PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
(As extended by S. Con. Res. 54, 79th Congress)

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 19
JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 157 THROUGH 172

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
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UNITED STATES
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WASHINGTON : 1946
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

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HEARINGS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part No.</th>
<th>Pages</th>
<th>Transcript pages</th>
<th>Hearings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1–399</td>
<td>1–1058</td>
<td>Nov. 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, and 21, 1945.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>983–1583</td>
<td>2587–4194</td>
<td>Dec. 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, and 13, 1945.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>3929–4599</td>
<td>10518–12277</td>
<td>Feb. 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, and 14, 1946.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>4601–5151</td>
<td>12278–13708</td>
<td>Feb. 15, 16, 18, 19, and 20, 1946.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>5153–5560</td>
<td>13709–14765</td>
<td>Apr. 9 and 11, and May 23 and 31, 1946.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part No.</th>
<th>Exhibits Nos.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>1 through 6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>7 and 8.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>9 through 43.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>44 through 87.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>88 through 110.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>111 through 128.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>129 through 156.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>157 through 172.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>173 through 179.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>180 through 183, and Exhibits-Illustrations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Hart Inquiry Proceedings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27–31</td>
<td>Army Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32–33</td>
<td>Navy Court of Inquiry Proceedings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>Clarke Investigation Proceedings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>Clausen Investigation Proceedings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Reports of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorsements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# INDEX OF EXHIBITS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exhibit No.</th>
<th>Hearings, page and date introduced</th>
<th>Exhibits page No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>23 11-15-45</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Selection of intercepted diplomatic messages sent and received by the Japanese Government and its foreign establishments between July 1 and Dec. 8, 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>24 11-15-45</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>Selection of intercepted messages sent and received by the Japanese Government and its foreign establishments between Dec. 2, 1940, and Dec. 8, 1941, concerning military installations, ships movements, espionage reports, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>87 11-16-45</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>Navy Department dispatch No. 252203 dated Nov. 25, 1941, directing the routing of trans-Pacific shipping through Torres Straits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>142 11-16-45</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>Chart showing plotting record of early plane flights Dec. 7, 1941, obtained by Opana Radar Detector Station.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>153 11-16-45</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>Army compilation of documents, tables, photographs, and maps offered by Colonel Thielen as illustrating his narrative statement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>153 11-16-45</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>Navy compilation of documents, tables, photographs, and maps offered by Admiral Inglis as illustrating his narrative statement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>172 11-17-45</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>Photostatic copy of Opana Radar Detector Station plot, submitted by Senator Ferguson, identified by Admiral Inglis, previously marked “Exhibit 3-B in evidence” in proceedings before Army Pearl Harbor Board.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>233 11-19-45</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>Material obtained by Army and Navy primarily from Japanese sources, relating to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-A</td>
<td>1792 12-18-45</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>Report dated Nov. 29, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-B</td>
<td>1792 12-18-45</td>
<td>415</td>
<td>Report dated Nov. 29, 1945, from General MacArthur, Tokyo, with further reference to Japanese plans for Pearl Harbor attack.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exhibit No.</td>
<td>Hearings, page and date introduced</td>
<td>Exhibits page No.</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>256 11-19-45</td>
<td>923</td>
<td>Selection of letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral J. O. Richardson, from Jan. 18, 1940, to Feb. 10, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>279 11-20-45</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Letter dated Jan. 24, 1941, from Secretary of Navy to Secretary of War regarding defenses of Pearl Harbor, and reply by Secretary of War, dated Feb. 7, 1941; letter from Adjutant General to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated Feb. 7, 1941, transmitting the above letters with instructions and receipt therefor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>319 11-21-45</td>
<td>1006</td>
<td>Memorandum dated Oct. 16, 1940, from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Hart, concerning a proposed blockade of Japan in the event of aggressive action over the reopening of the Burma Road.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>363 11-21-45</td>
<td>1013</td>
<td>Letters from War Department and Navy Department with enclosures, dated Nov. 7, 1945, and Nov. 14, 1945, respectively, to Congressman Frank B. Keefe, concerning data on amounts requested by the services, amounts approved by the Bureau of the Budget, and contract authorizations for the years 1932 through 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>397 11-21-45</td>
<td>1040</td>
<td>Letter dated Apr. 14, 1941, from Assistant Adjutant General, Hawaiian Department to the Adjutant General, entitled &quot;Air Defense of Pearl Harbor&quot; in reply to letter of Feb. 7, 1941, on this subject (see exhibit No. 10), enclosing Annex No. 7 to Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Joint Estimate Hawaiian Air Force, and Patrol Wing 2 (Naval Base Defense Air Force), and Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Security).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>401 11-23-45</td>
<td>1042</td>
<td>Dispatches from Ambassador Joseph E. Grew, Tokyo, to Department of State, dated Jan. 27, 1941, Nov. 3, 1941, and Nov. 17, 1941; memorandum dated Feb. 1, 1941 from Chief of Naval Operations to Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, advising him of contents of above message dated Jan. 27, 1941, which reported Japan would make surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in event of trouble with United States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 16. | 401 | 1061 | (a) Memorandum “Estimate Concerning Far Eastern Situation”, dated Nov. 5, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark;  
(b) Minutes of The Joint Board for Nov. 3, 1941;  
(c) Memorandum “Far Eastern Situation” dated Nov. 3, 1941, for General Marshall by General Gerow. |
| 16-A | 3839 | 1077 | Undated note from President Roosevelt to Secretary Hull, attached to letter dated Oct. 30, 1941, from Secretary Morgenthau to the President, transmitting a message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. |
| 16-B | 4341 | 1081 | Message dated Nov. 7, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, delivered through the Department of State. |
| 17. | 402 | 1083 | Memorandum “Far Eastern Situation” dated Nov. 27, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark. |
| 18. | 402 | 1084 | Documents relating to proposed “Modus Vivendi,” including Secretary Hull’s recommendation dated Nov. 26, 1941, to President Roosevelt. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit). |
| 19. | 402 | 1201 | Memorandum dated Nov. 29, 1941, by Secretary Hull for the President, and attached draft of a proposed message from the President to Congress, and proposed message from President to Emperor of Japan. |
| 20. | 402 | 1226 | Message dated Dec. 6, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Emperor of Japan, and related documents, including draft of proposed message dated Oct. 17, 1941. |
| 21. | 402 | 1246 | Two dispatches dated Dec. 6, 1941, from Ambassador Winant, London, to State Department; memorandum of conversation dated Nov. 30, 1941, between Secretary Hull and British Ambassador, with attached memorandum; memorandum handed to Mr. Hornbeck by Netherlands Minister on Nov. 21, 1941; dispatch from Secretary of State to United States Consul, Manila, P. I., dated Nov. 29, 1941. All documents concern intelligence information relating to Japanese military and naval units in the Far East. |
| 22. | 458 | 1252 | (a) British draft, dated Aug. 10, 1941, of proposed parallel communications to Japanese Government;  
(b) Two messages from the President (at Atlantic Conference) to Secretary Hull, Nos. 121645 and 169115;  
(c) Draft, dated Aug. 15, 1941 (not used), of proposed communication to the Japanese Ambassador brought to State Department by Sumner Welles following (Atlantic) conference between the President and British Prime Minister. |
<p>| 22-A | 1694 | 1262 | Revised draft (not used), dated Aug. 16, 1941, of draft dated Aug. 15, 1941 ((c) above), of proposed statement to the Japanese Ambassador, prepared by Sumner Welles. (See p. 556, vol. II, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941, Joint Committee Exhibit No. 29, for text of statement made to Japanese Ambassador by the President on Aug. 17, 1941.) |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exhibit No.</th>
<th>Hearings, page and date introduced</th>
<th>Exhibits page No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>22-B</td>
<td>1783 12-18-45</td>
<td>1269</td>
<td>Memorandum, dated Aug. 10, 1941, prepared by Sumner Wells of his conversations that date at the Atlantic Conference with Prime Minister Churchill and Sir Alexander Cadogan, concerning proposed parallel action with reference to Japan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-C</td>
<td>1783 12-18-45</td>
<td>1275</td>
<td>Memorandum, dated Aug. 11, 1941, prepared by Sumner Welles, of conversations that date at the Atlantic Conference between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, attended by Welles, Sir Alexander Cadogan, and Harry Hopkins concerning &quot;British-American Cooperation&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-D</td>
<td>1783 12-18-45</td>
<td>1292</td>
<td>Memorandum, dated Aug. 11, 1941, of conversation between Sumner Welles and Sir Alexander Cadogan, concerning &quot;British-American Cooperation&quot; at the Atlantic Conference, and Welles' subsequent conversation with the President.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>476 11-24-45</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>Message, dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, transmitted by Ambassador Winant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>476 11-24-45</td>
<td>1300</td>
<td>Message, dated Nov. 30, 1941, from Prime Minister Churchill to President Roosevelt, transmitted by Ambassador Winant.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>574 11-26-45</td>
<td>1301</td>
<td>Dispatch, dated Dec. 1, 1941, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to Secretary of State, reporting reaction in Japan to the Secretary's proposal of Nov. 26, 1941 (the so-called Ten-Point Note). See pp. 766 to 770, vol. II, Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan 1931-1941, for proposal dated Nov. 26, 1941, to the Japanese Government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>634 11-27-45</td>
<td>1303</td>
<td>Dispatch, dated Sept. 24, 1940, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to Department of State concerning general policy toward Japan (so-called &quot;green light&quot; dispatch).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>670 11-27-45</td>
<td>1315</td>
<td>&quot;Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941&quot;, Introduction and Documents (cloth edition, 1943), Department of State Publication 183.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Date</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>737</td>
<td>11-28-45</td>
<td>1316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>778</td>
<td>11-29-45</td>
<td>1326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>778</td>
<td>11-29-45</td>
<td>1334</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33-A</td>
<td>2092</td>
<td>12-31-45</td>
<td>1385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>11-30-45</td>
<td>1389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>11-30-45</td>
<td>1393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>839</td>
<td>11-30-45</td>
<td>1395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>38</td>
<td>841</td>
<td>11-30-45</td>
<td>1409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>928</td>
<td>12-4-45</td>
<td>1409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>12-4-45</td>
<td>1412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>988</td>
<td>12-5-45</td>
<td>1413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exhibit No.</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42 -</td>
<td>Copy of Army Regulation No. 10-15, dated Aug. 18, 1936, with amendments up to Dec. 7, 1941, entitled &quot;General Staff—Organization and Duties&quot;.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43 -</td>
<td>Instructions dated Jan. 27, 1941, of Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff concerning staff conversations to be held with representatives of British Commonwealth.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44 -</td>
<td>Compilation entitled &quot;Copies of Defense Plans&quot;, which contains extracts from various basic Army and Navy plans, to illustrate defensive measures contemplated against air attack. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45 -</td>
<td>Memorandum, dated Nov. 27, 1941, by Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, for the Chief of Staff, concerning &quot;Far Eastern Situation&quot; and warning messages to outpost commanders.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46 -</td>
<td>Photostatic copies of replies by General MacArthur and General Short to warning messages of Nov. 27, 1941, with routing slip.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47 -</td>
<td>Supplementary documents concerning the Nov. 5, 1941 Marshall-Stark memorandum for the President (see Exhibit No. 16), including dispatch dated Nov. 3, 1941, from Ambassador Gauss to State Department; message dated Nov. 2, 1941, from Chiang Kai-Shek to President Roosevelt; memorandum for Director of Naval Intelligence concerning &quot;Dispatch from Alusna, Chungking, 300850&quot;; dispatch 300850 from Alusna, Chungking, to OPNAV dated Oct. 30, 1941, and another same date, same correspondents; message dated Oct. 28, 1941, from General MacRudder, Chungking, to War Department.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49 -</td>
<td>Report dated Mar. 27, 1941, of United States-British Staff conversations (ABC-1).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exhibit</td>
<td>Page</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>1053</td>
<td>12-6-45</td>
<td>Report entitled “Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defense Plan No. 2” (ABC-22).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>1053</td>
<td>12-6-45</td>
<td>Compilation of communications between the War Department and General Herron at Hawaii, concerning 1940 alert of Hawaiian Department. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>1063</td>
<td>12-6-45</td>
<td>Compilation of correspondence between General Marshall and General Short from Feb. 7 to Oct. 28, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>1067</td>
<td>12-6-45</td>
<td>Minutes of “Conference in the Office of the Chief of Staff”, on Feb. 25, 1941, at which air defense of Pearl Harbor was discussed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>56</td>
<td>1076</td>
<td>12-6-45</td>
<td>Memorandum, dated May 13, 1941, concerning “Dispersion and Protection of Aircraft, Hawaiian Department” by Brig. Gen. Harry J. Malony, for the Chief of Staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>57</td>
<td>1077</td>
<td>12-6-45</td>
<td>Minutes of “Conference in the Office of the Secretary of War, May 19, 1941”, concerning use of planes in proposed expedition against Martinique, referring to supply of B-17 bombers that were not dispatched to Hawaii.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>58</td>
<td>1088</td>
<td>12-6-45</td>
<td>List of President’s appointments with military representatives from Oct. 1 to Dec. 7, 1941; telephone calls through White House switchboard on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941; White House dinner guests on Dec. 6, 1941; list of President’s appointments on Dec. 6 and 7, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>59</td>
<td>1092</td>
<td>12-6-45</td>
<td>General Marshall’s aide memoire to the President concerning “Defense of Hawaii”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>1094</td>
<td>12-6-45</td>
<td>General Marshall’s memorandum for the President concerning “Ground Forces”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61</td>
<td>1112</td>
<td>12-7-45</td>
<td>Photostatic copy of Dec. 7, 1941, warning sent by General Marshall to theater commanders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62</td>
<td>1284</td>
<td>12-10-45</td>
<td>Minutes of The Joint Board meeting, Nov. 26, 1941, at which the situation in the Pacific was discussed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exhibit No.</td>
<td>Hearings, page and date introduced</td>
<td>Exhibits page No.</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>1544</td>
<td>1645</td>
<td>Tentative draft of Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12-13-45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>1541</td>
<td>1677</td>
<td>Memorandum, dated July 3, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, U. S. Army, to Special Navy and Army Observers, London, instructing them to advise British that United States disapproves A. D. B. Report for reasons stated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12-13-45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>1642</td>
<td>1680</td>
<td>Dispatch, dated Dec. 6, 1941 (061255), from CinCAF to OPNAV, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941, by R. E. Schurmann, for the State Department, relating contents of the dispatch which reported the sighting of Japanese convoys in Far Eastern waters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12-15-45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>1642</td>
<td>1682</td>
<td>Intercepted messages, dated Aug. 17, 1941, from Japanese Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Government, repeating the material handed him that date by President Roosevelt after the President’s return from the Atlantic Conference (so-called “parallel action message”).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12-15-45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>1675</td>
<td>1689</td>
<td>Log of U. S. S. Boise for period Nov. 25 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and map showing position of the ship on certain dates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12-15-45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>1677</td>
<td>1715</td>
<td>Table showing scheduled inspections of ships at Pearl Harbor during October, November and December 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12-15-45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>1695</td>
<td>1716</td>
<td>Message, dated Aug. 18, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Churchill, concerning the President’s statements to the Japanese Ambassador on Aug. 17, 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12-15-45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>1696</td>
<td>1719</td>
<td>Message, dated Aug. 25, 1941, from State Department to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, quoting an extract from radio address of Prime Minister Churchill on Aug. 24, 1941. The extract refers to Japanese policies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12-15-45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>1696</td>
<td>1721</td>
<td>Dispatch dated Aug. 1, 1941, from State Department to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, and the Ambassador’s reply dated Aug. 2, 1941; both concerning the report of Japanese aggression against Thailand; digest of Secretary of State’s news conference on Aug. 6, 1941, when he was questioned concerning reports of Japanese aggression against Thailand.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12-15-45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>1700</td>
<td>1727</td>
<td>Three State Department drafts, all dated Oct. 16, 1941, of a proposed message from the President to the Emperor of Japan, and a memorandum expressing views of officers in the Far Eastern Division of State Department on the matter. No message was sent to the Emperor at that time (fall of the Konoye cabinet in Japan).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12-15-45</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index</td>
<td>Dates</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>1703</td>
<td>12-15-45</td>
<td>Three messages from State Department to Far Eastern offices, advising American citizens to leave the Orient, dated Oct. 6, 1940, Feb. 11, 1941, and Nov. 19, 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74-A</td>
<td>2768</td>
<td>1-19-46</td>
<td>Memorandum, dated Dec. 4, 1941, from Far Eastern Affairs Division officers to the Secretary of State concerning British suggestion on exchange of nationals with Japanese Government in event of hostilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>1705</td>
<td>12-15-45</td>
<td>Three messages, all dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Secretary Hull to Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, explaining the delivery of the so-called &quot;Ten Point Note&quot; on that date to the Japanese Ambassadors and their oral comments upon its receipt, and furnishing Ambassador Grew with the text of the note.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>1709</td>
<td>11-15-45</td>
<td>Translation of notes regarding discussion between Adolf Hitler, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, State Minister Meissner, and Japanese Foreign Minister Matsuoka in Berlin, Apr. 4, 1941, as introduced at the Nuremberg trials on Nov. 23, 1945.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>1712</td>
<td>12-15-45</td>
<td>Message, dated Aug. 31, 1940, from United States Embassy, Peiping, China, to State Department presenting summary of situation in Japan and Manchuria as prepared by A. T. Steele, correspondent for Chicago Daily News, which summary is referred to in Ambassador Grew's message dated Sept. 12, 1940 (Joint Committee Exhibit No. 26), his so-called &quot;green light&quot; dispatch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>1724</td>
<td>12-17-45</td>
<td>Navy dispatches concerning &quot;Kra Peninsula Alert (1941).&quot; (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>1724</td>
<td>12-17-45</td>
<td>Navy dispatches concerning Netherlands East Indies Alert (1941). (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>1724</td>
<td>12-17-45</td>
<td>Office of Naval Intelligence &quot;Fortnightly Summary of Current National Situations&quot; dated Nov. 1, Nov. 15, and Dec. 1, 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>1724</td>
<td>12-17-45</td>
<td>Selection of Office of Naval Intelligence periodic estimates and memoranda dated from Apr. 17 to Dec. 6, 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>1728</td>
<td>12-17-45</td>
<td>Navy Regulations concerning Duties of Intelligence Division (OP-16).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>1754</td>
<td>12-17-45</td>
<td>Message, dated Dec. 3, 1941 (031850), from OPNAV to CinCAF, CinPAC, COM 14, and COM 16, advising them of instructions Japanese sent on Dec. 2, 1941, to certain consular and diplomatic posts to destroy most of their codes and secret documents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>1775</td>
<td>12-17-45</td>
<td>Transcript of telephone call on Dec. 3, 1941, between Japanese citizen in Honolulu and person in Tokyo (so-called &quot;Mori telephone call&quot;).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exhibit No.</td>
<td>Hearings, page and date introduced</td>
<td>Exhibits page No.</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>1799 12-18-45</td>
<td>1870</td>
<td>Selection of Navy Department memoranda reporting Japanese fleet locations during period Nov. 4 through Dec. 3, 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>1825 12-18-45</td>
<td>1901</td>
<td>Tabulation showing Naval combatant strength of the Axis and Allied Powers as of May 1, 1941, and Dec. 7, 1941, in both Atlantic and Pacific Ocean areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>1938 12-20-45</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>Memorandum prepared by Gen. L. T. Gerow, regarding the respective responsibilities of the Army and Navy &quot;For Defense Against Air Attack in Hawaii&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>2066 12-31-45</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Dispatch dated Dec. 18, 1941, from the State Department to the American Legation, Bern, Switzerland, concerning Swiss Government's offer to represent American interest in Japanese-occupied territories, and instructions for closing of diplomatic stations under certain emergencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>2067 12-31-45</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Dispatches dated Dec. 15, 1941 (2), Feb. 16, 1942, and Mar. 25, 1942, from Ambassador Grew, Tokyo, to State Department, relating action taken in Tokyo to destroy codes, ciphers, and confidential papers and records after outbreak of hostilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>2075 12-31-45</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>Photostatic copy of p. 2, G-2 Record Section Register of Incoming Cables on Dec. 5, 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>2078 12-31-45</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>3 intercepted messages dated Nov. 26, 1941, from Ambassador Nomura to the Japanese Government, transmitting the so-called &quot;Ten Point Note&quot; which was handed to the Japanese Ambassador by Secretary Hull on that date.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>2091 12-31-45</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Memoranda dated July 12, 1940, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, concerning his conversation with Admiral J. O. Richardson on July 11, 1940, and a handwritten note by Admiral H. R. Stark.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exhibit</td>
<td>Date(s)</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98-99</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Memorandum dated Sept. 21, 1940, by Stanley K. Hornbeck, for Under Secretary Sumner Welles, concerning a Navy proposal for execution of a fleet problem involving simulated attack on the Panama Canal during January 1941, and three related memoranda.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Memorandum dated Nov. 26, 1941, by Secretary Stimson for the President concerning “Japanese Convoy Movement Toward Indo-China”.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Transcript of Interrogation on Dec. 8, 1941, of (Japanese) Prisoner of War No. 1, by Naval Intelligence officers at Honolulu, statement by the prisoner, and memorandum concerning “Investigation of Japanese Submarine Aground in Waimanalo Bay”.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Log of U. S. S. Enterprise from Nov. 24 to Dec. 16, 1941, inclusive.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Log of U. S. S. Lexington from Dec. 5 to Dec. 8, 1941, inclusive.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>“U. S. S. Lexington War Diary” for period Dec. 7 to Dec. 25, 1941, inclusive.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107</td>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Certain estimates of Japanese Situation and Intentions as made by British agencies and relayed to this Government during period from Oct. 21, to Nov. 22, 1941.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exhibit No.</td>
<td>Hearings, page and date introduced</td>
<td>Exhibits page No.</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107-A</td>
<td>2479 1-5-46</td>
<td>2393</td>
<td>&quot;The Findings, Conclusions and Action by the Secretary of the Navy&quot;, including the Fourth Endorsement by Secretary Forrestal to the Report of the Navy Court of Inquiry, and a summary of an offer by the Navy Department of a General Court Martial for Rear Adm. H. E. Kimmel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108</td>
<td>2364 1-4-46</td>
<td>2432</td>
<td>Memorandum, dated Nov. 2, 1944, by Stanley K. Hornbeck attached to his memorandum of Feb. 28, 1944, which related to an attached third memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck dated Nov. 27, 1941, entitled &quot;Problem of Far Eastern Relations. Estimate of situation and certain probabilities&quot;, described by him as &quot;a memorandum regarding the contents of which there have been leaks and misrepresentation&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>2476 1-5-46</td>
<td>2444</td>
<td>Guide to Symbols, and series of maps submitted by Admiral R. N. Turner, showing the location of ships Dec. 1 to 6, inclusive, 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>2477 1-5-46</td>
<td>2444</td>
<td>Compilation of letters from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral T. C. Hart, from Feb. 9, 1940, to Nov. 8, 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>2495 1-15-46</td>
<td>2457</td>
<td>Letter dated Dec. 5, 1941, from President Roosevelt to Mr. Wendell Willkie, concerning proposal from Australian Minister for Mr. Willkie to make a trip to Australia, together with related correspondence and memoranda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
<td>2496 1-15-46</td>
<td>2458</td>
<td>Dispatches and other material referred to in footnotes to Admiral Kimmel's prepared statement before the Joint Committee. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113-A</td>
<td>2807 1-19-46</td>
<td>2532</td>
<td>Letter, dated Feb. 21, 1941, from Admiral Kimmel to Pacific Fleet Commanders, concerning &quot;Battle Organization and Condition Watches&quot;.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113-C</td>
<td>3449 1-31-46</td>
<td>2538</td>
<td>(a) Revised Employment Schedules of Task Force 9, submitted pursuant to Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 14CL-41, together with documents which approve same; (b) Watch and Duty Schedules for Patrol Wing 2 (December 1941).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exhibit No.</td>
<td>Document Number</td>
<td>Date(s)</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114</td>
<td>2558</td>
<td>1-16-46</td>
<td>WPPac-46, and letters from Admiral Kimmel to his commanders, dated July 21 and July 25, 1941, promulgating WPPac-46, which is U. S. Pacific Fleet Operating Plan—Rainbow Five (Navy Plan O-1, Rainbow 5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>2558</td>
<td>1-16-46</td>
<td>Communications Intelligence Summaries concerning location of Japanese Fleet Units: (a) Fourteenth Naval District Summaries, dated Nov. 1 to Dec. 6, 1941; (b) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer Reports dated Oct. 27 to Dec. 2, 1941; (c) Pacific Fleet Intelligence Memorandum dated Dec. 1, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115-A</td>
<td>3449</td>
<td>1-31-46</td>
<td>Fourteenth Naval District “Communication Intelligence Summaries of Dec. 9 and 10, 1941, showing assumed Composition of Japanese Striking Force”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115-B</td>
<td>3450</td>
<td>1-31-46</td>
<td>Pacific Fleet Intelligence Bulletin No. 45-41, dated Nov. 27, 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117</td>
<td>2559</td>
<td>1-16-46</td>
<td>Selection of Army and Navy correspondence from Jan. 16, to Feb. 14, 1941, concerning the air defenses of the Hawaiian Islands.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118</td>
<td>2559</td>
<td>1-16-46</td>
<td>Memoranda, dated Nov. 30 and Dec. 5, 1941, of Admiral Kimmel, entitled “Steps to be Taken in Case of American-Japanese War within Next Twenty-Four Hours”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119</td>
<td>2559</td>
<td>1-16-46</td>
<td>Radio Log of Bishop’s Point Radio Station, Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>2559</td>
<td>1-16-46</td>
<td>(a) Memorandum dated Dec. 19, 1941, by Admiral Bellinger for Admiral Kimmel concerning “Availability and Disposition of Patrol Planes on morning of Dec. 7, 1941”; (b) Compilation of dates on which Pearl Harbor Air Raid drills were held during 1941; (c) Report of Army-Navy Board dated Oct. 31, 1941, convened to prepare recommendations covering the allocation of aircraft operating areas, Hawaiian area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121</td>
<td>2561</td>
<td>1-16-46</td>
<td>Statement by Admiral H. E. Kimmel and copies of correspondence submitted by him, concerning the circumstances of his retirement by the Navy Department, and related matters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exhibit No.</td>
<td>Hearings, page and date introduced</td>
<td>Exhibits page No.</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>2588 1-16-46</td>
<td>2736</td>
<td>Selection of correspondence, memoranda, and dispatches concerning the proposed construction of a combined operating center for Army and Navy in Hawaii from Oct. 29, 1941, to Jan. 7, 1942.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123-A</td>
<td>5015 2-20-46</td>
<td>2743</td>
<td>Additional selection of correspondence and memoranda concerning Joint Operations Centers for Army and Navy from Oct. 17, 1941, to Jan. 10, 1942. (See also Exhibit No. 123.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124</td>
<td>2674 1-17-46</td>
<td>2749</td>
<td>Intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages between Washington and Tokyo, dated Aug. 18 to Aug. 29, 1941, inclusive, concerning United States-Japanese negotiations and the United States note to Japan dated Aug. 17, 1941. These intercepted messages are additional to those published in Joint Committee Exhibit No. 1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>2678 1-17-46</td>
<td>2801</td>
<td>Log of the U. S. S. Wright from Nov. 27 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and chart of locations of the ship on Nov. 27 and Dec. 7, 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126</td>
<td>2767 1-19-46</td>
<td>2832</td>
<td>(a) Navy Department General Order No. 143, dated Feb. 3, 1941, entitled &quot;Organization of the Naval Forces of the United States&quot;; (b) excerpts from Navy Regulations, setting forth the general duties of a Commander in Chief; (c) Pacific Fleet Staff Instructions (1941), dated July 14, 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127</td>
<td>2768 1-19-46</td>
<td>2867</td>
<td>Correspondence, memoranda and dispatches concerning the aircraft situation in Hawaii after Dec. 7, 1941. (See also Exhibit No. 112, p. 77, for letter dated Jan. 7, 1942, by Admiral Nimitz on same subject.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128</td>
<td>2768 1-19-46</td>
<td>2870</td>
<td>Selected correspondence relating to the proposed prosecution of Japanese consular agents in Hawaii, recommended by United States Attorney in Hawaii by letter dated June 4, 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129</td>
<td>2842 1-19-46</td>
<td>2875</td>
<td>Navy Basic War Plan—Rainbow No. 5 (WPL-46), and letter dated May 26, 1941, from Admiral H. R. Stark promulgating the plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130</td>
<td>2879 1-21-46</td>
<td>2941</td>
<td>Selection of memoranda and dispatches contained in files of State Department concerning Japanese and United States air reconnaissance in Pacific prior to Dec. 7, 1941, including dispatch dated Nov. 29, 1941, from Ambassador Grew to State Department forwarding note from Japanese Government protesting reported flight of United States planes over Tiawan Nov. 20, 1941, and State Department's reply to Ambassador Grew.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131</td>
<td>2892 1-21-46</td>
<td>2943</td>
<td>Testimony of Admiral H. E. Kimmel before the Roberts Commission, Navy Court of Inquiry, and Army Pearl Harbor Board.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Selected items obtained by War Department from General MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo (see pp. 7874-7877, Joint Committee Transcript):

(a) Memorandum "Report on Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the American Ambassador, 7:30 a.m., Dec. 8, 1941;"

(b) Memorandum "Gist of Conference between Foreign Affairs Minister Togo and the British Ambassador, 8:00 a.m., Dec. 8, 1941;"

(c) Memorandum written by one Matsumoto, Head of Treaty Bureau, Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "On the Declaration of War against the United States and Great Britain—Meeting of Privy Council, Dec. 8, 1941."

Additional selected items obtained by War Department from General MacArthur's Headquarters, Tokyo (see pp. 13662-13665 Joint Committee Transcript): (a) Diplomatic messages between Tokyo and Washington which had not been completely intercepted, being Washington to Tokyo Nos. 881, 941, and Tokyo Circular Nos. 2288, 2313 and 2193; (b) Memoranda of three conversations on Aug. 19, 29 and 30, 1941, between German Ambassador Otte and Japanese Foreign Minister Toyoda and Vice-Minister Aman; (c) Memoranda dated Sept. 6 and 13, 1941, concerning basic conditions for a peace settlement between Japan and China; (d) Memorandum dated Nov. 26, 1941, summary of the progress of Japanese-American negotiations.

Statement by Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, of events and conditions leading up to the Japanese attacks Dec. 7, 1941, introduced at his request. Identical with exhibit he introduced before Roberts Commission and Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Dispatch dated Nov. 29, 1941, from War Department to Gen. W. C. Short, concerning reinforcement of advance Pacific bases, and five charts and Bureau of the Census publication on the Population characteristics of Hawaii used by General Short in his prepared statement before the Joint Committee.

Compiled summary of evidence concerning time of sending and receipt of War Department warning messages of Nov. 27-28, 1941, and replies thereto, together with photostatic copies of the messages.

Memorandum dated Nov. 14, 1941, by Lt. Col. C. A. Powell, Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department, concerning operation of radar equipment during recent military exercises, and attached transmitting memorandum for Special Assistant to Secretary of War.

Four original reports concerning training and operations time schedules of radar stations, Hawaiian Department, from Nov. 27 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive, and related material.

Photostatic copy of memorandum bearing approval of Gen. W. C. Short of report prepared by Gen. F. L. Martin dated Aug. 20, 1941, entitled "Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii." (See Joint Committee Exhibit No. 13.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exhibit No.</th>
<th>Hearings, page and date introduced</th>
<th>Exhibits page No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>140</td>
<td>3188 1-26-46</td>
<td>3203</td>
<td>Selection of memoranda by the Secretary of War, Chief of Staff, Judge Advocate General, including proposed charges against Maj. Gen. W. C. Short, retired, prepared by the office of the Judge Advocate General, and related material.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141</td>
<td>3311 1-28-46</td>
<td>3254</td>
<td>File of Capt. E. M. Zacharias, U. S. Navy, entitled “Notes, Correspondence, and Reports Relating to Pearl Harbor and Events Leading Up to It”.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>142</td>
<td>3324 1-29-46</td>
<td>3302</td>
<td>Compilation of Material Relating to so-called “Winds” code. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>142-A</td>
<td>3324 1-29-46</td>
<td>3318</td>
<td>(a) Memorandum dated Dec. 5, 1941, concerning interception by Portland F. C. C. station of Japanese Weather Broadcast; (b) Federal Communications Commission, Radio Intelligence Division, Night Watch Log for Nov. 24 to Dec. 8, 1941, inclusive:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>142-B</td>
<td>3674 2-4-46</td>
<td>3321</td>
<td>Additional material concerning translation of Circular No. 2494, from Tokyo, dated Dec. 7, 1941 (see p. 251, Exhibit No. 1), subsequent to the original translation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>142-C</td>
<td>3741 2-5-46</td>
<td>3322</td>
<td>Letter dated Feb. 4, 1946, from State Department to Committee Counsel enclosing paraphrases of three messages, two from London dated Dec. 15, 1945 and Jan. 31, 1946, and one from The Hague, dated Jan. 26, 1946, regarding the so-called “winds” messages, indicating no interception by the British or Dutch Governments of a “winds execute” message prior to Dec. 8, 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>142-D</td>
<td>3780 2-5-46</td>
<td>3323</td>
<td>Material from Hawaiian office, Federal Communications Commission, concerning the so-called “winds” code.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>143</td>
<td>3929 2-7-46</td>
<td>3332</td>
<td>Proceedings of the Roberts Commission appointed Dec. 18, 1942, by the President. (See Parts Nos. 22 through 25.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>144</td>
<td>3929 2-7-46</td>
<td>3332</td>
<td>Proceedings of the Inquiry conducted by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U. S. Navy, retired, pursuant to precept dated Feb. 12, 1944, of the Secretary of the Navy. (See Part No. 26.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>145</td>
<td>3929 2-7-46</td>
<td>3332</td>
<td>Proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, convened by the Secretary of War pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Cong., approved June 13, 1944. (See Parts Nos. 27 through 31.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Index Number</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>146</td>
<td>3928</td>
<td>Proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry, convened by the Secretary of the Navy pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 78th Cong., approved June 13, 1944. (See Parts Nos. 32 and 33.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>147</td>
<td>3929</td>
<td>Proceedings of Investigation conducted by Col. Carter W. Clarke, U. S. Army, Sept. 14, 15, and 16, 1944, and continued from July 13 to Aug. 4, 1945. (See Part No. 34.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>148</td>
<td>3929</td>
<td>Report of Investigation during the period Nov. 23, 1944, to Sept. 12, 1945, conducted by Lt. Col. Henry C. Clausen, A. U. S., for the Secretary of War, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board. (See Part No. 35.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>149</td>
<td>3929</td>
<td>Proceedings of the inquiry conducted by Admiral Henry Kent Hewitt, U. S. N., pursuant to precept dated May 2, 1945, of the Secretary of the Navy, and supplementary to the proceedings of the Navy Court of Inquiry. (See Parts Nos. 36 through 38.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>151</td>
<td>4421</td>
<td>Six memoranda prepared by Capt. L. F. Safford, U. S. Navy, during May, June, and July, 1945 in connection with the inquiry conducted by Admiral H. K. Hewitt, concerning intercepted Japanese messages. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>152</td>
<td>4794</td>
<td>Memorandum dated Dec. 23, 1941, “General Observations of Damage by Projectiles in the City of Honolulu on Dec. 7, 1941”, prepared by employees of the Honolulu Board of Water Supply, and a map of the city of Honolulu, T. H., showing points struck by projectiles, Dec. 7, 1941.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>154</td>
<td>5013</td>
<td>Compilation of selected correspondence between Gen. H. H. Arnold and Gen. F. L. Martin from Aug. 15 to Nov. 27, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155</td>
<td>5068</td>
<td>Original Radar Plot of Detector Station OPANA, Dec. 7, 1941.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>157</td>
<td>5201</td>
<td>Reports, findings, and conclusions of Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorsements. (See Part No. 39.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exhibit No.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>158</td>
<td>5201 4-11-46</td>
<td>3441</td>
<td>Compilation of selected documents obtained from State Department files relating to United States-British Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>159</td>
<td>5201 4-11-46</td>
<td>3488</td>
<td>Compilation of selected material obtained from State Department files relating to United States-Chinese Conversations concerning the Japanese situation. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>160</td>
<td>5240 4-11-46</td>
<td>3502</td>
<td>Transcript of remarks of the President on the occasion of the meeting of his cabinet at 8:30 (p. m.) and continuing at 9 o’clock with legislative leaders, on Dec. 7, 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161</td>
<td>5241 4-11-46</td>
<td>3508</td>
<td>Drafts of Secretary Knox and Secretary Stimson of a proposed message for the President to deliver to Congress on the state of relations with the Japanese Government. (See Joint Committee Exhibit No. 19 for final draft by Secretary Hull.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>161-A</td>
<td>5464 5-23-46</td>
<td>3520</td>
<td>Draft of a proposed message to Congress as prepared in the State Department, which contains suggestions made in the memoranda by Secretary Stimson and Secretary Knox, as shown in exhibit No. 161.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>162</td>
<td>5269 4-11-46</td>
<td>3534</td>
<td>Log of the Watch Officer, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, from 1145, Dec. 6, 1941, to 2000, Dec. 7, 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>162-A</td>
<td>5464 5-23-46</td>
<td>3543</td>
<td>Naval communications referred to by serial numbers in Log of the Watch Officer, as shown in exhibit No. 162.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>163</td>
<td>5292 4-11-46</td>
<td>3557</td>
<td>Log of the U. S. S. <em>Helena</em> from Nov. 26 to Dec. 7, 1941, inclusive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>164</td>
<td>5292 4-11-46</td>
<td>3593</td>
<td>Reports made by Gen. W. C. Short and his subordinate officers to the War Department concerning the attack on Oahu, T. H., Dec. 7, 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165</td>
<td>5292 4-11-46</td>
<td>3643</td>
<td>Copy of a partial translation of a document relating to a Feb. 23, 1941, conference between German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop and Japanese Ambassador Oshima.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>166</td>
<td>5468 5-23-46</td>
<td>3648</td>
<td>State Department dispatch No. 5682 dated Dec. 5, 1941, to the American Embassy in London. (This dispatch is mentioned in American Embassy, London, dispatch No. 5923 dated Dec. 6, 1941, to State Department, which appears in exhibit No. 21.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
167 | 5468 | 3652 | (a) State Department file copy of document handed by Secretary Hull to the Japanese Ambassador on Nov. 26, 1941 (the so-called Ten-Point Note); (b) State Department statement to the press on Nov. 26, 1941, relating to the delivery of (a); (c) State Department Press Release No. 585, dated Dec. 7, 1941, concerning the delivery and text of (a); and (d) memorandum dated Dec. 2, 1941, concerning President Roosevelt's remarks at his press conference that date, relating to delivery of (a) and general Far East matters.

168 | 5468 | 3666 | Compilation of documents from State Department files which are dated in November and December 1941, concerning a proposed *modus vivendi*, which documents supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 18. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)

169 | 5469 | 3696 | Compilation of documents relating to conversations between State Department officials and representatives of the Thailand Government, between Aug. 6 and Dec. 8, 1941. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)

170 | 5469 | 3789 | Compilation of documents from War Department files concerning the retirement of Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.) These documents supplement those introduced as exhibit No. 140.

171 | 5469 | 3942 | Compilation of documents from Navy Department files concerning the retirement of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and related matters. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)

172 | 5469 | 3978 | Compilations made by War and Navy Departments of data concerning airplanes and antiaircraft guns produced and their distribution from Feb. 1 to Nov. 30, 1941.

173 | 5469 | 3985 | Memoirs of Prince Konoye, former Prime Minister of Japan, and related documents.

174 | 5469 | 4030 | Compilation of miscellaneous documents from State Department files. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)

175 | 5470 | 4115 | Memorandum from Secretary of Navy dated Dec. 5, 1941 and letter from Secretary of War dated Dec. 6, 1941, submitting estimates concerning Japanese forces in Indochina and adjacent areas, to the Secretary of State for delivery to the President, and memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1941, from Secretary of State for the President.

176 | 5470 | 4121 | Compilation of location of United States naval forces in the Atlantic, Pacific, and Far East, also foreign naval forces in the Pacific and Far East, as of Dec. 7, 1941.

177 | 5470 | 4132 | Compilation of State Department documents dated in 1939, concerning a proposal made by former Japanese Prime Minister Baron Hiranuma for United States-Japanese understanding. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exhibit No.</th>
<th>Hearings, page and date introduced</th>
<th>Exhibits page No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>178</td>
<td>5470 5-23-46</td>
<td>4209</td>
<td>Compilation of documents from Ambassador Joseph C. Grew to the President and the State Department, and attached memoranda. (See table of contents attached to this exhibit.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>179</td>
<td>5470 5-23-46</td>
<td>4241</td>
<td>Miscellaneous documents from the files of the late President F. D. Roosevelt, as furnished to the Committee, concerning Far East matters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180</td>
<td>5471 5-23-46</td>
<td>4551</td>
<td>Organization charts of the Army and Navy at Washington, D. C., and Hawaii, as of Dec. 7, 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>181</td>
<td>5520 5-23-46</td>
<td>4565</td>
<td>The United States News, extra number, Sept. 1, 1945, publishing reports of the Army Pearl Harbor Board and the Navy Court of Inquiry, and related documents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>182</td>
<td>5537 5-23-46</td>
<td>4702</td>
<td>Compilation of military intelligence estimates, prepared by G-2, War Department, for period Jan. 1 to July 1, 1941.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>183</td>
<td>5468 5-23-46</td>
<td>4766</td>
<td>Material compiled at request of Senator Ferguson by letter dated May 20, 1946, to Committee counsel (p. 5464), including data concerning the test bombing of the Utah by the Army Air Corps in 1937, and data concerning the program of the Army Air Corps for 1940-45 production of B-17 4-engine bombers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
EXHIBIT NO. 157

(This Exhibit consists of reports, findings, and conclusions of the Roberts Commission, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Navy Court of Inquiry, and Hewitt Inquiry, with endorsements (See table of contents attached to this Exhibit) and will be found printed separately in the Joint Committee Record. See Index of Exhibits.)

EXHIBIT NO. 158

(This Exhibit is a compilation of documents relating to United States-British conversations concerning the Japanese situation, and consists of the following items:

1. Memorandum of conversation dated February 7, 1941 concerning the Far Eastern situation and attached aide-memoire.
2. Letter dated February 11, 1941 from Ambassador Halifax to Secretary Hull with two telegrams, A and B, each dated February 11, 1941 attached.
3. Paraphrase of message dated February 15, 1941 for the President from Prime Minister Churchill.
5. Paraphrase of telegram from the British Ambassador, Tokyo to the Foreign Office, April 13, 1941.
6. Memorandum for the President from Admiral Stark dated April 29, 1941 with attachments dated April 25, and 28, respectively.
7. Memorandum for the President from Secretary Knox enclosing a reply to certain U. S. proposals dated May 8, 1941 from Rear Admiral Danckwerts.
8. Memorandum of conversation dated October 17, 1941 concerning U. S.-Japanese relations between Secretary of State Hull and Ambassador Halifax, with attachment dated October 16, 1941.
9. Telegram dated November 5, 1941 (5 sections) from Ambassador Winant to the Secretary of State being a message for the President from Prime Minister Churchill.
10. Memorandum of conversation between Ambassador Halifax and Mr. Welles dated November 12, 1941 concerning U. S.-Japanese negotiations with attachment dated November 11, 1941.
11. Paraphrase of memorandum handed to Mr. Hornbeck by Mr. Dening of the British Embassy November 14, 1941.
12. Letter dated November 29, 1941 from the British Embassy, Washington to Secretary Hull.
13. Letter dated December 1, 1941 from Ambassador Halifax to Secretary Hull with enclosures dated November 30, 1941.
14. Letter dated December 8, 1941 from Ambassador Halifax to the President enclosing paraphrase of a report from London on the military situation delivered to the President from the British Embassy on December 8, 1941.)
In keeping with the attached aide-memoire of February 7 marked "very confidential," Mr. Butler, Counselor of the British Embassy, said that the Embassy had just received two telegrams from the British Foreign Office containing confidential information which the Embassy was instructed to communicate to the American Government. Mr. Butler said that the information was as follows:

The first telegram, dated February 6, was to the effect that according to reliable information the Japanese Embassy in London on February 4 received instructions to resume to a minimum its contacts with the British and to be prepared to leave on short notice; that these instructions were discussed at the Japanese Embassy in London; that some measures of the Embassy were
were dismayed by the instructions while others were not; that it was believed at the Japanese Embassy that the instructions had reference to some scheme of cooperation with Germany advocated by the Japanese military party.

The second telegram, also dated February 9, was to the effect that the notification date referred to in the first telegram was either February 9 or February 13 (the telegram as received by the British Embassy was garbled and the Embassy had not yet worked out whether the correct date was February 9 or February 13); that there was some indefinite reference to the plan in question being linked up with the Soviet Government and Chinese Communists; that the proposed action was being carefully planned so as not to appear to affect United States interests; that the movement of the United States Fleet was regarded as of a routine character; and that there was a good deal of talk at the Japanese Embassy in London about war.

Mr. Butler added that it was possible that the British Ambassador might ask to talk to the Secretary of State and to the President in regard to the information set forth in the two telegrams under reference.
Evidence is accumulating that the Japanese may already have decided to push on Southward even if this means war. Press reports indicate that Japan is using her position as mediator between Thailand and Indo China to gain, besides a preferential economic position, a Naval Base at Camranh Bay, Air Bases in Southern Indo-China and control of the Indo China customs. There is also reason to suppose that some military agreement with Thailand, directed against our territories and the Netherlands East Indies is under consideration.

The following are a few “straws in the wind”:

(a) His Majesty’s Ambassador in Tokyo reports a general feeling amongst the Japanese that a crisis in the Far East will come within the next few weeks.

(b) Cancellation of sailings of Japanese ships to the United States and the commandeering of ships by the Japanese Government have been reported. These reports have not so far been confirmed by the British Naval authorities in Singapore.

(c) Japan is continuing to supply munitions to Thailand. For instance, a Japanese steamer arrived at Bangkok on January 29th with the following war material for the Thai Government: 8,000 bombs, 20 tanks and 10,000 cases containing unspecified arms and ammunition.

(d) A telephone conversation was intercepted between two Japanese at Sourabaya and Lawang to the effect that the Japanese attack would take place on February 10th. The Netherlands authorities attach no undue importance to the conversation but think that it cannot be disregarded.

(e) A Japanese Naval Officer recently stated to students of the Malay language that time was very short indeed.

(f) The time-table of the “Asaka Maru” which is taking a Naval Mission to Berlin and may be bringing back machinery and certain metals, seems to indicate that action is not contemplated until the middle of March.

(g) A French source in Indo China reports concentrations in Formosa and Hainan.

While none of these indications may be conclusive in themselves, their accumulative effect is to suggest that a further movement is impending. Most of this information has already been given to the United States Naval Attaché in London.

BRITISH EMBASSY,
Washington, D. C., February 7th 1941.
Substance of Telegram A Received at the
British Embassy from the Foreign Office on February 11th.

The consequences of the Japanese movements in Indo-China and Thailand have been reviewed once more by the Chiefs of Staff, who have furnished an estimate of the immediate danger to be anticipated. This estimate is as follows:

The Japanese are now engaged in a movement designed both to increase their hold on Indo-China and to obtain strategic facilities in Thailand. According to the information in the possession of the British authorities it is unlikely that the Japanese will be content with this; it is probable that they are contemplating more drastic action, the exact nature of which is as yet uncertain. The general effect of the present Japanese movement is to weaken the strategic position of the British Empire in the Far East by enabling the Japanese to secure vantage points near Singapore. If the Japanese movement were to be extended, not only would this tendency be increased but the Japanese might obtain important economic resources which would greatly strengthen their capacity to carry on a war.

It is felt certain that the Japanese are acting with the encouragement of Germany and that they are planning more vigorous aggressive measures in direct agreement with the German Government. For these measures to help Germany, they must directly affect/
affect British interests and are therefore probably designed to force Great Britain into war with Japan. Such a war would expose to attack British communications with Australia and New Zealand, and British trade in the Far East and in the Indian Ocean, and might even jeopardize the communications between the United Kingdom and the Middle East. The efforts which the British authorities would be bound to make to prevent excessive damage to these vital interests would weaken their whole war effort against Germany. Indeed, if the threat to Singapore become imminent, the British authorities might be forced temporarily to transfer the British Fleet from the Mediterranean in order to free naval forces for action in the Indian Ocean.

It will be appreciated what a profound setback this last step would constitute. Thus war with Japan would inevitably lengthen the war with Germany and would, indeed, make ultimate British success improbable without the full participation of the United States.

Hence, while the direct danger to American interests in the Far East constituted by a further Japanese movement is clear, the indirect danger to the United States is ever more serious. Indeed, it seems evident that Japanese aggression against British interests in the Far East represents a serious threat to the safety of the United States on account/
account of its effect on the British war effort as a whole. It is essential, therefore, in the interests not only of the British Empire but of the United States, to take steps which will prevent the Japanese from taking the plunge.
In your further talks with the United States Government you will no doubt call attention to the views of the Chiefs of Staff. The important point to emphasize is that the initiative lies with Japan. If Japan is bent on war in combination with Germany, mere attempts on our part to avoid the issue are unlikely to be successful. The only thing likely to avert war is to make it clear to Japan that further aggression will meet with the opposition both of the United States and of ourselves.

A joint declaration to the Japanese by the United States and the British Empire that any attack on the Netherlands East Indies or on the British possessions in the Far East would involve Japan in war immediately and irreparably with both the United States and the British Empire is obviously the course most likely to achieve this end. It is realised, however, that such a proposal may present certain difficulties from the point of view of the United States.

So far as His Majesty's Government are concerned the Foreign Secretary has made it clear to the Japanese Ambassador that if British territories are attacked they will be defended with the utmost vigour. Speaking to the Japanese Ambassador on February 7th, Mr. Eden said that while His Majesty's Government had no aggressive intentions they did not intend to sacrifice the British possessions in the Far East at the dictation of any power. Nor were His Majesty's Government prepared to agree that Japan alone was entitled to control the destinies of the peoples of the Far East. Great Britain intended to discharge
discharge her obligations to those people in that part of the world for whom she was responsible and if British territories were attacked, the British people would undoubtedly defend them with the utmost vigour.

It would be most useful if the President, when seeing the new Japanese Ambassador on his arrival, could speak to him in somewhat similar terms and make plain beyond the possibility of misunderstanding the interest of the United States in Far Eastern affairs. If a joint declaration on the lines indicated above is impracticable then it is clearly of the greatest importance that the United States Government should independently go as far as they can to make plain their attitude to the Japanese Government.

With this object in view you should seek an interview with the President and in placing before him on the most comprehensive lines our information regarding the present situation in the Far East, inform him of the line already taken by the Foreign Secretary with the Japanese Ambassador in London.

You should furthermore point out that in the view of the British authorities the situation would be greatly improved if in addition to any statement or warning that the United States Government may see fit to make to Japan, the American naval forces in the Far East were to be increased, either by sending reinforcements to Manila or despatching a detachment to Singapore. At this stage of events the most effective check upon further Japanese adventures would appear to be some definite move on the part of the American Fleet.
MESSAGE DATED FEBRUARY 15, 1941 FOR THE
PRESIDENT FROM MR. WINSTON CHURCHILL
(PARAPHRASE)

There are indications, from many drifting straws, that the Japanese mean to make war on us, or to do something which would compel us to make war on them, during the next few weeks or months. Personally I am not sure that this is not a war of nerves which is intended as a cover for Japanese advances in Indochina and in Siam. Nevertheless I consider that I should let you know that should the weight of the Japanese Navy be thrown against us, situations beyond the capacity of our own naval strength would confront us.

Japan would not be likely, in my opinion, to dispatch such a large military expedition as would be necessary to besiege Singapore. Doubtless they would occupy oil fields and strategic centers in the Netherlands East Indies and vicinity which they desire and in this manner acquire a much better position for a subsequent full scale onslaught against Singapore. Also they would make raids on the ports and coasts of New Zealand and Australia, thus arousing much anxiety in those countries who have already sent to the Middle East all of their best-trained men. However, I fear most of all an attack by raiders, which might include battle cruisers, against our communications and trade routes in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. By inviting disaster elsewhere we could dispatch some powerful warships into these great expanses of ocean. But escorts would be few and far between and it would be necessary for all shipping to go into convoy. This would constitute an extremely serious additional limitation and disarrangement of our entire war economy. Moreover, it would end altogether all the military reinforcements which we had intended to develop in the Middle East from Indian and Australasian resources.

Should there be a threat of a major attack of New Zealand and Australia we would be compelled, of course, to remove our navy from the eastern Mediterranean. Such an action would result in disastrous military possibilities in that area, a certainty that some accommodation would have to be made by Turkey, and the reopening of German oil supplies and German trade from the Black Sea. Thus, Mr. President, you will see what an awful weakening of our war effort would come about; merely should Japan send her battle cruisers and her 12 cruisers carrying 8-inch guns into the eastern oceans, and still more should there be any serious invasion threat against New Zealand and Australia.
There are some who consider that in Japan's present mood she would have no hesitation to entertain an attempt to make war against both your country and mine. Although it is my personal belief that the odds are definitely against such an event, one cannot tell. Whatever you are able to do to instill in Japan anxiety as to a double war may succeed in averting this danger. Nevertheless should we alone be attacked, it would be difficult to overstate the grave character of the consequences.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Mr. Renshaw in Secretary Hull's office phoned the following paraphrase of a message for the President from the Former Naval Person:

"Have received better news concerning Japan. It seems Jap Foreign Minister is shortly going to Moscow, Berlin and Rome for the purpose of covering the failure of action against us. The fear of the U. S. appears to have postponed attack which seemed imminent. While completely understanding your situation pending enactment of Bill on which our hopes depend, the more these fears can be aroused the better.

"Appreciation given in my last message to you of naval consequences subsequent to Jap attack against us remains the same in all circumstances."

The message is dated February 20, 1941.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Telegram From the British Ambassador at Tokyo to the Foreign Office.
April 13, 1941 (Paraphrase)

We have been furnished the information below by a secret source of reliability who is in touch with the Prime Minister of Japan and who has been accurate on two previous occasions, namely, (1) advance notice (3 weeks) of the military alliance in the Three-Power Treaty of September 1940, and (2) the occupation of the Island of Hainan 14 days before the event.

We learn from this source that there is now at Hainan and Formosa an expeditionary force, with transports at hand, of from 12 to 15 divisions. On the pretense of maneuvers and at a time in mid-March when the disembarkation of foreigners at Nagasaki was forbidden, a total of 8 or 10 divisions were sent to Formosa. The expeditionary force is composed of these troops plus several divisions, 3 or more, which were already in Hainan.

There is a plan for the synchronization of a direct attack on Singapore with German action in blocking the Suez Canal in order that the passage of British naval forces may be prevented. It is said that an attack on the Suez Canal of devastating force is about to be launched. It is the idea of the Japanese that if an attack on Singapore is made soon, America will not be prepared to intervene, since opinion is not united at home and the United States is pre-occupied with such matters as aid to Britain, the battle of the Atlantic and the submarine menace. However, here is a Japanese fleet at Formosa besides light naval forces which are based in the Mandates. The original plan of taking Indochina bases was abandoned since that would have warned America which might have taken action. The current plan for a direct surprise attack on Malaya in force does not entail the use of such bases. Last night, although American newspaper correspondents had a story along these lines, they were unable to send it.

File No.: 740.0011 P. W./191.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I am sending by special officer messenger copy of the questions you asked us to send to the British when we were last in the White House, and also am enclosing copy of their reply.

Please note the "secret status".

[Signature]
April 25, 1941.

My dear Admiral Danokwerts:

1. The Chief of Naval Operations has instructed me to convey to you his view that the provisions of paragraph 6 of the main report of ABC-1 ought to apply to major changes in the disposition of the forces of the United States and the United Kingdom, even in advance of the time that the United States may enter the war. He proposes, therefore, to keep the British Chief of the Naval Staff informed as to all contemplated shifts of United States naval forces, and to invite the advice of that officer concerning such movements.

2. I have already informed you orally that one aircraft carrier and five destroyers are now en route from the Pacific to the Atlantic, and that the primary reason for this movement is because the U.S.S. RANGER (Atlantic Fleet) is soon to undergo an extensive navy yard overhaul.

3. However, the Chief of Naval Operations has in contemplation other changes of a more important nature. He therefore requests that you obtain the opinion of the Chief of the Naval Staff as to the following:

   (a) With due regard to the existing political situation in the Far East, and to the present strength of the United States Atlantic Fleet, would it be advisable, at this time, for the United States to transfer from the Pacific to the Atlantic three battleships, four light cruisers, and two destroyer squadrons? (Note that this force is nearly equal to the force to be transferred after the United States enters the war.)

   (b) If Axis pressure forces the British Mediterranean Fleet to leave the Mediterranean Sea, would this Fleet remain in the Indian Ocean or Far Eastern waters? Would it be desirable at the time this British fleet retires to the eastward, for the United States simultaneously to shift strong naval forces from the Pacific to the Atlantic?

Sincerely,

/s/ R.K. Turner

Dear Admiral V.H. Danokwerts, C.M.C.,
British Embassy,
1100 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.,
Washington, D.C.

Copy to:

War Plans Division, U.S. Army

Dear Admiral C.L.Burke,
My dear Admiral Turner:

I have to-day received a telegraphic reply from the British Chiefs of Staff to the contents of your letter dated April 25th, 1941 (Op-12-VED A161/EF13 (Serial 5.).)

2. The Chiefs of Staff express their gratitude for the proposals made in paragraph 1. of your letter, and ask that the Chief of Naval Operations may be informed of their full agreement with these proposals.

3. As regards the provision of reciprocal information, the Chiefs of Staff feel sure that the Chief of Naval Operations will appreciate the difficulty of providing a day to day report of all changes, but propose that a regular periodical summary of British major dispositions should be communicated by them. They suggest that it might be rendered weekly, and would be glad to know if this suggestion would be satisfactory to the Chief of Naval Operations.

4. The Chiefs of Staff consider that the move proposed in paragraph 3(a) of your letter would be advantageous. It would make more forces available for Western Hemisphere Defence Plan No. 2, and in the event of the United States entering the war would reduce the time taken for United States' Naval forces to relieve the British forces at present based on Gibraltar. The Chiefs of Staff feel satisfied that the consequential reduction in the strength of the United States' Pacific Fleet would not unduly encourage Japan.

5. As regards the question posed in paragraph 3(b) of your letter, while the Chiefs of Staff do not anticipate that any such contingency is likely at present, they state that should the circumstance arise, and the Suez Canal still be open, the Mediterranean Fleet would probably be sent into the Indian Ocean in the first place. In that event they agree that a further transference of Naval forces from the United States' Pacific Fleet to the Atlantic would be desirable.
6. If the Mediterranean Fleet was not able to pass direct into the Indian Ocean owing to the blocking of the Suez Canal, the Fleet would be brought into the Atlantic through the Western Mediterranean; an operation which the Chiefs of Staff consider feasible. In this event, and assuming that no other capital ship force had been sent to the Far East or Indian Ocean, a further reduction in the strength of the Pacific Fleet would be undesirable.

7. As regards the reference to the movement of the Mediterranean Fleet being limited to the Indian Ocean as a first stage, I believe it to be the views of the Chiefs of Staff that if Japan was a belligerent it would not be advisable to send to the Far East itself, to be based on Singapore, a naval force weaker than that put forward in ABC-1, Annex III, Page 15. Until, therefore, that strength was available it would be their intention to retain the Mediterranean Fleet (three battleships, etc.) in the Indian Ocean based probably in Trincomalee.

8. Nevertheless, I interpret their reply to mean that in their view a U.S. naval strength similar to that of the Mediterranean Fleet could be transferred into the Atlantic, in addition to those units proposed in paragraph 3(a) of your letter, if the Mediterranean Fleet moved into the Indian Ocean and Japan still remained a non-belligerent. It will be realised that such a further transfer to the Atlantic from the Pacific Fleet would facilitate an earlier despatch to the Far East of additional British naval forces which, in conjunction with the Mediterranean Fleet, would provide the necessary strength for satisfactory operation from Singapore in the event of Japan entering the war.

9. If the Chief of Naval Operations wishes to pursue this matter further, perhaps we might have a discussion on the subject, after which I could question the Chiefs of Staff in more detail.

Yours sincerely

V.H. Danckwerts

Rear Admiral R. K. Turner,
U. S. Navy Department,
Washington, D.C.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

My Dear Mr. President:

I am attaching herewith a formal reply from the Defence Committee of the British Cabinet to the query we put to Adm. Stark re: movement of part of the Pacific fleet to the Atlantic.

Yours sincerely,

J.K.
REPLY TO CERTAIN UNITED STATES PROPOSALS

SECRET

AIDE MEMOIRE.

Inform U.S. authorities that the issues raised by this proposal have been considered by the Defence Committee of the Cabinet and that as such a move vitally affects Australia and New Zealand we have obtained their opinions.

2. Our opinion which is concurred in in general by both Australia and New Zealand is that any marked advance by the U.S. Navy in or into the Atlantic would be on the whole more likely to deter Japan from going to war than the maintenance of the present very large U.S. Fleet at Hawaii, and further that it might exercise a profound influence on the present critical situation in Spain, Turkey and Vichy France. You should therefore strongly encourage American action in this sense.

3. The problem for the U.S. authorities is so nicely to judge the degree of the transfer that while still retaining the deterrent effect of a strong U.S. Fleet in the Pacific, there will also be the deterrent effect of an increased U.S. Fleet in the Atlantic.

4. It is not only the strength but also the composition of the Fleet in the Pacific which will act as a deterrent, and in our view the necessary effect will not remain unless the Fleet in the Pacific consisted of not less than 6 capital ships and 2 aircraft carriers. Inclusion of the latter is considered of the greatest importance.

8th May, 1941:

[Signature]
The British ambassador called and handed me the attached copy of a memorandum of conversation between the Ambassador of Japan and himself yesterday.

The ambassador said that he understood the difficulties of this country and Japan in finding ways and means of keeping up the appearance of not-too-strained relations between our two countries while the present government of Japan endeavors to improve public sentiment and opinion in support of the basic principles for which this government stands and which envisage a peaceful settlement in the entire Pacific area. The ambassador said he would communicate with his government in order to see if it had any suggestions along this line, which would aid the government of Japan to move in our direction on the fundamental issues involved.
The Japanese Ambassador asked rather mysteriously this morning for an interview with me, and came to see me this afternoon.

He began by recalling a conversation that we had had when he had first arrived in Washington as to the desirability of maintaining peace in the Pacific. In the course of this previous talk, we have been talking with Mr. Hull, and from these talks three principal points of difficulty had emerged.

The first point concerned the attitude of the United States Government as to the desirability of maintaining peace in the Pacific. Mr. Hull had told us that the United States Government had decided that the United States should do what it could to help maintain peace in the interest of the two powers which were most closely involved.

In the course of our conversation, Mr. Hull had said that he believed that the United States could do something to help maintain peace in the Pacific, but that he did not know how much could be done without the cooperation of other countries.

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3464 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

4. Reverting to the Tri-partite Pact, the ambassador said that though we might disagree, the Japanese government of the time had regarded adherence to it as the only policy that was possible for Japan to pursue. Having regard to the evidence of what he called anti-Japanese cooperation against Japan.

Freezing and embargo were resorted to likely to affect very seriously the ordinary Japanese earning classes who were accustomed to low standards, but would create difficulty for Japanese business, which was restless that some way out must be found.

5. I said that nobody wanted to struggle at all, either here or in the British Commonwealth. Provided Japanese policy was no longer such as to constitute a threat. Moreover, if he would allow us to say so, Japanese economic difficulties were of her own making, and certainly we did not set out...
of the difficulties largely created by one war by planning into another.

Both the United States and Great Britain wanted to see peace preserved in the Pacific, and there was no reason why peace should not be maintained if the Japanese government abandoned its expansionist policy, and were willing to recognize principles which both the United States and Great Britain signed to were maintained.

But do not let the Japanese government make the mistake of backing the wrong horse. I could well understand that many people in Japan might be misled by the succession of apparent Japanese victories, but let them remember that none of these victories had yet brought Germany within sight of the only victory that would win the war.

It might indeed well be argued that they had largely aggravated America's difficulties, and that the strain that they would impose would one by becoming intolerable.

The ambassador said that every in Japan agreed with this view, and that he himself was of opinion that the victory and victories were not the same thing as a war.

Referring to his own point, he asked or whether I thought that it would be possible to find any serious difference in the Pacific that might be of value in giving to the other point of the relating to the third point to which he had referred at the outset of our conversation, which he thought it would be extremely difficult for any new government to solve quickly.

I knew the close the relations of that matter were, but the United States government were, I hoped that would take a portion entirely seriously, and not treat it, mine and what story...
It is difficult to determine the exact number of those who perished in the attack on Pearl Harbor. Estimates vary, with some reports indicating thousands of casualties. The official figures were not immediately available, and the investigation into the event was ongoing. The attack was a significant event in American history, leading to the United States' entry into World War II. The investigation aimed to uncover the truth behind the decisive moment in history.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

[Text of telegram]

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

-34, 1937, December 8, 1941 (S.C. 772, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.)


...
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

China

TRIPLE PRIORITY

November 7, 1941, 8:20 a.m.

TO

Mr. Secretary of War,

Washington,

Telegraph in order received.

I am giving a wire to the

Yunnan Province in Indochina to stop

and to cut China's lines of communication

of great British Army. This is because of

serious Preoccupation and probability of

Great effort by expects very shortly.

The British

Preparation of the Burma road,

and the

China-India铁路, which is a

important line of communication

of the British Army. This is because of

an urgent request from

The Chinese High Command.

I have in mind that,

prevent small force of a single

Army.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (R)

FROM London.

DATED November 9, 1941

Spread, 2:07 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

1937, November 9, 9 a.m., (S S O E R O O T T H E T)

...long before the advent of the Chinese nation and

people will be shaken to its foundations. Our

people has stood for more than four years on the

Eastern Front, where the fire of our spirit cannot

directly reach us. It would be greatly exposed by

a Japanese triumph on the far front, where, so far

today, the fire of spirit of our people has not been

for the first time in our long war, a real collapse

of resistance would be possible. For more than four

weeks now, China has been forced into the man in

the field, and thus strengthened the will of the

people. The limitations of this must be obvious to

all, indeed I think they are already recognized by

our people and all those friends of China. If America

could open would a real to carry with them and

hope for the whole right answer. If a purpose

be not therefore not merely a matter of the

victory or defeat of China; the scope and security

of the
of the Pacific hand upon it. Indeed it is not too much to say that the outcome of the whole war may hang upon it. If China had the air force she needs I should be making no appeal to you, because I should feel confident of my ability to defeat the invaders. But I have nothing that I can call an air force to pit against what the Japanese would bring to bear upon me. For we may be sure that they will use their fine (from indecipherable) and their strongest. If ever in this battle Japan's air force can be shocked or even smothered, her power to enter upon what I have called fresh correspond will be much diminished. It is true that her army will remain in the field, but with that one may in little without support in the city, without which there will be risk of exposure.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3473

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM

London

DATED November 15, 1944

REG# 4480 560

Secretary of State,
Washington,

TRIPLE PRIORITY

197, No. 149 , 7 p.m. (SECTION 772)

East Germany; for publication only at
speed by political and economic reasons. Do
not let us therefore make the same mistake we made
in the previous comment: situation not yet clear;
clarification in this war and let the aggressor go; the
next may be to go, and the one, we are not
clear at this point even today. I (do)
know something today: situation may improve; day
then you in my role come to the

2/11/45. I myself, *see in place that I am a
for my country and the people. I tell you, no one
will go to war. We are the organization, we are
years. The American volunteer
farming, no. I'm trying to get that very much.

3/15/45. The time is 11:30; the

American, 41, and I'm a little

and American, 41, will go to the United

Mr. Carter
The British Ambassador called this morning at his request.

The Ambassador read to me a memorandum (the text of which is attached herewith) reporting on a recent conversation between the British Ambassador in Tokyo and the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs. I told the Ambassador that, as the Secretary of State had frequently pointed out to the Japanese Government, the British Government would be informed fully of the basis for any projected negotiations between Japan and the United States if the present conversations now in progress gave any definite promise that such negotiations would be undertaken. I communicated to the Ambassador, in
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
At a recent interview in Tokyo the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs told His Majesty's Ambassador that negotiations with the United States had now been proceeding since last April, and that his experience in such matters made him pessimistic about the outcome of an advisory process. In the Privy Council impatience was now taking the place of the hopes originally placed in the discussions, and it was therefore highly desirable to discover some way out before feeling became too exacerbated. Matters were being discussed which were of the utmost concern to British interests and Mr. Tojo said he was therefore somewhat surprised that His Majesty's Government were taking no part in the discussions. While he could understand that in the early stages we might prefer to leave matters in the hands of the United States Government, a joint had now been reached where a breakdown might have repercussions upon British interests. The Minister said he had a strong impression that, for reasons best known to themselves, the United States Government were deliberately dragging out the negotiations. If this were so it would of course be impossible for the Japanese Government to continue them.

Speaking for himself, Sir Robert Craige told the Japanese Foreign Minister that he felt sure that there had been no desire in any quarter deliberately to drag out the negotiations. But as he understood the position, the United States Government had been unable to elicit sufficiently definite assurances and undertakings in regard to Japan's future.
The objective under discussion was an ambitious one - namely, the settlement of the situation as a whole - and it was obvious that a task of this magnitude would require time as well as patience on both sides. As regards the attitude of His Majesty’s Government towards the negotiations, Sir Robert Craigie suggested that it was one of helpful expectancy, and that while the Foreign Secretary was desirous of finding a settlement reached which would be just to all the parties concerned, he was equally anxious not to intervene in any manner likely to impair the discussions between the United States and Japan.

Upon receipt of the above report of his interview with the Japanese Foreign Minister, Sir Ernest Craigie was instructed to speak to him as follows.

Although His Majesty’s Government are not fully acquainted with the details of the conversations which have been taken place, they are aware that the United States Government have been seeking a basis of discussion with the Japanese Government towards a general settlement in the Far East. The British Government have such a settlement to be in their own very interest, as well as that of Japan and it is their earnest desire that it should be achieved. It cannot be expected however that all the living should be in the future free, and no advantage is seen in entering upon negotiations unless some basis for
for discussion can be agreed upon in advance which establishes principles upon which agreement will be sought. The British Government have been content to leave this part of the proceedings in the hands of the United States Government who are well aware of the British position. Moreover the United States Government have assured the British Government (and it is believed that they have so informed the Japanese Government) that should actual negotiations become possible the British Government will at once be consulted. At that point the British Government will be very ready to collaborate with the United States and Japanese Governments in seeking a solution of their joint problems.

Sir R. Craigie was further authorised, at his own discretion, to urge upon the Japanese Government the advantage of a supreme effort to reach agreement with the United States, as against the desparate risks to Japan of allowing a situation to develop in which it might no longer be possible to control the issue of peace or war.

THE BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
November 11th, 1941.
MEMORANDUM HANDED TO MR. HORNBECK BY MR. DENEING OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY
NOVEMBER 14, 1941 (PARAPHRASE)

It may be of interest to the Department of State to have the following indications as to the possibility of an attack on Thailand by the Japanese. According to a report by the British Ambassador to Japan, there are several factors which indicates that early in 1942 is the most likely time for action against Thailand unless other factors result in precipitation of the crisis earlier.

It is stated by the British representative at Bangkok that there is no rain in Thailand from approximately mid-November until May and thus the dry weather lasts from December through April. He also reports that in the flat country, that is, Central Thailand and Cambodia, during the dry season the earth in the rice fields is baked hard. He was informed that at that time it is not difficult to improvise airstroes for temporary use, and suggests that if an attack on Thailand is contemplated by the Japanese, the beginning of 1942 may well be the best time for it.

Information has been received from the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, that there are at present about 30,000 Japanese troops in Cochin-China and Cambodia and that one and perhaps two tank regiments are included among these. Large quantities of anti-aircraft guns, motor transport and other transportation mate-rial have been imported, including small vessels which could be used for transport as far as the new boundary, situated in the northern end of Tonla Saidle Lake. It is known that there are a number of air fields in the North which have either asphalt or concrete runways and which can be used at any time of the year. There are in the South metal runways at Toutrane, Penon, Penh and Angkor, as well as an asphalt runway at Tan Son Nhat. Work is proceeding rapidly on the construction of runways at other fields in the South, at which heavy bombers will be used.

File No.: 740.0011 P. W./1465.
Dear Mr. Hull,

Then I got back to the Embassy this morning. I found a telegram from Eden asking whether it would be possible to let him see the text of the document given to the Japanese.

I have already told him of its general character as you described it to me, but I have no doubt, if you have no objection, he would be grateful for the opportunity of seeing the text.

Yours very sincerely,

(for the Ambassador)

[Signature]

The Honorable Cordell Hull, Secretary of State to the Japanese.
BRITISH EMBASSY,
WASHINGTON D C

The Prime Minister, as Prime Minister of Her Majesty's Govern-ment, has asked me to present to the Senate, and, if they think fit, to the House of Representatives, the following statement.

The First World War, in which the United Kingdom was involved from the first day of its commencement, was over and peace had been made. The world was trying to find a way to the future.

The British people had already borne a heavy burden of war, and the country was hungry for peace.

The British government had already decided to withdraw from the war, and the Prime Minister had already announced his intention to do so.

The Prime Minister has already said that he will do everything he can to make the peace as fair as possible.

The British people are already looking forward to the future, and are already making plans for the future.

I, therefore, ask the Senate and the House of Representatives to accept this statement, and to support the British government in its efforts to bring about a lasting peace.

Yours sincerely,
[Signature]

The Secretary of State
Secretary of War in the United States.
It is conceivable that United States Government may raise with you the question of the compatibility of the operation referred to with our treaty of non-aggression with Thailand. It may be useful for you to know therefore that we have given careful consideration to this point.

4. In July last we informed the Thai Government that we should regard the grant of bases to Japan as an infraction of that treaty. Similarly (although we have as yet made no communication to the Thai Government) we should not feel we could allow the treaty to be a bar to our entering Thailand if a Japanese invasion occurred or was clearly impending. But it would be greatly preferable if in these eventualities we could act in co-operation with the Thai Government. If therefore it were decided to undertake the operation, we should naturally do our best to secure Thais' consent. It would be important however not to reveal to the Thai Government prematurely the existence of our plan owing to the danger of leakage to the Japanese.

9. 11. 44.
BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

December 8th, 1941.

Secret.

Dear Mr. President,

I enclose herein copies of the latest report received from London on the military situation.

Believe me,

Dear Mr. President,

Very sincerely yours,

Halifax

The Honourable
Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
Washington, D. C.
The information provided is based on reports received up to 7 a. m., 7th December, 1941.

(I) NAVAL REPORTS:

Air reconnaissance reported at 3:15 a. m. 6th December, 2 Japanese convoys of 25 and 10 ships (respectively), escorted by cruisers and destroyers, by Point Cambo (Cochin China) on a course of 270 degrees West. Contact has been lost and there is no further news at present. The armed boarding vessel mentioned in yesterday's summary was sunk by torpedo aircraft. She had on board 300 British wounded and 100 prisoners of war. 201 persons were rescued. A small British merchant vessel was sunk off Cromer last night, it is thought by a mine.

(II) MILITARY REPORTS:

LIBYA. 6th December. We maintained pressure with our mobile columns on the whole front Bardia-El Adem and also on the enemy lines of communication behind. Latest reports indicate that the enemy has concentrated his forces South of El Adem and is moving South-East towards El Gobi which is held by our troops.

RUSSIA. German pressure on Moscow continues.

(III) AIR OPERATIONS:

6th December. Spitfires damaged seriously storage systems and buildings at two alcoholic distilleries in the Cherbourg Peninsula. Our aircraft also attacked similar targets in the Dunkirk area. Off the Norwegian coast a Hudson claimed hits on a 7,500 ton merchant vessel and Beauforts probable hits on a 4,000 ton merchant vessel and a 5,000 ton tanker.

LIBYA. Nothing further to my previous report.

CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN. 5–6th December. 20 Wellingtons attacked Naples for five hours. Over 25½ tons of bombs were dropped, two 4,000 pounders starting a large fire in the torpedo factory, while other bombs fell on the arsenal, air frame works, and the railway. We lost one aircraft.

(G IV) G. A. F. 6th December.

A German bomber was destroyed by our fighters South of Plymouth.

MALTA. 5–6th December. Some 20 bombers approached the island during a period of nine hours. Only 8 crossed the coast and caused some damage.

(V) AIRCRAFT CASUALTIES:

In operations over and from the British Isles—German 1.

(VI) 6th December.

The transfer from the Baltic States to Finland of broad gauge locomotives and rolling stock, including tank wagons, will help to relieve the transport situation and assist German economic exploitation. This confirms reports that the whole railway system in the Baltic States is in the process of being converted to standard gauge and also the opinion that Germany intends to convert the gauge of all railways in occupied Russia.

(VII)

Both empty and full oil trains from and to Italy have regular military escorts on the Romanian-Hungarian section of the route which indicates the degree of unrest in Hungary and Romania.

FURTHER REPORT 7th DECEMBER, 1941

Report received at 17:40 G. M. T. today from the Commander-in-Chief in China that the Japanese were attempting to land from 5 ships at Kota Bharu on the East coast of Malaya, immediately South of the Siam Malaya frontier.
EXHIBIT NO. 159

This Exhibit is a compilation of material relating to United States—Chinese conversations concerning the Japanese situation, and consists of the following items:

1. Memorandum for the President by Lauchlin Currie dated May 10, 1941 concerning the Chinese aircraft program attaching two documents, one prepared by the Chinese Mission and the other written by Dr. Hornbeck.

2. Telegram from Generalissimo Chiang-Kai-Shek dated July 8, 1941.

3. Telegram from Minister of Communications dated July 8, 1941 with attached telegram from Berlin dated July 4, 1941.

4. Cable to Lauchlin Currie from Owen Lattimore, Chungking, dated July 22, 1941.

5. Memorandum for the President from Sumner Welles dated August 7, 1941 with two enclosures, being

   (1) A note for the Secretary of State dated August 2, 1941 from the Chinese Ambassador with enclosure and

   (2) Communications to the American Embassy, Chungking, dated August 7, 1941.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 10, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Re: Chinese Aircraft Program

In connection with your consideration of the tentative aircraft program for China which I submitted yesterday, you may find the attached documents of some interest. The one without a title was prepared by the Chinese Mission here and the other was written by Dr. Hornbeck.

Lauchlin Currie

Lauchlin Currie
Singapore is the key to the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Its position determines the control of eastern Asia regardless of the fate of the Philippines. All steps taken so far by Japan indicate their intention to prepare for a move against Singapore.

One may assume that although Singapore is well fortified, small British land, sea, and air forces there are likely to find it difficult to sustain for long the full impact of the Japanese fleet, air, and land forces unless outside assistance be given.

The recent Soviet-Japanese pact has enabled Japan to release at least ten crack divisions and some five hundred first line planes now in Manchuria for operation in other theaters of war.

Singapore could be saved by active intervention of the entire United States fleet with its attendant dangers and complications.

There is, however, a powerful means to check Japanese attack on Singapore and the South Seas or to assist in the effective defense of the beleaguered key fortress, without the intervention of the United States fleet, and that is the creation of a small but efficient air force in China.

This force would constitute a threat to the flank of a Japanese advance southward. Every Japanese move, concentrations on Formosa or Hainan, convoys of transports into China, Siam, or further west, transport of troops across Indo-China, and above all, Japanese air concentrations in Tonkin and Cochini China would be watched systematically, but more important, exposed to constant attack and diversion.

The configuration of southeastern Asia exposes Japan to such action on the part of an efficient hostile air force. Such a force located between the Burma frontier and the province of Kweichow, mostly on high plateaus, has only to cover some 350 miles to reach the Japanese air concentrations at Hanoi, where hundreds of planes are crowding the few airports which the topography of the country permits to utilize. Further, it would interfere with Japanese military transports and troop concentration on Formosa, Hainan, Paracels Island, which are all within easy range. The force could as easily attack concentrations of Japanese planes, troops, and shipping in southern Indo-China and Siam.

The Japanese are sprawled all over China and the existence of this air force would enable the main body of the Chinese regular armies to undertake counteroffensive operations with good assurance of success, which they cannot do at present until so provided with the requisite air arm. The Japanese armies in central China depend exclusively for their supplies on the long and winding Yangtze, which provides an ideal target for an air force operating on interior lines. With the initial strength of the new air force the Chinese troops could launch counter-attacks, the main purpose of which would be not only to hold existing Japanese forces in China but to compel the continuous dispatch of strong reinforcements.

Finally, the main industrial areas within Japan, the triangle Kobe, Kyoto, Osaka, as well as Yokahama and Tokyo, could be attacked by bombers operating from existing air fields in China.

All the above objectives can be achieved efficiently and successfully by a force of 500 planes composed of 350 pursuit and 150 bombers. The existing lines of communication from ports of entry from the west permit to supply and maintain in the field such a force, and would be doubly assured if urgently supplemented by some 35 transport planes of the DC-3 type. The American-operated China National Airways Corporation estimate that this would give an additional capacity of 4,000 tons monthly from the rail head in Burma and over the most difficult section of the Burma highway.

The full strength of 500 planes could be reached by three stages.

The first stage when the 100 P-40's now on the water reach China and the pilots and ground crews now volunteering for service are already in the field. In July the force of pursuits could begin protecting the ways of access to China and particularly the Burma highway.

Second stage. A force ready to operate in September and composed of 200 pursuits and 100 bombers could be constituted if immediate decision were taken and intense preparations were made to supply an additional 100 pursuits and 100 bombers to be shipped during the month of May.

Third stage. By the first of November a full force of 500 craft would be ready to operate by shipment in June and July of 150 pursuits and 50 bombers. In addition, replacements at the rate of 15 percent would have to be provided.

The gradual development of the operations would by then permit the full force to attack all the objectives at the end of the rainy season. From the first
of November there is six months of clear weather over Burma and Yunnan, permitting extensive operations. Thus preparatory work would be accomplished under the cover of bad weather and the force would be ready to operate at the best season, provided immediate decision and requisite practical steps are taken, which would imply certain diversions of planes, equipment, and personnel, and concentrated preparation (including the question of shipping).

Permission has already been obtained to recruit pilots and ground crews for the P-40's already on the way. If permission is given to recruit an additional 150 pilots and 300 technical men for ground crews, the personnel of the force could be in the field by the end of July. There are 1,200 Chinese pilots and a large number of ground crews available in China; one-third experienced, one-third with fighting experience, and the remainder requiring more training, and the existence of this renders it possible to limit the number of the foreign members of the force.

With this personnel and aircraft in operation this summer, not only the determined Japanese move toward the south could be prevented or rendered difficult, but should this move materialize, vitally effective assistance would be afforded to the defenders of Singapore and the Dutch East Indies by constant attacks in the rear of the enemy forces.

To sum up:

Effective air operations in China should follow a carefully planned program which includes the procurement, shipment, assembly, and operation of specified types of airplanes in order to attain prescribed tactical and strategical objectives.

[3] The general outline of such a program follows.

**First Phase**

**Airplanes Required:**
1. 100 bombardment, modified Lockheed Hudson type.
2. 100 pursuit, P-40 type.
3. 100 pursuit, P-43 type.

**Volunteer Personnel:**
1. 100 pilots.
2. 160 technical and clerical.

**Tactical Objectives:**
1. Defence of air bases, Burma highway, supplies in transit and in storage in Yunnan province and industrial establishments in vicinity of Kunming, Yunnan, by:
   a. Local operation of pursuit airplanes.
   b. Counter-offensive operations of bombardment airplanes.

**Strategical Objective:**
To force the Japanese to divert a portion of the air force now available for expeditionary use to the defence of his bases in Indo-China and counter-offensive operations in Yunnan province.

**Time Schedule:**
1. The 100 pursuit airplanes, P-40 type, may begin initial operations early in July, 1941.
2. The 100 bombardment airplanes, Lockheed Hudson type, and 100 pursuit airplanes, P-43 type, may begin operations early in September if the airplanes of both classes are made available without delay.

**Second Phase**

**Airplanes Required:**
1. Maintenance of initial strength of:
   a. 100 pursuit, P-40 type;
   b. 100 pursuit, P-43 type;
   c. 100 bombardment, Lockheed Hudson type, by regular monthly replacement of losses.
2. Provision of additional airplanes of following classes, types, and numbers:
   a. 100 pursuit, P-43 or P-47.
   b. 50 pursuit, P-39.
   c. 50 bombardment, Lockheed Hudson, B-26 or B-23.
Volunteer Personnel:
1. Increase volunteer personnel as follows:
   a. Pilots, 150 additional.
   b. Technical, clerical, 250 additional.

Tactical Objectives:
1. Defence of all establishments in Yunnan province.
3. Attack Japanese supply dumps in Indo-China and Hainan Island.
4. Attack Japanese supply vessels, transports, tankers, and small naval vessels in harbors of Indo-China and Hainan Island and at sea between those places.
5. Occasional raids on Japanese industrial establishments in Japan.
7. Support of offensive operations of Chinese armies.

Strategic Objectives:
1. Force diversion of considerable portion of available Japanese air force to defence of Japanese establishments on South China coast and in Japan and to counter-offensive operations in interior of China.
2. Enable Chinese armies to assume operations which will make necessary heavy reinforcement of Japanese troops in China.
3. Destruction of Japanese supplies and supply ships in order to handicap operations of an expeditionary force to the south of Indo-China.
4. Destruction of Japanese factories in order to cripple production of munitions and essential articles for maintenance of economic structure in Japan.

Time Schedule:
1. The increase of the air force from 300 to 500 airplanes (350 pursuit and 150 bombardment) should be completed by October 31, 1941.

When the railway between the Burma Road and Siang Yun is completed, and this could be effected by June, 1942, sufficient carrying capacity would be amply provided for the maintenance in the field of 1,000 combat planes, or indeed any strength it is desired to build up to.

Table of approximate distances in statute miles

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The importance of Singapore to the defense of the British Isles and the British Empire and to the interests of the United States

1. The importance of Singapore to the immediate defense of the British Isles lies in the fact that any major naval power based in Singapore could command the Indian Ocean and the maritime routes of access to the raw materials and man-
power of India, Malaya, and most of the Dutch East Indies. While the British Isles could perhaps carry on without access to these materials and to this man power, the effect of such a loss upon the economic and financial resources of the British Isles—would be considerable. Such a loss by seriously weakening our own economy (rubber, tin, jute, quinine, vegetable oils, tungsten, antimony, mica are among the supplies that might be lost to us) would adversely affect the extent of our economic aid to the British Isles.

2. More important, the British Isles cannot carry on in a defensive position for an indefinitely prolonged period. However strong defensively, they must in time succumb unless a sustained offensive can successfully be launched against Germany. It is from this point of view [2] that Singapore assumes its greatest importance in the defense—as directed to ultimate survival—of the British Isles; i.e., the long-term defense of the Isles.

From point of view of ultimate offensive action against Germany, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Near East are areas of major and of obvious importance affording as they do (1) the key to an invasion of Europe through the disaffected occupied countries of the Balkans or through a weakened and perhaps collapsing Italy and (2) a possible means of once more bringing into action against the Axis the French forces in Syria and in North Africa. The significance of Singapore to the defense of the British position in the Near East lies in its domination of the only remaining effective lines of communication for the supply of materials and troops to that area. If these Japanese gained possession of Singapore it would seem that they could not only control Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies but most or all of the Indian Ocean as well. (See attached summary of distances from Singapore to various points.)

Troop reinforcements for the British forces in the Near East come from Australia, New Zealand, India, Burma, South Africa and/or the British Isles. Supplies for these forces come from some or all of the foregoing areas and/or [3] from among the following: Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, and the Western Hemisphere. As British naval power cannot ensure uninterrupted passage of the Mediterranean by British transports or by British merchant vessels (even though the increasingly doubtful assumption be made that the Axis powers will at no time during the war be able to close the Straits of Gibraltar), the only sure (for the present) route of access to the Near East from the areas named above is via the Indian Ocean to the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

3. It must also be remembered that one of Britain's major weapons against Germany is the blockade. The rôle of Suez and of the Eastern Mediterranean in the enforcement of the blockade is readily apparent. Singapore's rôle is hardly of less significance. The regions of the Indian Ocean and of the Pacific eastward and southward and northward from Singapore are vast reservoirs of supplies. While Great Britain controls the routes to those reservoirs, Germany can be kept in larger measure from drawing on them. Should Great Britain lose that control, not only would the British Isles be deprived of those supplies but those supplies would in substantial measure be made available to Germany—via the Persian Gulf and the Caspian and via Vladivostok. In the event of loss by the British both of [4] Singapore and of their position in the Near East, the Axis Powers would have direct and full access to each other and these supplies could, therefore, be made directly available to Germany with the result that all effectiveness of the strategy of the blockade would be lost.

In brief, were Singapore to be taken by Japan, Great Britain's tasks, both of (1) defending the British Isles and of (2) winning the war, would be rendered vastly more difficult and her chances of survival be greatly diminished.

4. Singapore is, furthermore, important from point of view of more obviously direct interests of the United States. Were Singapore to fall, the blockade of China (except for the inadequate and unreliable northwest route from Russia) could be made complete and the defeat of China by Japan would be facilitated. The control over the natural resources of the South Seas area which Japan would acquire if it took Singapore has already been indicated. Our own position in the Philippines—a far more valuable possession both economically and strategically than is usually recognized—would, of course, be strategically prejudiced.

It is in its effect upon China's resistance, however, that the fall of Singapore to Japan would most [5] conclusively affect (adversely) the direct interests of the United States (other than and in addition to our interest in survival of the British Empire). Were China to succumb we would be less able than now to protect our interests in the Far East. Our historic Far Eastern policy and our whole position in the Far East would be seriously compromised.
Not the least of the disastrous results of China's defeat would be a serious drop, as a result of such a blow to our prestige, in popular morale in this country and in the morale of the peoples of South America. The only remaining counterweights to the power and influence in the Far East of Japan would be those of Russia. With the collapse of China, Japan would be master in East Asia and in the South Seas, and Japan would be able to draw freely upon China's natural resources and manpower. The security of Australia and New Zealand—to both of which we are bound by increasingly strong ties—would be endangered. In addition, Japan's access to the great economic resources of India would be definitely facilitated and Japanese political influence in India would increase.

The increase in Japan's strength vis-à-vis the United States which would result from these various developments would be notable, and Japan's ability to challenge our [6] economic (and before long our political) position in Central and South America would be vastly increased. At the same time, our general commercial and strategic position would be considerably weakened—by our loss of the Chinese, Indian and South Seas markets for our exports (and by our loss of much of the Japanese market for our goods, as Japan would become more and more self-sufficient) as well as by inevitable restrictions upon our access to the rubber, tin, quinine, jute, tungsten, tung oil and other vital materials of the Asian and Oceanic regions.

5. It has been suggested that Japan would be only too glad to sell to the British and to us the products of the region, and that in fact, therefore, our (and the British) economic situation would not be adversely affected. The fate of British and American trade in Manchuria and in North China is persuasive evidence that our (and British) export trade would certainly suffer. Whether Japan's ability to dictate the terms upon which we could acquire rubber, tin, and other products would also prove harmful to us in times of peace need not concern us. The present and the immediate futures are times of war, and in the war that is raging not only is Japan an open if nonbelligerent partner of Germany and Italy but the United States is openly aiding Great Britain and China. [7] Japan must—while and so long as she is an ally of Germany—aid Germany in the latter's attempt to destroy the British Empire, and toward that end Japan must give support to Germany's attempts to hamstring the British in their operations—both general and particular—of resistance. Consequently, were Japan to acquire control of Singapore (i.e., control of the key ways to the vast natural resources of Asia and the South Seas) it could not with any warrant be expected that she would freely sell to the British or to us—we being Britain's greatest armorer and supplier—what we severally and jointly need (with our expanding requirements) of the strategic materials of the Orient.

6. There is little if any warrant for the view, rather lightly advanced in various quarters (and made without consideration of the above-enumerated reasons why successful Japanese aggression southward would make Germany's defeat far less likely), that, if and when Germany shall have been defeated, it would be an easy matter for Great Britain and/or the United States to put Japan out of any advanced positions which Japan may or might have taken while British and American attention and efforts were concentrated upon problems in the Atlantic and in Europe. Were the Japanese during the present war to occupy Singapore without having had to pay a huge [8] price, the Japanese Empire would be at the end of the war a very different entity from that which it is today, an entity much more powerful in a military sense than it is now. Is there any warrant for an assumption that at that point the British would be so powerful that they would and could move with success against such a Japan as would then exist? It may well be doubted, also, whether the people of the United States would at that point be willing to embark upon far-flung overseas operations for the mere purpose of driving the Japanese out of points in which they had established themselves on the western side of the Pacific.
Distances from Singapore to Various Points, in Statute Miles by Great Circle Measurements

West coast of Ceylon—1,700 miles.

(Note: If Singapore could not be defended, certainly Ceylon could not be— from Colombo to the mouth of the Gulf of Aden it is 2,000 miles and from Colombo to the northwestern tip of Sumatra it is 1,100 miles. Furthermore, Italian East Africa would be available for minor bases, thus permitting the distances from Colombo to the coast of Italian East Africa—2,000 miles at the mouth of the Gulf of Aden; 2,700 miles at the frontier between Kenya and Italian East Africa—to be halved. Bases at Singapore, Sumatra, Colombo and Italian East Africa would give Japan control of the Indian Ocean with consequent ability to blockade India and to cut all communications to the Gulf of Aden.)

Mouth of Gulf of Aden—3,700 miles.

Northwestern point of Australia—1,800 miles.

(From Java, which is controlled by Singapore, the distance is 1,200 miles.)

West coast of Borneo—400 miles.

Southern tip of French Indochina—450 miles (thus controlling Gulf of Siam)

Jolu in Sulu archipelago of Philippines—1,250 miles.
From most reliable sources originating from Japan it is learned that a secret agreement has been concluded and signed between Germany, Italy and Japan on the 6th of July, covering on the one hand recognition of Japanese spheres of interest, and on the other Japanese undertaking to advance southward and against Gibraltar. Please communicate the news to the President immediately.

Since the outbreak of the Soviet-German war, the Soviets have repeatedly stated their intention to conclude definite military agreements with us against Japan. Will you ask the President if he wishes to lay on the President, and if the President does so, to conclude such military agreements with China, Russia and the United States, the actual opening of the war on the United States?
Telegram from Minister of Communications

Dated July 3, 1941

The Government has secured definite information that the recent Japanese Imperial Conference made the decision to move southward against Singapore and the Dutch East Indies first before coping with the Siberian problem.

In accordance with this information all departments of the Government have received instructions from the Generalissimo to take immediate measures to meet this action.
Replying to your telegram No. 19 during Matsuoka's visit to Berlin, although understanding was reached as to the respective spheres of interest and responsibilities the three Axis partners were unable to agree on the tempo of action. Germany and Italy desired immediate Japanese advance southward to which Matsuoka would not agree owing to the then prevailing situation.

I now learn that since the outbreak of the Russo-German conflict complete agreement has been reached which calls for early action against Vladivostok by Japan, simultaneous with consolidation of Japanese bases in Indo-China and Thailand preparatory to an advance southward against the British and the Dutch.

Our friends here declare that we should be by no means discouraged by developments and hope that you may still be able to visit Switzerland.

Owing to the severance of diplomatic relations I am routing my telegram through Switzerland. I am proceeding there myself and hope to maintain contact with our friends from there.

Confidential
GALLERIES TO EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

COMMITTED, July 24, 1899.

The bill to incorporate the Union City Bank was referred to the Committee on Banks, and a copy of its report was ordered to be printed for the information of the House.

W. B. Mayo, Chairman.

Respectfully,

JOSEPH H. ROGERS.

Secretary of the Committee.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 7, 1941:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is enclosed a copy of a telegram addressed to you by General Chiang Kai-shek under date of July 31, 1941, together with a copy of a note from the Chinese Ambassador, dated August 2, forwarding a copy of the telegram in question. As General Chiang's message, in which he conveys to you his gratitude for your having acceded to his request to place Chinese assets in this country under freezing control, refers to other requests which he has made in the interest of strengthening China, it seemed advisable that reply should be made to his telegram without awaiting your return. I accordingly sent today a reply to General Chiang by telegraph through our Embassy at Chungking and enclose a copy of my telegram herewith. I trust that my reply meets with your approval.

Enclosures:

1. From Chinese Ambassador, August 2, with enclosure.
2. To American Embassy, Chungking, August 7.
Honorable Sumner Welles,
Acting Secretary of State

My Dear Mr. Secretary: I have just received a telegraphic message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek which he desires to be conveyed to the President. I shall be grateful if you will be so good as to transmit it to its high destination.

I am, my dear Mr. Secretary,

Very sincerely yours,

Hu Shih.

Enclosure: Telegram as above.

Translation

Telegram to the President of the United States from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Chungking, July 31, 1941.

My Dear Mr. President: I am most grateful to you for having acceded to my request to place all Chinese assets under freezing control. This is additional evidence of your desire to assist China in every possible way, and is appreciated by the Chinese people in that spirit.

I am sure that the action of your Government in freezing all Japanese assets will prove an important body blow to the aggressor.

The Chinese Government is sincerely grateful to you and your Government for having brought about concerted action, on both these measures, by practically all the friendly powers who are fighting aggression.

I am confident that my other requests which I have made to you in the interest of strengthening China's fighting power and meeting the emergency situation of the Far East, will receive your kind attention at the appropriate time.

Chiang Kai-shek.

X X

NAVAL RADIO
August 7, 1941.

AM Embassy,
Chungking.

Please inform General Chiang Kai-shek that the Chinese Ambassador promptly delivered to me for communication to the President General Chiang's gracious expression of appreciation of this Government's action in freezing Chinese assets in this country pursuant to General Chiang's request. State further that the communication will be promptly conveyed to the President, who is absent from Washington at this moment; and that, speaking for the President, I reaffirm that it is the desire and purpose of the people and Government of the United States to aid China in concrete ways in the struggle which the Chinese Government and the Chinese nation are most courageously making to preserve and maintain China's place and perform China's function as one of the great independent nations of the world.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 13, 1941.

MEMORANDUM

Remarks of the President on the occasion of the meeting of his Cabinet at 8:30 and continuing at 9:00 with legislative leaders, on December 7, 1941.
The conversations were interrupted for six weeks to two months. They were then resumed, with the same objective in mind. Despite the Japanese move into Indo-China, they continued until about two weeks ago, when we received indications from various sources—Europe and Asia—that the German government was pressing Japan for action under the tripartite pact. In other words, an effort to divert the American mind, and the British mind, from the European field, and divert American supplies from the European theatre to the defense of the East Asia theatre. About two weeks ago we began to realize that the probability of Japan being in earnest was so slim that it was time to make a final and definite effort to pin them down on the one subject that they had never ever been pinned down on, and that was that they were to agree to cease their acts of aggression, and that they would try to bring the China war to a close.

The result was that the Secretary of State sent a message on that point, to find out whether Japan would be willing to discuss or consider that point of non-aggression. That was the 26th of November. From that time on we were getting more and more definite information that Japan was headed for war, and that the reply to the Secretary of State would be in the negative.

About a week ago, in adding up some of the information . . . . in addition to that, moving 100,000 men in Southern Indo-China, the importance of that lies in the fact that geographically Indo-China was at a hub, from which any attack can be made in a number of directions. It is only a very short distance from there to the Philippines in the east. It is a relatively short distance from [2] there down to the Dutch East Indies, which is the most industrial part—southwest there is Singapore—fortified. To the west there is the Malay peninsula, parts of Thailand, and parts of the Malay Straits, and slightly to the northwest is the whole of Thailand—Siam, an independent kingdom, practically surrounded on two sides by England and France. Only a short distance from there, of course, lies Burma, and the entry—the bottleneck to the Burma Road, a short distance from Siam. We are getting a very large proportion of our supplies—rubber, tin, etc.—from that whole area of southwestern Pacific, and we are getting out over the Burma Road—two-way road—we are getting a large amount of very important material, such as tungsten and some oil—for the manufacture of paint.

In addition to that, of course, is the fact that if the Japanese did move to the south, to the Dutch East Indies, from Indo-China, the Philippines would be virtually surrounded. They would have the Japanese on both sides—Indo-China—the Mandated Islands to the west, this side of the Philippines, and the Dutch Indies, and the Japanese possessions in the South. They would be completely encircled by a military power.

And so the thing went along until we believed that under the pressure from Berlin the Japanese were about to do something . . . . And so yesterday I sent a final message to the Emperor . . . . The Japanese, we learned, were to bring the Secretary of State today a reply to his note of November 26. Actually, in point of fact (?), they telephoned to the State Department, after Hawaii had been attacked, for an appointment. They came to the State Department—[3] they were given an appointment within three-quarters of an hour, and they actually arrived at the State Department one hour after the terrific bombing attack on the Island of Oahu.

Which of course was an act which is almost without parallel in relationships between nations, equaled only by the Japanese episode of 1904, when two squadrons—cruisers—laying in the Harbor of Korea (?) and without any warning—I think on a Sunday morning, by the way—Japanese cruisers sank all of them. There are other parallels, of course, such as the descent on Denmark and Norway in this war, without any warning whatsoever. In fact right in the face of their treaties of non-aggression.

Sending that message to Congress, which is—after you have read and studied it—one of the most . . . falsehoods that I have had . . . .

And finally while we were on the alert—at eight o’clock—half-past seven—about a quarter past—half-past one, a great fleet of Japanese bombers bombed our ships in Pearl Harbor, and bombed all of our airfields. Shortly thereafter this was followed—about eleven o’clock, three hours later—by a third attack, which was not as violent, but most of the damage had already been done. The casualties, I am sorry to say, were extremely heavy. I cannot say anything definitely in regard to the number of ships that have been sunk. It looks as if out of eight battleships, three have been sunk, and possibly a fourth. Two destroyers were blown up while they were in drydock. Two of the battleships are
badly damaged. Several other smaller vessels have been sunk or destroyed. The drydock itself has been damaged. Other portions of the fleet are at sea, moving towards what is believed to be two plane carriers, with adequate naval escort.

In addition to that, this afternoon, in Guam—Guam was being bombed by two squadrons of Japanese planes, and we know—and it is entirely possible that at this moment Guam—which was not defended except by a few Marines, without much in the way of guns—in all probability has fallen to the Japanese.

Wake Island was also attacked, and we have no further word at the present time.

We believe that Manila was attacked, but that has not proved true, and it is possible that other ports of the Philippines—some ports in Mindanao—have been attacked. Those are merely reports.

. . . Three or four, probably, of the landing fields were very heavily bombed, and a very large number of aircraft were destroyed in the hangars, or on the fields.

I have no word on the Navy casualties, which will undoubtedly be very heavy, and the best information is that there have been more than one hundred Army casualties and more than 300 men killed and injured.

I do not know what is happening at the present time, whether a night attack is on or not. It isn’t quite dark yet in Hawaii. I suppose it’s four o’clock in the afternoon, and it will probably be dark in a couple of hours.

There might be . . . nothing definite on it . . . if the Japanese force turns out to be a good deal larger than we expected.

The fact remains that we have lost the majority of the battle ships there. Of course, in the long run, probably most of them can be salvaged, or repaired, to take their place in the line of battle again. That, however, is a long process, and will last very many months, depending on the damage.

I think probably—Oh yes—one more thing—Out in Shanghai the one small gunboat we have there has been taken over by the Japanese, and a British gunboat has been blown up. We still have two hundred Marines there . . . and we are not certain yet whether they have been gotten out or not. Probably not.

The Japanese at the same time . . . which were set for one o’clock Washington time—the Japanese made an attack on the Malay peninsula. That is definite. And the British fleet now in Singapore is now conducting war operations against the Japanese ships in the Gulf of Siam, and on the eastern side of the Malay peninsula, at the north end—top north end of the Malay Straits, just short of the—we will have to look up the map—just short of the Siamese—Thailand part of that peninsula, short of what they call the (?) Isthmus.

The Dutch government has declared that a state of war exists between the Netherlands Indies and the Japanese.

The British cabinet is in session. I have heard nothing from them on that—just the fact. And at nine o’clock tomorrow morning, their time, a special session of the Parliament is being called.

The Japanese have attacked the Malay Straits.

Now I think that is all there is in the way of information, but it has been suggested that the Army and Navy losses, and the rather definite statements that I have made about these ships, could not be spoken of outside, because we must remember that detailed military information, such as the damage to ships, or even the loss of personnel—that information is of value to an enemy. I think that is a matter of discretion, which all of you will accept.

Q. Didn’t we do anything to get—nothing about casualties on their side?

The President. It’s a little difficult. We think we got some of their submarines, but we don’t know.

Q. Well, planes—aircraft?

The President. We did get, we think, a number of their Japanese planes. We know some Japanese planes were shot down, but there again—I have seen so much of this in the other war. One fellow says he has got fifteen of their planes, and you pick up the telephone and somebody else says five. So I don’t know what the report on that is, except that somewhere Japanese planes have been knocked down on the island. I should say that by far the greater loss has been sustained by us, although we have accounted for some of the Japanese.

Q. There is a story coming over the radio that we got one of their airplane carriers.

The President. I don’t know. Don’t believe it. It was reported about eight o’clock. I didn’t believe it. A Japanese carrier has been discovered off the
Panama Canal and sunk by our forces. I wish it were true. But about the same time, the commanding officer in the Canal Zone said they were on the alert, but very quiet.

So that is literally everything I have got here. I think I have even covered the rumors as well.

Of course, it is a terrible disappointment to be President in time of war, and the circumstances... came most unexpectedly. Well, we were attacked. There is no question about that.

I thought that tomorrow, if it was agreeable to Senator Norris (?) he would be good enough to ask me to deliver a short message. I can't tell you what is in it at this time, because of... I will probably have... It has been reported but not verified that Japan has done one of two things. She has sent out word that her army and navy are in a state of hostilities with the United States; and the other reports state that they have declared war on the United States.

I frankly—I haven't any specific information whether both of those are true or not. Of course, the fact is that the—it might be called the principal defense of the whole west coast of this country and the whole west coast of the Americas has been very seriously damaged today. That is why I thought I would ask you—after all, there are two sides—I would ask you if it was all right if you would let me come before you tomorrow—I think the regular Senate session tomorrow.

Q. Yes.

The President. The House—

Q. Twelve o'clock.

May I make one suggestion, Mr. President, and that is that you come as early after twelve as possible, at your convenience. Are you going to suggest what the resolution will be before we leave?

The President. I don't know yet.

Q. A resolution inviting you to come?

The President. A resolution asking me to come.

Q. You don't want to continue any further than that tonight?

The President. No. I think what's happened in the last nine hours. I don't know what's going to happen by twelve o'clock tomorrow.

Q. My suggestion was made for this reason—after the prayer and the reading of the Journal, we stopped the long speeches, but it is the habit now to ask unanimous consent (?) I would like to introduce this resolution as soon as the Journal is read. Then you could come in at an early enough hour.

The President. Half-past twelve?

Q. Yes, I think—

The President. In the Senate?

Q. Five minutes to get there. We have to get that resolution—

The President. The concurrent resolution?

Q. Yes.

The President. Well, if that's all right with you, I will I will come any time—roughly half-past twelve is all right with me. Is that all right?

Q. Yes. Yes. Sam and I discussed that.

The President. Well, it is an awfully serious situation. There is a rumor that two of the planes—Japanese planes have a rising sun painted on them—but two of the planes were seen with swastikas on them. Now whether that is true or not, I don't know. It was a rumor, and therefore news until something a little more definite comes in. But that is a rumor.

Q. I can't help wondering what can we do to do anything—

The President. The only specific thing to do... our ships—we don't know what ships—are out trying to get the Japs at this moment... They can't send for fear of disclosing their position.

Q. There are two airplane carriers of the Japanese navy over there.

The President. Probably—in other words, if you take the timing out, those planes—carriers and their attending cruisers, and probably battleships—I don't know—at sundown last night, at about dark, were roughly twelve hours of darkness—standing in the dark, away from where they launched their planes. Now, let us assume that they launched those planes at a distance of a hundred miles at daylight. That means that they had twelve hours to get to that point in the dark, and running at perhaps 25 knots, that would be three hundred miles further away. In other words, at dark, last night, they might very well have been four hundred to five hundred miles away from the Island, and therefore out of what might be called a good patrol distance. Patrol out of a given point—300 miles under normal conditions, but 500 miles is a long way
for reconnaissance patrol. The planes run all through the night. At dawn they were one hundred miles away from their Island—they launched their planes—they steamed this way and that way, or reversed their course. The planes dropped their bombs and went back.

Q. Well, they were supposed to be on the alert, and if they had been on the alert... I am amazed at the attack by Japan, but I am still more astounded at what happened to our Navy. They were all asleep. Where were our patrols? They knew these negotiations were [10] going on.

The President. . . Here is a dispatch from General MacArthur in the Philippines. All possible action being taken here to speed defense. Pursuit planes are now reporting that by a counter-attack about fifteen enemy planes north of the Far (?) in Central (?)... which means that those Japs are over the Island of Oahu (?). Report has been received that bombing attack... far end of the Island of Mindanao... In all probability... attack may come from the Japanese Mandated Islands, which lie to the west of the Philippines. The only damage caused, said the report, is a hangar of a civilian airport. A report has just been received of a bombing attack on Camp John Hayes at Baguio.

That message was sent twenty minutes ago, and it is just about dawn in the Philippines at this moment—tomorrow of Monday.

Two hundred Marines are in Northern China (?). They have been asked by the Japanese army to disarm, to turn in all arms and ammunition, to assemble... The reply accepts the demands as of two o'clock today. That takes care of that. You have got the rest of it.

Q. That means two hundred of our Marines are now prisoners of the Japanese? The President. Yes.

Well, any of you good people got any questions?

Q. I didn't hear you say anything about sinkings between Hawaii and Oahu.

The President. Those are two reports. One was an armed transport supposed to be carrying a load of lumber. Is that right Harry?


The President. And the other one is—that was 1,500 miles off San Francisco—the other report which might release the same—that an American merchant ship had been sunk 700 miles. But they are just flabby (?).

Q. If that report is true, it is pretty close to California, is that right. Harry?

Q. Mr. President, you said you don't know what you are going to say tomorrow. Are you going to detail to Congress all the facts you have at that time, assuming they don't get any better you might... so far as the Japanese—

The President. Active hostilities, yes.

Q. Yes, that is what I mean.

The President. Well, let me get a little more time on it.

Q. Yes.

The President. In other words, at my Press Conference, they start off with the question "If". It's a little bit of "if"—what I will say tomorrow at half-past twelve.

Q. Have you any report of a mass meeting in Tokyo to be held at 7.30, in which Togo and Tojo and some other officials were to make speeches?

The President. I heard that the Prime Minister is going to make a statement, or a declaration, or speech, in Parliament at two o'clock tomorrow afternoon.

Q. The radio inferred about eleven o'clock.

Q. That would be about 7.30 our time. That's another rumor. It isn't confirmed.

[12] Q. . . make a formal declaration of war? They are so tangled up in the Axis that a declaration of war by Germany on us...

The President. We have reason to believe that the Germans have told the Japanese that if Japan declares war they will too. In other words, a declaration of war by Japan automatically brings...

Q. You haven't made any declaration yet?

The President. It is awfully difficult to know.

Q. Well, Mr. President, this nation has got a job ahead of it, and what we have got to do is roll up our sleeves and win this war.

The President. Doc (?) I am glad you said that because there are a lot of people all over the country who have been saying for the past few weeks—saying, well let's go in and clean up—blank—blank—blank. But of course that popular feeling—you can't do it—just wade in and clean them up.

Back in 1922-1923, I wrote an article for the Asiatic Magazine, and I pointed out at that time that from what I had seen of the Navy Department, war between
the United States and Japan would be won by us; but that it would be won primarily by the starvation and exhaustion of Japan—starvation or exhaustion. And always remember that they have no naval bases—they have nothing. And the old axiom used to be that a fleet loses five percent of its efficiency for every thousand miles it gets away from base. That is a rule of thumb. We saw our fleet at Hawaii, three thousand miles away to Japan itself . . . If anything happens to the ship, there is one thing in particular. If you are in home waters you can get it back to drydock or Navy Yard, but if you are in enemy waters [13] you have an awfully tough time getting back home. And therefore a fleet attack over in Japanese waters is almost an impossibility. And they are going to go through. We will have to, to prolong our national existence, but it makes this treacherous attack impossible in the future. We may have some very heavy losses. And the Japanese know perfectly well that the answer to her attack is proper strangulation of Japan—strangulation altogether.

Q. How big is the Russian Army now?

The President . . . The greater part of it is there. From our best information there will be no offensive on land from now on until the end of April.

Q. Not much danger in Siberia . . . ?

Q. Try to play this down, Mr. President, but I presume that we think of this problem—we probably have varied interpretations to place on the situation, so that we will probably have a declaration against Japan. Whether it goes any further will depend on conditions from now to then.

The President. I think we ought not to say anything about it—what action will be asked for, or what action will be taken by the Congress tonight.

Q. About all you can tell them is about the Message?

The President. But lots of things may happen.

Q. I was trying to get it from our points of view.

The President. The fact is that a shooting war is going on today in the Pacific. We are in it.

Q. By twelve o’clock tomorrow you will know whether Japan’s formality has taken a declaration of war on us, or a state of war [14] exists.

Q. . . . Japan had stated that a state of war existed between us, or that war existed. That does not necessarily mean a declaration of war. That comes from some authority that has power to declare war.

The President. Bill, this is the only thing that we have—from Shanghai. Who is Stanton? Is he our Consul there?

Q. Consul of China.

The President. Captain Smith of the U. S. S.? received a telephone call at 4.15 this morning. Japanese naval officers stated over the telephone that a state of war exists between my country and yours. I am taking control over the U. S. S.? . That’s the nearest official thing I have got, and that’s a telephone message. I think we had better not say anything about it. Remember that out there it is nearly just about dawn. They are doing things, and saying things during the daytime out there, while we are all in bed.

Q. We are in bed too much.

Q. Well, if that’s—well, that’s all we can say.

The President. What?

Q. That is all we can say.

The President. Yes.

December 7, 1941
My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing herewith a very rough draft of what I have sent over to the State Department as a means of helping in the drafting of a message. I hope it may be helpful.

I have had the assistance of both Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner in the summation of the military situation.

The news this morning indicates that the Japs are going to deliberately stall for two or three days, so unless this picture changes, I am extremely hopeful that you will get a two or three day respite down there and will come back feeling very fit.

Yours sincerely,

[Signature]

The President
En Route to
Warm Springs, Georgia

Enclosure
To The Congress of the United States:

The relations between the United States and the Japanese Empire have now reached a stage where I consider it incumbent upon me to acquaint the Congress with the exact facts of the situation and their extremely serious implications.

For the past six months, conversations have been carried on between the Secretary of State and the President of the United States and the Foreign Minister and Premier of Japan, for the purpose of arriving, if possible, at some understanding agreeable to both governments. Throughout this entire period, the government of the United States has been steadfast in its support of basic principles which should govern international relations. The principles for which we have stood in these discussions may be summarized as follows:

(Insert here Secretary Hull's summary of our basic principles which he gave to Nomura.)

We have employed every effort of which we were capable to reach an agreement. With the utmost of forbearance and patience, we have sought to bring Japan into accord with us on these principles. These efforts have failed. Japan has refused to change her posture, and relations between the two nations are threatened with rupture.

In our negotiations, we have kept in close contact with the governments of Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands Indies, and China. We have found these nations in complete agreement with the position we have assumed. In every proposal submitted to Japan, the rights and vital interests of these four nations have been faithfully represented. In the firm position which we have taken with respect to the Japanese attitude and conduct, we have had the moral support of these nations. We also have assurance of their material and military support if that becomes necessary.

[2] Simply stated, what we are confronted with in the Far East is a repetition of the tactics pursued by Hitler in Europe during the past two years. The methods which Hitler has used in Europe so successfully and which are being faithfully imitated by Japan, consist of a gradual expansion of power and control over neighboring peoples by a slow, progressive infiltration through which one nation after another is subdued and enslaved either by actual force or by threats of force.

If the Nazi power is to be defeated, the United Kingdom must not be overwhelmed. British military power mans the gate which holds back from the Americas the flood of German military strength. The supports of British power extend to all parts of the world. Weakening one support weakens the strength of the entire structure. A particularly important, possibly an essential part of that structure is Singapore, which, with the Philippines and the Netherlands Indies, furnishes great quantities of the raw materials required for the success of the American and British defense effort. The Southwest Pacific, important as it is to our economy, may be even more important as a military position, because it links together vital units of the British Commonwealth. Were Japan established in Singapore or the Netherlands Indies, the security of the British Isles themselves would be endangered, and thus the security of the United States threatened. Should this region fail, we would find that the brave troops of Australia, New Zealand, and India would necessarily be required at home to defend their own territories, and thus no longer could take part in checking the Nazi thrust to the east and to the south. The British position in the Near East would be undermined. Vichy France probably would fall completely under Nazi domination. Under Nazi control would then fall all [3] the territories and bases of that part of Africa which we see poised like a bludgeon over our friends in South America.

Japan has faithfully followed the familiar pattern of German aggression. Each proclaims a burning wish for peace, and each seeks that peace by making war on its neighbors, one by one. The united strength of these neighbors might once have checked this aggression, but each has faced its doom alone. Step by step, country by country, the sinister military power of Germany and Japan has swarmed forward until now, each abetting the other, both stand as remorseless threats to all remaining free peoples.

During the past 10 years, Japanese military power has moved westward into Manchuria; and then has moved southward through China into Indo-China and the islands of the sea. Today Japan has strong military, naval, and air bases which enclose three parts of the circle around the Philippine Islands, and directly front the British and Dutch in the southern rampart. Were the Malay States
and the Netherlands Indies to pass under Japanese military domination, two of our strong friends in the Far East would disappear. Standing alone, we then would see, surrounded and in a desperate plight, our territory in the Philippine Islands, and our friends, the Philippine people. We could not accept so intolerable a state of affairs.

The situation holds unmistakable threats to our vital interests. The successful defense of the United States, in a military sense, is dependent upon supplies of vital materials which we import in large quantities from this region of the world. To permit Japanese domination and control of the major sources of world supplies of tin and rubber is a menace to our safety which cannot be tolerated.

Unless the present course of events in the Far East is halted, and considerations of justice, humanity and the principle of equality between nations, are restored, we will witness in that region of the world, precisely what has already transpired throughout the continental limits of Europe where Hitler seeks dominion by ruthless force.

The progress and results of our patient negotiations with the Japanese Government demonstrate that Japan will not accept conditions which are fair, and which we believe are fundamental if peace and prosperity in the Pacific Area are to endure. It is clear that the Japanese Government has determined on immediate further military adventures. They have enlarged the sphere of the so-called "New Order" until now it even includes India, Australia, and New Zealand. Months ago Japan proclaimed total national mobilization. Their every available resource is devoted to military purposes. The Premier and other leaders, again and again, have appealed for Japanese unity in order (and I quote) "To tide over the gravest crisis that Japan has faced in all her glorious 1000 years of history" (end quote). Their leaders assure the Japanese people there is no hope of peace, and that large-scale war is directly ahead.

Information has reached us of dependable character that Japan contemplates further measures of aggression. She has assembled both land, sea and air forces for new conquests. She can go no further without seriously threatening the vital interests of Great Britain, the Netherlands Indies, Australia and ourselves. Unless Japan renounces such purposes and withdraws this threat of further conquest by force, the four nations involved must resort to force to prevent this aggression, since arguments appear to have failed.

In a final effort to prevent an extension of hostilities in the Far East, I have addressed an appeal to the Emperor of Japan to join me in my efforts. In the meantime, while I await the result of this latest effort toward peaceful solution, I felt it incumbent upon me to apprise the Congress, and through you, the people of the United States of the serious situation with which we are confronted.
DRAFT RECEIVED BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR OF MATERIAL FOR POSSIBLE INCLUSION IN THE PROPOSED MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS ON THE SUBJECT OF RELATIONS WITH JAPAN.
MEMORANDUM

For the President:

Memo which may be helpful as to certain portions of the message to the Congress.

Division of Far Eastern Affairs

Department of State
GENTLEMEN OF THE CONGRESS:

I have come before you to report to you on the serious danger which is threatening this country and its interests in the Far East. (here introduce such further opening matter as desired)

Our interest in the safety of the Philippines, the Netherlands and Malaysia.

For over forty years our government has been conducting the unprecedented experiment of training an Asiatic people in the methods of freedom and self-government as practiced by our own republic. While our immediate aim has been the development of this dependent Filipino people, thrown into our guardianship by the accident of war, into a self-governing and independent commonwealth, nevertheless we have other far-reaching interests in the success of that farsighted experiment. It is of the utmost value to the material welfare of the United States that there should exist in that portion of the world a friendly nation bound to us by the ties of association and gratitude which our long partnership in government has created. It has brought home to the nations and peoples of the Orient the name, the credit and the possibility of extensive commerce with the United States. It has helped to establish and stabilize close
relations on our part with that portion of the Pacific, including particularly Malaysia and the New Netherlands, which secure for us supplies of indispensable materials for our requirements both in time of peace and in war.

Thus for every reason, both spiritual and material, it is of vital importance that the purpose which we undertook four decades ago should be carried out to its intended logical fruition and that the people of the Philippines should achieve their ultimate position in the family of nations, bound to us by such ties of origin.

Our relations to China

The American policy which was thus put into effect in regard to the Philippines was in essence of the same far-sighted character as that which during the same period we applied to our relations with China. We were the founders of the policy of the Open Door, - the policy which was subsequently legalized in the so-called Nine Power Treaty, and which endeavored to preserve for that great nation its territorial and administrative integrity and to permit it to develop without molestation its sovereignty and independence according to the modern and enlightened standards believed to obtain among the peoples of this earth.
The Axis attack upon this American policy in the Far East

During the past decade, however, these enlightened policies of the American government, exemplified by our attitude towards China and the Philippines, have been endangered by a scheme of world conquest set on foot by the so-called Axis powers - Germany, Italy, and Japan. These nations have without provocation or excuse attacked and conquered and reduced to economic and political slavery most of the free governments of Europe. In the Far East their Axis has been represented by the government of Japan which in 1940 joined with Germany and Italy in a covenant avowedly aimed at the interests in the Orient of the government of the United States. Japan has for over five years been attempting to carry out such a scheme of conquest and spoliation in the Far East. In flat defiance of its own covenants in the Nine Power Treaty it has invaded and sought to overthrow the government of China. Step by step the fleets and forces of Japan, passing through the China Sea in the immediate proximity of the Philippine Islands, have also invaded and taken possession of Indo China. Today its forces are proposing to go further southward and are openly threatening an extension of this conquest into the territory of Thailand. This step would directly menace
the port and Straits of Singapore through which gateway runs the commerce of the world, including our own, between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

On the eastern side of the Philippines, Japan has also been extending its threatening activities through the Caroline and Marshall Islands where, in violation of the mandate under which it received the custody of those islands, it has been secretly establishing naval and air bases and fortifications directly on the line between the United States and the Philippine Islands.

By those steps Japan has placed itself in a position which encircles the western, northern, and eastern approaches to our territory and interests in the Philippines. Should it go further, it will completely encircle and dangerously menace the vital interests of the United States.
Our efforts to peacefully persuade Japan to abandon such a policy of conquest in our neighborhood in the southwestern Pacific and the failure of that attempt

(Here describe the negotiations carried on by Secretary Hull and their failure)

The danger to our vital interests which now confronts the United States on the failure of these negotiations.

(In summary only)

First: Japanese policy of conquest and exploitation which is now being carried out in China has already utterly destroyed in the portions of China occupied by Japan the peaceful and profitable commercial relations which the United States had previously enjoyed.

It has devastated and has sought to conquer the nation which for many centuries by its devotion to the arts of peace and commerce has been the most stabilizing influence on the western side of the Pacific Ocean.

The Japanese policy threatens to transform a peaceful continent into one devoting itself to the practice of war and dominated by the military leadership of Japan.
Second: This Japanese campaign of conquest and exploitation is now approaching and encircling the Philippine Islands. It threatens the commerce of those Islands and endangers their physical safety.

If it is successful, it will destroy the farsighted experiment which America has been conducting in those Islands and terminate their hope of independence and their peaceful democratic government.

It will destroy the mutually profitable commerce which exists between those Islands and the United States and upon which the high standard of living of the Filipinos now depends.

It will ruin the lifelong efforts and investments of thousands of American citizens who have transferred their homes and business activities to the Philippines on the faith that American principles of freedom and American methods of government would continue in those Islands.

It will forever terminate the prestige and influence of the United States which the American experiment in the Philippine Islands has been establishing throughout the Orient.

Third: It will threaten to cut off and destroy our commerce with the Netherlands East Indies and the Malayan Settlements.

If the Japanese are permitted to carry out their threat to attack and conquer these friendly countries,
our imports from these countries will be interrupted and destroyed.

These imports, principally rubber, are vital to our welfare both in time of peace and war.

From those countries we receive our chief supplies of rubber. (Here add other items)

In time of war, with the spirit of exploitation and destruction of commerce which exists in the world today, such an interruption of our trade with the Netherlands East Indies and the Malayan States would be catastrophic.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Adviser on Political Relations

To: The Secretary of War

From: The Secretary of State

Par
Colonel Steelman:

This is just as it stood at 8 o’clock yesterday: it has not been revised.

Sincerely,

[Signature]
[The first document inclosed was a copy of the draft of a proposed message to Congress which is included in Exhibit 19.]
Exhibits of the Committee:

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relations on our part with that portion of the Pacific, including particularly Malaysia and the New Netherlands, which secure for us supplies of indispensable materials for our requirements both in time of peace and in war. Thus for every reason, both spiritual and material, it is of vital importance that the purpose which we undertook four decades ago should be carried out to its intended logical fruition and that the people of the Philippines should achieve their ultimate position in the family of nations, bound to us by such ties of origin.

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also been extending its threatening activities through the
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11 April 1946.

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth V. Richardson.

In response to your request of 9 April 1946, there is forwarded a photostatic copy of the log of the Watch Officer of the Office of Chief of Naval Operations from 1145, 6 December 1941 to 2045, 7 December 1941.

Encl. (1).
1145-1900 Dec. 6, 1941

At 1505 H. Clark phoned from Phil Director's office in New York regarding delayed departure of SS Walter A. huckaback. See memo on OpiDo's board when recorded in box.
Saw Secret despatches 061535 and 061730.

At 1750 Capt. MacGruder, chief of staff, 4th N.D., phoned to report Finnish cargo ship "ADVANCE" had been seized at Pier 57, Phila. Walter being kept secret.

Conversation recorded in box.

1900, 6 Dec. to 0200 7 Dec.
at 2000 Major J.S. Harrison, aide to the Secretary of War, telephoned that the Secretary of War desired the following information by 0900, Sunday 7 Dec.: Compilation of
New of war in San Francisco, British, American, Japanese, Dutch, Russian. Also compilation of American men-of-war in Pacific fleet, with locations, and a list of American men-of-war in the Atlantic without locations. Admirals Dyer, Sorel, and the Secretary of the Navy were consulted and the Secretary directed that the information be compiled and delivered to him prior to 1000 Sunday, Dec. at 2030 the Coast Guard Duty Officer telephoned to
report the following:
Sent signal 070145 clear to Alcana Havana requesting that air transportation by navy plane be arranged for civilian engineers Stieck and Hansen urgently re-
required to make emergency repairs to U.S.S. Polaris at Guantanamo. Both men at Hotel Bristol Havana unable obtain transportation by said because of strikes. Conversation confidential.

On 2330 — Spanish S.S. Olivia placed in protective custody at 1745.

Action taken as indicated on dispatches.

0200 - 0300 — 7 Dec.

OPDO - Combat Action

his prior. - radio to

received on same.
00 7 Nov 1941 - 7 Dec 1941

OP 20 - Capt. Kendall

Read 2nd dispatch 070715

No action taken.

Read see desp. 070327. This was handled by C. J. O. - OP 20 and OP 12.

At 1145, Capt. Kendall called for release of information on Finnish ships. He was advised to call Capt. Scheirman.

The following officers were notified:

Capt. Kendall - 1st mo.
Capt. Kramer - ONI
Capt. Willingham - ONI
Capt. Scheirman - OP 10
Capt. Metcalf - OP 385
Capt. Mason - OP 12
In connection with one Pa. N.E. 1836, (disposition of this estate), all chiefs of Bureau were informed of contents. 

Provisions Brainard and 

Capt. Z. B. Beards 

Capt. Z. B. Beards 

1503. One for war. 

The above were -
COFT. Griffin
COFT. Mitrov
COFT. Wilkerson
Cooner, Cary
Cruise, Shaw
Cave, Chapman
Action taken after
diagram on map shown

[Signature]
EXHIBIT NO. 162A

MESSAGES NOTED IN THE LOG OF THE WATCH OFFICER OF THE OFFICE OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FROM 1900 6 DECEMBER TO 2000 7 DECEMBER 1941

Table of Contents

(a) Spenavo London to Opnav dispatch 061535, December 1941.
(b) ComTaskGroup 4.6 to ComTaskFor 4 dispatch 061730, December 1941.
(c) Opnav to Almsha Havana dispatch 070145, December 1941.
(d) ComOne to OpNav dispatch 062330, December 1941.
(e) CinCAF to Opnav dispatch 070327, December 1941.
(f) CinCAF to Opnav dispatch 070715, December 1941.
(g) CinCPac to CinCLant, CinCAF, Opnav, dispatch 071830, December 1941.
THE ADVERSA LBY HAS RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING REPORT FROM SINGAPORE:

"AT 0900 TODAY TWO JAP FORCES WERE SIGHTED OFF CAMBODIA POINT COURSE 270°. FIRST GROUP 25 TRANSPORTS A 0A, 2 C G, 10 DESTROYERS. SECOND GROUP TEN TRANSPORTS, 2 CRUISERS, 10 DESTROYERS.

ACTION: 300°...

SECRET
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

NAVY MAIL SERVICE

NAME

ADDRESS

DATE

TELEGRAPH

CONGRESS

[Handwritten text]

Indicate by a line address for which mail deviates from ordinary.

Unless otherwise designated the same address shall be used if

date and time for CIRCULAR or MAIL, otherwise the
text.

[Handwritten text]

COPY TO: R.F.A.E.D.

OP-35

OP-36

OP-38

[Handwritten text]

THIS SPACE IS FOR ABSTRACT OF PREVIOUS REFERENCE. IF THERE ARE NO REFERENCE NUMBERS OF INCOMING DISPATCH MUST BE SHOWN HERE.
THIS IS THE FIRST OF FIVE PARTS.

(1) WE HAVE MET AND DISCUSSED THE PROBLEMS WITH WHICH
WE ARE FACED IN THE FAR EASTERN AREA.

(2) IN THE EARLY STAGES OF A WAR WITH JAPAN OCCURRING
AT THE PRESENT TIME, THE INITIATIVE MUST INEVITABLY REST WITH
THE JAPANESE.

(3) IT IS CONSEQUENTLY NOT POSSIBLE FOR US TO DRAW UP
DEFINITE PLANS TO BE CARRIED OUT BY ALL OUR FORCES AT THE OUT-
BREAK OF WAR, AND THE MOST WE CAN DO IS TO DECIDE FOR THE
INITIAL DISPOSITIONS THAT APPEAR TO US BEST SUITED TO MEET THE
PROBABLE JAPANESE ACTIONS. PLANS FOR SUBMARINES AND NAVAL AIRCRAFT ARE DEFINITE AND READY.

(4) WE ARE AGREED THAT IT IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO PRE-
VENT ANY JAPANESE INVASION THROUGH THE PILIPINAS, PART TWO
WILL FOLLOW.
SECOND PART OF 79127.

(a) We are agreed on the following initial dispositions:

(A) British battle fleet to be based upon Singapore and operate as required from there as a striking force in connection with any Japanese movement in the China Sea, Dutch East Indies and through the Malay Barrier.

(B) Cruiser striking force to be based on East Borneo - "Burabaya - Darwin" to act as a striking force in connection with air reconnaissance. This force can provide cover, and when necessary, escort, for convoys within the Dutch East Indies and Philippine area or for an occasional important convoy from Australia to Singapore.

(C) The minimum cruiser force should be maintained in the Australia - New Zealand area to deal with a moderate scale of raider.
ATTACK OR ESCORT IMPORTANT CONVOYS.

(2) THE MINIMUM CRUISER FORCE TO BE MAINTAINED IN THE INDIAN OCEAN TO ESCORT IMPORTANT TRADE.

(6) THE ACTUAL DISPOSITIONS OF FORCES TO GIVE EFFECT TO "S" ARE CONTAINED IN APPENDIX I.

(PART THREE.)

(7) WE CONSIDER IT VERY IMPORTANT THAT ACTION IN THE FAR EAST AREA SHOULD BE CO-ORDINATED WITH THE MOVEMENTS OF THE U.S. PACIFIC FLEET, AND WE HOPE WE MAY BE INFORMED OF THE TIME TABLE VISUALIZED FOR THE MOVEMENT OF THIS FLEET TO TRUK IN ACCORDANCE WITH PLAN "RAINBOW Y": THE RELEASE OF CRUISERS FROM AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND IS INTIMATELY CONNECTED WITH THE MOVEMENTS OF THIS FLEET.

SECRET
(8) All operations of U.S. Army aircraft which touch the operation of any naval forces to be co-ordinated through CINCICAF.

(9) The setting up and use of a joint headquarters is found impracticable at this time.

(10) Strategic control. Strategic control as between H.M. and U.S. forces for the present to remain under respective commanders in chief and their operation to be co-ordinated under the principle of mutual co-operation.

(11) Tactical command. The policy in force in North Atlantic will be followed.

(12) We consider that liaison officers should not be exchanged between the United States Asiatic and British Eastern Fleets, and are taking the necessary action.

SECRET
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

(19) WE CONSIDER THAT IF THE ABOVE IS AGREED TO IN PRINCIPLE BY DUTCH, AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND AUTHORITIES IN CONSULTATION WITH BRITISH COMMANDER IN CHIEF EASTERN FLEET, NEXT WEEK, THEN ALL THAT REMAINS TO DO IN THE WAY OF CONFERENCE IS THE PERFECTION OF DETAILS BY OUR RESPECTIVE STAFFS.

SIGNED THOS C. HART AND S.V. PHILLIPS

(PART FOUR) IN ADDITION TO THE ITEMS REPORTED IN THE FIRST THREE PARTS WE ARE ALSO AGREED AS TO THE FOLLOWING:

- WITH THE GROWTH OF OUR FORCES IN THE FAR EAST, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO BE IN A POSITION TO UNDERTAKE MORE OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS. SUCH OPERATIONS ARE NOT PRACTICABLE FROM SINGAPORE, AND WE CONSIDER THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO HAVE, IN THE COURSE, A BASE FURTHER NORTH FROM WHICH TO OPERATE.

SECRET

CONTINUED ON PAGE 6.
SECRET

CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

-2- MANILA IS THE ONLY SUITABLE BASE AVAILABLE, AND WE CONSEQUENTLY CONSIDER THAT THE NECESSARY MEASURES SHOULD BE PUT IN HAND TO ENABLE MANILA TO BE USED BY THE BRITISH BATTLE FLEET. THE QUESTION OF JUST THAT ACTION IS NECESSARY FOR THIS PURPOSE WILL BE DISCUSSED BY OUR STAFFS.

-3- We consider that we should aim at having MANILA available as a base by the first of April 1942, if this can be done. (PART 5) APPENDIX L: SINGAPORE, BATTLESHIPS PRINCE OF WALES, ROYAL SOVEREIGN, CRUISERS MAGNITIM, HAMILTON, TROOP, DE RUYTER, (AUSTRALIA) (AND AFTER NOVEMBER) DESTROYERS: TEN BRITISH, 6 DUTCH, 4 U.S. (SEE NOTE). SOURABAYA - DARWIN - EAST MINDANAO - MUSCION, WARBLES, MARAWI, JAVA, DESTROYERS (U.S. SEE NOTE).
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

REFERENCE (SUBJECT TO RESTRICTION ON DISCLOSURE) TO MARSHAL (SHOULD)
BE OMITTED FROM PUBLICATION READING. ALL RECOGNIZED BY WRITING
PERSONAL AMPERSAND (AND). THIS SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED TO JOURNALS, PUBLICATIONS, OR RESTATEMENTS IN REPORTS OR OTHER USES WITHOUT
FURTHER NOTIFICATION.

NOT DESIGNED TO REPLACE THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

INVESTIGATION

RECOMMENDATION

ATTRACTION: CONSIDER REPORTS ON TOP SECRET.
<table>
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<th>NAVAL MESSAGE</th>
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**SECRET**

*Signature:* H. Gwynn

*Compt. U.S. Navy*
Remarks


W. C. Wells
Ens. D-V(G), USSR.

04-02 Steaming as before on course 000° T and pgo, 340° pste. Standard speed 15 knots, 118 rpm. Steaming at 2/3 standard speed, 12 knots, 118 rpm. Cruising turbines in operation. At 0435, sighted Cape Kama Light on the Island of Lanai bearing 025°, distant 3 miles. At 0600, shifted ship's control to Bridge, lighted fires under boilers numbers 2 and 5. At 0600, changed speed to standard speed, 15 knots, 118 rpm. Commenced steering various courses to form column astern the USS ST LOUIS. At 0620, changed speed to 2/3 standard speed 12 knots, 118 rpm. At 0626, changed speed to 1/3 standard speed 6 knots, 58 rpm. At 0642, changed speed to 1/3 standard speed 6 knots 76 rpm. At 0654, changed course 215° T and pgo, 301° pste and assumed position in formation 1000 yards astern the USS ST LOUIS. At 0718, cut in boilers number 2 and 6 on main and auxiliary steam lines. At 0726, changed course to 180° T and pgo, 174° pste. At 0734, changed course to 028° T and pgo, 014° pste. Average steam 545. Average rpm 116.7.

R. L. Cochran
Ens. U.S. Navy.

08-12 Steaming as before on course 028° T and pgo, 014° pste. Standard speed 15 knots, 118 rpm. Steaming at standard speed. Main turbines in operation. At 0800, mastered crew on stations, no absentee. At 0801, commenced steering various courses at various speeds conducting 6" 47 cal. control drill for DEB (T). At 0920, held Flight quarters. At 0901, catapulted plane #1108, pilot: Ens. P. Goldbrink, A-V(N), USSR, passenger, Rudgekey, K.V., 2530, USH. At 0902, catapulted plane #1109, pilot: Lt. (jg) C.R. Doerrlinger, USH, passenger, Ens. J.B. Halsey, A-V(N), USSR. At 0903, secured from Flight quarters. At 0925, ceased DEB training runs. At 0930, General quarters, condition "AFFIRM" set, for DEB (T) firing runs. At 0937, shifted ship's control to Conning Tower. At 0945, commenced steering various courses at various speeds conducting DEB (T) firing runs. At 1110, commenced firing DEB (T). At 1114, ceased firing. At 1115, changed speed to standard speed 15 knots, 118 rpm. Changed course right to 000° T and pgo, 340° pste. Secured from General quarters and Material condition "AFFIRM". At 1117, shifted ship's control to Bridge. At 1118, changed course to right to 070° T and pgo, 097° pste. At 1120, held Flight quarters to recover two aircraft, "DOG" method. At 1120, changed course right to 150° T and pgo, 140° pste. At 1128, changed course left to 105° T and pgo, 095° pste. Changed speed to 10 knots, 98 rpm. At 1134, plane #1109, hoisted aboard. At 1137, plane #1104, hoisted aboard. Let fires die out under boilers #2 and #6. At 1145, secured main and auxiliary steam stops on boilers #2 and #6. At 1150, changed course left to 320° T and pgo, 315° pste. Changed speed to 20 knots, 198 rpm. At 1157, secured from Flight quarters. Average steam 547. Average rpm 203.6.

D. L. C. Ewing
Ens. U.S. Navy.

12-16 Steaming as before on course 320° T and pgo, 310° pste. Standard speed 15 knots, 118 rpm. Steaming at full speed 20 knots, 198 rpm. Main turbines in operation. At 1201, changed course left to 285° T and pgo, 374° pste. At 1220, held Flight quarters to recover two aircraft, "DOG" method. Conducted maneuvering on various courses at various speeds to recover aircraft. At 1227, plane #1178 hoisted aboard. At 1231, plane #1089 hoisted aboard. At 1232, changed speed to...
## LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP HELENA

**CL50**

**Name:** HELENA  
**Decimal Number:** CL50  
**Pilgrim**  
**D.D.**  
**Type:**  
**Class:**  
**Hull Number:**  
**Flag:** U.S.  
**Command:** A.T.  

**Date:** Thursday 27 November 1941  
**Location:** Hawaiian Operating Area  
**Observer:**  
**Operator:**  

### ZONE DESCRIPTION

**Plus 104**  
**R. H. ENGLISH**

### DRILLS AND EXERCISES

**Morning**  
- **Division 1:** Streaming bombing target.  
- **Division 2:** Division tactics.  
- **Division 3:** Set Condition III in AA Batteries.  

**Afternoon**  
- **Draft for'd:** Fire Drill. General quarters.  
- **Draft ast:**  

### Weather and Conditions

**Temperature:**  
- **Maximum:** 88°F  
- **Minimum:** 78°F  

**Pressure:**  
- **Minimum:** 30  

**Visibility:**  
- **Maximum:** 30 miles  

**General Conditions:** Cloudy.
12-16 GMT commenced recovering bombing target. At 1533, recovered bombing target. At 1535, secured from divisional tactics. At 1545, sounded Flight quarters, prepared to recover one (1) plane independently "CAST" method. Average steam 547. Average rpm 144.6.

H. S. WASHBURN
Ensino, D-V(G), USNR.


F. L. BAILEY, Jr.
Ensino, D-V(G), USNR.

18-20 Steaming as before on course 303° T and pgo, 293° psgo. Standard speed, 15 knots, 148 rpm, steaming at 10 knots, 98 rpm. Main turbines in operation. At 1800, changed course to 120° T and pgo, 109° psgo. At 1815, commenced steaming on various courses at various speeds conducting NBP "Surprise" exercise. At 1818, General quarters. At 1942, completed firing NBP "Surprise" and set course 180° T and pgo, 169° psgo, at standard speed, 15 knots, 148 rpm. Secured from General quarters and Condition "AFIR". Average steam 545. Average rpm 165.4.

I. J. BAIRD
Lieut. (jg), U.S. Navy.

20-24 Steaming as before on course 180° T and pgo, 169° psgo. Standard speed 15 knots, 148 rpm, steaming at standard speed. Main turbines in operation. At 2001, changed course right to 140° T and pgo, 332° psgo. Changed speed to 8 knots, 78 rpm. At 2013, plane #1109, secured on board. At 2020, plane #1108, secured on board. Changed course left to 180° T and pgo, 169° psgo. Changed speed to 15 knots 148 rpm. At 2057, changed speed to 10 knots, 98 rpm. At 2129, changed speed to 15 knots, 148 rpm. Commenced steering various courses in accordance with zigzag Plan #11 on base course 180° T and pgo, 169° psgo. At 2201, ceased zigzagging. Changed course left to 110° T and pgo, 098° psgo. Changed speed to 20 knots, 198 rpm. At 2222, changed course right to 115° T and pgo, 104° psgo. At 2305, sighted HONOLULU, ST LOUIS, PHOENIX bearing 076° T, distance 20000 yds. At 2330, commenced steering various courses at various speeds to take position in column 600 yds astern PES ST LOUIS. At 2315 took station in column astern US S ST LOUIS on course 150° T and pgo, 159° psgo at fleet speed 12 knots, 118 rpm. Average steam 550. Average rpm 152.2.

P. V. THOMPSON
Ensino, U.S. Navy.

Approved: R. H. ENGLISH
Commanding.

Ensign: E. L. FRIDINGER
Commanding Assistant.
UNITED STATES SHIP HELENA

ZONr DESCRIPTION

<table>
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<th>Date</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
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<tr>
<td>10/4</td>
<td>Steaming under boilers 3, 4, 7, and 8, on course 000° T and pgs. 340° psg. Standard speed 15 knots, 148 rpm. Steaming at 2/3 standard speed 10 knots, 98 rpm. Cruising turbines in operation. Operating independently in the Hawaiian Operating Area. At 0015, held Fire Quarters for fire in the forward engine room. At 0022, fire was reported as false alarm. Secured from Fire Quarters. At 0030, changed course to 090° T and pgs. 073° psg. At 0119, sighted MOKAPUU Light, bearing 013° T, distant approximately 30 miles. At 0200, changed course to 180° T and pgs. 165° psg. At 0245, changed course to 270° T and pgs. 258° psg. Average steam 513.7. Average rpm 98.1.</td>
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<td>10/6</td>
<td>Steaming as before on course 170° T and pgs. 155° psg. Standard speed 15 knots, 148 rpm. Steaming at 2/3 standard speed 10 knots, 98 rpm. Cruising turbines in operation. At 0800, mustered crew on stations; 20 absentees. At 0900, changed course to 090° T and pgs. 079° psg. At 0905, the Summary Court Martial of which Lt-Comdr., J.A. MORROW, USNR, is senior member met to try the case of TRIPPLETT, J.R., Seaman, USH and PESCORDIA, A.J., MCc, USH. At 0921, stopped to recover aero from HONOLULU planes and to recover four (4) aircraft, &quot;Baker&quot; series. At 0950, the Summary Court Martial of which Lt-Comdr., J.A. MORROW is senior member, adjourned. At 1016, recovered plane #1109. At 1019, recovered plane #1108. At 1022, recovered plane #1176. At 1024, recovered plane #1065. At 1025, commenced steaming on various courses and velocities and was led to form various columns in column a stern of the USS HONOLULU, distance 800 yards. Average steam 550. Average rpm 98.3.</td>
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| 10/12 | Steaming as before on course 000° T and pgs. 340° psg. Standard speed 15 knots, 148 rpm. Steaming at 2/3 standard speed 10 knots, 98 rpm. Main turbines in operation. At 1200, sounded Flight Quarters. At 1227, changed course to left to 270° T and pgs. 258° psg. At 1230, catapulted plane #1108, pilot: Ens. F. GOLDBERG, A-V(N), USNR. Passenger: PARKER, D.R., MCc, USH. At 1231, secured from Flight Quarters. At 1231, commenced steaming at various speed on various courses to carry out divisional tactics. At 1240, steamed bombing target for Ex. A.A. 1. At 1245, commenced Condition III in AA Batteries. At 1500, GLOVER, E., Seals, received fracture to the distal phalanx middle finger, right hand, while testing primers on the left gun of mount Three (3). The man caught his fingers behind a powder case which caused injury. At 1535, secured from Condition III in AA Batteries. At 1507,
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**Chillers and Compressors**

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**Compressor Bank**

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**Galley Area**

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16-20 Moored as before. At 1745, Yard Oiler #21, made fast to port quarter. At 1815, commenced fueling ship, draft forward 24' 4", draft aft 24' 5". At 1845, completed fueling ship having received 5294.66 bbls. of fuel oil. Draft forward 24' 5", draft aft 24' 8". At 1851, Yard Oiler #21, cast off.

W. T. JONES,
Ensign, U.S. Navy.

20-24 Moored as before.

R. W. PLECK,
Ensign, A-V(N), USNR.

R. H. ENGLISH,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

E. L. FITZGERALD,
Lieut. Comdr.,
U.S.N., Navigator.

(This page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly with Log sheets.)
00-04. Steaming under boilers 3, 4, 7, and 8 on course 160°T and pgo, 160°p Teachers. Standard speed 15 knots, 148 rpm, steaming at best speed, 12 knots, 118 rpm. Main turbines in operation. In company with DEPSDIV NINE (less USS BOISE), as part of Task Force 1.5. In column 800 yards astern of the USS ST LOUIS. COMMUNICATING-BATTOR in USS HONOLULU (O.T.C.). At 0116, was joined by DEPSDIV 2. At 0130, changed course to 270°T and pgo, 256°p Teachers. Changed speed to standard speed, 15 knots, 148 rpm. At 0330, changed course to 315°T and pgo, 304°p Teachers. Average steam 26.5. Average rpm 12.9.

D. L. C. KING
Ensign, U.S. Navy.

04-08 Steaming as before on course 315°T and pgo, 305°p Teachers. Standard speed 15 knots, 148 rpm. Steaming at standard speed 15 knots, 148 rpm. Main turbines in operation. At 0600, changed speed to full speed, 18 knots, 178 rpm. At 0640, changed course to 000°T and pgo, 318°p Teachers. At 0605, commenced zigzagging on base course 000°T and pgo, 318°p Teachers. At 0649, ceased zigzagging and changed speed to 20 knots, 198 rpm. At 0655, changed course to 010°T and pgo, 359°p Teachers. At 0655, commenced zigzagging on base course 010°T and pgo, 359°p Teachers. Average steam 24.3. Average rpm 17.1.

L. C. SMITH
Lieut. U.S. Navy.

08-12 Steaming as before, zigzagging on base course 010°T and pgo, 359°p Teachers. Standard speed 15 knots, 148 rpm. Steaming at full speed 20 knots, 198 rpm. Main turbines in operation. At 0800, muster crew on stations; no absentees. At 0831, changed speed to standard speed, 15 knots, 148 rpm. At 0843, ceased zigzagging and resumed base course 010°T and pgo, 359°p Teachers. At 0851, commenced steaming on various courses in execution of signals for division tactics from COMMUNICATING-BATTOR. At 0854, changed speed to 18 knots, 178 rpm. At 0930, changed speed to standard speed, 15 knots, 148 rpm and commenced zigzagging according to plan on base course 350°T and pgo, 342°p Teachers. At 0937, ceased zigzagging and commenced steaming on various courses in execution of signals as before. At 1043, left formation and proceeded independently on various courses at various speeds to approach the harbor entrance. At 1139, with Pearl Harbor entrance channel buoy #2 abreast to starboard entered Pearl Harbor, T.H., and commenced steaming on various courses at various speeds conforming to the channel. Captain and Navigator on the bridge, 060 at the conn. Average steam 550. Average rpm 166.5.

W. C. WEILS
Ensign, D-V(0), USNR.

12-16 Steaming as before on various courses at various speeds, entering Pearl Harbor, T.H. Standard speed, 15 knots, 148 rpm. Steaming at 5 knots, 48 rpm. Main turbines in operation. At 1203, passed buoy #16 abreast to starboard. At 1231, moored in Berth Cast 5, with port anchor chain out to buoy C-5, 1 1/8" wire stern line out buoy C-5-S. At 1307, secured main engine, unnecessary boilers. At 1309, secured steering gear. Boiler #3 steaming for auxiliary purposes. At 1353, commenced fueling ship; draft forward, 23' 6" draft aft: 24' mean: 23' 4". At 1355, commenced receiving aviation gas. At 1420, completed taking on aviation gas. Amount received, 1890 gals. At 1530, fuel barge cast off port quarter after delivering on board 152,502 gals fuel oil. At 1500, Lt.-[jg], M.T. TIMM, left on three days leave. At 1545, pursuant to orders of Commanding Officer, the following named men left the ship, temporary duty and course of instruction in the RADAR, having been completed: HAMILTON, W.R., Jr., 262 31 70, CMIC, USNR, SWANTON, Jr., 262 64 59, Sealo, USN, BURTON, N.D., 360 10 29, Sealo, USN, EGAN, T.T., 243 58 65, Sealo, USN, ZAVADA, M., 243 75 75, Sealo, USN, RICHARDS, W.H., 287, Lt. 15, Sealo, USN, LINK, C.K., 376 34 70, Sealo, USN, SUTTSRON, W.L., 316 67 69, Sealo, USN.

C. W. BROWN
Ensign, D-V(0), USNR.

R. E. ENGLISH
Captain, U.S. Navy, Commanding.

A. L. FISHER
Lt. Comdr., NAV.

(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)
ZONE DESCRIPTION  Plus 10½ REMARKS

08-08 Moored in berth C-5, Pearl Harbor, T.H., with port anchor chain to buoy C-3½ and 1 5/8m wide stern line to buoy C-5-3. Boiler #3 steaming for auxiliary purposes. Ships present: Various units of U.S. Pacific Fleet with Combat Fleet on USS CALIFORNIA.

L. J. BAIRD
Liet. (jg), U.S. Navy.

09-09 Moored as before.

W. G. WELLS
Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.

08-12 Moored as before. At 0815, USS CHEM and USS UPAR stood in. At 0824, received the following stores for general mess, inspected as to quantity by Ens. R.E. BEISANG, D-V(G), USNR, and as to quality byのあるな。S.A., Pearl, USN, from Oaki Cold Storage Co. 400 lbs of ice. At 1045, received the following stores for the general mess, inspected as to quality by WILLINGHAM, B.N., PhM1c, USN, and as to quantity by Ens. P.O. ANDERSON, D-V(G), USNR, from Harders Co. Ltd. 400 lbs. of fruit mixture. At 1130, the Commanding Officer held mast at this date and awarded the following punishments: DURKEE, J.J., Flo, USN; Offense: (1) Violation of section 6030 R.L.H. 1935 (malicious injury) (2) Resisting arrest (3) Obscene language. (4) Striking Shore Patrol. (5) Drunk. Punishment: Recommended for General Court Martial. CULAKOS, A.D., Seaman, USN; Offense: AOL for a period of 23 hours, 30 minutes from 0100, 21 November 1941 to 0330, 22 November 1941. Punishment: Summary Court Martial. At 1145, received the following stores for general mess, inspected as to quantity by Ens. R.E. BEISANG, D-V(G), USNR, and as to quality by WILLINGHAM, E.W., PhM1c, USN, from Chon Cheung Co. Lt., 1500 lbs of celery. At 1200, DURKEE, J.J., Flo, USN, confined this date by orders of the Commanding Officer to await trial of General Court Martial.

P. O. ANDERSON
Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.

12-16 Moored as before. At 1410, pursuant to the orders of the Commanding Officer, FISHELL, H.C., 391 36 94, Se2c, USN, returned aboard in charge of HARDER, J.D., 382 27 75, Se2c, USN, and WILLINGHAM, A.D., 393 47 32, Se2c, USN having completed two (2) weeks temporary duty at the Fleet Machine Gun School, Navy Rifle Range, Pearl Harbor, T.H.

H. H. TARRER
Ensign, U. S. Navy.

16-20 Moored as before.

C. R. DOLPHIN
Liet. (jg), U.S. Navy.

20-24 Moored as before.

B. T. KELLY
2nd Liet. USMC.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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**LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP Pearl Harbor, P.H.**

**R. H. McElroy**

**Sunday, 30 November, 1941**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Notes</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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</table>
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

UNITED STATES SHIP
HELLENA

DATE: 20 NOVEMBER

DESCRIPTION

REMARKS

03-04 Moored in berth C-3, Pearl Harbor, T.H., with port anchor chain 205 feet and 1 5/8" wire stern line to buoy C-5-B. Boiler #4 standing for ordnance purposes. Ships present: Various units of U.S. Pacific Fleet with B.O. NAVAL CALIFORNIA (COMMITTEE).

H. O. OCS.
Ensign, D-3(V), USNR.

04-08 Moored as before.

R. L. OCS.
Lieut., U.S. Navy.

04-10 Moored as before. At 0800, muster crew on deck and held divine service on the forecastle. At 0900, 04 Y.G. cast off and moved to port quarter. At 0910, USS Y.G. 321 cast off.

P. V. THOMPSON,
Ensign, U.S. Navy.

11-16 Moored as before.

E. S. WASHBURN, Jr.
Ensign, D-3(V), USNR.

16-20 Moored as before.

E. A. PARKER,
Ensign, D-3(V), USNR.

06-26 Moored as before. At 2100, set Condition Baker. At 2315, darkened ship. At 0130, lighted ship. Secured from Condition Baker.

E. L. M. YRD.
Ensign, U.S. Navy.

Approved:
R. H. ENGLISH,
Captain, U.S. Navy,
Commanding.

Examined:
E. L. FREEMAN,
Lieu. Comdr.,
U.S.N., Navigator.

(Original (1910) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)
# LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP

**Situation:**

**CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Log</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### DRILLS AND EXERCISES

- **Morning:**
  - Drill 1: Received
  - Drill 2: Disembarked
  - Drill 3: On board

- **Afternoon:**
  - Drill 4: Drill for'd
  - Drill 5: Draft aft

### Meteorological Data

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<th>Wind</th>
<th>Rainfall</th>
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### Gyrocompass in Use

- **Standard Rate:**
  - **Variation:**
  - **Deviation:**

### Compass Details

- **Compass No.**
- **True北:**
- **Variation:**
- **Deviation:**
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<th>DATE OF DEATH</th>
<th>DATE OF SERVICE</th>
<th>SERVICE</th>
<th>UNIT</th>
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<tr>
<td>C. THURSTON</td>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>14 July 41</td>
<td>Co-Capt.</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>J. E. HARTSHINE, Jr.</td>
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<td>27 Feb 41</td>
<td>Executive</td>
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<tr>
<td>F. A. PETERSON</td>
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<td>2 Feb 41</td>
<td>Navigator</td>
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<tr>
<td>P. J. TONK</td>
<td>Lt. Comdr.</td>
<td>18 Sept 39</td>
<td>First Lieut.</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>J. G. NANCE</td>
<td>Lt. Comdr.</td>
<td>18 Sept 39</td>
<td>Damage Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>C. E. SMITH</td>
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<td>28 Aug 41</td>
<td>Gunnery Officer</td>
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<td>Asst. Gunnery Off.</td>
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<td>A. J. ROUTH</td>
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<td>C. B. BULLS, D-V (G)</td>
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<td>F. L. PEDDIE</td>
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<td>E. R. RAYFORD, Jr.</td>
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<td>R. L. COPELAND</td>
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<td>W. J. VALEY, D-V (G)</td>
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(List page to be used in Bureau of Navigation monthly with log sheets.)
## LIST OF OFFICERS

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<td>Capt. J.M.</td>
<td>LT (jg)</td>
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<td>1 Dec. 40</td>
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<tr>
<td>D. D. Helms</td>
<td>3rd Class</td>
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<td>A. A. Kimball</td>
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<td>W. W. H. Helms</td>
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<td>Navy</td>
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<td>F. T. Helms</td>
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<td>Navy</td>
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<td>Dec 12, 1941</td>
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<td>R. L. Helms</td>
<td>A. M.</td>
<td>Navy</td>
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<td>Dec 12, 1941</td>
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(Handwritten note at the bottom: "List to be revised to be correct.")

(The page seems to be a list of crew members of a U.S. Navy vessel involved in the Pearl Harbor attack.)
### LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP HELENA

**At Pearl Harbor, T.H. to**

**ZONE DESCRIPTION Pluses 10°**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE</th>
<th>3573</th>
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**CAPT. W. M. EMILSON, Commanding**

**LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP HELENA**

**At Pearl Harbor, T.H. to Monday 1 December, 1941**

**ZONE DESCRIPTION Pluses 10°**

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<td>[Water temperature]</td>
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**STANDARD MEAS. COMPL**

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**EXPERIMENTAL NEW DATA—OF SHIP**

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<th>[Effort]</th>
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(Original ribbon copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)
U. S. S. HELENA

Date 1 December 1941

20-24 Moored as before.

Signed: J. J. AMSTDIX, Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.

Approved: R. H. ENGLISH, Captain, U.S. Navy, Commanding

[Signature]

[Signature]
UNITED STATES SHIP HELENA Monday 1 December 1941

ZONE DESCRIPTION Plata 104

REMARKS

06-04 Moored in berth C-5, Pearl Harbor, T.H., with the port anchor chain to buoy C-5, and 1 5/8" wire stern line to buoy C-5-S. Boiler #3 steaming for auxiliary purposes. Ships present: Various units of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Yard and District Craft. S.O.P.A. (COMBATFOR) in USS CALIFORNIA.

H. F. SAUNDERS,
Ens. A-V(H), USNR.

OL-08 Moored as before. At 0515, blew tubes on #3 boiler.

I. D. JONES,
Ens. D-V(G), USNR.

08-12 Moored as before. At 0800, held quarters for muster. Absentees: SZMANSKY, F., J30, USN. 0630, 1 December 1941. At 0810, hoisted #1 Motor Boat aboard for repairs. At 0830, a large Andrews Recreation Party of 16 men, JOHNS, S.C., STIC, USN, in charge, left the ship. At 0836, hoisted out plane #1176, pilot Ens. C.R. HANKEY, A-V(H), USNR. Passenger: DAVIS, W.T., RMG, USN. At 0845, hoisted out plane #1108, pilot: Ens. F. COLBERG, A-V(H), USNR. Passenger: MURDOCKS, W.J., R130, USN. At 1025, lighted fires under boilers #1, 2, 4. At 1130, hoisted out plane #1108 aboard. At 1135, hoisted aboard plane #1176. At 1130, out in boilers #1, 2 and 4 on the main steam line.

H. A. BOWMAN,
Ens. D-V(G), USNR.

12-16 Moored as before. At 1220, completed making preparations for getting underway. At 1225, Pilot C.H. OTTERSON came on board. At 1225, got underway for Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T.H., in obedience to ComCmdrFor despatch #302000 of 15 November 1941. Pilot to the Conn, Captain and Navigator on the Bridge.

Steering on various courses and at various speeds conforming to the channel. At 1315, moored port side to berth #3 Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T.H., with the following lines: 1 5/8" wire bow and stern lines, 8" manila, forward and after bow and quarter spring lines and 8" manila bow and quarter breast lines. Ships present: Various units of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. ComCmdrFor in the USS CALIFORNIA (SCPA). At 1320, secured Special Sea Detail. At 1330, let fires die out under boilers #1, 2, 3, 4. At 1330, disconnected boilers #1, 2, 3, 4 from the main steam line. Boiler #3 steaming for auxiliary purposes. At 1339, pilot C.H. OTTERSON left the ship. At 1425, commenced receiving fresh water from the Docks. At 1425, pursuant to the orders of the Commanding Officer, USS SUMNER. LOVE, S.P., Seals, USN, 346 78 77, reported aboard for duty. Pursuant to the orders of the Commanding Officer, Recieving Station, Pearl Harbor, T.H., SMITH, 376 35 44, Seacor, USN, reported aboard for duty. Records and accounts of above men received on board.

W. C. SOLES,
Lieut. (jg), D-V(G), USNR.

16-20 Moored as before. At 1630, commenced receiving telephone service from the Yard. At 1722, hoisted out plane #1176, pilot: Ens. R.W. FLECK, A-V(H), USNR. Passenger: SLOANE, E.J., R130, USN. At 1725, hoisted out plane #1108, pilot: Ens. E.V. BADER, A-V(H), USNR, passenger: Ens. C.B. HANKEY, A-V(H), USNR. At 1845, pursuant to the orders of the Commanding Officer, Ref., ComCmdrFor serial 3175 of 13 November 1941, GOOD, F., 27A 29 05, OS13c, USN, was transferred to the Recieving Barracks, Pearl Harbor, T.H., for further transfer to Palmyra Island with baggage and transfer papers.

J. W. BARTLETT, JR.,
Ens. D-V(G), USNR.

Approved: R. H. ENGLISH,
Capt., U.S. Navy.

E. J. FABIGGER,
Lieut. Comdr.,
U.S.N., Navigator.
### LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP

**HELENA**

**CL50**

**Date:** Tuesday, December 2, 1941

**At:** Pearl Harbor, T.H.

**To:** Acadia

**ZONE DESCRIPTION:** U.S. 104

**R. E. ENGLISH**

**Capt. 1st. C. Navy. Commanding.**

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<th>Weather</th>
<th>Wind</th>
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<th>Log</th>
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**DRILLS AND EXERCISES**

- **Morning:**
  - Drill for Medical Practice
  - Drill for Picking

- **Afternoon:**
  - Drill for Medical Practice
  - Drill for Picking

**DIVERSE WEAPONS**

- After Enemy Fire

**WEAPON AND CO.**

- **1ST RHO:**
  - Expected number of men

**WEATHER DATA**

- **Maximum:** 30
  - **Minimum:** 70

**Observations:**

- 0800: Clear and calm
- 0900: Clear and calm
- 1000: Clear and calm
- 1100: Clear and calm
- 1200: Clear and calm
- 1300: Clear and calm
- 1400: Clear and calm
- 1500: Clear and calm
- 1600: Clear and calm

**Notes:**

- 0800: Clear and calm
- 0900: Clear and calm
- 1000: Clear and calm
- 1100: Clear and calm
- 1200: Clear and calm
- 1300: Clear and calm
- 1400: Clear and calm
- 1500: Clear and calm
- 1600: Clear and calm
ADDITIONAL SHEET

P. S. HELLENA

Date 2 December 1941

08-12 CONT

MILLER, J. 233 34 08 GM3c, USN 070004 of Nov. 7, 1941.
HENNETT, A. J. 346 76 79 GM3c, USN
LONRY, R. O. 269 39 99 Senio, USN

At 1030, Secured from Condition III in A-2 Batteries. Made monthly inspection test of smokeless powder samples. Test satisfactory. At 1055, completed hoisting in two planes. At 1105, the Summary Court Martial, of which Lieut. Comdr., R.D. SMITH, USN, is senior member, met to try the case of COZAKOS, A.G., Senio, USN. At 1130, the Summary Court Martial of which Lieut. Comdr., R.D. SMITH, is senior member adjourned to await further orders of the Commanding Officer. At 1140, completed hoisting in two planes.

E. A. LUIERMAN
Ensino, U.S. Navy.

12-16. Moored as before. At 1300, received the following stores for use in the general mess, inspected as to quantity by Ch. Pay Clk, T.M. WELCH, USN, and as to quality by WILLIAMS, C.B., Pharmc, USN, 40 jars green olives from American Fruits, Ltd. At 1305, mustered crew at quarters. At 1415, pursuant to orders of the Commanding Officer, the following men were transferred to the Naval Hospital, Pearl Harbor, T.H., for treatment: BURNOW, R. Jr., 261 89 59, MT2c, USN, Diag: Calculus, left (urinary). JERK, D.H., 360 13 93, Senio, USN, Diag: Deafness due to heavy firing. At 1445, received the following stores for the general mess, inspected as to quantity by Ch. Pay Clk, T.M. WELCH, USN, and as to quality by WILLIAMS, C.B., Pharmc, USN, from Tai Hing Co., 90 tins of pickles. At 1515, cut off boiler §3, to be used for auxiliary purposes.

W. R. KIZERLE
Ensino, D-V(2), USNR.

16-20. Moored as before. At 1600, let fires die out under boiler §3. At 1620, out off boiler §3, from auxiliary steam line.

I. J. BIRD
Lieut. (jg), U.S. Navy.

20-24. Moored as before.

R. T. WELCH
Ensino, D-V(5), USNR.
For this detailed task, let's break it down into sections for clarity:

### UNITED STATES SHIP

**HELENA**

**Zone Description:**
- **10/14**

**Remarks:**
- **C.G-C** Moored port side to berth #3, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T.H., with the following lines: 1 5/8" wire bow and stern lines, 2" Manila forward and after bow and quarter spring lines, 2" bow and quarter break lines. Receiving fresh water and telephone service from the dock. Boiler #3 steaming for auxiliary purposes. Ships present: Various units of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. S.O.P.A. (COM-RATC) in the USS CALIFORNIA.

**C.G-C**

**Remarks:**
- At 0630, commenced provisioning ship. At 0730, Lt.(jg) T.M. TUNI, USN returned from three (3) days leave. At 0735, the USS CUMMINS got underway.

**C.G-12** Moored as before. At 0800, held quarters for muster. Absentees: SIEGRAD, F., 53c, USN, ACL since 0100, 1 December 1941. At 0845, completed provisioning ships. At 0902, completed hoisting out two planes. At 0915, set Condition III watch in 44 batteries for exercise AA 3. At 1000, pursuant to the orders of the Commanding Officer. Reference: COMBASE FOR DESPATCH 16013 of December 1941 the following named men were transferred to sailing #3 for transportation and further transfer to Commanding Petrol Wing Cne for duty, with records and accounts.

**C.G-12**

**Remarks:**
- At 1010, hoisted #1 ENS aboard. At 1010, pursuant to the orders of the Commanding Officer U.S.S. BOISE, the following named men were transferred via sailing 48 to the West Coast for further transfer to various U.S.S. MAG/CMB Detail. Records and accounts delivered - E. L. E. V. 3, 201 76 86, Seattle, USN, KOK, A.B., 234 23 89, Seattle, USN, ARIZONA, 3, 233 60 43, Seattle, USN, NING, R.W., 360 70 31, Seattle, USN, EUGENE, 3, 377 35 63, Seattle, USN, BUNTING, X.E., 260 90 69, Fl.X, USN, VERSUS 7, 327 30 38, F.X. USN, E. S. M. T., 201 74 49, F.X., USN, MILLER, J.L., 405 75 42, F.X., USN. At 1010, pursuant to the orders of the Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BOISE the following named men were transferred via sailing #48 for further transfer. Records and accounts delivered.

### NAVY SERVICE RECORDS

**NAME**
- E.M.J.T.
- BRY, T.N.
- BEAVERS, W.B.
- MILLER, W.W.
- SMITH, W.
- BOWLING, N.M.
- RECKER, A.M.
- WOOD, C.T.
- PHILLIPS, A.
- RECTOR, O.P.
- McARTHUR, E.F.
- WOO, P.F.

**SERVICE NO.**
- 274 32 44
- 261 54 15
- 262 40 70
- 359 99 11
- 201 51 49
- 321 30 39
- 261 82 39
- 265 77 14
- 268 04 71
- 374 18 22
- 377 91 02
- 203 66 96

**RATING**
- AAR, M.E.
- GBM(AA)/USN
- MATE, USN
- E, USN
- AMM, USN
- SQM, USN
- BM1, USN
- AMM, USN
- SC, USN
- AMM, USN

**AUTHORIZATION**
- Ref: GCST LTR P16-3(1)/1
- Ref: GCST LTR P16-2/301
- Ref: GCST LTR P16-2/313
- Ref: GCST LTR P16-2/313
- Ref: GCST LTR P16-3/116
- Ref: GCST LTR P16-1/313
- Ref: GCST LTR P16-1/313
- Ref: GCST LTR P16-1/313
- Ref: GCST LTR P16-1/313
- Ref: GCST LTR P16-1/313

**Insignia:**
- U.S. Navy

**Date:**
- 10/14

**Signature:**
- L.C. Mccormick
- Ensign, D-V(10), USNR

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**Event:**
- December 2, 1941
-珍珠港事件
### LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP

#### TIBURON

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#### DRILL AND EXERCISES

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#### EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

[Past Log Entry]

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**Note:** The document contains data related to the log of a United States ship, including entries for date, time, location, course, speed, wind, temperature, barometer, tide, and weather conditions. Additional entries are for drill and exercises, with corresponding details for location, course, speed, wind, and weather conditions.
### UNITED STATES SHIP URENA

#### Wednesday, 3 December, 1941

**ZONE DESCRIPTION** Plus 104

#### REMARKS

**OO-04** Moored port side to berth No. 3, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T.H., with the following lines: 1 5/8" wire bow and stern lines, 8" manila forward and after bow and quarter spring lines, 8" manila bow and quarter taut lines. Boiler #4 steaming for auxiliary purposes. Receiving fresh water and telephone services from the Navy Yard. Ships present: Various units of the U.S. Pacific Fleet.

SCPA, ComEqTor in the USS CALIFORNIA. At 0020, the USS HENDONSET got underway and stood out.

W. W. JOHNS, Ensign, U.S. Navy.

**04-08** Moored as before.

P. C. ANDERSON, Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.

**08-12** Moored as before. At 0800, held quarters for muster and physical drill.

Absences: Szymanski, F., F3c, USN, absent over leave since 0100, 1 December 1941. At 0812, exercised crew at Emergency Drills. At 0829, secured from Emergency Drills. At 0900, hoisted out two (2) planes for instrument flight.


At 1100, pursuant to the orders of the Commanding Officer, REINHARDE, D.F., 260 22 28, EM2c, USN, left the ship to report to the Senior Patrol Officer, Honolulu, T.H., for duty with Permanent Patrol. To resume regular duties upon completion of this duty. At 1100, pursuant to the orders of the Commanding Officer, HALL, R.W., 325 00 01, WTLc, USN, left the ship for permanent duty with Beach Guard, to return to regular duties upon completion of this duty. At 1100, pursuant to the orders of the Commanding Officer, the following named can left the ship for temporary duty with Shore Patrol in Honolulu, T.H.: SHEETZ, R.D., 4258 21 35, EM1c, USN; MAY, M.W., #360 02 06, FG0c, USN; Szymanski, B.D., 4250 50 12, GM2c, USN. At 1115, the Camp Andrews Recreation Party of (18) men.

JONES, G.E., #272 06 17, EF3c, USN, returned on board.

At 1100, hoisted plane #1178 aboard. At 1105, hoisted plane #1178 aboard.

S. W. Brown, Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.

**12-16** Moored as before. At 1300, mustered crew at quarters. Absences: Szymanski, F., F3c, ACL since 0100, 1 December 1941. At 1305, USS OGLALA got underway to shift berths. At 1512, USS OGLALA moored port side to our starboard side.

At 1525, USS POGOLICH and USS HANGOVER stood in and moored.


**16-30** Moored as before. At 1823, USS WARD got underway. At 1916, USS MAURERT stood in to harbor.

A. H. Jones, A. W. SMITH, Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.

**20-24** Moored at base.

W. B. VIGGAN, T. G. LAMBERT, Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.

**24-29** Moored at base.

A. W. SMITH, Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.

**Appr.**

A. W. SMITH, Ensign, D-V(G), USNR.

**Exm.**

L. L. SMITH, Lt(jg), Hist., USNR.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Log</th>
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<th>Temperature</th>
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<th>Drills and Exercises</th>
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<td>30.00</td>
<td>72.68</td>
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UNITED STATES SHIP
HELENA

Thursday, 2 December 1941

REMARKS

00-04 Scored port side to berth J3, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T.H., with the
following lines: 1 6/8" white bow and stern lines, 8" manila forward and after
bow and quarter spring lines, 8" manila bow and quarter breast lines. WSS GOALALA
scored alongside to starboard. Boiler 68 steaming for military purposes. Receive
free water and telephone services from the Yard. Ships present: Various visit
the Pacific Fleet. CFA (ComDatFor) in the USS CALIFORNIA. At 0140, the Jap-
ansing aerial men returned from a tour of temporary duty with the Shore Patrol.

04-08 Scored as before.

04-12 Scored as before. At 0800, mustered crew at quarters. Absentees: S2K, W,
V3c, USN, ACL since 0100, 1 December 1941. At 1030, published the
findings and sentence in the case of CICERO, L.E., Seaman, U.S.N., tried by Summary
Court-Martial for being absent over leaves from 0100, 1 November 1941 to 1700,
1 November 1941. As a result, he received the ship which sailed at 0530, 1 November
1941. CICERO, surrendered aboard the USS SAN ANTONIO, finding: Guilty. Sentence:
To be confined for a period of one (1) month and to lose fifteen (15) dollars
per month of his pay for a period of four (4) months, total loss of pay amounting
to sixty (60) dollars. Approved by Convening Authority on 2 December 1941.

14-16 Scored as before. At 1245, commenced making preparations for changing
occupation. At 1245, the following men left the ship on a tour of temporary shore
leave in Honolulu: F.G., WOODHUR, L.C., M2c, 308 60 22, W.S., USN; MILLS, E.D.,
M2c, Lt, 320, W.M., USN; SCHUMAN, J.P., M2c 63 28, W.M., USN. At 1315, pilot
L. GULDEN came aboard. At 1325, W.N. 156 made fast to starboard bow. At 1335,
Y.T. 142 made fast to starboard quarter. At 1355, completed shifting berths.
Hoists in berth 41 and 42, Berth Berber, T.H. At 1440, Y.T. 156 cast oft star-
board bow. At 1502, Y.T. 154 cast off starboard quarter. At 1555, commenced
accelerating fresh water from the deck.

16-18 Scored as before. At 1600, received the roll call order for the general
roll call. At 1600, received orders to sail. At 1605, the medical officer, 600 lbs. in
weight, was taken to a landing craft P02. At 1630, received the following order for the
carpenters, from Chief petty officer Parkinson, W. W., 3rd class,修补工, 3rd class:
3rd class, 1530, and 1600. At 1655, received on board 150 charges of
30-caliber rifle and 200 rounds ammunition. 5x 35 and 1, 3, 4.

24-26 Scored as before. At 2245, the following men left the ship on a tour of
temporary shore leave in Honolulu: 1st Eng, C. S. COOK, L.E., W.N. 2207, W.S.,
USN; H. D. ZANDER, L.C., W.N. 2207, W.S., USN; H. D. CROCKETT, L.E.,
W.N. 2207, W.S., USN. At 0000, received on board 150 charges of
30-caliber rifle and 200 rounds ammunition. 5x 35 and 1, 3, 4.
**LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP HELENA**

**CL 50**

**Zone Description:**

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**Drills and Exercises**

- Morning
- Afternoon
- Lower Deck Inspection
- After Entering Port
- Draft aft'
- Draft aft'
- Set Condition III
- Watch 11.5" battery & searchlight

---

**Standard Mads. Comps.**

- S. H.
- Error
- Variation
- Deviation
- Magnitude
- Maximum
- Minimum

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**Admiralty New Data—Supplements**

- Run No. (Cable)...
- Time to submerge...
- Greatest depth...

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*(Original (ribbon) copy of this page to be sent to Bureau of Navigation monthly)*
ADDITIONAL SHEET

U.S.S. HELENA

Date 5 December

16-20 Moored as before. At 1600, received the following stores for the general mess, inspected as to quantity by Ens. R. J. KIRKLAND, Jr., D-V(2), USNR, and as to quality by KIRKLAND, F.C., Electrician, USN, from American Factories Ltd., 60 cases of mustard. At 1715, pursuant to orders of the Commanding Officer, USS SOLAC3, PUTLEY, J.T., Son 2c, USN, 2234 25 95, reported on board for duty. Records and accounts delivered in person. At 1800, pursuant to orders of the Commanding Officer Lieut. (j.g.) M.T. TOMPSON, USN, left the ship in charge of five (3) petty officers to report to Fleet Morale Officer for shore patrol duty at block recreation center area.

By C.G. R odland, Jr.,
Ensign, D-V(2), USNR.

20-26 Moored as before. At 2215, set Condition III, Watch II in the 5th Battery and searchlights. At 2235, hoisted out two aircraft for Night Flying, plane #1108, Ens. F. GOLDBERG, A-W(1), USNR, pilot, HUBBARD, F.J., #130, USN, passenger, plane #1178, Ens. C.W. HANNAY, A-V(2), USNR, pilot, SULLIVAN, W.J., #130, USN, passenger. At 7115, Lieut. (j.g.) M.T. TOMPSON, USN and five (5) petty officers returned to the ship, having completed shore patrol duty at block recreation center area. At 2320, secured from Condition III, Watch II in the 5th Battery and searchlights.

W. H. MEERLE,
Ensign, D-V(1), USNR.
06-08. Moored at side as berths 51 & 52, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T.H., with
the following lines: 1 5/4" wire bow and stern lines, 5" mainline forward
and after bow and quarter riding lines, 8" mainline bow and quarter breast lines.
Barge #8 is in operation for auxiliary purposes. Receiving fresh water and tele-
phone service from the Dock. Ship present: Various units of the U.S. Pacific
Fleet. COFA in the USS CALIFORNIA [convoy], 14 Nov. The following named men
returned ashore having completed a tour as temporary shore patrol in Honolulu.
T.H.: WOOLERY, J.W., 1FF, 24 Oct 20 22, USN; MILLER, C.D., #375 63 20, Enlisted, USN;
ANDERSON, J.D., #241 63 50, Enlisted, USN. At 0315, EARNSHAW, E., Enlisted, was
delivered at board by the Shore Patrol, having been AOC since 0100, December 6,
1941, and was made a prisoner at-large by order of the Commanding Officer.

E. C. RENSHAW
Ensign, D-7(t), USNR.

06-09. Moored as before.

H. F. SAUNDERS
Ensign, A-V(H), USNR.

06-12. Moored as before.
At 0800, held quarters for务必. Absences: SANDERSON, V., 20th, USN, AOC since 0100, 1 December 1941. At 0845, pursuant to the orders of the Commanding Officer, ref: Below deep. 242118 of November 1941, Ensign C.W. FRENCH, D-V(S), USN, was detached this date and ordered to report to
Commander for temporary duty under instruction, and then to duty with Exchange
army guard center Treasure Island, California. At 0900, launched out plane
11739, pilot: Ensign C.W. FRENCH, D-V(S), USN, passenger: Ensign C.W. FRENCH, A-V(H), USN, and
0315, delivered rear stores for the general mess: from Leve's
200 lbs soda crackers; from Imai Co., 200 lbs. candy, inspected as
of quality KOLONIDES, J.M., Finance, USN. At 0945, received the following ammunition from West Dock
ARMY Depot, Pearl Harbor, T.H., 20-50/10 th. projectiles - 20 live catapult
charges. At 1000, published the findings and sentence in the case of PEARLSTAFF, A.J., 20th, USN tried by S.O. for absences over leave. Findings: Guilty. Sen-
tence: Loss of pay of $18 per month for two (2) months, total loss of pay amount-
ing to $36. End. Court Discharge resulted on probationary period of six (6)
months. Approved: by the Convening Authority on 2 December 1941, and by ZO82
(CONVENER) on 4 December 1941. At 1445, received the following stores for
use in general mess, inspected as to quality by Ensign C.W. FRENCH, D-V(S), USN,
inspected as to quality by KOLONIDES, J.M., Finance, USN; from Chun Moon Ltd.,
Honolulu, T.H., 600 pounds fresh bananas, 30C pounds fresh lemons.

H. A. KIMBALL
Ensign, D-V(S), USNR.

12-16. Moored as before. At 1245, pursuant to the orders of the Commanding
Officer, U.S. Naval Hospital, Pearl Harbor, T.H., NOGUES, C.W., Santa, V-4, USNR
reported aboard for duty. Records and accounts to be forwarded by registered mail.
At 1250, pursuant to the orders of the Commanding Officer, ENWORTH, C.W., AOC,
USN, left the ship for temporary duty with reduced guard. At 1500, pursuant to the
orders of the Commanding Officer, the following men left the ship for tem-
porary duty with Shore Patrol in Honolulu, T.H.; HAST, H.W., #360 04 06, 0100,
USN, STARSEY, S.D., #259 21 05, 0100, USN, STARSEY, E.T., #250 90 43, 0100;
USN. At 1430, Lighted fires under No. 1 boiler. At 1510, lifted safety valves on boiler
43 by hand. At 1515, cut in Goller #3 on auxiliary steam line. At 1520, repaired
auxiliary steam stops on boiler #6.
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**DRILLS AND EXERCISES**

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**Notes**

- 3586 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
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**LOG OF THE UNITED STATES SHIP**

**HELENA**

**Location:** Pearl Harbor, T.H.

**Date:** Sunday 7 December 1941

**Crew:** R. H. English

**Commander:** Capt. F. F. W. Harris, Commanding.

**Drill and Exercises**

- Morning: roadway
- Afternoon: roadway

**Additional Notes:**

- **Latitude:** 39°30'N
- **Longitude:** 176°45'W
- **Speed:** 350
- **Course:** 350
- **Wind:** 20...2
- **Visibility:** 06...04
Moored port side to Berths #1 & #2 Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, T.H., with the following lines: 8" Manila bow line, 1 5/8" wire stern line, 8" Manila forward and after bow and quarter spring lines, 8" Manila bow and quarter breast lines. USS CILLA moored port to starboard side. Boiler #3 steering for auxiliary purposes. Receiving fresh water and telephone service from the dock.

Ships present were various units of the U.S. Pacific Fleet. CPOA in the USS CALIFORNIA (ComStratCor). At 0130, the following named men returned to the ship having completed temporary tour of duty as Shore Patrol in Honolulu, T.H.: WO2FDH, J. F., #261 60 22 En1c, USN; ANDREWS, J. P., #241 63 36 EM2c, USN; MILLER, C. D., #75 62 20 EH2c, USN; JACOBY, E. F., #243 63 91 OS2a, USN.

04-05 Moored as before. At about 0757, airplanes recognized as Japanese made a surprise dive bombing attack on Ford Island. Sound General Quarters. At about 0757, a series of three heavy explosions felt nearby. At about 0718, ship rocked by violent explosion on starboard side. This explosion caused by torpedo from a torpedo plane coming over channel south of Ford Island. Hit occurred approximately between frames 71 to 79.

04-12 Moored as before. At about 0801, opened fire with 2" AA batteries at Japanese planes, followed immediately by return of 1.1 and 50 cal. Enemy planes strafed boats and ships in harbor. One fighter type plane believed to have been hit falling toward Navy Yard in flames. The first attack appeared to consist of a strafing attack in coordination with a torpedo attack launched against this and other vessels in the harbor. At 0803, USS CILLA, alongside, listing to port. At 0810, Forward boiler operating station flooded. No. 1 engineroom flooded. Steam power cut out from ship. Fire reported in compartment E-203-31, and compartment closed off because of no water pressure. It was later determined that this was not an actual fire but smoke from torpedo explosion. At 0810, WO2, J. J., Ph1c, USN, confided in the bilge awaiting trial by GCX was released from the brig. At about 0820, first attack ended. CILLA laying heavy fire with 5" 1.1 and 50 cal. throughout the first attack. At 0830, signal hoisted to ships present to get underway. At 0840, signal hoisted to ships present to sortie in accordance with plan. At 0840, report received that after boiler operating station was flooded. At about 0840, Japanese submarine reported to be in North Channel. At about 0847, USS CILLA taken in tow by tugs was hauled astern to berth Baker 3. At 0855, plane attack coming in to starboard from South West. At about 0900, WO2, F. J. O., #261 60 22 EM2c, USN, from Baker 3, OS2a, USN, attached to USS CILLA, reported on board. At 0920, report received Japanese submarine sunk in Middle Loch. At 0900, Japanese planes attacked, approaching from Southeast and South, over Navy Yard, taking advantage of covering offered by Navy Yard buildings. Attack consisted of a series of dive bombing attacks with side bombing attack. Several bombs exploded alongside, several near pierman, no direct hits. Fire from ship with all anti-aircraft guns in action, was heavy and appeared to cause planes to veer off. One dive bomber which veered off was taken by 1.1 and 50 cal. and was seen to fall in water near Hospital Point. At 0920, Ensign, W. J. BAMBER, R. J. (Ph1c), USN, reported on board from temporary duty at Camp Andrews. At 0927, TUCKER, E. Z., FC1c, USN, reported on board with the following named men from a visit to Camp Andrews, Oahu, T.H.: LAMLEY, W. M., SC1c, USN; DEAN, W. W., Cox, USN; COXER, C. C., Sc2, USN; ANDREWS, W. J., Sc2, USN; BLOOMBERG, H. W., Sc2, USN; KENNEDY, L. J., PN2c, USN; HALLAY, H. D., Ye1c, USN; EATON, J. M., Ye1c, USN; SPENCER, E. Y., Ye2c, USN; ENGLISH, E. J., AE3c, USN; HILL, H. S., 22c, USN; VOCHERILLIS, K. C., Ye2c, USN; BAIN, C. H., AE2c, USN; MILLER, G. C., Tt2c, USN; DAVIS, M. L., F3c, USN; TAYLOR, J. L., NA1c, USN; HENDRICK, E. P., OS2c, USN. At 0927, anchor dropped. Ship in anchor. Aerial warfare. Carried登录 objects in channel off Flotation ditch. Believed to be first to torpedo and later thought to be by fleet. Report received Japanese submarine sunk. 1 antiaircraft of CILLA in good
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**DRILLS AND EXERCISES**

- **Morning**
  - Tug Detachment
  - Draft for duty
  - Draft off

- **Afternoon**
  - Tug Detachment
  - Draft for duty
  - Draft off

**WEATHER TEMPERATURES**

- Maximum
- Minimum
At 1025, draft of ship about 26' feet amidships, ship on even keel. At 1030, received orders from Commander to remain at berth until further orders. At 1030, condition of gurs; all after turrets at local control but no material damage; after main director and after sky control station were out of electric control and were shifted to manual control. Forward turrets no casualties. All mounts firing without air for gas ejection. Fuel oil fire on water reaching Ford Island. At 1030, received word to be prepared to receive PENNSYLVANIA alongside. At 1035, ammunition expended: 400 rounds 3"/50 cal., 3200 rounds 1"/75 cal. and 8500 rounds of 50 cal. All batteries in good condition. At 1035, the following massed men were DEAD and were transferred to the Morgue at the Pearl Harbor Hospital, Pearl Harbor, T.H.:
part of alley flooded. At 1319, enemy reported landing off MAUNAII. Own
planes firing on them. At 1322, enemy naval attack reported approaching nine (9)
miles southeast of BAYさのカNIT. At 1330, electricity power cut in galley, but
sandwiches being served to crew from galley. At 1330, report received that six
(six) enemy ships approaching MAUNAII shore, to aid landing party at MAUNAII.
At 1400, received report an unidentified destroyer approaching WALEAE. At 1445,
transferred planes and all aviators to Ford Island. At 1600, muster crew on
stations. The following casualties reported: DEAD Sent to Moroq, NE. PH., T.M.

ALMOSSE, S. F20 USN. GATES, A.J. T2c USN
CARTER, W.J. Seac2c USN. HINES, A.G. Seac2c USN
DIXON, R.F. F20 USN. PENSKE, J.J. C2c USN
HEFF, W.T. Seac2c USN. STEINHALL, R.D. Seac2c USN

The following men were MUTILATED and transferred to U.S. Naval Hospital, P.H., T.M.

ANDERSON, W.B. Seac JOHNSON, D.B. Seac
BARTLETT, J.B. Seac KELLY, A.R. F20
BARTON, E.A. M20c KUFE, E.G. Seac
BEVLER, W.R. Seac LOVE, R.C. T20
BYERLY, W.B. Seac McKay, N.W. T20
COHEN, F.A. Seac MCGUIR, I.A. T20
EDMONDS, L.H. F20 MCGREGOR, A.S. Seac
FIFE, L.H. Seac McKAY, R. Seac
DAHL, W.C. F1c MUNIZ, O.P. Seac
DAVIS, M.A. F1c MUCKROY, R.W. Seac
DOLLING, A.W. F1c POWERS, J.O. T20
HODGSON, W. G1c Pourn, J.O. F1c
HIL, J. S1c SMITH, J.L. CH(US)
FISHER, F.R. Seac SNIDER, D.P. PlStg. USCG
HILTON, H.F. T2c THOMPSON, R. F1c
HILL, D.W. F1c VANDERHALL, W.C. T20
HILTON, P.F. T2c WATERS, G.J. Seac
IREE, J. Seac WOOD, W.A. F1c
KIEHL, W.J. F1c WILSON, E. Seac
KEMP, W.A. F1c WISHAK, H.A. Seac
LEWIS, J.F. T20 WILCO, C. Seac
CROWLEY, T.P. F20 YANKOVICE, H.J. T20
WINTERBOTTOM, R.P. F1c

IMMUNED and retained on board:

THOMPSON, F.W. Seac1, U.S.N. KERRILL, A.W. Ch. Eqnl. U.S.N.
ROGERS, W.I. Seac5 ROGERS, H.A. Seac
THOMPSON, I.R. T2c WILLIAMS, H.A. F1c

MISSES:

UTOWA, J.I. M20c WOOLCOTT, E. MK2c
UTOSIO, A. Seac2c WOOLCOTT, C.W. Seac2c
DOWING, A.N. M20c WAYLAND, J.N. M1c
BEARDEN, L.I. M20c ULDORF, R.W. Seac2c

At 1722, sunset, darkened ship, set Condition BAYER and II in AA Battery. At 1726,
Draft of ship forward 29' 6". At 25' 2".

H.G. GROSS,
Ensign, E-5(Y2), U.S.N.
1900-1930 hoisted as before. At 2106, a flight of planes flew across from west
Ford Island and other shore batteries opened fire followed by ships in harbor.
One plane brought down by westward of Pearl Harbor. Information learned later
that these were friendly planes.

W.M. BING,
Ensign, D-5(Y2), U.S.N.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARDSON

At the hearing on January 25, 1946, Congressman Murphy asked to see the reports of the attack on Cahu which were sent to Washington by General Short and his subordinates. (Tr. 8312, 8346). The originals of those reports were shown to Congressman Murphy the same day, and copies are enclosed herewith.

Carl R. Nelson
CARL R. NELSON
Captain, AUS
URGENT

From: ST. SENATE

To: THE DEPARTMENT

N 1057 INCIDENT STEVEN

JAPANESE HIGH-DECK GOVERNMENT PROGRAMMENT PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
ATTACHED JAPAN FIELD TELEGRAM ADDRESSES A LEAD TO JAPAN
WELDER FIELD THREE WAVING JAPAN FIELD AND CAUGHT ON GROUND STOP DETAILS NOT YET ENDED
LAUGED OVER ONE HOUR STOP INCIDENT CARRIES ON SINKING OF HARBOR SABLY DAMAGED AND TRAINING SHIP ALSO SHIP DAMAGED STOP WILL DETAILS LATER END

ACTION COPY NO. 1 TO WHO

INF. COPY NO. 2 TO CHIEF OF ARMY AIR FORCES

INF. COPY NO. 3 TO SECREATY OF GENERAL STAFF

INF. COPY NO. 4 TO S. S. 1

INF. COPY NO. 5 TO S. S. 2

INF. COPY NO. 6 TO S. S. 3

INF. COPY NO. 7 TO S. S. 4
BATTLE CASUALTIES REPORTED THE TWENTY-SEVEN DECEMBER NINETEEN Forty-one known dead Thirty-eight wounded Three hundred sixty-six of which Twenty-five fifty-five the period one B Dash seventeen placed from mainland run into attack three injured end

SHORT

For Service of the Army and Navy, War Department, A.G.O., December 7, 1941. - To: A.C. of S., G-1. (Exact Copy)

Exact Action Copy To: A. C. of S., G-1, Copy No. 3

Exact Information Copy To: A. C. of S., G-2, Copy No. 2,
A. C. of S., G-3, Copy No. 3,
A. C. of S., G-4, Copy No. 4,

Secretary of the General Staff, Copy No. 5,
Chief, Army Air Forces, Copy No. 6,

WPD Copy No. 7

Action Copy
Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D.C.

DECEMBER 7, 1941

From: HAWAII

To: ADJUTANT GENERAL

No. 1066, 7th

FOR G TWO ENEMY AIR ATTACK RESUMED ELEVEN AM. MUCH LESS INTENSE THAN FORMER ATTACKS PERIOD MANILA REPORTS NO OVERT ACTS HAVE YET OCCURRED THERE SIGNED FIELDEK.

SHOUT

The contents of this wire containing essential information will be made and marked "SECRET". This copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care and will be returned to The Adjutant General without delay.

Exact Action Copy To: G-2, Copy No. 1.

Exact Information Copy To: M-1, Copy No. 2.

M-3, Copy No. 3.

M-4, Copy No. 4.

Secretary, General Staff, Copy No. 5.

The Department, A.G.O., December 7, 1941. To: G-2.

(Exact Copy)
Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D. C.

DECEMBER 9, 1941.

From: PT SHAFTER,

To: CHIEF OF STAFF.

NO. 1077. DECEMBER 8th.

RUMIAD FIVE FOUR NAUGHT DASH EIGHT DECEMBER
EIGHTH YESTERDAYS OPERATIONS CONSISTED OF HEAVY AIR
ATTACKS PRINCIPALLY AGAINST PEARL HARBOR, HICKAM, WHEELER
AND ELLOWS FIELDS SCATTERING BOMBS AT FORT SHAFTER,
CAPITOL BUILDING AND GOVERNORS HOME. OUR LOSSES SEVERE
IN AIRCRAFT. ENEMY LOSSES BELIEVED SMALL. ELEVEN PLANES
BROUGHT DOWN BY ARMY. GROUND FORCES UNHARMED. MORALE
EXCELLENT. ALL TROOPS ON BATTLE POSITIONS WITH TWO DAYS
OF FIRE AT POSITIONS. TOTAL LOSSES TWO HUNDRED KILLED
THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY FIVE WOUNDED VERY LARGELY AT
HICKAM FIELD. STATUS OF AIRCRAFT AS FOLLOWS: PLANES
AVAILABLE A EIGHTEEN NINE; B SEVENTEEN, NINE; A TWENTY,
EIGHT; PURSUIT, FORTY ONE TOTAL SIXTY SEVEN. PLANES
THAT CAN BE REPAIRED LOCALLY: B EIGHTEEN FOUR; B SEVENTEEN
TWO; A TWENTY TWO; PURSUIT NINE TO SIXTEEN. PRIORITY
FOR DESIRED ASSISTANCE: SIXTY HEAVY BOMBERS; TEN MILLION
ROUNDS POINT FIFTY CALIBER AMMUNITION WITH LINKS, REPEAT
LINKS; TWO HUNDRED PURSUIT PLANES; THIRTY SIX DIVE
BOMBERS. BOMB AS FOLLOWS: TWO THOUSAND POUND BOMBS
SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY; ELEVEN HUNDRED POUND BOMBS THREE

Action Copy
Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 441 Munitions Bldg Washington, D.C.

From

To

SNAKE 47 TO HON. L. HR. NO. 1077-30TH.

THOUSAND; SIX HUNDRED FOUNDED FOURTH SIX THOUSAND; THREE HUNDRED FOUND AMONG THE THOUSAND. SPECIAL ATTENTION TO INVENTING AND SPECIALLY DESIGN FOR 6.75 INCHES, AND AS I SHOULD BE FURNISHED WITH COMPLETE COMBAT GUNS AND WITH FULL COMBAT NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT, REQUIREMENTS FOR MACHINE TOOLS AND SHIP EQUIPMENT NOT YET DESIRED. PRELIMINARY SALVAGE REPORTS ARE FAVORABLE AS CONSIDERABLE QUANTITY OF NEW TOOLS HAD NOT YET BEEN INSTALLED IN HAWAIIAN AIR DEPOT AND WERE NOT DAMAGED. SUBPARAGRAPHS ONE HUNDRED A TENTH ASH THIRTY SEVEN MILLIMETER GUNS TO COMPLETE QUOTA. REPLACE ALL THREE INCH ANTIAIRCRAFT GUNS WITH FIVE INCH TOTAL OF EIGHTY SIX. THREE INCH GUNS TO BE USED FOR OUTLYING ISLANDS. TWO HUNDRED SIXTEEN POINT FIFTY CALIBER GUNS TO COMPLETE QUOTA. FORTY EIGHT DASH ONE HUNDRED FIVE M. SEVENTY FIVE IN TWO GUNS TO COMPLETE ORGANIC EQUIPMENT AND PERMIT USE OF OLD BRITISH SEVENTY EIGHTEEN BRS EACH GUNS TO REPLACE THOSE SHIPPED TO PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. ONE INFANTRY BATTALION PREFERRED LOCATION. ONE INFANTRY BATTALION. THIRTY THREE HUNDRED MAN. DEFENSE TROOPS TO FILL TABLE OF ORGANIZATION. FIFTEEN HUNDRED FIELD ARTILLERY TO FILL DIVISIONAL
RECEIVED AT THE WAR DEPARTMENT MESSAGE CENTER
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D.C.

From ____________________________

To ______________________________

Sheet #3 of Handout No. 1071-36th

Copies furnishes as noted:

ARTILLERY AUTHORITY TO EVACUATE ALL DEPENDENTS AT
GOVERNMENT RESIDENCES AND WIP FURNITURE. WAR
DEPARTMENT TO PUSH FOOD STORAGE FOR CIVILIAN POPULATION;
INVENTORY TO BE MADE AND SHIPMENT COMPLETED AS SOON AS
KNOWN. RATIONING OF GASOLINE HAS BEEN PUT INTO EFFECT
TODAY. TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTY JAPANESE AGENTS ARE UNDER
ARREST, FIFTY ADDITIONAL TO BE ARRESTED. ONE HUNDRED
AND NINETY TWO ORPHANS AND ITALIANS ARE BEING ARRESTED.
ONE JAPANESE NAVAL OFFICER PRISONER OF WAR, THIRTY
JAPANESE AMATEUR RADIO STATIONS HAVE BEEN CLOSED.

SHORT.
Received at the War Department Message Center
Room 3441 Munitions Bldg., Washington, D.C.

PRIORITY

From: HAWAII

To: AGO

No. 1098, 9th

Age Seven December following summary battle casualties
Enlisted men furnished for your information-color.
Dead identified one hundred fifty six not identified
Seventy four missing twenty wounded one hundred seventy four.

40th A.G.O
Dec 10 1941

Exact action copy to:

1. C. M. of S., 0-2, copy No. 1.
2. Sec. Genl. Staff, copy No. 2.
3. Adjutant General, copy No. 3.
4. Chief, Army Air Forces, copy No. 4.
5. Chief of Staff, copy No. 5.

PREP LED 71 TO: Chief of Staff, CGQ.

[Signature]

21 Dec 1941
P14 WTS
103 PJ

PRIORITY

From:

To:

PT. SHAFTER TH

THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

1105 DECEMBER TENTH

POP GENERAL ARNOLD STOP PURSUIT PLANES WERE DISPERSED TO
VARIOUS FIELDS ON OAHU STOP ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION
INDICATED THAT SABOTAGE WAS MORE PROBABLE THAN ATTACK
AND TO FACILITATE ANTI SABOTAGE MEASURES PLANES WERE NOT DIS-
PERSONED AROUND PURSUIT FIELDS STOP LAST FEBRUARY FUNDS WERE
REQUESTED FOR CONSTRUCTION OF BUNKERS AND NECESSARY
TAXIWAYS TO PERMIT DISPERSAL OF PLANES AT HICKMAN FIELD
STOP FUNDS HAD NOT BEEN RECEIVED AT TIME OF ATTACK STOP
WE ARE NOW RUSHING CONSTRUCTION OF THESE DISPERSAL
FACILITIES AT HICKMAN FIELD ALSO AT WADI AIRPORT AND AT
OTHER FIELDS.

HEADS

EXACT ACTION COPY TO: Chief, Army Air Forces. Copy No. 2

EXACT COPY TO: C. of S., W. F., Copy No. 2

Action Copy

Secretory, General Staff, Copy No. 4
HEADQUARTERS NAVAL AIRCRAFT

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

PORT CHASE, 1111

To:

The Chief of the Staff of the Army,

War Department,

Washington, D. C.

1. On November 27, 1941, at 3:15 P.M., due to a false report of a situation reported by the Chief of Staff from Situation Room at the

White House, Alert 41 was directed. This Alert was to form in the

Operating Procedure of the Service Department requires that naval installations to be protected against sabotage throughout Guam.

Within a few hours the entire area was in position and bridges, lights, and

stations, and many other installations considered vital were ready for 41, on a day. This protection, however, required both the

tact and the coordination of the normal training. This Alert did not require the discussion of one airman on the field in the kitchen.

forms, etc., would be more like if it were a day they were all on the base and in the barracks.

2. Alert 41, as above, was in effect at 7:55 A.M., on the day after the attack by an estimated one hundred and fifty Japanese planes on the Army and Navy installations on this Island.

3. The installations of the Aircraft Warning Jompany, both permanent stations and mobile, had not been activated December 7, although every effort was being made to install these early morning complete interceptor services, including all mobile stations, from 4:00 A.M. to 7:20 A.M., which was the normal practice in Alert 41. The interceptor service closed down at 4:00 A.M. by order of the Service Department.

The Guam mobile station, however, continued in operation above the usual training. The authorized office of the

White House, to the one operator in the Airplane Arm. Information was then made available to the various operators at the Airplane Arm.

A.M. and informed him that there was a large number of planes over the vicinity North 2 miles west of a line drawn 1/2 mile

north of the Opan station, reporting the situation. A Naval officer was sent to the operator for the purpose of checking whether there were any

planes, which were operating in the North, or one of the Army's planes operating from the West Coast, he said this to be entirely likely, and to

not react the situation. Unless if the circumstances, there was no marine attack. Also requested a further analysis by the

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE  3603

SECRET

4. When the first bombs were dropped, machine gun fire was opened, practically all observers were so surprised that for a few moments there was no action. Then, as the situation cleared, the word was passed down the line of the General Staff to move by quarters and immediately move all personnel and equipment out. The first thing to turn out all troops under Alert 43. This alert required all troops to occupy their battle positions in the shortest possible time and defend against their destruction. The orders were carried out as rapidly as possible under the circumstances and troops from all echelons moved promptly to their battle positions. The Advance CP of the Department was operating in the Alienam Center by 8:45 A.M. with limited personnel, and the Advance CP of the 25th Division, of the Hawaiian Air Force, and complete personnel of Advance CP of Department Headquarters by 11:00 A.M. Near echelons remained at their normal locations.

5. Three distinct attacks were made during the morning, the first one coming at 7:55 A.M., the second about 9:00 A.M., and the third about 11:00 A.M., each lasting approximately fifteen minutes. From a military standpoint the attack had been thoroughly planned and was almost faultlessly executed. Military objectives were successfully attacked with sufficient strength to bring about maximum destruction. In the Army, the airfields, the planes on the ground and the installations at the fields were the first objective. There were a few scattering bombs dropped at Fort Shafter and Fort Armstrong, those being sufficient to indicate that these two posts were also included as military objectives.

6. The largest number of planes concentrated on Pearl Harbor, and there each battleship, cruiser, and group of destroyers was given particular attention by a definite group of planes. Throughout there was every indication that the entire attack had been most carefully planned and every pilot knew exactly the part his plane was to play. There was very little evidence of any hit or miss bombing. From maps recovered from crashed planes, it was indicated that the pilots bombing Pearl Harbor knew the location of practically every ship, including exactly what type the ship was and where it was berthed. There was indication that each plane had been armed to execute its particular task. Enclosure No. 1 attached sets forth the type of planes identified and their general characteristics. It is believed that all planes came from carriers. The most serious damage to battleships was caused by torpedoes planes.

7. The damage, as far as the Army was concerned, was chiefly at Hickam Field, Wheeler Field and Bellows Field; Hickam Field suffering the greatest number of casualties and material losses. At Hickam Field the Hawaiian Air Depot was completely destroyed. Many of the bombers were wrecked on the ground and three hangars were burned. The mess hall and barracks were severely damaged, and the Post Exchange building was wrecked.

8. Wheeler Field suffered the second greatest amount of damage in personnel and equipment, and in actual numbers the Wheeler loss in personnel.

- 2 -
9. Hulleo Field suffered the loast. However, two pilots were killed there and one squadron of F-5s lost all but two planes. At Wake and Amchitka there were no casualties nor any material damage.

10. By noon on Sunday the situation was becoming somewhat normal. However, the civilian population was Just realizing what had happened and roads were becoming jammed with traffic going in every direction. The Honolulu Rapid Transit Company, which operates a large number of buses and trolleys for the largest transit in the City of Honolulu, under the direction of Mr. Fisk and his Civilian Relief Committee, immediately moved into action. From the War Department, all of the families from these areas. All during Sunday afternoon the following day this evacuation of families continued, the bulk of the families being quartered in schools and homes throughout the City. At Fort Shafter, where the Head Quarters of the Interceptor Command is being constructed in a year of the Koolau Mountains, the men and children of Fort Shafter and a few from Schofield Barracks were accommodated. Some confusion resulted in this initial evacuation. However, within a short period of the difficulties were eliminated and the system functioning in an efficient, highly satisfactory manner. Trenches were being dug by the Station Complement at all the posts in the immediate vicinity of quarters so that when the families returned to their quarters they would have some protection in case of actual raid by jumping into these trenches. Trenches are also being constructed in all parks, school grounds, and open places accessible to civil communities.

11. Prior to this time all Japanese agents, as well as Italian and German, had been listed by the Army G-2, Federal Bureau of Investigation and Naval Intelligence. Hence it was but a matter of a few hours until the Japanese agents wereding apprehended and assembled in the Immigration Station, which had been selected as a site heretofore. At present they are all assembled in the Quarantine Station on Sand Island, the total being as follows:

| Japanese | 370 |
| German   | 98  |
| Italian  | 11  |
| Total    | 479 |

There has been no difficulty, either at the time of apprehension or later during the period of confinement of these enemy agents. In the beginning the Department Military Police and Civilian Police constituted the guard. Later a rifle company of the 25th Division was employed. A special detachment is now being organized under the Provost Marshal for the guarding of the entire group. Under the Special Operating Procedure the Commanding General, 25th Division, is made responsible for guarding of all installations within the South Parish. However, within the next week the entire Police District 11, which includes the City of Honolulu, will be taken over by the Hawaiian Territorial Guard, under the direction of the U.S. Attorney General. This will relieve approximately six companies of infantry for combat duty.
12. The casualty report of 10 December 1941, is attached as Exhibit No. 2. The 24 hours following the submission of this report has changed the figures in but one respect, adding four to the total known dead and subtracting four from the seriously wounded.

13. Since 11:00 A.M. on 7 December 1941, there have been no attacks. A landing was not attempted, either from small boats, by air borne troops or by parachute troops, although during Sunday and Tuesday there was much information and many erroneous reports received at the Department CP. We have been unable to determine whether these reports were submitted by additional enemy agents or by imaginative individuals. The Army has one prisoner of war, a Naval Lieutenant, who swam ashore from a two-man submarine, which became stranded on a reef near Kaneohe Bay. A submarine of this same type was sunk by the Navy at about 7:15 Sunday morning within Pearl Harbor, after it was believed it had attacked the Raleigh. Very little information was obtained by G-2 from this prisoner. He apologized for his ignorance in navigating and stated that he expected and wanted to be shot as a result of his failure. This submarine was towed ashore and is now being examined by both the Army and the Navy. Some equipment was found intact in the planes that were shot down. In most cases this equipment, as well as the planes, engines, etc., appeared to be excellent for the purpose for which it was intended. Documents of all planes were dead when found. The Army shot down a total of eleven planes by pursuit planes and by antiaircraft.

14. Naval Law was declared on December 8th and all functions of the Military Government were initiated, with the Department Commander as Military Governor and the Department Judge Advocate General in actual charge as Executive. The cooperation of the civilian population, in view of this great change in their Government, has generally been excellent. Whether difficulties will arise in the future remains to be seen. However, all indications point to a general acceptance of this situation by the civilian population.

15. Approximately three weeks prior to the outbreak of hostilities, detachments from the 86th Engineers, reinforced by large groups of civilian engineers, departed from Honolulu on specially chartered vessels for Christmas and Canton Island for the purpose of constructing airstrips on these Islands by January 15th. Additional fields were being constructed or already established fields were being expanded in the Fiji Islands, New Caledonia and at Townsville, Australia. All of this work was directly under the Department Commander, with the District Engineer acting as his immediate representative. According to local agreement the Army was responsible for the defense of Christmas Island and the Navy assumed the responsibility for Canton Island. This was later changed on account of instructions from the War Department before the Navy had placed any of their defense forces on Canton Island. Defense forces were to have been dispatched to Canton Island December 9th but were interrupted by the state of war. To date there has been no delay in the construction and the supplying of these defense projects are being designed. It is felt, however, that certain modifications must be made.
for the sake of safety. The Ludington on December 8th was on route from Christmas to Canton carrying 1,000 tons of equipment for Canton, including a large still to guarantee a water supply. On orders from Washington the Navy, for purposes of safety, diverted the Ludington from Canton to Suao. Canton is very close to points where the Japanese are operating and the Navy feels that it will be impossible to protect it at this time.

Also, the water situation in a short time would be disastrous if the 300 civilians now there remain. The decision was made yesterday to send the Halsey's from here to Canton to take all civilians to Christmas to be employed upon the work there. The dredge and tugs were started yesterday from Canton to Christmas as the position was too exposed to leave these boats there.

Two 75mm guns, 6 Browning automatic rifles, and 6 water-cooled machine guns, all with antiaircraft mounts, are being sent on the Halsey's to reinforce the garrison at Canton, consisting of 15 Engineers, Medical and Signal Detachments. A detachment of ten Field Artillery is being sent to operate the 75mm guns. If approved by the Chief of Staff, this garrison will remain on the Island. There is available food for a period of six months. There are a good many thousands of gallons of water in storage and two stills in operation capable of producing 1,000 gallons of water per day. There is no harbor at Canton and it is impossible for anything but small boats or lighter drawing about eight feet to enter the harbor. By providing proper under-ground facilities it is believed that this garrison can remain at Canton and defend itself indefinitely. All engineer equipment, gasoline, oil, explosives, etc. are being left at Canton and work will proceed with a limited number of men available. With the increase in the number of civilians at Christmas work should go along much faster there. If Christmas and the field at Nandi, near Suao in the Fiji Islands, are completed by January 15th it will be possible to use this route without either Canton or Suao. The advisability of moving the civilians from Canton to Suao was considered but the Navy did not want them at Suao. The machinery on the Ludington now at Suao can be used to very great advantage at Nandi and the War Department is being requested to authorize the Ludington to unload this at Suao when the first convoy proceeds to the Philippine Islands. The work at Christmas, Nandi, and Townsville will be pushed to the max mum as the necessity for this additional air route to the Orient is more apparent now than ever before, particularly since Midway and Wake are being attacked and Guan is reported to be in the hands of the Japanese.

16. Today nine B-17s have arrived safely from the mainland, making a total of 23 now available in the Department with the possibility of repairing two more. There are 11 P-40s and 9 A-20s left, with 52 P-40s, 20 P-38s, P-40s and heavy bombers will be required before a sense of security is possible. This is particularly true in view of the severe losses which have been suffered by the Navy.

17. The ground troops in the Department have suffered no losses. Morale is high and a state of training throughout is perhaps the highest it has been for many years. Reinforcements, however, are highly essential, in air force, fillers for harbor defense units, field artillery, as well as the infantry regiments in both divisions. Antiaircraft artillery which is due to arrive in January and March should be sent at once. A battalion of tanks and a signal
Exhibit 13 is not essential. Two additional infantry regiments should be available in order to provide any reserve which may be needed.

Our tactical problems here is one of strong field fortifications prepared for occupation, held light with large reserves prepared to move by motor at an instant's notice. Counter-attacks are automatic. With the additional planes to be received much greater use will be made of the airfields on the outlying islands in order to gain surprise and security. The 39th Infantry is now

18. It is of the utmost importance that a large number of boats and of
crews for our airfields should be sent to Bellows Field. Ammunition reserves of all classes should be brought to the prescribed amounts as rapidly as possible.

20. Salvaging operations have resulted in the reclaiming of heavy tools and equipment at the airfields to the extent that we now have in condition over 80% of all machine equipment. This has resulted in being able to recommission many of the planes which were badly wrecked. These recommissioned planes are included in the total shown in the above paragraph. There was practically no damage to existing runways at the various airfields. The airfields, particularly the extension of runways to a minimum of 5,000 feet to provide for the use by heavy bombers, is being rushed to the limit at all fields on Oahu and outlying islands. For example, 1,000 feet has been added to the length of the runway at Bellows Field since Sunday, and part of the B-17 squadron which arrived this morning landed on Bellows Field. By the middle of next week the field at Hauli will be able to take any size plane. A total of approximately 200 tanks or other military equipment, including, I believe, the entire tank fleet, has been completed by the end of last week. Despite the construction of hulks for heavy bombers, the facilities in theunlikely, but not due to the light equipment which has been attacking the type of this purpose but not yet completed, we are well under way.

21. For many months I have been attempting to secure field fortifications which could not be completed without material for building and oil-including. I have been told repeatedly by the War Department that no funds could be made available for this purpose. We have secured the fortifications which were included on this map with all field fortifications are now in operation on the island in an extremely rapid rate. Essential roads and military posts are being made rapidly. Invasion camps for both civilians and military personnel are being constructed.

All military personnel will be sent home as quickly as transportation and facilities permit.
Mr. Chairmen: I now make a presentation to show how the flight of enemy planes was detected by the Office of the Chief Signal Officer of the Air Corps in Washington, and the orders issued by the Signal Corps to the District Signal Officers of the various cities of the United States during the flight of enemy planes over the country.

[Signature]

Walter C. Short
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army,
Commanding.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Enery aircraft believed used in air raid 2 December 1941.

1. Fighter 97 Nakajima.
   a. Nonretractible landing gear.
   b. Low wing, blunt nose.
   c. Single seat.
   d. Three machine guns, two in wings, 500 rounds per gun.
   e. Sea level speed 240 miles per hour, maximum.

2. Fighter Mitsubishi.
   a. Two 5cm cannon fires from wings; two machine guns fire through propeller.
   b. 550 pound bomb load.
   c. Speed 275 miles per hour, maximum.
   d. Maximum range (?)

3. Bomber Kamikazi Type Observation and Light Bomber Type 97 - uses also Diesel motor - (One shot down with Diesel motor near wheel.)
   a. Diheiral (slight positive).
   b. Low wing monoplane.
   c. Three machine guns - bomb load 661.3 rounds - 300 km.
   d. Speed 217.4 miles per hour, maximum.

4. Dive bomber 97 (referred to sometimes as Deck Type Reconnaissance).
   a. Low wing monoplane.
   b. Retractable landing gear.
   c. Single strut.
   d. Three in crew (pilot, 2d pilot and radio men).
   e. Speed sea level 200 miles per hour, maximum.

5. Torpedo Plane.
   a. No description in F.J. Appeared larger than other enemy aircraft; low wing, carried one torpedo directly under fuselage.

6. Type 0-1 Fighter (Mitsubishi).
   a. Ship board fighter.
   b. All metal low wing, internally braced.
   c. Fully retractible landing gear.
   d. Flush rivetting.
   e. Two 5cm cannons; each wing; two 7.7 machine guns in fuselage. No armor.
   f. Floating gear and arresting gear. (This ship at HAD).

7. Aichi Clock Type
   a. Ship board bomber.
   b. Two seater.
   c. Internally braced.
   d. Wings from oval plan.
   e. All metal except wing tip which is wood.
   f. Semi-retractible gear.
   g. Kinsei engine, model A4, twin row radial air cooled.

Page 1, Incl. 34.
SECRET

h. Weight empty 2338.
   0. Useless load 1272.
   i. Loaded 3660 (over all).
   j. Believe bomb at 950 pounds.
   k. No armor apparently.
   l. Two fixed guns fuselage.
   m. Flexible gun rear cockpit caliber 7.7.

   "Indicates type of ship according to F.M., July 1941, one of each
   was shot down and is in possession of Army or Navy."
Report of Casualties.

1. The following data reference battle casualties from midnight 6 December 1941 to midnight 9 December 1941 is hereby submitted.

(a) Number of patients in hospital prior to midnight 6 December 1941.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>T. G. H.</th>
<th>SGIO</th>
<th>Hickam</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>456</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1016</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(b) Admissions:

1. Battle casualties (seriously and slightly wounded).
2. Other than battle casualties
3. Number dead upon arrival at Hospital
4. Number died after admission.

<table>
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<th>SGIO</th>
<th>Hickam</th>
<th>Total</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>(10)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(21)</td>
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</table>

(c) Dispositions:

1. Battle casualties to duty.
2. All others.

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<th></th>
<th>T. G. H.</th>
<th>SGIO</th>
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<th>Total</th>
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<td>56</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>468</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(d) Total number of beds vacant.
(e) Total known dead.
(f) Total seriously wounded.
(g) Total slightly wounded.
(h) Total Battle Casualties.

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<th></th>
<th>T. G. H.</th>
<th>SGIO</th>
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<td>Number</td>
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<td>36</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>114</td>
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<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>358</td>
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</table>

|x This includes 44 dead bodies taken direct to the morgue.
Personally appeared before me, the undersigned, as authority for administering oaths of this nature, one Grover C. White, Jr., C.S.O., 2nd Lieut., Signal Corps, Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii, who after being duly sworn, according to law deposes and saith:

1. At the request of the Control Officer and Naval Liaison Officer the AES agreed to operate its detectors beyond the daily period of two hours before until one hour after dawn. The first schedule required operation of all stations from 4 A.M. to 6 P.M. This schedule was modified to the hours of 4 A.M. to 8 P.M. A temporary schedule was next devised which required all stations to operate from 6 A.M. to 11 A.M. and to have "staggered" operation, i.e., 5 stations from 11 A.M. to 1 P.M., the remaining 3 stations from 1 P.M. to 6 P.M. On Saturday, December 6, 1941, I contacted the Control Officer to request authority to have all stations operate from 4 A.M. to 7 A.M. only on Sunday, December 7, 1941; this was agreed to by the Control Officer.

2. Staff Sergeant Stanley J. Wichas, SCAMH, acting RDF Officer, reports that he saw nothing that could be construed as suspicious in the information received by the AES Information Center from 4 A.M. to 7 A.M. on Sunday, December 7, 1941. This is verified by Lt. Harry A. Tyler, Air Corps, who was the only officer in the Information Center from 4 A.M. to 7 A.M.

3. At approximately 7:30 A.M. a report was received from a Detector station at Opaeka a that a large number of planes was approaching Oahu on a course North 5 degrees East at a distance of approximately 132 miles. This information was immediately transmitted by the switchboard operator, Pfc. Joseph McDonald to Lt. Tyler, who talked to Opaeka about the flight. The statement of Pfc. Joseph McDonald, SCAMH, the switchboard operator is attached.

4. The Navy Liaison Officer's position within the Information Center was not manned when I reached the Information Center at about 8:30 A.M. This position was manned shortly thereafter by Technical Sergeant Melvin H. Stenffer, SCAMH, who remained on the position until approximately 4:30 P.M. when the position was taken over by Naval Officers.

Further the deponent saith not.

[Signature]
Grover C. White, Jr.
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps
Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii.

I, the undersigned, by Pfc. Joseph McDonald, do affirm

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7th day of Dec., 1941

at Fort Shafter, T. H.

[Signature]
Adam R. Freiberg
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps
Summary Court.
Personnelry appeared before me, the undersigned authority for administering oaths of this nature, one Joseph P. McDonald, Pvt 1st, Signal Company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii, who after being duly sworn according to law deposes and saith:

I was on duty as telephone operator at the AWS Information Center on Sunday morning, December 7, 1941. I received a telephone call from Opana at 7:20 A.M. stating that a large number of planes were heading towards Oahu from North 3 points east. I gave the information to Lt. Kermit A. Tyler, Air Corps, 78th Pursuit Squadron, Wheeler Field, T. H. and the Lieutenant talked with private Lockard at the Opana Station. Lt. Tyler said that it wasn't anything of importance. At that time the planes were 132 miles out. I asked if we shouldn't advise Corporal Beatty and have the plotters come back. The Opana Unit stressed the fact that it was a very large number of planes and they seemed excited. Lt. Tyler said that it was not necessary to call the plotters or get in touch with anyone.

Further the deponent saith not.

P. O. Joseph P. McDonald
Joseph P. McDonald,
Sig. Co., Aircraft Warning, Hawaii.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 24th day of December A.D. 1941

at Fort Shafter, T. H.

ADAM R. HUGHES,
2nd Lieut., Signal Corps,
Summary Court.
From FT. SHAFTER, HAWAII
To THE Audit Office

ONE TWO THREE FIVE EIGHTEENTH
FOR O TWO FOUR SIX EIGHT NINE
TWO SEVENTEENTH EIGHT SIX
EIGHT NINE

EYE WITNESS ACCOUNT EITHER COMPREHENSIVE OR RELIABLE
PERIOD STEPS WERE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY TO ASSEMBLE AVAIL
ABLE INFORMATION AND AS RECEIVED I SEND YOU WITH
TECHNICAL DATA TO ARMY AIR FORCE PERIOD PAR TACTIC
USED COLOR ALL TARGETS STRUCK ZAUNTLY (MULTIPLE)
PERIOD PRIMARILY OBJECTIVE PEARL HARBOR AND HUMAN ENEM
COMMA REGARDED AS SINGLE OBJECTIVE PERIOD.
OBJECTIVE WHEELER FIELD AND OTHER AIR FIELDS COULD
HURSES ATTACKED TARGETS FROM ALL DIRECTIONS THE TEM
OUSLY COMM INITIATING DIVE OF FORTY FIVE TO FIFTY DEGREES
FROM ALTITUDE OF THREE TO FIVE THOUSAND FEET CON
CONTINUATIVE ALMOST TO TOWELS ALTHOUGH HIGH ALTITUDE
HURSES FLY IN VEE FORMATION INDIVIDUAL PLANES IN FORM
ATION SEPARATED BY ABOUT TWO PLANE WIDTHS EIGHT TO
THIRTEEN PLANES IN FORMATION AND RELIEV
HURSES IN FORMATION FROM ALTITUDES ESTIMATED AT ONE
EIGHT TO TWELVE THOUSAND FEET PERIOD DIVE SALING THE
HIGH ALTITUDE ATTACKS CARRIED OUT SIMULTANEOUSLY DIVE
HURSES GAVE CLOSE SUPPORT BY COOPERATING THE
EFFORT OF CLOSE SUPPORT BY 20 MIL FEET IN ALTITUDE.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

3615

The three five December 16. Page two.

Under type period appears now high altitude bombers employed only against Pearl Harbor. Dash high area period having baited bombs dive bombers deployed machine guns against aircraft on the ground and within personnel period acquired to field. It appears enemy relied principally upon dive for destruction of aircraft. Coma bombs being deployed against building para usable at this time to estimate total bomber force employed to state number of G3M's utilized coma although appears almost certain at least three G3M's were used for no novelties either in equipment or tactics introduced. Period success of attack due to careful planning and preparation coma complete knowledge of objective, coma surprise coma and determination with which this fact being serviced.

Torpedo or RB-1's have been identified period type zero pursuit had two twenty-meter cannon in wings and two seven point seven machine guns firing through propeller. Period dive bomber had two seven point seven machine guns firing through propeller and one seven point seven
FLEXIBLE GUN IN REAR COCKPIT PERIOD FRAGMENTATION AND DEMOLITIONChpS WERE EMPLOYED BY DIVE BOMBERS PRESENT INFORMATION INDICATING NO BOMBS LARGER THAN ABOUT FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY POUNDS USED BY THIS TYPE PERIOD HIGH ALTITUDE BOMBERS REPORTED TO HAVE UTILIZED CONVERTED FIVE INCH SHELL COMMA EVIDENT PURPOSE TO SECURE PENETRATION PERIOD CHARACTERISTICS OF TORPEDOES NOT KNOWN AT THIS TIME PERIOD REPORTS THAT TWO MOTOR PLANES USED NOT POSITIVELY CONCLUDED SHIP FIELDED
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
NO. 1362 FROM HAWAII PAGE TWO

OF HIGHEST ALTITUDE HORIZONTAL GUNNERS NOT DEFINITELY
DETERMINED UNTIL ALL AVAILABLE AND PERTINENT INFORMATION HAS
BEEN REPORTED TO CHIEF, ARMY AND NAVAL SECURITY SERVICE.
OF EVIDENCE THAT ONLY SINGLE ENLISTED PLANES WERE
EMPLOYED BY ENEMY STPD. NOT OPPOSED TO ENEMY AIR.
OF THINE PLANES HAVE NOT YET NOTY TO BE YET INVESTIGATION
SHOWN TINKER END.

WARNING

The making of any copy of this memo is forbidden. Only such copies as are absolutely
necessary will be made and marked "SECRET". This
copy will be safeguarded with the greatest care and will be
returned to The Adjutant General without delay.

SIGNED FOR ACTION

Chase, Army Air Forces, Cy No. 1.

Secretary, Cy No. 1.

[Signatures and stamps]
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

In reply refer to:
AG 3702/36

21 December 1941.

Subject: Report of attack on Oahu, 7 December 1941.

To: The Adjutant General, War Department, Washington, D.C.

1. Reference your cable 823-16th of 17 December 1941, the report of
air attack was included in our radio 1302 this date.

2. The reports of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-3, of the Interceptor Command and of the Operation Officer,
Hickam Field are attached hereto as enclosure 1, 2, 3 & 4.

3. For the report of the then Commanding General, attention is in-
vited to the "Report of the Battle of Oahu" dated 12 December 1941,
by General Short and which has previously come forward to you.

For the Commanding General:

46 A G O
DEC 09 1941

Major, A. O. O.
Assistant Adjutant General.

Received

1 - Report of AG/3, G-2. (Dup)
2 - Report of AG/3, G-3. (Dup)

SUBJECT: Report of attack on Oahu, 7 December 1941.
AG 33112-21-43/SEC

War Department, A.G.O., December 24, 1941. To: Chief of Air Staff.

Received n/c
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

In reply refer to:

30 December 1941


TO: A. G. of S., C-2, War Department, Washington, D.C.

1. The following facts have been gleaned from numerous reports of eye-witnesses and supplement or correct reports sent you by radio.

2. The enemy effort will be covered under three general headings:

   a. HICKAM FIELD AREA: At 7:55 A.M., December 7, 1941, the first indication of an attack was 9 enemy single engines, low wing monoplanes, carrying torpedoes, which were observed southeasterly of Hickam Field hangar line, flying at an altitude of about 50 feet, and toward Pearl Harbor. They were in two echelons, 5 planes in the first and 4 in the second. This flight did not attack Hickam Field. At almost the same time, however, 9 dive bombers attacked the Hawaiian Air Depot buildings and Hickam Field hangar line from the South, and 3 additional planes attacked the same objectives from the Northwest. Several minutes later 9 additional dive bombers bombed Hickam Field hangar line from the Southeast. Immediately thereafter 7 additional dive bombers attacked the Hickam Field hangar line from the East.

   All planes dived at approximately 45 to 50 degrees from altitudes of 3000 to 5000 feet. Jams were released at about 1000 feet with the planes pulling out of dives from 800 feet to approximately 1000 feet.

   This attack lasted about 10 minutes. This attack and subsequent ones were supported by fighter planes.

   The second attack occurred at about 8:25 A.M., when between 6 and 9 planes approached from the South and attacked No. 1 Aqua System, technical buildings immediately behind hangar lines and consolidated barracks. These planes when first observed were flying level and released bombs from level flight at altitude of about 150 feet. Diving and immediately after this bombing attack our planes on parking apron were attacked with gun fire. About one minute later (8:25) a formation of probably 6 or 6 planes bombed the baseball diamond from a high altitude, evidently believing gasoline storage system to be in that area. The second attack lasted between 10 and 15 minutes.
b. MINERAL FLD AREA: At 9:00 A.M., Sunday, 7 Dec., 1941, approximately 25 planes approached Wheeler Field, generally from the southeast, at about 5,000 feet altitude. They continued to east of Wheeler Field, circled counter-clockwise, lost altitude and approached for attack from north at about 1,000 feet, generally perpendicular to the hangar line. The formation of the anti-aircraft gun was roughly a closed "V", with 5 sections of 4 planes each in the "V" formation, with a 6th plane occupying the right lead of the "V". A single odd plane flew slightly to the rear of the formation. The attack dived at an angle of about 45 degrees from horizontal. The attack struck hangar line and vicinity over a length of about 300 yards, starting from the engineering hanger, which is at the extreme southeast of the hangar line. Flak and machine gun fire were employed during dive bombing attack. Practically all bombs struck the hangar line and point in rear of the line as were released at 1,500 feet of 200 to 250 feet. After releasing bombs, planes continued to dive for a short distance and pulled at a short angle as start of five. No evidence of fire of what larger than the 300 yards.

After the first dive bombing the formation broke, apparently in all directions, with individual planes continuing gun fire, and without regard to possibility of collision. This phase of the attack was carried on from altitudes of approximately 200 feet. The only semblance of order appeared to be that planes surmounted counter-clockwise. Principal targets for this gun fire were our planes on hangar line and buildings and personnel in immediate vicinity. All planes in first attacking formation appeared similar externally and were single engine, low wing, monoplanes. While not positively established, it is presumed that evidence of 20 to 30 fire that this attack included fighters in support of dive bombers. The entire attack lasted approximately 15 minutes.
Subject: Report of Enemy Attacks Sunday, 7 December 1941 - Cont'd

Another attack struck Wheeler Field a few minutes after 9:00 A.M., same day. This attack consisted of 7 enemy planes which approached from the south, flying roughly in line at an altitude of about 500 feet. They fired machine guns at planes being taxied onto the air-drome but it is believed that no planes fired more than 25 to 50 rounds. All seven planes were single engine, low wing, monoplanes, two-seaters. They withdrew to the north. The whole second attack less than 5 minutes. This could very reasonably have been a group of planes expanding the remainder of their ammunition.

3. BELLows FIELD AREA: The attack on Bellows Field was initiated by a single Japanese fighter plane at approximately 8:30 A.M., December 7th. He came directly from the sea (East) and employed machine-gun fire on the tent area apparently expanding all his ammunition in this one attack.

At about 9:00 A.M., nine fighters attacked from the north in 3 groups of 3 planes each in "V" formation. This attack lasted about 15 minutes and consisted of gun fire only. It was initiated with a diving attack of all 9 planes, after which the 3 formations of 3 each peeled off and attacked from various directions.

After the single plane, tent-area attack, a B-17 which had arrived from the mainland and which had been unable to land at Hickam Field attempted to land at Bellows Field but rolled off the run-way. This plane was repeatedly machine-gunned by the 9 plane attack.

The attack at Bellows Field appeared well planned, rehearsed and well executed. One plane was reported shot down by Infantry troops defending the area but no part of it was recovered from the sea for identification purposes.

3. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS & REMARKS: Strafing planes came down to a very low altitude in practically all cases. Some 50 to 50 feet from the ground. Strafers used 50 caliber, 7.7 mm. and 20 mm. The torpedo planes which were employed only against Pearl Harbor came in to sight flying very low and did not change altitude until torpedoes were dropped.

Rigid flight discipline was demonstrated by the enemy and accurate bombing was evidenced. Such an attack could not have been performed without numerous and detailed rehearsals. Every movement seemed to have been rehearsed and was exceptionally well executed.

Liaison with battle force intelligence has been maintained but the general tactics of the enemy attack has not definitely been reconstructed.

A few bombs were dropped in Honolulu proper, but in all probability this resulted from individual planes clearing bomb racks before departing. A few bursts of machine gun fire were likewise delivered at targets other than military objectives.
Subject: Report of Enemy Attacks Sunday, 7 December 1941 - Cont’d

4. CONCLUSION: It is impossible at this time to state how many planes or how many carriers were employed, but it is still believed that at least three carriers were involved. Likewise, it is impossible to definitely establish whether or not any planes returned to a carrier, re-landed and participated in subsequent attacks. It is the opinion of this office that no planes did so. It is more probable that planes were launched from different carriers at different times or that different groups of planes were launched at staggered intervals. It has not been established from what direction or distance the carriers were when the planes were launched, although the Navy believes that at least one carrier operated from 150 miles north of Oahu. It is established that no land based planes were employed in the attack, and while many reports come in relative to enemy planes with more than one motor no positive identification of such planes has been established. It is believed that multi-motor planes reported were our own B-17’s, a flight of which arrived from the Mainland during the attacks.

Randall J. Felder,
Lieutenant Colonel, G.S.C.,
A. C. of S., G-2.
HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
PORT SHAPIRO, T. H.

In reply refer to:

G-2 SECTION CHRONOLOGICAL REPORT

20 December 1941

7 Dec '41

At 0755, 7 December 1941, the Japanese Imperial Navy sent its airplanes over Pearl Harbor, Hickox Field, Kaneohe Naval Air Station, Bellowe Field, Wheeler Field, Schofield Barracks, Fort Kamahama, other Army and Navy Installations and the City of Honolulu as well, in the opening blow in the present war between the United States and the Japanese Empire.

Lt. Col. Kendall J. Fielder, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, arrived in the G-2 Office in the headquarters building at Fort Shafter at 0805 and was followed at short intervals by other members of the section who came from all parts of the city. The section was in operation by 0830 although it handled a volume of messages prior to that time.

By 0830 the following subsections of the department G-2 were in full operation: Combat Intelligence, Public Relations, Administration, Army Contact Office (counter-subversive and counter-espionage). Contact with the Intelligence sections of the various posts in the Department was established by telephone beginning at 0815.

Immediate use of the radio stations in Honolulu, KFU and KMEB, was made by the section.

The first message put on the air by the section was that "Oahu has been subjected to a sporadic air raid. Do not drive on the streets or highways. Keep off the streets."

The radio then warned people to get vehicles off streets, to remain calm, to keep off the telephones, to keep their radios on, and that there would be announcements in Japanese and Filipino and that they should not be alarmed if they heard a foreign language on the air.

All military and naval personnel were warned to return to their posts immediately.

Civilians and all other emergency workers who had been organized for disaster relief were ordered to their predesignated posts.

About 0830 it was announced to the press that the planes had been definitely identified as Japanese.

The War Department was advised by this section of preliminary details of the attack about 0850.

The Contact Office which had been operating on a 24 hour basis was instructed to take particular precautions to watch sabotage and internal disorders. All agents of the Contact Office were functioning at this time.

Liaison between the section and the office of the Director of Civilian Defense was established about this time.

Shortly thereafter Governor Poindexter declared the Territory in a state of emergency thereby placing the Territory's "N-Day" law into effect at 1000.

As various Intelligence sections of the different posts in the department were contacted, they were instructed to report all enemy planes down, all enemy prisoners captured, all enemy activity in their respective sectors although these orders already were included in the Standing Operating Procedure for the Department.

SECRET
The efforts were begun at about 3:00 to prevent all light being shown in the buildings and on the site of the Army.

Liaison was established with the Navy just before 5:00. At 10:00 it was announced that a complete blackout was to be ordered immediately. This censorship went into effect about 11:00, and ship on the local press and radio also was invoked at this time.

This section advised the War Department of subsequent developments in the raid throughout the morning and early afternoon. Steps were taken by the section to apprehend all enemy agents and suspicious characters.

Steps were taken to assemble captured maps, papers and equipment for translation, decoding and evaluation.

The two Honolulu radio stations, KGK and KUN, were cut off the air shortly after 11:10 to prevent enemy planes from coming in on the beam. Station KFRC and KOTM in Hilo, Hawaii and Los Angeles, Marip, were cut off the air shortly afterwards. Thereafter all radio stations were on the air only for short intervals to broadcast announcements approved by this section dealing with military and civilian defense.

About 1400 the combat intelligence subsection began moving into the forward echelon position in the Alisman Store. The rear echelon handled combat intelligence from the Headquarters Building, Fort Shafter, then relayed information to the Forward Echelon as they completed their movement into the combat position.

Martial law was announced by General Short at 1545 after a conference between Governor Peindexter, General Short, and the G-2, Colonel Fielder.

General Short announced the blackout at this time, and blackout warnings were broadcast from radio stations at intermittent intervals between this hour and sundown.

A statement was issued at 1600 concerning martial law and the blackout to all press and radio agencies at this time.

Complete blackout of the entire Territory went into effect at sundown, 1600 after warnings by press and radio throughout the Islands.

Throughout the night the entire section functioned from the forward echelon, the rear echelon and the Honolulu Contact Office.

During the second air raid the rear echelon was subjected to falling shell fragments and machine gun fire from American guns shooting at the Japanese planes.

Many messages were handled during the night relative to parachute troops, enemy landings, and sabotage, all were found to be false.

GENERAL REMARKS

Throughout December 7 and 8, known enemy agents and suspect Japanese, German and Italian aliens were apprehended and detained. The Japanese Consul was held incommunicado in his Consulate. The G-2 section coordinated arrangements for interment and examination of those apprehended.
Efforts were started shortly after the attack on December 7 to reconstruct the enemy tactics of the attack. This involved interrogating dozens of eye witnesses, most of whom told widely differing stories, and the translation and decoding of many maps and papers. These efforts are still in progress and a full report will be made as a separate communication.

Attached hereto is a Work Sheet of Journal in Combat Intelligence Section.

1 Incl. (In dup)
   Work Sheet - Journal
   7 December 1941 -
   (7 sheets)
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WASHINGTON, D.C. - The investigation, which
will continue into the post-war period, is
as follows:

HAWAIIAN AIR BASE, reported as
airline officer.

AIRCRAFT JAMMED. Civilian police cannot handle.

Parachute troop landing near BARNES POINT - at
JENKEN & CANEVELL ROAD.

Lt. H. D. CHAMU, C. W., Co. A, 1st Separate Chemical
Battalion, Schofield Barracks, reported as liaison
officer.

Troops reporting in direction of Harbor from
Schofield. Salute firing.

Parachute troopers reported at BARNES POINT. Unverified.

Parachute troopers have landed on North Shore and have
been identified as wearing blue coveralls with red
discs on left shoulder. BARNES. Unverified.

Parachute troopers at WAIKIKI HEAD.

Both radio stations were ordered to get off the air,
because enemy aircraft were using the beams to come
in by. GENERAL MARMAN approved the action.

Parachute troop landing at BARNES POINT. Unverified.

Messages from manager of KAHU PLANTATION: No Parachute
troops have been signed all morning. Verified by 24th
Division, C-3.

Two local prisoners under guard at PT ARMSTRONG waiting
harbor orders. Also suspicious person reported by
civilian.

Protest General G. & Colonial Fldier. GENERAL
MARMAN told FM General to advise - the President has
signed Proclamation and directed that we initiate our
Apprehension and Detention Plan.

The Governor will declare Martial Law if the General
do desire.

No change in situation for 24th Division. Parachute
troops in Naval Sector are not confirmed.

Not true. reported. Not confirmed.

7 DECEMBER 1941
**EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE**

**LAND**

**SECRET**

7 DECEMBER 1941

**MESSAGE NO.  TIME  ITEM**

1. 1320 Navy reports parachute troops being landed near EAREHURST, wearing blue overalls with a red shield. Not verified.

2. 1320 Question re orders to shoot on sight wearers of blue denim. Is being checked. Chief of Staff orders no soldier to wear blue denim.

3. 1330 Landing party reported between BARBERED POINT and NAMAKULLI, being fired on by our 40's.

4. 1335 One Sampson about to land in front of LUALALEI.

5. 1409 Parachute troops reported by NPS's as landing at ST. LOUIS HEIGHTS near WATER TOWER.

6. 1410 Parachute troops near WATER TOWER on ST. LOUIS HEIGHTS. Not verified.

7. 1510 Teletype being moved from FT. SHAPLEY 9-2 to CHATER.

8. 1525 Quite a number of parachutists landed in PAUOA VALLEY, by EASTLAKE. No verification.


10. No time FPT. DIXON, 64TH C. A., definitely identified plane as GERMAN BATTLE 113, with JAPANESE MARKING.

11. 1532 COL. DIDGEON reports all lights at PEARL HARBOR will be blacked out unless necessary for urgent naval work.

12. 1535 Five parachute troops landed on ST. LOUIS HEIGHTS wearing blue denim with red marks.

13. 1631 Blackout tonight. BURLIZ.

14. 1825 CAPT. MCGREW, DIST. ENGINEER, has rounded up fishermen in KENALO BASIN and was told to report to Provost Marshall.

15. 1830 COL. BONHOM relieved due to mental condition.

16. No time All saloons closed, no liquor to be sold.

17. 1845 Blackout announced to DISTRICT COMMANDERS.

18. 1840 Blinker light on RED HILL.

19. 1911 Landing of parachute troops proved false.

20. 1917 Blinking light.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MESSAGE NO.</th>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>ITEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Blinker light in West Loch.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>2040</td>
<td>Blinker light near HATTEN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 &amp; 29</td>
<td>2109</td>
<td>Flares over LAYALNA BAY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>2311</td>
<td>Above flares sent up by NAVY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>2200</td>
<td>Pick-up of enemy alien progressing satisfactorily.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47</td>
<td>2245</td>
<td>Notice of alert.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>2250</td>
<td>Landing reported in KAKUA POCKET believed to be false from G-2, 24th Division.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>2200</td>
<td>COLONEL ROW just returned from HII and reports everything OK at HII.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 50         | 2303   | COLONEL MCDONALD to G-2. YA Batteries in ENALDA, 332 FLEET, HALE BAY, 9-19. Will fire to register, Will be notified 2 hours previously. Phoned CAPTAIN SMITH, G-2, Rear Echelon, to insert in papers.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

NAVAL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXHIBIT NO.</th>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>TEXT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Z</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Enemy Aircraft Carrier at K314. FORTUNE reported no enemy ships in sight. BURTON.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>1033</td>
<td>Enemy ships coming in 30 miles S.W. 033.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>1036</td>
<td>Unknown boat reported at 54 DE 21.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>1037</td>
<td>Three ships reported previously by radio 30 miles off G 39 are troop-ships escorted by enemy planes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K</td>
<td>1040</td>
<td>2 Surface Vessels approaching BARNES POINT from SSW, about 25 miles off.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q</td>
<td>1115</td>
<td>Enemy sinker Spal south entering port from HPH.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R</td>
<td>1117</td>
<td>2 IX SS 14 555022. BURGIN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>1145</td>
<td>5 inch gun Y 8, Naval Shell identified by 24th Division S-2, at Schofield Barracks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Y</td>
<td>1235</td>
<td>Four Japanese transports off BARNES POINT. From HPH. Not verified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KX</td>
<td>1310</td>
<td>Harbor Defense of Pearl Harbor report 3 DB location 54 BPRD moving west, identity unknown. Four Japanese transports off BARNES POINT. Unverified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>1430</td>
<td>Navy reports unidentified ships firing off OAHUALEI - approaching shore. No confirmation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QQ</td>
<td>1423</td>
<td>KANEHOE reports having captured document, mark 232 degrees, 90 miles from FORD ISLAND.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EKK</td>
<td>1745</td>
<td>Enemy surface craft reported 20 degrees, 32 minutes - 153 degrees, 16 minutes, course 272 degrees. Possibly a carrier. Sending torpedo aircraft to attack. Not verified.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECRET

NAVAL

7 DECEMBER 1941
A I R

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AIR BR. NO.</th>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>ITEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>All planes coming in off George. Flying low. That is all.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Planes coming in northwest of George. That is all.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>1005</td>
<td>Map and Section Orders found on Jap Pilot who crashed at 73 Kan. Will be translated at Contact Office and sent up here.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>1050</td>
<td>One JAP AIRCRAFT CAUGHT reported at 434A.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td></td>
<td>Report from 135 Rovy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Enemy ships coming in 30 miles SW -- 098.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>1147</td>
<td>3&quot; Shells fired identified at Schofield Barracks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td></td>
<td>Reports indicate about 40 Jap aircraft attacked Calhoun early Sunday A. M., apparently from aircraft carrier at 1054.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Three planes shot down; one at Ordnance Building, one near, one in Kalama and one in Pearl Harbor, near Hickam Field.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>1150</td>
<td>Enemy aircraft over Kalama Point, flying low.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>1155</td>
<td>Parachute troops near Yermes &amp; Caneel Ed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>1157</td>
<td>Bombing attack at Kalama.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>1159</td>
<td>Enemy planes reported heading for Pearl Harbor from south.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>1217</td>
<td>Enemy planes approaching Pearl Harbor from southeast.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>1236</td>
<td>Enemy planes approaching Pearl Harbor from SE south.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>1305</td>
<td>Enemy planes flying low overhead. From Hawaiian Air Force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>1320</td>
<td>Reports are planes are from a year of the pursuit ships. Report by Lt. R. B. King via Wheeler's teletype.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>1342</td>
<td>Enemy shells from south entering port N N W.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 Jap destroyer at 34° 45' 00&quot; course west.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>1352</td>
<td>Enemy destructor trying to land at Kalama at about 1040.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td></td>
<td>Enemy two boats landed at 434A. They may be small arms fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td></td>
<td>Two enemy destroyers found at 434A by small arms fire. That 1244. Sights Wide.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>1405</td>
<td>Jap up and enemy pilots being seen here. Armament sent for from Contact Office. Later found identified.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W</td>
<td>1406</td>
<td>Last word of sending at 1130 dropped bomb in capitol.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
|             |      | Armament sent for at 1040. Armament sent by 2 Telet. From Col. Ross.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

SECRET

7 December, 1941

AIR

MESSAGE TO TIMING ITEM

ER 1230 Unidentified station broadcasting on 55-60 meters. "MAILHEW bombed, landing off BARNERS POINT. Naval attacks 90 miles off BARNERS POINT."

ER 1340 LE RUST reports our task force No. 1 (4 cruisers, several destroyers headed west off BARNERS POINT), fired on by enemy aircraft. Report unverified.

PST 1415 Parachute found on HIAL Road near Japanese plane which crashed and burned, pilot killed. American Navy plane crashed in same vicinity. Pilot and enlisted man both killed.

1420 Two dead aviators - one searched - shot down in PEARL HARBOR YARD.

EX 1420 Airplanes approaching from north towards KAHAKU POINT, about 15 miles off. Not identified.

3S 1515 Three enemy planes flying south from SCHOEFIELD BARRACKS. Signed WING. No confirmation.

AAA 1515 Small carrier based plane, 2 seater (both men dead), one .30 Cal. M. G., carburetor made in Japan, is down at FT KAU and under guard. Guard relieved by COLONEL WILKINS orders.

BBS 1640 No activities off HALEIWI up to 5 miles out to sea. One plane over BILLOWS FIELD at 15,000 feet. Identity unknown.

1 1649 A large cutter (presumably JAPANESE) is reported at 55 DD 23 by BARRETT GROUP. Small boat going back and forth from boat to shore. Identity unknown.

CCO 1735 BARNERS POINT to KAHAKU 5 miles out, 500 feet, no activity, HALEIWI to KAHAKU same.

4 1745 One surface craft (Carrier?) reported at lat 20 Degrees, 32 minutes, long. 158 degrees, 16 minutes, course 271. Sending torpedo aircraft to attack.

LLL 2800 Strong radio interference reported by PEARL HARBOR.

11 1928 Enemy ship using call GEORGE MILE.

35 2104 HICKAM FIELD and PEARL HARBOR being bombed. Six or seven planes without lights; one plane was shot down.

15 2045 Unidentified plane flying toward PEARL HARBOR (low).

16 2059 Unidentified flight coming in.

20 2101 HICKAM being bombed.

21 2102 HICKAM & PEARL HARBOR being bombed.

19 2110 HICKAM attacked. Not confirmed.

20 2112 PEARL HARBOR attacked. Not confirmed.

26 & 30 2113 Above arcs our own planes trying to land.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MESSAGE NO.</th>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>ITEM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2150</td>
<td>2150</td>
<td>Bridge near gun position of 8TH FA marked with phosphorus -which was obliterated with mud by gun crew.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43</td>
<td>2205</td>
<td>64TH FA Bn reports PEARL HARBOR receiving naval bombardment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2300</td>
<td>2300</td>
<td>Seven planes reported trying to land at ALA MOANA and are being fixed on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51</td>
<td>2322</td>
<td>No attack on Australian area; one Battalion of Australian Imperial Forces enroute to Kaipong.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2350</td>
<td>2350</td>
<td>COLONEL DIMKEMAN (Liaison PEARL HARBOR - to LT. HURR USN, Liaison FORWARD EREHELON) - MIDWAY being attacked by ships 12 miles south and west of reef at 0940.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2350</td>
<td>2350</td>
<td>At MIDWAY, no actual bombing, but guns went into action - indicating planes in close. Being shelled. 24 direct hits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2350</td>
<td>2350</td>
<td>Unidentified ship in area.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3
FORT SHAFTER, T. H.

Forward Echelon,
20 December 1941

Subject: Operations Hawaiian Department, 7 December 1941.

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Department.

1. Hereewith report covering conduct of operations of troops of this command during the attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941.

a. Troops of the Hawaiian Department and outlying islands went on alert status under Alert No. 1 between 1500 and 1615 on November 27, 1941, on secret information from the War Department. Notification of enemy air attack on Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field was received at about 0810. Major Echelon Commanders and District Commanders were notified of the enemy air operations and ordered to function immediately under Alert No. 3, GOP ED, 5 November 1941. Beginning at about 0900, 7 December 1941, initial defense positions were occupied. The operations section moved to the Forward Command Post at 1000.

b. HAWAIIAN AIR FORCE: Hickam Field, Wheeler Field and Bellows Field were attacked by Japanese aircraft about 0755, 7 December 1941. The first attack was by dive bombers on the hangars, aircraft, barracks, Hawaiian Air Depot and Engineering Shops. The second attack at about 0850, preceded by heavy ground strafing against aircraft and antisubmarine defenses. The end of attack was at about 0950. The Hawaiian Air Force automatically turned over 18th Bombardment Wing to Naval control per Joint Army - Navy Agreement. At 0800 all Air Warning Service personnel were ordered to Air Warning Service Information Center. Serviceable pursuit aircraft were retrieved and took off at about 0850. Four A-20's and two B-17's were immediately salvaged, manned and took off at about 1140 under Navy control. Orders were issued at once to put all available aircraft in commission.

c. HAWAIIAN COAST ARTILLERY COMMAND: All troops were alerted at 0810 and took up positions under Field Order No. 1, Hawaiian Coast Artillery Command, except as follows: Battery "A," 41st Coast Artillery and Battery "B," 41st Coast Artillery in position at Fort Kamahana. Battery Hawkins, two 3-inch sea coast guns, Fort Kamakamae, manned by Headquarters Battery, 15th Coast Artillery. Interceptor Command assumed operational command of 53rd Coast Artillery Brigade (AA). Operations during the period of the raid as follows: Enemy planes attacking over Fort Kamahana at 0800, 1000, and 1120 taken under fire by automatic weapons of Harbor Defenses of Pearl Harbor and 53rd Coast Artillery Brigade units at Fort Kamahana. At least one plane was brought down. Casualties: Killed, three; wounded, fifteen. No material damaged.

d. 24th INFANTRY DIVISION: Enemy air attack came at approximately 0810, 7 December 1941. Machine gun squads, automatic rifle and riflemen from the 19th and 21st Infantry quickly returned
fire of attacking planes. Initial 0244-41 field positions occupied commencing at 0630, 7 December 1941. All units were in position and ready to operate under Alert No. 3 with initial issue of ammunition at 1700, except 240mm Howitzer batteries. 240mm batteries ready to fire at 1200, 8 December 1941. Other action during the period consisted of increasing number and strength of standing guards and patrols, already operating on anti-sabotage missions at the beginning of the period, and investigating false reports of enemy landing action in this Division's Sector. All units ordered to intensify fortification projects. Front line units were in position at 1100.

2. 25th INFANTRY DIVISION: At the time of the raid, this Division was functioning under Alert No. 1, in the patrolling of the Command and Fire Control Cable System and the guarding of vital installations in its assigned sector. At 0830 the Division Commander directed the drawing of all alert ammunition. At 0900 Alert No. 3 was placed in effect. At 0930 the Division departed for defense positions. Troops already in the field immediately increased the strength of anti-sabotage guards on the most vital installations and placed additional posts on secondary installations. 26th Infantry Division Journal records Wheeler Field bombed at 0840; at 0845 troops with small arms and antiaircraft machine guns fired on enemy aircraft; at 0830 the 26th Division Artillery was ordered to draw their initial issue of Field Artillery ammunition; at 0845 a second air raid of about forty enemy planes is reported; at 0900 orders received to occupy war positions maintaining two hundred yards between trucks.

1015 - 27th Infantry troops clear Schofield Barracks for John Rodgers Air Base.
1040 - Water tank of 25th Medical Battalion sent to Hickam Field Hospital. No water available at Hickam Field.
1109 - Remainder of 298th Infantry cleared Schofield Barracks for Bellows Field area (one battalion on duty that area since 27 November 1941).
1115 - Units of 58th Infantry in war positions, Ewa Sector.
1150 - 25th Infantry Bands take over guard duty at Schofield Barracks.
1310 - Firing Batteries of 25th Division Artillery enroute to war positions with one-half unit of fire.
1345 - Engineer supplies, consisting of 50,000 sand bags, barbed wire and pickets, etc., made available to each Infantry Regiment and Artillery Battalion by Division Commander.
1600 - 26th Division Artillery Command Post closed at Schofield Barracks and opened at Forward Command Post. All troops in war positions with at least one unit of fire all types of ammunition, except 240mm Howitzers. Ammunition supply built up during the night to two units of fire. The 25th Division cleared the Post of Schofield Barracks a half hour ahead of calculated schedule.

WILLIAM B. DONEGAN
Lieutenant Colonel, 44 S. C.,
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3

2 Notes:
1 - Report Hawaiian Interceptor Commander
2 - Report Base Operations, Hickam Field, T. H.

SECRET
HEADQUARTERS HAWAIIAN INTERCEPTOR COMMAND

18 December 1941.

Subject: Report of Enemy Activity over Oahu, 7 December 1941,

To: Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force.

At approximately 0802, a large formation of enemy airplanes were heard approaching Wheeler Field from the North at approximately 5000 feet. They peeled off and attacked the hangar line with Dive Bombers, releasing in all about thirty five bombs - of these, approximately four were 600 lbs; about three were 250 lbs; about eight were 100 lbs; the remainder were smaller and some appeared to be oil or other type of incendiary bombs. The airplanes appeared to release their bombs from an altitude of from 500 to 1000 feet. There were two types of bombers in the attack - one with non-retractable wheels appeared to be of the A-17 type, and the others were a little faster and had retractable wheels. Each type had a crew of two.

Bombs struck and burned Hangar No. 1 where the Base Engineering was situated and Hangar No. 3. They also burned a building used as a store house by the Post Exchange and a mobilization-type warehouse filled with cement. One bomb struck the 6th Pursuit Squadron barracks on the Southwest corner entering a window on the second floor where it exploded causing considerable damage to personnel and rendering the building unserviceable. One bomb which landed in the open made a crater approximately 15 feet in diameter and six feet deep.

After the airplanes had expended their bombs, they came to a very low altitude and machine-gunned the airplanes parked in front of the hangars. They also fired bullets through the windows of buildings, attempting to set them afire with incendiary ammunition. From belts of ammunition in one of the captured planes, it was noted that the ammunition was loaded two Armor-piercing, one tracer; two Armor-piercing, one tracer; two armor-piercing, one incendiary. The bullets punctured the gasoline tanks of the airplanes and set them afire with tracer and incendiary ammunition. This method of attack was very successful and destroyed fifty four airplanes by fire and twenty nine airplanes by other means. After the first raid, the personnel on the post were employed in pulling away unburned airplanes from those that were burning and removing as many as possible from the burning hangars. They were also employed in fighting the numerous fires caused by the raid and in rescuing the wounded.

Before the raid, all airplanes were tied down on the ramp in front of the hangars or were inside the hangars. None of them were loaded with ammunition. After they had been rescued from the fire and rolled away from the hangar line, the crews began arming them.
At approximately 0910, a second attack was made by seven airplanes, but little damage was done. These airplanes appeared to be expending on Wheeler Field what ammunition was left after the raid on Hickam Field and Pearl Harbor.

The following members of the 46th Pursuit Squadron took off from Wheeler Field about 0850 and were ordered by the Controller at the Information Center to proceed to the vicinity of Diamond Head at 8000 feet:

1st Lieut. L. M. SAUNDERS
2d Lieut. J. M. TRACkiER
2d Lieut. G. - STERLING
2d Lieut. P. - RASMUSSEN

They proceeded to the vicinity of Bollows Field and there attacked a formation of nine Japanese two-seater airplanes with retractable landing gears. Lieut. Saunders and Lieut. Rasmussen each shot down a Japanese airplane and Lieut. Sterling was shot down by the enemy. Lieut. Saunders reports that the Japanese two-seater airplanes could not climb the P-36 airplanes used by the 46th Pursuit Squadron. By about 0920, 1st Lieut. U. A. Moore and 2d Lieut. G. Norris of the 46th Pursuit Squadron got into the air. Lt. Moore fired at a Japanese airplane without result.

The 4th Pursuit Squadron was located at Haleiwa and between 0815 and 1000, made two flights. In the first flight were 2d Lieut. Kenneth Taylor, 2d Lieut. George Welch, 1st Lieut. John Webster, 2d Lieut. John Daines, each flying F-40's and 1st Lieut. Robert Rogers in a P-36. In the second flight were 1st Lieut. Robert Rogers, 2d Lieut. George Welch, 2d Lieut. Kenneth Taylor and 2d Lieut. Harry Brown in F-40's and 2d Lieut. John Daines in a P-36. Lieut. Welch shot down two Japanese planes in the first flight and two during the second flight. Lieut. Taylor shot down two Japanese planes during the first flight. Lieut. Brown shot down one Japanese plane during the second flight. Lieut. Daines was shot down at approximately 0915 over Schofield Barracks, probably by our own anti-aircraft troops.

The 44th Pursuit Squadron was on Detached Service at Bollows Field for Gunnery Training. Upon being notified of the attack at Wheeler Field, the crew of the attack at Wheeler Field, the crews began arming the airplanes. In an effort to take off under heavy fire from the enemy, Lieut. Whitesan was shot down immediately after take-off, Lieut. Hans C. Christensen was killed while getting into a P-40 to take-off. Lieut. Samuel W. Bishop took off and was shot down into the ocean. Although wounded in the leg, this pilot swam ashore.

The following casualties were incurred at Wheeler Field, excepting officers who were killed in flight:

38 Enlisted Men Killed,
99 Enlisted Men Wounded.

These casualties were suffered mostly by the men sleeping in the tents and those sleeping in the 6th Pursuit Squadron barracks that was hit by a bomb.

The Information Center for the Interceptor Command which had been set up in a temporary installation near Fort Shafter was operated as follows on 7 December 1941:

(a) 0810 - 0700

(1) All six detector stations operating per orders C/8, HED.
(2) 1st Lieut. HERMUT A. TYLE, AC, was Watch Officer.
(3) A plotting detail consisting of one NCO and 10 enlisted men was on duty.
(4) The Control Center at Wheeler Field was manned by Sgt Starry.

(b) 0700
(1) All detector stations closed down except one, the Opana Station at Kahuku Point, which remained in operation in order to continue training a new man operating the oscilloscope. This Station picked up plot at 0702 indicating airplanes at 136 miles bearing 0° to 3° and kept tracking the target.
(2) Lieut. Tyler continued as Watch Officer as his schedule stipulated that he remain on duty until 0800.

(c) 0720
(1) The Opana Station called to inform the Information Center switchboard operator that they were plotting a large group of airplanes. In view of contemplated arrival of B-17's from the mainland and probability of Naval aircraft operating, the Watch Officer did not consider it necessary to take any action.

(d) 0800
(1) Attack underway and all AWS personnel were called to duty.

(e) 0820
(1) Lieut. Grover C. White, Signal Corps, Communications Officer, and Master Sergeant Harold Taylor, Information Center Chief, arrived.

(f) 0830
(1) Major Lorry N. Tindal, Air Corps, arrived and took over the duties of Controller.

(g) 0920
(1) 1st Lieut. Edwin R. Cranberry, CAC, arrived and manned AA position.

(h) 0940
(1) 1st Lieut. A. A. Konkel, SC & Captain N. L. Tittle, SC, arrived.

(i) 0945
(1) 2d Lieut. V. A. Harril, CAC, arrived at AA position.

(j) 1005
(1) Major E. P. Bergquist, Air Corps, arrived.
(k) 1030.

(1) Lt Comdr F.E.G. Taylor, arrived.

(1) After 0800.

Since 0800 the Station has remained in continuous operation.

The following is a recapitulation of the airplanes at Wheeler Field as of 9 December 1941:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Stock</th>
<th>In Commission</th>
<th>Repairable</th>
<th>Repair Upon Receipt</th>
<th>Destroyed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>P-40B</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-40C</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-36A</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-26A</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-26B</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-47B</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S-12A</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-12A</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4-8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4-9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT-6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

H.C. Davidson
Brigadier General, Air Corps, Commanding.
SUBJECT: Report on Tactics Used in Bombing Attack of 7 December 1941.

TO: Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, Forward Echelon, T.H.

1. The following observations are reported in connection with the Japanese bombing attack on 7 December 1941.

   a. I was in the Post Operations Office at Hickam Field waiting for the arrival of twelve (12) incoming B-17s. Shortly before the attack, I noticed the time to be 0746. I would estimate the attack occurred within ten (10) minutes.

   b. The Hawaiian Air Depot repair hangar was dive bombed first, and the hangars on the roadside immediately thereafter. These attacks were pressed home to a very low altitude.

   c. The airplanes parked on the mat were strafed after the dive bombing of the hangars. Several planes were set afire. I noted a bright red flame on the ground under an airplane parked next to Hangar 5. I am unable to state whether this was an incendiary bomb or an airplane flare. The planes were the same type in some cases. I would say that the dive bombers were also used for strafing.

   d. The hangars and planes were also strafed by planes flying perpendicular to the hangar line. This action followed the strafing attack in c, which was parallel to the line.

   e. All strafing attacks came very close to the ground and ceased only when almost on top of the objectives.

   f. There was a short lull (about thirty (30) minutes) between the first and second attacks. During the second attack, my attention was concentrated on a high altitude attack by a formation of about twelve (12) planes which flew in from the south in a very tight formation. From the approach, which was directly along the hangars on the mat side, I would say that this attack was intended for the hangar line, although it hit the area just west of the hangar line (barracks, parade ground, etc.). I believe this group of bombs was over and to the left of the intended targets.

   g. The second attack was accompanied by strafing, although it seemed less severe than during the first attack.
h. Immediately after the high altitude attack, I observed a heavy dive bombing attack on the Pearl Harbor area. This was pressed home against an intense anti-aircraft fire, although I saw no planes shot down. The bombers in this attack did not come as low as those which conducted the attack in b above.

i. I observed only single engine planes.

j. I saw no enemy planes actually fall, although I observed two (2) which were smoking and appeared to be in trouble.

k. The attacks were finished about 0915 - 0930.

GORDON A. BLAKE,
Major, Air Corps,
Post Operations Officer.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARDSON:

In response to Congressman Murnigh's inquiry at page 4532 of the Committee transcript, there is enclosed a copy of a partial translation of a document relating to a 23 February 1941 conference between German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and Japanese Ambassador Oshima. The partial translation was obtained from the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality.

CARL R. NELSON
Capt., AUS

Incl - 1
Partial Translation of Document 1834-PS

Foreign Office
Ram No. 56/R

Strictly Secret

Personal

In the inclosure is forwarded, for strictly confidential and purely personal information, an extract of a report on my conference with the new Japanese Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 23 February 1941. These statements are of fundamental significance for orientation on the general political situation facing Germany in early Spring 1941.

To: The German Embassy in
  Ankara
  Madrid
  Moscow
  Rome (Quir.)
  Rome (Vat.)
  The German Legation in
  Athens
  Belgrade
  Bern
  Budapest
  Bukarest
  Helsinki
  Lisbon
  Pressburg (Bratislava)
  Sofia
  Stockholm
  one each

Enclosure
To RAM No. 56/R

Extract from the Report of the Conference of the Reich Foreign Minister with Ambassador Oshima in Fuschl on 13 February 1941

After particularly cordial mutual greetings, the RAM (Reich Foreign Minister) declared that Ambassador Oshima had been proved right in the policy he had pursued regarding Germany in the face of the many doubters in Japan. By Germany's victory in the west these policies had been [2] fully vindicated. He (the RAM) regretted that the alliance between Germany and Japan, for which he had been working with the Ambassador for many years already, had come into being only after various detours, but public opinion in Japan had not been ripe for it earlier. The main thing was, however, that they are together now.

Expanding upon the general political situation the Reich Foreign Minister declared: The Fuehrer had always looked for an understanding with England and he (RAM) had himself been sent to England as an ambassador in his time to undertake a last attempt in this direction. A certain possibility had existed in the person of King Edward, even though it had been doubtful from the beginning whether the king would prevail. He (the RAM) had been more than skeptical already at his arrival in London, and had considered the chances for an understanding as 100 to 1. Thus the war-inciter clique in England had then won the upper hand. When he (the RAM) left England, war was unavoidable. Then when it came to war the Fuehrer decided on a treaty with Russia—a necessity for avoiding a two-front war. Perhaps this moment was difficult for Japan. The treaty was, however, in the interest of Japan, for the Japanese empire was interested in as rapid a German victory as possible, which was assured by the treaty with Russia. Furthermore he (the RAM) had made it clear to Stalin as well as to the public that the treaty between the Reich and Russia in no way affected the German-Japanese relationship. Now the German-Japanese alliance has been concluded. Ambassador Oshima is the man who gets credit for it from
the Japanese side. After conclusion of the alliance the question of its further development now stands in the foreground. How is the situation in this respect?

As for the war against England, we had poor weather for our bombers during the Fall and Winter to be sure, but in spite of this, heavy damage has been done which has had a strongly retarding effect on English war production, etc. The bombings would continue in increasing measure so that we hope to destroy very much more than America was able to replace. We now had air supremacy over the whole continent. The time when we should win air supremacy over England would depend on further developments.

At sea the commitment of U-boat weapon had thus far been comparatively slight; after the end of March the commitment of the U-boat weapon would multiply in a short time. Then with the combination Air Force-U-Boat weapon we would deal terrible blows to England. The loss of tonnage already was making considerable difficulties for the English food supply. Meat and fats were already scarce. It was now a matter of reducing imports by sinkings to a definite level below the absolute minimum for English existence. Thereby England’s situation would take catastrophic shape overnight. The landing in England is prepared; its execution, however, depends on various factors, above all on weather conditions.

[3] Concerning America, the Reich Foreign Minister went on, it must be noted that Roosevelt is the most bitter enemy of Germany and Japan. As far as he was concerned he would like to enter the war. However we have an interest in keeping America out of the war. Should America enter the war in spite of this it could not wage the war militarily at all. The vast spaces of the oceans lying between us and America made this impossible. In East Asia, America would hardly dare to send its fleet beyond Hawaii, as it would then be threatened with destruction by the Japanese fleet. In the Atlantic Ocean there is a lack of commitment possibilities with the exception of England. Landing in Europe is impossible, and Africa also is too far removed. Supply points for the fleet and land troops are lacking. This points to the creation of American air bases in England for practical purposes. But in an air war we are located in a strategically advantageous position with respect to England. We could bomb England concentrically from the broad basis of the European coast while England had to spread out in fanlike fashion in its attacks on Europe and must thereby split up its forces. In an air duel—Europe vs. England—Germany would always be superior. We believed, however, that it should be possible to keep America out of the war by skillfully coordinated politics of the allied powers.

The Fuehrer would beat England wherever he would encounter her. Besides our strength is not only equal, but superior to a combined English-American air force at any time. The number of pilots at our disposal was unlimited. The same was true for our airplane production capacity. As far as quality is concerned ours was always superior to the English (to say nothing about the American) and we were on the way even to enlarge this lead. By order of the Fuehrer the antiaircraft defense too would be greatly reinforced. Since the army had been supplied far beyond its requirements, and enormous reserves had been piled up (the ammunition plants have been slowed down because of the immense stock of material), production would now be concentrated on submarines, airplanes and antiaircraft guns.

Every eventuality had been provided for; the war has been won today militarily, economically and politically. We had the desire to end the war quickly and to force England to sue for peace soon. The Fuehrer was vigorous and healthy, fully convinced of victory and determined to bring the war to a quick and victorious end. To this end the co-operation with Japan was of importance. However, Japan, in its own interest, should come in as soon as possible. This would destroy England’s key position in the Far East. Japan, on the other hand, would thus secure its position in the Far East, a position which it could acquire only through war. There were three reasons for quick action:

1. Intervention by Japan would mean a decisive blow against the center of the British Empire (threat to India, cruiser-warfare, etc.) The effect upon the morale of the British people would be very serious and this would contribute toward a quick ending of the war.

2. A surprising intervention by Japan was bound to keep America out of the war. America, which at present is not armed as yet and would hesitate greatly to expose her Navy to any risks West of Hawaii, could do this even less
so in such a case. If Japan would otherwise respect the American interests, there would not even be the possibility for Roosevelt to use the argument of lost prestige to make war plausible to the Americans. It was very unlikely that America would declare war if it then would have to stand by helplessly while Japan takes the Philippines without America being able to do anything about it.

3. In view of the coming new world order it seems to be in the interest of Japan also, to secure for herself already during the war the position she wants to hold in the Far East at the time of a peace treaty. Ambassador Oshima agreed with me entirely and said that he would do everything to carry through this policy.

The Reich Foreign Minister mentioned further that, if America should declare war because of Japan's entry into the war, this would mean that America had had the intention to enter the war sooner or later anyway. Even though it would be preferable to avoid this, the entry into the war would, as explained above, be by no means decisive and would not endanger the final victory of the countries of the Three-Power Pact. The Foreign Minister further expressed his belief that a temporary lift of the British morale caused by America's entry into the war would be cancelled by Japan's entry into the war. If, however, contrary to all expectations, the Americans should be careless enough to send their Navy in spite of all, beyond Hawaii and to the Far East, this would represent the biggest chance for the countries of the Three-Power Pact to bring the war rapidly to an end. He, the Foreign Minister, is convinced that the Japanese fleet would then do a complete job. Ambassador Oshima replied to this, that, unfortunately he does not think the Americans would do it, but he is convinced of a victory of his fleet in Japanese waters.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs further explained that closest cooperation was required for the common waging of the war, particularly as far as intelligence service and press were concerned. The cooperation with the Italians is already exemplary; the same is true for the cooperation with Rumania, Hungary and Slovakia. The press, radio, etc. of these countries were already so synchronized with each other that they form one single weapon. The same kind of close contact must be established with Japan. The Ambassador welcomed this and intends to set up a program with our men determining how our Japanese propaganda can be most effectively intensified in all fields.

Ambassador Oshima explained that when the Three-Power Pact was concluded, various opinions were still present in Japan. It was then that the Emperor intervened with an edict. It must be stated, however, that, impressed by the German victory in the West, the Japanese people are now entirely for the Three-Power Pact.

[5] Ambassador Oshima remarked further that in Japan, under the influence of the events, the hard feelings against America had risen considerably. The Reich Foreign Minister referred to the recent statement of Nomura, the Japanese Ambassador in the U. S. A., concerning Japan's attitude in case of America's entry into the war, and mentioned that he considered it appropriate to talk plain language with the U. S. A. Ambassador Oshima remarked hereto that the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had given instructions to that effect. The Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that particularly in view of the desire to keep America out of the war, plain language must be used. Only if the U. S. realized that they were confronting firm determination, would they hold back. The people in the U. S. did not like National Socialism. However, they were not willing to sacrifice their sons and therefore were against an entry into the war. The American people felt instinctively that they were drawn into the war for no reason, by Roosevelt and the Jewish wire-pullers. Therefore, our politics with the U. S. should be plain and firm, but, of course, not aggressive. In the U. S. they must realize that Germany, Italy and Japan had no hard feelings for the American people, but that should the U. S. A. have any aggressive desires, they would confront an iron front of determined people, a front, at that, which includes practically the whole world. One would therefore have to work in close cooperation against the attempts of misrepresentation by the British propaganda. As far as speeches and addresses of a principal nature are concerned it would be necessary to keep up a continuous exchange of ideas. In this connection the Minister for Foreign Affairs referred to a recent remark by Matsuoka concerning Japanese willingness to act as mediator for peace negotiations. This remark had been extensively exploited by the enemy propaganda.

The Reich Foreign Minister continued by saying that it was Japan's friendship which had enabled Germany to arm after the Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded.
On the other hand, Japan had been able to penetrate deeply into the English sphere of interest in China. Germany's victory on the continent has brought now, after the conclusion of the Three Power Pact, great advantages for Japan. France, as a power, was eliminated in the Far East (Indochina). England too was considerably weakened, Japan had been able to close in steadily on Singapore. Thus, Germany had already contributed enormously to the shaping of the future fate of the two nations. Due to our geographical situation we should have to carry the main burden of the final battle in the future, too. If an unwanted conflict with Russia should arise we should have to carry the main burden also in this case. If Germany should ever weaken, Japan would find itself confronted by a world-coalition within a short time. We were all in the same boat. The fate of both nations was being determined now for centuries to come. The same was true for Italy. The interests of the three countries would never intersect. A defeat of Germany would also mean the end of the Japanese imperialistic idea.

[6] Ambassador Oshima definitely agreed with these statements and emphasized the fact that Japan was determined to keep its imperial position. The Reich Foreign Minister then discussed the great problems which would arise after the war for the parties of the Three Power Pact from the shaping of a new order in Europe and East Asia. The problems arising then would require a bold solution. Thereby no overcentralization should take place, but a solution should be formed on a basis of parity, particularly in the economic realm. In regard to this the Reich Foreign Minister advanced the principle that a free exchange of trade should take place between the two spheres of interest on a liberal basis. The European-African hemisphere under the leadership of Germany and Italy, and the East-Asia sphere of interest under the leadership of Japan. As he conceived it, for example, Japan would conduct trade and make trade agreements directly with the independent states in the European hemisphere, as here-tofore, while Germany and Italy would trade directly and make trade agreements with the independent countries within the Japanese orbit of power, such as China, Thailand, Indochina, etc. Furthermore, as between the two economic spheres, each should fundamentally grant the other preferences with regard to third parties. The Ambassador expressed agreement with this thought.

The Reich Foreign Minister then touched upon the question, explicitly pointed out as theoretical, that the contracting powers might be required, on the basis of new affronts by the U. S. A., to break off diplomatic relations. Germany and Italy were fundamentally determined on this; after signing of the Three-Power Pact we should proceed if the occasion arises, but also jointly in this matter. Such a lesson should open the eyes of the people in the U. S. A. to the situation and under certain conditions bring about a swing toward isolation in public opinion. Naturally a situation had to be chosen in which America found herself entirely in the wrong. The common step of the signatory powers should be exploited correspondingly in propaganda. The question, however, was in no way acute at the time.
December 5, 1941.

AMERICAN EMBASSY
LONDON
FOR THE AMBASSADOR

With reference to your 5876, please read the following cable to Eden personally but leave no text of the message:

One. As proof of American policy of aid to Russia, this Government recently sent representatives to the Soviet Union in order to discuss the furnishing of supplies to the Soviet Union to assist it in its struggle against the Nazi invasion. These representatives entered into an agreement with the Soviet Government as to supplies; an agreement which was coordinated with a similar effort by the British Government.

Two. It is our conviction that the test of our good faith with regard to the Soviet Union is the measure to which we fulfill the commitments our representatives made.
in Moscow. We are exerting every effort to carry out these obligations and will continue to do so until the final victory.

Three. In so far as our post war policies are concerned, it is our belief that these have been delineated in the Atlantic Charter which today represents the attitude not only of the United States but also of Great Britain and of the Soviet Union.

Four. In view of this fact in our considered opinion it would be unfortunate were any of the three governments, now on common ground in the Atlantic Charter to express any willingness to enter into commitments regarding specific terms of the post war settlement. Discussions between the several governments looking toward fullest possible agreement on basic policies and toward later arrangements at the proper time and with full public knowledge will of course be expected to continue. Upon the conclusion of hostilities those nations contributing to the defeat of the Hitler forces will join in an effort to restore peace and order.
The participation at that time of the Soviet Government will be no less than that of Great Britain and our own. In order not to jeopardize the aims we shall all share in common looking to an enduring peace it is evident that no commitments as to individual countries should be entered into at this time. It would be unfortunate if we should approach the peace conference thus hampered. Above all there must be no secret accords.

Five. Our basic policy of aid to England is no less strong than that of aid to Russia and we are confident that there is no doubt in the British mind as to our good faith in carrying out our policy. It was in this spirit the Atlantic Charter was conceived, to which the Soviet Government has now given its adherence. Given the limitations of this Government, it would be difficult if not impossible for us to implement this common understanding by agreements of a more detailed nature at this time. Furthermore, the constitutional limitation to which this Government is bound must be kept in mind.
We have very frankly indicated our position in order that in view of the short time before Mr. Eden's departure he may have no misunderstanding as to the general lines of our position.

As to numbered paragraph seven of your telegram we abstain from comment because of uncertainty as to its meaning. In the event that further discussions on this are contemplated we would like to have fuller information.

Hull (R.A.)
The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which
which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary *modus vivendi* could be agreed upon to be in effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific were continuing.

On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to accomplish the purposes above indicated.

The Government of the United States most earnestly desires to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace and stability in the Pacific area, and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area. The proposals which were presented by the Japanese

Ambassador
Nothing of substance is contained in the August 7th statement of the Japanese Minister, in which he said that Japan had been involved in the current conflict as a result of the United States' refusal to make concessions to the Japanese government. According to Japan, the United States has been acting in concert with the British Government in their efforts to bring about a settlement of the Far Eastern question. The Japanese government considers this to be an attempt to establish a world order and to prevent the spread of Communism.

The Japanese government has announced that it will not accept any treaties or agreements that are not in its best interests. It is of the opinion that the United States' war policy is based on the idea of containing Communism, and that this will lead to a world conflict. The Japanese government believes that the United States' policy is not in the best interests of Japan, and that it is time for the United States to consider the consequences of its actions.

The Japanese government has announced that it will continue to resist any attempts to force it to accept terms that are not in its best interests. It is of the opinion that the United States' war policy is based on the idea of containing Communism, and that this will lead to a world conflict. The Japanese government believes that the United States' policy is not in the best interests of Japan, and that it is time for the United States to consider the consequences of its actions.

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contains provisions dealing with the practical application of the fundamental principles which we have agreed in our conversations constitute the only sound basis for worthwhile international relations. We hope that in this way progress toward reaching a meeting of minds between our two Governments may be expedited.
November 26, 1941.

OUTLINE OF PROPOSED BASIS FOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

Section I

Draft Mutual Declaration of Policy

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the
Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed
toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific
area, that they have no territorial designs in that area,
that they have no intention of threatening other coun-
tries or of using military force aggressively against any
neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their na-
tional policies they will actively support and give
practical application to the following fundamental
principles upon which their relations with each other
and with all other governments are based:

(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial
integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.

(2) The principle of non-interference in the internal
affairs of other countries.

(3)
(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

(4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:

(1) The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.

(2) The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalisms as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.

(3) The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.

(4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.

(5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.
Section II

Steps to be Taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan

The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:

1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.

2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland and Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and
and would use its influence to obtain for each of the
signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce
with French Indochina.

3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all mili-
tary, naval, air and police forces from China and from
Indochina.

4. The Government of the United States and the Gov-
ernment of Japan will not support -- militarily, politi-
cally, economically -- any government or regime in China
other than the National Government of the Republic of
China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial
rights in China, including rights and interests in and
with regard to international settlements and concessions,
and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agree-
ment of the British and other governments to give up
extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in
international settlements and in concessions and under
the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

6. The Government of the United States and the
Government
Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.

8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement.
The Japanese representatives were handed for their consideration a document that is the culmination of conferences back and forth during recent weeks. It is unnecessary to repeat what has been said so often in the past that it rests on certain basic principles with which the correspondents should be entirely familiar in the light of many repetitions.

For the Press.

The text of the document handed by the Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador on November 26, 1941, which consists of two parts, one an oral statement and one an outline of a proposed basis for agreement between the United States and Japan, reads as follows:

"Strictly confidential.

"Oral

"November 26, 1941.

"The representatives of the Government of the United States and of the Government of Japan have been carrying on during the past several months informal and exploratory conversations for the purpose of arriving at a settlement if possible of questions relating to the entire Pacific area based upon the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations. These principles include the principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

"It is believed that in our discussions some progress has been made in reference to the general principles which constitute the basis of a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Recently the Japanese Ambassador has stated that the Japanese Government is desirous of continuing the conversations directed toward a comprehensive and peaceful settlement in the Pacific area; that it would be helpful toward creating an atmosphere favorable to the successful outcome of the conversations if a temporary modus vivendi could be agreed upon to be in effect while the conversations looking to a peaceful settlement in the Pacific were continuing. On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to the Secretary of State proposals in regard to temporary measures to be taken respectively by the Government of Japan and by the Government of the United States, which measures are understood to have been designed to accomplish the purposes above indicated.

"The Government of the United States most earnestly desires to contribute to the promotion and maintenance of peace and stability in the Pacific area, and to afford every opportunity for the continuance of discussions with the Japanese Government directed toward working out a broad-gauge program of peace throughout the Pacific area. The proposals which were presented by the Japanese Ambassador on November 20 contain some features which, in the opinion of this Government, conflict with the fundamental principles which form a part of the general settlement under consideration and to which each Government has declared that it is committed. The Government of the United States believes that the adoption of such proposals would not be likely to contribute to the ultimate objectives of ensuring peace under law, order and justice in the Pacific area, and it suggests that further effort be made to resolve our divergences of views in regard to the practical application of the fundamental principles already mentioned.

With this object in view the Government of the United States offers for the consideration of the Japanese Government a plan of a broad but simple settlement covering the entire Pacific area as one practical exemplification of a program which this Government envisages as something to be worked out during our further conversations.

The plan therein suggested represents an effort to bridge the gap between our draft of June 21, 1941 and the Japanese draft of September 25 by making a new approach to the essential problems underlying a comprehensive Pacific settlement. This plan contains provisions dealing with the practical application
of the fundamental principles which we have agreed in our conversations constitute the only sound basis for worthwhile international relations. We hope that in this way progress toward reaching a meeting of minds between our two Governments may be expedited."

"Strictly confidential, tentative and without commitment."

"November 26, 1941.

"Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between the United States and Japan"

"Section I. Draft Mutual Declarations of Policy"

"The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan both being solicitous for the peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighboring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are based:

"(1) The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations.

"(2) The principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

"(3) The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.

"(4) The principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes.

"The Government of Japan and the Government of the United States have agreed that toward eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:

"(1) The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.

"(2) The principle of international economic cooperation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.

"(3) The principle of nondiscriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.

"(4) The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.

"(5) The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.

"Section II. Steps to Be Taken by the Government of the United States and by the Government of Japan"

"The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:

"1. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavor to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.

"2. Both Governments will endeavor to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherland and Thai Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indochina and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indochina, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indochina and would use its influence
to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indochina.

"3. The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indochina.

"4. The government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support—militarily, politically, economically—any government or regime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.

"5. Both Governments will give up all extraterritorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

"Both Governments will endeavor to obtain the agreement of the British and other governments to give up extraterritorial rights in China, including rights in international settlements and in concessions and under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.

"6. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.

"7. The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States and on American funds in Japan.

"8. Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.

"9. Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third power or powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.

"10. Both Governments will use their influence to cause other governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement.
December 2, 1941

MEMORANDUM

At the President's press conference this afternoon, the President announced that he had received a letter from the Emergency Railway Board concerning the settlement of the Railway demands. He read a part of the letter and said that the rest of it would be given to correspondents by Mr. Early.

The President commented that he trusted that that is the end of their trouble and that tomorrow he would be given the formal report and a transcript of the proceedings.

The President was asked if the Japanese marched into Thailand what would the United States Government do? The President evaded the question. Another correspondent asked if the President could give any indication of the nature of the information requested from the Japanese Representatives this morning. The President said let us put it this way, and this answers again many questions at the same time. Since last April we have been discussing with the Japanese some method to arrive at an objective that is permanent peace in the whole area in the Pacific and at times it seemed that progress was being made. During the whole period up to the end of June we assumed that as both nations were negotiating toward that objective - there would be no act contrary to the desired end of peace. We were therefore somewhat surprised when the Japanese Government sent troops to a specific over-all total into Indo-China after very brief negotiations with the Vichy Government at the conclusion of which the Vichy Government let it be understood clearly that they had agreed to this number of troops principally because
because they were powerless to do anything else.

Sometime later conversations were resumed with the
United States and again we made it perfectly clear that
the objective we were seeking meant the taking of no
additional territory by anyone in the Pacific area. We
received word the other day that there were large
additional bodies of Japanese forces of various kinds,
including troops, planes, war vessels, etc., in Indo-China
and that other forces were on the way. Before these forces
had arrived the number of forces already there had greatly
exceeded the original amount agreed to by the French and the
number on the way were much greater, and the question asked
this morning very politely, at my request, was as to what
the purpose and intention of the Japanese Government was as
to the future, eliminating the necessity of policing
Indo-China which is a very peaceful spot and we hope to
receive a reply in the near future.

In reply to a question as to whether any time for a
reply had been set, the President said that there had
naturally been no time limit set.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Letter dated November 18, 1941, from Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, transmitting a memorandum dated November 17, 1941, which had also been sent to the President, entitled “An Approach to the Problem of Eliminating Tension with Japan and Insuring Defeat of Germany.”

2. Memorandum dated November 18, 1941, of conversation between Secretary of State Hull and the British Minister concerning “Conversations Between Secretary Hull and the Japanese Ambassadors.”

3. Memorandum dated November 19, 1941, of conversation between Secretary Hull and the Netherlands Minister.

4. Memorandum dated November 19, 1941, of conversation between Secretary Hull and the Australian Minister.

5. Memorandum dated November 26, 1941, of conversation between Stanley K. Hornbeck and the Canadian Minister Counselor.

6. Memorandum dated November 29, 1941, of conversation between Secretary Hull and the Australian Minister.

7. Memorandum dated November 30, 1941, of conversation between Secretary Hull and the Australian Minister concerning “Conversation Between Australian Minister and Ambassador Kurusu.”

8. Dispatch #280 dated December 1, 1941, from the State Department to the American Embassy, Chungking, concerning the Chinese opposition to the proposed *modus vivendi* and the U. S. negotiations with Japan.
Dear Cordell:

I am enclosing copy of a letter and memorandum which I am sending to the President.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

The Honorable,

The Secretary of State.

Enclosures
November 17, 1941

AN APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM OF ELIMINATING TENSION WITH JAPAN AND INSURING DEFEAT OF GERMANY

I. Foreword

It is becoming increasingly evident that "all out" diplomatic preparedness is as important an instrument of defense as is adequate military preparedness. Military activity may win battles, diplomatic activity can make the fighting of those battles unnecessary; military victories can gain raw materials and equipment and can weaken the enemy, diplomatic victories can achieve similar gains. Without major diplomatic victories Germany could not have attained her spectacular success. Had they not suffered major diplomatic defeats neither England nor France would be in their present predicaments.

An "all out" effort involves in diplomacy as in military strategy the fullest use of every economic and political advantage. Just as our military forces in preparation for an "all out" defense or in actual warfare must make intelligent use of our geographical position, our rich resources, our vast labor power, technical equipment and democratic traditions, so must diplomacy utilize those advantages to the full if it is to have any chance of success.

We are rich — we should use more of our wealth in the interests of peace and victory. We are powerful — we should be willing to use our power before our backs are to the wall. We need no nation's lands — we should make full use of that fact. We keep our national pledges — now is the time that record of integrity should stand us in good
stead. We are protected by two oceans — let us exploit that protection while distance is still a potent barrier. We are a democracy — let us take full advantage of the strength of just covenants openly arrived at.

If ever there was a time when diplomacy could secure its most brilliant victories for the United States, now is that time! The longer we wait the less chance will we have to use diplomacy as an aid to our defense. The patterns of relationship jell; plans become irrevocable; opportunities lost are one forever. Action committed irrevocably to a course of action loses the power to exercise choice, to accept offers and make conditions.

If the President were to propose something like the amended agreement and the Japanese accede, the whole world would be electrified by the successful transformation of a threatening and bellicose powerful enemy into a peaceful and prosperous neighbor. The prestige and the leadership of the President both at home and abroad would skyrocket by so brilliant and momentous a diplomatic victory — a victory that requires no vanquished, a victory that immediately would bring peace, happiness and prosperity to hundreds of millions of eastern peoples, and assure the subsequent defeat of Germany!

The proposal is workable and could be spectacularly successful, if Japan could be induced to accept the arrangement, and the great advantages it offers to Japan, and the fact that the likely alternative is war might induce Japan to accept the arrangement.
The proposal is given below only in bare outline and
in only enough detail to indicate the essential points.
What is most needed at this moment is not a carefully
worked out program, but rather a decision to employ an
all-out diplomatic approach in the current discussions
with the Japanese.
II. Self-Evident Propositions Concerning United States and Japan

1. War between the United States and Japan would cost thousands of lives, billions of dollars; would leave the vanquished country bitter and desirous of revenge; would foster social disruption, and would not insure peace during our children's lives, nor permanently solve troublesome problems now standing between the two countries.

2. The United States prefers a just and peaceful settlement to war as a means of settling international difficulties, and is willing to go more than halfway to settle peaceably the issues that stand in the way of more friendly intercourse between the two countries.

3. The United States recognizes that Japan, because of the special nature of its economy, is greatly in need of opportunities for increased foreign trade, and in need of capital to repair the ravages of four years of warfare, and in need of assured sources of basic raw materials.

4. The United States recognizes that our immigration laws have in fact unjustly discriminated against the Japanese people.

5. The United States believes that in the long run the interest of both the Japanese people and the American people can best be served by establishing fair and peaceful conditions under which Japan and her neighbors can prosper.
7. I am not sure that a plan for the

 earliest date of the British and Lth. \n
 1928, in the event of the issue of

 10-12-30, will be ready for 1930 to

 1-9-31, as early as possible in the

 1931. If it is not possible to

 1932, an estimate for the probabil-

 1933.\n
7.

1. I am sure that it will be necessary

 1934.
III. Proposed Agreement

Because of the foregoing facts, the United States proposes to enter into an Agreement with Japan at once under which the United States and Japan will agree to do certain things, as follows:

On her part, the United States government proposes to do the following:

1. To withdraw the bulk of the American Naval forces from the Pacific.
2. To sign a 20-year non-aggression pact with Japan.
3. To promote a final settlement of the Manchurian question.
4. To actively advocate the placing of Indo-China under the government of a joint British, French, Japanese, Chinese and American Commission, which will insure most-favored-nation treatment for those five countries until the European War is ended, and which will govern the country primarily in the interests of the Indo-Chinese people.
5. To give up all extra-territorial rights in China, and to obtain England's agreement to give up her extra-territorial rights in China, and give Hong Kong back to China.
6. To present to Congress and push for enactment a bill to repeal the Immigration Act of 1927, which prohibits immigration into the United States of Japanese, and place the Japanese and the Chinese on the same basis as other peoples.
7. To negotiate a trade agreement with Japan, giving her (a) most-favored-nation treatment and (b) such concessions
on imports as can be mutually satisfactorily arranged, including an agreement to sell raw silk at a fixed price for 20 years.

6. To extend a $2 million 20-year credit at 3 per cent interest, to be drawn upon at the rate not to exceed $200 million a year except with approval of the President of the United States.

7. To set up a $500 million stabilization fund, half supplied by Japan and half by the United States, to be used for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate.

8. To remove the restrictions on Japanese funds in the United States.

9. To use its influence to the full to attempt to eliminate sources of potential friction between Japan and her neighbors, and to assure Japan access to the raw materials of the world on the same basis as now enjoyed by United States and Great Britain.

10. On its part, the Japanese Government proposes to do the following:

1. Withdraw all military, naval, air police forces from China (boundaries as of 1951) from Indo-China and from Thailand.

2. Withdraw all support — military, political, or economic — from any government in China other than that of the national government.

3. Replace with yen currency at a rate agreed upon among the Treasuries of China, Japan, England and United States all military scrip, yen and puppet notes circulating in China.
4. Give up all extra-territorial rights in China.

5. Extend to China a billion yen loan at 2 per cent to aid in reconstructing China (at rate of 100 million yen a year).

6. Withdraw all Japanese troops from Manchuria except for a few divisions necessary as a police force, provided U.S.S.R. withdraws all her troops from the Far Eastern front except for an equivalent remainder.

7. Sell to the United States up to three-fourths of her current output of war material -- including naval, air, ordnance and commercial ships on a cost-plus 10 per cent basis as the United States may select.

8. Expel all German technical men, military officials and propagandists.


11. Inasmuch as the United States cannot permit the present uncertain status between the United States and Japan to continue in view of world developments, and feels that decisive action is called for now, the United States should extend the above offer of a generous and peaceful solution of the difficulties between the two countries for only a limited time. If the Japanese Government does not indicate its acceptance in principle at least of the proffered terms
before the expiration of that time, it can mean only that the present Japanese Government prefers other and less peaceful ways of solving those difficulties, and is awaiting the propitious moment to attempt to carry out further a plan of conquest.
IV.

Advantages to Japan and United States of Such an Agreement

The advantages accruing to each government are listed below:

A. To the United States

1. In the event that Japan elected to reject the offer of peaceful solution under terms herein indicated, the United States would have a clearer idea of what to expect and would therefore know better how to shape her own policy.

2. Our naval power will be greatly increased at once by the freeing of our Pacific fleet for duty elsewhere.

3. We would be able to send more of our equipment to England and Russia without increasing our vulnerability to an attack from the East.

4. We will have stopped the war in China and have regained for her her freedom.

5. We will have paved the way for a substantial increase in post-war trade.

6. We would greatly strengthen the Allied position vis-a-vis Germany.

7. We will have saved ourselves from a war with Japan.

8. The money it would cost us would be a very small part of what we would save by not having to fight Japan, or by not having to be prepared for a two-ocean war.

9. A prosperous Japan and China can greatly help to restore our normal trade, and thus make easier our own transition to a peace time economy.
10. Insure for ourselves an increased supply of tin, antimony and wood oil and rubber from the Far East.

11. Handicap Germany in its present military campaign and at the same time give great moral encouragement to the British and Russian people.

12. Finally, military and naval experts who now fear a "two front" naval threat will be more enthusiastic about all out help to England and Russia. There will be much less cause to oppose the administration's foreign policy.

B. To Japan

1. Instead of being confronted with prospect of a more serious war and certain defeat in the end, she can have peace at once.

2. She can proceed at once to shift from a war economy to peace economy and at the same time experience prosperity rather than a serious depression.

3. She can withdraw from the China incident without loss of "face".

4. She can strengthen her currency and reduce her public debt.

5. Her foreign trade will greatly increase.

6. She can devote her energies and capital to reconstructing Japan, building up Manchuria, and developing new trade possibilities at a time when other countries are engaged in war or preparation for war.

7. She will at one stroke have solved some of her thorniest problems in her international relations.

8. She will avoid the social disruption that is bound to take place in Japan after an expanded and prolonged war effort.
The one danger inherent in the proposed concessions is that if accepted by Japan it would provide her with a breathing space during which she could greatly strengthen her military and economic potential. She might then be a greater threat to us a year or two hence than she is now.

Against that possibility are the following factors:

1. Owing to the scarcity of many raw materials she will not be able to expand her navy and air force during the next year nearly as much as we can -- particularly in view of the provision in the agreement that we can buy 80 percent of her current output of armaments.

2. The next two years are crucial for us. If we can obtain the release of the Russian, British and American forces now being tied up in the Far East by Japan's threatening, we will have done more to strengthen United Kingdom and Russia vis-a-vis Germany than we could with a whole year's output of planes and tanks and ships.

3. The Japanese people would be so relieved by the settlement of the China "incident", and the end of the threat of war with major powers, and would be so happy at the cessation of economic strangulation and the emergence of real prosperity, that it is hardly likely that any military clique could stir up significant trouble for years to come.

Altogether, the likelihood of Japan's strengthening her position and re-entering the world scene as a belligerent aggressor in the next few years seems very slim -- provided Germany is defeated.
It would, of course, be necessary to obtain Congressional approval before making definite offers, but through preliminary confidential conferences with leaders of both parties and with appropriate committees, the ground could be quickly prepared so that negotiations could go forward.

A completed document could in a week or two be offered to the Japanese Government. The world, including the Japanese people, would know the motives and the contents of our offer. If the Japanese government would not accept, it would have at least the great advantages of 

1. clarifying our own policy and rallying support behind the President, 
2. create serious division in Japan.

If the Japanese Government were to indicate its tentative acceptance in principle, the President could at once call a conference in Washington to be attended by Chinese, British, Russian, and possibly Dutch, East Indian and Philippine representatives. Inasmuch as all the important concessions are to be made by United States and Japan, the participation of other governments in the conference need not complicate negotiations.

The above proposed program of mutual concessions can be successful only if certain vital concessions are not left out. If adopted with those concessions peace in the Pacific would be gained, whereas if adopted without them "surreaement" would be the result, the threat of war would not be averted, and an exceptional opportunity to settle the issue on terms favorable to defeat of Germany would be lost.
Minimum concessions to be obtained from Japan should be withdrawal of troops from the mainland of Asia and sale to us of the bulk of her current production of armaments. If we do not achieve this, we shall not obtain any significant relief to allied military forces in the east while we would be making it possible for Japan to strengthen herself for possible later aggression when the situation is more propitious for aggressive acts on her part. The minimum objectives must be to free the American, British and Russian forces from the Pacific.
The British Minister called at my request. I said that I had engaged in a lengthy conference with the two ranking Japanese representatives, including Mr. Kuruau, who is here for the purpose of carrying on conversations with this Government. I added that the conversation related to the question of a proposed peaceful settlement for the Pacific area. I stated that nothing was agreed upon at this meeting and that the discussion included the subject of two opposing policies - of conquest by force on the one hand and a policy of peace, law and order on the other. I went on to say that the three main points on which we have encountered serious difficulties in former conversations with Ambassador Nomura, namely,
namely, the bringing of Japanese troops out of China, the Tripartite Pact and certain phases of commercial policy, were discussed at length; but that the Japanese made no concessions on the troop matter or on the matter of the Tripartite Pact. I told the Minister that the Japanese finally inquired whether a brief temporary partial arrangement could not be worked out that would enable them to improve public sentiment in Japan along the lines of peace rather than of military action. This would also include the idea of Japan's coming out of China. They said while the United States and maybe Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies, if they should be so disposed on consultation, would to a partial extent relax embargoes on exports to Japan, Japan on its part would correspondingly take steps in the direction of a peaceful policy and in organizing and educating its public opinion in support of such a policy during the next few months. The Japanese suggested further that the whole question of a general peaceful settlement for the Pacific area would be gradually developed and public opinion in Japan would enable them to meet us more satisfactorily themselves, and presumably satisfactorily to us, on
on the more difficult questions such as removing their troops from China and the Tripartite Pact. They did not, however, make any definite commitments as to just how far they could comply with our position with respect to these two points.

I said to the British Minister that I had made it clear to the Japanese that if their Government cared to present something on this point, I would give it consideration in the event it appeared to be feasible of consideration, but that I could make no promise, and that if it should be deemed feasible, I would confer with the Britian, the Dutch, the Chinese and the Australians about any phase of the matter in which they would be interested to which they would give consideration. I also said to the Japanese that, of course, unless Japan decides on a peaceful policy rather than a policy of force and conquest, we could not get far in any kind of discussion but that I could understand why they might need a little time to educate public opinion, as stated.

C.H.

S. CHI:MA
DATE: NOVEMBER 19, 1941

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY HULL AND THE TWO JAPANESE AMBASSADORS

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND THE MINISTER OF THE NETHERLANDS, DR. A. LOUDON

The Minister of the Netherlands called at my request and I repeated to him the substance of what I stated to the British Minister on yesterday in regard to my conversation with the two Japanese Ambassadors. He was very appreciative of this information, and especially of the disposition of this Government to cooperate wholeheartedly as heretofore with his Government.

C.H.

SUBJ A

PS/
Departiment of State

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: November 19, 1941

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION OF SECRETARY HULL WITH THE BRITISH MINISTER REGARDING UNITED STATES-JAPANESE RELATIONS.

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY OF STATE HULL AND MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA, THE RIGHT HONORABLE RICHARD G. CASEY.

COPIES TO:

The Minister of Australia called at my request and I gave him the substance of my statement to the British Minister yesterday afternoon.

C.H.

S:CH:DFB
Counselor

The Canadian Minister suggests that in connection with Article VI of the proposed "Mediterranean" agreement, it be given due weight to the matter of ensuring that the Canadian Government be included among those to be consulted.

PA/H:SKH:FLB
Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: NOVEMBER 29, 1941

SUBJECT: AUSTRALIAN OFFER TO ACT AS MEDIATOR BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

PARTICIPANTS: SECRETARY HULL AND THE AUSTRALIAN MINISTER, THE RIGHT HONORABLE RICHARD J. CASEY

COPIES TO:

The Australian Minister called at his request and made some reference to the possibility that he might cause Kurusu to call on him, at which time he would discuss the pros and cons of the present relations existing between all of the governments interested in the Pacific and wind up by suggesting that Australia would be glad to act as mediator or something of the sort. I really gave the matter no serious attention except to tell him that the diplomatic stage was over and that nothing would come of a move of that kind. I interrupted him to make this conclusive remark before the Minister could make a detailed statement of the matter on the assumption that he would develop a set of facts along lines that he began to intimate...
recent weeks by the British Ambassador, the Australian Minister, and twice by the Netherlands Minister.

C.H.
SERIALLY CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR ONLY.

Reference your 463, November 26, 10 a.m., and the Department's 277, November 26, 7 p.m.

The Department notes from your telegrams under reference that the Chinese Foreign Minister informed you that on November 26 the Chinese Ambassador at Washington had informed the Department that the attitude of China toward the temporary arrangement with Japan under tentative consideration at that time was "negative." You will have observed from the Department's telegram under reference reporting Inter alia the Chinese Ambassador's conversation with the Secretary on November 26 that China's attitude was made known to the Government and to various circles in Washington through various channels and through telegrams to several individuals.

The Secretary of State, whenever he has discussed with the Chinese Ambassador the matter of the current conversations with the Japanese, has made it plain that...
we have made no sacrifice of principles, that we expect to make none; that we have aided China; that we expect to continue to do so to the best of our ability; and that, should matters which concern China come up for discussion, we expect to consult with the Chinese Government at some appropriate stage.

As reported in your telegram under reference the Chinese Foreign Minister described frankly and with force the psychological effects on the Chinese public and the Chinese will to continue resistance which might be expected should there be adopted an arrangement such as the *modus vivendi* we had under consideration at that time. It will be recalled that the Generalissimo in his recent messages to the President and the Prime Minister of England also spoke frankly and forcefully of the psychological effects of a successful Japanese invasion of Yunnan Province. As you were informed in the Department's telegram under reference the Secretary of State in speaking to the Chinese Ambassador on November 26 pointed out that one of the prime points of the draft temporary *modus vivendi* which this Government was then tentatively considering was to protect Yunnan Province and the Burma
Road from the imminent danger described by the Generalissimo and in addition to remove the Japanese menace, for at least three months, to the whole South Pacific area and the Philippines.

In his conversation with you the Chinese Foreign Minister described serious and difficult internal and external problems of China. This Government is not unaware of those problems and we believe that the Chinese Government is also aware of many serious and difficult problems facing us and other similarly disposed powers such as Great Britain and the Netherlands.

We have on many appropriate occasions and we may now again assure China that in these trying and difficult days its interests have been and are being given most careful consideration in our study of our own problems and of the problems of other nations and peoples.

It may be noted that there have occurred recently several examples of the badly confused mechanism for the conduct of diplomatic relations between the governments resisting aggression. Those relations are so delicate
that it is most difficult to carry on such relations in a systematic and sound manner. There have for example been examples of intrusion into delicate and serious situations on the part of individuals who are not completely or adequately informed of the facts. Before taking action of any sort it would seem to be advisable to understand completely each other’s views. Each of the nations resisting the courses of aggression now rampant in the world should endeavor to realize that the other nations are in the light of all considerations to pursue the best possible course and it therefore would seem to be desirable for each such nation to continue a resolute course in the present critical world situation.

You are authorized, if a favorable opportunity presents itself, to make use of the foregoing, or portions thereof, providing you believe that it might be helpful in conducting the points raised by the Foreign Minister as reported in your telegram under reference.

Sent by operator 11, 19
EXHIBIT NO. 169

SELECTION OF

STATE DEPARTMENT DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THAILAND.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. State Department Information Bulletin No. 132 dated Aug. 6, 1941, concerning statement made by Secretary Hull that date at a press conference on the subject of Thailand.
3. Memorandum of Conversation dated Aug. 7, 1941, between the Thai Minister and M. M. Hamilton concerning "American press reports in regard to this Government's attitude toward developments relating to Thailand."
4. Dispatch dated Aug. 8, 1941, from State Department to U. S. Legation, Bangkok, concerning item No. 3 above.
5. Dispatch dated Aug. 8, 1941, from U. S. Minister, Bangkok, to State Department concerning reaction in Thailand official quarters to statements of Secretary Hull on Aug. 6, 1941.
6. Memorandum of Conversation dated Aug. 12, 1941, between the Thai Minister and M. M. Hamilton concerning "Thai Government's desire to obtain an expression of the attitude of the American Government toward Thailand."
7. Memorandum of Conversation dated Aug. 14, 1941, between the Thai Minister and Mr. Peck concerning "Request of Thailand for permission to purchase arms in the United States."
11. Memorandum of Conversation dated Nov. 4, 1941, between British Minister Sir Ronald Campbell and Under Secretary Sumner Welles concerning "Situation in Thailand."
12. Dispatch dated Nov. 6, 1941, from U. S. Minister, Bangkok, to State Department, concerning aid for Thailand.
13. Memorandum by S. K. Hornbeck concerning Aide Memoire handed the British Minister Sir Ronald Campbell on Nov. 6, 1941, and the attached Aide Memoire concerning material aid for Thailand.
14. Dispatch dated Nov. 11, 1941, from State Department to U. S. Legation, Bangkok, requesting inquiry on Thailand's petroleum requirements.
15. Dispatch dated Nov. 18, 1941, from State Department to U. S. Legation, Bangkok, concerning military aid to Thailand.
16. Dispatch dated Nov. 22, 1941, from State Department to U. S. Legation, Bangkok, concerning policy of this Government toward assistance to Thailand in the event she should be invaded.
17. Memorandum of Conversation dated No. 22, 1941, between First Sec'y British Embassy and Mr. Smyth concerning "Reported request of Japanese for use of Thai air fields for 'survey flights'."
18. Memorandum of Conversation dated Nov. 25, 1941, between the British Ambassador and Under Secretary Sumner Welles concerning "Aid Needed by Thailand."
19. State Department Radio Bulletin No. 280 dated No. 26, 1941, concerning press conference of Secretary Hull that date and information furnished press concerning the delivery of the so-called "Ten point note" to the Japanese Ambassadors.
20. Dispatch dated Nov. 27, 1941, from State Department to U. S. Legation, Bangkok, concerning the withdrawal of nationals from Pacific areas.
21. Memorandum dated No. 27, 1941, of conversation between the Thai Minister and Mr. Smyth and Mr. Adams, concerning the Minister's inquiry about press reports of the note handed the Japanese Ambassadors on Nov. 26, 1941 by Secretary Hull.
22. State Department Radio Bulletin No. 282 dated Nov. 28, 1941, which relates briefly the President's Press Conference of that date at which he mentioned the U. S.-Japanese negotiations.

23. Memorandum of Conversation dated November 28, 1941, between the Thai Minister and Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Smyth concerning "Aid to Thailand."

24. Dispatch dated Nov. 28, 1941, from U. S. Minister, Bangkok to State Department concerning radio speech by Thai Prime Minister on Nov. 27, 1941.

25. Memorandum of Conversation dated Nov. 29, 1941, between the Thai Minister and Mr. Smyth concerning "Thailand's treaties with Great Britain and Japan."

26. Memorandum of Conversation dated Dec. 1, 1941 between the Thai Minister, the Thai Military Attache and Mr. Adams and Mr. Smyth concerning "Aid to Thailand."


28. Dispatch dated Dec. 2, 1941 from State Department to U. S. Legation, Bangkok and attached dispatch of same date to American Consul, Singapore, concerning contemplated aid to Thailand in concurrence with British in form of aviation petroleum products.

29. Dispatch dated Dec. 3, 1941 from U. S. Minister, Bangkok to State Department reporting conference he had with Thai Foreign Minister concerning recent Japanese attitude toward Thailand and assistance offered by British and U. S.

30. Dispatch dated Dec. 4, 1941 from U. S. Minister, Bangkok, to State Department concerning his conversation that morning with Thai Foreign Minister who said the Thai Government hoped the American and British Governments would issue public statements that Japanese invasion of Thailand would incur armed resistance of those two countries in addition to Thailand's.


32. Dispatch dated Dec. 6, 1941 from Ambassador Gauss, Chungking, to State Department reporting rumor regarding proposed occupation of Thailand by British.

33. Dispatch dated Dec. 6, 1941 from State Department to U. S. Legation, Bangkok concerning credit extension to Thailand.

34. Memorandum of Conversation dated Dec. 7, 1941 between First Secretary, British Embassy and Mr. George Atcheson concerning "Reported desire of the Thai Government that British forces not move into Thailand."

35. Dispatch dated Dec. 7, 1941 from U. S. Minister, Bangkok, to State Department reporting Japanese attack on Thailand.

36. Dispatch dated Dec. 8, 1941 from U. S. Minister, Bangkok, to State Department reporting the agreement of Thai Government to allow Japanese passage through Thailand for their troops in order to attack Burma and Malaya, and related matters.
(NOT FOR THE PRESS)
(FOR DEPARTMENTAL USE ONLY)

Department of State
Division of Current Information

No. 132

COUNTRY JAPAN

DATE Aug. 6, 1941

Subject: Increasing indications that Japan is making demands on Thailand; statement in House of Commons by Mr. Eden that anything that threatens Thailand was of immediate interest to Great Britain

At the press conference today Secretary Hull said:

THAILAND

A correspondent remarked that there are increasing indications that Japan is making demands on Thailand. He said that Mr. Eden stated today in the House of Commons that anything that threatens the security and integrity of Thailand was of immediate interest to Great Britain, and he inquired if the Secretary would care to say anything on the situation in regard to our own policy. The Secretary replied that he believed we have many times discussed the question of conquest by force on the part of certain countries and that this has included the Pacific area. He said that we have made very clear our concern and our interest in respect to steps carrying out that sort of policy. He stated that Mr. Welles just a few days ago had occasion to give the press a statement on that general question as it relates to the Pacific area and that he might refer to the fact that prior to giving out that statement Mr. Welles read to the press his own (the Secretary's) statement of the issues that were presented when he himself appeared before the House Foreign Affairs Committee in support of the Lease Lend Bill last January and that he need not repeat those things here. Asked if the Secretary could say whether this Government had had occasion to express any views to the Government of Thailand concerning the present crisis there, Mr. Hull replied that he could not go into details now because it is not at a stage where he could be very definite on account of the many angles to the matter. A correspondent remarked that certain steps followed the occupation by Japan of Indochina and he asked if it was fair to assume that certain other steps would follow the occupation or attempted occupation of Thailand by Japan. The Secretary replied that it is fair to have increasing concern about any movement which would include the step to which the correspondent refers. A correspondent asked if the press could infer that this Government has increasing concern over events out there. Mr. Hull replied that this is what he was trying to say and that anything that Mr. Welles said regarding the Pacific area and Indochina would have a special application to Thailand in the present situation. A correspondent inquired if there have been some indications that Thailand has been offered what amounted to a protectorate over Malaya as well as Indochina so that the Japanese would have a protectorate similar to that of the British Commonwealth of Nations over Canada. Mr. Hull replied that we had not been advised on that subject. He said, of course, as the press knew, there had been a multiplicity of rumors and reports coming out of that area lately and that there are many angles to different and important phases of the situation, all of which we are observing as closely as possible.
WASHINGTON,
August 7, 1941

AMBASSADOR,
BANGKOK.

There is repeated for your information an extract from the dispatch of August 6, 1941 in regard to
my press conference of that date as follows:

QUOTE A correspondent mentioned that there were;
increasing indications that Japanese was making demands on
Thailand and he referred to Mr. Eden's speech in the
House of Commons to the effect that anything that threatened
the security and integrity of Thailand was of immediate
interest to Britain, and he wondered whether the Secretary
would care to say anything on the situation in
regard to our own policy. The Secretary said that he
thought that we had many times discussed the question
of concurrence by force on the part of certain countries,
and that it included the Pacific area. He said that we
had made very clear our concern and our interest in
respect to steps carrying out that sort of policy. He
pointed out that Mr. Weller's just a few days ago had
occasion to give the correspondents a statement on that
general questions as it related to the Pacific area.

Asked if he could say whether this Government
had had occasion to express any views to the Government
of Thailand concerning the present crisis out there,
Mr. Hull said he could not go into details now because
it was not at a stage where he could be very definite.
A correspondent pointed out that certain steps followed
the occupation by Japan of Indochina and he inquired
whether it was fair to assume that certain other steps
would follow the occupation or attempted occupation of
Thailand by Japan. The Secretary replied that it was
fair to have increasing concern about a movement that
would include the step to which the correspondent re-
ferred.

Asked if the correspondents could infer that this
Government has increasing concern about events over
there, the Secretary said that that was what he was
trying to say. He added that anything that Mr. Welles
had said regarding the Pacific area and Indochina would
have a special application to Thailand and the present
situation. UNQUOTE.

Enoch H. Hull

Sent by operator.
The Thai Minister called this afternoon at his request. He said that he had noted reports in the press last evening and again this morning in regard to matters relating to his country; and that, in as much his Government was very busy, at times it did not take occasion to inform him of current developments. The Minister then said that he wished us to know that, if there should be any items of information which we would wish to bring to his attention, he was constantly available and would be glad to come to the Department at any time for that purpose. I inquired whether the Minister had anything particular in mind. He replied in rather general terms and said that he was not in position to make an express inquiry.
inquiry in as much as he had received no instructions from his Government. After some general remarks I mentioned that we would of course be glad to inform him at any time upon request of exactly what the Secretary may have said at a press conference. The Minister then indicated eagerness to be informed of what the Secretary had said yesterday which had formed the basis of many stories in the American press.

I told the Minister that I had anticipated that he might wish to inquire in regard to the basis for the stories in the press and that I had, at hand, the record of what the Secretary had said at his press conferences yesterday and today. I then gave the Minister orally the substance of an extract from the Radio Bulletin of August 6, as follows:

"A correspondent mentioned that there were increasing indications that Japan was making demands on Thailand and he referred to Mr. Eden's speech in the House of Commons to the effect that anything that threatened the security and integrity of Thailand was of immediate interest to Britain, and he wondered whether the Secretary would care to say anything on the situation in regard to our own policy. The Secretary said that he thought that we had many times discussed the question of conquest by force on the part of certain countries, and that it included the Pacific area. He said that we had made very clear our concern and our interest in respect to steps carrying out that sort of policy. He pointed out that Mr. Wallace just a few days ago had occasion to give the correspondents a statement on that general question as it related to the Pacific area.

"Asked"
Asked if he could say whether this Government had had occasion to express any views to the Government of Thailand concerning the present crisis out there, Mr. Hull said he could not go into details now because it was not at a stage where he could be very definite. A correspondent pointed out that certain steps followed the occupation by Japan of Indochina and he inquired whether it was fair to assume that certain other steps would follow the occupation or attempted occupation of Thailand by Japan. The Secretary replied that it was fair to have increasing concern about a movement that would include the step to which the correspondent referred.

"Asked if the correspondents could infer that this Government has increasing concern about events over there, the Secretary said that that was what he was trying to say. He added that anything that Mr. Welles had said regarding the Pacific area and Indochina would have a special application to Thailand and the present situation."

I then informed the Minister that at the Secretary's press conference today the Secretary had been asked whether he had anything to say in regard to newspaper reports that the American and the British Governments had already promised Thailand aid if it should resist Japanese aggression; that the Secretary had replied that he did not have anything especially in mind on that subject; and that, when the Secretary had been pressed to confirm whether or not we had made such a communication to the Thai Government, the Secretary had replied that he did not know of any such communication.

I added that the Thai Minister of course was fully aware of the general attitude and policy of this Government in regard to countries which were resisting attack by
by forces of aggression. I mentioned that there was a country nearby to Thailand, namely, China, which was a good illustration of the attitude and policy pursued by this country in this respect.

The Minister seemed very appreciative of my having given him an account of what the Secretary had said at his press conferences yesterday and today in regard to Thailand.

FE: MAH: HES
This page contains written text that is not legible due to the quality of the image. It appears to be a letter or a report, mentioning a meeting or discussion related to the Japanese situation. The text is not clearly visible, making it difficult to transcribe accurately.
The Thai Minister called this afternoon at his request.

He said that he came on an important matter and under instruction from his Government. He stated that his Government had directed him to approach the Department with a view to obtaining an indication of this Government's attitude toward Thailand in the present international situation. He said that the Thai Government had, during the past few weeks when attention was centered on his country, made clear through a statement by the Thai Publicity Bureau — which statement his Government had instructed him to confirm to us — that the Thai Government desired to remain on friendly terms with all countries but that the Thai Government would, if Thailand should be attacked by some
by some other country, defend itself against such attack.

The Minister said that his Government was gratefully
appreciative of the statements made by Mr. Hall in
reference to Thailand during his recent press conference.

The Minister said that if I felt that it would be
preferable that he call on the Secretary in regard to
this matter, he would of course be glad to do so. I
commented that that was my initial reaction. I said that
I would like, however, to discuss the matter with higher
officers of the Department, after which I would expect
to get in touch with him.

I then continued that of course the Minister was
fully familiar with the attitude of this country toward
Thailand. I referred to the fact that the Thai Government
had been the first Far Eastern Government with which the
American Government had entered into treaty relations many
decades ago. I stated also that since that time there had
been a long record of friendship between our two peoples
and our two Governments; that some months ago when we
thought that the Thai Government was following a dangerous
course we had frankly told the Thai Government that we
thought it was "playing with fire"; and that, as I had
stated to the Minister only a few days ago, the attitude
and policy of this Government toward sending material
assistance to countries which were resisting aggression
were
were well known. I reminded the Minister that at that
view I had said that a country named in Scotland, namely, 
Osiris, furnished a good illustration of the way in which
I have had studied this country's policy of extending aid
in countering resisting aggression.

The Minister said that he interpreted the intimation
from his Government, although the intimation did not ex-
plicitly so state, to mean that the Noland Government
intended to maintain policy, in the event that Noland should be
attacked and should resist that attack, the Government of
the United States would extend material assistance to
Noland.

I said again that I would take this matter to the
Department and would then report to Congress on the subject.

Daniel Webster
The Thai Minister called to see Mr. Hamilton, but since the latter was engaged, he asked to see Mr. Peck.

The Minister recalled, for the information of Mr. Peck, that he had called on August 12 to inform Mr. Hamilton that he had just received a telegram from his Government which pointed out that the Thai Government had formally announced its intention of resisting with force any armed aggression that might be attempted against Thailand. On the basis of this declaration, the Thai Government inquired what the attitude of the American Government would be toward Thailand if such armed aggression should, in fact, take place; particularly, would the American Government render any assistance to the Thai Government in this emergency?
The Minister said that Mr. Hamilton had outlined to him the American Government's attitude and policy toward rendering assistance to countries which were resisting aggression, and Mr. Hamilton had instanced the aid that the United States is giving to China. The Minister, said further that Mr. Hamilton had indicated, before an authoritative reply could be given to the Thai Government's inquiry, he would wish to lay the matter before higher authorities of the Government.

The Minister said that today he had received another telegram from his Government which, in the gravity of its tone, indicated that a critical state had been reached in respect of the threat of invasion. His Government urged him to spare no effort to obtain an expression of the views of the American Government in this situation.

Reverting to his conversation two days ago with Mr. Hamilton, the Minister said that from the circumstance that Mr. Hamilton referred to American assistance to China, he inferred that Mr. Hamilton had in mind assistance of the Lend-Lease variety. Assuming this to be the case, the Minister wished to say that the Thai Government was not asking for armament on credit, but was prepared to make purchases on a commercial basis. The early acquisition of the arms
the arms it sought was of the utmost importance to the Thai Government, which, at present, is poorly supplied with equipment. Consequently, the Thai Government would be very grateful to learn how soon, if the American Government could make arms available for purchase, shipments could be arranged and could begin.

The Minister said that, speaking as man to man, the Thais were traditionally suspicious of Japan; he personally felt that in the recent contact with Japan his country had "played with fire", but he trusted that Mr. Peck understood the background of the matter.

The Minister observed, as his own personal reaction to recent news, that the large number of troops dispatched by Japan into Indochina was an ominous sign. The Japanese must have been aware that they would meet with no resistance in Indochina, which was under the control of Vichy and hence of Germany, and these forces must be intended for use elsewhere. Mr. Peck remarked that the newspapers suggested they might be intended for use against Malaya. The Minister replied that the Japanese, in his opinion, would never dare to make an attack on Malaya without previously occupying Thailand, because to do so would be to leave their flank open to attack from Burma. He deduced that these forces were intended for the occupation of Thailand and that the danger to Thailand was accordingly imminent and serious.

The fact
The fact of the matter now is that Thailand is determined to maintain its independence, if it can possibly find the means of doing so. In this emergency the Thai Government is anxiously waiting to learn the nature of the reply that the American Government will give to the inquiry transmitted on August 12.

Mr. Peck said that he would report to Mr. Hamilton at once the observations made by the Thai Minister.
Exhibits of Joint Committee

Page 3715

June 25, 1944

British Government

Sir,

In a telegram dated August 8 addressed to the Governor General of the Netherlands Indies Mr. Walter, Minister of Colonies, said that the British Foreign Minister had made the following statement to the Netherlands Minister at London:

"We have assumed the duties of safeguarding and restoring the possessions and rights of the Netherlands Government to the best of our ability during the war and after peace. It follows therefore that an attack upon the Netherlands Indies would lead us to do the utmost in our power. We must, however, remain sole judge of what actions or military measures are practicable and likely to achieve our common purpose. Should the United States of America be disposed to take supporting action many things would become possible which we cannot undertake now."

Two.

AUG 28 1944
Two. Mr. Churchill has addressed the following message to the Governor-General:

On a question in relation to this statement Eden confirmed that in the event of an attack by Japan the British Empire will back us up completely. The Declaration of the British Government can be considered satisfactory politically but it is disappointing from a strategic point of view. On the eighth instant a conference will be held with Eden to discuss the possibility of drawing up another formula in which the proposed staff discussions come automatically into action, since it has become clear now that the United States and England will not resist Japanese occupation of Thailand with force of arms. It is also brought to your attention that any guarantee or certainty of United States participation by force of arms is absolutely excluded.

Three. While the general public has no knowledge of the above quoted telegram, it has been circulated rather freely among high officials where it has aroused varying degrees of gloom, pessimism, and some bitter feeling against the United States.
The Minister of Thailand called by mutual agreement. He had previously had a conference with Mr. Hamilton of the Far Eastern Division, in which he discussed the purpose of his call to see me. (Reference is made to the record of Mr. Hamilton's conversation of August 12, 1941.)

The Minister said that pressure had been brought to bear on his Government in connection with rubber and perhaps one or two other commodities; that the troops of Japan have been moved up to a point on the new border between Thailand and Indochina just opposite and overlooking Bangkok. He was of the opinion that their first objective is to go south and attack Singapore. He said that the largest military forces are opposite Bangkok and
and that the Army had set out of their territory eastward with
the objectives are achieved at Shenyang. We believe
that the Japanese will probably strike some attack and
have against Shanghai in order to destroy the Duan Xue
reported.

The Minister indicated that pressure on his govern-
ment was more and more threatening and that no one could
tell just how or what hour Japanese troops and other
forces might move into his country. He said that his
government had announced that it was neutral and friendly
towards every country, but that if it should be attacked
it would defend itself as best as it possibly could. He
then stated that his real interest in calling on me was
to ascertain what the attitude of this government would
be towards his country in case it should be attacked and
also essential in good faith to defend itself. I repeated to
him that Mr. Hamilton had said concerning the long
friendship existing between our two countries and about
the probability of Japanese intervention by force at any
time despite agreements and understandings to the con-
tary. I stated that we have unswerved this by ex-
perience with them in the Chinese invasion and in other
instances; and that they are unquestionably set on a
rampage of invasion by force, the seizure of any and
all weak countries, and the placing of them under a
military
military despotism, which would dominate their political, economic, commercial and other affairs and interests and which would channel straight to Tokyo the cream of all benefits, advantages and gains.

I reminded the Minister that we have been aiding China against the aggression of Japan—aiding her in many ways—and that we would place Thailand in the same category; that I have already more than once expressed the serious concern of this country with reference to threatened Japanese intervention. I then added that in aiding all countries subjected to aggression and intervention by force, especially by countries like Germany and Japan, we do the very best possible to distribute such aid where it will be most effective. I said that we are increasing our production fairly rapidly and that the State Department will be glad to contact the official in charge of the defense program and inform him of the needs and desires of Thailand. I finally said that I would be glad to have the Minister call at any time for the purpose of exchanging information about the situation. He remarked that Thailand had the money to pay for the material that they would like to purchase in the United States.

O.K.

S: CHINAGAR
WASHINGTON.

Department of State

Washington, Nov. 2, 1941

RELATIONSHIP.

BANGKOK (THAILAND).

Your 410, October 29, 10 a.m.

The Department is particularly interested in the statement made to you by the British Minister that planes could be sent to Thailand from Singapore. The Department was on the point of informing the British Embassy in reply to an inquiry, that it favored the sending of planes from Singapore, but that reply has been held up pending consideration of matters related to the question of personnel.

[Signature]

Enciphered by... Sent by operator...
Sir Ronald Campbell called to see me this morning at his request.

He inquired whether this Government could as yet give the British Government a reply to the communication he had left with me a few days ago regarding the situation in Thailand.

I told the Minister that I had assumed that a reply had already been made to him by Dr. Hornbeck in as much as I had approved a draft reply some days ago and that it was my understanding that the Secretary of State had likewise approved this draft. I then called Dr. Hornbeck on the telephone who told me that the delivery of the reply had been held up owing to the information which had reached us last Saturday from Chongking relating to
planned attack by the Japanese by way of Indochina on

I consequently told Sir Ronald that certain questions
of an urgent character involving China as well as Thailand
had arisen just as Dr. Hornbeck was about to give the
reply of this Government to the British Embassy, and that
for the time being, therefore, our reply would have to be
postponed.

Sir Ronald said he fully understood the circumstances.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C).

Dated November 6, 1941
FROM Rec'd 9:10 P.M.

Secretary of State
Washington

URGENT.

504, November 6, 6 p.m., (SECTON ONE)
Department's 137, November 3, 10 p.m.

One. Both the British Minister and I, in
meant that 24 fighter planes be transferred
to Thailand from Singapore, had in mind their
presence from the United States. I have asked
the Bwell attaché now in Singapore to report
whether surplus planes exist there.

Two. I venture to suggest below factors
relevant to consideration of American policy
with respect to Thailand. After the Japanese
attack, the British consolidated
their defense until they decided to trans
fighter planes to Thailand. In the mean
time, the British have informed us of the
anticipated attack by the Japanese and
have written asking us to be prepared.

I, therefore, believe it is necessary
to act now to forward these planes
immediately.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED
This telegram must be closely kept and not be permitted to anyone. (C)

Rec'd 9:56 p.m.

FROM

Secretary of State,
Washington.

URGENT.

504, November 6, 1941

Telegram received November 6, 1941

RECEIVED

BANGKOK

Schemes has been of considerable advantage to the United States and Great Britain because if Japan had acquired a dominant position in this country it would have had a favorable position from which to negotiate for seaports and airfields and to obstruct American and British access to the tin and rubber resources here. If Thailand had in any important particular during recent months sided with Japan as the self-styled champion of Asia against American and British Imperialism the benefit to Japan's program would have been immense. As things stand Great Britain has been left undisturbed in control of three fourths of the tin output and our joint rubber purchases begun September 18 are proceeding at the rate of over 3,000 tons monthly. Our extensive missionary enterprises are continuing without the molestation they have encountered in Japanese controlled areas. The military implications

FECK

HTM
of a possible Japanese domination of Indo-China. Any action required by intimidation or invasion now to prevent this is a strategic way because of the essential advantage to Japanese strategy and in particular for the timing American aid to Thailand through Burma, but on the whole military considerations concern Great Britain more than the United States. The United States during the progress of hostilities is under no specific obligation to assist Thailand to maintain its independence. Whatever may be our future obligations are general commitments once victory over aggression is achieved.

There have been reports of the support of newly from the British Government to the Ministry of the Thai Prime Minister concerning the intended action in the event of a Japanese invasion. Apparently this draft can be reduced to an undertaking to give Thailand aviation gasoline and lubricating oil for military purposes at once, the
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

GS

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM

Dated November 6, 1941

Read 10:04 p.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

URGENT

504, November 6, 5 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

58 pieces of artillery over a period of about nine months and a promise to occupy Southern Thailand with armed forces when the invasion takes place in the north. Disregarding other considerations this seems a small return to make for the practical advantages we are receiving and for the risk Thailand is incurring through repudiation of Japanese overtures. If it could be done it would certainly be preferable to preserve this country as a political and military entity rather than to envisage partition of the country as a temporary expedient. Moreover, it happens that the British owned tin mines and all the rubber plantations are in the south and if they were saved and the bulk of the country abandoned to Japan a hostile propaganda would allege this to be proof of our merely selfish aims in the Orient.

Four, Indochina and Thailand will be dry and

PECK
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

TO: Secretary of State,

FROM: Bangkok

Date: November 8, 1941

RE: Urgent

Telegram received 3729, November 8, 5 p.m. (SECT: SIX).

Situation for military activities from January to

As of November 8, it was reported that

In the meantime, there were indications that some

In view of the situation, it was recommended that

No mention of military aid was

It was recommended that

If the

The

P. ECK

HTM
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

U.S.S. Pennsylvania

Arrived at Pearl Harbor, Dec. 8, 1939.

To Admiral King:

Sir, Instantly upon our arrival at Pearl Harbor, Dec. 8, 1939, we took up our positions and immediately proceeded to our orders.

Very respectfully,

[Signature]

(End of Telegram).
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE UNDER SECRETARY
LIAISON OFFICE

November 18, 1941

FE - Mr. Hamilton:

This subject was discussed at the Liaison Meeting held on November 12.
The consensus of opinion was that if any action concerning these planes should be taken, the initiative should come from the British without any urging from the United States.

U-L: Wilson: WLH

(File returned to FE)
Department of State

The Under Secretary

November 8, 1941

U-L

Mr. Wilson:

Please put this on the agenda for the next meeting of the Liaison Committee.

U - Liaison Office

Nov 8 - 1941

Department of State
Mr. Welles:

It seems to me that the question of planes for Thailand has reached a point where the only way to get forward with the matter is to have it considered by high officers of the War and Navy Departments along with officers of this Department. I therefore suggest that you may care to discuss this with General Marshall and with Admiral Stark.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3735

If it is at all possible to design planes that are fast and highly maneuverable, we need not fear planes that are slow and not very maneuverable. However, we should not feel too secure in that attitude. There are certain advantages in the use of fast planes, and those are large enough to justify the expenditure of such resources as are available.

There would be warrant for urging upon the British the value of fast planes from Singapore even if it could not be expected that planes could be sent immediately from this country. We have been building substantial air forces in China, and every plane that we send there contributes substantially toward increasing the security of Singapore. In the light of the combined British, Dutch and American possessions of the past few months in the general area known as Southeast Asia, the likelihood of a Japanese attack upon Singapore or the Malay Peninsula has been greatly diminished. At this point the British might well move planes
please from Singapore into China and into Finland, with some arraignment for a recall of certain eventualities, without great risk so far as Singapore is concerned (but, of course, with substantial risk so far as Hong Kong is concerned).
The reply hereunder was handed by me to Sir Ronald Campbell this morning.

PA/H:SKH:BGT
PA/H—Dr. Hornbeck:

FE—Mr. Hamilton:

I concur entirely in the views set forth in the suggested memorandum to the British Embassy. I suggest that this be given to the Secretary to read and if he concurs, that Dr. Hornbeck ask Sir Ronald Campbell to come in, and hand him the reply as drafted.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

The joint committee have been the parties of the agreements or any formal orders to give, appoint, or substitute. Furthermore, in matters of and related regulations which are in the line of the same point and subject matter, these other means upon their own ends, application, which

An appeal to the Secretary of State, as well as the Chief, without being any to the evidence of the present present motion being in some statements.
Congressional investigations into Pearl Harbor by Senator Taft, Senator Schmidt, and Congressmen were conducted during the Senate Committee. These measures were a result of the recommendations of these congressmen and the necessity to prevent further repudiation or cession in the event of war.

Such desires of the present-day governments to move in unison to the foreign government suggests the need for full understanding and full cooperation. It is essential that the foreign government accept military instruction, question is raised whether a suggestion that the foreign government accept military instruction might not be interpreted by the Japanese government as contrary to the political accord between the Japanese government and the foreign government. This is in accordance with the Japanese government's position in the French Indo-Chinese border controversy, and can serve as a pretext to the Japanese government for the exertion of additional pressure upon Thailand.

With regard to the question of aircraft, information has been received that the American Naval and...
Mr. Atlee at Bangkok are under the impression
that there are to certain airplanes at Singapore in ex-
cess of the number which can, with the trained pilots
available there, be used to advantage. The suggestion
is offered that the British may wish to consider the
release to Thailand of a number of these planes. Would
that be not practicable, there is offered the further
suggestion that, if the British Government, after
weighing its own needs and the needs of Thailand and
taking into account all political and military factors,
should decide to make available to Thailand some planes
being supplied to it from this country a certain number
of planes, this Government would be agreeable to such
an arrangement.

With regard to the question of aviation gasoline
and lubricating oil for the Thai air force, this matter
is being looked into and we shall expect to make reply
on this point in the near future.

Department of State,

Washington,
Amlegation
Bangkok (Thailand).

Confidential
Department's 137, November 3, 10 p. m. and 141, November 6, 1941, 6 p. m. to you.

In connection with consideration which the Department is giving to the question of making available to Thailand certain supplies, the Department requests that you endeavor discreetly to obtain information in regard to specifications and quantities of aviation gasoline and aviation lubricating oil that might reasonably be made available to the Thai air force under present circumstances. In sending to the Department your report and any recommendation which you may feel in a position to make, you should bear in mind the circumstance that, because of great and increasing demands upon this country's production of high octane gasoline, careful disposition of available supplies is imperative.

(SKH) Hull.
WASHINGTON,

November 16, 1941

Mr. [Name]

The Department has given this matter the most serious consideration and has explored every possibility of making available to the Thai Ministry of Defense the desired antitank and anti-aircraft guns and ammunition. It is very much regretted, however, that it has been found impossible at this moment to spare any of these guns or ammunition, in view of the tremendous needs of our own defense program as well as the very urgent needs for such materials in other areas.

Sincerely yours,

[Hull]

Telegram Sent

[Enciphered by...]

[Signed by...]

[Date: 18/11/1941]
Amlegation
Bangkok
153.

Your 520, November 15, 2 p. m. and previous messages in regard to assistance for Thailand.

One. The Department has on several occasions informed the Thai Minister in regard to the policy of the United States of extending assistance to countries resisting aggression and has stated to him that in the event that Thailand should be invaded and should endeavor in good faith to defend itself, the United States Government would place Thailand in the same category as China.

The question of supplying planes to Thailand has been under active consideration by this Government and by the British Government. An officer of the British Embassy informed the Department November 18 that in view of the serious demands on British resources, the British Government was unable to supply any planes at the present time and that it was doubted whether bombing or fighting planes would be supplied from other sources, although inquiries were being made. The United States Government has also explored every possibility of supplying planes to Thailand, but it has been found impossible to spare any planes for Thailand at this moment in view of the tremendous demands of our own defense program as well as the urgent needs for planes by countries now actively resisting aggression.

The question of supplying aviation gasoline and aviation lubricating oil to Thailand (your telegram no. 518, November 14, 7 p. m.) has also been under active consideration by the United States and British Governments. In a recent instruction to the British Minister at Bangkok, the British Foreign Office stated that the British Government was prepared at once to furnish limited amounts of aviation gasoline sufficient for the current requirements of the Thai air force. The appropriate authorities of the United States Government are now endeavoring to arrange for the supply of aviation lubricating oil to Thailand, and the Department expects to telegraph you further in this regard to the near future.

Two. It may be stated for your information that the British Government has recently authorized the British Minister at Bangkok to offer to Thailand twelve field guns and twenty-four howitzers; if this offer is accepted, twelve howitzers would be released at once from Malaya. The British Minister has also been authorized to assure the Thai Prime Minister that in respect to general defense, the British Government is ready to furnish UNQUOTE unobtrusive advice UNQUOTE; for this purpose the British Minister has been authorized in his discretion to obtain the agreement of the Thai Government to the appointment of three additional assistant British military attachés to Thailand.

(HULL)

(DA)

FE: RLS: MBW FE PA/H DE EA/T A-A.
Mr. Hayter of the British Embassy informed Mr. Smyth during a call on November 22, 1941 that according to a recent telegram from the British Minister at Bangkok, Japanese members of the Thai-Indochina Boundary Commission are seeking for the use of some Thai airfields for "survey flights" and also for aviation gasoline from Thailand, presumably to be used in these flights. Mr. Hayter added that this information had been given to the British at Bangkok by the Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

The Ambassador expressed the hope that it might be possible to
provide the British with the use of some of the planes already
on hand in the United States, or that the planes in Singapore
might be made available to the Thai Government without publicity
by flying them in at night. The Ambassador said that the trouble
was that the British Government urgently needed all the airplanes
they could get from us for use in Singapore. I said that that
was the situation with respect to the United States since,

as the Ambassador said, we were building up as rapidly as
possible our air strength in the Philippines, and I had
been informed by both General Marshall and Admiral Stark
that the planes that we had in the Philippines are infinitely
more valuable to us there than they would be in Thailand.

The Ambassador then suggested on behalf of his Govern-
ment that the situation might be ameliorated by a credit
of 10,000,000 to Thailand by the United States. I said
that this matter would be given immediate consideration.
Radio Bulletin No. 280

NOTE: This digest has been compiled from press and other sources and is in no way an expression of official opinion.

WHITE HOUSE

Yugoslavia.—At his press conference this morning Secretary Early informed correspondents that information had reached this Government from several of its Intelligence Services to the effect that the Germans have decided to make a final assault on Belgrade. He said that the reason behind the German plans is that the Nazi Army believes Belgrade to be the base of operations for the Chetniks. He continued that according to declarations of high German officials the bombardment to which Belgrade has been subjected will be nothing to compare to what is now in store for the city, and that the Germans have decided to raise Belgrade, which will be surrounded by troops and exposed to bombardment by artillery and from the air. He added that the sources of this Government's information are convinced that the Germans have decided to carry this attack on in the same way as they have done previously with the city of Chabatz.

STATE DEPARTMENT

Press Conference.—A correspondent said that according to reports two American military observers have been captured in Libya by the Axis forces and inquired whether we had the right under international law to demand their return or whether they were to be regarded as legitimate prisoners of war. The Secretary said that he would first have to look at the law to be certain of his answer. In reply to an inquiry as to the position that would be taken with regard to the further report that some newspaper correspondents have been captured, the Secretary said that then he would certainly have to look at the law. Questioned whether we had received any request to intervene in or prevent the reported plans of the Germans to bombard Belgrade, Mr. Hull indicated that he had no knowledge of any request so far as concerned the bombardment itself but that if he should learn anything he would be glad to tell the correspondents.

Asked about the conversations with the Japanese envoys today, the Secretary pointed out that he did not think he would serve either the correspondents or the Government any good purpose by undertaking to go into those matters at this time. In reply to a question whether he was going to meet the envoys again today or tonight, he said that the matter was now receiving attention. A correspondent pointed out that an allegedly authoritative Tokyo despatch took a gloomy view of the discussions because of the continued conference with the so-called ABCD powers, on the ground that these discussions were regarded as a threat against Japan. Mr. Hull replied that, as he had stated, he thought that it would not be of any advantage to go into these matters at the present.

Asked for comment on the reported news item from Buenos Aires to the effect that Argentina was reluctant to accept a three-year embargo on Argentine sales of strategic materials to the Axis powers in return for our agreeing to purchase Argentine commodities, the Secretary said that all he could say offhand was that we had been having some conversations on those subjects but that he thought that, perhaps with one or two exceptions, the discussions had referred to a one-year period.

Requested to elaborate on intimations received by the press from Mexico City this morning that we may soon begin a series of general staff talks with the Mexican Army, the Secretary said that we would naturally have to look to the Army and Navy for accurate knowledge on this subject.

DEFENSE

Lend-Lease.—Lend-Lease Administrator Edward R. Stettinius on Monday announced that total lend-lease expenditures at the end of October were approximately 919 million dollars and that increases since then have brought the figure to more than a billion dollars. The announcement added that the steady increase in lend-lease aid is shown by the following monthly amounts in millions of dollars:
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Actual contracts have been let for more than 75 percent of the first seven billion dollar Lend-Lease Bill and 100 percent of the funds therein have been allocated. The new six billion dollar appropriation is being allocated rapidly. Since the beginning of the war, our exports to the British, including Lend-Lease aid, have amounted to approximately five and a quarter billion dollars, most of which was financed by the British with their own dollars. In October, exports to the British were the largest of any month since the war began.

Local Defense Councils.—Director La Guardia of the OCD has announced that a total of 5,935 local defense councils have been organized throughout the United States to employ 753,407 volunteers as air raid wardens, auxiliary police, auxiliary firemen, bomb squads, rescue squads, etc., plus 196,101 persons holding Red Cross certificates issued since June 1. He said that he was gratified at the increase in number of local defense councils but that their organization must move at an even greater rate if we are to be prepared to meet any emergency.

Defense Effort Comparison.—The OPM Bureau of Research and Statistics has issued a comparison of present industrial defense efforts with that of the U. S. during 1917 and 1918 which shows in part: (1) disbursements for industrial activity month by month are at a higher level today than in World War I; (2) due to lower price levels, the U. S. is probably getting more value for every dollar spent than in 1917 and 1918; (3) the productive capacity of each workman has greatly increased because of increased industrial efficiency through technical advances and billions of dollars of additional investment.

Maritime Commission.—In a summary of contracts and progress in their whole shipbuilding program, the Maritime Commission reported that, as of November first, there were 809 vessels for which contracts had been let. Deliveries to date have amounted to 118, keels for 261 have been laid and 146 vessels have been launched.

Light Draft Vessels.—President Roosevelt signed legislation on Monday authorizing the expenditure of $300,000,000 for construction or conversion of 400 ships to be used as light-draft vessels by the Navy for inshore and Naval base defense work.

Ferry Command.—As the Army Air Corps Ferrying Command passes the three million mile mark in safe delivery flights, they report that their pilots pick up planes at “reception points” i. e., factories, fly them to “installation points” where flight equipment for over-water flight is installed, and deliver them to such “transfer points” as Montreal and Miami where the planes are checked over before the transoceanic flyers of the R. A. F. Ferry Command take over. The ACFC has been so organized that it will also be able to handle the President’s 50,000 plane-a-year program and its operations can be changed as the theater of war changes. It is providing valuable training for pilots and crews in flying military aircraft under carefully prepared flight plans.

Ordnance.—Ordnance Department awards on Monday totalled $94,477,819. Largest item was the contract awarded to General Motors for armor-piercing projectiles, which amounted to $35,705,287. A total of $11,708,300 was awarded to three firms for the manufacture of anti-aircraft guns.

The Denver Small Arms Manufacturing Ordnance Works, where production started in September will be expanded with new buildings and machinery for the manufacture of a greater quantity of small arms, the War Department announced yesterday.

Quartermaster Corps.—The Quartermaster Corps of the War Department has concentrated its purchasing this month on clothing for the Army. A total of $76,384,471 has been spent for this equipment. Besides large orders for shoes, wool trousers, raincoats and miscellaneous items, the Quartermaster Corps has ordered 16,816,585 yards of cloth, mostly all-wool serge, to be made into clothing.

Military Attachés.—The War Department has announced the assignment of the following three officers as Assistant Military Attachés to the Legation at Cairo: Captain Paul M. Wickens, Captain William S. Moore, and Captain Guy E. Parker.

Aluminum Plants.—Federal Loan Administrator Jesse Jones has announced that upon recommendation of the OPM an aluminum plant costing $33,000,000, including power facilities, and having an annual capacity of 128,000,000 pounds of aluminum will be constructed at Lake Catherine, Arkansas, and will be operated by the Aluminum Company of America under a five-year lease.

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<th>Month</th>
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Concurrently he announced that an aluminum fabricating plant, costing approximately $22,000,000 and having an annual capacity of approximately 60,000,000 pounds of fabricated aluminum, will be constructed on a 115 acre tract of land at Fairview, Oregon, and will be operated by the Aluminum Company of America.

Defense Housing Priorities.—Acting FWA Administrator Eddy has announced priorities for building materials which will expedite the defense public works program now in the construction stage are being obtained for contractors from OPM. He said projects in the $150,000,000 community facilities program will receive priority ratings generally ranging from A-2 to A-8.

USHA Administrator Strauss reported the USHA is building defense homes at an average cost of $2,750. The Lanham Act sets a $3,500 limit on construction cost of such homes.

President Roosevelt asked Congress for $15,000,000 in supplemental funds for defense housing. The funds would be used to build 3,000 trailers, 4,400 dormitory units and 3,550 portable houses.

Labor Supply.—The Social Security Board reports that estimates of labor needs in selected defense industries show that approximately 475,000 workers were scheduled to be hired in 9,900 establishments in 26 defense industries during the six-months period September 1941—February 1942.

Aircraft and shipbuilding industries are expected to take on nearly 250,000 workers, expanding current employment 32 and 38 percent respectively. Employees in 6,400 iron and steel and nonelectrical machinery establishments estimated they would need more than 87,000 additional workers in the next six months. The estimates forecast a layoff of 59,000 workers in the automobile and automobile equipment industry with 20,800 new hires. The tire and inner tube industry also anticipated a net reduction in employment. The number of workers engaged in manufacture of industrial rubber goods will also decline somewhat by the end of next February, the Board said.

The Board also reported labor shortages are expected to develop prior to January 1, 1942, in 179 of 306 selected defense occupations. Shortages were already occurring in 146 of these categories in mid-September. Sufficient employment service registrants are available to meet all reported demands in the remaining 127 occupations, the Board said.

Navy Enlistments.—At a Navy Department press conference this morning Admiral Nimitz, Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, said that the Navy now needs 13,000 volunteers a month to keep pace with expansion under the two ocean Navy shipbuilding program, and that by next July 15,000 or more volunteers a month would probably be required.

Aircraft Merger.—The press today reported a prospective merger of Vultee Aircraft, Inc., of Downey, California, which has plants in Downey, Nashville, and Wayne, Michigan, with the Consolidated Aircraft Corporation, whose principal plant is in San Diego, California. It was pointed out that such a merger, if carried out, will unite two concerns which have defense orders totaling about $1,000,000,000 and are turning out every type of plane—from small commercial vehicles to large 4-motor, 28-ton bombers.

The press quotes Major Reuben H. Fleet, president of Consolidated, and Mr. Richard W. Millar, president of Vultee, in a joint statement issued yesterday in part as follows: "Of our own volition we have for some time been mutually exploring the business aspects of a possible future association. The facilities, products, proximity of location and experience of Consolidated and Vultee so complement each other as to make possible the more expedient completion of their defense assignments."

MISCELLANEOUS

Crude Oil Production.—According to the press crude oil production in the United States for the week ending November 22 shot upward to 4,300,000 barrels, establishing a new all time high record by a wide margin. The crude oil output has been increasing steadily since the beginning of this year on an average of about 3,500,000 barrels daily according to statistics of the U. S. Bureau of Mines. The Office of the Federal Oil Coordinator for National Defense has estimated that the demand might reach 4,500,000 barrels daily by next year.

Life Insurance.—According to the press the Prudential Life Insurance Company of America today announced that its reserve basis would be cut from three and one-fourth to two and one-half percent and that premiums on new ordinary life insurance policies would be increased about eight percent on January 1. This
action follows the lead of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company which last week announced a reduction of its reserve basis from three to two and three-fourths percent. Both companies attribute this move to lower yields on high-grade bonds.

Cost of Living.—Labor Secretary Perkins has reported that the cost of goods purchase by wage earners and lower-salaried workers in large cities increased 1.2 percent from mid-September to mid-October. “Advances in rents and in prices of food—clothing, automobiles, and certain house furnishings, resulted in an increase of about 1.0 percent,” she said, “and excise taxes levied by the Revenue Act of 1941 caused the further increase of about 0.2 percent.” Miss Perkins said the cost of goods index for October 15, 1941 was 109.4 compared with 100 as the 1935–39 average.

Construction Prospects.—The OPM Bureau of Research and Statistics has issued a survey which predicts the volume of all construction next year will be higher than any year between 1930 and 1940 despite an expected 65 percent reduction in non-defense building. Total defense building, the survey stated, is expected to reach $9,000,000,000 in January 1942; $12,000,000,000 by July 1942; and $15,000,000,000 during 1943.

Home Building.—The Federal Home Loan Bank Board has announced material and labor costs for a standard six-room house as of September 1941, increased 13.2 percent above costs for the same period for 1940. Building supply costs during the 12-month period rose 12.3 percent as compared with a 15.2 percent labor cost increase.

Washington Rental Rates.—Acting Commissioner Hinrichs, U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, has reported that rents were raised for approximately one-seventh of homes occupied by white tenants in Washington suburban areas during the 22-month period from October, 1939 to August, 1941. Most of the increases in the suburban counties of Alexandria, Arlington, Montgomery and Prince Georges occurred after October, 1940 and were attributed to the increasing number of Government employees brought to Washington by the expanding national defense program.

Radio.—Lloyd A. Free, Director of the FCC Foreign Broadcasting Monitoring Service, has announced the establishment in London of a listening post to report on European radio propaganda. The London office, Mr. Free said, will utilize the monitoring facilities of the BBC and will have a four or five-man force. The purpose of the office will be to (1) listen to and record propaganda broadcasts made by Governments of the European continent to their own people, and (2) sift from these broadcasts any information which might be of value to the United States.

According to the press the office would be essentially a part of the Intelligence Service of the Government which at present has in operation monitoring stations in Washington, Puerto Rico and Oregon, supplying information to about 19 Government agencies.

Coal Strike.—Dr. John Steelman, appointed by the President to represent the public on the three-man board to arbitrate the captive coal mine dispute, today convened the board at the Hotel Commodore in New York City.

Stock Market.—Volume of trading on Tuesday: 840,000 shares. Dow-Jones closing stock averages: Industrials—116.96; Railroads—28.10; Utilities—15.80.

Stocks turned down today in moderate trading. Curb stocks were mixed and Chicago stocks irregularly lower. In Chicago wheat closed off one-half to seven-eighths cents and corn was off one-fourth to five-eighths cents.

Japanese Discussions.—Following a conference this evening between the Secretary and Ambassadors and Nomura and Kuruks correspondents were informed by a State Department official that the Japanese representatives were handed for their consideration a document that was the culmination of conferences back and forth during recent weeks and that it was unnecessary to repeat what had been said so often in the past that it rests on certain basic principles with which the correspondents should be entirely familiar in the light of many repetitions.
Telegram Sent

Department of State

Washington, November 24, 1941

AMBASSADOR,

BANGKOK (THAILAND).

Your S22, November 22, 9 a.m.

One. The Department under date of November 22 telegraphically instructed our officers in the areas mentioned as follows:

QUOTE The Department desires that the American diplomatic and consular officers concerned call to the attention of American citizens in the Japanese Empire, Japanese-occupied areas of China, Hong Kong, Macao, and French Indochina the advice previously given in regard to withdrawal and in so doing emphasize that the shipping problem in the Pacific is very difficult and that because of urgent demands elsewhere there is no assurance that it will be possible to retain in the Pacific even the present facilities. UNQUOTE.

Two. The Department believes that it would be inappropriate at this time for you to acquaint American citizens of the categories mentioned now in Thailand.
with the nature of the renewed suggestions in regard to withdrawal as contained in the above quoted instruction.

[Signature]

NOV 27 1941

Enveloped by __________________________

Sent by operator ____________________ M. 19
The Thai Minister called upon his own initiative. He said that sometime ago Mr. Hamilton had told him that when he had any question to ask in regard to matters affecting Thailand he should not hesitate to call and ask questions which he had in mind. Mr. Hamilton said that he was taking advantage of Mr. Hamilton's kindness this morning.

Mr. Smyth and Mr. Adams told the Thai Minister that Mr. Hamilton was in conference and regretted that he himself could not talk with the Thai Minister.

The Thai Minister asked whether the following two-sentence note, which appeared in The New York Times, was accurate:
accurate:

"The State Department said:

'The Japanese representatives were handed for their consideration a document that is the culmination of conferences back and forth during recent weeks. It is unnecessary to repeat what has been said so often in the past that it rests on certain basic principles with which the correspondents should be entirely familiar in the light of many repetitions.'"

Mr. Adams replied that he understood that the statement was substantially accurate. The Thai Minister asked whether the last sentence might be interpreted to mean that the United States insisted that the Japanese evacuate both French Indochina and China.

Mr. Adams replied that he had no information or authority which would enable him to be specific in his reply to the Thai Minister's question. Mr. Adams said, however, that the President and the Secretary of State had on many occasions outlined the attitude of this Government toward acquisition of territory by force. Mr. Adams said that there had been no change in this Government's attitude in that respect.

The Thai Minister thanked Mr. Smyth and Mr. Adams for the information which they had given him. He added that naturally his Government was vitally interested in the subject matter of the statement and he wished to keep his Government
Government informed.
Radio Bulletin No. 282

Department of State,
Division of Current Information,
November 28, 1941.

Note: This digest has been compiled from press and other sources and is in no way an expression of official opinion.

White House

Merchant Ship Arming.—The White House today made the following announcement:

"American merchant vessels sailing on routes between the United States and ports and ports of Spain, Portugal and their adjacent island possessions will not be armed. "American merchant vessels sailing in the inter-American trade between ports of the United States and ports in Central and South America will not be armed. "American merchant vessels sailing on routes in the Pacific Ocean will not be armed under existing circumstances. "Public announcement will be made of any change of policy affecting any of these routes."

Press Conference.—The President informed correspondents that he planned to depart from Washington at 3:00 p.m. today for Warm Springs, Georgia, on a vacation that had twice been postponed, and that while he did not know when he would return, he hoped that it need not be before December 2, adding that he might have to return because of existing conditions in the Pacific. Asked how long he expected these conditions to exist, the President referred the correspondent to Tokyo and not Washington. A correspondent inquired whether the President could comment on further developments concerning the Japanese situation and the President indicated that while not able to do so, no reply had been received to Secretary Hull's note (see Radio Bulletin No. 279 of November 26), but that talks had not broken down. He added that the American policy continued to be one of infinite patience.

A correspondent asked what the Administration's policy was with regard to legal and lobbying activities on the part of former public officials, particularly in the matter of construction projects in connection with the defense program. The President said that he had discussed this with the Attorney General and that they were in favor of legislation which would prevent such activities on the part of persons having previously held responsible Government positions. He pointed out that in the past certain Government departments had prohibited such activities within a two-year period of holding public office.

A correspondent mentioned a report that the people of Puerto Rico were apprehensive over the outcome of an economic survey to take place regarding countries in the Caribbean area because the so-called "plan" would prejudicially affect their country. The President replied that there was nothing in that story as presented by the correspondent. He said that a study was under consideration in which Puerto Rico would take part as well as other places in that area. He added that he did not see how the Puerto Ricans could worry about a study that has not yet begun and in which they would participate. Asked whether there was any possibility of Joint Anglo-American consideration of certain problems involved, the President said that that might be possible.

The President was asked if he had any information concerning the attitude of the independent steel companies with regard to the three-man arbitration board appointed by the President in the captive mine dispute and he replied that he knew nothing other than what had appeared in the press on the subject.

State Department

Finland. In response to inquiries as to developments in the Finnish situation, the Secretary of State today stated that the Finnish note had been given careful consideration but that it had thrown no light upon the question uppermost in the mind of this Government, that is, how far and to what extent the Finnish military policy is one of combined operations of the Germans and Finns vitally to injure Great Britain and her associates and to threaten the northern supply lines over which Russia is now receiving supplies and assistance from Great Britain and the United States to aid Russia in resisting the Hitler forces of invasion and conquest, and to what extent that Finnish policy is a menace to all America's aims for self-defense. The recent journey of the Finnish Foreign Minister to Berlin to join with Hitler's puppet governments over Europe in sign-
ing the “anti-Comintern Pact” used by Hitler solely as an instrument to wage a war of conquest and domination against free peoples, is highly significant and cannot be camouflaged or explained away by propaganda attacks on nations engaged in defending themselves.

The Secretary went on to say that the Department was giving careful attention to all the reports and information which might furnish a definite answer to this question. The concern of this Government, which has been emphasized by the studies made by the War Department and the statement of the Secretary of War on November 25, as to Finnish policy in this regard, has been made abundantly clear to the Finnish Government, the Secretary said.

The Secretary concluded by saying that every act of the Finnish Government since the delivery of its note has confirmed our apprehensions that it is fully cooperating with the Hitler forces.

CONGRESS

Anti-strike Legislation.—As movements continued within the House Rules, Labor and Naval Affairs Committees for various types of legislation designed to curb strikes in defense industries, the Senate Judiciary Committee today approved the bill sponsored by Senator Connally, the principal feature of which would permit seizure and operation of strike-bound defense plants (see Radio Bulletin No. 277 of November 22).

Concurrently the House Labor Committee today voted favorably on the Ramspeck bill which is described by the press as foremost among the various House proposals which have received the backing of Administration leaders and is regarded as a compromise of various proposals. According to the press, the bill at present embodies the substance of various proposals made including a strengthening by statute of the powers of the National Defense Mediation Board; a “cooling off” period before strikes could become operative; compulsory arbitration under Presidential discretion; and, as a last resort, Government seizure and operation of strike-bound plants. The press says that proponents of the bill regard it as a “reasonable measure” and thus likely to receive Presidential support, notwithstanding the anticipated opposition of the AFL as well as the CIO. President Green of the former yesterday was reported to have stated that no need existed for any such legislation in so far as concerns the AFL as it has allegedly supported no strikes of serious magnitude in defense industries. The CIO is said to oppose all anti-strike measures generally as of a “repressive” nature.

According to the press, representatives of management for the most part are in support of legislation of the type under consideration, with the exception of compulsory arbitration, which was yesterday denounced by the National Association of Manufacturers.

DEFENSE

Explosives.—The War Department today announced that production of Tri-Nitro-Toluene (TNT), the Army’s most important high explosive, has increased 111 percent in the first three weeks of November at the two Government-owned plants now in operation. TNT is used alone or mixed with ammonium nitrate as a bursting charge for high explosive shells and bombs.

Army Construction.—Brig. Gen. Somervell, former Chief of Army Construction Division, now Assistant Chief of Staff, speaking at the annual meeting of the Washington Society of Civil Engineers, said “a blitzkrieg of building” during the first 15 months of the $3,500,000,000 emergency building program has put the program “on schedule and we intend to keep it there”. To date, he said, “prompt and superior” shelters and training quarters have been provided for 1,500,000 troops and “two-score” munitions plants have been erected “from the ground up,” many of them months ahead of schedule. The construction effort, “the greatest ever undertaken in this Nation,” is not “puncheon-proof or perfect”. Mistakes have been made “but they have been frankly admitted and promptly rectified,” Gen. Somervell said.

Stimson.—War Secretary Stimson said at his press conference yesterday that optimistic press reports on performance of American equipment used by the British in Egypt and Libya had been borne out by meagre despatches from our military observers, but that “The whole campaign is still in a state of flux, and it will be some time before we have the whole story. So far as it has gone, our equipment has been satisfactory, and the press has not overemphasized our tanks.” He said that the Army “has shown really wonderful progress, and I
think along the right lines," in the current maneuvers in Carolina, and that the Army's goal is to develop hard-hitting combat units, whether armored or infantry, adding that this meant an "application all along the line of that principle which the Germans showed only in their panzer divisions." He pointed out that for the past year the Army has been concentrating on developing new self-propelled guns and other anti-tank weapons as the answer to the armored division and that progress is being made.

**Tanks.**—Following the reported wide interest shown in the performance of U. S.-built tanks in Libya, the War Department has announced that plans for the construction of new facilities or the expansion of existing facilities for the production of rivetless armor casting for tanks have resulted in commitments through the Defense Plant Corp. of sums totalling $53,500,000. Major General Wesson, Chief of Ordnance, yesterday said that production plans have for some time contemplated the complete elimination of the riveted type of construction on all combat vehicles. Cast steel hulls are now being made in considerable quantities for the medium tank and a minimum of 30 percent of future production will have the cast steel hull. The balance will be of welded construction. He went on to say that no reports from Libya criticizing the M-3 tanks, which are riveted, had been received and no orders have been issued cancelling the production of these tanks. However, the development of the cast armor plate and the use of welding puts the American tank far in advance of any known tanks. Such tanks are already in production and when the new facilities are completed, the entire output will be rivetless.

**Right Strips.**—The Army Air Force has announced that it will cooperate with the Bureau of Public Roads in expediting the projected $10,000,000 chain of "right strips" along public highways for landing fields in connection with the defense program. The Department said the strips are urgently needed in the Northeast, the Appalachian mountains, and Northwestern regions of the United States.

**Glider School.**—The War Department has announced that a new glider training school for officers of the Army Air Forces will open at 29-Palms, Calif., about January 1. The school will have an initial class of 12 students, the Department said, but will ultimately train 24 pilots every four weeks until a total of 126 students have been trained. The 29-Palms school is the third Army gliding school, the others being located at Lockport, Ill., and Elmira, N. Y.

**Merchant Ship Arming.**—Secretary Knox stated in a press conference on Wednesday that the Bureau of Navigation has been training gun crews since April 15, 1941, but that the program was not designed originally for providing armed guards on merchant vessels. Beginning October 15, he said, special schools were established and training was designed specifically for duty on armed merchantmen. He continued: "The results of the training program are highly satisfactory and trained crews are now available in any size to fit the armament of merchant ships as fast as they are armed." For administrative purposes, he said, two armed guard centers have been established, one each on the East and West coasts, which will serve as pools to receive the output of the training schools and will continue to train men, assign them to vessels and handle replacements.

**Defense Plant Corporation.**—The largest Defense Plant Corporation agreement made to date has just been signed with the Columbia Steel Corporation, to construct facilities for the production of pig iron, steel, and steel plates, near Provo, Utah. The cost is estimated at $91,000,000 and brings to $250,000,000 the amounts obtained by U. S. Steel for its affiliates in the 10,000,000-ton steel expansion program. Altogether, Defense Plant Corporation has invested $391,039,000 in the expansion of the steel industry.

**MISCELLANEOUS**

**Treasury Bonds.**—Treasury Secretary Morgenthau yesterday announced that the Treasury expects to borrow $1,000,000,000 or more in another "major financial operation" next week, and "barring unforeseen developments in the international situation," the Treasury would issue new bonds, but that no refunding would be included in next week's operation.

The Treasury also announced it will issue refunding bonds in January to retire more than $700,000,000 of Government obligations maturing early in 1942. In addition, the Treasury said, $339,000,000 in Farm Mortgage Corporation bonds will be refunded if the Corporation's Board approves.

**Taxation.**—Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Sullivan yesterday told a press conference that the Treasury does not plan to ask for any further increased taxes
on incomes earned during 1941 and that it does not intend to suggest to Congress any increases in the capital gain and loss tax that would apply to financial transactions made in 1941. The Treasury, however, is continuing work on new levies that would apply to 1942 earnings, he said.

Chairman Eccles of the Federal Reserve Board, speaking in New York City, said, "By the middle of next year defense expenditures will probably be running at an annual rate of somewhat more than 15 billion dollars above the middle of the current year. The conclusion is inescapable . . . that additional taxation must be imposed and further restraints applied . . ." He said he hoped "further taxation . . . will first tap the corporate excess profits and the middle and upper individual income brackets and close numerous conspicuous loopholes in the corporation, individual income, inheritance and gift tax structures . . ."

Public Works.—Acting FWA Administrator Edy has announced that prospectuses from which will be built the national shelf of post-defense public works and service projects are being received in the Public Work Reserve Washington office. The prospectuses list and describe public works and services proposed by State, municipal and other Governmental subdivisions for inclusion in the Reserve on which preliminary studies indicate that between 25 and 30 billion dollars may be expended over a six-year period.

Football Standings.—In what the press referred to as an up-set, the University of Texas football team yesterday defeated Texas A. and M. by a score of 23-0. Both teams were included in a sports writers’ poll held on November 25 listing the country’s ten leading teams in the following order: Minnesota, Texas A. and M., Duke, Notre Dame, Duquesne, Michigan, Missouri, Fordham, Northwestern, Texas. The same poll listed the second ten teams: Navy, Vanderbilt, Penn, Mississippi, Ohio State, Clemson, Oregon State, Alabama, Harvard, Georgia.

Army-Navy Game.—The Army-Navy game to be played tomorrow at Philadelphia at 1:15 p.m., E. S. T. will be broadcast by short-wave for foreign reception over the following stations to Europe and Latin America: WNBI, New York, 15,150 kilocycles or 19.8 meters; WRCA, New York, 17,780 kilocycles or 16.8 meters; WBOS, Boston, 11,870 kilocycles or 25.26 meters; WGFA, Schenectady, 15,330 kilocycles or 19.56 meters. To Orient: KGFI, San Francisco, 9,670 kilocycles or 31.02 meters.

Stock Market.—Volume of trading on Thursday: 810,000 shares. Dow-Jones closing stock averages: Industrials—115.64; Railroads—27.33; Utilities—15.69.

Stocks today reached new lows since June 1940 in moderate trading. Curb stocks were irregularly lower and Chicago stocks lower. In Chicago wheat closed approximately unchanged and corn was up one-fourth to one-half a cent.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Date: November 28, 1941.

Subject: Aid to Thailand.

Participants: Mom Rajawongse Seni Pramoj, Thai Minister, Mr. Hamilton, Mr. Smyth.

Copies to:

The Thai Minister called on his own initiative on Mr. Hamilton on November 28. He referred to recent newspaper reports in regard to increased Japanese troop movements to Indochina and stated that he was apprehensive that a Japanese attack on Thailand was imminent. He expressed the opinion that of the several possible areas in which the Japanese might attack, Thailand appeared to be the most logical; he commented that a Japanese attack on Siberia would bring Soviet air attacks on Japan, an attack from Indochina against the Burma Road would have to go through very difficult terrain, while an attack on Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies would be met by strong opposing forces. He said that the situation of Thailand was very different from that of China where the great extent of the country had permitted the Chinese to withdraw far into the interior in the face of Japanese attack. Thailand, however, was a very small country and retreat into the interior was not possible.

He continued in substance as follows: A Japanese attack on Thailand would probably be carried out by a drive of land forces through Cambodia, and by a simultaneous Japanese naval attack in the Gulf of Siam which would meet with
only feeble resistance from the few small gunboats constituting the Thai navy. The Cambodian area is chiefly jungle, but one good paved road cuts through it: Japanese mechanized forces could proceed along that road. Conscription for military service exists in Thailand, but while the army includes some 200,000 men, only about 40,000 are properly trained and equipped. A part of the Thai army, including most of the small mechanized force, is now stationed in the area ceded to Thailand by Indochina in May, 1941. During the dry season, mechanized forces can operate without difficulty through the plains of Thailand where Bangkok is located; Bangkok is the nerve center of Thailand and its occupation by an invader would practically put a stop to resistance. Thailand has only one first-class airport (at Bangkok) where heavy bombers can operate; there are two or three other small air fields in Thailand but these can accommodate only small planes, such as fighters. The capture of the Bangkok area would cut off the transportation route for relief supplies coming by railroad over the narrow peninsula from Malaya and there would remain only a few rough roads over the mountains into Burma which could not be used except in the dry season.

The Minister stated that in the event of a Japanese attack, Thailand would resist with all its forces. He expressed the hope that the United States could now supply a number of airplanes to Thailand, as this would have a very important effect on Thai morale and would "raise their spirits" immensely. Referring to statements made to him by the Department that, in case of attack on Thailand by an aggressor, the United States would place Thailand in the same category as China and would offer assistance, he suggested that immediate consideration be given to the problem of making such supplies available in Thailand, and suggested in particular that the question of transportation of supplies to the Thai military forces be carefully studied and plans made so that supplies could go forward without delay in the event that hostilities occur. Mr. Hamilton informed the Minister that this matter would promptly be brought to the attention of the appropriate authorities of this Government.

In discussing the general situation, the Minister remarked that Thailand has a non-aggression pact with Great Britain in which Great Britain promises to respect the territorial integrity of Thailand, but that this is not the case in Thailand's treaty with Japan; Japan merely promises to promote cordial relations, exchange information, and cooperate in economic matters. This fact, he commented, increased his apprehension in regard to a Japanese attack on Thailand.

FE: Smyth: NHS
WASHINGTON.

November 29, 11 p.m.

In a radio broadcast November 28, 9 p.m., the Prime Minister urged the people to be ready but to prepare to fight if war becomes inevitable. He stated that Great Britain and the United States had promised not to attack Thailand and that the Jap ambassador had announced that Japanese troops in Indochina are not intended for an attack on this country in any circumstances.

PECC
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation
DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

DATE: November 29, 1941.

SUBJECT: Thailand's treaties with Great Britain and Japan.

PARTICIPANTS: The Thai Minister and Mr. Smyth

COPIES TO: Secretary of St.

The Thai Minister telephoned Mr. Smyth on November 29, 1941, and, referring to his conversation with Mr. Hamilton on November 28, said that he would like to make clear a point wherein Thailand's treaty with Great Britain differs from her treaty with Japan.

He stated that Article I of the Anglo-Thai Pact of Non-aggression of June 12, 1940, reads as follows:

"Each high contracting party undertakes not to resort in any case either to war or to any act of violence or of aggression against the other, either alone or in concert with one or more than one third power and to respect the territorial integrity of the other high contracting party."

He then said that Article I of the "Treaty between Thailand and Japan concerning the Continuance of Friendly
Friendly Relations and Mutual Respect of Each Other's Territorial Integrity" of June 12, 1940, reads as follows:

"The high contracting parties shall mutually respect each other's territorial integrity and hereby reaffirm the constant peace and perpetual friendship existing between them."

The Minister pointed out that a non-aggression clause is found in the British treaty but not in the Japanese treaty.
Subject: Aid to Thailand.
Participants: Mom Rajawongse Seni Pramoj, Thai Minister, Lieutenant Colonel Mon Luang Kharb Kunjara, Thai Military and Air Attaché, Mr. Adams, Mr. Smyth.

Copies to:

The Thai Minister called on his own initiative, accompanied by his Military Attaché, Colonel Kunjara, on Mr. Adams and Mr. Smyth December 1, 1941. The Minister said that he had brought Colonel Kunjara along in order to explain the general military situation.

Colonel Kunjara said that according to his latest information the Japanese have approximately 150,000 troops in Indochina, about equally divided between northern and southern Indochina. He expressed the conviction that the real objective of any Japanese attack from Indochina would be the Burma Road, and he felt that it would be far easier for the Japanese to reach the Burma Road by going through Thailand than by attacking from northern Indochina through the difficult mountain country of Yunnan. He said that the Japanese could attack from southern Indochina into Thailand, using mechanized equipment, and then proceed north along the railroad from Bangkok; just south of Chiangmai a paved motor road branches off from the railroad and the Japanese could go north along this road to the Thai-Burma border and/or the Thai Indochina border. He believed that the Japanese would then probably cut through a corner of Burma toward the Burma Road. He pointed out that the pass through the mountains of northern Thailand would be far less difficult to cross from a military viewpoint than would be the passes which would have to be crossed by an army attacking from northern Indochina. For this reason he was extremely apprehensive that the Japanese intended shortly to launch an attack against Thailand from southern Indochina.

Colonel Kunjara gave the following information in regard to the Thai military and naval forces; the total strength of the Thai army is about 200,000 but only 40,000 are well-equipped and trained. The Thai air force possesses about 200 combat planes, of which 108 are pursuit planes (slower than current Japanese pursuits), 30 bombing planes and the balance observation and general service planes. There are about three pilots for every plane. The Thai artillery includes 15 regiments of field artillery (12 guns to a regiment) and one regiment of medium artillery. The mechanized equipment includes 80 tanks (all eight tons or under), several hundred trucks, and one platoon of armored cars. The Thai navy is composed of the following vessels: two heavy gunboats (2400 tons), two light gunboats (1200 tons), two sloops, nine first-class torpedo boats, five submarines, five smaller torpedo boats, twelve mosquito boats, and 36 naval planes. The naval personnel amounts to about 6,000 men.

Colonel Kunjara expressed the belief that a Japanese attack against Thailand would be carried out by a land attack through Cambodia and by a simultaneous naval attack; he believed that one Japanese naval force would attack along the coast in the region of Bangkok, while a second force would attempt to land men along the Kra peninsula in order to cut railroad communications with Malaya.

Colonel Kunjara said that the military equipment now most urgently needed by Thailand was heavy artillery, bombmg planes and pursuit planes. The Minister expressed the hope that means could be found to make this equipment available immediately in order that Thailand might be better able to resist aggression by Japan.

Mr. Adams informed the Minister that the information given by Colonel Kunjara and the request of the Minister would promptly be brought to the attention of the appropriate authorities of this Government.
REFERENCE your 536, November 27, 1 p.m., paragraph three.

As you know the Department has been carrying on for some months with the Japanese Ambassador here informal and exploratory conversations in an effort to determine whether there may be found a sound basis for the undertaking of negotiations looking to a comprehensive and [general] settlement covering the entire Pacific area. Those conversations are still continuing.

In Radio Bulletin no. 280, November 26, it was reported that the Secretary gave the Japanese representatives for their consideration a document based upon certain fundamental principles which are well-known as the principles upon which the American people and Government believe relations between nations should be based. In Radio Bulletin no. 282, November 28, it is reported that the President at his press conference on that date informed the correspondents that the talks with the Japanese had not broken down and that the American policy remained one of great patience.
Bearing in mind your request for information regarding the talks with the Japanese which might have possible effect upon the situation in Thailand, the Department would expect to inform you promptly of any information in this regard which might be of especial interest to you.
THE LEGATION,
BANGKOK,

The following telegram sent to the American Consulate at Singapore is repeated for your information:

(Telegraph Section: Here insert text of attached telegram to Singapore.)

You are authorized in your discretion to inform the appropriate Thai authorities of the foregoing.

Hull

D.S.

DEC 2 1941
In accordance with the wishes of the Minister to facilitate the supply to Thailand of certain quantities of aviation fuel, aviation grades of lubricating oils. The description of the request was transmitted to this Government and representatives here of the Netherlands Government will be able to respond. The shipment of these planes may require several days, and we, while we wish to facilitate the immediate delivery of small quantities of appropriate grades of aviation lubricating oils to Thailand. We understand from the Standard Vacuum Oil Company in New York that it will be possible for them to send by first boat approximately 18 tons of aviation grade lubricating oils from their own stocks at Singapore. While they will make their own arrangements with the Thai Government for the purchase of this material, we request that you communicate with the local representative of this oil company and render all assistance possible to expedite this delivery. It is requested

Enclosed by

Sent by operator ________ M. ________ P. ________
Mr. In a conversation I have had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs he referred to the seemingly mild attitude of the Japanser toward the Thai Government lately but said that the Thai Government thoroughly understood what Japan was planning against this country and definitely would resist Japan. I said I would be glad to telegraph this to my government. He referred appreciatively to the information received through the Minister in Washington that the United States would place Thailand in the same category as China in case of resistance to invasion.

Two, The Prime Minister was very disappointed at the meagerness of the assistance promised by the British Government in reply to his inquiry made about October 15. It is my opinion that the Government, however, as a whole and the Thai people are confidentially expecting that if the nation resists Japanese invasion it will receive immediate (e) from Great Britain and the United States.

[Signature]

PECK

(e) Apparent omission
This telegram was received closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C) Rec'd. 4 p.m.

FROM
Secretary of State,
Washington.

547, December 3, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

The Thais are well aware that these two nations are opposing Japanese aggression even at the risk of war and naturally infer that their own efforts will receive British and American support. See the Legation's telegram 564, November 26, 11 p.m.

paragraph no. 3, quoting two popular radio commentators as saying that Thailand will have friends to come to her assistance.

Thrace. If Japan invades this country and no aid as described is provided there is bound to be popular resentment against our two nations and possibly our citizens. This will be fomented by the Japanese and some Thais. I earnestly suggest that the British and American Governments as soon as possible inform the Thai Government what immediate and long term assistance it can expect against invasion.

FEOK
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

EJ  Bangkok
This telegram must be closely paraphrased Dated December 3, 1941
for it being communicated to anyone, (C) Rec'd 2:58 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

547, December 3, 5 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

This will enable the government to plan for the future intelligently either for resistance to the last extremity in the hope of ultimate victory through supporting British and American action or for a truce while awaiting a later settlement. Preliminary advice will also do much to avert a revolution of feeling if American and British aid is not speedily forthcoming. The Thai have confidence in Britain and the United States in spite of refusal to supply them with military equipment and I feel that it would be fair to inform them of our intentions with reference to their situation as soon as those intentions can be communicated.

My British colleague is telegraphing along the same general line.

(END OF MESSAGE).

FECK
In his letter of March 4, 1943, to the Secretary of War, Mr. Stimson said that the Japanese government will use their military resources to the utmost but that the United States will not find it necessary to use similar intensity and will not be concerned with any country in addition to Thailand's. He recalled American and British statements of last August, when he referred to in paragraph two of the Legation's note, November 9, 5 p.m., that the Thai Government believed a new and even stronger statement would accomplish two results—it could deter the Japanese from the invasion on which they are determined, and it could strengthen the will to resist of a Thai position.
FECK
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

Bangkok

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

Dated December 5, 1941

FROM

Secretary of State,
Washington.

551, December 5, 3 p.m.

During a call on the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning in reference to gasoline supplies he informed me that the Japanese Ambassador had just called and informed him that the Japanese forces in Indochina definitely would not be used to invade Thai and that they were concentrated for use against the Burma Road. Consequently Thailand need feel no anxiety. The Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me that his Government, in spite of Japanese assurances, is nevertheless greatly worried because it has received additional evidence that an attack by land and air is imminent. He was unwilling to tell the nature of the evidence but said he had asked the British Minister to call in order to clear up the recent M. British collection received no (prompt no) evidence of this sort recently so far as I am aware. The

Foreign
-2-  #551, December 3, 3 p.m. from Bangkok.

Foreign Minister inquired anxiously whether I had reported to the American Government the hope of the Thai Government that public statements would be issued by Great Britain and the United States promising to stand by Thailand if invaded by Japan (see Legation's 550, December 4, 3 p.m.).
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (a)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

Chungking via N. R.,

FROM:

DEOEB 6, 1941
Rec'd 11 am.

477, December 6, noon.

The Chief of the Information Department of the Foreign Office informed a member of my staff yesterday that the British "wanted to move into Thailand but hesitated to do so in the absence of a clear indication of the American attitude. He said that this report came from a very reliable source in the United States. I attach no significance to the report except as indicative of an interesting and somewhat prevalent tendency to play up the situation.

GAUSS

REG
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

TELEGRAM SENT

Department of State

Washington,

December 6, 1941

TO

AMERICAN LEGATION,

BANGKOK, (THAILAND).

Rush

Your telegram, December 4, 2 p.m.

You may assure Thai authorities that extension of a credit to Thailand for current needs is fully agreed to in principle, and that Department expects no delay in working out details with the appropriate lending agency of this Government.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

FD:FL:ME

Enciphered by

Sent by operator

9251 236

892.51/238
During a call on Mr. Atcheson this morning Mr. Hayter, in response to an inquiry whether there was any news, stated, after some hesitation, that the British Minister in Thailand had sent a message to the Foreign Office which began "For God's sake" and which was endorsed by the Thai foreign Minister requesting that British armed forces not move into Thailand.
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM: Gray
BANGKOK

Dated December 7, 1941
Rec'd 4 a.m., 8th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

555, December 7, 8 a.m.

The correspondents have been officially informed that the Japanese attacked Thailand at various places on the land and sea frontiers at 2 a.m., December 8, and that Thai forces resisted. The Government ordered cease firing 7:30 a.m., and negotiations are taking place. Bangkok is quiet. American citizens will concentrate in the Legation in case of disorders.

PECK

HM

DEC 1 1 1941
SPECIAL DIVISION
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

PS/ATB
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

From (c)

Christmas Island, 15th December 8, 1941

SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

117, December 9, 8 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

The Minister for Foreign Affairs summoned me and other diplomatic representatives in succession this afternoon. His remarks to me were the same as those of the British Minister. The gist follows:

The Emperor informed me with sincere grief that his Government had yielded to overwhelming Japanese forces and at D'Annunzio today had signed an agreement permitting passage of Japanese troops through Thailand by way of Bangkok in order to attack Burma and Malaya. In return Japan guaranteed the sovereignty independence and honor of the country.

There was an assurance that the country would not be partitioned. The Japanese offered to include restoration of all lost territory but the Thai Government refused because it wished the world to know that it only yielded to force and not for gain. I inquired how this arrangement

Peck
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

This telegram must be clearly & promptly transmitted & communicated to responsible authorities.

Bangkok

FROM

Dated: December 8, 1941

Recl'd: 2:43 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY,

887, December 8, 5 p.m. (SECTION TWO)

affected the status of the American Legation and
American citizens and the Foreign Minister replied
that these points were not discussed and that since
Thailand remained independent he believed that
American status was not involved. He volunteered
that in reply to a question from the British Minister
he had assured the latter that if British forces as
well entered this country to oppose Japan they
would not be opposed.

(The Prime Minister confirmed this over the
telephone to the British Minister)

Three. Events leading up to this agreement were
as follows. At 11 o'clock night of December 7 the
Japanese Ambassador and staff called on the Minister
for Foreign Affairs but the latter was absent near the
frontier at Aranya. The Japanese were finally received
by the
-3- 557, December 8, 5 p.m. (SECTION T?O) from Bangkok.

by the Foreign Minister and the latter was told that Japan was fighting for its life with Great Britain and the United States and intended to make wide spread attacks on their territory at 1 o'clock in the morning of December 8,

PECK

JRL
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM Bangkok

Dated December 8, 1941
Rec'd 2:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

557, December 8, 5 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

Part of these attacks would be made through Thailand and Japan demanded that passage of troops be allowed. Japan offered this country certain choices (one) to join Japan in the war against the United States and Great Britain in return for which Japan would not only guarantee the sovereignty, independence and honor of the country but would restore all territories lost previously to foreign powers; (two) Thailand could join the three power pact and permit passage of troops in which modified proposal there would be no promise of restoration of territory. The Thais refused to join the pact and the final agreement has been described. The Thai representatives said that in the absence of the Prime Minister who is Commander-in-Chief only (repeal no) reply could be given and no orders could be
-2-857, December 3, 5 p.m. (SECTION THREE) from Bangkok.

could be given and no orders could be issued to the

REG

JML
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

From Bangkok

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

357, December 8, 5 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

Thai troops; they asked therefore that the forcible attempt to enter Thailand at one o'clock should be at least deferred. The Japanese realized that no change would be made in the planned attack.

Fighting occurred during the night and this morning at Songora, Pattani and Prachuab on the southern coast and at Vatana and Arany on the Eastern frontier. The Thais lost possibly a battalion of troops at Pattani.

The Foreign Minister was deeply grieved; he recalled the efforts made by his (?) to (?) arms (?) and he expressed gratitude for the friendliness shown by the United States. He said that the hearts of the Thai were with the United States and Great Britain and I

PEGX

L'13

(*). apparent omission
TELEGRAM RECEIVED

BANGKOK

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (C)

FROM

Dated December 8, 1941

REC'D 4:52 P.M.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

557, December 8, 5 p.m. (SECTION FIVE)

could not but admit the sincerity of this country's effort to resist Japan and the overwhelming force to which it finally yielded.

It is the intention of the British Minister and myself to continue our duties normally so far as we can. It is almost impossible for our nationals under existing circumstances to leave and they have been offered quarters in the Legation if they wish.

The Legation telegraphed American citizens in northern Thailand advising them to consider leaving for Burma. The city seems as peaceful as usual.

(END OF MESSAGE)

PECK

L'43
### EXHIBIT NO. 170

(Note.—Documents contained in this Exhibit were obtained from files regarding Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short in the War Dept. and are supplemental to those documents appearing in Joint Committee Exhibit No. 140)

#### Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Documents Relating to Relief of Gen. Short from Command and His Subsequent Retirement (Page 3794)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dec. 18, 1941</td>
<td>Message to War Dept. reflecting the relief of Gen. Short by Gen. Emmons as commander of Hawaiian Dept.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 12, 1942</td>
<td>Message reporting departure of Gen. Short and others from Hawaii for mainland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 12, 1942</td>
<td>Message reporting arrival of Gen. Short and others at San Francisco.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jan. 13, 1942</td>
<td>Telegraphic orders to Gen. Short to proceed to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma for temporary duty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Handwritten memo by H. L. S. (Sec'y Stimson) re Gen. Short case.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 17, 1942</td>
<td>Memo for file by Col. Ostrander re actions taken with reference to handling Gen. Short's retirement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 17, 1942</td>
<td>Letter to Gen. Short accepting his retirement effective 2-28-42.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 18, 1942</td>
<td>Receipt from Gen. Short of retirement papers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 19, 1942</td>
<td>Notes from Col. Ostrander and others re handling of press release on Gen. Short's retirement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 14, 1942</td>
<td>Copy of letter from Sec'y Stimson to Sec'y Knox suggesting wording of saving clause in acceptance of retirement of Gen. Short and Adm. Kimmel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 25, 1942</td>
<td>Blind memo stating President intends to ask for a courts-martial of Gen. Short and Adm. Kimmel on question of dereliction of duty.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Article of War 97.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 26, 1942</td>
<td>Memo for Chiefs of Staff from JAG division re proposed courts-martial of Gen. Short.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 26, 1942</td>
<td>Final draft of press release on Gen. Short's retirement, as approved by President.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 27, 1942</td>
<td>Memo from Gen. Marshall for Sec'y of War relating that approved news release was read to Gen. Short over the phone before release.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 28, 1942</td>
<td>Press release on Gen. Short's retirement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 28, 1942</td>
<td>Wire service bulletin on announcement of retirement of Gen. Short and Admiral Kimmel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 9, 1941</td>
<td>Letter from Gen. Short to TAG asking retirement be changed to read &quot;for physical disability in line of duty.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar. 17, 1942</td>
<td>Letter from TAG to Gen. Short stating his request of Mar. 9, 1941 for change in retirement was not possible.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Section B. Documents Relating to Waiver of Statute of Limitations (Page 3818)

| Sept. 10, 1943 | Handwritten memo of H. L. S. (Sec'y Stimson) suggesting War Dept. get waiver from Gen. Short. |
| Sept. 10, 1943 | Memo from JAG to Sec'y of War re obtaining waiver as had been done by Navy Dept. with Adm. Kimmel. |
|              | Memo from Lt. Col. Wm. J. Hughes, Jr. to JAG re validity of agreement in advance to waiver statute of limitations. |
Sept. 7, 1943  Letter from Adm. Kimmel to Sec'y of Navy and waiver of statute of limitations.
Draft of letter from Sec'y of War to Gen. Short asking for waiver and proposed waiver.
Sept. 22, 1943  Telegram from Gen. Green to JAG re completion of his mission.
Sept. 28, 1943  Memo from Gen. Green for JAG re trip to see Gen. Short and obtain waiver.
Sept. 27, 1943  Memo from JAG to Sec'y of War suggesting a public announcement of the waiver.

SECTION C. DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE ROBERTS COMMISSION RECORDS (PAGE 3830)

Memo from Col. R. N. Young to JAG asking that entire Roberts Commission file be forwarded to the Executive Officer, Operations Division, War Dept, General Staff.
Nov. 23, 1942  Memo from Col. J. M. Weir to Executive Officer, OPD, WDGS, transmitting the entire record of the Roberts Commission.
June 26, 1944  Memo from Gen. Green to Gen. Weir stating Gen. Short had requested he be furnished complete copy of Roberts Commission proceedings.
June 23, 1944  Letter from Gen. Short to TAG asking he be furnished complete copy of proceedings of Roberts Commission.
June 30, 1944  Memo from Gen. White to Chief of Staff suggesting that Gen. Short's request for a copy of Roberts Commission proceedings be put to the President for decision.
July 4, 1944  Memo from Sec'y of War for President asking for decision on furnishing Gen. Short copy of Roberts Commission proceedings bearing OK of the President.
July 25, 1944  Informal action record ordering that Gen. Short be furnished a photostatic copy of Roberts Commission proceedings.
July 29, 1944  Memo from Col. West to TAG asking that an extra photostatic copy of Roberts Commission proceedings be prepared for use by the Army Pearl Harbor Board.
Aug. 9, 1944  Receipt from Gen. Short to TAG for photostatic copy of Roberts Commission, transcript, less Exhibits.

SECTION D. DOCUMENTS RELATING TO COUNSEL FOR GEN. SHORT (PAGE 3847)

Feb. 27, 1944  Message from Col. Greer to JAG re appointment as counsel for Gen. Short.
Mar. 10, 1944  Letter from JAG to Col. Greer re taking of testimony in Gen. Short’s case.
Feb. 29, 1944  Letter from Gen. Short to TAG asking that Col. A. J. Greer be detailed to act as his counsel in any court-martial.
Mar. 22, 1944  Letter from Gen. Short to JAG requesting that he be allowed to enter agreement with War Dept. safeguarding his rights if he participated in a program of recording testimony of certain witnesses.
July 24, 1944  Letter from Gen. Short to TAG requesting that Gen. T. H. Green be detailed as his military counsel.
JAG memo to TAG approving assignment of Gen. Green as counsel to Short.


**SECTION E. DOCUMENTS RELATING TO ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD AND PRESERVATION OF TESTIMONY PRIOR TO ITS ORGANIZATION (PAGE 3858)**

**Feb. 25, 1944**
Report of Navy Sec'y Press Conference when it was announced that Admiral T. C. Hart had been assigned to collect testimony from Navy officers concerning the Pearl Harbor attack, and that courts-martial would be postponed until after "war situation had subsided."

**Mar. 2, 1944**
Extracts from Sec'y of War's Press Conference where it was stated that War Dept. was cooperating with the Navy Dept. in assembling evidence in the cases of Gen. Short and Adm. Kimmel.

**July 18, 1944**
Letter from Gen. Short to TAG requesting detail of two officers as observers for him at all hearings of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

**July 21, 1944**

**July 26, 1944**
Memo from Gen. Grunert to Ass't Chief of Staff, G–1, War Dept. recommending that Gen. Short's request for officer observers at APHB hearings be denied.

**Aug. 3, 1944**
Letter from TAG to Gen. Short denying his request for appointment of two officer observers at APHB hearings.

**Aug. 2, 1944**
Message from TAG to Gen. Short advising him APHB contemplated calling him as witness and asks him for suggested list witnesses which he thinks have knowledge of facts bearing upon the investigation.

**Aug. 4, 1944**
Message from Gen. Short to TAG saying list of prospective witnesses will be furnished after consultation with his counsel.

**Aug. 14, 1944**
Action sheet memo, Ist endorsement by Gen. Grunert referring to request of Gen. Short that he be furnished a copy of APHB testimony before board, etc. Recommends he be furnished copy of his testimony before Board, that he be denied request for copy of all other testimony taken before the Board and that he be allowed to have access to Board's Exhibits at convenience of Board, the Exhibits to remain with the Board.

2nd endorsement to above by JAG recommended allowing copy of testimony of APHB be furnished Gen. Short, less Exhibits.

**Aug. 20, 1944**
Memo for record, Ass't Chief of Staff, G–1, approves request of Gen. Short for copy of APHB proceedings as set forth in 2nd endorsement above.

**Aug. 11, 1944**
Letter from Gen. Short to TAG requesting he be furnished a copy of transcript of testimony before APHB and access to its Exhibits, and TAG's approval as attached.

**Aug. 31, 1944**
Letter from Gen. Short to TAG requesting he be furnished copies of synopses of testimony before APHB.

**Sept. 20, 1944**
Memo by Gen. Grunert recommending disapproval of Gen. Short's request for synopses of testimony taken before APHB.

**Sept. 28, 1944**
Memo from Col. R. E. Kunkel to TAG recommending disapproval of Gen. Short's request for synopses of testimony taken before APHB.

**Oct. 1, 1944**
Memo of approval by Ass't Chief of Staff, G–1, of the recommendation of TAG above denying Gen. Short's request for synopses of testimony taken before APHB, and attached TAG letter to Gen. Short so advising him.

**Oct. 3, 1944**
Memo from Gen. McNarney to Gen. Grunert transmitting letter from Gen. Short to Sec'y of War and reply thereto by the Sec'y re testimony before APHB.
Sept. 29, 1944  Letter from Gen. Short to Sec'y of War referring to fact
that APHB has apparently not been furnished full de-
tails re intercepted Jap messages, and asks that all such
information be made available to the Board.

Oct. 2, 1944  Reply to Gen. Short's letter of Sept. 29, 1944 by Sec'y of
War assuring him the APHB was exploring all sources of
evidence bearing on the Pearl Harbor attack.

Aug. 24, 1944  Memo by Col. West for Staff and members of APHB
re handling of Board's transcript of testimony.

Sept. 2, 1944  Letter from Col. Wm. J. Hughes, Jr. to Col. Chas. W.
West, Recorder, APHB re copy of Major Clausen's
memo of July 10, 1944 to Mr. Amberg, which he did not
think should be furnished to Gen. Bragdon, as counsel
for Col. Wyman.

Sept. 2, 1944  Memo from Col. Hughes to Maj. B. R. Powell re order
creating APHB and referring matter of Col. Theodore
Wyman, Jr., to Board, with attached copy of order of
Sec'y of War dated July 8, 1944 creating the APHB,
and memo of acting Sec'y of War dated July 12, 1944
referred Wyman matter to Board.

Sept. 4, 1944  List of personnel of APHB making trip to Hawaii in
connection with its investigation.

Sept. 13, 1944  Letter from Col. West to Col. Hughes re APHB transcripts.
Sept. 21, 1944  Memo from JAG to Gen. Weir stating that on recom-
menation of Gen. McNarney, the APHB be advised
that Col. Hughes of the JAG office be allowed to familiar-
ize himself with APHB proceedings to facilitate review
of APHB Report by the JAG when report submitted to
him for opinion.

Oct. 23, 1944  War Dept. Press Release reporting APHB report had been
received by the Sec'y of War, who had referred it to the
JAG for consideration.

Oct. 26, 1944  Excerpt of Press Conference of Sec'y of War in which
the Sec'y stated the situation had not changed re APHB
and refused any comment on the report.

Nov. 30, 1944  Semi final draft of statement for Sec'y of War on APHB
report indicating partial approval and disapproval of
"criticism by Board, and that further investigation would
be conducted under his direction. Handwritten JAG
note concludes "errors of judgment only". . . . "Reason:
forestall demand for Cr. M."

Aug. 12, 1944  Message from TAG to CG, 9th Service Command request-
ing he facilitate work of APHB which would hold
hearings at San Francisco.

Aug. 29, 1944  Message from Gen. Somervell to Gen. Richardson re trip
of Gen. Bragdon to Honolulu as counsel for Col. Wyman,
and preparation of records for his examination.

Dec. 6, 1944  Memo from JAG to Sec'y of War re effect of inactivation
or discharge of APHB military personnel upon amenity
ability to prosecution for unauthorized disclosure of
classified information.

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Memo from Harvey H. Bundy to Col. Hughes re com-
bination of safe containing documents to be examined

F. CONGRESSIONAL CORRESPONDENCE WITH WAR DEPT. AND DOCUMENTS RELATING TO
LEGISLATION EXTENDING STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS (PAGE 3963)

Feb. 14, 1942  Letter from Sen. Hayden transmitting copy of letter of
constituent and War Dept. reply of Feb. 19, 1942.

16, 1943 and Oct. 8, 1943, and JAG memo of Oct. 4, 1943
saying delay in answering letter, and proposed draft of

Nov. 22, 1943  Letter from Sen. E. C. Johnson to JAG re Gen. Short's
case and reply dated Nov. 25, 1943 stating waiver of
statute of limitations had been obtained.
May 18, 1944  Reply of Sec'y of War to letter from Congressman Mansfield dated May 10, 1944 stating he does not consider a trial of Gen. Short must be held during war time and waiver obtained would permit trial later.

May 25, 1944  Memo from JAG for Legislative and Liaison Division and draft of letter to Congressman Celler in reply to his letter of May 18, 1944 re H. J. Res. 283 to extend statute of limitations.

June 3, 1944  Letter from Sen. Ferguson to JAG re question of "manifest impediment" stated in Article of War 39, and reply dated June 1, 1944 enclosing memo re "meaning of 'Manifest Impediment' in Article of War 39" prepared by Col. Hughes.

June 1, 1944  Letter from JAG of Army to JAG of Navy transmitting copy of his letter to Sen. Ferguson of same date and copy of memo re "Manifest Impediment.'

Dec. 9, 1943  Letter from Attorney General to Director of Budget Bureau re H. J. Res. 199 stating he had no objection to it.

Dec. 13, 1943  Letter from Attorney General to Director of Budget Bureau re H. J. Res. 199 stating that he does not think the resolution will accomplish the purpose its sponsors have in mind, but he has no objection to it.

June 9, 1944  Letter from Attorney General to Director of Budget Bureau re S. J. Res. 133 stating he has no objection to it.

June 6, 1945  Letter from Sec'y of War to Director of Budget Bureau re S. J. Res. 66 stating the Department regarded the legislation would be ineffective to extend the statute of limitations.

June 8, 1945  Transcript of conversation between JAG and Ass't Solicitor General Hugh Cox re meaning of legislation directing Sec'y of War and Sec'y of Navy to commence investigations of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

June 15, 1944  Transcript of Conversation between JAG and Gen. McNarney re legislation directing Sec'y of War to investigate attack on Pearl Harbor and for similar action by Navy.

June 15, 1944  Memo from J.A.G. of Navy to Sec'y of Navy re legislation directing investigation of Pearl Harbor attack.

June 15, 1944  Memo from JAG of Navy to Sec'y of Navy re legislation relating to Pearl Harbor Prosecutions.

Draft of statement for Sec'y of Navy re Joint Resolution regarding Pearl Harbor catastrophe.

June 15, 1944  Memo from C. H. Bull, Navy, to Gen. Weir re Kimmel-Short courts-martial suggesting it be decided by the President.

June 17, 1944  Memo from JAG of Navy to Sec'y of Navy re S. J. Res. 133 recommending a Navy Court of Inquiry.

June 24, 1944  Memo from JAG to Sec'y of War re Public Law 339, 78th Cong. directing investigation of Pearl Harbor attack by Secretaries of War and Navy, recommending a board of officers be appointed to conduct the investigation for the Sec'y of War.


Dec. 30, 1943  Memo from JAG of Navy to Sec'y of Navy re H. J. Res. 189 saying it could be ignored.

Section A
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

From: F. T. Schaefer
To: Adjutant General

NO. 1649-JANUARY 12

Major Generals Walter C. Short (Comma) accompanied
by First Captain Louis W. Truman (Comma) and
Frederick W. Martin (Left on Clipper Eleven)
January for MAINLAND ASSIGNMENT STOP Capt
Truman is proceeding by AIR on temporary duty
with Roberts Commission SEMICOLON upon com-
pletion this duty has been instructed REPORT
your office for travel to station of General
Short

47 A.G.O
Jan 12 1942
Recevtd
10:40 p.m.

Received
2/23/42
Signal Corps, United States Army

War Department Message Center,
Room 3441, Munitions Building,
Washington, D. C.

Received at
HQ WDC and 4TH Army Pres SanFran 121P Jan 12

AG

WNDC

Major Generals Walter C. Short O Dash 1621 and Frederick L. Martin O Dash 2507 Reported This HQ for duty Jan Twelfth Compliance War Dept Orders

De Witt CO WDC and Fourth Army

853P

Reported for Duty Jan 1ST

Received By Gen Adams

Noted

Delivered

Col Whipple

Gen.

Reported for Duty Jan 1ST

Noted

Delivered

Gen.

1697-1698

11/12/42

Received

Division II.

Eleven Days

Division II.

11/12/42

Eleven Days

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Division II.

Division II.

Division II.

Division II.
TELEGRAM
OFFICIAL BUSINESS—GOVERNMENT RATES

FROM WAR DEPARTMENT

TO

WAR OF 1917-18

DURING 1919-20

AS 230,31 (1-12-42, 15)

AMBER 25, 1925.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
MEMORANDUM

Schenk

This is to be held for a few days to await the completion of the investigation.

H.C.S.
were accepted as effective to further action in national interests at the interests of the government.
CONFIDENTIAL

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
PERSONNEL DIVISION
WASHINGTON

February 17, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTENTION OF:

Subject: Inquiry in connection with the retirement of Deputy General Officers, United States Army.

The Secretary of War directs:

1. That a joint hearing with the retirement of major general Short, United States Army, the following matters will be

a. That notice be issued for the purpose of The Adjutant General to inform all General Officers in the Army in effect that all applications for retirement for over 60 years of age at the age of sixty and over, effective January 1, 1942, will be decided on by the Board of Review and will be subject to the following conditions:

b. That the Board of Review, in its discretion, may reduce the retirement age for any or all of the conditions listed above.

c. That the Secretary of War and the Adjutant General will be responsible for the approval of the Board of Review.

d. That the Secretary of War and the Adjutant General will be responsible for the approval of the Board of Review.

2. That the Secretary of War and the Adjutant General will be responsible for the administration of the Board of Review.
CONFIDENTIAL

COMMUNICATION

3801

EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

EXHIBIT

OF

JOINT

COMMITTEE

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E.H.
The application of Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army, for retirement is approved by the President, and by his direction Major General Short is retired from active service to take effect February 28, 1942, under the provisions of Section 1243, Revised Statutes, after more than thirty-nine years' service.

February 17, 1942.

APPROVED
By order of the Secretary of War:

E. S. ADAMS,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.
CONFIDENTIAL

February 17, 1942.

Maj. Gen. Walter C. Short, U. S. Army,
610 N. W. 15th Street,
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

In reference to your letter of January 25, 1942,
requesting retirement under the provisions of R. S. 1343;
10 U. S. C. 943; H. R. 1939, sec. 220, you are advised
that your application for retirement is accepted, effective
February 28, 1942, without condonation of any offense or
prejudice to any future disciplinary action.

By order of the Secretary of War:

L. S. ADAI45Y

Maj. Gen.,
The Adjutant General.

To be sent by courier Major LeBlanc
by 1st class mail leaving 3:45 PM, February
17, 1942.
February 19, 1942.

Notes - (from Col. Ostrander)

1. At 9:45 A.M. - Feb. 19, if nothing heard from General Short - call Colonel Walsh (G-1 office) and report fact. Walsh 2406.

2. Wait for Secretary of War's release on order. (Reg. mail - return receipt demanded)

Notes by Col. Hemenway

Herewith -
1. Het. order (original and two carbons)
2. Lot of transmittal with one form.
3. Memo to AG from G-1, Feb 17th with one carbon.
4. Memo - Sequence of events (by Col. Ostrander)
5. Signed receipt from Gen. Short for letter advising re retirement.
7. Copy of retirement order as originally drafted showing administrative correction reference P/A for shipment of H.I. goods.

9:45 A.M. - February 19th

- Called Col. Walsh for instructions.
- Reported no word from General Short.
- Walsh stated that last night General Hillaring called, stating Sec. Simpson had talked to President (assumed Sec. Knox was in on this) and that any communication to press would be made by President.
- No orders to issue until release obtained from Sec. War or G-1.
DEAR FRANK: Here is my own revised suggestion as to the saving clause to be inserted in the acceptance of the retirement:

"without condonation of any offense or prejudice to any action on behalf of the Government."

Any reasons we want to give for our action can be said to the press. I am in favor of leaving the acceptance itself in this language if the Attorney General says that it is sufficient to keep open the power to court martial. I will talk with you about it on Monday if you desire.

Faithfully yours,

/S/ HENRY L. STIMSON,
Secretary of War.

HON. FRANK KNOX,
The Secretary of the Navy.

HLS: ECN

FEBRUARY 25, 1942.

The President intends to ask for a court-martial on the issue of whether as stated in the report of the Roberts' Commission, there was a dereliction of duty on the part of Admiral Kimmel and General Short; the court to be held as soon as the public interest permits. It is the privilege of the officers themselves to ask for such a court-martial.
ARTICLE OF WAR 97: When and by whom ordered:

A court of inquiry to examine into the nature of any transaction of or accusation or imputation against any officer or soldier may be ordered by the President or by any commanding officer; but a court of inquiry shall not be ordered by any commanding officer except upon the request of the officer or soldier whose conduct is to be inquired into.

Charges and specifications sworn to.

Anybody subject to military law may swear to them. No officer has a right to institute a court martial against himself.
February 26, 1942.

MEMORANDUM for the Chief of Staff.

Subject: Retirement of General Walter C. Short.

1. General Short was notified that his application for retire-
ment was accepted effective February 25, 1942. "Without condemnation of
any offense or prejudice to any future disciplinary action."
I understand then at the time this notice was delivered to General
Short he was orally notified by the courier delivering the letter
that if he had any objections to make they should be made within
twenty-four hours, otherwise the order for his retirement would
issue. Under these conditions the rights of the Government to bring
him to trial before court-martial are preserved and trial may be
had at any time within the period of the Statute of Limitations
when it may be in the public interest to do so.

2. It would seem inadvisable at this time as a matter of
policy to issue a statement that these officers will be tried by
court-martial at any specified future time. Nothing would be gained
by such commitment. The exigencies of the service may be such that
it will be impossible at that time to try these officers. It is
impossible to tell what the war conditions will be at any future
time, the officers who would be required as witnesses will vary
probably be scattered all over the world, and it might be a physical
impossibility to assemble them for such a trial. Furthermore,
these officers will most likely be engaged in most important duties
from which they cannot be relieved without serious damage to the
war effort. The defense would certainly attempt to pass part of the
blame to the War Department. Such evidence or argument, if publicly
aired, would tend to discredit the War Department and cause a lack
of confidence by the people in the men in charge of the war operations.
This would certainly be so if the trial would result in acquittal
or a mild sentence.

3. With reference to the suggestion that it is the privilege
of the officers themselves to ask for such a court-martial, in so
far as General Short is concerned there is no law which authorizes
him to request a court-martial. He would, under the 97th Article
of War, demand a court of inquiry but there would be no object in
granting such a request inasmuch as the Roberts Commission has
already investigated the matter and covered the same ground as
would a military court of inquiry. Furthermore, when officers are
preferred they must be sworn to by a person subject to military law.
to the effect that he personally signed the charges and specifications and that he has personal knowledge of the matters set forth in the specifications, or that he has investigated the matters set forth in the specifications, and that the same are true in fact to the best of his knowledge and belief. The theory of the Articles of
War is that persons are tried by a court-martial, not upon their own request but upon charges preferred as above stated. No such charges have as yet been preferred, and it is thought inadvisable for the President to announce in advance of such preferment that the officers concerned will be tried, as his doing so would give an opportunity to the defense to allege that the President is the accuser and to charge that the court convened by him, the sentences of which is subject to his approval, is not an impartial body.

Signed and sworn to in pursuance of law.

[Signature]

[Date]
February 26, 1942.

The Secretary of War announced today the acceptance, effective February 26, 1942, of the application for retirement of General Walter C. Short, "without condonation of any offense or prejudice to any future disciplinary action."

The Secretary of War announced at the same time that, based upon the findings of the report of the Roberts' Commission, he had directed the preparation of charges for the trial by court-martial of General Short, alleging dereliction of duty. The Secretary of War made it clear, however, that the trial upon these charges would not be held until such time as the public interest and safety would permit.

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
MEMORANDUM

Papers on Gen. Short: Retirement as approved.

by the Pres.

C/0
February 27, 1942.

SECRET
WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

General Haring read the approved news release to General Short over the telephone yesterday evening at about seven o'clock. A copy of the news release was also sent by air mail, special delivery, to General Short at Fort Sam Houston, Texas, where he is visiting at present.

[Signature]
Chief of Staff.
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

WASHINGTON -- The Secretary of War outlined today charges for the court-martial for the attack on Pearl Harbor--Gen. Walter C. Short, Secretary Knox, however, has not yet announced the charges for the court-martial of Kimmel--the same accusations made by the Roberts Commission.

The secretary of war today announced that Short would be charged with "specific acts of negligence", the same as attributed to Kimmel.

The Secretary of War, Gen. George C. Marshall, today announced that his recommendations for the court-martial of Kimmel had not yet been presented to the President.

WASHINGTON -- President Roosevelt today named U.S. agents on the U.S.-Mexico border to negotiate a treaty to settle the dispute between the United States and Mexico over the U.S.-Mexico border.

WASHINGTON -- The Senate Agriculture Committee today named a sub-committee to seek a conference with President Roosevelt in an effort to heal the breach between the White House and the farm bloc over prices of farm products.

WASHINGTON -- Japanese naval forces sink a British cruiser and a U.S. destroyer in a battle near a British island yesterday.

ESP
Navy Department Commmique #47, 28 February 1942.

The Secretary of the Navy announced today the acceptance effective March 1, 1942 of the application for retirement of Rear Admiral E. E. Kimmel, U.S. Navy, "without censure of any offence or prejudice to any future disciplinary action." The Secretary of the Navy announced at the same time that based upon the findings of the report of the Roberts Commission he had directed the preparation of charges for the trial by court martial of Rear Admiral Kimmel alleging dereliction of duty. The Secretary of Navy made it clear, however, that the trial upon these charges would not be held until such time as the public interest and safety would permit.
Subject: Physical Condition.

To: The Adjutant General,
United States Army,
Washington, D. C.

1. On February 27, 1942, the undersigned reported to the Station Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, and requested a thorough physical examination prior to contemplated retirement. This examination was completed on February 28, 1942, and the report of the same is a matter of record at the hospital named above.

2. As a result of the examination, including necessary laboratory procedure, I was advised by the examining physicians that on account of a heart and lung condition I should limit and restrict my physical activities. At the same time I was advised informally that my physical condition existing at the time of the examination and necessarily for some time prior thereto was such as would have warranted and required my retirement from active service on account of physical disability.

3. In view of the foregoing it is requested that a copy of the report of the physical examination pertaining to my case and referred to above be obtained from the Commanding Officer of the Station Hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, and that appropriate action, based upon the recorded physical findings, be taken by your office.

4. Although the effective date of my retirement was February 28, 1942, it is requested that, if possible, action be taken to change my status to retirement on account of physical disability incurred in line of duty and incident to the military service.

5. I am aware of the probable legal difficulties in the way of such a course of action. In the event the action requested can not be now legally accomplished, then it is requested that the report of the physical examination be filed with my retirement papers. If the report of the physical examination sufficiently establishes physical disability in line of duty and incident to the military service which, but for the accomplished fact of retirement at my own request, would have warranted or required my retirement for physical disability, then I request that a finding to that effect be entered upon the same and included with the record of my retirement.

6. I disclaim any intention to embarrass or annoy the War Department in time of war with my personal affairs. However, having now discovered for the first time my physical condition, I very naturally desire that it be made of record with my retirement file and that any corrective action deemed appropriate be taken in connection with the same.

WALTON C. SHORT,
Major General, U. S. Army.
March 17, 1942

Change in Retirement Orders.

Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army, Retired,
Officers Club,
Fort Sam Houston, Texas.

1. Reference is made to your letter of March 9, 1942, advising of physical examination at Station hospital, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, and requesting action be taken to change your status to retirement on account of physical disability.

2. After retirement under the provisions of Section 1243, Revised Statutes, becomes effective, there is no legal authority to change same to retirement for physical disability. However, the report of your physical examination will be obtained and filed with your record.

By order of the Secretary of War:

Major General,
The Adjutant General,

[Signature]

Endorsed on April 16, 1942.
WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
MEMORANDUM

To: J.A.G.

Received, 7 Sept 1943

Of all the adventures, this presents I think you had best go ahead and try to follow the Navy’s example. And get a warning of the Station.

“Small ship will not be harmed; on contrary, he will most likely be complimented by the BLA.

14/5
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

Subject: Court-martial of Major General Walter C. Short.

1. The statute of limitations will bar trial of General Short and Admiral Kimmel 7 December next.

2. To meet this situation the Navy Department has obtained from Admiral Kimmel a waiver of the statute of limitations. Copy of letter of Secretary Knox to Admiral Kimmel and photostats of his reply and waiver are attached hereto.

3. In obtaining the waiver from Admiral Kimmel the Navy Department used as an intermediary Rear Admiral Harris, retired, with whom Admiral Kimmel practices civil engineering in New York City. It is believed desirable that if a waiver is presented to General Short, he should likewise be approached by a personal friend.

4. This office has heard, though it cannot verify, that the Navy Department's action in getting the waiver was approved in advance by the President. The possibility that General Short will not execute a waiver is fully appreciated but an effort in that direction by a trusted intermediary, who can if necessary display Admiral Kimmel's waiver, seems on the whole worthwhile. The undesirable alternatives would be to request legislation extending the statute of limitations in General Short's case or to order an immediate investigation under Article of War 70 and refer the case for trial before a court composed of officers senior to General Short. Arrangement before such a court would stop the running of the statute but the court could hardly proceed with the trial due to the impracticability of obtaining witnesses who are scattered all over the world and could only adjourn indefinitely. Another possibility would be to drop the matter entirely, decision as to which, in view of his former instructions, would doubtless be a matter for the President.

5. In the event a waiver from General Short is desired, there are enclosed herewith letter to him to be signed by you, for delivery by hand, and form of waiver.

Myron C. Cramer,  
Major General,  
The Judge Advocate General.

3 Inds.  
Incl. 1 - Copy ltr. of Sec. of Navy.  
Incl. 2 - Photo, copy ltr. 7/9/43 w/l incl.  
Incl. 3 - Ltr. to Gen. Short w/l incl.
Validity of agreement in advance to waive statute of limitations.

Examination of the meagre applicable authorities indicates that an agreement made in advance to waive a criminal statute of limitations is of very dubious validity. While the law is that if the bar of the statute is not asserted it is waived, the basis of the statute of limitations is the sound public policy that prosecuting officers must be diligent to prosecute while the witnesses are available and the details of the crime are fresh in their minds. It is a question whether an accused can agree to waive this public policy. But assuming he can so agree his agreement is at best a contract. If he breaches it he is merely guilty of a breach of contract. His substantive right to plead the statute would not, in my opinion, be destroyed by an advance agreement not to plead it. He might say the agreement was without consideration or that there was no warrant of law for his agreement in advance to waive the statute of limitations. As to undisclosed offenses, charges as to which had not then been investigated and served on him within the meaning of Article of War 70 nor referred for trial and as to which a court had not even been appointed at the time of the waiver, a substantial showing might be made of his inability to waive a substantive right under these conditions.

No cases of agreements to waive a criminal statute of limitations can be found in the books, itself a strong indication that no one has ever attempted it. There is a statement in 16 Corpus Juris Secundum, page 228, repeated in 22 Corpus Juris Secundum, page 235, to this effect:

"An indictment, found after the expiration of the time for beginning the prosecution, is barred by the statute of limitations, and it is not saved by the fact that the prosecution was withheld on account of an agreement with accused."

The case cited, however, Com. v. Werner, 5 Pa. Superior, 249-251, shows that the agreement was not an agreement to waive the statute but an agreement to support the prosecutrix and her children.
In civil cases a specific agreement not to assert the statute of limitations is usually upheld. However, in such cases the debtor has reaped an advantage from his promise and the basis of the decision is the equitable ground of estoppel. In 130 A.L.R. 21 there is a minority view illustrated by Shapley v. Abbott, 42 N.Y. 443, containing the trenchant statement:

"No case has occurred to me in which a party can, in advance, make a valid promise that a statute founded in public policy shall be inoperative."

The case relied upon by the Navy, Mullen v. U.S., 212 U.S. 516, is hardly conclusive. There a Naval officer was convicted by a court of inquiry as a result of which he was liable to discharge from the service. In this situation he applied to the Secretary of the Navy for a court-martial to try him on charges based on the findings of the court of inquiry. The Secretary of the Navy agreed to the trial by court-martial provided that the accused would agree that the evidence before the court of inquiry, which a statute prohibited being submitted to the court-martial, could in fact be submitted to the court-martial. The Supreme Court on the basis of Schick v. U.S., 195 U.S. 65, permitting waiver of trial by jury, held that the accused could waive his right to have the witnesses appear personally at the trial and that as the Secretary was under no legal obligation to call a court-martial and did so for the benefit of the accused, he could convine the court under such conditions exacted in advance as he saw fit. The case finally turned on the fact that the accused had been deprived of no substantial right as he was allowed to call additional witnesses if he wanted to.

My conclusion therefore, from a quick search, is that a waiver in advance is, as an abstract question, of doubtful legality.

As a concrete question, if the accused executes a waiver he could only repudiate it at the trial by pleading the statute of limitations. The court would probably overrule the plea on the basis of the waiver which the prosecution would thereafter submit in evidence.

Under Capone v. Aderhold, 2 Fed. Supp. 280, affirmed in 65 Fed. 2d 130, error in passing upon the validity of a plea of the statute of limitations is error committed in the exercise of jurisdiction which can not be reached on habeas corpus. The only thing the accused could do, therefore, would be to sue in the court of claims for his pay which court, under Dynes v. Hoover, 20 Howard 65, Swaim v. U.S., 165 U.S. 563, undoubtedly would refuse to open the record and retry the case on this point.

My recommendation therefore is that an attempt should be made to secure a waiver from the accused and that the waiver should follow the form, in general, of that obtained by the Navy.

William J. Hughes, Jr.
Lieutenant Colonel, J.A.O.D.
280 Bronxville Road, Bronxville, N. Y., September 7, 1943.

From: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. N., Ret., 280 Bronxville Road, Bronxville, N. Y.

To: The Honorable Frank Knox, Secretary of the Navy, Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

Reference (a) Letter from Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. N., Ret., proposing a waiver of the Statute of Limitations. Enclosure (A) Agreement not to plead the Statute of Limitations in bar of trial by General Court Martial.

Sir: Receipt is acknowledged of your undated letter, Reference (a), delivered to me by hand August 27th, 1943, concerning a General Court Martial in my case, in which letter you state that the two-year statute of limitations controlling Naval Courts Martial will have run on my case on December 7th, 1943, and you propose that I should now agree not to plead the statute of limitations in bar of trial and you enclose a proposed form of waiver.

You state in Reference (a) that you think that the public interest and safety would now permit proceeding with my trial, but that you further believe that so long as the war continues it will be manifestly impracticable to have a number of important witnesses appear before the court on account of their war duties. For this reason, among others, you feel that it would be in the best interests of all concerned if I should now agree not to plead the statute of limitations in bar of trial and you give me your assurance that the trial will be held at the earliest practicable date.

It is my personal desire to be brought to trial by General Court Martial in open court at the earliest practicable date. Delay in the matter is opposed to my personal interests, since the passage of time and the circumstances and casualties of war and of the period following may make it difficult, perhaps impossible, to assemble and produce the evidence and the witnesses required. I have at all times been anxious to subordinate my own interests to the national welfare, which appears to require that my trial be delayed. I am therefore forwarding to you herewith a waiver, Enclosure A, executed by me which I hope will be satisfactory to you.

Respectfully,

Husband E. Kimmel.

Encl. (1)

Enclosure (A) to Letter Dated September 7th, 1943, from Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. N., Ret., to the Secretary of the Navy

I, Husband E. Kimmel, Rear Admiral, United States Navy, Retired, hereby agree on my honor as an officer and a gentleman that I will not plead, nor permit any attorney or other person on my behalf to plead, the statute of limitations in bar of my trial by General Court Martial in open court for any alleged offenses with which I may be charged relating to the period on or before December 7th, 1941, should my trial be held during the present war or within six (6) months thereafter.

I take this action voluntarily, believing it to be in the public interest.

Husband E. Kimmel.
Major General Walter C. Short,  
United States Army, Retired.

My dear General Short:

In connection with your possible trial by general court-martial, the two-year statute of limitations prescribed by Article of War 39 will, unless action is taken to prevent it, bar your trial by general court-martial 7 December 1943. The filing of the statute of limitations would be stopped by either a present waiver by you or your arraignment before a general court-martial, which, probably, would adjourn the case until later.

So long as the war continues it will be impracticable to have a number of important witnesses appear before the court on account of their war duties. In this situation it has occurred to me that the practical thing to do is to postpone any possible trial until later and that you may desire for this purpose to execute a waiver of the statute of limitations. In the event that you see fit to do this, I give you my personal assurance that any trial determined upon will be held at the earliest practicable date.

If you should agree with the foregoing your prompt return of the inclosed form of waiver, duly executed by you, is requested.

Sincerely yours,

[Incl.]

Secretary of War.

Stenographic notes and rough draft in this case have been destroyed.

Disinterested officer

Custodian
WAIVER

September, 1943.

I, WALTER C. SHORT, Major General, United States Army, Retired, hereby agree on my honor as an officer and a gentleman that I will not plead, nor permit any attorney or other person on my behalf to plead, the statute of limitations in bar of my trial by General Court Martial in open court for any alleged offenses with which I may be charged relating to the period on or before December 7th, 1941, should my trial be held during the present war or within six (6) months thereafter.

I take this action voluntarily, believing it to be in the public interest.

Walter C. Short,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.
Memorandum for: The Judge Advocate General.

There is attached hereto a waiver dated September 20, 1943, signed by Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army, Retired, in which he agrees to waive the statute of limitations in bar of his trial during the present war and within six (6) months thereafter.

The above waiver was obtained pursuant to your verbal instructions.

T. H. Green,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Assistant Judge Advocate General.

Incl.
Waiver & pertinent papers.

WAIVER

September 20, 1943.

I, Walter C. Short, Major General, United States Army, Retired, hereby agree on my honor as an officer and a gentleman that I will not plead, nor permit any attorney or other person on my behalf to plead, the statute of limitations in bar of my trial by General Court Martial in open court for any alleged offenses with which I may be charged relating to the period on or before December 7th, 1941, should my trial be held during the present war or within six (6) months thereafter.

I take this action voluntarily, believing it to be in the public interest.

Walter C. Short,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.
THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL:

MISSION COMPLETED SUCCESSFULLY RECOMMEND NO PUBLICATION RETURNING VIA NEW ORLEANS GREEN
Pursuant to your instructions, I arrived at General Lee's headquarters at three A.M. and was met at that time by Major General C. H. Smith. I was delivered from General Smith's headquarters, pursuant to my instructions communicated with him, according to instructions. I immediately conferred with General Woodruff and gave him the agreement to waive the statute of limitations and other papers prepared by Lieutenant Colonel H. H. Hughes, Jr., of this office. General Woodruff left at once the same day by plane for Dallas at 6 p.m. and returned at 3 p.m., 22 September 1945. Upon his return, General Woodruff informed me that he had interviewed Major General Walter C. Hart, U. S. Army, retired, at Dallas, Texas on 20 and 21 September and that General Hart had signed the agreement to waive the statute of limitations.

General Woodruff handed the signed agreement to me and I reported to you by radio on Wednesday, 22 September 1945 that the mission had been accomplished. I then returned to Washington, made my report to you and placed the signed waiver and the other papers in files.

General Woodruff had plane reservations to proceed to his home on 23 September 1945 and I presume he left on that date.

T. F. Green
MEMORANDUM for The Secretary of War.

Subject: Court-martial of Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army, Retired.

1. Under date of 7 September 1943, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy, Retired, executed an agreement to waive the statute of limitations in bar of trial by general court-martial in open court for any alleged offenses with which he may be charged relating to the period on or before December 7, 1941 should his trial be held during the present war or within six months thereafter.

2. Under date of 20 September 1943, Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army, Retired, executed a similar agreement.

3. In view of the public interest in the matter as evidenced by recent newspaper articles and letters from Congressmen, it is suggested that it would be desirable that some public announcement be made by the War and Navy Departments. It is recommended that if an announcement is to be made, it be made simultaneously by both departments thus achieving solidarity.

4. The following is a suggested draft of an announcement on the subject.

The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy have concluded that it is undesirable in the public interest to proceed at this time with the trial of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and Major General Walter C. Short. Accordingly, it has been decided to postpone proceedings against these officers until such time in the future as may be decided upon as being appropriate.

Both officers have voluntarily agreed to waive the statute of limitations in bar of their trials.
for the duration of the war and for six months thereafter.

The postponement will not affect the existing rights of the government nor those of the officers concerned.

MYRON C. CRAMER

Myron C. Cramer,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General

1 Incl.- Copy of waiver.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL:

Subject: Secret documents pertaining to the Investigation at Pearl Harbor.

The secret documents delivered to you by Colonel Oscar B. Abbott on March 2 constitute the entire file on the above subject. These documents are delivered to you for use in connection with the charges you are preparing relative to the proposed trial of Major General Walter C. Short. They are to be considered of utmost secrecy.

J. H. HILLERING,
Brigadier General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

Incl.

1 envelope containing:

List showing documents furnished the Army.
List showing documents furnished the Navy.
Minutes of deliberation to ascertain report facts relative to the attack upon Japanese forces upon Territory of Hawaii, 12-7-41.

1 package containing anorthesis notes of testimony before Commission appointed by the President, 12-11-41, to investigate attack by Japanese of Dec. 7, 1941, on Hawaii.

1 package containing 10 volumes transcript of testimony before Commission investigating Japanese attack on Hawaii, 12-7-41, plus 1 annex of original testimony.

1 package containing secret, confidential, and unclassified documents marked and enclosed in envelope (1 item remainder).

GERARD N. BYRNE
Major, Infantry
Assistant Executive
SECRET

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
WASHINGTON

MARCH 26, 1942.

SUBJECT: Secret documents pertinent to the investigation of Carol Carter,

SECRET

1. The secret documents listed below constitute the entire file upon the above subject. These documents are for use in connection with charges you are to prepare relative to the proposed trial of Carol Carter. They must be considered of the strictest secrecy.

Envelope containing:

1. A sheet of paper entitled "Extracted from the Personal Diary of Mrs. Carol Carter at the Scene of the Incident," prepared and signed by Carol Carter.

2. A search warrant for the arrest of Mrs. Carol Carter for the alleged incident.

3. A copy of the transcript of the interrogation of Carol Carter before the Joint Committee on the National Defense, 12-13-41, in connection with the investigation of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

4. A package containing 10 volumes, transcript of testimony before the Joint Committee on the investigation of the Japanese attack on Hawaii, 12-17-41, in the case of enfeebled testimony.

5. A package containing secret, confidential and classified documents, numbers 1 to 30, inclusive, as follows:

a. A memorandum of 12/24/41, Capt. [signature], to Executive Officer, Hawaiian Territory, re: security of parking areas near Tomochichi [Redacted], military, etc.
CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

Follows (typed, together with charts accompanying the manuscript, this latter being rolled together with the charts)

1. A. Secret "DBW "Annex 1 to accompany 10 1 Fixed Installations", Island of Oahu.
2. Secret tab "Hawaiian Defense Project 1941 - Anti-aircraft Disposition".
3. Day sharing military reservations on Island of Oahu.
5. Copy and explanatory material showing ground defenses at Hickam Field.
6. Map of Hickam Field showing disposition of aircraft at time of attack.
7. Statement by a general officer in 2nd Art of event and conditions leading up to the Japanese attack, December 7, 1941.
8. Letter of December 7, 1941, to Dr. Davidson, from a general officer, stating that a将领 corps was sent to Formosa island, that our ships were on guard, and other events from all units (received December 7, 1941).
9. Reports of action of troops in Oahu, and Pearl Harbor, etc., in main defensive officer, showing ground and activities at Pearl Harbor April 13, 1942, to December 7, 1941.
10. Letter of December 18, 1941, from H.M. Secretary of War to C.J. Nimitz, reporting results of operations by all units from July 1 to July 31, 1941, and field orders or instructions for the week of
11. Letter of Nov. 6, 1941, to H.M. Secretary of War, forwarding reports on activities of all units from July 1 to July 31, 1941, and field orders or instructions for the week of
12. Letter of Nov. 6, 1941, to H.M. Secretary of War, forwarding reports on activities of all units from July 1 to July 31, 1941, and field orders or instructions for the week of
13. Letter of Nov. 6, 1941, to H.M. Secretary of War, forwarding reports on activities of all units from July 1 to July 31, 1941, and field orders or instructions for the week of

SECRET
SECRET


22 Letter dated Dec. 7 '41, Frank K. Miller, Capt., U.S. Navy, to the Secretary of the Navy — subject, Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii (copy)


24 Letter 12/2/41, Maxwell Durney, Major U.S. C., to Major General Frank L. Hays, implementing General Durney’s testimony before the investigating commission.
SECRET

[Text in redacted]

SECRET

[Redacted text]

Washington, D.C., October 27, 1941.

To The Honorable Senator 

Executive.

[Redacted text]

[Signature]

[Redacted text]

3/0/42

SECRET
Colonel, 3/23.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL:

Subject: Report of Roberts Commission.

It is desired that you forward to the Executive Officer, Operations Division, WDGS, for file, the report of the Roberts Commission, together with all supporting papers and records in connection therewith, now in your possession.

By direction of the Chief of Staff:

[Signature]

R. H. Young,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Secretary, General Staff.
MEMORANDUM to Executive Officer, Operations Division, War Department General Staff.

Subject: Report of Roberts Commission.

1. Pursuant to undated directive of the Chief of Staff (herein, for file in your office, the following enumerated papers and documents constituting the report of the Roberts Commission and supporting papers and records in connection with said Commission Report:

1 envelope containing:
List showing documents furnished the S/Mar
List showing documents furnished the S/Navy)
Minutes of Commission to ascertain and report facts relating to the attack made by Jap. armed forces upon Territory of Hawaii, 12-7-41.

1 package containing shorthand notes of testimony before Commission appointed by the President, 12-19-41, to investigate attack by Japanese of Dec. 7, 1941, on Hawaii.

2 packages containing 10 volumes transcript of testimony (Vol.1-8, in 1 before Commission investigating Japanese attack on Hawaii, 12-7-41, plus 1 annex of amended testimony. (Vol.9-16 in other)

1 package containing secret, confidential and unclassified documents as numbered 1 to 36, inclusive as follows:

No.
1 Memorandum of 12/23/41, Capt.O.A. Keungla, A.O.S., to Executive Officer, Hawaiian Interceptor Command, concerning parking areas and bunkers at Wheeler, Halesia, and Bellows Fields, together with charts accompanying the memorandum (the latter being rolled together with the charts)
1-A Secret "OP. Map annex I to accompany 3C 1 Fixed Installations", Island of Oahu.
2 Secret Map "Hawaiian Defense Project 1941 - Anti-Aircraft Dispositions"
3 Map showing military reservations on Island of Oahu (1 copy)
4 Special Military Map AA of Hawaiian Islands (1 copy)
5 Map and explanatory addenda showing ground defenses at Hickam Field.
6 Chart of Hickam Field showing disposition of aircraft at time of attack (1 copy)
7 Statement by Major General Walter C. Short of events and
conditions leading up to the Japanese attack, December 7,
1941 (1 folder memo, maps, etc.)
8 Letter of December 8, 1941, F. V. Davidson, Brigadier
General, A.G., Commanding Hawaiian Interforce for Command,
to Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, embodying diary
and other records of all units from O.O.I. November 1941
(two copies)
9 Reports of P. L. Duggan, 2nd Lt., and Edward R. Kent,
Capt. Inf., Ground Defense Officers, showing ground defense
activities at Bellows Field March 15, 1941 to December 7,
1941. (2 copies, carbon not complete).
Commanding Bellows Field to C.O. Ham. Dept., reporting
records of operations by all units from O.O.I., Nov. 41 to
U.P.E., 7 Dec. '41, and Field Orders or Instructions for
Alert Procedure (3 copies - all less incl. indicated).
11 Letter, 22 Dec. '41, Jay F. Thomas, 1st Lt. 8th Obsn. Sq.
(O.C.O.), Operations Officer, to C.O. Ham. Dept., through
C.O. Bellows Field, giving records of operations of and
instructions received by 8th Obsn. Sq. from O.O.I. 15 Nov.
41 to 0730 7 Dec. '41.
Bellows Field, to Major Landry C-J, Ham. Air Force, re
position of planes and bunkers on said Field at time of
attack, together with layout map or general plan of
Bellows Field accompanying the memorandum (4 copies)
13 Statement dated 22 Dec. '41, Rev. R. Kent, Capt. Inf.,
Ground Defense Officer, Bellows Field, concerning ground
defense activities at said Field on Dec. 7 '41 and
thereafter (2 copies)
14 Memo. 22 Dec. '41, Leonard J. Wedington, Lt. Col. A.G.,
Commanding Bellows Field, to Major Landry, C-J, Ham.
Air Force, reporting action taken at said Field on orders
given by the responsible commanders, for security since
Dec. 7 '41
15 Memorandum, Leonard C. Hurst, Lt. Col. A.G., Commanding
 Hickam Field, to C.O. Ham. Air Force, under date 23 Dec. '41,
containing information as to arrangements made, orders
issued, and verbal action, since Dec. 7, for proper
 protection of Hawaiian Air Depot, Hickam Field
16 Letter 22 Dec. '41, Rev. J. Flood, Colonel, A.G., Commanding
Wheeler Field, to C.O. Ham. Air Force, giving information
concerning arrangements or instructions and orders for
security of Wheeler Field since attack of Dec. 7
17 Letter 23 Dec. '41, J.K. Ward, Brig. Genl. USA, Commanding
10th Bombardment Wing, Air Corps, to C.O. Ham. Air Force,
concerning arrangements and instructions and orders for
security since Dec. 7 (less incl. indicated)
SECRET

21 Copy of letter dated Feb. 7 '41, Henry L. Stimson, Sec'y of War, to the Secretary of the Navy - subject, Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.
22 Memorandum dated 26 Dec. '41, Robert H. Dunlop, Col. A.O.D., Adjutant Genl. Hawaii Dept., to Major Brooks E. Allen, Air Corps, containing tabulation showing percentage of strength of all major echelons, post and district commanders present at 8 a.m. 7 Dec. 1941, except Kaul Dist.
23 Letter 12/25/41, Maxwell Murray, Major Genl. USA, to Major General Frank McCoy, supplementing General Murray's testimony before the investigating commission.
24 Memo. 20 Dec. '41, A.J. Meehan, Major A.O.C., A.G.O. of S., O-3, Hq. Hawaiian Air Force, to Roberts Commission, showing numbers and types of aircraft for Hawaii, specified in Defense Plan; airplanes on hand 7 Dec. '41; airplanes ready for immediate use; planes on hand after raid and usable after raid; and airplanes that took to the air Dec. 7.
26 Translation of Word conversation.
28 Standing Operating Procedure 24th Inf. Div. dated 27 Nov. '41.
30 Standing Operating Procedure Hawn. C.A. dated 26 Nov. '41.
31 Standing Operating Procedure Hawn. Dept. dated 5 Nov. '41.
32 Certain inclosures (2 in number) from General Short's report, copy of which is in War Department in Washington (33-2 33-1).
33 Copy of letter 11/17/41 F. L. Martin, Major General USA, Commanding Air Officer to C.O., Hawn. Dept. forwarding special reports concerning provisions for security of installations at Hickam and Wheeler Fields and Hawaiian Air Depot.

SECRET - 3 -


2. Receipt of the foregoing documents is requested by endorsement hereto.

For The Judge Advocate General:

[Signature]

John M. Weir,
Colonel, J.A.S.O.D.,
Executive

OPERATIONS DIVISION, WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF, Washington, D. C., November 26, 1942. TO: Office of the Judge Advocate General, War Department, Washington, D. C.

The undersigned has received the documents and papers listed in the basic letter for file in this Division.

THOS. T. HANKEY,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff

C. J. LEHIM,
Lt. Colonel, J. S. C.,
Custodian, Registered Documents, OPD.
WAR DEPARTMENT
Army Service Forces
Office of the Judge Advocate General
26 June 1944

Memorandum:

For General Weir,

Inclosed herewith for the office file is a copy of a letter from Major General Walter C. Short, Retired, to The Adjutant General, dated June 23, 1944, in which General Short requests to be furnished with a copy of the full proceedings of the Roberts Commission.

T. H. Green,

Incl.

To Gen. Cramer

[Signature]
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Copy of the Roberts Commission Proceedings.

TO: The Adjutant General.

1. On September 20, 1943, I signed an agreement not to plead the statute of limitations in bar of my trial by General Court-Martial in open court for any alleged offenses with which I may be charged relating to the period on or before December 7, 1941, should my trial be held during the present war or within six months thereafter.

2. In order that I may be apprised of the possible scope of the charges which may be brought against me and in order that I may make an intelligent effort to prepare my defense against such possible charges, I request that there be furnished me at this time a copy of the full proceedings of the Roberts Commission.

WALTER G. SHORT,
Major General, U.S. Army, Retired.
WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT, GENERAL STAFF
PERSONNEL DIVISION
WASHINGTON

WARP 201 Short, Walter C. 30 June 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Request for copy of the Roberts Commission Proceedings.

I. Discussion.

1. In a letter to The Adjutant General (Tab A), Major General Walter C. Short, Retired, requests that he be furnished a copy of the full proceedings of the Roberts Commission.

2. The War Department is informed that the Secretary of the Navy (Mr. Knox) several months ago furnished Admiral Kimmel a photostatic copy of the report of the Roberts Commission. The Navy Department is unable to state whether Secretary Knox obtained informal approval from the President before this action was taken.

3. The Judge Advocate General expresses the opinion that General Short is entitled to and should be furnished a copy of the report of the Roberts Commission; that the Commission was appointed by and reported to the President of the United States; and that a copy should not be furnished General Short without prior approval by the President.

II. Action recommended.

1. That the attached memorandum for the President be signed and dispatched.

2. That when the memorandum has been dispatched this file be returned to G-1 for further action.

APPENDED:

Incl. Tab A
Draft of Memo to the President for signature of the S/W.

Approved by The Secretary of War

Maj. Gen., Chief of Staff

[Signature]

By Maj. Gen., Asst. Chief of Staff.

[Signature]

NOTED DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Major General Walter G. Short has requested that he be furnished a copy of the full proceedings of the Roberts Commission. A copy of General Short's letter is attached.

I am informed that the Navy Department, presumably with your approval, has furnished Admiral Kimmel with a photostatic copy of the report. I believe that General Short is also entitled to a copy, in order to prepare his own defense, and request your approval of his request.

OK

Secretary of War.

Inclosure
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

War Department General Staff

Memo

To: C/3
From: O/3

Subject: Pearl Harbor

For

Rev. and represent

Approved

Disapproved

That Master sergeant Walter W. Baugh, Jr., 25, of 1200 W. 16th St., southeastern St. Louis, Mo., has been requested to make an oral statement by the House Committee on the Armed Services in Washington, D.C., on the morning of May 27th.

For the assignment of staff, etc.

Lt. Col. C. J. 

Secretary

Gen. W. 

Li Col. C. J. 

Approved

FILE

CONFIDENTIAL

1945

26 Apr

1945

24 Apr
WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

29 July 1918.

MEMORANDUM TO THE WAR DEPARTMENT:

(Attention: H. Col. Kelly)

Subject: Photostatic Copy of Transcript of
Testimony Before Roberts Commission.

1. It is my understanding that plans have been made to make
a photostatic copy of the transcript of testimony before the Roberts
Commission, the same to be received by Major General Walter S. Short,
U.S. Army, retired, in accordance with a recent directive from
her authority.

2. It would be advantageous if an additional copy could be made
for this use, and it is accordingly requested that one be made and transmitted
to me in due course, without delay, and delivered.

For the Ward:

[Signature]

Col. H. W.
Colonel, J.M.P., D.P.
Recorder.
Received of the Adjutant General photostated copy of the Roberts Commission report which investigated the attack on the Territory of Hawaii, 7 December 1941, consisting of 16 volumes of transcribed testimony and one volume of transcribed testimony of Rear Admiral Wiamal (not attached).

WALTER C. SHORT, Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.
WMU v WARC NR 9

FROM ALLEN J GREER COLONEL RETIRED WUX BUFFALO NY 27 NPT

TO JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL US ARMY WAR DEPT WASHDC

GR NC BT

GENERAL WALTER SHORT TELEPHONED ME THAT YOUR REPRESENTATIVE WILL SEE HIM TUESDAY AND ASKED ME AS HIS COUNCIL TO SEE YOU MONDAY AM LEAVING HERE TONIGHT AND ARRIVING WASHINGTON MONDAY MORNING SHALL GO IMMEDIATELY TO YOUR OFFICE PLEASE RESERVE APPOINTMENT.
I wrote, like to call your attention to the fact that there is the last settlement of a

my.

I must state that the President of the United States, after the publication of the

had an act made

of the

had lost

it was realized

that he

was not a mistake of

he

was to realize

Furthermore, I want to assure the

government's previous record speaks for his honor

over his head for

that these

attention of the Chief

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It must now be realized that Gen. Short was not alone responsible for the disaster of Dec. 7, but that the War, the Navy, the State Departments and the President himself must share responsibility. Far beyond them all the American people for not realizing the necessity for national preparedness are also responsible. The very fact that Gen. Short had such a high opinion of himself made it impossible for him to suspect the treacherous attack which the Japanese made. Conditions which made such an attack possible in a friendly nation during time of peace cannot be tolerated in a civilized world and to prevent their recurrence is one of our major objectives in this war.

I offer the above to you as suggestions and hope they will not be considered presumptuous.

I would like even to present them personally to the President or to Mr. Cordell Hull, a former regimentsal commissary of Spanish War days for whom I have the most cordial respect and personal regard.

If trial takes place it will be impossible to avoid bringing in such issues as the McArthur incident and others which will force political and not factual matters into the case with results that cannot be other than unfortunate.

I wish to thank you for your courtesy and the cordial reception of my opinions Monday. I hope I am not un duly presuming upon your time but complex situations cannot be discussed in a few words.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Allen S. Greer, Colonel
United States Army Retired.

AD1ovg
10 March 1944

Colonel Allan J. Grover,
Buffalo Evening News,
214-218 Main Street,
Buffalo, New York.

Dear Colonel Grover:

I have delayed replying to your letter of 1 March 1944 pending the return of General Weir from his conference with General Short. General Weir took advantage of being in Dallas to inspect several judge advocate offices in that vicinity; consequently his return was somewhat delayed.

As a general proposition, General Short appears to be agreeable to the proposed taking of testimony in the manner that you and I talked over when you were in my office. General Short made one request to the effect that nothing be started before the first of April because his wife was to undergo a minor operation and he desired to wait until she had recovered from that before anything was done. That, of course, is agreeable to the War Department.

I note the suggestions made in your letter. Of course any such suggestions will have to await further consideration of the matter.

Very sincerely yours,

Myron C. Germer,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.
Telephone conversation between General Weir and Colonel Springer, 4 March 1944

Weir: Now with reference to the case up there - remember? Tell General Cramer that he wants Tom as active service and as the JA counsel.

Springer: Wait just a minute - he wants Tom as - What?

Weir: Active service - on active duty. In other words he has a retired officer. He also would want a JA and someone on active duty. He would like to have Tom.

Springer: Tom, right here.

Weir: Yeah. As well as Colonel Greer, retired. Greer is about 67, 68, if I recall it. He wants officers on the court who would be senior to him as of the time in question. In other words he doesn't want any temporary lieutenant generals or someone like that who are way junior to him now - junior to him on the Regular list, on any court. He'll have civilian counsel at the time in question. He has not yet employed counsel but he intends to. He's all for this investigation of course as I told General Cramer yesterday, but he doesn't want to start on anything before the first of April. His wife is to be operated on in the hospital in Dallas sometime the forepart of this month and it will be a couple of weeks probably before he'll want to begin on that. Of course he wants the testimony preserved but as I told General Cramer these depositions, or whatever we're going to call them, should be used only if the witness is not alive or available at the time. One of his principal witnesses and probably a principal witness on both sides, is now dead, so we've lost that man's testimony - got it?

Springer: Yes, I got that all right. John, General Cramer said when I talked to you to ask you if Morse and Dainow were still to go up to the conference?

Weir: Well I had planned to have Dainow up there to the conference to edit the -

Springer: We'll, that's what I figured so I told him to count on it.

Weir: It's not dreadfully important about Morse - I thought Morse would have an opportunity to see the people up there and check on their library so he wouldn't have to make those trips all over the west.

Springer: Well he's made most of his trips hasn't he?

Weir: He's made a couple but he hasn't gone very far west. You might check with him on that. I'm checking here with people as I go along. Jones will be there.

Springer: Is Jones getting his own orders?

Weir: Wait a minute - he's getting his own orders and they've been
approved here so he'll be there. Now what's the dope on the conference - everything going along all right?
Subject: Detail of Colonel Allen J. Greer, U. S. Army, Retired as Counsel.

To: The Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

1. I request that Colonel Allen J. Greer, U. S. Army, Retired be detailed to act as my counsel in any court-martial that may take place as a result of the attack of the Japanese on Pearl Harbor, T. H.

2. I request that Colonel Greer be placed on active duty at once to represent me and to assist in the preparation of depositions to be taken in the case, accompanying the officer detailed by the War Department to prepare and take the deposition. As a preliminary to this work I request that Colonel Greer be directed to report to me and go over with me the preparation of the interrogatories of the witnesses for the defense.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

---

Subject: Testimony of witnesses with knowledge of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

To: The Judge Advocate General, U. S. Army.

Recently I was interviewed by Brigadier General John M. Weir, J. A. G. D., at my home in Dallas, Texas. Among other things General Weir informed me that the Secretary of the Navy had appointed Admiral Hart to take testimony of witnesses who had knowledge of the attack on Pearl Harbor and record their testimony in order that it might be preserved against the possibility of the trial of Admiral H. E. Kimmel in the future. He stated that the Secretary of War contemplated taking similar action in my case and that the War Department desired an expression of my views on the matter. In reply I stated that I desired to cooperate with the War Department to the fullest extent consistent with the protection of my rights, and that while I concurred, in principle, with the proposal to perpetuate the testimony I believed myself entitled to such stipulations as might be necessary to safeguard my rights.

Since my interview with General Weir I have given further consideration to the matter. I am sure that there is no intention on the part of the War Department to place me in the position of being compelled to release any rights I may have in the premises.

In this connection I believe that before the commencement of any proceedings to which I am to be a party it would be only fair and just that I be apprised of the basis of the proceedings, their scope, the use to which the records may be put and such other details as will permit me to save my rights. I believe it would be a relatively simple matter to make an agreement as to those details and that such an agreement would insure that the proceedings will be disposed of in an orderly and efficient manner. It seems to me that some such agreement is so essential to the safeguarding of my rights that I would be compelled in self-defense to insist on it as a condition precedent to my participation in the proposed proceedings. If, therefore, the War Department decides to proceed with the perpetuation of the testimony in my case as contemplated, I would appreciate being informed before the commencement of the proceedings as to the views of the War Department on this point.

In a letter which I handed to General Weir I asked that in the event proceedings were begun Colonel Allen J. Greer, Retired, be made available to me as counsel. I reiterate that request. I stated informally to General Weir that I would like to have Brigadier General T. H. Green, J. A. G. D., as my counsel under the same circumstances providing he was willing to serve in that capacity. This latter request is now reduced to writing.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.
To Adjutant General.

1. General Brown is the senior assistant judge advocate general and is normally in charge during an absence. In view of the importance of the case in question I am willing to have him available as counsel for General Short provided it will not unduly interfere with the performance of his present duties.

2. I recommend that the basic request be approved and request that the detail of General Brown be included.

[Signature]

War Services, Surg., Adjutant General.  
For War Services General.
AMPH DAVI Short, Walter C., 1st Ind. (24 Jul 44)

WD, AGO, Washington 25, D. C., 9 August 1944.

TO: Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army, Retired, 3141 Southwestern Boulevard, Dallas 5, Texas.

Approved provided it will not unduly interfere with Brigadier General Green's present duties. This approval is given with the express understanding that the detail will be in addition to his other duties.

By order of the Secretary of War:

J. A. ULLIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.
Secretary Knox announced that the United States Task Force which attacked Saipan and Ulithi-Atoll had destroyed 135 enemy planes in the air and on the ground with the loss of but six of our planes. In addition two ships were sunk and nine others damaged.

Although the United States force was detected by the enemy while approaching the islands on February 21 and attacked by enemy land-based planes for nearly two days, not one of our ships was sunk or even damaged. Enemy installations were bomb- ed and strafed by planes from our carriers. On February 23, Liberators of the 7th Army Air Forces took part in the bombing of Kunai, and on the same day other planes participated with Navy planes in bombing four enemy-held atolls in the Marshalls.

In consenting upon the report from the Pacific Fleet Headquarters, Secretary Knox said that the amazing thing was the heavy damage our pilots had inflicted on enemy aircraft with such small loss to themselves. Further, he said, despite the two-day attack by enemy torpedo planes and bombers on our forces, apparently not a single ship had been hit.

In response to a question, he said that reports he had received indicated that the Japanese have improved their planes, but the quality of their pilots is deteriorating.

The Secretary announced that Admiral N. C. Hart had been assigned to collect testimony from Navy officers concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor for use at the court martial of Admiral Kimmel and General Short. He said that this was being done because many of the officers were scattered throughout the world and many were engaged in hazardous duties. He said that it was an attempt to be absolutely square with Admiral Kimmel and that the testimony should be taken by a high ranking officer in whom both the accused and the Navy Department had confidence. He explained there was no change in the decision to postpone the court martial until after the "war situation has subsided and the trial can be held safely."

Then asked whether this action was being taken in conjunction with similar action by the War Department to re-call that it was not one that he did not know whether the Army would take like steps or not.

Vice Admiral F. J. Forrestal, Chief, Bureau of Yards and Docks, attended the conference and reported briefly on the work of the seaboats in the Pacific area which he had toured recently with Under Secretary Forrestal. He said there were about 100,000 men in the Pacific construction battalions and they were doing excellent work in repairing damage to damaged installations as well as building new bases. On or near the, he said, the main islands the men have made, he said, was to under-estimate the good which seaboats could restore bases and repair damage. Not only were the seaboats superior to the Japanese in skill but also in the supply of construction equipment. He said the Seaboats Special, or the stevedore detachments, were doing an outstanding job.
Extract from Transcript of Press Conference of Secretary of War
Held at 10:30 A.M., Thursday, March 2, 1944.

PRESS:

Is the War Department planning to record the testimony of officers who may be later unavailable who have knowledge of events for use in the case of Major General Walter C. Short, as announced by the Navy?

SECRETARY:

The War Department is working in full cooperation with the Navy Department in assembling such testimony.

PRESS:

Is it true that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are studying a plan for the formation of a Department of National Defense, and if so, will that be put into effect before the close of this present war?

SECRETARY:

I am told there was an interesting story in the newspapers on that subject, but I have no comment to make on it.

PRESS:

Does your reply to the previous question mean that you are taking testimony?

SECRETARY:

Yes, I understand so. We are taking steps to preserve that evidence, which means that we must be taking testimony.

GENERAL SURLES:

Yes, we are working with the Navy Department.

PRESS:

Could you say who is taking that testimony?

SECRETARY:

I think that is a matter which is usually not discussed in public—a lawyer perhaps.
PRESS:

I think the reason the question was asked is because the Navy Department announced that Admiral Hart would be the officer in charge of assembling the testimony in the Navy. We wondered if you had designated a specific officer for that.

SECRETARY:

I can't answer that. I didn't know that Admiral Hart had been appointed. My information was just as I put it, that we are acting with the Navy to preserve that testimony.
Subject: Detail of officers as observers with the board of officers investigating the Japanese Attack of December 7, 1941.

To: The Adjutant General, U. S. Army.

1. At the request of the War Department, on September 20, 1943, I signed an agreement not to plead the statute of limitations in bar of my trial by General Court-Martial in open court for any alleged offenses with which I may be charged relating to the period on or before December 7, 1941, should the trial be held during the present war or within six months thereafter. I understand that in accordance with a recent act of Congress, the War Department is under consideration the appointment of a board of officers for the purpose of investigating and reporting the facts concerning the attack by the Japanese upon the Territory of Hawaii on December 7, 1941.

2. I am now and always have been willing to face a court-martial or a court of inquiry at the earliest possible moment to answer for any deficiencies implied or alleged against me for which apparently I was unjustly relieved from command. It is my assumption that the proposed board is being convened for the purpose of determining any and all alleged improper acts or omissions on my part on or before December 7, 1941. In order to expedite any future trial, I herewith request that I be permitted to have a seat with the Board at the examination of all witnesses to officers of my selection to represent me at such hearings as well as to cross-examine all witnesses appearing before the Board. I desire to point out that in the event of my being required to meet any future resultant charges, this privilege will greatly enable the time necessary adequately to prepare my defense. I desire to point out also that such representation will assist in bringing to light more clearly my position and the situation prior to and on December 7, 1941, and thus present a more complete picture to the Board and the Secretary of War. It is urged that this request be granted in fairness to the undersigned as well as to the United States, as in the end it should result in the saving of time for all concerned.

3. If the above-mentioned request is granted I shall be glad to submit the names of the officers whom I desire to represent me.

Walter C. Short,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.
WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
PERSONNEL, DIVISION G-1
WASHINGTON

MYAP 201 Short, Walter C. 21 July 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR LT. GEN. GEORGE C. GURHART, USA,
President, Pearl Harbor Investigation Board, directed by
Public Law 332, 78th Congress.

The request of Major General Walter C. Short,
USA Retired, contained in the attached memorandum for The
Adjutant General, dated 16 July 1944, is referred to your
board for remark and recommendation in consultation with
the Office of The Judge Advocate General.

[Signature]

R. E. White,
Major General,
Assistant Chief of Staff.

Encl.
Memo to TAG (18 Jul 44)
fr Gen Short.
201-SHORT, Walter C.
Headquarters Army Pearl Harbor Board, Munitions Building, Washington, D.C.,
26 July 1944.

To: The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, War Department.

1. Following consultation with the Office of the Judge Advocate General the Board has considered the various factors involved and concluded that the request of Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army, Retired, that he be permitted to have sit with the Board at the examination of all witnesses two officers of his selection, to represent him at such hearings as well as to cross-examine all witnesses appearing before the Board, should be denied.

2. Although it is recognized that certain advantages might be gained were the request granted, it is believed that such a course of action would also entail numerous undesirable consequences, a consideration of which suggests the advisability of not permitting the requested procedure.

3. In this connection it is pertinent to note that the Board is merely a fact finding agency of the War Department, and not initially charged with an investigation of any specific alleged acts of commission or omission on the part of Major General Short or any other individual in the military service. However, should substantial evidence of such acts be adduced, the Board contemplates affording an early opportunity to the individual or individuals concerned to appear before it, with or without counsel, and to testify, call witnesses, and offer anything that may be desired in his or their behalf. The Board also contemplates permitting such person or persons again to appear after all other evidence has been adduced, to offer anything further that may be desired in his or their behalf.

4. It appears proper to point out that in the event formal charges should result from the Board’s investigation, any accused person must also under Article of War 70, be afforded further opportunity fully to present his case prior to any subsequent trial on such charges.

5. It is recommended that Major General Short be advised accordingly.

For the Board:

GEORGE CRUMERT,
Lt. General, U.S. Army,
President.

Incl.

Copy of Memo fm
Gen. Short w/d
Detail of Officers as Observers with the Board of Officers Investigating the Japanese Attack of December 7, 1941

THRU: Commanding General,

Eighth Service Command.

TO: Major General Walter C. Short, U. S. Army, Retired,

XL41 Southwestern Boulevard,

Dallas 5, Texas.

1. Your letter of 18 July 1944, Subject: "Detail of officers as observers with the board of officers investigating the Japanese Attack of December 7, 1941," is acknowledged. Although it is recognized that certain advantages might be gained were the request granted, it is believed that such a course of action would also entail numerous undesirable consequences, a consideration of which suggests the advisability of not permitting the requested procedure.

2. In this connection it is pertinent to note that the Board is merely a fact finding agency of the War Department, and not initially charged with an investigation of any specific alleged acts of commission or omission on the part of any individual in the military service. However, should substantial evidence of such acts be adduced, the Board contemplates affording an early opportunity to the individual or individuals concerned to appear before it, with or without counsel, and to testify, call witnesses, and offer anything that may be desired in his or their behalf. The Board also contemplates permitting such person or persons again to appear after all other evidence has been adduced, to offer anything further that may be desired in his or their behalf.

3. It appears proper to point out that in the event formal charges should result from the Board's investigation, any accused person must also under Article of War 70, be afforded further opportunity fully to present his case prior to any subsequent trial on such charges. Consequently, your request that you be permitted to designate two officers of your selection to represent you at hearings before the Board of Officers appointed under the provisions of Public Law 399, 78th Congress, is denied.

By order of the Secretary of War,

[Signature]

J. A. U. D.,

Major General,
The Adjutant General.
WAR DEPARTMENT—OFFICIAL BUSINESS

OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

Office of origin:  War Department—Office of the Adjutant General
Office of destination:  W. D., A. G. O., Post  The Adjutant General

Date:  2 August 1944
Telephone:  79772

To:  COMMANDING GENERAL SIXTH SERVICE COMMAND

TRANSMIT FOLLOWING TO MAJOR GENERAL WALTER C. SHORT U.S. Army Retired State Army Pearl Harbor Board contemplates calling you as a witness in Washington DC on Thursday August tenth stop the Board invites you to furnish it by air mail at once room four seven four three munitions building a suggested list of witnesses which in your opinion have knowledge of facts clearing upon the investigation stop your request for copy Roberts Commission Report approved stop anticipate the photostatic copy same will be completed and available upon your arrival Washington stop other requests regarding counsel being considered request you acknowledge receipt of this radiogram SPIO dash M and inform this office when list of witnesses may be expected unquote

ULIO THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

Distribution:
Classified Message Center:
Secretary, General Staff:
Operations Div. NDM:
Army Pearl Harbor Board, Rm 4743 Munitions.

W. D., A. G. O. Post No. 309
September 1, 1944

70718 0—46—pt. 19—29
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

TO: The Adjutant General.

As to General Short's requests, the following is recommended:

a. That his request to be furnished with a copy of his testimony before the Board be granted.

b. That his request that he immediately be furnished a copy of the testimony taken to date by the Board and that hereafter he be furnished with a copy of the remainder of the testimony from day to day as it is taken, be denied.

The Board does not believe it wise to grant these requests because of the danger of publicity, the granting to one witness what is denied to others, and the possible jumping to conclusions as to the Board's report before all evidence has been received, sifted and conclusions thereon reached. However, the Board has no objection to having General Short or his advisor, General Green, at the Board's headquarters peruse and study the record of testimony taken now and when the Board returns to Washington prior to a rehearing of General Short.

(Over)
For the recent investigation and hearing, General Green, have decided upon the question of the President and cabinet. However, your message about the signing of the army and navy orders and related matters were dealt with the Army.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

L. Jan., Chief, Army
President.

[Enclosure]

From: Officers Branch
To: The Judge Advocate General

For Record.

[Signature]

[Enclosure]

From: Officers Branch
To: The Judge Advocate General

For Record.
I cannot see where any harm will be done by giving General Short a
copy of the testimony already taken, less exhibits, and, from now on,
the day to day stenographic transcript. As to the danger of publicity,
after all, he has already been furnished a copy of the full Roberts' report
containing the stenographic transcript, etc. Also, giving General Short
the day to day transcript will serve to keep him currently advised of the
testimony, which will enable him to prepare in advance his own testimony
in answer thereto if he wishes to offer such testimony. This will avoid the
delay which would be caused at the end of the case by being compelled to
allow General Short additional time to read over the voluminous record
preparatory to his possible reappearance before the Board and the possible
production of witnesses on his behalf. The closing of the entire case
and the filing of the Board's report at the earliest possible moment is,
of course, of the utmost importance.

MYRON C. CRAMER

Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.

 Hughes, 'Jr., -rs/vsf

All notes and rough drafts have been
destroyed.

Custodian, C.

Disinterested officer
I. That the request of Major General Walter C. Short is approved, as concurred in by the TJAG, in the second indorsement.

II. That all concerned be advised accordingly.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1r

[Signature]

[Date: 20 August 1944]

[Inclosure]

Informal action sheet

fr AOO to 0-1, 18 Aug 44,
w/incl.

WEEKLY RANTUM FOR RECORD: In the attached letter, General Short requests to be furnished with a copy of his testimony before the Pearl Harbor Board; a copy of the testimony taken to date by the Board; and that hereafter he be furnished with a copy of the remainder of the testimony from day to day as it is taken. He also requests access to all the exhibits from time to time. The President of the Board recommends that General Short's request be furnished with a copy of the testimony taken to date by the Board and that hereafter he be furnished with a copy of the remainder of the testimony from day to day as it is taken, be denied. TJAG concurs in General Short's request.

[Date: Aug 22 1941]

NOTED-DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF

CONFIDENTIAL
WAR DEPARTMENT
Room 1044, Benjamin Building,
Washington

11 August 1944.

SUBJECT: Request for Copy of Testimony Given Before the Board of Officers.

TO: The Adjutant General of the Army.

1. On appearing this morning before the special Board of Officers holding a hearing in connection with the investigation of the facts surrounding the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, I requested to be furnished with a copy of my testimony before the Board as soon as practicable and likewise requested that I be provided with a copy of all of the testimony taken by the Board before the Board proceedings are concluded. I made these requests for the purpose of examining and reviewing the same so that if any supplementary or explanatory statements were desirable I might have the further opportunity of presenting them in order that the said Board might have the full advantage of my intimate knowledge of the facts as they existed at that time. The Chairman of the Board stated that my requests were of such a nature that they should be decided by the War Department and suggested that I make direct application concerning the same.

2. Accordingly, I request that as soon as practicable I be furnished with a copy of my testimony before the Board. I request also that immediately I be furnished a copy of the testimony taken to date by the Board and that hereafter I be furnished with a copy of the remainder of the testimony from day to day as it is taken. I also request access to all of the exhibits from time to time. The Board appears to have three reporters for the purpose of expediting the transcribing of the testimony and I believe approval of my requests would present no administrative difficulty.

3. In order to expedite matters, I request that these copies be given to Brigadier General T. H. Green, 2056 Benjamin Building, who will forward same to me wherever I happen to be.

/s/ Walter C. Short
/s/ WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General, U. S. Army.
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

DJFC-3/F 23A Short, Walter G., 1st Ind. (11 Aug 44)


THRU: Brigadier General T. H. Greene, En 2364, Munitions Hldg. Washington D.C.

TO: Major General Walter G. Short, U.S. Army, Retired.

The request of Major General Walter G. Short, U.S. Army, Retired, to be furnished with a copy of the testimony taken to date by the Army Pearl Harbor Board, less available, and that thereafter to be furnished with a copy of the remainder of the testimony from day to day as it is taken, is approved.

By order of the Secretary of War:

J A. ULY

J. A. ULY
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

Copy for, TJAG, re 2nd Ind, SPUGJ 1944/8535

WJH, Jr. 77535

17 Aug 44, stating that no harm can be seen in furnishing Maj Gen Short a copy of the testimony already taken, and day to day stenographic transcript.

AUG
CONFIDENTIAL
3141 Southeastern Boulevard,
Dallas 3, Texas.
August 31, 1944.

SUBJECT: Synopses of Testimony taken before the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

TO: The Adjutant General of the Army.


2. It would greatly facilitate matters if I was furnished with copies of the synopses of testimony being prepared by the Army Pearl Harbor Board for its use. I therefore request that in addition to full transcript of the testimony there be furnished to me at this time a copy of the synopses of testimony already prepared for use by the Board and that I be furnished with copies of the future synopses as and when they are prepared.

3. As there will be a large amount of testimony for me to examine and as time is of the essence I request that action on this request be expedited as much as practicable.

4. In order to expedite matters I request that the copies of synopses be delivered to my counsel, Brigadier General T. H. Green, 20% Munitions Building, who will forward them to me.

Walter C. Short,
Major General, U.S. Army, Retired.
AGPO-W 201 Short, Walter C. 1st Ind. ACK/ab/2146 (3: 21 Sep 44)

WD, ACO, Washington 25, D.C., 1 September 1944.

TO: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board, Bldg 36, Presidio of San Francisco, San Francisco, Calif.

For remark.

By order of the Secretary of War:

J. A. ULD
Major General
The Adjutant General

AGPO-W 201 Short, Walter C. 2nd Ind. 09/4th
Army Pearl Harbor Board, 20 September 1944.

To: The Adjutant General, U.S. Army, Washington, D.C.

1. The analyses referred to are not as yet the official record of the Board and will not be until verified and accepted in whole or in part. At present they merely are work sheets being compiled by officers loaned to assist the Board.

2. Further, there is but one complete copy of the analyses sheets referred to and the Board will need this copy for study until it completes its report, whereupon that copy may or may not become a permanent part of the record. Nor can that copy, of which there are between four and five hundred sheets, be spared by the Board to have copies thereof made.

3. Hence disapproval of General Short's request now, or in the future, is recommended.

For the Board:

George C. Marshall
Lt. Gen., U. S. A.
President
The Judge Advocate General

25 September 1944

Synopsis of Testimony taken before the
Army Pearl Harbor Board.

Officers Br., AOD  Rem 2441

Majutians 78978

For review and recommendation. The original correspondence with
two inroomments has not as yet reached this office.

1 incl.
Cy, ltr. 31 Aug 44, w/2 Inds.

K. B. Rush, COL, AOD
Chief, Officers Branch.

SDJ 1944/0335

To: The Adjutant General. Attention: Officer's Branch, Room 1030,
Munitions Building.

As it appears from second intercom from the Pearl Harbor Board to
The Adjutant General, dated 27 September 1944, that the synopses of
testimony requested by General Short in the basic communication are not
yet completed and at the present time are merely worksheets which do not
in any way constitute the official action of the Board and as, in any
event, the Board states it can not at the present time spare those
papers, it is recommended that General Short be advised that the
requested synopses can not under the circumstances be furnished him.

For The Judge Advocate General:

R. H. Kaakel,
Colonel, J.A.O.D.,
Chief, Military Justice Division.

1 incl.

n/c
**CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

War Department General Staff  
Disposition Form  
Personnel Division, 0-1

**File:** WDAP Col Short, Walter C.  
**Date:** 1 October 1944.  
**Subject:** General Officer.

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That the attached correspondence be returned by endorsement in accordance with the recommendation of The Judge Advocate General, as contained in the attached Transmittal Sheet SP30J 1944/3835, 28 September 1944.

For the Assistant Chief of Staff, O-11

LG. WALKER: JR.
Lt Col. G S O
Assistant Executive

**MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:** In basic communication Major General Walter C. Short requests that in addition to full transcript of testimony there be furnished him a copy of the synopses of testimony already prepared for use by the Board, and that he be furnished with a copy of the future synopses as and when they are prepared. Lieutenant General George Grunert, President of the Board, recommends disapproval in 2nd endorsement. The JAO recommends that General Short be advised that the requested synopses cannot under the circumstances be furnished.

**OCT 2, 1944**

NOTED-OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

CONFIDENTIAL

ASAP H. C. Short, Walter C., 1st Lieut. (31 Aug 44)

816, ACO, Washington 25, D. C., 6 October 1944.

TO: Brigadier General T. H. Green, U. S. Army, Re 201 Short, Walter C., Go.


The synopsis of testimony requested in the basic communication are not yet completed and are merely worksheets which do not in any way constitute the official action of the Board and as the Board can not at the present time spare these papers, the requested synopsis can not under the circumstances be furnished.

By order of the Secretary of War

J. A. OLD

DISTRIBUTION:

G-1 "309, Re 25925

The Judge Advocate General, re Transmittal Sheet, 26 Sep 44, SPGD 1944/0535.


20 Sep 44, ACO-4, 201 Short, Walter C., Go.

Brigadier General T. H. Green, U. S. Army, Re 201 Short, Walter C., Go.

Munitions Bldg. Washington 25, D. C.
MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL GROVER:

Enclosed is a copy of a letter dated September 29, 1944, signed by Major General Walter J. Short, Retired, along with a reply to General Short which has been signed by the Secretary of War.

The Secretary of War directs that these be forwarded for appropriate action by your board.

JOSPEH T. MCCNARNEY
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Deputy Chief of Staff

COPY FOR
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

CONFIDENTIAL
Honorable Henry L. Stimson,
Secretary of War,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The testimony which was taken before the so-called Roberts Commission and that currently being taken in the hearing now pending before the Army Pearl Harbor Board was recently made available to me. Upon examining these records, to which none of the exhibits have been attached, I fail to find a disclosure of certain vital information which high Washington officials appear to have had prior to December 7, 1941, of the imminence of an attack by the Japanese. Such information was not made available to me in the exercise of my command in the Hawaiian Islands. As I understand that the Army Pearl Harbor Board is now about to complete its hearings and since this important factual data is not included in the testimony of the Board thus far furnished to me, I feel compelled to call this matter to your attention.

From statements in the records of these two hearings, it is to be noted that a knowledge of pertinent facts which are not later disclosed in the record is inferred. This important factual information is essential to a full appraisal of the situation. I specifically refer to the following instances: On pages 318 and 319 of the testimony taken before the Roberts Commission the questions asked by Justice Roberts indicate that as chairman of the commission he was in possession of facts of the utmost importance to this case which pointed to a definite warning of an attack against Pearl Harbor which apparently was known to officials in Washington from certain intercepted Japanese code messages. So far as I have been able to learn these facts are not a part of the record of these hearings.

Again in the testimony of Admiral Kimmel before the Army Pearl Harbor Board (Vol. XXI, page 1811) it is clearly indicated that certain vital information was in the hands of the War and Navy Departments regarding the imminence of an attack, which information was certainly not transmitted to me. The information upon which he based this statement is likewise not a part of the record of the hearings. Without a doubt he would not have made such a statement if he did not have evidence to support it.

It is also respectfully pointed out that General Marshall had some important information on which he relied at the time he

3141 Southwestern Boulevard,
Dallas 5, Texas,

September 29, 1944.
sent me the coded telegram (referred to at Vol. IV, page 309, of Pearl Harbor Board testimony) under date of December 7, 1941, which unfortunately did not reach me until seven hours after the attack. The information upon which General Marshall must have relied in sending this message likewise does not appear in the record before the Board thus far furnished me.

The facts upon which these actions and statements were based clearly go to the very essence of the present inquiry. I believe, therefore, you will readily agree that a full and complete disclosure of all the information which was in the hands of Washington officials prior to December 7, 1941, with regard to the imminence of an attack, should be obtained and made a matter of record in the proceedings of the current investigation as they are of the utmost importance in appraising this entire situation.

As the perfecting of the record in this investigation is of course of great importance to me personally, I urge that no steps be left unturned to make a complete investigation of the same, so that all of the evidence concerning this matter is in the record of the hearings of the Board. It is therefore urgently requested that the Board delay the completion of its proceedings until such time as this can be accomplished. In this connection I request also that my counsel be given access to all War Department records which would be pertinent to this matter.

Furthermore, if a thorough investigation of the War Department records by the Board and by my counsel do not disclose the facts and evidence upon which the statements and actions above referred to were made, I request that an appropriate call be made upon any other source which might have such pertinent information, particularly the Navy Department, and that they be required to furnish and make all such evidence available to the Board and to my counsel.

The War Department has denied my request to have a representative at the Board proceedings and to cross-examine witnesses and therefore unless my request herein is granted there is no means available to me by which I may be assured that all the pertinent evidence will be made available to the Board and to me.

Sincerely,

Walter C. Short,
Major General, U.S. Army, Retired.
October 2, 1944.

Major General Walter C. Short, USA Retired,
3711 Southwestern Boulevard,
Dallas 5, Texas.

Dear General Short:

Your letter of 29 September 1944 is being placed in the
hands of the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

This Board was appointed by my order to ascertain and report
to me the facts relating to the attack made upon the Territory of Hawaii
on 7 December 1941, and to make such recommendations as it may deem
proper. You may therefore rest assured that the Board is exploring
all sources of evidence bearing upon the subject.

I am directing General Omerert to permit your Military Counsel
to examine its exhibits in the presence of a member of the Board. No
copies of these exhibits, however, may be made.

I am also directing that appropriate warnings relating to
military security be given to your counsel for the information and guid-
ance of all concerned.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY L.
Secretary of War.

C. Y. FOR
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Cunmert
General Russell
General Frank
General Greens
Colonel Tuchman
Colonel North
Colonel Hughes
Major Glierson
Captain Burkart
Lieutenant Murphy
Mr. Markins
Sergeant Montgomery
Miss Brunson

1. The copies of our Transcript to date of departure marked "Copy for General Cunmert" and original of all exhibits will be taken with us. The other four (4) copies will be left behind. This includes Volumes 1-15, inclusive.

2. While absent from Washington, two copies of our daily transcript, i.e., those marked for General Cunmert and General Russell, will be retained with the Board. As soon as corrections are completed, the other three (3) copies will be mailed to the Board Headquarters in Washington, to be numbered and utilized by digesting staff. This includes Volume 16 (testimony of 28 Aug. 1944) and subsequent volumes of testimony taken outside of Washington.

3. The copies of Transcript marked "For the Recorder" will be turned over to General Short (through his counsel, General Green) as soon as corrections and numbering are completed. The mentioned counsel will also be permitted to examine copies of all exhibits to the proceedings but will not be furnished copies.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
Room 4741, Munitions Building
2 September 1944

Colonel Charles W. Hest, Recorder
Army Pearl Harbor Board
Building 36, Presidio of San Francisco
San Francisco, California

Dear Colonel:

I enclose herewith copy of memorandum I have today sent to
Major H. R. Powell, G.S.C., who is acting on behalf of Brigadier
General J. S. Bragdon, counsel for Colonel Hyman.

I wrote this letter after considerable thought and consulta-
tion with General Blades, as there would be a distinct embarrass-
ment involved in giving General Bragdon a copy of Major Clausen’s
memorandum of 10 July 1944 to Mr. Amberg. This memorandum is
referred to, as you will note, in the memorandum of the Acting
Secretary of War to the Judge Advocate General dated 12 July 1944.
In spite of this fact, it was felt that General Bragdon, as counsel,
had a right to the order referring the Hyman case to the Board. In
the event General Bragdon follows up the present request by request-
ing Major Clausen’s memorandum, I shall, unless instructed to the
contrary by the Board, decline to give it to him on the ground that
it contains confidential information to which he is not entitled.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM J. HUGHES, JR.
Colonel, J.W.V.

Incl-Copy of same to
Major Powell with incls
HEADQUARTERS, ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
Room 1711, Munitions Building

2 September 1944


Subject: Order Creating Pearl Harbor Board and Referring Matter of Colonel Theodore Ryman, Jr., to Board

1. Pursuant to your oral request for transmission to Brigadier General J. J. Bragdon, who you state has been appointed counsel for the above-named officer, there is attached hereto copy of confidential order by the Secretary of War dated 8 July 1944 creating the Pearl Harbor Board, copy of supplemental order of the Secretary of War dated 1 July 1944, and copy of confidential memorandum of the Acting Secretary of War dated 1 July 1944 referring the matter of the investigation of Colonel Theodore Ryman, Jr., and any others who might be involved in Hawaiian defense projects to the Pearl Harbor Board.

WILLIAM J. HUGHES, JR.
Colonel, J.A.G.O.
Officer in Charge

3 Inc1
Inc1: Confidential
Dtd: 8 July 44
Inc2: Issued order of 3/4
Dtd: 1 July 44
Inc3: Confidential of Acting S/4
Dtd: 17 July 44
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Due to the nature of the document, it is not possible to transcribe the content accurately. The text appears to be a mixture of printed and handwritten elements, which makes it challenging to provide a clear representation.

CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONFIDENTIAL

By order of the Secretary of War

J. D. Dug
Major General
The Adjutant General
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

1. The board appointed by letter orders, this office, AMC A-L. A 810. 31 (26 Jun 44), 9 July 1944, subject: "Orders", as amended by letter orders, this office, AMC A-L. A 210. 211 (10 Jul 44), 11 July 1944, subject: "Amendment of Orders", pertaining to each of the following-named officers, will consider the phase which related to the Pearl Harbor Disaster of the report of the House Military Affairs Committee, as directed by the Acting Secretary of War in his memoranda for the Judge Advocate General, 13 July 1944:

Lt. Gen. George C. Kenney, USA,
Maj. Gen. Henry D. Russell, USAFFE, USA,
Maj. Gen. Walter E. Frank, CSM2, USA,
Col. Charles W. West, USAFFE, USA.

2. Major Henry G. Clausen, O 807813, JAGG, is appointed as Assistant Recorder without vote on the above referred to Board.

By order of the Secretary of War:

[Signature]

Adjutant General.

Distribution:
O Statistics Br, CS, M 38050, The Pentagon.
Of Br Sec, Br 1005, Munitions Bldg. w/d
Col. Burger, M 1055, Munitions Bldg. w/d
1. Each officer's 201 file.
AC of 8, OPD, WD, M 38400, The Pentagon.
CS, Army Air Forces, M 601092, The Pentagon.
The Judge Advocate General, M 2761, Munitions Bldg.
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONFIDENTIAL

July 24, 1960

Subject: Report of Pearl Harbor attack including negligent administration of Selective Service System, Inc., and related

1. The recommendations contained in paragraph 2 of the memorandum dated July 10, 1948, of Major General C. L. Crampton, Chief, Office of Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, on the same subject, are

2. Immediately upon the appointment of a board of officers pursuant to Public Law 339, with powers, to investigate the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor attack, the names of the necessary

3. As it is understood Major Crampton will be detailed as assistant recorder of this board, he will continue in that capacity to coordinate the activities referred to paragraph 2 hereof with the activities of the Pearl Harbor board in the present case.

(Signed)

Robert P. Patterson
Deputy Secretary of War.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD
Room 4741, Munitions Building
4 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL J. A. SEITZ, G. &., OOF, Room C830, Pentagon

Subject: List of Personnel Relating and Accompanying the Army Pearl Harbor Board to Hawaii.

Pursuant to your request by telephone on 4 September 1944, that you be furnished with a complete list of all the personnel including and accompanying the Army Pearl Harbor Board on its trip to Hawaii, the names of such personnel are as follows:

Lt. Gen. George C. Marcy, 01554, USA
Maj. Gen. Henry H. Boll, 012769, USA
Maj. Gen. Walter H. Frank, 057971, USA
Col. Charles H. Hart, 017774, JAG
Col. Harry L. Toolin, 0905430, AC
Lt. Colonel Charles K. Nelson, Jr., 0957164, AC
Maj. Henry L. Clausen, 0907613, JAG
Maj. Robert G. Hurt, 01900134, AOE
Capt. James L. Murray, Jr., 0513430, AC
Capt. John K. Montgomery, 30816271
Mr. Lloyd L. Nicholas
Mr. Earl W. Dewall
Mr. H. R. O'Connor
Mr. Stephen S. Mason
Mr. Leon E. Golding
Mr. Verle C. Brown

WILLIAM J. HUGHES, JR.
Colonel J.A.G.
Officer in Charge
Colonel William J. Hughes, JAGD
Room 4741, Munitions Building,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Colonel Hughes:

Three copies of all volumes of the transcript covering our San Francisco hearings to include number 23, which was the last testimony taken there, were duly transmitted to you by registered mail prior to our departure from that place. This was in accordance with my memorandum dated 24 August 1944, a copy of which was furnished you and Major Burk- hart.

Our schedule of operations here has been a rather intensive one and it has been somewhat difficult for the Board members to keep the record "read". However, they do not want the record send back there to run out of copy. Therefore, it has been decided not to wait until the records are read and corrections are made on all copies (as per plan set forth in previous memorandum) but to send you two copies of each volume as soon as available and before corrections are made. These two will be those marked Secretary of War and Recorder. If you are still transmitting the latter to General Green on behalf of General Short, it should be explained to him that slight minor corrections may later have to be made. So far as Burkhart's crew is concerned, I may say that usually the corrections to be made are of an obvious or minor nature. They will usually pick up any glaring error which may creep in.

In accordance with the foregoing remarks there is being transmitted to you via earliest available transportation, two copies each of volumes 24 - 27 inclusive, and subsequent copies will be forwarded as soon as completed.

Trusting that everything is working along all right and look forward to seeing you again, am, with the best regards.

[Signature]

13 September 1944
MEMORANDUM FOR JIGADIER GENERAL JOHN N.inee.

Subject: Pearl Harbor Board Proceedings.

1. I discussed the Pearl Harbor matter with General McCormack this morning and he told me that when the Board had made its report it would very probably be referred to me in the usual course for opinion. In that event I pointed out that the time element was such that either I or someone in my office ought to begin to familiarize himself with the testimony in order that no undue delay should occur at this end. General McCormack stated he wished this procedure to be followed and to advise the Pearl Harbor Board accordingly.

2. I would like you, therefore, to inform the Board of the above and to have Colonel Hughes familiarize himself with the testimony so as to be able to assist me when the time comes.

Myron C. Kramer,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.

Hughes, W.J. Jr.--tn
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION

SSSSSa^:

[Image 0x0 to 482x812]

The report of the Army Board which was appointed to assist the Secretary of War in investigating the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe has now been received by the Secretary.

The Secretary has referred this report, which is based on testimony taken during the last three months and recorded in nearly 8,000 pages, to the Judge Advocate General for consideration. The Secretary will also personally review the report and such part of the record as may be advisable.

The report has been classified by the Army Board partly as SECRET and partly as TOP SECRET, and this classification will be reviewed for security by appropriate military authorities.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESS:

The following is the text of a question and the reply made by the Secretary of War at his press conference on October 26, 1944:

PRESS:

Can you disclose whatever you can about the nature of the Army's Pearl Harbor report? Does it recommend court-martial action against General Short or any other Army officers? Does it alter in any way the Army's expressed plan to hold a trial after the war is over of General Short? Is there any chance any part of the report or a summary thereof will reach the public prior to election day, or prior to the end of the war, or ever? When will it be made available to Congress?

SECRETARY:

Have you ever read the statute under which my duties are combined?

PRESS:

I read that and couldn't find it called for a report to Congress on that thing.

SECRETARY:

Then, why do you ask the question? I am going to follow this statute:

"The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are severally directed to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophes described in Section I above and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts may justify."

That is the duty of the law under which I am acting. I do not care to comment on any future action on the Pearl Harbor report of the board which was appointed to assist me, except to say that I shall give this report the consideration necessary in order to carry out the serious duty by which I was charged by this act of Congress. The present status of the report is as given in the press release last Monday immediately after the report was handed to me.
Memorandum:

Do I take the legal view of the matter? I do not.

I am of the opinion that there is a case of such a nature that it should not be referred to the Army.

Rt. General.

G. M.
By Joint Resolution of the Congress, approved June 13, 1944, the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy were severally directed to proceed with an investigation into the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts might justify. In order to meet the wishes of Congress as expressed in this resolution, I have conducted such an investigation. In order to assist me to this end, there was appointed by order dated July 8, 1944, a Board of three general officers which was directed "to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941 and to make such recommendations as it might deem proper."

This Army Pearl Harbor Board has conducted an extensive and painstaking investigation. It has held hearings in Hawaii, San Francisco, and Washington. It has examined a total of 151 witnesses and received many exhibits. I have read its report and examined such parts of the evidence taken as I deemed necessary. The Judge Advocate General of the Army, at my direction, has also examined the report and the record and has given me fully the benefit of his views.

I recognize the importance to any individual concerned of having a decision taken as to what, if any, action is to be instituted against him and, after weighing all the considerations, I am clear that the public interest as well as justice and fairness will best be served by a statement of my present conclusions. So far as they may be made public, consonant with the public interest, my conclusions are as follows:
The Army Pearl Harbor Board, although it recommended no disciplinary or other action, concluded that there were several officers in the field and in the War Department who did not perform their duties with the necessary skill or exercise the judgment which was required under the circumstances. On the recorded evidence, I agree with some but not all of the Board’s conclusions.

As far as the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department is concerned, I am of the opinion that his errors of judgment were of such a nature as to demand his relief from a Command status. This was done on January 11, 1942, and in itself is a serious result for any officer with a long record of excellent service, and conscientious as I believe General Short to be. In my judgment, on the evidence now recorded, it is sufficient action.

Furthermore, I am satisfied that proper steps were taken to correct such inadequacies of either personnel or organization as were shown to exist either in the War Department or in the field at the time of the Pearl Harbor disaster. My conclusion is that under all the circumstances the evidence now recorded does not warrant the institution of any further proceedings against any officer in the Army.

In accordance with the opinion of the Judge Advocate General, I have decided that my own investigation should be further continued until all the facts are made as clear as possible and until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts can be obtained, and I have given the necessary directions to accomplish this result.

Some of the testimony may be much delayed where witnesses are engaged
in combat in active theaters of operation. My present decision will be reviewed when the investigation has been finally completed.

Finally, I am absolutely clear that it would be highly prejudicial to the successful prosecution of the war and the safety of American lives to make public at the present time the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board or the record on which it is based.

Furthermore, to publish merely portions of the Board's report or record would necessarily distort the facts and the conclusions, which would likewise be against the public interest.
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
WAR DEPARTMENT
CLASSIFIED MESSAGE CENTER
OUTGOING CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

OFC-3869R (29 Aug 44)

Subject: Visits of Gen. Braden to FPA

OCT. Pacific Theater Sec.

29 August 1944

Commanding General

WAR in Pacific Ocean Area

Fort Shafter, T. H.

Number WAR 38692

To Richardson from Somervell signed Marshall.

Orders are being requested for Brigadier General J. S. Braden to proceed to Hawaii in connection with the Army Pearl Harbor Board hearings there. General Braden will act as counsel for Colonel Wynn who will appear before board. It is desired that these officers reach Hawaii on or about 10 September. It is requested that you have the department engineer have the records pertaining to the construction of aircraft warning stations, the war reserve gasoline project and all work pertaining to both, also the records pertaining to the Rohi Connolly contract and any other contracts for work or materials relating to the above projects, reviewed and a chronological analysis made thereof so that it will be available for the officers above. It is particularly desirable that there be a chronological record of the actual work done and of all delays in connection therewith, with reasons therefor. Also that local priorities and changes therein be listed according to their occurrence. It is further suggested that the analysis be developed under the three general headings of: (a) The project for the aircraft warning stations; (b) The war reserve.

CM-OUT-38692 (30 Aug 44)

SECRET

THE MAKING OF AN EXACT COPY OF THIS MESSAGE IS FORBIDDEN

COPY NO. 18
1. It is my opinion that court-martial jurisdiction to hear and determine offenses, or to receive and consider information in connection with the investigation made by the Army Pearl Review Board, as of or in connection with the discharge or reinstatement of a member of the National Guard of the United States, is subject to military law only when an active duty, and not to offenses involving violations of Articles of War 30, 50, and 57, where jurisdiction over the offense is vested under other laws. As a general rule, jurisdiction as to an offense committed during a period of service which has then been terminated is not revived by a recent entry into the military service. Under Articles of War 30, retired officers and enlisted men of the Regular Army remain subject to military law.

2. Any person who willfully communicates or transmits, or attempts to communicate or transmit, any document, writing or note relating to the national defense to any person not entitled to receive it is subject to prosecution under the provisions of the Espionage Act (sec. 1, Title I, act of 15 June 1917 (40 Stat. 527)), sec. 1, act of 28 Mar. 1918 (52 Stat. 79); 30 U.S.C. 31). The Department of Justice has informally expressed its view that the unauthorized disclosure of classified information would constitute a violation of the mentioned statutes, but would be willing to recommend such action if necessary.

HINCH C. CRANE
Byron G. Crane,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.
MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL WILLIAM J. HUGHES, JR., J.A.G.D., ROOM 2714
MUNITIONS BUILDING, EXTENSION 77535

The Secretary of War directs that the combination of the outer safe in room 4D-854, be given to Colonel Edward F. Meachling, Executive Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, upon the following understanding:

a. The inner safe will remain where it is, without access.

b. The combination to the outer safe will be disclosed to no more than two officers.

c. The door to the outer safe will not be allowed to remain open unless an officer is in attendance.

d. The occupants of the room, entrance to which is obtained through the outer safe, will vacate the room for such period of time as Lieutenant Colonel Henry C. Clausen, JAGD, may require to enable him to complete the present work assigned to him by the Secretary of War.

e. Colonel Meachling will acknowledge the above by appropriate indorsement hereon.

Harvey H. Bundy
Special Assistant to the Secretary of War
February 1, 1942

Mr. President: As Secretary of War;

Washington, D.C.

My dear Sir:

I am in receipt of letters from several of my constituents protesting against the retirement of General Short and Admiral Kimmel, a copy of one of which I am enclosing. I shall be most pleased if you will advise me of the present status of this matter.

Very sincerely,

Carl Hayden
DO NOT DETACH THIS SHEET

OFFICE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

Date

To

Adj. General.
Under Sec. of War.
Asst. Sec. of War.
Asst. Sec. of War (Air).
Asst. Chief Clerk.
Chief of Staff.
Chief of Engrs.
Chief of Ord.

Panama Canal.
Dir. Personnel.
Chief, Air Corps.
Chief of Finance.
Q. M. General.
Judge Advocate Gen.
Public Relations.
Chief Signal Corps.

For

Necessary action.
Direct reply.
Necessary action and preparation of reply for signature of Secretary of War.
Necessary action and preparation of reply for signature of Administrative Assistant.
Remarks and recommendation.
Memorandum for Sec. of War or Administrative Asst. Investigation and report.
Notation and filing
Noted by Sec. of War or Administrative Asst. and returned for filing.
Previous papers.
Mark "Personal attention of Administrative Asst."
Correction.
Remarks:

By direction of the Secretary of War:

JOHN W. MARTYN,
Administrative Assistant.

Form No. 8
WD 201 Short, Walter C.
(2-14-42)

Honorable Carl Hayden,
United States Senate.

Dear Senator Hayden:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter of February 14, 1942, requesting information as to the present retirement status of General Short and Admiral Kimmel, and enclosing copy of a letter from one of your constituents, Mrs. F. N. Guild of Tucson, Arizona, in which she protests the retirement of these two officers.

The conditions surrounding the case of Major General Walter C. Short, United States Army, are of very confidential nature; and, in view of the report of Justice Roberts concerning this matter, I feel confident that you will appreciate the necessity for such procedure. As soon as a decision has been reached by the Department, full publicity of the action to be taken will be made.

Since the case of Admiral Kimmel comes under the jurisdiction of the Navy Department, it is suggested that you address the Secretary of the Navy concerning that officer.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Secretary of War, C.W.K.

[Dispatched]
FEB 19 1942

[Stamps and markings]
60 East Short, Walter C.
(11 Sep 1943)

16 September 1943.

Honorable C. Wayland Brooks,
United States Senate.

My dear Senator Brooks:

Your letter of 11 September 1943 concerning Major General Walter C. Short, C-1621, United States Army, Retired, to the Secretary of War, has been referred to me for appropriate reply.

Before appropriate action can be taken, it is necessary that I secure certain information in this matter. I feel certain, therefore, that you will appreciate the necessity for a slight delay before a final reply will be possible.

Very respectfully,

J. A. Uliner,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.
Honorable C. Wyndam Brooks,
United States Senate.

Dear Senator Brooks:

In further reply to your letter of 11 September 1943 inquiring whether the statute of limitations will bar the trial of Major General Walter C. Short (Retired) for alleged offenses committed on or about 7 December 1941, you are advised that the two-year period of the statute of limitations embodied in Article of War 59 will expire 7 December 1943, but that in the meantime General Short has executed a waiver of the statute of limitations. General Short's action in executing a waiver is similar to that of Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel who executed a waiver covering the naval statute of limitations. Public announcement of this effect was made in the press on 8 October 1943.

In answer to your second inquiry as to whether General Short was placed on the retired list following the attack on Pearl Harbor, you are advised that General Short, upon his own application, was retired from active service 28 February 1942, "without condonation of any offense or prejudice to any future disciplinary action".

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd.) HENRY L. STIMSON
Secretary of War.

Copy for The Adjutant General
3910 CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

1st Ind.

To: The Adjutant General (THRU Personnel Division, G-1, war Department General Staff):

1. Enclosed is draft of reply for the signature of the Secretary of War, to letter of Senator C. Wayland Brooks.

2. The return of this file was delayed because of the anticipated public announcement of the signing of a waiver of the statute of limitations by General Short. This announcement appeared in the newspapers of 1 October 1943.

Myron C. Cramer,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.

2 Incl.

Incl. 1 - ARO Transm. Sheet
y-20-43 w/ incla.

Honorable C. Wyland Brooks,
United States Senate.

Dear Senator Brooks:

In further reply to your letter of 11 September 1943 inquiring whether the statute of limitations will bar the trial of Major General Walter C. Short (Retired) for alleged offenses committed on or about 7 December 1941, you are advised that the two-year period of the statute of limitations embodied in Articles of War 39 will expire 7 December 1943, but that in the meantime General Short has executed a waiver of the statute of limitations. General Short's action in executing a waiver is similar to that of Rear Admiral Husband Kimmel who executed a waiver covering the naval statute of limitations. Public announcement to this effect was made in the press on 3 October 1943.

In answer to your second inquiry as to whether General Short was placed on the retired list following the attack on Pearl Harbor, you are advised that General Short, upon his own application, was retired from active service 29 February 1942, "without condemnation of any offense or prejudice to any future disciplinary action."

Sincerely yours,

Secretary of War.
United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS

November 22, 1943

Major General W. C. Cramer
The Judge Advocate General
United States Army
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Cramer:

I am in receipt of a letter from Fred W. Simpson of Colorado Springs, Colorado, as follows:

"The writer begs to again rise to a point of order and ask why Kimmel and Short cannot be court martialed before the statute of limitations bars such a trial, which should be as we understand it before December 7, 1943. The permission given both of these men to retire instead of being tried at once seems to me to be letting them off very easy, to say the least."

It will be appreciated if you will favor me with a reply in duplicate which I may transmit to Mr. Simpson.

Many thanks for your cooperation and courtesy.

Sincerely,
Honorable Edwin C. Johnson,

United States Senate.

Dear Senator Johnson:

Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of 22 November 1943 in which you quote from a letter received by you from Fred W. Simpson, Colorado Springs, Colorado, relative to the statute of limitations barring possible future courts-martial of General Short and Admiral Kimmel.

In a press announcement, 3 October 1943, the Secretary of War stated that General Short had executed an instrument waiving as a defense the statute of limitations should he be tried by court-martial subsequent to 7 December 1943. A similar announcement with reference to Admiral Kimmel was made by the Secretary of the Navy.

Very sincerely yours,

Myron C. Cramer

Myron C. Cramer,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.
Memorable Mr. Mansfield,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Mansfield:

I have your letter of May 10, 1944, requesting to be advised as to the War Department policy with reference to the trial of Lieutenant General Walter C. Short for alleged offenses growing out of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. You point out that the statute of limitations, as extended by Congress, will expire June 7, 1944.

The War Department does not take the view that General Short must be tried before June 7 next. Some time ago General Short executed a waiver of the statute of limitations which operates to extend it until the end of the war and six months thereafter and thus permits his trial irrespective of the date set by the act of Congress referred to by you (Act of December 20, 1943, Public Law 206, 78th Congress). I understand a similar waiver was executed by Admiral Kimmel. Under these circumstances, I do not feel that the trial of this case in time of war is necessary. Such a trial would of necessity be very lengthy, would give publicity to highly confidential matters and would require the attendance of many important Army and Navy officers who at present are engaged in active operations against the enemy all over the world. For these reasons, I feel that it would not only be against the public interest but it would also be highly detrimental to the successful conduct of the war to bring this case to trial during the period of active operations.

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd.) HENRY L. STimson
Secretary of War.

COPY
MEMORANDUM FOR LEGISLATIVE AND LIASON DIVISION, OFFICE CHIEF OF STAFF, ECON 30-31A, THE PENTAGON.

Subject: H. J. Res. 283 “To extend the time limit for immunity”.

1. Transmitted herewith is draft of a letter prepared for the signature of the Under Secretary of War, in reply to a letter dated 18 May 1944, from Honorable Emanuel Celler, in regard to House Joint Resolution 283, purporting to extend the statute of limitations in the Kissel-Short cases and requiring prosecution of these officers within a three months’ period.

2. Attention is invited to the possibility that unless Representative Celler’s letter to the Under Secretary of War is deemed personal, or quasi-official in character, the present matter should, under existing practice, be coordinated with the Bureau of the Budget if the Under Secretary’s reply is to be deemed the official expression of the War Department.

Myron C. Crandall,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.

2 Incls.
Incl. 1 - Husting slip
19 May 44, v/2 incls
Incl. 2 - Draft of reply to Representative Celler.
Honorable Emmanuel Celler,
House of Representatives,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Celler:

In reply to your letter of May 18, 1944, requesting my views as to H. J. Res 283, a Joint Resolution to extend the time limit for immunity from prosecution of persons involved in the attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941, I enclose herewith copy of a letter dated May 18, 1944, from the Secretary of War to Honorable Mike Mansfield which expresses my views on this general subject matter.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Under Secretary of War.

1 Incl.
Copy ltr to Hon. Mike Mansfield fr H/W, 18 May 1944.
United States Senate
WASHINGTON, D.C.

June 3, 1944.

Major General Myron C. Cramer,
The Judge Advocate General,
Headquarters Army Service Forces,
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Cramer:

I am in receipt of your letter of June 1 with reference to the
meaning of "manifest impediment" in Article of War 39 prescribing a
statute of limitations of two years unless some manifest impediment to
trial exists.

I note you now think it is possible that this could be interpreted
to mean that one of the impediments would be if the Government could not
produce witnesses. I am of the opinion that Congress and the people of
the United States could not take a chance on such interpretation. I
think the original opinion of the Attorney General and the authorities
holding that it is an impediment which a man himself creates are the ones
we would have to rely on and that, therefore, an extension of the
statute is essential if we are going to see that justice is really done.
The thing which has troubled me considerably is that the army has not
been fit to take a waiver from anyone other than General Short. They
have assumed on their part, at least up to two days ago, to hold to the
theory that there could be only one person guilty for what happened at
Pearl Harbor. I think this is a wrong presumption. It is for this
reason that I hope an investigation will be made so those who are guilty
will be brought to trial at the earliest possible date consistent with our
security. Surely trials could be conducted with reference to some of the
acts committed at Pearl Harbor which would not interfere with our
war effort.

As a matter of law I am wondering whether the army assumes that
they cannot investigate any phase of the government other than the army.
If this is true, then I think Congress itself should endeavor to in-
vestigate any phase which the army feels it should not investigate be-
cause of the law. It would appear to me that the army should have the
right to probe into other agencies to ascertain whether or not what was
done by such agencies was the cause of the trouble rather than those acts
committed by army officers. I would appreciate your opinion on this
important matter.

With best personal regards, I am

Sincerely,

[Signature]
Honorable Homer Ferguson,
United States Senate.

Dear Senator Ferguson:

I enclose herewith copy of memorandum prepared in this office as to the meaning of "manifest impediment" in Article of War 95 prescribing a statute of limitations of two years unless some manifest impediment to trial exists.

I feel, as suggested in the memorandum, that a court might readily hold that the existence of a state of war constituted a "manifest impediment" to trial of an alleged offender where his trial in time of war would either be impossible due to the absence of military witnesses engaged in the war effort or would be detrimental to the public interest because of the likelihood of giving information to the enemy. However, I do not care to take a positive position on the matter due to my belief that the situation is already taken care of by General Short's agreement not to plead the statute which I have every reason to believe he will adhere to. In the event that the unusual should occur and General Short should violate his solemn agreement, it is difficult for me to believe that a court-martial confronted with a fraud of this character would sustain his plea of the statute of limitations. Moreover, as I suggested to you yesterday, such action by General Short would subject him to trial for conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman under Article of War 95.

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Permanence
Byron J. Cramer
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General

1 Inc.
Copy of memorandum.

Hughes, Wm. J., Jr., -cfe/vsm
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE 3919

MISCONCEIVED US MEANING OF "MANIFEST IMPEDIMENT" IN ARTICLE OF WAR NO.

Article of War 39 provides a two-year statute of limitations but also provides:

"That the period of any absence of the accused from the jurisdiction of the United States, and also any period during which by reason of some manifest impediment the accused shall not have been amenable to military justice, shall be excluded in computing the aforesaid periods of limitation."

It is well settled that the above statute of limitations does not destroy the jurisdiction of the court but is a mere defense which must be pleaded. In re Parrish, 127 Fed. 2d. In re Elkite, 17 Fed. 784; Johnson v. U.S., 14 Fed. Cases 337, 44. 1910; paragraph 67, page 83, paragraph 73, page 33, Manual for Courts-Martial, 1929.

Before, therefore, any question can arise as to whether the statute of limitations has run or not, the accused must plead it. At that point the court will determine whether a "manifest impediment" existed during any particular part of the period. As to the meaning of "manifest impediment", the preceding reference to absence led the Attorney General in 14 Op. Atty. Gen. 266 to hold that it meant an "impediment" similar in kind to absence which rendered the trial impossible. In In re: Parrish, 14 Op. 507.510, the court held that:

""Manifest impediment" as used in the 33th article, does not mean merely want of evidence, or ignorance as to the offender or offense by the military authorities, but it means something akin to absence—want of power, or a physical inability to bring the party charged to trial."

In the case of Harris, 14 Op. Atty. Gen. 266,267, the Attorney General held "manifest impediment" did not refer to commencement of the offense by the accused, but that it meant something akin to absence—want of power or a physical inability to bring the party charged to trial."

There are, however, intimations that "manifest impediment" may include something more than mere physical absence or some other
impediment purely personal to the accused. Thus, in 6 Op. Atty. Gen.,
161, 183, the question was presented whether an officer who was dis-
missed the service but later restored to duty, could be tried on charges
pending at the time of his dismissal. The argument apparently being
that the period he was out of the Army, and hence not amenable to trial,
constituted a "manifest impediment." The Attorney General said:

"The circumstances which may cause delay in bringing an
officer to trial can be arranged in three classes: 1st. Those
that are created or interposed by the act of the party; 2d.
Circumstances arising independently either of his action or
that of the Government; and 3d. Such as are controlled by
the Government itself.

"Causes of delay arising from the conduct of the party
accused are manifest impediments within the meaning of the
68th article. It is a broad principle of law and of natural
justice that no one can take advantage of his own wrong;
accordingly, whenever we find statutes of limitations in
favor of offenders, they are coupled with an exception
against persons beyond the jurisdiction of the proper court,
and fugitives from justice. Naugh, in a note on the words
'manifest impediment' in the English statute, says it is
'preventing witnesses appearing against him, or the like.'
In Colonel Johnson's case, cited by that author, the charge
was mutiny in arresting the captain general of New South
 Wales, who was the principal witness for the Crown, but who
did not arrive in England, where the court martial was held,
for more than two years after the mutiny had been committed.

"This was held to justify a delay beyond the period of
three years in bringing the offender to trial."

It is evident from the above that the present case came within
the second subdivision involving as it does "Circumstances arising
independently either of his action or that of the Government." This
was the situation in Colonel Johnson's case, cited with approval by
the Attorney General, wherein it was the absence of a prosecuting
witness which was held to be a "manifest impediment" (see Naugh's
Military Law Authorities, page 123; see also Naugh, "Practice in

One of the reasons for not bringing the accused to trial at the
present time is, as is well known, the absence and dispersal all over
the world of important Government witnesses. If the absence of witnesses,
which merely renders a trial more difficult, constitutes a "manifest
impediment," the fact of a actual war which renders it detrimental to
American interests to try the offenders in time of war, would likewise
constitute a "manifest impediment." It cannot be supposed that Congress,
It seems, therefore, entirely possible that a court might construe the existence of a state of war as a "manifest impediment" on the theory that trial of the offender at such a time would conflict with its own purpose. As against this, are the cases already cited which up to now, at least, limit the meaning of "manifest impediment" to extreme and total or permanent and not including a situation where it is merely reasonable for the Government to try the offender at the particular time. For, on this aspect, Kilburn's Military Law and Practice, page 329, states:

"It must further be added that a delay as a delay for prosecution beyond the period of the limitation, caused by the fact that it was not convenient or deemed advantageous for the Government to prosecute before, can clearly not be treated as an "impediment.""

The matter being doubtful, it is felt on the whole that too great reliance should not be placed upon the possibility that a state of war constitutes a "manifest impediment" within the meaning of Article of War 59.
Dear Admiral Cate:

I inclose herewith copy of a letter, dated today, which I have sent to Senator Ferguson, inclosing a copy of a memorandum prepared in this office on the meaning of "manifest impediment" contained in Article of War 39.

Very sincerely yours,

Byron C. Cramer,

Byron C. Cramer,
Major General,
The Judge Advocate General.

1 Inc.
Ltr to Sen. Ferguson w/inc.

Hughes, W.I., Jr., cfe
Honorable HAROLD D. SMITH,
Director, Bureau of the Budget
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Smith: In compliance with your request of December 8, I have examined the resolution (H. J. Res. 199) which is before you in enrolled form, to extend the time limit for immunity.

The Joint Resolution would extend the statute of limitations affecting the possible prosecution of any person connected with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe or involved in any other possible or apparent dereliction of duty, for the period of six months.

The debates in the Senate and House of Representatives on this resolution indicate that it was the view of the sponsors of the legislation in Congress that as a matter of precaution in order to avoid any question as to the binding effect of any waivers of the statute of limitations that have been obtained so far, and in order to extend the right of the Government to prosecute any persons who have not waived the statute of limitations it was desirable that that statute of limitations in respect to such cases be extended by congressional action.

I found no objection to the approval of the Joint Resolution.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]


Honorable HAROLD D SMITH,
Director, Bureau of the Budget,
Washington, D. C.

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I am inclined to the view that the resolution is not likely to have the effect its sponsors apparently have in mind. If present waivers of the statute of limitations are binding, the legislation would be superfluous. If the waivers are not effective, the statute of limitations expired on the day on which the bill was finally passed by the Congress and the resolution cannot now revive the right of the Government in institute prosecutions.

In view of the fact, however, that the resolution is at best innocuous, I find no objection to its approval.

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

November 13, 1943.

Honorable HAROLD D SMITH,
Director, Bureau of the Budget,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Smith: In compliance with your request of June 8, 1944, I have examined Senate Joint Resolution 133, to extend the statute of limitations in certain cases.
The Joint Resolution extends any statute of limitations that operates to prevent the court martial and prosecution of any person involved in any matter in connection with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe, or involved in any other possible or apparent dereliction of duty, crime or offense against the United States, for a further period of six months. As you know, Public Law 208, Seventy Eighth Congress (Act of December 20, 1942; 57 Stat. 605), extended these statutes for a period of six months from December 7, 1943.

Section 2 of the bill directs the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophe, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts may justify.

I call your attention to my letter dated December 13, 1943, commenting on House Joint Resolution 199, Seventy Eighth Congress, which became the Act of December 20, 1943.

I find no objection to the approval of the present resolution.

Sincerely yours.

Delivered by messenger 6-9-44.

[Signature]

Attorney General.
Dear Mr. Smith:

The War Department offers no objection to the approval of the enrolled enactment, S. J. Res. 66, "To extend the statute of limitations in certain cases".

The purpose of the enactment is to extend for a further period ending six months after the date of the termination of hostilities in the present war with Japan as proclaimed by the President or as specified in a concurrent resolution on the two Houses of Congress, whichever is the earlier, in addition to the extensions provided for in Public Laws 203, 339, and 489, 78th Congress, all statutes, resolutions, laws, articles, and regulations, affecting the possible prosecution of any person or persons, military or civil, connected with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, or involved in any other possible or apparent dereliction of duty, or crime or offense against the United States, in connection with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, that operate to prevent the court martial, prosecution, trial, or punishment of any such persons.

In the War Department's letter to you, dated December 10, 1943, commenting upon the enrolled enactment, H. J. Res. 179, which became Public Law 203, 78th Congress, it was pointed out that, in the opinion of this Department, that enactment, if approved by the President, would be ineffective to extend the period of limitations prescribed by Article 39 in regard to any offenses denounced by the Articles of War, which may have been committed in connection "with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe of December 7, 1941, or involved in any other possible or apparent dereliction of duty" by military personnel who have continued amenable to prosecution. That conclusion was based upon the premise that the two year period of limitation prescribed by Article 39 expired in respect to any such persons or offenses at midnight, December 7, 1943, and that any subsequent extension thereof by the approval of that resolution would be ex post facto and, therefore, void. In the War Department's letter to you dated December 3, 1944, commenting upon the enrolled enactment, S. J. Res. 156, which became Public Law 489, 78th Congress, it was stated that the foregoing considerations applied to the enactment, S. J. Res. 156. The same considerations also apply to the enactment, S. J. Res. 66, 79th Congress.
The War Department is unable to estimate the fiscal effect of the enactment, if approved.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY L. STIMSON
Secretary of War.
Telephone Conversation Between General Cramer and Hugh Cox, Assistant Solicitor General, 8 June 1944

Cox: * * * to proceed forthwith with an investigation—is cast in such a form that it does give the services some leeway as to the nature of the investigation, etc., and that although the words in the concluding clause doesn't have the language about discretion in it, it probably doesn't require any—the institution of proceedings any particular time, and for that reason the Attorney General told Judge Rosenman that considering the possibility of criticism that the President might be subjected to if he did veto it, it was his personal view that the President ought to think pretty carefully before he did decide to veto it. Now we are not going to put all that in a report. I think we'll just send to the Budget probably a noncommittal report stating that we don't have any objection or we don't take any position one way or another on the thing. But I thought you ought to be informed as to what the Attorney General had said to Judge Rosenman.

Cramer: Yes, I'm certainly very glad to know that. Well now, he doesn't think that the bill in its present form—if the President approves it, will that put us up against the proposition that we have to go ahead?

Cox: Oh I think you would be under a duty probably to have some kind of an investigation.

Cramer: We're going to have an investigation anyway, there's no question about that.

Cox: I don't think that otherwise, and I agree with the Attorney General about that, it imposes any immediate duty on you at all. If you ever finish the investigation and got full possession of all the facts, then the question would arise as to when you had to commence proceedings and I think you could construe that section so that the word "forthwith" doesn't apply to commence such proceedings, so you would have some latitude there anyway.

Cramer: Well that's just the question—I don't know—

Cox: The legislative history I think creates some doubt about it because they did take out the words "in their discretion".

Cramer: Yes, well the investigation as far as that's concerned, we'll start that any time, just as soon as we find out what's going to happen to this bill and where we are at. We didn't take it because at first there was going to be a two-party investigation and then General Short's wife was sick (I guess you heard me tell that), so that's the reason we haven't taken any.

Cox: Well that seemed—we look at section 2, that's the only immediate obligation that's imposed on you. Now I think that's improper, that is I don't think Congress has got the right to tell you to go ahead forthwith with an investigation but they've done it and it's a question I suppose for the President of weighing an impropriety against the criticism that might come from vetoing the thing.

Cramer: You see they say after investigating the facts surrounding the catastrophe described in section 1 above and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts may justify. But doesn't that imply that they mean to do it within the six months period since they've extended the statute?

Cox: I wouldn't construe it that way I think, General. I think—suppose your investigation for one reason or another isn't finished within the six months—the section shows you're not supposed to start proceedings until you've got all the facts. You may not be able to get the facts in six months; these people are scattered all over the world I suppose.

Cramer: Yes, they are everywhere; there's a question whether we can get them in that length of time. But I do feel this to a certain extent, if the President approves the bill, he does or at least implies that he is concurring with Congress in that directive, that binds the Secretary of War and Secretary of Navy to go ahead, don't you think there's the possibility of that?

Cox: Well again I think it's—I draw a distinction between the investigation and the proceedings. I think he certainly binds himself and them to go ahead with the investigation, which you are going to do anyway. Now on the proceedings I think there—I don't think he binds himself to starting proceedings within the six months period. I think it depends on what happens in your investigation—how the thing goes and what the situation is when the investigation is completed. I think it's pretty clear from the record of the history of the debates that I'm looking at that you can make a strong argument that Congress didn't intend you to start proceedings at any time if it was the judgment of the services that those proceedings would interfere with the war.

Cramer: Well that's probably true when you go through the records of the debates—I had those in front of me yesterday.
Cox: The Senate Debate and the House Debate both have got a lot of statements of that kind. It's not free from doubt but I think it's tenable, strong position.

Cramer: Well many people—the last I haven't talked to since I talked to you, but they were very keen about a veto on it. I doubt myself whether the President would veto it.

Cox: Well I got the impression from what the Attorney General said—heard—Judge Rosenman say—that the Judge would be very reluctant to have him veto it.

Cramer: Yes. So maybe we can get him to put in something in the message explaining the situation that by that he is not binding himself—

Cox: To start any proceedings if the proceedings are going to interfere with the war. I think it's quite possible that the people at the White House might approve that.

Cramer: Well all right. That's a good suggestion, I'll see what I can do about it. And thank you very much. Goodbye.

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**Telephone Conversation Between General McNarney and General Cramer, 15 June 1944**

Cramer: Good morning, General. I wanted to talk with you a bit about this Short-Kimmel business. I suppose you saw where the President signed the bill yesterday and made a statement to—in a general way about he understood that it was not to interfere with the war effort, which approves our going ahead with some sort of an investigation. Now I'm just wondering what the best procedure is. I've been talking with Admiral Gatch about it and we're both of about the idea that it ought to go up at least to the level of the two Secretaries to agree to do something in concurrence with each other and probably it would be a wise idea to put it up to the President and have sort of a joint commission of some kind—what do you think of that?

McNarney: Well I think that whatever we do must be joint—certainly if we are going to have an investigation it should be a joint investigation, with both the Army and Navy on—now if the President would like to add some civilian I would have no objection to that.

Cramer: Well of course—

McNarney: We've already had one commission but I'm sure you and Gatch ought to get together and submit a recommendation to the two Secretaries as to what you think the—what type of a thing it should be.

Cramer: I see. Now so far as having a joint investigation is concerned that would have to be directed by the President I suppose anyway even if it were only Army and Navy.

McNarney: Oh no, it wouldn't have to be directed by the President because we have a directive to go ahead and do it haven't we?

Cramer: We have a directive to go ahead and do it, yes.

McNarney: The Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy could agree to that if it's restricted to Army and Navy people.

Cramer: But of course the—it says severally—I don't know what they mean by that act severally but the Act of Congress says that the Secretary of War and Navy shall severally be directed to proceed, which means separately I presume.

McNarney: Well I think we'd still have to do it separately.

Cramer: The only question about it would be this—if we agreed on a joint commission some way as to what authority it would have to subpoena witnesses and all that sort of thing. I mean if we just voluntarily agreed to appoint a joint committee.

McNarney: Well you'll have to give them enough authority to call witnesses before them and swear them I suppose.

Cramer: Well my offhand thought on that is that they'd have to have a special act of Congress authorizing like you people did on the Roberts Commission.

McNarney: They would, huh? I'm not enough of a lawyer to know all those things but I think the best thing to do is for you and Gatch to get together and make us a recommendation as to what we ought to do.

Cramer: All right, fine.

McNarney: I'm not enough of a lawyer to be able to determine it but I do think that whatever we do should be joint.
Cramer: Yes, well I think that's true. And they are sort of holding off—I told them we'd hold off so they wouldn't give any more public statements over there unless we made them together.

McNarney: Yes. Well I'll tell you I'll call Horn and tell him that I think that it should be joint and that I've asked you to get in touch with Gatch to submit some sort of a recommendation.

Cramer: All right, that will be fine. Goodbye.

McNarney: Goodbye.

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Department of the Navy,
Office of the Judge Advocate General,
Washington 25, D. C., 15 June 1944.

Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy.

At 10:45 this morning I had a talk with General Cramer and General Weir in General Cramer's office on the Joint Resolution extending the Statute of Limitations as approved by the President on June 13. I pointed out that this Joint Resolution directs the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War severally hold an investigation into the Pearl Harbor catastrophe and expressed the opinion that this requires us to proceed separately. General Weir opined that if the Secretaries acted severally upon a report it would satisfy the law in this respect. Both General Cramer and General Weir thought strongly that it would be preferable for the President to appoint a Joint Commission to handle the whole matter at once. I also agree that this would be preferable procedure providing that it complies to the Statute.

I told General Cramer that I contemplated recommending to the Secretary of the Navy that he immediately convene a Court of Inquiry which would be given the Roberts Commission Report and Admiral Hart's Report and would be authorized to summon any witnesses in the Naval service on shore duty within the United States; that in my opinion summoning witnesses outside of the United States would interfere with the prosecution of the war and would be counter to the President's expressed understanding in the statement he made of his reason of approving the Joint Resolution. General Cramer and General Weir thought it would be preferable to leave such a matter up to the discretion of the Board and tell them not to summon any witness which would interfere with our war effort.

If a Commission is appointed by the President we all agreed that there should be a General and an Admiral on it to deal with the strategic considerations. We thought that Mr. Hackworth of the State Department, or at least someone high up in the State Department should be on the Commission to cover the diplomatic phases and that there should be two other members so that the Commission would be predominately civilian. It occurs to me that perhaps a retired Judge and a Senator would be advisable.

We agreed that we should present our views to the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy and that they probably would wish to take this up with the President.

T. L. Gatch,
Judge Advocate General of the Navy.
To: Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: New Legislation relating to Pearl Harbor Prosecutions.


JUN 1, 1944

1. Under date of 17 March 1944 the attention of the Secretary was called to the fact that it was necessary that this office ascertain the availability of certain officers in the event that a court martial should be convened to try persons involved in the disaster at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. In the subsequent instructions were requested.

2. Referring to a list of officers submitted to him by the Secretary, Admiral King stated that the detachment of these officers from duty at sea to participate in a court martial would seriously interfere with the war effort. This office was thereupon instructed to hold this entire matter in abeyance and in compliance with that order no further action was taken.

3. Under date of June 13, 1944 the President approved a Joint Resolution of the Congress which, in addition to extending the statute of limitations to December 7, 1944, provided as follows:

"The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are generally directed to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophe described in section 1, above, and to commence proceedings against such persons as the facts may justify."

4. It is respectfully requested that appropriate instructions be issued in order that the provisions of the Joint Resolution may be complied with.

7th Lt. CAPSH
Judge Advocate General
In accordance with the mandate of Congress expressed in the recently approved Joint Resolution relating to the catastrophe at Pearl Harbor, I shall at once order a formal Court of Inquiry to investigate all facts relating to this disaster.

Congress directed as follows:

"The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are severally directed to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophe described in section 1, above, and to commence proceedings against such persons as the facts may justify."

When Congress passed this legislation, it knew that Admiral Hart had been engaged for some time in examining many witnesses with a view toward perpetuating their testimony. Nevertheless, Congress directed that I proceed with an investigation of the facts.

Inasmuch as Congress is not satisfied with the procedure taken by Admiral Hart and wishes further investigation by me, it is my duty to order a formal Court of Inquiry.

When this Court of Inquiry has completed its work and reported its findings to me, and should the facts so justify, those considered derelict in their duty at Pearl Harbor or connected with that catastrophe, will be proceeded against as directed by Congress.
Office Memorandum

TO: General John Weir USA
FROM: Cornelius H. Bull
Office JAG, USN
SUBJECT: Kimmel-Short court martial.

DATE: JUN 15 1944

1. In my humble judgment - the sooner this matter gets over on the doorstep of No. 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue the better. After all, Mr. X is the only man who can decide whether these two officers should be court maritaled - or if they should. Neither your secretary nor mine can decide this matter.

If Admiral Gatch recommends a court for Kimmel to the Secretary of the Navy he will have to lay this matter before the President for a decision. We both know that the President would, in all probability, just put the matter in his files ("under consideration") certainly until after the elections.

Should the President decide that more investigation be needed, he could set up a composite Board or Court of Inquiry as he saw fit.

When Mr. Forrestal has instructed us how to proceed and what to do I'Il sound off.

RegardS,

(Signed)

Special Assistant
in the Office of the Judge General
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

1. With further reference to the action to be taken by the Navy Department pursuant to Section 2 of S. J. Res. 133, commonly known as the Short Resolution, in which the Secretaries of War and Navy are "severally directed to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophe" (the attack on Pearl Harbor of 7 December 1941), I have informally sounded out several members of Congress, including two members of the Conference Committee, with respect to their interpretation of the directive of S. J. Res. 133.

2. All of the Congressmen approached were substantially in agreement on the points discussed. I feel that their opinions present a fair consensus of the majority of the members of Congress. The reactions of the members with whom this matter was discussed may be summarized as follows:

(1) The Resolution contemplates separate investigations by the Army and Navy, as indicated by the use of the word "severally". The suggestion of a joint Army and Navy investigating commission, with civilian members, convened by order of the President, did not meet with approval. It was felt that such a commission would be a duplication of the Roberts Commission, and therefore largely wasted effort. Apparently there has been widespread dissatisfaction with the report of the Roberts Commission—a feeling that it did not tell the full story. Another Presidential inquiry would be construed as another attempt to stall or delay the announcement of charges against any officers at fault. There seemed to be a feeling among the members canvassed that it was the intent of Congress that any investigation be directly under the control of the Armed Services, rather than convened and controlled by the President.

(2) The purpose of directing the investigation was primarily to provide the respective services with the necessary information for the drawing of charges and specifications against any offenders.
The directive for an investigation "forthwith" was motivated largely by the opinions expressed to the cognizant Congressional Committees that the Army and Navy did not have sufficient information upon which to base charges and specifications. It was not the intention of the Congress to specify any particular type or form of investigation. The Army and Navy should make whatever type of investigation they deem most efficacious for obtaining the above mentioned information.

These expressions of opinion confirm my original belief that the most appropriate action would be a Naval Court of Inquiry, to inquire into the facts and make recommendations as to disciplinary action of officers found to have been at fault.

Respectfully

T. L. GATCHE
Judge Advocate General of the Navy

cc: Adm. T. C. Hart
  Maj. Gen. Myron C. Cramer
CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR. Thru: Deputy Chief of Staff.

Subject: Pearl Harbor Investigation directed by Public Law 539, 78th Congress, approved June 18, 1944.

1. Section 3 of Public Law 539, 78th Congress provides:

"The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are severally directed to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding the catastrophe described in section 1 above, and to commence such proceedings against such persons as the facts may justify."

Admiral Call has advised me that in his opinion the above provision requires separate investigations. He says that various members of Congress have told him that this was their understanding of the resolution. There is something to be said for this viewpoint, the dictionary meaning of the word "severally" being "separately; one at a time; each by itself; collectively" respectively (Webster). Bouvier and Black in their law dictionaries define it as "distinctly, separately, apart from others". Admiral Call has, therefore, recommended to the Secretary of the Navy the appointment of a Naval Court of Inquiry, a copy of which recommendation is attached hereto.

2. It is my belief that public opinion will not be satisfied with anything less than a broad, sweeping investigation into the activities of the War, Navy and such other Departments as may be involved in the Pearl Harbor disaster. However, the Navy’s viewpoint, and possibly the wording of the Act, precludes a joint investigation of this character at this time without higher authorization. Lacking such authorization a Board of Officers appointed by the War Department could hardly make an investigation into the activities of Navy personnel in connection with the Pearl Harbor disaster, nor could it inquire into the activities of other Departments on that occasion. It would appear, therefore, that the most that an Army Board may do at the present time is to make a thorough investigation into the activities of the War Department in connection with this disaster, find the facts, and make recommendations.

3. As to the method, it is recommended that a Board of Officers be appointed, to be composed of three General officers assisted by a recorder who should probably be an officer of The Judge Advocate General’s Department, and a technical adviser who should be an officer familiar with the military problems involved. Provision should administratively be made

Hughes, W.J., Jr.-rm-agb
for such other military and civilian personnel as may become necessary. The employment of a civilian reporter or reporters should likewise be authorized, the expenses of which should be paid out of the appropriation for contingent expenses of the War Department. Such a board would have power to administer oaths under Article of War 114.

4. In the event the above recommendations are concurred in, a suggested draft of directive appointing such a board is enclosed herewith.

Myron C. Crumer,
Major General
The Judge Advocate General.

Incl.
Incl. 1-Draft of directive.
Incl. 2-Reply to the Secretary of the Navy, 17 Jun 44.
June 1944.

SPECIAL ORDERS

No.

1. Pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 539, 78th Congress, approved 15 June 1944, a Board of Officers is hereby appointed to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941, and to make such recommendations as it may deem proper, as follows:

   a. Member;
   b. Member;
   c. Member;
   d. Recorder, without vote;
   e. Technical adviser, without vote.

2. Such military and civilian personnel may be assigned to assist the Board as the Board shall request.

3. The Board will convene at the call of the senior member and will hold sessions at such time or times and at such place or places as it may deem advisable. The Board is empowered to prescribe its own procedure and is authorized to employ a civilian reporter or reporters.

4. Military and civilian personnel will render the Board all necessary information and assistance.

By order of the Secretary of War:

S. C. MARSHALL,
Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

J.A. ULIC,
Major General.
The Adjutant General.

Hughes, W. J., Jr.— Stub—sm
30 June 44

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

MEMORANDUM

General Crozier,

Admiral Reuss just told me that the office of the transcript of testimony of the Roberts Commission has the War and Navy Dept. files (2 copies) are the...
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

MEMORANDUM

only copies in existence.

Rebek

[Signature]
Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy.

H. J. Res. 199 has been approved by the President. This Resolution purports to extend the statute of limitations for trials by court martial for six months. Statements were made at the time of the passage of the Resolution that it would make mandatory the trial of Admiral Kimmel within the additional six months period. I foresee that such contentions will again be advanced.

It has been my view that the agreement Admiral Kimmel made not to plead the statute of limitations in bar of trial was not strictly necessary, but that his agreement made assurance doubly sure. Our statute of limitations reads:

"Article 61. No person shall be tried by court martial * * * for any offense * * * which appears to have been committed more than two years before * * * unless by reason of having absented himself, or of some other manifest impediment he shall not have been amenable to justice within that period."

It is my view that where the circumstances are such that the convening of a court martial and the summoning of the necessary witnesses would interfere with out prosecution of the war, as determined by the President or the Secretary of the Navy, there is clearly such a "manifest impediment" as is contemplated by the statute. There is an argument to the contrary, including two very ancient Attorney General's opinions where the circumstances were different, but I submit that the words of the statute mean exactly what they say.

In any event we are amply justified in ignoring H. J. Res. 199. The attached copy of a letter from the Attorney General to the Director of the Budget sets out the reasons.

I submit this memorandum that you may be prepared for developments.

Respectfully,

T. L. GATCHE, 
Judge Advocate General of the Navy.

Memorandum for General Cramer.

1. A statute of limitations can not be extended after it has run (Falter v. U. S., 23 Fed. 2nd 420, 425; Moore v. State, 43 N J. Law 203), the reason being that the prosecution being dead, the accused has a vested right to repose. Thus in civil cases it can not be extended once it has run.

2. The above distinction is recognized in the Federal statute of limitations, 18 U. S. C. 582, which prescribed a new statute of limitations and provided in so many words that it should not apply to offenses already barred but would apply to cases wherein "the existing statute of limitations had not yet fully run".

3. General Short's offenses were all barred under Article of War 39 on December 7, 1943, and the act of December 20, 1943, was powerless to revive the dead prosecution.

4. It is unthinkable that General Short would break his word not to assert the statute of limitations. If he did so, he would alienate any vestige of chance of acquittal by public opinion. But assuming he did assert the bar of the statute, it is believed the agreement would stand up on the following grounds:

a. There was ample consideration on both sides.

b. The statute of limitations does not deprive the court of jurisdiction; it is a mere defense which must be asserted (Johnson v. U. S., 13 Fed. Cases 867, No. 7418). If pleaded, the court must sustain the plea before the prosecution is barred. It is unbelievable that where an accused has lulled the Government into security until the statute has run he would be allowed to reap the benefit of his own fraud.

c. The agreement might constitute a "manifest impediment" to trial within the meaning of Article of War 30. 14 Op. Atty. Gen. 265 discusses a manifest physical impediment but there is no reason why the impediment need be a physical one. Fraud on the part of the accused might very reasonably constitute a manifest impediment.

d. The accused's fraud would make him a fugitive from justice which traditionally stops the running of the statute. See 18 U. S. C. 583.
5. The real danger of the present legislation is that someone might construe it to be different from an ordinary statute of limitations and to deprive the courts of jurisdiction to try the offenders at any other time than the period as extended. This is a very real danger.

Wm. J. Hughes, Jr.,
Lieutenant Colonel, J. A. G. D.,
Assistant Chief, Military Justice Division.
EXHIBIT NO. 171

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Letter from Rear Admiral Kimmel to Secretary of the Navy Forrestal dated 8 September 1945.
2. Letter from Secretary of the Navy Forrestal to Rear Admiral Kimmel dated 28 August 1945.
3. Dispatch #180328 December 1941 from CincPac for Action to PacFlt.
4. Letter from Rear Admiral Kimmel to Secretary of the Navy Knox dated 26 January 1942 with endorsement dated 27 January 1942.
5. Press and radio release from the Navy Department dated 14 April 1944.
6. Memorandum from T. L. Gatch, Judge Advocate General of the Navy, to Admiral King dated 13 April 1944.
7. Letter from Secretary of the Navy Knox to Rear Admiral Kimmel dated 10 September 1943.
8. Letter from Rear Admiral Kimmel to Secretary of the Navy Knox dated 7 September 1943 with enclosure.
9. Letter from Secretary of the Navy Knox to Rear Admiral Kimmel with enclosure.
10. Memorandum from Rear Admiral Jacobs to Secretary of the Navy Knox dated 17 August 1943.
13. Memorandum of Secretary of War, H. L. Stimson.
15. Navy Communication #191909 February 1942 from Com12 for Action to SecNav.
16. First Endorsement from BuNav to Rear Admiral Kimmel dated 17 February 1942.
17. Letter from Secretary of the Navy Knox to Rear Admiral Kimmel dated 16 February 1942.
18. Letter from Secretary of the Navy Knox to Rear Admiral Kimmel.
19. Memorandum from Edwin Dickinson, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, to Captain Gatch, Assistant Judge Advocate General, Navy Department, dated 14 February 1942.
20. Memorandum from the Attorney General Francis Biddle to the Secretary of War, dated February 14, 1942.
22. Covering title sheet addressed to Assistant Solicitor General, Department of Justice.
23. Memorandum from Captain Gatch, Ass’t, JAG, Navy Department, to Ass’t Solicitor General, Department of Justice, dated 14 February 1942, with letter from Secretary of the Navy Knox to Rear Admiral Kimmel attached.
24. Letter from Secretary of War Stimson to Secretary of the Navy Knox dated 14 February 1942.
25. Memorandum from Secretary of the Navy Knox to Admiral Jacobs dated 7 February 1942 with attached memorandum for the Secretary on Stimson’s memo by Admiral H. R. Stark, dated 31 January 1942.
27. Letter from Rear Admiral Kimmel to Secretary of the Navy Knox dated 28 January 1942 with endorsement of the same date.
28. Letter from Rear Admiral Kimmel to Secretary of the Navy Knox dated 26 January 1942 with endorsement dated 27 January 1942.
280 Bronxville Road, Bronxville 8, N. Y., 8 September 1945.

From: Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy (Retired)
To: The Secretary of the Navy.
Subject: General Court Martial in my case.

1. In view of the agitation for a Congressional Investigation before Congress reconvened and the action of the Senate in ordering a joint Congressional Investigation of Pearl Harbor, I wish to defer my reply to your letter of 28 August 1945 until that investigation is completed.

(S) H. E. KIMMEL.
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

28 August 1943

To: Rear Admiral Harold E. Rial, U.S.N., N.C.

Subject: General Court Martial in your case.

1. In your letter of September 7th, 1943, to the Secretary of the Navy, you stated "It is my personal desire to be brought to trial by General Court Martial in open court at the earliest practicable date."

2. In his letter to you the Secretary of the Navy gave you his assurance that a trial before General Court Martial would be had at the earliest practicable date that the public interest and safety would permit. In view of the present state of the war and in view of this assurance of the Secretary of the Navy I am disposed to order your trial by General Court Martial in open court in the event that you still desire to be so tried.

3. It is requested that you advise me promptly whether or not you desire to be tried by General Court Martial.

/s/ James Forrestal

[Signature]
ADMIRAL HUSBAND E KINNELL HAULED BORN HIS FLAG THIS DATE AND VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM S RYE USN ASSUMED TEMPORARY COMMAND OF THE US PACIFIC FLEET IN ADDITION TO HIS PRESENT DUTIES

DISTRIBUTION
BUNAV.......CO2 MARK ANY REPLY RESTRICTED

BUA, BUR, 18/11, 38, 28, 25, FILE

Restricted
KIMMEL, Husband E.
Rear Admiral, U.S.N.
(22O7- -Kn)

January 26, 1942

From: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U.S.N.
To: The Secretary of the Navy

Subject: Request for Retirement under the Provisions of Section 1443 Revised Statutes.

1. After forty one years and eight months service in the United States Navy, I hereby request that I be placed upon the retired list in accordance with the provisions of Section 1443 Revised Statutes.

2. I hold myself in readiness to perform any duty to which I may be assigned.

HUSBAND E. KIMMEL

1st Endorsement

January 27, 1942

From: Commandant, Twelfth Naval District and Naval Operating Base, San Francisco, California
To: The Secretary of the Navy

Subject: Request for Retirement under the Provisions of Section 1443 Revised Statutes

1. Forwarded.
PEARL HARBOR WITNESSES UNAVAILABLE DUE TO WAR ASSIGNMENTS

Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox has received a memorandum from Admiral Ernest J. King, U.S.N., Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet, in which Admiral King officially informed the Secretary that certain officers of the Navy now serving on battle fronts in various parts of the world, could not be withdrawn from their military duties in order to participate as members or witnesses in court martial proceedings in connection with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

In his consideration of the case of Rear Admiral Husband Kimmel, U.S.N. (Retired), and of the procuring of members and witnesses for a court martial, the Secretary had requested Admiral King to advise him as to the availability of certain officers should a court martial be convened.

Admiral King, answering the Secretary, said: "About half the officers listed are on duty at sea in command of forces engaged with the enemy and in accordance with planned operations. Others at sea are performing duties on the staffs of those commanders."

At his press conference on April 11, 1944, Secretary Knox was questioned in connection with Congress’ extension of the time for trial of those involved in the Pearl Harbor catastrophe to June 7, 1944, and the Secretary said he would obtain the opinion of his legal advisers.

"I have discussed this matter with Rear Admiral Gatch, the Judge Advocate General of the Navy" said Secretary Knox, "and I have been advised by him that, inasmuch as Admiral Kimmel has long since signed an agreement not to interpose the statute of limitations as a bar to his trial, there is now no necessity to construe any acts of Congress on this subject."

The Secretary further explained that Admiral Thomas C. Hart, U.S.N. (Retired), is now in Hawaii pursuing his investigation into matters relating to the attack upon Pearl Harbor by the Japanese on December 7, 1941.

"I would certainly feel derelict in my duty if I took from the Fleet and the fighting fronts the officers whom Admiral King has placed in those positions," concluded the Secretary.
MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL KING

There has been a great deal of agitation in the press recently regarding the Pearl Harbor matter, with especial reference to the delay in the trial of Admiral Kimmel.

Particular attention is directed to the statements of Secretary Knox at his press conference on April 11, in which the Secretary is supposed to have said that he would refer the matter to the Attorney General for a legal opinion as to (the Secretary) "was confused".

It is submitted that inasmuch as Admiral Kimmel has signed a valid waiver of his right to plead the statute of limitations in bar of trial, there is now no need to "interpret" any Acts of Congress upon this subject - especially the one extending the time within which trial must take place.

Even though the Navy's case were complete in every respect, no action can now be taken for reasons you have already given, namely the non-availability of officers on duty at sea.

I have drafted a suggested press release which, I believe will do much toward settling this matter - for the duration of the war at least.

[Signature]
Judge Advocate General
To: Rear Admiral Russell E. Kimmel, U.S.N., Ret.,
230 Bronxville Road,
Bronxville, New York.

Subject: Agreement not to plead the statute of limitations in bar of trial by General Court Martial.

Reference (a) Your letter of Sept. 7, 1943 and enclosure therewith.

1. Receipt is acknowledged of your letter, above referenced, with which you enclosed an agreement of the same date, bearing your signature, in the following language:

"I, RUSSELL E. KIMMEL, Rear Admiral, United States Navy, Retired, hereby agree on my honor as an officer and a gentleman that I will not plead, nor permit any attorney or other person on my behalf to plead, the statute of limitations in bar of my trial by General Court Martial in open court for any alleged offenses with which I may be charged relating to the period on or before December 7th, 1941, should my trial be held during the present war or within six (6) months thereafter.

"I take this action voluntarily, believing it to be in the public interest."

2. The Secretary of the Navy understands and fully sympathizes with your personal desire to be brought to trial by general court martial in open court at the earliest practicable date for any alleged offenses with which you may be charged relating to your performance of duty on or before December 7th, 1941. He therefore appreciates and commends the patriotic spirit in which you have voluntarily assumed the above obligation. This action on your part is in keeping with the best naval traditions.

s/ FRANK NOX
FRANK NOX

CONFIDENTIAL
260 BRONXVILLE ROAD
BRONXVILLE, NEW YORK

September 7th, 1943.

From: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U.S.N., Ret.,
280 Bronxville Road,
Bronxville, New York.

To: The Honorable Frank Knox,
Secretary of the Navy,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

Reference (a) Letter from Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, to Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U.S.N., Ret., proposing a waiver of the Statute of Limitations.

Enclosure A Agreement not to plead the Statute of Limitations in bar of trial by General Court Martial.

Sir:

Receipt is acknowledged of your undated letter, Reference (a), delivered to me by hand August 27th, 1943, concerning a General Court Martial in my case, in which letter you state that the two year statute of limitations controlling Naval Court Martial will have run on my case on December 7th, 1943, and you propose that I should now agree not to plead the statute of limitations in bar of trial and you enclose a proposed form of waiver.

You state in Reference (a) that you think that the public interest and safety would now permit proceeding with my trial, but that you further believe that so long as the war continues it will be manifestly impracticable to have a number of important witnesses appear before the court on account of their war duties. For this reason, among others, you feel that it would be in the best interests of all concerned if I should now agree not to plead the statute of limitations in bar of trial and you give me your assurance that the trial will be held at the earliest practicable date.
September 7th, 1943.

From: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U.S.N., Ret.
To: The Secretary of the Navy

It is my personal desire to be brought to trial by General Court Martial in open court at the earliest practicable date. Delay in the matter is opposed to my personal interests, since the passage of time and the circumstances and casualties of war and of the period following may make it difficult, perhaps impossible, to assemble and produce the evidence and the witnesses required. I have at all times been anxious to subordinate my own interests to the national welfare, which appears to require that my trial be delayed. I am therefore forwarding to you herewith a waiver, Enclosure A, executed by me which I hope will be satisfactory to you.

Respectfully,

[Signature]

Encl. (1)
September 7th, 1943

Enclosure A - to letter dated September 7th, 1943, from Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U.S.N., Ret., to the Secretary of the Navy.

I, HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, Rear Admiral, United States Navy, Retired, hereby agree on my honor as an officer and a gentleman that I will not plead, nor permit any attorney or other person on my behalf to plead, the statute of limitations in bar of my trial by General Court Martial in open court for any alleged offenses with which I may be charged relating to the period on or before December 7th, 1941, should my trial be held during the present war or within six (6) months thereafter.

I take this action voluntarily, believing it to be in the public interest.
To: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U.S. Ret.

Subject: OCM in your case.

Enclosure: Form of agreement.

1. The report of the so-called Roberts Commission alleged certain derelictions of duty on your part. Your application for retirement was approved, and it was stated therein that in the opinion of the Navy Department's ordering you for trial should it be so determined. On February 28, 1942 I stated to the press that trial upon these charges would not be held until such time as the public interest and safety would permit.

2. The two year statute of limitations controlling naval courts martial will have run in your case on December 7, 1943, subject to the exception therein relating to cases in which there exists a manifest impediment to the trial of the accused. Therefore, if orders for your trial are not issued prior to the date stated, you could plead the statute of limitations in bar of trial, and its application to your case would have to be determined in the manner provided by law.

3. I think that the public interest and safety would now permit proceeding with your trial, but I further believe that so long as the war continues it will be impracticable to have a number of important witnesses appear before the court on account of their war duties. For this reason among others I feel that it would be to the best interests of all concerned if you should now agree not to plead the statute of limitations in bar of trial upon my assurance that the trial will be had at the earliest practicable date subsequent to the expiration of the two-year period.

4. If you agree with the foregoing your prompt return of enclosure is requested.

[Signature]

[Received August 27, 1943]
I, HUSBAND E. KIMMEL, Rear Admiral, United States Navy, Retired, hereby agree on my honor as an officer and a gentleman that I will not plead the statute of limitations in bar of my trial by general court martial for any alleged offenses I may have committed on or before December 7, 1941, should my trial be held during the present war or within six months thereafter, and that I will not permit any attorney or other person on my behalf to make such plea.

I make this agreement voluntarily, in recognition of the fact that during the present war and for the stated period thereafter it will be impracticable to obtain the attendance before a general court martial of witnesses who would be important for my defense, as well as witnesses required by the prosecution.

Received August 27, 1943

H. E. Kimmel
CONFIDENTIAL.

Memorandum for

The Secretary of the Navy.

The attached memorandum brings up the question of the trial of Rear Admiral Kimmel, based on the findings of the Roberts Board.

In order to be sure that he be brought to trial, if such is desired, it is necessary that specifications and charges be preferred prior to 7 December, 1943.

If such charges are preferred, I am of the opinion that Admiral Kimmel will demand immediate trial.

I do not think it is in the national interest to permit this case to come to trial at present.

I have discussed this case with Admiral King, and he agrees with me that the final decision in the case must be made by the President.

RANDALL JACOBS.
4 August 1943

Addressing for Rear Admiral Randall Jacobs

Major General Lyman C. Cramer, Judge Advocate General of the Army, came into my office this afternoon and stated that he had reported to General Marshall that if any action is going to be taken relative to the trial by general court martial of General Short a determination should be arrived at because the Statute of Limitations expired on December 7, 1943. General Marshall stated that the matter would have to be taken up with Secretary Stimson and then asked General Cramer to make inquiry as to what action the Navy Department was taking with respect to Admiral Kimmel for the reason that it would be advisable that the War Department and the Navy Department be in accord with the action that is to be taken.

General Cramer was informed that Captain Gatch had been selected as the relief of Admiral Woodson as Judge Advocate General and in view of the importance of the matter I would immediately take the matter up with him. Likewise I advised General Cramer that in view of the fact that the subject was one affecting personnel presumably Captain Gatch would want to take the matter up with Admiral Jacobs, the Chief of Naval Personnel. Furthermore, I expressed the view to General Cramer that the ultimate decision as to the action to be taken in the case of General Short and Admiral Kimmel would be for the decision of the President of the United States, that the respective Secretaries would very likely be the ones to present the matter for the decision of the President and that the respective Secretaries might express their views as to the policy governing the action to be taken but that the President would render the decision to the Secretaries who in turn would then take such action as was determined upon.

It so happened that upon the arrival of Captain Gatch you came in to my office and the above subject matter was discussed. You requested that a memorandum be prepared with respect thereto and that you in turn would take the matter up with Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations.
This memorandum consequently is being forwarded for your information and such instructions in the premises as are determined upon.

L. E. Bratton
Acting Judge Advocate General of the Navy
The Navy Department issued the following communiqué:

The Secretary of the Navy announced today the acceptance, effective March 1, 1942, of the application for retirement of Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U.S. Navy, "without condonation of any offense or prejudice to any future disciplinary action."

The Secretary of the Navy announced at the same time that, based upon the findings of the report of the Roberts Commission, he had directed the preparation of charges for the trial by court-martial of Rear Admiral Kimmel, alleging dereliction of duty. The Secretary of the Navy made it clear, however, that the trial upon these charges would not be held until such time as the public interest and safety would permit.
WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
MEMORANDUM

I think this formula will be OK for a preliminary announcement. But I am going to have the substance given to you at short notice. Is it different in the form? This is the text required by decree No. 7/1.

Let me know if you agree on a wire today or a similar course. 10/3/19.
The investigation of Pearl Harbor was complex and multifaceted. The events that transpired were a result of both strategic decisions and unforeseen circumstances. The USS Arizona, for instance, was destroyed by a direct hit from a Japanese bomb, and the damage to the ship was catastrophic. The Congress, following the attack, held extensive hearings and investigations to determine the causes and consequences of the event. The hearings were a platform for experts, military officials, and civilians to share their insights and experiences. The outcome of these investigations would shape U.S. policy and military strategy in the years to come.
ORDERS RETIREMENT RAID KIMSEL DELIVERED ELEVEN ZERO FIVE THIS DATE

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18/1
First Endorsement

February 17, 1942

From: The Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.
To: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy,
Twelfth Naval District.

Via: The Commandant.

Subject: Transfer to the Retired List after forty (40) years' service.

1. Forwarded.
February 16, 1942

From: The Secretary of the Navy
To: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy,

Subject: Transfer to the retired list after forty (40) years' service.

Reference: (a) your request for retirement, dated January 26, 1942.

1. Your request to be transferred to the retired list after the completion of forty (40) years' service in accordance with the provisions of U. S. Code, Title 34, Section 341 is, by direction of the President, approved. You will be transferred to the retired list of officers of the United States Navy as of March 1, 1942.

2. This approval of your request for retirement is without condonation of any offense or prejudice to future disciplinary action.

3. Acknowledgment of receipt is requested.

/\s/ Frank Knox
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Petition

Further to our release of February 19, I enclose a copy of the Attorney General's memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy, 19th April 19, which was sent to the President in the form of a recommendation of the retirement request of Admiral E. H. Kimmel, U.S.N.

The three alternatives for accomplishment which had been submitted to the Attorney General are contained in a short memorandum attached to the Attorney General's decision. The Attorney General's recommendation will cover the suggestion of a complete change-over for paragraph 2 of the proposed memorandum to the Secretary of the Navy to hear Admiral Ray E. Kimmel, U.S.N.

Your file is returned herewith.

For the Acting Assistant
 Solicitor General

Special Assistant to the
 Attorney General
February 14, 42

SECRETARY:

I have given considerable thought to the memorandum which you have sent in connection with the action taken of the request for retirement which have been made by Admiral Kimmel and General Short. In this connection, I have read the opinions and other material which accompanies the memorandum.

It seems to me that the action which may be raised as a section (unit the word "Relief court martial proceedings") may be put in the present to be more in section a "without commitment of any offense," and I have been able to see that the reference to court martial would, of course, be of some concern, that section was definitely, I have the understanding, that have moved a number of them I have not been able to act immediately. Similarly, the reference to no. Please may request to those officers that it felt that it may be made additional, an opportunity to take those to be the action of whether or not they were guilty of one please to the district reference to immediate proceedings.

Section 5... is not as well as I think it is not the issue of whether there is a question of the, and I want to make sure that the section is under this action, and I mean to make the purpose of the act section. I believe it would be proper to use the language on the same, I want to point to a that the 8th and 13th section, Section 8, 13th section, 17th section of the act, on the

Affix

Admiral, General
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

10th July, 1864.

At a meeting held this day, the attention of the committee was called to the following letter:

A. "I am requested by the President of the United States to ask the inhabitants of the State of Texas to assist in the collection of the late revenue, as they have done so efficiently in the past.

B. "I shall be pleased to have a list of the names of those who have assisted in this manner.

C. "I think it essential that we should have a detailed list of all those who have rendered assistance.

A. "I am in entire agreement with your views."


DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

MEMORANDUM

[Body of memorandum]

[Signature]

Date: [Date]

Page: 1 of 1
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL

MEMORANDUM

5-14-42

Asst Solicitor General

I understand the army is putting before you similar papers in the case of General Short.

The Secretary of the Navy says that the President wants the opinion of the Attorney General whether or not the Secretary's letter attached will properly protect the interests of the country.

He would like this opinion today.

Respectfully,

[Signature]

Asst JAG, Navy
From: The Secretary of the Navy.
To: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U. S. Navy.
Subject: Transfer to the retired list after forty (40) years' service.
Reference: (a) Your request for retirement.

1. Your request to be transferred to the retired list after the completion of forty (40) years' service in accordance with the provisions of U. S. Code, Title 34, Section 381 is, by direction of the President, approved. You will be transferred to the retired list of officers of the United States Navy as of March 1, 1942.

2. This action in approving your request for retirement will be no bar to your requesting a general court-martial, or to the Navy Department's ordering you for trial should it be so determined.

3. Acknowledgment of receipt is requested.
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

Dear Mr. Franklin,

I am in favor of having the attorney-general test the decision if the attorney-general says the judge is correct to keep him in the lower courts. I would, with you about it on Tuesday, if you have

Sincerely yours,

Henry B. Stearns
Secretary of War

Rev. Franklin
The Secretary of War House
SECRET

Attachment A

I am attaching herewith a confidential memorandum dealing with treatment of Admiral Kimmel and the "protest" outlined in Secretary Stimson's memorandum of the one which is being followed.

I wish you would hold this memorandum in confidence and be sure to remind me to carry it out in the sequence indicated.

ATTACHMENT
EXHIBITS OF JOINT COMMITTEE

New Department
Committee on the Conduct of War Operations
Washington

March 21, 1917

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Am unable to see over in time to meet committee on Unit (a) in last part of paragraph 1. Our paragraph (a) of paragraph 1 to be here in line with the following:

"Abstain some little time and see if the application had not been made at the respective constituent units (a) in lieu of the districts covered by the respective constituent units (a) that the acceptance of their reports for retirement made by the Army and War Department trial of court martial, without action of the individual of the individual concerned, it is noted that neither officer has so far as the or or an active court martial. In any case a court martial is practical impossibility at the time when it would be certain that the military secrets which are passed from the case in "

[Signature]

[NRS]
At the outset of the Chamber of State in the President's office, I said to the felllow members with him:

1. The President of the United States: He told me that

In the meantime, when he was unmasked, partly that

He then suggested that:

(1) Both the Army and Navy must act alike — on

(2) Wait about a week and then announce that no

(3) About a week later announce that the applications

2. In the next place I told the President that I thought

that probably all other matters in the present excitement about the

Pearl Harbor report would die down except the pressure for unity of command.

I told him how I had treated a similar question last week by an off-the-

record statement, taking care to disclose nothing except such matters as

wouldn't do harm if they should leak. He agreed with this suggestion and

off his own bat suggested the same method of approach that I was, namely,
disclosure of the unity of command at Panama, in the Caribbean, and some
other places up the coast.
From: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U.S.N.
To: The Secretary of the Navy
Subject: My Request for Retirement
Reference: (A) My ltr. to the Secretary of the Navy of 26 January 1942 requesting retirement under the provisions of Article 1443 Revised Statutes.

1. Reference (A) was submitted after I had been officially informed by the Navy Department that General Short had requested retirement.

2. I was officially informed today by the Navy Department that my notification of General Short's request was not intended to influence my decision to submit a similar request.

3. I desire my request for retirement to stand, subject only to determination by the Department as to what course of action will best serve the interests of the country and the good of the service.

Husband E. Kimmel

1st endorsement

January 28, 1942

From: Commandant, Twelfth Naval District and Naval Operating Base, San Francisco, California
To: The Secretary of the Navy
Subject: My Request for Retirement

1. Forwarded.

W. W. Greenslade
From: Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, U.S.N.
To: The Secretary of the Navy
Subject: Request for Retirement under the Provisions of Section 1443 Revised Statutes.

1. After forty-one years and eight months service in the United States Navy, I hereby request that I be placed upon the retired list in accordance with the provisions of Section 1443 Revised Statutes.

2. I hold myself in readiness to perform any duty to which I may be assigned.

HUSBAND E. KIMMEL

1st Endorsement

January 27, 1942

From: Commandant, Twelfth Naval District and Naval Operating Base, San Francisco, California
To: The Secretary of the Navy

Subject: Request for Retirement under the Provisions of Section 1443 Revised Statutes

1. Forwarded.

W. GREENSLADE
In response to your oral request, you will find inclosed:

(1) a table, based on information supplied by the Army Air Forces, containing the following data on American-produced bombs for the period 1 February - 30 November 1941: (a) brief description, (b) range with and without bomb load, (c) total deliveries, (d) deliveries to foreign countries (showing whether pursuant to cash contract or lend-lease), (e) Army shipments to Hawaii, and (f) Army shipments to the Philippines. It will be noted that (c) and (d) represent deliveries in this country while (e) and (f) represent arrivals at destination. Navy shipments to the Hawaiian and Philippine areas are not shown.

(2) a table, based on information supplied by the Army Ordnance Department and the Army Service Forces, containing the following data on Army anti-aircraft weapons for the period 1 February - 7 December 1941: (a) production, (b) transfers to foreign countries, (c) shipments to Hawaii, and (d) shipments to the Philippines. Navy production, transfers and shipments, if any, are not shown.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Range with max. bomb load</th>
<th>Range without bombs</th>
<th>1 February–30 November 1941</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Total deliveries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Cash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-17</td>
<td>AAF Heavy Bomber, 4-eng.</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>2,750</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-24</td>
<td>AAF Heavy Bomber, 4-eng.</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-25</td>
<td>AAF Medium Bomber, 2-eng.</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B-26</td>
<td>AAF Medium Bomber, 2-eng.</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PB2Y</td>
<td>Navy Patrol Bomber, 2-eng.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBY</td>
<td>Navy Patrol Bomber, 2-eng.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBM</td>
<td>Navy Patrol Bomber, 2-eng.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-20</td>
<td>AAF Light Bomber, 2-eng.</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-22 (167)</td>
<td>AAF Light Bomber, 2-eng.</td>
<td>1,227</td>
<td>1,425</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-28</td>
<td>AAF Light Bomber, 2-eng.</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-29</td>
<td>AAF Light Bomber, 2-eng.</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-30</td>
<td>AAF Light Bomber, 2-eng.</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>212</td>
<td>Light Bomber, 2-eng.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A-27</td>
<td>AAF Light Bomber, 1-eng.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V-12</td>
<td>AAF Light Bomber, 1-eng.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8A</td>
<td>Navy Light Bomber, 1-eng.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBD (A-24)</td>
<td>Navy Light Bomber, 1-eng.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SB2U</td>
<td>Navy Light Bomber, 1-eng.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VF3B</td>
<td>Navy Light Bomber, 1-eng.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBN</td>
<td>Navy Light Bomber, 1-eng.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBC</td>
<td>Navy Light Bomber, 1-eng.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3,128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Maximum for latest 1941 model under ideal conditions.
2 Navy shipments not shown.
3 In September 1941, 9 of the 21 B-17s then in Hawaii were flown to the Philippines.
4 Army records do not indicate whether transferred under cash contract or lend-lease.
5 Originally French contracts, transferred to Britain then repossessed by U. S. at date of Pearl Harbor Aircraft transferred after Pearl Harbor.
6 Defense Aid Contract.
7 Enroute at outbreak of war; diverted to Australia.

1 February–7 December, 1941

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Antiaircraft weapon</th>
<th>Production</th>
<th>Transfers to foreign countries</th>
<th>Shipments to Hawaii</th>
<th>Shipments to Philippines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 inch, mobile</td>
<td>3 182</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37 mm., mobile</td>
<td>282</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90 mm., mobile</td>
<td>136</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 cal., water-cooled</td>
<td>4,806</td>
<td>1,805</td>
<td></td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 All pursuant to lend-lease except 80 3-inch guns for the Netherlands East Indies.
2 Equipment already held by organizations transferred to Hawaii or the Philippines between 1 February–7 December 1941 not included.
3 Includes 80 3-inch mobile guns for the Netherlands East Indies believed to have been produced during this period.
Memorandum
To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

In response to your request dated 21 March 1946, for a table containing the data outlined by you in respect of American produced bombers for the period 1 February to 30 November 1941, there has been prepared and is forwarded herewith a set of tables entitled:

**LONG RANGE PATROL BOMBER AND SCOUT BOMBER ACCEPTANCES SHOWING DELIVERIES TO THE NAVY AND TO FOREIGN COUNTRIES 1 FEBRUARY–30 NOVEMBER 1941**

The term "acceptances" as used in the tables includes all deliveries of military aircraft of the types described that were produced by the specified manufacturer in question. It will be noted that the foreign deliveries were not lend-lease transfers, and that of the total acceptances of 835 long range and scout bombers, there were delivered to the Navy 582, and to the foreign countries 253; and of those to the Navy, 218 were sent to the Hawaiian area and to carriers operating in the Pacific as explained in the footnotes to the attached tables.

*John Ford Baecher,*
*Commander, USNR.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type and Description</th>
<th>Range Without Bombs</th>
<th>Range With Bombs</th>
<th>Manufacturer</th>
<th>Customer</th>
<th>Acceptances</th>
<th>Total Deliveries To Navy</th>
<th>Total Deliveries to For. Countries</th>
<th>Total Deliveries to Hawaiian Area</th>
<th>Total Deliveries to Philippines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Navy Patrol Bombers—2 Eng.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBY-5</td>
<td>2,990</td>
<td>2,320 (4 x 1,000)</td>
<td>Consolidated-Vultee, S. D...</td>
<td>U. S.</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-5ME</td>
<td>2,990</td>
<td>2,320 (4 x 1,000)</td>
<td>Consolidated-Vultee, S. D...</td>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-5ME</td>
<td>2,990</td>
<td>2,320 (4 x 1,000)</td>
<td>Consolidated-Vultee, S. D...</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-5ME</td>
<td>2,990</td>
<td>2,320 (4 x 1,000)</td>
<td>Consolidated-Vultee, S. D...</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-5MN</td>
<td>2,990</td>
<td>2,320 (4 x 1,000)</td>
<td>Consolidated-Vultee, S. D...</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBY-3A</td>
<td>2,450</td>
<td>1,365 (4 x 1,000)</td>
<td>Consolidated-Vultee, S. D...</td>
<td>U. S.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBM-1</td>
<td>4,050</td>
<td>2,775 (6 x 1,000)</td>
<td>Martin</td>
<td>U. S.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy Patrol Bombers—4 Eng.: PBY-2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBC-4</td>
<td>2,310</td>
<td>1,380 (8 x 1,000)</td>
<td>Consolidated-Vultee, S. D...</td>
<td>U. S.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Scout Bombers—1 Eng.:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBD-2</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>655 (1 x 1,000)</td>
<td>Curtiss</td>
<td>U. S.</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBD-5 (SBD)</td>
<td>1,570</td>
<td>1,225 (1 x 1,000)</td>
<td>Douglas</td>
<td>U. S.</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBD-3</td>
<td>1,415</td>
<td>1,205 (1 x 1,000)</td>
<td>Douglas</td>
<td>U. S.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBD-3A</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Douglas</td>
<td>U. S.</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHN-1</td>
<td>1,110</td>
<td>690 (1 x 300)</td>
<td>Naval Aircraft Factory</td>
<td>U. S.</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V156-B-1 (SB2U)</td>
<td>2,450</td>
<td>1,120 (1 x 1,000)</td>
<td>Vought-Sikorsky</td>
<td>U. S.</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N3PB-5</td>
<td>2,450</td>
<td>1,120 (1 x 1,000)</td>
<td>Northrop</td>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>855</td>
<td>582</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Range is considered as the maximum total distance, under ideal conditions. Figures are in statute miles with planes in patrol or scout condition, as case may be.
2 It is to be noted that there were no Lend-Lease transfers of long range patrol bombers or scout bombers during the period covered.
3 Not included in this category are 20-2 Engined land planes (PBO/A/3-29) transferred by the Army to the Navy in September and October 1941.
4 This figure does not indicate the complete picture of the movement of patrol planes to the Hawaiian area during January-November 1941. During January 1941, 1 squadron of PatWing 1, equipped with 12 PBY-3's, left the west coast for the Hawaiian area. In April PatWing 1 headquarters and a second squadron equipped with 12 PBY-3's also moved to the Hawaiian area. This increased the number of planes in Hawaiian Area by 24 over the number present on 1 Jan. 1941, but by 12 during the period covered by this report. In October and November, 3 squadrons of 12 planes each and 1 squadron of 6 planes then in the Hawaiian area returned to the West Coast and exchanged their PBY-3's for PBY-5's after which they returned to the Hawaiian area. During this same period the third squadron of PatWing 1, equipped with 12 new PBY-5's also left the West Coast for Hawaii. This accounts for the 84 new PBY-3's moved into the Hawaiian Area during the period covered by this report and represents a total of 24 additional planes in the Hawaiian Area over the number present on 1 Feb. 1941; an increase of 36 during the period 1 January-30 November 1941.
5 26 PBY's had been transferred to the Philippines in December 1940 and remained in that area until after 7 December 1941.
6 Assigned to carriers in the Pacific.
7 These 78 SBD-3A's were turned over to the Army by the Navy during September and October 1941.
8 Arrived at Ewa 13 May 1941, assigned to Marine Scout Bomber Squadron 231.
9 Single-engine G3S seat float plane—not used by U. S. Navy.
MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Seth W. Richardson

In response to your oral request, and also that of Senator Ferguson (Record of Proceedings, Page 12,997) referred to in Item #19 of your memorandum of 29 March 1946, there has been prepared and is forwarded you herewith, since Navy activity in sending shore based anti-aircraft guns to the Pacific Ocean areas was accomplished through the Marine Corps, tables showing the troop and weapon status, with increases and decreases as the case may be, of the U. S. Marine Corps defense battalions and post and station personnel at Oahu, Palmyra, Johnston, Midway, Wake, Samoa, Guam, Cavite, Olongapo and Shanghai, on 1 February 1941 and 7 December 1941, together with a concluding summary.

John Ford Baecher
Commander, USNR
### U.S. Marine Corps troops and weapons status

#### OAHU
(Defense Battalions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>5'' 51 cal.</th>
<th>3'' AA Army Type</th>
<th>3'' AA</th>
<th>S/L</th>
<th>AA, 50 cal. M3</th>
<th>AA, 30 cal. MG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/1/41</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>12/7/41</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>1,155</td>
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<td>28</td>
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#### OAHU
(Post & Station)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>5'' 51 cal.</th>
<th>3'' AA Army Type</th>
<th>3'' AA</th>
<th>S/L</th>
<th>AA, 50 cal. M3</th>
<th>AA, 30 cal. MG</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Men</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2/1/41</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>716</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/7/41</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>855</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>139</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### PALMYRA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>5'' 51 cal.</th>
<th>3'' AA Army Type</th>
<th>3'' AA</th>
<th>S/L</th>
<th>AA, 50 cal. M3</th>
<th>AA, 30 cal. MG</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Men</td>
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1 Includes: Aviation, 11 officers and 49 men, Army, 1 officer and 5 men.
2 Includes 199 Samoan Reserves.
### GUAM

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¹ Supplied by Navy Yard Cavite and manned on 1 May 1941 by Marines.
² Sailed from Shanghai 28 Nov. for Olongapo. Arrived Olongapo 2 Dec. 1941.

### Summary

**U. S. MARINE CORPS. TROOPS AND WEAPONS STATUS PACIFIC AND FAR EAST**

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<th>3&quot;/23</th>
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² Supplyment 1942