lieu of the 16" battery recommended by you, and of two 6" seacoast batteries (fixed) to replace the two batteries of 155 mm guns authorized for temporary defense is probable.
The 8" seacoast guns will not be available before July, 1942, and the 6" seacoast guns not before December, 1942.

8. In view of the expected approval of fixed armament for the Kaneohe Bay Area the plan submitted by reference e for the installation of the 8" railway battery on Mokapu Peninsula and for the construction of 155 mm gun positions is considered too elaborate. Plans should be revised to provide for temporary installation of the 8" railway battery, and for construction of Panama mounts for two 155 mm gun batteries. Provision should be made for splinterproofing magazines and plotting room only and should be confined to that which can be constructed by field fortification methods and materials.

9. A revised project, to include detailed estimates of cost, is desired for the defense of Kaneohe Bay based on two batteries of two 6" BC guns, and one battery of two 8" BC guns, all shielded type.

[3] 10. No change in the eventual project for the antiaircraft defense of Kaneohe Bay over that prescribed for the temporary defense Paragraph 3 a (2) above, is contemplated.

11. Reinforcement of either the peace or war garrisons of the Hawaiian Department by additional troops for the beach and land defense of Kaneohe Bay is not contemplated at this time.

By order of the Secretary of War:

(s) E. S. ADAMS,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

2 Incls:

#1 Memor from Ch. of Eng. to Ch. of Coast Artillery, C. of E. 662B (Oahu), August 26, 1941.

#2 1st Ind. frm Ch. of Coast Artillery, to A. C. of S, WPD 663/45–F–1, July 23, 1941. (added)

Original Incl. #1 w/d

A true copy.

Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[SECRET]

Paraphrase

Radio 320—13th

The Adjutant General.
Washington, D. C.

Additional funds needed to complete railway gun position project also funds needed to erect positions in Kaneohe Bay area as para four B paren two paren letter this headquarters thirty one July nineteen forty one subject coast artillery armament for naval air station Kaneohe Bay paragraph due added costs of materials and labor in this area railway gun positions in approved project could not be built with funds allotted last fiscal year. Stop Estimates prepared by district engineer Honolulu aver that one hundred seventeen thousand two hundred fifty six dollars required to add to funds received last fiscal year for railway gun positions Stop Building of positions for one four gun eight inch railway battery and three four gun one fifty five batteries in Kaneohe Bay area estimated to cost two hundred fifteen thousand two hundred sixty five dollars Stop Above amounts include direct and indirect costs and are for sites recommended as first priority by commanding general Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command in which I agree for immediate construction paragraph project will follow Stop District engine Honolulu is submitting cost estimates to chief of engineers by radio Stop Pending the receipt of this letter strongly recommend that money in amount of three hundred thirty two thousand five hundred twenty one dollars be contained in pending appropriation bill.

A true copy:
Edward von Geldern
Edward von GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.
In reply refer to:
Engr. 662/4 x 662/7
Via "Clipper" Air Mail
Subject: Provision of three (3) Panama Mount 155-mm Battery Positions and one (1) 8-inch Railway Gun Battery Position for the Defense of Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. References:
   a. Secret letter TAG to HHD, 8 April 1941, Subject: "Defense of Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H." file AG 381 (3-13-41) M-WPD, with 1st Indorsement HHD to TAG dated 18 June 1941.
   b. Secret letter HHD to TAG, 5 June 1941, Subject: "War Garrison for Initial War Operation", file AG 320.3/37b, with 1st Indorsement TAG to HHD, dated 22 July 1941.

2. Reference a. directs that the Army assumes the responsibility for the defense of the Kaneohe Bay area. A study by this headquarters of the armament requirements for the defense of Kaneohe Bay and submitted by my 1st Indorsement to reference a. requested the inclusion of the following items of Seacoast Defense Armament in the Hawaiian Defense Project for this purpose:
   3 Batteries of 155-mm guns.
   1 Battery of two 12-inch barbette guns with related equipment

3. A restudy of the project for the defense of the Kaneohe Bay area submitted by reference b. recommended that the following armament be provided:
   Two 155-mm gun batteries
   Two 6-inch fixed gun batteries of two guns each
   One 16-inch long range casemated gun battery of two guns on barbette carriages.

4. A realization of the fact that it will be at least two years before these items of fixed armament, namely, the two 6-inch batteries and the one 16-inch battery, can be installed, makes it necessary that some provision be made immediately for the employment of mobile artillery to defend this area. The 1st Indorsement from The Adjutant General's Office to reference b. authorized the following additional units for the defense of Kaneohe Bay:
   One battalion of Coast Artillery, 155-mm guns with one additional gun battery.
   One Harbor Defense Battery.

Pending the installation of the fixed batteries, it is recommended that the Seacoast Defenses of the Kaneohe area consist of the following items of mobile artillery:
   Three 155-mm gun batteries.
   One 8-inch railway gun battery.

The proposed locations and fields of fire of these batteries are shown on map, Enclosure No. 1.

5. Since there is no railroad running from Honolulu to Kaneohe Bay, it will be necessary to move this railway battery to Kaneohe Bay by truck trailer, and it is proposed to install this battery on fixed mounts similar to those of Battery Granger Adams on Black Point.

6. Each of the 155-mm battery positions should include the following:
   (1) 4 Panama mounts.
   (2) 4 splinterproof ammunition shelters for 25 rounds at each gun position.
   (3) 4 gun bunkers.
   (4) 4 splinterproof personnel shelters.
   (5) 2 splinterproof propellant shelters for 150 charges each.
   (6) 2 splinterproof projectile shelters for 150 projectiles each.
   (7) 1 splinterproof plotting room.
   (8) The roads and ramps necessary for the occupation of the position.
   (9) Camouflage treatment of all the above listed installations.

Considering the urgent need for combat training and the large amount of labor required to complete field works now being constructed by the troops of this command, it is believed advisable to construct these positions by contract.
7. The cost of installation of the three batteries of 155-mm guns including the acquisition of land has been estimated at $93,630.00. The cost of the transportation and installation of the 8-inch railway battery in an emplacement similar to that of Battery Granger Adams has been estimated at $121,035. These estimated costs include both direct costs and indirect costs. Inclosure No. 2 is a tabular breakdown of these cost figures.

8. It is recommended that the installation of these three batteries of 155-mm guns with the necessary field fortifications and the construction of one 8-inch gun battery position be approved, and that funds in the amount of $215,265.00 be allotted to the U. S. District Engineer, Honolulu, for construction.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

2 Incls:
(1) Map
(2) Breakdown

A True copy.
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[Exhibit 1D]
[SECRET]

27 August 1941.

Deslege Brown
1st Lieutenant, Corps of Engrs.
Assistant Department Engineer.

To: The Adjutant General,
Washington, D. C.

Beurad anno fifteen July district engineer estimates cost of forty five hundred foot runway at three hundred thirty thousand dollars due to railroad relocation and heavy fill Stop Thirty five hundred foot runway is longest that can be provided without railway relocation. Stop Reduction from thirty seven hundred feet due to bunker construction and new housing Stop Strongly recommend construction of thirty five hundred foot runway as auxiliary landing strip comma forty five hundred feet economically unfeasible. Stop main runway can be used by planes requiring longer run. Stop Auxiliary also needed for use while main runway is being leveled recommend immediate allotment of twenty five thousand dollars for levelling of main runway and thirty thousand seven hundred for thirty five hundred foot auxiliary runway.

A true copy.
Edward von Gildern,
Edward von Gildern,
2nd Lieutenant, F. A.

Subject: Improvement of Landing Facilities at Wheeler Field, T. H.

2nd Ind.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Office, Chief of the Air Corps,

To The Adjutant General THRU Chief of Engineers.

1. Attached hereto is a copy of the radiogram transmitted to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H. on July 15, 1941.

2. In explanation thereof, you are advised that this office concurs with the opinion that the uneven areas in the runways, referred to in the basic communication, should be eliminated in the interests of safe operation.

3. This office considers runways of 4,500 feet in length to be an absolute minimum for military airports at sea level, with an additional 500 feet of length for
each 1,000 feet of elevation or fraction thereof. This minimum likewise meets the requirements for the future installation of an instrument landing facility, if there is provided that the same time forty to one clear angles of approach at both ends of the runway in question.

4. If such clearances are not available at the north end of the present N–8 runway, or of the proposed new N–8 runway, because of quarters built at that end of the field, then the runway lengths should be extended on the southerly ends sufficiently to insure that a 4,500 foot length of runway will exist south of a point where a forty to one clearance angle may be realized.

5. There is no objection to the runway crossing the railroad spur, if necessary, providing the runway pavement is kept flush with the top of the rails and there is; no break in the runway grade, and providing, of course, rail traffic is controlled. If a difference in grade exists, the rail grade should be brought to that of the runway, or the spur relocated.

6. It is requested that the District Engineer be advised of these considerations, and that his new estimates be made accordingly.

7. No funds are available at this time for the construction and improvements recommended in the basic communications. The recommendation, however, will be placed in our "Suspense File" for further consideration upon receipt of a revised estimate, and when funds therefore become available.

For the Chief of the Air Corps:

WALTER J. REED,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Asst. Chief, Bldgs. & Grounds Div.

Incl. Cy, Radio 8/21/41
cc: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
   For information only
   This is not an authorization

A true copy.
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt. F. A.

Signal Corps, United States Army

War Department Message Center,
Room 3441, Munitions Building,
Washington, D. C.

56 WTJ 125 WD
Pt Shafter TH 1057 A Aug 27
THE AG
Washington DC.

Keurad Agno fifteen July district engineer estimates cost of forty five hundred foot runway as three hundred thirty thousand dollars due to railroad relocation and heavy fill stop thirty five hundred foot runway is longest that can be provided without railway relocation stop reduction from thirty seven hundred feet due to bunker construction and new housing stop strongly recommend construction of thirty five hundred feet runway as auxiliary landing strip comma forty five hundred feet economically unfeasible stop main runway can be used by planes requiring longer run stop auxiliary also needed for use while main runway is being levelled . . Recommend immediate allotment of twenty five thousand dollars for levelling of main runway and thirty thousand seven hundred for thirty five hundred foot auxiliary runway.

SHORT.

305 AM

A True Copy:
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
Immediate Action

War Department,
The Adjutant General's Office,
Washington.

1st Ind.

AG 580.82—Wheeler
Field (8-27-41) NO

War Department, AGO, August 28, 1941—To the Chief of the Air Corps.

In connection with letter your office dated July 11, 1941, file 611.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[S] John B. Cooley,
Adjutant General.

A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.

Subject: Improvement of Landing facilities at Wheeler Field, T. H.

2nd Ind. (12-E10)

War Department,
Office, Chief of the Air Corps,
Washington, D. C., September 2, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shaffer, T. H.

1. With reference to your radiogram dated August 27, 1941, attention is invited to 2nd Indorsement of basic letter dated June 21st, subject as noted above, a copy of which is attached hereto.

2. A request has been made this date that $25,000 be included in the funds estimated to be required for use in future airfield development. This sum is to be used for the leveling of the main runway at Wheeler Field.

3. No request will be made for the inclusion of funds for the construction of the auxiliary runway, pending receipt of the revised estimate as requested in the 2nd Indorsement referred to above.

By order of the Chief of the Air Corps.

Frank M. Kennedy,
Colonel, Air Corps,
Chief, Building & Grounds Division.

Incl. Cy 2nd Ind. 8/25/41

A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[Exhibit 1E]

Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 10 June 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Request that the following Secret official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

This message is routine.

Robert J. Fleming, Jr.,
Major, Corps of Engineers,
Assistant Department Engineer.

A true copy:
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.

To the Adjutant General
Washington, D. C

Division engineer San Francisco has informed me that the priority covering contract W dash four one four ENGR seven eight four with Interstate Equipment Corporation Elizabeth New Jersey is now a dash one dash G stop This contract is the one for furnishing all materials for cableway to Kaala aircraft
Warning station Stop Motor and all electrical equipment sub contracted to General Electric Stop Division engineer states that with this priority there is strong probability that delivery this electrical material to contractor will be delayed about fifteen weeks Stop This Kaale station is the most important in aircraft warning system and early completion of this cableway is essential Stop I consider this aircraft warning service as the most important single project in this Department Stop Strongly recommended that the War Department give all possible assistance to Chief of Engineers to have priority on this contract changed to a dash one dash B

ENC-SEC by Capt. C. J. Harrison SC—715P June 10 1941

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

75 War EM 61 WD

C G

Hawn Dept Ft Shafter T. H.

904 26th

Agmc rerad three zero zero nine priority contract W dash four one four Engr seven eight four kaala AWS Station advanced to A dash one dash C Chief of Engineers will instruct Division Engineer on procedure should results under this priority be unsatisfactory

616P

True Copy

Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[SECRET]

29 September 1941.

SIG 676.3

Subject: Aircraft Warning Service Installation Hawaiian Department.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, file AG 660.2 A. A. (7–5–41) MC–E, 8 July 1941, subject: "Aircraft Warning Service Philippine and Hawaiian Departments." A report of a Board of Officers convened at this headquarters to restudy the AWS project is being transmitted to the War Department by Clipper mail under separate cover. This board has considered the employment of the six fixed and six mobile stations allocated to this Department by the War Department. The increased number of stations now available has necessitated some adjustments in both type and location of the stations in the previously approved project of three fixed and five mobile units, as well as new locations. The results of this restudy are covered fully in the report being submitted, and are summarized in the following paragraphs.

Locations a. Kauai. There have been no changes in the fixed station now approved at Kokee. In the former project the mobile station on Kauai was planned for operation on the Waimea Kokee road. This mobile station is now recommended for operation on the coast north of Kilauea Village at latitude 22°13'50"', longitude 159°23'54"'. There is no change in the base camp at Kauai which is now under construction at Kokee for the personnel of both the fixed and mobile stations.

b. Maui. No change has been made in the previously approved fixed station which is now under construction at Red Hill on Haleakala. Formerly approved project contained a mobile station to operate along the road up Haleakala. The project now being submitted makes no change in this mobile unit.

c. Hawaii. The former project contained a mobile station for the Island of Hawaii, which was to be operated from the upper terminus of the Mauna Loa truck trail, with a base camp for personnel at the Kilauea Military Camp. This station has been eliminated in the restudy and has been replaced by a fixed station in the vicinity of Pahoa at latitude 19°26'50"' and longitude 154°57'5"', and by a mobile station to operate from an initial position near Kahuku Ranch at latitude 19°30'30"', longitude 155°41'40"'. A base camp similar to that on Kauai will be constructed near the fixed station for the personnel of both that station and the mobile unit.
d. Oahu (1) There is no change in the previously approved fixed station for Mt. Kaala.

(2) The formerly approved mobile station at Manawahua is to be replaced by a fixed station.

(3) Opana. Under the former project, there were not sufficient [2] stations to replace one on the north shore of Oahu. With the increase in the number of stations allowed, this is now possible and it is recommended that a fixed station be installed at the Opana Triangulation station at coordinates (98.655–19.182).

(4) The increase in the number of stations has also made advisable the consideration of other locations for mobile units on Oahu. This reconsideration indicated that a location at Makapuu Point had many advantages over the former approved Pali location, and it is accordingly recommended that the Makapuu Point Station be considered as an initial operating position in lieu of the former Pali location.

(5) The increase in the number of stations allowed has also made possible the provision of units in reserve against the possibility of failure of one of the primary stations. Since Oahu is the central point in the islands for which protection must be secured, it has been decided to concentrate the reserve units on this island. For this purpose two mobile units are recommended as a mobile reserve and for general operations on Oahu and on other islands if necessary. These stations will be utilized as needed to either replace the other Oahu stations or reinforce the coverage in certain sectors. Locations on Oahu which have been considered for their employment are the Pali location discussed above, on the high ground along Tantalus Road, at Fort Shafter, and at various points along the coast.

(6) Information center. There has been no change in the previous location for the Information Center which is now under construction at Fort Shafter. In compliance with other directives, this installation has been combined with various command posts into an air defense command post.

2. Reference is made to 2d Ind, Hq Haw Dept, OSigO, 31 May 1941, to the letter Sig. 676.3 (AWS) dated 17 October 40 in which Signal funds totalling $75,281.84 were requested for the installation of radio and wire facilities for the original three fixed and five mobile stations. Due to the abandonment of the mobile station at the Nuuanu Pali on Oahu and the Moana Loa Station on Hawaii, this sum can be reduced by $2,296.00 to $72,985.84. The allocation of additional stations has necessitated increased demands for Signal communications. These additional communication facilities are summarized as follows:

a. Radio facilities for the control from the Information Center of pursuit task forces. This includes a station at the control airdrome with four satellite stations at the principal pursuit fields on Oahu.

Total cost .................................................... $55,000

b. Emergency power for pursuit radio control transmitters. This power is to allow the operation of pursuit control during commercial power failure.

Total cost .................................................... $12,000
c. Commercial power extensions to include provision of adequate commercial power for the base camps and the principal alert stations at locations where this is economically feasible.

Total cost .................................................... $39,000

[3] d. AWS radio communication facilities to include additional transmitters and receivers at the new fixed stations, receivers at the Information Center and allied antenna and control equipment as established by standard practice.

Total cost .................................................... $18,000
e. AWS wire and cable facilities to include additional cable extensions for the added stations on Oahu, together with additional telephone and teletype equipment. This item also includes a cable installation from the Hawaii base camp to the detector unit at Pahoa.

Total cost .................................................... $10,900
f. Commercial wire facilities to include leased lines from all base camps to the nearest commercial exchange, leased lines from the principal alert stations to the nearest exchanges, together with the yearly rental charge.

Total cost. $10,463.67
Total Sig funds. 145,400.00

3. Estimates for the internal wire facilities of the Information Center and the allied Air Defense wire facilities are being held in abeyance pending more reliable information upon which to estimate the necessary funds. It is believed, however, that estimates for the Information Center should be included in the next available appropriation bill. Information Center layouts and schematic diagrams of the Information Center Wire Net have been forwarded to the Chief Signal Officer for review. This data is being transmitted as an inclosure to the aforementioned board proceedings.

4. Funds in the amount of $890,804 have been made available to the Dist. Engr. Honolulu, to complete the previously approved project of three fixed and five mobile stations. Some of these funds were for stations which are being superseded by other stations in the revised program. The tabulation below shows cost estimates on the new stations, less the amounts available from the superseded stations, and the total of engineer funds supplementing those now on hand required to complete the revised projects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Oahu Manawaha</th>
<th>Opana</th>
<th>Makapuu</th>
<th>Kauai Kilauea</th>
<th>Hawaii Pahoa</th>
<th>Kahuku</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Cost of Site</td>
<td>$2,000</td>
<td>$2,000</td>
<td>$2,000</td>
<td>$7,500</td>
<td>$500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Clearing</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Grading</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>$500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Right of Way-Access Road</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Road Constr.</td>
<td>58,470</td>
<td>28,000</td>
<td>5,700</td>
<td>24,800</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Bldg. Constr.</td>
<td>28,250</td>
<td>29,250</td>
<td>11,965</td>
<td>12,300</td>
<td>74,720</td>
<td>12,070</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Fuel Storage</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>2,700</td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Water Supply</td>
<td>2,970</td>
<td>4,400</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Sewage Disposal</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>2,970</td>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Man Proof Fence</td>
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<td>3,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>98,000</td>
<td>70,050</td>
<td>19,365</td>
<td>42,600</td>
<td>111,600</td>
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Subtotals by Islands

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<tr>
<th>Island</th>
<th>Oahu</th>
<th>Kauai</th>
<th>Hawaii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$187,415</td>
<td>$42,600</td>
<td>$129,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>76,735</td>
<td>12,600</td>
<td>36,217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>110,680</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>98,943</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Funds now available from superseded sites

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Island</th>
<th>Oahu</th>
<th>Kauai</th>
<th>Hawaii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$187,415</td>
<td>$42,600</td>
<td>$129,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>76,735</td>
<td>12,600</td>
<td>36,217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>110,680</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>98,943</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Supplemental funds required

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Island</th>
<th>Oahu</th>
<th>Kauai</th>
<th>Hawaii</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$7,910</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>240,583</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36,100</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19,250</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19,250</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>315,233</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Grand Total Engineer funds

$238,623

5. Secret radiogram No 321, this hq, 13 September 41, submitted for advance consideration the above cost estimates with the exception of those which had been previously submitted as stated in par 2 above. Since no information has been received concerning the previous recommendation, those estimates are being added to the figures submitted by the radiogram cited.

6. I strongly recommend that funds in the amount of $315,233 for engineer construction, and $218,400 for signal communications and one year's rent of leased wire facilities, total $533,633, to be included in pending appropriation bills, and made available as soon as possible for the completion of the revised project.

WALTER C. SHORT
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

True Copy.
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt. F. A.
Via Clipper Airmail
Engr. 523.07

Subject: Priorities and Preference Ratings.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. On 4 June 1941 I wrote a letter, file Engr. 523.07, subject: "Priority in Shipping Space for the Hawaiian Electric Company", in which the question of securing shipping space priorities for this company was discussed. A copy of this letter is inclosed for ready reference. At that time the main problem was the securing of shipping space; since then it has developed that difficulties are also arising concerning the procurement of materials. I have directed that an investigation be made of this priority question, and the results of this investigation indicate that some clarification and coordination is highly desirable.

2. At the present time priorities and preference ratings for Army activities are assigned by the various procurement agencies and contracting officers. There is now no coordination in the Department between these various agencies, each of which is dealing direct on priorities questions with its Chief in the War Department. This is satisfactory as long as only one procurement agency or contracting officer is involved. There are cases, however, in which more than one agency is involved, and the number of these will undoubtedly increase in the future; I believe it is advisable to have a coordinating agency in the Department to not only coordinate these cases locally, but also to bring to the attention of the War Department the advisability of similar coordination between the Chiefs of the respective agencies. Also there are many procurement problems on which the establishment of priorities and preference ratings is necessary which no agency is now handling. The 14th Naval District has already established a central priority office in the local bureau of supplies and accounts where priorities information is kept available, and where preference ratings on all Navy orders are issued.

3. The following outlines in greater detail some of the problems on which difficulty has already been encountered:

a. We have some projects in which more than one supply or construction branch is interested. While there is no complaint with the present system by which each agency handles priority matters with its Chief in the War Department there is a probability that desirable action by one agency may be overlooked with the result that the second agency might be held up in its work even though it had taken all action necessary.

b. Hawaii presents a special problem in procurement as do the other overseas departments, due to the shipping situation. The present priorities instructions are concerned with procurement; in this Department, however, priorities on shipping space are important. There are large quantities of essential materials transported on commercial shipping. These shipments involve not only government shipments but also shipments by private concerns of materials which are to be incorporated in defense installations.

c. Practically all construction materials must be imported into the island. The various constructing agencies are, of course, anticipating their needs and are having materials procured on the mainland and shipped to the department. It is impossible to anticipate every item needed, and in the past the various supply houses in the department, such as the Honolulu Iron Works, the Hawaiian Electric Company, and others, have maintained local stocks from which small items could be procured as they were needed. These local stocks are now becoming a matter of concern. For example, the mainland agents of the Hawaiian Electric Company have advised the company that it can not expect to obtain replacements for its ordinary warehouse and operations stocks unless a preference rating is placed on this procurement. Practically all of our defense contracts demand electric power and unless the company’s local stocks are maintained it will be impossible to install power connections without waiting for the arrival of necessary materials for each connection from the mainland. A specific example of this occurred recently where a sub-contractor on the Hickam Field low-cost housing had to import by Clipper air express at an expense of $1,600.00, some plumbing items which under normal conditions could have been obtained from local stocks.
d. As stated above shipping priorities are also important. To our knowledge there is now no coordinated shipping priorities, although the Matson Navigation Company, which handles the bulk of the shipments, is granting unofficial priority to items on which a procurement priority has been obtained. As far as government bought and shipped materials are concerned there has been no great difficulty although considerable detail work has been involved in radioing about specific shipments. There are large quantities of materials, however, which are being ordered by private firms either for direct supply to government agencies or for incorporation in defense works directly or indirectly, and these private concerns are encountering great difficulties in securing shipping space for this material.

4. To meet this increasing problem I propose to set up an office in this department to be responsible for coordinating all priorities matters, and I have selected the Department Engineer’s office as the section in which this control can best be established. Additional officers, not necessarily engineers, will be placed on duty in that office to furnish needed assistance. [3] The following is a preliminary outline of the duties of this section:

a. To establish an information bureau where request for information on priorities can be promptly filled.

b. To keep me informed of the priorities and preference ratings assigned by regular supply branches to their own procurement in order to insure that these are coordinated. In this work with the regular supply branches and construction agencies it is not intended that the coordinating office will assume any control over these agencies; it is intended, however, that the coordinating office keep informed of what action these agencies are taking in priority matters.

c. We assign preference ratings covering procurements which are essential to defense work and which are not now covered by existing instructions.

5. In the directive of the Priorities Committee of the Army and Navy Munitions Board, 27 November 1940, it is noted that all Panama Canal defense projects are placed in priority classification A-1-b. There is no similar blanket coverage for devets projects in this department; and the rating which can be assigned to any project in this department depends upon its classification as a general project under the other entries in this directive. The aircraft Warning Service project is the most important single project in the department, and under the general classification in this directive the highest priority which could be assigned to it would be A 1-f. It is believed that the conditions facing this department are similar to those in Panama and that a similar blanket priority classification for our defense projects should be authorized, and that this rating should be high. If this is done it would not be necessary to assign this high a rating to all projects, and this department could reserve the high rating for the exceptional projects which were considered absolutely essential.

6. As stated above, the maintenance of adequate local stocks by local supply firms is essential. Existing instructions on the issuance of preference ratings are predicated on the fact that the firm to whom the rating is issued is a government contractor. The local supply firms who must obtain preference ratings to maintain stocks are not actually government contractors at the time they place their mainland orders. These firms become contractors, however, when a government agency orders materials from their stocks. The question involved here is one of time; and obviously we should not wait until the specific need for a stock item arises to issue a preference rating then delay the job while the item is being procured and shipped. It is believed that some authority should exist for us to give preference ratings for the procurement of any items which we, through experience and knowledge of future projects, select as essential.

[4] 7. The following is therefore recommended:

a. The establishment of a blanket priority for Hawaiian defense projects as has been done for Panama Canal defense projects, and authorization to this headquarters to apply this high rating to cases of exceptional importance.

b. Waiving of the requirement that preference ratings can be issued only to government contractors and authorization to this Headquarters to issue these ratings for the procurement of those items which we anticipate will be essential to the defense program.

c. Consideration of the establishment of a liaison with shipping agencies on the West Coast to insure that defense materials ordered by private firms receive proper priorities in shipping space.
It is further recommended that prompt consideration be given to subparagraphs a and b above and this headquarters advised by radio of the War Department's attitude.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

1 incl: C/Ltr. Engr. 523.07 4 Jun 1941
Record copy Engineers
A true copy.
Edward Von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

114.14-18-C-32 RGC/amw
(8-18-41)

1st Indorsement

PRIORITIES COMMITTEE,
ARMY & NAVY MUNITIONS BOARD,
WAR DEPARTMENT BUILDING,
Washington, D. C., August 18, 1941.

To Commanding General, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Office of the Department Engineer, Fort Shafter, T. H. (THRU: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.)

1. The following information is submitted in answer to the recommendations on page 4 of letter from Lieutenant General Walter C. Short:

2. The establishment of a blanket priority specifically to Hawaiian Defense Projects is not considered necessary inasmuch as the Directive, Priorities Committee, Army and Navy Munitions Board, established the preference rating A-1-c for "Construction, equipment, defense and development of outlying bases, not included in the Continental United States". This Directive is the cumulative result of an exhaustive study of the military importance of the various items required by the military and naval forces of the United States, and has received the approval of the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy.

3. Attention is invited to a copy of communication of July 31, 1941, from the Army and Navy Munitions Board to "Supply Arms and Services of the Army and Bureaus and Offices of the Navy", which explains the procedure covering the issuance of project rating orders to Army and Navy construction projects outside of the Continental United States. It will be noted that the project rating orders issued in accordance with these instructions will not be confined to items on the Critical List, but will include all items necessary to complete the construction of a particular project. These ratings may be extended in the usual way, and it is believed should cover the recommendation as made in paragraph 7 b.

4. Attention is invited to the "Defense Supply Rating Plan" recently inaugurated by the Office of Production Management. This is a plan developed whereby the manufacturers who supply so-called "Off the shelf" items to defense industries are permitted to get material with which to manufacture additional stock so as to make a supply available to defense customers. This plan may be of value to some of the concerns in the Hawaiian District and is mentioned for your consideration.

5. The establishment of a liaison with shipping agencies of the West Coast has been referred to the Division of Emergency Shipping, Maritime Commission. That Commission has a record of the situation as it exists and as it has been for some time. They are further checking into the situation, but definite decision to establish a liaison agency has not been made.

For the Priorities Committee:

ROBT. G. COOK,
Major, Ordnance, USA.

1 Incl. no change.
A True Copy:
Edward Von Geldern
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.
Via Air Mail
AG 523 Priority
(7-7-41) MB

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., August 26, 1941.
To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

Attention is invited to preceding Indorsement.
By order of the Secretary of War:

Brigadier General,
Acting The Adjutant General.

1 Incl. n/c.
A True Copy.
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.

14 August 1941.

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,
Washington, D. C.

Relet this headquarters third July file engr five two three point zero seven subject priorities and preference ratings stop. This question of priorities becoming more pressing and many local supply houses are now advised by mainland agents that no shipment can be made until priority is secured stop. Request radio advice as to action on recommendations paragraph seven of letter cited.

A True Copy:
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., Oct. 23, 1941.

In reply refer to:
Engr. 523.07
Subject: Office of Production Management Field Service.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter dated 13 August 1941 from the Army and Navy Munitions Board, a copy of which is inclosed. Reference is also made to letter from his headquarters, file Engr. 523.07, subject "Priorities and Preference Ratings," and 1st Indorsement from Priorities Committee, Army and Navy Munitions Board, 18 August 1941, file 114.14-18-C-32-RGC-amw (8-18-41).

2. The conditions as to securing priorities for materials needed in the Hawaiian Islands are growing worse steadily, and a large part of the difficulties encountered can be traced to lack of information and to failure of field offices, whose region includes this Territory, to make themselves known to local Federal officials and business men. The long distances involved in travel, the difference in time, and the high cost of telephonic communication, all make contact with any regional office difficult.
3. Governor Poindexter has already submitted a request to Washington for the establishment of a local office of the Priorities Division, OPM, and at his request I concurred in his suggested action. A copy of my letter of September 13, 1941 to the Governor is inclosed for your information.

4. It is therefore requested that the War Department propose the establishment in Honolulu of a field office of the Office of Production Management, to include the Priorities Division, initially, with provision for adding representatives of other divisions later, if required.


2 Incls: (1) Cy of ltr Army & Navy Munitions Board, 8/13/41; (2) Cy of ltr to Gov. Poindexter, 13 Sept 41.
A true copy:
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.

AG 334.8 Production Management Board
(10-23-41) MB
1st Ind
IG/mm–1713

To: The Under Secretary of War.
2 Incls. No change.
A true copy.
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.

18–C–32 RGC/amw
(11–13–41)

PRIORITIES COMMITTEE
ARMY & NAVY MUNITIONS BOARD

WAR DEPARTMENT BUILDING,
Washington, D. C., November 13, 1941.

To Commanding General, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Office of the Department Commander, Fort Shafter, T. H. (THRU: The Adjutant General, War Dept., Washington, D. C.)

1. Recommendation has been made to the Office of Production Management and a field office of the Office of Production Management be established in Hawaii at an early date. They have requested to advise this Committee as to the action contemplated or already accomplished in this direction. Such information will be forwarded when received.

For the Priorities Committee:

(/s/) RoBT. G. COOK,
Major, Ordnance, USA.

2 Incls. No change.

AG 334.8 Production Management Board (10–23–41) MB

IG:wc–1713

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,
November 17, 1941.

To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
Attention is invited to preceding Indorsement.
By order of the Secretary of War:

(/s/) E. L. Adams,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

2 Incls. n/c.
A true copy.
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
VIA "CLIPPER" AIR MAIL
Engr. 600.12 (Gen.)
Subject: Revolving Fund for Purchase of Materials.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. The delay in securing necessary materials for our construction program has become a matter of serious concern. Experience indicates that from three to four months are necessary to procure construction materials from the United States after funds for projects are allotted, and increasing transportation difficulties may lengthen this time.

2. The following is the situation of the two constructing agencies:
   a. The District Engineer has no revolving fund for advance procurement of materials. Among the first Engineer projects approved, however, were two large projects; one the additional ammunition storage facilities, and the other the Air Corps mobilization housing. As soon as these allotments were received, the District Engineer immediately ordered all or a large part of the necessary materials to complete the entire project. With his construction crews now well organized, the rate of using these materials has greatly accelerated and the stock is being depleted because the rate of use is greater than the rate of arrival from the mainland.

   b. The Constructing Quartermaster is in somewhat the same situation. While the Quartermaster General has authorized the establishment of a stock pile of lumber, no funds have been advanced for the procurement of other materials. These other materials are not available for local purchase in any appreciable quantities, and as a result, there will undoubtedly be delays.

3. I understand that the Division Engineer, San Francisco, has recommended to the Chief of Engineers that a revolving working fund of $1,000,000.00 be allotted to the District Engineer, Honolulu, to permit that officer to procure materials in advance. This fund would be a revolving fund. All expenditures from it for materials would be reimbursed from other projects funds as these projects were approved and utilize the materials.

4. I think that this materials situation may become critical. As stated in previous communications, a large part of our construction forces have been imported from the mainland on contracts which require either their continued employment or return to the mainland at Government expense. It is obvious that if there is any lack of materials not only will the jobs be delayed, but also the cost to the Government will be increased. I therefore strongly recommend that the suggestion of the Division Engineer, San Francisco, be adopted, that the District Engineer, Honolulu, be allotted a revolving fund of $1,000,000.00, and that similar arrangements be made for the Constructing Quartermaster to permit him to stock materials in addition to lumber.

(s) Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

AG 600.12 Hawaiian Dept 1st Ind.
(7–28–41) MO

War Department, AGO,
August 1, 1941.

To: Chief of Engineers AND The Quartermaster General, IN TURN.

For remark and recommendation.
By order of the Secretary of War:

Adjutant General.

A true copy.

EDWARD VON GELDERN,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.

400.31 (Honolulu) 335.
Subject: Revolving Fund for Purchase of Materials.
To the Adjutant General (Through the Quartermaster General.)

It is recommended that a revolving fund of $1,000,000.00 be authorized for the purposes indicated in the basic letter. If the necessary funds are not available to the War Department from any other source, it is believed that this amount could be advanced from the Fifth Supplemental, 1941, Deferred Storage Program, (Air Corps), Items a & b, Parking Storage Areas, Reserve Airplanes. As a final resort, the sum of $1,000,000.00 now reserved for construction at the Mobile Air Depot, (Brookley Field) could be advanced for this purpose. In either case, reimbursement should be effected upon the appropriation of funds for construction in Hawaii under the 1943 Construction Program.

For the Chief of Engineers:

(s) John R. Hardin,
Chief of Engineers,
Corps of Engineers,
Construction Section.

Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
20 August 1941.
Fred W. Herman,
Lt. Col., Corps of Engineers,
Assistant Dept. Engineer.

Reference clipper letter this headquarters July twenty eighth file Engr six hundred point one two parenthesis gen period parenthesis subject revolving fund for purchase of materials Stop Information has been received from district engineer Honolulu that allotment of one million one hundred thousand dollars has been received which can be utilized for advanced purchases of materials as recommended in letter cited Stop Constructing quartermaster has not repeat not received similar allotment as revolving fund to permit advance purchases of materials nor any information thereof Stop Strongly recommend revolving fund allotment similar to that established for district engineer be made to constructing quartermaster to permit advanced ordering of materials for defense contracts

A true copy.
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.

QM 411.1 C-P
(Hawaiian Dept.)

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. The Quartermaster Corps has established a stock-pile reserve of lumber in Hawaii in the amount of $600,000.00. It is therefore recommended that a revolving fund in an amount not to exceed $500,000.00 be authorized. If the
necessary funds are not available to the War Department from any other source, funds in allotted status to the Quartermaster Corps can be made available.

For the Quartermaster General:

(s) L. R. Groves,
L. R. Groves,
Colonel, Q. M. C.,
Assistant.

A true copy.
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.

Subject: Revolving Fund for Purchase of Materials—Hawaiian Department
AG 600.12 Haw. Dept.
(7–28–41) MO-D

4th Ind.
ESA

War Department, AGO,
September 27, 1941.
To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

The establishment of revolving funds as requested in basic communication is not favorably considered. The Quartermaster General will, however, augment the lumber stock pile now maintained in the Hawaiian Department sufficiently to meet requirements for War Department approved projects for both Engineer and Quartermaster construction. A similar stock pile of other classes of construction materials will also be established by The Quartermaster General without delay. The materials used from these stock piles will be replaced from applicable funds of projects for which used as soon as such funds become available to local constructing agencies.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Major General,
The Adjutant General.

A true copy.
Edward Von Geldern,
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.

Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., September 13, 1941.

In reply refer to: Engr. 600.12 (Gen.)
Major General R. C. Moore
Deputy Chief of Staff, War Department,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dick:
The situation surrounding the obtaining of materials for defense contracts is becoming more and more critical. On many items a delay of between three and four months occurs between the time an allotment of funds for a project is received and the materials necessary are obtained from the mainland. We have recently received word on some electrical equipment which indicates that delivery cannot be made for six months.

In a conference with Colonel Hannum, Division Engineer is San Francisco, when he was here sometime ago, he mentioned that he had recommended to The Chief of Engineers that a revolving fund of $1,000,000.00 be set up to permit the District Engineer to make advance purchases of materials and plant. I followed up Hannum's recommendation to the Chief of Engineers with a strong letter to the War Department urging that this revolving fund be set up for the District
Engineer and that similar arrangements be made for the Constructing Quartermaster. The District Engineer informed me today that he had received an allotment of $1,100,000.00 from the Chief of Engineers which could be utilized for the advance purchase of materials. The Constructing Quartermaster, however, has not yet received similar information, and while he is authorized to stock lumber locally, he has no revolving fund for which to make advance purchases of materials other than lumber.

I am following up my previous recommendation by radio to The Adjutant General today. I think that the matter is sufficiently important to bring it to your attention, and I will appreciate it if you would have someone look into this matter. A copy of my letter of July 28th and of the radio follow up of September 13 are inclosed for ready reference.

Very sincerely,

WALTER C. SHORT,  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

2 Incls: Cy. ltr. Engr. 600.12 (Gen.) 28 Jul 41, Cy. rad. 20 Aug 41.

A true copy:
Edward Von Geldern,  
Edward Von Geldern,  
2nd Lt., F. A.

WAR DEPARTMENT,  
Office of the Chief of Staff,  
Washington, September 29, 1941.

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,  
Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, Honolulu, T. H.

DEAR WALTER:

I have your letter of the thirteenth relative to the establishment of revolving funds in connection with construction in Hawaii.

Owing to legal restrictions we cannot approve your request for revolving funds. However, it appears that the wording of the appropriation from which the Quartermaster General maintains the lumber pile you mention is such that those funds may be used to make advance purchases of other materials required for construction.

The Quartermaster General will take immediate measures to establish a stock pile of construction materials other than lumber, sufficient to meet requirements for both Engineer and Quartermaster construction. The conditions under which these stock piles will be reimbursed will be covered in the reply of the War Department to your official request of July 28, 1941.

The Chief of Engineers advises that the allotment of $1,100,000 made to your District Engineer, to which you refer, is from funds now available for approved projects. This allotment should not be construed as making these funds available to you as a revolving fund, nor for advance purchase of materials, except for the projects to which the funds apply.

I believe that when these stock piles have become established the situation you outline will be greatly relieved.

Sincerely yours.

[ ] R. C. Moore,  
R. C. Moore,  
Major General, Deputy Chief of Staff.

A true copy:
Edward von Geldern,  
Edward von Geldern,  
2nd Lt., F. A.
Air Mail via Clipper

Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, U. S. A.,
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander, Fort Shafter, T. H.

Dear Short: The copy of your report on the additional air routes has been received. The quantity of details requiring coordination, and the distances involved in the projects make the short time consumed in getting rolling almost unbelievably short.

I extend you my personal thanks for the effort you have expended on this job and the results you are getting.

The way things are working out now, it looks as if we will be using trans-Pacific airways almost continuously from now on. Our plans are O. K. for 4-engine bombers, but what are the prospects for medium bombers? Do you think we should even study that phase of trans-Pacific operations?

Best regards.

Sincerely.

[sgd] H. H. Arnold,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Deputy Chief of Staff for Air.

A true copy:
Edward Von Geldern
Edward Von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.

Subject: Increase in the Strength of the Third Engineers.
AG 320.2 (11-1-40) M-C
3rd Ind.
ESA
WAR DEPARTMENT. A. G. O., February 10, 1941.

To Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Action is being taken to increase the allotment of Regular Army enlisted men for the Corps of Engineers, Hawaiian Department by 107. This allotment will permit the organization of the 3rd Engineers in accordance with Table of Organization 5-11, November 1, 1940. Regular Army personnel are not available to increase further the strength of this regiment.

2. Since War Department policy forbids sending trainees to the Overseas Departments it will not be practicable to aid you in creating an Engineer Battalion (Separate) as recommended in your radio of January 23, 1941.

3. As previously advised, plans provide for the activation of a separate Engineer Company (Avn) for your Department.

By order of the Secretary of War:

A True Copy:
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[secret]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., February 19, 1941.

In reply refer to:
Engr. 322.03
Subject: Additional Engineer Troops.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to letter, this headquarters, Engr. 322.03, 23 August 1940, which recommended the assignment to the Department of an Engineer regiment
November considerations of correspondence.

2. These previous recommendations for an increase in the Engineer component in the Department were based upon the assumption that some civilian labor would be available. It has now been necessary to take this into account. The increase in the defense contracts of the Navy will now necessitate the importation of unskilled labor as well. This development makes impossible the assumption that any appreciable local labor will be available and requires that previous estimates of the minimum number of Engineers necessary be revised upwards.

3. I consider it essential that a regiment of Engineers (Aviation) be furnished this Department as an integral part of the Hawaiian Air Force and that a regiment of Engineers, General Service, be furnished to this Department as Department Engineer troops. There is sufficient work immediately on hand in connection with Air Corps activities on the outlying islands and on Oahu to keep a regiment of Engineers continuously occupied. There is also sufficient work in connection with military roads and trails in department units to keep a regiment of General Service Engineers continuously occupied. There is also sufficient work in connection with the Hawaiian Division such as bombproofing of Division command posts and communication centers, road blocks and other tactical employment to keep the Third Engineers continuously occupied.

4. It is therefore recommended that one regiment of Engineers (Aviation) (T. O. 5–411) and one regiment of Engineers, General Service, (T. O. 5–21) be authorized for this Department and that these units complete with personnel and equipment be furnished as soon as possible.

WALTER C. SHORT, 
Lieutenant General, 
Commanding.

Record copy: Engineers.

A True Copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41.

Subject: Additional Engineer Troops. Hawaiian Department.

AG 320.2 (2–19–41) MC–C–M 1st Ind.

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,
May 16, 1941.

To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. a. The 34th Engineers (Combat), will be activated in your department with an allotted strength of 1127 enlisted men under T/O 5–171, November 1, 1940, less band and basic privates, on June 1, 1941 (AG 320.2 (4–8–41) M–C, radio April 9, 1941).

b. The regiment will be organized with cadres to be furnished by units now in your department, as directed by you, and with selectees to be dispatched from the Continental United States.

c. Every effort will be made to send individuals who have completed their basic training; however, in order to make maximum use of the available shipping, some curtailment in their basic training may be required. If this is done, you will be informed so that they can complete their training in Hawaii. Under the present tentative schedule, it is proposed to dispatch the full quota except thirty-six attached medical, in June. The Medical Department personnel will be dispatched in November.

d. The actual date of activation of the regiment will conform to the arrival of personnel in your department.

2. While your recent request for additional medical enlisted men was disapproved because of non-availability of personnel, the 34th Engineers (and the 97th and 98th Coast Artillery Regiments whose activation is covered in separate correspondence) is allotted a full quota of attached medical personnel, less basics. You are authorized to make a redistribution of this attached medical personnel, reporting such readjustment to this office.
3. It is desired that you submit a report on the following:
   a. The actual date of activation of the 34th Engineers.
   b. Changes in the distribution of three-year men in engineer units in connection with the organization of the 34th Engineers.

4. Attention is invited to letter, this office, April 21, 1941, AG 381.4 (1-27-41) M-D-M, subject: Reports of change in status reports—Defense Reserves, Overseas Departments.

5. Your request for aviation engineers is being considered separately.

6. The allotment of commissioned personnel and the grades and ratings of enlisted personnel will be made separately.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[8] E. S. ADAMS,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

3 Inclosures—

   Incl. 1.—Copy of ltr., 5-15-41, to C. G., Third Corps Area.
   Incl. 2.—Copy of ltr., 5-15-41, to C. G., New York Port of Embarkation.
   Incl. 3.—Copy of ltr., 5-15-41, to The Quartermaster General.

A True Copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[CONFIDENTIAL]

WAR DEPARTMENT,
The Adjutant General’s Office,
Washington, June 18, 1941.

AG 320.2
(6-5-41) MR-M-C

Subject: Constitution and Activation of Certain Engineer Units (804th Engineer Battalion, Aviation (Separate), and Personnel for Engineer Headquarters, Hawaiian Department Air Force).

To: The Commanding Generals, Fourth Army, Hawaiian Department, Ninth Corps Area, and San Francisco Port of Embarkation.

Extract

1. The 804th Engineer Company, Aviation (Separate), now in Hawaii, will be disbanded at the earliest practicable date and concurrently therewith the 804th Engineer Battalion, Aviation (Separate), will be constituted and activated with an authorized strength of 21 officers and 625 enlisted men, including 10 attached medical. The personnel, unit funds, and equipment of the 804th Engineer Battalion, Aviation (Separate).

By order of the Secretary of War:

[8] E. S. ADAMS,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

A True Copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

WAR DEPARTMENT,
The Adjutant General’s Office,
Washington, May 28, 1941.

AG 320.2 (5-28-41) MC-C-M

Subject: Additional Engineer Troops and Reinforcements for Coast Artillery Garrison, Hawaiian Department.

To: The Commanding General, Third Corps Area.

The Sailings of USATs Manhattan, Washington, and Wood for Hawaii have been indefinitely postponed. So much of letters, this office, May 15, 1941, AG
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

320.2 (2–19–41) MC–C–M, subject: Additional Engineer Troops, Hawaiian Department, and May 10, 1941, AG 320.2 (2–18–41) MC–C–M, subject: Reinforcements for Coast Artillery Garrison Hawaiian Department, as pertains to movement of trainees to Ports of Embarkation and overseas movement is rescinded. Instructions covering final disposition of trainees earmarked by the two letters mentioned above will follow this communication.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Adjutant General.

Copies furnished:

The Commanding Generals, First Army, GHQ Air Force, Hawaiian Department, San Francisco and New York Ports of Embarkation;
The Chief of Staff, GHQ
The Chief of Chaplains
The Chief of Coast Artillery
The Chief of the Air Corps
The Chief of Chemical Warfare Service
The Chief of Engineers
The Chief of Ordnance
The Chief Signal Officer
The Quartermaster General; and
The Chief of Finance.

A true copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

WAR DEPARTMENT,
The Adjutant General's Office,
Washington, June 23, 1941.

AG 320.2 (6–16–41) MC–C–M
Subject: Additional Engineer Troops, Hawaiian Department.
To: The Commanding Generals, Hawaiian Department, Third Corps Area and the New York Port of Embarkation;
The Quartermaster General.

Letter this office, May 15, 1941, AG 320.2 (2–19–41) MC–C–M, subject: Additional Engineer Troops, Hawaiian Department, to the Commanding General, Third Corps Area, the Commanding General, New York Port of Embarkation, and the Quartermaster General, respectively; and 1st Indorsement this office, May 15, 1941, AG 320.2 (2–19–41) MC–C–M, same subject, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, are rescinded. Letters, this office May 23, 1941, AG 320.2 (5–23–41) MC–M, May 24, 1941, AG 320.2 (5–24–41) MC, and May 27, 1941, AG 320.2 (5–26–41) MC, subject: Additional Engineer Troops, Hawaiian Department, to the Commanding General, Third Corps Area are also rescinded.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[sgd] E. S. ADAMS,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

Copies Furnished:

Chief of Staff, GHQ
The Commanding Generals, First Army, and S. F. P. of E
The Chief of Chaplains
The Chief of Coast Artillery
The Chief of the Air Corps
The Chief of Chemical Warfare Service
The Chief of Engineers
The Chief of Ordnance
The Chief Signal Officer
The Chief of Finance
The Surgeon General

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

Subject: Additional Selective Service Trainees for the Hawaiian Department.
AG 320.2 (4–21–41) MC–C

ES A
War Department, A. G. O.,
May 21, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Radio No. 721, this office, April 9, 1941, requested your views on the practicability of securing additional selectees locally, and it was not intended that an appeal be made to the Governor of the Territory of Hawaii to secure 1,127 additional selectees in excess of the existing quota.

2. In connection with your remarks on labor shortage in Hawaii, a resolution recently passed by the Board of Supervisors of the City and County of Honolulu, copies of which were sent to the Secretary of War and other governmental heads, protested the organization of a port company in Hawaii on the grounds that the supply of labor was ample and that needs of National Defense projects could be met without importation of additional personnel from the United States. This matter is brought to your attention for information only. No further action appears necessary or desirable at this time.

3. Personnel for the 34th Engineers will be provided from the Continental United States in two increments. Details have been communicated to you in separate correspondence.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[sgd] E. S. Adams,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

A true copy:
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 21 April 1941.

In reply refer to:
AG 381
Subject: Additional Selective Service Trainees for the Hawaiian Department.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. War Department radio No. 721, of 9 April 1941, proposes activation in this Department of the 34th Engineer Regiment (C) in June with a strength of 1127, including 36 attached medical personnel. It further proposes that the 3d Engineers (C) will furnish the cadre; the balance to be local selectees.

2. As the existing Territorial quota of 1400 Selectees has already been exceeded by approximately 500, and those now inducted assigned to organizations, an appeal was made to the Governor of the Territory of Hawaii to secure the additional personnel required to activate this new unit. The Governor's reply, attached, states that he is without authority to call additional quotas of trainees, and even if such authority existed, he is opposed to providing additional manpower at the expense of National Defense projects and local industry which have already absorbed all available labor.

3. The labor shortage in Hawaii is acute. Skilled labor for work on National Defense projects is now being imported and it is quite likely that the importation of unskilled labor will become necessary to maintain defense work schedules.

4. In view of these circumstances it is urged that the War Department provide personnel from the Mainland U. S. for the activation of new or expansion of existing units in the Hawaiian Department.

[sgd] Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

2 Incls.
1. Letter to Governor, T. H.
2. Letter from Governor, T. H.

A True Copy:
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
AG 320.2/55
Subject: Reinforcements for Coast Artillery Garrison, Hawaiian Department.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is invited to:
   A. Letter the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War, dated 24 January 1941, with reference to the defense of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base against a surprise attack, copy forwarded to this headquarters as enclosure to letter TAG to HHD, 7 February 1941, subject: "Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii," file AG 381 (1-24-41) M.

2. The increasingly critical international situation, together with the vital need, as expressed in Reference A, for adequate provision for the best defense which can be provided for the security of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base and the Fleet against surprise attacks makes it essential that the antiaircraft artillery garrison of Oahu be placed upon a war footing without delay. While not specifically mentioned in Reference A, there is a similar requirement for a sound defense of the Fleet and its base against raids by surface ships. This would have special importance if the fleet should be withdrawn from Pearl Harbor. An adequate defense, ready for prompt action, can not be provided with the present garrison because of the necessity for dual assignments of Coast Artillery batteries to anti-aircraft and harbor defense missions. The reinforcements required for the antiaircraft artillery and harbor defense garrisons to provide the degree of defense considered essential are discussed below.

3. Antiaircraft Artillery:
   a. The approved defense project provides for twenty-five (25) gun batteries, five (5) searchlight batteries, and sixteen (16) automatic weapons batteries manning a total of seventy-two (72) mobile and twenty-six (26) fixed AA guns, seventy-five (75) searchlights, one hundred and twenty (120) 37 mm AA guns, and two hundred (200) cal. .50 AA machine guns. (NOTE: Three hundred and forty-five (345) cal. .50 AA machine guns are provided in the defense project, of which two hundred (200) are manned by antiaircraft artillery and the remainder by other troops.) With the present garrison, including the assignment of all but two (2) harbor defense artillery batteries to antiaircraft assignments, only nineteen (19) gun batteries, three (3) searchlight batteries, no 37mm batteries and six (6) machine gun batteries can be manned because of the shortage of both personnel and equipment. The major shortages in antiaircraft artillery armament are sixteen (16) three inch AA guns and associated equipment (of which six (6) guns are understood to be enroute to this Department), all one hundred and thirty-five (135) 37 mm AA guns, two hundred and thirty-six (236) cal. .50 machine guns, and thirty (30) sound locators.
   b. To man the entire antiaircraft artillery defense project, avoiding dual assignments to all but four harbor defense batteries, requires an increase in the existing garrison of the following antiaircraft artillery personnel:

   2 Regiments Coast Artillery AA (Mobile) T/O 4-11.
   1 Battalion Gun Coast Artillery AA (Mobile) (less searchlight battery) T/O 4-15.

Approximately ninety (90) officers and two thousand (2000) enlisted men as individual filler replacements to activate three (3) gun batteries and three (3) 37 mm batteries of the 64th CA (AA), now in active, and to bring to war strength the active elements of this regiment.

c. In paragraph 10 a of 2nd Indorsement of Reference C, the War Department provided for only one half of the reinforcements of the peacetime garrison of antiaircraft artillery which, at that time, were considered essential to provide a reasonably effective antiaircraft defense prior to the date unit reinforcements from the mainland could affect the situation. With the increasingly critical international situation at this time, it is urgently recommended that all war
reinforcements of antiaircraft artillery personnel, both unit and filler reinforcements described above, together with the existing shortages in antiaircraft artillery material be sent from the mainland with the least practicable delay.


The status of the defense which can be established with existing personnel of the peace garrison of harbor defense artillery is described in detail in par 6f, of the basic document, Hawaiian Defense Project, Revision of 1940. Briefly, only one 16-inch battery and the seacoast searchlights of the Ulapau Group can be manned by batteries with harbor defense as their only mission. By employing the undesirable expedient of dual assignments to harbor defense and antiaircraft missions, and of harbor defense and Field Artillery missions, both 16-inch gun batteries, the one 14-inch battery, one of the two 12-inch gun batteries, none of the three mortar batteries, three of the five 8-inch batteries (fixed and railway), six of the twelve 155 mm batteries (two manned by Field Artillery personnel) and none of the two 6-inch and two 3-inch [3] batteries can be manned upon initial deployment. As shown in Table I, par. 7 to HDP-40, an increase of approximately 165 officers and 3400 enlisted men as individual filler reinforcements and One Regiment Coast Artillery (TD, T/O 4–31W) is required to fully man the harbor defense artillery. By not manning the three fixed seacoast mortar batteries, which are not essential to a defense against raids, the total number of individual filler reinforcements may be reduced to approximately 150 officers and 2700 enlisted men. This increase in the garrison will be sufficient to provide only one relief as manning details for harbor defense guns, but will be adequate so that key observation stations, air guards and similar details can be maintained continuously.

5. Summarizing, it is urgently recommended that:

(a) The Coast Artillery garrison of this Department be brought to substantially war strength by the dispatch from the mainland of the following reinforcements:

1. Two Regiments CA (AA) Mobile, T/O 4–11.
2. One Battalion CA (AA) gun, Mobile (less searchlight battery), T/O 4–15.
3. One Regiment CA (TD), 155mm gun, T/O 4–31W.
4. Individual antiaircraft artillery filler reinforcements to include 91 officers and 2064 enlisted men.
5. Individual harbor defense artillery reinforcements to include approximately 150 officers and 2700 enlisted men.

b. Existing major shortages in the armament of the approved antiaircraft artillery projects, as set forth in par. 3 above, be filled as soon as practicable.

WALTER C SHORT,
Lieutenant General,
Commanding.

[1]

A True Copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12–22–41.

[SECRET]

Subject: Reinforcements for Coast Artillery Garrison, Hawaiian Department.
AG 320.2 (2–18–41) MC–C–M 1st Ind.

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,
May 10, 1941.

To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. The Coast Artillery garrison, Hawaiian Department, will be augmented by approximately 276 officers and 5,734 enlisted men between June, 1941, and March, 1942, in three increments paralleling the estimated delivery of material, as follows:

a. June, 1941:

1) AA filler replacements, 60 officers and 1,337 enlisted men.

2) 62 officers and 1,329 enlisted men required to activate the following units in the Department:
98th Coast Artillery (AA) (Semi-mobile), less band, 3d Battalion (37-mm Gun), Battery E (Searchlight), basic privates and attached medical, under T/O 4–111, November 1, 1940, and component tables.

(3) 17 officers and 359 enlisted men to activate the 2d Battalion, 97th Coast Artillery (AA) (Semi-mobile), less Battery H (Gun), Battery E (Searchlight) and basic privates, under T/O 4–115, November 1, 1940 and component tables.

b. November, 1941:

(1) 48 officers and 885 enlisted men to activate the 97th Coast Artillery (AA) (Semi-mobile), less band, 2d Battalion (Gun), 3d Battalion (37-mm gun), and basic privates, under T/O 4–111, November 1, 1940, and component tables.

(2) 4 officers and 134 enlisted men to activate Battery H (Gun), 97th Coast Artillery, less basic privates, under T/O 4–17, November 1, 1940.

(3) Attached Medical personnel, 98th Coast Artillery, 7 officers and 49 enlisted men.

[2] March, 1942:

(1) AA filler replacements, 24 officers and 661 enlisted men.

(2) 54 officers and 980 enlisted men to activate the 3d Battalion (37-mm Gun), 97th Coast Artillery and 3d Battalion (37-mm gun), 98th Coast Artillery, each less Battery M (Gun) and basic privates, under T/O 4–125, November 1, 1940 and component tables.

2. Cadres for the new units will be furnished from existing units in the Hawaiian Department; their source, strength and composition will be determined by you.

3. Every effort will be made to send individuals who have completed their basic training; however, in order to make maximum use of available shipping, some curtailment in their basic training may be required. If this is done, you will be informed so the individuals can complete their basic training in Hawaii.

4. The actual activation of the various units will conform to the arrival of personnel in the Department.

5. While your recent request for additional medical enlisted men was disapproved because of non-availability of personnel, the 97th and 98th Coast Artillery Regiments (and the 34th Engineers whose activation is covered in separate correspondence) are allotted full quotas of attached medical personnel, less basics. You are authorized to make a redistribution of this personnel, reporting such readjustment to this office.

6. It is desired that you submit a report on the following:

a. The actual dates on which various units are activated.

b. Changes in the distribution of three-year men in Coast Artillery units in connection with activation of new units.

c. List of all Coast Artillery units and installations in the Department including allotted strengths and tables of organization under which organized; this report to be submitted upon completion of the activation of all new units and distribution of the last increment of AA filler replacements.


8. The allotments of commissioned personnel and the grades and ratings for enlisted personnel will be made separately.

9. Recommendation for augmentation of harbor defense artillery is not favorably considered at this time because the additional personnel is not available. The antiaircraft reinforcements will strengthen the seacoast defenses by the relief of all but four harbor defense batteries from dual antiaircraft missions.

By order of the Secretary of War:

(sgd) F. S. Adams,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.
Copies furnished:
   The Commanding Generals, Third Corps Area and New York & San
   Francisco Ports of Embarkation:
   The Chief of Staff, GHQ;
   The Chief of Chaplains;
   The Chief of Coast Artillery;
   The Chief of the Air Corps;
   The Chief of Chemical Warfare Service;
   The Chief of Engineers;
   The Chief of Ordnance;
   The Chief Signal Officer;
   The Quartermaster General;
   The Surgeon General; and
   The Chief of Finance.

A true copy:
   L. W. TRUMAN,
   Capt. Inf.
   12-22-41

[SECRET]

AG 320.2/57

Subject: Increase of enlisted strength, 251st Coast Artillery (AA), National Guard (California).

To: The Adjutant General.

1. On January 9, 1941, the then Department Commander, Lieutenant General Herron, radioed for authority to increase the enlisted strength of the 251st Coast Artillery (AA), National Guard, from present allotted strength to a peace strength of 1450 by assignment of selectees from Ninth Corps Area. On January 17, 1941, the War Department replied by radiogram to the effect that the recommendation made in January 9, 1941 radiogram was not favorably considered and that the policy of the War Department is that selective service personnel in overseas garrisons will be limited to those procured within the overseas department itself and that no additional selective service personnel will in time of peace be sent from the continental United States to overseas departments.

2. I am again submitting this request as I am of the firm opinion that the situation here is different than in the United States, and that this is a special case which deserves further consideration. The facts are:

   The 251st National Guard is the only National Guard organization on duty outside of the continental limits of the United States;

   This regiment is composed of white officers and enlisted men;

   The selective service trainees now in being in this Department are composed of 169 Japanese out of the quota 700. The next draft quota of 700 which is to be inducted in March will undoubtedly be composed of approximately the same ratio of Japanese; namely, about 67%;

   The selective service trainees are of varied mixture, such as Japanese, Hawaiian, Part Hawaiian, Filipinos, Chinese, Korean, and other mixtures;

   Any assignment of the selective service trainees to the 251st Coast Artillery (AA) would result in a mixture of races, largely Japanese, being assigned to a white organization, which is contrary to War Department policy, as stated in War Department Letter AG 291.2f (10.9/40) -M-A-M, October 16, 1940, Subject: "War Department Policy in regard to Negroes", paragraph:

   The Colonel, Commanding the 251st Coast Artillery (AA), states that because of the feeling in California against orientals, any assignment of selective service trainees from this Department to his command would cause dissension, and lessen the efficiency of his command fully 50 percent.

[2] All replacements now coming from the mainland are required for the Regular Army troops here.

   All the selective service trainees in this Department will be needed to fill the Hawaii National Guard units which are composed of races of the same type as in the selective service draft.
3. In view of the above, the only justifiable solution of this problem is to assign selective service trainees from the mainland, and preferably from the 9th Corps Area, to the 251st Coast Artillery (AA), National Guard. It is my opinion that it will be contrary to the best interests of all concerned to assign selective service trainees in this Department to the 251st Coast Artillery (AA) to increase its strength.

4. Since this is a special situation incident to this Department. I do not believe the present War Department policy, as stated in WD Radiogram, January 17, 1941; I.e., of not sending any additional selective service personnel from the continental United States to overseas departments, should apply to this Department.

5. I therefore again request that the 251st Coast Artillery (AA), National Guard, be increased from present allotted strength to a peace strength of 1450 by assignment of selective service trainees from the 9th Corps Area.

(sgd) Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

A true copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[SECRET]

Subject: Increase of Enlisted Strength, 251st Coast Artillery (AA), National Guard (California).
AG 320.2 (2-25-41) M-C 1st Ind.
WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,
ESA

To the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Your recommendation that the 251st Coast Artillery (AA) be increased from its present allotted strength of 1181 to a strength of 1450 by assignment of selectees from the Ninth Corps Area is not favorably considered.

2. As stated in radiogram from this office, January 17, 1941, all selective service personnel to be procured in the current fiscal year have already been allotted to units and activities. Additional personnel could be allotted to the 251st Coast Artillery (AA) only at the expense of other units or activities.

3. If trainees were sent to the 251st Coast Artillery (AA) at the present time, it is not considered that they could be of great value to the regiment or to the defense of the Hawaiian Islands due to the short period of time they would be available after completing their basic training. Selectees inducted now would probably reach the Hawaiian Department some time in April 1941. Their basic training would require approximately three months making them fully available about July 1941. As the 251st Coast Artillery (AA) is scheduled to be returned to the United States for return to an inactive status of September 16, 1941, it appears that any selective service personnel sent at this late date would be available to the regiment for a maximum of two months.

By order of the Secretary of War:

(sgd) E. S. ADAMS,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

A true copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[SECRET]

[1]

AG 320.2/58

25 February 1941.

Subject: Reinforcements for Hawaiian Department.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is invited to:
   A. Letter, TAG to HHD, 4 February 1941, subject: "Tables of Organization, Overseas Departments" file AG 320.2 (1-17-41) P(C);
   B. Letter, TAG to HHD, 27 December 1940, Subject: "Equipment for Field Artillery Units", file AG 320.2 (12/20/40) P.
C. Letter, HHD to TAG, 18 February 1941, subject: "Reinforcements for
Coast Artillery Garrison, Hawaiian Department", file AG 320.2/55.

D. Letter, HHD to TAG, 19 February 1941, subject: "Additional Engineer
Troops", file Engr. 322.03.

2. The requests for troop reinforcements as stated in Reference C and D, hold
priority over the requests given herein. The following reinforcements are re-
quested for this Department at the earliest possible date and in the priority in
which they are listed.

a. In accordance with Reference A, authority is requested to organize the 11th
Field Artillery under WD T/O 6-41, dated November 1, 1940. The 11th Field
Artillery (less 3d Battalion) is now organized under Standard War Departme-
t, Tables of Organization with units organized and maintained at war strength, as
follows:

   (1) 11th Field Artillery (less 3d Bn), T/O 6-41, January 3, 1939.
   (2) Hq & Hq Btry, 11th Field Artillery, T/O 6-42, January 3, 1939.
   (3) 1st ana 2d Bn, 11th Field Artillery, T/O 6-45, December 7, 1938.
   (4) Hq & Hq Btry, 1st and 2d Bn, 11th Field Artillery, T/O 6-46. January 7,
       1938.
   (5) Four (4) batteries, 11th Field Artillery, T/O 6-47, December 7, 1938.

b. That one Infantry Battalion, Light Tanks, be authorized for and the neces-
sary personnel and material to organize same, be furnished this Department.
The number of possible localities for hostile beach landings make the availability
of a mobile reserve having the characteristics of light tanks of [2] great tactical
importance for counterattacks. The 11th Tank Company (Light Tanks) or-
organized under Standard WD, T/O 7-8, dated March 17, 1938, is the only tank
unit in this Department and could be the nucleus for the Infantry Battalion of
Light Tanks, requested herein.

c. That the organization of two (2) Military Police Companies, under WD,
T/O 7-55, dated November 1, 1940, (Military Police Battalion) be authorized
and that the necessary personnel be furnished from the Mainland for organiza-
tion of the two (2) companies in this Department. The technical duties required
of Air Corps enlisted personnel are retarded due to the required training for and
actual performance of interior guard duty at both Hickam and Wheeler Fields.
It is believed that an organized Military Police Company stationed at each of these
fields would release Air Corps personnel for necessary air activities and also render
more efficient interior guard and military police duty. The Military Police per-
sonnel could be efficiently trained in anti-sabotage work and also in close-in
defense without disrupting scheduled training. It is the intention to use the
Military Police personnel to perform similar work at outlying air fields under the
control of the Commanding Officers of Hickam and Wheeler Fields and also to
accompany Air Corps Units to those outlying fields when either Wing is operating
under its Dispersion Plan.

d. That the necessary reinforcements be furnished so that the Infantry Regi-
ments of the Hawaiian Division, be organized under WD, T/O No. 7, dated No-
vember 1, 1940: Infantry Division (Square). These regiments are now organized
under Standard WD, T/O 7-11, dated December 6, 1938, as modified to fall within
the "Allotment of Grades and Ratings for Enlisted Men, and authorized Recruiting
Strength" as published in mimeograph letter, TAG, August 7, 1940, file AG 221
(8-7-40) E. Approval of this request would permit compliance with Reference
A, above, and also make available the necessary personnel and material au-
thorized by current standard War Department Tables of Organization.

e. That the 11th Field Artillery Brigade (less 11th Field Artillery) be organized
under WD, T/Os dated November 1, 1940 and that the necessary reinforce-
ments be furnished this Department. That War Department, Tables of Basic Allow-
ances for Field Artillery, No. 6-1, dated November 1, 1940, be made applicable
to the 11th Field Artillery Brigade (less 11th Field Artillery).

3. A Study is now being made of all Special Tables of Organization at present in
use by units in this Department, with a view of submitting recommendations for
changes that will permit organization and functioning under current Standard
WD, Tables of Organization.


[sgd] Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General,
Commanding.

A true copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41.
[SECRET]

SUBJECT: Reinforcements for Hawaiian Department.

AG 320.2 (2-25-41) M-C
1st Ind. WVC

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,
April 11, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. The augmentation of Coast Artillery and Engineer components of the Hawaiian Department is being considered separately, and you will be advised in the near future of the action taken thereon.

2. The augmentation of the Field Artillery and Infantry components of the Hawaiian Division, and the addition of a Tank Battalion and two Military Police Companies to the peace garrison are not considered urgent, nor is it practicable to provide the personnel at this time. It is believed the necessary guard duties can and should be performed by troops in the Department without organizing Military Police Companies for this purpose.

3. The reorganization of Infantry and Field Artillery elements of the Hawaiian Division under latest War Department tables of organization is approved. This can be accomplished without additional personnel. The majority of the units in other foreign garrisons and in the Continental United States are below table of organization strengths yet conform to standard tables. As stated in letter, February 4, 1941, AG 320.2 (1-17-41) P (C), subject: "Tables of Organization, Overseas Departments", this can be accomplished by reducing the size of component elements of a unit or by carrying certain elements inactive.

By order of the Secretary of War:

(sgd) W. V. Carter,
W. V. CARTER,
Brigadier General,
Acting The Adjutant General.

A true copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41.

[Exhibit 1K]

AG 320.2 (3-5-41) M-WPD

[SECRET] AGW/11

April 9, 1941.

Subject: Aircraft Warning Service and Air Defense.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.


2. It is suggested that you consider the advisability of organizing your department for air defense, along lines similar to those described in letter, this office, March 17, 1941, AG 320.2 (2-28-41) M-WPD-M, i.e., charging your senior air officer with functions corresponding to those of the Commanding General, GHQ Air Force in the United States. These functions would include the peacetime organization and training of both fixed and mobile Aircraft Warning Services and of Interceptor pursuit aviation.

By order of the Secretary of War:

D. R. VAN SICKLER,
Adjutant General.

A true copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-23-41.
AG 320.2/61

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 3 May, 1941.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

Considerable study has been given to the organization of a Hawaiian Air Defense Command and the proposed plan was presented in paragraph 7, secret letter, this headquarters to TAG, dated 25 April 1941, subject: "Reorganization of the Forces of the Hawaiian Department."

For the Commanding General:

Carl Grosse,
Major, A. G. D.,
Assistant Adjutant General.

A true copy:
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41.

[SECRET]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 24 April 1941.

In reply refer to: 320.2
Subject: Air Base Group.

1. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, recently requested the War Department to designate Bellows Field, T. H., a permanent Air Corps station under the jurisdiction of Headquarters Hawaiian Department.
2. A further request is being prepared by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to have the War Department authorized the creation of a separate Air Corps station for the 15th Pursuit Group on Oahu, T. H.
3. Subject to the approval of the above mentioned recommendations, a redistribution of Air Base Group units will be necessary and the following is recommended:
   a. The 18th Air base Group (R) (tentative T/O 1-411) Wheeler Field, T. H., be redesignated an "Air Base Group, Air Base" (Single).
   b. An "Air Base Group, Air Base" (Single) (tentative T/O 1-411) be authorized for Bellows Field, T. H.
   c. An "Air Base Group, Air Base" (Single) (tentative T/O 1-411) be authorized for the new station of the 15th Pursuit Group.

F. L. Martin,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

A true copy:
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41.

SUBJECT: Air Base Group
AG 320.2 (4-24-41) MC-C 2nd Ind.

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,
June 26, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. The Troop Unit Basis FY 1942, provides for two additional materiel squadrons for the Hawaiian Department Air Force. It is believed that this provides sufficient air base units to care for Bellows Field.
2. Action on your recommendation for the organization of an additional air base group for station with the 15th Pursuit Group is held in abeyance pending decision on the new station.
3. It is desired that you submit without delay your recommendations for station and construction for the two additional materiel squadrons.

By order of the Secretary of War:

D. B. Van Sickle,
Adjutant General.

A true copy:
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[SECRET]
AG 320.2/94
3rd Ind.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 22 July 1941.

To: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D. C.

Reference paragraph 3, 2nd Indorsement, it is recommended that the two additional material squadrons be stationed at Bellows Field. Construction to care for these squadrons has been included in letter this Headquarters to the War Department dated 5 April 1941, Engineer file 600.12, subject: "Construction at Bellows Field, T. H."

For the Commanding General:

O. M. McDole,
Major, A. G. D.,
Assistant Adjutant General.

A true copy:
L. W. Truman
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

CHIEF OF THE AIR CORPS,
Washington, D. C.

Request authority be obtained for the activation of Bellows Field of a headquarters detachment to provide officer and enlisted staff for the post commander. Stop Absence of an air-base group in the Bellows Field set-up necessitates the above. Stop Minimum personnel for Hq Bellows Field now being furnished on DS from Hickam and Wheeler Fields. Stop First two grade personnel available locally. Stop Request for allotment of grades and ratings for the above follows by airmail. Stop Request radio reply signed Martin.

A True Copy:
L. W. Truman
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

Confidential
380-22

CHIEF OF ARMY AIR FORCES,
Washington, D. C.

Request information as to status of air base group for Bellows Field. Stop Seven hundred troops now station thereat and the administrative situation is becoming difficult. Stop Refer thirty nine August fifteen. Signed Martin

A True Copy:
L. W. Truman
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Confidential
From
6 War WD

C G, Hawaiian Dept., Ft. Shafter, T. H.
172—27th
The activation of the air base group for Bellows Field reurad three eighty was not favorably considered by Secretary War because this would exceed the garrison strength now allotted Hawai. Stop The Adjutant General has been requested to activate a headquarters detachment in accordance with your letter August fifteen same subject A one dash seven.

ARNO LD.
316P/27.

Decoded by Lt Jos Engelbertz SC 10:00A, 29 Sept. 41.
A True Copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT,
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL’S OFFICE,
Washington, September 27, 1941.

AG 320.2 (8 15 41)
MR-M-AAF
Subject: Activation of Air Corps Units.
To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.
1. The Headquarters Detachment, Bellows Field, T. H., is constituted and will be activated by you at the earliest practicable date.
2. Grades and ratings for this detachment will be as indicated on the attached enclosure.
3. Personnel for this detachment will be furnished from personnel now available in the Hawaiian Department with no increase in strength of the Hawaiian Air Force.

By order of the Secretary of War:

(S) OTTO THUSON,
Adjutant General.

1 Incl. Copies furnished:
Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force
Chief of Staff, GHQ.
Chief of the Army Air Forces
Chief of the Air Corps
Divisions of the War Department General Staff.

A true copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

SECRET

56 WAR RC WD


C G Hawaiian Dept. Ft. Shafter, T. H.

Seven Nine Thirty Air base group at Bellows Field and URAD August Seven reference hdqrs Bellows Field reurad April Twenty-four Stop Desired that following information be furnished by most expeditious means to this office Stop One what are total Air Corps personnel requirements for Hawaiian Dept quy rtewo what are total personnel requirements for arms and services with Air Corps query three number of air base groups and location that will be required for Hawaiian Dept.

ULIO.
352P.

Decoded by: Capt. C. J. Harrison, SC. 1030A, Aug. 31, 1941.
A true copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

79716 O—46—pt. 18—16
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,  
Washington, D. C.

Following Air Force requirements submitted re your seven nine thirtieth Stop Following units and personnel required at present two air base groups paren single paren comma one for Bellows Field and one for Kahuru Point semicolon two hundred twenty enlisted men required to replace Fourteenth Bombardment Squadron transferred to Philippine Department Stop Other services required as follows Bellows Field colon Medical Corps one officer seven enlisted Dental Corps one officer semicolon Quartermaster Corps one officer thirty enlisted comma Ordnance Department one air base company of four officers and sixty men Stop For Kahuru Point colon Medical Corps three officers twelve enlisted one Dental Corps comma/Quartermaster Corps one officer thirty enlisted comma Signal Corps ten enlisted specialists Stop In order that the Hawaiian Air Force may be brought to the strength necessary to enable that force to provide the air defense of Oahu it is necessary that the following additional personnel be provided as soon as possible colon Air Corps three thousand eight hundred seventy one enlisted comma Medical Corps six officers thirty six enlisted one Dental Corps comma Quartermaster four officers seventy enlisted Stop Also three air base squadrons one each at Barking Sands Kauai comma MORSE Field and Hilo Hawaii Stop In the near future two additional air base squadrons will be required one at Lanay paren under construction paren one at Parker Ranch paren Project to be submitted paren Stop This need covered in full detail in confidential letter commanding General Hawaiian Air Force to Chief Army Forces dated twenty August forty one forwarded from this headquarters twenty-fifth August Stop The above increased personnel both Air Corps, arms and services was not repeat not included in my letter ag three twenty zero point three slant thirty seven 2 dated June fifty forty one

EMC secret by Lt. G. Lennox S. C., 1146A Sept. 9, 1941.

A true copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,  
Capt. Inf.  
12-22-41

SECRET

126 WAR EM WD  

C. G., HAWN DEPT Pt. Shafter T. H.

17th Fourteenth Bombardment Squadron H is relieved from assignment to Eleventh Bombardment Group H and from permanent station at Hickam Field and assigned to Commanding General U S Army Forces in the Far East Manila P I for permanent station to be designated by him

ADAMS,  
1101P.

Decoded by Capt. C. J. Harrison, 1138P Oct 17 1941.

A TRUE COPY:
L. W. TRUMAN,  
Capt. Inf.  
12-22-41

8 NOVEMBER 1941.

CHENEY L. BERTHOLF,  

786-6th  
CHIEF OF ARMY AIR FORCES,  
Washington, D. C.

Request immediate consideration be given to the assignment of three repeat three air depot groups to the Hawaiian Air Force Stop Procurement of sufficient civilian employees for the Hawaiian Air Depot is impossible Stop Discharge of enlisted men at the convenience of the Government for the purpose of accepting
employment in the Hawaiian Air Depot fails to remedy the shortage in personnel Stop At present our depot maintenance is far behind schedule Comma resulting in the grounding of thirty percent of our tactical planes Stop Lack of both personnel and material is becoming increasingly acute Stop From a standpoint of second and third echelon maintenance we are poorly prepared for any augmentation in airplane strength Stop We must have maintenance personnel and material at once Stop No no personnel is available here for the activation of these groups signed Martin

ENC secret by LTCR Tiemah SC 310PM Nov. 8, 1941.
A True Copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

SECRET

59 WAR MC WD

Washington, D. C., 748P Nov. 15, 1941.

C G Hawn Dept. Ft. Shafter, T. H.

Four zero two fifteen. Reference your radiogram number seven eight six of Nov eighth for additional air depot groups period This matter is now under advisement period Answer will be made in the immediate future period At the present time the air depot groups are not available for transfer to your department period When depot groups can be made available to your dept will his increase in Air Force personnel come within the authorized war garrison strength now approved for the Hawaiian Dept period From Arnold.

Adams,
120A/15/16.

Decoded by: Capt C. J Harrison SC 435P Nov. 16, 1941.
A True Copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

18 November 1941.
Wm E Donegan,
Lt. Col. G. S. C.
A. C. of S., G-3

889—19th
The Adjutant General,
Washington, D. C.

Reference your four zero two fifteen of November fifteen increase of Air Depot groups will not repeat not come within authorized war garrison strength now approved for Hawaiian Department Stop Request that personnel for Air Depot groups be furnished as soon as possible Stop Air groups urgently needed due to difficulty in procuring civilian employees Stop Hawaiian Air Force will be severely handicapped in proposed augmentation in airplane strength Stop Demands for depot maintenance will be unlimited Stop Authorized war garrison strength must be increased to accommodate air depot groups End

Enc see by Lt J H Babcock, 137P Nov. 19, 1941.
A True Copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT,
The Adjutant General’s Office,
Washington, November 18, 1941.

AG 320.2 (11-1-41)
MR-M-AAF
Subject: Activation and Redesignation of Air Corps Units.
To: Commanding Generals,
Caribbean Defense Command, Panama Canal,
Hawaiian and Philippine Departments,
Newfoundland Base Command and
U. S. Forces in Far East
Chief of Army Air Forces.

1. The following units are constituted and will be activated at the earliest practicable date by the Department commanders concerned:
2. The initial strength of the 5th and 7th Airways Squadrons will be 19 officers and 110 men. Grades and ratings will be issued in a separate communication.
3. The 5th and 7th Airways Squadrons will furnish the servicing detachments for Airways stations in the Pacific Area. Weather and Communications personnel for the Airways stations will be furnished by the Chief of the Army Air Forces upon receipt of a requisition from the appropriate Department commander.
4. These units will be activated from personnel now available to the respective Department commanders.
5. Further replacements for the 5th Airways Squadron and 5th Air Corps Squadron, Communications, will be furnished by the Chief of the Army Air Forces upon receipt of a requisition from the Commanding General, U. S. Forces in Far East.
6. Attached is a Manning table for an Airways station.
7. The following units are redesignated as indicated:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OLD DESIGNATION</th>
<th>NEW DESIGNATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Corps Detachment, Weather, Philippine Islands.</td>
<td>5th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional control).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Corps Squadron, Communications, Caribbean.</td>
<td>6th Air Corps Squadron, Communications (Regional Control).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Corps Detachment, Weather, Panama.</td>
<td>6th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional control).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Corps Detachment, Communications, Hawaii.</td>
<td>7th Air Corps Squadron, Communications (Regional Control).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Corps Detachment, Weather, Hawaii.</td>
<td>7th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional control).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Corps Detachment, Communications, Newfoundland Base Command.</td>
<td>8th Air Corps Squadron, Communications (regional control).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Corps Detachment, Weather, Newfoundland Base Command.</td>
<td>8th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional Control).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Assignment of units:
Caribbean Air Forces:
6th Air Corps Squadron, Communications (Regional control) with squadron headquarters at Albrook Field.
All Communications detachments in the Caribbean Area including Puerto Rico and the Communications detachments at all Airways stations in the Caribbean Area.
6th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional control) with squadron headquarters at Albrook Field.
All Weather detachments in the Caribbean Area including Puerto Rico and the Weather detachments at all Airways stations in the Caribbean Area.
Far East Air Force:
5th Air Corps Squadron, Communications (Regional control) with squadron headquarters at Nichols Field.
All Communications detachments in the Far East Area. 5th Air Corps squadron, Weather (Regional Control) with squadron headquarters at Nichols Field.
All Weather detachments in the Far East Area.

Hawaiian Department Air Force:
7th Air Corps Squadron, Communications (Regional control) with squadron headquarters in the Hawaiian Department Area.
7th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional control) with squadron headquarters in the Hawaiian Department Area.

Newfoundland Base Command:
8th Air Corps Squadron, Communications (Regional control) with squadron headquarters at Newfoundland Airport.
All communications detachments at the British Bases in the Northeast, and Bermuda.
8th Air Corps Squadron, Weather (Regional control) with squadron headquarters at Newfoundland Airport.
All Weather detachments at the British Bases in the Northeast, and Bermuda.

9. Weather Sections and Communications Sections now assigned as a part of Airways detachments are removed from assignment thereto and reassigned as a Weather or Communications detachment to the appropriate Weather or Communications squadron of that area. The detachments will remain at their Airways stations.

10. Weather and Communications personnel for the Airways stations will be furnished by the Chief of the Army Air Forces on receipt of a requisition from the Department commander concerned.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[S] Otto Johnson,
Adjutant General.

Copies furnished: Chief of Staff GHQ, Commanding General, Air Force Combat Command, Chief of Air Corps, Divisions of the War Department, General Staff. 1 Incl.

A true copy:
L. W. Truman,
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41.

[Confidential]

873-18
Chief of Army Air Forces,
Washington, D. C.

Request that authority be obtained to activate station complements of a strength in grades and ratings equal to those at present organized on the mainland at the following Air Corps Fields within this department colon Hickam Field Wheeler Field Morse Field Barking Sands Stop No provision has been made for personnel for Base and Post functions with the result that the wings at Hickam Field and Wheeler Field are forced to provide administrative personnel for the posts in addition personnel from the Eighteenth Wing Hickam Field and from the Air Base Group Hickam Field are required to man Barking Sands and Morse Field comma both major outlying fields. Personnel for post administration must be obtained somewhere and it is now being obtained at the expense of our tactical organizations Stop If the tactical organizations should be moved into the field post administration would collapse Stop It is urgently recommended that the authority requested above be obtained immediately signed

Martin

A True Copy:
L. W. Truman,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
WAR WE


COMMANDING GENERAL, Hawaiian Dept., Ft. Shafter, T. H.

455-25th

Until such time as present initial war garrison limitations imposed upon Hawaiian Department have been lifted additional personnel can not repeat not be sent to that department. Stop With view to securing an increase in the air strength for that station action has been initiated and you will be advised when final action is taken Stop Referring to your eight seven three

A True Copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[Exhibit 1L]

[SECRET]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 25 April 1941.

In reply refer to:
AG 230.3/37

Subject: Reorganization of the Forces of the Hawaiian Department.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is invited to:
A. Secret letter, HHD to TAG, 25 February 1941, subject: "Reinforcements for Hawaiian Department", file AG 320.2/58.
B. Secret radio, TAG to HHD, 19 April 1941, 744-18th and reply thereto, HHD to TAG, 22 April 1941. AG 325/18-18a.
C. Secret letter, HHD to TAG, number 2645-18, dated 18 April 1941, in connection with Medical Department Enlisted Reinforcements. On file in Department Surgeon Office.

2. It is recommended that authority be given this headquarters to organize the present Hawaiian (Square) Division into two (2) separate and independent Triangular Divisions. Under War Department, tables of Organization, No. 70, dated November 1, 1940, current shortages exist in both personnel and material but it is believed that a desirable reorganization can be accomplished without increases in present strength other than the expansion of certain units as requested in my References A, C, and D, and requested reinforcements to organize a Reinforcement Troop in each of the proposed Triangular Divisions. In paragraph d, Reference A, I requested the necessary reinforcements to organize the Infantry Regiments of the Hawaiian (Square) Division under current War Department, Tables of Organizations, No. 7, dates November 1940, and assuming favorable action on the recommendation, the reinforcements requested herein for the expansion of existing units are in accordance with Reference A. A summary of the proposed reorganization with tables showing personnel shortages hereto as Inclosure No. 1.

3. Primary reasons for this request are as follows:
a. For tactical purposes the Defense of Oahu is conducted in two sectors, they are, the North Sector and the South Sector. Two (2) Triangular Divisions are considered more flexible to accomplish defensive operations in the two separate sectors.
b. The proposed reorganizations presents no serious problems as to organization, command, staff and tactical unity.
c. The Hawaiian (Square) Division, as now organized and employed, constitutes a separate channel of command. Due to present organization it is less flexible than the proposed two (2) Triangular Divisions and also retards the prompt execution of missions requiring the employment of one or more units of the Division in coordination with units of the other echelons under the control of the Department Commander.
d. As now constituted the land defense is assigned to the Division Commander as the Beach and Land Defense Officer, with the result that it permits the Department Commander to play no part in the defensive action, if and when, the air and coast defenses are knocked out.

4. National Guard and Selectee Units.

a. It is proposed to assign one of the two National Guard Infantry regiments now in Federal Service to each of the Triangular Divisions.

b. If the two National Guard Infantry regiments now in Federal Service are demobilized upon completion of one year's training and the Department's full yearly quota of three thousand (3,000) selectees are authorized, then it is planned to form two Infantry regiments from the selectees and assign one selectee Infantry regiment to each of the Triangular Divisions. See Reference B.

c. Should the two (2) National Guard regiments now in Federal Service and two (2) tentatively planned selectee regiments be in Federal Service at the same time then, it is planned to assign one selectee Infantry regiment to each of the Triangular Divisions and one or both of the National Guard regiments to defense missions on the Outlying Islands or retain one National Guard regiment as a Department reserve unit on Oahu.

d. By employing one National Guard regiment with each of the Triangular Divisions it will forstall an expected request for a Brigade organization of the two Hawaiian National Guard Regiments.

5. Station Compliments.

a. Schofield Barracks,

(1) It is recommended that a Brigadier General be assigned to Schofield Barracks for duty as an administrative Post Commander and that he be provided with a staff and commissioned assistants, warrant officer, nurses, enlisted men and civilian employees as shown in Inclosure No. 2, attached hereto, which lists the net minimum requirements desired in addition to permanent personnel now on duty at Schofield Barracks and not assigned to units of the present Hawaiian (Square) Division.

b. Fort Shafter.

(1) It is recommended that a Lieutenant Colonel be assigned to Fort Shafter as the Administrative Post Commander and that he be provided with the officer and enlisted Station Complement personnel as shown in Inclosure No. 3, attached hereto. The necessity for a station complement for the post of Fort Shafter is predicted upon operational missions of its garrison, the 64th Coast Artillery (Antiaircraft) regiment. When thus employed the regiment is absent from its station and because of post and administrative requirements is deprived of its maximum fighting strength. It is believed this serious handicap could be eliminated by employment of a Station Complement at Fort Shafter.

c. Station Complements are not requested for stations under control of the Hawaiian Air Force and the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade for the following reasons:

(1) Hawaiian Air Force: The duties of units of the 18th Bombardment Wing (Hickam Field) and the 14th Pursuit Wing (Wheeler Field) necessitate maximum operation, maintenance and control from Air Fields under the control of the Wing Commanders and from which the Post Administrative Staff and enlisted assistants will not be moved. With full consideration of the anticipated complement of three hundred (300) airplanes, no need for Station Complements exists.

(2) Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade: Practically all of the field operational functions will be performed in the vicinity of the permanent station and no necessity for Station complements is considered except for Fort Shafter, as noted above.

6. After preparation of this letter, your lst. Indorsement to our reference A was received. This request is being forwarded with a view of having it available for reference in the War Department, under the following conditions:

a. That this communication with its request for reinforcements as listed in Inclosure #1, be given reconsideration at the earliest date it is practicable to provide the reinforcements requested.

b. That authority be granted me to reorganize the present Hawaiian (Square) Division into two (2) Triangular Divisions by using the present available personnel and material. This can be accomplished in accordance with the last of your paragraph 3, lst Indorsement, dated April 11, 1941, to my Reference A.


a. In order that maximum coordination in all activities pertaining to the Air Defense of Oahu may be accomplished, I propose to create an Air Defense Com-
mand to be commanded by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, who will continue control of the 18th Bombardment Wing. I propose to constitute the Air Defense Command as follows:

(1) Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force.
   (a) Headquarters and Staff, Hawaiian Air Force.
   (b) 18th Bombardment Wing.
   (c) Air Defense Command.
       1. Aircraft Warning Service.
       2. 14th Pursuit Wing.
       3. Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade.

b. In the organization of an Air Defense Command no interference with normal antiaircraft training is contemplated. Only while actually performing operational missions is it planned to place the antiaircraft Artillery under the control of the Air Defense Commander. Furthermore, no increase in the numbers of the Staff of the Hawaiian Air Force is believed necessary in order to create an air defense Command for this Department. It is planned to have the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, and his staff also perform the duties of the Commander and the Staff of the Air Defense Command. In order to avoid divided responsibilities due to the dual missions now required of some beach defense batteries, no action will be taken to form an Air Defense Command until the first increment of the antiaircraft artillery reinforcements, described in secret radiograms War Department, 25 and 26 April, 1941, have been received.

c. An Air Defense Command for the Hawaiian Department is believed peculiarly adaptable to this theater and will best meet the needs for defense against attacks from the air.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

3 Incl.

#1—Summary of Proposed Reorganization
#2—Station Complement, Schofield Barracks.
#3—Station Complement, Fort Shafter.

A true copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[SECRET]

Subject: Reorganization of the Forces of the Hawaiian Department.

AG 320.2 (4-25-41 MC–C) 1st Ind. ESA
WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O.,
July 29, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Reference is made to 1st Indorsement, this office, July 22, 1941, AG 320.2 (6-5-41) MC–E, subject: War Garrison for Initial War Operations, Hawaiian Department.

2. In view of the action taken on the correspondence referred to above, basic communication is being returned without action.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Major General.
The Adjutant General.

3 incl. n/e

A True Copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41
Wah JI

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Hawaii,

Eight three seven twenty ninth Secretary of War has decided that in connection with other vital needs total war repeat war garrison of your department for initial war operations must be reduced to approximately fifty eight thousand officers and men stop. It is not believed advisable to reduce Air Corps combat comma antiaircraft and AWS units now set up stop Therefore a reduction must be made with respect to other troops stop Recommendations desired as expeditiously as possible as to manner of effecting required reduction.

Adams.

657A

A True Copy:

L. W. Truman,

Capt. Inf.

12-22-41

AG 320.37/37B

Subject: War Garrison for Initial War Operations.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is invited to:

A. Secret Radio, TAG to HHD, 29 May 1941, 837–29th.


2. In compliance with instructions contained in Reference A, the composition of the war garrison for initial war operations has been studied. Table I herewith, shows the forces recommended, totaling 59,425 officers, warrant officers, nurses, and enlisted men, but not including the civilian employees now shown in Table I, par. 7, HDP–40.

3. The proposed war garrison consists of the following major units:

a. Two Triangular Divisions, less reconnaissance troops, with the Infantry and Signal Corps personnel at reduced strength.

b. Corps troops consisting of a light tank battalion, the existing 11th Ordnance Company, Division Pack Train, and Co. A, 1st Separate Chemical Battalion, and the recently authorized 34th Engineers, Combat, and the 804th Engineer Battalion (Avn.).

c. The Hawaiian Air Force with service elements at present strenths.

d. Harbor Defense Coast Artillery as now provided in the approved defense project reduced by the personnel required to man three fixed seacoast mortar batteries and three 155-mm GPF batteries.

e. Antiaircraft Artillery with no reduction from the approved defense project.

f. Service, elements, with reductions in the mobilization strengths as shown in par. 7 HDP–40, and with many units entirely eliminated.

4. (a) The necessity for the defense of existing military air fields on the outlying islands of the Hawaiian group, together with the recently assumed responsibility for the defense of the Naval Air Station at Kaneohe, Oahu, directed by secret letter WD to HHd, 8 April 1941, Subject: “Defense of Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay, Oahu, T. H.”, file AG 381 (3–13–41) M–NPD, and provision of a suitable mobile reserve for the beach and land defense of Oahu are three vital missions which can not be performed with any degree of success with an initial war garrison of approximately 59,000 troops.

b. The 299th Infantry recently has been transferred from Oahu to the islands of Hawaii, Kauai, Molokai, and Maui for the defense of air fields, thus leaving the proposed North Sector division short one Infantry Regiment.
c. Plans for the defense of the Naval Air Station at Kaneohe, now in preparation in this headquarters, indicate the minimum increase in the war garrison for this mission will include the following:
1 Regiment Infantry.
1 Regiment Field Artillery, 155mm How., truck drawn.
1 Battalion C. A., 155mm guns plus one additional battery.
1 Regiment C. A., (AA), (semi-mobile) (less 1 gun battalion).
1 Battery C. A., 12-inch barbette guns.

d. Assuming that two Infantry regiments will be furnished, one to replace the 299th Infantry and one for the defense of Kaneohe Bay, it is believed that the mobile reserve for the beach and land defense should be comprised of the light tank battalion now included in Table I herewith, and Infantry units detached from one or both of the triangular divisions recommended in Table I herewith.

e. It is therefore urgently recommended that the strength of the war garrison for this department be increased from approximately 58,000 to approximately 70,600 men so as to provide the following unit reinforcements from the mainland not now shown in Table I herewith:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
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<td>2 Infantry Regiments, T/O 7–11 Nov. 1, 1940</td>
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<tr>
<td>1 Regiment F. A. 155mm How T/O 6–41 Nov. 1, 1940</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Regiment C. A. (AA) Semi-mobile (less 1 gun bn) T/O 4–111 Nov. 1, 1940</td>
<td>1,797</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Bn C. A. 155mm guns, w/1 additional gun btry, T/O 4–35 Nov. 1, 1940</td>
<td>694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Btry C. A. 12-inch barbette guns, T/O 4–67 Nov. 1, 1940</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total                                                                 11,279

5. Reference is invited to par. 5 and inclosures I and 2 of reference B in which it was recommended that station complements be provided for Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter. Table I herewith includes provisions for the Quartermaster Corps, Finance Dept., Medical Corps, Signal Corps, and Ordnance personnel required for these station complements. It is highly desirable that the war garrison be increased sufficiently to provide the complete station complements for these two stations, an increase of 731 officers and men for Schofield Barracks and 131 officers and men for Fort Shafter.

6. Summarizing, in Table I herewith the war garrison for this Department has been reduced to a strength of 59,425. To provide a mobile reserve for the beach and land defense of Oahu, and to defend the Naval Air Station at Kaneohe and military air fields on outlying islands, an increase to approximately 70,600 officers and men is essential. A further increase of about 860 officers and men is highly desirable to furnish station complements for Schofield Barracks and Fort Shafter. I therefore recommend that the war strength of this command for initial war operations be fixed at approximately 71,500 officers and men.

7. Recent operations in Europe, particularly the failure of the British to hold the island of Crete, indicate the vital importance to the defense of Oahu of the nearby air fields on the other islands of the Hawaiian group. Hostile use of any of these air fields, considering modern methods of air warfare, would be extremely hazardous to the defense of Oahu. While not yet included in the war garrison recommended for this Department, it is probable that in the near future, plans will be submitted for the garrisoning of each of the outlying islands by a force consisting of approximately one regiment of Infantry and a composite battalion of Field Artillery.

WALTER C. SHORT, Lieutenant General, U.S. Army, Commanding.

1-Incl.—Table I.
A true copy:

L. W. TRUMAN, Capt. Inf. 12–22–41

Subject: War Garrison for Initial War Operations, Hawaiian Department.
AG 320.2 (8–5–41)MC–E 1st Ind. ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., July 22, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. The war garrison recommended in paragraph 2 of the basic communication, totalling 59,425 officers, warrant officers, nurses and enlisted men, reduced to
57,249 as shown in inclosure 2, and augmented by the following units for the defense of Kaneohe Bay:

1 Regt CA (AA), semi-mobile (less one gun Bn, band and bases) ........................................ T/O 4-111 11-1-40 .... 1,590
1 Bn CA 155 MM Guns with 1 addit. gun btry .......................................................... T/O 4-35 11-1-40 .... 694
1 Btry CA .................................................. T/O 4-67 11-1-40 .... 157

Total ................................................... 2,441

is approved. Paragraph 7, HDP-40 will be amended accordingly.

2. The recommendation contained in paragraph 6 of the basic communication to establish a war garrison of 71,500 officers and men for initial war operations in your department is not favorable considered. Troops in excess of the 59,690 authorized in paragraph 1, above, will be sent to Hawaii only in case the situation develops a need therefor and provided such additional troops can be made available in connection with other requirements.

By order of the Secretary of War:

(Signed) E. S. Adams,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

2 Incls;
#1—N/c.
#2—Initial War Garrison, Haw. Dept. (Added)

A true copy:

L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

Initial war garrison—Hawaiian Department

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>T/O</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Mobilization strength</th>
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</thead>
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</tr>
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<td>a. Department Headquarters:</td>
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<td>Hq Sp Troops</td>
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<td>Hq Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP Co Haw Dept</td>
<td>7-7</td>
<td>11-1-40</td>
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<td>10-87P</td>
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<td>Total Dept HQ</td>
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<td>b. North Sector Division (Triangular)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Div Hq</td>
<td>70-1</td>
<td>10-1-40</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; MP Co</td>
<td>70-2</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recon Troop</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Div Sig Co</td>
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<td>298th Inf WD Ltr AG 221E</td>
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<td>Div Arty</td>
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<td>Engn Bn</td>
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<tr>
<td>Med Bn</td>
<td>8-65</td>
<td>10-1-40</td>
<td>38</td>
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<tr>
<td>QM Bn</td>
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<td>c. South Sector Division (Triangular)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Div Hq</td>
<td>70-1</td>
<td>10-1-40</td>
<td>26</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hq &amp; MP Co</td>
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<td>Recon Troop</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Div Sig Co</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>27th &amp; 33 Inf</td>
<td>7-11</td>
<td>10-1-40</td>
<td>206</td>
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<tr>
<td>298th Inf WD Ltr AG 221E &amp; Radio</td>
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<td></td>
<td>5-11-41</td>
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### Initial war garrison—Hawaiian Department—Continued

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<tr>
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<th>Mobilization strength</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>Off</td>
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<td><strong>c. South Sector Division—Crn.</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>8-1-39</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18th Bomb Wing</td>
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<td>Hq &amp; Hq Sq 18th Bomb Wing</td>
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<td>23rd Bomb Sq (Hy)</td>
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<td>31st Bomb Sq (Hy)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>721st Bomb Sq (Hy)</td>
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<td>4th Recon Sq (Hy)</td>
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<td>14th Bomb Sq (Hy)</td>
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<td>18th Bomb Sq (Hy)</td>
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### EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

#### Initial war garrison—Hawaiian Department—Continued

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A True Copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf. 12-22-41

[Exhibit 1M] 2 May 1941

AG 320.3/38
Subject: Organization of Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington D. C.

1. References:
A. War Dept. Secret Radio No. 739, 24 April 1941.
B. War Dept. Secret Radio No. 760, 26 April 1941.
E. Letter VD to FED dated 2 April 1941, subject: "Coast Artillery units for Hawaiian Department", file AG 3GC.2 3G26-41 M (Ret) M-C. WD 320.2 straight Misc.

2. Upon the arrival of the first increment (Ref. A) of the war reinforcements of the Antiaircraft Artillery Garrison of this Department in June 1941, the organization of the Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade will be required. This brigade will be composed of all Antiaircraft Artillery Units in the Department except the one or two batteries of harbor defense artillery regiments which still have dual assignments to harbor defense and Antiaircraft Artillery missions. The organization of this brigade is mandatory not only because of the strength of the units involved but also because of the organization of the Air Defense Command (Reference D) this brigade will be required to function independently of the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade for tactical operations and in training therefore.
3. It is proposed that the Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade, Hawaiian Department, will be organized as follows:

53rd C. A. Brigade (AA) (RRF.N.).
Hq. and Hq. Btry, 53rd CA Brigade (Ref H.).
Int. Btry, 53d CA Brigade (T/O 4–08 (a) HAD) (Ref. C & R).
64th C. A. (AA)
251st, C. A. (AA)
251st, C. A. (AA) easi-mobile (less 3d Ea) (Ref. A)

Subject: Organization of Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade.
AC 340.2 (5–2–41)
MR–O

1st Ind.
War Department, A. G. O., June 12, 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. You are authorized to activate the Headquarters and Headquarters Battery and Intelligence Battery, 53rd. Coast Artillery Brigade, within the recently authorized organization of Coast Artillery garrison, Hawaiian Department, by 1998 filler replacements. No additional personnel can be made available at this time.

2. It is desired that the date of activation of these units and report showing the reallocation to units of grades and ratings of your present allotment, Coast Artillery Corps, to include these units be furnished this office.

3. Separate action will be taken on the allotment of additional grades and ratings and on the recommendation to assign a brigadier general to the Department.

4. Table of Organization 4–06 (S) (HAD) is approved as submitted, and is being reproduced and distributed.

By order of Secretary of War:

Major General,
The Adjutant General.

A true copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12–22–41

[Exhibit 1X]
MM AA guns listed as under procurement from by nineteen forty one funds in 00 secret file six six zero point two slant eleven capron.

ENC TIEMAN
Nov. 6, 1941
A True Copy:
L. W. TRUMAN,
Capt. Inf.
12-22-41

[Exhibit 10]

TALK GIVEN BY GENERAL SHORT TO CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ON ARMY DAY

GENTLEMEN:
I am especially pleased to be able to come before this representative gathering of Honolulu business men on the occasion of the celebration of Army Day. Today our military establishment is being brought closer to the view of the general public throughout the entire United States by exhibits and various demonstrations, in order that the people may become better acquainted with some of our equipment, methods and procedures, and now I am afforded the opportunity of discussing some of our plans which will demand close and active cooperation on the part of the civil community and by various departments of your civil government.

You are all aware of the tremendous effort being expended by industry, labor and all departments of the government toward the accomplishment of a gigantic program of national defense. While there are many evidences of this activity here in Hawaii, through defense projects being carried on both by the Army and by the Navy, the tempo of action has not reached as deeply into the private life of the average citizen as has been the case in many cities on the Mainland. Conditions are changing overnight and procedures and practices of today may be changed by the plans and activities of tomorrow. None of these matters are being handled, or even considered, in the light of actual warlike moves nor with any feeling of hysteria, but simply as carefully considered plans which are to be effected for the future security of each and every individual, including the youngest child and the oldest adult, of our nation.

I have been asked many times what the community can do to assist National Defense. The following items are of prime importance:
(a) Production and storage of food.
(b) Organization of doctors and nurses for care of injured and wounded.
(c) Organization of an auxiliary to the police force to guard utilities and prevent sabotage.
(d) Preparation of plans and making of provisions for evacuation of women and children and preparation of shelters for workers in vicinity of essential industries.

These islands are in no way self sustaining in the matter of food. This is due not to lack of fertility of your soil but to your specialized agriculture.

All of you are vitally interested in the food supply of these islands. In any emergency, which might include the possibility of a disruption of communications with the Mainland, a most important safety measure would be to begin at once the planting of basic food crops which are known by actual practice to be the most easily grown in this soil and climate. Such produce might include sweet potatoes, string beans, lima beans, Chinese cabbage, peanuts and some other local varieties of vegetables. The plantations have done important development work and are prepared to produce these articles in quantity should the necessity arise. An immediate increase in the stocks of such items as rice, flour, canned milk, fats and oils would be a great safety factor and with rising prices is sound economy. Shortage of storage for the food shipped in is now a problem. This condition can be materially alleviated if housewives will well stock their cupboards with non-perishable items. This action would operate to clear needed space on retail and wholesale merchant’s shelves for further storage of additional foods. This plan is good present day economy because of steadily rising food prices. There is at present a plan on foot for the construction of large warehouse storage by government subsidy and I believe that this plan should have the support of us all as a defense measure. In the pursuit of this project speed is all important.

Along this same thought I read with much interest in the local press of March 19, 1941, an item which referred to the possible repeal of the personal property tax which so greatly affects the merchant or importer who desires to cooperate.
in holding large stocks of food available in his warehouse or store. I would like to voice my approval to such an Act, or other similar legislation which would freeze the tax for any corporation or individual at an amount not to exceed that paid in the past year. This would make it possible for more adequate and plentiful stores of food stuff to be maintained without imposing a hardship on any individual or organization.

It is further important that the local fishing fleet be kept in operation, as it supplies a very large proportion of our daily subsistence. Increased cold storage for meats should be provided. Existing dairy herds on Oahu should be conserved and feed stored.

In the general defense measures for these islands there is no civilian effort of higher importance than preparedness now for an adequate food supply for all the people in time of emergency.

The preparation of your emergency medical service in the case of an extreme emergency such as an air attack or actual assault upon the city is of vital importance. The functions of the military forces under such conditions or control, would be to take measures to insure that civilian agencies, expanded as required, continued to function and not to displace them by a military operating agency. It is therefore definitely necessary that prompt action be taken to organize your medical service into the maximum possible number of teams with mobile equipment capable of being rapidly moved from place to place and set up in existing buildings. Staffs of doctors, nurses, technicians, and others required for the stations should be selected and trained and be ready at any time for immediate duty.

Adequate initial medical supplies for these stations should be obtained, classified, packed, and stored in a manner making them readily available. Necessary vehicles must be on hand by loan or otherwise. Suitable trucks, of the delivery type, for rapid conversion to use as ambulances should be listed and obtainable at once. Necessary personnel for the immediate expansion of hospitals properly located to the extent at least of the porches, dayrooms, etc., should be listed by each. All of these preparations should be accompanied by the preparation of shelters, from air attack, of the best types available. Suitable buildings should be selected to replace hospitals in the zones of probable bombardment. Preparations of this nature should be made in cooperation with the Red Cross.

The organization of a force of ex-service men to supplement the police force in guarding utilities and preventing sabotage I understand is under way. This move will release troops for defense purposes. Consideration should be given to the employment of the R. O. T. C. of the University of Hawaii for the same purpose.

Here in Hawaii we all live in a citadel or gigantically fortified Island. Many residents have their homes well within the limits of actual military fortifications, docks, arsenals or many other types of legitimate military targets. Should we ever be faced with a military operation by any enemy against this island (which we fervently hope may never come true), the residents in these areas must be cared for and protected. Plans for such care and protection quite properly come under the jurisdiction of your civil governmental agencies, and I believe these should now receive careful, detailed and mature consideration. I repeat that these matters are not to be viewed with alarm or hysteria, but simply as defense projects and exactly in the same classification as any of the present housing activities which you see around you every day. If you, as civilian organizations, are making plans for adequate warehouse and pier space for the handling of defense materials should you not give some degree of the same effort toward the security and protection of your families from any possible contingency? I believe that you already have a Defense Committee, under the leadership of the Governor of the Territory and the Mayor of Honolulu which has given, or is about to give, some consideration to these matters, and I advance, for the consideration of this committee, some of my ideas on this subject.

There has been considerable information in the New York newspapers as to the plans which are being formulated and discussed by the Mayor of that city for the protection of its inhabitants from any possible air raids. Elaborate measures have been suggested for shelters, fire protection, and other phases of which you are well aware. It is my suggestion that some such plans be initiated for the city of Honolulu. My belief is that any such proposals should be considered not only from a possible wartime condition but also with a view of fitting into the plans for the expansion, betterment and improvement in the civil facilities. In other words, why should we not make plans which will not only form the nucleus for protective measures and which will, at the same time, furnish additional recrea-
tion centers for our civil and military population. My plans envision a recreational center for each precinct, or perhaps smaller section of the city, which would be located somewhere in the highlands away from military targets. There might properly be selected by the Forestry Service, the City Planning Commission or other appropriate body. These camps would be located where a source of fresh water is available, some degree of natural shelter and with a view of accessibility. Here would be installed, in the following order of importance, water, sanitary facilities, outdoor grills and other cooking installations, and mess halls. The Forestry Service, National Parks Administration, and the CCC have already had considerable experience in the construction and laying out of such installations as many such recreational camps already exist on the Mainland. You yourselves have seen some of the results of these activities in your National Park on Hawaii.

Thousands of you people spend your hours of leisure and recreation at the beaches. Why would it not be feasible as well as healthful to divert a portion of such time to comfortable and attractive camps in the hills? Forming the habit of such excursions to adequate and well planned camps would accomplish a dual purpose in establishing not only additional recreation features but at once establishing the basis for evacuation camps should they ever be required in the future.

In case of actual hostilities, which involved this community, all able-bodied males would be utilized by industry or by the military services in one manner or another. Normal business routine would be continued to the greatest extent possible. Any evacuation camps would thus be dedicated to the use of women, children, and male citizens who would not be qualified for other duties. The Army has definite plans to go ahead immediately on the construction of similar camps for the use of the families of Army personnel should such an occasion ever demand that drastic action. In the meantime the camps will be utilized as recreation centers by all of our personnel.

I take this opportunity of laying before you the foregoing plan as deserving your consideration. I believe the evacuation of the women and children from the area of probable bombardment the most essential and difficult problem confronting the community. Without advance planning the greatest confusion and loss of life might result.

I again repeat that the foregoing suggested plans are to be considered as important defense measures with the same priority as given other defense plans. They are not to be thought of as indications of any immediate pending threat, but rather as carefully considered measures to safeguard our homes and families in case of any future dangers. The bill now before the Legislature creating a major Disaster Relief Department, if enacted, will put you in a position to complete these plans and preparations. The Army is ready to do all within its power to help you and you must feel free to call upon us for advice at any time.

My thoughts have been expressed to you quite frankly, as I believe we must understand each other on all questions and work out our common plans together. Army Day was inaugurated with such an ideal as its basis and I am pleased to have had this opportunity of bringing before you some ideas and suggestions which may have material work to you now and in the uncertain days of the future.

I thank you.

[Exhibit 1P]


Item No. 1 Letter from General Short to Governor Poindexter, re storage facilities for Food Supply. General Short states that after a conference with a civilian committee on food supply and facilities for storage, he is in hearty accord with action taken to date. He feels strongly that the problem is of vital interest to both the civil population and the military. The civil authorities should take the initiative for their own supplies, and their actions will receive his utmost support. (See Inclosure No. 1).

Item No. 2 Letter from General Short to War Dept. asking authority to issue invitations for purchase of Irish potatoes grown in Hawaii, stating serious problem of food supply under emergency conditions, and stating his objective is to stimulate continuous Irish potato production in Hawaii. (See Inclosure No. 2).
Item No. 3  Radio from Gen. Short to War Dept. referring to his letter of 4 April 1st, and asking priority radio advice as soon as decision has been reached. (See Inclosure No. 3).

Item No. 4  1st Indorsement to Gen. Short’s letter of 4 April 1, from War Dept., granting authority to contract for Hawaiian-grown potatoes, providing price does not exceed 2$3 per pound. (See Inclosure No. 4).

Item No. 6  Memo to Board of Directors, Honolulu Chamber of Commerce from the Executive Secretary, John A. Hamilton:
1. Prior to April 7, 1941, there was very little buying of food supplies for emergency use. However, on April 7,Lt. General Walter C. Short, Commanding Officer of the Hawaiian Department, United States Army, suggested the desirability of purchasing additional food supplies for use during a possible emergency.
2. Beginning with April 7, the consumer began to purchase additional food supplies in quantities ranging from an extra can of milk to as much as $800.00 per family as reported by one retailer. Retail merchants report that 20 to 30 per cent of their customers have purchased additional food supplies in the last 30 days. This means that the retailers’ stocks on hand would be depleted rapidly.
3. It would be expected that the retailer, when food stocks are moved rapidly from the shelves as a result of heavy consumer purchases, would reorder quickly from the wholesaler or the manufacturer. This has been done. In fact it would appear that retailers have increased their purchases by 20 to 25 per cent above normal.
4. Wholesalers generally support the report of the retailers with regard to the increase of consumer buying as reflected in the increase in the buying done by the retailer from the wholesalers.
5. Of the three wholesale firms visited, two reported large stocks of foodstuffs on hand as a result of additional warehousing space secured to care for the additional demand and the prospective needs in the event of an emergency. Also these firms report a satisfactory replenishment of stocks although additional time is required to get merchandise from the manufacturers to the docks in Honolulu.
Note. The direct result of Gen. Short’s public address of 7 April 1941 was to increase the supply of food in storage in Hawaii from 20 to 35%.

Item No. 7  In a published statement prior to a general meeting of agriculturists throughout the islands at the University of Hawaii, Gen. Short said, “All efforts to increase local food production are steps toward increased security for Hawaii”.

Item No. 8  At an address to the University Assembly on Aug. 13th Gen. Short stated:
13 Aug 41  “Among defense projects which I have publicly emphasized has been that of the home production of food to sustain the civilian population during an emergency. I regard this project of local food production as of primary importance to the defense of Hawaii.”
“So far as food supply is concerned, the military organization here is self-sufficient as to its reserves of essential items. It will look after itself in time of war, and it is now projecting food production on military reservations to supply its needs—so far as is practicable.
“I have also supported shipping priorities for all foods—cattle, dairy and poultry feeds, as well as food for human consumption. This support includes farm machinery which is important for large-scale crop production.”—(From the Honolulu Advertiser, 14 Aug 41)

Item No. 9  Copy of radiogram from Delegate King to Gov. Poindexter stating the War, Navy and State Departments and the Budget Bureau were lukewarm in their interest in procuring food reserve stocks for Hawaii. (See Inclosure No. 5 attached).
For reply to Delegate King, stating Gen. Short's continued support, see Inclosure No. 6.

[4] Item No. 10 The Food Production Plan for Hawaii was formally presented in complete form to the Directors of the Hawaiian Sugar Planter's Association and accepted by them as the basic operating plan for local production of food crops, cattle and dairy products. This plan covers production not only of Oahu but of all the out-islands as well, setting up acreage and crops allocations to plantations, both sugar and pineapple, which were accepted by them as defense requirements. Small farmers were included in the plan as well. Seed requirements were set up; as well as insecticide, fertilizer and machinery requirements for producing crops sufficient to sustain the entire population for six months. This plan was based on the Army plan and was supported and urged thru-out by Gen. Short. It is now in operation in its initial phases as planned. Gen. Short arranged for the procurement of all seed, insecticides, fertilizer and machinery for harvesting this crop, as well as arrangements for procuring the necessary priority allocations of shipping space required. (See Incl. No. 7.)

Item No. 11 Letter from Gen. Short to War Dept., stating that the project of the Emergency Food Reserve for Hawaii which failed of approval by the Bureau of the Budget should be brought up for reconsideration, and asking the support of the War Dept. when it comes up. (See Inclosure No. 8.)

Item No. 12 Letter from Gen. Short to Gov. Poindexter, stating that he has always regarded a reserve food supply as of primary importance in defense plans, giving supporting data, and asking the Governor to obtain an inventory of food on hand in the Territory, in order to support his request for an emergency reserve food supply. (See Inclosure No. 9.)

Item No. 13 Radiogram from General Short to War Dept. stating in detail the immediate requirements of food, seed, livestock feed, farm machinery, insecticides and fertilizers, including shipping space required, for current civilian needs. (See Inclosure No. 10.)

[5] Item No. 14 WD Radio #685, 17 Dec. 41 "Shipmen of Food for Civilian Population". In reply to Haw'n Dept. radio #1182, the War Dept. states food will be procured and delivered to civil authorities in Hawaii, first shipment to leave within one week, second shipment following week; every effort to be made to provide critical items indicated by the radios of Gen. Short and of the Governor. (See Inclosure No. 11.)

As a direct result of Gen. Short's letter to the War Department of December 3, 1941, the attached radiogram (Inclosure No. 11) from the War Department, dated December 17, 1941, was received, indicating the immediate shipment of the Food Reserve Supply to Hawaii.

While Gen. Short was not asked for letters of support for certificates of necessity for the construction of storage for the Emergency Food Supply because this was not needed, he has consistently supported such construction, both by the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. for the dry storage, and by the Oahu Ice and Cold Storage Co. for the refrigerated storage.

When the Emergency Food Reserve was turned down by the Bureau of the Budget Gen. Short stated publicly that storage completed, or under construction for the Emergency Food Supply would be specifically reserved for the purpose for which the certificate of necessity was granted by the War Dept.

At present the warehouse space of the Hawaiian Pineapple Co. is ready, and that of the Oahu Ice and Cold Storage Co. will be ready in the very near future.

The Civilian Food Administration, as planned by Gen. Short, is now in full operation under Governor Poindexter's Council of Civilian Defense, which in turn is affiliated with the National Office of Civilian Defense.
Civilian authorities of the Food Administration freely acknowledge the impetus of Gen. Short's consistent urging of plans to implement the Food Administration for an emergency, so that it has been able to get into operation without delay on the basis of plans set up by the Army.

Enclosure No. 1.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., March 21, 1941.

Honorable Joseph B. Poindexter,
Governor, Territory of Hawaii, Honolulu, T. H.

My dear Governor Poindexter: Mr. H. H. Warner and Mr. Richard Kimball, acting as your committee on emergency food storage, conferred with me March 19th relative to storage facilities and food supply, and the adequacy in general of the supply of food stuffs during any emergency in which incoming shipments might be curtailed. The conference included the action taken to date to obtain storage facilities, including their meeting with local importers and bankers, the action taken by Delegate King, and your radiogram of March 18th to Delegate King. I assure you that I am in hearty accord with the action taken to date and am in full concurrence therewith.

I strongly feel that the problem of assuring the civil population an adequate supply of food stuff during any emergency in which incoming shipments might be curtailed or cut off is of vital interest both to the civilian community and the military. I believe that the civilian community should take the initiative as this problem is primarily and initially the concern of the civil authorities. However, the military cannot be divorced of its concern in this problem as it is relatively of equal vital interest to the military. Any action which you may take to insure such an adequate supply of food for the civil population will be concurred in by me and have my utmost support.

With kindest personal regards,
Sincerely,

Walter C. Short,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

Enclosure No. 2

[1]

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 4 April 1941.

Subject: Authority to Issue Invitations for Purchase of Irish Potatoes Grown in Hawaii.

To: The Adjutant General, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.

1. In view of the present military situation it is of high importance to increase the local production of food within these islands so that they may become self-supporting.

Hawaii at present imports 85% of its food supplies from the mainland. In the event of an interruption of communications the sustenance of the civil population would become a serious problem. Under certain conditions the solution of this problem becomes a mission of this Department.

In view of these conditions it is believed that the subsidizing of local food production by governmental agencies is entirely justified as an emergency defense measure provided that the increase in cost to the government is not unreasonable.

In this connection attention is invited to Radiograms (381) this Headquarters, to the Quartermaster General, 22 and 23 August 1940, and to his reply thereto of 26 August 1940, authorizing this Department to contract for Irish potatoes under conditions as set forth in 1st Indorsement, W. D. —OQMG, July 5, 1938; and to related correspondence over the past four years.

2. Under the authority above quoted 1,929,000 pounds of Hawaiian-grown Irish potatoes have been contracted for delivery during February, March and April of this year at an average cost of $.025 per pound. Mainland-grown potatoes were delivered to the Navy during this period at an average of $.018 per pound. Therefore, the project of Irish-potato growing in Hawaii for the purpose of increasing local food production as an emergency defense measure
was carried out in this case at an increased cost to the Army of $0.007 per pound, or approximately $13,500 for the total project in terms of money. It is believed that this differential would hold good as an average throughout any year until growers have established a year-around crop when the spread would become less. Actually, the wastage on Island-grown potatoes is nil for shrinkage, loss of weight or spoilage such as occurs with mainland potatoes in their shipment to Hawaii. This fact materially reduces the differential cost to the government as above indicated. The increase in cost is considered justified as a safety defense measure to assure the future expansion of the local crop. This can be accomplished only by this assurance to the grower of the return of his cost of production. Sugar planters—who provide the bulk of the production, are entirely willing to go along on this project and break even.

3. The efforts of this Department during the past year have directly resulted in the increase in production of 1,242,086 lbs of locally grown Irish potatoes over 1940.

4. It is believed that for a part of the first year Island production will not be able to meet the requirements of the Army for Irish potatoes, but the project is still considered well worth the added cost to the government during the period that the requirements can be met. Local producers feel that they can quickly build up the industry to a point where Hawaii can meet the demand throughout the entire year.

5. It is now proposed to stimulate continuous Irish potato production in Hawaii. For this purpose authority is requested to contract for Hawaii-grown Irish potatoes for the fiscal year 1942, for monthly or quarterly periods, or for periods of six-months, or for one year as seem most likely to accomplish the purpose at the time of the offering.

(Sgd) Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

Enclosure No. 3.

R. S. Bamberger,
Colonel, A.G.D., Adjutant General,
12 May 1941.

The Adjutant General,
Washington D. C.

Remylet four April subject authority to issue invitations for purchase of Irish potatoes grown in Hawaii. Stop As soon as decision has been reached relative to request contained in paragraph five thereof request priority radio advice

SHORT

Enclosure No. 4

AG 432 Hawaiian
Dept. (4-4-41) M-D 1st Ind. ESA

WAR DEPARTMENT, A. G. O., May 2, 1941.

To: The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

Authority is granted to contract for Hawaiian-grown Irish potatoes for the fiscal year of 1942 on the basis proposed in Paragraph 5, basic letter, provided the contract price shall not exceed 2½¢ per pound.

By order of the Secretary of War:

(Sgd) E. S. Adams,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

Enclosure No. 5

Poindexter
Warner

September 16, 1941.

Further reference my wire September 15th regarding food storage at recent meeting attended by Maverick Ashby and representatives War Navy Interior State and Budget Bureau spokesman for service departments indicated rather like warm interest in program for producing surplus food stocks for Hawaii Period Would appreciate your asking commanding general and commandant if their letters dated last March endorsing this project still represent their views and wire me this information.

Delegate King.
Honorable Samuel Wilder King,  
Delegate to Congress,  
604 House Office Building,  
Washington, D. C.

September 17, 1941.

In opinion of local well informed persons recent international developments only increase the likelihood of demand exceeding the supply of cargo space available for carrying civilian food requirements from mainland to the territory which formed the basis for the original surplus food program. Period Commanding general endorses his previously expressed view for the needs of this project as stated in his letter to Governor Poindexter March twenty first. Period Admiral Bloch presently on off island vacation and unavailable Period. Opinion of governors food commission made plain in radiogram to you of August twenty second Period Regardless of current situation in Pacific personally feel that as we approach shooting operations with accelerated local defense construction projects the shipping facilities for civilian supplies to the islands are more likely to be restricted than when plan was originally drawn. Period Your suggestion that Maverick appraise local problem himself as soon as possible is receiving hearty support of interested parties and strongly urge you to persuade him make such a trip to obtain first hand information on this matter.

H. H. WARNER  
Director Agricultural Extension Service  
University of Hawaii and  
U. S. Department of Agriculture Cooperating

Enclosure No. 8

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT.  
OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT COMMANDER,  
Fort Shafter, T. H., 3 December 1941.

In reply refer to:
AO430
Subject: Emergency Reserve Food Supply for the Civilian Population of Hawaii.  
To: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D.C.

1. The present military situation in this area has engendered a strong feeling among the civil authorities that the project of the Emergency Food Reserve for Hawaii which has lately failed of approval by the Bureau of the Budget, should be brought up again at this time for reconsideration based on new data to be presented.

2. It is my feeling that this project should be progressed as a sure way to meet any food shortage with which the Territory may be confronted in emergency, and for this reason I have written a letter to the Governor of Hawaii in support of this project. A copy of this communication is enclosed.

3. In view of the necessity of a reserve food supply as indicated above, and in the enclosure herewith, I request the support of the War Department for this project when it comes up for reconsideration by the Bureau of the Budget.

WALTER C. SHORT  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.

1 Incl—  
Let. Gov. of Hawaii re  
food storage dated  
12-3-41.

Enclosure No. 9

December 3, 1941.

AG-430
Honorable Joseph B. Poindexter,  
Governor of Hawaii, Honolulu, T. H.

MY DEAR GOVERNOR: The present military situation in the Pacific indicates the necessity of advancing certain plans for the care and protection of the civil population of Hawaii in the event of an interruption of normal shipping between the Islands and the mainland.
I have always regarded the accumulation of a reserve food supply for Hawaii as of primary importance in our defense plans, and I have publicly announced this view on appropriate occasions.

I feel strongly that the project for the reserve food storage which has lately been refused approval by the Bureau of the Budget, might well be again advanced at this time.

In support of this view I should like to quote from the annual report of the Diversified Crops Committee of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association transmitting the final Food Production Plan for Hawaii to the Trustees of that organization:

"We think that our year of work on these plans has given us a sufficiently clear understanding of the various phases of the problems of emergency food supply to enable us to express an opinion. And that opinion is, that no stone should be left unturned in the effort to have adequate supplies of essential basic foods stored here against an emergency."

Additionally I should like to quote in part from a radiogram from Delegate King of October 24, 1941, addressed to yourself and to Mr. H. H. Warner of your Emergency Food Commission, on the subject of the refusal of the Bureau of the Budget to approve the Food Storage Plan. This communication was submitted at the time as information to the members of the commission, including the Army representative present.

"Perhaps appeal by Governor addressed to President through Interior Department supported by inventory of specified food commodities and length of time such supplies could meet local needs would help bring about further consideration this program.

"Direct appeal from local administration based on factual data would bring quicker action."

It is apparent from the above that the surety of a food supply during the initial phases of a war situation and prior to any supplementary local food production, can be safely predicated only upon the presence of a reserve of food stored here, and that the chance of getting the approval of the Bureau of the Budget for this project rests largely upon the ability of local authority to submit factual data as to amounts of food currently in Hawaii.

This requirement cannot be met with any degree of accuracy except by data obtained through a physical inventory of food on hand.

It is my feeling that as a matter of safeguarding the public welfare against the coming emergency, the project of a defense reserve of food for Hawaii should be again advanced at this time, and that it should be supported in this case by a factual statement of the amount of food currently on hand in the Islands.

For this purpose it is believed that the local importers and others concerned would voluntarily take an inventory to supply the required data in response to a request from you. It would seem that an appropriate date for this inventory might well be the end of this calendar year to tie in with other legal inventory requirements of the territory, or even sooner in view of the time element involved in assembling the figures.

May I take this opportunity to assure you of my continued wish to be of any assistance in the present emergency.

Very sincerely yours,

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

Copy of this let. furnished War Department

Enclosure No. 10

[Radiogram] 14 December 1941.

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.

Oahu food inventory of December ninth shows thirty seven days of essential foods on hand for two hundred fifty five thousand civilian population Stop This reserve must be constantly maintained by immediate shipments to supply current consumption Stop Thirteen days rice comma eighteen days potatoes and onions are most serious deficiencies Stop One hundred thirteen thousand head of cattle equal to one hundred fifty two days reserve supply for all civilians in Territory comma and twelve thousand head swine equal to ten days reserve supply for all
civilians in Territory are on hand. Important that this reserve be maintained by no more than normal slaughter. Food store inventories on outlying islands being taken. Sugar and pineapples on hand ample for Territory. Shipment of twenty thousand net tons of food for civilians in Territory per month for current needs requiring one million two hundred and fifty thousand cubic feet of shipping space per month. It is expected that commercial firms will place orders on mainland for necessary subsistence for current needs of civilian population providing there is an allocation of shipping made available. It is essential that allocation for this shipping be made immediately. In addition shipments of seven thousand two hundred net tons of food for Army personnel per month requiring four hundred fifteen thousand cubic feet of shipping space per month comma first shipment immediately comma are urgently needed. Shipment of emergency food reserve for storage to value of two million five hundred thousand dollars for human food and nine hundred thousand dollars value of animal and poultry feed comma total three million four hundred thousand dollars equal to forty eight thousand net tons requiring two million seven hundred fifty thousand cubic feet of shipping space is urgently needed. Letter will follow showing items for purchase for this emergency food reserve for storage. Stop. Requisition has been already communicated by Governor Poindexter to Swope Department of Interior and Delegate King. Stop. Orders have been placed for seed comma, insecticides comma, fertilizer comma, and agricultural implements through Division Engineer South Pacific Division San Francisco. Stop. Forty thousand eight tons and fifty thousand ship tons of shipping required for these items. Stop. This must be shipped immediately. Request War Department obtain shipping spaces or Government shipping for all shipments covered in this communication both for immediate shipment and future monthly shipments.

Enclosure No. 11.

[Radiogram]

Washn D. C. 403 A Dec 17 1941.

C G.

Hawn Dept, Ft. Shafter, T. H.

685 16th Department of Agriculture will procure and deliver to civil authorities in Hawaii food for civilian population comma URAD one one eight two period. First shipment planned to leave within one week followed by second shipment following week period. Every effort will be made to provide critical items indicated in URAD and that of Governor.

ADAMS.

346A

[Exhibit 1 Q]

Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Office of the Department Commander, Fort Shafter, T. H., July 11, 1941.

In reply refer to:
Via "Clipper" Air Mail
Engr. 383

Subject: Protection of the Civilian Population against Air and Other Attack.
To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. Reference is made to radiogram from Delegate Sam King to me, a copy of which is inclosed for ready reference. This radiogram raised questions concerning funds to be allotted to Hawaii under the Lanham Act for the protection of the civilian population against air and other forms of attack. These questions are answered in this letter which is submitted to the War Department in accordance with request in the radiogram. A copy of this letter and all inclosures is being forwarded direct to Dr. C. E. Fronk, in care of Division of Territories and Island Possessions, Department of the Interior. Dr. Fronk is now in Washington as the Governor's representative in this matter.
2. Evacuation camps will be built in units designed to care for 240 people. This size is determined by the capacity of the standard mess hall (Fig. 74, FM 5-35) which will serve 120 people at one sitting. The ideal unit would be built in a quadrangle 100 yards wide by 120 yards long. This arrangement will facilitate guarding against prowlers, contribute to privacy, and shorten average distances between shelters and latrines, mess hall, baths, and wash rooms. See typical layout plan inclosed herewith (Incl. No. 1).

a. This typical layout will be modified as necessary to adapt it to ground forms, streets, etc.; but the general principle of using shelters to form a partially inclosed communal area will be observed.

b. The design has been made extremely simple to permit erection by unskilled labor, and the use of any type of building material. Materials available in local stocks will be used to the utmost to conserve shipping space. Windows and doors are omitted. Occupants will devise curtains to secure such privacy as they wish. It is proposed to construct all units except bath houses and water served latrines without floors initially. If lumber is available, wooden floors will eventually be laid on wooden sleepers. If lumber is not available, floors will be finished with volcanic cinders, crushed rock, or sand stabilized with portland cement if available. If floors cannot be provided, occupants will have to provide themselves with something to stand on.

[2] c. Cane, a locally available product, will be used to the fullest extent practicable. Studding, rafters, flooring, and probably sleepers supporting flooring will have to be imported if not in stock. Roofs will be made from galvanized iron, if obtainable.

d. All structures have been designed to utilize standard sheets of cane, plywood, and standard lengths of lumber.

e. The mess hall is an adaptation of the standard mess hall shown in Fig. 74, FM 5-35. Construction is greatly simplified by omitting doors and windows which permits spacing all studs uniformly 24” on centers (See Incl. No. 6).

f. All other buildings are simple shed construction. See inclosed sketches of shelters, latrines, bath houses, and wash houses. (Incls. 2 to 5).

(1) 960 lineal feet of living room shelters will be provided for each camp. They will be built in lengths which are multiples of 8’. Standard double bunks (Fig. 71, FM–5–35) will be placed 8’ apart. (Incl. No. 2). Partitions will be of cane so nailed that they may be easily removed. Occupants will remove and shift cane partitions to give any length room desired.

(2) The same type construction will be used for latrines, bath houses, and wash rooms as in living quarters. Details of interior arrangements are indicated on inclosed sketches. Latrines will be equipped with water closets when a sewer system is available and the necessary plumbing supplies can be secured. Otherwise pit latrines will be used. Running water will be available at all camps. Plumbing will be installed in mess halls, bath houses, and wash houses in the order named as far as available materials will permit.

g. Protection against bombardment will be provided by slit trenches as indicated in the typical layout sheet (Incl. No. 1) when camps are on flat ground. Camps in gulches will be provided with conveniently located alcoves dug into deep slopes.

h. Dispensary buildings and administration buildings will not normally be built. In the general instance sufficient space in permanent residences or other buildings will be available for those purposes.

i. Protection of funds and valuables may be made a function of a central administration service. No provision will be made for that in construction plans.

[3] 1. Evacuees will be encouraged to bring small articles of furniture such as mirrors, chairs, hammocks, mattresses, curtains, etc. They will also be encouraged to bring simple hand tools. It is presumed that subsequent to evacuation a systematic collection will be made of abandoned articles required for camp comfort.

3. a. Camp locations have been selected with a view to the following. For locations see Incl. 7.

(1) Utilizing existing roads, utilities installations, and community service units such as stores, post offices, churches, etc.

(2) Avoiding ground at present under cultivation.
(3) Placing a large percentage of evacuees near areas suitable for growing vegetables.

(4) Securing dispersion.

b. The equivalent of 42 units (240 persons each) with a capacity for 10,080 people will be constructed as extensions of existing permanent plantation villages. In addition to this extension many villages will be increased by one mess hall, latrine, bath house, and wash house to permit increasing the number of occupants in the permanent buildings which will be utilized solely as dormitories. Plantation villages in the higher latitudes are usually built on the edges of gulches. The camp extensions will, in the general instance, be sited in these gulches and will vary greatly in size and layout, depending on terrain conditions. These camps will be spread throughout the central valley in areas least subject to probable enemy activity. Distances from Honolulu will vary from 8 to 26 miles. The estimated average distance is about 20 miles. Locations are shown on Incl. 7. These camps will have running water, but will not have sewer connections. The following advantages are characteristic of these units:

(1) Provide a high degree of dispersion.

(2) Sited in excellent locations for protection.

(3) Well located for utilization of occupants in food production.

(4) Adaptable to race segregation which will be desirable to present communal discord.

(5) Can readily be amalgamated with existing village administrations which will facilitate government.

(6) Utilize existing installations.

[4] c. 42 units (240 persons each) with a capacity for 10,080 people will be located at Waialua, north of the Schofield Barracks East Range boundary and south of the North Fork of Waialua Reservoir. The distance from Honolulu is about 21 miles by Kamehameha Highway. This location offers the following advantages:

(1) Will be an extension of an existing city in areas fairly well supplied with roads.

(2) Can readily be supplied with sewer facilities if materials are available.

(3) Will be included in anti-aircraft defense of Schofield Barracks and Wheeler Field.

(4) Is in an area of rich soil adaptable to utilization of evacuees in food production.

d. 21 units (240 persons each) with capacity for 5,040 people will be located in four valleys leading into the Koolau Range from the evacuated areas. For location see Incl. 7. They will be between 2 and 3 miles of the evacuated area. e. 21 units (240 persons each) with a capacity for 5,040 people will be located in gulches west of Aiea. For location see Incl. 7. They will be an average of about 13 miles from Honolulu.

4. The projected air-raid shelters are intended to protect 6,000 persons other than military personnel whose continued presence in the danger area is essential to the defense of Oahu. The number is based upon reports submitted by essential governmental agencies, public utilities, and commercial firms.

b. The proposed locations of shelters is shown on the inclosed map of Honolulu (Incl. No. 8). These locations have been determined from reports of probable distribution of personnel submitted by the organization affected.

c. It is proposed to construct the shelters of reinforced concrete and to limit the normal capacity of each shelter to from 10 to 15 persons which can shelter from 16 to 25 people for short periods. However, other materials will be substituted for reinforced concrete if cement and steel are not available in sufficient quantities. When practicable existing structures will be utilized by increasing protective characteristics. Tunneling will be practicable in some locations. Inclosures 9 to 12 show details of the various types to be used, depending on conditions.

[5] d. The cost of reinforced concrete shelters has been estimated at $100.00 per person to be sheltered. That is each shelter will cost from $1,000 to $1,500. No estimate of unit cost can be made for shelters built of substitute materials. Should shortage of materials limit the number of concrete shelters built, the available funds will be applied to building as many shelters of substitute materials as possible.
It is presumed that the shelters provided for personnel essential to defense will be supplemented by private individual shelters and by shelters erected by commercial interests not essential to defense. The costs of these shelters should be borne by the individual.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

13 Incls:
   Incl. #1 Layout plan
   #2-5 Sketches
   #6 Fig. 74
   #7 Map
   #9-12 Drawings
   #13 Radio, 4 July 41

A True Copy:
Edward von Geldern,
EDWARD VON GELDERN,
2nd Lt., F. A.

[SECRET]
5 ND DJ 243 Govt REP
ZPN 1 Radio, Washington, D. C., July 4 0128 1941.

Govt Rep Lt General Walter C. Short,
Fort Shafter, TH Oahu

Following from Doctor C. E. Fronk quote Reurletter June twenty reference number three eight one War Department considering whether problem lies purely within military jurisdiction or should be responsibility of civilian agency period In latter case Office of Civilian Defense may be made responsible for program of Federal Works Agency with funds from Lanham Act period In conference with General Lorenzo D. Gasser Army representative on LaGuardias committee I was requested obtain as soon as possible full details proposed evacuation period Am advised allocation of funds according to estimate submitted by Colonel Lyman in memorandum dated June nineteenth reference number three eight three would not be made on basis data so far available here period More explicit information regarding number and exact location of camps comma number of persons at each camp comma together with areas to be evacuated and distances from city to proposed camp sites will be required substantiated with maps period Recommend provision for shelters be included in which case character and material of shelters should be incorporated in your estimates period Referring to splinter shelters exact location and number also necessary together with any other data that may be pertinent period Would greatly appreciate your forwarding this material by fastest mail through War Department with compy direct to me addressed care Division of Territories and Island Possessions Department of Interior period Outlook encouraging letter follows unquote Delegate Sam King.

Tod,
1628
610A/4

A true copy:
Edward von Geldern,
Edward von Geldern,
2nd Lt., F. A.
December 22, 1941.

My dear General Short: I have the honor to present an entirely unsolicited expression of interest from many leading men of Honolulu.

There are a hundred more who I am sure would have felt honored to sign this, if time had been available. I wished to place a copy of this letter in your hands without further delay.

Yours very truly,

A true copy:

Robert J. Fleming, Jr.,
Robert J. Fleming, Jr.,
Major, G. S. C.,
Asst. to G-4.

Honolulu, T. H., December 22, 1941.

The President,
The White House, Washington, D. C.

Sir: We, the undersigned, representing substantial business and social institutions in Hawaii, and having had for many years in many ways a vital interest in the armed forces stationed in Hawaii, do hereby wish to express our sincere appreciation of the services rendered to this Territory and to our Nation by Lieutenant General Walter C. Short.

We have found him at all times to be most cooperative and furthermore he has exercised a vigorous leadership in causing this community to prepare for an emergency such as exists at present. Almost a year ago he laid out a plan for this purpose and has taken all steps practicable toward carrying out such plan.

General Short's thorough foresight and his forceful presentation of his ideas to our Territorial Legislature, to our local officials, and to our community in general have been very largely responsible for (a) the enactment of a sound "M-Day" Bill; (b) for the provision of a Territorial Guard; (c) for the decision to increase stored food and to produce food; and (d) for the prevention of sabotage. He has shown a correct and a sympathetic attitude toward the problems of the civil community in assuring cooperation of civilians.

He has maintained a high morale in his Command and has conducted "alerts" from time to time. He has proceeded with preparing the troops and with plans, now looking for financing from federal funds, for adequate and safe storage of sufficient supplies and equipment of all sorts for their use in a probable emergency.

We are encouraged by the fact that a committee has been appointed to go into various phases of the entire case, believing that the excellent men you have selected will render a just report, fair to all concerned.

Meanwhile, we wish to express to yourself and to all concerned our high esteem and our full confidence in the character and ability of General Walter C. Short as a citizen and as an officer, whatever his assignment may be. This letter is prepared without the knowledge or consent of General Short or any other officials, merely in our hope that no unwarranted discredit may accrue to the record of such a conscientious and able officer, through adverse publicity or other wise. This concern is in no way lessened by our vital interest in the adequate defense of Hawaii and our Nation.

With very best respects and wishes, we are

Yours very truly,

Lieutenant General Walter C. Short,  
Fort Shafter, T. H.

My Dear General Short: Having noted in the public press that an investigation is being made as to the military preparedness of the Army and Navy in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, I believe it appropriate that I make to you a statement as to the state of preparedness of the civil communities of these Islands for war when they were so insidiously and treacherously attacked on December 7, 1941.

The citizens of the Hawaiian Islands have always appreciated that these Islands were important to National Defense from a military standpoint, but it has been only since your arrival in these Islands on February 5, 1941 that it has been brought home to the civil population the importance of the part it would play in the event of a war in the Pacific. On December 7th, the citizens of these Islands met the hour of their test in such a manner as to make me proud to be the Chief Executive of these Islands. Your foresight in urging the population to prepare to meet the possible vicissitudes of war and the joint efforts of the Army and civil population in planning and preparing for this emergency was magnificently rewarded.
It may be of interest to point out in detail some of the plans and preparations which bore fruit on December 7, 1941:

(1) The enactment of the Hawaiian Defense Act by a special session of Legislation called for that purpose. This legislation permits a mobilization of the entire civil economy of the Islands in the interest of National Defense or in the event of disaster. By virtue of this act, civilian defense was planned and many of its phases were brought to such a point of preparation that they were able to go into action immediately and to function effectively on December 7, 1941.

(2) The production and conservation of food: Householders were persistently urged to stock their shelves in canned food. It is estimated that this resulted in increasing the available food supply of the Hawaiian Islands by more than twenty percent. Federal appropriation was requested for procurement and storage for food reserve. This appropriation has, since [2] December 7, 1941, been authorized. By agreement with plantation owners, plans were made for the procurement and storage of seed and the planting of certain large areas with quick growing food crops. Agreements were also made for the growing, in normal times, of those crops not usually grown in marketable quantities. In furtherance of this plan, the War Department was induced to permit the purchase of Island grown potatoes for the use of the Army although the price was above that of mainland potatoes. In anticipation of the receipt of reserve supplies of food asked for in the emergency, the Army supported a certificate of necessity for building an adequate warehouse to meet these needs. This warehouse is now available for the storage of food supply when it arrives.

(3) The medical facilities for the care of the injured and wounded during any disaster was one of the first things accomplished by the civilians of these Islands for an emergency. This resulted in mobilizing the entire medical profession of the Islands with all its medical facilities. Approximately three thousand persons were given training and instruction in First-Aid as required by the Red Cross. The persons thus trained assisted in carrying out the arduous tasks of evacuation. Twenty First-Aid units were organized, each unit consisting of personnel of about one hundred and twenty. An ambulance corps of one hundred and forty improvised ambulances were organized. The performance of their tasks by these groups was one of the highlights of the civil defense efforts on December 7, 1941.

(4) Plans for the evacuation of women and children and the preparation of shelters for workers in essential industries had reached a high state of perfection on December 7, 1941, and the evacuation of women and children from areas attacked was accomplished in a most admirable manner.

(5) An auxiliary police force to guard utilities and to prevent sabotage was organized at an early date in our preparation and it was able to function instantly when called upon to do so on the morning of December 7th. Their work of this force was exceptional and excellent.

(6) Legislation authorizing a home guard was enacted at the special session of the Territorial Legislature. It was well planned and so organized that 1400 of such home guardsmen could and were placed on duty thereby relieving members of the Army for other military duty.

(7) There were many other matters too numerous to detail here which were planned and accomplished at your instigation. Important among these was the bringing home to the public the urgent necessity for cooperation and public service in times of emergency.

All of the foregoing required tremendous effort on the part of the local authorities, the citizenry and military authorities. All such efforts have been rewarded since December 7, 1941, in that Territorial and City Governments and all phases of the public welfare have overcome all obstacles and have operated smoothly as a direct result of prior planning and training.

It is my belief that the public has confidence in the military and civil authorities. The fact that the Japanese Government has seen fit to inflict a treacherous attack has not in any way diminished the faith of this community in your demonstrated abilities. I wish to state that the magnificent way in which the Territory of
Hawaii met its problem in its crucial hour was in a large measure due to your foresight. I am deeply grateful for your efforts on behalf of the Territory.
You are at liberty to use this letter in any way which you see fit.

Very sincerely yours,

(S) J. W. Poindexter,
Governor of Hawaii.

This is a True Copy.
L. W. Truman
L. W. Truman,
Captain, Infantry.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF A. C. OF S., G-4
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.
SECRET

TELEGRAM

OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

CABLEGRAM

CONCLUDING GENERAL

HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

FORT SHAFTER T H

CONSULT C IN C PACIFIC FLEET REFERENCE HIS DISPATCH NUMBER TWO

EIGHT ZERO SIX TWO SEVEN TO CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS PERIOD IN VIEW OF

INFORMATION CONTAINED IN ABOVE DISPATCH COMMA THE MOVEMENT OF THE TWO ARMY

Pursuit Squadrons As Indicated in War Department Cable Number Four Six Six

Comma November Two Six Comma One Nine Four One Comma Will Be Suspended Period

These Squadrons Should however Be Prepared to Move on Short Notice Period

Paragraph War Department Has Offered to Take Over Defense of Pacific Advance

Bases From the Navy Except for Furnishing Antiaircraft Equipment Period

Consult C in C Pacific Fleet Reference Requirements and Areas to Be Defended

Period War Department Has Also Assumed Responsibility for Defense of Christmas

And Canton Period It is Contemplated That You Will Form Base Defense Units

From the Hawaiian Garrison Specially Organized as Task Forces for Particular

Areas Period If These Units Are Moved From Oahu Comma Necessary Replacements

From the United States Will be Furnished Period Report Your Conclusions and

Recommendations to the War Department At the Earliest Practicable Date

ADAMS

PACIFIC NO 29/11, 11/29/41

Green cv was destroyed by

torpedoes 12/7/41, 778 - 1904

SECRET

ADJUTANT GENERAL
CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

1940
OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APRIL MAY JUNE JULY AUG

1941
SEPTEMBER OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APRIL

DEFENSIVE MEASURES

MESSAGES FROM WASHINGTON

MESSAGES TO WASHINGTON

REQUESTS
## Defense Funds - Requests & Grants
### 7 Feb to 7 Dec 1941

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bunkers</th>
<th>$1,565,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roads &amp; Trails</td>
<td>$1,370,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battery for Kaneohe Bay</td>
<td>$215,265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEN Airports</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheeler Field Improvement</td>
<td>$15,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camouflaging Airfields</td>
<td>$66,310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fund for Materials</td>
<td>$1,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bombproofing Hawaiian Air Depot</td>
<td>$3,480,650</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Requested** $22,953,697  **Granted** $350,000

### Non-Fiscal Requests
- 18 Feb.: Two Regiments of Mobile Coast Artillery
- 25 Apr.: Organization of 2 Triangular Divisions
- 25 Feb.: Increase of Strength of 251st C.A. Regiment
- Requests for Priorities on Materials
DISTRIBUTION OF JAPANESE POPULATION - OAHU

SCHOFIELD BARRACKS
HELLEN FIELD
NAVAL AIR STATION, EWA
NAVAL AIR STATION, KAPOLEI
BEELONGS FIELD
HICKAM FIELD
PORT HARBOR
NAVDYARD
HONOLULU
HONOLULU CITY

1000 JAPANESE
500 JAPANESE
1000 OTHERS
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS
7 Dec. 1941
Pearl Harbor

Hawaiian Time

3:00 AM: War Dept. radioed 8:00 PM message
12:00 PM: Marshall warning sent.
2:50 PM: Marshall warning rec'd.
3:45 AM: Navy destroys two-man submarine
6:40 AM: Marshall sends warning
7:20 AM: Planes reported by Opana radar station
7:55 AM: First attack on Hickam Field and elsewhere
8:00 AM: First unarmed B-17s arrive at Hickam Field
8:05 AM: Col. Phillips reported attack
8:05 AM: First enemy plane shot down
8:10 AM: Alert "3 ordered Schofield Barracks attacked
8:30 AM: Infantry division moved to battle positions
8:50 AM: Pursuit planes took off
9:00 AM: Second attack. Civilian surgical teams reported
12:00 NOON: Civilians evacuated
Population

Second Series
Characteristics of the Population

Hawaii
SIXTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1940

REPORTS ON HAWAII

Population:
Number of Inhabitants—Hawaii.
Characteristics of the Population—Hawaii.

Earning:
General Characteristics—Hawaii.

Agriculture:
Farms, Farm Property, Livestock, and Crops—Hawaii.

Business:

Manufacturers:
Census of Manufacturers—Outlying Areas.
SIXTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1940

POPULATION

Second Series
Characteristics of the Population

HAWAII

Prepared under the supervision of
Dr. LEON E. TRUESDELL
Chief Statistician for Population

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON: 1943
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

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HAWAII BY COUNTIES, ISLANDS, AND CENSUS TRACTS

Part 1.—TRACTS IN HONOLULU COUNTY AND KAUA'I COUNTY

KAUA'I CO.

HONOLULU CO.

INSET MAP A-B

SCALE 1:5,000

KAUA'I CO.

SCALE 1:5,000
HAWAII BY COUNTIES, ISLANDS, AND CENSUS TRACTS

Part 2.—TRACTS IN HAWAII COUNTY AND MAUI COUNTY

MOLOKAI I.
M-19 (KALAWAO)

LANAI I.
M-16

KAHOOLaweI.

MAUI CO.

HAWAII CO.
INTRODUCTION

This second Population bulletin for the Territory of Hawaii presents data on the characteristics of the population, including sex, age, race, nativity, place of birth, citizenship, marital status, school attendance, highest grade of school completed, employment status, class of worker, occupation, industry, wage or salary income, and months worked in 1939. In the first Population bulletin, entitled “Number of Inhabitants,” the total population of the Territory on April 1, 1940, was given for all of its political subdivisions, including counties, judicial districts, representative districts, census tracts, cities, towns, and villages. There remain to be presented for the Territory and for Honolulu city statistics on age by marital status, relationship to head of household, and education, on data by age, wage or salary income, and class of worker, and on industry by race.

Arrangement of tables.—The tables in the present bulletin are arranged on the basis of the areas for which figures are presented. Tables 1 to 17 present statistics for the Territory as a whole and for Honolulu city. Tables 18 to 20 contain the figures for counties. Table 21 gives data by judicial districts and census tracts. Figures for cities of 5,000 to 100,000 are shown in tables 22 and 23. The amount of detail presented in this bulletin is generally greater for the larger places than for the smaller ones, and data from earlier censuses are presented for the larger areas only.

Availability of unpublished data.—The statistics in this bulletin presented for the Territory as a whole and for Honolulu city represent practically all of the data tabulated in this phase of the 1940 program. Although similar statistics have been tabulated for Hilo and Wailuku cities, and almost as much detail has been tabulated for counties and for Honolulu census tracts, it is not possible, because of space limitations, to publish the data in full detail.

These unpublished statistics, however, can be made available upon request, for the cost of transcribing or reproducing them. Requests for such statistics, addressed to the Director of the Census, Washington, D. C., will receive a prompt reply which will include an estimate of the cost of preparing the data.

EXPLANATIONS AND DEFINITIONS OF TERMS

Sex and race.—Because of the importance of the classification of the population by sex, practically all of the data in this bulletin are presented separately for males and females. Moreover, as far as feasible, the data are also presented by race. Seven major race classifications are distinguished in the tabulations; namely, Hawaiian, part Hawaiian, Caucasian, Chinese, Filipino, Japanese, and “other races,” the latter comprising mainly Koreans and Puerto Ricans. In the 1940 census, several revisions were made in the race classification. Portuguese, Spanish, and “other Caucasians” were combined into one group, “Caucasian”; persons from Puerto Rico were classified as a separate group because of special interest in their number; and all persons of mixed Hawaiian and other blood were classified as part Hawaiian. All statistics in this bulletin classifying the population by race are in accordance with the 1940 definition. The complete classification by race, sex, and nativity is shown in the following table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race</th>
<th>All Classes</th>
<th>Native</th>
<th>Foreign Born</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>Total</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
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<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican</td>
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<tr>
<td>All others</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Nativity.—In the classification by nativity, a person born in continental United States or in any of its territories or possessions is counted as native. Likewise included as native are the small number of persons who, although born in a foreign country or at sea, are American citizens by birth because their parents were American citizens.

Place of birth.—The native population is classified, with respect to place of birth, into five groups: Those born in the Territory of Hawaii, those born in the Philippines, those born in Puerto Rico, those born in other United States territories or possessions (including American citizens born abroad or at sea), and those born in continental United States.

The foreign-born population is classified according to country of birth. All classifications of the 1940 population according to country of birth are based on the political boundaries of January 1, 1937, which were practically the same as in 1930.

Age.—The age classification is based on the age of the person at his last birthday before the date of the census, that is, the age of the person in completed years.

Age data for the Territory, Honolulu city, and counties are presented by 5-year periods up to 54 years and by 10-year periods to 74 years. For cities of 5,000 to 100,000 figures are presented by 5-year periods up to 54 years and 10-year periods from 35 to 74 years. Data are also available in various tables for additional age groups having some special significance, i.e., 21 years and over and the various groups shown in connection with school attendance and employment status.

Citizenship.—The classification of the foreign born by citizenship comprises two main groups, naturalized and alien; the second group is further subdivided into those having first papers that is, those who have made formal declaration of intention to become citizens of the United States) and those having no papers. In addition, there is a third group made up of foreign-born persons for whom no report on citizenship was obtained. Since it is likely that most of these persons are aliens, they are often included with the aliens in summary figures for citizens and noncitizens.

Marital status.—In the classification by marital status four major groups are shown: Single, married, widowed, and divorced. In all censuses there were a few persons for whom the enumerators failed to report marital status. All these persons are here classified as single.
School attendance.—The school attendance tabulation for 1940 is based on the replies to the enumerator's inquiry as to whether the person had attended, or been enrolled in, any regular school or college between March 1 and April 1, 1940. Night schools or vocational schools were not included unless they were a part of the regular school system; and no correspondence schools were included. The school attendance question in the Census of 1930 applied to a somewhat longer period, namely, the seven months between September 1, 1929, and April 1, 1930. Furthermore, in the earlier censuses the question was not restricted as to type of school.

Highest grade of school completed.—In 1940 the census, for the first time, included a question on the formal educational attainment of each person. The question on the schedule asked for the last full grade that the person had completed in the regular school system—public, private, or parochial school, college, or university. This question replaced the inquiry on illiteracy included in previous censuses and provides data on educational status, a characteristic which is significant for every population group, especially in combination with other characteristics.

The tabulations on last year of school completed which are presented in this bulletin, are restricted to persons 25 years old and over, practically all of whom have completed their formal education. All tables presenting data on education include the median year of school completed. The median year of school completed may be defined as that year which divides the population group into equal parts, one-half having completed more schooling, and one-half having completed less schooling than the median. These medians are expressed in terms of a continuous series of numbers representing years of school completed. For example, the compilation of the first year of high school is indicated by 9 and of the last year of college by 16.

Employment status.—In the classification by employment status in the 1940 Census of Population, all persons 14 years old and over are classified on the basis of their activity during the week of March 24 to 30, 1940, into two principal groups: (1) Persons in the labor force, including those employed for pay or profit or at unpaid family work, those on public emergency work, and those seeking work; and (2) persons not in the labor force. The latter group includes persons reported as engaged in their own home household; those in school; those unable to work; all inmates of penal and mental institutions and homes for the aged, infirm, and needy, regardless of their activity during the census week; others not employed, not on public emergency work, and not seeking work; and persons for whom employment status was not reported.

The various categories of persons in the labor force are defined as below:

Employed (except on public emergency work).—The group classified as employed includes: (a) Persons who worked for pay or profit at any time during the week of March 24 to 30, 1940; in private work or nonemergency Federal, Territorial, or local government work, or assisted without pay on a family farm or in a family business; and (b) persons not actually at work and not seeking work during the week of March 24 to 30, 1940, but who worked, businesses, or professional enterprises from which they were temporarily absent because of vacation, illness, industrial dispute, for weather, or lay-off not exceeding 6 weeks with definite instructions to return to work on a definite date. The group "Employed (except on public emergency work)" includes not only employees but also proprietors, farmers, self-employed persons, and unpaid family workers.

On public emergency work.—This category includes persons who, during the week of March 24 to 30, 1940, were at work for work on, or equipped to, public emergency work projects conducted by the Work Projects Administration (WPA), the National Youth Administration (NYA), or the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). In the interpretation of the data for persons on public emergency work, allowance must be made for the misclassification of considerable numbers of public emergency workers. The number of persons reported in the censuses as on public emergency work in Hawaii was 2,326, whereas the number recorded on the pay rolls of the Federal emergency work agencies at the time of the census was 5,568.

Seeking work.—This category represents persons without work of any sort in the week of March 24 to 30, 1940, who were actively seeking work during that week. The group seeking work was subdivided into experienced workers and new workers, the latter being persons who had not previously worked full time for 1 month or more. Persons seeking work for whom a report on work experience was lacking were classified as experienced workers.

Persons with a job but not at work were classified as employed because the strict definition of this group and the fact that these persons were reported as not seeking work, tended to eliminate all except those with unemployment attributing to the employment from which they were temporarily absent.

Number of unemployed.—The total number of unemployed, as usually defined, includes (1) persons seeking work and without any form of public or private employment and (2) those on public emergency work programs established to provide jobs for the unemployed. Because of the misclassification of public emergency workers, the census total of these two groups understates the amount of unemployment. More satisfactory figures can be obtained by adding to the census figures for persons seeking work, the number of persons on pay rolls of the Federal emergency work agencies at the time of the census. This procedure yields a total of 8,675 unemployed persons.

Comparison of 1940 data for the labor force with previous data for gainful workers.—The 1940 data for the labor force are not directly comparable with the census statistics for gainful workers in 1930 and earlier years because of differences in definition. "Gainful workers" were persons reported as having a gainful occupation, that is, an occupation in which they earned money or a money equivalent, or in which they engaged in the production of marketable goods, regardless of whether they were working on seeking work at the time of the census. The labor force is defined in the 1940 census on the basis of activity during the week of March 24 to 30, and includes only persons who were employed, seeking work, or on public emergency work in that week. Thus seasonal workers who were neither working nor seeking work at the time were counted as unemployed, whether or not they had previously worked in the labor force in 1940; such persons were classified for the most part as gainful workers in 1930. In addition certain classes of persons, such as retired workers, some inmates of institutions, and recently incapacitated workers were frequently included among gainful workers in 1930, but in general, such persons are not in the 1940 labor force. On the other hand, the 1940 labor force includes persons seeking work without previous work experience, that is, new workers, and persons reported as in the labor force for whom neither occupation nor industry was entered on the schedule. Most of the relatively few new workers at the time of the 1940 census were under 16 years of age and were not counted as gainful workers. Likewise, some persons who were actually gainful workers, but for whom neither occupation nor industry was reported, were not included in the gainful worker figures for 1930 and earlier years.

The 1940 labor force figures are restricted to persons 14 years old and over, whereas the number of gainful workers shown in earlier censuses included persons 10 years old and over. The number of workers 10 to 13 years old has become relatively small and no longer justifies the additional burden of enumeration and tabulation necessary to retain the 10-year age limit. In making comparisons between the 1940 labor force data and the gainful worker statistics in earlier census reports, the slight difference in age limits should be taken into consideration. The gainful worker statistics shown in this bulletin for earlier censuses exclude those 10 to 13 years old.

Class of worker.—Class-of-worker statistics for employed workers (excluding persons on public emergency work) are given...
in table 12, which shows the numbers of wage or salary workers, employees and own-account workers, unpaid family workers, and workers who failed to report class of worker. The composition of the various categories is described below:

Wage or salary workers.—This class consists of persons who worked as employees for wages or salary (in cash or kind). It includes not only factory operatives, laborers, clerks, etc., who worked for wages, but also those who were self-employed (or tips or commissions) in such fields as hotels, room and board, salesmen and other employees working for commissions, and salaried business managers, corporation executives, and government officials.

Employees and own-account workers.—This group consists of persons who operated their own business enterprise. It includes not only the owner-operators of large stores and manufacturing establishments, but also small merchants, independent craftsmen, farmers, professional men, peddlers, and other persons conducting enterprises of their own. It does not include managers paid to operate business (except those on public emergency work), by sex, for the Territory and for Honolulu city (table 12). In other tables, occupation data are shown in terms of 12 major occupation groups, representing major groupings of the detailed classifications of all industries.

Industry classification.—The industry classification used in the 1940 Census for Hawaii contains 376 titles. In this bulletin, the detailed occupation classification is used only for the presentation of occupation statistics for Hawaii. It is included in the tables on public emergency work), by sex, for the Territory and for Honolulu city (table 12). In other tables, occupation data are shown in terms of 12 major occupation groups, representing major groupings of the detailed classifications of all industries.

Coverage of industry classifications "Government" and "Domestic service."—The industry classification "Government (not elsewhere classified)" does not include all persons employed by governmental agencies. Persons are included in this classification only if they were engaged in activities that are peculiarly governmental functions. Government employees who were engaged in activities that are commonly performed by employees of private enterprises are included in the industry classification in which their activities fell. For example, a tax collector is included in the industry classification "Government," but a carpenter employed on a Federal building project is classified in the category "Construction." The total number of persons employed by governmental agencies, therefore, cannot be obtained from the industry classification.

The industry group "Domestic service" is somewhat more inclusive than the major occupation group "Domestic service workers." This group includes "Housekeepers, private family," "Laundrymen, private family," and "Gardeners, private family." The industry classification "Domestic service" includes not only these workers but also persons in occupations such as practical nurse, old-age and home nurse, and gardener, if they were employed by private families.

Comparison of occupation and industry statistics for 1940 with data from earlier censuses.—No comparisons of the 1940 census data on occupations and industries with those of previous censuses are included in this bulletin. Such comparisons are complicated by three important considerations.

First, gainful workers, the group for which occupation and industry statistics were presented in previous censuses, are not strictly comparable with the 1940 labor force.

Second, the occupation and industry data shown here do not include self-employed persons.

Third, the 1940 classifications of occupation and industry differ from those used in earlier censuses, with respect to arrangement and content of titles. For example, in 1939, most of the occupation titles were grouped under a few major industrial headings ("Agriculture," "Forestry and fishing," "Extraction of minerals," etc.), based upon the industry in which the occupation was most commonly followed. In 1940, however, the occupation titles are grouped into 12 major occupation groups ("Professional and semiprofessional workers," "Carpenters, foremen, and kindred workers," "Operatives and kindred workers," etc.).

Wage or salary income and receipt of other income.—In the 1940 census, all persons 14 years old and over (except inmates of specified institutions) were asked to report the amount of money wage or salary income received in 1939. (Those who received over $5,000 were required only to report that they had received more than that amount.) Persons 14 years old and over were also asked to report whether they had received $50 or more from source other than wages or salaries in 1939. This comparatively small amount was chosen in order to identify those persons whose incomes, for all practical purposes, were limited to receipts from wages or salaries. A question regarding the exact amount of nonwage income was not included because of the very considerable additional burden of enumeration that such a question would have entailed.

Wage or salary income, as defined for the purposes of the 1940 census, includes all money received by persons as compensation for work or services performed as employees, including commissions, tips, piece-rate payments, bonuses, etc., as well as receipts commonly referred to as wages or salaries. Employees were instructed not to consider as wage or salary income receipts from business profits, fees, travel reimbursements, sales of crops, unemployment compensation, etc., nor compensation in forms other than money, such as meals, lodging, clothing, fuel, etc.

"Other income" includes all income other than money wages or salaries, such as income from roomers or boarders, business profits, professional fees, income in kind, receipts from the sale of farm products, rents, interest, dividends, unemployment compensation, direct relief, old-age assistance, pensions, annuities, royalties, and regular contributions from persons other than members of the immediate family. Other income does not include receipts in the form of lump-sum insurance settlements, occasional gifts of goods or money, inheritances, receipts or profits from the sale of properties (unless the person earned his living by buying and selling such properties) or reimbursements for travel expenses.

In this bulletin, the group of persons for whom the receipt or nonreceipt of other income was not reported is combined with the
group without other income of $50 or more, since the majority of the persons failing to report probably had no other income.

Data on wage or salary income and other income in 1939 are presented in table 16 for the experienced labor force, which comprises employed persons, those on public emergency work, and persons other than new workers seeking work, during the week of March 24 to 30, 1940. In this table statistics are presented separately for wage or salary workers and for other experienced workers (that is, for the combination of employers, own-account workers, unpaid family workers, and persons for whom class of worker was not reported). The group of wage or salary workers is subdivided into (a) private and nonemergency government workers, and (b) public emergency workers. The category "public emergency workers" includes both persons who were on public emergency work during the census week and persons seeking work during that week who had last worked on public emergency projects. This category is therefore somewhat larger than the employment status group "on public emergency work."

The statistics on wage or salary income and receipt of other income refer to the calendar year 1939, while the classifications by employment status and class of worker refer to the week of March 24 to 30, 1940. Because of the rapid turn-over of emergency project employment, the difference in time reference is probably not important in connection with the wage or salary income distribution of public emergency workers. A considerable proportion of the wage or salary income reported by public emergency workers was derived from private employment. Likewise, some persons who were employers, own-account workers, and unpaid family workers at the time of the census had been employed as wage or salary workers during a part or all of the year 1939, and reported themselves as having received various amounts of wage or salary income.

Two important factors may have made for inaccurate reporting of wage or salary income. First, persons who received their compensation in many installments of irregular amounts may not have been able to determine accurately the total amount received. Second, some informants who replied to the census inquiries for the whole family undoubtedly did not know the precise amount of wage or salary income received by each member. Nevertheless, the statistics present a reasonably accurate picture of the amount and distribution of wage or salary income received in 1939.

MONTHS WORKED IN 1939.—In order to show the relationship between income and amount of employment during the year, statistics on wage or salary income and receipt of other income are presented for wage or salary workers classified according to number of months worked in 1939. The classification by number of months worked was obtained from a question regarding the number of weeks worked for pay or profit, including public emergency work, or at unpaid family work, which was asked for all persons 14 years old and over except inmates of certain institutions. For persons with periods of part-time work, the report was to be made in terms of equivalent full-time weeks, a full-time week being defined as the number of hours locally regarded as full time for the given occupation and industry. Paid vacations or other absences with pay were included in the number of weeks worked.

The returns for weeks worked in 1939 have been converted into months in the tables in this bulletin, because a large proportion of the reports were only approximate, and did not represent valid statements of the precise number of weeks of work. The groupings of months worked that are used in this bulletin are listed below, with their equivalents in terms of the original reports of weeks worked.

**Number of months worked** | **Number of weeks worked**
--- | ---
Less than 6 months | 0 to 23 weeks, or not reported.
6 to 8 months | 24 to 35 weeks.
9 to 11 months | 36 to 49 weeks.
12 months | 50 to 52 weeks.

Data on months worked in 1939 were not tabulated for employers, own-account workers, and unpaid family workers. For such workers, the data on months worked are less significant and less reliable than for wage or salary workers. Moreover, for workers in these groups, the amount of employment in 1939 has little relation to the amount of wage or salary income received.
### TABLE 1—RACE, BY NATIVITY AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1910 TO 1940

#### [Percent not shown where less than 0.1]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA, NATIVITY, SEX, AND CENSUS YEAR</th>
<th>All classes</th>
<th>Hawaiians</th>
<th>Part Hawaiians</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Filipinos</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Other races</th>
<th>Pearl Harbor Attack</th>
<th>Characteristics of the Population</th>
<th>FOR THE TERRITORY</th>
<th>FOR HONOLULU CITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PERCENT BY RACE</strong></td>
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<td><strong>PERCENT BY NATIVITY</strong></td>
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<td>31,100</td>
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<td>32,900</td>
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<td>19,700</td>
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<td>16,900</td>
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<td>32,900</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>PART HAWAIANS</strong></td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### NOTES

- **Race**
  - Hawaiian: Born in Hawaii or one or both parents born in Hawaii.
  - Part Hawaiian: One parent born in Hawaii.
  - Chinese: Born in China, or one or both parents born in China.
  - Filipino: Born in the Philippines or one or both parents born in the Philippines.
  - Japanese: Born in Japan or one or both parents born in Japan.
  - Other Race: All others.

- **Sex**
  - Male: Sex shown.
  - Female: Sex not shown.

- **Territory**
  - Pearl Harbor Attack: Characteristics of the Population.

- **Hawaiian Islands**
  - Honolulu City: Characteristics of the Population.

- **Table 1**
  - Race, by nativity and sex, for the territory and for Honolulu city: 1910 to 1940.

- **Characteristics of the Population**
  - Pearl Harbor Attack: Characteristics of the Population.

- **Percent not shown where less than 0.1**

- **Table 1 contains races, by nativity and sex, for the territory and for Honolulu city: 1910 to 1940.**

- **Percent not shown where less than 0.1.**

- **Table 1 includes data for Pearl Harbor Attack and Honolulu City.**
### Table 2.—Age, by Race and Sex, for the Territory and for Honolulu City: 1940 and 1930

The following table shows the age distribution of the population of the Territory of Hawaii, by race and sex, for the years 1940 and 1930. The data include the number of males and females in each age group and the percentage of the total population in each age group.

#### Hawaii

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
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<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
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<th>Female</th>
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</table>

### Notes

- The population data is for the Territory of Hawaii, including Honolulu City.
- The table presents the age distribution by race and sex for the years 1940 and 1930.
- The data includes the total number of males and females in each age group, as well as the percentage of the total population in each age group.
- The data is presented in tabular form, with columns for age groups and rows for racial and gender categories.
### CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION

#### TABLE 2—AGE, BY RACE AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940 and 1930—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Hawaiian</th>
<th>Non-Hawaiian</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Others</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
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<tr>
<td>Under 5 years</td>
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#### TABLE 3—FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION BY CITIZENSHIP, RACE, AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940 and 1930

<table>
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<th>Race, Age, and Sex</th>
<th>Total 1940</th>
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<th>Non-Hawaiian</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Others</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiian</td>
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<td>26,118</td>
<td>52.4%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Hawaiian</td>
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<td>24,429</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
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#### THE TERRITORY: 1940

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<th>Percent</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
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#### FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION 25 YEARS OLD AND OVER

<table>
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<td>Percent</td>
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<td>Number</td>
</tr>
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<td>Hawaiian</td>
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<td>52.4%</td>
<td>26,118</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-Hawaiian</td>
<td>24,429</td>
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<td>24,429</td>
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<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>2,028</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>2,028</td>
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Table 3.—FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION BY CITIZENSHIP, RACE, AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940 AND 1930—Continued

<table>
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<th>First papers</th>
<th>No papers and not reported</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Naturalized</th>
<th>First papers</th>
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HAWAIIAN

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<th>Total</th>
<th>Naturalized</th>
<th>First papers</th>
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CHINESE

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<th>Total</th>
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<th>First papers</th>
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MIXED OR FOREIGN BORN

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<th>Total</th>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MIXED OR FOREIGN BORN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEX, RACE, AND AGE</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Naturalized</th>
<th>First papers</th>
<th>No papers and not reported</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Naturalized</th>
<th>First papers</th>
<th>No papers and not reported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>44,845</td>
<td>4,896</td>
<td>10.9</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>3,996</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>3,450</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

JAPANESE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEX, RACE, AND AGE</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Naturalized</th>
<th>First papers</th>
<th>No papers and not reported</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Naturalized</th>
<th>First papers</th>
<th>No papers and not reported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>21,175</td>
<td>20,821</td>
<td>98.4</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>947</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2,708</td>
<td>2,699</td>
<td>98.9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
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</table>

OTHER RACE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEX, RACE, AND AGE</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Naturalized</th>
<th>First papers</th>
<th>No papers and not reported</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Naturalized</th>
<th>First papers</th>
<th>No papers and not reported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>3,998</td>
<td>3,945</td>
<td>98.7</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>2,275</td>
<td>2,275</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

HONOLULU CITY: 1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SEX, RACE, AND AGE</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Naturalized</th>
<th>First papers</th>
<th>No papers and not reported</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Naturalized</th>
<th>First papers</th>
<th>No papers and not reported</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>28,738</td>
<td>25,738</td>
<td>89.6</td>
<td>1,040</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>19,932</td>
<td>15,967</td>
<td>79.8</td>
<td>3,965</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>1,532</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>2,388</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.—MARITAL STATUS OF THE POPULATION 15 YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1920 TO 1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA AND CENSUS YEAR</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Single</th>
<th>Married</th>
<th>Widowed</th>
<th>Divorced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE TERRITORY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, 1940</td>
<td>178,563</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>47,715</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>3,733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, 1930</td>
<td>154,911</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>46,367</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>3,247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, 1920</td>
<td>104,845</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>43,327</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>3,891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HONOLULU CITY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, 1940</td>
<td>67,034</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>21,811</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>3,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, 1930</td>
<td>57,293</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>19,849</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>3,615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, 1920</td>
<td>48,446</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>18,577</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>4,292</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.—MARITAL STATUS OF THE POPULATION 15 YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1920 TO 1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA AND CENSUS YEAR</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Single</th>
<th>Married</th>
<th>Widowed</th>
<th>Divorced</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE TERRITORY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, 1940</td>
<td>178,563</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>47,715</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>3,733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, 1930</td>
<td>154,911</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>46,367</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>3,247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, 1920</td>
<td>104,845</td>
<td>63.8</td>
<td>43,327</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>3,891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HONOLULU CITY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, 1940</td>
<td>67,034</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>21,811</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>3,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, 1930</td>
<td>57,293</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>19,849</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>3,615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, 1920</td>
<td>48,446</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>18,577</td>
<td>38.1</td>
<td>4,292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AREA, AGE, SEX, AND CENSUS YEAR</td>
<td>Attending school</td>
<td>In school 1940</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>In school 1930</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALL RACES</td>
<td>100,995</td>
<td>110,168</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>99,780</td>
<td>89.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAWAIIAN</td>
<td>7,877</td>
<td>8,542</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>7,632</td>
<td>81.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAWAIIAN'S</td>
<td>6,772</td>
<td>7,304</td>
<td>89.5</td>
<td>6,411</td>
<td>78.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAWAIIAN'S</td>
<td>1,105</td>
<td>1,238</td>
<td>84.1</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>36.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAWAIIAN'S</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>1,028</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>23.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAWAIIAN'S</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>108.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAWAIIAN'S</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>115.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHITE HAWAIIAN</td>
<td>6,623</td>
<td>7,028</td>
<td>85.6</td>
<td>6,431</td>
<td>79.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHITE HAWAIIAN</td>
<td>6,168</td>
<td>6,598</td>
<td>84.7</td>
<td>5,898</td>
<td>89.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHITE HAWAIIAN</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>94.7</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHITE HAWAIIAN</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>86.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHITE HAWAIIAN</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHITE HAWAIIAN</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATCHMENT</td>
<td>1,038</td>
<td>1,107</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>1,102</td>
<td>94.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATCHMENT</td>
<td>1,025</td>
<td>1,082</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>1,076</td>
<td>74.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATCHMENT</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATCHMENT</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5.—School attendance by age, race, and sex, for the territory and for Honolulu City: 1940 and 1930**

(Percent not shown where base is less than 100)
### Table 5.—School Attendance by Age, Race, and Sex, for the Territory and for Honolulu City: 1940 and 1930—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA, AGE, SEX, AND COLOR YEAR</th>
<th>HAWAIIAN</th>
<th>PART HAWAIIAN</th>
<th>CAUCASIAN</th>
<th>CHINESE</th>
<th>FILIPINO</th>
<th>JAPANESE</th>
<th>OTHER RACES</th>
<th>All Races</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females, age 5 and over</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males, age 5 and over</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 6.—Persons 25 Years Old and Over of School Completion, Race, and Sex, for the Territory and for Honolulu City: 1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA, AGE, SEX, AND COLOR YEAR</th>
<th>HAWAIIAN</th>
<th>PART HAWAIIAN</th>
<th>CAUCASIAN</th>
<th>CHINESE</th>
<th>FILIPINO</th>
<th>JAPANESE</th>
<th>OTHER RACES</th>
<th>All Races</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females, age 5 and over</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Males, age 5 and over</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

TABLE 9.—PERSONS 25 YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED, RACE, AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA, SEX, AND YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED</th>
<th>ALL RACES</th>
<th>HAWAIIAN</th>
<th>PART HAWAIIAN</th>
<th>CAUCASIAN</th>
<th>CHINESE</th>
<th>FILIPINO</th>
<th>JAPANESE</th>
<th>OTHER RACES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, 65 years old and over</td>
<td>84,986</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>3,598</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>7,187</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>6,899</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No school years completed</td>
<td>20,677</td>
<td>24.5</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>1,504</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>2,159</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School years completed</td>
<td>64,309</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>5,446</td>
<td>150.0</td>
<td>1,393</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>4,740</td>
<td>69.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married, 65 years old and over</td>
<td>82,041</td>
<td>98.0</td>
<td>3,566</td>
<td>99.8</td>
<td>7,163</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>6,838</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td>2,945</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median school years completed</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 7.—PLACE OF BIRTH, BY SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY: 1940 AND 1930

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOTAL NUMBER</th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>613,383</td>
<td>305,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>604,238</td>
<td>298,410</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Hawaii       | 462,925 | 232,137 |
| Kentucky     | 45,958  | 25,206  |
| Louisiana    | 45,773  | 25,032  |
| North Carolina | 45,681   | 24,725  |
| Ohio         | 45,633  | 24,566  |
| Pennsylvania | 45,300  | 24,465  |
| West Virginia | 45,137   | 24,093  |

| Northerners  | 45,100  | 24,030  |
| Italians     | 45,050  | 24,010  |
| Greeks       | 44,950  | 23,925  |
| Dutch        | 44,850  | 23,825  |
| Russians     | 44,800  | 23,800  |
| Irish        | 44,750  | 23,725  |
| Scotch       | 44,700  | 23,675  |
| Welsh        | 44,650  | 23,625  |
| Other Europe | 44,600  | 23,600  |

| China        | 44,500  | 23,500  |
| Cuba         | 44,450  | 23,425  |
| Iceland      | 44,400  | 23,375  |
| Other foreign | 44,350   | 23,325  |

| All foreign and not reported           | 44,300  | 23,300  |

1 Includes persons born at sea under the United States flag and American citizens born abroad.
2 Includes (for 1940 only) a few persons from "Other Asia."
## Table 8—Employment Status of Persons 14 Years Old and Over, by Race and Sex, for the Territory and for Honolulu City: 1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area, Race, and Sex</th>
<th>Population 14 years old and over</th>
<th>Employed (or on comp. work)</th>
<th>Out of labor force</th>
<th>Seeking work</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>New workers</th>
<th>Total in institutions</th>
<th>Other and not</th>
<th>period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HAWAII</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9,988</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hawaiian</td>
<td>12,167</td>
<td>7,390</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>4,777</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>3,714</td>
<td>977</td>
<td>18,138</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Part Hawaiian</td>
<td>7,402</td>
<td>4,421</td>
<td>60.0</td>
<td>2,981</td>
<td>41.0</td>
<td>2,372</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>9,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>4,765</td>
<td>2,970</td>
<td>62.7</td>
<td>1,795</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>1,342</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>4,752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MALE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9,988</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hawaiian</td>
<td>5,780</td>
<td>3,312</td>
<td>57.3</td>
<td>2,468</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>2,073</td>
<td>641</td>
<td>9,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Part Hawaiian</td>
<td>3,578</td>
<td>2,130</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>1,448</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>1,242</td>
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<td>989</td>
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<td>674</td>
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<td>27</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9,988</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>184</td>
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<td>121</td>
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<td>27</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>HONOLULU CITY</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>55.4</td>
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<td>44.6</td>
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<td>60.6</td>
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<td>39.4</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td></td>
<td>9,988</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1940</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1,160</td>
<td>54.0</td>
<td>961</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>895</td>
<td>166</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9,988</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>1940</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1,901</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>1,225</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>1,199</td>
<td>166</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1,122</td>
<td>62.1</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>38.0</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>3,692</td>
</tr>
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<td>704</td>
<td>57.7</td>
<td>519</td>
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<td>519</td>
<td>109</td>
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<td>60.0</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE**

3147
### CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION

#### Table 9. EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF PERSONS 14 YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY AGE AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area, Age, and Sex</th>
<th>Population 14 Years Old and Over</th>
<th>In Labor Force</th>
<th>Not in Labor Force</th>
<th>Percent of Labor Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All male, 14 and over</td>
<td>325,609</td>
<td>68,672</td>
<td>156,937</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male, 14 to 19 years</td>
<td>5,067</td>
<td>1,118</td>
<td>3,950</td>
<td>22.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male, 20 to 24 years</td>
<td>29,748</td>
<td>5,321</td>
<td>24,427</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male, 25 to 34 years</td>
<td>73,016</td>
<td>13,694</td>
<td>59,322</td>
<td>18.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male, 35 to 44 years</td>
<td>79,532</td>
<td>15,364</td>
<td>64,168</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male, 45 to 54 years</td>
<td>50,486</td>
<td>9,163</td>
<td>41,323</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male, 55 to 64 years</td>
<td>26,004</td>
<td>4,518</td>
<td>21,486</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male, 65 years and over</td>
<td>16,330</td>
<td>3,046</td>
<td>13,284</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, 14 and over</td>
<td>314,890</td>
<td>68,672</td>
<td>156,937</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### HONOLULU CITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area, Age, and Sex</th>
<th>Population 14 Years Old and Over</th>
<th>In Labor Force</th>
<th>Not in Labor Force</th>
<th>Percent of Labor Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male, 14 and over</td>
<td>101,946</td>
<td>21,568</td>
<td>80,378</td>
<td>21.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male, 14 to 19 years</td>
<td>1,518</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>26.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male, 20 to 24 years</td>
<td>12,370</td>
<td>2,257</td>
<td>10,113</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male, 25 to 34 years</td>
<td>27,736</td>
<td>4,899</td>
<td>22,837</td>
<td>17.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male, 35 to 44 years</td>
<td>23,774</td>
<td>4,365</td>
<td>19,409</td>
<td>18.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male, 45 to 54 years</td>
<td>14,957</td>
<td>2,601</td>
<td>12,356</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male, 55 to 64 years</td>
<td>7,977</td>
<td>1,452</td>
<td>6,525</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male, 65 years and over</td>
<td>2,104</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>1,704</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, 14 and over</td>
<td>99,034</td>
<td>21,568</td>
<td>77,466</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

*Parent not shown where base is less than 100*
## Hawaii

### Table 10.—Persons in the Labor Force, 1940, and Gainful Workers, 1930 and 1920, by Age and Sex, for the Territory and for Honolulu City

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA, CENSUS YEAR, AND AGE</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>PERSONS IN LABOR FORCE OR GAINFUL WORKERS</th>
<th>PERCENT OF POPULATION IN LABOR FORCE OR GAINFUL WORKERS</th>
<th>PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONS IN LABOR FORCE OR GAINFUL WORKERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Total Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>THE TERRITORY</strong> 1940</td>
<td>301,964</td>
<td>120,444</td>
<td>181,520</td>
<td>55,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, 15 and over</td>
<td>301,964</td>
<td>120,444</td>
<td>181,520</td>
<td>55,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 and 15 years</td>
<td>301,964</td>
<td>120,444</td>
<td>181,520</td>
<td>55,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 and 17 years</td>
<td>301,964</td>
<td>120,444</td>
<td>181,520</td>
<td>55,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 and 19 years</td>
<td>301,964</td>
<td>120,444</td>
<td>181,520</td>
<td>55,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 and 24 years</td>
<td>301,964</td>
<td>120,444</td>
<td>181,520</td>
<td>55,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 34 years</td>
<td>301,964</td>
<td>120,444</td>
<td>181,520</td>
<td>55,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 to 44 years</td>
<td>301,964</td>
<td>120,444</td>
<td>181,520</td>
<td>55,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 to 54 years</td>
<td>301,964</td>
<td>120,444</td>
<td>181,520</td>
<td>55,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 to 64 years</td>
<td>301,964</td>
<td>120,444</td>
<td>181,520</td>
<td>55,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65 years and over</td>
<td>301,964</td>
<td>120,444</td>
<td>181,520</td>
<td>55,646</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Honolulu City

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA, CENSUS YEAR, AND AGE</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>PERSONS IN LABOR FORCE OR GAINFUL WORKERS</th>
<th>PERCENT OF POPULATION IN LABOR FORCE OR GAINFUL WORKERS</th>
<th>PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONS IN LABOR FORCE OR GAINFUL WORKERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Total Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HONOLULU CITY</strong> 1940</td>
<td>126,867</td>
<td>48,661</td>
<td>78,216</td>
<td>25,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total, 15 and over</td>
<td>126,867</td>
<td>48,661</td>
<td>78,216</td>
<td>25,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 and 15 years</td>
<td>126,867</td>
<td>48,661</td>
<td>78,216</td>
<td>25,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 and 17 years</td>
<td>126,867</td>
<td>48,661</td>
<td>78,216</td>
<td>25,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 and 19 years</td>
<td>126,867</td>
<td>48,661</td>
<td>78,216</td>
<td>25,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 and 24 years</td>
<td>126,867</td>
<td>48,661</td>
<td>78,216</td>
<td>25,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 to 34 years</td>
<td>126,867</td>
<td>48,661</td>
<td>78,216</td>
<td>25,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 to 44 years</td>
<td>126,867</td>
<td>48,661</td>
<td>78,216</td>
<td>25,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 to 54 years</td>
<td>126,867</td>
<td>48,661</td>
<td>78,216</td>
<td>25,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55 to 64 years</td>
<td>126,867</td>
<td>48,661</td>
<td>78,216</td>
<td>25,405</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Notes

1. Figures for 1920 and 1930 represent gainful workers.

2. Percent not shown where less than 0.1 or where base is less than 100.

3. Figures for 1940 and 1930 represent gainful workers.
### CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION

#### Table 11. — Age of Persons in the Labor Force, by Race and Sex, for the Territory and for Honolulu City: 1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Hawaiian</th>
<th>Part Hawaiian</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Filipino</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Other races</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>2,562</td>
<td>3,042</td>
<td>3,042</td>
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<tr>
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<td>753</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>753</td>
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<td>117</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>117</td>
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<td>779</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>779</td>
<td>117</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Asian</td>
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<td>3,107</td>
<td>2,562</td>
<td>3,042</td>
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#### Waipahu

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<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Filipino</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Other races</th>
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<td>134</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>12</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>180</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
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<td>210</td>
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</table>

#### Honolulu Total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
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<th>Part Hawaiian</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Filipino</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Other races</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>565</td>
<td>706</td>
<td>565</td>
</tr>
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<td>37</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2,252</td>
<td>1,874</td>
<td>2,252</td>
<td>1,874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>7,780</td>
<td>7,780</td>
<td>1,874</td>
<td>7,780</td>
<td>1,874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Male</td>
<td>4,321</td>
<td>1,625</td>
<td>1,230</td>
<td>1,625</td>
<td>1,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>3,459</td>
<td>1,627</td>
<td>1,644</td>
<td>1,627</td>
<td>1,644</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Honolulu City

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Hawaiian</th>
<th>Part Hawaiian</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Filipino</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Other races</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
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<td>748</td>
<td>438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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### Not reported

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<tr>
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<th>Filipino</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
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</tr>
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#### Pearl Harbor

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<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Other races</th>
</tr>
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### Not reported

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<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Filipino</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Other races</th>
</tr>
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### Table 13. Detailed Occupation of Employed Persons (except on Public Emergency Work), by Sex, for the Territory and for Honolulu City: 1940

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<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>4,267</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>403</td>
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<td>8,594</td>
<td>4,991</td>
<td>6,291</td>
<td>2,681</td>
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<tr>
<td>Authors, editors, and reporters</td>
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<td>48</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>31</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lawyers</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>17</td>
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<tr>
<td>Editors and reporters</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemists, engineers, and metallurgists</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clergymen</td>
<td>688</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College professors, physicians, and instructors</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dentists</td>
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<td>129</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Civil engineers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other technical engineers</td>
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<td>Electrical engineers</td>
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<td>Industrial engineers</td>
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<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lawyers and judges</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management and superintendence</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>283</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physicians and surgeons</td>
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<td>Pharmacists</td>
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<td>283</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>1,017</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>37</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teachers (n. e. c.)</td>
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<td>1,040</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer and data processing and recording</td>
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<td>1,017</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other professional workers</td>
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<td>1,040</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actuaries</td>
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<td>1,017</td>
<td>67</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accountants</td>
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<td>1,040</td>
<td>67</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auditors</td>
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<td>1,017</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>37</td>
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<td>Architects</td>
<td>1,063</td>
<td>1,040</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>37</td>
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<tr>
<td>Architectural and art teachers</td>
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<td>1,040</td>
<td>67</td>
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<td>Choral directors</td>
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<td>1,040</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teachers (n. e. c.) (excluding parochial teachers)</td>
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<td>1,040</td>
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<td>1,040</td>
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<td>Auditors</td>
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<td>1,017</td>
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<td>Architects</td>
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<td>1,040</td>
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<td>Architectural and art teachers</td>
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<td>1,040</td>
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<tr>
<td>Choral directors</td>
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<td>1,040</td>
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<td>1,040</td>
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<td>1,040</td>
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<td>Architectural and art teachers</td>
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<td>1,040</td>
<td>67</td>
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<td>Choral directors</td>
<td>1,084</td>
<td>1,017</td>
<td>67</td>
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<td>Chemists</td>
<td>1,063</td>
<td>1,040</td>
<td>67</td>
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<td>1,084</td>
<td>1,017</td>
<td>67</td>
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<td>1,040</td>
<td>67</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teachers (n. e. c.)</td>
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<td>1,040</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>37</td>
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<td>1,017</td>
<td>67</td>
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<tr>
<td>Teachers (n. e. c.)</td>
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<td>1,040</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- "M. e. c." means not elsewhere classified.
- Numbers may not add to totals due to rounding.
### CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION

#### Table 13.—Detailed Occupation of Employed Persons (Except on Public Emergency Work), by Sex, for the Territory and for Honolulu City: 1940—Continued

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<th>FEMALE</th>
<th>HONOLULU CITY</th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
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<td>Prop., managers, and officials, etc.</td>
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<td>72</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers and miscellaneous government officials</td>
<td>1,057</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers, United States</td>
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<td>72</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers, city</td>
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<td>72</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers, county and state</td>
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<td>72</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postmasters</td>
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<td>72</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other specified managers and officials</td>
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<td>72</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advertising agents</td>
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<td>576</td>
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<td>Clerks</td>
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<td>72</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goods and shippers and stevedores of livestock and other farm products</td>
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<td>72</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit managers</td>
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<td>72</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flour mill and flour millers, etc.</td>
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<td>72</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturers and superintendents, building and construction</td>
<td>1,057</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inspectors, federal, state, and county</td>
<td>1,057</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>576</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proprietors, managers, and officials (n. e. c.) by industry</td>
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<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar industry</td>
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<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
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<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>7,197,210</td>
<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and kindred products (exc. sugar)</td>
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<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bakery products</td>
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<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Newspaper industries</td>
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<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canning and preserving, fruits, vegetables, and sea food</td>
<td>7,197,210</td>
<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous food products (exc. sugar)</td>
<td>7,197,210</td>
<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing industries</td>
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<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building and construction</td>
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<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber and wood products</td>
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<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other manufacturing industries</td>
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<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation, communication, and other public utilities</td>
<td>7,197,210</td>
<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroads (incl. railroad repair shops)</td>
<td>7,197,210</td>
<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street railways and trolley lines</td>
<td>7,197,210</td>
<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raising and distributing</td>
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<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>7,197,210</td>
<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and retail trade</td>
<td>7,197,210</td>
<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesalers' and jobbers' lines</td>
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<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and dairy products stores, and milk rel.</td>
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<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General merchandise and variety stores</td>
<td>7,197,210</td>
<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug and drugstores</td>
<td>7,197,210</td>
<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous retail trade</td>
<td>7,197,210</td>
<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture and furnish. and equip. stores</td>
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<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor vehicles and accessories retailing</td>
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<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardware, farm implements, and building material retailing</td>
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<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General merchandise retail stores</td>
<td>7,197,210</td>
<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous personal services</td>
<td>7,197,210</td>
<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traveling and tour operators</td>
<td>7,197,210</td>
<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telephone and telegraph services</td>
<td>7,197,210</td>
<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunications</td>
<td>7,197,210</td>
<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>7,197,210</td>
<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities</td>
<td>7,197,210</td>
<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance, insurance, and real estate</td>
<td>7,197,210</td>
<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banking and trust offices</td>
<td>7,197,210</td>
<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real estate and related services</td>
<td>7,197,210</td>
<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance and real estate</td>
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<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal services</td>
<td>7,197,210</td>
<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundries and laundry services</td>
<td>7,197,210</td>
<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salaries and related services</td>
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<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous personal services</td>
<td>7,197,210</td>
<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public utilities</td>
<td>7,197,210</td>
<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplies and related services</td>
<td>7,197,210</td>
<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous industries and services</td>
<td>7,197,210</td>
<td>1,937,210</td>
<td>1,418,013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most inspectors in manufacturing industries are classified as operatives.
### Table 18—Detailed Occupation of Employed Persons (Except on Public Emergency Work), by Sex, for the Territory and for Honolulu City: 1940—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>THE TERRITORY</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>THE TERRITORY</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers—Continued</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masons, tile setters, and concrete finishers</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bricklayers, Stonemasons, and Carpenters</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stonecutters and stone carvers</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mechanics and repairmen, except automobile</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinists and engine drivers, except ship</td>
<td>1,467</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>1,467</td>
<td>289</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanics and repairmen, except ship</td>
<td>1,472</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>1,472</td>
<td>289</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Metalworkers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fabricators and construction and stoneworkers</td>
<td>1,338</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>1,338</td>
<td>454</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glaziers</td>
<td>1,181</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>1,181</td>
<td>454</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Painter, finishers, and scene painters</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>322</td>
<td>454</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Clerks and tellers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks and tellers</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>454</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operatives and kindred workers—Continued</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operatives and kindred workers—Continued</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other specified operatives and kindred workers</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photocopy process workers</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power station operators</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other specified operatives and kindred workers</td>
<td>4,973</td>
<td>3,783</td>
<td>2,190</td>
<td>1,948</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other operatives and kindred workers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other operatives and kindred workers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing (excl. metal)</td>
<td>4,973</td>
<td>3,783</td>
<td>2,190</td>
<td>1,948</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and kindred products not specified</td>
<td>4,973</td>
<td>3,783</td>
<td>2,190</td>
<td>1,948</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bakery products</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Beverages</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Canning and preserving fruits, vegetables, and fish</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>1,194</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Most products</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most products</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation and other public utilities</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroads (incl. railroad repair shops)</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Water transportation</td>
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<td>82</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous transportation</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
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<td>50</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Electrical light and power</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous industries</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Water and sanitary services</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Wholesale and retail trade</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and retail trade</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>301</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesalers and retailers not specified</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and kindred products stores and milk dealers</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apparel and accessories stores, except shoe</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>50</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent retail trade</td>
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<td>50</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and retail trade</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>50</td>
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<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>70</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Federal government</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal and municipal personal services</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amusement, recreation, and related services</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amusement, recreation, and related services</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Industry not reported</strong></td>
<td>19</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Domestic service workers** | 8,600 | 3,199 | 5,441 |

| Housekeepers, private family | 30 | 17 | 13 |
| Laundrymen and laundrywomen | 4,940 | 1,999 | 2,941 |

**Service workers, except domestic and professional** | 8,678 | 4,940 | 3,738 |

| Firemen, fire department | 30 | 17 | 13 |
| Guards and watchmen | 4,940 | 1,999 | 2,941 |
| Warehousemen (except salesmen) | 916 | 51 | 865 |
| Warehousemen (except salesmen) | 916 | 51 | 865 |
| Watchmen (except salesmen) | 30 | 17 | 13 |
| Policemen, sheriffs, and marshals | 4,940 | 1,999 | 2,941 |
| Policemen, sheriffs, and marshals | 4,940 | 1,999 | 2,941 |
| Probation officers and detectives, except government | 4,940 | 1,999 | 2,941 |
| Probation officers and detectives, except government | 4,940 | 1,999 | 2,941 |
| Sheriffs and bailiffs | 20 | 12 | 8 |
| Hotel, restaurant, and room attendants | 30 | 17 | 13 |
| Hotel, restaurant, and room attendants | 30 | 17 | 13 |
| Service workers, except domestic and professional | 4,615 | 2,952 | 1,663 |

**Missions and other religious institutions** | 8,678 | 4,940 | 3,738 |

| Attendants, boys and girls schools | 322 | 321 | 321 |
| Attendants, boys and girls schools | 322 | 321 | 321 |
| Chlorine and chlorine products | 322 | 321 | 321 |
| Chlorine and chlorine products | 322 | 321 | 321 |
| Lumber and timber workers | 322 | 321 | 321 |
| Lumber and timber workers | 322 | 321 | 321 |
| Porters | 9 | 5 | 4 |
| Porters | 9 | 5 | 4 |

* excludes operatives and clerical workers in "non-operatives and clerical workers" in this group, and workers who are classified with other workers in their respective occupations. In "Domestic service workers," includes housekeepers, private family, and laundrymen and laundrywomen.
## TABLE 13.—DETAILED OCCUPATION OF EMPLOYED PERSONS (EXCEPT ON PUBLIC EMERGENCY WORK), BY SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940—Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Honolulu City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers, except domestic and professional—Continued.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooks, except private family</td>
<td>821</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Servants, except private family</td>
<td>612</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wartime engineers</td>
<td>965</td>
<td>752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartenders</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waiters and waitresses, except private family</td>
<td>828</td>
<td>568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other service workers, except domestic and professional</td>
<td>987</td>
<td>896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attendants, professional and personal service (v. s. a. n. h.), etc.</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attendents, recreation and amusement</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steering boards and lifeboats and keepers</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confectioners, bakers, barmen, and barmen, except private family</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caterers, dining and refreshment</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others, amusement place or assembly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers and farm workers</td>
<td>58,097</td>
<td>5,481</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm foremen, except sugar industry</td>
<td>2,195</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm laborers, except sugar industry</td>
<td>45,792</td>
<td>1,927</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm laborers (wage workers), sugar industry</td>
<td>7,428</td>
<td>870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers (wage workers), except sugar industry</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm laborers (unpaid family workers), sugar industry</td>
<td>1,602</td>
<td>1,634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers, except farm and mines</td>
<td>14,150</td>
<td>1,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fisher and oystermen</td>
<td>1,672</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canners, except farm and vineyard</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Longshoremen and stevedores</td>
<td>1,290</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other specified laborers</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garbage collectors and our watchers and pest control</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumberers, rustlers, and woodchoppers</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teamsters</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers (v. s. a. n. h.), by industry</td>
<td>11,109</td>
<td>1,108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food industry, except dairy products</td>
<td>2,431</td>
<td>2,431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairy industry</td>
<td>1,598</td>
<td>1,608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture (ex. sugar)</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry, fishing, and mining</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining (ex. sugar)</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction and repair of buildings</td>
<td>3,214</td>
<td>1,246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing (ex. sugar)</td>
<td>1,691</td>
<td>636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and kindred products (ex. sugar)</td>
<td>1,139</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing and cooking utensins, furniture, and implements</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canning and preserving foods, vegetables</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyeing</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wearing apparel, millinery, and kindred industries</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairy products</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other specified food products</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ship and boat building and repairing</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation equipment</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber, furniture, and kindred industries</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper and allied products</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor not reported</td>
<td>972</td>
<td>826</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## TABLE 14.—MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP OF EMPLOYED PERSONS (EXCEPT THOSE ON PUBLIC EMERGENCY WORK), BY RACE AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY: 1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area, Major Occupation Group, and Sex</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Hawaiian</th>
<th>Part Hawaiian</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Filipinos</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Other races</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Hawaiian</td>
<td>Part Hawaiian</td>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>Filipinos</td>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>Other races</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>150,799</td>
<td>4,138</td>
<td>11,211</td>
<td>64,412</td>
<td>10,258</td>
<td>96,275</td>
<td>4,414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional workers</td>
<td>9,692</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>971</td>
<td>4,154</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>3,255</td>
<td>533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teachers and superintendents</td>
<td>10,513</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>1,543</td>
<td>4,507</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>3,642</td>
<td>582</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physicians, surgeons, and officials, except farm workers</td>
<td>11,572</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>1,899</td>
<td>5,182</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>3,539</td>
<td>603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical, sales, and kindred workers</td>
<td>10,272</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>1,732</td>
<td>4,199</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>3,390</td>
<td>532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operators and kindred workers</td>
<td>10,241</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>1,581</td>
<td>4,185</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>3,326</td>
<td>527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service and repair workers, except domestic</td>
<td>8,510</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>1,181</td>
<td>3,714</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>2,163</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm laborers (wage workers), except farm foremen</td>
<td>37,322</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>1,606</td>
<td>10,210</td>
<td>10,322</td>
<td>1,297</td>
<td>2,367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers, except farm and mine</td>
<td>9,998</td>
<td>1,389</td>
<td>1,772</td>
<td>3,143</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>2,205</td>
<td>433</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor not reported</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 14: Major Occupation Group of Employed Persons (Except Those on Public Emergency Work), by Race and Sex, for the Territory and for Honolulu City: 1940—Continued

#### PERCENT DISTRIBUTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA, MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP, AND SEX</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Hawaiian</th>
<th>Part Hawaiian</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Filipinos</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Other races</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Male</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional workers</td>
<td>2,475</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>2,070</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semiprofessional workers</td>
<td>738</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers and farm managers</td>
<td>1,904</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>1,920</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers, except domestic</td>
<td>1,058</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>1,092</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical, sales, and kindred workers</td>
<td>1,173</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>1,128</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operative and kindred workers</td>
<td>1,465</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>1,380</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers, except farm and mine</td>
<td>659</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers, except domestic</td>
<td>4,912</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>4,668</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers (rural workers) and farm foremen</td>
<td>979</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>909</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm laborers (unpaid family workers)</td>
<td>1,197</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>1,148</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers, except farm and mine</td>
<td>1,290</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>1,180</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Female** | | | | | | | |
| Professional workers | 4,702 | 113 | 4,589 | 114 | 113 | 113 | 113 |
| Semiprofessional workers | 1,822 | 12 | 1,732 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 |
| Farmers and farm managers | 1,861 | 79 | 1,782 | 81 | 79 | 79 | 79 |
| Service workers, except domestic | 1,778 | 195 | 1,586 | 195 | 195 | 195 | 195 |
| Clerical, sales, and kindred workers | 1,732 | 114 | 1,618 | 113 | 114 | 114 | 114 |
| Operative and kindred workers | 1,904 | 132 | 1,779 | 130 | 132 | 132 | 132 |
| Laborers, except farm and mine | 1,063 | 78 | 985 | 78 | 78 | 78 | 78 |
| Service workers, except domestic | 3,309 | 220 | 3,074 | 220 | 220 | 220 | 220 |
| Farmers (rural workers) and farm foremen | 1,321 | 12 | 1,313 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 |
| Farm laborers (unpaid family workers) | 1,152 | 20 | 1,132 | 20 | 20 | 20 | 20 |
| Laborers, except farm and mine | 1,231 | 17 | 1,214 | 17 | 17 | 17 | 17 |

#### HONOLULU CITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA, MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP, AND SEX</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Hawaiian</th>
<th>Part Hawaiian</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Filipinos</th>
<th>Japanese</th>
<th>Other races</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Male</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional workers</td>
<td>2,588</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>2,476</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semiprofessional workers</td>
<td>872</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers and farm managers</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>662</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers, except domestic</td>
<td>872</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical, sales, and kindred workers</td>
<td>872</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>856</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operative and kindred workers</td>
<td>1,017</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>999</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers, except farm and mine</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service workers, except domestic</td>
<td>2,017</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1,997</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmers (rural workers) and farm foremen</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm laborers (unpaid family workers)</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers, except farm and mine</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Female** | | | | | | | |
| Professional workers | 2,677 | 114 | 2,563 | 114 | 114 | 114 | 114 |
| Semiprofessional workers | 872 | 16 | 856 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Farmers and farm managers | 674 | 12 | 662 | 12 | 12 | 12 | 12 |
| Service workers, except domestic | 872 | 16 | 856 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Clerical, sales, and kindred workers | 872 | 16 | 856 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Operative and kindred workers | 1,017 | 16 | 999 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Laborers, except farm and mine | 587 | 16 | 571 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Service workers, except domestic | 2,017 | 16 | 1,997 | 16 | 16 | 16 | 16 |
| Farmers (rural workers) and farm foremen | 554 | 40 | 516 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 |
| Farm laborers (unpaid family workers) | 672 | 40 | 631 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 |
| Laborers, except farm and mine | 672 | 40 | 631 | 40 | 40 | 40 | 40 |
### Table 15.—Detailed Industry of Employed Persons (Except on Public Emergency Works), by Sex, for the Territory and for Honolulu City: 1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Territory</th>
<th>Honolulu City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Manufacturing (ex. sugar) — Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing (ex. sugar) — Continued</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile, except printing</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture, except plumbing</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture, except plumbing</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture, except plumbing</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture, except plumbing</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture, except plumbing</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture, except plumbing</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture, except plumbing</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture, except plumbing</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture, except plumbing</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture, except plumbing</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture, except plumbing</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture, except plumbing</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture, except plumbing</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture, except plumbing</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture, except plumbing</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Transportation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>6,740</td>
<td>6,150</td>
<td>6,740</td>
<td>6,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air transportation</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railways and railway express</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airlines and railway express</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railways and railway express</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railways and railway express</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railways and railway express</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Wholesale and retail trade

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale trade</td>
<td>5,365</td>
<td>5,365</td>
<td>5,365</td>
<td>5,365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and dairy products stores, and milk retail</td>
<td>1,928</td>
<td>1,928</td>
<td>1,928</td>
<td>1,928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug stores, and milk retail</td>
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<td>3,702</td>
<td>3,702</td>
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<td>General merchandise stores</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Appliance accessories stores</td>
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<tr>
<td>Furniture, and appliance stores, except stores</td>
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<tr>
<td>Home, furniture, and appliance stores</td>
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<td>1,363</td>
<td>1,363</td>
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<tr>
<td>Furniture and house furnishings stores</td>
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<td>705</td>
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<tr>
<td>Motor vehicle and accessory retailing</td>
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<td>Fixing stations, and accessory retailing</td>
<td>514</td>
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<td>514</td>
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<td>Fixing stations, and accessory retailing</td>
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<td>Fixing stations, and accessory retailing</td>
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<td>Fixing stations, and accessory retailing</td>
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#### Finance, insurance, and real estate

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<th>Industry</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Finance, insurance, and real estate</td>
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<td>1,611</td>
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<tr>
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<td>736</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Insurance</td>
<td>614</td>
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<td>Real estate</td>
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<td>588</td>
<td>588</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>614</td>
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<tr>
<td>Real estate</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>588</td>
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</table>
### Table 15.—Detailed Industry of Employed Persons (except on Public Emergency Work), by Sex, for the Territory and for Honolulu City: 1940—Continued

#### Industry

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<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>The Territory</th>
<th>Honolulu City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
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<tr>
<td>Business and repair services</td>
<td>7,434</td>
<td>159</td>
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<tr>
<td>Automotive storage, rental, and repair services</td>
<td>1,820</td>
<td>41</td>
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<tr>
<td>Business and repair services, exc. automobile</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advertising</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business services, except advertising</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>76</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interisland repair services and hand trade</td>
<td>864</td>
<td>26</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Personal services</strong></td>
<td><strong>8,128</strong></td>
<td><strong>942</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Domestic service</td>
<td>1,620</td>
<td>197</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brides and lodging places</td>
<td>963</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landscaping, cleaning, and dying services</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous personal services</td>
<td>945</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Amusement, recreation, &amp; related services</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,037</strong></td>
<td><strong>410</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theaters and motion pictures</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>206</td>
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<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous amusement and recreation</td>
<td>18,757</td>
<td>240</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>20,885</strong></td>
<td><strong>335</strong></td>
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* "N. c. e." means not elsewhere classified.

### Table 16.—Wage or Salary Income and Receipt of Other Income in 1939 for Experienced Persons in the Labor Force in 1940, by Class of Worker and Sex, for the Territory and for Honolulu City

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area, Wage or Salary Income in 1939, and Sex</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Without Other Income in 1939</th>
<th>With Other Income in 1939</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wage or salary workers</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private and non-</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>emergency</td>
<td>government</td>
<td>experienced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>government workers</td>
<td>labor force</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>153,960</td>
<td>124,961</td>
<td>28,538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1 to $999</td>
<td>10,378</td>
<td>7,815</td>
<td>1,013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,000 to $1,999</td>
<td>3,105</td>
<td>2,515</td>
<td>804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2,000 to $2,999</td>
<td>2,947</td>
<td>2,529</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$3,000 to $3,999</td>
<td>3,595</td>
<td>3,149</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$4,000 to $4,999</td>
<td>1,774</td>
<td>1,415</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$5,000 to $7,999</td>
<td>2,265</td>
<td>1,809</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$8,000 to $9,999</td>
<td>13,903</td>
<td>10,951</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10,000 or more</td>
<td>16,966</td>
<td>13,027</td>
<td>57,871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,000 to $1,999</td>
<td>4,481</td>
<td>3,782</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2,000 to $2,999</td>
<td>6,256</td>
<td>5,197</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$3,000 to $3,999</td>
<td>3,185</td>
<td>2,456</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$4,000 to $4,999</td>
<td>1,183</td>
<td>1,183</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not reported</td>
<td>1,171</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>398</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Female | | | | | | | |
| None | 157,937 | 128,937 | 28,538 | 156 | 240 | 30 |
| $1 to $999 | 10,378 | 7,815 | 1,013 | 112 | 37 | 10 |
| $1,000 to $1,999 | 3,105 | 2,515 | 804 | 24 | 12 |
| $2,000 to $2,999 | 2,947 | 2,529 | 345 | 30 | 3 |
| $3,000 to $3,999 | 3,595 | 3,149 | 345 | 30 | 3 |
| $4,000 to $4,999 | 1,774 | 1,415 | 112 | 12 | 3 |
| $5,000 to $7,999 | 2,265 | 1,809 | 88 | 12 | 3 |
| $8,000 to $9,999 | 13,903 | 10,951 | 88 | 12 | 3 |
| $10,000 or more | 16,966 | 13,027 | 57,871 | 60 | 6 |
| $1,000 to $1,999 | 4,481 | 3,782 | 108 | 12 |
| $2,000 to $2,999 | 6,256 | 5,197 | 60 | 6 |
| $3,000 to $3,999 | 3,185 | 2,456 | 108 | 12 |
| $4,000 to $4,999 | 1,183 | 1,183 | 108 | 12 |
| Not reported | 1,171 | 773 | 398 | 12 |

| Male | | | | | | | |
| With $1 or more | 629 | 373 | 252 | 156 | 240 |
| Female | | | | | | | |
| With $1 or more | 629 | 373 | 252 | 156 |

* Includes married for persons for whom the receipt or nonreceipt of other income in 1939 was not reported.
## CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION

### Table 16.—WAGE OR SALARY INCOME AND RECEIPT OF OTHER INCOME IN 1939 FOR EXPERIENCED PERSONS IN THE LABOR FORCE IN 1940, BY CLASS OF WORKER AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY—Continued

[Percent not shown where less than 0.1; median or percent not shown where base is less than 100]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>WAGE OR SALARY INCOME IN 1939, AND 93-40</th>
<th>WITHOUT OTHER INCOME IN 1939</th>
<th>WITH OTHER INCOME IN 1939</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WAGE OR SALARY WORKERS</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Privatc and non- emergeny government workers</td>
<td>Public emergency government workers</td>
<td>Privatc and non- emergeny government workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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</table>

### THE TERRITORY—Continued

#### Female—Continued.

<table>
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<th>AREA</th>
<th>WAGE OR SALARY INCOME IN 1939, AND 93-40</th>
<th>WITHOUT OTHER INCOME IN 1939</th>
<th>WITH OTHER INCOME IN 1939</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WAGE OR SALARY WORKERS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Privatc and non- emergeny government workers</td>
<td>Public emergency government workers</td>
<td>Privatc and non- emergeny government workers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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### HONOLULU CITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>WAGE OR SALARY INCOME IN 1939, AND 93-40</th>
<th>WITHOUT OTHER INCOME IN 1939</th>
<th>WITH OTHER INCOME IN 1939</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WAGE OR SALARY WORKERS</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Privatc and non- emergeny government workers</td>
<td>Public emergency government workers</td>
<td>Privatc and non- emergeny government workers</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOTAL</td>
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</tbody>
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### Notes

1. Includes statistics for persons for whom the receipt of nominal or other income in 1939 was not reported.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wage or salary workers</th>
<th>Other experienced persons in labor force</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Wage or salary workers</th>
<th>Other experienced persons in labor force</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Wage or salary workers</th>
<th>Other experienced persons in labor force</th>
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<tr>
<td>females</td>
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<tr>
<td>$1 to $499</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1 Includes statistics for persons for whom the receipt or nonreceipt of other income in 1938 was not reported.
### Table 17.—WAGE OR SALARY INCOME AND RECEIPT OF OTHER INCOME IN 1939 FOR PERSONS WHO WERE WAGE OR SALARY WORKERS (EXCEPT PUBLIC EMERGENCY WORKERS) IN 1940, BY MONTHS WORKED IN 1939 AND SEX, FOR THE TERRITORY AND FOR HONOLULU CITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA, WAGE OR SALARY INCOME IN 1939 AND SEX</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>WITHOUT OTHER INCOME IN 1939</th>
<th>WITH OTHER INCOME IN 1939</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Less than 6 &amp; not reported</td>
<td>6 to 12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE TERRITORY</td>
<td>3160</td>
<td>11,066 18,378 97,920 73,904 7,276 9,944 16,320 10,530</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Male

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WAGES OR SALARIES</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>WITHOUT OTHER INCOME</th>
<th>WITH OTHER INCOME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Less than 6 &amp; not reported</td>
<td>6 to 12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3160</td>
<td>11,066 18,378 97,920 73,904 7,276 9,944 16,320 10,530</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Female

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WAGES OR SALARIES</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>WITHOUT OTHER INCOME</th>
<th>WITH OTHER INCOME</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Less than 6 &amp; not reported</td>
<td>6 to 12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3160</td>
<td>11,066 18,378 97,920 73,904 7,276 9,944 16,320 10,530</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Hawaii

### Table 17: Wage or Salary Income and Receipt of Other Income in 1939 for Persons Who Were Wage or Salary Workers (Except Public Emergency Workers) in 1940, by Months Worked in 1939 and Sex, for the Territory and for Honolulu City—Continued

(Percent not shown where less than 0.1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area, Wage or Salary Income in 1939, and Sex</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Without Other Income in 1939</th>
<th>With Other Income in 1939</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>8 to 11 mos.</td>
<td>12 mos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>not reported</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HONOLULU CITY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>41,508</td>
<td>4,558</td>
<td>3,516</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1 to $99</td>
<td>1,852</td>
<td>1,247</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$100 to $199</td>
<td>3,108</td>
<td>1,016</td>
<td>262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$200 to $299</td>
<td>2,335</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$300 to $499</td>
<td>2,290</td>
<td>560</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$500 to $699</td>
<td>2,310</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$700 to $899</td>
<td>2,542</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$900 to $1,099</td>
<td>5,234</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,000 to $1,299</td>
<td>6,730</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,300 to $1,499</td>
<td>4,346</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,500 to $1,799</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,800 to $1,999</td>
<td>1,314</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2,000 to $2,999</td>
<td>1,654</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$3,000 or over</td>
<td>1,418</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1,324</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Not reported.

Median wage or salary income for persons with $1 or more.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area, Wage or Salary Income in 1939, and Sex</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Without Other Income in 1939</th>
<th>With Other Income in 1939</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8 to 11 mos.</td>
<td>12 mos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>not reported</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HONOLULU CITY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>55,828</td>
<td>3,308</td>
<td>7,719</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Not reported.

Median wage or salary income for persons with $1 or more.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area, Wage or Salary Income in 1939, and Sex</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Without Other Income in 1939</th>
<th>With Other Income in 1939</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8 to 11 mos.</td>
<td>12 mos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>not reported</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HONOLULU CITY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Not reported.

Percent distribution.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area, Wage or Salary Income in 1939, and Sex</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Without Other Income in 1939</th>
<th>With Other Income in 1939</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8 to 11 mos.</td>
<td>12 mos.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>not reported</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HONOLULU CITY</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Not reported.

1 Includes statistics for persons for whom the receipt or nonreceipt of other income in 1939 was not reported.
### Characteristics of the Population, by Counties: 1940 and 1930

**Table 18.**

#### Marital Status

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcounty</th>
<th>The Territory</th>
<th>Hawaii County</th>
<th>Honolulu County</th>
<th>Kauai County</th>
<th>Maui County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marital status</td>
<td>Male, 15 years old and over</td>
<td>117,662</td>
<td>96,079</td>
<td>11,615</td>
<td>10,972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single</td>
<td>66,126</td>
<td>52,459</td>
<td>5,795</td>
<td>3,661</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Married</td>
<td>51,536</td>
<td>43,329</td>
<td>5,720</td>
<td>3,582</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Widowed</td>
<td>5,036</td>
<td>4,742</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### School Attendance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcounty</th>
<th>The Territory</th>
<th>Hawaii County</th>
<th>Honolulu County</th>
<th>Kauai County</th>
<th>Maui County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Persons 6 years old and over</td>
<td>211,662</td>
<td>175,451</td>
<td>17,770</td>
<td>5,712</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number attending school</td>
<td>158,911</td>
<td>137,451</td>
<td>11,362</td>
<td>4,432</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons 7 to 15 years old</td>
<td>64,615</td>
<td>52,269</td>
<td>7,806</td>
<td>3,872</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number attending school</td>
<td>31,123</td>
<td>26,706</td>
<td>5,100</td>
<td>2,313</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons 16 years old and over</td>
<td>64,615</td>
<td>52,269</td>
<td>7,806</td>
<td>3,872</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number attending school</td>
<td>31,123</td>
<td>26,706</td>
<td>5,100</td>
<td>2,313</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Persons 2 years old and over

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcounty</th>
<th>The Territory</th>
<th>Hawaii County</th>
<th>Honolulu County</th>
<th>Kauai County</th>
<th>Maui County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-school years completed</td>
<td>106,590</td>
<td>93,510</td>
<td>7,410</td>
<td>6,670</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No school years completed</td>
<td>22,469</td>
<td>19,100</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>2,469</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school: 1 to 4 years</td>
<td>22,469</td>
<td>19,100</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>2,469</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 years or more</td>
<td>15,884</td>
<td>13,600</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>884</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school: 1 year</td>
<td>12,418</td>
<td>10,580</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>438</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 years or more</td>
<td>7,372</td>
<td>5,702</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>372</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College: 1 year</td>
<td>2,221</td>
<td>1,661</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>161</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 years or more</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>42</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Persons 2 years old and over

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcounty</th>
<th>The Territory</th>
<th>Hawaii County</th>
<th>Honolulu County</th>
<th>Kauai County</th>
<th>Maui County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No school years completed</td>
<td>78,448</td>
<td>63,388</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>6,560</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No school years completed</td>
<td>11,774</td>
<td>7,090</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,684</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade school: 1 to 4 years</td>
<td>11,774</td>
<td>7,090</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,684</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 years or more</td>
<td>11,526</td>
<td>7,560</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>2,560</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High school: 1 year</td>
<td>11,526</td>
<td>7,560</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>2,560</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 years or more</td>
<td>5,056</td>
<td>3,240</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>1,556</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College: 1 year</td>
<td>982</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>232</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 years or more</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No school years completed</td>
<td>53,000</td>
<td>43,300</td>
<td>6,700</td>
<td>2,900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No school years completed</td>
<td>9,560</td>
<td>7,440</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,680</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### Race and Nativity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subcounty</th>
<th>The Territory</th>
<th>Hawaii County</th>
<th>Honolulu County</th>
<th>Kauai County</th>
<th>Maui County</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population: 1900</td>
<td>209,324</td>
<td>92,200</td>
<td>50,080</td>
<td>64,900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native—all races</td>
<td>194,991</td>
<td>81,940</td>
<td>43,200</td>
<td>65,900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native—foreign born</td>
<td>5,333</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign born—first paper</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>151</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign born—no papers and not reported</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native—all races</td>
<td>179,068</td>
<td>60,348</td>
<td>29,700</td>
<td>49,900</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native—foreign born</td>
<td>5,333</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Characteristics of the Population

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Kauai County</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Race and Nativity</td>
<td>1900</td>
<td>92,200</td>
<td>50,080</td>
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<tr>
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<td>60</td>
<td>151</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>25</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Table 18. Composition of the Population, by Counties: 1940 and 1930

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>The Territory</th>
<th>Hawaii County</th>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign born—no papers and not reported</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 18.—AGE, RACE, AND SEX, BY COUNTIES: 1940 AND 1980

#### Hawaii County

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country and Age</th>
<th>Man</th>
<th>Woman</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii County</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Honolulu County

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country and Age</th>
<th>Man</th>
<th>Woman</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Kauai County

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country and Age</th>
<th>Man</th>
<th>Woman</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Maui County

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country and Age</th>
<th>Man</th>
<th>Woman</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Big Island County

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country and Age</th>
<th>Man</th>
<th>Woman</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 19.—AGE, RACE, AND SEX, BY COUNTIES: 1940 AND 1930—Continued

| County and age | Total | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female | Male | Female |
|----------------|-------|------|--------|------|--------|------|--------|------|--------|------|--------|------|--------|------|--------|------|--------|------|--------|------|--------|------|--------|------|--------|------|--------|------|--------|
| 1930           | 7064  | 3403 | 3661   | 2082 | 1580   | 813  | 473    | 2082 | 1580   | 813  | 473    | 2082 | 1580   | 813  | 473    | 2082 | 1580   | 813  | 473    | 2082 | 1580   | 813  | 473    |
| 1940           | 7214  | 3505 | 3709   | 2094 | 1620   | 894  | 497    | 2094 | 1620   | 894  | 497    | 2094 | 1620   | 894  | 497    | 2094 | 1620   | 894  | 497    | 2094 | 1620   | 894  | 497    |

注：
- 请提供完整的文档内容以便进行进一步的处理和分析。
## Hawaii

### Table 30—Persons 14 Years Old and Over, by Employment Status, Major Occupation Group, Industry Group, and Sex, by Counties: 1940

#### EMPLOYMENT STATUS, MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP, AND INDUSTRY GROUP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THE TERRITORY</th>
<th>HAWAII COUNTY</th>
<th>KAUAI COUNTY</th>
<th>OAHU COUNTY</th>
<th>MAUI COUNTY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### EMPLOYED (except on emergency work)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Persons 14 years old and over</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-64</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65-74</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-84</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85-94</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95+</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Not in labor force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Persons 14 years old and over</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-64</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65-74</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-84</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85-94</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95+</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 21.—Race and Age, by Sex, for Judicial Districts and Census Tracts, by Counties: 1940

| County, Judicial District, and Census Tract | Total | Race | Sex | Age | Under 5 | 5 to 9 | 10 to 14 | 15 to 19 | 20 to 24 | 25 to 29 | 30 to 34 | 35 to 39 | 40 to 44 | 45 to 49 | 50 to 54 | 55 to 59 | 60 to 64 | 65 to 69 | 70 to 74 | 75 to 79 | 80 to 84 | 85 and over | 15 to 19 | Male | Female |
|-------------------------------------------|----------------|------|-----|-----|--------|--------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| Hawai‘i County, 3rd Judicial District... | 72,747 | 48,808 | 215 | 6,703 | 4,543 | 3,906 | 2,987 | 2,035 | 1,586 | 1,283 | 1,112 | 956 | 858 | 750 | 640 | 530 | 420 | 320 | 220 | 120 | 68 | 20 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| Puna district... | 7,738 | 4,516 | 215 | 6,703 | 4,543 | 3,906 | 2,987 | 2,035 | 1,586 | 1,283 | 1,112 | 956 | 858 | 750 | 640 | 530 | 420 | 320 | 220 | 120 | 68 | 20 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| Keauka district... | 3,476 | 1,476 | 215 | 6,703 | 4,543 | 3,906 | 2,987 | 2,035 | 1,586 | 1,283 | 1,112 | 956 | 858 | 750 | 640 | 530 | 420 | 320 | 220 | 120 | 68 | 20 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| North Kohala district... | 5,269 | 5,269 | 215 | 6,703 | 4,543 | 3,906 | 2,987 | 2,035 | 1,586 | 1,283 | 1,112 | 956 | 858 | 750 | 640 | 530 | 420 | 320 | 220 | 120 | 68 | 20 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| North Kohala district... | 5,269 | 5,269 | 215 | 6,703 | 4,543 | 3,906 | 2,987 | 2,035 | 1,586 | 1,283 | 1,112 | 956 | 858 | 750 | 640 | 530 | 420 | 320 | 220 | 120 | 68 | 20 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| North Kohala district... | 5,269 | 5,269 | 215 | 6,703 | 4,543 | 3,906 | 2,987 | 2,035 | 1,586 | 1,283 | 1,112 | 956 | 858 | 750 | 640 | 530 | 420 | 320 | 220 | 120 | 68 | 20 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| North Kohala district... | 5,269 | 5,269 | 215 | 6,703 | 4,543 | 3,906 | 2,987 | 2,035 | 1,586 | 1,283 | 1,112 | 956 | 858 | 750 | 640 | 530 | 420 | 320 | 220 | 120 | 68 | 20 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| North Kohala district... | 5,269 | 5,269 | 215 | 6,703 | 4,543 | 3,906 | 2,987 | 2,035 | 1,586 | 1,283 | 1,112 | 956 | 858 | 750 | 640 | 530 | 420 | 320 | 220 | 120 | 68 | 20 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| North Kohala district... | 5,269 | 5,269 | 215 | 6,703 | 4,543 | 3,906 | 2,987 | 2,035 | 1,586 | 1,283 | 1,112 | 956 | 858 | 750 | 640 | 530 | 420 | 320 | 220 | 120 | 68 | 20 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| North Kohala district... | 5,269 | 5,269 | 215 | 6,703 | 4,543 | 3,906 | 2,987 | 2,035 | 1,586 | 1,283 | 1,112 | 956 | 858 | 750 | 640 | 530 | 420 | 320 | 220 | 120 | 68 | 20 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| North Kohala district... | 5,269 | 5,269 | 215 | 6,703 | 4,543 | 3,906 | 2,987 | 2,035 | 1,586 | 1,283 | 1,112 | 956 | 858 | 750 | 640 | 530 | 420 | 320 | 220 | 120 | 68 | 20 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| North Kohala district... | 5,269 | 5,269 | 215 | 6,703 | 4,543 | 3,906 | 2,987 | 2,035 | 1,586 | 1,283 | 1,112 | 956 | 858 | 750 | 640 | 530 | 420 | 320 | 220 | 120 | 68 | 20 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |
| North Kohala district... | 5,269 | 5,269 | 215 | 6,703 | 4,543 | 3,906 | 2,987 | 2,035 | 1,586 | 1,283 | 1,112 | 956 | 858 | 750 | 640 | 530 | 420 | 320 | 220 | 120 | 68 | 20 | 10 | 10 | 10 | 10 |

Note: The table provides a breakdown of the population demographics for different counties and judicial districts in Hawai‘i as of 1940. It includes data on race, age, and sex distribution for various census tracts, grouped by counties. The table is intended to provide insights into the characteristics of the population at that time.
### Table 21.—Race and Age, by Sex, for Judicial Districts and Census Tracts, by Counties: 1940—Con.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTY, JUDICIAL DISTRICT, AND CENSUS TRACTS</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Race</th>
<th>AGE (YEARS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5 to 9</td>
<td>10 to 14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honolulu County—Continued.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honolulu City—Con.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust 1.</td>
<td>4,429</td>
<td>3,023</td>
<td>872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust 2.</td>
<td>3,380</td>
<td>2,220</td>
<td>710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust 3.</td>
<td>2,329</td>
<td>1,425</td>
<td>494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust 4.</td>
<td>2,151</td>
<td>1,361</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust 5.</td>
<td>2,070</td>
<td>1,291</td>
<td>434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust 6.</td>
<td>2,029</td>
<td>1,243</td>
<td>418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust 7.</td>
<td>1,988</td>
<td>1,194</td>
<td>373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust 8.</td>
<td>1,959</td>
<td>1,182</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust 9.</td>
<td>1,931</td>
<td>1,159</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust 10.</td>
<td>1,909</td>
<td>1,151</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** This table provides a detailed breakdown of the race and age distribution by sex for Judicial Districts and Census Tracts, by Counties: 1940. It lists the total population for each category, along with subcategories for age groups ranging from 5 to 85 and over, and for each sex within the county trusts. The data is organized in a tabular format, providing a clear and structured view of the demographic information. The table is part of a larger report, likely focused on statistical analysis and population demographics.
### CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION

#### TABLE 21.—RACE AND AGE, BY SEX, FOR JUDICIAL DISTRICTS AND CENSUS TRACTS, BY COUNTIES: 1940—Con.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTY, JUDICIAL DISTRICT, AND CENSUS TRACT</th>
<th>TOTAL POPULATION</th>
<th>SEX MALES</th>
<th>SEX FEMALES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenned  County—Continued</td>
<td>32,815</td>
<td>16,969</td>
<td>15,846</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washoe County</td>
<td>10,825</td>
<td>5,179</td>
<td>5,646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washoe district</td>
<td>8,579</td>
<td>4,267</td>
<td>4,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washoe district—Continued</td>
<td>38,495</td>
<td>20,389</td>
<td>18,106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carson district</td>
<td>2,086</td>
<td>1,047</td>
<td>1,039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clark County</td>
<td>10,496</td>
<td>5,271</td>
<td>5,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clark County—Continued</td>
<td>23,555</td>
<td>11,919</td>
<td>11,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elko County</td>
<td>7,475</td>
<td>3,737</td>
<td>3,738</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elko County—Continued</td>
<td>15,795</td>
<td>7,933</td>
<td>7,862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eureka County</td>
<td>5,721</td>
<td>2,929</td>
<td>2,792</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eureka County—Continued</td>
<td>11,845</td>
<td>5,902</td>
<td>5,943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humboldt County</td>
<td>3,295</td>
<td>1,637</td>
<td>1,658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humboldt County—Continued</td>
<td>6,873</td>
<td>3,412</td>
<td>3,461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lake County</td>
<td>2,990</td>
<td>1,505</td>
<td>1,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lake County—Continued</td>
<td>6,098</td>
<td>3,044</td>
<td>3,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyon County</td>
<td>1,420</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lyon County—Continued</td>
<td>2,932</td>
<td>1,463</td>
<td>1,469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mineral County</td>
<td>1,381</td>
<td>693</td>
<td>688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mineral County—Continued</td>
<td>2,841</td>
<td>1,420</td>
<td>1,421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nye County</td>
<td>1,392</td>
<td>692</td>
<td>698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nye County—Continued</td>
<td>2,845</td>
<td>1,424</td>
<td>1,421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pershing County</td>
<td>1,162</td>
<td>581</td>
<td>581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pershing County—Continued</td>
<td>2,365</td>
<td>1,181</td>
<td>1,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storey County</td>
<td>1,333</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storey County—Continued</td>
<td>2,730</td>
<td>1,366</td>
<td>1,364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washoe County—Continued</td>
<td>32,815</td>
<td>16,969</td>
<td>15,846</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Notes:
- *Table 21:* Race and age, by sex, for judicial districts and census tracts, by counties: 1940—Con.
- *Columns:* Total population, sex males, sex females.

#### Source:
- *Baker, Canton, Enderby, Howland, Jara, Johnstone, and Midway Islands.*

*Commissions with Washoe City.*
### TABLE 31.—RACE AND AGE, BY SEX, FOR JUDICIAL DISTRICTS AND CENSUS TRACTS, BY COUNTIES: 1940—Con.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTY, JUDICIAL DISTRICT, AND CENSUS TRACT</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Sex</th>
<th>Race and Age, By Sex and Race</th>
<th>Age 30 and Under</th>
<th>15 to 24</th>
<th>25 to 34</th>
<th>35 to 44</th>
<th>45 to 54</th>
<th>55 to 64</th>
<th>65 to 74</th>
<th>75 and over</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>12,058</td>
<td>3,997</td>
<td>3,495</td>
<td>2,718</td>
<td>1,014</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>12,058</td>
<td>3,997</td>
<td>3,495</td>
<td>2,718</td>
<td>1,014</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiian</td>
<td>12,058</td>
<td>3,997</td>
<td>3,495</td>
<td>2,718</td>
<td>1,014</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kauai</td>
<td>12,058</td>
<td>3,997</td>
<td>3,495</td>
<td>2,718</td>
<td>1,014</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>95</td>
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<td>Other races</td>
<td>12,058</td>
<td>3,997</td>
<td>3,495</td>
<td>2,718</td>
<td>1,014</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>604</td>
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<td>24,116</td>
<td>7,994</td>
<td>6,990</td>
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<td>850</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>348</td>
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### TABLE 22.—COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION, FOR CITIES OF 5,000 TO 100,000: 1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CITY</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Nonwhite</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Honolulu</td>
<td>72,360</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>1,520</td>
<td>78,880</td>
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<td>Pearl Harbor</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>41,000</td>
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### MALE, ALL AGES

- Under 5 years: 1,593,000
- 5 to 9 years: 1,383,000
- 10 to 14 years: 1,216,000
- 15 to 19 years: 1,073,000
- 20 to 24 years: 939,000
- 25 to 29 years: 799,000
- 30 to 34 years: 672,000
- 35 to 39 years: 584,000
- 40 to 44 years: 496,000
- 45 to 49 years: 408,000
- 50 to 54 years: 322,000
- 55 to 59 years: 241,000
- 60 to 64 years: 165,000
- 65 to 69 years: 101,000
- 70 to 74 years: 51,000
- 75 to 79 years: 20,000
- 80 to 84 years: 10,000
- 85 years and over: 5,000

### MARITAL STATUS

- Married: 9,419,000
- Married: 8,419,000
- Widowed: 1,000,000
- Divorced: 9,000,000
- Separated: 5,000,000

### FEMALE, 15 YEARS OLD AND OVER

- Married: 2,460,000
- Widowed: 3,000,000
- Divorced: 1,000,000
- Separated: 500,000

The data includes the composition of the population for cities of 5,000 to 100,000, focusing on the age distribution and marital status.
### CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION

#### TABLE 23.—PERSONS 14 YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY EMPLOYMENT STATUS, MAJOR OCCUPATION GROUP, INDUSTRY GROUP, AND SEX, FOR CITIES OF 5,000 TO 100,000: 1940

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<tr>
<th>Major occupation group</th>
<th>Industry group</th>
<th>City size</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
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<td>Industry group</td>
<td>14 years</td>
<td>Total population aged</td>
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EXHIBIT NO. 135

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE CONCERNING TIME OF 27 AND 28 Nov 41 WAR DEPARTMENT WARNING MESSAGES TO HAWAII AND REPLIES THERETO

1. 27 Nov Marshall warning message (Exhibit 32, p. 7)
   received in War Dept code room—6:00 P. M. Washington time; 12:30 P. M. Hawaii time
   filed in War Dept signal center—6:11 P. M. Washington time; 12:41 P. M. Hawaii time
   received in Hawaii signal center—6:46 P. M. Washington time; 1:16 P. M. Hawaii time
   decoded in Hawaii—7:52 P. M. Washington time; 2:22 P. M. Hawaii time
   Received in Hawaii: 1:16 P. M. 27 Nov—Short (APHB Tr. 420); Phillips (Roberts Tr. 220)
   Phillips took to Short about 2:30 P. M. 27 Nov—Dunlop (Clausen Rep. 65)
   Short immediately talked it over with Phillips and made alert decision—Short (APHB Tr. 282)
   Decided on alert in "a very few minutes"—Short (APHB Tr. 520)
   Put Alert No. 1 into effect within 30 minutes—Short (Navy Court Tr. 241)

2. 27 Nov G-2 warning message (Exhibit 32, p. 10)
   received in War Dept code room—6:06 P. M. Washington time; 12:36 P. M. Hawaii time
   received in Hawaii signal center—7:14 P. M. Washington time; 1:44 Hawaii time
   decoded in Hawaii—9:30 P. M. Washington time; 4:00 P. M. Hawaii time
   Fielder doesn't recall whether he showed G-2 message to Phillips and Short before or after Alert No. 1 was ordered—Fielder (Roberts Tr. 311)
   Fielder had already taken action under Alert No. 1 before 4:00 P. M. staff conference; G-2 message was decoded at 4:00 P. M., was not presented to staff conference but only to Phillips and Short—Fielder (Roberts Tr. 312-12)
   Alert decision based on Marshall message, without G-2 message—Phillips (APHB Tr. 1116, 1131)
   "Subsequent" message from G-2 seemed to confirm action—Phillips (APHB Tr. 1128)
   "Subsequent" G-2 message taken by Short as tacit approval of alert against sabotage—Phillips (APHB Tr. 1131, 1142)

3. 27 Nov Short reply to Marshall warning (Exhibit 32, p. 12)
   encoded in Hawaii—11:10 P. M. 27 Nov, Washington time; 5:40 P. M. 27 Nov Hawaii time
   filed in Hawaii signal center—11:35 P. M. 27 Nov Washington time; 6:05 P. M. 27 Nov Hawaii time
   received in War Dept code room—5:57 A. M. 28 Nov Washington time; 12:27 A. M. 28 Nov Hawaii time
   Short answered within 30 minutes—Short (APHB Tr. 395, 420)

4. 28 Nov Adjutant General sabotage warning (Exhibit 32, p. 13)
   filed in War Dept signal center—8:42 P. M. 28 Nov Washington time; 3:12 P. M. 28 Nov Hawaii time
   decoded in Hawaii—4:25 A. M. 29 Nov Washington time; 10:55 P. M. 28 Nov Hawaii time*
   Short considered as reply to his report of 27 Nov, felt it indicated tacit consent to alert against sabotage—Short (APHB Tr. 111, 345, 422; Roberts Tr. 48, 50)
   No doubt that War Dept was fully cognizant of Short's 27 Nov report when Adj Gen message was sent—Short (APHB Tr. 296)
   War Dept came back only with more sabotage, so Short thought they approved what he was doing—Short (APHB Tr. 421; Navy Court Tr. 244-46)
   Sabotage messages caused Short to feel War Dept agreed with his own judgment that greatest danger was internal—Short (APHB Tr. 430)
   Alert ordered prior to receipt of Adj Gen sabotage message—Phillips (Roberts Tr. 229-21)

*Not shown on available document; data taken from testimony of Hain (APHB Tr. 3310-11).

79716 O—46—pt. 18—21
5. 28 Nov Arnold sabotage warning (Exhibit 32, p. 14)
   received in War Dept code room—8:15 P. M. Washington time; 2:45 P. M. Hawaii time
   Short saw before Martin did—Martin (Roberts Tr. 346-47)
6. 29 Nov Short reply to Adjutant General sabotage warning (Exhibit 32, p. 17)
   encoded in Hawaii—8:15 P. M. 29 Nov Washington time; 2:45 P. M. 29 Nov Hawaii time
   filed in Hawaii signal center—8:47 P. M. 29 Nov Washington time; 3:17 P. M. 29 Nov Hawaii time
   received in War Dept code room—12:57 A. M. 30 Nov Washington time;
   7:27 P. M. 29 Nov Hawaii time
7. 4 Dec Martin-Short reply to Arnold, sabotage warning (Exhibit 32, p. 19)
   filed in Hawaii signal center—6:21 P. M. 4 Dec Washington time; 12:51 P. M. 4 Dec Hawaii time
   received in War Dept code room—1:24 P. M. 10 Dec Washington time;
   7:54 A. M. 10 Dec Hawaii time
SECRET

RADIOGRAM

TELEGRAM

OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

PRIORITY

COMMANING GENERAL, HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
FORT SHAFTER, T.H.

NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN APPEAR TO BE TERMINATED TO ALL

PRACTICAL PURPOSES WITH ONLY THE RAREST POSSIBILITIES THAT THE JAPANESE
GOVERNMENT MIGHT COME BACK AND OFFER TO CONTINUE PERIOD JAPANESE FUTURE
ACTION UNPREDICTABLE BUT HOSTILE ACTION POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT PERIOD
If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided this United
States desires that Japan commit the first overt act period this policy
should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a
Course of action that might jeopardize your defense period prior to hostile
Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other
measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so
as not comma repeat not comma to alarm civil population or disclose intent
Period report measures taken period should hostilities occur you will carry
out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan period
Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential
Officers

MARSHALL

WAR DEPARTMENT MESSAGE CENTER: PLEASE SEND SAME RADIOGRAM TO:
COMMANING GENERAL, CARIBBEAN DEFENSE COMMAND,
QUARRY HEIGHTS, C.Z.

SECRET

[stamped] CODE SECTION
W.D.M.C.
1941 NOV 27 PM 6:00

[handwritten] ready to send
at this time
DRV
The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in Code.

SECRET

P1 WAR PR5Y

WASHINGTON D.C. 611PM NOV 27 1941

C O

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

472 37TH

NEGOTIATIONS WITH JAPAN APPEAR TO BE TERMINATED TO ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES WITH ONLY THE BAREST POSSIBILITIES THAT THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT MIGHT COME BACK AND OFFER TO CONTINUE STOP JAPANESE FUTURE ACTION UNPREDICTABLE BUT HOSTILE ACTION POSSIBLE AT ANY MOMENT STOP IF HOSTILITIES CANNOT COMMENCE REPEAT CANNOT COMMENCE BE AVOIDED THE UNITED STATES DESIRES THAT JAPAN COMMIT THE FIRST OVERT ACT STOP THIS POLICY SHOULD NOT COMMENCE REPEAT NOT COMMENCE BE CONSTRUED AS RESTRICTING YOU TO A COURSE OF ACTION THAT MIGHT JEOPARDIZE YOUR DEFENSE STOP PRIOR TO HOSTILE JAPANESE ACTION YOU ARE DIRECTED TO UNDERTAKE SUCH RECONNAISSANCE AND OTHER MEASURES AS YOU DEEM NECESSARY BUT THESE MEASURES SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT SO AS NOT COMMENCE REPEAT NOT COMMENCE TO ALARM CIVIL POPULATION OR DISCLOSE INTENT STOP REPORT MEASURES TAKEN STOP SHOULD HOSTILITIES OR URGE YOU WILL CARRY OUT THE TASKS ASSIGNED IN RAINBOW FIVE SO FAR AS
The following message was received at Radio Station WTJ in CODE.

SECRET CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED

THEY PERTAIN TO JAPAN STOP LIMIT DISSEMINATION OF THIS HIGHLY SECRET INFORMATION TO MINIMUM ESSENTIAL OFFICERS

MARTHA

116P/27

(SECRET )
Received as a (CONFIDENTIAL) communication
(RESTRICTED )
(Strike out two)

Decoded by

LT J M - 9/8
2259 23 27 1943

Answer should be marked "ANSWER to Code Message No. 472 27".

NOTE: See AR 330-8 and 236-8 for handling messages of this classification.
SECRET

WASHINGTON, D.C., Oct. 27, 1941

To Commanding General, U.S. Army in Hawaii

JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE COME TO PRACTICAL END.
STOP HOSTILITIES MAY ENSUE. STOP SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES MAY
BE EXPECTED STOP INFORM COMMANDING GENERAL AND CHIEF OF
STAFF ONLY

Drop

War Dept G-2 file copy
stamped on back:

"CODE SECTION
W. D. M. C.
1941 NOV 27 PM 6:06"
MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Request that the following official radiogram be sent. This message does not cover or refer to a matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or in a different security classification.

ᐋ(include text not applicable).

Sent as Radiogram Message Center Time Filed Check Code Clerk
No. 959-21 L

Approved for Transmission:

[Signature]
Adjutant General

NOTE: This form to be used only for Radiograms and Cablesgrams. One copy only to be submitted. The making of an exact copy of Secret or Confidential Radiograms is forbidden. Only such non-identifying copies as are absolutely necessary will be made and marked 'copy' or 'Confidential' as the case may be. This copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care and when no longer required will be returned to the Records Division, Adjutant General's Office, without delay. (AR 360-5)
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

P 9 J RADIOMATIC 0-4-0

605B

Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D.C.

PRIORITY NOVEMBER 20, 1941

From PONT SHAPTER TH

To CHIEF OF STAFF

NO. 959 NOVEMBER 27TH

REPORT DEPARTMENT ALERTED TO PREVENT SABOTAGE PERIOD

LIASON WITH NAVY REURAD FOUR SEVEN TWO TWENTY SEVENTH

SHORT

46 A GO

REC'D 8 DEC 1941

Received

NOTED

ROOM, WPD 10/18

Action Copy

RUST, NOV 20 1941
HEAL JARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT ADJUTANT GENERAL:

Request that the following official radiogram be sent. This message does NOT cover subject matter previously sent in a message, either in the clear or having a different security classification.

Priority

*Strike out words not applicable.

Sent as Radiogram Message Center Time Filed Check Code Clerk

114 MAR KR 139 MD PRTY

NASH DC 842P MUX 28 1941

C Q

HASA DEPT FT SHAFTER T H

482 28TH CRITICAL SITUATION DEMANDS THAT ALL PRECAUTIONS BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY AGAINST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES WITHIN FIELD OF INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF DEPARTMENT PASSED PARAGRAPHS THERE WID SO THIRTY DAM FORTY FIVE END PAREN

STOP ALSO DESIRE THAT YOU INITIATE FORTNIGHTLY ADDITIONAL MEASURES NECESSARY TO PROVIDE FOR PROTECTION OF YOUR ESTABLISHMENTS COMMA PROPERTY COMMA AND EQUIPMENT AGAINST SABOTAGE COMMA PROTECTION OF YOUR PERSONNEL AGAINST SUBVERSIVE PROPAGANDA AND PROTECTION OF ALL ACTIVITIES AGAINST ESPIONAGE STOP THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT ANY ILLEGAL MEASURES ARE AUTHORIZED STOP PROTECTIVE MEASURES SHOULD BE CONFINED TO THOSE ESSENTIAL TO SECURITY COMMA AVOIDING UNNECESSARY PUBLICITY AND ALARM STOP TO INSURE SPEED OF TRANSMISSION IDENTICAL TELEGRAAMS ARE BEING SENT TO ALL AIR STATIONS BUT THIS DOES NOT REPEAT BUT AFFECT YOUR RESPONSIBILITY UNDER EXISTING INSTRUCTIONS

TRUE COPY

C M CÔTELL

LT COL EPMTHY

NOTE: This form to be used only for Radiograms and Cablesgrams. One copy only to be submitted. The making of an exact copy of Secret or Confidential Radiograms is forbidden. Only such extracts as are absolutely necessary will be made and marked secret or confidential as the case may be. This copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care and when no longer required will be returned to the Records Division, Adjutant General's Office, without delay. (AR 500-4)
ATTENTION COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE PEARL HARBOR.

AS FOLLOWS BE ISSUED TO ALL DEPARTMENT AND UNIT COMMANDERS:

DESIGNED ACTION AGAINST THIS UNPREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED END.

RESPONSIBILITY OF THE WAR DEPARTMENTHang ARTILLERY, 155-MM.

FIVE POINTS DESIGNING THIS SPECIAL ACTIVITIES TO BE DETAINED.

ONCE ILSGO IT IS REWARDED YOUR COMMANDANTS IMMEDIATELY.

YOU IMMEDIATELY PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS:

SUGGESTIVE PROPAGANDA AGAINST PROTECTION, AND THE TACTICAL INCIDENT.

PROTECTION AGAINST SPANISH, IF YOU, WITHOUT PROCEEDING ANY COMMUNICATIONS.

THIS DOES NOT MEAN ANY AUTHORITY ON THE INCIDENT.

AND PUBLICITY PROTECTIVE INCIDENT UNDER PROCEED.

HERE IT IS ALSO SEEN THAT ON THE COMMANDANTS IMMEDIATELY.

THE CHIEF AUTHORITY OUTLINE THE FOLLOWING:

PERIOD SHOWN ABOVE.

Official - Secret

Adjutant General.

[stamped] CODE SECTION

W. D. H. C.

1941 NOV 28 PM 8:15
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON D. C.

RE: YOUR SECRET RADIO FOR EIGHT TWO TWENTY EIGHT COMMA FULL PRECAUTIONS ALL READY
TAKEN AGAINST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE FIELD OF INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITY
OF WAR DEPARTMENT PARAGRAPH THREE MID THIRTY DASH FORTY FIVE AND PARAGRAPHS
AND MILITARY ESTABLISHMENTS INCLUDING PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT STOP AS REGARDS PROTECTION
OF VITAL INSTALLATIONS OUTSIDE OF MILITARY RESERVATIONS SUCH AS POWER PLANTS COMMET
TELePHONE EXCHANGES AND HIGHWAY BRIDGES COMMA THIS HEADQUARTERS BY CONFIDENTIAL
LETTER DATED JUNE NINETEEN NINETEEN FORTY ONE REQUESTED THE GOVERNOR OF THE TERRITORY
TO USE THE BROAD POWERS VESTED IN HIM BY SECTION SIXTY SEVEN OF THIS ORGANIC ACT WHICH
PROVIDES COMMA IN EFFECT COMMA THAT THE GOVERNOR MAY CALL UPON THE COMMANDERS OF
MILITARY AND NAVAL FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII TO PREVENT
OR SUPPRESS LAWLESS VIOLENCE COMMA INVASION COMMA INSURRECTION STOP FURNISH TO
THE AUTHORITY STATED THE GOVERNOR ON JUNE TWENTY CONFIDENTIALLY MADE A FORMAL
WRITTEN DEMAND ON THIS HEADQUARTERS TO FURNISH AND CONTINUE TO FURNISH SUCH ADEQUATE

NOTE: This form to be used only for Radiograms and Cablesgrams. One copy only to be submitted. The making of an exact
copy of Secret or Confidential Radiograms is forbidden. Only such extracts as are absolutely necessary will be made
and signed on a separate sheet as the case may be. This copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care and when
no longer required will be returned to the Records Division, Adjutant General’s Office, without delay. (AD 1162-31)

The Adjutant General

Approved for Transmission

Date: 8/2/42
PAGE TWO

PROTECTION AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO PREVENT SABOTAGE COMA AND LAWLESS VIOLENCE IN CONJUNCTION THERewith COMA BEING COMMITTED AGAINST VITAL INSTALLATIONS AND STRUCTURES IN THE TERRITORY STOP PURSUANT TO THE FOREGOING REQUEST APPROPRIATE MILITARY PROTECTION IS NOW BEING AFFORDED VITAL CIVILIAN INSTALLATIONS STOP IN THIS CONNECTION COMA AT THE INDICATION OF THIS HEADQUARTERS THE CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU ON JUNE THIRTIETH NINETEEN FOURTY WAS ELECTED IN COUChANCE WHICH PERMITS THE COMMISSION GENERAL HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT COMA TO CLOSE JUNEAU IN PREVENT THE USE OF AND TRAVEL UPON COMA ANY HIGHWAY WITHIN THE CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU COMA

WHENEVER THE COMMISSION GENERAL DEEMS SUCH ACTION NECESSARY IN THE INTEREST OF NATIONAL DEFENSE STOP THE AUTHORITY THEREFORE GIVEN HAS NOT YET BEEN LARcular STOP RELATIONS WITH F B I AND ALL OTHER FEDERAL AND TERRITORIAL OFFICIALS ARE AND HAVE BEEN CORDIAL AND MUTUAL COOPERATION HAS BEEN GIVEN IN ALL PARTY MATTERS

ENC 500 BY

SHORT

LT J ENGELSBAK S0
2001 29 NOV 11

NOTE: This form to be used only for Radiograms and Cablegrams. One copy only to be submitted. The making of an asset copy of Secret or Confidential Radiograms is forbidden. Only such extracts as are absolutely necessary will be made and marked secret or confidential as the case may be. This copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care and when no longer required will be returned to the Records Division, Adjutant General's Office, without delay. (AR 880-8)
Memorandum No. 986. November 29th.

To your secret radio four eight two twenty

Eighth, full precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of war dept parol paragraph three mid sc thirty dash forty five end parol and military establishments including personnel and equipment. As regards protection of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power plants, telephone exchanges and highway bridges, this orders by confidential letter dated June nineteen nineteen forty one requested the governor of the territorial to use the broad powers vested in him by section sixty seven of the organic act which provides in effect that the governor may call upon the commander of military and naval forces of the united states in territory of hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection etc. Pursuant to this authority stated the governor on June twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand on this basis to furnish and continue to furnish such aid.
PROTECTION AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO PREVENT SABOTAGE, AND LAWLESS VIOLENCE IN CONNECTION THEREWITH, BEING COMMITTED AGAINST VITAL INSTALLATIONS AND STRUCTURES IN THE TERRITORY. PURSUANT TO THE FOREGOING REQUEST APPROPRIATE MILITARY PROTECTION IS NOW BEING AFFORDED VITAL CIVILIAN INSTALLATIONS. IN THIS CONNECTION, AT THE INSTIGATION OF THIS HEADQUARTERS THE CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU ON JUNE THIRTIETH NINETEEN FORTY ONE ENACTED AN ORDINANCE WHICH PERMITS THE CHIEF OF THE HAWAIIAN DEPT., TO CLOSE, OR RESTRICT THE USE OF AND TRAVEL UPON, ANY HIGHWAY WITHIN THE CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU, WHENEVER THE COMMISSIONER DEEMS SUCH ACTION NECESSARY IN THE INTEREST OF NATIONAL DEFENSE. THE AUTHORITY GIVEN HAS NOT YET BEEN EXERCISED. RELATIONS WITH FBI AND ALL OTHER FEDERAL AND TERRITORIAL OFFICIALS ARE AND HAVE BEEN CORDIAL AND MUTUAL COOPERATION HAS BEEN GIVEN ON ALL PERTINENT MATTERS.

SHORT.
11 WTJ

RADIOGRAM

1281F/49th

Received at the War Department Message Center Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

DECEMBER 10, 1941

124P  M.

From  PT SHAPERO TH

To  CHIEF ARMY AIR CORPS

RECEIVED

HQ, USAF, AIR A.G.

DECEMBER 4TH

RECEIVED

NO. 1035

FOLLOWING REPORT IN COMPLIANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN
AGMAP FOUR EIGHT FOUR DASH TWENTY EIGHT COLON INSTRUCTIONS
CONTAINED IN SUBJECT RADIOGRAM ISSUED TO ALL ESTABLISHMENTS AND
UNITS UNDER CONTROL OF HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE ON TWENTY NINE NOVEMBER
STOP ENTIRE SUBJECT OF PROTECTION RECENTLY RECEIVED COMMA AND
CONTINUES TO RECEIVE COMMA DETAILED AND COMPREHENSIVE ATTENTION
AS RESULT OF THREE REPORTS REPAKED BY SPECIAL INSPECTOR DURING
JUNE AND JULY STOP ONE STOP ADDITIONAL STEPS INITIATED
SPECIFICALLY TO COMPLY WITH SUBJECT RADIOGRAM SUBSTANTIALLY AS
FOLLOWS: COLON ASSEMBLY OF INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS OF MAJOR SUBDIVISION
OF HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE TWENTY NINE NOVEMBER STOP PERSONAL
INSPECTION OF STATIONS AND ACTIVITIES BY AIR FORCE COMMANDER
ONE AND TWO DECEMBER STOP INCREASE IN SIZE OF GUARD WHERE
DESIRABLE STOP INSTRUCTIONS ISSUED TO EXPEDITE OVERHAULING OF
PASS SYSTEM COMMA CIVILIAN AND MILITARY COMMA NOW IN PROGRESS STOP
THIS ENTIRE DEPARTMENT IS NOW OPERATING AND WILL CONTINUE TO
OPERATE UNDER AN ALERT FOR PREVENTION OF SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES STOP
PARA SEGREGATE DISCIPLINE BEING GIVEN ALL EMPHASIS PRACTICABLE
THROUGH OFFICIAL AND QUASI OFFICIAL AGENCIES STOP WORK HAS
ACTUALLY BEGUN ON ESSENTIAL PROTECTIVE FENCING AND FLOOD
LIGHTING PROJECTS STOP/PAKA WITH REFERENCE TO COUNTER PROPAGANDA COMMA THE PROBLEM IS EDUCATIONAL RATHER THAN REGULATORY AND AT PRESENT IS BEING DEALT WITH THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF SQUADRON TALKS STOP NEED IS FELT FOR A WAR DEPARTMENT PUBLICATION PAREN POSSIBLY IN FORM OF DEVELOPMENT AND EXPANSION OF FOREWORD TO SOLDIERS HANDBOOK COMMA PM TWENTY ONE DASH ONE HUNDRED PAREN SUITABLY ARRANGED AND ORDERED FOR USE OF RELATIVELY INEXPERIENCED PERSONNEL COMMA DEALING WITH STATUS OF SOLDIER AS CITIZEN COMMA IDEALS AND DOCTRINES INFLUENCING FOUNDRERS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT COMMA STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT COMMA PLACE OF MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IN THE STRUCTURE COMMA NATIONAL OBJECTIVES COMMA WITH DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL COMMA TOGETHER WITH DISCUSSION OF THOSE FORMS OF GOVERNMENT INIMICAL TO DEMOCRATIC FORM TOP SIGNED MARTIN END SHORT
EXHIBIT NO. 136

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER,
Washington, November 19, 1941.

Memorandum to Mr. Harvey H. Bundy, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War
Subject: Performance of SCR-270

1. There is attached a copy of a memorandum from the Department Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, relative to the operation of Radio Set SCR-270 in the Hawaiian Islands, which is forwarded for your information.

/S/ Eugene V. Elder
EUGENE V. ELDER,
Lt. Col. Signal Corps.

Memorandum for Colonel Colton, Chief, Matériel Branch.

In recent exercises held in the Hawaiian Department, the operation of the radio set SCR-270 was found to be very satisfactory. This exercise was started approximately 4:30 in the morning and with three radio sets in operation. We noted when the planes took off from the airplane carrier in the oscilloscope. We determined this distance to be approximately 80 miles, due to the fact that the planes would circle around waiting the assemblage of the remainder from the carrier.

As soon as the planes were assembled, they proceeded towards Hawaii. This was very easily determined and within six minutes, the pursuit aircraft were notified and they took off and intercepted the incoming bombers at approximately 30 miles from Pearl Harbor.

It was a very interesting exercise. All the general officers present were highly pleased with the proceedings of the radio direction finding sets and the personnel associated with the information centers.

We have had very little trouble with the operations of these sets. When the fixed stations are installed in the higher mountains surrounding Hawaii, we expect to have as good an air warning system available for use as is now operating for the British on their tight little island, as their situation is approximately the same as ours is on Hawaii.

C. A. POWELL,
Lt. Col. Signal Corps,
Department Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department.

EXHIBIT NO. 137

WAR DEPARTMENT

Classified Message Center Outgoing Clear Message

OPD 381 Haw (19 Nov 45)
Operations Div WDGS Current
Group WDOPD 74676
19 November 1945.

COMGENAFMIDPAC Ft Shafter T H
Information:
CINCAFPAC Admin Manila P I
Number: WCL 22214
From: WARSEC

Congressional Pearl Harbor Committee desires all orders and memoranda pertaining to time schedule for operation of and training at radar stations in Hawaiian Department during the period 27 November 41 to 7 December 41. Some evidence here indicates that schedule was initiated by verbal order on 27 November 41. In that case confirmatory written order or memorandum is requested.

End.

ORIGINATOR: OPD
MC-OUT-22214 (Nov 45) DTG 201810Z 1s
Unclassified

79716 O—46—pt. 18—22
Radio Message Dated 21 November 1945 From CG AFMIDPAC, Ft. Shafter, TH to War Department

[Paraphrase]

Will forward by air mail on 21 November four original papers relating to time schedule for radar stations' operation and training in Hawaiian Department from 27 November to 7 December 1941.

[Description of the four papers is omitted.]
SUBJECT: Operating Time Schedule for Radar Stations on Oahu from 27 November 1941 to 7 December 1941.

TO: The Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington 25, D. C.

ATTENTION: AG of S, Operations Division.

References: (a) Radio, Nr: WCL-22214, DTG: 201834Z Nov 45, from the Secretary of War to the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific.
(b) Radio, Nr: RJ-73381, DTG: 212004Z Nov 45, from the Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, Middle Pacific, to the War Department, Operations Division.

1. Inclosures are forwarded to furnish information requested by reference (a) and referred to in reference (b), both above.

2. An exhaustive search through the files designated under Headquarters Hawaiian Department has not disclosed the publication of Official Orders of any kind in connection with the time schedule of training at, or the operation of radar stations on Oahu during the period prior to 7 December 1941.

3. The inclosures consistently show that the time schedule, effective 27 November 1941, placed the aircraft warning radar stations on Oahu in tactical operation from 4:00 A. M. to 7:00 A. M. each day. Except for Sunday, operation was continued for training from 7:00 A. M. to 11:00 A. M., while the afternoon period, from 12:00 noon to 4:00 P. M., was set aside for routine maintenance duties.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL:

4 Incls:
#1 - Affidavit of Lt Grover C. White, Jr., Signal Corps.
#2 - Memorandum to the Department Signal Officer, Signed by W. H. Tetley, Captain, Signal Corps.
SECRET

(Basic: Ltr, HAPMIDP.4C, file MFGT AG 413.684, sub: "Operating Time Schedule for Radar Stations on Oahu from 27 November 1941 to 7 December 1941.

*3 - Memorandum to General Short, dated 19 December 1941, signed by C. A. Powell, Lt Colonel, Signal Corps.

*4 - Letter, Hq Hawaiian Department, subject: "Detector Operation", dated 20 December 1941, signed by Lt Colonel W. H. Murphy, Signal Corps.
SECRET

Port Shafter, T. H.) Personally appeared before me, the undersigned, as authority for administering oaths of this nature, one

1. At the request of the Control Officer and Naval Liaison Officer the AWS agreed to operate its detectors beyond the daily period of two hours before until one hour after dawn. The first schedule required operation of all stations from 4 A.M. to 6 P.M. This schedule was modified to the hours of 4 A.M. to 4 P.M. A temporary schedule was next devised which required all stations to operate from 4 A.M. to 11 A.M. and to have "staggered" operation, i.e., 3 stations from 11 A.M. to 1 P.M., the remaining 3 stations from 1 P.M. to 4 P.M. On Saturday, December 6, 1941, I contacted the Control Officer to request authority to have all stations operate from 4 A.M. to 7 A.M. only on Sunday, December 7, 1941; this was agreed to by the Control Officer.

2. Staff Sergeant Stanley J. Wichas, SCAMH, acting RDF Officer, reports that he saw nothing that could be construed as suspicious in the information received by the AWS Information Center from 4 A.M. to 7 A.M. Sunday, December 7, 1941. This is verified by Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, Air Corps, who was the only officer in the Information Center from 4 A.M. to 7 A.M.

3. At approximately 7:20 A.M. a report was received from a Detector station at Opana that a large number of planes was approaching Oahu on a course North 3 degrees East at a distance of approximately 132 miles. This information was immediately transmitted by the switchboard operator, Pfc. Joseph L. Donaldson to Lt. Tyler, who talked to Opana about the flight. The statement of Pfc. Joseph L. Donaldson, SCAMH, the switchboard operator is attached.

4. The Navy Liaison Officer's position within the Information Center was not named when I reached the Information Center at about 8:20 A.M. This position was named shortly thereafter by Technical Sergeant Merle E. Stouffer, SCAMH, who remained on the position until approximately 4:30 P.M. when the position was taken over by Naval Officers.

Further the deponent sayeth not.

[Signature]
Grover C. Hite, Jr.
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps,
Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, "Hawaii.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of June 1941

at Fort Shafter, T. H.

[Signature]
Ada M. Ruggles
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps,
Summary Court.

Invol. #1 to Rule HAFMIDPAC, File WPDCT AGK7.684(21 Nov 45) dated 21 Nov 45, subject: Operating Time Schedule for Radar Stations on Oahu from 27 November 1941 to 7 December 1941.

SECRETO
MEMO: To Department Signal Officer.

The instructions given me verbally by Colonel Murphy were to operate from Dawn-2 to Dawn+2, which at that time was from 04:00 to 07:00. This schedule was supplemented by a training schedule from 07:00 to 11:00 everyday except Sunday. The afternoon period was devoted to routine maintenance.

W. H. TETLEY,
Captain, Signal Corps.

SECRET

Inst #2 to HAPMIDPAC Ltr, file HE05T AG 413.684 (21 Nov 45), dtd 21 Nov 45, subj: Operating Time Schedule for Radar Stations on Oahu from 27 November 1941 to 7 December 1941.
In reply refer to: HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT Office of the Signal Officer
Fort Shafter, T. H.

19 December 1941.

Memorandum to General SHORT:

1. Instructions were issued by Lt Col W. H. MURPHY Acting Depart-
ment Signal Officer to Capt W. H. TETLEY, C. O. Sig Co A.W.H. on November
27 to start immediately operating the radio locators from two hours
before dawn to one hour after dawn which order was complied with to
include December 7.

2. This schedule was supplemented by a training schedule from 7:00 A
to 11:00 A every day except Sunday. The afternoon period was devoted to
routine maintenance.

C. A. POWELL
Lt Col, Signal Corps
Dept Signal Officer

SECRET

Incl 3 to HAFMIDPAC Ltr,
file MPOCT AG 413.684 (21 Nov 45), std 21 Nov 45,
subj: Operating Time Schedule for Radar Stations
on Oahu from 27 November 1941 to 7 December 1941.
In reply refer to:

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
Office of the Signal Officer
Fort Shafter, T. H.

20 December, 1941.

SUBJECT: Detector Operation.

TO: Department Signal Officer.

1. On November 27, 1941, after conference with Assistant Chief of Staff G-3, and receiving instructions to operate all mobile detectors from two hours before before dawn until one hour after dawn, I, as Acting Department Signal Officer, gave immediate instructions to Captain TETLEY, Commanding Officer of the Aircraft Warning Company, to initiate the above detector operation so long as Alert No. 1 was in force.

2. The detectors in question operated daily thereafter during the prescribed period except when having occasional operational trouble. In addition, the six detector stations operated daily except Sundays from 7:00 A.M. until 11:00 A.M. for routine training. Daily except Saturday and Sunday, the hours 12:00 noon until 4:00 P.M. were devoted to training and maintenance work.

W. H. MURPHY
Lt Col, Sig C.
CONFIDENTIAL

Basic: (Lt. B.S., 2d August 1941, "Study of the Air Situation in Hawai".)

AG 361/884 14th
1st Ind.

MEMORANDUM For: ALLAN W. THOMAS, Fort Leavenworth, K. S., August 1941. To:
Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.

I agree in this study.

[Signature]

WILLIAM J. SMITH,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Chief of Staff.

[Signature]

Date (1941).
EXHIBIT NO. 139

CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

EXHIBIT NO. 139

1. Summary of Situation

a. With the fall of the Third Konoye Cabinet, the 16th instant, tension in the Pacific reached a new high. The fall of said cabinet is apparently primarily due to a breakdown of the rapprochement negotiations between America and Japan, and also due to extreme pressure from the rightist elements in Japan as a result of German success against Russia, and also for fear of complete encirclement of Japan by the ABCD group.

b. The situation is generally admitted as being extremely critical, and is still necessarily uncertain, due to the fact that the formation of the new cabinet has not been completed and, consequently, little or no definite information is available as to the attitude of individual members, and nothing as to what the attitude of the cabinet as a whole will be.

c. Based upon contemporary opinions from various sources, however, it is fairly certain that Japan's basic policy, as heretofore frequently stated, will remain unchanged; and it is expected that Japan will shortly announce her decision to challenge militarily any nation or combination of nations which might oppose the execution of said policies - irrespective of what means she may choose to adopt or course she may decide to take in their achievement.

2. Conclusions

According to present indications, it is highly probable that Japan will, in the near future, take military action in new areas of the Far East. The primary reasons for such a move or moves are believed to be as follows:

A. Capabilities

1. Desperate economic conditions internally-making it perhaps preferable to risk a major foreign war rather than internal revolution.

2. Violent opposition by the "rightist" elements who are opposed to any appeasement of the democracies and desire more active cooperation with the Axis - for the time being.

3. That major successes of the Axis in Europe and the potential collapse of Russian resistance, afford an unparalleled opportunity for expansion with chances of minimum resistance - that is, when the strength of the Axis is at its maximum, and the strength of the democracies not yet fully mobilised.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

4. A desire to break the so-called entwined-ment of the ABCD block.

b. Probable Moves. The most likely moves which Japan may make in the near future, and the sequence thereof, are as follows:

1. Attack Russia from the east.

2. Pressure French Indochina and Thailand for concessions in the way of military, naval, and air bases, and guarantees of economic cooperation.

3. Attack British possessions in the Far East.

4. Defend against an American attack in support of the British.

5. Attack simultaneously the ABCD block which ever points might promise the greatest tactical, strategic, and economic advantages.

c. Reasons Justifying These Moves. The basis for each of the above possible moves are considered to be as follows:

1. Attack on Russia.

(a) Japan's desire to extend her first line of defense as far to the west as possible as a primary defense against potential aerial attacks on the heart of Japan proper by a continental power.

(b) To set up a buffer state between herself and Germany (assuming that Germany will eventually attempt to extend her influence and control eastward to the Pacific.)

(c) To secure immense quantities of much-needed raw materials known to be in Siberia.

(d) To secure effective control over, or perhaps stamp out, communism in the Far East by striking at the root or source of the doctrine.

(e) A possibility that an attack on Russia at this time can be undertaken with a reasonable chance of non-military intervention by the United States; and that even the British might not resort to active military action in support of Russia in the Pacific, due to the fact that both the Americans and British are preoccupied in Europe, and that neither power has any genuine desire to ever see the state of the USSR emerge sufficiently strong to again place the democratic states with the sinister ideals of communism.
(f) To open communications with Germany for the purpose of closer cooperation and supply, in case it becomes necessary to continue the war against other Pacific powers.

(g) To achieve a spectacular victory which is now greatly needed to revive the morale of the people and prepare them for future efforts toward the south.


Pressure on French Indo-China and Thailand for concessions of military, naval, or air bases, and guarantee of economic cooperation, is entirely to be expected, and this may either precede or follow, or occur simultaneously with an attack on Russia, in order to insure security in the south while her primary objective in the north is being achieved; and to afford her more and better strategic bases from which she can operate against Ch'ungking's lines of communication, and/or American and British lines of communications in case it becomes necessary to defend herself against either or both of these powers. Also, to secure additional raw materials, food, etc.


Following the principle of defeating one opponent at a time - famous with her Axis partner, Hitler - it is believed that Japan, if faced with certain British military resistance to her plans, will unhesitatingly attack the British, and do so without a simultaneous attack on American possessions, because of no known binding agreement between the British and Americans for joint military action against Japan, and that the American public is not yet fully prepared to support such action. However, it must be evident to the Japanese that in case of such an attack on the British, they would most certainly have to fight the United States within a relatively short time.

4. Simultaneous Attack on the ABCD Powers

While a simultaneous attack on the ABCD powers would violate the principle mentioned above, it cannot be ruled out as a possibility for the reason that if Japan considers war with the United States to be inevitable as a result of her actions against Russia, it is reasonable to believe that she may decide to strike before our naval program is completed.

An attack on the United States could not be undertaken without almost certain involvement of the entire ABCD block, hence there remains the possibility that Japan may strike at the most opportune time, and at whatever point she might gain for her the most strategic, tactical, or economical advantages over her opponents.
3. In conclusion, barring unforeseen and untoward incidents, which might set off a conflict in any quarter and invite measures and countermeasures never contemplated, it is believed that the above represents the most logical major moves that Japan may take and the probable sequence thereof. This is assuming that the new cabinet will be, as generally predicted, "strongly military" and will support the present demands of the "rightists" elements which were largely responsible for the fall of the Third Kenyōs cabinet.

GEORGE W. BICKNELL
Lt. Colonel, G.3.C.
Asst. A.C. of S., G-3
Contact Officer.

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G-2 ESTIMATE OF INTERNATIONAL (JAPANESE) SITUATION

I. Summary of Situation. Reference paragraph 1, G-2 Estimate of the
International (JAPANESE) Situation, 1200 Oct. 17, 1941, there have been no
fundamental changes in the international situation, centering on Japan,
since the time mentioned; and the estimate is still in almost complete
accord with contemporary opinions of most high officials and reputable
observers who are known to be in close touch with the various phases of
the present fast moving situation. However, the following generally sum-
mary is considered appropriate at this time:

a. A crisis of the first magnitude was created in the Pacific by the
fall of the Third Konoye Cabinet on the 16th instant. The fall of said
cabinet was allegedly precipitated by unsatisfactory progress of the rappro-
chement negotiations between America and Japan, and by extreme pressure
from "rightist" elements who have been clamoring for stronger ties with the
Axis and more forceful opposition to the ABCD block, including Russia.

b. An apparently imminent collapse of the Russian forces in the west,
together with the loudly proclaimed German successes everywhere, tended to
accentuate the cry for action on the side of the Axis to such a degree that
the Konoye cabinet could no longer resist, hence resigned on block, and was
almost immediately replaced by a new cabinet headed by ex-War Minister,
General Tojo.

c. Ministers of the new cabinet, as well as Premier Tojo, have
openly declared their intentions of stronger ties with the Axis - which
automatically underscores Japan's policies with "Intensified aggression";
definitely places Japan in a camp hostile to the United States and other
democracies; makes all protestations of peaceful intentions a sham or
objective of suspicion; and forces America into a state of constant vigi-
lance - but at least clarifies the situation to such an extent that we do
know where we stand, what to expect, and what should be done.


However, several important incidents have transpired, or are
scheduled to take place, which are certain to have a profound bearing on
the probable course of events in question in the near future. These are:

a. The formation of a new Japanese "War Cabinet", headed by ex-War
Minister, General Tojo.

b. The decision of Premier to continue his predecessor's order to
permit three Japanese vessels to visit American ports for the purpose of
transporting stranded Americans and Japanese nationals to their respective
homelands.

c. Premier Tojo's expressed desire to continue rapprochement nego-
 tiations with the United States.

v. The order by the navy department to American vessels to avoid
Asianic ports in the north Pacific, including Shanghai.

e. The announced decision of the American government to abandon
Vladivostok as a port of entry for war supplies to Russia, and to adopt
the port of Archangel as the sole point of entry for such shipments.
1. Announcement of Ambassador Nomura's return to Japan for consultation with the new cabinet.

2. Justifications for conclusions. The following is a brief analysis and evaluation of the above, based on limited reports, and is not to be regarded as conclusive, but rather to assist in making accurate conclusions on the general situation as subsequent events and special situations are presented:

a. New Cabinet. Paragraph 1 above is the general answer. The only other noteworthy viewpoint received, and considered to be worth mentioning, is that General Tojo was selected to head the new cabinet because he was the only man considered capable of controlling the "extremist" army elements, and thus stave off any precipitate action untill such time as the situation in Europe has become definitely clear, and until at least a decisive stage has been reached in rapprochement negotiations with the United States.

b. Japanese vessels to America. The Japanese government's decision to permit three ships to visit America for the purpose of repatriating stranded nationals of both countries, may be regarded either as a peaceful gesture or as a measure to "clear the decks" in the Pacific with a view to future naval and military moves. It will be recalled that the Japanese were careful to remove Japanese nationals from the interior of south China before spreading military operations to that section. It is considered impracticable to remove all Japanese nationals from America and American territories.

c. Rapprochement Negotiations. Inasmuch as the new Japanese cabinet has openly declared its intentions of stronger ties with the Axis -- definitely our enemy -- we can only expect Japan to make a similar use of peace negotiations as her partner, Hitler, i.e., as a means to delude and disarm her potential enemies. From a military point of view such peaceful overtures should be preceded by concrete evidence of sincerity before they can be seriously considered.

d. Navy Order to Clear American Ships from North Pacific. This action on the part of the navy seems to have been largely "precautionary", which also appears fully justified -- realizing that we are now definitely dealing with an exponent and ally of Hitler.

2. Abandonment of Vladivostok as a Port of Entry for Russian Supplies. Two issues are here involved:

(1) Military. The crucial point as to whether we will be able to continue to face Hitler across the English Channel, across the Atlantic, or on American shores, centers in the British Isles. Convoys must cross the Atlantic in order to hold the British Isles at all cost, irrespective of what happens in the Pacific. Convoys to Archangel, for the greater part of the distance, could be carried on incidental to convoys going to the British Isles. Requirements of armed escorts for the remaining distance to Archangel, would probably be less than what would be required over any Pacific route. In fact, with a hostile Japanese fleet in the Pacific, any practicable route across the Pacific to Russia may have been entirely ruled out. Assuming this to be the case, the most logical step would be not to undertake a thing that would certainly have to be abandoned later.

(2) Diplomatic. Inasmuch as the shipping of supplies to Russia via Vladivostok has been one of the major issues between America and Japan recently, the abandonment of said route may serve to keep the door of diplomacy open for a longer period; and, in case of an unforeseen major reverse for the Axis in Europe, might provide an open door for successful negotiations at a time when Japan desired to change her mind, seeing that further ties with the Axis are useless, and that a compromise with the democracies has become inevitable.
f. Nosura's report to New Cabinet. This is considered a very normal procedure with the Japanese government. Mr. Nosura will be expected to give a review of his efforts in Washington and perhaps the last word on the American attitude. If his previous work is still in harmony with Japan's new policy, he may return to Washington. If not, it seems a fair assumption that he may not even be replaced. In case the abnormal procedure is followed, of dispatching a subordinate to Tokyo, it may be taken as an attempt to conceal the real gravity of the situation. This is not, however, a prediction.

* * * * *

REMARKS. Everyone is interested in the answer to the question, When will Japan move? - a question which no one dares predict with certainty. However, the following points are considered to be worthy of mentioning:

A. Things which tend to indicate that a major move will not take place for approximately another month are:

(1) The dispatch of Japanese vessels to the United States for return of stranded nationals of both countries to their respective homelands.

(2) Ambassador Nosura's return to Japan for purpose of reporting to the new cabinet.

(3) Repeated declarations by Japanese officials that Japan desires to continue rapprochement negotiations.

(4) Extreme cold over Eastern Siberia makes military operations against Russia very risky before spring.

(5) A protracted Russo-German war seems much more likely now than it did immediately prior to the assumption of office by the new cabinet, and that the "rightists" who were crying for action against a "collapsing" Russia, may again hesitate to take the final plunge on the side of Hitler. If the intense cold plus a tired Russian army is able to stop the invincible legions of Hitler before Moscow (5), wisdom may dictate not to risk the matchless legions of Nippon against a rested Russian army under temperatures still lower than around Moscow.

(6) Announcement that Cabinet leaders have requested Emperor Hirohito to convocate a special five-day session of the Imperial Diet, beginning Nov. 15, at which time, it is predicted, the government will be asked to clarify its stand on international policies, particularly with reference to former Premier Konoye's message to President Roosevelt and the progress of the Washington negotiations.

In other words, it seems logical to believe that no major move will be made before the latter part of November - in any direction - with a chance that the great break, if it comes, will not occur before spring.

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MEMORANDUM

To the J.A.G.

Will you kindly give me your opinion on a further question—in addition to that embodied in the opinion—viz.

If Mr. Short's proposed application for voluntary retirement were accepted, with the announced understanding that such action would not preclude a future court martial for the alleged offenses in the Pearl Harbor, would that be valid—could a subsequent court martial be validly brought, should it be found advisable?

11-2-5
WAR DEPART. ENT
OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

To Secretary of War.

Judge Advocate General's
recommendations referred

Walter C. Short.

S.P.M.
MEMORANDUM for the Chief of Staff.

Subject: Course of action with respect to General Walter Campbell Short.

1. Pursuant to your instructions I submit the following comments with respect to possible courses of action against the above-named officer on account of the derelictions disclosed in the report of the President's Commission to investigate the Japanese attack on Hawaii on December 7, 1941. These comments are based solely upon the text of the report of the Commission. I have not seen or examined the 1867 typewritten pages of testimony taken by the Commission nor the 3000 printed pages of records and documents examined by it.

2. General Short may be tried by a general court-martial or he may be summarily discharged from the Army by the President pursuant to the provisions of Article of War 118.

3. With reference to trial by general court-martial, it is assumed that the evidence taken by the Commission sustains its findings of fact and conclusions and would warrant such procedure should it be deemed advisable. However, it is impossible to predict with certainty the result of any trial or the sentence which the court might impose. In this case should a court acquit or impose a sentence less than dismissal I can see no advantage resulting from such a trial. It will be noted that the offenses charged against General Short are offenses of omission or nonfeasance which require a much stronger showing to justify a trial than those involving misfeasance or malfeasance. General Short's nonfeasance or omissions were based on an estimate of the situation which, although proved faulty by subsequent events, was, in so far as I am able to ascertain from the report of the Commission, made or concurred in by all those officers in Hawaii best qualified to form a sound military opinion. That estimate was that an attack by air was in the highest degree improbable.

4. There are, in my opinion, serious questions of policy which should be considered in connection with a possible trial of this officer by general court-martial.

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CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

a. If a court should find him guilty and sentence him to anything less than dismissal, the Army would be accused of whitewashing General Short. This accusation would be much more strongly made should the trial result in his acquittal.

b. Such trial would have to be in open court, otherwise the War Department would be subject to criticism of whitewashing General Short if acquitted, or of persecuting him if convicted.

c. The ramifications of this case are such that in a trial by court-martial it would be necessary to introduce in evidence numerous secret plans, orders and other papers which do not appear in the Commission's report. Both the prosecution and the defense would need these documents in order properly to present their cases. It certainly would be against the public interest to disclose some, at least, of these various war plans and documents. Such being the case, it would be impossible to prevent the publication of these plans and documents except by closing the court during those sessions in which these secret papers were read and discussed. The result of a trial by a court partly in open session and partly in secret session might be that the War Department would be subject to the same charges of whitewashing or persecution as referred to in subparagraph b above.

d. A general court-martial would require the time and energy for a considerable period of a large number of generals and other officers of high rank as members of the court-martial, and for personnel of the prosecution and defense. It would consume much time and effort of the numerous officers of the Army and Navy whose services would be required in order properly to present the case for trial, or whose attendance would be required as witnesses. The ramifications of such a trial would be so great and it would require the time of so many officers from the lowest to the highest rank that it would interfere seriously in the main job now before the War Department, namely the prosecution of the war.

e. The career of General Short as an active Army officer is finished and closed. Because of the lack of confidence which the public now has in him, which lack of confidence would no doubt be shared by his future subordinates, it is unthinkable that any command should again be entrusted to him. General Short knows this. That in itself is a very severe punishment. Furthermore, General Short has been relieved of his command which reduces him from a lieutenant general to a major general. The addition to that punishment of any punishment other than dismissal, such as a reprimand, loss of files, forfeiture of pay or suspension from

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a command, would be inappropriate.

5. For the President to discharge General Short summarily under the provisions of Article of War 118 would tend even more strongly than a dismissal by a sentence of a general court-martial to enable him afterward to claim persecution. Revised Statutes, section 1244, provides that when an officer is 62 years old he may be retired from active service at the discretion of the President. General Short will be 62 years old on March 30, 1942. However, it is unnecessary to discuss this course of action for the reason that you have informed me that General Short has offered to apply for retirement at any time you may desire to accept it. He may lawfully be retired upon such application.

6. General Short entered the Army as a second lieutenant of Infantry on February 2, 1901, and had, up to December 7, 1941, nearly 41 years of honorable and most creditable service. He reached the next to the highest rank that an Army officer can reach, namely that of a lieutenant general.

/. I realize that the question of what ought to be done in this matter has been the subject of heated discussion in the press and elsewhere and whatever may be done will probably subject the War Department to criticism. However, in view of all the considerations hereinabove discussed, I respectfully suggest the advisability and the desirability of accepting the application of General Short for retirement. However, in this connection I would further suggest that it would be both politic and just to coordinate the action taken by the War Department with that taken by the Navy Department in the case of Admiral Kimmel.

Myron C. Cramer
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.

CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM for the Secretary of War.

Subject: Course of action with respect to Major General Walter Campbell Short.

1. After considering my memorandum for the Chief of Staff of January 27, 1942, on the above subject, you have asked me a further question, as follows:

"If General Short's proposed application for voluntary retirement were accepted, with the announced understanding that such action would not preclude a future court martial for the alleged offenses in re Pearl Harbor, would that be valid - Could a subsequent court martial be validly brought, should it be found advisable?"

2. A retired officer is as a matter of law still an officer of the Army and still subject to court-martial as much as though he were still on the active list (A.W. 2a; Nat'l Defense Act, sec. 2; 10 U.S. C. 4). Neither does his retirement amount to a break in the continuity of his service which would prevent his trial after retirement for an offense committed before retirement (Dig. Op. JAG 1912, p. 992, par 1 G 2b). The real question involved is whether the retirement of an officer on his own application constitutes a condonation of his offense, barring trial for it.

3. There are opinions of this office to the effect that under certain circumstances release from arrest or confinement or promotion may constitute such a condonation. I find no precedent holding either way with respect to retirement. Retirement after thirty years' service upon the officer's own application under section 1243, Revised Statutes (10 U.S.C. 943; Mil. Laws, sec. 326), is "in the discretion of the President". The foregoing is one of the two statutes under which General Short may be retired at once on his own application. If he be retired under that statute, there may be some plausibility in a contention that the President's exercise of discretion in terminating the officer's active service on his own application constitutes a bargain between him and the officer to the effect that he will not further be prosecuted for known offenses occurring prior to retirement. There is no statutory or judicial authority for such a view, and I regard it as unsound as a strict matter of law. Therefore I
answer your inquiry by saying that as a matter of law the retirement of General Short under the above statute upon his own application in the discretion of the President does not involve the passing of judgment by the President upon the officer's past services or a condonation by him of prior offenses which would prevent subsequent trial by court-martial.

4. Nevertheless, as a matter of fairness rather than law, there is force in the supposed contention above stated. General Short has volunteered to submit an application for retirement. He may reasonably suppose that a request to him from an official source, in answer to his voluntary suggestion, to submit his application for retirement, involves a tacit agreement that the issue of his official conduct of the defense of Hawaii prior to and on December 7 will be closed by his retirement, and that no charges will be preferred against him growing out of such conduct.

5. Another statute under which General Short might be retired immediately upon his own application, is the second proviso of section 3 of the act of June 13, 1940 (54 Stat. 380), reading: "Provided further, That any officer on the active list of the Regular Army or Philippine Scouts who served in any capacity as a member of the military or naval forces of the United States prior to November 12, 1918, shall upon his own application be retired with annual pay equal to 75 per centum of his active-duty annual pay at the time of his retirement unless entitled to retired pay of a higher grade as hereinafter provided, except that officers with less than twenty years' service and officers who are under investigation or who are awaiting trial by courts martial or the result of such trial, or whose cases are pending before courts of inquiry shall be retired only when the application for retirement in each case has been approved by the Secretary of War; * * *"

It is manifest that War Department approval of an application of General Short for retirement under the above statute, would amount in effect to a finding that he is not under investigation or awaiting trial by court-martial, and would thus tend even more strongly to support a contention that any offenses chargeable against him were condoned by the action.

6. If General Short should be retired on his own application under the above circumstances and if afterward he should be brought
to trial for his conduct of the defense of Hawaii, it may be anticipated that charges of bad faith would be made against the War Department by him or by others in his behalf. I think it most desirable that no opportunity be afforded for such accusations. I assume that General Short's offer of retirement as made was not subject to any conditions. Therefore, I suggest that before his offer be accepted he be given to understand, preferably in writing for the purpose of the record, that such retirement will not constitute a condonation of his offenses, if any, on the part of the War Department, or be considered a bar to any future trial by general court-martial in case such trial should be deemed advisable.

7. Should General Short refuse to submit his application for voluntary retirement with such a condition attached, the President may, without any application by General Short, retire him upon his reaching the age of 62 years on March 30, 1942, pursuant to the provisions of Revised Statutes, section 1244 (10 U.S.C. 944; Mil. Laws, sec. 323), and may make announcement to that effect at the present time.

[Signature]

Lyron C. Cramer,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.

l Incl.
Let. to C. of S.
1/27/42.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

CHARGE—VIOLATION OF 36TH ARTICLE OF WAR

Specification 1: Failure to provide an adequate inshore aerial patrol.
Specification 2: Failure to provide adequate anti-aircraft defenses.
Specification 3: Failure to set up an Interceptor Command.
Specification 4: Failure to provide a proper aircraft warning service.
Specification 5: Failure to provide for the transmission of appropriate warnings to interested agencies.
Specification 6: Failure to establish a proper system of defense by cooperation and coordination with the Navy.
Specification 7: Failure to issue adequate orders to his subordinates as to their duties in case of sudden attack.
Specification 8: Failure to take adequate measures to protect the Fleet and Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.
Specification 9: Failure to have his airplanes dispersed in anticipation of a hostile attack, after having been warned of the danger thereof.
Specification 10: Failure to have his airplanes in a state of readiness for an attack.
Specification 11: Failure to provide for the protection of military personnel, their families, etc., and of civilian employees on various reservations.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
SERVICES OF SUPPLY,
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL,
Washington, April 20, 1942.

Memorandum for The Judge Advocate General.

Subject: Preparation of charges against Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army, Retired.

1. Pursuant to the oral direction of The Adjutant General to report to you for duty in connection with the preparation of charges against the above-named officer, in addition to my regular duties in his office, and having so reported and been directed to prepare tentative charges as aforesaid, the following comments are submitted with the tentative charges prepared.

2. Possible Lines of Procedure. An examination of the record of the board which investigated the attack by the Japanese on the Island of Oahu, on December 7, 1941, (hereinafter referred to as the Roberts Board), led to the conclusion that, at the present time, there were only three courses open:

(a) To prepare charges and specifications against General Short, not based entirely on the evidence adduced before the Roberts Board, but on that evidence and on evidence which it was believed may be further adduced, either (1) by recalling witnesses already examined for further questioning, or (2) by calling new witnesses from whom pertinent testimony may be expected.

(b) To prepare charges and specifications at this present time but based only on such evidence as was adduced before the Roberts Board which appears legally sufficient to support such charges and specifications.

(c) To refrain from drawing charges and specifications at this time, and to await a period when additional evidence may be adduced before a second board, and then to draw such charges and specifications as the accumulated evidence appears to warrant.

We have followed the first course, (a), because it not only appears to be in conformity with the direction that charges be now prepared, but because it is certain that the formal investigation of the charges which must precede arraignment will bring out additional evidence. For example, we believe that knowledge of the Navy Department radio of November 27, 1941, ("This is a war warning"), can be brought home to General Short, but from the Roberts record there would be difficulty in establishing that as a fact. General Short states categorically, "I didn't see it". Record, page 143. Only almost immediately to admit that he "did not know whether I saw it or not. I am not sure". Record, page 144. The Roberts record does not establish the fact, one way or another, for Admiral Kimmel's subordinates admit they did not carry out the Admiral's explicit direction that the radiogram was "for personal delivery to General Short", but, so far as they are concerned, it only reached G-3. (Record, page 662). Whether G-3 ever got the message to General Short was not brought out.
Again, Admiral Kimmel testified that the Navy Department informed him on December 3, 1941, that based on information from reliable sources that Japanese diplomatic and consular officers in Washington, London, Hong Kong, Singapore and Batavia were directed to destroy most of their codes and ciphers and to burn secret documents. (Record, page 583). But, while General Short testifies to conferences with Admiral Kimmel from November 27, 1941, to December 6, 1941, and, in fact, to a conference on that very date, December 3, 1941, there is nothing in the record to indicate whether or not this information was given him by Admiral Kimmel.

Further, we have noted newspaper statements by possible witnesses who did not appear before the Roberts Board on points covered by our charges. Thus, Mrs. Mary Kogan, wife of First Lieutenant Milton M. Kogan, D.C., a reserve officer, is quoted in the press as stating that they had never received any instructions at Schofield Barracks as to what to do in case of an air raid, and further that a Hawaiian newspaper had predicted an attack by the Japanese “that week end”. (See clipping in Brief and Resume submitted herewith.) Also, Mr. Raymond Coll, a Hawaiian newspaper editor is quoted by a Washington newspaper, shortly after the submission of the report of the Roberts Board, as stating, in substance, that General Short and Admiral Kimmel had made clear by their utterances before December 7, 1941, the possibility and imminence of a Japanese attack at an early date. (We have not been able to examine the Hawaiian newspapers at the Library of Congress because we were informed that they are now at the bindery, but this is another “lead” which should be followed in preparing the case.) Staff Sergeant Joseph Lockard, the enlisted man who was operating the Opana radar on the northern tip of the Island of Oahu, and who gave warning of the approach of the Japanese airplanes on this morning of December 7, 1941, was not questioned.

It is not necessary to multiply other instances. The Roberts Board, of necessity, could not go into many matters which would properly concern a court-martial.

3. Theory upon which Charge and Specifications were framed. The theory on which we have prepared the charge and specifications is that of nonfeasance. We have endeavored in each specification to show a duty and then to allege a neglect or failure to perform that duty. The line which General Short’s defense will take is obvious from his statements before and to the Roberts Board. He will contend that there was no neglect of duty, but simply errors of judgment; that he had reported the measures he had taken to the War Department, and if he was in error in not going beyond “Alert No. 1” (protection against sabotage only), the War Department was equally in error in not inviting his attention to the supposed neglect; that from the nature of his instructions many of the neglects or failures with which we may charge him concerned defensive measures which he could not take without “causing unnecessary publicity and alarm”, contrary to the instructions in the Chief of Staff’s radiogram of November 27, 1941; [3] that it was the duty of the War Department to warn him more specifically if it had thought hostilities imminent, and that it did not do so until the radiogram of December 7, 1941, which he did not receive until after the attack. The obvious answer to this line of defense is that he had been warned, not once but repeatedly, both by the War Department and Navy Department messages, of the imminent dangers, well before December 7, 1941; that he had been placed in a position that every schoolboy knows was one of exposure to sudden attack; that his own battle plans referred to it as “frontier”; that what the War Department may or may not have thought of the possibility of a sudden attack could not relieve him of his responsibility; that his failure to take effective and vigorous measures of defense against outside attack can not be condoned as mere errors of judgment. In short, the case will come down to this—Has the Government shown clearly and unequivocally neglect of duty or has it merely pointed out errors of judgment, excusable under the circumstances. We think that we can show such neglect, and that General Short will not be able to escape its consequences by any “Tu quoque” argument.

4. The Proposed Charge and Specifications. It will be noted that there is only one Charge, viz., violation of the 95th Article of War. There are several reasons why it is not recommended that any other article be invoked. In the first place, no precedent has been found for employing the 95th Article of War in a case of this nature—in fact, the case appears to be unique—and if it be conceded that the 95th Article of War could be used, there would immediately be an outtry
that the War Department was practically informing the court-martial that it desired the officer dismissed the service. Then, to use the 96th Article of War avoids anything in the nature of a personal attack on General Short. A court-martial, whose members of necessity must, in most instances, know him personally, would hesitate to find him guilty of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman unless it was very firmly convinced that he had deliberately falsified.

However, while General Short did not, in my opinion, deliberately falsify his testimony before the Roberts Board, he certainly made statements without a sufficient background on which to base them, and actually the statements were contrary to the facts. A statement made "with disregard of a knowledge of the facts" may be a false official statement equally with one made with full knowledge of its falsity. (See, for example, specifications 110 and 141, Appendix 4, Manual for Courts-Martial, 1928.) Examples of such statements are, in substance, as follows:

(a) That the Interceptor Command was fully working from November 27, 1941, to December 6, 1941. (Record, page 51.) But General Davidson, who was supposed to be in charge of it, states that the Interceptor Command was not set up or functioning on or before December 7, 1941, and, in fact, that it was not activated until December 17, 1941. (Record, pages 170, 179, 196. See also Lt. Col. Powell, S. C. Department Signal Officer, Record, page 353.)

(b) There were Navy liaison officers at the Interceptor Command Station—General Short thinks that three naval officers may have been detailed there to relay information to the Navy, but none were there on the morning of December 7, 1941. (Record, pages 68-70.) But no Navy liaison officers had as yet been detailed for this duty or had made their appearance at the Station. (Lt. Comdr. Taylor, Record, page 1230; Major Bergquist, Record, page 381; Admiral Kimmel, Record, page 632.)

(c) "The inshore reconnaissance was a daily thing. We had planes all around the Island constantly." (Record, page 107.) But General Davidson states, in answer to a question whether there were less planes in the air early Sunday morning, December 7, 1941, than usual, "Well, we don't generally have any planes in the air on Sundays." (Record, page 181.) And General Martin, Commanding the Hawaiian Air Force, states that up to December 7, 1941, there were no inshore aerial patrols for a possible enemy. (Record, page 1648.)

(d) First Lieutenant Tyler, Air Corps, was the control officer for the Interceptor Command (on December 7, 1941). (Record, page 66.) But Lieutenant Tyler was simply an observer who had only seen the "board" once before and had never operated it. He had no instructions whatever beyond observing for training purposes, and was at the Station after all the others but one had departed at 7:00 o'clock a.m. on December 7, 1941, only because he had been told to stay there until 8:00 o'clock a.m. (Record, page 368.) Major Bergquist had taken upon himself to have officers like Lieutenant Tyler assigned so that he could train them in the system. There was no assignment of this officer, Lieutenant Tyler, by order from General Short's headquarters or the headquarters of General Martin, commanding the Air Forces. (Record, page 379.)

If higher authority should reside specifications based on statements of General Short, such as are above mentioned, it would be easy to prepare them. But it is submitted that all such inconsistencies can best be developed by testimony relating to alleged acts of negligence, rather than by specifications charging false official statements. Thus, the proposed specification (number 3) as to the lack of an Interceptor Command, in effect contradicts flatly the allegation made by General Short that there was such a command functioning on December 7, 1941. The court-martial can determine whether he made the statement truthfully, deliberately, falsely, or with disregard of its truth or falsity. It should be kept in mind that a sentence of dismissal can be adjudged under A. W. 96 as well as under A. W. 95.

The specifications, all laid under the 96th Article of War and alleging a neglect or omission which was continuous down to and including December 7, 1941, are eleven in number, and, in substance, cover the following alleged offenses:

[5]

1. Failure to provide an adequate inshore aerial patrol.
2. Failure to provide adequate anti-aircraft defenses.
3. Failure to set up an Interceptor Command.
4. Failure to provide a proper aircraft warning service.
5. Failure to provide for the transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.
(6) Failure to establish a proper system of defense by cooperation and coordination with the Navy.

(7) Failure to issue adequate orders to his subordinates as to their respective duties in case of sudden attack.

(8) Failure to take adequate measures to protect the Fleet and Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.

(9) Failure to have his airplanes dispersed in anticipation of a hostile attack, after having been warned of the danger thereof.

(10) Failure to have his airplanes in a state of readiness for an attack.

(11) Failure to provide for protection of military personnel, their families, and cetera, on various reservations.

Some, if not all, of these specifications may be expanded into several specifications. Thus, the failure to provide adequate anti-aircraft defense (specification 2) may be subdivided as follows, to wit:

(a) Failure to have the available anti-aircraft guns in readiness.

(b) Failure to have the available ground machine guns in readiness.

(c) Failure to have adequate ammunition at hand for the anti-aircraft and the ground machine guns.

But it is believed that it will be much wiser to limit the specifications to a comparatively small number of distinct heads. When one begins to divide and subdivide he almost invariably ends by pleading evidence and unnecessarily hampering the prosecution by too great particularity. All three of the subdivisions set forth above are comprehended in failure to provide adequate antiaircraft defense. If, of a large number of specifications, the accused is found guilty but of a few, there is always an attempt to show persecution. Thus, in the well-known case of Oberlin M. Carter, the accused was tried on 37 specifications and found guilty of but four, and his defenders have constantly referred to that fact (overlooking that these four specifications were the most serious of the entire thirty-seven). Specifications of large and general import focus attention on the larger issues, and, in a case of this nature, that is highly desirable. General Short is not to be tried for some obscure military offense, but for neglect of duty in matters of the greatest moment to the whole country.

[6] Nor can General Short plead ignorance of the nature of the accusations against him on the ground that the specifications lack particularity, because in these specifications we have used language taken from battle plans and agreements to which either he was a subscribing party or of which he cannot deny knowledge without admitting gross ignorance. Certainly General Short cannot ask us to be more specific in our charges than he was in the written plans and agreements to which he was a party. If he knew what the plans and agreements meant, he cannot be deceived or misled by the same language in the charges.

It will be noted also that these specifications cover the specific matters in which General Short was found negligent by the Roberts Board. (See Report of Board under “Conclusions”, pages 9, 10, 12, 13, 16 and 17.)

5. Statute of Limitations. From the nature of the offenses charged, it seems clear that it is proper to treat them as continuing down to and including the date of the attack, December 7, 1941. The failure to take adequate measures is not a single failure on a specific date but a failure on every day it continues. Hence, the statute of limitations, set forth in the 39th Article of War, for the offenses charged is two years and arraignment before a duly constituted court-martial must be had on or before December 6, 1943, if these charges are to be brought to trial. In order to give the investigating officer and the trial judge ample time to perform their respective duties, it would seem that formal charges would have to be served not much later than January 1, 1943, for months would be required to secure depositions of absent witnesses and documentary evidence, not to speak of the difficulty of assembling a court of general officers. It is not unlikely, also, that the investigating officer or the trial judge advocate, or both, might find it necessary to visit the situs of the alleged derelictions.

6. Liaison with the Navy Department. As divers allegations of negligence are based on failure to cooperate with the Navy or to act on information received through the Navy, it will no doubt be necessary to call on the Secretary of the Navy for permission to examine the Navy officers who testified before the Roberts Board. The statute of limitations for any naval court-martial also appears to be two years. (See Section 1624, Revised Statutes, Art. 61.)
7. Verification of Charges. If desired, the charges can be verified, as on information and belief, by Major Steuart or myself, since from our examination of the Roberts record we believe that there is legal justification for trial.

8. Assistance rendered by Major Dell King Steuart, J. A. G. D. In the review of the voluminous record made by the Roberts Board, the examination of divers maps and other documents submitted, and in the analysis of and searching out of the evidence on which to base these charges and the initial ground-work in the preparation of the charges, I cannot speak too highly of the work done by my assistant, Major Dell King Steuart, J. A. G. D. Major Steuart was unknown to me when, with your approval, I selected him for this task, and, in my opinion, he has done a thorough piece of work in a highly efficient manner which has not only materially lightened my own review of the record, but which will be of the greatest assistance to anyone who is assigned to try this case. I desire to take this opportunity to express my appreciation of his loyal cooperation.

F. Granville Munson
F. GRANVILLE MUNSON,
Colonel, J. A. G. D.

4 Incls
Incl a—Charge and Specifications.
Incl b—Brief and Resume of Record of Roberts Commission.
Incl c—Pertinent notes—Roberts Commission (typewritten).
Incl d—Pertinent notes—Roberts Commission (longhand).
CHARGE SHEET

Name, etc., of accused: Short, Walter C., (O-1522), Major General, United States Army. (Give last name, first name, and middle initial in that order followed by rank, branch, and service as by Retired.

Other appropriate description of accused. (Give name, etc., to follow in same manner)

Age Pay, $__________ per month. Allowances to dependents, $__________ per month. (Base pay plus pay for length of service)

Government Insurance deduction, $__________ per month.

Data as to service: (As to each terminated enlistment, give including date of service and organization to which enlisting. As to current enlistment, give the initial date and the term thereof. Give similar data as to service not under an enlistment)

Data as to witnesses, etc.: (Give names, addresses, and date if for accused. List documentary evidence and note where each item thereof may be found)

As the question of the witnesses who may be called depends on the direction of higher authority as to the manner in which the case shall be tried (viz., on the testimony of only those witnesses who appeared before the Roberts Board, on the testimony of those witnesses plus that of additional witnesses, etc.) these data are left for future action. A list of the witnesses before the Roberts Board may be found in "Brief and Resume of Record of Roberts Commission" or "Notes Taken from Transcript of Roberts Commission to Investigate Attack on Pearl Harbor".

Data as to restraint of accused: (Give date, place, and initial date of any restraint of accused)

W. D., A. G. O. Form No. 118
April 3, 1943
Charge: Violation of the 96th Article of War.

Specification 1: In that Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army, Retired, then Lieutenant General, United States Army, commanding Hawaiian Department, being then and there charged with the duty and responsibility of providing for, and the execution of, defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of the Island of Oahu, in his command, and of the establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of Oahu defensive coastal area, did, on the 7th day of December, 1941, and at all times prior thereto, utterly neglect and fail in his said duty and responsibility, by failing to establish and provide for an adequate inshore aerial patrol of said area commensurate with the critical relations between the United States and Japan which he then knew to exist, same being a neglect to the prejudice of military discipline, and conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service.

Specification 2: In that Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army, Retired, then Lieutenant General, United States Army, commanding Hawaiian Department, being then and there charged with the duty and responsibility of providing for, and the execution of, defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of the Island of Oahu, in his command, and of providing for the beach and land, sea-coast, and anti-aircraft defense of said Island of Oahu, did, on the 7th day of December, 1941, and at all times prior thereto, utterly neglect and fail in his said duty and responsibility by failing to provide adequate anti-aircraft defenses for such area commensurate with the critical relations between the United States and Japan which he then knew to exist, same being a neglect to the prejudice of military discipline, and conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service.

Specification 3: In that Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army, Retired, then Lieutenant General, United States Army, commanding Hawaiian Department, being then and there charged with the duty and responsibility of providing for, and the execution of, defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of the Island of Oahu, in his command, and of providing for an interceptor command to coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery (including Naval and Marine Corps anti-aircraft artillery), the aircraft warning service, and attached units, did, on the 7th day of December, 1941, and at all times prior thereto, utterly neglect and fail in his said duty and responsibility by failing to establish and provide for such interceptor command, same being a neglect to the prejudice of military discipline, and conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service.

Specification 4: In that Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army, Retired, then Lieutenant General, United States Army, commanding Hawaiian Department, being then and there charged with the duty and responsibility of providing for, an dt the execution of, defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of the Island of Oahu, in his command, and of providing an aircraft warning service for the Hawaiian Island, in his command, did, on the 7th day of December, 1941, and at all times prior thereto, utterly neglect and fail in his said duty and responsibility by failing to establish and provide for an adequate aircraft warning service commensurate with the critical relations between the United States and Japan which he then knew to exist, same being a neglect to the prejudice of military discipline, and conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service.

Specification 5: In that Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army, Retired, then Lieutenant General, United States Army, commanding Hawaiian Department, being then and there charged with the duty and responsibility of providing for, and the execution of, defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of the Island of Oahu, in his command, and of establishing an aircraft warning service for the Hawaiian Islands, with provision for the transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies, did, on the 7th day of December, 1941, and at all times prior thereto, utterly neglect and fail in his said duty and responsibility by failing to provide for the transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies of the approach or movement of possible hostile aircraft received through any aircraft warning service for said Hawaiian Islands, or otherwise, same being a neglect to the prejudice of military discipline, and conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service.

Specification 6: In that Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army, Retired, then Lieutenant General, United States Army, commanding Hawaiian Department, being then and there charged with the duty and responsibility of
acting jointly and in coordination with the United States Naval Forces in holding the Island of Oahu, in his command, as a main outlying naval base, and of coordinating joint defensive measures of the military and naval forces for the security of the United States Fleet in and near Pearl Harbor, and the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, Island of Oahu, from hostile raids and air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war, did, on the 7th day of December, 1941, and at all times prior thereto, utterly neglect and fail in his said duty and responsibility by failing adequately to collaborate and cooperate with the said United States Naval Forces in their aforesaid joint defensive measures in a manner commensurate with the critical relations between the United States which he then knew to exist, same being a neglect to the prejudice of military discipline, and conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service.

Specification 7: In that Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army, Retired, then Lieutenant General, United States Army, commanding Hawaiian Department, being then and there charged with the duty and responsibility of holding the Island of Oahu, in his command, against attacks by land, sea and air forces, and in providing for the beach and land, sea coast, and anti-aircraft defense of said Island of Oahu, with particular attention to Pearl Harbor Naval Base on said Island of Oahu and the naval forces there present, did, on the 7th day of December, 1941, and at all times prior thereto, utterly neglect and fail in his said duty and responsibility by failing to issue to his subordinates adequate orders and instructions commensurate with the critical relations between the United States and Japan which he then knew to exist, as to their various duties in the event of sudden hostile attack against said Island of Oahu, same being a neglect to the prejudice of military discipline, and conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service.

Specification 8: In that Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army, Retired, then Lieutenant General, United States Army, commanding Hawaiian Department, being then and there charged with the duty and responsibility of coordinating the joint defensive measures of the military and naval forces for the security of the United States Fleet in Pearl Harbor and for the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, Island of Oahu, in his command, and for the defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war, and of providing for the beach and land, sea coast, and anti-aircraft defense of said Island of Oahu, with particular attention to Pearl Harbor Naval Base and the naval forces there present, did, on the 7th day of December, 1941, and at all times prior thereto, utterly neglect and fail in his said duty and responsibility by failing to take and provide for adequate and proper defense measures, commensurate with the critical relations between the United States and Japan which he then knew to exist, for the security of the said Pearl Harbor Naval Base and the naval forces there present, same being a neglect to the prejudice of military discipline, and conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service.

Specification 9: In that Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army, Retired, then Lieutenant General, United States Army, commanding Hawaiian Department, being then and there charged with the duty and responsibility of holding the Island of Oahu, in his command, against attacks by land, sea and air forces, and of providing for the beach and land, sea coast, and anti-aircraft defense of said Island of Oahu, did, on the 7th day of December, 1941, and at all times prior thereto, utterly neglect and fail in his said duty and responsibility by failing to make proper ground disposition, commensurate with the critical relations which he then knew to exist between the United States and Japan, of aircraft under his command, in that the said aircraft were not properly dispersed in anticipation of hostile air attacks which might be delivered prior to a declaration of war, same being a neglect to the prejudice of military discipline, and conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service.

Specification 10: In that Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army, Retired, then Lieutenant General, United States Army, commanding Hawaiian Department, being then and there charged with the duty and responsibility of holding the Island of Oahu, in his command, against attacks by land, sea and air forces, and of providing for, and the execution of, all defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of said Island of Oahu, did, on the 7th day of December, 1941, and at all times prior thereto, utterly neglect and fail in his said duty and responsibility by failing to have the aircraft under his command in a
proper state of readiness, commensurate with the critical relations between the United States and Japan which he then knew to exist, for the defense of the Island of Oahu, as aforesaid, same being neglect to the prejudice of military discipline, and conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service.

Specification II: In that Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army, Retired, then Lieutenant General, United States Army, commanding Hawaiian Department, being then and there charged with the duty and responsibility of providing for the defense of the Island of Oahu, in his command, against attacks by land, sea and air forces, did, on the 7th day of December, 1941, and at all times prior thereto, utterly neglect and fail in his said duty and responsibility by failing to provide adequate measures and means, commensurate with the critical relations between the United States and Japan which he then knew to exist, for the protection of military personnel and their families, and of civilian employees of the Army, at and in the immediate vicinity of the various military reservations on said Island of Oahu from air raid attacks, same being a neglect to the prejudice of military discipline, and conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service.
(Signature of accuser) .................................................................
                     (Grade, organization, or branch)

AFFIDAVIT

Before me, the undersigned, authorized by law to administer oaths in cases of this character, personally
appeared the above-named accuser this .............................. day of ........................................, 19....... and
made oath that he is a person subject to military law and that he personally signed the foregoing charges
and specifications, and further that he has personal knowledge of the matters set forth in specifications

........................................................................................................
(IIndicate by specification and charge number)

and that he has investigated the matters set forth in specifications ..........................................................
(IIndicate by specification and charge number)

and that the same are true in fact, to the best of his knowledge and belief

........................................................................................................

(ISignature) ........................................................................
                     (Grade and organization)
                     (Official character, as summary court, notary public, etc.)

Notes.—At (*) strike out words not applicable.

If the accuser has personal knowledge of the facts stated in one or more specifications or parts thereof, and his
knowledge as to other specifications or parts thereof is derived from investigation of the facts, the form of the
oath will be varied accordingly. In no case will he be permitted to state alternatively, as to any particular
charge or specification, that he either has personal knowledge or has investigated.

If the oath is administered by a civil officer having a seal, his official seal should be affixed.

1st IND.

Headquarters ................................................................., ........................................, 19...
                     (Place) (Date)

Referred for trial to .................................................................
                     (Grade, name, and organization of summary court, or trial judge advocate)
                     (Summary) (Trial judge advocate of special or general)

Headquarters ................................................................. 19...
                     (Centralized or order)
                     (Grade and name of commanding officer)

By ...........................................................................
                     Adjutant.
I have served a copy hereof on (each of) the above-named accused, this day of ______________________, 19____.

(Signature) _____________________________, Trial Judge Advocate.

(Space for use where Trial is by Summary Court)

CASE No. ______________________

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<tr>
<th>SPECIFICATIONS AND CHARGES</th>
<th>PLEAS</th>
<th>FINDINGS</th>
<th>SENTENCE OR ACQUITTAL AND REMARKS</th>
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</table>

Place ........................................ Date ______________________, 19____.

Summary Court: ...................................

Headquarters .................................. Date ______________________, 19____.

(Place and date)

(Grade and organization)

Commanding. ....................................

(Grade and organization)

Entered on service record in cases of conviction ______________________

(Initials of personnel adjutant)

(4)

(WRITE NOTHING BELOW THIS LINE)
SECRET

BRIEF AND RESUME OF TESTIMONY AND EXHIBITS TAKEN BEFORE ROBERTS COMMISSION INVESTIGATING ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR, DECEMBER 7, 1941, WITH LIST OF POSSIBLE SPECIFICATIONS BASED THEREON

[NOTE: This Brief and Resume is based upon, and a further condensation of, approximately 100 pages of notes taken from the report of the Roberts Commission. For a more complete statement of the testimony of each witness reference may be had to the aforesaid 100 pages of notes.]

INDEX

1. Index.
2. Reference note.
3. Explanatory note.
4. Witnesses examined by the Roberts Board and their functions.
5. Basic Documents and pertinent data.
21. Specification 1: Failure to provide an adequate inshore aerial patrol.
22. Specification 2: Failure to provide adequate anti-aircraft defenses.
24. Specification 4: Failure to provide a proper aircraft warning service.
25. Specification 5: Failure to provide for the transmission of appropriate warnings to interested agencies.
26. Specification 6: Failure to establish a proper system of defense by cooperation and coordination with the Navy.
27. Specification 7: Failure to issue adequate orders to his subordinates as to their duties in case of sudden attack.
28. Specification 8: Failure to take adequate measures to protect the Fleet and Naval Air Base of Pearl Harbor.
29. Specification 9: Failure to have his airplanes dispersed in anticipation of a hostile attack, after having been warned of the danger thereof.
30. Specification 10: Failure to have his airplanes in a state of readiness for an attack.
31. Specification 11: Failure to provide for the protection of military personnel, their families, etc., on various reservations.

[2] In re Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army, Retired

NOTE: The specifications on the charge sheet number 1 to 11, inclusive. The evidence relied upon to sustain each specification will be found in this Brief and Resume under the headings of Documentary Evidence and "Possible Specifications", each bearing a number that corresponds to that of the specification as drawn. In addition to the evidence shown under each particular specification, evidence set out under other specifications may also be relevant. Hence, it is advisable to first read all the Documentary Evidence, then the evidence contained in said Brief and Resume under all the specifications with this fact in mind.

DELL KING STEWART,
Major, J. A. G. D.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

This concise resume of pertinent evidence with suggestions of possible specifications that might be based thereon, is a concentration and evaluation of over 4,900 typewritten pages of testimony and exhibits.

From this vast fund of material it was found that certain evidence therein tended in a degree to establish certain specifications herein enumerated under the heading of "Possible Specifications", and each item of such evidence has herein been listed, together with page in the record where it may be found, under the appropriate "Possible Specification".

It will be found that certain evidence is lacking, in whole or in part necessary to sustain some specifications, but it is thought that from all of the other pertinent evidence that such deficiency might readily be supplied by a further search and the securing of such additional evidence as may be necessary to sustain the specification to which it pertains. In some instances, it will be found that from the evidence in the record it appears that any deficiencies might be supplied by an examination in greater detail of the same or other witness.

The "Possible Specifications" are but tentative suggestions, and may be divided, sub-divided or combined in various ways when put in final form.

It has been the purpose of this resume to set forth each scintilla of evidence that either proves or tends to prove a certain possible specification, as set out in the record that has been examined, and, as stated above, in any instance where the evidence is either lacking, insufficient or unsatisfactory to sustain such specification, it will have to be supplied by further investigation or other appropriate measures.
There are sixteen volumes of the Roberts Record and thirty-six exhibits. The method used herein for reference thereto is that R6-780 means volume number 6, page 780. Ex. 15, means exhibit number 15.

DELL KING STEUART,
Major, J. A. G. D.

Officers Examined and Their Official Capacities

2. Major Wm. S. Lawton, GSC, T. H.
6. Major Brooke E. Allen, AC Hickman Field
10. Major Gen. Henry T. Burgin, CG CA (sea coast and antiaircraft artillery)
15. Lt. Col. Carrol A. Powell, Dept. Signal Officer
16. Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, AC
17. Major Kenneth P. Bergquist, AC
18. Major Lorry Norris Tindall, AC
21. Sergeant Mobley L. Hall, Wheeler Field
22. Capt. Frank W. Ebey, CAC
23. Col. Wm. J. McCarthy, CAC
24. Pvt. Creed Short, ambulance driver
25. Lt. Stephen Saltzman, CA
26. Pvt. Raymond F. McBriarty, Bellows Field
27. Sgt. Lowell Vincent Klatt, 98 CA
29. Lt. Howard Frederick Cooper, Hickam Field
30. Capt. Melbourne H. West, Camp Malakole
31. Lt. Willis T. Lyman, CA—Malakole
32. Civilian Chas. Utterbach
33. Rear Adm. Husband E. Kimmel, USN, Cincpa
34. Rear Adm. Claude Chas. Bloch, Commandant 14th. Naval District
35. Walter Stanley Delany, Ass’t C of S, and Operations Officer of the CinC
36. Capt. Chas. H. McMorris, USN, War Plans Office
37. Vice Adm. Wm. Satterlee Pye, USN
38. Rear Adm. Patrick N. L. Bellinger, CO Naval Planes when on shore.
39. Lt. Com. Edwin T. Layton, Fleet Intelligence Officer
40. Comdr. Joseph J. Rochefort, Combat Intelligence
41. Lt. Col. Claude A. Larkin, USMC, CO Ewa Field, Marine Planes
42. Capt. James M. Shoemaker, CO US Naval Air Station, Kaneohe Bay
43. Lt. Col. Leonard Weddington, CO Bellows Field
44. Lt. Comdr. Wm. E. G. Taylor (helping-army set up AWS).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Known to Genl.</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>Joint Army &amp; Navy Def. Plan,-Rainbow 5</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>This was the basic plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan.24,'41</td>
<td>Letter Secy. of Navy to Secy. of War</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Sets forth in detail expected attack on Fleet in P.H.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.1,'41</td>
<td>Adm.Kimmel takes com.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.7,'41</td>
<td>Secy of War answers Secy of Navy Letter</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Secy War states both sent to Gen. S. and in his statement admits letter 2/7/41 received from W.D., 2/19/41.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.7,'41</td>
<td>Gen.Short takes com.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb.15,'41</td>
<td>Pac Pt. Com.Letter 2CL-41 (Security Measures)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>This corresponds to Army, SOP, and based on this CG and Adm.Bloch drew &quot;Joint Air Operations Agreement&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar.21,'41</td>
<td>Joint Air Operations Agreement.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>When part of Army or Navy Air Forces will come under command of other.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar.31,'41</td>
<td>Addendum I to 2CL-41 and Annex</td>
<td>Signed by CG, Hawi Air Forces &amp;Adm. (Summarizes situation in detail).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr.11,'41</td>
<td>Joint Coastal Hawaiian Frontier Defense Plan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr.11,'41</td>
<td>Addendum II to 2CL-41</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>This is naval instruction as to degrees of readiness of plans based on Addendum I.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June, 1941</td>
<td>See letter Secy. War to Navy dated Feb.7,1941</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Radar equipment supposed to be delivered to CG in Oahu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 19,'41</td>
<td>Letter Gen.Short to Adm. Kimmel</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Stating ANS &quot;will be in operation in the near future&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug.5,'41</td>
<td>Letter Gen.Short to Adm. Kimmel</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Stating ANS is &quot;rapidly nearing completion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None given</td>
<td>Joint Action of Army and Navy, R5-553.</td>
<td>It appears so</td>
<td>Plan of Joint Board stating specific functions of Army in re ANS and transmission of info to Navy Page 8 of Brief.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct.15,'41</td>
<td>2CL-41 (Revised)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>No particular import this matter.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct.16,'41</td>
<td>CNO to Cincpf.</td>
<td>Yes, R240</td>
<td>&quot;Japan may attack US and Britain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 5,'41</td>
<td>Standing Operating Procedure, Hawn Dept.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Ex.32. Duties ANS and Interceptor Command.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.24,'41</td>
<td>CNO to Cincpf. Directed to inform Army</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>&quot;Surprise aggressive move of Japs in any direction a possibility.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.27,'41</td>
<td>CNO to Cinc directed to inform Army</td>
<td>Adm. Kimmel</td>
<td>&quot;This is a war warning.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.27,'41</td>
<td>C of S to CG, Hawn Dept.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>&quot;Hostile action possible at any moment. Negotiations terminated.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.27,'41</td>
<td>G-2 to G-2, Hawn Dept.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>&quot;Possible that hostilities may begin.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None given</td>
<td>Hawn Dept.,Field Order No. 1.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Lawton says this created Interceptor Command.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.28,'41</td>
<td>G-2 to C, Areas &amp; Overseas Depts.</td>
<td>Must have ?</td>
<td>&quot;Critical situation demands&quot; watch for subversive activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov.28,'41</td>
<td>CG to WD</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>&quot;Alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec.1,2,3,</td>
<td>Gen.Short says in conference with Navy.</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Doesn't remember anything they discussed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>CNO to Cincpf.</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>This is message Japs to destroy ciphers, codes, burn papers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec.6,'41</td>
<td>Japs burning papers</td>
<td>Yes ?</td>
<td>Reported to C of S Powell night before. He reported at Staff meeting this date.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec.7,'41</td>
<td>WD warning to CG</td>
<td>Not at time.</td>
<td>This was message that came too late.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All plans and messages are set out fully in Ex. 36 by Gen. Gerow.
YAP. Mon, April 12, 1947.

THE ATTACK ON EARL HARBOR AS SEEN BY THE JAPANESE.

This photograph, showing the enemy blasting our ships on the morning of Dec. 7, was taken by a Japanese aerial cameraman, sent from Kubyshev to Moscow, whence it was radiographed to New York. The four vessels on the near side of Ford Island (center) are described (left to right) as two United States cruisers, one of which is on fire; the U. S. S. Utah, lying on her side, and an auxiliary craft that also has been hit. Beyond the island a column of water rises near a line of United States warships while a bomber flies away (to right of column). According to the Japanese caption, American planes were lined in rows on foreground of island.

Associated Press Radiophoto, passed yesterday by United States and Russian censors.
May Urges Death for Kimmel & Short

By United Press


May made the recommendation at an Army Day celebration in this little county seat in the Cumberland Mountains.

Tom Holland, editor of The Pikeville County News, defined “shooting match” as “Kentucky language for a lawful execution.”

May placed complete blame for the success of the Japanese attack on the two commanders. He said they were given sufficient warning of attack.

“It was probably the morning after Saturday night,” May said. “You just know Honolulu is noted for its night week clubs.”

Sgt. N.Y.C., which she left immediately after her marriage last April.

All across the continent she found the same listlessness. In the Middle West in particular she noticed there were no signs that a war was in progress.

She left Hawaii February 29, flew by clipper to San Francisco and completed the trip by train. In California she saw the first lights at night she had seen in three months, and here at home she experienced one of the greatest letdowns of her life.

“The city is just like it was when I left it, although America is facing the greatest war in her history,” she said yesterday. “No one here is at all perturbed, while life in Hawaii is like living in a fortress. I feel like saying, ‘Wake up, people, and do something.’ Unfortunately it may take a bombing to make them do this, but there will be no laxity then. I can never forget the feeling you have during an air raid—you want only one thing, and that is your life.”

Saw Rising Sun Insignia.

Mrs. Kogan and her husband were awakened at their home in Schofield Barracks at 7 A.M. December 7 by loud noises in the sky. They threw on wraps and walked out into the yard, thinking it was something different in the way of maneuvers. They commented to each other that if war was like this it must be terrible. Smoke was rising in all directions.

The gigantic explosion of bombs, the heavy roar of coast artillery fire and the rattle of machine gun fire seemed to be shaking the entire island.

Out of the dogfight overhead a plane crashed and came toward them, flying low. They watched it until they saw the rising sun insignia on its side, saw its machine gun spouting, saw bullets kicking up soil at their feet. It was then they knew the thing was real and the horror of the Hawaiian commander’s reaction to the escape.

Nightmare for 24 Ho.

“I think I’ll go shave,” the son of Mrs. Charles C. Allen of Los Angeles.

And then she asserted her status as a bride. “I think it’s Captain P. Mason, commander of the Naval Air Station, on behalf of President Roosevelt.”

She was a nightly. By next 24 hours. She helped make of surgical dressings all morning and then she was hustled in a quadrangle to await evacuation. It was well after dark when she and other women were taken away by bus. They passed by the burning cruisers of Pearl Harbor, through a blackness broken frequently by tracer bullets. Along the roadside they could hear the excited talk of many people. All going toward Honolulu.

Eventually the bus drew up at a school building in Kahili Valley. There the evacuees lay down on the floor on a thin layer of blankets and tried to sleep.

“Before December 7,” she recalled, “we hadn’t even been told what to do with its people.”

“Hawaii has had her bombing experience and Hawaii is prepared,” she said. “But I’m afraid for Washington.”
PLANS

1. Joint Army and Navy Defense Plan of 1935. See Ex. 36 and R1-5. Based on above War Plans Division prepared Army Strategical Plan which consists of Operations Plan—Rainbow 5, and Concentration Plan—Rainbow 5. Mission assigned Hawaiian Coastal Frontier under Army Strategical Plan are:

   a. Joint.—Hold Oahu as main outlying naval base and control and protect shipping in coastal zone.

   b. Army.—Hold Oahu against attacks by land, sea and air forces and against hostile sympathizers. Support naval forces in protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers. * * *

   c. Navy.—Patrol the coastal zone; control and protect shipping therein; support the Army.

Based on above plan General Short and Admiral Bloch appeared and signed on April 11, 1941 the—

2. Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Ex. #36, states in part—

   "1. General:

   1. In order to coordinate joint defensive measures for the security of the fleet and for Pearl Harbor Naval Base for defense against hostile raids or air attacks delivered prior to a declaration of war and before a general mobilization for war, the following agreements, * * *, are adopted.

   "II. Joint Air Operations:

   2. * * *

   a. Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels * * *

   b. Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. * * *"

In addition to foregoing, Major Lawton states (R1-5) that this plan says—
"The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, shall provide for the beach and land, sea-coast, and anti-aircraft defense of Oahu, with particular attention to Pearl Harbor Naval Base and naval forces present, etc., etc."

"The Army to provide for anti-aircraft and gas defense, intelligence and warning services, protection of landing fields and naval installations and outlying islands consistent with available forces, defense of installations on Oahu vital to the Army and Navy and to the civilian community for light, water, power, and for interior guard and sabotage * * * within Hawaiian Island * * *, establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of Oahu defensive coastal area in cooperation with the naval inshore patrol, * * *, and an aircraft warning service for the Hawaiian Islands, * * * ."

Under this Plan the Navy was to be responsible for "distant reconnaissance". Based upon above there was issued Field Order #1 which was a secret operations order for Hawaiian Department (R1-17). Major Lawton states that this document creates the interceptor command and the aircraft warning service.

Then to further amplify Field Order #1 which was secret, the Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) of 5 November 1941 was issued (Ex. 32).

Section II, paragraph 15f provides:

"The interceptor Command will:
Coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery (including available Naval and Marine Corps AA artillery), the aircraft warning service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of anti-aircraft measures of units not under military control, to include:
(1) Arrival and departure of all friendly aircraft.

(2) The coordination of the anti-aircraft fire of Naval ships in Pearl and/or Honolulu Harbors.

(3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies."

R1-34 states where these three documents were examined and briefly their contents.

Based upon the Joint Army and Navy Plan-Rainbow 5, Admiral Kimmel on February 15, 1941, issued his security measures in a letter known as "Letter 2CL-41", which was later revised on October 15, 1941, and known as Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter No. 2CL-41 (Revised). R5-following page 549. Paragraph (G) of this letter provided that Commandant 14th, ND would be the Naval Base Defense Officer, known as N. B. D. O., and as such should cooperate with the Army for "defense against air attack".

In furtherance of this proposed cooperation Admiral Bloch and General Short on March 20, 1941, drew up an agreement which was signed and approved by them March 21, 1941 (R5-554-556). This was known as their Joint Air Operations Agreement. This provided in brief that Defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under tactical command of the Army, and that under certain situations Army planes would go to the Navy to assist them with their "distance patrol" and other times Navy planes on shore would operate under Army control.

April 9, 1941, the N. B. D. O. issued an Annex for the Naval Forces to this Joint Air Operations agreement based upon this agreement, Letter 2CL-41, 15 February 1941, and Addendum I to the Plan.

[9] Addendum I is a joint estimate of the air action necessary, dated 31 March 1941, signed by Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force (General Martin) and Admiral Bellinger (R5-556C). This states, in pertinent part, as follows:

I. Summary of the Situation:

(a) Relations between US and Orange are strained, uncertain and varying.

(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile action by a declaration of war.

(c) A successful, sudden raid, against our ships and Naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offensive action by our forces in the western Pacific for a long period.

(d) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian waters with no prior warning from our intelligence service.
II. Survey of Opposing Strengths:

(a) Orange might send into this area one or more submarines and/or one or more fast raiding forces composed of carriers supported by fast cruisers. For such action she is known to have eight carriers.

III. Possible Enemy Action:

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:
1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
2. A surprise attack on Oahu including ships and installations at Pearl Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.

(b) It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of 300 miles.

(c) A single attack might indicate or not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack.

(d) 

(e) In a dawn air attack there is a high probability that it could be delivered as a complete surprise in spite of any patrols we might be using.

IV. Action Open to United States:

[10] (4) None of the above actions can be initiated by our forces until an attack is known to be imminent or has occurred. On the other hand, when an attack develops time will probably be vital and our actions must start with a minimum of delay. Therefore appears that task forces should be organized now, missions assigned, conditions of readiness defined and detailed plans prepared so that coordinated immediate action can be taken promptly by all elements when one of the visualized emergencies arises.

V. Decisions:

2. Air Combat Group. (To) Intercept and destroy hostile aircraft. Identify and report types of attacking aircraft. Trail attacking carrier type plane to carrier and report location to commander search and attack group.

(c) Provide a means for quickly starting all required action under this plan when:
(a) An air attack occurs on Oahu.
(b) Information is received from any source that indicates an attack is probable.

Addendum II to this Plan follows on R5-556K, see also R5-556M, N, and this briefly describes the various states of readiness of the planes necessary to perform their duties under this plan. The two lowest degrees or states of readiness are:

Material Readiness, E—All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan; and under Operational Readiness #5, All types—four hours.

On January 24, 1941, Secretary of the Navy Knox wrote to the Secretary of War Stimson, which letter reads in pertinent part, as follows (R16-1823-1827):

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study by the Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This re-examination has been, in part, prompted by the increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan, and by reports
from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases. If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.

In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a major disaster to the fleet or naval base warrant taking every step, as rapidly as can be done, that will increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned above.

The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be:

1. Air bombing attack.
2. Air torpedo plane attack.
3. Sabotage.
4. Submarine attack.
5. Mining.
6. Bombardment by gun fire.

Defense for all but the first two appears to have been provided for satisfactorily. The following paragraphs are devoted principally to a discussion of the problems encompassed in (1) and (2) above, the solution of which I consider to be of primary importance.

Both types of air attack are possible. They may be carried out successively, simultaneously, or in combination with other operations enumerated.

* * * Attacks would be launched from a striking force of carriers and their supporting vessels.

The counter measures to be considered are:

(a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before air attack can be launched;
(b) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they can reach their objectives;
(c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire;

* * * * * * * *

To meet the needs of the situation, I offer the following proposals:

1. That the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii.

2. * * * *

3. That local joint plans be drawn for the effective coordination of naval and military aircraft operations, and ship and shore anti-aircraft gun fire, against surprise aircraft raids.

4. That the Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree on appropriate degrees of joint readiness for immediate action [12] in defense against surprise aircraft raids against Pearl Harbor.

5. That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu for defense against surprise aircraft raids, be held at least once weekly so long as the present uncertainty exists.

* * * * * * * *

Sincerely yours,

FRANK KNOX.

On the 7th day of February, 1941, the Secretary of War answered this letter, in brief, as follows:

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

1. In replying to your letter of January 24, 1941, regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort.

2. (Here the Secretary outlines the Hawaiian Project for defense. Says all material for aircraft warning service will be there not later than June, 1941, etc.)

* * * * * * * *

6. With reference to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General,
Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making those measures effective. **Henry Stimson.**

This last letter from War to Navy is Ex. 22, and reported on page R16-1827 of transcribed testimony. In General Short's statement he admits receipt on February 19, 1941, "of your letter of February 7, 1941", and refers to much information on aircraft he didn’t have. (It is inferred that this is the letter to which he refers, but it should be checked.)

On the 20th day of August, 1941, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force (General Martin), submitted to the War Department, [13] through the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department (General Short), a plan for the Air Defense of Oahu (Ex. 35). It states, in pertinent part, as follows:

I. General:
1. The key to this plan is found in the provision for first, a complete and thorough search of the Hawaiian area daily during daylight; secondly, an attack force available on call to hit a known objective located as a result of the search, and, thirdly, if the objective is a carrier, to hit it the day before it could steam to a position offshore of Oahu where it could launch its planes for attack.

   * * * * * * *

II. Facts Bearing on the Case:
1. Facts:
   a. The Army mission is: "To defend the naval base of Oahu. * * *"  
   d. To perform its missions, the Fleet must have freedom of action without responsibility for the defense of its base.
2. Assumptions:
   * * * * * * *
   c. The Hawaiian Air Force is primarily concerned with the destruction of hostile carriers in this vicinity before they approach within range of Oahu where they can launch their bombardment aircraft for a raid or attack on Oahu.
   * * * * * * *
   c. Our most likely enemy, Orange, can probably employ a maximum of six carriers against Oahu.

IV. Discussion:
Part 1. The Search:
1. The only manner in which the Hawaiian area can be thoroughly searched for enemy surface craft, particularly aircraft carriers, in the event of a situation requiring such action, is to provide a sufficient number of aircraft to conduct a daily search of a desired area during daylight hours with 100% coverage through 360 degrees. * * * *
Part 2.
1. Section 1:
   a. An enemy should be primarily interested in obtaining the maximum cover of darkness for his carrier approach. This section illustrates four possible uses of darkness by an enemy to cover his approach. * * * *
   c. * * * * The early morning attack is, therefore, the best plan of action open to the enemy.

V. Conclusion:
1. * * * *
2 a. The most favorable plan of action open to the enemy, and the action upon which we should base our plans of operation [14] is the early morning attack in which the enemy must make good the following time schedule:
   (1) Cross circle 881 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn of the day before attack.
   (2) * * * *
   (3) Launch his planes 233 nautical miles from Oahu at dawn the day of the attack.

VI. Recommendations:
* * * * * * *
4. * * * The sole purpose of the existence of the military establishment on Oahu, ground and air, is for the defense of Oahu as an outlying naval base. * * *

It has been said, and it is a popular belief, that Hawaii is the strongest outlying naval base in the world and could, therefore, withstand indefinitely attacks and attempted invasions. Plans based on such convictions are inherently weak and tend to create a false sense of security with the consequent unpreparedness for offensive action.

Just prior to December 7, 1941, there were several communications that are mentioned throughout the testimony and should be borne in mind, as follows:

1. General Short on R2-40 admits receiving the following from the Navy 16 Oct. 41:

   The following is a paraphrase of a despatch from the CNO which I have been directed to pass to you. Quote: "Japanese cabinet resignation creates a grave situation. If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be anti-American and extremely nationalistic. If the Konoye cabinet remains it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the United States. Either way hostilities between Japan and Russia are strongly possible. Since Britain and United States are held responsible by Japan for her present situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack those two powers. View of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative action against Japan."

2. R9-1094: On November 24, 1941 CNO to Cincpf—General Short thinks (R2-39) he probably saw it:

   There are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of [15] negotiations with Japan. This situation, coupled with statements of Nippon Government and movements of their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including an attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility. The Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch and concurs and requests action addressed (* * *) inform senior Army officers their respective areas. Utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Jap action. * * * (These communications are all found Ex. 36)

3. War Department to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, November 26, 1941. in re two planes to photograph islands to locate Jap guns, ships, etc.

4. CNO to Cincpf dated November 27, 1941 (there is considerable discussion about whether this was delivered to General Short or not, but Admiral Kimmel tells just how it was delivered by a Lieutenant Burr to G-3, either Donegan or Lawton, on November 27, 1941, in R6-622,3, it reads in part (See R9-1095):

   This is a paraphrase of a classified dispatch.

   * * * * * * *

   "Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 only. Guam Samoa and Continental Districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Inform naval district and army authorities. British to be informed by Spenavo."

5. Chief of Staff to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, 27 November 1941:

   Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all [16] practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the US desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japa-
nese action, you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur, you will carry out tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

6. G-2, War Department, to G-2, Hawaiian Department, dated November 27, 1941:

Advisé only the CG and the C of S that it appears that the conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Acts of sabotage and espionage probable. Also possible that hostilities may begin.

7. G-2, War Department, to all Corps Areas and Overseas Departments, dated November 28, 1941:

Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of the War Department * * * (then discusses sabotage. See Ex. 36).

8. Commanding General to Chief of Staff, November 28, 1941:

Report department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy.

9. Chief of Staff to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, December 7, 1941 (this message never delivered prior to attack):

Japanese are presenting at 1:00 P.M., EST, today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly. Inform naval authorities of this communication.

[17] On R5-553, Admiral Kimmel testifies in regard to a publication known as "Joint Action of the Army and Navy." He says, "This publication was prepared by the Joint Board and promulgated to the two services by a joint order signed by the Secretaries of War and Navy. Under a heading "The Specific Functions of the Army in Coastal Frontier Defense"—(the Army will provide (I have added the Italicized words for clarity—DKS)):"

A communication and intelligence system to include an aircraft warning service, among the elements of the land defense, with provision for the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Navy.

On R5-554 Admiral Kimmel reads a statement from this "Joint Action of the Army and Navy", page 32 thereof, which states:

An aircraft warning service is a communication and intelligence service which forms part of the communication and intelligence service of the frontier defense. The purpose is to warn centers of population, industrial plants, public utilities, and military and naval establishments of the approach of hostile aircraft, and to alert Air Corps units and antiaircraft artillery units. It consists essentially of observers, of information centers for plotting the courses and distributing information of approaching hostile planes, and of the necessary communications.

(Note: This above document is discussed but no date thereof given, although Adm. Kimmel says it was in force December 7, 1941, and prior thereto. Check it.)

Ex. 7: On page 11, General Short in his statement cites an extract from the Joint Coastal Frontier Plan which is also his Ex. D attached thereto, and it reads:

"Method of Coordination. The CG, Hawn Dept, and the Commandant 14th Naval Dist. have determined that in this joint plan the method of coordination will be by mutual cooperation [18] and that this method will apply to all activities wherein the Army and Navy operate in coordination, until and if the method of unity of command is invoked, as prescribed in Joint Army and Navy Defense Plan, 1933, Chap. 2, par. 9b."

On R5-553, Admiral Kimmel reads a Naval Dispatch dated December 3, 1941, which states:

"OpNav informs CinC Asiatic, CinC Pac, Combat 14-15 that highly reliable information has been received that instructions were sent Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Washington,
and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn secret documents."

Ex. 16: This is account of action and orders taken since December 7th at Wheeler Field. This document is extremely illuminating in that it indirectly shows what was necessary and not done prior to the attack—such as information for conduct of families during air raids; blackouts, what to do in gas attacks, orders for gas masks. (No provision for these things prior thereto.) It includes:

Special Orders for chemical air attack dated December 9, 1941.
Air raid instructions, dated December 7, 1941.
Statement that they distributed Stewart Klaxon's for air raid warning system after attack. (Consequently, must have had them prior thereto.)
December 9, 1941, sets up a practice air raid for Honolulu. This signed by General Short.
December 9, 1941, had them exchange their old gas masks for new ones as old ones were unserviceable.
Submitted Col. Wm. Flood, Commanding Wheeler.


Ex. 20: This is a communication from General Martin to Commanding General dated September 20, 1941, arranging for Joint Army and Navy practice drill for 17-22 November, 1941. (This was a plan for the drill.) States they want to test "ability of carrier aviation to attack defenses of Oahu"—"efficiency of Interceptor Command". "* * * defense of Oahu will be directed by the Interceptor Commander using recently installed equipment and controlling operations from his control board."


"Sec. 1, para. 6—Every unit is responsible for its security at all times from hostile ground or air forces."
See pars. 233-273, incl., FM 10-5 (particularly applicable to "close in" defense by all sea coast artillery and AA units.) "Sec. 1, para. 10—AA defense is a responsibility of every unit. See Paras, 261-273, FM 100-5."
"All units will have their automatic weapons habitually in readiness for AA defense.

d. All unit commanders will be held responsible for the following:
(1) Maintenance of air guards to give timely warning of the approach of hostile aviation; * * *
(3) Reduction of vulnerability to air attacks and observation by dispersion of personnel and material when in bivouac or in position, * * * Sec. 1, para. 11 * * * an adequate alarm system will be provided. (Alarms for air attacks, close-in defense and blackouts indicated.)"

Ex. 32: SOP, Hawaiian Department, 5 November 1941. This is practically same content as preceding Ex. 31 in re all things mentioned above.

Ex. 27: This is telephone conversation on December 3, 1941, [20] between a Japanese in Honolulu by name of Mori and a Military or Naval officer in Tokio, translated and available to Military Intelligence, Hawaiian Department, December 5, 1941. (This does not seem to show very much of importance except that Tokio inquired about the number of air planes flying about daily and if Mori knew "anything about United States Fleet").

Ex. 28: SOP, 25th Division—See Section I, para. 10, "Alarm system" and Sec. I, para. 6 a, b (1) (2)—relative to having AA guns and ammunition.
Ex. 29: SOP, 24th Division. See in re AA defense and Sec. 1, para. 13—"alarm system".

POSSIBLE SPECIFICATIONS

1. FAILURE TO PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE INSHORE AERIAL PATROL

R1-5: Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan—provides amongst other things for Army the "* * * establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the waters of Oahu defensive coastal area."
R1-14: Major Lawton states that Army fliers were to patrol inshore area off Oahu (about 20 miles) and Navy to operate a surface patrol in same area.

R2-127: Gen. Short states there were no planes in the air this Sunday morning of attack, and that it was "Most unusual". Would have to ask Davidson why not. But had they been in the air "they would have had no ammunition. They were only training."

R2-107: Gen. Short states, "Inshore reconnaissance was a daily thing. We had planes around the Island just constantly."

R2-102: Pursuit planes not armed at time of the attack, Gen. Short admits. Says, "They were not on a war footing." (There was no "inshore" patrol established. He means that training planes were just flying around for the training. They had no ammunition while in the air.)

R2-172: Gen. Davidson had charge of the pursuit planes on the Island and says that none of his planes ever flew before 7:30 A.M. and then just for training and never flew on Sundays.

R2-181: General Davidson says there were no planes in the air this Sunday morning just the same as any other Sunday morning. They were resting.

R6-738: Adm. Bloch says that he and Gen. Short signed the Joint Coastal Hawaiian Frontier Defense Plan, April 11, 1941. By this Navy undertook the distant reconnaissance and the Army to provide an "inshore aerial patrol" to run out 25 to 50 miles at sea. Prior to December 7th he don't think Army ever did this.

R14-1648: Gen. Martin was Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, and admits that prior to December 7, 1941, there was no inshore patrol.

[22] R2-200: Gen. Rudolph, Commanding General, bombers, says that he was only training crews to bring over the bombers from the mainland. That when his ships were up they would have no ammunition unless they were doing some target practice in connection with their training. None of his planes were in the air at time of attack December 7, 1941, at 7:55 A.M. and that none got in the air until after the attack.

R2-127: General Short, after stating that "planes were in the air constantly", was asked, "Well, were they the planes of your inshore patrol?" He replied, "Well, they were planes that were in training, but they would see just as much as—yes, they would have only been inshore patrol; they wouldn't have gone over 15 miles; they wouldn't have seen anything that those training planes wouldn't have seen constantly."

R2-107: General Short states, "My reconnaissance under the plan with the Navy is limited to just the immediate offshore of the island, ordinarily limited to 15 miles. * * *" (See statement of Admiral Bloch, R6-738, supra.)

[23] 2. FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSES

R1-5: Joint Coastal Frontier Plan makes Army responsible for aircraft defenses.

R2-80: General Short admits that all anti-aircraft batteries didn't have ammunition. Admits four batteries had to go some distance to get it, and some had to go to the crater after it, and those who had it had to unbox it.

R2-88: 25th Division had to draw ammunition for their artillery and was not in battle position until 4 P.M.

R2-128: Alert #1 didn't provide for air attack at all, but only for uprisings "* * * where there was no threat from without."

R2-189-30: General Davidson says the biggest difficulty was that plane guns were not loaded and the ammunition was in a hangar that was afire.

R2-100: General Davidson states that he been in position with his ships he could have shot down Jap planes before they reached their objective.

R3-257: General Wilson says that by the time he got to the field the men themselves had gotten the machine guns out and "had gotten busy."

R3-234: Colonel Phillips states that AA guns had no ammunition. Thinks they should have under FM 100-5. (This he speaks of would be mobile units.)

R3-252: General Wilson, 24th Division says his troops had to draw ammunition.

R3-262: General Murray, 25th Division, says that he had violated regulations and had previously drawn ammunition. He says he knew the area for drawing ammunition (small) at Schofield and as it was congested he knew that it would be a regular slaughter if Japs attacked with bombs. He thought there might be a surprise raid, so he did this. Says it took about six hours to draw ammunition owing to the congestion in the area.
R3-274: General Burgin says some of his AA guns were in position "in 15 or 20 minutes and others had to go to the other side of the Island and were not in position until afternoon. A great many did get into position." (This latter remark implying that they all did not. Negative.)

R3-275: General Burgin says that all of his guns did not have ammunition. Men had to go to the crater for it, and even that was near guns was still in boxes and had to be unboxed before could be used.

R3-270: General Burgin says that when he got Alert #1 he expected Alert #2 right away. Alert #2 "is where we take ammunition."

R3-345: General Martin said that had Alerts 2 or 3 been in effect their planes would have had fuel and ammunition.

R4X:34: Sergeant Mobley Hall tells of having to get machine guns [24] for anti-aircraft shooting out of the supply room at Wheeler Field and set them up and then go for "supplies." (Presumably ammunition.)

R4-437: Captain Ebe, CAC, says his CA guns were not in position at Barbers Point at time of attack. Had to get 4 guns down there under fire. Got some machine guns out of supply room and set them up in a tennis court and fired, then set them on a barge and fired back at attacking Japs. They had no machine guns or ammunition at time of attack.

R4-458: Lieutenant Stephen Saltzman, 98th CA, had no guns and their machine guns were in storeroom.

R4-459: Lieutenant Saltzman says they had ammunition pits and gun pits, but had to dig in ground for barracks for the men (?). They had no automatic weapons except .30 Calibre Brownings with infantry adapter mounts for anti-aircraft fire. Had no AA guns and the machine guns they had were in the storerooms.

R4-473: Lieutenant Cooper—came to Hickman Field—men were getting machine guns out, trying to put them together—they lacked water cans.

R4-469: Lieutenant Colonel Jack Howard, QMC, has charge of depot—many supplies—and on R4-471, says depot an easy target and had no machine guns for anti-aircraft at time of attack.

R4-473: Lieutenant Cooper, above, states that men were desperately and bravely bringing machine guns out and trying to shoot them.

R4-497: Captain West, CAC, had some machine guns (ground) at Camp Malakole, but had to get AA guns out of storage and set them up.

R4-498: West says no equipment in place and ready to fire. Says not ready at Pearl Harbor for 1 or 2 hours after attack.

R4-500: Lieutenant Lyman, CA, his was a machine gun battalion—had no AA guns and their machine guns were in storage about 50 yards away.

R10-1166: Lieutenant Colonel Larkin, USMC, CO of Ewa Field, had planes for Army use December 7, 1941, but Army never called nor was he called that entire day (Army controlled these land planes by the plans in effect.) Says for their anti-aircraft they had only some .30 calibre machine guns that they took out of some destroyed planes.

R10-1191: Captain Shoemaker, Commanding Officer Ford Island, (1193-1197). Army were supposed to install AA guns and ammunition and supposed to man them. This is an Army battery. They had been there before on some tests, but December 7th they never showed up at all all day long. They got out some machine guns but the ammunition was in storage.

R10-1210: Commander Martin, Kaneohe Bay, had no anti-aircraft except ground machine guns and rifles. All planes here were put out of commission.

[25] R10-1217: Lieutenant Colonel Weddington, Commanding Officer, Bellows Field, had planes but no ammunition. No anti-aircraft whatever. Got out their machine guns but had to go to the crater for ammunition. Post wasn't authorized any ammunition he says.

R13-1590: Colonel Pickett, USMC, was at Navy Yard Barracks—they were not supposed to handle the anti-aircraft defenses but no one called them so they of their own accord got machine guns out of the shed and ammunition and set them up. They were not set up or ready in any way and they had to do this under fire. Took them about 20 minutes.

R14-1648: General Martin says they did not set up machine guns at fields for the protection of planes.

R16-1838: Lieutenant Colonel Whaling saw one of our AA's shoot at our own plane.

R5-553: Admiral Kimmel testifies in regard to a publication known as the "Joint Action of the Army and Navy." He states, "This publication was prepared
by the Joint Board and promulgated to the two services by a joint order signed by the Secretaries of War and Navy." He says Army was to provide—

"A communication and intelligence system to include an aircraft warning service, among the elements of the land defense with provision for the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Navy."

R5-554: Admiral Kimmel purports to read from page 32 of this document wherein it defines the functions of an aircraft warning service. (This is fully set out on page 17 this Brief and Resume under Documentary Evidence.) No date of this is given but the Admiral says it was in force and effect December 7, 1941, and prior thereto.

Ex. 9: Statement of Captain Edward Kent that he was ground defense officer at Bellows Field. They had some ground machine guns but no ammunition. Had asked for some ammunition about December 1, but it hadn't arrived.

Ex. 13: Captain Edward Kent makes another statement that at Bellows Field they had no rifles or ammunition issued, so they issued some rifles to use for their anti-aircraft. Their machine guns were not set up until after the attack. Had only rifles and a few machine guns from the grounded planes to ward off the attack.

Ex. 28: SOP 25th Division.
Ex. 29: SOP 24th Division (These sop's all provide for each unit responsible for its own air attack defense.)

Ex. 31: SOP, CAC—"Section 1, par. 6—Every unit is responsible for its security at all times from hostile ground and air forces." See paragraphs 233-273, FM 100-5. (Particularly applicable [26] to "close-in" defense by all sea coast artillery and antiaircraft units.)

Ex. 32: SOP, Hawaiian Department, November 5, 1941.

R4-427: Lieutenant Welsh says that pits were dug for installing AA guns in some places but the guns were not ready.

R4-471: Colonel J. Howard, QMC, had many supplies in his QM depot which was an easy target but had no machine or other guns for anti-aircraft defense.

Ex. 7: Statement by General Short—page 24: "All anti-aircraft batteries had skeleton crews guarding them. All units had in their possession ammunition for rifles, pistols, automatic rifles and machine guns."

Ex. 7, p. 23: Here appears a written statement by Lieutenant Kermit A. Tyler wherein he says at time of attack he was "Pursuit Officer at the Interceptor Control Center." (But see statements of his superior officer, Major Bergquist, (R3-379), Tyler merely sent there to watch it and familiarize himself with its operation.)

Ex. 7, p. 22: Appears an affidavit of Private Joseph P. McDonald who was the telephone operator at the AWS information center at time of attack. (Merely verifies that Lockard called in, Private McDonald wanted Lieutenant Tyler to call back the men at the Board, but Lieutenant Tyler said it was not necessary.)

R2-80: General Short here, and also in his statement (Ex. 7, p. 24), said that all anti-aircraft batteries had .30 caliber, .50 caliber, and small arms ammunition, "in their immediate possession." Then he says, "All but four batteries had their ammunition for the 3-inch guns immediately accessible. For instance, down at DeRussy the ammunition was in the casemate. They had to carry it probably 75 yards, but their men were right there, and the guns were all set up and in position, but the ammunition was not right along side of the guns. There were four batteries that had to go further for their ammunition. * * *

(B. C. D, and F, 6th Infantry). The first one of those batteries started drawing its ammunition at the ** ** Crater, where we had our ammunition in caves, at 8:15, ** **. And by 10:15 they had all drawn what we call a day of fire, which for that particular battery is 300 rounds per gun. ** **. They moved out, and they had about a thousand yards to go, and by 8:15 were actually drawing ammunition, ** **."

Q: "And the batteries you say all had the ammunition at the—"

A: Immediately accessible. They were not right along side of the gun. I say they had to step into the casemate and probably carry the ammunition 75 yards. Down at Fort Kamehameha they probably didn't have to carry it that far, and they were in action very quickly as a result of that. The casemate was closer to the position."

R2-81: General Short says under Alert #2 the ammunition would have been along side of the guns.
3. FAILURE TO SET UP AN INTERCEPTOR COMMAND

R1-5: Joint Coastal Frontier Plan—Army to provide against air attack.
R1-16: F. O. #1, dated November 28, 1941, sets up duties and responsibilities of Interceptor Command.
R1-18: SOP, Hawaiian Department states in pertinent part: “The interceptor command will coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery, and available Naval and Marine Corps anti-aircraft artillery, aircraft warning service and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of anti-aircraft measures of units not under military control, to include (1) arrival and departure of all friendly aircraft, (2) the coordination of the anti-aircraft fire from naval ships in Pearl and Honolulu Harbors, (3) transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies.
R2-51: General Short here explains the workings of the Interceptor Command, just as though it was all set up and definitely states that General Davidson was in command thereof December 7th.
R2-68, 9: General Short states that ordinarily a Naval Officer was at the Board in the information center to relay any information on to the Navy in compliance with (3) above—and that he thinks three Naval Officers were detailed there. Says they were not there December 7th.
R2-178: General Davidson states definitely that on December 7th this command was not set up, that it was not activated.
R2-170: General Davidson states that he was not in charge of interceptor command December 7th because there was no interceptor command on that date. (Gen. Davidson had been in US from about Oct. 15, 1941 until Dec. 3, 1941, and after the 3rd he took the 4th and 5th in writing up his findings from the mainland where he had been studying the workings of interceptor commands, so he knew very little that was going on.)
R2-179: Davidson says interceptor command was not activated until “a few days ago” (Dec. 24, 1941.)
R2-196: Interceptor Command activated December 17, 1941.
R3-232: Colonel Phillips, Chief of Staff, admits interceptor command activated December 17, 1941.
R3-274: General Burgin, Command General CA, (sea coast and anti-aircraft artillery), when they are ready to fire turns his anti-aircraft over to the interceptor command, as had been doing in drills, and did this December 7th., and says “they were just shooting at everything * * * I don’t think they had much control.”
R3-330: General Martin in speaking of AWS was asked, “Who had it if you didn’t?” Answer “It was under the Signal Officer who [28] was in charge of the installation of the equipment.”
R3-333: Lieutenant Colonel Powell, Department Signal Officer, had been setting up this command and that it had not been organized on December 7th. That he had been in U. S. with General Davidson. Interceptor Command had not been organized in accordance with SOP.
R3-356: Colonel Powell says that on morning of December 7th he was at his home in Honolulu at time of attack. Was not at AWS. (This is where interceptor commander would be.)

4. FAILURE TO PROVIDE A PROPER AIRCRAFT WARNING SERVICE

R1-5: Joint Coastal Plan—Army to provide for aircraft warning service.
R1-16: F. O. #1 provides army’s responsibility for AWS.
R1-18: SOP, Hawaiian Department, Army to supply and “provide for transmission of information to all interested agencies”. (Navy?)
R2-178: Although General Short had stated that this under General Davidson, General Davidson here states that it was not under his command as the Signal Corps were just setting it up and they were operating it a little.
R3-232: Colonel Phillips states that the “radars are still not installed”, (apparently meaning the fixed ones).
R3-233: Had only three mobile units in use, and two of these not operating at time of attack. (They were only ordered to operate between 4 and 7 a. m., after that they could use them to train if they wanted to, but not required, and as no training on Sunday, they all quit at 7 a.m., December 7th, except the one boy, Lockard.) (Navy did not know that this was only time they were operating. Were not told.)
R3-253: When Colonel Powell, Signal Officer, got back from U. S., G-3 told him to operate it from 4 to 7 a. m., and this he did, but it was not set up yet in accordance with SOP for Interceptor Command.

R3-259: General Martin, Commanding General, Air Force, says December 7th the AWS was under the Signal Officer (Col. Powell) who was installing the equipment, never under Martin's command. (Which it would have had to be to be under Gen. Davidson.)

R3-337: General Martin says that AWS was never under his command.

R3-339: General Martin in speaking of AWS was asked, "Who had it if you didn't", answer, "it was under the Signal Officer who was in charge of the installation of the equipment."

R3-353: Colonel Powell, Signal Officer, says that on December 7th the detector instruments were under his direction, and it was planned that when he got the AWS working satisfactorily that he would turn it over to the Interceptor Command.

R3-354.5: Colonel Powell says that at time of attack he had seven listening posts (AW stations) set up and could have enough men to operate them 24 hours, but there were not enough stations as they wear out under strain.

R3-368: Lieutenant Tyler, AC, was told by Major Bergquist to go over to the information center this morning from 4 to 8 a. m.—didn't know what to do—had no instructions—had only seen "board" once before and had never operated it. Says at 7 a. m. all those who had been there sitting around the board with earphones on, took them off and all went home, except the switchboard operator, who is always there, and himself because he had been told to stay there until 8:00 o'clock. This officer had no instructions whatever as to his duties there. At about 7:20 a. m. the radar station at Opana (northern tip of Island) called in all excited and said a large number of planes were coming in from about 132 miles north. This was Lockard and he told this to Lt. Tyler, who told him not to worry about it. In about ten minutes Lockard, called in again, very excited, the operator asked the Lt. if he shouldn't call the men back to the board. Lt. Tyler said not to. Very soon the attack came.

R3-377: Major Bergquist had been helping voluntarily to set up the information center and he states that it was not finished. He had voluntarily and without instructions, had officers under him go over to the board to act as watch officers, just to see it operate and learn what it was about, and this is why he had Lt. Tyler go over there this morning from 4:00 to 8:00 o'clock. The Board only operated until 7:00 a. m. but he had told Tyler until 8:00 and that is why he was there.

R3-380: He states that he knew that Lt. Tyler knew nothing about the Board and didn't expect him to as it was not necessary to have any air officer there at that time at all.

R3-383: Major Bergquist states that the Aircraft Warning Service Company, operating under the Signal Corps, were the ones ordered to operate the AWS from 4:00 to 7:00 a. m. The Air Force merely cooperated on its own initiative. Major Tindall, Commander Taylor and himself were all Controllers and could have operated it.

R3-382: Major Bergquist says that they could have operated the mobile units 24 hours a day at the time and that the sets could have stood it. The difficulty was with the gas engines operating the sets rather than the sets themselves, but even then could have operated them.

R3-390: Major Tindall says that altho not detailed or instructed to go over to the Information Center, he knew that it would probably be undermanned at the time of the attack on December 7, 1941, so he voluntarily went over there to help out if he could. Major Bergquist, Comdr. Taylor and himself were the only three who might be qualified to act as control officers and none of them were detailed there at that time as it had not been finished and was not ready, and even then it was only ordered to operate between 4:00 and 7:00 a. m. There was no naval officers there as there never had been any assigned. So there were none there this morning "the same as any other morning".

R10-1229: Lt. Comdr. Taylor says the AWS was "not ready by any means", and there was no naval liaison officers detailed there.

R3-356: Colonel Powell, Signal Officer, whose direction the AWS was at the time of the attack, states that at that time he was at his home in Honolulu, not at the AWS center.

R5-553: Admiral Kimmel testifies in regard to a publication known as the "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy", saying, "This publication was prepared by
the joint board and promulgated to the two services by a joint order of the Secretaries of War and Navy. "He says that it provides under a heading "The specific functions of the Army in Coastal Frontier Defense" that the Army shall provide—"A communication and intelligence system to include an aircraft warning service, among the elements of the land defense, with provision for the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Navy."

R5-554: Admiral Kimmel reads from this document on page 32 thereof where it defines functions of AWS. (This will be found in Documentary Evidence.)

[36a] Ex. 7, p. 23: Here appears a written statement by Lieutenant Kermit A. Tyler wherein he says at time of attack he was "Pursuit Officer at the Interceptor Control Center." (But see statements of his superior officer, Major Bergquist (R3-379), Tyler merely sent there to watch it and familiarize himself with its operation.)

Ex. 7, p. 22: Appears an affidavit of Private Joseph P. McDonald who was the telephone operator at the AWS information center at time of attack. (Merely verifies that Lockard called in, Private McDonald wanted Lieutenant Tyler to call back the men at the Board, but Lieutenant Tyler said it was not necessary.)

[31] 5. FAILURE TO PROVIDE FOR THE TRANSMISSION OF APPROPRIATE WARNINGs TO ALL INTERESTED AGENCIES

Exhibit 32: Standing Operating Procedure—Nov. 5, 1941: Section II, paragraph 15j provides: "The Interceptor Command will: Coordinate and control the operations of pursuit aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery (* * *), the aircraft warning service, and attached units, and will provide for the coordination of anti-aircraft measures of units not under military control, to include:

(1) Arrival and departure of all friendly aircraft.
(2) * * *
(3) Transmission of appropriate warnings to all interested agencies."

R5-553: Admiral Kimmel testifies in regard to a publication known as "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy", saying "This publication was prepared by the Joint Board and promulgated to the two services by a joint order signed by the Secretaries of War and Navy." Under a heading therein 'The specific functions of the Army in Coastal Frontier Defense' it says the Army will provide:

"A communications and intelligence system to include an aircraft warning service, among the elements of the land defense, with provision for the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Navy."

(Altho in the record it does not appear that the date of this document was, Admiral Kimmel says it was in effect Dec. 7, 1941.)

R5-554: Admiral Kimmel reads from page 32 of above stated document, viz: "An aircraft warning service is a communication and intelligence service which forms part of the communication and intelligence service of the frontier defense. The purpose is to warn centers of population, industrial plants, public utilities, and military and naval establishments of the approach of hostile aircraft, and to alert Air Corps units and anti-aircraft artillery units. It consists essentially of observers, of information centers for plotting the courses and distributing information of approaching hostile planes, and of the necessary communications."

R2-68-70: General Short testifies that there were Naval Officers at the Information Center at all times to get this information and relay it to the Navy. That they were liaison officers detailed there for that purpose—and he thinks that three naval officers had been so detailed to act in "transmitting" any warnings to the Navy. But, altho they had always been there on previous mornings, there were none there this morning of the attack.

R3-380: Major Bergquist says that Lt. Tyler at the Board this morning would not know that the planes heard were not Navy planes because the Navy liaison position at the Board had not been filled yet.

R3-381: Major Bergquist says that there had never been any navy liaison officers at the Board prior to December 7, 1941, and that Comdr. Taylor had contacted the navy in regard to sending some such officers over for that purpose, but none had as yet been sent.

R3-389: Major Bergquist also states that there was no bomber liaison at the Center until in afternoon, December 7, 1941.

R5-632: Admiral Kimmel states that no naval officer had ever been detailed to the AWS center to keep navy advised.
R1-5: Major Lawton sets out the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Plan. Therein the Navy is to provide for a “distant reconnaissance”.

R1-14: Under this Plan the Army was to conduct an inshore aerial patrol and the Navy a surface patrol of the same area. Major Lawton thought this distance would be about 20 miles out.

R6-788: Admiral Bloch says that he and General Short signed this Plan and under that the Army were to conduct an inshore aerial patrol to a distance of 25 to 50 miles.

Exhibit 7, page 11: In his exhibit D General Short sets out the following extract from the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan:

“Method of Coordination. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Dept., and the Commandant, 14th. Naval District, have determined that in their joint plan the method of coordination will be by mutual cooperation and that this method will apply to all activities wherein the Army and Navy operate in coordination, until and if the method of unity of command is invoked, as prescribed in Joint Action of Army and Navy, 1935, Chapter 2.”

R1-18: Standing Operating Procedure, 5 Nov., 1941, states that the Interceptor Command shall control the AWS and “provide for transmission of appropriate-warings to all interested agencies.”

R2-42: After War Dept. radiogram of Nov. 27, 1941, Gen. Short states that he only ordered Alert #1, and operation of AWS 4:00 to 7:00 A.M., but it doesn’t appear that he notified the Navy of these steps.

R2-108: Gen. Short states that he didn’t ask Navy about the “distant reconnaissance”.

R2-127: Gen. Short doesn’t know why the planes were not in the air this Sunday morning of the attack. Says there were planes all around the Island constantly. “Most unusual” that they were not up this morning. However, it would have made no difference as if they had been up they had no ammunition as they were only training up to that time.

R2-164: Gen. Short says that he did not discuss with the Navy whether they considered Alert #1 sufficient; says they, “Never talked it over.”

R2-167: The General says that with all his guns and materiel he couldn’t have guaranteed that the Fleet would be safe. (But never talked it over.)

R2-53: Gen. Short tells of the many meetings with Admirals Kimmel and Bloch just prior to the time of attack, but nothing to show that the Navy were ever informed that interceptor command had not been activated; that AWS was only working from 4:00 to 7:00 A.M.; that there was no inshore aerial patrol, or that only Alert #1 as to sabotage was in effect.

R2-68, 9: Gen. Short states that ordinarily a naval officer was at the Board at the Information Center—that he thinks that three officers were detailed there from the Navy. (This was not true so it shows they were not mutually cooperating.)

R2-108: Gen. Short says he never asked the Navy what distance reconnaissance they were making as, “It was their full responsibility. I didn’t know just where they went, and I don’t know just what they did when they were out. That was a naval responsibility. * * * and I did not feel that it was my business to try to tell Adm. Kimmel how he would conduct his reconnaissance”.

R2-119: Gen. Short says that Alert #1 doesn’t call for the operation of the AWS at all, but were doing it anyhow.

R2-128: Gen. Short states that Alert #1 didn’t cover air attack at all. And no particular precautions were taken whether the Fleet was in or out of the Harbor.

R2-186: Gen. Davidson states that a Navy Officer (Comdr. Taylor) had been around helping them set up the AWS, but not there every morning and that he was not detailed there as a liaison officer.

R2-222: Col. Phillips, Chief of Staff, Hawaiian Dept., was the senior Army member of the Local Joint Planning Committee (Army and Navy security measures) but that they had never met since he became Chief of Staff and was a member, November 6, 1941. Also, that they never met even after the communications of Nov. 27, 1941.

R3-223: Col. Phillips never consulted with the Navy Fleet or Dept. heads at any time between Nov. 27, 1941, and Dec. 7, 1941.
R3-227: Col. Phillips says that after the War Dept. radio of Nov. 27, 1941, he and Gen. Short talked it over and decided on Alert #1. He thought that the Navy would make "reconnaissance," but never asked them or consulted them in any way.

R3-227, 8: Col. Phillips never did know when the fleet were in or out of the Harbor, and he says knowing this fact would have made a difference in their plans of defense. "* * * but as Chief of Staff, I never knew."

R3-229: Col. Phillips states that he was never present at any conferences between Commanding General and the Navy Commanders. That the General always took his aide along with him to these conferences. Says that the General was personally handling the protection and/or cooperation with the Navy. "Short was handling all that himself."

R3-233, 6: Col. Phillips says that "they" depended on the Navy to warn them. (I presume that he means by the distant reconnaissance.)

R3-245: Col. Phillips states again that there were no meetings of the Joint Planning Committee.

R3-270: General Burgin says that Gen. Short expressed himself "very forcefully" along the line that with the Navy scouting, etc., no ships could get close enough to land a plane. He got the impression that Gen. Short got this from the Navy.

R3-273: Gen Burgin, Commanding General sea coast artillery and anti-aircraft artillery, says he never knew when the Fleet was coming in, altho it would have helped him with his defenses had he known this.

R3-283: Gen. Burgin says that the Navy never gave any information as to when they were coming in except when they were practicing.

R3-293: Lt. Col. Fielder, G-2, Hawaiian Dept., states that at the Staff meeting on the morning of Dec. 6, 1941, he reported that the Japs were burning papers at the Consulate. That he knew of this a short time before this. That the FBI had reported it to one of his men and he in turn told meeting of the Staff. (Gen. Short says that he did not know of this, and Col Fielder does not state specifically whether Gen. Short was at this Staff meeting.) Says nobody paid any attention to this burning of papers.

R3-381: Major Berquist says that there had never been any Naval liaison officers at the Information Center, prior to Dec. 7, 1941.

R5-538: Admiral Kimmel says that he inspected the Pearl Harbor defenses and was astounded at their weakness.

R5-554: Adm. Kimmel says that my Army and Navy Joint Agreement signed March 20, 1941, "defensive air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of the Island of Oahu" would be under the tactical control of the Army. Signed by Adm. Bloch and Gen. (This is true. See under Documentary Evidence.)

[34] R5-556C: Here Admiral Kimmel sets out the Joint Agreement and the Joint Estimate of the Situation (Addendum I). (These are set forth in the preceding pages under Documentary Evidence.)

R5-569: Adm. Kimmel says that the Navy were not informed until about Dec. 9, 1941, that the radar operated by Sgt. Lockard at Opana had picked up the approaching Jap planes the morning of the attack. Had they been they might have trailed them back to carriers.

R5-581, 2: Adm. Theobald states that the "war warning message" of Nov. 27, 1941, from CNO to the Navy "was given by a Naval Officer to an Army Officer."

R5-583: On December 3, 1941, the CNO sent Adm. Kimmel a message that they had reliable information that the Jap consulates at Hong Kong; Singapore, Batavia, London and Washington were to destroy most of their codes and ciphers and burn secret papers at once. (Gen. Short admits he was in conference with Adm. Kimmel this day, but it is not brought out whether he was informed of this message.)

R5-608, 9: Adm. Kimmel states that there were no Navy morning or evening patrols except over the route to Honolulu(?), and to the south where a task force was out—nothing to the north. He says no evening patrols anywhere at anytime.

R12-1481: Adm. Kimmel says that the Army was furnished with a schedule that did show what ships were in or out of the Harbor at a given time and this had been so for months.

R5-630-7: Adm. Kimmel states that he thought the AWS was working, and that radar sets were in good shape, had never been informed otherwise. He knows that no naval officer was detailed at the Information Center as a liaison officer. He had the SOF, 5 Nov., 1941, Hawaiian Dept., and from that thought the Interceptor Command and the AWS was working as provided therein. Just learned at time of hearing that the permanent radar sets were not even then installed.
R6-062, 3: Here Adm. Kimmel states just how he understands the “war warning” message was given to Gen. Short. Says Comdr. Layton gave it to Lt. Burr (Navy liaison at Army Hq.) who gave it to G-3 (Col. Donegan or Major Lawton) on Nov. 27, 1941.

R6-067: Gen. Short wrote Adm. Kimmel June 19, 1941, saying that the AWS “will be in operation in the near future.” Aug. 5, 1941, Gen. Short wrote him again that AWS (aircraft warning service) is “rapidly nearing completion.”

R6-069, 670: Tentative SOP (Standing Operating Procedure) of Interceptor Command was never given Adm. Kimmel he states.

R6-069: Adm. Kimmel knew there was no distant patrol of Dec. 7, 1941.

R6-730. 1: Admiral says that Gen. Short never told him at any time what he proposed to do after the messages of Nov. 27, 1941.

R6-733-738: Adm. Bloch didn’t know the radars were not working all the time, didn’t know anything about the inshore aerial patrol.

R7-771: Adm. Bloch states that the conversations between Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short were very general.

R7-804, 5: Adm. Bloch says that he and Gen. Short talked many times after Nov. 27, 1941, and that Gen. Short never told him at any time prior to Dec. 7, 1941, that he was only alerted to prevent sabotage. After attack he went to the General’s office and said, “Weren’t you on alert?” and the Gen. replied, “Only against sabotage.” Navy Condition 1 is their highest form of Alert while Army, Alert #1 is their lowest. He thought the Army was on a “high” alert. Didn’t know about the various types of alerts.

R7-806: Adm. Block thought Gen. Short was given the “war warning” despatch because he was given one by Adm. Kimmel.

[35] R7-831: Capt. DeLany, USN, knew that the AWS was very unsatisfactory, and “couldn’t get information out of it.”

R7-859: Admiral Pye says that he would depend for warning upon scouting by aircraft, “and it would seem reasonable to suppose that with all of the Army observation posts it would be impractical for enemy aircraft to arrive in this position in such a fashion that we could not fully man our guns.” He assumed that Army’s AWS was in full operation—“** * * because on these drills they had given adequate warning.”

R7-865: Adm. Pye says that Navy had its guns manned and ammunition at then at all times after Nov. 27, 1941.

R9-1094: Here Lt. Comdr. Layton introduces several Naval despatches right up until December 3, 1941, showing the imminence of war. (However, these are not brought home to Gen. Short in the record, but this might be checked. If they were cooperating they should have been made known to him.)

R9-119: Rochefort knew that Jan Consulate was burning papers the Wednesday before Dec. 7, 1941.

R14-1624: Gen. Short here says that the SOP, Nov. 5, 1941, was issued as an accomplished procedure. This sets out the functions of the Interceptor Command and provides that the Army will transmit warnings to “interested agencies”. (Ten copies of this were given the Navy.)

R14-1626: Gen. Short upon being recalled admits that at time of attack the Interceptor Command had not a “definite organization”. “We were working it informally”. Doesn’t know for sure whether the Navy knew this or not. (He didn’t say this before.)


R14-1648: Gen. Martin admits that prior to Dec. 7, 1941, there was no inshore aerial patrol by the Army Air Force.

R16-1823-1827: Here are set out the two letters. One from Secretary of Navy, Jan. 24, 1941, setting out the matter of protection of the Fleet at Pearl Harbor, and the answer thereto by Secretary of War, Feb. 7, 1941, which were sent to General Short and received by him. He admits receipt thereof in his statement as of Feb. 19, 1941. (See Documentary Evidence this Brief and Resume.)

R2-184: General Short was asked, “You didn’t actually coordinate with the Navy as to whether they considered Alert #1 sufficient?” He replied, “I didn’t go down and ask the Navy, no, sir, whether they considered it sufficient. I am sure from all of our talk that everybody understood just what was being done.”

Question to General Short, “** * * . Was it intended that the same alert would be ordered by the Navy or by the Army in each case?” He replied, “I hadn’t—yes.”

R2-38: General Short was asked if he got the “war warning” message to Navy. He replied, “I don’t remember. I perhaps saw it in that I was in conference
with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch on the 27th for 2 or 3 hours. I was in conference with him on December 1—Admiral Kimmel on December 1, and with both of them on December 3; so in all probability I did see the one to which you refer. I am not sure whether it was sent to me officially."

[35a] R2-39: General Short states the same answer would apply to the Naval Communication of November 24, 1941. (See documentary Evidence in this Brief and Resume.)

R2-46: General Short says, "Now, to take up the question of having no information to indicate an attack, as I say, I was in constant communication with the 14th Naval District. I had nothing in the way of alarming news. In our Coastal Frontier Defense Plan we coordinate the work of the Army and Navy by mutual cooperation."

R2-46: General Short here discusses the Joint Air Operations Agreement of March 21, 1941, and says what they each agreed to do, and then, after stating the Navy was responsible for distant reconnaissance, says "The question of just how the total reconnaissance was carried out was never known to me."

R2-107: General Short states, "My reconnaissance under the plan with the Navy is limited to just the immediate offshore of the Island, ordinarily limited to 15 miles."

(See statement of Admiral Bloch, R6-738, supra.)

R2-70: General Short in speaking of the operation of the Interceptor Command station said there would under battle conditions "be a total group of about 30 officers there. Including the naval officer. I think three naval officers is the normal quota that they have there."

[36] 7. FAILURE TO ISSUE ADEQUATE ORDERS TO HIS SUBORDINATES AS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE DUTIES IN CASE OF SUDDEN ATTACK

R2-66: Gen. Short here tells about Lt. Tyler being at the Board on this morning of the attack and getting the call regarding the approaching planes from Lockard. (But he had no instructions whatsoever regarding any duties there or what he was to do in case anything happened.)

R2-162: Gen. Short says that no planes had any ammunition. Were only training.

R2-163: Gen. states that no troops under his command were on a war footing.

R2-177: Gen. Davidson here sets out two telegrams whereby he is instructed not to disperse the planes.

R2-178: Gen. Davidson was never instructed to operate the AWS—it was just being set up, by Signal Corps.

R2-172: Gen. Davidson had charge of the pursuit planes but had never been instructed to have any in the air prior to 7:30 A.M. when they started the day's training—never told to operate an aerial inshore patrol—never told or instructed to have his planes in the air on Sunday mornings.

R2-186: Gen. Davidson states that he was never informed as to the serious international situation between U. S. and Japan. Hence, his subordinates, including Lt. Tyler, did not.

R2-200: Gen. Rudolph, Commanding General 18th. Bombardment Wing, has charge of the bombers, states he positively had no information of critical relations between U. S. and Japan.

R2-201, 2: Gen. Rudolph states that as an instructor that had he ever seen a radiogram stating "this is a war warning" he would never have had his planes concentrated, and especially on a Sunday morning.

R2-203: Major Allen, AC, says at attack he rushed out—got into a plane—it wouldn't start—he didn't know what to do—asked instructions—finally got into the air at Hickam Field about 11:30 A.M.

R2-205: Major Allen never heard a discussion, even informally, that there might be an attack by Japan.

R2-206: Major Allen, AC, didn't know that there was a flight of 12 of our own bombers coming in from the mainland at the time of the attack—saw some of our own men fire on these pilots as they were trying to land.

R3-226: There were no restrictions on social functions. All liberties and leaves of the men were normal.

R3-353: Col. Powell, Signal Corps, who had been getting the AWS together had been in the U. S. with Gen. Davidson from about Oct. 15, 1941, to Dec. 3, 1941, and when he got back G-3 had already told Col. Murphy, whom he had left
in charge, to operate the AWS between 4:00 and 7:00 A.M. He was told nothing else to do than just this. *Says there was no way of getting any information to the Navy.*

R3-257: Col. Phillips, C of S, states that no one ever reported to him that any ammunition was insecure in a hangar at Hickam Field. He says that no one ever reported to him that Lockard had picked up the planes that morning until a few days later when the Signal Officer just mentioned it informally.

R3-245: Col. Phillips didn’t know whether Navy had been given SOP, Nov. 5, 1941, or not, or whether they would know what Alert #1 meant or not, or whether they had a similar procedure. (Navy were given 10 copies.)

[37] — R3-249, 250: Brig. Gen. Durwold Wilson, CG 24th. Division, was verbally told by Col. Haynes, G-2 25th. Division, on Nov. 27th. that he had seen a telegram that Jap Negotiations were off, but no mention was made that hostilities might ensue. Never called into conference or consulted.

R3-251: Gen. Wilson says that he felt safe from attack on account of the patrol system (?), altho he says he knew nothing about it except by hearsay. He thought the Navy had an inshore and off-shore patrol.

R3-254: Gen. Wilson was at the “Ann Etzler’s Cabaret” the preceding Saturday night at Schofield Barracks. Col. Phillips was there -R2-216.

Gen Short was there.

Gen. Murray was there -R3-264.

Gen. Burgin at “a little party at Ft. Ruger.”

Major and Mrs. Dupree had rather “large party at Schofield”—R3-226.

Gen. Martin was at Dinner Party at Hickam Field –R3-332.

R3-299: Col. Fielder, G-2, says that he and Gen. Short discussed the possibility of an attack in a “purely academic way.”

R3-260, 1: Gen. Murray, CG 25th. Div., “planned to take a horseback ride that morning. Was perplexed * * *”.

R3-264: On Nov. 27th, when Gen. Murray got Alert #1 he was not informed in any way as to the seriousness of the situation. No intimation—nothing.

R3-265: On Nov. 27th when Gen. Murray got Alert #1

R3-265: He says that he talked with Gen. Short several times between Nov. 27, 1941, and Dec. 7, 1941, but the Gen. had never intimated any serious or critical situation. He had only mentioned that he couldn’t get all the funds he wanted for various things. Nothing in re international situation.

R3-273: Gen. Burgin thought the Interceptor Command was working and thought that Gen. Davidson was in charge of it.

R3-274: Gen. Burgin states how on this morning of the attack he got his anti-aircraft ready and turned it over to the Interceptor Command as he had done on the drills, and says, “They didn’t have good control”. (There wasn’t any Interceptor Command and this Gen. didn’t know it, altho he turned over his guns to it. It was just then being run by Majors Tindall and Bergquist who voluntarily went over there thinking that it would be undermanned.)

R3-316: Lt. Col. Bicknell, Ass’t G-2, got the information that the Japs were burning papers on December 5, 1941, and informed Staff meeting next morning. Says that it meant that war was imminent to him.

R3-337: Gen. Martin says that Gen. Davidson was the Interceptor Commander, then on page 338 he didn’t even seem to know that it was not activated until Dec. 17, 1941.

R3-368: Lt. Kermit Tyler was told by Major Bergquist to go over to the Information Center of the AWS this morning but didn’t know why. He had no instructions only to be there between 4:00 and 8:00 A.M. He had never operated a Board and had only seen one once before.

R3-377: Major Bergquist had been helping the Signal Corps set up the AWS, and knew it was operating between 4:00 and 7:00 A.M. so he thought it would be a good idea to acquaint the officers under him with it by having them take turns going over there and watching the Board. So without being told to do so he sent over Lt. Tyler. Says that no Air Corps officer was required to be there as it was not under the Air Corps as yet. Page 380—he states that he knew that Lt. Tyler knew very little about it, didn’t expect him to. Says there were no naval officers ever there as they had been assigned there as yet.

R3-383: Major Bergquist says that the Air Corps were merely cooperating on their own hook. Page 384—he states that there was no bomber liaison [38] there at the Center until afternoon of that day.
R3-386: Major Bergquist states that he came there about 10:00 A. M. as he was not detailed or assigned there, but merely came to help out.

R3-390: Major Tindal says that he was not detailed or assigned to the Information Center of the AWS, but knew it would probably be undermanned so he went over there to help out. He was the first officer there and the men were trying to man it themselves.

R4-415: Lts. Taylor and Welsh rushed to Maleiwa Field—no one told them to go up or to do anything—no squadron commander present. (He was hunting deer on another Island.) So on their own initiative they both took to the air after loading ammunition. They brought down several planes.

R4-427: Lt. Welsh says the guards there had no instructions as to what to do if enemy planes came over.

R4-447: Col. McCarthy says that on Dec. 7, 1941, he never did receive instructions to put in Alert #3 so he just did it himself and did what he could.

R4-448: Col. McCarthy says that from about Nov. 22, 1941, until Dec. 2nd or 3rd that Alert #2 had been in effect. Says that Post Commander called in several Battalion Commanders and verbally gave them orders to put Alert #2 in effect.

R4-476: Lt. Cooper says that they had been on Alert #3 for about two weeks. (I don't understand these two officers and it should be checked.)

R4-454: Pvt. Shortt, ambulance driver, rushed to the hospital—three or four doctor officers there—had no instructions or orders—knew that men were injured so without any instructions he went out and picked up wounded by himself—no litter service or assistance at all.

R4-461: Lt. Saltzman stated that he couldn't conceive of this attack "in my wildest dreams". Says that this is what the Junior Officers thought:—"Knowing that the Signal Corps, the AWS has outposts all over the Islands and that they are manned almost continually and that Navy patrols these waters, I never felt that we would be completely surprised the way we were." (This last word is "did" in record.)

R4-491: Pvt. McBriarty at Bellows Field says that about 8:30 A. M. a plane flew over shooting its machine guns, but as no one was hit they thought nothing of it and he went on to Church.

R14-1654: Gen. Martin says that no search was made for carriers on this morning.

R14-1659: Gen. Davidson says that the Interceptor Command did not direct that a search for planes from carriers be made this morning. (How could it?)

Exhibit 16: This document gives in detail the things they have done since the attack such as practice air raids, drills for gas attacks, practice air raid on Honolulu, distributed the Klaxons for air warning system. This at Wheeler Field. (See contents of this Exhibit more fully set out under specification 11.) (While this is all negative evidence, nevertheless it does show what was not done prior to the attack and what could have been done to alleviate the severity of said attack and the loss sustained.)

Exhibit 17: This sets forth what was done by Gen. Rudolph subsequently at Hickam Field. (See this under specification 11.)

Exhibit 15: Blackout instructions for Hickam Field, issuance of gas masks; air raid drills; plans for evacuation of women and children, etc.) Klaxons for air warning service had not been issued.

[39] 8. FAILURE TO TAKE ADEQUATE MEASURES TO PROTECT THE FLEET AND NAVAL BASE AT PEARL HARBOR

R1-5: Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Plan (See Documentary Evidence in this Brief and Resume)—"Army to provide for land, sea coast and anti-aircraft defense of the Island of Oahu, with particular attention to Pearl Harbor and the naval forces there present. See also Exhibit 25, Plan for Air Defense of Oahu, * * *

"III. Facts Bearing on the Case.

1. Facts:

a. The Army mission is: 'To defend the naval base of Oahu'. * * *

b. To perform its missions, the Fleet must have freedom of action without responsibility for the defense of its base.'

Also, Joint Army and Navy Defense Plan, 1935, Rainbow 5:

a. Joint—Hold Oahu as main outlying naval base and control and protect shipping in coastal zone.
R1-14: By above Plans Army was to conduct an inshore aerial patrol. (The distance of this is in debate.)

R2-42: After warning of November 27, the only measures General Short took were to order Alert #1 (sabotage and uprisings) and radar operation 4-7 a.m.

R2-80: General Short states that all anti-aircraft batteries, and these included PH, did not have ammunition. Says that by 10:15 a.m., they were already, though.

R2-51: General Short states what measures he took after November 27——See page 42 above.

R2-53: General Short states that he met with Kimmel and Bloch several times just prior to December 7, but nothing to show that they were informed that interceptor command was not organized; AWS was not working only 4-7 a.m.; that there was no inshore patrol or that only Alert #1 was in effect. (There is much to show otherwise, however.)

R2-108: General Short says he never asked the Navy what distance reconnaissance they were making as “It was their full responsibility”. “I didn’t know just where they went, and I don’t know just what they did when they were out. That was a naval responsibility. * * * and I did not feel that it was my business to try to tell Admiral Kimmel how he would conduct his reconnaissance.”

R2-119: General Short states that Alert #1 is not for air attack and under this it was not necessary to operate AWS at all.

R2-127: General Short states no planes in air at time of attack this Sunday morning, he didn’t know why, says it was “most unusual”.

R2-157: General says that no special precautions are taken whether Fleet is in or out of the harbor.

R2-162: General admits his planes were not on a war footing at time of attack and had no ammunition.

R2-178: General Davidson says the AWS not under his command at this time——that Signal Corps were just setting it up. (Materials had been there since June, according to Secretary of War’s letter of February 7, 1941.)

R2-186: General Davidson says a naval officer was helping set up the AWS but none were detailed to serve there for liaison. (Hence, there was no provision for transmitting information to interested agencies.)

R2-172: General Davidson states no planes of his (pursuit) were ever in the air prior to 7:30 a.m., and never any on Sundays.

R2-190: General Davidson had 80 planes in commission and 60 not, this morning.

R2-189, 190: General Davidson states that the biggest difficulty was that the plane guns were not loaded and the ammunition was in the hangar that was on fire.

R3-222, 3: Colonel Phillips, Chief of Staff, was senior army member of Local Joint Planning Committee, but it never met since he was a member. Never consulted with Navy Fleet or District heads from November 27 to December 7.

R3-227, 8: Colonel Phillips says he never consulted Navy. He never knew when Fleet was in or out of the Harbor and this would affect the plan for defense. Never present at any conference of Commanding General with Navy. “General Short was handling all that himself.”

R3-234: Colonel Phillips states that anti-aircraft guns, mobile units, had no ammunition. Thinks that under FM 100-5 they should have had some.

R3-245: As Chief of Staff he never knew what forces the Navy had. Depending on Navy to warn them. (?)

R3-273: General Burgin says although he had the sea coast artillery and the anti-aircraft artillery he never knew when fleet was coming in although it would have helped him a lot to know this.

R3-283: Lieutenant Colonel Fielder reported at Staff meeting morning of December 6, that Japs were burning papers.

R3-316: Lieutenant Colonel Bicknell, Assistant Chief of Staff, got information that Japs were burning papers at 5 p.m., Friday, gave to Staff next morning. Also brought the Mori message to Commanding General the night before, but they could make nothing of it. (Ex. 27.)

R3-325: General Martin states that Japs seemed to know everything about them. “Unfortunately we were in Alert #1, that was the most unfortunate thing of all.”

R3-368: Lieutenant Tyler detailed to Board with no experience, no instruction, wasn’t even supposed to be there. Opana called and reported planes but
Tyler not told what to do, didn't know so he did nothing, and planes, although they had been detected, came on and surprised them all.

R3-380: Major Bergquist says AWS not organized or set up; no interceptor command activated; no naval liaison or other means for getting information to Navy. On his own responsibility sent Tyler up there to get acquainted with it. Says had sufficient personnel to operate 24 hours. Bergquist was not detailed there, but did voluntarily go there and help take charge of it when the attack came.

R3-390: Major Tindall voluntarily went over there during attack as he knew it was not set up and would be undermanned.

R4-437: S: Captain Ebeys says his truck drawn coast artillery was not in position at Barbers Point. They were machine gunned on the way. They had to get machine guns out, set them up and fire back.

R4-485: Sergeant Kiatt: C. A., says the switchboard and telephones for his battle post were in the barracks supply room—not installed.

R4-497: S: Captain West says that at Malakole they had some machine guns but the anti-aircraft had to be gotten from the storage and set up. No equipment in place and ready for fire.

R5-538: Admiral Kimmel says he inspected defenses at Pearl Harbor and was astounded at their weakness.

R5-549: (See two letters (2CL-41) of Navy's—SOP, Hawn. Dept. in Documentary Evidence. Also Ex. 35 "Air Defense of Oahu").

R5-556C: On March 31, 1941, Bloch and Martin signed joint estimate of situation covering joint Army and Navy Air Action in event of hostile surprise attack. (See this in Documentary Evidence it covers the exact thing that happened.)

R5-581, 2: Admiral Theobald says that November 27, "war Warning" message given by "a naval officer to an army officer".

R6-730, 1: Admiral Kimmel says that Short at no time ever told him what measures he was going to take as a result of the messages of November 27.

R7-804: Bloch didn't know Army not on a "high" alert—never knew different kinds of alerts.

R10-1191: Captain Shoemaker, Commanding Officer, Ford Island, says Army was to set up an anti-aircraft defense of the island and man it, but that on this day they didn't even show up so they got out some machine guns but had to get ammunition from storage.

R14-1624: Short says hat SOP, 5 November 1941, was issued as "accomplished procedure". (This was given the Navy.)

R14-1622: General Short says, "Frankly, * * * I was more serious about the training rather than expecting anything to happen at that time".

R14-1634, 5: General Short admits reconnaissance and radar working haphazardly up until December 7, because "I didn't think the situation demanded it."

R14-1641, 2: General Short states that if he had had all the material he needed it wouldn't have made any difference in his plans.

R3-333: The AWS Company, operating under the Signal Corps were the ones ordered to operate the AWS from 4 to 7 a.m. The Air Force merely cooperated on its own hook. Operating on a war footing there would be a controller and a pursuit officer present at the Information Center. Major Tindall, Commander Taylor and himself (Major Bergquist) were all controllers and could have operated it.

R3-389: General Martin in speaking of AWS was asked, "Who had it if you didn't?" Answer, "It was under the Signal Officer who was in charge of the installation of the equipment."

R3-337: General Martin says that AWS was never under his command.

R3-333: Colonel Carroll Powell says that at time of attack the Interceptor Command had not been organized in accordance with SOP. On this day AWS was under his direction.

R3-356: At attack he was at his home in Honolulu. Was not at the AWS station.

R3-389: Major Bergquist says there was no bomber liaison at Information Center until in afternoon, December 7.

Ex. 20: Joint drill to test efficiency of interceptor command. (See).

R12-1481: Admiral Kimmel says Army was furnished with schedule showing when ships in and out and had been getting this several months.

R5-553: Admiral Kimmel testifies in regard to a publication known as the "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy." He states, "This publication was prepared by the Joint Board and promulgated the two services by the Secretaries of
War and Navy by a joint order signed by them respectively”. It states what the Army shall provide for under a heading “The specific functions of the Army in Coastal Frontier Defense” —

“A communication system and an intelligence system to include an aircraft warning service, among the elements of the land defense, with provision for the prompt exchange of information or instructions with the Navy.”

R5–554: Admiral Kimmel then reads from page 32 of this Joint Action plan and it defines and describes the duties of an aircraft warning service. (This is copied verbatim on page 8, Documentary Evidence, in this brief and Resume.) Admiral Kimmel says this was in effect December 7, 1941, and prior thereto.

R2–168: General Short was asked:

Q: “Well, your basic plans state specifically that that is the responsibility of the forces (Army) here, to protect that base.”

A: “That is correct.”

Q: “All right. Now, if you had those ideas have you discussed them with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch along those lines? Have you ever discussed with them the situation, or rather, whether or not they should bring their fleet in, or how many? Has that ever been discussed?”

A: “I don’t think that I have discussed that particular point as to how many ships they would bring in.”

Ex. 36: See communications of both the Army and Navy dated October 16, 1941; November 24, 1941; November 27, 1941 (one to Army direct from War Department, and the “war warning” dispatch to Cincpf), and November 23, 1941, and the Navy dispatch of December 3, 1941 (although it is not shown that General Short saw this latter, he says he was in conference with both Admiral Kimmel and Bloch on December 3, 1941), all bearing upon the warnings of danger given to General Short. These various documents also appear in this Brief and Resume under Documentary Evidence.

R2–84: General Short admits purposely grouping the planes as they were then easier to guard against sabotage.

R2–177: General Davidson set out two telegrams from Hawaiian Air Force not to disperse planes.

“No. 27, 1941. * * * HAF Four two C place Alert number one in effect immediately. Anti-sabotage only. This is an actual repeat actual alert—not a drill.”

Followed by:

“Under alert #1 aircraft will not be dispersed. All units continue training under condition easy five.”

Easy five meant E5 which was ready in four hours. So just continued to train normally under condition E5. Nothing ready.

R2–200: General Rudolph states alert #1 “did not include airplane raids; it included sabotage. Therefore, we bunched the planes because we could have much better protection against sabotage.”

Ex. 6: This map shows the bunched arrangement of planes at Hickam Field.

R2–162: General Short admits that pursuit planes were not on a war footing at time of attack and were not supplied with ammunition.

R2–127: General admits no planes in the air this fateful Sunday morning.

R2–128: General states that Alert #1 doesn’t cover air attack at all.

R3–345: General Martin states that had Alerts 2 or 3 been in effect the planes would have had fuel and ammunition, would have been better.

R3–33: Martin states that he had 140 pursuit planes at time and about one-half of them out of commission.

R2–190: Davidson says that he had 80 ships (pursuit) in commission at time and 69 out of commission.
R2-180, 90: General Davidson state that the biggest difficulty at the time was that the planes guns were not loaded and the ammunition was in a hangar that was on fire.

R2-177: General Davidson shows two telegrams from Commanding General, Hawn Air Force, not to disperse planes under Alert #1.—

"Nov. 27, 1941. * * * HAF Four two C place Alert number one in effect immediately. Anti-sabotage only. This is an actual repeat actual alert not a drill."

"Under alert #1 aircraft will not be dispersed. All units continue training under condition easy five."

R5-556K, M, N : Addenda I and II to the plan of Army and Navy made in accordance with the Joint Air Operations Agreement of March 21, 1941 (R5-556A) provide conditions of aircraft readiness, in pertinent part, as follows:

"Material Readiness, E—All aircraft conducting routine operations, none ready for the purposes of this plan; and under Operational Readiness #5. All types—four hours."

R3-383: Major Bergquist says that if there had been Alert #2 the planes would have been dispersed: a pilot there at all times and a man sitting in the cockpit at all times to warm it up, and could be up in 1 to 3 minutes.

R3-389: Bergquist says there was no bomber liaison at information center December 7th until in the afternoon.

R4-415-423: Lieutenant Taylor and Welsh rushed to Maltewa Field and the men were just loading ammunition (30 cal.) into the planes—there was no Squadron Commander there (he was bear hunting on Molokai Island)—had no instructions at all so just jumped in to the planes and brought down six Japs and were cited for this by the Government.

R8-893: Admiral Bellinger says that all Navy planes were armed with machine guns and had ammunition. (Also, somewhere in there that Navy planes were all dispersed.)

R14-1658: General Martin states that he did not set up machine guns at Fields for protection of planes. (What about the SOP's and FM 100-5—Every unit will be responsible for its own defense from air attack.)

Ex. 25: In statement by Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, states that there were no airplanes ready for immediate use at time of attack.

R2-200: General Rudolph, Commanding General bombers, says that he was only training crews to bring over the bombers from the mainland. That when his ships were up they would have no ammunition unless they were doing some target practice in connection with their training. None of his planes were in the air at time of attack December 7, 1941, at 7:55 a.m., and that none got in the air until after the attack.

R2-201, 2: General Rudolph, Commanding General bombers, says that if he had had any intimation of pending trouble he would never have had his planes bunched or concentrated, but would have had them ready for the air, "Especially on a Sunday morning."

R5-561: Here General McNarney reads a statement submitted by General Short in re condition of Reconnaissance and Bomber planes on December 7, 1941:

Reconnaissance planes in commission—6.
Reconnaissance planes out of commission—7.
Bomber planes in commission—39.
Bomber plane out of commission—33.

R2-128: General Short after saying it was "most unusual" for planes not to be in the air this Sunday morning, was asked how he would explain that. He replied, "I wouldn't be able to explain it without asking General Davidson why; but if they had been up and training they wouldn't have had ammunition, for normally in training they did not carry ammunition."

R2-128: General Short says further "* * * . There is no question, if we had had pursuit in the air fully armed and expected this attack at 8 o'clock, why, we probably would have—we might have been able to stop it to a considerable extent, at any rate."

R2-162: General Short was asked, "Were the pursuit planes armed and supplied with ammunition at all?" He replied, "They were not."

R2-163: General Short was asked, "Were the bombers in the same state of unpreparedness as the fighting planes?" He replied, "Yes, sir."
11. FAILURE TO PROVIDE FOR PROTECTION OF MILITARY PERSONNEL, THEIR FAMILIES ET CETERA, ON VARIOUS RESERVATIONS

R3-232: Colonel Phillips states that the Hawaiian Home Guard was not in existence December 7th—"It was just being organized." Says there was no aerial warning service "with sirens in tower downtown" at that time. Have been established since.

R3-233: Colonel Phillips states again that there was no system of air raid warnings.

R1-5: Under the Joint Coastal Plan the Army mission was to provide against air and gas attack.

R4-412, 13: Colonel Phillips again states there were no sirens or warnings at various fields of any kind prior to attack. No warning devices of any kind. Also, again no air raid warning for "tower" prior to December 7th.

R4-514: Civilian Chas. Utterbach states that civilian comment was, "They caught them asleep, by Golly."

Ex. 15: This contains a group of orders and instructions issued issued subsequent to attack at Hickam Field. (While this evidence is of subsequent measures it does show what security measures were lacking prior to the attack.) It shows: gas masks issued; a gas alarm system established; blackout regulations promulgated: one communication dated December 20, 1941, states, "The Hawaiian Air Depot is dependent upon the inverted sections of gasoline tanks for shelter and protection of our personnel in the event of an air raid. * * * It is requested that we be permitted the use of these sections until such time as adequate air raid shelters are built for our personnel, * * *" (Permission was granted by 1st Indorsement.) ; and a system of air raid wardens established.

Ex. 16: By order General Short gives orders for a practice air raid alarm on December 10 for Honolulu. Issued December 9, 1941. Also states that Members of the Military Police, Honolulu City Police, Home Guard and Honolulu Fire Dept. have been issued a supply of Stewart Hand Kklaxon sirens for distribution throughout the City of Honolulu.

December 9, 1941—Standing orders first issued for defense against gas attack. December 7, 1941—Bulletin "Information for Conduct of Families in Air Raids."

Ex. 17: This contains subsequent instructions by General Rudolph, Commanding General 18th Bombardment Wing. This states gas masks issued to all personnel. Sirens issued for use in giving air raid alarms. Construction for additional facilities underneath barracks floor initiated, to protect men occupying barracks. Continuous daily patrols have been flown in cooperation with the Navy. Evacuation plans [47] for women and children initiated. Complete blackout instructions put into effect.

(These exhibits are all negative evidence, but show (1) that these obvious safety measures they call for were not done prior to the attack, and (2) that the facilities were there and all of these things could have been done prior to the attack had anyone even suspected there might be trouble.)

(An article appears in the Washington Star for week of March 23, 1942, of an interview of Mrs. Mary Kogan, 1340 Taylor Street, N. W., wife of Lieutenant Milton Kogan, wherein she states that she and her husband were at Schofield Barracks at time of attack. She states therein, in pertinent part, "It was then they knew the thing (the attack) was real and that the warning of a Hawaiian Newspaper a week earlier that Japan could be expected to attack that week end had come true. * * * Before December 7, we hadn't even been told what to do in case of an air raid"). [Underlining supplied.]

(As showing that General Short must have known of imminence of attack, a Mr. Raymond Coll, a Hawaiian newspaper editor is quoted by a Washington Newspaper, shortly after the submission of the report of the Roberts Board, January 24, 1942, as stating, in substance, that General Short and Admiral Kimmel had made clear by their utterances before December 7, 1941, the probability and imminence of a Japanese attack at an early date.) (We have not been able to examine these Hawaiian papers at the Congressional Library as the papers were at the bindery at the time of this report.)
June 12, 1942.

MEMORANDUM for the Files.

I today saw General Hilldring and Colonel Donal Wilson, the officer who is to succeed him on July 1, about the general court-martial charges we have drawn up in the matter of General Short. General Hilldring explained the background of the situation to Colonel Wilson. General Hilldring advised me that there was nothing to do at the present time but hold the papers but suggested that I should at some time tell the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff that we had prepared a draft of specifications and were awaiting any further instructions.

M.C.C.

July 21, 1943.

Took up this matter with Sec. Marshall. He told me that it would have to wait until seeing Stimson’s return. That it was a matter for his decision.
Memorandum for Mr. Bundy:

Subject: Secretary's Press Release of 28 February 1942 Re General Short.

1. Attached hereto are two copies of the Secretary's press release of 28 February 1942.

2. Pursuant to his direction the Judge Advocate General's Office on 4 March undertook preparation of charges against General Short, utilizing all available data including the Roberts Report and transcript. This work was completed 20 April 1942 and resulted in preparation of charges alleging violation of the 96th Article of War, with eleven specifications as follows:
   - Specification 1: Failure to provide an adequate inshore aerial patrol.
   - Specification 2: Failure to provide adequate anti-aircraft defense.
   - Specification 3: Failure to set up an Interceptor Command.
   - Specification 4: Failure to provide a proper aircraft warning service.
   - Specification 5: Failure to provide for the transmission of appropriate warnings to interested agencies.
   - Specification 6: Failure to establish a proper system of defense by cooperation and coordination with the Navy.
   - Specification 7: Failure to issue adequate orders to his subordinates as to their duties in case of sudden attack.
   - Specification 8: Failure to take adequate measures to protect the Fleet and Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.
   - Specification 9: Failure to have his airplanes dispersed in anticipation of a hostile attack, after having been warned of the danger thereof.
   - Specification 10: Failure to have his airplanes in a state of readiness for an attack.
   - Specification 11: Failure to provide for the protection of military personnel, their families, etc., and of civilian employees on various reservations.

3. The above charges were merely tentative and possible charges and were never approved by the Judge Advocate General or transmitted to the Secretary of War. Of course, they were never made public.

WILLIAM J. HUGHES, JR.,
Colonel, JAGD.

1 Incl. Cy Press Release (dup)
EXHIBIT NO. 141

Notes, Correspondence, and Reports Relating to Pearl Harbor and Events Leading up to it.

16 October 1940. Received report from Japanese sources in Mexico of intentions to bomb four (4) Battleships on 17 October 1940. This report conveyed in person by me to CINCPAC (Admiral Richardson) then at San Pedro, Calif., with three (3) Battleships and one(1) Heavy Cruiser. Official report made to C.N.O. (D.N.I.) by Comdt 11th. Naval District, San Diego. (See O.N.I. files for copy.)

13 November 1940. Assisted in Investigation and recommendations regarding Intelligence facilities in Hawaii. This being conducted by Capt. W.K. Kilpatrick U.S.N. on orders of CINCPAC (Adm. Richardson).

14 November 1940. Discussed with Admiral Block the vulnerability of Fleet at Pearl Harbor and recommended certain measures for security. Obtained his permission to have sent to Honolulu certain key men to build up the Intelligence organization.

9 February 1941. Letter to Admiral H.R. Stark USN regarding my conversations with Admiral NOJIMA at San Francisco on 8 Feb. (Copy attached).

11 February 1941. Letter to Admiral H.K. Kimmel USN regarding NOJIMA conversations and the existing situation. (Copy attached).


March 1941. Conversation with Admiral Kimmel (CINCPAC) and his Chief of Staff (Capt. W.L. Smith USN) regarding NOJIMA interview, and SURPRISE ATTACK on our Fleet by Japanese in case hostilities eventuate. Details of this conversation are covered in a Personal and Confidential Memo to Chief of Staff to CINCPAC, Rear-Admiral Milo Dresnal, USN, for presentation to CINCPAC (Admiral Nimitz) and dated March 17, 1942. (Copy Attached).

16 September 1941. Letter to Admiral Stark urging caution, and other matters. (Copy attached).

October 1941. Japanese discussion of chances of success of air attack on Pearl Harbor, copy of this presented to Capt. C.H. McMorris USN (Planning Officer on staff CINCPAC) a translation of "When Japan Fights", by Honolulu Hyst. (Copy attached).

20-24 October 1941. Extensive conversations with an Investigator from Washington, Mr. Curtis B. Munson, (believed to be from high levels) carrying a letter from Admiral Stark (CNO) to "open everything to him". He was given an accurate picture of the situation existing and how it would develop. He was told to "forget about uprisings and sabotage" about which he was most concerned because the Japanese would start the war "with an air attack on our Fleet for the purpose of disabling four Battleships, some details are included in my memo to Adm. Dresnal, mentioned above and copy attached. (See Munson authentication attached.)

13 November 1941. Conversation with Lieut. C.H. Coggin, MC USN, (Attached to Intelligence organisation), regarding existing Officer Morale and lack of readiness for war. Details included in report to Fleet Intelligence Officer, same date. (Copy attached).

20-25 November 1941. Conversations with Lieut. Coggin regarding existing low army morale. Details in Confidential memo to District Intelligence Officer, 14th Naval District, Honolulu dated 5 December 1941. (Copy attached).

Nov./Dec. Conversations regarding failure to apprehend Seven (7) Japanese agents found photographing Kaneohe Naval Air Station on all sides, on 4 November 1941. (This one of first spots hit by attacking aircraft). Details available in O.N.I. Files, including Teletype report to F.B.I. Office in Honolulu. For whole Intelligence situation, this known only to Officer in Charge of Investigations, Lt.-Comdr. W.B. Stevenson, USNR, now at Honolulu. (See letters from Director State, Fish, Marine, dated 11 Nov. 1940. - Referred to at end of this mem.)

27 November 1941. Detailed discussions with Mr. Lorrin B. Thurston, Head of Radio Station KGU, Honolulu and Editor of Honolulu Advertiser regarding present serious situation and preparation of his radio station for necessary broadcasts at time of air attack.
26 November 1941. Sailed with Task Force 8 (Adm. Halsey) for Wake Island.

2 December 1941. News report of arrival in Washington of Japanese Ambassador to Peru. This was indicated by me as one of the conditions which would bring a "break" one way or another, in my conversations with Munson and others.

5 December 1941. Report from CINCUS that unidentified submarine had been reported in the operating areas on night on 5 December. This was the condition on which I had advised all in my conversations, including Adm. Halsey, that the Japanese would be ready to strike. From 1800 to 2400 I endeavored to intercept Japanese conversation on Radio short wave. There was nothing that would have justified any report to my Task Force Commander or CINCUS.

7 December 1941. (0800) When Communication Officer reported the attack on Cahu, switched on Radio and KU Honolulu was sending out the words we had discussed on the evening of 27 November.

At night we joined the USS Detroit and Destroyers and Scouted to the Southward for the Enemy. Nothing sighted. Entered Pearl Harbor at daylight, 8 December.

Additional items which indicate contributions to Pearl Harbor.

Facilities for espionage provided by the newspapers in Hawaii, particularly those in Japanese language.

Details are emphasized and summarized in a report to CINCUS immediately after Pearl Harbor and dated 7 January 1942. (08 July 1943)

Lack of Security Indoculation of Naval Officers and inadequate Security facilities.

Details are summarized in a letter to CINCPAC dated 27 January 1942. (10 January 1943)

Inadequate selection of officers for Intelligence duty.

Details summarized in letter to CINCPAC dated 27 January 1942. (10 January 1943)

Inadequacy of Intelligence functions before Pearl Harbor as indicated by memo to CINCUS dated 2 January 1942, as requested by a member of his staff.

Letters from D N I (Adm. Halsey) W o A d i v i s i o n I n d i c a t i n g

need for clarification of arrangements with F B I.
In reply refer to No.
Op-16-B
SR/MD
42-8
Serial No. 0325016

CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Zacharias:

Thanks for your letter of November 5th. You are quite right that clarification is highly desirable. Enclosed is a copy of an official letter stating that such action is now under way.

The fact that some clarification was desirable has been apparent to me ever since the F.B.I. letter was written. However, that F.B.I. letter was not a directive issued to the Army and Navy; it was a warning, of which we obtained a clarification. The White House statement of 6 September was really intended to inform law enforcement officials to whom they should report certain information, but, unfortunately, named only F.B.I., whereas it should also have stated that subjects of a certain character of direct interest to the Army or Navy should also be reported to the proper officials of those departments. Anyway, there soon will be something in the hands of the members of all three intelligence services which will clear up this particular matter.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

CONFIDENTIAL

W. S. Anderson,
Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,
Director of Naval Intelligence.

Captain E. M. Zacharias, L.C.M.,
Eleventh Naval District,
Naval Operating Base,
San Diego, California

Enclosure
In reply refer to No. 07-16-B

CONFIDENTIAL

Nov. 19, 1940

From: Chief of Naval Operations
To: Consulant, Eleventh Naval District

SUBJECT: Cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Reference: (a) Confidentia{ cutter Serial No. 1-519 of November 6, 1940.

1. Receipt of reference (a) is acknowledged.

2. This Office concurs with the desirability of the situation being cleared up with respect to the President's directive of 26 June 1939 and the Federal Bureau of Investigation letter of September 6, 1939 quoting a White House statement. Stems are now underway to prepare a joint directive which will clear up the matter.

W. S. Anderson,
By direction.

cc: DIO-1

CONFIDENTIAL
My dear Admiral:

I think that you will be interested in a conversation which I had with Admiral Nimitz yesterday. It lasted for more than an hour and we were alone the entire time in his room at the hotel. Having known him intimately and favorably over a long period we were in a position to speak frankly. I decided to use this for such a conversation in order to determine if possible the purpose for which he was sent over here and to explore, if possible, the latitude which might be in his hands.

As a result of the conversation I have formed the following impressions:

(1) That President Roosevelt has a partnership in the Island in greatly concerned over the China venture, therefore Admiral Nimitz was sent here to determine the best bargain to be obtained.

(2) That previous thought that he might be coming to "look us to sleep" while Japan proceeds to the southward, has been abandoned definitely.

(3) He will try to prevent an embargo on oil and other essentials now being obtained here, and will request reconsideration on those now under embargo.

(4) Japan definitely has decided that they cannot "conquer" China or exert sufficient control while Chiang Kai-shek maintains his present position and strength. They realize that their best way out is a peace. This will be a tentative first by trying to disengage us from further aid to China, thereby allowing the Yung Chin-well group to gain control under Japanese direction. If this is impossible he will then explore the other possible ways of bringing about peace in China.

(5) That no activity between Japan and the U.S. can be avoided if he is given any basis for an approach to the leaders in Japan, it indicates to him that an immediate definite indication of sincerity by Japan would have to be forthcoming if our Government were to consider such an approach.

In the course of the conversation he made the following positive statements:

(1) That his mission was to prevent a resort to force between Japan and the U.S. in settling present disagreements.

(2) That Japan has completely changed her view with regard to China, and that peace is essential to both countries.
(3) That if the U.S. is patient until Europe is settled, then the Far Eastern situation will take care of itself. (This statement I took to be a reading of the same intimated earlier to ask him if imminent meant probability of force by us in the Far East). My reply was optimism over British prospects which prompted the question from him, "Do you think it will be a long war?" My answer was negative and reason given was the effect upon the German people when they finally heard the aid to Britain.

(4) That the signing of the axis pact was done only after a sharp division of opinion and with only a slight balance of influence in its favor. Now, the mistake is realized but as it is a "unit approach" nothing can be done towards canceling it. It must die a natural death. (The previous day a leading Japanese business representative in San Francisco returned to the signing of the pact by Japan as a grave mistake. Then asked what could have brought this about he stated without hesitation and authoritatively that it was accomplished by bribe of officials with tremendous sums of money from Germany.

Details of Conversation

After the usual change of pleasantries I opened the conversation by indicating to the Admiral that I thought he had been given a most difficult task and asked him how he expected to handle it. He said, "My hope is to prevent a resort to force in existing difficulties between our two countries." I replied, "Of course you know that at least 60% of the American people are reconciled to any action or war as the Far East is concerned, and you yourself have often said that such a conflict would be disastrous for Japan and entail great loss for the U.S.

"I now desire to see Japan defeated and destroyed." In 1906, you will agree?" He answered in the affirmative, and I continued, "Well, we would like to save her again because the very same reasons exist today. The American people have long since learned that a strong Russia or a strong China was the end of Japan, in which case problems for us will come from other sources. I have always told the Japanese that we would go to war if our commerce was blocked off, because that has been the cause of every war in which we have engaged. Now see what has happened to all foreign trade in Manchuria, what would happen in the rest of Asia?" At this he apologized for their extramural and reminded him that they are the ones who bring on war. I then said, "Admiral, one thing which the American people can't reconcile is why Japan, a country which has called continually for 'equal opportunity' could sign a pact with Germany which has done away with all opportunity and has the utmost contempt for all other nations?" He replied that there was a sharp division of opinion in
Japan as to the advisability of signing the pact and that only a very small balance of influence made it possible. Now they realize the mistake but it is a "fait accompli" and it is practically impossible to cancel it. Therefore it will have to die a natural death.

"Admiral, I would like to know why you think you can pick a war like that China-wai, get him up and count upon him working for Japan?"

I replied that it was very simple for peace in China and that this war was very necessary now to combat the growing menace of Communism, which has spread Russian influence as far south as Manchuria. "In this case," I said, "it seems to me that you need a man like Chiang Kai-shek to contend against the growing menace of Communism, and if you can come to terms with the Japanese people of any "soft" recant his original objective, we can now stop the war in China and settle down to prosperity!" do you think it would be accepted?" This question was certainly unexpected for the Admiral. I then said very seriously, "It would have to be handled very carefully, and then only in the extreme case, because of the steps they take." I replied that I remember well the affair of 1931. "That of course would clear up the rest of China for a resumption of normal affairs under the careful direction of Chiang Kai-shek and the local development could continue. The fears of Japan about a strong China in Manchuria or an over strong China would disappear." The Admiral again indicated the difficulty of approaching such problems in China. He asked, "But I could not agree that the more difficult period was the more important for China; and I added, "Of course, you understand that it is really vital to assist in solving the serious situation." He then asked, "Yes, for example?" I replied, "If I were asked, I would say immediate cessation of all Japanese activities in Manchuria and French Indo-China." He made no comment on this and remained thoughtful for an appreciable interval.
in the conversation I have had with you to my right as of this morning's remarks, and do know, if the steps I have taken and indications I am giving to the President, the President has indicated that he had no objection and would agree to continue riding.

The next step is then one of providing to the Department of Justice a reasonable time for its consideration and to take the necessary steps to ensure the constitutional rights of the United States and to the Department of Justice, recognizing the vital interest of the Department of Justice in the matter at hand, and the vital interests of the Government and the Federal Government in the matter at hand, and to this end the Department of Justice is prepared to make any necessary modifications in the matter at hand, but, however, I do not think the President will not tolerate either in here, or any suggestion of any coercion which restrains their freedom to do what they will.

In conclusion I tell the President that he has been noted in the press of having stated the mission on the condition that while he may accept the Japanese Government would not take any steps in the event of which might bring about a war. We neither accept nor reject the thing, but, if we have the press, we have to take the press, and the press is a very powerful thing with the American public, and they will see in every movement we do.

I am sure Mr. Kouda is expected by Mr. Sakai, as Mr. Kouda, as well as for Mr. Kouda, went to San Francisco, and has not before mentioned as a good man. Men of real character to whom I have not been with him since 1919, and I have the impression of Mr. Sakai's references to the American people. It is believed that he will be able to lead a general public and that the activities of our relations will not be interfered by Mr. Sakai.

Mr. Kouda was received in a cordial and friendly manner and to which we are not allowed to make any reference. I think you have not been in this country in recent years, and I am sure that we have not been at all represented in the matter at hand, in making a reference.
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

[Text not legible]
Dear Admiral Kim:

Some time ago, when I advised Admiral Richardson that I intended to contact Admiral Homer upon his arrival in the United States, Admiral Richardson requested that I give him the results of our conversation. As these have been incorporated in a letter to Admiral Stark, I am enclosing a copy of it for your information.

It is my opinion that a new situation has developed which might or might not affect previous estimates.

With kindest regards and best wishes,

Yours,

[Signature]

Respectfully yours,

[Signature]

Admiral C. W. Kim, United States Navy

[Address]

Cc: Maj. J. B. Miller

[Address]

[Handwritten notes]
In September, 1941.

Dear Mr. [Name],

I am writing to urge that there is possibility of reopening counter-espionage activity, but we must not relax until we have concrete demonstrations of sincerity.

I am writing particularly to invite attention to a recent visit I consider most urgent and opportune in view of our present relations with the British. I am writing to assure you that I do not want Captain Kirk to feel that an "old timer" was trying to impose his views on a new arrival, and that in this case I would want him in the most receptive.

I have tried unsuccessfully for years to get from the British really beneficial ideas, such as dot net files of Japanese naval officers, and also, general ideas on the British counter-espionage systems, and the new and present relations in all of this should be available to us. I am certain that to one who came after the things I consider most important, I know that our intelligence and analysts do not have the work necessary to pursue these items. Counter-espionage is a profession in itself requiring soliciting and evaluations required, none of which our people have undertaken. I know of only a few officers qualified to undertake this work. The JIC sent two men to London for several weeks, but I dare say they spent most of their time at Scotland Yard on methods of investigation. Investigation and counter-espionage are as far apart as the poles; therefore, JIC, while excellent in their own field of investigation, will never be able to do our work for us, because counter-espionage and counter-fifth column activities are basic military operational functions.

I am in mind a man who is now working for the Commander-in-Chief, and we pleased him with results. This man had ordered to Homeland to help build up the organization in the most vital spot. When I arrived in London last November to take command of the JIC, I was asked to assist in a survey of the Intelligence Organization, and this resulted in radical changes in and additions to personnel, space, and equipment. With the training now instituted here, I am asking to feel some of the security which we had to the little district as soon as the necessary work now underway is well done, both here and abroad, this man should be available to make a trip to London. He is Lieutenant C. F. Cooper (OC), and being a doctor his analytical abilities and
In myellow, I will also circulate some fresh information on certain subjects and events. We are well aware in W.C. that recently completed bilipt their investigation work. Some of the, some the are, advised us we could a little more Taternary.

Of course, I look forward to the day when I will be in the position to continue to work out the many ideas which I am trying to be vital to our Intelligence Organization. As you know, a long time ago I expressed myself as to the need of a well-trained and well-equipped Intelligence Organization. If we were to start a difficult "collusion" job, and we are eventually to make our personnel, particularly the lower men, realize the important elements. Last year, while in Washington, Admiral Anderson asked me one day if I would be willing to sacrifice my career for Intelligence. I replied, "Admiral, the time has come when if we don't think about sacrificing our careers, there won't be any to sacrifice." Of course, I am dedicated with my ship and will soon have in mind of my two years in grade, sit if and when the situation demands my state and above will stand.

My kindest regards and best wishes, I am,

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

[Address]

Admiral E. R. Stark, C.H. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations
Navy Department
Washington, D.C.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3267

[Text not legible due to image quality]
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

CONFIDENTIAL

December 5, 19-

EMBARGO FOR: 

The Assistant Intelligence Officer.

Subject: Army Morale.

1. Preliminary information regarding the morale of local Army troops has come to the attention of the writer within the last two weeks. The nature of this information is such that it is difficult to determine to what authority it would be submitted. From the disclosures of these informants it is nevertheless self-evident that steps should be taken to correct the conditions now existing.

2. To begin with, certain informants who frequent places visited by Army and Navy enlisted men report that the experienced soldier of the regular Army is disgusted and rebellious to authority, and the unanimous coddlng attitude which is shown the enlisted personnel in the regular. This soft handling has resulted in greatly increased discipline both on the regular, the volunteer, and the volunteer. The lower ratings in the Army have become aware of their immunity against disciplinary action and have taken full advantage of this immunity to an extent which strains and diametral all regular non-commissioned service prior to the present emergency. An example of this attitude is shown in a recent incident in which a newly-enlisted private will break any public order to obtain his foot out of the Army. The non-commissioned officers have all learned that it is useless to place the enlisted man on report for infractions of the regulations because the officer, with few exceptions, will support the offender, represent the petty officer, and give a lecture upon the importance of the enlisted man to be handled. The few officers who are known to have made an attempt to inculcate proper discipline, and to enforce this discipline by assigning punishments in accordance with the regulations and the regulations themselves have been removed to other positions by higher authority. The result is the regular Army is confused and their morale is seriously injured by this policy and they do not know what is the proper course of action.
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet
(continued):

(3) Take appropriate action immediately on any intransigent or continually skeptical key officer who is unwilling to assume responsibility for positive action or recommendations.

(4) Continue and speed up training in all the above specialists' jobs. (This war is going to require many replacements and we have too few already).

(5) Give Commanding Officers afloat digest of pertinent intelligence activities with which they might be confronted or which might add to general plan (this should have been a comprehensive peace-time activity but it is not too late to correct).
7 January 1942.

Memorandum for the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.

Subject: Interview with the Military Governor (General Kibara) regarding reestablishment of Japanese Language Newspapers in Hawaii.

In accordance with the directions of the Commander-in-Chief, Captain E. M. Saunders, U.S.N., accompanied by Captain I. H. Mayfield, U.S.N., OIC 14th Naval District, called upon General Kibara to present the views of Captain Saunders on the Japanese Language newspapers, with a view to establishing reasons sufficient to prevent resumption of the publication of these papers in Hawaii. After delivering the Commander-in-Chief's message, the General was advised of my background of twenty years connection with Naval Intelligence and status as a Japanese Language Officer, and the following statement was then made:

"There is concrete evidence that Hawaiian newspapers in the past have been used for espionage purposes. There is concrete evidence that enemy agents are still at large in the Islands. There is concrete evidence that enemy transmissions of information have not been stopped. It is therefore firmly believed that unless the writing, editing, and printing of these Japanese papers is done by Caucasians, they can and will be used for transmission of information to the enemy."

The General then asked how such information is transmitted, which I explained as coded conversation, chosen words, advertisements, etc. He then said that this would be checked.
carefully by his people to see that there were no derelictions. I explained that there were no translators whom he could obtain who would be sufficiently trained in espionage techniques to be able to pick up any such insertions. He then indicated that the work on the paper would be done by second generation Japanese. I then explained the influences and pressures that had been exerted on these people for many years and that with all the time that I had worked on them I am still to receive a single bit of information which we knew them to have and which any real American citizen would turn over to his government. (I forgot to tell him that this pressure extends to liquidation and is an effective method of the narcotic and gas-lime ring whom we know work with enemy agents and are used to keep people in line). I then asked the reasons for repudiation, which he explained was for morale purposes, stating that because of the large number of Japanese who cannot read English he thought that it would be a big morale factor for the population if they could get news in their native tongue. In addition, he would be able to get to them refutation of claims that are made on the Tokyo broadcasts. I explained that this could be done just as well in the English newspapers and was certain that the second generation would keep their parents informed of everything appearing therein. Why should we be so solicitous about the alien Japanese? These are the ones who are our most dangerous suspects. We knew that for years these people have had their assigned details.

At some point in the conversation the General made the
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

statement, "What is the use of stopping the newspapers when there are so many other sources of information open to them"? (This supine acceptance of an intolerable condition is most amazing.) I replied, "We should stop all of these sources and if we don't start somewhere we are not going to make any headway". He said, "We have no censorship of mail between the Islands and that is an easy method for the agents". I then said that if this is necessary, it should be done also. He then remarked that the mail was piling up tremendously now, which I advised was a good form of censorship in lieu of the other, provided it is held long enough.

The General then questioned the availability of Japanese agents and I had to say that he would find that there are at least six hundred and probably more key men still at large. The conversation then turned to the methods of picking them up which I assured him could and should be done. Upon asking how, I told him by a general round-up of all first generation (alien Japanese), all second generation who have been in Japan from early childhood, because they (the very dangerous group known as KIBEI) have been in touch with the younger elements in Japan who are the ultra chauvinists upon whom the Nazis have worked and it is they who have brought about the present situation; and finally all the second generation who have been continually in contact with visiting Japanese Dignitaries, Naval Officers, etc., all of whom should have been listed in the files. At this he expressed general inability to do such a job for several reasons; first, "We need these Japanese for labor, it is a different situation from the coast."

-5-
where there is a labor market. Then there is the problem of housing and feeding all of this large group if taken in, and we can't spare the labor and materials and time to do this extensive work, if we are going to prepare for another attack. Our first job is to get all these ships out of the harbor before another attack comes." I then emphasized that the one way to bring the Japanese back for another attack was let their agents have freedom of movement to get information out, because they will have sufficient exact data necessary to operate as they did before, we should create the impression of being fully prepared and of welcoming a return. The General, perturbed replied, "Oh no, we wouldn't welcome a return."

The General then said that he was not worried about information getting out but was more concerned with the sabotage that might take place at the time that an attack is to be made. I then explained that the sabotage threat did not exist in Hawaii because they did not have any access to industrial activities, utilities, etc., as they did on the West coast, except the one power plant here which was not vital, and the dock facilities. I then outlined the vulnerability of the West Coast and the steps I had taken in July, 1940 in Washington to put into effect concrete plans utilizing all existing governmental agencies for a general round-up before their efforts could be successful. He then insisted that his communications here were vulnerable although strategic points were under guard.
He reaffirmed again the necessity for the Army preparing to repel attack, to which I replied that the first step in such a move is to deny information to the enemy and if we hope to keep them from coming back we had better take in all of their agents. He expressed belief that FBI and MID were doing all they could and I had to say it is obvious that what had been done is not enough. Incidentally, I was the one who tried over a period of two years to have M.I.D. implemented by giving Colonel Oldfield (OS-9th Corps area) ammunition for letters to Washington. Nothing would be done until M day. I was the one who gave P.B.I. its start from the Eleventh Naval District. I know exactly what both agencies have and their capabilities. He then asked what more could be done. I replied it is absolutely necessary to round up every Japanese of any generation to whom any suspicion attaches. Those few already in custody are only the ones on whom concrete evidence is in the files. The other can be apprehended and must be.

We then made moves to break off the conversation at which time the General made the statement, "I am not going to stop the newspapers unless it can be proved to me that they are being used for espionage purposes. I have the dual responsibility here of preparing the defenses and of keeping up the morale of the people."

I replied, "The morale will be of little consideration if we allow them to originate a belief that we are displaying signs of weakness, and from my knowledge of them I can say definitely that republication of these newspapers will be so viewed. And if we..."
let them know that we have any fears, or are relaxing in our vigilance and do not take the proper steps to curb the activities of their agents, we are encouraging them to come back.

He reiterated his decision to let the papers go to press, until it can be proved further that they are being used for espionage purposes.

I stated that we would make that attempt. This, he indicated, he would be glad to have us do. It is therefore assumed that our Intelligence service is authorized to obtain from the Army all data regarding the methods of handling those publications and to cover all individuals connected therewith.
Conclusions

It is my considered opinion that the sole consideration of the Army is devotion to the effort of building their defenses so that they will be able to defend Oahu from an attack in force by the enemy Fleet with enemy air support from one of the other islands upon which the enemy will be able to establish a base.

It is further considered that in formulating their plans, there has been no consideration whatever of the psychological factors and characteristics of the Japanese.

That no consideration is being given to the possibility of preventing such an attack by denying information to the enemy, which fact allowed them to work with such complete accuracy in the previous attack.

That the above situation is an extremely dangerous one for the Navy and that immediate action should be taken to remove every element of such danger. It can be done and must be done.

There is definitely a lack of any thought of the Fleet and its protection. They are thinking only in terms of combat defense.
Recommendations.

It is recommended that the Commander-in-Chief as Senior Officer present prevail to prohibit the publication of these Japanese newspapers, and that he take necessary steps to obtain coordinated and cooperative effort on the part of all governmental agencies in the area, in order to remove the menaces noted above.

Respectfully,

E. W. Zacharias
Captain, U.S. Navy.
CONFIDENTIAL

Facts concerning the reopening of the Japanese Language Newspapers.

If it is proposed to resume the publications mentioned, Nippo Ji Ji, and Hawaii Hochi, and the editorial staffs which managed the papers previously, the whole proposal may be regarded simply as a very dangerous experiment. Both of these papers have always been strongly pro-Japanese, and frequently anti-American. The sentiments of the staffs cannot be expected to change overnight, or by request. Having for many years been absorbed in the furthering of Japanese ambitions, we may expect these people to seize every opportunity to turn the new publications to the advantage of Japan. This can best be done by using the newspaper as a secret means of informing local fifth columnist of intended plans. Announcements of this sort are now impossible, except by telephone. The resumption of newspaper publishing will give the enemy a means of widespread signaling. This will be almost impossible to detect—the whole story may be told in a misplaced comma or a misspelled word.

Any person who scoffs at the above idea as fantastic, obviously knows nothing whatever about either German or Japanese espionage practices. The idea is being used at the present moment in every city in Europe; it is years old and is standard practice in every Intelligence organization.

Let us consider for a moment who are the persons now in charge of the two newspapers under consideration—who have not been placed in detention: On the Nippo Ji Ji, we have the son of the owner. The owner himself, Yasutaro Soga, is under detention because of both espionage and propaganda activities. The elder Soga was a member of the advisory council of five which met with the Japanese Consul in affairs of the Japanese State. His newspaper has for many years been violently pro-Japanese and frequently openly anti-American.

The son, Shigeo Soga, was born in Hawaii, educated on the mainland, "travelled" in Japan. He has been completely in his father's confidence in matters concerning Japan, and has represented his father's newspaper in important matters for several years. To our undercover informants, he has revealed his real pro-Japanese feelings on many occasions. To entrust this man with the resumption of publication would be extremely dangerous. However, such the same situation exists with regard to the rest of the staff. None of them can be trusted, in the light of past experience.

In the case of the Hawaii Hochi, the editor is an Eurasian named Makino. He is the son of an Englishman named High, a blacksmith, and a Yokohama girl named Makino. He took his mother's name, and is now known as Fred Makino. More than ten years ago this man led the Japanese people in a court action instituted against a bill introduced in the Territorial Legislature for the control of foreign language schools. Makino is known as a violent and previously outspoken pro-Japanese, formerly a leader in Territorial labor movements.
CONFIDENTIAL

He and his agents have identified and shadowed our own counterespionage agents on some occasions. It is hoped that neither he nor any member of his staff is seriously considered as proper supervisors of a Japanese paper in war-time.

It is freely admitted that it is desirable to print information for disinformation among the local Japanese which will counteract the Japanese propaganda—but such a project cannot be safely carried out unless the publication from top to bottom is staffed by dependable persons, who must be Americans.

There is no reason whatever why the publication of such propaganda from Japan cannot be affected in the English newspapers and broadcast all of which are read by the second generation, who are the ones we are trying to reach. The alien Japanese should not be a consideration.

Another consideration must be recognized. That is the feeling of the local Filipinos. If the Japanese newspapers are printed and distributed, they, being unable to read and judge for themselves the contents, are bound to be very seriously disturbed about it. We know very definitely that they are already very much agitated and it can be said without hesitation that we cannot, for the sake of local peace and harmony, afford to further disturb their confidence in the Government. Race riots are a definite possibility from this source and this warning should be recorded.

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May Ryan

Danger in Resuming of Publication
For Nokchi and Rippu

We presume that these two Japanese newspapers will resume publication under the strict censorship of the Military Government, but we must consider of some dangers will be caused by the publication in the Japanese language.

1. It will give a greater encouragement to the older Japanese aliens who are now very optimistic over the war situation in Manila.

2. It will help to build the morale for Japanese victory upon the minds of the younger Japanese (or American citizens) who are under absolute control of their parents.

3. It will give a greater chance to the enemy (Japanese) agents in using these papers for conveying their ideas of secret activities in the plain language (using slang, proverbs and poems).
BY January 1, 1943

From: Captain Ellis M. Zacharias, U.S. Navy.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Security Indoctrination, necessary for.

Enclosure: (A) Intelligence Bibliography for Naval Officers.

1. One of the principal difficulties encountered in establishing a really effective security program in the Navy arises from a basic lack of appreciation by many naval officers of the vital necessity therefor. Even in the higher ranks, despite accumulated experience of years, there have been instances of surprising obtuseness and regrettable lack of appreciation of the scope and importance of Intelligence work. In some instances officers have gone so far as actively to oppose necessary security measures apparently feeling that such measures reflect both upon the integrity of their men and constitute unwarranted restrictions upon their own freedom of movement and expression. In others the simplest and most elementary efforts to safeguard the establishment against penetration by foreign agents and subversive elements have been largely nullified by the apathetic or skeptical attitude of responsible officers.

2. The foregoing is especially true of shore establishments and yet, in general, these stations offer greater opportunity for espionage and sabotage with less chance of detection than any other portion of the naval establishment. The technical excellence of our material, our progressive design policy and our acknowledged world leadership in Naval Aviation, all offer rich rewards to the foreign espionage agent. Many of our shore establishments by reason of construction and grouping of buildings and other equipment offer rich prizes to the saboteur.

3. Having been a nation more or less insulated in the past from the intrigue and espionage of Europe and the Orient, we appear to have developed a rather widespread belief that the spy and the saboteur are creatures confined largely to those areas and are existent in this country chiefly on the silver screen or in the sensational magazine. That this blissful state of affairs does not, in fact, exist is becoming increasingly apparent as is also the fact that the Navy as a whole and its officers in particular must be indoctrinated with a sound appreciation of the
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vital importance of Intelligence and an intelligent grasp of its scope and methods. In view of the unfortunate lack of any such program of indoctrination at the Naval Academy, the Postgraduate School, or in the service, such indoctrination and training must, in a large measure, come through aroused interest, reading and study by the individual officers themselves.

4. That this situation cannot be doubted by anyone who has taken part in the informal group discussions held in the wardroom afloat or the officers' clubs ashore. Logically it must follow that, as the result of this widespread feeling, the Navy offers an easy field of activity for the enemy agent. It is known that this is the reputation which we enjoy abroad. It is so easy to obtain information here that to do so can hardly be regarded as a noteworthy feat.

5. The need for proper indoctrination of personnel is considered acute. It is well realized that they must acquire this indoctrination under their own power. To attempt to drive or force them to security efforts will only succeed in alienating them and thus placing the security program further than ever from accomplishment. Therefore, they must be led and instructed in such a manner that they will not be aware of forces tending to direct and change their opinions.

6. It is believed that the best way to accomplish this end is to direct their thoughts to the proper channels by means of reading material placed at their disposal. If the majority of officers can be induced to read of espionage matters, they would indoctrinate themselves and their former ill-founded convictions would disappear.

7. As a means of arousing interest in this vital subject on the part of the average officer, the appended list of books relating thereto has been prepared. These are entirely of the non-fiction variety and include the best in the field. They are arranged generally in the order of recommended priority. Reviews of the more important ones are included.

8. It is believed that this list provides the basis for a concrete and logical course of reading and study in this important field. It is therefore urgently recommended that it be
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Printed or mimeographed and given wide distribution ashore and afloat and that, insofar as possible, the books listed be supplied to the appropriate activities. If necessary to obtain reprints of those now out of print, this should be done at the earliest opportunity and in sufficient quantity to provide several copies for each ship and shore station. If necessary, to reduce expense and save time, these books should be reproduced in paper cover form by any one of the many publishing houses who do such reprint work.

9. The enclosure was prepared by an officer of the Navy who has worked continually and in conjunction with the writer, but for certain reasons his name is withheld at this time, but it is largely through his efforts that this excellent compilation has been made. Proper recognition has and will be made for his work.

E. W. ZACHARIAS.
27 January, 1943.

From: Captain Ellis M. Zacharias, U.S. Navy.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Selection of Officers for Intelligence Duty.

1. The following letter, prepared more than a year ago was withheld awaiting more favorable circumstances which would ensure attention. Under the present circumstances it is felt that it should be forwarded immediately:

The greatest single weakness of our Naval Intelligence today lies in the fact that our officers are selected for reasons other than special fitness for this kind of work. FOR MANY YEARS officers throughout the Navy have been assigned to Intelligence work for trivial or irrelevant reasons and with little regard for the aptitude or personal qualifications of the officer concerned. They have been given Intelligence work as collateral duty because they have had little else to do. Until quite recently they have been induced as Naval Attaches largely because they were socially inclined. Some have been recruited because they were of foreign extraction or could speak, sometimes haltingly, in a foreign tongue. Some owe their assignment to fortuitous circumstances or their own curiosity and interest.

In consequence of this policy, Naval Intelligence, already inferior in numbers and financial support, when compared with similar organizations abroad, has become inferior in quality as well.

A brief consideration of other Intelligence services reveals the marked contrast which exists at the present time, and goes far to explain the causes underlying our inferiority.

The Intelligence services in other countries are regarded generally as a career which demands the highest individual qualifications, and whose members deserve and receive the most careful and intensive training. The foreign conception of the Intelligence branch is that it serves as the eyes, ears and memory of the fighting forces, and that, for this important duty, the best men are none too good.

In selecting agents, foreign governments comb their entire services for candidates who can meet the highest standards of
27 January, 1945

Subject: Selection of Officers for Intelligence Duty.

Character and aptitude and who give promise of profiting from a program of strenuous training. In at least six foreign countries the chosen agents are sent to school for periods of two to four years and the successful graduates are returned to these schools at intervals throughout their careers. As a student he is trained to observe, to remember, to classify and to evaluate. He studies the arms, equipment, uniforms, organization, history, geography, language, plans and policy of the countries with which he is to match wits. And he, in turn, is studied by older intelligence officers to determine his special qualifications and how they may best be utilized. After finishing his course in general Intelligence the officer begins to specialize, and, in two of the world’s first class powers today, this specialization has been carried to the point where he may be assigned to espionage or counter-espionage against one potential enemy only. The officer remains in this section for a long period of years or for his entire career, constantly perfecting his knowledge of the enemy.

It is easy to realize, when we compare our own haphazard and casual selection of intelligence officers with the realistic and efficient methods employed abroad, that, in this endless battle of wits which we are fighting in peace and in war, we find ourselves practically helpless against the overwhelming odds imposed by the superior numbers and training of our opponents. When the American intelligence officer, selected almost at random, and without training worthy of the name, pits himself against the elite of other services he is badly outmatched, and the resulting struggle must be called, in many instances "no contest."

What is to blame for the present situation? Probably many contributing factors are involved. This country, enjoying geographical isolation from other great powers and relatively long periods of peace, has been lulled by our wealth and growing power into a false sense of security no longer justified in the light of world events. This "Fool’s Paradise" is shared by large proportions of our ranking officers, few, if any, of whom have ever received intelligence training in their long, peaceful careers. Yet now, when world tension increases andespionage is carried on wholesale, we must depend upon these officers to initiate a policy or realism for which their experience so inadequately prepares them. Ranking officers belittle the thought of spies or the suggestion of dangerous sabotage from within, they
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Laugh at the possibility of subversive threats to our morale, they have spoken disparagingly of the Intelligence service, regard Intelligence officers as mere embellishments of the service, and resent and even combat efforts aimed at effecting security. Meanwhile foreign agents throng to our shores, the Spy’s Happy Hunting Ground, and steal and buy military and naval secrets out from under the noses of these same officers. Two of our latest cruisers had spies working aboard during construction and during trial runs without being apprehended. They were even allowed to take blueprints home with them at night. Not a single spy has been caught in this country in the last fifteen years as a result of forthright and efficient counter-spying work. The few who have been apprehended fell victim to purely accidental and unfortunate circumstances and blunders.

Therefore, the writer regards our first great need as proper indoctrination of all officers, particularly those in command.

The second great need is for training of Intelligence officers. This should be begun by a general course given in the line P.O. school. It should comprise no less than one hundred hours of instruction. This course would achieve two worthwhile purposes. First, it would indoctrinate all officers in a subject scarcely less important than any other technical subject, and second, it would serve as a basic course from which to select young officers who are qualified for advanced study and careers in which assignment as Intelligence officers would play an important part.

The present futile gestures in the direction of training for Intelligence must be converted into a real effort. A long list of courses of instruction exists at present merely on paper, and serves only to mislead those concerned with our efficiency in this branch. The “building” of an efficient Intelligence officer requires more time than the construction of a battleship and, as a common sense precaution, cannot be delayed until flashes of gunfire are seen on the horizon.
Subject: Selection of Officers for Intelligence Duty.

The Standards of a Good Intelligence Officer

The officer selected for Intelligence duty must have special personal and temperamental qualifications to be successful in that duty. He must possess a mental alertness which will enable him to cope with agile and clever opposition, fortified by ample financial resources. He must be imaginative enough to visualize the possible plans of enemy agents and at the same time be sufficiently analytical to properly evaluate the information which comes to him. There must be in his natural or acquired make-up a certain amount of suspicion and disbelief. He must be mentally aggressive and possess the initiative required to plan effective operations. He should be discreet and not garrulous, and should understand human nature, its strength and its weaknesses. Additionally, he should be willing to hazard his own personal standards of conduct in the accomplishment of an important objective contributing to the national welfare in time of war.

He must be realistic. He must have the ability to see things as they are, and to have the courage to bring them to the notice of his superior.

The orthodox and conservative type of naval officer is designed by training and indoctrination not to be an Intelligence officer. For this reason the selection of personnel from the Navy for this type of duty should be made early in the officer's career so that he may be trained in the stratagems of this important branch of the service.

It is recommended that this latter be given wide distribution among the officers of the Fleet - as coming from the Commander-in-Chief, in order to promote a general interest in this subject and encourage reading and study of books related thereto. A selected list of such books has been forwarded this date to the Chief of Naval Operations.

E. H. ZACHARIAS.
May 31, 1942.

Memorandum for Admiral E. D. Graff

In accordance with your request after our conversation this morning, the following memo is submitted:

My conversation with you is impelled from a sense of duty because of what I consider a serious situation existing in Hawaii. Once before, in such a situation, I gave concrete opinions and advice which apparently could not break through preconceived ideas. History was about to repeat itself and no one would believe it. I have no personal ambitions or desires regarding the subject matter other than ensuring that we have a safe and well protected base for our Fleet, which is the sole reason for the existence of Hawaii. It has been my attitude that it makes no difference who does a job so long as it is done efficiently and thoroughly.

Any criticism direct or implied is offered solely from a constructive viewpoint and is for the purpose of preventing in the future a recurrence of a disaster such as that of 7 December.

Only a few people know that I had cautioned Admiral Kimmel and Captain Smith, during the course of an hour and a half conversation with them, of the exact events to take place on 7 December, not only as to what would happen, but also how and when. My only error was that the Japanese were after four battleships and they got five. I also gave them the reasons for my conclusions and advised them of the steps necessary to prevent such an attack. From time to time, in contact with the staff, I would voice possibilities and only two months before the attack amazed at unrealistic attitudes I said, when are we going to stop these surprise inspections and prepare for surprise attack.

About that same time Mr. Hoover, a representative from Washington, (believed to be a presidential agent) carrying a letter from Opana to “open everything to him”, sought me for an expression of views on probabilities and my opinion as to what action should be taken with the Japanese here and on the West Coast. After outlining to him my firm conviction that if Japan decided to go to war with us it would open by an air attack on Pearl Harbor, on a weekend and probably Sunday morning, with all the reasons therefor, and I then stated, “You now have two envoys in Washington. When the third one arrives you can look for it to break immediately, one way or the other”. This envoy arrived in Washington about 2 December 1941.
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

On the night of 27 November, after dinner with Lorrin Thurston, Head of the Honolulu Advertiser and EBU, I related the impending possibilities as above and he said, "Here I am a 0-2 Officer and I haven't even been advised what to send out over the radio in case of an attack". I advised him precisely to say, "We are having a sporadic air attack, everyone should keep calm and remain indoors. Do not go on the streets as it will prevent the military from getting to their stations, there is nothing to worry about". On 28 November I sailed with Task Force 8 for Wake Island. Upon receipt of CinC's despatch on 7 December, "The Islands are being attacked this is no drill", I turned on my radio and EBU was sending out my exact words. At least someone believed it. This was probably made certain by the press announcement about 3 December that the Ambassador to Peru had arrived in Washington as a third envoy. Seeing this, Mrs Thurston reminded her husband and they were alerted.

On Friday, 9 December, having received a report of a submarine off Oahu - one of the things I gave Admiral Kimmel as a positive indication of intention to attack - I listened all evening on short wave for Japanese conversation. All was garbled conversation but the intensity of the acknowledgments (typically Japanese) indicated to me that something was imminent. I tried to obtain a single word which would justify me in requesting ComTaskFor 8 to advise CINCPAC, but nothing could be made out. I knew what the reaction would be to a recommendation from thin air and I assumed that proper warnings would be coming from Washington.

I have made it a point when aloft to give my advice to Intelligence activities both ashore and afloat and when necessary even to the point of "butting in". I had tried for years to have detailed a Fleet Intelligence Officer who was not tied up as Flag Secretary or on other jobs. Finally two years ago Commander Dyar advised me that CINCPAC was short to have a Fleet Intelligence Officer. I recommended Lt-Commander Layton, who has consistently done a splendid job in an office where there should have been twenty officers instead of two. Early in November I was about to see Captain Smith and advise that he get some help for Layton and Hudson as they were both worn down and appeared ready to crack up. But I hesitated, wondering why should I have to advise CINCPAC on the adequacy of his force. It should have been obvious to any Commander that Intelligence at such a time was his most vital issue. I decided not to approach Smith, because I found that Intelligence was not receiving its proper recognition.
One of the contributing factors to 7 December was the reluctance of Admiral King to assume his prerogatives and tell the Commandant to carry out directives or some one else would be obtained to do the job. The possibilities of an unpleasant situation should have been readily apparent to the Department when a former Commander-in-Chief is put under a younger man. Petty jealousies are bound to be present and these grow into opposition. A typical incident was one incident which I observed closely. When I arrived in Honolulu in November, 1940 to take command of the Salt Lake City I was asked to assist in a survey of the District Intelligence Office which was initiated by the Commander-in-Chief. It was learned then that recommendations had been blocked and that the office was of little value.

This survey included immediate and extensive recommendations, including trained personnel to be taken from my old 11th District to build up the 14th as quickly as possible.

The next day, after telling Admiral Blosch the security we enjoyed in the 11th and indicating the complete lack here he approved all steps to remedy the situation. Accordingly, the personnel arrived and expansion, planning and training were rapid. During the course of a subsequent survey to outline faults in the District, the report or digest was brought to the attention of Admiral Blosch. This survey was made by an officer who was working for the Commander-in-Chief and also helping the District. At the sight of this critical survey coming from the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Blosch gave vent to his wrath and Intelligence activities suffered for quite a time.

The skepticism of the Commandant regarding necessity for security was also typical from a remark once made during security efforts, "Bring me a Japanese spy. I've never seen one and would like to see one". His yard was full of them.

On 16 September, 1941, in a letter to Admiral Stark, I stated, "It is gratifying to see that there is a possibility of resolving the Japanese situation, but we must not relax until they have given concrete demonstrations of sincerity."

All of the foregoing is simply to indicate the possibility of qualified personnel accurately estimating the situation, and the distressing fact that nothing was done about it.

I am now concerned because of another situation which is growing in seriousness and proportions. Rumors are increasing  and I find not only the morale of civilians falling lower and lower but also that of Naval Officers. This is a typical
fifth column technique and it must be stopped. It not only softens up our own people but it is throwing the second generation Japanese into the laps of enemy agents, many of whom are still not in custody. I used to be most optimistic about the Japanese never returning here for another raid, but the persistence of the present situation, which they will learn about soon enough, will be an invitation to them to return. This situation can be corrected somewhat by strong "offensive" pronouncements but not by "defensive" ones, and by punitive action against rumor mongers. I found one woman frantically engaging in this because an army man told her how terrible the gas attack would be when it came. Someone is spreading a rumor that there is to be a Japanese Fleet attack on April 11th. I am now trying to trace the source of these rumors. Rumors are sometimes started to enhance the position of an individual or organization.

Apparently, on the West Coast they are undecided how to handle the Japanese situation. Here, where it is much more difficult, I find that little or nothing is being done. Make no mistakes about it, the proper handling of this situation requires two qualifications: first, highly professional Intelligence activities, and second, a thorough knowledge of the Japanese people. The Army in Hawaii has no one qualified to handle either. I know what they have and what they are capable of doing. It makes no difference who does the job as long as it is done efficiently and thoroughly. But I venture to make the flat statement that little or no results have been received on cases turned over to them by the 14th Naval District. I find that the numerous Japanese amateur operators have only been abomined by letter only not to operate. Adequate searches have not been made. Known suspects have not been taken into custody. Strategic locations are still endangered by the presence of enemy aliens. The problem can be solved in forty-five days by qualified personnel and intelligent action.

In my interview with General Terasawa, I was impressed with his incompetence. He appeared to have no thought of his own. He gave as the reason for continuing the Japanese newspapers that they were necessary for the morale of the enemy aliens. At the same time, the Army has assembled all the second generation Japanese into one battalion of the Territorial Guard and has disbanded it. Five sailors have been discharged and put into labor battalions. This action will have the effect of sending these
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

boys slipping home and into the laps of enemy agents. It is most serious. There are sensible solutions to all these problems which certain of us have worked out, but it is inadvisable to let incompetent hands take on pre-judiced solutions.

After my interview with General Deane, I searched for the reasons for what seemed like an undue influence upon him. Yesterday I think I discovered the answer. I was told that one of his principal advisors on Island and Japanese matters is General Walls, a highly paid official of one of the large local industries whose objectives are still "maintenance of the status quo".

At the present time the Army is endeavoring to take over control of the Intelligence Organization in Hawaii. Under those conditions the Commander-in-Chief would be tying his own hands voluntarily. Their past and present training and performances in no way qualifies them for the work. I know their capabilities and what they have become because I was in the Army for many years, tried to have them implemented on the west coast, but the War Department invariably replied, "No action will be taken until day". As a result they "had not a single trained intelligence man with which to start an organization". The quotations are from General Miles, the head of G-2.

The Naval Intelligence Organization of the 14th District has been built up and trained through the intensive effort of two excellent officers with years of experience behind them. Through their knowledge, excellent personnel have been enrolled and trained and I am safe in saying that in spite of obstacles which should have been help, this organization is so far superior to the Army and F.B.I. for Intelligence work that there is no comparison.

Conclusion

Hawaii, as a defense outpost of the United States, is of value solely as a safe base for the Fleet. The protection of it provides the only device for the existence of the Army. An offensive attitude is a requisite to this defense. This offensive attitude does not exist. Under the present state of Administration, the influences at work, and the degenerating morale, I cannot escape the feeling that unless firm action is taken we are approaching a situation which might result in something worse than that of 7 December. (It has always been my considered opinion for a long time that because of the racial situation the Hawaiian Islanders will eventually require a military government. Its purposes dictate that it should be a Naval military government, therefore now is the time to start it.)
Recommendation

That the Commander-in-Chief, as Military Commander, exercise his function as Military Governor and take command of all activities that the administration of martial law be delegated to a Deputy, as at present, if such administration has been satisfactory, and that the Intelligence Organization be centered under the Commander-in-Chief, in order to insure the security of the Fleet and the Fleet Base.

That power of arrest be extended to special agents of the Naval Intelligence Organization. (The most vitally interested agency but the only government agency not having the power.)

That the security of the Naval District and the Navy Yard be incorporated under a competent head (The present security officer, Victor Houston, was recently removed from the Police Commission and it is inconceivable that he should be in a position to hamper Naval security.)

E. H. LACH, Maj.
"The American Commander-in-Chief has been occupied by various secret plans but the three points which he is the most concerned are:

(1) Will a Japanese fast STRIKING FORCE made up of cruisers and aircraft carriers come on a scouting or striking mission?

(2) Will Japanese submarines hover near the Islands to attack or harass the Fleet?

(3) Will a Japanese Expeditionary force be sent overseas?

The first of these is the most fearsome. Suppose Japan were to form a fast striking force composed of such speedy battleships (whose speed America cannot match) as the HASENA, KONGO and KIRISHIMA, the aircraft carriers AKAGI and KUJO, and the MACHI class of heavy cruisers? This would be a fast-stepping force that would be truly matchless and invincible! Were they opposed to even the large guns of American battleships, they could utilize their superior speeds, thus leaving their slow adversaries behind. If opposed to a cruiser force they could close in and with telling blows crush the opposition. Truly, this would be a peerless force; able to close to battle, or open out, if out gunned! If this Fast Striking Force should meet misfortune, losing one or two fast battleships or aircraft carriers, they would surely be a severe blow to Japan and we would have to grit our teeth, smothering our rage until the day of a decisive Main Engagement to obtain our revenge.

Maybe such a bold venture would be too great a risk, who can say? On the other hand, warfare is a risk and he who hesitates, or fears the risks of bold venture, cannot wage war! Moreover, an attack off Hawaii would be the first battle of the Pacific War and if in the very first engagement one can wrest the courage away from the enemy by one's own daring, it would put him in a funk or give him the jitters."

Excerpt from "WHEN JAPAN FIGHTS" by Mr. Masakazu Hirata.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

West Point, N. Y.
July 30, 1943

I have read the recently and confidential report of Captain E. H. Sencer, U. S. N., as a memo and for Admiral Dresnel, dated April 17, 1943, and desire to state that the remarks relating to me and the outline given to me as indicated therein is exact and correct in detail.

In addition he suggested that the attack would conform to their historical procedure, that of hitting before war was declared.

Charles B. Kusmin

Relevant extracts from above report:

"About that same time Mr. Kusmin, a representative from Washington, (believed to be a Presidential agent) carrying a letter from Onnav to "open everything to him", sought me for an expression of views on probabilities and my opinion as to what action should be taken with the Japanese here and on the West Coast. After outlining to him my firm conviction that if Japan decided to go to war with us it would open by an air attack on Pearl Harbor, on a weekend and probably Sunday morning, with all the reasons therefor, and I then stated, "you now have two envoys in Washington. When the third one arrives you can look for it to break immediately, one way or the other". This envoy arrived in Washington about 2 December 1941."
EXHIBIT NO. 142

MATERIAL RELATING TO "WINDS" CODE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Data received concerning establishment and nature of Winds Code.
   d. Dispatch from Poote (Batavia) to Secretary of State Hull dated 12/4/41.
   e. Dispatch from Thorpe (Batavia) for General Miles, received War Dept. 12/5/41 (per log of incoming cables, Committee Exhibit 93).

2. Dispatches and Data Relating to Monitoring for Winds "execute".
   a. OPNAV to Cincafe, Cinpace dated 11/28/41 (Committee Transcript, page 7316).
   b. Committee action Cincafe, info. Cinpace, OPNAV, Comfourteen, dated 12/1/41, (Committee Transcript, page 7315).
   c. General Miles dispatch to G-2, Honolulu, dated 12/5/41, Committee Exhibit 32.

3. Certification of Secretary FCC, dated 8/18/44, with attachments as follows:
   a. Messages FCC requested to monitor (Doc. No. 1)
   b. Message intercepted by FCC 12/4/41 (Doc. No. 2.)
   c. Message intercepted by FCC 12/3/41 (Doc. No. 3.)
   d. Two messages intercepted by FCC 12/8/41. (Doc. No. 4)

4. Material relating to whether winds "execute" message sent or received.
   a. Communication from Army liaison officer to Committee dated 12/3/45 and enclosed cables between War Dept. and General MacArthur.
   b. Summary of interview of SHINROKU TANOMOGI dated 11/30/45 (enclosure 3 of report to Chief of Staff, War Dept., from General MacArthur dated 12/13/45—Exhibit 8D, page 6606 of Record).
   c. Communication dated 12/6/45 from State Dept. to Committee Counsel, with enclosed paraphrase of State Dept. cable dated 11/6/45, relative to monitoring for winds "execute" message by British, Australia and Dutch East Indies.
   d. Same dated 11/20/45, with enclosed paraphrase of cable dated 11/16/45 from Canberra to State Dept.
   e. Same dated 12/5/45 with enclosed paraphrase of cable dated 12/4/45 from London to State Dept.

5. List of messages appearing in Committee Exhibit 1 dealing with instructions to Japanese representatives to destroy codes, sent through ordinary channels of communication.

6. Material relating to Navy intercept JD-1: 7001, marked "cancelled."

8. Examples of JD-1 #’s cancelled and JD-1: 6998-7004.

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
Circular #2353

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.
In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S relations in danger: HIGASHI NO KAZEAME.¹
(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations: KIT.:NOKAZE KUMORI.²
(3) Japan-British relations: NISHI NO KAZE HARE.³

¹ East wind rain.
² North wind cloudy.
³ West wind clear.
This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Forward as urgent intelligence.

25432 JD-1: 6875

(Y) Navy Trans. 11-28-41 (S-TT)

I (b)

SECRET

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
Circular #2354

When our diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous, we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

1) If it is Japan-U. S. relations, "HIGASHI".
2) Japan-Russia relations, "KITA".
3) Japan-British relations, (including Thai, Malaya and N. E. 1.) ; "NISHI".

The above will be repeated five times and included at beginning and end.

Relay to Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, San Francisco.

25392 JD-1: 6850

[1]

(Y) Navy Trans. 11-26-41 (S)

1 (c)

Top Secret

28 November 1941
From: CINCPAC
Action: OPNAV
Info: COMSIXTEEN CINCPAC COMFOURTEEN 281430

Following Tokyo to net intercept translation received from Singapore X. If diplomatic relations are on verge of being severed following words repeated five times at beginning and end of ordinary Tokyo news broadcasts will have significance as follows X. Higashi Higashi Japanese American X Kita Kita Russia X Nishi Nishi England including occupation of Thai or invasion of Malaya and Nei XX on Japanese language foreign news broadcasts the following sentences repeated twice in the middle and twice at the end of broadcasts will be used XX America Higashi no Kaze Kumori XX England X Nishi no Kaze hare X Unquote X British and COMSIXTEEN monitoring above broadcasts

1 (d)

Telegram Received

BF. This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (SC).

---------------

Batavia
From: Dated December 4, 1941
Rec'd. 9:19 a.m.

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.
220, December 4, 10 a.m.

War Department at Bandoeing claims intercepted and decoded following from Ministry Foreign Affairs Tokyo:

"When crisis heading to worst arises following will be broadcast at end weather reports: one east wind rain war with United States, two north wind cloudy war with Russia, three west wind clear war with Britain including attack on Thailand or Malaya and Dutch Indies. If spoken twice burn codes and secret papers."

Same re following from Japanese Ambassador Bangkok to Consul General Batavia:

"When threat of crises exists following will be used five times in texts of general reports and radio broadcasts: one Higashi east America, two Kita North Russia, three Nishi west Britain with advance into Thailand and attack on Malaya and Dutch Indies."
Thorpe and Slawson cabled the above to War Department. I attach little or no importance to it and view it with some suspicion. Such have been common since 1936.

HSM

From: ALUSNA BATAVIA
Date: 5 DEC 1941
Decoded by: KALAIĐJIAN
Paraphrased by: PURDY

From Thorpe for miles War Dept. Code intercept:—Japan will notify her consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end. East wind rain XXXXXX United States: north wind cloudy Russia: west wind clear England with attack on Thailand Malay and Dutch East Indies. Will be repeated twice or may use compass directions only. In this case words will be introduced five times in general text.

Distribution:
War. Dept. Action Files: CNO 290P 29A Record Copy: 29C X Show
OPDO Top Secret

Naval Message
Message
From OPNAV
Released by: L. F. Safford

Date
TOR CODE ROOM: 2548
CINCAF
CINCPAC
282301

Unless otherwise designated this dispatch will be transmitted with deferred precedence.

New Tokyo broadcast schedules as follows X Jig victor jig one two two seven five kc six pm and seven pm to Pacific Coast six thirty pm to Western Hemisphere X Jig hypo love five one six zero kc eight pm nine pm and ten pm to China coast X Jig unit option nine four three zero kc six thirty pm to Western Hemisphere X Jig hypo prep’one one nine eight zero kc ten thirty pm to Europe X Probably Tokyo time.

Top Secret—Ultra

1 December 1941
From:
Action: CINCAF
Info: CINCPAC, OPNAV, COMFOURTEEN

Jig victor jig press tonight in closing seventeen hundred schedule stated quote "All listeners be sure and listen in at zero seven zero zero and zero seven thirty tomorrow morning, since thee may be important news" unquote XX Suggest frequencies seven three two seven X nine four three zero X and one two two seven five X times Tokyo lct.
December 5, 1941.

Assistant Chief of Staff Headquarters,
G2 Hawaiian Department,
Honolulu, Territory Hawaii:

Contact Commander Rochefort immediately thru Commandant Fourteen Naval District regarding broadcasts from Tokyo reference weather.

Top Secret

United States of America,
Federal Communications Commission,
Washington, D. C., August 18, 1944.

I hereby certify that the attached are true copies of documents described as follows:

Document No. 1 is a true copy of the weather messages which Major Wesley T. Guest (now Colonel), U. S. Army Signal Corps, requested the Commission's monitors to be on the lookout for in Tokyo broadcasts and to advise Colonel Bratton, Army Military Intelligence, if any such message was intercepted. This request was made on November 28, 1941 at approximately 2140 GMT.

Document No. 2 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station JVV3, intercepted by Commission monitors at approximately 2200 GMT, December 4, 1941, which at 9:05 p.m. EST, December 4, 1941, having been unable to contact Colonel Bratton's office, was telephoned to Lieutenant Brotherhood, 20-G. Watch Officer, Navy Department, who stated that he was authorized to accept messages of interest to Colonel Bratton's office.

Document No. 3 is a true copy of a weather message from Tokyo station JVV3, intercepted by Commission monitors at 2130 GMT, December 5, 1941, which was telephoned to Colonel Bratton at his residence at 7:50 p.m. EST, December 5, 1941.

Document No. 4 is a true copy of two weather messages intercepted by Commission monitors from Tokyo stations JLG-4 and JZJ between 0002 and 0035 GMT, December 8, 1941, and telephoned to Lt. Colonel C. C. Dusenbury, U. S. Army Service Corps, at the request of Colonel Bratton's office at approximately 8 p.m. EST, December 7, 1941. Document No. 4 also contains the Romaji version of these messages.

on file in this Commission, and that I am the proper custodian of the same.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the Federal Communications Commission to be affixed, this twenty-first day of August, 1944.

T. J. Slowie,
Secretary.

Top Secret

Document No. 1

GROUP ONE IS EAST WIND RAIN
GROUP TWO IS NORTH WIND CLOUDY AND
GROUP THREE IS WEST WIND CLEAR STOP
GROUPS REPEATED TWICE IN MIDDLE AND AT END OF BROADCAST

The above are the weather messages Major Wesley T. Guest requested the Commission to monitor on November 28, 1941.
DOCUMENT NO. 2

TOKYO TODAY NORTH WIND SLIGHTLY STRONGER MAY BECOME CLOUDY TONIGHT TOMORROW SLIGHTLY CLOUDY AND FINE WEATHER
KANAGAWA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLOUDY FROM AFTERNOON MORE CLOUDS
CHIBA PREFECTURE TODAY NORTH WIND CLEAR MAY BECOME SLIGHTLY CLOUDY OCEAN SURFACE CALM

Weather message from station JVW3 transmitted at approximately 2200 GMT, December 4, 1941.

DOCUMENT NO. 3

TODAY NORTH WIND MORNING CLOUDY AFTERNOON CLEAR BEGIN CLOUDY EVENING. TOMORROW NORTH WIND AND LATER FROM SOUTH. (repeated 3 times)

Weather message from Tokyo station JVW3 transmitted at approximately 2130 gmt December 5, 1941.

DOCUMENT NO. 4

This is in the middle of the news but today, specially at this point I will give the weather forecast:
WEST WIND, CLEAR
WEST WIND, CLEAR

This is in the middle of the news but today, at this point specially I will give the weather forecast:
WEST WIND, CLEAR
WEST WIND, CLEAR

Above are the two weather messages from Tokyo stations JLG4 and JZJ transmitted by them between 0002 and 0035 GMT December 8, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MITCHELL:

Pursuant to your request the War Department directed General MacArthur's Headquarters to make inquiries in Japan concerning the Winds Code.

Attached are unparaphrased copies of the cables exchanged between the War Department and General MacArthur.

HARMON DUNCOMBE,
Lt. Colonel, GSC.
DEAR MR. MITCHELL: In compliance with your request of December 3, 1945, I enclose a paraphrase of our cable of November 6, 1945 to London, the Hague and Canberra inquiring about the "winds" message.

My letter of yesterday advised you of the answers we have received from London and the Hague.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Herbert S. Marks,
\//\ Herbert S. Marks,
Assistant to the Under Secretary.

Enclosure:
Paraphrased cable.
The Honorable William D. Mitchell, General Counsel,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Congress of the United States.

30 October 1945.

GSB 168
From: War Department
To: Commander-in-Chief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces, Pacific, Tokyo

On 19 Nov 1941 Japanese Foreign Office advised its representatives abroad that in case diplomatic relations with United States, Great Britain or Russia were about to be severed a certain signal in form of false weather report would be broadcast in news message and that all code papers were then to be destroyed. Signal was to be "Higashi No Kaze Ame" (east wind rain) in case of break between Japan and United States, "Kitano Kaze Kumori" (north wind cloudy) in case of break between Japan and Russia and "Nishi No Kaze Hare" (west wind clear) in case of break between Japan and Great Britain. Congressional committee investigating Pearl Harbor attack has requested that Japanese records and authorities be examined to ascertain whether any signal implementing this or any similar code was in fact transmitted on or prior to 7 Dec and if so exact time and manner or transmittal. Inconclusive evidence available here suggests such signal may have been transmitted on or about 4 Dec. Request that all reasonable steps be taken to obtain such information and that this request and resulting information receive no publicity.

3 November 1945.

BSG 187
From: Commander-in-Chief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces, Pacific, Tokyo
To: War Department

GSB 168 dated 31 Oct investigation has been initiated and results thereof will be communicated at the earliest practicable date. Progress in work of this kind is of necessity somewhat slow. However, every effort will be made to expedite it. Necessary steps have been taken to avoid publicity.

6 November 1941.

GSB 180
From: War Department
To: Commander-in-Chief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces, Pacific, Tokyo

Supplementing GSB 168 there follows full Japanese text of two circulars from Tokyo Foreign Office dated 19 Nov 1941:

Circular 2353. Kanchoo fugoo atsukai kokusai jigyoo no hippaku no kekka itsu saika no jita ni taichi itaru kamo hakarezaru tokoro kakaru baai wagahoo to aitekoku tomo tsumashin wa tadachi ni teishi seraru bekki wo motte wagahoo no gaikoo kaukei kiken ni hinsuru baai ni wa waga kaigai
hoosoo no kakuchi muke nihonoo news no chuukan oyobi saigo ni oite tenki yohoo to shite. 1. Nichibei kankei no bai ni wa "higashi no kaze ame". 2. Nichiso kankei no bai ni wa " kita no kaze kimori". 3. Nichiei kankei no bai ("tai" shin chuu "maro" Netherlands E. I. kooryoku oboe fukumu ("nishi no kaze hare". 02 do zitsu kurukaeshi hoosoo sesshinmeru koto to seru wo motte migi ni yori ango, shorui te hitoto shobun aritashii. Nao migi wa gen ni gokuhi atsukai to seraretashi.


Both messages sent in __________.\(^1\) Believe broadcasts mentioned for signalling in circular 2353 were voice broadcasts and those in 2354 were Morse code.

\(^1\) Code designation omitted.

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**BSG 196**


*To:* War Department.

Reference message 1 November requiring search of Jap records and interrogation of authorities to ascertain whether an implementing signal to circulars 2353 and 2354 (see GSB 180) Tokyo Foreign Office 19 November 1941 was ever transmitted. Investigation discloses that all pertinent records were burned prior to emperor’s rescript of 14 August 1945. Interrogation of authorities so far has resulted in absolute denial of transmission of such an implementing message and existence of any prearranged instructions which would permit transmission of such an implementing signal. It would help the investigation if pertinent authorities could be confronted with circulars 2353 and 2354. This has not been done before in order to avoid disclosing to the Japanese the fact that we had this info. Investigation will be continued but without much prospect of success unless appropriate authorities can be confronted with circulars mentioned.

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**BSG 186**

*From:* War Department.

*To:* Commander-in-Chief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces Pacific, Tokyo.

Reference BSG 196 you are authorized to confront Japanese Officials with copies of circulars 2353 and 2354 but without disclosing when or by what means they were obtained.

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**BSG 210**


*To:* War Department.

In reply to radiogram 31 October 1945, GSB-186, the results of interrogation of number of employees have indicated that signal implementing circular 2353 and 2354, was probably not transmitted prior to 8 December, Tokyo time, but was transmitted by radio voice broadcast at some hour after 0230, 8 December, Tokyo time. Exact hour unknown. No evidence can be obtained that implementing signal was transmitted by radio telegraph. 1 employee, now in Tokyo, states that he received radio voice broadcast signal in Rangoon at 0930, 8 December, Tokyo time (0630 Rangoon time). No info has been obtained that any signal implementing similar code was transmitted.

As stated in my message number BSG-196, the burning of pertinent records prior to Emperor’s rescript of 14 August 1945 precluded obtaining info on this subject from that source. Furthermore, individuals who were in authority at time under consideration admitted nothing until they were confronted with circulars 2353 and 2354 of Tokyo Foreign Office, 19 November 1941, pursuant to authority contained in your GSB-186.

These employees did not disclose when or by what means these circulars were obtained. Further investigation here appears unprofitable. Request authority to discontinue it.
GSB 196
From: War Department
To: Commander-in-Chief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces Pacific, Tokyo

Reference BSG 210. Only use of Winds code (either voice or radio telegraph) shown here by available contemporaneous records is voice broadcast from Tokyo between 0902 and 0935 on 8 December Tokyo time using code words referring to British Japanese relations. In order to assist in evaluating information given in your BSG 210, Joint Congressional Pearl Harbor Committee desires to know first whether persons who conducted interrogation or those who were interrogated had any knowledge that prior to the interrogation of the United States had information establishing use of Winds code on 8 December Tokyo time, and, secondly, if such persons did have such knowledge, whether they knew that the United States had no definite information establishing use of Winds code at any time prior to 8 December Tokyo time. Prompt reply will be appreciated.

27 November 1945.

BSG 214
From: Commander-in-Chief Advance Hq. US Army Forces Pacific, Tokyo
To: War Department

Reur GSB-196 persons who conducted interrogation had no knowledge that prior to interrogation United States had info establishing use of Winds code on 8 Dec Tokyo time. Persons who were interrogated were not asked whether they knew that United States had info establishing use of Winds code on 8 Dec Tokyo time. Also, interrogated persons were not asked whether they knew that United States had no info establishing use of the Winds code at any time prior to 8 Dec Tokyo time. They will be questioned on these points at once and answers provided. Employee referred to in my BSG-210 who stated that he received voice broadcast signaling Rangoon at 0930, 8 Dec Tokyo time (0630 Rangoon time) may have meant that he received code words referring to British-Jap relations. He will be questioned again. This partial reply is made now and full reply will be forwarded as promptly as employees can again be found for questioning.

27 November 1945.

GSB 197
From: War Department
To: Commander-in-Chief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces, Pacific, Tokyo.

Information supplied in BSG 214 is believed sufficient answer to Committee's question, which was directed towards prior knowledge of interrogators and whether anything had developed in the interrogation which would indicate such prior knowledge on the part of Japanese. It seems clear from your BSG 214 that there was no such indication. Please confirm this.

It is requested that no further interrogation on this point be conducted unless Congressional Committee indicates desire to press inquiry further, in which event you will be advised.

Further interrogation of employee referred to in BSG 210 to ascertain whether broadcast heard in Rangoon used code words referring only to British-Japanese relations would be helpful. Other wise you may consider interrogation completed.

30 November 1945.

BSG 219
From: Commander-in-Chief, Advance Hq. US Army Forces, Pacific, Tokyo
To: War Department

Reur GSB 197 nothing developed during interrogation which indicated on part of Japanese prior knowledge of character stated in your GSB 197.

Employee who heard Rangoon broadcast states he does not recall code words heard but believes they referred to severance of British-Jap relations. This resulted from further questioning of this employee and without prompting as to character of answer given.
U.S. Naval Technical Mission to Japan

Interrogation No. 11.

Place: FLTLOSCAP
Date: 30 November 1945

Subject: Radio Tokyo Broadcast December 8.
Personnel Interrogated: Mr. Shinroku Tanomogi, Head of Overseas Department of Japan Radio Broadcasting Corporation in December 1941; presently member of the Diet and secretary to the Minister of Transportation.
Interrogator: Captain Peyton Harrison, USNR.
Interpreter: Lt. (jg) Stanley E. Sprague, USNR.

Summary:

Mr. Tanomogi, as head of the Overseas Department, was in charge of programs, including news programs, beamed to foreign countries. All news releases were controlled or "censored" by the Information Bureau of the Cabinet, the Communications Bureau of the Communications Ministry, and the General Staff.

Mr. Tanomogi was usually on duty at Radio Tokyo every other night. He was on duty the night of December 7 (Tokyo Time) and stated that the regular schedule of programs was broadcast. At about 0400 on December 8, he received a telephone call from the Information Bureau informing him that Japan was at war and that scheduled programs would have to be rearranged and preparations made for broadcasting important government communiques. An official of the Information Bureau arrived at Radio Tokyo early on the morning of December 8 to work out details with Tanomogi's staff. Tanomogi remained at Radio Tokyo until about 1800 of December 8. He stated that they broadcast only what was given them by Domel News or by the Information Bureau. "All news was official government news".

Mr. Tanomogi was asked if he remembered the "east wind rain" weather report broadcast about 1500 on December 8. He replied that he was not listening to the broadcasts at that particular hour, but that he had a vague recollection of some such announcement being broadcast among the releases abruptly ordered for transmission that day by the Information Bureau.

Mr. Tanomogi was handed a copy of Drew Pearson's article in the Honolulu Star-Bulletin of November 9, 1945. He stated that he would have known of it if a message such as that described as being broadcast December 4 had been transmitted and that he had no recollection at all of any "east wind rain" report or any similar phrase being broadcast prior to December 8.

Paraphrase of Incoming Telegram

To: London, the Hague and Canberra, November 6, 1945.
From: Secretary Byrnes

The Congressional Joint Committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack has sent to the Department a communication of which the essential portion is quoted below:

"Under date of November 19, 1941, Japan advised its representatives abroad that if danger arose of a breach of diplomatic relations with the United States, or Russia or the British, and the cutting off of other means of international communications, an emergency system for warning Japanese diplomatic representatives of impending break in diplomatic relations would be used, by adding in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast the following:

"(1) In case Japan-United States relations were in danger, the words Higashi No Kazeame (East Wind Rain).
"(2) In case of Japan-Russian relations in danger, the words Kitanokaze Kumori (North Wind Cloudy).
"(3) In case Japan-British relations in danger, the words Nishi No Kaze Hare (West Wind Clear).

this signal to be given in the middle and at the end of the broadcast as a weather forecast, 'each sentence to be repeated twice'. This arrangement also said, 'When this is heard, please destroy all code papers, etc.'
"At the same time, on November 19, 1941, the Japanese sent further notice to its representatives that when their diplomatic relations with the United States, Russia or the British were in danger, there would be added at the beginning and at the end of Japanese general intelligence broadcasts words as follows:

"(1) If it were Japan-United States relations, the word 'Higashi'.
(2) If it were Japan-Russia relations, the word 'Kita'.
(3) If it were Japan-British relations (including Thai, Malaya, and Nei), the word 'Nishi'."

these words to be repeated five times at the beginning and end of the broadcast.

"The Joint Congressional Committee Investigating the Attack on Pearl Harbor of December 7, 1941 are trying to ascertain whether any broadcast under this system were monitored and overheard, either by the United States or by Australia, the Dutch East Indies or the British, and, if so, on what day and at what time such a broadcast was overheard, and if so the text of the broadcast, and whether either of the three nations mentioned, having overheard the broadcast, advised the United States of the fact. We are particularly interested in the period from November 27th to December 7th inclusive, and suggest that the inquiry first cover that period and then, if time permits, work back to November 19, 1941."

You are requested urgently to inquire of the government to which you are accredited concerning the above and at the earliest possible moment to telegraph a report of the results.

4 (d)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

MY DEAR MR. MITCHELL: I am enclosing as requested by your office a paraphrase of the cable from Canberra which was referred to in my letter of November 26.

Sincerely yours,

(S) Herbert S. Marks
(T) HERBERT S. MARKS.
Assistant to the Under Secretary.

Enclosure: Paraphrase of cable from Canberra.

The Honorable WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, General Counsel,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack,
Congress of the United States.

Paraphrased copy

CANBERRA, November 16, 1945.

SECRETARY OF STATE, Washington,
168, November 16, 3 p. m.

Nothing has been revealed by an exhaustive search of the records of the monitoring service according to the Department of External Affairs. It is stated however that they may have missed certain messages in code as at that time trends only were followed and Japanese broadcasts were not taken down verbatim by the monitoring service.

MINTER.

4 (e)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, December 5, 1945.

MY DEAR MR. MITCHELL: I enclose a paraphrased cable dated December 4, 1945, just received from London in reply to our inquiry of November 6 as to whether the British had monitored and overheard any Japanese broadcasts using the so-called "winds" code between November 19 and December 7, 1941.
As to the Netherlands, the Counselor of the American Embassy at The Hague advised us by telephone this morning that the Dutch Foreign Office has now stated in reply to our inquiry of November 6, that the most careful search has had negative results.

Sincerely yours,

(S) Herbert S. Marks
(T) HERBERT S. MARKS,
Assistant to the Under Secretary.

Enclosure: Paraphrased cable.

The Honorable WILLIAM D. MITCHELL, General Counsel,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack:
Congress of the United States.

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PARAPHRASING OF INCOMING TELEGRAM

To: Secretary of State, December 4, 1945
From: American Ambassador, London

The Foreign Office has just informed us that while their inquiries are not yet finished, up to the present no evidence has been found that any “wind” message was received before the morning of December 8, 1941, the day following the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Foreign Office says that there was relayed to Singapore from Hongkong a broadcast by the Japanese which contained messages in code and which was received in Singapore six hours following the attack on Pearl Harbor. The text of the Japanese code is not available yet but if desired we will ask the Foreign Office for more particulars.

The following messages appearing on the indicated pages of Committee Exhibit 1 deal with instructions sent in code via ordinary commercial channels of communication, to Japanese representatives to destroy their codes:

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Appendix A

Top Secret—Ultra

8 NOVEMBER 1945.

Subj: JD–1: 7001, special studies concerning

1. In an effort to locate JD–1: 7001 the following sources have been exhaustively studied:
   a. numerical file of JD–1 #'s.
   b. chronological file of Japanese Diplomatic translations.
   c. the “Japanese diplomatic traffic log” for 1941.
   d. old GZ card index of Japanese diplomatic traffic, under Tokyo circulars and Tokyo-Washington circuit.

2. A special study of JD–1 #'s was made to determine the relationship between the date of the message, the date of translation of the message, and the JD–1 #. The results of this study are attached to this memo.
3. From this study it would appear that JD-1: 7001, if such number was assigned to a translation, was for a message dated 28 November 1941, translated on either 12-2-41 or 12-3-41 by the Army. As all of the JD-1 #'s on both sides of JD-1: 7001 were translated on either 2 December 1941 it seems reasonably certain that the message was dated on or prior to 3 December 1941.

4. Throughout the JD-1 numerical file there are incidents of cancelled numbers. The reasons for some of these cancellations are not given; others are given as follows: “duplicate of message previously numbered”, “additional part of message already assigned a number”, and “number skipped by mistake”.

5. In October 1944 and on 14 May 1945 Lieut. Comdr. G. E. Boone called Col. Rowlett at Arlington Hall and secured from him the following information concerning the Army numbering system in 1941: Occasionally numbers were cancelled, but there was no indication given of the reason for the cancellation, by whom it was made, nor by whom it was authorized. He stated that there were other cases of numbers cancelled in the 1941 file.

/s/ Sally T. Lightle,
/t/ SALLY T. LIGHTLE,
Lieut., USNR.

Enclosure with Op-20-G Top Secret—Ultra Serial 00036(20)

**Study of JD-1 #'s to determine relationship between date of message, date of translation, and JD-1 #**

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*1 Revision.*
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Top Secret—Ultra

**Examples of JD-1 #’s Cancelled and JD-1: 6998–7004**

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Dupl. of 957
911 Cancelled

Top Secret—Ultra
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Number Cancelled
Part 3 of 3
Bangkok-Tokyo=8 Feb. 1941 #92
(See JD-1: 971)

Top Secret—Ultra
(All handwritten:)
Cancelled=
Part 2 of 957
1004=

Top Secret—Ultra
(All handwritten:)
Number skipped in error (Cancel)
2074

Top Secret—Ultra
(All handwritten:)
Cancelled by Army after being numbered.
4647

Secret
From: Batavia (Isizawa)
To: Tokyo
November 22, 1941
Purple.
#1253.

To be handled in Government Code.
Departmental secret.

The activities of KOO CHOO SUI, backed up by the CHI GOO KAI and the
KOO HOO (an intelligence society and a publication), is working hard in our
behalf to stamp out anti-Japanism. Several incidents have occurred lately and
his opponents are rather belligerent. Consequently, Governmental surveillance
over KOO is rather close. From April to September of this year we afforded
KOO a subsidy for the KOO HOO and a fund for collecting intelligence, amounting
to from 2,000 to 3,000 guilders. KOO is so familiar with the Chinese and
natives here that in case of emergency he can do much to help us. That is why
I have employed him so far. He is ready at our direction to start the distribution
of pamphlets designed to win over as many of his consanguinaries and the
natives as possible. I think that we should continue to avail ourselves of his
services. He has a family of eight. Therefore, I think we should let him have
3,000 guilders for operating expenses; 15,000 guilders for living expenses, and
12,000 guilders as a subsidy for the KOO HOO as of from October 1st to the end
of the year. Will you please, therefore, arrange to appropriate and remit that
amount, namely 30,000 guilders.

Army 25638 6998 Trans. 12-2-41 (6)
Top Secret—Ultra

From: Rome.
To: Tokyo.
27 November 1941
(Purple)
# 91
(1st section—undecodeable)
(2nd Section)

Although supply movements are beset with difficulties, including occasional sinkings of convoys, these supplies are continuing and they are optimistic of the final outcome. Furthermore * * * (Remainder of section 2 undecodeable) (3rd section)

As regards Italian-French relations, up to now independent conversations between the French and Italians have not taken place. However, with the elimination of Weygand it is being said in various quarters that a great increase in use of Tunisia army transportation facilities is contemplated.

JD-1: 69-9 Secret (M) Navy Trans. 12-2-41 (G-TT)

[1] Secret
Top Secret—Ultra

From: Tokyo
To: Hsinking
November 28, 1941.
Purple.

#782 (corrected to #882).

Re your #751.

1. We have been communicating with the German representatives here, giving them much of the Manchukuan opinion and, as a result of a talk between OTAKI and WCHLTHAT, the final draft for a new German-Manchukuan pact is proposed by Germany as follows:

(a) The title of the pact is "A provisional agreement for extending German-Manchukuan economic Relations."

(b) This pact is effective until the last day of March next year.

(c) The balance of 85,000 tons of soy beans shall be delivered before the end of March at the old price although the agreement expires the end of January.

(d) 4,500 tons of soy bean oil, including the undelivered balance on the contract for jinusan, shall also be delivered by the end of March.

(e) Exchange permits shall be given for the unused balance of German contingent goods specified in the pact of May 31, 1941. (Minister WAGNER must have a list of about one million marks' worth of goods in Japan, Manchukuo, Shanghai and other Far Eastern points.)

(f) Export permits shall be given for German goods which are now held or may in the future be held in Manchukuo at the convenience of the holders. If a state of emergency should arise, this goods shall not be confiscated nor seized. The above should be administered on a rational basis.

[2] (g) The application of this contract will be acted on by specified conferences of local tradesmen.

(h) The term for repayment of the "W" account shall be extended to May 31, 1942. However, this understanding shall be made directly with the bank at the same time the pact is set up; it will not be mentioned in the pact.

(i) 1,000,000 marks shall be appropriated at the end of November and December respectively and 1,500,000 marks at the end of January and February respectively from the "B" account for repayment of the "X" account. (Although their representatives have already expressed their wishes to WAGNER, when I talked with WAGNER on the 21st I did not mention this. As he believes it should be handled from special funds, I think it is best for Manchukuo to negotiate for necessary funds on short term credit under this measure).

(j) Germany will offer credit to a maximum of 10,000,000 marks, because of the reduction in amount of shipments of Manchukuan products (soy beans and soy bean oil). For this credit a new account, "V," will be set up. Thus, the

1 In Libya.
"X" account should be liquidated during the term of the new pact through the 5,000,000 marks from account "B" and soy bean payments, and account "W" should be reduced by at least 1,000,000 marks from soy bean payments.

(k) The balance of account "B" shall be used for payments to Germany. Manchukuo is at liberty to make payments under heading (c) from any account whatsoever.

[3] (1) The second section and the second paragraph of the third section of the pact of May 31, 1941 (means for conversion of obligations not yet settled at the expiration of the pact) shall be left unchanged.

2. Although Manchukuo will probably want to pay Germany through regular channels, because of the obstacles to transportation I think it would be better to deduct German payments from (a) together with a suitable rate of interest. Moreover, believing that the terms of this pact are reasonable since Manchukuo's credit responsibilities are greatly increased, as soon as they get Manchukuo's approval Germany will send it to Berlin. As they wish to have it returned to Tokyo with the signatures of WCHLTHAT, SPINDLER and the Manchukuan representatives not later than Christmas, they demand speedy consideration by Manchukuo.

Please press the Manchukuo government for prompt adoption of the above pact and please wire a reply. Since Japan and Germany are virtually in agreement on the Chinese text, please urge them again to let us know at once their opinion of the German-Manchukuan understanding mentioned in our secret message #474 dated September 27th (German edition: German text).

This telegram has been discussed with military authorities and Vice Minister MIURA.

Army 25631

Trans. 12–3–41 (5)

Not available.

Top Secret-Ultra
(Typed)
JD-1: 7001
Number cancelled.
7001
Top Secret-Ultra
Secret
From: Buenos Aires (Tomii)
To: Washington
November 28, 1941
Purple
#17

We have received the consignment from your office. Please advise us the call letters and general news.

Army 7002
Secret
Top Secret-Ultra
From: Rome
To: Tokyo
November 28, 1941.
Purple.

#706. (Primary importance)

According to reports received from the Vatican through CICOGNANI, the Papal representative in Washington, many indications are evident that Japan forms a great obstacle to the United States' early termination of the present anti-Axis war. Public opinion in the United States is that America would be able to achieve victory for Great Britain simply by large-scale production of military supplies if it were not for this obstacle. In the event of a Japanese-American clash, assistance to England and the Soviet would decrease, making necessary American military intervention by means of forces on the European continent. Moreover, there are a great many who believe that during American-Japanese negotiations Japan put forth stipulations encroaching upon American interests and honor and so causing conditions to become extremely delicate.
There were also reports to the effect that the difficulties of Japanese-American negotiations constrained the Interventionist faction headed by the President and strengthened the position of the Isolationists.

Army 7003 25630 Trans. 12-2-41 (MR)

[f] Secret
Top Secret-Ultra
From: Hsingking
To: Peking, Nanking and Shanghai
November 28, 1941
Purple
Cir. 231 (Message to Tokyo #779)

Local military intelligences are as follows. For you information.

1. At the military review in celebration of the anniversary of the revolution, 47 airplanes of an unrecognizable type flew over the city of Kubyshev. They were definitely of American design and construction. It seems that large numbers have recently been arriving.

(The above is a report of the Japanese Military Attaché in the Soviet.)

2. Large bodies of anti-Communist mobile forces are fighting in the vicinity of Mininsk (Russia) and Barungulin * (south of Krusnoyarsk), destroying lines of communication and attacking the Kolhoz and Sofhoz. (The above is a spy report.)

3. The 39th Sharpshooters Division (in the neighborhood of Kogailko *) has executed before the firing squad 20 unsuccessful deserters who tried to get into Manchukuo between May and November. To date, 46 Soviet troops have deserted. The Soviet, in order to prevent desertion, has moved certain detachments away from the border or have strung charged barbed wire fences along the border. Another means which they are utilizing is making the regiment responsible for detachments from which there have been deserters. (The above is intelligence of primary importance.)

4. Recently to the Ude Front, the surveillance troops of the outer Mongolian area have within the last few days deliberately trespassed on Mongolian territory several times, even to the extent of 10 to 20 kilometers. They are taking a strong, hostile attitude toward Japanese surveillance troops. (The above is intelligence of primary importance.)

I have transmitted this to Peitai, Shanghai, and Nandai.
Army 25682 Trans. 12/3/41 (5)

a Kana spelling.

EXHIBIT NO. 142A

Dec. 5, 1941.

Mr. Sterling: At 7:45 p.m. Mr. Carter called in from Portland with the following information:

J2W3 2130G
TODAY NORTH WIND MORNING CLOUDY AFTERNOON CLEAR BEGIN CLOUDY EVENING. TOMORROW NORTH WIND AND LATER FROM SOUTH. (The above was repeated three times)

J2W3 sent a time signal at 2200G and then:
WILL NOW GIVE YOU THE WEATHER REPORT (nothing further, carrier on but no modulation—evidently cutoff in Tokyo).

Remarks by Carter: They are getting a more complete picture of the operations now and it is evident that at 2130G the Tokyo weather is transmitted and at 2200G the Tokyo weather and weather for other prefectures. Reception is getting better and estimate efficiency on this assignment has increased approximately twenty-five percent.

Foned Col. Bratton and gave him the message at 7:50 p.m.

Remarks by Col. Bratton: Results still negative but am pleased to receive the negative results as it means that we have that much more time. The information desired will occur in the middle of a program and possibly will be repeated at frequent intervals. (Asked Col. Bratton if I should communicate the information to Portland—concerning the fact that the desired data will be in the middle of a program.) No. I will have a conference with Lt. Col. Dusenberg in the morning and will contact Mr. Sterling in that regard.

DE
(The following handwritten)

Night Watch Log—Nov. 24th to Dec. 8th 1941

Return this file promptly.

Papers are not to be removed from the file.

Secret

Nov. 24, 1941

1. At 6:35 PM the Supervisor of the Coast Guard Radio Station at Alexandria, Va., telephoned to report that W9WGI was causing serious interference to their circuit on 4050 kcs. Requested Supervisor to inform this office immediately if the interference was again heard. (No further reports from CG up to midnight)

Nov. 25, 1941

At 9:10 the Supervisor of SA-P telephoned in from Jackson, Miss., requesting information relative to the resignation of Henry Gantt, an operator at SA-10. (Memo. re: conversation placed on Mr. Sterling’s desk.)

Nov. 26, 1941

Handled routine correspondence and traffic.

Nov. 27, 1941

At 6:20 pm Monitoring Officer Cave of NA-9 called in regard to Wash. Case 4001 and 4002. Mr. McIntosh gave Cave the information requested.

Nov. 28, 1941

At 7:55, the Major Guest telephoned in requesting Mr. Sterling’s home phone number. Gave him the requested information. At 8:00 pm long distance operator called on Na. 2963 stating that Portland, Oregon was calling and desired to contact Mr. Sterling. Informed operator that Mr. Sterling was not here, but that he could be reached at his home Evergreen 278. At 10:20 Mr. Sterling called giving instructions he wished passed on to Mr. Norman, Mr. North and Miss Perry.

Nov. 29, 1941

Handled routine correspondence and traffic.

Dec. 1

1. 5:05 P. M. Monitoring Officer CA-8 (Bairiey) telephone to report that Ferguson (Wash. 3423) original informant, has moved out of neighborhood where original key clicks had been heard and requested further instructions. Told Bairiey to contact Officer House of Auburn Police for further information. Also contact Ferguson at his new address for detailed description of signals he had heard previously.

2. At 5:45 P. M. telephoned Col. Bratton. Gave him a message per Mr. Sterling’s instructions.

3. 9:05 P. M. telephoned Mr. Sterling re verification of frequencies for Portland.

4. 9:30 P. M. Monitoring Officer Duncan SA-5 telephoned from Tallahassee, Fla, stating he had heard unlicensed station JUMP (Wash. 3930) and probably could have complete evidence of unlicensed operation within two days. He stated that the subject was undoubtedly using a phonograph oscillator. Duncan requested information as to whether he should remain in Tallahassee or return to St. Augustine and work on some in-active alleged subversive cases. Informed Duncan to remain in Tallahassee two more days and endeavor to complete his evidence on Wash. 3930.

5. 9:45 P. M. sent TWX to Portland confirming frequencies.
Dec. 2

1. 7:35 P. M. long distance operator called on Na 2995 asking for Mr. Sterling. Operator stated that Portland, Ore. was calling. Informed her that Mr. Sterling was not here but that he could be contacted at his home in Baltimore, Evergreen 278.

Dec. 3

1. 6:15 P. M. received TWX from GS-P relative to NDA cases.
2. 6:25 P. M. telephoned Mr. Peterson for information concerning NDA cases.
3. 6:43 TWX to GS-P containing instructions relative to NDA cases.
4. 7:15 P. M. long distance operator of Portland, Ore. called on NA 2995 for Mr. Sterling. Informed her that Mr. Sterling was not in office at present but that I would try to contact him.
5. 7:20 called Lafayette Bowling Alley and had them page Mr. Sterling. They reported that Mr. Sterling had already departed.
6. 7:45 P. M. Mr. Sterling called this office and directed me to take message from Mr. Carter at Portland, Ore.
7. 7:52 P. M. contacted Mr. Carter at Portland, Ore. and obtained message for Mr. Sterling.
8. 7:55 P. M. telephoned Col. Bratton at his home and delivered a message in accordance with Mr. Sterling's instructions.
9. 8:37 P. M. Mr. Sterling called this office and contents of message from Portland, Ore. was read to him.

Dec. 4

1. 6:55 P. M. called Mr. Norman at his home in reference to message from GS-P concerning Mr. McKinney. Mr. Norman advised that no further action was necessary.
2. 8:12 P. M. received a message from Mr. Carter at Portland, Ore.
3. 8:25 P. M. unable to contact Lt. Col. Dusenburg either at the War Dept. or at his home.
4. 8:40 P. M. telephoned Mr. Sterling requesting instructions relative to a message from Mr. Carter.
5. 8:45 P. M. called ONI watch officer at Navy Dept. to ascertain if he was permitted to accept messages of interest to Col. Bratton's office. The officer in charge stated that he was not certain but that he would inquire and call me back.
6. 9:05 P. M. Lt. Brotherhood 20-G Watch Officer Navy Dept. telephoned to state that he was authorized to accept message in question. Gave Lt. Brother- hood the message from Mr. Carter.
7. 9:32 P. M. Lt. Brotherhood called to inquire if any other reference to weather was made previously in program intercepted by Portland. Informed him that no other reference was made.

Dec. 5

1. 7:45 P. M. Mr. Carter called in from Portland, Ore. with a message.
2. 7:50 P. M. telephoned Col. Bratton at his residence and repeated the message from Mr. Carter.
3. 11:05 P. M. Monitoring Officer Dunphey of CA-6 telephoned in requesting information on Wash. Case 3259. Informed Dunphey would try to get the information for him in the morning.

Dec. 6

1. Handled routine correspondence and traffic.

Dec. 8

1. 6:15 A. M. Mr. Meriwether called in, no results. Told him take six hours off, then assume duties for six hours, then eight hours off, alternating with Baltimore Unit.
2. 8:00 A. M. Mr. Meriwether called in, no results. Told him to remain on job until noon when CA-6 unit would take over. Informed him to take over watch again at 6:00 P. M.
3. 8:50 A. M. NA-3 called re Washington case 3722, off air. Mac gave him some important bearing and/or intercept assignment.

4. 12:00 Noon. Mr. Meriwether and Mr. Blum at office. One will take 6:00 P. M. to Mid., the other 6:00 A. M. to Noon, sandwiched with Falls Church.

5. 12:10 P. M. Mr. Berle of State Department called—Wanted Mr. Fly, finally got Mr. Fly.

EXHIBIT NO. 142B

From: Tokyo
To: (Circular telegram)
7 December 1941
(Plain Japanese language using code names)
Circular #2494

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.

Note: The above is the translation furnished the President and other high officials at 1100 (EST) on Dec. 7, 1941. In the rush to get it out, one code word was overlooked. The correct translation reads as follows:

"Relations between Japan and the following countries are not in accordance with expectation: England, United States."

This omission, which was not discovered until January, 1944, does not appreciably change the information that was available at 1100 (EST) on Dec. 7, 1941.

Note: The Army translation of Circular #2494 (supplied in March, 1944) is as follows:

"Relations between Japan and _____ are approaching a crisis (on the verge of danger): England, United States."

Note: See JD #6985.

JD-1: 7148 Secret (M) Navy Trans. 7 December 1941 (STT)
The Honorable Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel

Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
Congress of the United States.

Dear Mr. Richardson: Enclosed are paraphrases of three telegrams received regarding the "winds" message, supplementing previous correspondence on this subject.

Sincerely yours,

Herbert S. Marks,
Assistant to the Under Secretary.

Enclosures:

1. Telegram from London, December 15, 1945;
2. Telegram from The Hague, January 26, 1946;

Telegram Received From The American Embassy at London, Dated December 15, 1945 (Paraphrase)

This morning we had a conversation regarding the "winds" messages with a Foreign Office Japanese expert who was in the Foreign Office immediately preceding and at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor. He declares that, so far as he knows, prior to December 8, 1941 no such messages were received. Investigation is still being carried on but the Foreign Office has as yet no information which would change the statement contained in the Embassy's telegram of December 4, 1945 on this subject.

Telegram Received From The American Embassy at The Hague, Dated January 26, 1946 (Paraphrase)

We have been informed by the Foreign Office in a note dated January 24 that all reports of monitored Japanese broadcasts were destroyed before the invasion of the Netherlands East Indies by the Japanese. The same is true of the archives of the Netherlands Indies Government. For this reason the Foreign Office regrets that it is unable to supply the information which has been requested by the Congressional Committee investigating the Pearl Harbor attack.

Telegram Received From The American Embassy at London, Dated January 31, 1946 (Paraphrase)

The Foreign Office states that the investigation requested in the Department's telegram 9745 of November 6, 1945 has drawn a complete blank and that it does not seem worthwhile to make any further investigation.
November 14, 1945

MEMORANDUM TO Mr. Gehlen:

I have received a letter from the
supervisor of the night division on November 14, 1945. I
sent it to you for your information.

I am sorry, I am the only one at this moment of the
night intelligence division not yet wired.

I am important to protect, I am the night
boss.

C. C. Stirling
Assistant Intelligence Engineer

Exhibit
MR. GEORGE E. STERLING
Chief, Radio Intelligence Division
Federal Communications Commission
Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. STERLING:

I have read with interest the extracts from the Army and Navy Pearl Harbor boards. I agree with you that the Army's statement to the effect that "On December 7 a number of illegal radio stations interfered with the radio operations of the Army" is the result of ignorance and lack of understanding on the part of army personnel. I would like to know the exact basis for the statement. I assume that something more than the general allegation was made.

There have been numerous references in the newspapers lately to the cabled Japanese weather message which was to reveal their plans. In reading through the translations of Japanese news broadcasts recorded at HAP and translated by the O.N.I., Honolulu, I came across the following with which you are probably familiar. However, since it differs considerably from the current news stories and may be in addition to the "weather message" referred to, I am sending it for your information. This translation was made from recordings of the J2I Japanese language broadcast on 9535 kc. for December 8, 1941. Japan time. The translation included a report of the Japanese attacks for the day (December 8, Japan time, being December 7, Honolulu time) and therefore, the "weather forecast" followed rather than preceded the Pearl Harbor attack. The O.N.I. translator inserted the following in parentheses between news items: "Here a weather forecast was made—so far as I can recollect, no such weather forecast has ever been made before. His exact words were: "Allow me to especially take a weather forecast at this time—'West wind, clear!" Since these broadcasts are also heard by the Japanese Navy it may be a sort of code." It will be noted that the O.N.I. translator was apparently unaware of any previous search for such a forecast. The same weather forecast was repeated later in the December 8 broadcast.

The translations made by the O.N.I. were furnished this office and the FBI by messenger. We did not receive the translations for December 8 until December 25, 1942. As a matter of fact I believe that the translations for December 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7 were all received from the O.N.I. on December 25. This was not at all usual since recent translations had generally been received from a week to two weeks after the date of the broadcast.

Present indications are, according to the newspapers, that the Senate House Committee which is investigating the Pearl Harbor attack will not visit Hawaii for sometime.

Sincerely yours,

/ s/ Lee H. Dawson
Station JZI Program
Jul. 12/3/41 (Japan Time)
Frequency 9355 kilocycles.

With our army in retreat in SE Asia, it is
understandable that the British Empire has
also been in retreat. Our present army is in
eastern Pacific at Horn today, the 3rd of
June, and its achievements of last three weeks, in
Army and Navy headquarters, are: (1) our new
3rd Army Headquarter in Horn, (2) Our
Eisenhower-Johnson in Horn, (3) The
British lift in Horn, (4) Our 3rd Navy
Headquarter in Horn, (5) Our 3rd Luftwaffe
Headquarter in Horn, (6) Our 3rd Army
Headquarter in Horn, (7) Our 3rd Air
Headquarter in Horn, (8) Our 3rd Navy
Headquarter in Horn.

Our new Headquarter in Horn is the
British lift. The British lift is also
our new Headquarter in Horn. The British
lift is also our 3rd Army Headquarter in
Horn.

Our 3rd Army Headquarter in Horn is
Eisenhower-Johnson. Eisenhower-Johnson is
either our 3rd Army Headquarter in
Horn, or our 3rd Luftwaffe Headquarter in
Horn.

Our 3rd Navy Headquarter in Horn is
Eisenhower-Johnson. Eisenhower-Johnson is
our new Headquarter in Horn, or our 3rd Navy
Headquarter in Horn.

Our 3rd Luftwaffe Headquarter in
Horn is Eisenhower-Johnson. Eisenhower
Johnson is our new Headquarter in Horn,
or our 3rd Luftwaffe Headquarter in
Horn.

Our 3rd Army Headquarter in Horn
is Eisenhower-Johnson. Eisenhower
Johnson is our new Headquarter in
Horn, or our 3rd Army Headquarter in
Horn.

Our 3rd Luftwaffe Headquarter in
Horn is Eisenhower-Johnson. Eisenhower
Johnson is our new Headquarter in Horn,
or our 3rd Luftwaffe Headquarter in
Horn.

Our 3rd Navy Headquarter in Horn
is Eisenhower-Johnson. Eisenhower
Johnson is our new Headquarter in Horn,
or our 3rd Navy Headquarter in
Horn.

Our 3rd Luftwaffe Headquarter in
Horn is Eisenhower-Johnson. Eisenhower
Johnson is our new Headquarter in Horn,
or our 3rd Luftwaffe Headquarter in
Horn.

Our 3rd Army Headquarter in Horn
is Eisenhower-Johnson. Eisenhower
Johnson is our new Headquarter in Horn,
or our 3rd Army Headquarter in
Horn.
Our Imperial Army is repulsing the British troops which have invaded Thailand. In regard to this, our embassy in Bangkok made the following announcement at 4 a.m. today: For a long time, we have been expecting the British troops to invade the southern part of Thailand and, as expected, they have begun to cross the Malay border early this morning. To preserve the peace of the Southern Pacific and protect the independence of Thailand, our government immediately started a negotiation with Thailand and, at the same time, started an attack against the British troops, which are being presently wiped out. Thus was the statement announced by our embassy in Thailand.

The next is a Dispatch from Bangkok. At 9 a.m. today, Bangkok has been in a state of war and to maintain the peace and order within the international settlement, our army and navy have been sent to the north in order to maintain the peace and order, and prosperity of the international settlement. The Japanese troops have been hostile feeling towards the residents carrying a peaceful occupation within the settlement.

Our Imperial Army has advanced to the northern province. In regard to this, a Dispatch from Bangkok reported that our Imperial Army has been ordered in Australia to disarm to the 200 Japanese soldiers stationed in Houton, as a result of the (5) and since April 1st, the disarmament of the Japanese was carried out at 1 p.m. today.

Today, His Majesty, the Emperor, released the following Imperial decree to our Imperial Army and Navy: "Since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, the Army and Navy have stoically fought for over four years to punish the bandits. In spite of their great achievements, the war has not been quelled yet. After considering the past and seeing the English and American statesmen's clauses are reasonable, I attempted to hold my government settle the situation peacefully. In spite of this, not only did England and America show no sincerity to consider peace, but instead strengthened their military and economic situation in an attempt to make our country yield. Hence, to protect our country's existence and self-defense and establish lasting peace in East Asia, I have decided to declare war against England and America. Having faith in your loyalty and bravery, I look forward to the accomplishment of our ultimate aim, the uplifting of our country's glory".

In reply to this Imperial decree, the Minister of War and Navy has issued the same, respectively, as the following reply: "Your subject, the Minister, respectfully reply: Your subjects, all of us, believe, respectfully reply. We cannot help but deeply appreciate your great idea. With us (7) whoever it is, subject, please be in humble order. We are now preparing for the great movement of the United States and others, and we expect
to respond to your will. On behalf of the government and the Army and Navy, we, Hideki and Shigotaro, your subjects, respectfully make this reply. December 8, 1941.

(Signed) Hideki Tojo, Minister of War.
Shigotaro Shinoda, Minister of Navy.

Since our Army and Navy has started a war against England and America in the Western Pacific at dawn today, our government at 7 a.m. today held an emergency session of the cabinet at the President’s residence. Outside of Foreign Minister Togo, all the cabinet ministers were present. Firstly, Minister of Navy Shinoda reported the development of war against England and America and based on this report, the course to be taken by the government was decided, whereupon Premier Tojo called on the Emperor and reported the decision.

According to a Domi dispatch from Washington, Foreign Minister Togo reported by order Envoys Kurusu and Nomura to call on Secretary of State Hull at 1:00 P.M. on the 7th, 3:30 A.M. of the 8th Japan time, and present our government’s official reply to the American note of the 26th. At the same time, Foreign Minister Togo invited American ambassador to Japan, Drew, to his official residence at 7:30 A.M. today and handed him an official note similar to the one handed to Secretary of State Hull. Immediately afterwards at 7:45 A.M., he invited British ambassador to Japan, Craigie and explained to him the text of this reply.

Immediately after our loyal Army and Navy had entered a state of war with England and America at dawn today, it was decided to break off diplomatic relations with both countries and enter a state of war. Consequently, our government at 11:45 A.M. today declared war against England and America. At the same time, in order for the convocation of a two days special session of the Diet on the 15th was issued, at the emergency session urgent bills of appropriations and other nature will be presented and, at the same time, the government’s policy to cope with the unprecedented emergency is expected to be explained by Premier Tojo and other ministers.

(Here a weather forecast was made as far as I can recollect, no such weather forecast has ever been made before. His exact words were "Allow us to especially make a weather forecast at this time, 'west wind, clear'." Since these broadcasts are also heard by the Japanese Army, it may be some sort of code.)

At 8:30 A.M. today, our government in the Foreign Ministry announced the results of the Japan—American negotiation in the Japan—American note. The announcement has clear the main facts of the effort exerted by our government till the very last minute to preserve the peace of the Pacific. Japan’s note to America was an official reply to America’s note of the 26th and notified the fourth settlement can be expected even if the negotiations were to be continued. It actually was an oral notice.
to America, and within it, our country made public to the world the reason for declaring the war. It is as follows: That America's principles adhered to in the Japanese-American negotiation are idealistic and her proposal, for example, is absolute and ignores the realities of East Asia. That England and America's economic oppression is more mean than armed resistance. That the imperialistic exploitation of England and America has been the root of disorder in East Asia. That the continuation of aid to Ch'angking absolutely cannot be ignored by our country. That England and America, scheming with the other hostile nations, are intensifying their action to make Japan and China fight each other, but our country is......... Taking these five points up, our country's fairness was made clear to the world.

Now, let me give you the text of the Foreign Ministry's announcement. From the standpoint of settling the Pacific problems pleasantly and thus contributing toward world peace, our government has carried on negotiations with America ever since the middle of last April. At first, a proposal was made by America, but, just at that time, the joint defense of France into-China was concluded. Then, England and America, cooperating with each other, took action to strengthen their economic oppression. Hence, Premier Kanjo sent a message to President Roosevelt in August to urge America to reconsider her action. However, America, adhering to her claims for the abrogation of the Japanese-Spanish-Italian alliance, the withdrawal of Japanese troops stationed in China and the matter of international trade without discrimination, totally rejected our claim. Of course, these demands cannot be accepted by our country. As a result, our country hurriedly dispatched Envoys Hurusu to America and bearing patience upon patience, our country continued the negotiation with a conciliatory attitude. However, America, adhering to her principles, which are counter to the realities of East Asia, assumed an attitude to ignore our claims and effort. At the same time, England, Ch'angking, Dutch East Indies and Australia renewed their effort to strengthen their anti-Japanese preparation. Hence, the Japanese-American negotiation finally reached a critical state. Besides, the situation surrounding our country became such as to leave no room for optimism, since it became clear that America absolutely has no intention to continue the negotiation, our government sent a telegram on the 7th to the American government and made her attitude clear. The developments of the Japanese-American negotiation announced by the Foreign Ministry were as follows: Our country's desire to establish the East Asia mutual prosperity sphere and contribute toward world peace has been trampled by the world war fever and the challenging threats of England and America. America, mobilizing 10,000,000 soldiers and setting up a two-ocean navy of 3,000,000 men, has intensified her unjust scheme to make the world her own. Even in the recent Japanese-American negotiation, they attempted to oppress our country with an arrogant attitude of being not even afraid of God, and in an attitude toward the leader of East Asia, it was too much to ignore. In spite of this, our country, hoping for America's consider tion to the very end together with our people, continued to remain calm. However, today, the war of the
Pacific has been brought about by America and England. It should be definitely stated at this time that President Roosevelt and Premier Churchill have undertaken the Pacific war without consideration of the war's vocation on humanity as one of their purposes for the direction of the world. In the course of the four and a half years of the joint incident, each and every Japanese has shed tears of indignation against England and America's wicked hostilities attitude, but has remained patient for the sake of the peace of the Pacific as well as the world. This patience, today, has reached its limit. The time has come to rise suddenly and risk the fate of the nation for the cause of justice in the future.

At dawn today, December 8, the announcement by April army and navy headquarters to the effect that our high army and navy will enter a state of war against American and British forces in the Western Pacific at dawn today was made public throughout our country through the radio and newspapers. Every one throughout the country has now further strengthened their determination that the inhumanity has not ceased and instantly, our peace-loving time has been transformed into a determination to punish the evil and cut off the sinister hands of the outrageously wicked England and America. Today, the day, is made clear and devoid of even a speck of cloud and makes this the day which seemed to be consecrated to the promising future of Japan when Japan was destined to fight for the establishment of a world order of Fudai, and as well as the just like the brilliant eyes of the sun, our national nerve, as an indication of our strong air defense, is flying over everywhere. When I received this report that war in the Pacific had been declared, I hurried to my.............. and on my way, I saw a reflection in the glass window well as those working, a heroic unmanned expression of mankind. Then with the issuing of the Imperial decree declaring that if anything the nation's determination to march forward and support the other side will surged forth. Not long afterwords, hiking to the central headquarters of our country was announced over the radio, and, at this time, the achievements of our Navy, which is carrying on its part ofsubstancions, and British forces from Java to Honolulu with the world's largest amount of power as though the Pacific were to end, and we moved throughout the nation. Hence, the confidence and spirit of our people, land and America, and the world is the show of the vitality of the world to be transmitted to rise within the heart of the people.

The next is A.M. dispatch from the Special News Service, Rich et ten that according to a statement by the U.S. War Department, official sources in Washington believe that the war will end in 54 hours.

At this time it has been announced: 'Of course' (repeated this forecast).

Now let us broadcast to you that this is the time to rise suddenly.
director of the 2nd section of the information bureau entitled "To the people resident abroad in receiving the Emperor's decree of war.

Japanese minister abroad, a Imperial decree declaring war against English, was received in Japan at 11:45 am, December 8, Japan time. It was first properly address to you. Then, I believe that you know the details of the Japanese-American relations in detail. As the country's chief, I will refrain from mentioning anything. Today, our Imperial army and navy of two-thirds loyal has already at rest in attack in the Eastern Pacific and over wide range, in an occupying brilliant results. To accomplish this great war, we, 10,000,000 people of Japan, shall most bulls put into practice the spirit of service, to unite solidly to rest the mind of our majority, the Emperor, for there is nothing to fear. As you already known, the Japanese-American relations went through all sorts of complications and difficulties during the past eight months, and America made the following decision on our country. They were (1) complete and unconditional evacuation of Japanese troops from China; (2) the abolition of the Berlin Agreement; (3) immediate evacuation of the tripartite alliance; and (4) a so-called ideological framework, indicating her definite refusal to recognize the realities of East Asia. Consequently, not only has she attempted to impose the natural demand for the strengthening of the mutual prosperity relations between Japan and the southern nations, but she also strengthened her ASCO concentration and intensified her coercion toward Japan, both economically and militarily. At the same time, she, utilizing Shanghai as her tool, is planning her own defense at the expense of China and is endeavoring to achieve her ambition of dominating East Asia as well as the Far East. Although we were enduring the unendurable and exerting our utmost effort to redress the Japanese-American relations with a conciliatory spirit for the sake of world peace and humanity, it became definitely clear that America will never reconsider. I shall repeat: The first that we must remain patient and exerted her utmost effort in the Japanese-American negotiation till today, or clearly explained in the Imperial decree, was based on our noble spirit to maintain the peace of the world and thus contribute toward world peace and not that we were afraid of England and America's economic and military strength. Nevertheless, America, understanding our military and national strength, is trying to make our country yield before her oppression, assumed
EXHIBIT NO. 143

(This exhibit is the proceedings of the Roberts Commission appointed December 18, 1941 by the President and will be found printed separately in the Joint Committee record. See Index of Exhibits.)

EXHIBIT NO. 144

(This exhibit is the proceedings of the inquiry conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, Retired, pursuant to precept dated February 12, 1944 of the Secretary of the Navy and will be found printed separately in the Joint Committee record. See Index of Exhibits.)

EXHIBIT NO. 145

(This exhibit is the proceedings before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, convened by the Secretary of War pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Congress, approved June 13, 1944, and will be found printed separately in the Joint Committee record. See Index of Exhibits.)

EXHIBIT NO. 146

(This exhibit is the proceedings of the Naval Court of Inquiry convened by the Secretary of the Navy pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Congress, approved June 13, 1944, and will be found printed separately in the Joint Committee record. See Index of Exhibits.)

EXHIBIT NO. 147

(This exhibit is the proceedings of the investigation conducted by Colonel Carter W. Clarke, September 14, 15, and 16, 1944, and continued from July 13 to August 4, 1945, and will be found printed separately in the Joint Committee record. See Index of Exhibits.)

EXHIBIT NO. 148

(This exhibit is the report of investigation during the period November 23, 1944, to September 12, 1945, conducted by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, AUS, for the Secretary of War, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, and will be found printed separately in the Joint Committee record. See Index of Exhibits.)

EXHIBIT NO. 149

(This exhibit is the proceedings of the inquiry conducted by Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt, U. S. N., pursuant to precept dated May 2, 1945, of the Secretary of the Navy, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry, and will be found printed separately in the Joint Committee record. See Index of Exhibits.)
Admiral William F Halsey, U.S.Navy
Commander Sc.4th Pacific Fleet
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

Dear Bill,

You have on your staff Commander A.D.Kramer, U.S.N., who was on duty in the Communications Office in the Navy Department at the time of the attack on Pearl harbor and for some time prior to that date. I believe he has knowledge of facts and incidents which occurred in the Navy Department which are of interest and value to me. Will you please obtain from him an affidavit and ask him if he will supply me with a copy. I will assure him that I will make no use of the affidavit without his permission so long as he is alive. If he does not wish to supply me with a copy of the affidavit, I would appreciate it very much if he will make the affidavit, put it in a secure place and inform me when I can obtain it.

There was a message received in the Navy Department on December 4th or 5th, 1941, which came to be called the "Winds Message". I should like to know:

What station first received the Winds Message?

What date was it received in Washington?

When was it deciphered, translated, decoded and delivered to responsible officials in Washington?

What officials in Washington saw the translation of the Winds message and when?

What was the substance of the information contained in the Winds Message?

What action towards notification of Field Commanders of contents of message and implications thereof was taken?

There was a note delivered by the Japanese Ambassador to Mr. Hull on 7 December 1941.

When were the first 13 parts of this message received, decoded, and delivered to responsible officials in Washington?

What officials in Washington received translations of the first 13 parts of this message and when did each receive them?
Admiral William F. Halsey, USNavy 18 March 1944

When was the 14th part of the message received, decoded and delivered?

What officials in Washington received translations of the 14th part of this message and when did each receive it?

What action was recommended by you or anyone else of which you have knowledge?

There was a message directing the Japanese Ambassador to deliver a note to Secretary Hull in person at 1:00 P.M. Eastern Standard Time on 7 December 1941.

When was this message received in the Navy Department?

What agency decoded the message and when was decoding completed?

What agency translated the message and when was the translation delivered to the Navy Department?

What officials in Washington received translations of this message and when did each receive it?

What action was taken as a result of this message?

When Commander Kramer delivered this message to Mr. Knox a memorandum pointing out that 1:00 P.M. Eastern Standard Time was sunrise in Honolulu and midnight in Manila and that the whole thing meant sunrise air raid in Pearl Harbor within a few minutes after the delivery of the Japanese note.

Will you please have Commander Kramer answer all of the fore-going questions of which he has knowledge and put them in the form of an affidavit and also request him to include in his affidavit any other matters of which he may have first-hand knowledge. I shall be very grateful to him for this matter will be of considerable interest and value to me.

My kindest regards to you always Bill.

Most Sincerely yours,

/s/ H.M. Kimmel.
Memoranda Prepared by Captain Safford

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5. Memorandum dated 22 June 1945 for Admiral Hewitt regarding Pearl Harbor Investigation.------------------------------------------ 19
6. Memorandum dated 14 July 1945 of Conversations in connection with Admiral Hewitt’s Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Disaster-------------------------- 20

Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.

17 May 1945.

Memorandum for Lieut. Commander John F. Sonnett, U. S. N. R.

Subj: Evaluation of Messages of 26 November 1941.

Ref:
(a) Opnav—242230 (Nov. 1941).
(b) Com 14—266110 (Nov. 1941).
(c) Com 16—261331 (Nov. 1941).
(d) Com 14 Communication Intelligence Bulletins (Nov.1—6 Dec. 1941).
(e) Station “H” Chronology (Dec. 1—6 Dec. 1941).
(g) CINCPAC “Weekly Intelligence” Vol. 1, No. 22, 8 Dec. 1944—P. O. W. Account of Raid on Pearl Harbor.
(i) Jane’s Fighting Ships—1941 edition.

Encl:
(B) “Japanese Naval Vessels” (ONI—December 1942).

1. Reference (a) advised that Com 16 intercepts were considered most reliable and requested Com 16 to evaluate reports on Japanese naval movements and send despatch to Opnav, info Cincpac. Com 16’s estimates were more reliable than Com 14’s, not only because of better radio interception, but because Com 16 was currently reading messages in the Japanese Fleet Cryptographic System (“5-number code” or “JN25”) and was exchanging technical information and translations with the British C. I. Unit at Singapore. McCollum knew this and gave it due consideration when he drafted reference (a).

2. Reference (b) summarized Japanese naval activities for the current month and advised that some large scale movement involving most if not all of the Japanese Navy was about to take place. The message itself was summarized in its last sentence, as follows:

Evaluate above to indicate strong force may be preparing to operate in Southeastern Asia while component parts may operate from Palao and Marshalls.

This information was reliable, timely, and accurate on the whole. It must be realized, moreover, that this estimate was based entirely on “radio intelligence,” the Com 14 C. I. Unit being unable to read anything except the Weather Ciphers and other minor systems of the Japanese Navy at that particular time. This fact was known in the Navy Department, and the Director of Naval Communications and the Director of Naval Intelligence were so informed by me.

3. The major project of the 14th District C. I. Unit in November 1941 was attack on the Japanese Flag Officers Cryptographic System (Transposition Cipher superposed on a “4-character code”—think we called it “AD”)—in which they were being backed up by similar attack in the Navy Department. This system (its earlier editions) had been our main source of information on the Japanese Navy from 1926 or 1927 up until about November 1940. It was the most difficult as well as most important system the Japanese Navy was using and our most skilled and most experienced officers and men were attempting its solution. If we could have solved the Flag Officers System, Admiral Kimmel
would probably have known of the Japanese plans and the Pacific Fleet would have not been surprised on December 7, 1941. Unfortunately, neither the U. S. Navy nor the British cryptanalysts ever succeeded in cracking this system. The "5-numeral" system yielded no information which would arouse even a suspicion of the Pearl Harbor Raid, either before the attack or afterwards. The Japanese abandoned the "AD (?)" system in 1942 or 1943, apparently because of excessive delays and unreadable messages. As regards the "JN25" or "5-numeral" system, the current code (JN25B) had been in effect since 1 December 1940, remained in effect until 27-31 May, 1942, and was partially readable in November 1941. A new system of keys was introduced on 4 December 1941 and reported by Com 16-194152, but the carry over of the old code made their solution quite simple, and we were reading messages again by Christmas, Corregidor getting the "initial break" on 8 December 1941. The Hawaiian C. I. Unit did not commence work on the Japanese Navy's "5-number" system until 10 December 1941, at which date it discontinued attack on the "Flag Officers System." (The Navy Department continued its attack on the "Flag Officers System" as long as it remained in use.)

4. Reference (c) contained Com 16's evaluation of reference (b) plus extensive observations and comments of his own, and in general agreed with Com 14's estimate. Com 16 had the benefit of his own translations plus "tips" from Singapore. Com 16 also had much better direction finder service as distances were much less, differences of longitude much less, and the bearings lines generally cut at more favorable angles for reliable plotting. This advantage was lost with the capture of Guam a few days after the Pearl Harbor Raid.

5. The discrepancies between references (b) and (c) are mostly artificial, the only important difference being in the following sentences, which are quoted below:

Ref. (b), Com 14-260110:

There is believed to be strong concentration of submarines and air group in the Marshalls which comprise airron twenty four at least one carrier division unit plus probably one third of the submarine fleet.

[3] Ref. (c), Com 16-261331:

"Second section (expected to operate in mandates) crudiv five X Cardiv three Ryujo and one Maru---"

"Cannot confirm supposition that carriers and submarines in force are in mandates X. Our best indications are that all known first and second fleet carriers still in Sasebo-Kure area X---"

It is apparent that everyone has jumped to the conclusion that "carrier division unit" meant "carrier division," but such was not the case. Commander Williams used the term "unit" rather loosely: in this instance it was later identified, on November 30, 1941, as "a unit of plane guard destroyers" (i. e., two or more destroyers attached to Cardiv 5). Another source of confusion was in the loose use of the term "Mandates." To Com 14 it meant Jaluit, Marshalls, and Eastern Japanese Mandated Islands, but to Com 16 it meant Palau or Halmahera. The Japanese Mandated Islands stretched over an East-West belt 2,100 miles long, so the distinction is important.

6. A study of reference (d) reveals the following:

(a) Call "SI TI 4" (previously identified as Cardiv 4) was located at Jaluit on November 19, but on November 21 was identified as a Submarine Squadron.

(b) The November 25th statement, "One or more of the Carrier Divisions are present in the Mandates," was retracted on November 27 by the statements:

"No further information of Carrier Division Five in Mandates."

"Carriers are still located in home waters."

(Note: According to reference (j) the Pearl Harbor Attack Force sailed from the Kurile Islands on 27 November 1941.)

(c) On November 30, the above discrepancies were reconciled by the statement:

"The presence of a unit of plane guard destroyers indicates the presence of at least one carrier in the Mandates, although this has not been confirmed."
(d) Another interesting bit of information appeared on November 30:

"The only tactical circuit heard today was one with Akagi and several Marus."

(e) The December 2nd Summary comes clean:

"Almost a complete blank of information on carriers today. Lack of identification has somewhat prompted this lack of information."

(f) The last specific mention of carriers was on December 3rd:

"No information on submarines or carriers."

(g) The record as to carriers is closed with the December 5th entry:

"No traffic from the Commander Carriers or Submarine Force has been seen either."

(h) The earlier estimate of submarine concentration in the Marshalls is reaffirmed on November 30 as follows:

"This unit cannot agree with Com 16 that there is not a submarine concentration in that area (the Marshalls). Every evidence points to a concentration of not only the small (RO-class) Fourth Fleet submarines there but also a good portion of the Fleet submarines of the Submarine Force."

(Note: See enclosure (A) and reference (g).

7. In view of the foregoing, and after consideration of all other information available to me at this time, I evaluate Com 16's statement "All known First and Second Fleet carriers still in Sasebo-Kure Area," to refer specifically to the following carriers:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CarDiv 1</th>
<th>CarDiv 2</th>
<th>CarDiv 5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kaga (F)</td>
<td>Soryu (F)</td>
<td>Shokaku</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Akagi</td>
<td>Hiryu</td>
<td>Zuikaku</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These carriers were in the vicinity of the Japansese main islands on that date, and participated in the Pearl Harbor Raid on 7 December 1941.

CarDiv 3, Ryujo and (Kasuga) Maru, were stated by reference (c) as earmarked for operations under Cinc Second Fleet in the forthcoming offensive in Southeastern Asia and were not specifically located, although it was implied that they were at Palau. They did not represent an offensive threat against U. S. possessions other than Guam and the Philippines. Reference (h) and enclosure (A) list the Kasuga (Maru); reference (i) and enclosure (B) do not; she might have been the Shoho.

CarDiv 4 (Hoshio and Zuiko), second line and escort carriers used for training pilots in flight deck operations, may have been assigned to the Fifth Fleet, or to the First Fleet (see enclosure (A)), or directly under the Cinc Combined Fleet. These ships did not represent an offensive threat against U. S. possessions at that time.

5. The Koryu was listed in reference (h) as being in the Sasebo-Kure Area. Reference (i) describes the Koryu as a sister ship of the Soryu and Hiryu. Enclosure (B) and later information indicate the Koryu was nonexistent. She was undoubtedly confused with one of the four auxiliary carriers.

8. Reference (e), prepared by the Chief Radioman in Charge of Radio Heia, supports and amplifies reference (d), but introduces one element of confusion. Extracts are quoted below.

1 December 1941

(Nothing of particular interest.)

2 December 1941

"Cinc Second Fleet has shifted to Sasebo and is probably going to South China to direct operations of units sent to this area from the Empire."

"No signs of movement of the Third Fleet or Carriers were given in today's traffic. It is believed that they remain in the vicinity of Kyushu. CarDiv 4 is believed to still be at Sasebo. CarDiv 3 has not shown any activity during the last few days, and it is possible that this unit has gone South."
3 December 1941

“It is believed that the Carriers are still based at or near Sasebo.”

4 December 1941

“Very little activity was observed in the Sasebo or Kure areas. The Carriers are believed to have remained in the vicinity of Kyushu.”

“The large number of high precedence messages and general distribution might indicate that the entire Navy is being instructed to be prepared for drastic action.”

5 December 1941

“No indication as to locations of the Carriers was noted in today’s traffic, although it is believed they remain in the vicinity of Kyushu.”

6 December 1941

“At 0430, Tokyo was heard using 32 kcs, dual with 12330 kcs for UTU broadcast of traffic. This broadcast was discontinued at 1800, but 7285 kcs (M) was immediately brought up and used until 1900, when it was secured. This broadcast was in addition to Tokyo’s regular UTU. Tokyo also broadcast traffic on 6665 kcs (A) during the evening.”

“Saipan, Takao and Ominato were also heard broadcasting traffic to units in their vicinities. The use of this method of delivering messages tends to keep unknown the positions of vessels afloat, and is probably one of the first steps toward placing the operation of the Navy on a wartime basis.”

9. Reference (f) states on page 9:

“The Naval Intelligence Service in Hawaii, due to lack of information indicating that the bulk of Japanese carriers were at sea, concluded they were in home ports.”

The Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer (Lt Comdr. E. T. Layton U.S.N.) and the Hawaiian Communication Intelligence Officer (Comdr. J. J. Rochefort, U.S.N.) deny ever making such a statement to the Roberts Commission. This information must have come from the District Intelligence Officer (Capt. I. H. Mayfield, U.S.N.) or one of the members of Admiral Kimmel’s staff, who were completely outside of the picture as regards Communication Intelligence or locations and movements of Japanese Naval Forces. The statement can find some support in reference (e) but none in reference (d), which was the last word in this matter.

10. Reference (d) was examined by a member of the Roberts Commission—but was not submitted as evidence. Reference (d) was not available to Admiral Hart because it was not submitted to him at Pearl Harbor and could not be located at the Navy Department. Reference (e) was not located until the day before I gave my “on-the-record” testimony to Admiral Hart. It did not quite fit the description of Com 14’s Daily C. I. Summaries that Rochefort had told me about in the spring of 1943, but I figured my memory or his had been at fault. So reference (e) was submitted to the “Hart Investigation” to substantiate my testimony as well as refresh my memory. It is apparent that reference (e) has been the source of confusion and misleading evidence in the two earliest investigations of the Pearl Harbor Disaster.

L. F. Safford, 
Captain, U.S. Navy.
Memorandum for Lient. Commander John F. Sonnett, U. S. N. R.
Sub: Evaluation of "UTU" Broadcasts.

Ref:
(a) Com 14—Routine 9522990 (Dec. 1941).
(b) Com 14 Communication Intelligence Bulletins (1 Nov.–6 Dec. 1941).
(c) Station "H" Chronology (1 Dec.–6 Dec. 1941).
(d) CinCAF—Priority 028345 (Dec. 1941).
(e) CinCAF—Priority 028730 (Dec. 1941).
(f) CinCAF—Routine 921636 (Dec. 1941).
(g) CinCAF—Priority 0611255 (Dec. 1941).

Encl: (A) Copies of references (d), (e), (f) and (g).

1. Reference (a) reported to Com. 16 and to Chief of Naval Operations:

   "UTU's are being sent by HA FU 6 (Tokyo Radio) on 32 kilocycles instead of 39 kcs as before."

This message was sent with ROUTINE precedence was handled by the Navy Department Code Room, and was delivered to Op–20–G at 1943 GCT on 6 December 1941 according to notation on the message.

2. Reference (a) is, to a large extent, evaluated by references (b) and (c), relevant portions of which are quoted below:

2 December 1941 (Ref. (b))

"The most prominent factor in today's traffic is the apparent confusion in the routing of traffic for certain major parts of the Japanese Fleet. There were instances where the same dispatch was repeated several times after it appeared on the Tokyo broadcast, and also where Takao Radio received the same dispatch that it previously sent. ComSixteen reported Second and Third Fleets in Takao area and that Takao was broadcasting traffic to those fleets. This broadcast was not uncovered here and contrary to location reports, there was one indication that these two fleets were not close to Takao. In several instances, Takao Radio forwarded traffic to Tokyo for these fleets. Summing up all reports and indications, it is believed that the large fleet made up of Second, Third and First Fleet units has left Empire waters but is either not close enough to Takao for good communication or is proceeding on a course not close to Takao."

3 December 1941 (Ref. (b))

"Traffic volume normal with receiving conditions good."

"It is the impression that both Second and Third Fleets are underway but are not verified by Radio Intelligence means."

3 December 1941 (Ref. (c))

"Takao, using call NUKU, was heard broadcasting traffic on 7155A kcs (night) and 14310A kcs (day). This broadcast was similar to the Tokyo UTU broadcast. Traffic was broadcast to CinC's combined, Second and Third Fleets, Comdr. Combined Air Force, Comdr. Indo-China Force and several unidentified afloat calls."

4 December 1941 (Ref. (b))

"Traffic volume normal with fair receiving conditions. Takao Radio (in Formosa) today instituted a fleet broadcast system using the prefix UTU in heading so that there are now two fleet broadcasts in operation."

"It is now believed that CinC Second Flet is in the vicinity of Takao and that apparently conflicting evidence is due to traffic destined for the Tokyo UTU broadcast which CinC Second Fleet is still copying."
4 December 1941 (Ref. (c))

"Takao continued to broadcast traffic on 7155A kcs (night) and 14310A kcs (day) to ships in that vicinity. A regular series of UTU numbers are being used by Takao and the broadcast is similar to Tokyo's. Takao uses the call NUKU, and calls RJU (All ships in my vicinity?)."

5 December 1941 (Ref. (b))

"Traffic volume heavy. All circuits overloaded with Tokyo broadcast going over full 24 hours. Tokyo-Mandates circuit is duplex operation. There were several new intercept schedules heard. Ominat Radio working Sama and Bako sending fleet traffic. The Takao broadcast handling traffic to Second and Third Fleets while the Tokyo broadcast is still handling traffic for these units also. It is noted that some traffic being broadcast several days old which indicates the uncertainty of delivery existing in the radio organization."

[9] "Neither the Second or Third Fleet Commanders have originated any traffic today. They are still frequently addressed but are receiving their traffic over broadcast. They are undoubtedly in Takao area or farther South since the Takao broadcast handles nearly all their traffic."

5 December 1941 (Ref. (c))

"Takao continues the use of the UTU broadcast on 7155 kcs to units in that area. From all indications, CinC's Second and Third Fleets are in the Takao area or have moved even farther South from Takao."

"Saipan, Ominato and Takao were heard broadcasting traffic to vessels in their vicinity. Tokyo broadcast traffic on 12330 kcs in addition to his regular UTU broadcast. At 0430/6th Tokyo was observed using 32 kcs for an UTU broadcast. This frequency was used dual with 12330 kcs. Signals were very strong during the day. The use of this low frequency indicates traffic sent on this broadcast is for ships at a great distance from Tokyo."

6 December 1941 (Ref. (b))

"Traffic volume very heavy with a great deal of old traffic being transmitted. Messages as far back as 1 December were seen in the traffic. This is not believed an attempt to maintain a high traffic level, but is the result of confusion in traffic routing with uncertainty of delivery. The stations now holding broadcasts are: Tokyo (with 3 distinct and separate broadcasts), Saipan, Ominato, and Takao."

"Still no traffic from the Second and Third Fleet Commanders. These units are sending their traffic via the Takao and Tokyo broadcasts."

"Fifth Fleet appears dispersed about the Japan Sea with Ominato broadcasting traffic for this unit."

6 December 1941 (Ref. (c))

"Takao continues to broadcast traffic for ships in that vicinity on 7155 kcs (A) (night) and on 14310 kcs (A) (day)."

"At 0430, Tokyo was heard using 32 kcs, dual with 12330 kcs, for UTU broadcast of traffic. This broadcast was discontinued at 1800, but 7285 kcs (M) was immediately brought up and used until 1900, when it was secured. This broadcast was used in addition to Tokyo's regular UTU. Tokyo also broadcast traffic on 0665 kcs (A) during the evening."

[10] 3. It was a matter of official record in Op-20-G, and common knowledge among our intercept operators, that the Naval Radio Station Tokyo had, on several occasions during the period 1936-1941, keyed other transmitters for test or during Grand Maneuvers of the Combined Fleet. The transmitters that are specifically remembered are:

- Haranomachi (250 miles north of Tokyo) (Commercial) 19.6 kcs 400 kw (reported)
- Fukuoka (near Sasebo) (Commercial) 32 kcs 100 kw (estimated)
- Kure (Navy) 57 kcs 50 kw (estimated)
- Yokosuka (Navy) 63 kcs 50 kw (estimated)
By way of comparison, corresponding characteristics are listed for the transmitter used for regular Tokyo UTU broadcasts:

Tokyo (Navy) 39 kcs 100 kw (estimated)

It was also a matter of general knowledge and official record that Tokyo Radio normally operated at reduced power but did not hesitate to go to full power when anything important occurred. Broadcasts on 19.6 kcs from Haranomachi (JAA), the most powerful station in Japan, would have implied submerged reception by submarines or transmission to a far-distant surface force.

4. References (d), (e), (f) and (g) report actual sighting of the Japanese Naval Forces referred to in paragraph 2 above. Reference (g), reporting the Japanese Amphibious Force which landed at Kota Bharu a day or two later, was deciphered in the Navy Department Code Room at 1557 GCT on 6 December 1941. This was approximately two hours before reference (a) was received by Op-20-G. In view of the actual sighting of the Japanese Invasion Force heading for the Kra Peninsula, reference (a) came as an anticlimax.

L. F. Safford,
Captain, U. S. Navy.


From: CINCAF
Date: Dec. 2, 1941
Decoded by: Laresen
Paraphrased by: Purdy

920345. CR9759

Patrol plane sighted 9 submarines speed 10 course south at 9230 GMT LAT 13-10 north long 110 degrees.

Shown DOO 9800
Shown OPDO 9850
Shown 38W 9850

Dist: 38W Action
Record Copies 38S DOO 38 12 13 16
Nav aide JRB

CNOL
20 OP

[12] From: CINCAF
Date: 2 Dec 1941
Tor Code Room 1048
Decoded by: Weinstock
Paraphrased by: Purdy

929739. CR9778

Bear 070 from Saigon distant 180 M miles 3 type 1-61 submarines in cruising formation headed south 15 knots. 21 transports anchored Camranah Bay with six planes patrolling overhead.

Distribution:
38W Action.
Record Copy: 38S. 12 38 16
Files: CNO 200P General

Shown OPDO by W. Bell 021120
SHOW OPDO
GBM: No action copy requested

NavAide JRB H

[13] Todays reconnaissance no results of significance other than as previously reported X the nine submarines were line abreast five mile spacing X ships in Camranh are mostly large several probably cargo only X our planes having been sighted on Indo China coast three successive days have discontinued search that locality for the present XX action addees are C X M and cinc esina via numeral cypher XX goodnight.
38W—Action
Record copy 38S—12—38—16
13—Navaide

From: CINCAF
To: OPNAV
By: HUTCHINSON

Exact Translation NAVCOM-14

[GOLF BALLESDXX] Cinc China reports quote two five ship convoy with escort six cruisers and ten destroyers lat eight north one zero six east at zero three one six Greenwich today X convoy ten ships with two cruisers and ten destroyers seven dash forty north one zero six dash twenty two hours later X all on course west X three additional ships seven dash five one north one zero five east at zero four two course three ten X this indicates all forces will make for Kohtron repeat Kohtron unquote X my scouting force sighted thirty ships and one large cruiser anchored Camranh Bay XX NIBLEX

Priority Secret
From: CINCAF
To: OPNAV
By: CURTIS

Exact Translation

[15] Secret
Memorandum for Lieut. Commander John F. Sonnett U. S. N. R.
Subj: Information concerning the Japanese passenger ship TATUTA MARU and American passenger ship PRESIDENT MADISON.

Ref:
(a) CinCAF 010300 (Dec. 1941).
(b) OpNav 671722 (Dec. 1941).
(c) “Where Away” (1944) by Perry & Leighton.
(d) AmCon Batavia #263 dated Dec. 31, 1941.
(e) AmCon Singapore #391 dated Dec. 29, 1941.
(f) Minister Vichy #1191 dated Aug. 14, 1942.

1. Reference (a) requested authority for CinCAF to use the PRESIDENT MADISON for evacuation of American Marines plus about 615 American Nationals in North China area, and advised that the MADISON could arrive at Chingwangtao (seaport for Peiping) on 10 December 1941.
2. Reference (b) advised CinCAF six days later that the State Department was informing the Japanese Government of the MADISON’S movements and requesting that she be allowed to proceed “freely and without hindrance” in return for similar arrangements “made for TATUTA MARU now enroute Los Angeles to evacuate Japanese Citizens.” It is apparent from the tone of reference (b) that war in Eastern Asia is anticipated but that this war does not include the United States. Reference (b) was prepared by the Central Division of Naval Operations (Op-13) and the records of that Division may contain additional information on this subject.
3. Reference (c) states on pages 39–48 that the USS MARBLEHEAD joined the PRESIDENT MADISON on 9 December 1941 in Balikpapan (Borneo) and escorted her to Surabaja (Java). It mentions the “frightened passengers” on the MADISON. References (d) and (e) report the departure of the MADISON (with evacuees) for Colombo on 29 December 1941.
4. Reference (f) is the State Department’s only readily available reference to the TATUTA MARU. It reports that the TATUTA MARU will be used as an “exchange ship” for civilian internees. However, it is believed that additional information could be located in the files of the State Department, of Op-13, and of Op-20–G.
5. An interesting story appeared in reference (c) on page 28, as follows:

“Back in the States it was still December 6th. A minute or two after three that morning a plain-language message came over the radio. * * * By 8:15 the general alarm began hammering the MARBLEHEAD’s people into wakefulness. * * * Over the loudspeaker system were coming the
relentless words: 'Man your battle stations.' When all stations had been
manned, an announcement was made over the public address system:
'We have just received an official plain-language message which says, "The
Japanese have commenced hostilities. Act accordingly."'

L. F. Safford,
Captain, U. S. Navy.

Note: The Memorandum bear the following handwritten notes:
"The authors were a bit ambiguous at this point."
"Dick Lern, Navigator of the MARBLEHEAD says this was just after the
attack on Pearl Harbor, Monday Dec. 8th, Tarapan Time. A check with the
book shows that 'still Dec. 6th referred to the quiet evening' the day before 0300/8th
(Tarapan Time)=2100/7th GCT=1930/7th (Pearl Harbor Time)"
"This could have been based on CincPac 071542 or NSS 071930 ([Illegible] 142).

[17] Secret

[Handwritten note:] Note: Not given to Adm. Hewitt or Lt. Cdr. Sonnett.
Memorandum of conversation with Mr. Walter Foote at the State Department on
Wednesday, 30 May 1945.
1. Mr. Walter Foote was the American Consul General at Batavia, Java, from
1927 until the capture of Java by the Japanese in 1942, except for a short tour
of duty in Australia. At the present time he is attached to the State Depart-
ment and is standing-by to return to Java as diplomatic representative of the
United States Government. Mr. Foote knew all the NEI officials intimately and
was taken into their confidence in all official matters in their relations with
Japan. Mr. Foote may be reached on Branch 420 at the State Department,
in care of Miss Jane Wilson.
2. Mr. Foote got his information about the Winds "Set-Up" message from
"Tony" Lovink, Advisor to the Governor General for East Asiatic Affairs.
Mr. Lovink is now Netherlands Ambassador at Chungking, being one of the few
high Dutch officials to escape from Java. Mr. Lovink was head of the NEI
Intelligence Service and was well informed as to Japanese plans and inten-
tions. As early as July, 1941, Mr. Lovink informed the Governor General
that Japan was planning the conquest of East Asia and the only thing in doubt
was just when the Japanese would commence their advance. Mr. Lovink said
the Winds "Set-Up" was the first tangible thing that he had to show his Govern-
ment to prove his predictions. As he expressed it, "It was the first thing I could
sink my teeth into." Mr. Lovink kept warning the NEI Government as to the
Japanese plans and preparations for war, and was regarded as an alarmist.
Subsequent events proved him 100% correct throughout.
3. Mr. Lovink informed Mr. Foote of the Winds "Set-Up", and Mr. Foote
sent Batavia confidential message #220, dated 4 December 1941, addressed to the
State Department, after thinking the matter over for about two hours. This
message was largely at Mr. Lovink's behest. Lient Colonel Thorpe, USA, and
Lient. Commander Slawson, USNR, got their translations of the Winds "Set-
Up" directly from the NEI War Department at Bandoeng. (Lt. Comdr. Slawson
was killed in action off the coast of New Guinea.) (Lt. Col. Thorpe is believed to be still alive.)
4. The Dutch listened for the Winds "Execute" message but did not hear it.
Mr. Foote is positive that he would have been notified if any Winds "Execute"
had been heard in Java. The Dutch were convinced that Japan was going to
make war on them on December 6, 1941, when the big convoy of 35 transports
(Mr. Foote's Collection), guarded by about six cruisers and several destroyers,
was sighted heading straight for Kota Bharu (Malaya). The Dutch did not
think that Japan was going to attack the United States and Pearl Harbor
came as a complete surprise to them.
5. Vice Admiral Helfrich, NEI Commander in Chief, ordered his subs to sea on
December 6, possibly earlier, and stationed them to defend the Netherlands East
Indies. Submarines had orders not to commence hostilities [18] without
positive orders. When the news of the Jap attack on Pearl Harbor reached Java,
the Governor immediately broadcast the following message to all NEI armed
forces:

"We are now at war with Japan which has just attacked Pearl Harbor;"
or words to that effect. The Dutch Navy commenced hostilities immediately
after this broadcast but took no hostile action before. (Vice Admiral Hel-
frich attended the San Francisco Conference in 1945 as one of the Dutch delegates.) The story that NEI Fleet put to sea on December 6, 1941, with orders to sink anything flying the Japanese flag seems to be a somewhat garbled version of what actually happened.

6. The NEI Intelligence were very alert. They had all the leading Japanese under constant surveillance throughout November and December, 1941, and had most of them under arrest within fifteen minutes of the time the news of the attack on Pearl Harbor was broadcast by the Governor General. Mr. Foote personally saw one whole block of Japanese run down the street in their underclothes in the custody of NEI policemen.

7. Mr. Foote lived next door to the Japanese Consul General and saw his arrest a few minutes after the previously-mentioned incident. Mr. Foote saw the Japanese Consul General burn his codes and secret papers in his back yard a day or so before Pearl Harbor. He could see servants bringing papers from the consulate and could see the smoke flame up each time a new batch was thrown on. (Mr. Foote was burning his own secret papers at the same time in his own back yard.)

8. When Mr. Foote came to Washington about a year ago, prior to going to duty at Curacao, NWI, he looked up all his telegrams and reports on file in the State Department to refresh his memory. Mr. Foote recalled the #220 as soon as he saw it. He stated that there was no record in the State Department of any further reference to the Winds Message or anything in the nature of a war warning, and that he did not recall ever having sent one. He is thoroughly convinced that the Dutch did not hear the Winds “Execute” message but that they would have believed it if they had heard it. Mr. Foote was one of the very last white men to leave Java. He escaped on a small steamer from a small port down the coast with nothing but the clothes on his back. He received the warning to get out from Captain J. M. Creighton, U. S. Navy, who escaped through some other route, believed by plane.

9. “Tony” Lovink was thoroughly convinced that the Winds “Execute” message would contain the Japanese Government’s decision as to peace or war with Russia, the United States, and England (including NEI), respectively, and impressed this fact on Mr. Foote.

10. The above memorandum is prepared from notes made at the time and is a reasonably accurate summary of Mr. Foote’s statements.

22 JUNE 1945.

[19] Secret
Memorandum for Admiral Hewitt.
Subj: Pearl Harbor Investigation.
Ref: (a) My testimony given this date.

1. I now recall that Lieut. Commander Brotherhood told me that he did not receive a written copy of the “False” Winds Message from the F. C. C., but merely received the information by telephone. The only written version of the “False” Winds Message we ever had prior to 1944 was a memorandum of the phone call in Brotherhood’s handwriting. Only one significant word (North) appeared and it was in English. It was this memorandum that Kramer threw in the “burn bag” after telling Brotherhood that this was not what we were looking for.

2. The Winds “Execute” Message which passed through my hands on the morning of 4 December 1941 was a teletype copy (typed on yellow teletype paper) of the entire Japanese broadcast about 200 or 300 words long. Three significant words (Kita, Higashi, and Nishi) appeared and they were in Japanese. Kramer’s translation appeared in pencil, or colored crayon, at the bottom of the sheet. There was very little chance of confusion.

3. I would like to make one correction in the testimony I gave today:
“Mr. Phillip Cate, Japanese translator, employed by the Navy Department is still alive. It was his brother, employed as a Japanese translator by the War Department, who died a few weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor.”

Respectfully,

L. F. SAFFORD,
Captain, U. S. Navy.
CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH ADMIRAL HEWITT'S INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR DISASTER.

1. This memorandum is prepared, while events are still fresh in my mind, for possible use in connection with future investigations of the Pearl Harbor Disaster or Court-martials in connection with Pearl Harbor. It includes certain acts which strike me as irregular or unusual and probably illegal.

2. On or about Friday, 11 May 1945, I was called to an unofficial conference (or meeting) conducted by Lieut. Comdr. John Sonnett, USNR, in Room 1083A, Navy Building. He was in civilian clothes, as he has been on every occasion on which I have seen him. Sonnett told me that he had been assigned as a legal assistant to Admiral Hewitt in an investigation of the responsibility for the Pearl Harbor Disaster, that he was also a special representative for Secretary Forrestal in this investigation, and that he was authorized to handle Top-Secret and Secret information and documents. He showed me papers signed by Secretary Forrestal and Fleet Admiral King verifying these statements. At my request, he let me read the Precept which directed Admiral Hewitt to conduct the investigation. It was my understanding that Admiral Hewitt had not yet returned to Washington and that Sonnett was getting things lined up to expedite matters after the Admiral's arrival.

3. I answered many questions pertaining to my testimony before previous investigations and discussed discrepancies between my testimony and the testimony of other witnesses. Sonnett requested that I give him, by the end of the next week, written memoranda to be used as a basis of study and examination (under oath) on the subjects listed below. This was done, and the memoranda submitted as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>Date submitted</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Winds Message&quot; (6 pages)</td>
<td>15 May 1945</td>
<td>Withdrawn on 18 May 1945 at the suggestion of Lt. Cdr. Sonnett. Original retained for possible future use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of Messages of 26 Novem-</td>
<td>17 May 1945</td>
<td>Also lists the 6 carriers described by Com 16 as &quot;all known First and Second Fleet Carriers.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ber 1941 (6 pages)</td>
<td></td>
<td>No action was taken because Jap invasion fleet had been sighted by RAF planes off Kota Bharu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of &quot;UTU&quot; Broadcasts (8</td>
<td>19 May 1945</td>
<td>Indicates that on 7 Dec. 1941 the CNO refused to believe that the U.S. would be involved in the war that was imminent in East Asia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pages)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatuta Maru and the President Madison (1 page)</td>
<td>21 May 1945</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


4. It was apparent to me on my very first meeting with Lieut. Comdr. Sonnett that he was acting as a “counsel for the defense” for the late Secretary Knox and Admiral Stark rather than as the legal assistant to the investigating officer. His purpose seemed to be to re-‘ute testimony (before earlier investigations) that was unfavorable to anyone in Washington, to beguile “hostile” witnesses into changing their stories, and to introduce an element of doubt where he could not effect a reversal of testimony. Above all, he attempted to make me reverse my testimony regarding the “Winds Execute” Message and to make me believe I was suffering from hallucinations.

5. I talked to Sonnett the second time on 18 May 1945, and the third time a day or two later. On these latter occasions, like the first, Sonnett tried to persuade me that there had been no “Winds Execute” Message, that my memory had been playing me tricks, that I had confused the “False Winds Message” with what I had been expecting, and that I ought to change my testimony to permit reconciling all previous discrepancies and thereby wind up the affair. In some cases the idea was stated outright, in some cases it was implied, and in other cases it was unexpressed but obviously the end in view.
6. I distinctly recall Lieut. Comdr. John Sonnett, USNR, making the following statements to me during the course of the above-mentioned conferences:

"You are the only one who seems to have ever seen the 'Winds Execute' Message."

"How could the 'Winds Execute' be heard on the East Coast of the U.S. and not at any of the places nearer Japan?"

"It is very doubtful that there ever was a 'Winds Execute' Message."

"It is no reflection on your veracity to change your testimony."

"It is no reflection on your mentality to have your memory play you tricks—after such a long period."

"Numerous witnesses that you have named have denied all knowledge of a 'Winds Execute' Message."

"You do not have to carry the torch for Admiral Kimmel." [22]

7. I testified before Admiral Hewitt the first time on or about 24 May 1945, before he went to Pearl Harbor. I testified before Admiral Hewitt a second time on 22 June 1945, after his return from examining witnesses at Pearl Harbor. Upon completion of my testimony (in which the "Winds Execute" Message had figured), I asked him, "off-the-record," if there was still any doubts in his mind as to the "Winds Message" having been sent by Japan and disseminated in the War and Navy Departments. The Admiral looked startled, and before he could reply Sonnett said:

"Of course, I am not conducting the case and I do not know what Admiral Hewitt has decided, but to me it is very doubtful that the so-called 'Winds Execute' Message was ever sent."

Admiral Hewitt thought a minute or two more and then said:

"You are not entitled to my opinion, but I will answer your question. There is no evidence of a 'Winds Execute' Message beyond your unsupported testimony. I do not doubt your sincerity, but I believe that you have confused one of the other messages containing the name of a wind with the message you were expecting to receive."

8. For my part, I do not doubt Admiral Hewitt's integrity, but I do believe that Sonnett has succeeded in pulling the wool over his eyes.

9. I also believe that Sonnett employed similar tactics on other witnesses whose testimony had favored Admiral Kimmel, particularly Rochefort and Kramer.

10. Copies of the memoranda described in paragraph 3 are appended hereto. Also appended is a memorandum to Admiral Hewitt, dated 22 June 1945, clarifying my testimony regarding the "Winds Execute" Message and indicating that Sonnett had attempted to trick me into stating the opposite of what I intended to say.

/s/ L. F. Safford,
/t/ L. F. Safford,

Captain, U. S. N.

[23] [Following Memorandum bears this handwritten note:]

18 May 1945.

Withdrawn on May 18, 1945 at the suggestion of Lt. Cdr. Sonnett.
Retained for possible use at the Next (?) Investigation of Pearl Harbor.

L. F. SAFFORD.
Memorandum for Lieut. Commander John F. Sonnett? U. S. N. R.

Subj: Winds Message.

1. To the best of my knowledge and belief the following officers knew, in December 1941, that the Winds “Execute” message had been broadcast from Tokyo on (or about) 4 December 1941 (and prior to 7 December 1941), although some of them did not learn about it until after the attack on Pearl Harbor:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Present rank</th>
<th>Station and duty on 7 December 1941</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>George C. Marshall</td>
<td>General of the Army</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, U. S. Army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sherman Miles</td>
<td>Maj. Gen. U. S. A.</td>
<td>Director, Military Intelligence, War Plans Division (Military Intelligence Division (WDGS))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otis K. Sadtler</td>
<td>Col. U. S. A.</td>
<td>In charge, Far Eastern Section, Military Intelligence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rufus S. Bratton</td>
<td>Brig. Gen., U. S. A.</td>
<td>Chief of Signal Intelligence Service, Office of Chief Signal Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rex W. Minecker</td>
<td>Col., U. S. A.</td>
<td>In charge, Japanese Section, SIS, Office of Chief Signal Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harold Doud</td>
<td>Col., U. S. A.</td>
<td>In charge, Intercept Section, SIS, Office of Chief Signal Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert E. Schukraft</td>
<td>Col., U. S. A.</td>
<td>Principal Cryptanalyst, Japanese Section, SIS, Office of Chief Signal Officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frank B. Rowlett</td>
<td>Lt. Col. (Signal Corps Reserve), U. S. Army</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-- NAVY --

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Station and duty on 7 December 1941</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>H. R. Stark</td>
<td>Admiral, U. S. Navy</td>
<td>Chief of Naval Operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. E. Ingersoll</td>
<td>Admiral, U. S. Navy</td>
<td>Asst., Chief of Naval Operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T. S. Wilkinson</td>
<td>Vice Adm., U. S. N.</td>
<td>Director of Naval Intelligence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leigh Noyes</td>
<td>Rear Adm., U. S. N.</td>
<td>Director of Naval Communications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. R. Beardall</td>
<td>Rear Adm., U. S. N.</td>
<td>Naval Aide to the President.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. R. Redman</td>
<td>Rear Adm., U. S. N.</td>
<td>Asst. Director of Naval Communications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. E. Beatty</td>
<td>Rear Adm., U. S. N.</td>
<td>Aide to the Secretary of the Navy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. W. Welker</td>
<td>Capt., U. S. N.</td>
<td>Op-20-GX. In charge, Intercept and Direction Finding Section.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L. W. Parke</td>
<td>Comdr., U. S. N.</td>
<td>Op-20-GZ. In charge, Charge, Translation and Dissemination Section. (Actually attached to Far Eastern Section of Naval Intelligence.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. L. Bryant</td>
<td>Chief Ship's Clerk, U. S. N.</td>
<td>Watch Officer in Op-20-GY.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 [Handwritten note]: Corrected after return. LFS.

2. An element of confusion was caused by the Tokyo Weather Forecast or “False” Winds Message intercepted by the F. C. C. at 2200 GCT, 4 December 1941, and phoned to Lt. Comdr. Brotherhood during the evening of 4 December 1941. It is believed that certain officers attached to Op-20-G in December 1941 had in mind the “False” Winds Message when they informed me that they knew of the “Winds Message.” Their names are as follows:

Lt. Comdr. G. W. Linn, U. S. N. R.
Lt. Comdr. F. M. Brotherhood, U. S. N. R.
Lt. Comdr. A. V. Peringer, U. S. N. R.
Lt. F. L. Freeman, U. S. N.
Ens. Wilmer Fox, U. S. N.

The F. C. C. interception of another Winds Execute Message between 0002 and 0035 (GCT), 8 December 1941, proves that the Japanese Government did use this system for broadcasting war warnings.

97916 0—46—pt. 18 —32
3. There never has been any doubt in my mind that the Winds "Execute" Message was broadcast from Tokyo two or three days prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor and forwarded to the Navy Department. The points in doubt, which I sought to clarify by sighting the incoming Japanese message (or its translation), were:

(a) Exact date [i.e. December 4 (Thursday) or December 5 (Friday) 1941].

(b) Exact wording of the original Japanese broadcast.

(c) Station call, time and frequency of the Japanese Radio Station which broadcast it. (This would reconcile "skip" phenomena.)

(d) Whether received in voice or Morse code.

(e) Station which intercepted the message.

4. After receiving the Winds "Execute" Message I discussed with Lt. Comdr. Welker (Op-20-GX) the advisability of discontinuing the special intercept watches being maintained to pick up the Winds "Execute." However, only two days previously we had translated Tokyo Circular #2409 (JD #6853) dated 27 November 1941—setting up a system for sending out "Hidden Word Messages" (INGO DENPO) in event of strained relations. Although we expected these would come over regular commercial circuits (as proved the case on the morning of 7 December 1941), we could not be sure, and it seemed advisable to continue the existing set-up which covered all possibilities (even though it meant the operators continuing their doubled-up watches), and required no further orders and no possibility of misunderstanding and confusion. It is my impression that Welker discussed the matter with Capt. Schukraft, and the Army made a similar decision. I have not discussed this with Welker since September 1942 and I have no idea how well he remembers this incident.

5. Somebody must have notified the War Department about the Winds "Execute" Message because Colonel Bratton telephoned to Admiral Noyes and requested a copy of the original Japanese broadcast so that he could verify the translation. (This was customary in highly important intercepts.) Admiral Noyes got quite indignant and told Colonel Bratton that the Navy's translation was correct and that the War Department would not be furnished a copy of the original message. The foregoing incident, if verified by Colonel Bratton will prove that the Winds "Execute" got as far as Rear Admiral Noyes and G-2.

6. There is one possible source of information on the Winds Message which has not been checked, namely—the Australian C. I. Organization. The Australians had a small C. I. Organization and in December 1941 they were intercepting Japanese Diplomatic radio traffic and reading messages in the J-19 system. (The Dutch in Java were also reading J-19, as well as the British in Singapore and London and the U. S. Army and Navy in Corregidor and Washington.) The Australian C. I. Unit had liaison with the Singapore C. I. Unit, including exchange of translations and keys, except for the Purple and Red machines. The Winds "Set-up" message (Tokyo Circulars #2353 (JD #6875) and #2354 (JD #6850), dated 19 November 1941) were in J-19. Singapore sent translations to Corregidor (CinCAF 281430 (COPEK) to OpNav) and undoubtedly sent these same translations to Australia. The Australians may have intercepted the Winds "Execute" Message on 4 December 1941. If so, this was the basis of Senator Ferguson's "Australian War Warning" which received much publicity in December 1943. This hypothesis could be easily proved or disproved. The following secret message to the Fleet Radio Unit, Melbourne, is suggested:

Secret

"From: SECNAV."

"To: FRUMEL."

"Referring CINCAF twentyeight fourteen thirty November nineteen fortyone and Tokyo circulars twentythree fiftythree and twentythree fiftyfour dated nineteen November same year in jig nineteen did Australians intercept or know of such a warning broadcast from Tokyo on or about four December nineteen fortyone X If affirmative forward by airmail certified. Transcript of broadcast as received with notation as to date X time X frequency X voice or Morse X call letters of transmitting station X location of intercepting station and other relevant data."

[Handwritten note: Australia knew of the Winds "execute" but did not intercept this message locally.

[NOTE: This message was never sent. LFS.]"
7. Lieut. Colonel Rowlett heard of the Winds "Execute" by office gossip a day or two before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. A few days after the attack Colonel Saddler came to him and said, "I would like to see the Winds Message," or words to that effect. Rowlett referred him to Major Doni, in charge of the section, who in turn referred him to Colonel Minckler, the Chief of S. I. S. The rest of the story belongs to the Army Investigation rather than the Navy Investigation except for the fact that it furnishes further proof of the authenticity of the Winds "Execute" Message and that some written record of it did exist in the War Department in December 1941.

8. A complete exposition of Radio Wave Propagation would be very lengthy and out of place. It is sufficient to say that the radio frequencies used between Japan and the United States were quite erratic in performance, and that long distance radio communications in an East-West direction are more difficult and less reliable than those in a North-South direction. A few pertinent examples can be given, namely:

(a) The long fourteen (14) part Tokyo Serial #902 (JD-1 #7143) was intercepted solid at Bainbridge Island, Washington. Part Two (of Tokyo Serial #902) and Tokyo Serial #904 (JD-1 #7144) were also copied at Cheltenham, Maryland, and forwarded to the Navy Department and used for the actual decryption. (This is verified in the GY Log for 6 December 1941.) The rest of Tokyo Serial #902 was "uncopyable" at Cheltenham.

(b) Part Two of the very important three-part Tokyo to Berlin #985 (JD-1 #6943) was missed but the first and third parts were copied solid.

(c) We finally had to call on Corregidor to cover the Berlin-Tokyo circuits as the combined efforts of Intercept Stations in the East Coast, West Coast, Hawaii and England could not provide better than fifty (50) percent coverage. During the period 1 December–7 December 1941, the Navy Department received seventy (70) Japanese Diplomatic intercepts from Corregidor as compared with Seventy-three (73) from Bainbridge Island, Twenty (20) for all other U. S. Navy Stations, and ninety-three (93) for all U. S. Army Stations. The Japanese were trying to reach Rio and Buenos Aires as well as San Francisco, Mexico City, and Washington. (See distribution of Tokyo Serial #2354.) It is not at all surprising that the frequency used to reach Washington, Rio, and Buenos Aires skipped over the West Coast and Hawaii. There is a possibility that this frequency was heard in Australia even though it skipped over Manila, Singapore, and Java.

9. There is one final place where written confirmation of the Winds "Execute" Message may exist—the Record of Proceedings of the Roberts Commission. I cannot believe that they could cover up so completely that some mention of the Winds "Execute" did not slip into the record. First they said I didn't know what was going on around me; now they claim I am suffering from hallucinations. Under the circumstances it is only fair that I be permitted to search through the record for such evidence in order to prove my sanity, as well as my intelligence and my veracity.


[29] 10. In conclusion the following quotation from my secret memorandum to Colonel West, dated 2 October 1944, is submitted for consideration:

"The reason for my stressing the 'Winds Message' so much in my testimony (in all three cases) is because we could afford to talk about it, even print it in the newspaper, without detriment to the war effort. Even the Dutch know of the Code and the FCC listened for the message. We had the same information—at the same time—from more secret but less dramatic sources. Also the 'Winds Set-up' was the nearest thing to a warning CINCPAC ever got. If the 'Winds Execute' had been heard at Pearl Harbor, the fleet would not have been surprised. And because CINCPAC was given no information that the 'Winds Execute' had been sent, everybody at Pearl Harbor believed it had not been sent and that the Japs were still making up their minds as to the next step."

/s/ L. F. Safford,
L. F. Safford,
Captain, U. S. Navy.
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941

(J19)
Circular #2354

When diplomatic relations are becoming dangerous we will add the following at the beginning and end of our general intelligence broadcasts:

(1) If it is Japan U. S. relations "Higashi"
(2) Japan Russia relations "Kita"
(3) Japan British relations; (including Thai, Malaya, and NEI) "Nishi"

The above will be repeated five times and repeated five times at beginning and end.

Relay to Rio de Janeiro, B. A., Mexico City, and San Francisco.

[Handwritten note] J-19 Key for this message passed to Washington (Navy Dept) by London (Admiralty) on Nov. 24, 1941.


From:

To:

War Department at Bandoeng claims intercepted and decoded following from Ministry Foreign Affairs Tokyo:

"When crisis leading to worst arises following will be broadcast at end weather reports: One east wind rain war with United States, two north wind cloudy war with Russia, three west wind clear war with Britain including attack on Thailand or Malaya and Dutch Indies. If spoken twice burn codes and secret papers."

Same following from Japanese Ambassador Bangkok to Consul General Batavia:

"When threat of crises exists following will be used five times in texts of general reports and radio broadcasts: one Higashi east America, two Kita north Russia, three Nishi west British with advance into Thiland and attack on Malaya and Dutch Indies."

Thorpe and Slawson cabled the above to War Department. I attach little or no importance to it and view it with some suspicion. Such have been common since 1936.

Secret

[32]  Secret
From: Alusna Batavia
For Action: OPNAV RRRRR
Date: 5 Dec. 1941
Decoded by: Kalaidjian
Paraphrased by: Purdy

From Thorpe for Miles War Dept. Code Intercept: Japan will notify her consuls of war decision in her foreign broadcasts as weather report at end. East wind rain United States: north wind cloudy Russia: west wind clear England with attack on Thailand Malay and Dutch East Indies. Will be repeated twice or may use compass directions only. In this case words will be introduced five times in general text.

Distribution:
War Dept. Action Files: CNO 29P 29A
Record Copy: 29G X Show OPDO
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
19 November 1941
(J19)
Circular #2353

Regarding the broadcast of a special message in an emergency.

In case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations) and the cutting off of international communications, the following warning will be added in the middle of the daily Japanese language short wave news broadcast.

(1) In case of a Japan-U. S. relations in danger:
   HIGASHI NO KAZEAME (EAST WIND RAIN)
(2) Japan-U. S. S. R. relations:
   KITANOKAZE KUMAME (NORTH WIND CLOUDY)
(3) Japan-British relations:
   NISHI NO KAZE HARE (WEST WIND CLEAR)

This signal will be given in the middle and at the end as a weather forecast and each sentence will be repeated twice. When this is heard, please destroy all code papers, etc. This is as yet to be a completely secret arrangement.

Forward as urgent intelligence.

[Handwritten note:] J-19 Key for this message passed to Washington (Navy Dept) by London (Admiralty) on Nov. 24, 1941.

JD-1: 6875 (X) Navy Trans 11-28-41 S (TT) Intercepted Nov 19, 1941.

[34] From: CINCAF
For Action: OPNAV
Date: 28 NOVEMBER 1941
Information-COMSIXTEEN
Decoded by: P R White

CINCPAC
COMFOURTEEN

Following Tokyo to net intercept translation received from Singapore X if diplomatic relations are on verge of being severed following words repeated five times at beginning and end of ORDINARY TOKYO NEWS BROADCASTS will have significance as follows X Higashi Higashi Japanese American X Kita Kita Russia X Nishi Nishi England including occupation of Thai or invasion of Malaya and Nishi XX on Japanese language foreign news broadcasts the following sentences repeated twice in the middle and twice at the end of broadcasts will be used XX America Higashi no kaze kumori XX England X Nishi no kaze hare X unquote X British and comsixteen monitoring above broadcasts.

Secret

EXHIBIT NO. 152

BOARD OF WATER SUPPLY, HONOLULU, HAWAII

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON DAMAGE BY PROJECTILES IN THE CITY OF HONOLULU ON DECEMBER 7, 1941

Immediately following the Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, 1941, and after several water main breaks and interruptions of water service had been reported, the writer was delegated by Mr. Frederick Ohrt, Manager and Chief Engineer, Board of Water Supply, to visit the various points in the city where damage had been done and to take notes on the damage and get photographs where practical. This was desired in order that the water department, as a vital agency, would be better qualified in the event of renewed attacks to operate effectively in protecting water mains and other installations and repairing any that were damaged.
Accordingly, on December 8, and several days following, some forty to fifty places were visited and available information collected. The chief points are listed below:

A Partial List of Points in Honolulu Reported as Struck by Projectiles on December 7, 1941.

(Not all these points were visited; some are probably duplicates due to confusion in reporting.)

| Washington Place | 2113 Bingham Street |
| South and Queen Streets | Iolani School & Judd Street |
| 2840 Kalahi Street | Henry Street, upper end |
| 2683 Pacific Heights Road | 1838 Puowaina Street |
| 625 Ala Moana | 56 Wyllie Street |
| 758 Kaaloa Street | Lewers and Kubio Streets |
| 1807 Lilihia Street | Kamehameha Heights |
| 2633 Rooke Street | 44 Dowsett Avenue |
| Alewa Heights | May Damon residence, Moanalua |
| Fort and School Streets | 2522 Kalibi Road |
| Kuhio and Kalakau Streets | Moanalua Garden |
| 610 E Street, Damon Tract | Police Shooting Range, water front |
| North School Street | 2640 Kamanaliki Road |
| 2160 Numana Road | Walpa Lane |
| Iolani Palace | 1443 Nuuanu Avenue |
| Judd and Lilitha Streets | 956 Spencer Street |
| Nisei Club, 44 South School | 1630 Lelilehua Street |
| Lewers and Cooke Company | Robello Lane |
| Hanoli and McCully Streets | Hawaiian Gas Products, Kuwili St. |
| Kalihi Pump Station | 467 Judd Street |
| Fort Armstrong | Judd and Ihohena Streets |
| Nuuanu and Kukui Streets | Dowsett Ave. and Alika Drive |
| 734 McCully | Kamamanu Park |
| 3122 Duval Street | Kukui Street |

Principal sources of information were the daily papers, the Territorial and City-County offices of Public Works the City-County Road and Garbage Departments, the Board of Water Supply Maintenance and other divisions, the Honolulu Police Department daily log, and finally persons at the various sites of damage. The writer is not an expert in the field of ballistics, or high explosive projectiles, and to avoid error has recorded only what was actually seen, as to damage and explosion effects, without attempting to say what sort of projectile was responsible.

Many observers have testified to the immediate commencement of fire after the striking of projectiles at Lunalillo School and at McCully and King Streets, suggesting that these projectiles may have been of the incendiary type. At many other points the projectiles landed either inside or near houses and then exploded to produce two marked effects, (1) blast damage, and (2) splinter damage. The combination of these two was sufficient to totally wreck a small two- or three-room house when landing in it, or one side and a room or two of a larger house. In such case the damage as the far side of the house or two or three partitions away was not great.

The blast damage was very severe on an adjacent wall, floor, or windows, or on furniture in the room struck, blowing them out, and generally wrecking furniture. In some cases wood splinters or fragments of bric-a-brac were driven through plaster board in the manner of tornado damage. However, it was noticeable that blast damage fell off very rapidly and unbroken windows would be found in the second or third wall removed from the focus of explosion.

Splinter damage was similar in its falling off characteristics. Prentiss says splinter velocities may be 5,000 to 7,000 ft./sec, or 3 to 4 times that of a rifle bullet, but that because of small size and irregular shape, the velocity falls off very rapidly. Observations in Honolulu confirm this strongly. Splinters often went through wooden partitions or the first web of concrete hollow tile but commonly did not go through a second 1" board, and in no case seen by the writer did they go through both sides of an 8" hollow tile wall. In the near vicinity of the focus there was much tearing and rending of wood due chiefly to blast, or to displacement of the structure. In cases where the projectile landed in the street a few feet from buildings, the outer walls were well spattered by splinters, many of which did not pass through even the wooden wall.
A few passed through one or two wooden walls, or broke off corners of wood or masonry. Many windows were broken. It is the writer's impression that except for large glass windows, by far the most damage was blast damage. (This applies to the particular projectiles involved chiefly on December 7, 1941, but is no prediction.)

Some projectiles landing in gardens and out of doors apparently did not explode at all, but merely made a one- or two-foot hole in wet ground and passed several feet downward. General advice to persons in air raids is well borne out by observations. At any point seen by the writer, a person lying in a two-foot trench or behind a two-foot embankment 20 feet away would have been safe. Of course some persons not over 20 feet away were unharmed without protection but that was good luck. Injury and death were due to being tossed about by blast effect, to being struck by objects actuated by blast, and to splinters or fragments of pavement or pavement thrown by explosion.

Damage in one store was exceedingly slight by direct hit, blast or explosion, but came chiefly by water from the breaking of one sprinkler head. The corner of one small garage annex was struck by a projectile which knocked off one or two cubic feet of the concrete foundation and splintered the corner of the woodwork but did not explode and did no injury to two people eight or ten feet away. All the observations of the writer indicate that on hearing a raid alarm it is imperative to get under the best cover that is nearby, and that side cover is most important, and roof cover next. If roof cover is not available, an open trench or the corner of a walled garage even if open to one side offer a large proportional safety.

Prepared by:

/s/ Chester K. Wentworth,
CHESTER K. WENTWORTH,
Principal Geologist.

Approved by:

/s/ Frederick Ohrt,
FREDERICK OHRT,
Manager and Chief Engineer,

December 23, 1941

(The remaining portion of Exhibit 152 is a map of the City of Honolulu, reflecting points struck by projectiles, December 7, 1941, and is reproduced as Item No. 37 in Exhibits—Illustrations to Proceedings of Joint Committee)

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EXHIBIT NO. 153

STATEMENT TO THE JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

A RECORD OF CIVILIAN AND INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS IN THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941

Introduced by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association, Territory of Hawaii

[1] To the Joint Congressional Committee to Investigate the Pearl Harbor attack

1. Purpose of this statement

It is the understanding of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association that your Honorable Congressional Committee has as its objective an exhaustive investigation intended to present to the public a full report on all activities leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, 1941, and that in carrying out this investigation all persons have been invited to present to the Committee any material, documents or other relevant information pertaining thereto.

It is the further understanding of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association that your Committee, in addition to its primary objective of bringing before the public any relevant information having any bearing or significance relative to a final determination of responsibility for that disaster, is also interested in correcting any deficiencies, omissions, misimpressions or incorrect conclusions or
inferences resulting from the reports of previous investigating committees or boards.

The Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, on behalf of its member plantations, plantation agents, and the officials and individuals associated with these organizations, and on behalf of the Territory of Hawaii generally has therefore prepared this statement for the consideration of your Committee, with the request that it be entered into, and made a part of, the record of the Committee's investigation for three primary reasons:

First, it is believed that the information presented herewith, duly supported by records and documents or true copies thereof, has direct bearing upon the activities of the armed forces in this area prior to December 7, 1941; and

Second, it is conclusive proof of an outstanding record of cooperation with the armed forces in the fulfillment of their mission prior to the beginning of the war in the Pacific, as well as subsequent thereto, on the part of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, its member plantations, their agents, and individuals associated therewith and the Territory of Hawaii generally; and

Third, it is believed that the information presented herewith, duly supported by records and documents or true copies thereof, is conclusive proof of the error contained in certain testimony given before the Army Pearl Harbor Board, appointed by the Secretary of War, pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 539, 78th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, to Ascertain and Report the Facts Relating to the Attack made by the Japanese Armed Forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941, and is also conclusive proof of the falsity of the inferences and conclusions which could be drawn from the reading of the Report of said Board as released to the public on August 29, 1945, in that said Report incorporated excerpts of the testimony herewith objected to in a manner indicating that the statements contained in said testimony were accepted by the Army Pearl Harbor Board, [2] which thereby were capable of false and misleading impressions, and which in fact did result in false and misleading impressions in the public mind that said testimony and the presentation in said Report intimated a lack of cooperation with the Army and the Army Commanders in Hawaii, which conclusion is erroneous, is entirely lacking in foundation, and has resulted in a grave injustice to the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, its member plantations, their plantation agents, officials and individuals associated therewith and the people of Hawaii generally.

The testimony specifically objected to as presented before the Army Board to Investigate Pearl Harbor are those portions of the testimony of Major General Henry T. Burgin, U. S. A., Commanding General of Artillery, Hawaiian Department, said excerpts of testimony being set forth on pages 174–177, inclusive of the report of said Board as released on Wednesday, 29 August 1945, by the Secretary to the President of the United States. The statements in said testimony were that (1) one of the great handicaps to development of field artillery positions was resistance from land owners to letting the artillery go on the land or lease it for the placing of battery positions; (2) that if General Short had gone to Alert #3 there would have been great opposition from important and influential civilians on the island and particularly those who compose what is known as the Big Five; (3) that among those influential citizens whom he thought might have voiced their objection were, among others, Mr. Walker, a sugar man, General Wells, and the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, and those having the land and crop interests in sugar and other crops. The testimony to which objection is taken is set forth verbatim as Exhibit "A", appended herewith.

It is contended that the statements in this testimony before the Army Board to Investigate Pearl Harbor are in error, that the statements are entirely lacking in foundation, and that the inferences of lack of civilian cooperation in Hawaii with the Army and Army Commanders which inferences resulted from the inclusion of said testimony in the Report of the Army Board are likewise in error and lacking in foundation, and that the weight of the evidence supported by the records prove conclusively an outstanding record of cooperation in Hawaii on the part of the people generally, and in particular on the part of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, its member plantations, their plantation agents, officials and individuals associated therewith.

Summary

The following statement presents to your Committee a record of cooperation with the armed forces prior to December 7, 1941, and thereafter on the part of
the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, its member plantations, their agents, and officials and individuals connected or associated therewith, and on the part of the Territory of Hawaii, which, it is submitted, is an outstanding record of cooperation and assistance.

On the part of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association and its member plantations, this record of cooperation is one of established policy extending over a period of many years, built upon close relationship with the armed forces, and mutual recognition of the needs and requirements of the military and the contributions that could and have been made by the plantations in the defense plans of Hawaii. This policy of cooperation was further eugenized and developed through the close liaison always maintained between the sugar industry and the military authorities by Major General Briant H. Wells (Ret.) a former Deputy Chief of Staff, United States Army, who in 1934 was made Vice-President and Executive Secretary of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association following his retirement from the Army on completion of his tour of duty as Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. This established policy of cooperation is proven by the fact that sugar plantation lands were made available for Army use prior to Pearl Harbor on each and every occasion that the Army requested the use of such lands. It is demonstrated by the establishment as early as 1940 of an extensive plantation provisional police organization with the purpose of providing police organization for the primary purpose of providing aid and assistance in the defense of Hawaii and the fulfillment of the mission of the armed forces in Hawaii. It is demonstrated by the comprehensive emergency food subsistence program for Hawaii developed by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association long prior to the war, and the organization prior to the war of comprehensive civilian defense committees engaging in extensive preparedness activities under plantation auspices in close coordination with civilian and military authorities. All of these instances of close cooperation and coordination are further emphasized by the war record of the sugar plantations of Hawaii and of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association in the aid and assistance given the armed forces on December 7, 1941 and thereafter, making available all plantation facilities, machinery, equipment, and manpower, in a period of critical emergency.

On the part of the people of the Territory of Hawaii it is submitted that the record of civilian preparedness activities prior to the war is outstanding for its appreciation of the emergency conditions existing in the Pacific long prior to Pearl Harbor. The readiness of the people of Hawaii to do whatever the military and naval commands might advise or desire and in many instances to undertake these preparedness activities on their own initiative, at considerable expense, with the firm conviction long prior to December seventh of the necessity for developing extensive defense preparations reflects to the lasting credit of the people of Hawaii.

This record of cooperation is presented hereafter in full. The preparedness activities of the civilian community of Hawaii is presented in the statements of persons in the community participating in the organization of these activities. It is submitted that these statements provide a complete refutation of the testimony referred to in the report of the Army Board to Investigate Pearl Harbor and any inferences therefrom resulting from the inclusion of said testimony in the report of said Board. This record of cooperation with the military by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, its member plantations, their plantation agents, and the officials and individuals connected therewith, and the record of civilian preparedness activities on the part of the people of Hawaii generally is submitted to your Committee with the request that it be made a part of the record of your Honorable Committee.

[4]

II.—Certain Inferences of Lack of Civilian Cooperation in Hawaii as Contained in, and Resulting from, the Report of the Army Board to Investigate Pearl Harbor are in Fact Conclusively Refuted Elsewhere in the Same Report.

Certain inferences contained in said testimony are refuted elsewhere in the same report of said Army Board, although not specifically referred to in that portion of the report incorporating this testimony. For example, at page 59 of said report it is stated (italics added):
"General Herron, who preceded General Short, had been directed on June 17, 1940, by Washington, to institute an alert. (R. 213) This alert lasted six weeks. (R. 214-215). After it was suspended at the end of six weeks it was reinstated for a period. The alert was an all-out alert, with complete dispersal of forces into combat positions and with full equipment and ammunition.

"General Herron testified that there was no disturbance of the civilian population by the use of this all-out alert which was instituted under conditions similar to those which later prevailed for General Short's alert.

'When asked as to the Alerts 1, 2, and 3 of Short, he disposed of these alerts with the following language:

"'General Herron. That was a refinement that the training men put over on General Short when he came out there. I told him I would not do any such thing. There was only one kind of alert, and that was a total alert, and then I would do it in accordance with the situation. But the training men liked refinements, and they recommended three kinds because the Navy had three kinds. But they did not get to the real point of the thing. The Navy has three kinds, but the all-out alert is number one, always. Now they ease up into two and three; but these young men did not know that, and when Short came out they put over the three and got them reversed, so that Short went into the Number 1, which was sabotage. It did not seem to him a very important change, I don't suppose, and it turned out to be vital. It was too much of a refinement.' (R. 226-227)"

And at page 78 (italics added):

"As the entire attack upon Pearl Harbor did not extend beyond approximately three hours, it is obvious that the selection of the correct alert was vital. Historically, and by way of precedent, Short had before him the action of General Herron in the preceding year of an all-out alert under Field Order No. 1 of Herron by which complete dispersal of planes and troops and guns was affected, with ammunition at the guns. The record shows (Colonel Capron and other witnesses—R. 1398, 2025, 2720, 2728, 2772-2773, 3096-3097) that there was no disturbance of the civilian population as a result of the action by Herron. This is significant, in view of the fact, as will later appear, that General Short gives that explanation as one of his primary reasons for the selection [5] of Alert Number 1, because he might alarm the population. (R. 427-428, 532-533).

"It should be kept in mind that the civilian population was accustomed to the continued movements of the Army and Navy in their frequent maneuvers and practice operations. Much of the civilian population in this instance was living practically in the midst of one of the greatest military and naval installations anywhere, so that their state of mind would be far different, from that of people on the mainland unaccustomed to such sights. Then, too, the newspapers oftentimes contained much more exciting news, threats and disturbing events, than anything that an alert could stir up, either by the Army or Navy or both. The explanation therefore lacks both substance and credibility."

And further on page 79 (italics added):

"At this point the question of sabotage which led to the selection and implementation of Alert No. 1 should be examined. No single instance of sabotage occurred while Short was in command up to December 7. It was true that there were 35,000 aliens of Japanese origin and there was a total of 160,000 or about 37% of the population of Japanese origin or affiliations (R. 289), but in no case was there any instance of misbehavior, despite a very exhaustive investigation being made constantly by the F. B. I. and by G-2, as well as by Naval Intelligence.

"We have investigated the state of mind and the information as to the actions of the Japanese population in an endeavor to understand why it was that General Short adopted his anti-sabotage alert on November 27 in the face of the increasing international tension, and of his own estimate and that of the Navy that an air attack was the most dangerous form of attack likely to be encountered. We therefore resorted to the testimony of a great variety of witnesses in all walks of life in Honolulu, resident there during 1941, and inquired of their feelings and views and the whole situation as to the Japanese population.

"We could find no substantial evidence of any fear by these witnesses, including some of the best-informed leaders in the civil life of the Islands, that the Japanese would commit acts of sabotage. Their knowledge was based upon long residence in the Islands and experience with the Japanese. Governor Poindexter, newspaper editors like Raymond S. Coll, of the Honolulu Advertiser, United States District Attorney Angus Taylor, Shivers, head of the F. B. I., General Wells, executive vice-president of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, and
Walter Francis Dillingham, president of the Oahu Railway and Land Company and owner or director of many other enterprises in the Islands, concurred with many other witnesses such as ranch owners, government officials, leaders in business, that the risk of sabotage, so long as the Army and Navy were in a predominant position, before an actual landing and show of success by the Japanese, was a relatively minor matter. However, the Army was sabotage-minded. There appeared to be no substantial basis for this fear other than speculation as to what a large body of citizens and aliens of Japanese ancestry might do in case of stress."

On pages 130–131 it is further stated (underlining added):

"The third portion of the message (from the Chief of Staff's Message dated November 27, 1941, to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department) is this:

'Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not to cause consistent alarm the civilian population or disclose intent. Report measures taken.'

"Comment: This was an order. Short could take such measures, including reconnaissance, as he deemed necessary. What was available to Short for reconnaissance and defensive action and the measures taken by him are fully discussed elsewhere.

"Here again we find the limitation that he must act cautiously. However, the weight of evidence indicated that a higher form of alert then that taken would not have alarmed the public."

These statements indicate that that portion of the testimony pertaining to objection on the part of influential citizens to an Alert #3, is itself refuted by the record and conclusions of the Army Board. The factual record supports this conclusion that the sugar plantations, and the Territory of Hawaii generally have at all times supported, assisted, and cooperated fully in all maneuvers, alerts, and other activities, training or otherwise, of the military authorities in Hawaii.

III.—The Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, its Member Plantations, the Plantation Agents and Officials and Individuals Associated Therewith Have as a Matter of Established Policy Cooperated in Every Way with the Army and Army Authorities

As to that portion of this testimony which was placed in the record, and thereafter the report of the Army Board, the statements to the effect that there was opposition from land owners to letting the artillery go on the land or lease it for the placing of battery positions, the record of cooperation with the military on the part of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, its member plantations and their plantation agents is to the exact contrary, said record of cooperation being an outstanding one over a period of many years, reflecting in the written record thereof, cooperation which has presented no opposition to the military at any time in matters pertaining to requests connected with any defense preparation, plans and training, or other measures taken by the military. This record of cooperation is one commonly recognized, appreciated and accepted by former and present Army Commanders in this area.

To refute such statements and to acquaint your Committee with the record of cooperation of the sugar industry of the Territory of Hawaii with the Army and with Army authorities as a matter of policy, the files of all plantations and of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association have been reviewed thoroughly. Endeavor has been made in the material presented hereafter to present a factual, complete picture of this record of cooperation, resulting from the established policy of the plantations to assist the armed forces in their needs and requirements. Supporting documents and records are included as exhibits. Brief statements of other community preparedness activities have been included to the extent that a true and accurate presentation can be made with brevity covering very extensive activities, where supporting documents would be voluminous.

Should the Committee desire additional material, records or other documents, the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association is prepared to present such additional material at the convenience of the Committee.
IV.—Sugar Plantation Lands Were Made Available for Army Use Prior to Pearl Harbor Whenever The Army Requested The Use of Such Lands

The record of the sugar plantations in making lands available to the uses and requirements of the Army is an exceptional record extending over a period of many years. Since the major military activities in Hawaii prior to Pearl Harbor centered on Oahu, the location of Pearl Harbor, a study has been made of the requests made by the Army to Oahu sugar plantations during the period commencing in 1939 and extending up to December 7, 1941. This study involved a careful comprehensive review of all plantation records during this period. Review of all records of plantations and the records of the plantation agents discloses not a single instance in which any plantation denied entry to the Army. On the contrary every request, regardless of its nature, whether mere permission to use lands for a certain period or purpose without formal documents, or lease or license to enter, or entry prior to condemnation, was granted with promptness and complete cooperation, reflecting a mutual appreciation of the problems facing the military authorities which is illustrative of a high degree of coordination between civilian interests and the military which it is contended, would not have been duplicated in any other part of the country.

The requests received by the plantations from the Army during the period mentioned totalled one hundred seventy-nine (179). Approval was given in every case. These requests were of various natures. For example, permission to carry out maneuvers on plantation roads and lands, to establish gun positions, either temporary or permanent, to install cable, radio and telephone communications lines, construct extension spurs to railroads, enter upon plantation lands for surveys for airfields and other installations, and a variety of other related military uses such as camouflage tests in cane lands.

These requests as granted by the seven plantations located on the Island of Oahu are graphically presented on the map attached herewith as Exhibit "B", made a part hereof.

The plantation boundary lines are approximate only, and encompass lands owned or under the control of the sugar plantations. Each black circle represents one request granted. All sugar plantations at one time or another granted blanket permission to the Army for maneuvers of infantry units, Artillery units, or the entire Hawaiian Department. Blanket permission so granted is reflected in shading the various plantations.

[8] Grouping of the circles in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor and Haleiwa reflect the greater concern of the military authorities with these areas. The fewer circles shown on the more remote plantations are indicative of lesser utilization by the military authorities of the lands of those plantations. It should be remembered that verbal authorizations granted, of which there were many, are not shown. Only requests supported by documents have been counted.

This visual presentation reflects the full cooperation at all times of all sugar plantations, regardless of the nature of the requests received by the plantations for the use of their lands. Without discussing each and every request, illustrative examples of the requests received, together with the authorization granted to the Army indicate how closely integrated the Army activities and plantation activities have been on Oahu and conclusively prove the high degree of cooperation. Without burdening down this statement with an exhaustive presentation, a few examples have been selected at random and are supported herewith by true copies of the substantiating documents.

Requests for permission to enter upon plantation lands were in many cases so common that blanket permission for the use of all plantation lands was often granted. In a letter dated November 8, 1940, Mr. James N. Orrick, the Manager of Kahanu Plantation Company, located on the North shore of Oahu, volunteered to Lieutenant General Herron, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to grant a blanket authorization covering the use of all the roads and lands under the control of the plantation for maneuver purposes, and including the use of plantation water and any other facilities deemed necessary to carry out maneuvers. In replying to this letter on November 13, 1940, Lieutenant General Herron stated:

"I am in receipt of your exceedingly gratifying letter of November 8th in regard to the use of plantation lands by the troops of this command. What you say in regard to the good conduct of troops on your lands and your most generous offer of a blanket permission give me the greatest pleasure. Please accept my sincere thanks for any my appreciation of your very helpful offer."
Copies of this exchange of correspondence are set forth herewith in full in Exhibit “C”. Similarly by indorsement on February 17, 1941, blanket permission was granted by Oahu Sugar Company to the 64th Coast Artillery (Anti-Aircraft) to occupy positions from time to time on the property owned and controlled by the plantation. Copies of the exchange of correspondence between the Army Colonel Commanding the 64th Coast Artillery (AA) and the plantation manager are included in Exhibit “C”. A similar authorization had previously been given on November 21, 1939, on an unlimited time basis by Honolulu Plantation Company to the same Coast Artillery unit. This correspondence is also included in Exhibit “C.” Similar blanket permissions were also granted by other plantations, and are recorded on the attached map. Contrary to any of the statements concerning opposition from land owners relative to leases of land for gun positions, the records of the sugar plantations indicate that prompt and comprehensive authorization was at all times given whenever request was made by the Army authorities. Immediate entry was granted as a matter of established policy without requiring execution of the formal documents.

[9] For example, in June, 1941, the Real Estate Officer, Headquarters Hawaiian Department, was in the process of leasing three sites of approximately three acres each from Ewa plantation Company, two of which were required for anti-aircraft gun sites, the remaining one for a Sub-Sector Command Post. In a letter dated June 4, 1941, Mr. A. S. Davis, Vice-President of Ewa Plantation Company, pointed out that the plantation was prepared to discuss the terms and conditions of the lease and further added:

“If, however, the importance of this matter to the National Defense Program is such as to require immediate occupancy by the War Department of the areas proposed to be taken, Ewa will be agreeable to such a plan, upon the understanding that, at a later date, maps delineating the specific areas will be furnished by you, together with a formal document.”

Copy of this letter is set forth in full in Exhibit “D”.

A similar letter dated May 29, 1941, was sent by Mr. John H. Midkiff, Manager of Wai’alea Agricultural Company, Limited, to the same Real Estate Officer, Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, authorizing entry on plantation lands to permit immediate construction of eight gun emplacements, two mortar positions, and permanent trenches and fortifications, it being understood that maps delineating the specific areas would be furnished with a formal instrument covering same at a later date. This authority was granted less than one week from the date of receipt of the request. Copy of this letter is included in Exhibit “D”.

Similarly, when on April 25, 1941, Lieutenant General Short, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, addressed a letter to Mr. H. A. Walker as President of Waialua Company, requesting that the Army be permitted to initiate construction of certain railway spurs across the plantation lands, pending final acceptance by the War Department of the license already granted to the Army to enter and use the plantation lands involved, the plantation through its agents, American Factors, Limited, of which Mr. Walker was President, authorized immediate entry. This authority for immediate entry was transmitted within three days of the time that General Short made his letter request. Exchange of this correspondence is set forth in Exhibit “D”.

Other examples can be selected at random. It should be pointed out, moreover, that many of these requests involving troop maneuvers meant many hundreds or even a few thousand men and many vehicles using plantation roads and lands during maneuvers of individual units, as part of division maneuvers, or the entire Hawaiian Department, such maneuvers being scheduled in many instances as surprise alerts. There are attached therewith copies of three letters to Wai‘alea Agricultural Company, Ltd., and to Ewa Plantation Company with reply indorsement thereon authorizing use of lands for planned maneuvers during 1941, and reflecting the constant use of plantation lands by Army units. (Exhibit “E”.)

A variety of other requests have been made in the past to the plantations by the Army and promptly granted in a spirit of complete cooperation. For example, in January 1941, the Commanding General of troops at Schofield Barracks desired to perform experiments with the possibilities of camouflaging gun positions in
concerning. This assistance was immediately given by Waialua Agricultural Company, Limited. Exchange of correspondence is attached hereto in Exhibit "F".

At another time a request was addressed to Oahu Sugar Company requesting that new plantings of cane be started about five yards from the fence line at the Waipio Sub-Station (electric power station) in order that defense of the Sub-Station [19] against sabotage might be facilitated and at the same time be made more effective. This request was immediately recognized as set forth in the correspondence included in Exhibit "F".

Further evidence of the willingness of the plantations to cooperate in all matters pertaining to the defense potential of plantation facilities is reflected in a letter of Waialua Agricultural Company, Limited dated July 21, 1939, furnished to various Army authorities including the Department Service Command at Fort Shafter which supplied the authorities with information relative to total employees, the racial groups, engineer and motor equipment available, railroad equipment, etc. Copy of this letter, included in Exhibit "F", is illustrative of the information which has been furnished by all plantations in response to Army requests.

Commanding officers have always been appreciative of this established policy of cooperation as evidenced by this active assistance promptly granted.

When Lieutenant General Herron relinquished his command of the Hawaiian Department to Major General Short in February, 1941, he addressed letters of appreciation to the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association expressing appreciation for the continued and substantial contributions of the Association to National Defense. This letter concluded:

"Please believe that the liberal and helpful attitude of the Association is not lost upon the Army and that we are grateful. For my successor, General Short, I bespeak your good offices and a continuance of the generous assistance you have always given to the Army in Hawaii."

Copy of this letter is set forth in full as Exhibit "G".

Letters of appreciation were addressed by General Herron to the various plantations recognizing the cooperation given. Similarly, letters have been received from other commanding officers reflecting their appreciation for consistent cooperation. On June 3, 1940, the Commanding General, Schofield Barracks and Hawaiian Division, Major General Wm. H. Wilson, U. S. A., addressed letters to the plantations expressing appreciation for the cooperation given during the maneuvers in May 1940. Illustrative of these letters is that addressed to Oahu Sugar Company, Limited, included in Exhibit "G". This letter states:

"The success of the maneuvers, completed May 25, 1940, has in a great measure been facilitated by the cooperation of private land owners in allowing Hawaiian Division to use land during this period."

Other phases of this continuous cooperation have been recognized, as for example in a letter from Lieutenant General Short, dated November 29, 1941, thanking Mr. Hans L'Orange, Manager of Oahu Sugar Company, for the assistance rendered in surveys, layouts and location of the airport in the vicinity of Kipapa, although the original plans to locate an additional airport at that location was changed in favor of construction at Kahu Point. This letter is set forth verbatim in Exhibit "G".

With such evidence of cooperation it is believed that the record of the plantations in making their lands available whenever requested by the Army and to whatever extent required is a record of complete cooperation. It is difficult therefore to understand for what purpose or on what basis the testimony protested herein, amounting as it did to a grave injustice to the Territory generally, could have been introduced in the record without factual support or to understand how the Army Board could therefore proceed to indicate [11] acceptance of this testimony without ascertaining the true factual record of cooperation.

V.—Organization of Sugar Plantation Provisional Police Guard in July, 1940

An outstanding example of a record of cooperation between the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association and its member plantations with the Army is demonstrated in the early organization of the Plantation Provisional Police throughout the plantations on Oahu, commencing at the early date of July 30, 1940. Undertaking this program of organization of groups of employees trained in police work under leadership and guidance of trained police of the police
force of the City and County of Honolulu, the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association and the plantations through the Oahu Sugar Managers' Association proceeded to develop an effective police organization whose objective was complete training to meet any emergency which might arise.

At a special meeting of the Oahu Plantation Managers' Association held at Waipahu on July 19, 1940, in conjunction with the Army and City and County Police authorities, Mr. T. G. S. Walker was appointed Coordinator of Plans for any emergency which might arise. In a confidential memorandum dated July 30, 1940, to all Sugar Plantation Managers on Oahu, the newly appointed Coordinator outlined the various alerts which the organization of the Provisional Police was intended to meet. Plan No. 1 envisioned an alert. Plan No. 2 envisioned "sudden and unpredicted overt acts by disloyal inhabitants, whether accompanied or not by hostile 'Blitzkrieg' from air or sea." This confidential memorandum is set forth in full as Exhibit "H".

No publicity was given to these initial plans nor to their purposes. Nor was any publicity given to the fact that the sugar plantations were undertaking this program in cooperation with Army authorities. In the confidential memorandum dated July 30, 1940, issued by the Coordinator, it was requested that this work be kept as confidential as possible and the police be mentioned as the instigators rather than the Army. This was at the request of the Army authorities.

This organization contemplated, in addition to the actual organization and training of police, the procurement of any information bearing upon any phase of internal security. This is reflected by the transmission of Memorandums to the Coordinator and to the Chief of Police as early as July 31, 1940, setting forth lists of local Japanese on the plantations as well as pointing out incidents of rumors and their source, and the names and locations of any questionable characters.

At a meeting held at the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association Board room on Tuesday, August 6, 1940, at which Major Melvin L. Craig, Department Provost Marshal, Major W. O. Poindexter, Provost Marshal's Office and the Chief of Police, Mr. W. A. Gabrielson, and the Managers of all Oahu plantations were present, the Chief of Police presided requesting details as to number of personnel, trucks and living quarters to be supplied by each organization. Districts and each beat boundaries were explained. A program of lectures at each of the plantations was outlined covering the next two weeks. A Memorandum of the Coordinator states relative to this meeting that "Major Craig expressed General Charles D. Herron's thanks for the splendid cooperation being shown by the Plantation Managers." (See Exhibit "T").

Although it was never publicly expressed, the salary of the Coordinator, who was employed on a fulltime basis for the organization [12] of this provisional police, was paid entirely by the seven Oahu plantations, through the Oahu Plantation Managers' Association, on a pro rata basis.

The close coordination which was maintained by this voluntary organization with the Army forces of the Hawaiian Department and with the Police Forces, City and County of Honolulu, is shown by the provisional police plan for emergency guard divisions prepared by the Office of the Chief of Police on August 12, 1940, and issued over the signature of the Chief of Police, Mr. W. A. Gabrielson. This plan issued as a confidential memorandum states that "the provisional police plan is to provide the personnel and other means necessary to protect from overt acts all agencies and establishments, both civil and military, which are essential to the defense of the Island of Oahu, the defense of which is not charged to combat elements nor located on military reservations. In the performance of this mission the City and County of Honolulu Police Department will take over when directed by the Department Commander." This plan is set forth in full as Exhibit "J". The plan divided the Island of Oahu into four police districts, Police District No. 1 embracing the City of Honolulu and the remaining three districts comprising the rural districts.

Dividing the rural districts into beats corresponding to the plantations and one beat comprising the three pineapple plantations, the plan then contemplated the selection of guards after careful scrutiny of their records, estimating that a grand total of 836 guards would be required for this plan. Prior to the date that the plan was to become effective, it was stated that the Army would furnish the Police Department a detailed map of installations to be guarded. Sugar plantation managers agreed to provide messing and housing facilities for the personnel furnished from their respective plantations. Until proper arrangements were made otherwise, the sugar plantations agreed to furnish the necessary.
trucks, including one riot truck equipped with armor plates or sand bags and armed with machine guns and sufficient personnel, located at every police district headquarters. Tour of duty on each installation would be based upon the decision of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department prior to the effective date of the plan. The plan also contemplated that arms, ammunition and equipment sufficient for the proper discharge of these duties would be furnished by the Army. This organizational plan was distributed to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Division, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, the Chief of Police, the Provost Marshal, Hawaiian Department and the Provost Marshal, Hawaiian Division.

On the basis of this provisional plan, and proceeding in cooperation with the plantation managers, the Coordinator proceeded to organize the necessary guards on each plantation. It should be pointed out that this organization was entirely separate from the units of regular plantation police.

Actual organization embraced much more than that of police guard. A memorandum of the Coordinator indicated that interest was being worked up in local food production, storage of food, establishing a fire alarm system and also emergency facilities and hospitals. Reports relative to Nazi or Japanese activity and rumors pertaining thereto were checked carefully at all times. Commencing in December, 1940, arrangements were made to give men from each plantation instruction in shooting on the police range.

The complete coordination between the Coordinator of Provisional Police plans, the plantation managers and the provisional police on the plantations and the Army authorities is reflected in a letter to the plantation managers from the Coordinator dated December 17, 1940, pointing out that the [13] Coordinator had been requested by the Army authorities to sit in on the Headquarters Staff exercises covering war conditions. The coordinator stated:

"During these exercises Col. Craig took me around and introduced me to the various Headquarters Staffs who would be especially cooperating with the plantation managers and civic authorities.

"Col. Hayes, the Chief of Staff, tentatively suggested that the plantation managers and some of their executive staffs might care to have a similar exercise worked out for them with regard to the possible conditions which might face them in time of emergency. It was suggested that Col. Poindexter might work out such a plan with the Chief and me, and at some mutually agreed on date suitable to all plantations, the plantation managers and their executive staffs might go through an exercise with Poindexter, the Chief, and possibly myself acting as neutral judges."

This letter is set forth in full as Exhibit "K".

In December, 1940, it was arranged that General Herron visit Governor Poindexter to explain the urgency of finding some means, if possible, under the home guard defense laws by which funds could be drawn to uniform, equip, and give armed training to the provisional police guard. Apparently no action developed from this since the plantations continued to finance the arrangements whereby the continuation of this training was possible.

In February, 1941, during one of the frequent Army alerts, a meeting was held between Army authorities, the Chief of Police, and executives of the civilian personnel of District #1. Each was asked to give a short summary of their actions regarding their anti-sabotage precautions, etc. On the basis of this alert and this coordination with the civilian personnel comprising the police guard of District #1, the Coordinator made arrangements whereby the other districts were trained for immediate response to any alert. Although the meeting with the civilian defense group during the Army alert was called at one hour's notice by the Army authorities, every company notified was represented by its chief executive.

On March 8, 1941, the Coordinator, Provisional Police Plan furnished to all plantation managers and to the pineapple plantation representative, Wahiawa, the complete mobilization plan for the provisional police. At this time the sketches showing the "vital points" in the various districts which the Army wished the provisional police force to guard were not furnished but were withheld to be forwarded as soon as released by the Department Provost Marshal.

In May, 1941, the Army planned and carried through Hawaiian Department maneuvers. The provisional police were invited to participate in these maneuvers. Five hundred eighty-two (582) members of the Provisional Police Guard did so participate. Officers and non-commissioned officers of the Army were designated to supervise and instruct the guard in the use of riot shotguns, as
reflected in the copy of letters of instructions dated May 5, 1941, from General Short to the Commanding General, Schofield Barracks, set forth in full as Exhibit "L." Five rounds of ammunition per man were furnished by the Army. Silhouette type targets were provided. Instructions for guards at bridges and other installations to [14] guard against sabotage by persons approaching on the ground or descending from the air by parachutes were spelled out specifically. Reports indicated all guards performed satisfactorily, keen and alert in the performance of their duty.

Soon after this alert, T. G. S. Walker, Coordinator, Provisional Police Plan, was selected by the Mayor, City and County of Honolulu, to act as Coordinator of the Emergency Disaster Council commencing June 17, 1941. Major Douglas King, Assistant to the Chief of Police, was designated by Chief of Police Gabriel son to continue the work of Coordinator in matters pertaining to this police guard organization. Throughout the remaining months until December 7, 1941, instruction continued unabatedly. The Army was requested and did furnish the noncommissioned officers to give instruction in the use of firearms. Instruction talks by the Chief of Police, the Chief of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department Provost Marshal were arranged at the various provisional guard units. Courses of instruction in First Aid which the Army authorities considered most necessary were also undertaken.

Immediately prior to December 7, 1941, this provisional guard detail totalled between 1500 and 1800 plantation employees. This unit swung into action on December 7th assuming guard duties immediately according to prearranged plan, thereby relieving Army personnel for duty elsewhere. They stood at their posts for many hours during the early days of the war pending final arrangements whereby many of these men became air raid wardens, or assumed other active defense duties.

VI. The Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association Developed a Comprehensive Emergency Food Subsistence Program Long Prior to the War

For a long period prior to the war, the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association had been directing attention to problems of local food subsistence. In 1935 the Association had created and established a Diversified Crops Committee composed of men representing all phases of agricultural activity in the Territory. Originally concerned primarily with study and research directed towards ascertaining what food crops could be grown in the tropical Hawaiian climate with profit to the growers and also as a phase of plantation activities, the Committee devoted considerable attention and effort to plans for producing locally crops in such quantities and of such a nature as would provide the entire population with adequate subsistence if any emergency stopped the flow of foodstuffs into the Territory from outside sources.

Successive Commanding Generals of the Hawaiian Department had been emphasizing subsistence food production as a major defense problem of the Territory, as a phase of the mission of the military forces. For a period of at least eight years before the emergency resulting from war in Europe, plans were being formulated, developed and revised by the Department Service Command and by the Civil Affairs Section, G-5, Headquarters Hawaiian Department.

Being fully cognizant of the activities of the Army in emergency food subsistence planning, Major General Briant H. Wells (Ret.), former Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, and Secretary of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association following his retirement from the Army, had invited the Army to designate a representative to attend meetings of the Diversified [15] Crops Committee and work with the Committee in coordinated planning. Lt. Col. James A. Ulio had been designated in 1937 by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department and thereafter an Army representative was appointed each year. The close relationship between the Diversified Crops Committee and the Army authorities is reflected in a memorandum of Lt. Col. Ulio in 1937, explaining the objectives of the Diversified Crops Committee. Copy of this Memorandum is set forth in full as Exhibit "M".

In the latter part of 1940 the plans developed by the G-5 Section were officially made known to various civilian groups. With these expressions of mutual recognition by the military and civilian groups of the necessity for adequate planning to meet any emergency, new impetus was given to the activities of the Committee. The Pineapple Producers Cooperative Association also appointed a special food production committee which immediately undertook to determine
the extent to which pineapple lands on Oahu could be used to supplement cane and small farmers' lands in food production.

The close coordination between the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association and the Army is reflected in the letter dated February 1, 1941, of Lieutenant General Herron to the Association previously referred to and set forth in full as Exhibit "G." In this letter General Herron stated in part:

"The attitude of all of your personnel is beyond praise, but I feel that I should especially express appreciation of the invaluable aid of your Secretary, General Wells, and of the vital and highly intelligent work done by your Diversified Crops Committee and its members."

In this connection, it should be kept in mind that every effort was made by the Trustees, President and Secretary of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association to include on the Committee expert agriculturists although they might not be directly employed by the sugar plantations or the Association. For example, the Standing Committee appointed by Mr. H. A. Walker as President for 1941 included Dr. H. L. Lyon, Chairman, Director of Experiment Station, Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association; Mr. H. P. Agee, Agricultural Consultant for Castle & Cooke, Limited, sugar factors, and Hawaiian Pineapple Company, Ltd; Dr. J. H. Beaumont, Director of the Experiment Station, U. S. Department of Agriculture; Dr. D. L. Crawford, President, University of Hawaii; Dr. A. L. Dean, Vice President, Alexander & Baldwin, sugar factors; Col. Casey Hayes, G-5 Section, Hawaiian Department; Mr. L. D. Larsen, Director Plantation Activities, and Vice President, C. Brewer & Co., Ltd., sugar factors; Mr. W. W. G. Moir, Agriculturist, American Factors, Ltd., sugar factors; and Mr. H. H. Warner, Director, Agricultural Extension Service, University of Hawaii. This representative group of agriculturists therefore included experts whose services the Army could not have obtained otherwise.

On January 30, 1941, sub-committees were appointed as active operating committees. These included an Animal Husbandry Sub-Committee, to promote production of meat, milk and eggs; a Chemical Supplies Sub-Committee, to ascertain requirements in fertilizers, fungicides, insecticides, weed killers, etc., and take steps to insure an adequate supply of each; a Field Operations Sub-Committee, to plan appropriate food crops on requisitioned land in sufficient quantities to assure an adequate diet for every person on Oahu; an Inventories and Disbursements Sub-Committee, to keep track of the fluctuating food supply and advise as to its equitable distribution, with particular [16] attention to inventories and the promotion of food conservation and food storage; a new crops Sub-Committee, to locate and demonstrate new food crops that might be grown to advantage; the Pineapple Producers Cooperative Association Relations Sub-Committee to coordinate the efforts in food production of the two respective organizations; and a Truck Gardens Sub-Committee, to stimulate production of truck crops on plantations, on small farms and in home gardens by independent growers. On February 7, 1941, an additional Army representative, Major A. R. Lamb, Sanitary Corps, was appointed to the Diversified Crops Committee as alternate for Colonel Hayes.

Indicative of the seriousness with which the Diversified Crops Committee undertook to develop comprehensive plans for emergency subsistence is the distinction made by it between plans developed for "Emergency A" and those developed for "Emergency B." "Emergency A" was defined as a condition of total blockade and complete isolation of Oahu from the mainland and off-islands. "Emergency B" contemplated a condition of total blockade and isolation of the Territory of Hawaii from the mainland or other sources of food and feeds.

Starting out in January, 1941, to develop intensively a plan of emergency subsistence for Oahu, the Field Operations Committee enlarged its personnel in May, 1941, by the addition of representatives on the islands of Maui, Hawaii and Kauai, with the additional responsibility of developing, with the assistance of the representatives of the Planters' Associations of the several islands, a Territorial emergency subsistence plan in which each of the islands might contribute to the subsistence of the civilian and military population of Oahu to an extent most consistent with their own and general Territorial interests. The enlargement of the Committee contemplated also the development of emergency subsistence plans for each of the islands with the assistance of the Planters' Associations of the several islands. These efforts, directed as they were to the extreme emergency, Emergency "A," were entirely of a cooperative nature, to be coordinated with the military and government authorities. Final plans as submitted contemplated the requisition-
The terms of the following sub-committee were at all times proceeding under clear recognition of the importance of the development of comprehensive emergency planning, which is clearly illustrated by the tone of a letter addressed to the then Territorial Governor, the Honorable Joseph B. Poindexter, on June 19, 1941, signed by Harold L. Lyon, Chairman of the Diversified Crops Committee and Director of the Experiment Station of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, following a conference of General Wells, Secretary of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, and Dr. Lyon with the Territorial Governor. He pointed out that the Committee had available at that date feasible plans for food and feed production in the Territory with the intention of placing these plans at the disposal of a food Administration, and when such Administration was created. He also made clear that the Committee assumed for purposes of the planning:

"If the emergency situation develops — that is, complete isolation of Oahu — the conditions which make this possible will render such exposed sections of the Island as Waimanoe, Kahuku, and Waimanalo unfit and unreliable for farming operations; therefore, plantings for the emergency should be confined to the four major and centrally located plantations."

This letter is set out in full as Exhibit "N".

In the first few months of 1941, the Diversified Crops Committee had already evolved extensive plans of such a complete nature that Walter C. Short, Lieutenant General, United States Army, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, accepted the plans as submitted as the basis for all planning for Oahu. In a letter dated May 15, 1941, addressed to the Secretary of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, General Short stated:

"Please express my thanks to the Trustees of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association for the Report of the 'Field Operations Committee' and for the 'Emergency Planting Plan' of the Diversified Crops Committee.

"I feel that the Report, together with the Plan, is the best and most complete study on the subject of local emergency food production yet accomplished, and that this work will constitute the basis for all planning on this subject for Oahu.

"In this connection I have directed that the Planting Plan with such minor changes as may be necessary from a military standpoint, be incorporated in our current Food Production Plan for application to Army use should this ever be required.

Copy of this letter is set forth in Exhibit "O".

Efforts of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, its member plantations, and the various food specialists who had joined in the comprehensive emergency subsistence planning did not cease, however, with this approval, but continued throughout the rest of the year. On October 23, 1941, the Field Operations Committee submitted to the Diversified Crops Committee of the HSPA a complete "Emergency Food Production Plan," its comprehensiveness being indicated by the fact that it consisted of over one hundred and twenty-five pages of estimates, charts, graphs and compilations, representing a complete plan for any emergency. Commencing with careful estimates of the requirements for emergency subsistence rations for all the people in the Territory, the plan then specified the kinds of vegetables that should be grown, how many acres should be planted, how many pounds of seed obtained, what the initial seed orders should be, with computations of average yields per acre, and determination of the number of acres of sugar cane land, and pineapple lands to be planted and harvested each month and day. Fertilizer requirements were estimated for the various crops, and amounts determined on the basis of acreage requirements. Insect control requirements were also computed. Equipment, tools and machinery requirements were also determined, and the number of the various kinds specified, with a listing of the priority of procurement. Tentative allotments of acreages of emergency crops among the various plantations were attempted with guidance from the military authorities in allotting subsistence food crops on Oahu to the four central plantations, Oahu Sugar Company Ltd., Waialua Agricultural Company, Ltd., Ewa

Assuming the necessary seeds and equipment were procured, and planting undertaken, it was still recognized that it would require considerable time for the crops to mature for harvesting. The Committee therefore compiled a list of staple foods and the amounts needed of each which the Committee recommended for storage and considered necessary to carry over an estimated six months period from the beginning of the emergency to the initial production of food crops. This list was later the basis for the imports and storage by the Federal Surplus Commodity Corporation acting in conjunction with the military authorities and the Food Control Section of the Office of the Military Governor.

The number of animals required, the number needed to be imported, the number that should be culled for economy of feed, the requirements of feeds and forage, and the acreages needed to be planted and harvested were computed carefully. The seed requirements for this feed were also tabulated, and the fertilizer needs for feed production, and the machinery required for feed crops. Considerations relative to increasing banana and papaya production and increasing the consumption of pineapples were explored carefully. Culture of yeast from sugar was explored as a means of supplying protein needs.

It was this plan which represented the culmination of years of attention and active experiments. It was this plan which the Army adopted as a basis for all emergency food subsistence planning.

As early as 1937, the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association had appropriated money for food crop experiments and continued these experiments at some expense over a period of years. Money was also appropriated for the purchase of agricultural equipment required for cultivation of these emergency food crops and some equipment was purchased and delivered prior to the outbreak of war.

Considerable optimism has always been expressed by the uninitiated over the possibilities of growing temperate climate food crops in Hawaii, and considerable effort has been directed to this. The Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association spent time and money, with all of the technical assistance of the extensive facilities of the experiment stations in experiments directed towards selectivity of suitable crops. The experiments conducted were without question worth many more times their cost, for they included the lessons gained from the experiments of expert talent familiar with climate and soil.

While these developments proceeded, in full coordination between the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association and the Army, other committees were established such as the Food Committee appointed by the Mayor, City and County of Honolulu, in 1940, the Governor's Committee on Food Storage in March 1941, and the Governor's Emergency Food Commission in June 1941. Membership of these committees was closely integrated with that of the membership of the Diversified Crops Committee.

Subsequent to December 7, 1941, an Advisory Committee for Food Crop Production was established by the Military Governor. However, the experiments and plans of the Diversified Crops Committee, Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, provided the basis for subsequent efforts directed towards local emergency food subsistence.

Any additional information desired relative to the extensive plans prepared for emergency food subsistence can be furnished promptly by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association.

**VII.—Oahu Sugar Plantations Provided the Basis for the Development of an Efficient Civilian Defense Organization Throughout Rural Oahu Prior to the War**

Having organized an extensive provisional police organization throughout all of the plantations as early as 1940, and participated in blackout practices as early as 1939, the plantations were prompt in undertaking the development of civilian defense organizations in 1941, so that by December 7, 1941, each plantation had trained its personnel to swing quickly into action when the emergency arose.

Early in August, 1941, the Mayor of the City and County of Honolulu appointed Mr. Stafford L. Austin, Manager of Honolulu Plantation Company, as a member of the Major Disaster Council. Mr. Austin proceeded immediately to organize
a Rural Oahu Committee, with districts corresponding to the areas occupied by the plantations except for the Wahiawa area composing the town of Wahiawa and the pineapple plantations, and the Kaneohe area on the windward side of Oahu. Each of these divisions was in turn in charge of the plantation manager, ho in turn supervised various defense committees which prepared plans and mobilized all available plantation facilities for defense emergencies.

An appreciation of the extensive and efficient preparedness organization possible under this procedure requires appreciation of the facilities which the plantations were able to make available. In addition to the executive talent, and the existing organization of superintendents, supervisors, and all plantation workers, there were all of the physical plant facilities of each plantation, including power and light, fire fighting equipment, trucks, cranes, and fully equipped, completely staffed hospitals. Accustomed to working as units, the plantations provided efficient organizations to develop promptly elaborate civilian defense preparations. The assistance which the plantations were able to provide on the morning of December 7, 1941, not only to civilians in the vicinity of plantations but also to Army and Navy personnel and installations is ample proof in itself of the close coordination of the plantations and the military authorities, the integration of the plantation facilities with the military requirements, and the effectiveness of the defense preparations made by all plantations.

Without burdening your Committee with an exhaustive presentation of the activities of each plantation in the development of civilian defense organizations, the organization developed by Honolulu Plantation Company provides an example of similar organizations developed by all plantations, closely coordinated through the Chairman of the Rural Oahu [20] Committee of the Major Disaster Council.

Throughout August and September, each plantation designated committees which proceeded to hold regular meetings, engage in training, and organize plantation facilities. Committees were established for the following: Transportation-Evacuation, Police, Medical, Fire and Air Raid Warning, Communication and Intelligence, Food Administration, Electric Power and Light, Rural Water, and Engineering. There is attached herewith an Exhibit "P", an outline of the Major Disaster Organization developed at Honolulu Plantation Company and distributed on October 3, 1941, by the Chairman of the Rural Oahu Committee to all Plantation districts.

The Fire and Air Raid Warning Committee proceeded to train its personnel, already trained in fire fighting, in the methods of handling incendiary bombs and fires resulting from other enemy action. This Committee distributed instructions, and conducted lectures and demonstrations for the education of the public in accordance with the procedure that became common throughout the mainland after the outbreak of the war.

The Medical Committee prepared plans to supply medical aid during the time of disaster, designating collecting points, conducting first aid training for all plantation personnel, and encouraging training of nurses. Since each plantation as a matter of policy had complete hospital and medical facilities engaged in the treatment of injuries and sickness of plantation personnel, and had long experience in the maintenance of public health, these additional preparations were able to be completed promptly and in manner hardly to be duplicated in any other mainland locality. Moreover, the location of the plantation hospitals throughout the island, and in many cases in close proximity to Army airfields and posts, and as in the case of Honolulu Plantation Company, within a few miles of Pearl Harbor, naturally resulted in attention being given to possible need of the plantation facilities for military personnel. Close liaison existed between the plantation doctors and Army and Navy Medical officers.

The Police Committee prepared plans for the protection of transportation routes, and the guarding of installations, the directing of traffic, maintenance of order in time of disaster, instruction of behavior in case of air raid alarm and of blackout, and the prevention of looting. The existing plantation police provided personnel already trained for these functions and responsibilities.

The Food Administration Committee prepared plans for extensive company food production, coordinating these plans with the Diversified Crops Committee of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association. Educational campaigns were commenced for the development of home gardens.
The Transportation and Evacuation Committee prepared listings of all available transportation, and compiled organization charts for motor and rail transportation personnel. Maintenance of all equipment was a responsibility of this committee. In effect, the work of this committee was a pooling of all existing transportation facilities of the plantation to direct their utilization for emergency purposes when required, for operation and maintenance of equipment was of course part of the daily plantation operation.

The Communication and Intelligence Committee, in addition to communication liaison between the various headquarters of the Major Disaster Organization, also engaged in intelligence activities to ascertain any subversive activities, false rumors, unrest or other developments which might be of value to the military intelligence agencies and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or which might be of assistance to the plantation provisional guard in maintaining order.

The Electric Power and Light Committee was organized for the purpose of proper maintenance of the plantation electric system which all persons, civilian and military, recognized as an important source of power for standby service in case of damage to the Hawaiian Electric Company plant, the island's main source of electric power.

The Rural Water Committee outlined alternate sources of water in case of destruction or obstruction of the existing system, and planned emergency transportation of drinking water if required.

The Engineering Committee was established to plan for construction of air raid shelters, and formation of damage repair crews.

These committees met regularly and were not mere paper committees. The plans developed by these committees at Honolulu Plantation Company were the basis for action on December 7, 1941, just as each plantation on Oahu was engaged in identical activities. First aid classes were well attended in close coordination between the plantation hospital staffs and the Medical Preparedness Committee of the Honolulu County Medical Society. Equipment needed in fighting fires resulting from enemy air raids was obtained and individual householders had been instructed to obtain necessary fire fighting equipment as early as September 27, 1941. This equipment was specified to include bags of sand, ladders, receptacles for spare water supply, and a fire extinguisher if possible.

Householders were encouraged to store additional food, and for this purpose basic subsistence items were imported in quantity by plantation stores. Special precautions were taken to keep careful account of all explosives, and in addition to the customary precautions additional inspections were made daily of all explosives stores. Close coordination was at all times maintained with the other plantations and the respective districts, and with the various committees of the Major Disaster Council.

The plantations, and plantation personnel, were proud of the civilian defense organization they developed and they are proud of the immediate response they were able to make on the morning of December 7, 1941. It is submitted that the civilian defense preparedness achieved by the sugar plantations through the organization of the various committees on each plantation, and coordinated through the Rural Oahu Committee of plantation managers, represents one of the best examples of such organizations then in existence.

There is attached herewith as Exhibit "Q" a report of the Chairman of the Rural Oahu Committee which presents in summary from the activities of the rural civilian defense divisions on the morning of December 7, 1941 and immediately thereafter.

[22] VIII.—The Personnel and Facilities of Hawaii's Sugar Plantations Provided Immediate and Valuable Assistance to the Army and Navy in Meeting the Emergency Resulting from the Attack on Pearl Harbor

The preparedness of the plantation provisional police units has been discussed, as has the preparation of the Civilian Defense of Major Disaster Committees. These organizations undertook their assignments immediately. The planning of the Diversified Crops Committee of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, for emergency food subsistence, was utilized thereafter.

In addition to these pre-Pearl Harbor defense preparations by all of the sugar plantations, there was the further direct participation of the plantations with the Army and Navy in rallying to meet the sudden emergency. The material and in many ways almost indispensable aids provided to the Army and Navy by the sugar plantations on December 7, 1941 and thereafter was not alone the
uniting of forces to meet a common enemy. It was also organized assistance, reflecting the appreciation of the sugar industry over a long period of years of the integrated relationship existing between the sugar industry and the military authorities and the essential part of the plantations in the plans of the military for the defense of Hawaii.

At the request of Army authorities all sugar plantations had at various times prior to the war submitted information concerning the defense potential of the sugar plantations. There was every indication in the manner by which this information was requested and compiled that the Army considered the plantation facilities as an integral part of the plans of defense of Hawaii. The sugar plantations, and the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association had proceeded accordingly. As has been previously pointed out, the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, particularly under the guidance of the Vice-President and Executive Secretary, Major General Briant H. Wells (Ret.), former Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, proceeded on established policy of close coordination and cooperation with the military forces.

On the morning of December 7, 1941, every plantation mobilized to aid the military forces in whatever way or manner assistance might be given. The war record of the sugar industry, particularly on that fateful day and for months thereafter is a record which would require volumes to record. It covers much more than civilian preparedness. It includes direct assistance to the armed forces themselves, in a manner that can be appreciated fully only as the location of the plantations in close proximity to Pearl Harbor, Army, Navy and Marine airfields and other installations is recognized with the extensive facilities of each plantation in machinery, equipment and manpower and the close relationship that has at all times existed between the plantation personnel and the personnel of the military forces, and the practical liaison with the military commanders which Major General Wells continued. It can truly be said that the sugar plantations were in the war immediately alongside the Army and Navy.

It is submitted that the part played by the sugar plantations in meeting this emergency has no parallel in any part of our country. A few examples serve to illustrate this.

[23] **Plantation Hospitals Received Many of the Wounded Service Personnel**

Some plantations were subjected to enemy strafing fire the morning of attack and suffered casualties. Plantation hospitals were immediately receiving victims of the attack. These casualties received at plantation hospitals on Oahu included Army, Navy and Marine personnel as well as civilians.

**Plantation Equipment was Dispatched to Installations Attacked by the Enemy**

Plantation trucks and cranes with plantation personnel to man the equipment were dispatched to Pearl Harbor, Ewa Marine Air Station, Hickam Field, Wheeler Field and other Army and Navy installations as requested or required. Equipment dispatched by Ewa Plantation Company on the Seventh is illustrative of this aid and assistance. At the request of the Ewa Marine Aviation Group, three cranes and two caterpillar tractors with twelve equipment operators were engaged in aiding the Marine Air Station in the removal of aerial bombs from magazines and loading them on bomb carts and distributing the loaded bombs as directed. This crew stood by at the air station throughout the night of the Seventh. Another crane and two additional tractors were dispatched on December 8th to expedite this work. From that time until December 21, 1941, some Ewa Plantation men and equipment remained at the Marine Air Station. The men were even trained in fusing aerial bombs and placing them in the bomb racks of planes.

Shortly after the attack the Navy requested all possible assistance in supplying pumps, welding units, and cranes for use at Pearl Harbor. This equipment was dispatched promptly, remaining in use in some instances for many months.

Construction equipment from the plantations was made available throughout Oahu and all other islands for emergency construction of airfields and other installations. In many cases this equipment was of primary importance in making possible the rapid development and completion of airfields at a time when the utmost speed was essential to insure airfield facilities on Oahu, and the other islands.
Plantation Labor Provided a Large Construction Force for the Army

The pool of plantation manpower with many men trained in equipment operation was also available for emergency construction. Army recognition of the aid and assistance which the plantations could provide is reflected in the final pooling of these available resources for dispatch at the call of the military through a central Coordinator for the plantations. Through this central coordinator's office, foremen and skilled and unskilled laborers were dispatched to a great variety of projects. Coordination of this plantation labor was not limited to Oahu but included the other islands of Hawaii also, where the plantation labor supplied for Army construction was of extreme importance since the plantations were virtually the only source of labor on these islands and virtually no defense construction had been undertaken prior to the war, thereby emphasizing the urgency of construction which the plantations were able to expedite.

Stevedores and dock working crews were obtained from plantation labor, tractor and crane operators, carpenters, welders, electricians, garage and machine shop mechanics, truck drivers, blacksmiths, painters, plumbers, sheetmetal workers, power plant operators, locomotive operators and trainmen, accountants—these categories of labor supplied by the plantations to the Army and reporting where directed, are illustrative of the type of labor furnished, well trained in their respective skills. Man-hours of labor supplied under this procedure to the Army during the time of emergency until the Army was able to recruit the necessary workers, both locally and from the mainland, illustrates the importance of this labor to the Army:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Man-Days</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1941 (December)</td>
<td>66,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>300,178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>54,394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>3,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>514,130</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Power was Supplied from Plantation Electric Power Plants

On December seventh, all plantations immediately undertook standby service at their electric power plants as units in the island-wide coordination of generating plants. On a number of occasions subsequent to the Seventh, various plantations were called upon to carry the electrical load in their localities whenever emergencies arose such as those resulting from accidents, from major repairs, or emergency demands for additional power at the shops at Pearl Harbor and elsewhere. In these cases the coordination of the available sources of power through the central control of Hawaiian Electric Company proved of inestimable value to the armed forces in meeting the unprecedented demands for power that followed the enemy attack with the development of the defenses of Hawaii, and the expansion of the fleet repair shops at Pearl Harbor. Recognition by the military authorities of the value and importance of the plantation power facilities is demonstrated by the construction of a 300,000 gallon concrete fuel oil storage tank at Ewa Plantation to serve the plantation power plant. This construction was undertaken at the direction of the Corps of Engineers.

Plantation Repair Shops were Utilized Constantly by the Army and Navy

Following the attack, plantation machine shops were utilized for a wide variety of repairs as well as for the fabricating of substantial armament units. The machine shops of Ewa Plantation Company, for example, fabricated tank barriers, 30-caliber gun mounts, 37-, 75-, and 155-millimeter gun mounts, tank repair stands, and fuel storage tanks. Equipment was repaired and rebuilt. At this one plantation, 37 percent of the total man-hours worked by the machine shop crews during the period from January 1st to September 30th, 1942, was for the account of the Army.

Other plantation shops such as plumbing, carpenter, and blacksmith shops were similarly engaged in repair, fabrication and construction work for the armed forces.
Plantation Water and Inventories of Supplies were Available to the Armed Forces

Plantation water supply systems proved of great aid to the armed forces at this time of emergency. An example of this is the furnishing of water to Barber's Point Naval Air Station and to Ewa Marine Air Station by Ewa Plantation Company. The scarcity of water on the arid Ewa plain presented a serious problem in normal times. Had the Navy been required to develop new sources of potable water before construction work could have started, valuable time would have been lost. Although furnishing of this water created a substantial drain on the plantation system, the plantation was able to maintain fairly constant pressure while meeting the Navy's requirements. From December 7, 1941 through September 1942, Ewa supplied the Navy a total of 77,260,000 gallons of water.

Miscellaneous materials were obtained from the plantations for a multitude of requirements particularly during the very early days of the war. The supply of sugar bags was immediately seized upon for the use of the armed forces and the civilian defense authorities to be filled with sand for protection of vital installations and gun positions.

Volunteer Units Were Formed With Plantation Personnel

Plantation Personnel was trained to form organized volunteer units to aid in guarding essential installations and in the active defense of Hawaii. These volunteer units, organized as regiments in rural Oahu and on the other islands were trained in the use of weapons and in combat methods, thereby providing assistance to the military through release of troops for other combat assignments. Organization of these units, with the organization of businessmen in Honolulu was accomplished in close coordination with the military authorities. These volunteer units, important as they were on Oahu, were of even greater importance on the other islands as troops were moved to forward areas for offensive operations.

These examples of the participation of the plantations in the defense of Hawaii can be no more than illustrative of the many activities in which the plantations engaged in active support of the military during the war. All plantations of Hawaii participated in this close coordination with the military forces. The role played by the plantations located on the islands of Hawaii other than Oahu was demonstrably of primary importance to the Army in the emergency of defense preparations.

It is submitted that here in the war record of Hawaii's sugar plantations there is more than response to a common emergency; that in this record there has been a degree of organized assistance which could have been achieved only after careful consideration and planning on the part that the plantations could play in an emergency as a natural phase of the close coordination and cooperation with the military forces which the management of the sugar industry and the officials of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association had developed as a matter of established policy long prior to the war.

IX.—Under War Conditions and in Spite of Serious Limitations in Manpower, Hawaii's Sugar Plantations Continued to Maintain Sugar Production at Nearly Peacetime Levels During the War Years

Sugar and its byproduct, molasses, have been basic agricultural commodities required in the prosecution of the war to a successful conclusion. It has long been recognized how essential it is that sugar production be maintained at the highest possible level. Hawaii's sugar plantations did not fail therefore to direct the utmost effort to continue the production of sugar, in accordance with directives from Washington to exert every effort to this end.

Problems of decreasing manpower, as a result of the attraction of employment with the Army, Navy, and their Contractors, presented great difficulties. Equipment required for Army and Navy construction involved delays in planting and harvesting. Scarcity of materials affected maintenance and impeded operations. Blackout restrictions and other military regulations reduced the hours of work and resulted in problems of working conditions requiring constant adaptation.

In spite of these considerations, however, Hawaii's sugar plantations exerted additional effort towards meeting the multitude of problems presented, directing more intensive effort to achieving exceptional total tonnage production for these war years.
There is attached herewith as Exhibit "R" a chart comparing sugar cane acre-age, sugar production, average number of male adult employees (unskilled) and total men days of all employees (unskilled) on Hawaiian Sugar Plantations from the period 1936 through 1944. This chart shows a production of 870,109 tons in 1942, 887,640 tons in 1943, and 874,947 tons in 1944. Hawaii's sugar industry is proud of this record, and the great contribution that this represents to the nation's successful prosecution of the war.

This record has not gone unacknowledged. By letter dated November 2, 1945, addressed to the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, the Secretary of Agriculture acknowledged this production record in observing:

"The work of your institution, I am told, proved especially significant in the recent war period. Notwithstanding rigid military regulations and a very trying manpower situation, the Hawaiian Islands maintained their sugar production at near peacetime levels. For this accomplishment the Nation can be grateful."

This letter is set forth in full as Exhibit "R".

X.—Conclusion

It is submitted that this record of the sugar industry in Hawaii in its cooperation with the military authorities in preparedness activities prior to the war, and in coordination of activities with the military throughout the war is an outstanding record, representing a complete refutation of any of the inferences and statements contained in the report [27] of the Army Board to Investigate Pearl Harbor which might reflect upon this record.

Hereafter there are attached the statements of persons in the civilian community of Hawaii who participated in the preparedness activities of the civilian community of Hawaii prior to the war. These illustrative statements are presented so that your Committee may be cognizant of the part played by the people of Hawaii to prepare for any emergency which might arise. It is submitted that the degree of civilian preparation thereby achieved reflects to the lasting credit of Hawaii.

It is respectfully requested that this statement of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association with the statements of civilian preparedness in Hawaii set forth hereafter be made a part of the record of your Committee to the end that the grave injustice to the Territory of Hawaii resulting from the incorrect and misleading statements and inferences in the report of the Army Board to Investigate Pearl Harbor relative to Hawaii's cooperation with the Army during the critical period prior to the war may thereby be corrected in the manner which the excellent war record and preparedness activities of the sugar industry and Hawaii prior to the war so amply justifies.

Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association,  
P. E. Spalding, President.

December 1, 1945.

I, Chauncey B. Wightman, of the City and County of Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii, and Secretary of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, having seen the original documents from which copies were made and are attached as exhibits in the statement submitted herewith to the Joint Congressional Committee to Investigate Pearl Harbor, submitted to the committee on behalf of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association and their member plantations and the copies contained in the statements submitted by Mr. Alfred L. Castle, relative to the preparedness activities of the Hawaii Chapter, American Red Cross; Mr. T. G. S. Walker, relative to the preparedness activities of the Major Disaster Council, City and County of Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii; Dr. H. L. Arnold, relative to the preparedness activities of the Medical Preparedness Committee, Honolulu County Medical Society; Dr. F. J. Pinkerton, relative to the preparedness activities of the Honolulu Blood Plasma Bank; Addison E. Kirk, relative to the preparedness activities of the Transportation Committee, Major Disaster Council, City and County of Honolulu; and Mr. Heaton L. Wrenn, relative to the preparedness activities of the Honolulu Police Reserve, do hereby certify that said copies as contained in this statement submitted herewith to the Joint
Congressional Committee to Investigate Pearl Harbor are true and exact copies of the original documents thereof.

Chauncey B. Wightman
CHAUNCEY B. WIGHTMAN.

TERRITORY OF HAWAII,
City and County of Honolulu, ss:

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15th day of January, 1946.

[SEAL]
ALBERTA VAN BROCKLIN,
Notary Public, First Judicial Circuit, Territory of Hawaii.

My Commission expires 6-30-1949.

[28] EXHIBIT "A"—EXCERPT OF TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL HENRY T. BURGIN BEFORE ARMY BOARD TO INVESTIGATE PEARL HARBOR (ARMY BOARD REPORT, pp. 173-177 INCLUSIVE)

3. Antiaircraft Artillery and Coast Defenses. General Burgin commanded the Coast Artillery Command consisting of seacoast artillery plus all antiaircraft artillery in the Hawaiian Department. He commanded the 53rd Coast Artillery Brigade composed of the 64th Regiment, 251st Regiment, and the 98th Regiment. He testified that the Interceptor Command was being organized on a temporary basis saying:

"We had constant training and maneuvers, practice, where that particular thing was stressed, and the antiaircraft was turned over to interceptor Command. For at least six weeks or two months prior to December 7, we had, every Sunday morning, one of these exercises with the Navy. Our AA would go out in the field and take their field positions, they would know that the Navy was coming in, with carrier-based planes, and they would simulate an attack on the island, and we put our guns out mainly along the roadways, sometimes in position, and practiced simulating fire against this simulated attack made by the Navy. And we were out just one week prior to December 7. On Sunday; but, by some stroke, we didn't go out on December 7. The fleet was in the harbor."

And again he said, as to the Interceptor Command:

"It worked, yes, because we would get the information of the planes coming in, and immediately the interceptor command would take over. All that is, so far as turning it over to the interceptor command, is that the interceptor command tells you when to hold fire and when to resume fire." (R. 2602-2604).

This brought him to his opinion expressed in the record that if the Interceptor Command had worked during the drills and exercises on the morning of December 7, then it could have worked for the attack. He said in his opinion it would not have made any difference anyway, "because we didn't have ammunition with our mobile antiaircraft. If they had been out in the field without any ammunition, they would have been worse off than they actually were." (R. 2604)

He said of his antiaircraft batteries:

"They were all ready to go into action immediately, with the exception that the mobile batteries did not have the ammunition." (R. 2604)

A reference to the next section will show that it was General Short who supported the Ordnance Department in refusing to issue this ammunition to troops when they went out for exercises in the field.

Additionally, General Burgin found that he could not. [29] even put his guns into final position because of the conditions now described.

General Burgin pointed out one of the great handicaps to development of field artillery positions was resistance from land owners to letting the artillery go on the land or lease it for the placing of battery positions. He described the situation as follows:

"General Russell. Is it true, therefore, General, that prior to December 7, 1941, so far as you can recall, you had never had all of your mobile batteries in the positions which they were to occupy in the event of hostilities?

"General Burgin. That is correct; they had not all been in the actual position they were to go in.

"General Frank. Was that because of this opposition to the people who owned the land?

"General Burgin. Yes, and the fact that we had not yet gotten the leases all fixed up, so that we could move into those positions for practice." (R. 2628)
He also pointed out that if General Short had gone to Alert No. 3 there would have been great opposition from important and influential civilians on the island and particularly those who compose what is known as the Big Five.

As to this he said:

"General Russell. Is there in your mind some thought that there would have been developed a considerable opposition among the influential civilian population here on the island toward the results of Alert Number 3?"

"General Burgin. I think there is no doubt about it, in the world.

"General Russell. In other words, if General Short had ordered Alert Number 3—and I am asking this question in the interest of clarity—if General Short had ordered Alert No. 3 and thrown all of his people into readiness for immediate combat, including the issuing of ammunition, it might, or, in your opinion, it would have provoked opposition on the part of some of the responsible and influential civilian population here on the island?

"General Burgin. I feel positive it would.

"General Grunert. Even though he might have explained that to the influential citizens, there would still have been opposition?

"General Burgin. I don't believe you could have explained it, at that time.

"General Grunert. Who are some of those influential citizens that you think might have voiced their objection?


"General Grunert. Is Dillingham one of them?

"General Burgin. Mr. Dillingham, Mr. Walker.

"General Frank. Which Walker?

"General Burgin. I don't know. He is a sugar man. General Wells." (R. 2629)

He said amongst those people were the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, and those having the land and crop interests in sugar, pineapples, etc.

In this connection it should be noted that there is proof in this record that one of the things that may have influenced Short in Selecting Alert Number 1 and not stirring up the Japanese population was the opposition that developed then and later from the large commercial interests on the island using Japanese labor, that they did not want it disturbed and that they would be shut down in their business if a substantial portion of it was either deported or interned. (R. 2654)

As General Burgin testified, if the tables had been reversed and Americans had been situated in Japan like the Japanese were in Hawaii they would have been locked up before the war started and not afterwards. (R. 2649)
Lieutenant General C. D. Herron,
Commanding, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

Dear General Herron: During the past 17 years the Army has at times used our roads and lands for maneuvers and each time your staff has requested our permission before carrying out these exercises. During this period we have never had an occasion to complain about the condition in which our roads and lands were left by the Officers and men under your command. With this in mind I wonder if, during these strenuous times, it would be of any help to you and your staff to have for maneuvering purposes, a blanket okeh covering the use of the roads and lands under our control. If so, I will be glad to have it forwarded immediately.

This will also cover the use of plantation water and any other facilities that you might deem necessary to successfully carry out maneuvers.

If there is any other way in which we can cooperate please do not hesitate to call on us.

Yours very sincerely,

/s/ James N. Orrick,
Manager, Kahuku Plantation Company.

JNO: L

Commanding General

War Department,
Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii, November 13, 1940.

To: Mr. James N. Orrick,
Manager, Kahuku Plantation Company, Kahuku, Hawaii.

My Dear Mr. Orrick: I am in receipt of your exceedingly gratifying letter of November 8th in regard to the use of the plantation lands by the troops of this command. What you say in regard to the good conduct of troops on your lands and your most generous offer of a blanket permission give me the greatest pleasure. Please accept my sincere thanks for and my appreciation of your very helpful offer.

We shall be delighted to have the blanket permission and I trust that should any transgression occur, as it must in time, you will immediately notify us in order that we may make prompt restitution and take the necessary preventive measures against repetition.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ C. D. Herron
C. D. Herron,
Lieutenant General,
Commanding.

November 18, 1940.

The Commanding General

Headquarters, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, Oahu, T. H.

Dear Sir: Until further notice you and your command are hereby permitted for maneuvering purposes the free use at any time of all roads and lands under our control at Kahuku.

Permission is also granted for the withdrawal of domestic water from the pipeline situated on the Kamehameha Highway near our Main Store at Kahuku.

Yours very truly,

/s/ James N. Orrick, Manager.

Kahuku Plantation Company.
In reply refer to: 680
OAHU SUGAR CO.,
Waipahu, Oahu, T. H.

GENTLEMEN: In carrying out training in various missions for the defense of Oahu this regiment must use positions, usually on the sides of roads, for searchlight units. Each of these units consists of about ten men and the searchlight equipment. The units arrive at the positions just before dark, occupy them for three or four hours and then depart. Four of these positions are located on your property.

1. 1000 yards southeast of pump camp #5 at first locked gate on the road to Manawahua.
2. At a railroad crossing 0.6 miles north of the road which begins just west of the Waipahu Grade School.
3. On a cane field road at the east end of the stables which are just off Kunia Road near Kunia Camp #1.
4. On cane field road at the southwest edge of a reservoir by the camp 1¼ miles north of Ewa Junction and about 0.5 mile east of Kam Highway.

As the various missions and plans change from time to time, new positions have to be occupied, and as each position requires permission it is readily seen that freedom of movement to meet each situation is hampered. It is therefore requested that this regiment be granted blanket authority to occupy positions from time to time on the property owned and controlled by you.

This of course would be granted with positive assurance that every care will be exercised to prevent damage to the property.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) C. K. Wing
C. K. WING,
Colonel, 64th CA (AA) Commanding.

WAIPAHU, OAHU, T. H., February 17, 1941.

To: Colonel C. K. Wing, Commanding 64th C. A. (AA), Fort Shafter, T. H.

Permission to use specific positions as described in the above letter is hereby granted.

Your request for blanket authority to move to other positions not specifically described herein is also granted.

Yours very truly,

OAHU SUGAR COMPANY, LIMITED,
(Signed) H. L'OrANGE, Manager.

HL'O: W

[35] HEADQUARTERS 64TH COAST ARTILLERY (AA)
OFFICE OF THE REGIMENTAL COMMANDER
Fort Shafter, T. H., February 11, 1941.

[36] HEADQUARTERS 64TH COAST ARTILLERY (AA),
Aiea, Oahu, T. H., November 16, 1939.

In reply refer to: 680 (P&T)
HONOLULU PLANTATION CO.,
Aiea, Oahu, T. H.

GENTLEMEN: In carrying out training in various missions for the defense of Oahu this regiment is in need of positions usually along side of roads to place small groups of men with equipment such as searchlight units with a crew of about 8 to 10 men. Some of the desired positions are located on property belonging to or controlled by your company. It is requested that permission be granted this regiment to place these groups of men with their equipment of the following locations:

A position on Aiea Heights
A position on Red Hill

The men arrive at these positions with their equipment just before dark, occupy them for three or four hours and then depart.
As these various missions and plans change from time to time, new positions have to be occupied and as each position requires permission, it is readily seen that freedom of movement to meet each situation is hampered. It is therefor requested that this regiment be granted blanket authority to occupy positions on the property owned or controlled by you from time to time. This of course would be granted with positive assertion that every care will be exercised to prevent damage to the property and interference with traffic on roads.

Very truly yours,

/s/ C. K. Wing
C. K. WING,
Colonel, 64th CA (AA),
Commanding.

[39]
Colonel C. W. Wing,
Commanding, 64th C. A. (AA), Fort Shafter, Oahu.

DEAR Sir: We will be pleased to grant you permission to occupy any position you wish, on the plantation, so you may carry out your various missions and plans, as requested in the last paragraph of your letter of November 16th, 1939.

Yours truly,

HOUOULU PLANTATION COMPANY;
STAFFORD L. AUSTIN, Manager;

SLA: ESB

[38] [39]

EXHIBIT “D”

Captain J. E. Young, Q. M. C.,
Real Estate Officer, Fort Shafter, T. H.

LAND MATTERS

DEAR Sir:

In connection with Ewa Plantation Company’s leasing to the Army of three sites of approximately three acres each (not referred to in our letter to you of May 29, 1941) the locations of which were tentatively agreed upon between Acting Manager Slater Miller and your Lieutenant Colonels Lynd and Taliaferro, we wish to say in this respect that Ewa Plantation Company is prepared to discuss with you the terms and conditions to be embodied in such a lease, and for this purpose we accordingly ask that you telephone or write us to arrange a place and date of meeting.

As we understand, the site proposed by Lieutenant Colonel R. F. Lynd for the Sub-Sector Command Post lies in the vicinity of Ewa Field 20.1 crossed by the 200-foot contour ditch. Of the other two sites selected by Lieutenant Colonel E. H. Taliaferro for anti-aircraft gun sites, one lies in the reclaimed area adjacent to Ewa Field 64 and the other on the North slopes of Honouliuli Valley in the neighborhood of Ewa Field 32.

For your information, before any lease can be entered into with the Army covering these three sites, we believe it will be necessary for you to locate same on the ground and prepare maps and descriptions. Further, if you intend to record the lease, it will require the subdivision, for land court purposes, of certain lots on which these sites are located, all such work to be undertaken at your expense.

If, however, the importance of this matter to the National Defense Program is such as to require immediate occupancy by the War Department of the areas proposed to be taken, Ewa will be agreeable to such a plan, upon the understanding that, at a later date, maps delineating the specific areas will be furnished by you, together with a formal document. If, in the immediate taking of such areas, cane crops are thereby demaged, you will reimburse or compensate Ewa Plantation Company for all such crop damages and all other damages incidental to such taking.

Very truly yours,

/s/ A. S. D.
A. S. DAVIS,
Vice-President, Ewa Plantation Company.
QM 660. C–RE (Gen.)

Captain J. E. Young, *

Q. M. Corps, Real Estate Officer,

Headquarters, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

DEAR SIR: This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of 22 May, 1941, requesting confirmation of verbal permission for the use of certain small areas of land by the War Department for military purposes.

Permission is hereby granted the War Department for military use, as requested, of the small areas of land desired. It is understood that maps delineating the specific areas will be furnished with a formal instrument covering same at a later date. This permission covers the following approximate sites:

Seven gun emplacements and three bomb-proof shelters to be constructed at various locations along Puuiki Beach, all located on Lot A of Land Court Application 1089.

One gun emplacement at Kaiaka Bay, located on Grant 1976, Apana 3, under lease to Waialua Agricultural Co., Ltd., from Dorthea Emerson.

Two mortar positions, located on land leased from the Bishop Estate by Waialua Agricultural Co., Ltd., near the City of County Reservoir at Haleiwa.

Permanent trenches and fortifications, located just above the Wahiawa Ditch and below the road leading across Helemano 6 Reservoir on Land Commission Award 7713, Apana 34.

The permission to use these various sites for military purposes is granted subject to the following provisions:

1. No growing crops are to be disturbed.

2. No plantation facilities, such as irrigation ditches, pipe lines, etc., are to be disturbed without making prior arrangements.

3. All fences or gates leading to the various sites will be closed at all times.

4. That the use of these various sites by the government will not in any way constitute a release of title to the land by Waialua Agricultural Co., Ltd.

5. The permission granted for the use of lands which are leased by Waialua Agricultural Co., Ltd., from other parties only extends until the expiration of the leases involved.

6. Permission to use the above sites is granted for the extent of the present National Emergency, and in the event that the use of sites is desired beyond said emergency, [44] then it is felt that same should be covered by a formal document properly executed by all parties and interests.

I hope this fulfills your immediate request and that it will serve until the necessary formal instruments can be prepared for approval.

Very truly yours,

Waialua Agricultural Co., Ltd.,

/s/ John H. Midkiff, Manager.

JM: mhs

[42]

THE COMMANDING GENERAL,

Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

DEAR SIR:

LICENSE FOR RAILWAY ON WAIANAE CO. LAND

Referring to your letter of April 28th, Engr. 662/7, requesting permission to enter at once upon the land of Waianae Company at Maili, Lauelaulei, Oahu, for the purpose of constructing railway spurs authorized under license, the execution of which by the War Department is now pending, please be advised that on behalf of said Company, you are hereby authorized to make immediate entry upon said land for the purpose specified.

Your very truly,

American Factors, Limited,

/s/ C. T. B.

C. T. Bailey,

Manager, Land Department.

CTB: LL

79716 O—46—pt. 18—34
In reply refer to: Engr. 662/7

Mr. H. A. Walker,
President, Waiwaiwai Company,
% American Factors, Limited, Honolulu, T. H.

DEAR MR. WALKER: This is to acknowledge receipt of Mr. Bailey's letter dated 17 April 1941 transmitting to me a document and three duplicate copies of a license for the railway to be located on the land owned by your company at Mail, Lualualei, Oahu.

Pending final acceptance of this document by the Secretary of War, it is requested that the Army be permitted to initiate the construction of these spurs.

I desire to express my sincere thanks for your prompt and helpful attitude that you and other officers of your Company have adopted toward the furtherance of this military project. Your hearty cooperation exemplified fine support of the national defense of your country.

Very truly yours,

WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

EXHIBIT "E"
HEADQUARTERS 24TH DIVISION ARTILERY,
Schofield Barracks, T. H., November 6, 1941.

WAIALUA AGRICULTURAL CO.,
Waialua, T. H.
Mr. J. H. Midkiff, Mngtr.

DEAR SIR: Request is made for use of certain portions of your land as described below:

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<th>Purpose</th>
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<tr>
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<td>ROOP-K</td>
<td>Nov 27</td>
<td>AM-PM</td>
<td>Btry B, 52 FA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>ROOP-K</td>
<td>Nov 25</td>
<td>AM-PM</td>
<td>Btry B, 52 FA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>ROOP-K</td>
<td>Nov 26</td>
<td>AM-PM</td>
<td>Btry B, 52 FA.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The usual precautions to safeguard your property will be observed. Cultivated or plowed land will not be entered upon. Your workers and machinery will not be interfered with. Every effort will be made not to damage roads.

Reply by endorsement hereon will suffice. The enclosed envelope requires no postage.

Very truly yours,

/s/ REX H. DONALDSON

ROX. H. DONALDSON,
Major, 24th Division Artillery,
Land Officer.

First Endorsement

To Major REX. H. DONALDSON
24th Division Artillery,
Land Officer, Schofield Barracks, T. H.

1. Approved.

/s/ Joseph Matson, Jr.

JOSEPH MATSON, Jr.,
Civil Engineer, Waialua Agricultural Co., Ltd.

JM: mhs
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

[45]

HEADQUARTERS ELEVENTH FIELD ARTILLERY BRIGADE,
Schofield Barracks, Territory of Hawaii, March 25, 1941.

Mr. H. R. Shaw,
Wai'alu'a Agricultural Co., Wai'alu'a, Oahu.

DEAR SIR: Request is made for use of certain portions of your land as described below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Vehicles</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Johanna</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>RSOP</td>
<td>April 7</td>
<td>A. M</td>
<td>13th FA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johanna</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td>April 11</td>
<td>A. M</td>
<td>13th FA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anahulu</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>RSOP-K</td>
<td>April 7-8</td>
<td>Day &amp; Night</td>
<td>13th FA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anahulu</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Camp-K</td>
<td>April 14-17</td>
<td>Day &amp; Night</td>
<td>11-8th FA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euc. Forest</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>RSOP-K</td>
<td>April 7-8</td>
<td>Day &amp; Night</td>
<td>13th FA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euc. Forest</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Camp-K</td>
<td>April 14-17</td>
<td>Day &amp; Night</td>
<td>13th-8th FA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brig. Woods</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Camp-K</td>
<td>April 14-17</td>
<td>Day &amp; Night</td>
<td>13th FA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERA Camp</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Camp-K</td>
<td>April 14-17</td>
<td>Day &amp; Night</td>
<td>13th-8th FA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kailua Point</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Camp-K</td>
<td>April 14-17</td>
<td>Day &amp; Night</td>
<td>13th FA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puikl Woods</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Camp-K</td>
<td>April 14-17</td>
<td>Day &amp; Night</td>
<td>13th-8th FA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The usual precautions to safeguard your property will be observed. Cultivated or plowed lands will not be entered upon. Your workers and machinery will not be interfered with. Every effort will be made not to damage roads.

Very truly yours,

/s/ R. W. van de Velde,
R. W. VAN DE VELDE,
Captain, 11th F. A. Brigade.

Note: Areas for April 14-17 are for North Shore maneuver, we do not know definitely which will be used, but may, at one time or other, have to use all.

WAI'ALUA, T. H., March 28, 1941.

/s/ Harold R. Shaw,
HAROLD R. SHAW,
Wai'alu'a Agricultural Co., Ltd.

[46]

EWA PLANTATION CO.,
Ewa, Oahu, T. H.
(Att. Mr. S. M. Miller, Field Superst.)

DEAR SIR: Request is made for use of certain portions of your land as described below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Vehicles</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>290</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>RSOP-K</td>
<td>Sept. 22, 1941</td>
<td>All Day</td>
<td>Hq. 1st Bn 13th FA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>290</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>RSOP-K</td>
<td>Sept. 25, 1941</td>
<td>All Day</td>
<td>Btry. C 13th FA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>292</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>RSOP-K</td>
<td>Oct. 3, 1941</td>
<td>All Day</td>
<td>Btry. A 13th FA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>277</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>RSOP-K</td>
<td>Oct. 3, 1941</td>
<td>All Day</td>
<td>Btry. B 13th FA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The usual precautions to safeguard your property will be observed. Cultivated or plowed lands will not be entered upon. Your workers and machinery will not be interfered with. Every effort will be made not to damage roads.
Reply by endorsement hereon will suffice. The enclosed envelope requires no postage.

Very truly yours.

/s/ R. B. Hood,

Major, 11th F. A. Brigade.

EWA PLANTATION COMPANY,

Approved.

"Restricted"

[s/]

EXHIBIT "F"

SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, T. H., January 13, 1941.

Mr. H. R. Shaw,

Waialua Agricultural Co., Waialua, T. H.

Dear Mr. Shaw: There follows a very peculiar request. General Murray is very anxious to make some experiments with the possibilities of camouflaging gun positions in cane fields. In order to accomplish this we have to have the cooperation of some plantation. You and the Waialua Co. have been most cooperative and for that reason I feel that I may be "working a willing horse to death." Please feel free to refuse if you so desire.

Here is the proposition: We would like two plots of cane approximately 40' x 40', one side of which to be directly on a road with no irrigation ditch to cross. Some of the cane will be cut out of these plots and we will run a gun into each, stretch a camouflage net over it and experiment with various methods of placing the cut cane on the nets until we find the method which shows least change in an air photo. This experiment to be made during February 25-27. We need a full growth of cane to get as much height as possible and thought if you were planning to burn a field about that time, the cane cut for the experiment would not be wasted.

I realize that you are in business and that your concern is not set up be an auxiliary to the Army, so please be frank in your reaction to this request.

Cane, covering so much of the lowlands, as you know, is one of our problems and we can think of no other way to solve it.

Very truly yours,

/s/ R. W. van de Velde

R. W. VAN DE VELDE,

Captain, 11th F. A. Brigade.

OK

M

[48]

CAPTAIN R. W. VAN DE VELDE,

11th Field Artillery Brigade,

Schofield Barracks, T. H.

Dear Captain Van de Velde: Your request of January 13th for cane areas in which to make tests on camouflaged gun positions has been received, and I believe we can make the necessary arrangements.

As you anticipated, it would be necessary to arrange the test in an area which would be harvested within three days of the date of the experiment. Whether an area which would suit your purpose from the viewpoint of roadset and topography would be available between the exact dates of February 25-27 cannot be predicted this far in advance.

My suggestion would be that about February 15-20 we make an inspection together of the areas which will be harvested between that time and March 1st. By choosing several alternate positions, I could notify you several days in advance of the date each area is to be cut, and you could make final arrangements as influenced by availability of a gun battery or of Air Corps participation.
As always, we shall be happy to cooperate with the Army in this experiment, and are sure that you will cooperate to minimize disturbance of our normal production operations.

Very truly yours,

HAROLD R. SHAW,  
Waialua Agricultural Co., Ltd.

HEADQUARTERS TWENTY-SEVENTH INFANTRY,  
OFFICE OF THE REGIMENTAL COMMANDER,  
Schofield Barracks, T. H., September 23, 1941.

Superintendent,  
Oahu Sugar Plantation Co.

DEAR SIR: It has been brought to my attention recently that the property adjacent to the Waipio Sub Station has been cleared of cane.

If it would be convenient to you I would like to request that new plantings be started about five (5) yards from the fence line in order that defense of the Sub Station against sabotage may be facilitated and at the same time be made more effective.

Sincerely yours,

/sgd/ Wm. A. McCulloch,  
WM. A. McCulloch,  
Colonel, 27th Infantry,  
Commanding.

[50]  
SEPTEMBER 29, 1941.  
41/1041

WM. A. McCulloch  
Colonel, 27th Infantry  
Commanding Schofield Barracks, T. H.

DEAR SIR: In reply to your letter of September 23, 1941 please be advised that new plantings of cane in the area adjacent to the Waipio Sub Station will be started five (5) yards from the fence line.

Yours very truly,

OAHU SUGAR COMPANY, LIMITED.  
(Signed) H. L'Orange, Manager.

HL'O: M  
JULY 21, 1939.

Lieut. CLYDE R. McBride,  
2nd Bn., 13th Field Artillery,  
Schofield Barracks, T. H.

DEAR SIR: In reference to your letter of July 17, 1939 requesting data on the Waialua Plantation of possible military interest and value, we are glad to supply the following information:

(A) Personnel data as of June 30, 1939:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ancestry</th>
<th>Citizen</th>
<th>Non-Citizen</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Children</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>833</td>
<td>1,704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>808</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>1,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porto Rican</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>447</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaiian</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo-Saxon</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Others</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>1,029</td>
<td>1,560</td>
<td>1,670</td>
<td>838</td>
<td>1,754</td>
<td>4,262</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) Adult Male Personnel Employed  
(2) Total Plantation Population
Estimated total population of Haleiwa Village (Non-Plantation) ________ 4,000

(B) Engineer and Motor Equipment Available:

(1) Trucks and Trailers, 19.
   Total Cargo Capacity, 65 Tons.
   Passenger Capacity, 1105 persons.

(2) Tractors rated by horsepower:

   HP  22  30  35  40  65  70  75  95  Total
   No. 13  2  1  5  2  2  2  2  29

(3) Miscellaneous Engineer Material:

   Mobile Cane Loaders, 7.
   Excavator Bucket, 1.
   Drag Line Bucket, 2.
   Road Grader, 10', 1.
   Bull-dozers, 2.
   Tractor-trailers, 3.
   Heavy Breaking Plows, 2.
   Heavy Disc Plows, 2.
   Portable Air Compressors, 2.
   Portable Welding Machines, 2.
   Portable Concrete Mixers, 2.

   Detailed list of hand tools and normal warehouse supply submitted to Department Service Command in August, 1938.

(C) Railroad Equipment:

   (1) Length Permanent Narrow-Gage Main Line, 55\(\frac{3}{4}\) miles.
   (2) Length Portable Track (12-foot section), 10 miles.
   (3) Number of Locomotives, 7.
   (4) Number of Cane Cars (3 to 4 tons cargo capacity), 736.
   (5) Number of Labor Cars (Beating Capacity—25 men), 25.
   (6) Number of Flat Cars, 36.
   (7) Number of Oil Cars, 2.

   [52] (D) Time required to lay one mile narrow gage portable track approximately 20 man-days of 8 hours. Our average figure to date for 16-man crews in each harvest field is 3.83 man-days for 1,000 feet of portable track.

   (E) Time necessary to burn and clear one acre of cane land highly variable, depending on weather conditions and yield of cane, and whether for commercial or military purposes. A working approximation would be 8 man-days to burn and cut one acre of cane, plus 7 man-days with proper equipment to load and clear the area.

   (F) Possibility of cutting off water supply of Haleiwa and Waialua not feasible at individual sources of supply, as we maintain 19 pumps supplying 108 million gallons per 24 hours from 114 wells. Destruction of power plant at (1) Waialua Mill and (2) Hawaiian Electric Transformer station, and of concrete reservoir at Haleiwa would probably accomplish purpose.

   (G) Plantation roads and ditches are semi-permanent in the sense that they are placed on key terrain features, and are seldom moved.

   (H) The legend that plantation water supply is poisoned is entirely mythical. Practically all pump water is potable but subject to contamination in open channels; gravity mountain water is usually very turbid as well. During a few months of the year, fertilizer is applied in the irrigation water within the field but not in main supply canals. Arsenic berbixides are applied directly to vegetation along roads and ditches and within cane fields—never in the irrigation water.

   (1) Other Features of Possible Interest:

   (1) The plantation maintains complete shops for railroad, electrical and mechanical repairs. Detailed list of power tools available submitted to Department Service Command, August, 1938.

   (2) Electric Power—Mill Power Plant, 3,000 KWH; Hydroelectric plant near Brigade Woods, 383 KWH.

   (3) Billeting—total number of dwellings, 1,087; average floor area per dwelling, 900 square feet.

   (4) Livestock—65 mules, 15 pack-mules, 14 horses.

   (5) Wahiauwa Tunnel—four miles long, 4 feet by 6 feet cross section, gives completely covered and concealed route for foot troops from Kaukonahua Bridge near Artillery Gate, Schofield, to Brigade Woods.
A similar tunnel on east side of Kawaloa Gulch gives covered approach from Wahiawa-Pupukea Road to Eucalyptus Forest.

Very truly yours,

H. P. Shaw,  
Irrigation Overseer.

HPS: es.  
cc: Department Service  
Command, Fort Shafter, T. H.  
A. C. of S., G-3 Hawaiian Division, Schofield Barracks  
S-3, 21st Infantry Brigade, Schofield Barracks  
S-3, 27th Infantry, Schofield Barracks  
Mr. C. R. Siscoff

[53]

EXHIBIT "G"  
WAR DEPARTMENT,  
HEADQUARTERS HAWN, DEPARTMENT,  
Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii, February 1, 1941.  

HAWAIIAN SUGAR PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION,  
Honolulu, Hawaii.

GENTLEMEN: It would be unseemly and ungrateful to quit my command of the Hawaiian Department without expressing the appreciation of the Army for the continued and substantial contributions of your Association to National Defense. The attitude of all of your personnel is beyond praise, but I feel that I should especially express appreciation of the invaluable aid of your Secretary, General Wells, and of the vital and highly intelligent work done by your Diversified Crop Committee and its members.

Your Forester, Mr. George A. McEldowney, has for many years in his own time advised and assisted the Schofield Barracks authorities in their reforestation program and the very substantial progress made in the last two years is largely due to him.

Please believe that the liberal and helpful attitude of the Association is not lost upon the Army and we are grateful. For my successor, General Short, I bespeak your good offices and a continuance of the generous assistance you have always given to the Army in Hawaii.

With all good wishes and sincere thanks, I am,

Sincerely,

C. D. Herren,  
Lieutenant General,  
Commanding.

[54]

HEADQUARTERS SCHOFIELD BARRACKS  
AND HAWAIIAN DIVISION,  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL,  
Schofield Barracks, T. H., June 3, 1940.

In reply refer to: 354.2 (6-3-40) 4

Mr. Hans L'Orange,  
Manager, Oahu Sugar Company,  
Waipahu, T. H.

DEAR MR. L'ORANGE: The success of the maneuvers, completed May 25, 1940, has in a great measure been facilitated by the cooperation of private land owners in allowing the Hawaiian Division to use land during this period.

Every effort was made to prevent damage to property and inconvenience to land owners. A survey is being made to insure the repair of any damages caused by troops during maneuvers. If property, under your control, has been damaged, incident to its use by troops, a report from you giving details will be appreciated.

Please accept my appreciation for your cooperation and generosity in allowing the army to use your lands during this maneuver, and for all past favors.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) Wm. H. Wilson  
Wm. H. Wilson,  
Major General, U. S. Army,  
Commanding.
In reply refer to: Engr. 600.12 (Kipapa)

Mr. Hans L'Orange,
Manager, Waipahu Plantation,
Waipahu, T. H.

Dear Mr. L'Orange: After considerable study and investigation, the War Department has decided that the additional airport to be constructed on this Island should be located in the vicinity of Kahuku Point rather than in the vicinity of Kipapa Gulch where I originally recommended its construction.

I wish to thank you for your efforts in assisting members of my Staff with the location, surveys and layouts of the airport in the vicinity of Kipapa. Your knowledge of local conditions was of great value in this study. Since there is still a possibility of future expansion of the air forces in this department, Kipapa may re-enter the picture at some later date. However, all action upon that site has been stopped at the present time.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

Confidential Memorandum
To All Sugar Plantation Managers Oahu, T. H.

Owing to current events, the Oahu Sugar Managers Association at a special meeting held at Waipahu July 19th, in conjunction with the Army and Police Authorities, appointed the writer as co-ordinator of plans for any Emergency which might arise. It was, however, carefully pointed out that this is purely a precautionary measure and does not necessarily denote a belief that such an Emergency is near or even bound to come.

However, the Plantation Managers are faced with the necessity of having plans for two phases.

I. The Alert—Plan No. 1.

II. Sudden and unpredicted overt acts by disloyal inhabitants whether accompanied or not by hostile "Blitzkreig" from air or sea—Plan No. 2

Plan No. 1:
This will come in force the instant that information received or other indications denote the advisability of putting in precautionary measures. This plan is taking shape rapidly, and I hope to report to you more fully on this in the next week or so.

However, it might be well for you to remember that the Alert will probably mean that:
(a) As far as possible Plantation work should proceed as normally as possible.
(b) Previous plans to keep people calm should be put in force.
(c) All personnel for guard duty, transportation, housing facilities, etc., promised under this plan would probably be immediately required by the Police.
(d) Further guards for your own private property and buildings would be required. Cane fire preventive patrols might be advisable.
(e) Arrangements for putting plan No. 2 into effect would have to be made.

Plan No. 2:
I will discuss this in a future memorandum and also verbally with individual managers.

It is requested that this work be kept as confidential as possible and the Police be mentioned as the instigators rather than the Army.

Yours very truly,

/s/ T. G. S. Walker,
Co-ordinator Emergency Plan.
EXHIBIT "I"

POLICE HEADQUARTERS,
Honolulu, T. H.

Confidential Memorandum: Provisional Police Plan

A meeting was held at the H. S. P. A. Board Room 10 A. M. Tuesday, August 6th, 1940.

The following were present: Major Melvin L. Craig, Major W. O. Poindexter, Chief of Police W. A. Gabrielson, Mr. George Y. Bennett, Waimanalo Sugar Co.; Mr. J. N. Orrick, Kahuku Plantation Co.; Mr. J. H. Midkiff, Waialua Agricultural Co.; Mr. Hans L'Orange, Oahu Sugar Co.; Mr. J. D. Bond, Ewa Plantation Co.; Mr. Robert Fricke, Waianae Plantation Co.; Mr. S. L. Austin, Honolulu Plantation Co.; Mr. T. G. S. Walker.

Chief of Police Gabrielson presided. Details as to number of personnel, trucks and living quarters to be supplied by each organization were discussed. District and Beat Boundaries were explained.

Dates for lectures by Police to Provisional Police were fixed to start as follows:
- Kahuku Plantation Co., 5 P. M., Monday August 19.
- Waianae Plantation Co., 5 P. M., Tuesday August 20.
- Ewa Plantation Co., 7 P. M., Tuesday August 20.

Subsequent meetings will be announced later, though it was thought if possible lectures and instructions should be given weekly at same time and place until course is finished.

Major Craig expressed General Charles D. Herron's thanks for the splendid co-operation being shown by the Plantation Managers.

Meeting adjourned 11:20 A. M.

CONFIDENTIAL

T. G. S. WALKER,
Co-Ordinator Provisional Police Plan.

EXHIBIT "J"

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE,
Honolulu, T. H., August 12, 1940.

PROVISIONAL POLICE PLAN FOR EMERGENCY GUARD DIVISION

PLAN FOR THE ORGANIZATION BY THE CHIEF OF POLICE OF THE VOLUNTARY GUARD DIVISION

Maps: Island of Oahu 1/62,500 w/4 overlays attached hereto; Island of Oahu, 1/62,500 (SECRET) showing Signal Corps installations to be distributed by Army when emergency occurs.

1. The Provisional Police Plant is to provide the personnel and other means necessary to protect from overt acts all agencies and establishments, both civil and military, which are essential to the defense of the Island of Oahu, the defense of which is not charged to combat elements nor located on military reservations. In the performance of this mission, the City and County of Honolulu Police Department will take over when directed by the Department Commander.

2. The Island of Oahu is divided into four (4) police districts, namely, Police District No. 1, City of Honolulu; and Police Districts Nos. 2, 3, and 4, comprising the rural districts.

3. There will be a Captain of Police in charge of the Provisional Guard Division, who will have two assistants, namely,

   (1) the Captain of Police in charge of Police District No. 1; and
   (2) the Captain of Police in charge of rural Oahu Districts Nos. 2, 3, and 4.

   b. There will be a lieutenant of Police in charge of each Police District No. 2, 3, and 4; and to assist these lieutenants of Police will be three (3) Sergeants of Police for each Police Beat.

   c. The personnel required within Police Districts will be supplied from the following sources:

      (1) DISTRICT NO. 1—Police officers on pension, the American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, Public Utilities, Pineapple Companies, and other citizens of the City of Honolulu.
(2) **DISTRICT NO. 2**

**Beat 1**: Waimea Bridge to Brigade Woods (Inclusive). Waialua Agricultural Co., Ltd. Mr. John Midkiff.

(a) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols—79 men.

(b) Housing, sleeping and cooking facilities.

[60] (c) One (1) truck for shift changes.

**Beat 2**: Brigade Woods to Kipapa Gulch (Inclusive). Three Pineapple Plantations:

(a) California Packing Corporation

(1) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols—55 men.

(2) One (1) truck (riot).

(b) Hawaiian Pineapple Company.

(1) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols—55 men.

(c) Libby, McNeill & Libby.

(1) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols—32 men.

(2) One (1) truck for shift changes.

(3) **DISTRICT NO. 3**

**Beat 1**: Pearl Harbor Junction to Pearl City Junction (Inclusive). Honolulu Plantation Company—Mr. Stafford Austin.

(a) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols—58 men.

(b) Housing, sleeping and cooking facilities.

(c) One (1) truck for shift changes.

**Beat 2**: Pearl City Junction to Kunia Road. Oahu Sugar Company—Mr. Hans L’Orange.

(a) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols—66 men.

(b) Housing, sleeping and cooking facilities.

(c) Two (2) trucks; 1 riot and 1 for shift changes.

**Beat 3**: Kunia Road to Nanakuli (Inclusive). Ewa Plantation—Mr. Douglas Bond.

(a) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols—63 men.

(b) Housing, sleeping and cooking facilities.

(c) Two (2) trucks for shift changes.

**Beat 4**: Nanakuli to Kaena Point (Inclusive). Waianae Plantation—Mr. Robert Fricke.

(a) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols—112 men.

(b) One (1) truck for shift changes.

(4) **DISTRICT NO. 4**

**Beat 1**: Makapuu Point to Kokokahi Road, Waimanalo Plantation—Mr. George Bennett.

(a) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols—40 men.

(b) Housing, sleeping and cooking facilities.

(c) One (1) truck for shift changes.

**Beat 2**: Kokokahi Road to Kahana Bridge. (Not inclusive). Mr. George Bennett.

(a) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols—30 men.

(b) One (1) truck for shift changes.

**Beat 3**: Kahana Bridge to Waimea Bridge (both inclusive). Kahuku Plantation—Mr. J. W. Orrick.

(a) List of men required for Provisional Police Guards and Patrols—102 men.

(b) Housing, sleeping and cooking facilities.

(c) Two (2) trucks; 1 riot and 1 for shift changes.
d. Each police district commander will be responsible for the guarding and protecting of all vital installations, both civil and military, and within his respective district.

c. Training.

(1) Guards will be selected, after their records have been carefully scrutinized, from lists supplied by organizations detailed to do so in the Provisional Police Plan. Information as to details of training will be published in a separate Police Memorandum.

f. Divisional strength:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District Patrols &amp; Guards</th>
<th>Shift</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Channel Street to Awa Street (Patrol)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awa St. to Pier 37, via RR (Patrol)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Plant, Hawaiian Electric</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual Telephone:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Plant</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaimuki</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wailupe</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanau</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalihi</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punahou</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Railroad Bridges, Kalihi</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewer Disposal, Nuuanu Plant</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewer Disposal, Date St.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sower Disposal, Ala Moana &amp; Fort Armstrong</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[82] Water Supply, Beretania St</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Supply, Houghtailing &amp; King</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Supply, Kapahulu &amp; Harding</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Shaft, Kamehameha Ix Road</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Shaft, 16th &amp; Claudine Aves. (Kaimuki)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Radio Stations</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters' Clerks &amp; Timekeepers</td>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire and Police Alarm (City Hall)</td>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[82] Prior to the date that this plan is to be effective, the Army will furnish the Police Department with a detailed map of installations that are to be guarded.

4. a. Campsites—Locations of:

(1) Police District No. 2:
Wahiawa—CCC Camp
Wai'alua—Wai'alua Agricultural Co.

(2) Police District No. 3:
Aiea—Honolulu Plantation Co.
Waipahu—Oahu Sugar Co.
Ewa—Ewa Plantation Co.
Waianae—Army Military Reservation.

(3) Police District No. 4:
Kaneohe (to be erected)
Kahuku—Kahuku Plantation Co.
Waimanalo—Waimanalo Sugar Co.

b. All sugar plantation managers, excepting Waianae Company, which is not supplying housing, have agreed to provide the mess and housing facilities for the personnel furnished from their respective plantations.

c. One (1) riot truck, equipped with armor plate or sandbags and armed with machine gun and sufficient personnel, will be located at every police district headquarters. One (1) pick-up truck will be located at each police beat headquarters. (Until proper arrangements can be made, the sugar plantations will furnish the above mentioned trucks.)

d. The tour of duty on each installation by the various guards, pay, etc., will be published in a later Police Bulletin. The same will be based upon the decision of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department prior to the effective date of this plan.
There will be designated a Lieutenant of Police as Supply Officer, who will be in charge of all supplies for all police districts. He will function directly under the Chief of Police.

All guards will be furnished with distinctive markings, insignias, uniform, etc., which will readily designate them as special police guards. (Suggested uniform for these guards would be the Army fatigue clothing, plus fabricated sun helmet of proper design).

Arms (service riot guns), ammunition and equipment, sufficient for the proper discharge of these duties will be furnished by the U. S. Army.

5. a. Each riot truck, patrol car, and sub-district headquarters will be equipped with radio. (It is recommended that the Territory of Hawaii extend the use of its voting booths for headquarters in the several sub-police districts.)

b. Command Posts:
Chief of Police, Honolulu Police Station.
Captain of Police-in-charge Division, Honolulu Police Station.
Captain of Police, District 1, Honolulu Police Station.
Captain of Police, Districts 2, 3, 4, at Wahiawa.
Lieutenant of Police, District 4, at Kaneohe.
Lieutenant of Police, District 2, at Wahiawa.
Lieutenant of Police, District 3, at Pearl City.

W. A. Gabrielson,
Chief of Police.
City and County of Honolulu.

1 Enclosure: Chart—Organization, Voluntary Guard Division.
Distribution:
Commanding General, Hawaiian Division—1.
Commanding General, Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade—1.
Chief of Police—1.
Provost Marshal, Hawaiian Department—1.
Provost Marshal, Hawaiian Division—1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District, Beat Description</th>
<th>Huts</th>
<th>Stations</th>
<th>R. R. Bridges</th>
<th>Hiway Bridges</th>
<th>Trucks</th>
<th>Beat</th>
<th>Men Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Patrols &amp; hrs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. 1. Makapuu Point to Kokokahi Road (inclusive), 2. Hokokahi Road to Kahana Bay Bridge (not inclusive), 3. Kahana Bay Bridge to Waiman Bridge (both inclusive),</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. 1. Pearl Harbor Junction to Pearl City Junction (inc), 2. Pearl City Junction to Kuma Road, 3. Kuma Road to Nana- kuli (inc), 4. Nanakuli to Kaena Point (inc),</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. 1. Waimea Bridge to Brigade Woods (inclusive), 2. Brigade Woods to Kapaa Gulch (inclusive),</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECAPITULATIONS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>District I</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District II</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>District III</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>District IV</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Grand Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Waiau Power Plant, 6.
Subject: Suggested Exercise for Plantations.

To: All Plantation Managers and Mr. Leo Rodby.

The Army authorities very kindly asked me as your representative to sit in on their Headquarters Staff exercises to cover war conditions.

In these exercises, only the staffs of the various units work, being told that theoretically they have so many men and such and such equipment under their control. Each officer affected is given a bunch of sealed envelopes with instructions to open them up at the different specific times stated on each envelope. Inside these sealed envelopes are messages stating that such and such an event has taken place; the officer then has to state in writing whom he contacted and what action he would take with the theoretical force at his command to handle the situation.

During these exercises, Colonel Craig took me around and introduced me to the various Headquarters Staffs who would be especially cooperating with the Plantation Managers and civic authorities.

Colonel Hayes, the Chief of Staff, tentatively suggested that the Plantation Managers and some of their executive staffs might care to have a similar exercise worked out for them with regards to the possible conditions which might face them in time of emergency. It was suggested that Colonel Poindexter might work out such a plan with the Chief and me, and at some mutually agreed on date suitable to all the Plantations, the Plantation Managers and their executive staffs might go through an exercise with Poindexter, the Chief and possibly myself, acting as neutral judges.

Would you please let me know what you think of the above plan, and if you wish me to go further into the matter with the Army and Police authorities.

Please keep this confidential until a final decision is made on the matter.

/s/ T. G. S. Walker,
T. G. S. WALKER,
Co-ordinator, Provisional Police Plans.

[66]

EXHIBIT "L"

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., 5 May 1941.

Subject: Participation of Provisional Police Guards in Department Maneuvers during period 17 May to 18 May 1941.

To: Commanding General, Schofield Barracks, T. H.

1. In connection with Department Maneuvers to be held in May, five hundred eighty-two (582) members of the Provisional Police Guard will participate during the period 12:00 noon, 17 May to 12:00 noon, 18 May 1941, inclusive. The contemplated plan calls for the employment of one hundred ninety-four (194) of those men for each relief while guarding installations located within Police Districts II, III and IV.

2. It is desired you designate nine (9) officers (junior grade) and nine (9) non-commissioned officers to supervise and instruct these guards in the use of the Riot Shot Gun, and nine (9) Medical Corps enlisted men who are capable of administering first aid. This personnel to report to the office of the Department Provost Marshal at 10:00 am, 10 May 1941. It is further desired that a total of 235 Riot Shot Guns and a total of 2,910 rounds (5 rounds per man) of ammunition for same be made available for target practice, and a total of 235 targets—E. Silhouette type.

3. The personnel mentioned above will be stationed as indicated and the Riot Shot Guns and ammunition for same distributed as shown below:
Police District II

Beat 1:
Place: Haleiwa Court House
Officer: 1 Commissioned Officer as Supervisor
NCO: 1 NCO as Instructor
1st Aid: 1 EM to administer 1st Aid
Guns: 31 Riot Shot Guns
Targets: 31

Beat 2:
Place: Wahiawa Court House
Officer: 1 Commissioned Officer as Supervisor
NCO: 1 NCO as Instructor
1st Aid: 1 EM to administer 1st Aid
Guns: 31 Riot Shot Guns
Targets: 31

Police District III

Beat 1:
Place: Pearl City Court House
Officer: 1 Commissioned Officer as Supervisor
NCO: 1 NCO as Instructor
1st Aid: 1 EM to administer 1st Aid
Guns: 19 Riot Shot Guns
Targets: 19

Beat 2:
Place: Waipahu Athletic Field
Officer: 1 Commissioned Officer as Supervisor
NCO: 1 NCO as Instructor
1st Aid: 1 EM to administer 1st Aid
Guns: 24 Riot Shot Guns
Targets: 24

[67] Beat 3:
Place: Administration Building, Ewa
Officer: 1 Commissioned Officer as Supervisor
NCO: 1 NCO as Instructor
1st Aid: 1 EM to administer 1st Aid
Guns: 24 Riot Shot Guns
Targets: 24

Beat 4:
Place: Waimanalo Courthouse
Officer: 1 Commissioned Officer as Supervisor
NCO: 1 NCO as Instructor
1st Aid: 1 EM to administer 1st Aid
Guns: 24 Riot Shot Guns
Targets: 24

Police District IV

Beat 1:
Place: Waimanalo Plantation Gymnasium
Officer: 1 Commissioned Officer as Supervisor
NCO: 1 NCO as Instructor
1st Aid: 1 EM to administer 1st Aid
Guns: 14 Riot Shot Guns
Targets: 14

Beat 2:
Place: Kaneohe Court House
Officer: 1 Commissioned Officer as Supervisor
NCO: 1 NCO as Instructor
1st Aid: 1 EM to administer 1st Aid
Guns: 11 Riot Shot Guns
Targets: 11

Beat 3:
Place: Kahuku Plantation Co. Police Station (near Picture House)
Officer: 1 Commissioned Officer as Supervisor
NCO: 1 NCO as Instructor
1st Aid: 1 EM to administer 1st Aid
Guns: 37 Riot Shot Guns
Targets: 37
Objectives

This committee is composed of the following:

Commissioned Officers........................................................................ 9
Non-Commissioned Officers................................................................... 9
Enlisted Men capable of administering 1st Aid........................................... 9
Riot Shot Guns..................................................................................... 235
Rounds of Ammunition for Riot Shot Guns.............................................. 2910
Targets.................................................................................................. 235

By command of Lieutenant General Short:

[68]

EXHIBIT "M"

Subject: Objectives of the Diversified Crop Committee of H. S. P. A.

1. Basic Considerations.
   a. The purpose of crop diversification should be dual, namely, to make the local community more self-sufficient in time of peace and to develop local facilities so that Oahu may be made entirely self-supporting in time of war.
   b. A broadened agricultural base to include a greater diversification of food crops will be of great value in a depression, will be an influence to improve the well-being of local labor at all times and may well be the determining influence in the defense of these islands in time of war. The cost of the development of diversified agriculture may be considered as a very reasonable insurance premium protecting an investment of many millions.
   c. The local climate and other conditions make it economically sound to put the major agricultural effort of the islands into sugar and pineapple production. The major emphasis on these two products should not be altered.
   d. Present trade relations with the West coast in food commodities provide a valuable mainland tie which should not be severed.
   e. A reasonable objective should be to accomplish a 50% self-sufficiency in time of peace accomplished by putting major emphasis on those things which are most suited to local production.
   f. Crop diversification in the Hawaiian Islands, to be effective must be within the plantation system. This is apparent in view of the fact that plantations control all suitable land, control most of the labor and are financially the only agencies capable of undertaking any such activity.
   g. Crop diversification should be given "infant industry" assistance and protection. This is necessary in view of the fact that the local agricultural field is completely occupied.
   h. Diversified agriculture should be developed under conditions such that a relatively small amount of land in the most suitable location will be devoted to it. This will require land in an area outside the heavy rain belt and where irrigation is easily feasible.
   i. Food production must be so organized as to provide for a continuous flow of produce to the market. Retailers will patronize the agency which can promise continuity of supply. This will require control by the plantations, the H. S. P. A. or a growers associations such as the Maui Association.

/s/ J. A. Ullo.

[69]

EXHIBIT "N"

EXPERIMENT STATION OF THE HAWAIIAN SUGAR PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION

APPENDIX SEC. III-R-(1) JUNE 19, 1941.

The Honorable Joseph B. Poindexter,
Governor of Hawaii, Iolani Palace, Honolulu, T. H.

My Dear Governor Poindexter: In compliance with your request, I submit the following brief statement regarding what has been done and what should be done to insure an adequate food supply for Hawaii in case of an emergency.

The Diversified Crops Committee.

In 1935, the H. S. P. A. called together, as a Diversified Crops Committee, a group of men representing all phases of agricultural endeavor in the Territory.
Ever since its inauguration, this Committee has functioned continuously and at the present time its membership is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member</th>
<th>Member</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J. H. Beaumont</td>
<td>Col. Casey Hayes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. P. Agee</td>
<td>L. D. Larsen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. W. Broadbent</td>
<td>H. L. Lyon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. L. Drewford</td>
<td>W. W. G. Moir</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. L. Dean</td>
<td>H. H. Warner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. D. Ednie</td>
<td>Nell Webster</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the primary function of the Diversified Crops Committee was to find new crops that could be grown in the Territory with profit to the growers, it has from the very first given much attention to plans for producing, locally, crops in such quantities and of such a nature as would provide the entire population with adequate subsistence in case some emergency stopped the flow into the Territory of foodstuffs from outside sources. During the past year, all the efforts of this Committee have been focussed on this one objective.

**A Food Administration with Authority an Obvious Necessity**

The Diversified Crops Committee has at all times held the opinion that whenever an emergency develops necessitating the local production of a large part or all of the food required to feed the people in this Territory, a Food Administration would be set up and financed by the Federal Government, and given unlimited powers to requisition land, water, labor, machinery, fuel and all seeds and cuttings of food plants.

The Diversified Crops Committee has, through long continued efforts on the part of its members and their associates, worked up feasible plans for food and feed production in this Territory with the intention of placing these plans at the disposal of a Food Administration if, and when, such an Administration was created.

On request, the Diversified Crops Committee can supply inventories of stocks of essential foods, feeds, fuels, etc. present at the time in the Territory and can also provide an estimate of the cost of any operation which it recommends.

**If Prepared for the Worst, any lesser Emergency can be Easily Handled.**

It is quite probable that if an emergency develops, the Territory will experience a gradual curtailment of transportation facilities but we should be prepared to promptly meet the worst possible situation. As the bulk of the Territory's population resides on the Island of Oahu, the most serious situation that can arise is the complete isolation of Oahu, not only from the mainland but from the other Islands in the group as well. The Diversified Crops Committee has prepared a food production plan to meet this critical situation should it ever arise. If some agency is authorized and financed to carry out this plan to meet the worst possible situation, it will be able to cope rather easily with any situation of lesser severity which may be inflicted upon us. The Diversified Crops Committee has, therefore, drawn up a Basic Plan to meet the extreme situation; this plan being so drawn that it can be put into effect by increments, the entire plan becoming effective only when the extreme situation is about to be realized.

**Adequate Funds should be made Immediately Available.**

If the extreme situation develops—that is, complete isolation of Oahu—the conditions which make this possible will render such exposed sections of the Island as Waianae, Kahuku and Waimanalo unfit and unreliable for farming operations; therefore, plantings for the extreme emergency should be confined to the four major and centrally located plantations. The lands of these plantations are among the most highly productive in the Territory and their use for growing diversified crops will represent a heavy financial investment. The minimum area of irrigated lands required for planting under the Basic Plan is 8,700 acres. These sugar cane lands, when requisitioned, will all be carrying heavy crops of cane and it will require much energy, labor and expense to get this cane out of the ground, put the land in shape and plant other crops. Seeds and propagating material for the crops to be planted must be grown or purchased.

Seeds for some crops can be purchased from outside sources but that for others, such as pigeon pea, must be grown locally. The sweet potato should be our most extensively planted food crop as it is our most reliable, but we shall have to have much more propagating material than is now available in the
Territory. Steps should be taken at once to secure appropriate land and grow thereon the propagating material of the essential crops which will be required for the initial plantings under the Basic Plan.

The planting, cultivating and harvesting of the food crops that must be grown will require special machinery not now to be found on sugar plantations or elsewhere in the Territory. The procuring of this machinery should be attended to at once as it will take time to get it here from the mainland. Following recommendations of the Diversified Crops Committee, the H. S. P. A. has already invested several thousand dollars in emergency machinery, but this will only serve to demonstrate what is needed. The H. S. P. A. has also spent many thousands of dollars on the promotion of diversified crops through field and feeding experiments carried on under the supervision of the Diversified Crops Committee.

We Must Grow Crops for Feed.

In addition to growing food crops for human consumption, we must grow crops to feed beef cattle, dairy cattle, hogs and poultry, for we must have meat, milk and eggs. The by-products of the sugar and pineapple industries will be employed to advantage as feed, but these will not go very far towards fulfilling requirements. We must grow forage crops for cattle, root crops for hogs and seed crops for poultry.

Protein Foods and Feeds.

A life sustaining diet for all animals including man must provide a considerable amount of protein, that is, organic compounds containing nitrogen. Hawaii’s standard crops are notoriously rich in carbohydrates but very low in protein. As a consequence, the Territory imports, under normal conditions, large amounts of foods and feeds which supply protein. To provide adequate protein for human consumption and for stock feed will be one of the most serious problems to be solved in an extreme emergency.

All plants can make protein out of carbohydrates and inorganic nitrogen, but animals do not possess this ability, so must derive all their proteins from plants. The sugar cane, pineapple and banana make protein for their own bodies, but place very little of it in the products which we recover, so, in an emergency, we must grow plants that put protein in that portion of their bodies which we, as humans, use for food. Bean plants deposit a lot of protein in their seeds and, as we can grow many varieties of beans successfully in Hawaii, they constitute one crop on which we can rely for a considerable part of our protein in an emergency.

Another crop rich in protein, the cultivation of which is being advocated by the Diversified Crops Committee, is yeast. This lowly organism can be grown easily in a weak sugar solution to which has been added ordinary fertilizer salts. It feeds on the sugar and, picking up the nitrogen and mineral elements, builds up protein, growing at a prodigious rate. The yeast organism does not construct a complicated body but merely clothes its living substance with a thin membrane. A mass of dry yeast, therefore, is largely protein. Under favorable conditions, which are easily maintained in any climate, a crop of yeast grows to maturity in less than 24 hours, so it is quite possible to harvest a crop every day in the year.

At a pilot plant in Honolulu, financed by the H. S. P. A., all the details of yeast production as a commercial crop has been worked out. The dry product is 50 per cent protein and very rich in the vitamins of the “B” complex. It is quite palatable and a number of people have, for some time, been eating it regularly to determine its value as a source of protein in the human diet. Their reactions are all very favorable. Up to the present time, most of the output of this pilot plant has been used in feeding experiments at the University with cattle, hogs and poultry. The results of these experiments clearly indicate that yeast is an excellent source of protein for these food-yielding animals. However, since this yeast has proven to be a good protein food for humans, it would be poor economy to feed it to beef cattle in an emergency, for it will be necessary to feed at least 10 pounds of yeast protein for every pound of protein recovered in beef.

Since an abundance of sugar will always be available on Oahu, the Diversified Crops Committee recommends that adequate facilities be provided so that in an emergency yeast may be produced in large quantities for food and feed. Under our conditions, the culture of yeast affords the surest and quickest method of producing the essential protein.
Stores and Storage Most Essential.

It will be at least 6 months after operations under the Basic Plan have been started before its returns will fully meet the needs of the population, so it is essential that we have on hand supplies of food and feed to carry us through this critical period.

We have learned by experience that crops cannot be successfully grown on our lands unless they are supplied with adequate fertilizers and as all fertilizers used in Hawaii are brought in from outside sources, it is essential that an adequate supply of these materials be imported and held in reserve for use in case an emergency develops.

In order to combat the diseases and insect pests which are certain to attack the divers crops which we must grow in an emergency, we should have on hand an adequate supply of appropriate insecticides and fungicides. These materials should be brought into the Territory while transportation facilities are still available.

Most of the energy consumed in the Territory outside of sugar factories is derived from fuel oil, diesel oil and gasoline brought from the mainland. We cannot have electric lights and electric power if the flow of these fuels from the mainland is stopped. Most of the water used for domestic purposes and irrigation on Oahu is pumped from wells with power derived from fuel oil. Deprive Oahu of fuel oil, and the water supply of Honolulu would fail completely, while most of the can fields on the Island would have to go without water and the crops which they carry would be ruined. Deprive Oahu of Diesel oil and gasoline and it would be impossible to operate the machinery necessary to the cultivation of field crops. It is most essential, therefore, that if an extreme emergency is impending, large supplies of fuel oil, Diesel oil and gasoline be held in storage on Oahu for, if our power supply fails, we will be unable to long survive.

Cultivation of Truck Crops in Hawaii Not Profitable under Normal Conditions

The chief aim of agriculture is to capture radiant energy by means of crops which store it in products which can be utilized by man. Of all known crops, sugar cane is the most efficient producer of such products and, consequently, its cultivation adds more to our national resources in a given time than can the cultivation of any other crop. So long as normal transportation between Hawaii and the mainland can be maintained, Hawaii can contribute most to our national resources by growing sugar for shipment to the mainland, and most to our national prosperity by buying from the mainland products produced more efficiently there than they can be produced in Hawaii.

Hawaii is tropical and its fields are not suitable to the cultivation of temperate zone crops. If such crops are grown, the yields are not comparable to those obtained in temperate climes.

It should be obvious to any student making a careful examination of the situation that anyone undertaking the production of truck crops in Hawaii on a scale sufficient to satisfy the local demand for these crops is embarking on a course that will lead to financial disaster if mainland produce has continued access to our market. If Hawaii must undertake the production of food crops to tide her through a national emergency, the Federal Government should underwrite the enterprise, as it cannot survive when the emergency is passed and will be liquidated at a considerable loss to its promoters.

Yours respectfully,

(Signed) Harold L. Lyon, Director.

[74]

EXHIBIT "O"

Headquarters Hawaiian Department,
Office of the Department Commander,
Fort Shafter, T. H., May 15, 1941.

Major General Briant H. Wells (Ret.)
Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association,
Honolulu, T. H.

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

I feel that the Report, together with the Plan, is the best and most complete study on the subject of local emergency food production yet accomplished, and that this work will constitute a basis for all planning on this subject for Oahu.

In this connection, I have directed that the Planting Plan with such minor changes as may be necessary from a military standpoint, be incorporated in our current Food Production Plan for application to Army use should this ever be required.

Very truly yours,

/s/ Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT.
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

[75]

EXHIBIT "P"

RURAL OAHU COMMITTEE,
MAJOR DISASTER COUNCIL,
October 3rd, 1941.

To All District Chairman

GENTLEMEN: For information and guidance, I am enclosing herewith the Outline of Organization as used by Mr. Penhallow of District "S". The functions under such sub-committee may be changed to suit local conditions in each district. Further information regarding the function of each committee, will be found in the "Outline of Plan for Protective Measures for Civillian Population of Oahu in case of Bombardment," recently delivered to you.

We have also received a letter from Dr. R. B. Faus, In Charge of Detail Plans and Training, which we give you herewith:—

"At the request of Mr. Walker, I am pleased to inform you that one unit of the Emergency Medical and Ambulance Service has been formed at Kailua under the direction of Dr. Chinn. I know one is being formed at Kanehoe under the direction of Dr. Ching and a third at Waialawa under Dr. Mack.

"First Aid classes have been conducted at Kahuku and Waialua under Drs. Rothwell and Davis. (Classes have been and are being held at Aiea under Dr. Thompson). Dr. Garton Wall informs me that he is all set at Ewa Plantation. I have not been informed as to what further assistance they may need in the way of equipment and man-power to develop their units."

From the foregoing, it is evident that any information and assistance needed for the formation of Medical units in the various districts, will be gladly given by Dr. Faus and his committee Please address all communications to Dr. Faus thru these headquarters.

Yours truly,

/s/ S. L. Austin
STAFFORD L. AUSTIN,
Chairman, Rural Oahu Committee,
Major Disaster Council.

SLA: FSB
Encl.

[76] Major Disaster Committee—District 8

Chairman: Richard Penhallow
Vice Chairman: Robert Johnston
Transportation: Alfred Muller
Police: George W. Groves
Medical: P. H. Liljestrand
Fire: T. B. Goskirk
Communication: Intelligence, S. K. Toomey
Food Administration: Jaul I. Fagan, Jr.
Electric Power-Light: Syl. Sonognini
Transportation-Evacuation: A Muller
List of available transportation (less Police, Fire, Medical and communication requirements)
Organization chart for transportation personnel, motor & R. R.
Maintenance of equipment
Co-operation—Police, Medical, Fire, Communication, Food Administration and Electric committees.

Police: G. W. Groves
Provisional Police and company guards
Protection of Transportation Routes
Utility installations
Prevention of Looting
Direction of Traffic
Maintenance of order in time of disaster
Instruction in behavior when alarm sounds (Schools, etc.)
Training of Police personnel
Black-out committee (J. K. Evans)
Education of Public
Co-operation—All other committees.

Medical: P. H. Liljestrand
Outline of plan to supply medical aid during time of disaster:
Location of Hospital and Aid Stations
Location of Collecting points
Organization of Personnel
Training of Personnel
Education of Public
Maintenance of Public Health, Prevention of Epidemic:
Immunization
Sanitation
Co-operation—All other committees.

Fire: T. B. Gos Kirk
Organization of Fire brigades
Maintenance of equipment
Training of Personnel
Education of Public, Incendiary bombs, etc.
Co-operation—All other committees.

Communication and Intelligence: S. K. Toomey
District Headquarters:
Communication Liaison between Rural Headquarters and district organization
Communication Liaison between units of district organization and between units and headquarters
Organization chart of personnel including messengers and radio and telephone personnel (2 Radio Patrol Cars).

[77] Intelligence:
Keep in constant touch with the grape vine, to learn in advance of subversive activity to enable Police to maintain order. (Camp Police personnel)
Co-operation—All other committees.

Food Administration: P. I. Fagan, Jr.
Company food production. (Prepared plan)
Home gardens. (Educational campaign)
Store inventories. (Maintain periodical check)
Household inventories. (Encourage increase)
Make an outline of your organization's arm's and personnel
Co-operation—All other committees.

Electric Power and Light: Syl. Sonognini
Organization chart of maintenance crews
Maintain Plantation electric system by repairing breaks as soon as they occur
Co-operation—All other committees.

Rural Water: A. M. DaVico
Organization Chart of Maintenance & Repair crews
Description of System
Outline of Alternate sources in case of destruction or obstruction of present system
Plan for transporting drinking water if impossible to pipe
Cooperation with Rural Water Department, City & County
Cooperation with all other committees.

Engineering: J. M. Nakano
Organization Chart of administrative personnel & necessary crews for
damage repair
Plan for air raid protection by clocks in villages:
Suitable plans for Air Raid Shelters
Recommendation for location of Air Raid Shelters
Cooperation with Engineer, Rural Chairman's Advisory Staff
Cooperation with all other committees.

[78] EXHIBIT "Q"

RURAL OAHU COMMITTEE,
CIVILIAN DEFENSE CORPS,
December 21st, 1941.

Mr. T. G. S. Walker,
Director, Civilian Defense Council, Honolulu, Hawaii.

Dear Sir: With reference to your memorandum of December 30th, 1941, on
the subject of Civilian Defense, I give you the following. I am enclosing here-
with the Organization Chart of the Rural Oahu Committee of the Civilian De-
fense Council, so that you may get a clear picture of the set-up in Rural Oahu.

Within an hour of the attack on Pearl Harbor by the Forces of the Rising
Sun, this whole rural organization was functioning 100% in all capacities. The
various committees were standing by at their designated Stations for immediate
action.

From then on everything moved along smoothly and the civilian activities
were taken care of in all the districts without delay. All vital public utilities
installations were placed under guard and plantation power plants were standing
by to come onto the main lines at the moment's notice of a power failure.

In the weeks following the "Blitz", all defense requirements of labor, equip-
ment and supplies for both the Army and Navy were handled through this
office for the Rural Districts, which turned out to be a tremendous job. How-
ever, we believe that the wants of the Army and Navy were well taken care of.
In fact, all labor, equipment and supplies were pooled for their immediate use.
One special article of which they were in dire need, was sand bags and their
wants in this line were quickly made available to them from the stocks of sugar
bags on hand at the plantations. Approximately 1,000,000 bags were requi-
sitioned for this purpose.

All food inventories were taken care of with dispatch by the Committee of
Food Administration which was ably handled by the Chairman, Mr. W. W.
Morrell. This licensing of stores was also done by the same group of men in the
Rural Areas.

Our Rural Engineering Committee is busy at this time, gathering all infor-
mation on utilities in the Rural Districts to make it available to the U. S. E. D.
Department of Utilities, who has asked that this be done by our Rural Civilian
Defense Committee.

The rationing of gasoline in the Rural Districts is being well taken care of
by the nine district chairmen. This is a big job in itself and the chairmen are
to be congratulated on the fine manner in which they handled all the various
and sundry items that were asked of them to do. All this work being done
on their own time and everyone has given freely of their time.

[79] We want to take this opportunity to express our appreciation for the
fine work done by your office and the excellent and efficient manner in which
all our problems were handled by your organization. I do believe that the Oahu
Defense Organization really put their hearts into the job at hand, and made it
so with a minimum of delay. The chairman of the Rural Committees did a
swell job and as Chairman of the Rural Oahu Committee, I have nothing but
praises for the fine work these gentlemen have done and are still doing.

Sincerely,

/s/ Stafford L. Austin,
STAFFORD L. AUSTIN,
Chairman, Rural Oahu Committee, Civilian Defense Corps.

SLA: ESB
EXHIBIT \( R \)  
CHART COMPARING SUGAR CANE ACREAGE - SUGAR PRODUCTION - AVERAGE NUMBER OF MALE ADULT EMPLOYEES (UNSKILLED) AND TOTAL MEN DAYS ALL EMPLOYEES (UNSKILLED) ON HAWAIIAN SUGAR PLANTATIONS.
HAWAIIAN SUGAR PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION,
Honolulu, Hawaii.

GENTLEMEN: I regret very much that previous commitments have made it impossible for me to accept the kind invitation extended by your President, Mr. P. E. Spalding, to attend the 50th Anniversary dinner of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association.

Please extend my congratulations to the officials of your association's experimental station in their observance of its 50th year of operation. Your association has earned recognition as a research organization through the persistent efforts of its scientific personnel. It is only necessary to compare the per-acre production of sugar cane in your area with the similar results of any area in the world to realize the outstanding scientific progress made by the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association. The work of your institution, I am told, proved especially significant in the recent war period. Notwithstanding rigid military regulations and a very trying manpower situation, the Hawaiian Islands maintained their sugar production at near peacetime levels. For this accomplishment the Nation can be grateful.

The scientific knowledge your association has acquired through the years provides the best kind of basis for further important research. Knowledge is one thing which can never be surplus. In building the kind of free world for which we have fought, we shall have use for all the knowledge we possess and can acquire. One way or another, we must build a world of plenty for all people. That is the only way the world can survive. Let us work together, using all available knowledge, to expand the world's economy and meet the needs of mankind.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ CLINTON P. ANDERSON, Secretary.

[82] CIVILIAN PREPAREDNESS ACTIVITIES AND ESTABLISHMENT OF MAJOR DISASTER COUNCIL, CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU

T. G. S. Walker, Honolulu, Hawaii

[83] Probably no community in the United States has been more closely geared to the activities of the Army and Navy throughout its entire history than has the community of the Territory of Hawaii and more particularly the Island of Oahu and the City and County of Honolulu.

It is believed that the Territory of Hawaii was among the very first, if not the first, integral part of the United States of America, to realize that war with Japan was becoming inevitable and that the civilian population would not only be vitally affected by the war but should organize to take care of as many of the civilian public as possible without calling on the military authorities and Army troops for help.

BLACKOUT PRACTICES

As early as 1939, the City and County government of Honolulu, with the cooperation of Army authorities, organized and carried out a comprehensive total blackout for the Island of Oahu. The cooperation of the public was outstanding and the mechanics of blacking out for the island in case of a sudden attack proven satisfactory. Similar blackout practices territorial-wide were carried out in 1940 and 1941 with equally favorable response from Army authorities. A copy of the radio statement of General Short following the blackout test of Hawaii on May 20, 1941, is attached herewith in full as Exhibit "A".
ORGANIZATION OF EMERGENCY RELIEF COMMITTEE

In July 1940, one of the Supervisors of the Board of Supervisors, City and County of Honolulu, Mr. A. S. Cleghorn Robertson, had proposed the formation of a committee to prepare a major emergency disaster plan and to draft a bill to effectuate the same for submission to the Board of Supervisors. At a meeting of a general committee of businessmen and leaders of the community held at the Mayor's office on July 8, 1940, a motion had been made by Mr. Cain which was duly passed reading in part "to determine how much money, if any, would be needed and how much work would be involved in the establishment of such a committee."

By letter dated July 16, 1940, Mayor Crane, the Mayor of the City and County of Honolulu, appointed a subcommittee with instructions "to study more fully the Emergency Disaster Plan." This subcommittee, at this early date of July, 1940, proceeded to consider a broad Emergency Disaster Plan contemplating "sabotage during the period of strained relations; war with its attendant possibilities of partial blockade; blockade; bombardment; bombing, landing parachute troops; landing of major boats or troops." The agenda states that by "strained relations", the subcommittee envisaged conditions to exist in which it seems possible that a foreign power will attempt sabotage and preparations for an attack on this Territory and that during such a period government of the city would be conducted as in normal times up until the time [34]. That the Governor declared martial law. At such time the subcommittee envisaged that the Governor would take charge of the administration with the aid of the National Guard and the Emergency Disaster Plan could therefore provide for the cooperation of our citizenship with the Governor and the National Guard. At the discretion of the Governor, assistance of Federal troops, Army and Navy, could be obtained at this time and cooperation with those forces should be foreseen and provided for. The agenda also conceived the possibilities that upon the inception of war the government of the Territory would presumably be taken over by the military authorities. Therefore, any proposed emergency disaster plan could provide for cooperating with the military force "so that as little burden as possible falls on the shoulders of troops who will be necessary in the field."

Following this expression of community interest in preparedness activities, the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association and the Oahu Plantation Managers Association had initiated at their own expense the training of a Provisional Guard Unit at their own expense. This development is discussed in the statement of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association.

On April 3, 1941, Mayor Lester Petrie who succeeded Charles S. Crane as Mayor of the City and County of Honolulu called a meeting of the Board of Supervisors with various department heads to "consider the formulation of and participation by the City and County government in a major disaster plan for this community." The undersigned, as Coordinator for the Plantation Provisional Police Unit was present at this meeting. Mayor Petrie explained that "the object is really to coordinate our plans and schedules with the military service so that in the time of extreme emergency, the military service will not be hampered unnecessarily by civilian problems which we can well take care of ourselves." He explained that he had discussed these proposals with General Herron and with General Short. General Short was then expected to discuss these civilian activities at the Army Day luncheon, which he did on April 7, 1941.

At this time, also, the Honolulu Medical Society was proceeding with its organization of an Emergency Preparedness Committee. At the meeting of the Mayor, Dr. Clarence E. Frink and Dr. Thomas Mossman of the Medical Preparedness Committee pointed out that the Committee was then working on some twelve aid stations possibly increasing that to twenty to be located throughout the city, operating on a twenty-four hour basis in time of emergency. Different concerns in town had already volunteered about one hundred commercial trucks for ambulances. About sixty drivers had volunteered for training and a first aid unit was being set up for display and training.

The Chief of Police explained that at that time a force of between 2,000 and 2,500 men had been organized to guard public utility companies, plantations, both sugar and pineapple, the City and County, the oil companies, and other installations. This plan contemplated complete tie-up with the Army and the civilian police.
The Mayor explained that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss organizational activities possible on the part of the City and County of Honolulu in view of the existing defense activities being carried forward by individual groups and organizations and the discussions in the Territorial Legislature. As a result of this meeting a temporary committee of five was appointed by the Mayor which in turn called upon the undersigned to assist in studying emergency disaster plans. This committee recommended to the Mayor the appointment of a Major Disaster Council composed of City and County department heads with certain representatives of the utility companies. Appointment of a full-time Coordinator was also recommended, and a proposed resolution was submitted urging the Territorial Legislature to allocate sufficient funds for a major emergency. Representatives of the Army, Navy and Territorial Government were to be appointed to the Council.

In the meantime, on April 8, 1941, an ordinance was proposed before the Board of Supervisors of the City and County of Honolulu, to create a Major Disaster Council. This ordinance was approved on April 26, 1941. The Major Disaster Council so created was to consist of the Mayor, a City and County department head as Vice-Chairman, and such other persons as the Mayor might appoint with the approval of the Board of Supervisors. This Council was charged with the coordination of all community resources and by means of mutual cooperation and effort to create a plan for utilizing all resources for relief and general welfare of the people in the event of some major disaster. The Mayor was empowered to declare when an emergency disaster existed. The divisions of the Council were set forth to include, among others, transportation, communications, power and light, law and order, fire protection, water and water supply, medical, Red Cross, rescue demolition and gas protection, air raid warning, mortuary work, finance and supplies, and rural Oahu. The Ordinance authorized a coordinator to be responsible for the entire plan.

The Mayor proceeded, therefore, with the appointment of the Council and the undersigned Coordinator. The first meeting of the Major Disaster Council was held on June 24, 1941. Copy of the Minutes of this first meeting is attached herewith as Exhibit "B." Also attached as part of the same exhibit is an organizational chart of the Council as originally established.

Close coordination was maintained with the Army through the designation by General Short of Lt. Colonel Casey Hayes, F. A., U. S. Army, of G-5 Section, Hawaiian Department, and Col. H. K. B. Lyman, CE, U. S. A., Department Engineer, as advisors of the Council. Capt. C. C. Baughman, USN, Captain of the Yard, Pearl Harbor, was designated by the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, as Navy Advisor. By October, 1941, the Department Surgeon, Colonel Edgar King, USA, had been designated an advisor.

The undersigned as Coordinator, with the Executive Committee of the Council, proceeded to set up suitable headquarters, organized and trained volunteers, tabulated available transportation and evacuation facilities, designated emergency reporting points for all personnel equipment, and took all other possible steps to cushion the shock to civilians in any emergency that might arise. The necessity for relief of trained Army personnel for actual combat by having civilians handle as many of their own problems as possible was a paramount consideration in all of the above plans and activities.

The provisional police organization as developed subsequent to June, 1940, was merged with the Major Disaster Council. All plantation managers and other chairman of the various districts were appointed Major Disaster Council chairmen with the fullest possible power to act for the Council in their own districts in case of an attack.

On July 1, 1941, the Emergency Medical and Ambulance Committee of the Honolulu Medical Society which had been training volunteers several months with funds supplied by the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce and some considerable assistance from the Hawaiian Chapter, American Red Cross, was made a Major Disaster Committee with Dr. H. L. Arnold as Chairman and Dr. Robert Faus as Vice Chairman. The Mayor and Board of Supervisors allocated $6,000 to cover this Committee's expenses for the period from July 1–December 31, 1941. The above sum was augmented by $5,000 from proceeds of a benefit football game. A full report of the activities and medical preparedness by Dr. H. L. Arnold is set forth hereafter. Private individuals, the Chamber of Commerce, and Committee Members themselves made contributions to the activities of the Major Disaster Council. The contributions were
not limited to any racial group but included all nationalities—Caucasian, Hawaiian, Filipino, Chinese, and Japanese.

The Coordinator for the Major Disaster Council from the time of appointment to December 7, 1941, delivered approximately 150 talks to business and fraternal organizations, parent-teachers association groups, etc., emphasizing the need for preparedness and the need for volunteers. The response of the community to these talks, and the response of the publicity given to the activities of the Major Disaster Council in the formulation and preparation of plans was considerable.

Mayor Lester Petrie and the Board of Supervisors of the City and County of Honolulu approved the purchase on City and County funds of medical equipment totalling $50,000; medical supplies $10,000; fire fighting equipment worth $72,500 and two-way radio equipment $7,500. Most of this equipment arrived in November, 1941, and was of inestimable value on December 7, 1941. In the purchase of fire equipment, able assistance provided by Mr. Charles W. Scurth, Federal Works Engineer, was of great value in permitting procurement through the Lanham Act. This equipment started arriving in Honolulu in February, 1942. Close liaison was maintained with Army and Navy Intelligence as well as with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In its coordinating activities, the Major Disaster Council joined with Army, Navy and FBI representatives in establishing a committee with prominent representatives of each racial group resident in Hawaii for the purposes of formulating plans for meeting the problems attendant upon any war emergency with the variety of racial groups present in the Territory.

In conjunction with the Army authorities and parallel with the public appeal of Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, Commanding general, Hawaiian Department, a campaign was initiated to get householders to purchase canned goods for storage up to the limit of their cupboard space. In this manner large spaces in warehouses and store shelves were cleared permitting merchants to make large purchases in shipments from the Coast in October and November, 1941. The amount of shipping space thus released for war materials was appreciable.

**COOPERATION WITH TERRITORIAL OFFICIALS—M-DAY LAW**

During this period it was becoming more and more apparent that the situation called for wider authority and more financial backing than that possible under City and County financing. The Major Disaster Council urged Governor Joseph Poindexter to call a special session of the Legislature to enact an M-Day law, giving the Governor unusual emergency powers. This session was called by the Governor on September 15, 1941. And at the request of the Governor and President of the Territorial Senate, a special committee of the Major Disaster Council under the chairmanship of Mr. Fred Ohrt, compiled a financial report showing what “M-Day funds” in their opinion should be set aside for preparedness activities and in case of an attack. This recommendation was for $1,500,000 the first year and a total of $8,000,000 in case of a war of three years. Also at the request of the Territorial Senate, the Coordinator and members of the Major Disaster Council attended this session and gave advice regarding the M-Day Bill.

It was at this session that Lt. General Walter C. Short appeared at the request of the Territorial Government and gave a strong talk on the danger of the situation and the urgent needs. The Territorial Legislature passed the M-Day Bill allocating $500,000 to this Administration and setting up a reserve fund of $1,000,000.

The work of the City and County Major Disaster Council had undoubtedly alerted large numbers of the population to the dangers involved in the Pacific and the necessity for serious, intensive defense preparedness. It is impossible to present briefly any complete picture of the extensive preparations that were made and the training and preparations carried through. In any event, however, the rapidity with which the personnel of the Major Disaster Council organization reported for duty immediately after the attack on December 7, 1941, and proceeded to discharge their pre-assigned duties efficiently and effectively is ample proof of the excellent organization that had been developed. There is attached herewith as Exhibit “C” a copy of a summary prepared by the undersigned of the activities of the Council following the attack. This report was prepared on January 2, 1942, following the activities of that fateful time. Additional reports of the various sub-committees are available if desired.
CONCLUSION

By this summary of defense activities, the undersigned has attempted to present in summary form only the extensive preparedness activities undertaken by the civilian community prior to the war. Additional brief statements of the chairmen of the Hawaii Chapter of the American Red Cross, the Medical Preparedness Committee, the Transportation Committee, the Blood Bank, and the Reserve Police follow this statement.

It is believed that after a review of these statements it will be evident that the civilian community had succeeded, long prior to Pearl Harbor, in developing elaborate preparations for any major disaster and demonstrated complete cooperation with the Army and the Navy with active response to any of the desires or suggestions of the military authorities for civilian preparedness. It is believed that this is certainly a matter to be entered into the record of the Honorable Investigating Committee to counteract any inferences or impressions in the testimony and report of the Pearl Harbor Army Board which might be construed to the contrary.

Additional information and material is available relative to the activities of the Major Disaster Council should the Committee so desire.

T. G. S. Walker
T. G. S. WALKER

[88]

EXHIBIT "A"

GENERAL SHORT'S BLACKOUT BROADCAST TALK, 20 MAY 1941

General Short (Following introduction by announcer): I am speaking to you from the command post of the Hawaiian Department somewhere on the Island of Oahu. Into this command post tonight have streamed the messages from the many vantage points both on this island of Oahu as well as from Hawaii, Maui, Lanai, Molokai and Kauai, telling the story of the great job the Territory of Hawaii has done in blacking out the Islands.

Far underground in the command post are located the vital nerve centers of command and communications of the Hawaiian Department. Staff officers have been receiving these reports both from Army airplanes and observation posts. In an actual emergency it is into these C. P's that the story of the blackout would stream.

From a vantage point in an observation post nearby I have with my own eyes witnessed the complete blackout of Honolulu, the great Pearl Harbor naval base, Schofield Barracks, and the Army's Hickam Field.

I have watched the swift and expeditious manner in which this job was done. From the reports pouring into the command post and handed to me here, I have been apprised of the success of the exercise throughout the entire Territory.

Hawaii has had, probably, more practice in blackout than any other major American community. But she has out-done her previous efforts tonight. Loyalty and cooperation with your Territorial Blackout Committee has spelled success in a job which would have made the task of enemy bombers a difficult one.

With such a spirit activating all Americans in this time of national trial I think we can meet with confidence all threats of enemy encroachment even that of bombardment from the air.

Governor Poindexter, Mr. Sinclair and members of the Territorial Blackout Committee, and to the people of the Territory of Hawaii, I extend my praise and congratulations, and giving you my aloha, I say Good Night.

[89]

EXHIBIT "B"

MINUTES—MAJOR DISASTER COUNCIL, CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU

The first meeting of the Major Disaster Council of the City and County of Honolulu was called to order by Mayor Lester Petrie, at 1:30 P. M. on Tuesday, June 24th, 1941, in the Assembly Room of Honolulu Hale.
Mayor Petrie opened the meeting by announcing that while a Council such as this had been under consideration for some time, it was necessary to get official backing before anything of importance could be done. The Board of Supervisors of the City and County of Honolulu had, therefore, on April 8th, 1941, passed Ordinance No. 891, Bill No. 24, creating the Major Disaster Council of the City and County of Honolulu, outlining its duties and functions, and providing for its maintenance. Mayor Petrie explained that the work had been delayed while the "M" day bill was under consideration in the Territorial Legislature, but now that it seems advisable, the organization of the Council would proceed immediately.

The Mayor expressed his appreciation for the response given by the downtown business men to his invitation to serve on the Council, and their indication of willingness to serve on this committee.

Mayor Petrie announced that he had appointed Mr. T. G. S. Walker as Co-ordinator of the Major Disaster Council, and that Mr. Walker had his staff organized and was at the service of the members.

A call of the roll showed all members of the Council present or officially represented.

Mr. T. G. S. Walker, Co-ordinator, gave a resume of what has been done by, and what could be expected of, the co-ordinator's office. He said that the principal aim was to try and stop the overlapping of individual organizations, and to get all civilian defense workers under the authority of the Mayor and Board of Supervisors. Mr. Walker said that in the main the committees would be run by City and County executives, but that no defense plan would be complete without the cooperation of the industrial and business leaders, and for this reason the splendid response of these leaders was greatly appreciated.

The Co-ordinator announced that the policy would be that the Co-ordinator will simply be the liaison man, who will work with the Army and Navy authorities so that our efforts will coordinate with their defense plans. He stated that both the Army and the Navy had been asked to serve on the Major Disaster Council in an advisory capacity, and that General Short had delegated, as representatives of the Army, Col. A. K. B. Lyman and Col. Casey Hayes; while Admiral Block had sent as the representatives of the Navy, Captain C. C. Baughman.

Mr. Walker stressed the fact that the work of the Council would of necessity be done by the chairmen of the various committees which the Mayor would appoint later in the meeting, and by their assistants, but that his office and staff would at all times be available for information or assistance. He suggested that in order to facilitate the handling of major problems, and to save the members of the Council from having to meet too frequently, an Executive Committee be appointed, and that it be comprised of the chairmen of the main committees of the Council.

Mayor Petrie said that he considered this the best procedure. He then asked the approval of the Council on the following appointments to the chairmanships of the various committees set up by Ordinance 891:

1. Co-ordination—T. G. S. Walker
2. Transportation—Addison E. Kirk
3. Communications—Alvah A. Scott
4. Law and Order—W. A. Gabrielson
5. Fire Protection—W. W. Blaisdell
6. Water and Water Supply—Frederick Ohrt
7. Streets and Highways—Joseph F. Kunesh
8. Medical: Health & Sanitation—T. M. Mossman, M. D.
9. Red Cross: Rescue etc.—John F. Gray.
10. Finance—George Waterhouse

The Mayor added that he had requested the Board of Supervisors to approve the name of W. W. Beers as a member of the Council, and that this action would be taken at the Board meeting today. Mr. Beers would then be appointed in charge of a new committee to handle the Food problem.

It was moved, seconded and unanimously carried that the list of chairmen submitted by Mayor Petrie be approved.

Mayor Petrie then asked that each member of the Council submit in writing to the Co-ordinator, the name, address and telephone number of an alternate who could represent him in case of enforced absence from a meeting of the Council.
The Mayor then suggested that the Executive Committee be comprised of the following:

Mayor Lester Petrie, Chairman
Joseph F. Kunesh, Vice-Chairman
W. A. Gabrielson
Frederick Ohrt
W. W. Blaisdell
T. M. Mossman, M. D.
John F. Gray
Alvah A. Scott
Addison E. Kirk
Supervisor John M. Asing
George Waterhouse
W. W. Beers
Col. A. K. B. Lyman
Col. Casey Hayes
Captain C. C. Baughman
T. G. S. Walker, Co-ordinator

The list was accepted as presented.

The suggestion was made, however, that the Council be kept advised at all times of the action taken by the Executive Committee, and this was agreed to be a necessary procedure.

The Mayor then presented for discussion the subject of finances. He pointed out that all phases of the work were handicapped by the lack of funds, and he stated that the City and County had reached its limit in supplying money to carry on the work. He then asked for suggestions as to a solution of the problem.

[91] A long discussion followed as to ways and means of financing the work of the Disaster Council.

Mr. Dillingham suggested that at least part of the cost should be borne by the Federal Government, and suggested that immediate contact be made with the Office for Emergency Management at Washington. Major General Wells concurred in this view. The Co-ordinator explained that this had already been done; and Mayor Petrie pointed out that the Governor and Dr. Fronk were now on their way to Washington to present the territorial situation to the Chairman of the Emergency Office. It was agreed that no direct action could be taken by this group that would in any way interfere with the Governor's program.

Mayor Petrie announced that just prior to his departure for the mainland, Governor Poindexter had appointed the following Territorial Advisory Defense Council:

Honorable Lester Petrie, Chairman
Dr. H. L. Arnold
Honorable William Ellis
Col. Perry M. Smoot
Honorable A. S. Spencer
Honorable S. M. Spencer
General Briant H. Wells

The Mayor read to the Council a letter from Admiral Block, in which he stated his willingness to cooperate with the Major Disaster Council; and he greeted the representatives of the Army and Navy who were present, thanking them for the wonderful cooperation they had given and were giving.

Mayor Petrie then stressed the necessity for the various committee chairmen keeping the Co-ordinator informed on all activities within their committees, furnishing him with copies of all pertinent correspondence, and also with a list of the personnel of the committees, together with office and home addresses and telephone numbers.

It was suggested and agreed that all publicity should be released through the office of the Co-ordinator.

After some discussion it was agreed that afternoon meetings were most convenient for the majority of the members, and the first meeting of the Executive Committee was called for 2 P. M. on Thursday, May 26th, 1941, in the office of the Mayor.
Mayor Petrie announced that all members of the Major Disaster Council must sign the Oath of Loyalty, and stated that notaries would be present in the Assembly Hall at the close of the meeting to administer the oath.

The meeting adjourned at 2:30 P. M. to meet again at the call of the Chair.

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**Key to Organization Chart**

**Major Disaster Council, City and County of Honolulu**

1. Co-ordination & Intelligence: T. G. S. Walker
2. Transportation: Addison E. Kirk
3. Communications: Alvah A. Scott
4. Power and Light: Leslie A. Hicks
5. Personnel: D. Ransom Sherretz
6. Law and Order: W. A. Gabrielson
6A. Provisional Police: Major Douglas C. King (Ret.)
7. Law Enforcement: W. A. Gabrielson
8. Fire Protection: W. W. Blaisdell
8A. Fire Wardens: Paul Carter, Director
9. Water and Water Supply: Frederick Ohrt
10. Streets and Highways: Jos. F. Kunesh
11. Medical: Thos. M. Mossman, M. D.
12. Health and Sanitation: F. M. Haralson, M. D.
13. Red Cross: John F. Gray
13A. Housing & Shelter-Evacuation: Frank E. Midkiff
13B. Necessities of Life: Lyman H. Bigelow
13C. Rehabilitation: W. A. Gabrielson
14. Rescue, Demolition, Gas Prot: Federated Churches
15. Air Raid Warning: A. K. Powell
17. Recreation: Jon Wiig
18. Mortuary Work: George Waterhouse
19. Law: Oren E. Long
20. Finance and Supplies: Stafford L. Austin
21. Education: W. W. Beers
22. Rural: Food Production:
   A. Zone 1—District 5: Sam Damon
   B. Zone 2—District 4: Cleghorn Robertson
   C. Zone 3—District 4: Tom Waddoups
   D. Waterfront Warden: J. L. Friel
23. Engineering: H. A. R. Austin
24. Publicity: Walter Macfarlane
25. Camouflage: Roht. O. Thompson
26. Protection of Art: Edgar C. Schenck

Not shown: Sub-committees reporting direct to Co-ordinator’s Committee.
The Co-ordinator of the Major Disaster Council of the City and County of Honolulu notified the Mayor promptly upon receipt by him of word that the Island of Oahu was being bombed, by enemy Japanese planes. He then proceeded immediately to his headquarters at the City Hall.

All Committee Chairmen and members of the Council were notified by telephone and radio to report immediately to the City Hall for duty. Within an amazingly short time all Chairmen and sub-chairmen of the twenty-six committees under the Major Disaster Council, had reported, and organizations composed of committee members and volunteers proceeded according to previously laid plans.

Mayor Petrie, who is also Chairman of the Major Disaster Council, authorized the Co-ordinator to use the facilities of the City Hall for headquarters, as he saw fit, thus making it possible to concentrate the majority of the work near the office of the Co-ordinator.

The Co-ordinator was then appointed Director of Civilian Defense for the Island of Oahu by the Territorial Director.

A clerical staff, composed of City and County employees, court workers, and volunteers from private industry, and others, was organized to handle the dissemination of information and instructions from the Co-ordinator to his Chairmen. This staff worked steadily all day Sunday and through the night. On Monday an arrangement was made to divide the staff into three groups, each working an eight hour period, viz: 8 A.M. to 4 P.M.; 4 P.M. to 12 midnight; and 12 midnight to 8 A.M. A competent person was appointed to direct the work of each group. These volunteers continued in full force for the first week—there being several hundred of them—after which the government employees returned to their departments, where they were needed as many department heads are also chairmen of Major Disaster Council committees. From that time on a strict volunteer staff has carried on. In the past week it has been possible to cut this group down to approximately thirty-five persons during the day, and a smaller number of volunteers at night, but a crew has been maintained on twenty-four hour duty in the Co-ordinator's office since the commencement of the war on December 7th, 1941.

In accordance with arrangements which had been made during the preparatory period, the American Legion delegated twelve men for use by the Co-ordinator in his office. These Legionnaires served as assistants to the Co-ordinator, and as guards and aides, performing any service asked of them willingly and efficiently. Two of these Legionnaires were appointed as Shift Directors in the office of the Co-ordinator. One other Shift Director and three Liaison Officers were also appointed by the Co-ordinator to assist him in the handling of the tremendous volume of work which centered in his office during the first three days following the attack. With these Shift Directors and Liaison Officers there were stenographers, typists and clerks on duty day and night.

Attached to this resume are copies of the reports of activity by the various individual committees during the period from December 7th to December 31st, 1941. These reports speak for themselves, and I can add nothing but the highest praise of the manner in which directions and instructions forwarded from the Co-ordinator's office to the Committee Chairmen, were followed out by the Chairmen and their workers.

As martial law was declared immediately after the disaster, and all civilians ordered off the streets, it was necessary that some means of identification for civilian defense workers be devised.

The Military Governor ruled that only Major Disaster Council identification cards would be recognized, and for several days this office issued identification cards, each bearing a number; arm bands (white with a large, red "CD" printed on them); and red, white and blue "CD" stickers for automobiles to all persons presenting proof that they were engaged in civilian defense operations. A record was kept of all cards, bands and stickers issued.

The number and type of volunteers was amazing, and most gratifying. They ranged from Army and Navy wives, resident civilians etc., to mainland salesmen whose work was interrupted and tourists who were stranded in Hawaii and anxious to do their bit. All came forward and offered their services, then served faithfully in whatever task was assigned them. One City and County official
stepped into a job of manual labor in order to get help quickly to people in distress. Many volunteers gave up any possibility of income to serve in civilian defense as long as they were needed; others found themselves without employment for one reason or another, when they returned to their businesses at the end of the first few strenuous days. Many of these latter have continued to work long hours without remuneration and without complaint.

During the first two or three days practically all questions regarding all phases of the problems facing the City and County of Honolulu came to this office. Clerks were on duty twenty-four hours a day to answer these calls and aid persons in need of information and assistance. Queries ranging from an inquiry from a Navy wife asking if her husband had been killed at Pearl Harbor, and service men attempting to locate their evacuated families, to simple questions of whether or not we were still being bombed, passed over the desks of these clerks, were disposed of, and a record kept of them. In the first two nights of the Blackout hundreds of calls were received. Some reported suspicious lights and signalling which warranted the investigation they received; others proved to be very bright stars twinkling in our blue Hawaiian sky. One woman threatened to go through the Governor to the President of the United States if guards were not placed on a downtown hotel, which was at the moment heavily guarded. Others reported incidents which were passed on to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

To sum up the activities of the Co-ordinator's office, for the first three days all placing of evacuees, taking over of schools for first aid stations; directing and instructing fire wardens, securing guards for buildings, utilities, etc., were directed and supervised by the Co-ordinator, and the work was carried out by the Committees of the Major Disaster Council as the Civilian Defense for the Island of Oahu.

[96] For the last two weeks the office has continued to function, carrying out the instructions and orders of the Military Governor, and Civilian Governor and the Territorial Director of Civilian Defense, and generally carrying on civilian defense operations. For the third week of the War there has been maintained in the City Hall a skeleton crew on twenty-four hour duty—all committees having returned to their own headquarters. There is, however, a large staff on call which can be rounded up and ready to work within an hour from the receipt of any announcement of an alert.

/s/ T. G. S. W.
T. G. S. WALKER,
Director, Civilian Defense for the Island of Oahu.

JANUARY 2nd, 1942.

[97] HAWAII CHAPTER, AMERICAN RED CROSS—ITS PART IN THE CIVILIAN PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM

Alfred L. Castle, Honolulu, Hawaii.

[98] The Hawaiian Chapter, American Red Cross, was set up in World War I on a Territory wide basis. It maintained a certain amount of service on Oahu after the war, and a skeleton organization throughout the Territory. There was no difficulty therefore for the Chapter to swing into any preparedness program for World War II.

PRELIMINARY

In June of 1940 the Hawaii Chapter decided that it should prepare itself and likewise take active part in the production and shipment of needed articles to our probable Allies, particularly Britain. At the Executive Committee meeting of June 13, 1940 a Production Committee was set up with Mrs. H. V. Von Holt, Chairman; Mrs. S. R. Damon, vice-chairman; and Mrs. Arthur Molynieux, chairman of Production. Mrs. H. S. Turner, was chairman of Surgical Dressings; Mrs. David Akana, chairman of Supplies, Instruction and Supervision; Mrs. Heaton L. Wrenn, chairman of Knitting; and Mrs. Peter K. McLean, chairman of Volunteer Special Services funds. After this same meeting contact was made with supply houses in Honolulu to the end that raw materials and supplies would always be on hand. It was pointed out that Hawaii might be the object of attack. Groups on Oahu, Molokai, Kauai, and at three localities on Hawaii were already at work on surgical dressings. From then on, for a period of 9–10 months, the majority of dressings and garments of various sorts produced
were sent to the British Red Cross. Contact was, however, maintained with the Army here, for at the meeting on November 28, 1940 Mrs. von Holt reported that the Army had recommended that one quota of surgical dressings be kept here for local use, a quota being approximately 17,000 dressings. At that meeting, however, it was felt that about 50,000 dressings should be kept here, which was done for those early stages.

**EXPANDED WORK**

By March of 1941 the Chapter had materially increased its work, and was more definitely pointing to the need for local preparedness. It was reported that from our local production 145,000 surgical dressings, and over 6000 knitted garments had been made and shipped to the British Red Cross, but from then on policy changed and production was held here. At the meeting of March 21, 1941 the pending M-day bill in the Hawaiian legislature was discussed. The First-Aid Committee reported some 1000 women had completed courses. Mrs. Moir reported that two Motor Corps classes had been completed, one at Schofield Barracks totalling 30 women and one in Honolulu with 28. Further steps were taken at that meeting to set up again the formal Branch organizations on the outside islands.

**MAJOR DISASTER COUNCIL**

In April of 1941 the Supervisors of Honolulu created a Major Disaster Council to coordinate the resources of the City, with residents, firms, agencies and organizations to meet any major disaster or emergency. The Red Cross, acting under National charter, could not surrender in any way either its direct prerogatives or obligations, but the Hawaii Chapter immediately cooperated with such Council and throughout did its agreed-upon part. Because of their long experience, Mr. John Gray, for nearly 20 years with the Red Cross in Hawaii and executive secretary of the Chapter, and Alfred L. Castle, [99] Chapter vice-chairman, were at once assigned to the preparedness work, both acting as members of the Major Disaster Council and liaison between the Army and Red Cross. Mr. Castle had organized the Hawaii Chapter in World War I, was the first Field Director here, was a deputy commissioner and executive secretary for the Red Cross in Siberia, and special reprehensive to Japan, China, and the Philippines in World War I. The relations between the Hawaii Chapter and the Major Disaster Council were of the best throughout.

**WAR PREPAREDNESS**

The plans of the Red Cross were laid primarily with a view to air attack by Japan, an attack which might be directed not only against military and naval objects but also against the city, whether deliberate or not. The possibility of bombardment was considered, and, to a small degree, invasion and its effect on the civilian population. Besides repeated conferences with the Major Disaster Council (hereafter called the Disaster Council), conferences were had by Messrs. Gray and Castle, individually or together, with the Commanding General Walter G. Short, and the Department Surgeon, Col. Edgar King and members of his staff. As a result of the conferences with the Army, General Short on May 10, 1941 wrote Mr. Castle a letter which stated in part: 

"* * * In the first priority and requiring immediate action are:

1. The organization and training of aid station groups and the provision of initial equipment for not less than twelve such stations.

2. The provision of an adequate reserve of medical supplies for the civilian population.

It is understood that the training of personnel for the aid station groups has been well begun and that a primary objective is to provide funds for completion of the training and for the purchase of initial equipment for twelve stations. The time element is very important as the supplies, both initial and reserve, must, I am informed, be secured on the mainland, not being locally available.

"* * * It also is my understanding that the arrangements for carrying on this work, as contemplated by your organization, are fully concurred in by other local groups now concerned with the same problem."

General Short's letter is attached hereto in full and marked Exhibit "A". Relationships between the Army and Red Cross throughout the entire period to December 7 were of the best.
Under this general title of War Preparedness the work will be grouped under appropriate subheadings.

(a) First Aid Training and Aid Stations.

By the end of March 1941 and as a part of the intensive Red Cross program nearly 1,000 persons had received first aid training.

In April of 1941 the Preparedness Committee of the [100] Honolulu County Medical Society, headed by Dr. Harry L. Arnold with Dr. Robert B. Faus as executive officer undertook, in cooperation with the Red Cross, a very intensive first aid training program. Red Cross instruction books were used, and Red Cross certificates awarded for those who passed. Strictly Red Cross classes were also continued separately. While the larger part of this operation was conducted by the Preparedness Committee, and the history will appear in the reports of Dr. Harry L. Arnold, Chairman of that Committee, the net result was that many thousand persons were trained and qualified prior to December 7.

On April 25, 1941 a joint statement on the training plan was issued by the Preparedness Committee and the Red Cross and published in the Honolulu Press. Such statement is here to attached and marked Exhibit "B".

In September of 1941 the National Red Cross in Washington sent to Hawaii two expert instructors in first aid and water safety to assist in the intensified program.

As a part of the general program it was essential that aid station equipment be obtained so that on an attack there would not only be available trained personnel but aid stations fully equipped, with trained personnel, so that casualties could be effectively handled. It was contemplated that much of the funds necessary would come from the M-Day bill being considered by the Territorial Legislature in April. The bill apparently was lost the last night of the session in the first days of May, and no relief was forthcoming. The Red Cross then at once stepped in and supplied emergency funds, until after June 30 the Board of Supervisors of the City was able to make further appropriations. Had not the Red Cross stepped in at that time the entire program might have been seriously jeopardized. (See letter of Mr. Castle to Dr. Arnold, dated May 13, 1941, marked Exhibit "C", enclosing copy of the letter of General Short (Exhibit "A"), and Dr. Arnold’s reply thereto, marked Exhibit "D").

It was likewise necessary to obtain the actual equipment for first aid stations, which are referred to in the correspondence attached variously as “units,” “medical units,” “aid stations” and “emergency units,” and physically to set these up for operation at carefully selected sites. The Army, in the first instance, came to the rescue, agreeing to loan 20 units to the Red Cross. In early June sixteen units had been received from the Army, which were immediately put to use. (See excerpt from letter Mr. Gray to Mr. Castle, dated June 10, 1941, marked Exhibit E.)

Meanwhile, to hasten matters and to get further aid from the National Red Cross in Washington, John Gray, executive secretary of the Hawaii Chapter, left here on April 15 for Washington armed with letters from Colonel King, the department surgeon, specifying medical supplies and emergency units necessary for use for the civilian population in case of an attack, and not purchasable locally. The medical supplies will be referred to later. Later in May and June Mr. Castle was in Washington also discussing both subjects with National Red Cross headquarters. Tentative agreements were reached and by the end of July twelve complete medical station units, costing some $25,000, were ordered for shipment to the Hawaii Chapter. (See excerpt from letter Mr. Mitchell to Mr. Castle, dated July 22, 1941, marked Exhibit F.)

These units all arrived in Hawaii prior to December 7, and were held in accord with a letter from Colonel King, [101] dated July 29, 1941, marked Exhibit "G".

On the Japanese attack, Honolulu had adequately trained personnel and properly equipped first aid stations at 20 separated points, sufficient to meet any emergency existing on that day and for the entire war as it developed. Each station had been adequately supplied far in advance by the Hawaii Chapter, Red Cross, with surgical dressings and other production equipment.

The matter of expansion of hospital facilities referred to in General Short's letter was handled by the Preparedness Committee.

(b) Medical Supplies.

The Department Surgeon, Colonel King, felt that emergency supplies of drugs and medicines, not procurable locally, should be on hand for civilian use, with
which we agreed. This list, prepared by Colonel King, was taken on April 15
to the National Red Cross by Mr. Gray and under date of May 16, 1941, the
Red Cross here was advised that National would send such supplies. In June
the City decided to make certain purchases of medical supplies, but Mr. Castle
then in Washington was able to explain that such purchases did not conflict or
in any way overlap the articles desired of the Red Cross. The medical supplies
requested of the Red Cross were delivered in Honolulu beginning in August, in
various batches, up to December 4, 1941, at a cost of about $40,000.

(c) Production Department—Surgical Dressings.

Beginning in April 1941, all production was held in Hawaii, and the character
of the production was molded to meet an anticipated attack. The number of
workers, all volunteers, who came to the work rooms at the Castle Kindergarten
and elsewhere steadily increased. Work done was on surgical dressings, hospital
garments, operating robes, convalescent robes, pajamas, knitted goods and other
necessary articles. In July the Department Surgeon was given a statement,
marked Exhibit "H," showing the disposition of locally produced Red Cross
surgical dressings in the Territory, in addition to actually finished goods held
in Honolulu. The statement also showed that material had been ordered for
approximately 240,000 more surgical dressings.

In August a quota of surgical dressings, about 17,000 dressings, was divided
among the 20 aid stations operated by the Preparedness Committee (Drs. Arnold
and Faus). Certain hospital garments and other emergency robes or garments
were likewise distributed.

Long before December 7 the Red Cross used certain homes, with proper base-
ments, and two school buildings, at widely separated parts of the City, for the
storage of such articles that would be used at once in case of an attack. There
were more of such storage centers, away from headquarters at Castle Kindergarten,
and in them were stored surgical dressings, hospital garments and robes,
convalescent robes, and such, women's and children's clothing, and canned goods.
All centers were selected with a view to both geographical distribution and quick
accessibility.

In October and November the Hawaii Chapter in its surgical dressings produc-
tion centered on special Army dressings, and between November 25 and December
4 delivered to the Army Medical Department here a total of 58,121 dressings.

On December 7 the parties assigned to headquarters and to the storage centers reported on a prearranged schedule. From one center over
19,000 dressings were released for the Pearl Harbor hospital, together with certain
garments, and one quota, about 17,000, was sent to Tripler Hospital from another
center, deliveries in each instance being made by the Red Cross Motor Corps.
The foundation laid and the experience gained during the entire year of 1941
made possible the enormous and specialized production for the services, Army,
Navy and Marine, which steadily increased throughout the war, in the latter
months averaging well over 1,000,000 surgical dressings per month.

(d) Motor Corps.

Motor Corps was organized in April and May of 1941, its first work being the
collection, sorting and distribution of books and magazines to our armed forces.
In order to qualify, members had to take prescribed courses. Regular duty was
started on July 21, 1941, with 28 Army wives, 17 Navy and 49 civilian women,
military or single. Due to the evacuation policy of service personnel, by Decem-
ber 7 there were only three in Motor Corps directly connected with the Army or
Navy, their places being largely filled by local women. In order that the Army
and Navy should be fully acquainted with Motor Corps uniform, cars, and in-
signia, as well as for humanitarian reasons, Motor Corps from July on took con-
valescents from Military and Naval hospitals for drives and excursions. During
the fall months additional training was given in first aid, emergency delivery of
babies, military drill, gas and chemical warfare lectures and demonstration,
and blackout driving. A complete list of assignments, subject of course for change,
was made for attack day, so on December 7 certain Corps members reported at
once to assigned posts, and the balance at headquarters.

On December 7, and for the immediate days thereafter, not a single prepara-
tion proved to be futile. Motor Corps carried supplies to Hickam, Pearl Harbor,
Schofield and other posts, assisted evacuees, and hurried back and forth from all
Army and Navy posts on innumerable assignments. Naturally, such posts were
closed to the public on the attack, but the fact that Motor Corps and the Red Cross uniform had been previously well known made it possible to go right through to complete vital assignments, whereas others were turned back. All this was not an accident—it had been carefully thought out and prepared for months in advance; and on that particular day, a Sunday, proved a Godsend.

(c) Evacuation and Disaster Relief.

It had been agreed in advance that evacuation, housing and feeding of civilians caused by an enemy attack was primarily a governmental function. Nevertheless, the Red Cross stood by to assist and cooperate. On December 7 Motor Corps assisted in transporting evacuees. The Red Cross took charge, and assumed responsibility for the large group of evacuees housed at the University of Hawaii. Movements of evacuees were quickly coordinated without the slightest friction between the Disaster Council and the Red Cross.

In accordance with prearranged plans the heads of the large supply houses in Honolulu, together with adequate staff and all available trucks and drivers, reported at once on December 7 for duty. Telephone orders from the Red Cross for clothing, mattresses, blankets, canned goods and innumerable items were promptly filled and delivered by the Red Cross. Motor Corps or properly authorized civilian trucks, as the case might be. The Red Cross did not have to go through any red tape but orders were taken over the phone and the charges made later. December 7 and the following few days cost the Red Cross some $50,000.

(f) Canteen Service.

This corps was organized in August 1941. It had training in serving convalescents from Navy hospitals on picnics, and certain Allied contingents passing through Honolulu, both in conjunction with Motor Corps. The Navy had loaned the original equipment.

At 10 a.m. on December 7 the Canteen Corps was called to duty and set up service at once in the Iolani Palace grounds, feeding medical unit workers, officials, truck drivers, guards, emergency police, civilians, or any one who needed food in such grounds. Canteen Corps remained on 24-hour duty until December 17 when gradually its work in the Palace was taken over by the O.C.D. Service to evacuees, located and living in other parts of Honolulu was, as stated above, handled by the Relief Council and the Red Cross. By the time O.C.D. took over, the evacuee problem had largely worked itself out.

It is interesting to note that the acting chairman of this unit passed the entrance at Pearl Harbor that morning at 6:30 on an Inter-Island steamer on her return to Honolulu, receiving her call for service at her home shortly thereafter.

(g) Home Service Department.

This department, trained to assist service men and their families, was organized in September 1941 but not specifically as a war measure. On December 7, because of its trained personnel, it was at once of value in assisting evacuees to look up separated members of families, render temporary assistance and advice, to assist in new living arrangements, and to answer inquiries from the mainland.

CONCLUSION

The fact that civilian affairs ran so well on December 7 is definitely due to the intensive preparation of the Disaster Council, with all its ramifications, and the Red Cross. There was no panic or any semblance of one. It is remarkable that throughout all the training period there was no friction, but only a “pull-together” and “get-ready” spirit. The closest cooperation prevailed between the Disaster Council, its able director, T. G. S. Walker, Drs. Arnold and Fans, the Army medical department acting under authority of the Commanding General, and the Red Cross. On December 7 the Disaster Council’s headquarters were at the City Hall, and the Red Cross at the Castle Kindergarten, both in the same block. The preparedness work as a whole stimulated the Red Cross workers in that period, and certainly assisted as a starting point for the amazing record of the Hawaii Chapter, all of which, except for “military secrets”, appears in the printed Hawaii Chapter reports issued subsequently for each year.

Alfred L. Castle.

ALFRED L. CASTLE.
Mr. A. L. Castle,  
Acting Director, American Red Cross, Honolulu, T. H.

My dear Mr. Castle: It has been brought to my attention that the local chapter of the American Red Cross has offered to take such action as may be needed, to continue the program of preparation for emergency relief for the civilian population, to become effective in event of disaster particularly such as might eventuate from an enemy air attack on the city. It is understood that the leadership thus assumed will be available until superseded by an appropriate Government agency or until for other reasons it is no longer needed.

That leadership, under those conditions as offered by the American Red Cross, is a source of the greatest satisfaction to me. May I again bring to your attention what seem to be the most urgent local needs. In the first priority and requiring immediate action are:

1. The organization and training of aid station groups and the provision of initial equipment for not less than twelve such stations.
2. The provision of an adequate reserve of medical supplies for the civilian population.

It is understood that the training of personnel for the aid station groups has been well begun and that a primary objective is to provide funds for completion of the training and for the purchase of initial equipment for twelve stations. The time element is very important as the supplies, both initial and reserve, must, if I am informed, be secured on the mainland, not being locally available. Closely linked with the items in the first priority but not of such extreme urgency in point of time are:

1. The expansion of hospital facilities for the civilian population.
2. The provision of an adequate number of vehicles for ambulance service on call.

It also is my understanding that the arrangements for carrying on this work, as contemplated by your organization, are fully concurred in by other local groups now concerned with the same problem.

I consider your proposed action to be both adequate and timely and should like to see it be put into effect in the shortest practicable time in order to meet any disaster or emergency situation.

Yours very truly,

(Walter C. Short)  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Commanding.

While the United States is not actually at war, and there is no occasion for war hysteria, the international situation is so critical that the civilian population of Honolulu must realize that the time has come now—not tomorrow for intelligent, adequate, civilian defense preparedness. No sane person can think otherwise. The Army and Navy is not here to protect the population of Honolulu; their duty is to defend Hawaii as one of the most vital parts of the American Defense system. In case of emergency the civilian population must be prepared to care for itself.

As one of the first and most constructive steps in this program the Preparedness Committee of the Medical Association has undertaken the task of recruiting, training and getting ready for instant mobilization a large group of civilians who will be so organized that they can quickly render first aid, collect, sort, and transport to hospitals injured civilians with proficiency.

At least 50 doctors are now freely giving their time for this training period. This program needs men and women who can become thoroughly trained in this work. As a part of the enrollment in this training and work, those taking the course are required to respond to their posts of duty at any call in an emer-
gency. Honolulu must be able to mobilize quickly and efficiently, and its volunteers must be competent to perform tasks assigned.

No program can be carried through without cost. The instruction books and supplies involved cost in excess of $1.00, but the booklet received is a valuable one for anyone to own. The majority of people taking the course will undoubtedly gladly pay this $1.00, but certain firms and individuals have contributed enough so that if anyone cannot afford this sum the booklet and supplies will be furnished them free.

At the end of the course examinations will be given in cooperation with the Red Cross, and those passing will receive proper certificates. To qualify for such certificate, the person must have attended instruction classes for at least 20 hours, must pass a written examination and certain demonstration tests in artificial respiration, digital pressure, etc., and practical problems.

The Red Cross, for a long time here in Honolulu and throughout the Territory, has been making up surgical dressings and materials of all types which would be imperatively needed in case of an emergency. The call on the Red Cross is and has been heavy, and will be for some time to come—how long no one knows.

The instruction courses being given by the Preparedness Committee do not overlap or conflict with the First Aid classes of the Red Cross. These latter classes are educational—vital so now—and will continue as formerly, with the granting of the certificates to those who pass successfully. In less than a year now, 897 persons have successfully passed [107] the work prescribed in the Red Cross courses, providing a most valuable nucleus for any defense work.

(Honolulu, Hawaii, April 25, 1941)

ROBERT B. FAUS,
Executive Officer in Charge of Plans and Training
for Preparedness Committee.

ALFRED L. CASTLE,
Vice Chairman Hawaiian Chapter, American Red Cross.

[108]

EXHIBIT "C"

Dr. HARRY L. ARNOLD,
Chairman, Preparedness Committee of the Honolulu Medical Association,
Honolulu, T. H.

DEAR DR. ARNOLD: Confirming our conversation of recent date, I wish to define the relationship of the Red Cross with your committee in connection with the point of first aid training, the equipment of first aid stations, etc., as originally worked out by your committee.

The program originally proposed by your committee was a very vital part of the plans already prepared for M-Day. It had been assumed that the legislature would pass the M-Day bill, which in turn carried with it an appropriation of $50,000 for what I may term the "training period," and a further $250,000 after an emergency should be declared. This bill failed under circumstances not necessary here to relate, and left the entire program somewhat in chaos. Unless something was done for civilian defense, the attitude of Hawaii towards such defense seemed a disgrace.

The work of your committee, and the training in first aid for emergency purpose, were already under way. It seemed criminal to drop this for lack of funds. Accordingly, a tentative arrangement was worked out by which your executive officer, DR. R. B. FAUS, became Chairman of the Disaster Relief Committee of the Red Cross. You are also a member and you are familiar with the personnel of that committee, which consists of six. If you want to suggest another doctor or someone else on the committee please let me know, but, as pointed out below, the work will in practice function through your own committee.

The program so splendidly outlined and started by your committee is not technically a Red Cross function. Your own program is more properly a Government function which would have been carried out through funds provided by the M-Day bill. The Red Cross would in the usual situation function as a relief organization after a disaster has occurred. However, the Red Cross cooperates with other agencies, and in this particular instance it is obvious that work started by you must not stop; it is vital to defense, and is the first step in preparing against a disaster which might be much worse except for adequate preparedness.
It will not be the policy of the Red Cross to endeavor in any way to direct or control your work. For that reason we appointed Dr. Faus chairman of our committee, as the work he is heading up seems the most vital to be carried on. However, we will have to supply the funds, budget the same, and have the same properly audited; the same would be true whether you worked with Government funds or Red Cross. There are other matters in connection with disaster relief which we ourselves will have to work out and which were contemplated by the M-Day setup.

If and when Government funds are available the work of your committee will undoubtedly come under the Gov-

ment setup, where it should properly come. There is no thought on the part of the Red Cross to retain any function properly belonging to another group, or in any way to take any credit for the work of the Medical Association. We are only trying to carry on as a stopgap until an M-Day program with Government funds can be perfected for I am convinced this must come sooner or later.

The big problem now is of course finance. I am informed that the minimum requirement of your present program is $20,000, with more to come if the work is expanded to complete the setup. The Red Cross has not that amount available. It will therefore be our problem to consider ways and means of raising funds and of carrying on the work being done by you, until such time as Governmental funds are available. Please understand that the amount of assistance we can give is limited by the financial problem. I believe the present arrangement, as soon as this is approved by your committee, can be covered by temporary budget allotment.

I feel, also, that the present arrangement is a happy one, as the work of the Production Department of the Red Cross, and its own First Aid classes, very closely dovetails in with your work.

I enclose a copy of a letter from General Short which sets forth this entire matter far better than I can. He is very definite in his statement that this work should continue, and certainly the Red Cross will endeavor to cooperate to the best of its ability. Let me repeat again our assurance that we are not trying to dictate policies to you, or interfere with or control your work, but are merely trying to make possible the continuation of this work until our assistance is superseded by the appropriate Government agency.

Very truly yours,

/S/ ALFRED L. CASTLE,
Vice Chairman, Hawaiian Chapter of the American Red Cross.

ALC: GB
ENCL.

[110]

EXHIBIT “D”

HONOLULU, HAWAII, May 13, 1941.

Mr. ALFRED L. CASTLE,
Vice-Chairman, Hawaiian Chapter of the American Red Cross,
Honolulu, T. H.

DEAR MR. CASTLE: We are deeply appreciative of your letter of even date, offering the financial assistance of the American Red Cross in making preparations for disaster relief of the civilian population of Honolulu.

It is the unanimous opinion of this committee that we should accept your offer and proceed as rapidly as possible to secure the necessary funds and supplies as outlined in General Short’s letter. The amount mentioned in your letter ($20,000) would not be adequate for the full program, but would provide for the initial training period.

Yours very truly,

HONOLULU COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY,
By (s) H. L. ARNOLD, Chairman.
[111]

**Exhibit “E”**

Excerpt—letter from John F. Gray, Secretary Hawaii Chapter, to Mr. Alfred L. Castle, dated June 10, 1941.

“Under date of June 7th I wired you to let you know something of what had been happening here. I am now enclosing a clipping from the Advertiser June 5, 1941, outlining in more detail the action taken by City-County officials with regard to providing medical supplies and fire equipment. Bids have been let for the supplies and apparently these will be available in the near future.

In the meantime Mr. Evans, Special Representative from National Headquarters whom you did not meet, has contacted the military and civilian authorities during a brief stay of four or five days and he is to return on June 16th for a ten days’ or two weeks stay at which time civilian activities will be coordinated with official agencies. Until then it was deemed advisable that the training of the medical units continue without interruption and the Army agreed to loan us up to twenty units, authority for this having been received from the War Department in Washington.

To date I have signed for sixteen of these units which have been delivered to the Armory in the custody of Dr. Faus and Mr. Fitkin who are assigning units to their various commanders. Mr. Evans also thought it advisable and wired for Washington to ship us twelve complete units for our own use here. Undoubtedly we shall have to set up at least one unit on each of the larger outside islands if for no other than psychological reasons.

Just this morning Mr. Davis of Consolidated Amusement authorized me to give publicity to the donation of the ambulance and that will be released within a day or two.

Production work is progressing very nicely under the leadership of Mrs. Molyneux. Mrs. von Holt was ill going up to the coast, as you may know, and she stayed in Los Angeles only a week before returning. She is not on duty yet but hopes to be very soon.”

[112]

**Exhibit “F”**

Excerpt—letter from L. M. Mitchell, Assistant to the Vice Chairman, American Red Cross, to Mr. Alfred L. Castle, Vice Chairman, Hawaii Chapter, dated July 22, 1941.

“Meantime, we are proceeding with the matter of medical supplies and have authorized the purchase of equipment for the twelve stations in accordance with the request transmitted by the Chapter and the letters prepared by the Army authorities. As soon as medical station equipment can be purchased, it will be shipped to your Chapter for assembly in the twelve station units, since it is not feasible at this end to break up the purchases and assemble the units prior to shipping. It is understood that these medical station units will be held for the emergency and that in the event an emergency need does not develop and there is later need for them elsewhere, they will be available for such use. With this understanding, the cost of this equipment is being met by the National organization.

“As indicated in our cable of yesterday to Mr. Gray, we have already ordered the revolving stock of medical supplies requested some time ago as a reserve to be held in Honolulu for immediate use in case of emergency. These supplies have actually been purchased for China and are shipped to Honolulu to protect your ability to meet any emergency that may arise. They should be held intact so that, if necessary, they may be forwarded to China at a later date, or shipped elsewhere as the need arises. It may be advisable with some items to forward the stock on hand in Honolulu to China and replace with fresh supplies in the interest of keeping the stock currently fresh. From time to time, the situation will be reviewed and appropriate action to keep the stock in current condition for immediate use will be made.”
[113] EXHIBIT "G"

(Letterhead of Headquarters Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.)

Mr. John F. Gray, Field Director,
American Red Cross,
426 Dillingham Building,
Honolulu, T. H.

My Dear Mr. Gray: The following plan for the storage and issue of certain amounts of American Red Cross medical supplies, designated as "Reserve" and "Aid Station Equipment (12)" has been approved:

1. Both the Reserve and the Aid Station Equipment will be held in storage for actual use and not issued for training purposes. If items for training purposes cannot be secured from any other source, minimal quantities as approved by this office to be issued for this purpose.

2. All items to be stored under the control of the Commanding Officer, Hawaiian Medical Depot, properly dispersed, Storage to be at the risk of the American Red Cross.

3. Method of Storage:
   a. Reserve Supplies. According to usually accepted rules.
   b. Aid Station Equipment. Each to be earmarked for a particular local civilian Aid Station group. To be so marked and the proper civilian officials notified.

4. Issue. By order of the Department Surgeon, subject to approval of the Department Commander.

Please notify Captain Paul Nixon, Hawaiian Medical Depot, Fort Shafter, as far in advance of arrival of supplies as your information permits. Include approximate cubic footage space required and list of items.

Reference transportation, request delivery by you at points to be specified by Captain Nixon.

Yours very truly,

Edgar King,
Colonel, Medical Corps,
Department Surgeon.

Information Copy:
Mr. A. L. Castle,
312 Castle & Cooke, Ltd.
Honolulu, T. H.

[114] EXHIBIT "H"

SURGICAL DRESSINGS

HAWAII (1 quota) — Hilo has material and is making a quota to be stored in Hilo: Mrs. R. M. Lindsay, Hilo, Phone 2006.
KOHALA (1 quota) — Has completed quota, five boxes, stored. Mrs. James M. Beck, Mahukona, Phone, Kohala 368.
KEALAKEKUA (2 boxes) — 2 boxes shipped from Oahu. Assorted. To be stored by Mrs. William J. Paris, Kainahulu, Hawaii, Phone, 2 W 716.
LANAI (1 quota) — Ship from Oahu 5 boxes completed by Oahu. To be stored by Mrs. H. B. Caldwell, Lanai City, Lanai, No phone, must wire.
MOLOKAI (1 quota) — Material for 1 quota is being made up on Molokai and will be stored by Mrs. George P. Cooke, Kaunakakai, Molokai, Phone, 7 W 29.
MAUI (2 quotas) — Has material to make one quota. Will ship from Oahu quota now being completed by Kahuku. To be stored by Mrs. Stanley Eimore, Spreckelsville, Maui, Phone, 4 W 576.
KAUAI (1 quota) — Has material and is making quota to be stored by Mrs. J. C. Plews, Lihue, Kauai, Phone, Lihue 326.
OAHU (3 quotas) — Will make and store 3 quotas here in three separate places. Material on hand for 3 quotas plus. Material for 14 extra quotas ordered from the mainland.

# One quota contains approximately 17,000 dressings.
MEDICAL PREPAREDNESS IN THE TERRITORY OF HAWAII PRIOR TO DECEMBER 7, 1941

H. L. ARNOLD, M. D., Honolulu, Hawaii

MEDICAL PREPAREDNESS

The first organized effort of the medical profession of Honolulu to prepare for the medical aspects of war, began in June of 1940. Dr. Clarence Fronk was appointed by the officers of the Territorial Medical Association to represent them on the National Committee on Medical Preparedness. During the following year, Doctors Fronk, Faus, Wallis, Keay and Burden were appointed as a Territorial Committee on Preparedness. The County Medical Society also appointed a Committee in 1940, consisting of Doctors Fronk, Palma, Fred Lam and James Kuninobu. This Committee met, made plans, and endeavored to interest the profession, but in general, their efforts did not meet with much success. However, on April 11, 1941, following discussions with the Surgeon, Hawaiian Department, Colonel—now Brigadier General—Edgar King, the Honolulu County Medical Society elected a committee, consisting of seven members, Doctors Larsen, Judd, Strode, Pinkerton, Withington, Faus and the writer. These men were called the Preparedness Committee, and were given power to act for the Society in making the necessary arrangements to prepare for the care of civilian casualties in the event of war.

Organization

The first meeting of this committee was held on April 15, 1941. The conviction of every member of the committee that war was imminent and that it was urgently necessary for preparations to be made to care for a potentially large number of injured civilians is reflected in the following excerpts from the minutes of this initial meeting.

* * * The following specific actions were taken:

Dr. Robert Faus was reappointed to the position which he held under the previous preparedness committee. It was decided that his work was to be facilitated by the Committee in any way which Dr. Faus might suggest.

The actual listing of medical personnel on this Island for duties during war conditions was decided to be an absolutely necessary factor and this work will go forward as rapidly as possible.

Dr. Fronk stated that the Army would be able to furnish beds and linen for the potentially expanded hospitals. Dr. Fronk also stated that it was unlikely that subsidiary hospitals anywhere near the business districts would be useful.

The potential local manufacture of typhoid vaccines was discussed and approved.

The offer of Dr. James Kuninobu of supplying medical personnel from the Japanese Medical Society for service in the event that it is needed was accepted gladly and he will be so notified.

Dr. Pinkerton reported that the blood and plasma bank situation was satisfactory and well under way.

Dr. Faus was given charge of the arranging for supplies of orthopedic apparatus such as Thomas splints and Kirschner stirrups.

The minutes of this first meeting of the Preparedness Committee are attached hereto in full and marked Exhibit "A".

Dr. Robert Faus (now Colonel, M. C., A. U. S.) was made executive officer in charge of plans and training and functioned as such until after December 7, 1941. Subcommittees were formed and additional advisers called in from time to time. Liaison was established with the Army, the Hawaii Chapter, American Red Cross, the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce, the City and County government, the Major Disaster Council under Mr. Walker, the Nursing Association, and innumerable other less important organizations. The close liaison maintained with the Hawaii Chapter of the American Red Cross is reflected in the exchange of correspondence with that organization (See the following letters in the presentation of the Hawaii Chapter, American Red Cross: Letter of Mr. Castle to Dr. Arnold dated May 13, 1941, marked Exhibit "C" enclosing copy of letter from Lt. General Walter C. Short, and Dr. Arnold's reply thereto marked Exhibit "D").
Training

The physicians of the city were divided into groups and assigned to specific duties in the event of war. One group of surgeons, with their volunteer nurses, was assigned to go to military hospitals and assist military surgeons in caring for their casualties, since it was obvious that the medical staffs of these hospitals for normal times would not be able to deal with a sudden influx of casualties resulting from enemy action. Other groups were assigned to do the same thing for the local civilian hospitals. Still others were assigned to First Aid Stations to care for minor casualties, and to prepare for transportation to the hospital those casualties too badly injured to be taken there without prior treatment. Twenty First Aid Stations were set up throughout the City in schools and public buildings, and in some instances in private buildings through the generosity of the owners, and to each of these a staff was attached. It was obvious that it would be necessary to train large numbers of lay personnel in the primary care of casualties, and there were not enough teachers to do this. Therefore, a course was instituted for "teaching teachers." A large class of teachers was trained by Dr. Faus and given diplomas by the Hawaii Chapter of the American Red Cross, and the work of training the workers themselves then began. In all nearly 3,000 individuals representing all nationalities were given courses and certificates of graduation in the principles of First Aid, Ambulance Training, etc.

All of these training activities included extensive publicity throughout the entire community. Records of the Preparedness Committee show that from the time of its inception to November 30, 1941, members of the committee had delivered a total of 18 public speeches while newspaper publicity had totalled 3,775 inches in the columns of the local newspapers.

Finances were a problem from the beginning. Obviously, it was necessary to have some sort of an office and to have at least a skeleton personnel to do typing, mimeographing, mailing and so forth. The funds for this purpose came very largely from the Hawaii Chapter of the American Red Cross, although the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce, the Committee [118] members themselves, and many other persons of all nationalities contributed liberally of their funds for the purpose. The Army detailed a medical officer to the sole duty of assisting in the work. The large mercantile firms of Honolulu, such as American Factors, T. H. Davies, and many others, were contacted for permission to make arrangements to convert their fleets of trucks into ambulances by the addition of frames to hold stretchers. Two hundred and fifty such trucks were thus fitted and the drivers trained before December 7, 1941.

Nursing Services

A survey of the nursing facilities of the Territory, under Miss Matthews, was instituted and carried out and the nurses available for emergency duty in every community were listed, with their telephone numbers and capabilities.

Hospitals

The hospitals of the City were studied critically, with a view to discovering how their capacities to care for patients could be increased, and how they could be evacuated of the less seriously ill to permit the entrance of large numbers of casualties, should the occasion arise.

Supplies and Equipment

The supplies and equipment of the Aid Stations were in part loaned by the Army, and in part purchased by funds donated by the Hawaii Chapter of the American Red Cross, the Chamber of Commerce, and the City and County of Honolulu. Each Aid Station had at least two doctors assigned to it, two dentists, at least three nurses, a group of nurses' aides, ambulance drivers, and many other types of specialized personnel. These volunteers attended regular weekly meetings from June, 1941, until long after the war had begun.

Ambulances

Three ambulances were donated—one by the Wholesale Liquor Dealers' Association, one by the Consolidated Amusement Company, and one by the Schuman Carriage Company. These vehicles were almost indispensable during the training period for transportation of supplies, equipment and personnel to the various stations. The ambulances which would be depended upon if war came, however, were the converted trucks volunteered by Honolulu business firms. Mass rallies were held on several occasions in the Armory, and in the auditorium of McKinley
High School for the purpose of stimulating interest and furthering the course of training.

On each of the "outside" islands, a chairman was selected by the local County Medical Society and put in charge of the work, as had been done in Honolulu. The preparations were, of necessity, less elaborate and extensive than were in Honolulu, but every island, including Lanai, had made, long before December 7th, Definite and detailed plans for what they would do in the event of enemy action.

Evacuation

Evacuation sites were provided for the various hospitals, to serve for a place to put less seriously sick patients, to make room for more seriously injured and to increase their possible capacity. It was also assumed that it was likely that a hospital might well be destroyed by fire or bombing and that the entire organization might find it necessary to move to new quarters. These were selected and arrangements made for transportation to them. The Major Disaster Council's transportation division, under Mr. Kirk, was responsible for these arrangements. In spite of the serious objection of the Bureau of Narcotics of the International Revenue Department, arrangements were made with the Hawaii Chapter of the American Red Cross to have on hand a generous supply of morphine. This was stored in a safety deposit vault, pending the need for its distribution. Typhoid vaccine was arranged for, from the Territorial Board of Health, it being felt that in the event that the people in the community, or any considerable number of them, were evacuated to the mountains, typhoid fever would promptly become a problem.

Blood Bank

The blood plasma bank, which had been established some time before, continued under the management of Dr. Pinkerton, also a member of the Committee, and strenuous efforts were made by him to increase the supply of stored plasma to be ready for an emergency. Due to general lack of public understanding of the blood donation idea, however, the quantity, while large in comparison with most cities was, of course, far from adequate. The work of the Honolulu blood plasma bank is discussed more fully in a separate presentation by Dr. F. J. Pinkerton.

Did the Plan Work?

On the morning of December 7th, the Headquarters diary of the Emergency Medical and Ambulance Service at Kaahumanu School shows that the chain telephone system which had been set up in preparation for such an event began to function at 8:20 A.M., when Mrs. Nash called her office staff to duty. At 8:35 A.M., the ambulance trucks from Davies and Company and American Factors, Ltd. were ordered to fit their frames and be ready for call. Other companies were alerted later by Mr. Paul Meyer, officer in charge of the ambulance pool.

At 9:00 A.M., Colonel King, then Department Surgeon, telephoned in a request for twenty-six doctors and twenty nurses to report to Tripler Hospital. These nurses and doctors were called immediately; fortunately, most of the doctors of the City were attending a postgraduate lecture on wound surgery at that hour. At 9:10 A.M., Colonel King requested that as many trucks as possible, fitted as ambulances report to Hickam Field to carry wounded from Hickam to Tripler Hospital. Twelve trucks left immediately and others left as rapidly as they drove in to report. By 9:20 A.M., forty-five trucks were on their way to Hickam Field. Most of the wounded from Hickam Field were transported by these ambulances, and most of the treatment of the wounded was done by civilian physicians, nurses and volunteer helpers.

The Aid Stations were all manned promptly and reported in from time to time as shown on the attached blotter. In all, 2,344 persons were treated for illness or injury on December 7, 1941, by these organizations. Distribution of these treatments and, to some extent, the nature of them, is listed on the enclosed sheet. Lunalilo Station was actually struck by a Japanese bomb, set on fire, and compelled to move to an adjacent building.

Distribution of cases treated at the Medical Unit is shown on the tabulation attached herewith as Exhibit "B."
[120] The recognition of the Army for the services rendered on December 7, 1941, is reflected in the following memorandum from the Office of the Surgeon, Hawaiian Department, dated January 19, 1942:

"Memo to: Dr. H. L. Arnold, Office of Civilian Defense.
"From: Headquarters Hawaiian Department—January 19, 1942.
"Request that the following statement, which has the approval of the Department Commander, be published in the Honolulu County Medical Journal:

"The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, wishes to take this opportunity to thank the physicians and their assistants for the splendid aid and cooperation rendered on December 7 and the period following in the care of the wounded. All did a superior job.'
"For the Department Surgeon.

(Signed) SIDNEY POSNER,
"Captain, Medical Corps."

Miscellaneous Activities

The balance of the day's activities was devoted to innumerable details of rendering assistance to sick and injured persons, to hospitals and doctors and to moving supplies and equipment to places where they were needed.

The wisdom and adequacy of the plans and training schedule were, it is submitted, demonstrated by the relatively prompt and smooth functioning of the organization when war came. The devoted service of the volunteer trainees and trainers, who spent hours and hours of time in preparing for war can never be adequately praised.

Major General Norman Kirk, the Surgeon General of the United States Army, in addressing a large group of physicians from the Service and the civilian community on January 26, 1945, at Kamehameha Hospital said, "Before beginning my talk, I want to express the thanks of the Army to the civilian physicians of Honolulu for the magnificent job they did on December 7th, when they were ready for it and we weren't."

H. L. ARNOLD.

[121]

EXHIBIT "A"

MINUTES OF FIRST MEETING OF PREPAREDNESS COMMITTEE OF THE HONOLULU COUNTY MEDICAL SOCIETY—APRIL 15, 1941

All members present, and by invitation Dr. Clarence Fronk and Dr. Thomas Mossman. It was decided that the President of the County Medical Society should ex officio be invited to all meetings of the Committee in future, and that these meetings would be held weekly on Tuesday at noon at the Pacific Club when there were matters to be discussed and that notification would be sent out in plenty of time in advance. A quorum will consist of four members and the reporting will be done by the Chairman of the Committee.

The division of the committee into the following categories was approved:
Dr. Robert Faus—Executive, in charge of all phases of the Committee's work.
Dr. N. P. Larsen—In charge of plans for hospital expansion and evacuation.
Dr. Joseph Strode—In charge of hospital teams for civilian casualty care.
Dr. J. R. Judd—In charge of hospital teams for military casualty care.
Dr. Paul Withington—In charge of the collection and primary care of casualties.
Dr. F. J. Pinkerton—In charge of liaison with Chamber of Commerce, the Red Cross, other branches of the County disaster organizations, and Supplies and Publicity.
Dr. H. L. Arnold—In charge of administration, hygiene and sanitation.

It was agreed and considered of vital importance that all medical personnel be under the control of this committee and assignments of such personnel be made only under its sanction.

The following specific actions were taken:
Dr. Robert Faus was reappointed to the position which he held under the previous preparedness committee. It was decided that his work was to be facilitated by the Committee in any way which Dr. Faus might suggest.

Dr. Mossman stated that he was in the process of preparing a master list of the available medical supplies on Oahau and he is to continue this work.
[122] The actual listing of medical personnel on this Island for duties during war conditions was decided to be an absolutely necessary factor and this work will go forward as rapidly as possible.

When and if the Disaster Board of the City and County lays plans for the construction of evacuation camps or shelters, recommendations for the hygiene and sanitation of these camps will be offered. Dr. Enright and Dr. Haralson were to be approached regarding the desirability of publicity concerning the need for typhoid and smallpox vaccination on a voluntary basis as soon as this can be done.

Dr. Fronk stated that the Army would be able to furnish beds and linen for the potentially expanded hospitals. Dr. Fronk also stated that it was unlikely that subsidiary hospitals anywhere near the business district would be useful.

The potential local manufacture of typhoid vaccines was discussed and approved.

The offer of Dr. James Kuninobu of supplying medical personnel from the Japanese Medical Society for service in the event that it is needed was accepted gladly and he will be so notified.

Dr. Pinkerton reported that the blood and plasma bank situation was satisfactory and well under way.

Dr. Faus was given charge of the preparing supplies of orthopedic apparatus such as Thomas splints and Kirschner stirrups.

A committee consisting of Drs. Fronk, Judd and Strode will confer upon two matters: one, the appointment of hospital teams for the care of hospitalized patients in both military and civilian hospitals and also upon the standardization of the treatment for burns and the acquisition of necessary supplies for this work. It was suggested that the physicians of the city be circularized as to what good and serviceable instruments they have which would be available for the use of the general disaster committee in the event of serious need for such instruments.

The principle was laid down that doctors who are asked to teach in the evacuation units now being organized will not of necessity be expected to serve in these units in the actual emergency but all doctors who are asked to do this work of teaching are urged to cooperate to the fullest extent.

Captain Gay is caring for the coordination of medical services during potential disaster with the other functions of the general disaster committee.

It was decided that all actions taken by the Committee should be given publicity by posting them in the office of the Honolulu County Medical Society.

There being no other business, the meeting was adjourned.

/s/ H. L. ARNOLD,
Chairman, Preparedness Committee,
Honolulu County Medical Society.

HLA: H

EXHIBIT “B”

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<th>Cases treated at the medical unit, December 7–31, 1941</th>
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[124] Preparedness of the Honolulu Blood Plasma Bank Prior to December 7, 1941

F. J. Pinkerton, M. D., Honolulu, Hawaii

[125] During the year 1940 many informal discussions were had by the physicians in Honolulu concerning the merits of a Blood Bank and the importance of such in the event that war developed between the United States and Japan. Ways and means were discussed pro and con by a few of the more interested and far-thinking physicians. Finally, at the suggestion of the Public Health Committee of the Chamber of Commerce, a letter was written to the chairman of the committee putting the general thoughts of the various discussions in letter form and suggesting that the Public Health Committee might be interested in financing and operating such a Blood Bank.

Since such a project involved the voluntary donations of blood from a favor-able group, the matter was discussed with representatives of the Junior Chamber of Commerce and their interest and support solicited with the thought in mind that the membership, composed of young men, would be the best group to call upon for voluntary blood donations.

In February, 1941, an outline of the proposed blood and plasma bank was presented to the Public Health Committee of the Honolulu Chamber of Commerce and a committee was appointed by the chairman to supervise and inaugurate and begin operations of the blood bank. This committee was composed of the following:

Chairman of Public Health Committee, Chamber of Commerce, as chairman.
A representative of the Health Committee from the Jr. Chamber of Commerce.
A Pathologist.
A representative of the Surgeon of the Hawaiian Department, U. S. Army.
The Territorial Commissioner of Health.
The Medical Director of the Queen's Hospital.
The City and County Physician.

Principal provisions of the plan were:
1. A central bank was to be established in the City and County Emergency Hospital to draw blood and prepare plasma.
2. The Hawaii Chapter of the American Red Cross was asked to assume charge of publicizing the project and securing donors.
3. The supply of plasma and its production for the Blood Bank was to be under the direction and control of the Public Health Committee of the Chamber of Commerce of Honolulu.
4. No blood or plasma was to be offered for sale.
5. As a beginning the central supply was to consist of 100 flasks of plasma, 250 cc. each.
6. Certain equipment was to be purchased for hospitals on Oahu desiring to prepare plasma in addition to that of the central bank. (In order to decentralize and to encourage widespread interest in the technical preparation of plasma and the operation of a blood bank it was decided to offer to all the hospitals minimum equipment which could be brought into operation when an emergency arose and to train the technicians of those hospitals in the technic.

Budget: A budget of $2,000, later increased to $3,000 was appropriated by the Public Health Committee of the Senior Chamber to convert space at the City and County Emergency Hospital into a laboratory, and to purchase equipment and pay salaries. A physician, a medical technologist and a bacteriologist were employed to supervise the laboratory. Eight hospitals on Oahu, (six in Honolulu and two in rural Oahu) agreed to participate in the program. Equipment was purchased for all of them and their own technicians were trained in plasma technic by the Blood Bank technologist.

Opening of bank: After four months of preparation and securing equipment from the mainland, the first blood was drawn on June 2, 1941. A schedule of bleeding nine to twelve donors a week was maintained. At the end of three months, 96 men and women had given blood and 77 flasks of plasma were on hand.
Additional appropriation: $1,000 additional was appropriated by the Chamber of Commerce and a plan approved for doubling the goal to 200 flasks and to speed operations to care for about 30 donors a week. Under the new schedule, within five weeks 133 donors had given blood and the goal of 200 flasks had been passed.

Cost: The cost of the last 138 flasks came to $7.25 per 250 cc., as compared to the cost of $19.50 to $27.50 per 250 cc., for commercial plasma.

Red Cross: In October of 1941 the Blood Bank project was offered to the American Red Cross but this organization did not accept the offer because of lack of approval from Washington.

Closing of bank: In November of 1941 the Chamber of Commerce feeling that the demonstration had been successful and that enough experience had been had to insure protection to the community in the event of war, closed its doors. Several weeks were required to draw and culture the plasma then in the process of production and to take inventory of the equipment.

Storage: On December 1, 1941, 203 flasks of plasma were placed in the cold storage warehouse at the Hawaiian Electric Company and plans were made to turn the central laboratory over to the City and County Hospital for an indefinite period (to carry on the functions of a central blood bank for emergency needs if required).

Sneak attack on December 7, 1941: On December 7, 1941, our Army and Navy bases were attacked and an urgent appeal by Service hospitals went out for plasma. The chairman of the Public Health Committee of the Chamber of Commerce delivered 75 flasks to the Tripler General Hospital, 50 flasks to the Queen’s Hospital for civilian use and 45 flasks to the Pearl Harbor Naval Hospital. Within six hours the total supply, the product of months of effort, was exhausted. The doctors who attended the wounded that day tell of men who were carried in, very evidently marked for death, and they also tell how many of these men still live because of the life-giving plasma being on hand and ready for instant use to be poured back into their veins.

Immediate expansion of blood bank: Now the value of those months of preparation, of standardizing technic, of training technicians, was felt. A call for donors was broadcast over local radio stations and the response was overwhelming. A schedule of 50 donors per hour, 10 hours a day, 7 days a week was maintained for two weeks. Every available doctor and nurse was enlisted to assist. Between 20 and 30 doctors worked on a volunteer basis from 3 to 5 hours daily in taking the donors, many of them in addition to their First Aid Station duties. Men and women from all walks of life and all economic levels stood in line for hours. War workers came after their long shift of duty, as did dock workers and workers in the sugar and pineapple fields. The original blood bank laboratory was placed on 24 hour duty, the personnel working in three eight-hour shifts, sterilizing equipment, preparing sodium citrate, culturing plasma and dispensing it.

The laboratory at the Queen’s Hospital typed the donors, ran serological tests on the blood, prepared plasma and dispensed blood and plasma.

Units were instituted at the Experiment Stations of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association and the Pineapple Producers’ Cooperative Association. Equipment and technical assistance were borrowed from the University of Hawaii.

The other seven hospitals absorbed part of the load of plasma preparation with equipment provided by the Public Health Committee in advance of the attack. Personnel of all these hospitals had been trained during 1941 for just such an emergency.

The Blood Bank was again offered to the American Red Cross but this offer was not accepted; it was then taken over by the Office of Civilian Defense who assumed responsibility for expenses incurred as of December 7, 1941.

F. J. Pinkerton
F. J. PINKERTON. M. D.
Preparedness Activities of the Transportation Committee, Major Disaster Council, City and County of Honolulu, Territory of Hawaii, Prior to December 7, 1941

Addison E. Kirk, Honolulu, Hawaii

The following is a brief summary of the activities of the Transportation Committee, Major Disaster Council, City and County of Honolulu, prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. Unfortunately, the records of this Committee have been forwarded to Washington, D. C., with the files of the local Office of Defense Transportation.

The Major Disaster Council was formed on June 24, 1941, with each member assigned as chairman of a committee. The Transportation Committee was formed immediately thereafter with members heading some committee, each of which dealt with a particular type of transportation with the exception of the Engineering Committee. Various meetings were held, including joint meetings, with the representatives of the Evacuation Committee and other committees affected by transportation.

In the beginning the Committee's activities consisted of a complete survey of all types of transportation including railroad, highway, ships, barges, tugs and airplanes. The Engineering Committee made a survey and an analysis of each garage, service station and repair shop on the island. The information secured was tabulated and cross indexed. Prior to December 7th, roughly 5,000 trucks, buses and vehicles of all types were listed. This listing included the individual responsible for the unit, key personnel in larger companies with telephone numbers and addresses for out of hour calls.

The list of vehicles ranged from heavy duty trucks to small pick-up trucks and included refrigerated units which might be used for the temporary storage of food at evacuation centers.

The Engineering Committee, in its survey of garages, had a complete list of the machines, tools and other equipment available for emergency repairs as well as major overhauls. Personnel of each garage was listed and special training noted. Compilation of the capacity of all gasoline storage was included, both for the purpose of refueling during an emergency and for the dispersion of this highly necessary fuel.

The "danger zone" which had been established by the military authorities was divided into four zones with a committee member in charge of each.

In classifying transportation vehicles, including buses, the listing was divided with those available in the city of Honolulu in one and those in the country districts in the other. As stated before, by December 7th, there were approximately 5,000 of these vehicles listed. These did not include certain trucks which had been turned over to the Medical Committee for use as ambulances. Prior to December 7th these vehicles had been outfitted as ambulances with removable equipment which could be installed in a very few minutes.

With the attack on December 7th, all committee members reported to their posts and calls for transportation equipment began to come in shortly after the attack.

I am pleased to report that the cooperation of those people volunteering their equipment was 100%. The volunteer drivers exceeded the requirements. I am happy to report that all requests for transportation received after 9 a.m. December 7, 1941, were filled satisfactorily and in each instance, the vehicles were dispatched not later than twenty minutes after the call came in.

The largest single job done that day was the evacuation of the women and children from Schofield Barracks and from Hickam Field to various cafeteria equipped schools in Honolulu. The movement from these posts was done in total blackout without serious incident.

Respectfully submitted,

A. E. Kirk,
Chairman, Transportation Committee,
Major Disaster Council.
[131] Organization of the Civilian Police Reserve in the City and County of Honolulu Prior to December 1, 1941

Heaton L. Wrenn, Honolulu, Hawaii

[132] On July 28, 1941, with the approval and under the authority of the Honolulu Police Department and Chief of Police W. A. Gabrielson, the Honolulu Police Reserve was organized under the leadership of Major Douglas G. King, a former officer in the British Army. The purpose of the Police Reserve was to provide a trained body of citizens who could assist and augment the regular Honolulu Police force in time of emergency. 144 men enrolled in the first group and these men were given a course in police training. This training consisted of 14 lectures by police instructors. The subjects included the apprehension of criminals, search and seizure, judo, the law of arrest, criminal law, criminal investigation, traffic work, identification work, first aid and other pertinent subjects. The lectures were held once a week on Monday evenings at the Central Intermediate School from 7:30 to 9:00 P. M. The final evening lecture was concluded on October 27, 1941. Thereafter the men were given training during the daytime in drilling, judo, riot guns and pistol shooting. 24 of those enrolled in the first class dropped out during the course of instruction. 120 of the first class were commissioned as officers of the Honolulu Police Department on November 3, 1941.

Beginning on September 9, 1941 the members of the class started accompanying regular police officers on their beats on every eighth day. On the graduation of the class it was decided that the group would meet once a month for further instructions. The first meeting of the group was held on December 1, 1941 at the Central Intermediate School.

A second class of 38 men was started on November 25, 1941. This course of instruction was interrupted by the events of December 7, 1941.

On December 7, 1941, 114 of the first class and 28 of the second class went on active police duty. On December 7, 1941 the 142 members of the Police Reserve did regular police duty guarding important installations, working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation in picking up enemy aliens and persons suspected of being dangerous to the security of the community, guarding the office of the Japanese consulate, evacuation work in bombed areas, traffic duty, and in fact doing the same type of work as the regular police officers. Following December 7, 1941 the members of the Reserve for a time did duty every day and night for several weeks then the group was divided so that they did duty every other day. Subsequently the Reserves were divided into six groups, each of which did regular beat work during the third watch for one night a week and on two nights a week every seventh week.

The members of the first class who went on duty on December 7, 1941 represented the several racial groups comprising our population and were largely business men. For example, the group numbered among its members an undertaker, a physician and surgeon, an interior decorator, bank tellers, a dentist, trust company officials, salesmen, accountants, lawyers, an instructor in physical culture, steamship executives, newspaper executives, contractors, an industrial relations director, radio executives, chemists, clerks, architects, dairymen, investment brokers, bankers, merchants, hotel executives, insurance salesmen, securities salesmen, theater executives, a veterinarian, florists, bookkeepers, scientists, mechanical engineers and agriculturists.

[133] Following December 7, 1941 additional groups of Reserves were given intensive police training, commissioned as officers and did active police duty. The Reserves for a substantial portion of the time they were on active police duty numbered approximately 300 men at one time on active status.

The Honolulu Police Reserve was the first organization of its kind organized in the United States and probably the only group whose members went on regular duty as commissioned uniformed police officers performing all the functions of regular police.

The Police Reserve continued on an active status until October 13, 1945.

Heaton L. Wrenn.
Heaton L. Wrenn
EXHIBIT NO. 154
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GENERAL ARNOLD AND GENERAL MARTIN
Correspondence between General Arnold and General Martin (1941)

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Date</th>
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<th>Subject</th>
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<td>Martin...</td>
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<td>Inclosing study of Hawaiian air situation.</td>
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<td>Same.</td>
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1 Pages referred to are indicated by italic figures enclosed by brackets and represent pages of original exhibit.


Major General H. H. Arnold, U. S. A.
Commanding General, Army Air Forces,
Washington, D. C.

MY DEAR GENERAL ARNOLD: There has been mailed under separate cover a secret study which was being made at the time the memorandum from the Secretary of the General Staff was received requesting that "a study be made of the air situation in Hawaii."

This study was originally made by Colonel Farthing as Commanding Officer of the 5th Bombardment Group (Heavy) assisted by Major Rose and Captain Coddington. It has been prepared as a staff study and carefully checked as to its contents with certain additions being made by the G-3 Section of the Hawaiian Air Force. It represents to me the complete possibility of the Hawaiian Islands being defended from attack by carrier-based aircraft. It is not making a statement which can not be fully realized upon to say that, "The defense of the Hawaiian Islands can be accomplished with the 180 heavy bombardment airplanes which are setup for this mission by this study." That being true, then, by occupying outlying fields on this island group and with the requisite number of airplanes and the combat crews as called for by this study, the defense of the Hawaiian Islands has been accomplished and need cause the War Department nor the Army Air Force further concern.

The original of this report is being forwarded through the Department Commander of the Hawaiian Department but I am sending you a copy direct so that you may have an opportunity to consider this study prior to the original arriving in the War Department.

Most sincerely,

(S) F. L. Martin,
F. L. MARTIN,
Major General, U. S. Army.


Subject: Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii.
To: Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.
Thru: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H.

1. In compliance with copy of corrected memorandum for the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, OCS 17234-25, from the Secretary, General Staff, dated July 17, 1941, "that a study be made of the air situation in Hawaii", there is attached for consideration of the War Department a plan for the employment of long-range bombardment aviation in the defense of Oahu. This plan clearly presents the air defense of the Hawaiian Islands. Attention is called to the recommendations therein.

2. No increase in personnel of the permanent air garrison of Hawaii is necessary to bring the actual heavy bombardment strength to one group. Under provisions of Table of Basic Allowances No. 1, War Department, dated December 1, 1940, fourteen additional heavy bombardment airplanes will be required to provide a total strength of one group of thirty-five B-17D type airplanes. This force is so small for the mission to be performed that it is considered entirely inadequate.
3. When the RDF installation is completed and the 15th Pursuit Group has its full complement of 80 fighters no further increase for pursuit aviation is considered necessary. Provision should be made to maintain at all times the 14th Pursuit Wing at full combat strength of 80 fighters and 105 interceptors. It is contemplated that pursuit aviation will perform its normal mission in the defense of these islands by intercepting and destroying enemy aircraft in the vicinity of or over the Island of Oahu. This is considered an adequate force to perform the pursuit mission in the defense of these islands.

4. A combination medium bombardment-torpedo force is considered highly desirable in order that attack can be made under conditions of low visibility when horizontal bombing is not feasible and is therefore recommended as a component part of the Hawaiian Air Force. (See Study No. 2 in attached plan).

5. On the assumption that there is a possibility of enemy surface craft reaching the shores of Oahu, one squadron of dive bombers is considered necessary to assist the ground forces in withstanding an invasion effort by concentrating on denying the enemy any opportunity to establish beach heads. The quick and accurate striking power of dive bombers makes them particularly effective for close-in support of the ground forces and this premise is borne out by information contained in intelligence reports received on the war in Europe. Dive bombers would also be employed against hostile surface craft and submarines which had penetrated close to the shores of Oahu.

6. With the addition of the force of medium bombardment-torpedo airplanes and one squadron of dive bombers no further increase in the number of light bombardment airplanes is required.

7. One additional observation squadron should be assigned the Hawaiian Air Force to supplement the new ground organization of the Hawaiian Department which is being re-organized into two triangular divisions. The ground forces of the Hawaiian Department should be provided with three observation squadrons. At present there is assigned one observation squadron (C&D) and one light bombardment squadron which could be diverted to observation duty.

8. To increase the number of aircraft in the Hawaiian Air Force as outlined in this letter and in the attached plan it is estimated that approximately 3,871 additional men should be assigned. A minimum of 216 combat crews and 180 maintenance crews are necessary to operate 180 B-17D type airplanes. Sufficient personnel are now present in the Hawaiian Air Force to man 70 combat crews and 70 maintenance crews for heavy bombardment aircraft. Additional personnel equal to the differences above should be assigned to the Hawaiian Air Force to meet these requirements. Further personnel increases should be made to activate two medium combination bombardment-torpedo squadrons, one dive bomber squadron, one additional observation squadron and five air base squadrons. The five air base squadrons will be used to maintain the outlying fields tabulated below which will house heavy bombardment squadrons as indicated. The two Air Base Groups (S) are to be used to maintain Bellows Field and the site selected for the station of the 15th Pursuit Group.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Barking Sands</th>
<th>Morse Field</th>
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<th>Lanai</th>
<th>Parker Ranch</th>
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9. The dive bomber squadron and three observation squadrons with allied services will become, in effect, an air support command and will be stationed at Bellows Field.

10. Tables of Organization prescribe five enlisted men for each heavy bombardment combat crew. For continuous daily operation a minimum of fourteen men will be necessary for each heavy maintenance crew. Using these figures as a basis, personnel requirements have been computed as shown in Inclosure No. 2.

11. There is at present available, under construction and awaiting approval of the War Department, housing for 12,288 enlisted men. This study will require housing for a total of 12,813 men to provide for all Air Corps and associated personnel. This leaves but 525 men to be cared for in a future project which will be submitted when this study has been approved. For detailed analysis of housing see Inclosure No. 3.
12. It is my conviction that by increasing the present strength of the Hawaiian Air Force by one observation squadron, a minimum of one dive bomber squadron, two squadrons of combination medium bombardment-torpedo airplanes and by increasing the strength of long-range bombardment to a total of 180 airplanes a positive defense of the Hawaiian Islands can be assured without any assistance whatever from the naval forces giving the Navy complete freedom of action.

(S) F. L. Martin,
F. L. MARTIN,
Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

3 Incls—
Incl #1—Plan for the Employment of Long-Range Bombardment Aviation in the Defense of Oahu. (In triplicate).
Incl #2—Personnel Requirement Recapitulation. (In triplicate).
Incl #3—Air Force Housing Facilities. (In triplicate).
[Note.—For inclosures see Army Exhibit 35, Roberts Record.]

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[5] Basic: (Ltr. HAF, 20 August 1941, "Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii.")
AG 381/264 HDP

1st Ind.

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,
Fort Shafter, T. H., August 1941.

To Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.

I concur in this study.

/S/ Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,
Commanding.

3 Incls. (dup).

---

[6]
Major General F. L. Martin,
Hawaiian Air Force,
Honolulu, T. H.

DEAR MARTIN: There has just been brought to my attention the Hawaiian Department Tentative Standing Operative Procedure publication July 14, 1941. I note under Section 2 that the Hawaiian Air Force is charged with being prepared to release a provisional battalion totaling 500 men to assist the auxiliary police force. It is further observed that the Hawaiian Air Force is charged with defending Schofield Barracks against ground and sabotage attacks.

The combat units, together with the auxiliary and service units set up for the Hawaiian Department, have been designed primarily to insure the full effectiveness of air force operations during that critical time indicated under the Hawaiian Department Alert No. 1. It would appear, however, that we have overestimated the requirements for the Hawaiian Air Force. Obviously, it would be impossible for the Hawaiian Air Force to carry out the mission above noted, in addition to its Air Force combat mission, unless there were a surplus of Air Corps and related troops.

As we are so short of trained officers and personnel in the Air Force, it is most undesirable to employ such personnel for other than Air Corps duties, except under most unusual circumstances.

It would seem that the proper step to be taken would be a request made on the War Department to increase the Hawaiian Department by the number of personnel required to assist the auxiliary police force and to defend Schofield Barracks. Our action would then be to reduce the numbers of Air Corps and auxiliary personnel by that number.

However, before any official steps are taken, I would appreciate your unofficial and informal comment.

Sincerely,

H. H. ARNOLD,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Chief of the Army Air Forces.
3 November 1941.

Major General H. H. Arnold,  
Chief of the Army Air Forces,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Happy: In reply to your request for unofficial and informal comment upon the use of Air Corps troops as ordered by "Hawaiian Department Tentative Standing Operating Procedure," dated July 14, 1941, the following information is submitted.

During the department maneuvers, which lasted from the 12–24 May of this year, the Department Commander, General Short, became very much interested in the proper employment of all military personnel in a last stand defense of Oahu. At that time he mentioned the fact that the Air Force had approximately 4,000 enlisted men at Hickam Field and nearly 3,000 at Wheeler Field; he saw no reason why these men should not receive some training as Infantry so that after the Air Force was destroyed they could assist the ground forces in the defense of the island. I told him it was not possible to give such training at this time as the Air Force's first mission, that of training combat crews, was in a most unsatisfactory state. In order to obtain these combat crews the men must be processed through our technical schools and in addition thereto gain experience in the actual performance of these duties under proper supervision.

As no further comment was made at the time, I thought the matter was a closed issue. Without further warning a letter was received from the Hawaiian Department, dated 5 June 1941 on the subject of training Air Corps personnel for ground defense missions. This letter directed that—

a. At Hickam Field: The training of two battalions of 500 men each to perform the following missions:
   (1) One battalion to provide ground close-in defense for Hickam Field.
   (2) One battalion to be prepared to take over initially under the direction of the Provost Marshal, Hawaiian Department, the anti-sabotage mission within Police District No. 1, City and County of Honolulu, now assigned to the 1st Battalion, 27th Infantry, under the provisions of FO #1, OHD 38.

b. At Wheeler Field: The training of one battalion of 500 men to perform the following missions:
   (1) Provide ground close-in defense of Wheeler Field.
   (2) Be prepared to take over initially under the direction of the Headquarters Commandant, Hawaiian Division, the protection of the Schofield Area now assigned to the 2d Battalion, 21st Infantry, under the provisions of FO #1, OD 40.

The training of these 1,500 men was conducted under the supervision of Infantry instructors, after three o'clock in the afternoon, four afternoons per week. The men who were placed in these battalions were the most recent arrivals in the islands, plus a certain number of noncommissioned officers required in the organization. The officers for these battalions were reserve officers regularly assigned to these two stations but from other arms of the service. As the Air Corps training for the enlisted men in these battalions progressed they received assignments with the Air Corps commensurate with their ability and training. The Infantry drill in the afternoon, which usually lasted from 3:00 p. m. to 4:30 p. m. interfered a great deal with the performance of their normal duties and when an alert was called these men were required to take their defensive positions which took them away from their Air Corps assignments. This left the organizations to which these men belonged extremely short of the necessary personnel for carrying-on the functions required of the Air Corps organizations. In other words, there was imposed upon these men the performance of a duty assigned to them for the last defense of this island when the Air Force was still carrying-on its primary mission in the defense of the island. As soon as sufficient reliable data could be collected as to the inroad this was making on Air Force activities, a letter dated August 25, 1941, was prepared on this subject and taken to the Department Commander, General Short, in person showing that it was inconsistent with the Air Force mission to require its men to train as Infantry and to take their Infantry positions when an alert was called, leaving vacant their proper assignment with the Air Force. The only relief from the performance of these duties General Short would give at the time was that those assigned to such duties and properly trained for the performance of these duties need not receive more training than was necessary to insure that they would be properly prepared to assume these duties when called upon.
A new "Standing Operating Procedure" is being prepared but has not yet been published. A copy of this procedure which was submitted to this headquarters for comment made no mention of the assignment of Air Corps troops for Infantry missions, other than that Air Corps troops will be trained for the close-in defense of Army airdromes on the Island of Oahu. I have delayed answering your letter awaiting the publication of this "Standing Operating Procedure", that I might be sure that the provisions of the existing "Standing Operating Procedure" had been changed as indicated above.

[9] It is my belief that the letter which I mentioned above, pointing out the unnecessary handicaps placed upon the Air Force in training as Infantry at a time when they were unable to conduct sufficient training to meet their primary mission as Air Force troops, has received consideration. In this letter I asked the Department Commander to rescind his instructions requiring Air Corps troops to train as Infantry at least until such time as we had developed sufficient combat and maintenance crews to meet the Manning Tables for the number of airplanes allotted to the Hawaiian Air Force. I am attaching hereto a copy of the letter on the subject of diversion from Air Force training, dated August 25, 1941.

It is my firm belief that no attempt would be made by an enemy force to make a hostile landing on these islands until the Hawaiian Air Force has been destroyed or reduced in effectiveness to the point where they could offer little if any resistance. When the present allotment of airplanes has been received and these airplanes are properly manned by competent combat crews, there is no enemy in these waters strong enough to destroy the Hawaiian Air Force or effect a landing on these shores.

I can well understand how one charged with the defense of these islands, assuming that the Hawaiian Air Force had been destroyed, would wish to utilize to the fullest extent the military man power available to him in carrying out his mission of the defense of Oahu. For Air Corps troops to be effective under such circumstances they should be properly trained for the parts they are required to play in such defensive action but I just do not wish my Air Force troops to receive training for this "last ditch fight" until they have been properly trained for their primary mission with the Air Force.

General Short is a very reasonable man of keen perception. It is now my belief that he sees more clearly the training problems confronting the Air Force and realized its enormous proportions. I do expect that the training of Air Force troops as Infantry will not be permitted to seriously interfere with their proper training for their normal mission.

I feel very strongly that a War Department policy should be established or orders issued which will prescribe that troops from the ground forces have the responsibility of the defense of airdromes and performance of interior guard duty. If the interior guard duty is to be performed by Air Force troops, then a special table of organization should be issued for a Military Policy Company to be established at each post for the performance of interior guard duty. Due to the importance and value of property on Air Corps stations, troops performing interior guard duty should be especially well trained for this service. These services can never be efficiently performed except by those who are regularly and permanently assigned to such duty. The duties to be performed by troops for the close-in defense of an airdrome are quite similar and require the same training as that given to all ground troops for a similar mission. As to [10] the number of men required, it makes no difference whatever whether the defense of airdromes and interior guard duty are performed by Air Force troops or troops from other arms. In either case troops performing these duties must have this as their sole responsibility and assignment.

I am happy to say that this problem of training Air Force troops with Infantry, which has caused me such deep concern, seems now on its way to a satisfactory solution. Having given me this opportunity to unofficially and informally bring this matter to your attention I shall, if in the future this burden becomes unbearable, bring it to your personal attention.

I am forwarding under separate cover a study which has been made of our personnel requirements to meet the allocation of airplanes for the Hawaiian Air Force. As you will observe tables of organizations for the respective units have been adhered to as far as possible. Our experiences indicates the num-
ber of men in these organizations barely meets the demands on this personnel for our operations.

Expressing to you my high esteem I beg to remain,

Most sincerely,

F. L. Martin,
Major General, U. S. Army.

[11]

Major General F. L. Martin,
Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force,
Hickam Field, T. H.

DEAR FRED: Your letter of November 3, 1941, was very enlightening on the use of Air Force troops in Hawaii. I am happy to learn that in your opinion a satisfactory solution to the problem will be arrived at shortly.

When the new “Standing Operating Procedure” of the Hawaiian Department is published, I would be interested in knowing the policy which it expresses toward air troops and their employment in local defense of air bases. These matters are of vital interest and the decisions reached in Hawaii may aid in the solutions of similar situations in the United States or in other theaters.

In your letter you urged that a War Department policy be issued which will prescribe that ground forces assume the responsibility of airdrome defense. The broad policy governing local ground defense of air bases has been published in War Department Training Circular No. 47, dated July 18, 1941. Paragraph 16 of this circular states the order of availability of troops for defense, and Air Corps troops are listed in the 4th priority with a notation that their primary mission is operation, maintenance and repair of aircraft. I believe that this is a plain statement of current War Department policy on this matter.

I am appreciative of your efforts to keep me abreast of developments affecting your command.

Yours very truly,

H. H. Arnold,
Major General, U. S. A.,
Chief of the Army Air Forces.

EXHIBIT NO. 155

(Exhibit 155 is the original Radar Plot of Station OPANA, December 7, 1941 and will be found reproduced as Item No. 38 in Exhibits—Illustrations to Proceedings of Joint Committee)
Exhibit No. 156

To: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

Subject: Final recommendations Far Eastern Intelligence Organization.

I have the following recommendations to submit:

1. That the Military Attaché, Thailand and the Military Attaché, Singapore be removed from jurisdiction of the Philippine Department and placed directly under the War Department. As things now stand, we have an inconsistent situation in that these two are under the Philippine Department, while our offices in Japan and China are of course under the War Department. To correct the situation a radiogram should be sent to the Commanding General, Philippine Department substantially as follows:

Inform Japanese and Brink that effective this date they are placed under War Department jurisdiction. The War Department desires that they combine to send a copy of all reports direct to Philippine Department.

2. That Burma, Malay, the Dutch East Indies and French Indo-China be transferred to the Far Eastern Section. In support of this it is obvious that Burma should be grouped with China, primarily on account of the Burma Road, and secondarily, because of the communication net. Respecting the transfer of the other three places named, all of Southeastern Asia should in my opinion be considered as one large operational area, very closely related to China, Japan and Philippine Islands. Should this transfer be approved there should of course be transferred to the Far Eastern Section the clerical personnel tentatively set up for their handling in the British and Western European Sections.

3. That instructions be issued that the Commanding General, Philippine Department, the Military Observer, Singapore, the Military Attaché, Thailand, the Military Attaché, China, and the Military Attaché, Japan substantially as follows:

The War Department desires that there be full and complete cooperation with British Intelligence agencies in the area under your jurisdiction, such cooperation to include exchange of information on the strength and disposition of our own forces, as well as of other countries in which we may be actually interested.
In this connection it is further recommended that the director of Naval Intelligence be asked to consider making similar arrangements to our corresponding Naval organizations and Intelligence agencies. According to General Lee in London, the British have already instructed the Far Eastern people to this same end and particularly desire that Naval information be included.

4. That we form a Secret Service organization to operate in the Far East. From my conversations with the Far Eastern Combined (Intelligence) Bureau and also the chief of the British Secret Service (also Singapore), I am convinced that much information, particularly as regards areas under Japanese control and other remote areas, can be secured only through the operations of such a system. Such a system obviously must be kept separate from our normal Intelligence organization, and we should, I think, lean heavily upon British advice and experience in organizing. The chief of the British Service in Singapore informed me that in case we should desire to organize a similar system, he was prepared to assist us in every way, including the recruitment of native operatives. As much as it is highly desirable for obvious reasons not to have a regular army officer directing such an organization, I recommend that Major Warren Cleary, a retired officer now on duty in the Public Relations Section and a Japanese language graduate, be sent to Singapore to consult with the chief of the British Secret Service there regarding the details of organization and the selection of an operating headquarters, which should probably be either in Singapore or Hongkong.

5. PERSONAL

A. Abroad

(1) I recommend that the A1. Corps be requested to furnish a well qualified and well rounded officer for duty in Singapore where there is a great mass of information on the air forces and the air fields of the entire Far East. He should, of course, be accredited to Singapore.

(2) I repeat my former recommendation that we send to Singapore one of our very best Japan men. In present military Observer, Col. Bridg, is well qualified to cover Malaysia, the Dutch East Indies and French Indo-China. Additionally, however, since much of the work of the Far Eastern Combined Bureau and most of the work of the British Secret Service is oriented on Japan, I consider it essential that we have in Singapore a Japan man who is thoroughly familiar with our present information on Japan. Major Kohin, now at present last, military attaché in Tokyo, answers the requirements fully and would, in addition, be of value to the British in evaluating information on Japan, and would thus enable us to give something back to the British in return for the information that we
extract from their files. So little information is obtainable at present in Japan that I feel we should at once transfer Papa to Singapore. Papa should likewise be accredited to Singapore.

(3) My original radio recommendations concerning the Singapore office called for two full-time clerk-stenographers. The radio recommendations naturally reached Washington in advance of my letter explaining the necessity for the personnel, and in reply to the radio only one clerk and a messenger were authorized. The messenger is of course necessary and should have been included in my original recommendations. At least one additional clerk-stenographer, however, will be necessary, and I recommend that Papa be authorized to hire one additional clerk at a salary of $1300.

(4) Since the British Branch Intelligence Office in Hongkong is largely oriented on Japan, I feel that we should likewise have a Japan man in Hongkong (in addition to our China man stationed there). Major Joseph J. Wynne, U.S., a Japanese language graduate, is qualified and desires the detail. It is recommended that he be ordered to Washington for a short period of orientation and then sent to Hongkong. He should of course be accredited to Hongkong as an official observer.

(5) The transfer of Papa to Singapore will of course have some effect upon the Tokyo office. In case my recommendations concerning the establishment of a Secret Service organization in paragraph 2 above are not favorably considered, I recommend that Papa be sent to Tokyo as Assistant Military Attaché. Otherwise, Tokyo can still carry on by utilizing the services of Major C. Stanton Babcock, Cavalry, who has just completed his formal language study, who is already an M.A. in name, and who is, in fact, at present actually working in the Tokyo office as Papa's assistant.

(6) Since temporary promotion for our observers and attaches abroad is apparently out of the question, I recommend that we do what we can to increase their prestige by making each of them as not at present, either GSC or Actng GSC. While this may seem somewhat inconsequential here in Washington, in my opinion it will definitely enhance their prestige abroad.

3. Within the Far Eastern Section
While the tentative allotment of Reserve and civilian personnel is in general satisfactory, I consider it essential that we at once place a well qualified China language graduate (Regular Army) in charge of the China desk, so that as the Reserve and civilian personnel now being selected becomes available, we will have someone already familiar with the China situation to direct their activities. While there are a number of China graduates on our books, I feel that, particularly in
view of the present aid to China program and the possible duration of a long military alliance, we should have been able to consider one of our very best men in the China service, Major A., who has already been made unavailable to us by virtue of his work with the China Foreign Office, and possibly we should have considered for the China section. Major A., however, has only recently joined the joint committee. I recommend that Major Roberts be at once transferred to the Far Eastern section to take charge of the China desk before he illness will force him to seek medical aid so that it will be considered unadvisable to save him. As a replacement for Roberts in the China section, I desire to recommend Major Joseph K., who, in my estimation, has the best qualifications of any of the men in the joint committee, is in direct charge of the Chinese Intelligence section, is of the highest character, and is in direct charge of their counter intelligence section. His work in the Philippine Department will expire shortly. I can assure the committee that in no instance has there been any recommendation of any retransfer, which I believe, is necessary for the best service.
(1) Thailand - $1,000
(2) Singapore - (a) Observer - $500
(b) Air Observer - $1,000
(c) Naval Observer - $1,500
(3) China - (a) As is, Changking - $2,000
(b) As is, Peiping - $1,000
(c) As is (air) Changking - $2,000
(d) As is, Peiping - $1,000
(e) As is, Peiping - $1,000
(f) Japan Observer, Peiping - $1,200
(4) Japan - (a) As is, Tokyo - $1,000
(b) As is, Tokyo - $500