PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION
OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
SEVENTY-NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
PURSUANT TO
S. Con. Res. 27
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE ATTACK ON PEARL
HARBOR ON DECEMBER 7, 1941, AND
EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
RELATING THERETO

PART 27
PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

Printed for the use of the
Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack
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HARBOR ATTACK

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EDWARD P. MORGAN, Assistant Counsel
LOGAN J. LANE, Assistant Counsel
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## JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBIT NO. 145

### ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

### INDEX TO TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

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PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

MONDAY, AUGUST 7, 1944

PENTAGON BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.


General Grunert. The Board will come to order. Colonel West, will you swear the reporters?

(Thereupon J. Chester Wilfong and Lloyd L. Harkins were sworn; Earl H. Pendell, affirmed.)

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL, CHIEF OF STAFF, WAR DEPARTMENT (WASHINGTON, D. C.)

General Grunert. Will the Recorder swear the witness, please?

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder.)

1. Colonel West. General, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

General Marshall. General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, War Department; Washington, D. C.

2. Colonel West. General, the procedure prescribed for the Board requires that all witnesses examined by it be advised [3] prior to testifying of their rights under Article of War 24. The Article of War mentioned reads in pertinent part as follows:

No witness before a military board * * * shall be compelled to incriminate himself or to answer any question the answer to which may tend to incriminate him, or to answer any question not material to the issue when such answer might tend to degrade him.

In other words, do you fully understand that you do not have to answer any question the answer to which may tend to incriminate you, but that if you do, such testimony may later be used against you?

General Marshall. I do. I would like to say, before you get under way, I appreciate very much your coming over here, rather than my going over to your place of doing business. I would also like to say that I have not had time even to read more than about half way through the notes which they prepared for me, but I thought, in view of the fact the Secretary did not feel he could appear for quite some time, it was essential that I at least make a preliminary appearance
before the Board, to give you as much data as I could, so that you could get ahead on that basis without undue delay. If necessary, I can appear again, regarding any details that either I am misty about, or that you wish to go into, that I am not prepared to give you today.

3. General GRUNERT. We appreciate very much the opportunity to get this background. We need a starting point, and to get the War Department background is the start I think we need.

General, the order convening this Board states, in part:

4. Pursuant to the provisions of Public Law 339, 75th Congress, approved 13 June 1944, a Board of officers is hereby convened to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on 7 December 1941, and to make such recommendations as it may deem proper.

Now, since the existence of the Board is based on the Public Law referred to, the Board made a study of congressional hearings thereon, and as a result deemed it part of its duties to go into the War Department background and viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. In consequence, the Board drew up a list of subjects on which it desires to question the Chief of Staff.

The large field to be covered by the Board in the limited time available made it advisable to assign objectives or phases of inquiry to individual members, although the entire Board will pass upon all objectives or phases. General Russell was assigned to this particular phase, so he will lead in propounding the questions, and other members will assist in developing them. That is just to get one member more familiar than the rest of the Board to go into the thing. General Russell, if you will take over, and either follow the list of subjects, or develop the thing as you see fit, you may proceed.

4. General RUSSELL. It is my thought, General Marshall, that it would probably be well to follow first the subjects that were listed in the memorandum that was sent over, and if it becomes necessary to refer elsewhere as we go along, we can do it.

The first subject on this list is described, there, in general terms as the “War Council.” Apparently some confusion has arisen as to the identity of that group. I am responsible for getting it into the record, and I have in mind the statements of the Secretary of State about the meetings between the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and, on occasions, with the higher military and naval authorities; so it is that group to which we refer. In order to elucidate just a little further, I might say that it was determined to discuss that subject with you, because of frequent references to the “war council” in the White Paper which the State Department has prepared and is circulating, showing the State Department’s activities, through those critical years prior to 1941.

The first question under the subject of “war council” was the composition of that War Council. Do you recall who attended those meetings?

General MARSHALL. Normally, I think it was the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the Secretary of the Navy. On frequent occasions, also, Admiral Stark and myself attended, and we brought with us occasionally other officials, or we took other officials with us. They occurred in Mr. Hull’s office. I think, in most instances, there
was no record kept—as far as I know. I haven’t a clear picture of a recorder being present; he may have been; I doubt it; certainly not on all occasions, and I do not recall on any occasion. I may be quite wrong about that. How often Admiral Stark and I went, I could not say. My dim recollection is that during this critical period, in the latter part of August, up until the outbreak of war, we probably went to most of the meetings, because I remember I was having a very hard time managing my business and attending the meetings, because they were rather lengthy; so I recall my dilemma of the time involved in doing business there.

5. General Russell. General Marshall, were there any limitations imposed upon you or other representatives of the War Department as to what you might disclose, that might have transpired at these council meetings?

General Marshall. I don’t recall any limitation. It was a matter purely of our judgment.

6. General Grunert. That was left entirely to the Secretary of War’s judgment, or your judgment, or to what either one of you saw fit to do?

General Marshall. I have no recollection of the matter, at all. I rather think that nothing was said about it, and it was just left to our good judgment. As a matter of fact, I might add that, on the security end, most of the restrictions were proposed and imposed by the military authorities, meaning officers, rather than others; so if there was any tendency to restrict and hold, it would have been on our part rather than on the other. I recall none whatsoever.

7. General Russell. Is it true, or not, General Marshall, that as we moved along into 1941, and into the autumn of 1941, these meetings were more frequent than they had been theretofore?

General Marshall. Yes, sir; that is true. I would like to have about 10 minutes of a closed session.

(There was a closed session from 11:10 a.m. to 12:07 p.m., during which time the Recorder, the Assistant Recorder, and the three reporters withdrew.)

FULL SESSION RESUMED

8. General Russell. General Marshall, when we were discussing the relation between the War Department and the State Department as reflected in the council meetings, a moment ago, you said that those meetings were a little bit more frequent, in the latter part of 1941, than they had been theretofore.


9. General Russell. In those meetings, the subject of our relation with Japan was discussed, I assume?

General Marshall. With great frequency.

10. General Russell. Were the possibilities of an assault on Hawaii by carrier-borne aviation considered in those meetings, or was that considered as a part of the War Department operations?

General Marshall. I don’t recall any specific discussion of an attack on Hawaii. There were general discussions of Japanese assaults, but they related more to the Indo-China theater, where we had positive evidences of their preliminary movements.
11. General Russell. Would you say, as a generalization, that the relation between the American Government and the Japanese Government became more tense as time went along, in 1941?

General Marshall. Decidedly so. I will add that we were very fearful of some warlike act by the Japanese, which immediately would have brought about a state of war in the Pacific, for which, at the time, we were not prepared; in addition to the fact that we had an immediate, close-up interest in the great events that were taking place in the European theater.

12. General Russell. Speaking from memory, General Marshall, could you recall any occurrences in any of the council meetings in the fall of 1941 which affected to any degree the thinking of the War Department toward possible trouble with Japan?

General Marshall. I think there were numerous indications brought to our attention by the State Department, or to the attention of the State Department by the War and Navy Departments, all of which indicated a very serious crisis developing in the Pacific in relation to Japan. I know that we, meaning Admiral Stark and myself, made it very clear, I think, to the Secretary of State, that it was of the utmost importance to utilize every resource to delay so long as possible any outbreak in the Pacific.

I recall that, I think early in September, in a discussion at one of these meetings, the question was asked of us, what was the earliest date in the near future that we would be reasonably prepared to take appropriate action; and we finally gave December 5, I believe, as that date. However, I recall particularly Admiral Stark felt that navally we would not be sufficiently prepared until, I believe, January or February—February is my recollection—and December 5 did not give sufficient time. The Army estimate of December 5 was based on the prospective sailings of transports and cargo boats to the Philippines and the movement of a total approaching 100 Flying Fortresses, being completed, in the Philippines by that time.

Actually the sailings were not made at so early a date as anticipated, due to combined difficulties of obtaining the necessary boats—that is, removing them from their then civil, commercial operations—and also the delay in receipt of materiel beyond the dates that had been given us, and, in particular, the delayed receipt of 45 Flying Fortresses, and the further delay of about two weeks, I believe, in their take-off from San Francisco for Hawaii, because of unexpected head winds.

13. General Russell. General Marshall, based on the information which was available to the War Department in the late fall of 1941, what if any conclusions were reached as to the probable plans of Japan for attack, as they related to the places to be attacked?

General Marshall. We anticipated, beyond a doubt, a Japanese movement in Indo-China and the Gulf of Siam, and against the Malay Peninsula. We anticipated also an assault on the Philippines. We did not, so far as I recall, anticipate an attack on Hawaii; the reason being that we thought, with the addition of more modern planes, that the defenses there would be sufficient to make it extremely hazardous for the Japanese to attempt such an attack.

14. General Grunert. From what we have learned, I do not think there is any use going into paragraph “B”, about the Atlantic Charter.

General Marshall. Here is something. In further answer to your
question, I find the memorandum to the President on the subject of the Far Eastern situation, dated November 27, states this:

If the current negotiations end without agreement, Japan may attack the Burma Road; Thailand; Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; the Philippines; the Russian Maritime Provinces.

There is little probability of an immediate Japanese attack on the Maritime Provinces, because of the strength of the Russian Forces. Recent Japanese troop movements all seem to have been southward.

[10] The magnitude of the effort required will militate against direct attack against Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies until the threat exercised by United States forces in Luzon is removed.

Then there are some remarks on the Burma Road or Thailand objectives, and this:

The most essential thing now, from the United States viewpoint, is to gain time. Considerable Navy and Army reinforcements have been rushed to the Philippines, but the desirable strength has not yet been reached. The process of reinforcement is being continued. Of great immediate concern is the safety of the Army convoy now near Guam, and the Marine Corps convoy just leaving Shanghai. Ground forces to a total of 21,000 are due to sail from the United States by December 8, 1941, and it is important that this troop reinforcement reach the Philippines before hostilities commence.

Precipitance of military action on our part should be avoided as long as consistent with national policy. The longer the delay, the more positive becomes the assurance of retention of these islands as a naval and air base. Japanese action to the south of Formosa will be hindered and perhaps seriously blocked as long as we hold the Philippine Islands. War with Japan certainly will interrupt our transport of supplies to Siberia, and probably will interrupt the process of aiding China.

After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed that joint military counter action against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the United [11] States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100° East—

I referred to that a little while ago.

or south of 10° North—

"10° North" cuts them off from the Gulf of Siam.

Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

Japanese involvement in Yunnan or Thailand up to a certain extent is advantageous, since it leads to further dispersion, longer lines of communication, and an additional burden or communications. However, a Japanese advance to the west of 100° East or south of 10° North, immediately becomes a threat to Burma and Singapore. Until it is patent that Japan intends to advance beyond these lines, no action which might lead to immediate hostilities should be taken.

It is recommended that—

prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcements, military counter action be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens United States, British, or Dutch territory as above outlined:

in case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the United States, the British, and the Dutch Governments that advance beyond the lines indicated may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint military opposition be taken;

steps be taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and Dutch for the issuance of such warning.

[12] That is signed by Stark and signed by me.

15. General Russell. Now, General Marshall, General Short went out to the Hawaiian Department early in 1941; I believe that is true. General MARSHALL. Yes.
16. General Russell. Did he come to the Department in Washington for conferences before going out?

General Marshall. He came to Washington. I haven't a very clear recollection of our interview here. The normal procedure would be for him to go into War Plans Division and familiarize himself with the plans relating to the theater into which he was going. I have a very indistinct recollection of that visit. However, I have a letter I wrote him just at that time.

17. General Russell. The letter to which you refer is the letter of February 7, 1941?


18. General Russell. General Marshall, do you believe that that letter contains a complete statement as to the situation in Hawaii and the policies which General Short was to follow in his administration of the affairs of the Department?

General Marshall. No. There was a dozier or a file in the War Plans Division, of all the War Department instructions regarding the particular defense of that theater. This letter of mine gave a personal touch to my general views on the matter. I might say that since then I have rarely if ever written to any theater commander, so there could never be any confusion between my letters and the plans of the War Plans Division. As a matter of fact, I have rather given offense because I have not written. They have written to me, but I have seldom ever written to them. [13] I have made it all an official basis, coming from the Operations Section, which was the old War Plans Division. However, in this, this is not a complete defense of Hawaii, at all.

19. General Russell. I think that this letter of February 7 should be incorporated into and made a part of the record.

20. General Grunert. What is the restricted, confidential, or other classification?

21. General Russell. It is a secret letter.

General Marshall. Well, I do not know as it is secret, now.

22. General Russell. It is marked "Secret."

23. General Grunert. We cannot put anything in the record that is not supposed to be treated in that manner.

General Marshall. Yes, I think you can put this in. All that letter of his that is here can go into the record.

24. General Russell. I think then we will attach that letter.

(Letter of February 7, 1941, is as follows:)

(Stamped) Secret

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF,
Washington, February 7, 1941.

Lieut. General Walter C. Short,
Fort Shafter,
Territory of Hawaii.

My Dear Short: I believe you take over command today, however, the reason for this letter is a conversation I had yesterday with Admiral Stark.

[13] Admiral Stark said that Kimmel had written him at length about the deficiencies of Army matériel for the protection of Pearl Harbor. He referred specifically to planes and to antiaircraft guns. Of course the facts are as he represents them regarding planes, and to a less serious extent regarding caliber
.50 machine guns. The 3-inch antiaircraft gun is on a better basis. What Kimmel does not realize is that we are tragically lacking in this matériel throughout the Army, and that Hawaii is on a far better basis than any other command in the Army.

The fullest protection for the Fleet is the rather than a major consideration for us, there can be little question about that; but the Navy itself makes demands on us for commands other than Hawaii, which make it difficult for us to meet the requirements of Hawaii. For example, as I told Stark yesterday—he had been pressing me heavily to get some modern antiaircraft guns in the Philippines for the protection of Cavite, where they have collected a number of submarines as well as the vessels of the Asiatic Fleet—at the present time we have no antiaircraft guns for the protection of Cavite, and very little for Corregidor. By unobtrusively withdrawing 3-inch guns from regiments now in the field in active training, we had obtained 20 3-inch guns for immediate shipment to the Philippines. However, before the shipment had been gotten under way the Navy requested 18 of these guns for Marine battalions to be specially equipped for the defense of islands in the Pacific. So I am left with two guns for the Philippines. This has happened time and again, and until quantity [15] production gets well under way, we are in a most difficult situation in these matters.

I have not mentioned Panama, but the naval requirements of defense there are of immense importance and we have not been able to provide all the guns that are necessary, nor to set up the Air units with modern equipment. However, in this instance, we can fly the latest equipment to Panama in one day, some of it in four hours.

You should make clear to Admiral Kimmel that we are doing everything that is humanly possible to build up the Army defenses of the Naval overseas installations, but we cannot perform a miracle. I arranged yesterday to ship 31 of the P36 planes to Hawaii by aircraft carrier from San Diego in about ten days. This will give you 50 of this type of plane, deficient in speed compared to the Japanese carried based pursuit, and deficient in armament. But at least it gives you 50 of the same type. I also arranged with Admiral Stark to ship 50 P40-B pursuit planes about March 15th by Naval carrier from San Diego. These planes just came into production this week and should be on a quantity basis of about 8 a day by the first week in March.

The Japanese carrier based pursuit plane, which has recently appeared in China, according to our information has a speed of 322 miles an hour, a very rapid ability to climb and mounts two .20mm and two .30 cal. guns. It has leak-proof tanks and armor. Our P40-B will have a speed of 360 miles an hour with two .50 cal. machine guns and four .30 caliber. It will lack the rapidity to climb of the Japanese plane. It will have leak-proof tanks and [16] armor.

We have an earlier model of this plane, the P40, delivered between August and October, but the Chief of the Air Corps opposes sending it to Hawaii because of some engine defect which makes it unsafe for training flights over water. Up to the present time we have not had available a modern medium bomber or a light bomber. This month the medium bomber will go into production, if not quantity production. This plane has a range without bombs of 3,000 miles, carries 2,000 pounds and has a speed of 320 miles an hour—a tremendous improvement on the old B18 which you now have. It can operate with bombs 640 miles to sea, with a safe reserve against the return trip. We plan to give you first priority on these planes. I am looking into the question of providing at least a squadron of Flying Fortress planes for Hawaii.

I am seeing what can be done to augment the .50 caliber machine gun set-up, but I have no hopes for the next few months. The Navy approached us regarding barrage balloons. We have three now under test, and 80 in process of manufacture, and 3,000 to be procured if the President will release our estimates. However, this provides nothing against the next few months. I am looking into the question of possibly obtaining some from England, but they are asking us and not giving us these days. The first test of the first forty deliveries in June will probably be made in Hawaii.

You, of course, understand the pressures on the Department for the limited matériel we have, for Alaska. [17] for Panama, and, most confidentially, for the possible occupation of the Azores, not to mention the new leased bases. However, as I have already said, we are keeping clearly in mind that our first concern is to protect the Fleet.

My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if no serious harm is done us during the first six hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing
defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by Air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority.

Please keep clearly in mind in all of your negotiations that our mission is to protect the base and the Naval concentration, and that purpose should be made clearly apparent to Admiral Kimmel. I accentuate this because I found yesterday, for example, in a matter of tremendous importance, that old Army and Navy feuds, engendered from fights over appropriations, with the usual fallacious arguments on both sides, still persist in confusing issues of national defense. We must be completely impersonal in these matters, at least so far as our own nerves and irritations are concerned. Fortunately, and happily I might say, Stark and I are on the most intimate personal basis, and that relationship has enabled us to avoid many serious difficulties.

Faithfully yours,

/s/ G. C. MARSHALL.

[18] 25. General Russell. General Marshall, in the letter of February 7, you stated that the mission of the Army out there was the protection of the Navy.


26. General Russell. Do you regard that as an accurate statement of the relation between Army and Navy in the Hawaiian Department?

General Marshall. Yes. That is the reason for the Army's being there.

27. General Russell. To protect?

General Marshall. Hawaii's importance to us is as a naval-air base, and it is the center of Pacific Fleet activities. Our mission was to protect it, and for that reason, the eventual arrangement of command was a naval command.

28. General Russell. In this letter, February 7, General, the statement was made by you to General Short that—

The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the situation.

Did anything that occurred between the date of this letter of February 7 and the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, cause you to change in any way that estimate of the situation in Hawaii?


(Discussion off the record.)

[19] 29. General Russell. General Marshall, between the date of February 7, 1941, and the date of December 7, 1941, do you recall any communications with General Short carried on by you either by telephone or letter or radiogram or any other method, a record of which is not in the War Department files?

General Marshall. No; I have no recollection of such a thing.

I have here another letter, of March 5. I do not know whether you have it in the record or not. It reads:

(Letter dated March 5, 1941, is as follows:)

MY DEAR SHORT: I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first priority. General Chaney has prepared a report of recent exercises held in the United States and incorporated therein his views and recommendations based on his experience in these exercises and his observation of the system and method employed by the British. A copy of this report is being sent to you.

An air defense exercise is contemplated for the West Coast in the Spring. This exercise is to include an establishment similar to that which has been set
up in the Air Defense Command exercise in the Northeast and tested during January. It is highly desirable that representatives from Hawaii be present to observe the details of this exercise. If this is found to be impracticable, we will consider having officers sent to the exercise who shortly thereafter are due for station in Hawaii.

Faithfully yours,

/s/ G. C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff.

30. General Russell. That is an important matter. Where did that letter come from?
   General Marshall. I wrote that to General Short.

31. General Russell. From what files in the War Department did you get that letter?
   General Russell. In other words, where is there a record of that letter, so far as the official files of the War Department are concerned? We have not run across it yet.
   General Marshall. I do not know.

32. General Russell. It might lead us to believe that there may be others.
   General Marshall. My practice, when those personal letters come to me, is to send them right to the Operations Section, and they go into the files.

33. General Russell. That letter could have been missed in a hurried search. I am sure if I had seen it I would have picked it up.

34. General Russell. Was there an answer to that letter, General?
   General Marshall. On the 15th of March General Short replies:

   General George C. Marshall,
   Chief of Staff of the Army, War Department, Washington, D. C.

   Dear General Marshall: In reply to your letter of March 5th I shall give you a brief review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department in regard to defense from air attack.

   General Marshall. Do you have that letter?


36. General Russell. Is there anything in that answer that could not be used now? In other words, is there something that might in the future jeopardize the defense?

   General Marshall. The letter continues:

   DISPERSION AND PROTECTION OF AIRCRAFT

The most serious situation with reference to an air attack is the vulnerability of both the Army and Navy air fields to the attack. Hickam Field is the most conspicuous target in sight and the Ford Island Navy Field is not much better. Wheeler Field is less conspicuous only because it is in the center of the Island. On all fields the planes have been kept lined up on the field where they would suffer terrific loss. As I wrote you in my letter of February 19th some work has been done towards the preparation of emergency fields on outlying islands, but in no case has arrangements been completed for the dispersion of the planes in the vicinity of the field or the preparation of bunkers to protect them. I asked for money and Engineer troops to do this work. The pursuit planes must necessarily be protected on the Island of Oahu on account of their limited cruising radius.

The Navy is organizing its new landing field at Barbers Point for the use of the carrier borne planes. They also are well along on the construction of an air base at Kaneohe Bay to which the 5 patrol squadrons will be moved. From their point of view this will improve the situation greatly. With the arrival of the additional 50 pursuit planes Wheeler Field will be so badly congested that it will be necessary to establish another landing field. Before my
arrival this had practically been decided upon adjacent to the new Navy landing field at Barbers Point. However, the Navy objected very strenuously to this and I think rightly so as planes coming in or going out from either field would have to fly over the other field and constitute a considerable element of danger. We have located another field about four miles northeast of Schofield Barracks. I think this is far more desirable from every point of view as we shall not be in danger of losing planes through the action of small landing parties or of having them damaged or of having the field put out of use by shelling from enemy ships. The runway will be about 5,000 feet so the bombers can use it as an emergency field should Hickam Field be out of action on account of bombing. The Observation Squadron and the squadron of light bombers is being [23] moved to Bellows Field in the next few days so as to lessen the congestion at Wheeler Field.

Plans have been made to provide gas and bombs at all emergency landing fields on outlying islands and for the stationing on Kauai, Maui, and Hawaii of the Battalions of National Guard which came from these islands for the protection of the air fields from sabotage and small landing parties. Incidentally these battalions would serve to prevent local disorders. Unless there is an emergency these troops will not be sent to the other islands until the camp buildings for one company have been provided at each air field. Part of each battalion can be quartered in existing Armories on these islands usually at some distance from the air field.

**ANTI- AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY**

In general we have no serious shortage in 3 inch antiaircraft artillery, only 16 guns being required to complete our complement. As far as I know no provision has been made for 90-mm Antiaircraft guns. 20 out of 135 37-mm antiaircraft guns have been received. The exact date of the arrival of the others is not known. We are still short 236 of .50 caliber machine guns. Perhaps the most serious shortage is 8 long range detectors (AWS) which are supposed to arrive in June. Our present sound locators have a range of only 4½ miles so they are practically useless. The new detectors will have a maximum range of 120 miles.

The shortage of personnel is much more serious [24] than that of equipment. Practically all of the Coast Artillery is assigned dual roles. This means that much of the Antiaircraft equipment would not be manned if it were essential to man the Harbor Defense guns at the same time. To man the authorized equipment would require 2 regiments of Coast Artillery (AA) (Mobile) (TO 4–11), 1 battalion, gun, Coast Artillery (AA) (Mobile) (less searchlight battery) (TO 4–15), 90 officers and 2,000 replacements to activate 3 gun batteries and 37-mm batteries. These were covered in my letter of February 19th.

**COORDINATION OF ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSE**

The coordination of Antiaircraft defense presents quite a different picture at Hawaii from that existing in most places on the mainland. The island is so small that there would not be the same degree of warning that would exist on the mainland. After the installation of our new detectors we shall have some warning from the different islands and almost continuous service in the most dangerous direction for approximately 75 miles. The pursuit aviation, however, will have to be prepared to take the air in the minimum amount of time.

On account of the congestion in the areas at Hickam Field, Pearl Harbor, and Barbers Point, the coordination of the Army and Navy aircraft and of the Antiaircraft Artillery presents a very serious problem. We have had a committee of the Army and Navy working on this subject. The committee submitted its report March 1st and it is now being reviewed by General Martin, [25] commanding the Hawaiian Air Force, General Gardner, commanding the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Brigade, and Admiral Bellinger, commanding the Naval Air Station. We have had a number of combined air exercises in the past month and expect to have a minimum of one each week so we should find out anything that is wrong with the plan.

**WEST COAST DEFENSE EXERCISE**

If the situation here is such as to make it possible I would like to send both General Martin and General Gardner to the West Coast Defense Exercise.
Martin is the senior with his temporary rank and probably will command our air defense if it appears that such a command is the proper solution of our problem. Gardner has had much more experience with this subject and I feel that it would be wise to send him also as he would be able to get all the details. If it is not advisable at the time to send these two officers I would like to send their Executives as I am sure a lot would be learned from the exercise.

I feel that the question of Antiaircraft Defense against air attack is the most serious problem that we have to face and I hope that funds and Engineer troops can be made available soon so that we can get definitely on the way on this subject.

Very sincerely,

/s/ WALTER C. SHORT.

[28] 38. General Russell. Do you have any other letters in that file, or interchange of letters?

General Marshall. There is a letter from me to General Short, dated March 28. There is one from General Short to me, dated March 6, with relation to aircraft warning service.

39. General Frank. Is this file a part of your personal files, or War Department files?

General Marshall. I do not have any personal file.

40. General Frank. That file can be made available to us, can it not?

General Marshall. Oh, yes. I mentioned the one of March 6 without reading it. Then there is my letter to him of March 28 regarding relieving congestion by the construction of one additional field and by the dispersion of grounded aircraft in protected centers; stating that a company of aviation engineers will be sent during April, and further increases in the engineer garrison are contemplated when the necessary personnel can be made available; and my hope of arranging for the early augmentation of the antiaircraft garrison so as to provide full strength units, and also my approval of the proposal to send General Martin and General Gardner.

Then there is another letter from General Short to me, of April 14, regarding certain parcels of land.

(Excerpt from letter dated April 14, 1941, is as follows:)

Knowing that you are very much interested in the progress that we are making in cooperating with the Navy I am enclosing the following agreements made with them:


2. Agreement signed by the Commander of the Hawaiian Air Force and Commander, Naval Base Defense Air Force to implement the above agreement.

3. Field Orders No. 1 NS (Naval Security) putting into effect for the Army the provisions of the joint agreement.

I have found both Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch very cooperative and we all feel steps have been taken which make it possible for the Army and Navy Air Forces to act together and with the unity of command as the situation requires.

We still have some detail work to do with reference to coordinating the air force and the antiaircraft defense.

On May 5 a letter from General Marshall to General Short, referring to the letter of April 14th to which I just referred, reading as follows:

(Letter dated May 5, 1941, is as follows:)

Lieutenant General WALTER C. SHORT,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

MY DEAR SHORT: Thank you for your letter of the 14th enclosing the joint plans and the estimate concerning possible air action. It is evident that you have been on the job, and I know that the Navy is delighted to have such generous cooperation.
[28] The matter of locating strong points at various points throughout the island looks sound to me, and authority to go ahead on the leasing of land parcels was radioed on April 22nd. War Plans and the Air Corps are still looking into the matter of the additional airdrome on Oahu, and I expect to have an answer for you in a short time.

I am hoping to leave in the next day or so on an inspection trip to the West Coast, which will include a visit to Alaska. I think they are doing a fine job up there and it will be good to get away from my desk for awhile. Last week the Appropriations Committee kept me on the stand through two successive sessions of four hours each, which involved answering a barrage of questions on all matters great and small.

It is most gratifying to hear you say that everything is going along extremely well and do not hesitate to write at any time.

Faithfully yours,

/s/ G. C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff.

On May 29 I received a letter from him in which he reports on certain maneuvers, which I think will be probably very interesting to you gentlemen if you have not already seen it.

41. General Russell. That letter is not in the file that was made available by the Adjutant General's Office.

General Marshall. Then there is a letter from me to General Short, dated October 10, reading as follows:

[29] (Letter dated October 10, 1941, is as follows:)

Lieutenant General Walter C. Short,
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter Hawaii.

Dear General Short: The mimeographed standard operating procedure for the Hawaiian Department, dated July 14, has just come to my attention and I am particularly concerned with missions assigned to air units. For instance, the Hawaiian Air Force, among other things, is assigned the mission of defending Schofield Barracks and all air fields on Oahu against sabotage and ground attacks; and with providing a provisional battalion of 500 men for military police duty.

This seems inconsistent with the emphasis we are placing on air strength in Hawaii, particularly in view of the fact that only minimum operating and maintenance personnel have been provided. As a matter of fact, we are now in process of testing the organization of airbase defense battalions, consisting tentatively of a rifle company and two antiaircraft batteries, designed for the specific purpose of relieving the air maintenance people from ground missions of this kind at locations where there are no large garrisons for ground defense, as there are in Hawaii.

I wish you would give this your personal consideration.

Faithfully yours,

/s/ G. C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff.

[30] Another letter from me, dated October 28, referring to a letter which I do not see here. General Short wrote me on the 14th, and it is not in here.

(Letter dated October 28, 1941, is as follows:)

Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short,
Commanding General, Hawaiian Department,
Fort Shafter, T. H.

Dear Short: With reference to your letter of October 14, I can understand your motives in giving ground defense training to Air Corps personnel which at present are excess for the equipment provided. However, the present rate of expansion of the Air Force is such that they are having considerable difficulty in obtaining experienced maintenance men and it is important that they be permitted to concentrate on the technical training of all potential mechanics, regardless of available equipment. Also, it is equally important that they utilize
all available time on this specialized training and the men not be left without assigned duties particularly during the maneuver period.

I suggest that you prepare a separate phase of your alert plan based on the assumption that the Air Force has been destroyed and a hostile landing effected. This plan could provide for the use of the necessary Air Corps personnel for ground defense and afford a means of indoctrinating them in ground defense tactics. It should, however, for the present at least, be [31] subordinated to their own specific training requirements.

It would appear that the best policy would be to allow them to concentrate on technical Air Corps training until they have completed their expansion program and have their feet on the ground as far as their primary mission is concerned. War Department Training Circular 47, which was issued July 18, 1941, can be accepted as a guide except in extreme situations.

Faithfully yours,

/s/ G. C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff.

Here [exhibiting] is General Short's letter of October 14, 1941, replying to my letter of October 10, in which I referred to his standing operating procedure and said that it "has just come to my attention and I am particularly concerned with missions assigned to air units," and so forth.

Letter dated October 14, 1941, is as follows:

General George C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff of the Army,
War Department, Washington, D. C.

Dear General Marshall: I have your letter of October 10th with reference to the use of men of the Air Force on other than strictly air duties. At the time our tentative Standing Operating Procedure was put out the Air Corps had 7,229 men. Full Combat details and all overhead required only 3,885 men for the planes and organizations actually on hand. This left a surplus of 3,344 men with no assigned duties during Maneuvers. One of the main reasons for the [32] assignment was to give these men something to do during the Maneuvers. Another reason was the belief that any serious threat of an enemy ground attack of Oahu could come only after destruction of our Air Forces. The fact that our planes had been destroyed would not mean that all the men had been put out of action. It is probable that several thousand men would still be left and it would not look plausible to have them sit down and do nothing while Infantrymen were detailed to protect them and their air fields. The training after the first two weeks takes up only about four hours per month of their time. It seems to me that they should continue to be trained as Riflemen in the immediate defense of air fields. As regards their use as Military Police that was not correct. The plan was to use them for guarding certain essential utilities, which did not require team training. However, this will be unnecessary as the Legislature has just passed the Home Guard Bill, which will go into effect very soon. They will be able to take over guarding of all essential utilities, highway bridges, railroad bridges, etc.

If it is not desired to train Air Corps men for their own protection and for the final defense of the air field I would like to be so advised.

Very sincerely,

/s/ Walter C. Short.

42. General Russell. Do those constitute the complete exchange of letters between you and General Short?


43. General Russell. I repeat the question then, General Marshall. If there are any others than these transmitting information from you to General Short they are in the records of the War Department?

General Marshall. Yes. Those letters are, in effect, about what an officer in my position would say orally if he visited the command. They are not specific directives. It is what he thinks; it is what he is interested in; it is his interpretation.
44. General Russell. Particularly the Board was interested in communications to General Short which bore on the relations between the Japanese and our Government in their relations in the Pacific. You have nothing in your file here relating to that?

General Marshall. Not other than the radios that made certain statements regarding that.

45. General Russell. To refresh your memory, General Marshall, and in order that further search may be made, if necessary, the records which have been made available to the Board indicate that on July 7, 1941, a message was sent out from the Adjutant General to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department in which the Japanese probabilities were discussed. It is in this language:

(Message dated July 7, 1941, is as follows:)

"For your information. Deduction from information from numerous sources is that the Japanese Government has determined upon its future policy which is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups. This policy is at present one of watchful waiting involving probable aggressive action against the Maritime Provinces of Russia if and when the Siberian Garrison has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia. Opinion is that Jag activity in the South will be for the present confined to seizure and development of Naval, Army, and Air Bases in Indo China although an advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out. The neutrality pact with Russia may be abrogated. They have ordered all Jap vessels in U. S. Atlantic ports to be west of Panama Canal by first of August. Movement of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are being requisitioned.

The situation which developed at that time has been discussed by you previously. Our records show, General Marshall, that not again, until October, did anything go from the War Department out to General Short relating to our relations with Japan and the probabilities there.

In October, General Marshall, a memorandum originated in the Operations Department General Staff, at Washington, in which was discussed a Navy estimate of Japanese probabilities in the Pacific in which the Navy had stated that they thought war with Russia was imminent and that, since Japan held the British and us responsible for their present situation, there was a possibility of their attacking us. General Gerow prepared a memorandum which bears your initials and some other. [35] initials, disagreeing with that estimate and stating that the general recommendation was made that this be sent to the Hawaiian Department:

Tension between the United States and Japan remains strained, but no abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent.

From July down to October we have nothing else in our records, and we were wondering whether or not something else did exist or whether that October radiogram constitutes the next message to General Short.

General Marshall. So far as I know, it does. I think we have some passing back and forth between the War Plans Division and his staff out there, and I will check on that. That goes on pretty much all the time.

46. General Russell. General Marshall, eliminating messages from the Navy which were shown to General Short, the next record that we have of any communication from the War Department to General Short is on the 27th of November, on which date the alert order went
out and a message from G-2 of the War Department to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department; and I was wondering if your files showed any other communications between the October message and the November 27 message.

General Marshall: I do not know of any. I will check up very carefully.

47. General Grunert. Was it SOP between you and the Navy that Navy messages of importance were shown to the Army and that Army messages of importance were shown to the Navy or did you agree that this particular message should or should not be shown?

[36] General Marshall. We did not say that. There were no instructions to the Commander not to show it at all. We put that in, in these critical cases, to make certain that there was do doubt about it. I know of no instructions to an Army Commander not to show this to the Navy. That was left to his own discretion. When we come to important things we put that in specifically.

I would like to explain to you here that the reason for that is that we did not want to compromise our codes; and if we sent instructions out, if the Navy sent them out and we sent them out, it presented a great hazard in the compromise of the codes.

48. General Grunert. But all those messages during that critical period, I believe, or most of them, did say to show it to the Navy; and in that case you did not send an additional message?

General Marshall. No; in order not to compromise the codes.

49. General Russell. General Marshall, I will eliminate the Navy messages. A message that has been discussed considerably by the Board is the message of November 27, 1941, which bore your signature and went out to General Short.

General Marshall. I have it here.

50. General Russell. Do you recall giving instructions for the preparation of that message or participating in its preparation?

General Marshall. I was away on the 27th. I left here on the afternoon of the 26th. I went down to maneuvers in North Carolina and did not return until the night of the 27th. [37] Incidentally, I think I left immediately after that, on the 28th, and went back again; and I have a rather distinct recollection of comparing the effect of this statement:

If hostilities cannot comma repeat cannot comma be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not comma repeat not comma be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm civil population or disclose intent.

I have a rather distinct recollection of considering those two statements. One, incidentally, was a governmental policy, the instructions of the President. My very dim recollection of the policy—and General Gerow or Colonel Bundy might have been more accurate in their recollection—is that I indicated the insertion of the overt act. But I am not quite clear on that. They may have gotten it from a joint board discussion, as General Gerow sat on the joint board.

I was trying to recall how that instruction came to us, but I think it was in a personal interview, but I do not recall it. I know it was the Government's policy.
51. General Russell. General Gerow's testimony indicates that you did not participate in the preparation of this message of November 27, by a statement as to who did participate and your name was omitted.

[38] General Marshall. I think they knew I was not here. As I say, my recollection is very hazy, but I have rather a memory with reference to the matter I have just spoken of. It may have been, of course, when I looked at it when I returned the following day.

52. General Russell. Similarly, General Marshall, if a message had been sent by G-2 of the War Department to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department on the same date, November 27, you being absent from Washington would not have had any personal knowledge of its contents?

General Marshall. I probably would not have seen it anyway.

53. General Russell. To continue the history of the November 27 message, General Marshall, it requested that General Short report the action taken on it?


54. General Russell. Subsequently General Short sent a reply to that message in which he refers to the November 27 message from you over your signature by number. That message of General Short reporting action taken merely states:

Report Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with Navy REURAD four seven two twenty-seventh.

The original of General Short's report indicates that it was initialed by Secretary Stimson and has a stamp "Noted—Chief of Staff," and was initialed by General Gerow.

The Board has been interested to know the procedure in your office as it relates to stamping documents which do not bear your signature. Does that indicate that you did or did not see those messages?

[39] General Marshall. Well, I think if you look at the preceding message from the Philippines you will find that same rubber stamp on there, "Noted—Chief of Staff."

55. General Russell. That is true.

General Marshall. And you will find it at the top of the message. You will find my initials.

56. General Russell. Yes; I do see them. General Marshall. But not on the other one. I do not know about that. I do not know what the explanation is. I initial them all; that is my practice. What happens, of course, is that there is more than one copy. One goes to the particular section that has the responsibility for working on it, which in this case was the War Plans Division, now the Operations Division, and then one comes to me. I initial it and then it goes out to the record. Where I think the Secretary of War ought to see it, and if he is not in the distribution, I check it to him. Where I think there is somebody else that should be notified, I indicate on the face of my copy who else is to be informed of this. As a matter of routine one agency is charged with the execution of the matter pertaining to the message. But in this particular case I do not know. I have no recollection at all.

57. General Russell. The fact that it reached the Secretary of War's office and was by him initialed—would that or not indicate that you had sent it up to him or that it might have been sent up to him by someone else?
General Marshall. In this connection I invite your attention to the fact that this was filed behind a message from General MacArthur. I note that I did not initial it. They evidently came in together.

58. General Russell. If they were together you might or might not have seen them?

General Marshall. I have no recollection at all. The presumption would be that I had seen it.

59. General Russell. You cannot recall, General Marshall, whether or not you had at that time examined the message of the 27th to which General Short’s radiogram was a reply?

General Marshall. No. As a matter of fact, my memory is that I discussed that message when it was being prepared, though General Gerow thinks that I saw it afterwards.

60. General Grunert. Who has authority to put out such a message?

General Marshall. The Acting Chief of Staff; in that case, whoever was acting in my absence. I do not remember who it was. Probably it was Arnold. He was the Deputy then.

61. General Grunert. It was by direction of somebody; otherwise they would not just out of a clear sky, after November 27, have sent a warning message. It was either by direction of somebody to send it or after some sort of a meeting or conference held that they did. Otherwise why should it have been sent on the 27th? Why not on the 26th or the 28th? Do you see what I am trying to get at?

General Marshall. I see exactly what you mean, but I am having difficulty in explaining it to you. I think the message was based on something that came in on the 26th, I rather imagine, but I have no clear recollection.

62. General Grunert. But the decision rested, as to whether a message would be sent or not, with the OPD, or would it have to have the O. K. of your office?

General Marshall. Normally it would have to have the O. K. here. It is a question of good judgment. They send all sorts of messages all the time. I only see a small fraction of the messages sent by other people. I see the big directives. The same thing would apply to the Secretary of War. That was a very important message. I still have a very haunting memory that I was in on the discussion of the preparation of the message.

63. General Grunert. There was a so-called message that has not been mentioned yet, I believe, a message of November 28, signed by the Adjutant General and apparently prepared in the office of the Air Force, which dealt mainly with protection against sabotage of airplanes. Do you know anything about that message?

General Marshall. I know by having looked into it afterwards. What actually occurred—and General Arnold can give you a more direct statement than I can—Arnold was terribly concerned over the fact that they thought they had picked up sabotage on three or four of the big planes in this country, in the factories. They were pretty certain that certain things were the result of sabotage in the plants. But we never had any conclusive proof. So he was sending out a message, without any relation to this at all, in regard to that matter, and G-2 objected to it as a normal staff operation, that that was their bailiwick and not that of the Air Corps. The net result was that the
message was redrawn, as I recall, by G-2, and afterwards O. K.'d by the War Plans Division and sent, and it went all over the Army, overseas, and Alaska.

[43] 64. General Grunert. Now, your message of the 27th—that was directed to how many agencies? Panama, Hawaii, the Philippines, and West Coast?


65. General Grunert. And the G-2 was to all the G-2's?


66. General Grunert. It went to all the G-2 departments?

General Marshall. All. It went all over the place.

67. General Grunert. The air sabotage message, was that also of wide distribution?


68. General Grunert. Is there any idea in your mind that the recipients of those three messages could have interpreted them or confused them to one taking the place of the other as the latest instruction?

General Marshall. I would say that all of these things occurring at the same time, this coincidence of reception may have had its bearing on the matter, very much as the leading planes that we finally got off from San Francisco arrived—were due to arrive—right in the middle of the confusion of the Japanese arrival, which undoubtedly did not help the expectations, the anticipations of enemy air approach. The G-2 sends a great many messages, as we all know from our own experience, and you had a coincidence there of, to a certain extent, unrelated messages going in at the same time.

69. General Grunert. Did you see the reports from the others—from Panama, the West Coast, and the Philippines, in reply to your message of November 27th? Apparently you did, because they are initialed.

General Marshall. I think I initialed all of the others. The only one I did not initial, I think, was the Hawaiian one.

70. General Grunert. And they having reported all the measures taken, it seems odd that the Hawaiian should be the only one to misinterpret or confuse the three messages. They all got the same messages, so I would like to know if there is any light that I could get on why Hawaii particularly could interpret it one way, and the other three, the other way.

General Marshall. I don’t know; I don’t know.

71. General Grunert. I have put in enough, so far. Go ahead.

72. General Frank. I would like to ask a question. Since Hawaii did not take any measures other than those against the sabotage, as indicated in the message, and since that reply had been asked for in your message of November 27th, was that Hawaiian reply satisfactory?

General Marshall. In the first place, as I told you, I have no very distinct recollection in the matter. The first definite reaction I have on it would be confused with the "backsight" state of mind. Colonel Bundy, who had immediate charge of this phase of the affairs in War Plans Division, spoke to me about it. His reaction to the message had been that, when he referred to his liaison to the Navy, that the whole thing opened up, because under the agreement that Short had brought
about with Admiral Kimmel, the Navy was charged with the deep reconnaissance, the Army, with the close-in affairs that pertained to Oahu direct. As I recall the matter, the only way the Army would have been involved in the deep reconnaissance would have been in detaching units to serve under the Navy. Well, the main thing of course was the deep reconnaissance, to get a warning of the approach of these people. The reaction to the message also would have to be based on a knowledge of what the actual detailed defense order was. I was unaware of that. I believe that the No. 1 alert was changed in November, when the No. 1 was the top alert and later No. 1 became the preliminary alert.

73. General Frank. This reply does not refer to a numbered alert. It simply refers to the fact that he is taking measures against sabotage, and the point I was trying to make is this: since there was a critical situation existing in the Pacific, as you stated in answer to one of General Russell's questions, and since the Generals in Panama and the Philippines had taken more conclusive measures for protection, did it not seem that the measures taken in Hawaii were somewhat sketchy?

General Marshall. Yes, unless you would assume, as the men who were working on the thing did assume, that when he established his liaison with the Navy, that meant that reconnaissance had started. To what extent they were familiar with the details on the sabotage alert, meaning that it took all the planes and massed them, unarmed, on the air fields, and that the antiaircraft guns wouldn't have any ammunition by them, and things of that nature, I do not know.

74. General Frank. There is lurking in the background, as a result of that report having been called for, and a reply made to it, an assumption that the reply was satisfactory. If it were not satisfactory, would it not have been a logical step for this office to have checked up on him?


75. General Grunert. It was OPD's business to advise you on that particular phase, wasn't it? You, yourself, do not, necessarily, have time to look into all those things.

76. General Frank. No; that is true.

General Marshall. I have a responsibility, though, and the whole question was how you interpreted his reply.

77. General Russell. General Marshall, the Board has been interested in knowing what information there was in the Office of the Chief of Staff as to the actual steps which General Short had taken for the defense of Oahu in response to this message of November 27th.

General Marshall. I just have no recollection of it, at the time. I might add that these messages went to all these various commanders, and they all came back, the replies came in, and they were analyzed in the War Plans Division. Business went ahead.

78. General Russell. They were seen by you and referred out to the War Plans Division for the proper action?

General Marshall. Yes. Well, they go to them direct, and a copy comes to me.

79. General Russell. A little earlier in your testimony, General Marshall, reference was made to the SOP's from the Hawaiian Department, and as I recall, your file indicated that they reached you in
October. These SOP's have in them these alerts 1, 2, and 3; 1 being the lowest type of alert. I have been told by someone in the War Plans Division that these SOP's were not received in the War Department until after the attack on December 7.

General Marshall. I couldn't answer that.

[46] 80. General Russell. I am merely making this suggestion, now, because it may become material later, with the request that search be initiated.


81. General Russell. That is, to determine when those SOP's actually reached the War Department.

General Marshall. All I know is that I was told that this No. 1 alert alternated in its character from one extreme to another during November and December.

82. General Grunert. There was a so-called "SOP" of November 5, which may be the one which changed the alerts, if a change was made. The testimony of one Admiral Bloch also shows that he considered No. 1 of the Army to be a counterpart of No. 1 of the Navy, and therefore he didn't know this or that. How true that is, we are going to find out, but then so far as the report from Short as to the measures taken is concerned, you did not exactly know to what extent the measures taken for sabotage extended to other protective means?

General Marshall. No, I did not. As a matter of fact, my recollection is as to these various defense measures from all our overseas theaters, that I had not attempted to reach them all. In most cases of that kind, though, I don't recall it. In this, I have an outline made of the principal points, and I look at that. I recall reading very carefully the adjustment that Short made with the Navy, which was a brand-new departure, where they defined reconnaissance activities, the Navy taking the overseas reconnaissance mission as its responsibility, and the Army, the close-in reconnaissance, so far as air was concerned, as its responsibility. I recall it very [47] well, because the air people objected, and I supported Short. So I had a reason for recalling that quite distinctly.

83. General Russell. General Marshall, on the point that you are discussing now, it is not clear, to me at least, and I do not know whether it is, to the other Members of the Board, what action was necessary, and who initiated the action to make effective the plan for the reconnaissance in the Department. I do not believe the question is clear.

Let us assume that when the message of November 27 reached General Short, he had concluded that this outer patrol and inner patrol should be made effective. We are not clear as to who should have made the initial movement to have initiated those patrols.

General Marshall. My own view of that would be that if the message, as I believe this message was, was repeated to the naval officer, which meant it was instructions from the Navy Department, they would take action according to it, implementing the thing, as that officer's, because Short had no command over him. For several years he had known General Short, but they each had a certain mission, at a certain time. Now, the point is, though, that the message went to one, to be repeated to the other, and worked out both ways, whoever started the message. In this case it was started on the War Department side.
84. General Russell. Well, is it your view that both having seen the message of November 27, without more ado the Navy should have started their distant reconnaissance?

General Marshall. That is right. That is my view.

85. General Russell. And the Army, the close-in?

General Marshall (reading):

[48] Prior to hostile Japanese action, you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.

86. General Grunert. That leaves it up to both parties to live up to their responsibilities?

General Marshall. The commanders of overseas garrisons—it is quite conceivable they might be attacked, without anything from the War Department, whatever. Of course, in all of this the point is the transition from peace to a war-time state of mind, and many alerts; as you and I recall, in the year 1907, in the Philippines. I, myself, have gone through two Japanese alerts.

87. General Russell. You were rather well acquainted with the foreign policy of the United States as it related to Japanese activities, were you not?


88. General Russell. Did you regard that policy as a rather definite and firm policy?

General Marshall. I don’t believe I could comment on that. In the first place, I don’t quite understand the question, and in the next place I would rather not be involved, as a military official, in expressing myself on the foreign policy of the United States.

89. General Russell. I was leading up to this question—that the message of November 27, 1941, apparently can be easily broken down into two parts; one dealing with what General Short should do in the event of hostilities; the other part dealing with what General Short should do prior to hostilities. He was directed to initiate reconnaissance and take other measures [49] that he thought necessary, and then there are these restrictions or limitations or cautions. He is to carry out these necessary measures, and reconnaissance, so as not to alarm the civilian population, or disclose intent, and then as a general caution he must “limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.” Members of the Board have been debating whether or not those cautions or restrictions, or however they may be properly defined, were of such nature, first, as to minimize in General Short’s mind the seriousness of the situation which actually existed. I am not sure that that is a fair question; it may be a pure opinion.

General Marshall. I am inclined to think it is. I think that that matter ought to just stand on the record. We have got the record of what he was told, and you can draw your conclusions from that—the series of messages, and also I think you have got to have very clearly in mind as I say the transition from a peace state of mind to a war state of mind.

90. General Russell. I certainly shall not care to pursue the matter further or to press you on it.

91. General Grunert. Just to have it in the record for our future consideration, I want to put a query, to be answered, or not as you see fit, or whether or not the question is such as to really demand an
answer. That is this: Here, the same message, or three messages, go
to at least four prominent commanders, or three of them, overseas—
Panama, Hawaii, and the Philippines, and one, on a presumably ex-
posed West Coast. Three of them apparently interpret those mes-
sages in one way, and the fourth one does not; so the three of them
report all the measures they have taken, or show by their reports that
[50] they considered this as quite a critical and dangerous
situation; so they take greater measures than the fourth does. Now,
is there anything in the case of that fourth, which happens to be the
Hawaiian Department—are there any peculiar circumstances there
that it should be interpreted in a different way for that command than
it was in Panama, the Philippines, or on the West Coast?

General Marshall. All I can say to that is this—and my answer
does not explain the contrast between the very, very urgent attitude
of the naval and army commanders in Hawaii, in the spring and early
summer, with relation to air and antiaircraft and radar requirements.
All I can say is that Hawaii had always 150,000 Japanese in a very
congested district, there, and no commander could ever forget that;
and the others did not have them. That did not exist in Panama.
You had Panamanians over the border, but certainly you had no feeling
of fears regarding them. In the Philippines you had no Japanese
population certainly of any moment. It actually developed later
there was a fifth column, very well organized, out there but you
had always present in your mind in Hawaii the large Japanese popu-
lation, of unpredictable activities. There, I think, is quite a contrast
between that one man and the other three. As I say, I don't know;
I have never had explained to me, why there was apparently the
cessation of fears of air attack, that seemed to be preeminent in the
mind of Admiral Kimmel in February, when he wrote a letter to the
Secretary of the Navy, and that official wrote to the Secretary of
War, and embarrassed us greatly, because we had almost nothing to
give—we were bankrupt so far as materiel was [51] concerned—and the later urgent requests with regard to radar, for
example.

92. General Russell. Those are the only questions I have.
93. General Frank. I would like to ask one question, here. Back
here, in the beginning, you stated that the presence of the Army in
Hawaii was for the protection of a naval and air base?

General Marshall. I said, a naval and air base.
94. General Frank. I just wanted to get it straightened out in the
record.

General Marshall. Naval and air. Originally it was naval, and
then it became naval and air.
95. General Frank. Have you any information to give or any com-
ments to make relative to the failure of any contractors on Hawaiian
projects to complete their work on time, prior to December 7?

General Marshall. I have no knowledge on that, but we will ex-
amine the records to see if there is any indication, here.
96. General Frank. Have you any information as to whether or
not any military personnel neglected their duties relating to Hawaiian
construction contracts?

General Marshall. I have no knowledge of that.
97. General Frank. Do you have any information to give to the Board on a Mr. Wilhelm Rohl?

General Marshall. I have not, personally; but I will have them examine into the records of the War Department to see if there is anything on the subject here.

98. General Frank. Were you in any way familiar with the Hawaiian defense contract let by Colonel Theodore Wyman?

[52] General Marshall. I was not.

99. General Frank. Now, General Marshall, a reading of the Roberts Commission testimony leads one to the conclusion that there was a general feeling in both the Army and the Navy, and in Hawaii, that there would not be an air attack. In other words, there was a state of mind of security against an air attack. Do you believe such a state of mind existed?

General Marshall. I was unaware of it. The previous communications we had had, notably those of the spring and up to June 1941, related very specifically to the urgency of measures protective against an air attack.

100. General Frank. Do you believe that the presence of the Fleet in being at Pearl Harbor mainly constituted a feeling of security that contributed to this state of mind?

General Marshall. I had had no opinion on that, and up to this instant I do not know whether I have formed any opinion on that or not. I had never thought of that particular aspect of the matter.

101. General Frank. At that time, December 1941, what in your opinion was the general feeling in military and naval circles relative to the effectiveness of the air attack with bombs and torpedos?

General Marshall. As I recall, we considered it as very effective, in view of what had occurred in the European theater.

102. General Frank. Over a period of two years, ending December 7, 1941, on about how many occasions was the Hawaiian Department required to go on alert?

General Marshall. I will have to get that data for you.

103. General Frank. This next question: Was any consideration [53] ever given in the War Department to the possibility of a feeling of apathy that might ensue as a result of "crying wolf! wolf! too often"?


104. General Frank. With respect to the messages on sabotage sent to General Short from Washington, do not the provisions of his war plan and his standing operating procedure provide for full defense against sabotage?


105. General Frank. Were not the provisions of these plans known in the War Department?

General Marshall. They must have been.

106. General Frank. Then why was sabotage especially singled out?

General Marshall. By whom?

107. General Frank. By messages that were sent to him. Between November 16 and 28 there were six messages sent to him, four of them told him to be careful not to disturb the Japanese, and three of them cautioned him about sabotage.
General Marshall. Two of those on sabotage that are related to air were just coincidences, and those, not to disturb the Japanese, related to air, and the extreme anxiety not to have anything happen which would provoke a break, which would enable the Japanese to say that we were taking action, to give them an excuse for action; and that was to enable Mr. Hull to stall this thing off as long as possible. All measures against sabotage are very difficult of set-up, because they indicate their purpose so plainly when you have to deploy your people around the key points and have them stay there in tents or otherwise, so they always provoke a difficult situation, and one that we were fearful would give the Japanese some handle to place the accusation against us that we were taking action of a hostile character directed towards them. That is as nearly as I can recall the reason for the three messages that you refer to, I think, though I have to look at the messages to familiarize myself with what they say. I don’t recall them.

108. General Frank. In accordance with that, you feel that it was a responsibility for the War Department to caution about sabotage?

General Marshall. In relation to what I have just said. We were trying to be very certain that we did not take measures which the Japanese could put their fingers on and say that we were doing something that was hostile; and most of your sabotage defense has to be right out in the open, a great portion of it. Now, in that respect we were doing something. We had to talk about it, too, because that was related to the meetings with Mr. Hull, where we were trying to do anything possible that could be done to stall off a break in the Pacific.

I have got to go. I have got something that just won’t wait.


110. Colonel West. As these proceedings are confidential, we are cautioning everyone not to mention anything.

(Thereupon, at 2 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
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1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.
The Board at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.


Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, and Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder.

General Grunert. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. JOHN L. MCKEE, 87TH DIVISION, FORT JACKSON, SOUTH CAROLINA

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

General McKee. Brigadier General John L. McKee, 87th Division, Fort Jackson, South Carolina.

2. General Grunert. General, in an attempt to get at the facts in looking at the War Department background and viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack, it is hoped that, by reason of your assignment as a member of the OPD at that time, you can throw some light on the subject. In order to cover so large a field in the time available, individual Board members have been assigned objectives and phases, although the entire Board will pass upon all objectives and phases. General Russell has this particular phase assigned to him, so he will lead in propounding questions, and the other members will assist in developing it.

3. General Russell. General McKee, what were your duties and assignments during the year 1941?

General McKee. In July 1941, I was assigned to the War Department as a member of the War Department General Staff. I was assigned to War Plans Division, to the project group of War Plans Division. Specifically, I handled matters which pertained to the Hawaiian defense project.

4. General Russell. Prior to your assignment to the General Staff in July of 1941, where were you and what were you doing?

General McKee. I was P. M. S. T. at the Valley Forge Military Academy, Wayne, Pennsylvania.
5. General Russell. At some time prior to your assignment to the General Staff in 1941, had you been on duty in the Hawaiian Department?

General McKee. Yes; I was on duty in the Hawaiian Department from 1935 to 1937.

6. General Russell. What was your assignment in the Hawaiian Department?

General McKee. During the first, I should say, three months I commanded the 1st Battalion of the 19th Infantry. Then I was Assistant G–4, Hawaiian Department. My specific duties were to handle the Hawaiian defense project.

7. General Russell. Were you reasonably familiar with the plans for the defense of Oahu as developed by the War Department?

General McKee. I believe I was.

8. General Russell. Did that familiarity include the joint plan between the Army forces and the Navy forces in the Territory?

General McKee. Yes, sir. I was familiar with it.

9. General Russell. General McKee, your position, however, in Hawaii, and later on the General Staff, concerned itself principally or more immediately with problems of materiel and supply generally; is that true?

General McKee. Personnel and materiel.

10. General Russell. Is it true or not that in your study of those problems of personnel and materiel it was necessary for you to be familiar with the tactical situation and the strategical plans and demands?

General McKee. Yes; that is true.

11. General Russell. You were familiar with the several documents which embodied the plans that you have just testified about, were you?

General McKee. That is correct.

12. General Russell. For the benefit of the Board, and in order to clarify our thinking and our study of these documents, would you describe these documents briefly, beginning with the basic or underlying document and working toward the definite and detailed plans?

General McKee. The plans on file in the War Department on December 7, 1941, which concerned the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, were based on the Orange Plan, which was then obsolete.

May I refer to this document to get the correct name?


General McKee. The War Plans Division prepared a strategic plan which consisted of Operations Plan Rainbow No. 5 and Concentration Plan Rainbow No. 5.

14. General Grunert. Who prepared that?

General McKee. War Plans Division.

15. General Grunert. Of the War Department?

General McKee. The War Department General Staff. A copy of Operations Plan Rainbow No. 5 was sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, on August 21, 1941. Receipt was acknowledged on September 3, 1941. A further revision of the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5 was approved by the Joint Board on November 19, and a copy of the Joint Army and
Navy Basic War Plan Rainbow No. 5 was sent to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, on November 28, 1941. As far as I know, the latter document was not received prior to December 7. As I recall, it did not change the mission or concept of the defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.

16. General GRUNERT. Then the plan actually in existence, to be carried out, had been receipted for by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, September 3, 1941?

General McKee. That is correct. But the plans on file in the War Department were not based on that plan. As I understood it, they were in the process of revision at that time. The mission and the concept were not materially changed over the Orange Plan. The Orange Plan related to a specific action.

[60] 17. General GRUNERT. What plan was the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department operating under as of December 7, 1941?

General McKee. Under Rainbow No. 5.

18. General GRUNERT. And he had been operating under that since September 3, 1941?

General McKee. That is correct, sir.

19. General RUSSELL. Was that the document which you referred to a little while ago as being obsolete?

General McKee. No, sir. The document which I referred to as being obsolete was the Orange Plan. The Orange Plan related to a specific operation, whereas the Rainbow Plan related to any war in which the United States should become engaged.

20. General RUSSELL. Is a copy of the Orange Plan, obsolete, among the documents which you brought over to the hearing room with you this morning?

General McKee. No, sir; I did not bring the Orange Plan.

21. General RUSSELL. Then it has no materiality in establishing the relationship between the War Department and the Hawaiian Department?

General McKee. No, I think not, because the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, had received Rainbow No. 5.

22. General FRANK. In September?

General McKee. In September; and although we had not received any revision of the plan based on Rainbow No. 5——

23. General FRANK. From him?

General McKee. From him, on December 7, because of the fact that the mission was practically the same, a little bit broader in scope, perhaps, and there was no real necessity to change his basic plan.

[61] 24. General RUSSELL. Would it be possible at this time for you to identify, for the convenience of the Board, the document on the table which you referred to as Rainbow 5?

General McKee. This (indicating) is War Department Operations Plan Rainbow No. 5, 1941.

25. General RUSSELL. The document which you have just handed me is the entire plan, or are there other documents related to it?

General McKee. There are other documents related to that. There is the Basic War Plan, the Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 5, and that is Operations Plan Rainbow No. 5 (indicating).
26. General Russell. Can you identify the last document which you have just described?
   General McKee. It is Operations Plan Rainbow No. 5.
27. General Russell. Do you see it on the table here?
   General McKee. That is it, right here (indicating). The Basic War Plan is not here.
28. General Frank. I thought you just identified that as the Basic War Plan.
   General McKee. No; the Operations Plan, War Department Operations Plan Rainbow No. 5. The Joint Basic War Plan is not here. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, did not have a copy of the Joint Basic War Plan; he only had a copy of the Operations Plan Rainbow No. 5, which is based on the Joint Plan.
29. General Grunert. Was there any reason why he should be furnished a copy of the Joint Plan?
   General McKee. No, sir.
30. General Frank. Why not?
   [62] General McKee. Because this Operations Plan assigned him his mission. It establishes a category of defense and, as I recall, I think it sets up the missions, the troop bases.
31. General Frank. What do you mean by "category of defense"?
   General McKee. Categories of defense were assigned to coastal frontiers. The category of defense determined the type of attack which the Joint Board visualized the particular coastal frontier might be subjected to, and formed the basis for the missions which it set up for the defense of the coastal frontier.
32. General Frank. How many categories were there? Do you remember?
   General McKee. I do not remember, General. I know the category of defense for the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier was Category D.
33. General Grunert. What does that signify in regard to the other categories?
   General McKee. I do not have it specifically stated here, but Category D did not visualize a major attack against that coastal frontier. By "major attack" I mean an attack which would result in the occupation of the area by a hostile force.
34. General Russell. Let me say for the benefit of the Board that this is a line of questioning which will be developed when we get on the other documents.
35. General Grunert. I thought it might leave a doubt in anyone's mind in reading the testimony as to what Category D was, and I wanted to develop it to see whether or not it was the highest category or the lowest, or in between, and, generally, [63] what that category did cover.
36. General Russell. We can clarify it at this moment.
   I hand you, General McKee, the Hawaiian defense project, and call your attention to subparagraph b under section 2 of that, in which category of defense D is described, and will ask you to tell the Board, having refreshed your memory from this.
37. General Frank. What is a category?
   General McKee. It is a classification of defense, of the type of defense, based on what the War Department visualizes that the type of action will be.
38. General Frank. How many were there for the Hawaiian Department?
   General McKee. There was only one. The category of defense assigned the Hawaiian Department was Category D, which assumes the possibility but not the probability of a major attack.

39. General Grunert. What is included in the definition of a major attack?
   General McKee. By "major attack" was meant an attempted landing on the shores of the land area of that coastal frontier.

40. General Grunert. Might it be described as an all-out defense?
   General McKee. Yes, sir; that is a better definition.

41. General Grunert. Then Category D included how far up the scale toward an all-out defense? I might add, did it include raids and air attacks and submarine attacks?
   General McKee. Yes; it did include raids, air attacks, and blocking of channels by hostile vessels.


43. General Grunert. Is the mission of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department stated in comparatively few words and will you put that in the record?
   General McKee. Yes. You want the mission of the Army as stated in the Hawaiian defense project?

44. General Grunert. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, which I presume is what you call the Army?
   General McKee. Yes, sir. It is so stated here as the Army Hawaiian defense project, which is a document prepared by the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. It states:

   Missions: Mission for the Army; to hold Oahu against attacks by sea, land and air forces and against hostile sympathizers, and to support the Naval forces.

45. General Grunert. Give me the mission as far as the Navy is concerned, if you have it right there.
   General McKee (reading):
   Mission for the Navy; to patrol the coastal zone and to control and protect shipping therein; to support the Army forces.

46. General Russell. Let us go back and see if we can straighten this up, General. You say that sometime in September 1941, the War Department sent General Short a plan for the defense of the Hawaiian Department. Is that right?
   General McKee. It sent in this plan in August, as I recall it, and receipt was acknowledged on September 3.

47. General Russell. Would you, please, for the Board [65] identify with a note just what document or documents were sent to General Short at that time?
   General McKee. Yes, sir.

48. General Russell. Will you just take a piece of paper and put it on here so that we will know what you are talking about?
   General McKee. This (indicating) is the plan that was sent to the Hawaiian Department.

49. General Russell. Suppose you just make a note to that effect.
   General McKee (after writing note as requested. It was receipted for by the Hawaiian Department on September 3, 1941.
50. General Russell. General, was this document which you have just identified for the record the only instruction which General Short had from the War Department for his defensive mission out there? General McKee. He had received instructions from time to time from the War Department, specifically from the Chief of Staff, and those instructions were not in conflict at any time with the plan.

51. General Russell. Do you know anything about when other instructions were received by General Short, personally?

General McKee. I do not know personally.

52. General Russell. When you say that he had received instructions from the Chief of Staff, is that a surmise or is it based on fact?

General McKee. It is based on my knowledge of the records.

53. General Russell. What records do you refer to?

General McKee. The War Department records.

54. General Russell. Will you describe them a little bit more definitely so that we may locate them?

General McKee. Well, there was correspondence, personal correspondence, between the Chief of Staff and General Short, beginning with about the 7th of February, 1941, right straight on up and including December 7, 1941.

55. General Frank. Were you then currently conversant with this correspondence?

General McKee. Was I then currently conversant with it?

56. General Frank. Yes.

General McKee. In a general way, yes, because it usually resulted in some action being taken in the way of priorities for means.

57. General Russell. Do you have something definitely in mind as illustrative of your answer to General Frank?

General McKee. Well, I have in mind the question of radars; I have in mind the question of antiaircraft artillery; the dispersal of airplanes; provisions for bunkers; and the dispatching to the Hawaiian Department of an increase in air strength.

58. General Russell. Those things all resulted from correspondence between General Marshall and General Short?

General McKee. For the most part, yes; either that or action of the Joint Board. One thing that resulted from the action of the Joint Board was the project for the defense of the Kaneohe Bay area, which occurred—

59. General Russell. Rather late in 1941?

General McKee. No; it was approved, as I recall it, by the Joint Board in April 1941. The project was set up for the defense of Kaneohe Bay, which the Army had not assumed prior to that time, and the means had been set up in the Hawaiian defense project but had not reached him on December 7, 1941. The additional means, I mean.

60. General Russell. In response to this operational plan which was sent out to General Short and received by him on September 3, did he prepare any documents for the defense of the Hawaiian theater or the Hawaiian frontier and return them to the War Department?

General McKee. Not to my knowledge. It was my understanding that they were in the process of revision. But the War Department was not particularly alarmed about that, because of the fact that his current defense plan, although not based on Rainbow No. 5, was in consonance with it.
61. General Frank. Had he had time between the receipt of this Rainbow 5 and December 7 to have prepared such a plan and have gotten it back to the War Department?

General McKee. Well, I hardly think so.

62. General Grunert. In that respect, from your experience with plans and so forth, how long does it usually take for a revision to be completed, no matter whether major or apparently minor? Does it usually take up to four or six months to get it through to the War Department, on account of all the ramifications?

General McKee. That is correct, sir. I hesitated with regard to the Hawaiian Department because actually it entailed no major revision. It was basically the same.

63. General Grunert. That is, in your opinion there was no [68] major revision needed, in the opinion of the War Plans Division?

General McKee. That is correct, sir.

64. General Russell. General, if no plan had been prepared by the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and returned after the receipt of your plan, in September, on what plan or plans was the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department proceeding for the defense of the Hawaiian frontier on December 7, 1941?

General McKee. As far as the War Department knew, he was proceeding on the joint plan. Let me get the correct nomenclature—Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, and plans pertinent thereto, they consisting of the Joint Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, the Naval Operations Annex, the Army Operating Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier.

65. General Russell. Wait just a minute. I have before me the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, and I have before me the Joint Defense Plan, Hawaiian Theater, labeled "Operations Annex." Now, you have mentioned a third document?

General McKee. I mentioned the Army Operating Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, and Operations Orders pertinent thereto. These are the several subordinate plans. This was of 1938, and revised in 1940; Army Operating Plan for Hawaiian Coastal Frontier; Hawaiian Department; and this was a division, the 18th Wing, and the separate Coast Artillery Brigade. This is the Hawaiian Department document.


General McKee. That, together with the Operations and Orders, which were issued by the control of the Hawaiian division of the 18th Wing, the Hawaiian Separate Coast Artillery Command, and the Operations and Orders, are the Hawaiian Department.

67. General Russell. Then we have here before us, General, all of the material documents published by the War Department?

General McKee. No, sir—published by the Hawaiian Department. That is, but the other is not.
68. General Russell. Let me finish my question—published by the War Department and the Hawaiian Department, for the defense of the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, on the 7th of December, 1941?

General McKee. No, sir. You did not mention the Hawaiian Defense Project, revision of 1940; and then there was an SOP which I have since learned never reached War Plans Division, but somehow or other got to General Marshall, and he commented on it and sent it back to General Short in a personal letter. It was a tentative SOP.

69. General Grunert. By “SOP” you mean “standing operations” and operating “procedure”?

General McKee. Yes, sir.

70. General Grunert. Do you recall the date on that? Was it November 5, 1941?

General McKee. No, sir; it was earlier than that. There was another one issued, so I later learned, I believe somewhere around November, which had not been received in the War Department on December 7.

71. General Frank. Did it have to do with the use of air troops, outlining their duties?

General McKee. Yes, sir. The point in question was, in the first SOP missions were assigned the Air Force for the defense of air fields, and it was brought to General Marshall’s attention by General Arnold, and General Marshall wrote a personal letter to General Short.

72. General Grunert. By “protection of air fields” you mean the ground protection by air personnel?

General McKee. Yes, sir; that is what I mean.

73. General Grunert. That is all.

74. General Russell. General, now, let us analyze these plans briefly. I hand you the War Department operations plans Rainbow No. 5. I think you have been over it. Whether it is in the record very clearly or not, I do not know. From that will you tell us the mission of the Army out there, as assigned to General Short?

General McKee. Yes, sir. The mission that I read previously was not from this document. It was from the Hawaiian Defense Project of 1940.

75. General Russell. Who prepared the Hawaiian Defense Project of 1940?

General McKee. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department.

76. General Russell. He did not assign himself a mission, did he?

General McKee. The defense project requires that the commander preparing it set forth his mission and his concept of it, which forms a basis for his planning. It was his [72] understanding.

77. General Russell. Well, let us go back to the question, General, and see if you can read out the mission which was assigned to General Short by the War Department.

General McKee. You want the joint or the Army mission?

78. General Russell. Let us have the joint, first, and then the Army. General McKee. I read paragraph 30:

HAWAIIAN COASTAL FRONTIER

(c) Missions,

(1) Joint—Hold OAHU as a main outlying naval base and control and protect shipping in the Coastal Zone.
(2) Army—Hold OAHU against attack by land, sea, and air forces, and against hostile sympathizers. Support naval forces in the protection of the sea communications of the Associated Powers and in the destruction of Axis sea communications by offensive action against enemy forces or commerce located within the tactical operating radius of occupied air bases.

(3) Navy—Patrol the Coastal Zone; control and protect shipping therein; support the Army.

79. General Russell. In the statement of his mission by the Hawaiian Defense Commander, General Short, was that mission set forth in identical terms in his document with the one by the War Department?

General McKee. No, it was not, because this mission is somewhat broader and superseded his publication of the Hawaiian Defense Project of 1940, and is somewhat broader in scope. The first part of it is essentially the same.

80. General Russell. Now, General McKee, did the War Department have a plan which General Short had worked out to effectuate and to accomplish that mission, which provided for the distribution of his forces and the establishment of strongpoints, gun positions, and so forth?

General McKee. Yes, sir. He had such a plan. It is incorporated in the plans which you have before you, there—the detailed plan for the disposition of his forces.

81. General Russell. To repel an all-out invasion?

General McKee. Yes, sir; to repel an all-out invasion, because in the Hawaiian Defense Project he states that while the War Department has assigned Category D, which does not visualize an all-out attack, the other bases for training and planning have adopted that as meeting any contingency.

82. General Russell. Could you find that, right quickly, in the Hawaiian Defense project, for us?

General McKee (reading):

Basis for planning

(1) Missions and Conditions.

(a) All defense plans of Oahu will be based upon the following conditions:

The currently assigned category of defense will be Category D. The defense of Oahu will be joint defense by Army and Navy forces under the missions as stated in Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan Orange.

(b) Possible and probable war situations are:

(1) The sea lanes from the continental United States to Hawaii are open and, that the garrison of Hawaii will be reinforced from continental United States.

(2) That the most probable form of attack is a surprise attack consisting of raids, and bombardments by ships, ships' fire, and air forces, and action by local sympathizers.

(3) That the sea lanes from the continental United States will be closed and that there will be an attack by a major expeditionary force. From the War Department point of view, this contingency is so remote that it will make no additional allowances of either men or reserves to meet it. This is commonly referred to as the “cut-off from the Mainland situation”.

(4) The latter contingency forms the basis for our training, as being all inclusive and providing maximum reality for the troops during their training.

(c) Conclusion.

To adopt a defense plan adequate initially, to meet an enemy's maximum effort. This plan is outlined in the next paragraph.

And so on.

83. General Grunert. May I interject a question, there?

Those instructions are to the effect that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department has been furnished certain means, and
they prescribe a category defense, which in this case happens to be Category D. Is it not possible and reasonable to suppose that conditions might change, in which an all-out defense might become necessary in a hurry, before the War Department can implement the defense command for an all-out defense, and therefore an all-out defense might be required with whatever means were handy, and the information given to the defense commander in the interim would not necessarily make him wait for a change of category?

General McKee. That is correct, sir, because the category defense says—"the possibility but not the probability." He must always be prepared for the possibility.

General McKee. That is correct, sir, because the category defense depends a great deal upon what is furnished the commander to defend with?

General McKee. That is correct, sir.

85. General Grunert. That is all I have right now.

86. General Russell. Now, General McKee, after this document had gone out to the Hawaiian Department in September 1941, and the War Department received no changes in the plans of the Hawaiian Department for its defense, am I correct in assuming, or is my recollection correct, that you stated that the War Department attached no importance to General Short's not having sent in revised plans, because these original plans in the main were in line with the operations plan which arrived in September?

General McKee. That is correct. There was hardly time for him to do it, in the first place. In the second, the War Department did not press him, because the plans which we knew to be in force were considered adequate to meet any contingency.

[76] 87. General Russell. Now, again, in November, this document that I referred to as the September Rainbow No. 5, was amended and sent out to him again with some changes?

General McKee. That is right.

88. General Russell. And you never received a receipt from General Short on that, at all?

General McKee. That is correct. I do not recall what that amendment was, but I am quite sure that it did not materially change the mission or the concept.

89. General Russell. General, some time in November, late November, 1941, certain messages were sent out to General Short relative to the enemy situation, and some directions as to what he should do. Are you familiar with those messages?

General McKee. I am familiar with the messages, but I knew nothing about them at the time they were sent.

90. General Russell. Do you recall any information which reached the War Plans Division in November, from the Chief of Staff, or from G-2 which materially altered, the international situation as it related to the Pacific?

General McKee. Yes, sir. There was considerable information that reached the War Plans Division as a result of the conferences that the State Department were having at that time, and as the result of information given the War Plans Division by G-2. As a result of that information there were several messages sent to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, acquainting him
with the situation. In fact, messages had been sent him previous to November, informing him of the strained relations with Japan.

91. General Russell. General, let us go back now to the information which your division received from the Chief of Staff. Was that information in writing?

General McKee. I cannot answer that, because I did not figure in on it. May I explain the organization? I would like to explain the organization of the War Plans Division. The War Plans Division had a project group and a strategy-and-policy group. Colonel Bundy was the Chief of the Strategy and Policy Group, and Colonel Bundy and General Gerow were the two individuals who received this information for War Plans and acted upon it.

92. General Russell. Do you know what that information was?

General McKee. The information was concerning the strained relations with Japan—the possibility of war with Japan, actually.

93. General Russell. Was it general in its nature, or specific?

General McKee. I can't answer that, because it did not come to me, and I can only be guided by what I saw later in the messages.

94. General Russell. Then all you can testify about the information which reached your division from G-2 and the Chief of Staff results from the action which was taken by War Plans Division?

General McKee. That is correct, sir.

95. General Russell. So you did not see any documents containing specific information, or hear any conversations between the Chief of Staff or G-2 and your division, which conveyed any specific information?

General McKee. I did not hear them; no, sir.

96. General Russell. So, so far as you know, there was just a change in the operations of your division, or in its instructions to General Short, and you believe that that was predicated on enemy information which must have been received from those sources?

General McKee. That is correct.

97. General Grunert. May I suggest you change “enemy” information to “information concerning Japan,” because at that time I do not think Japan was an enemy. I know that Japan was not an enemy.

The Colonel Bundy to whom you refer is now deceased, is he not?

General McKee. That is correct, sir.

98. General Grunert. And General Gerow, to whom you referred, is now in Europe?

General McKee. That is correct, sir.

99. General Russell. General, let us turn to the other side of the picture, now. You say that you are familiar with the messages that were sent to General Short in late November, and you say further that there were other messages sent out there to give him the information on these strained relations with Japan; is that true?

General McKee. That is true. There was correspondence between the Chief of Staff and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department—personal correspondence, in which he expressed his alarm at the situation. Also, a message, as I recall, that went out in July 1941, with specific reference to the Japanese situation.

100. General Russell. Colonel West, will you get that out of the general's file for us, please?
[79] General McKee. I think I have it in this thing. I prepared at the time of the Roberts Commission. July 7, 1941, a message was sent to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department with regard to the Japanese situation.

101. General Russell. What did that message say about probable Japanese intentions then?

General McKee (reading):

For your information deduction from important information from numerous sources is that the Japanese Government has determined upon its future policy and is supported by all principal Japanese political and military groups. This policy is at present one of watchful waiting involving probably aggressive action against the military provinces of Russia if and when the Siberian garrison has been materially reduced in strength and it becomes evident that Germany will win a decisive victory in European Russia. Opinion is that Jap activity in the south will be for the present confined to seizure and development of naval, Army, and air bases in Indo-China, although an advance against the British and Dutch cannot be entirely ruled out. The neutrality pact with Russia may be abrogated. They have ordered all Jap vessels in United States Atlantic ports to be west of the Panama Canal by first of August. Movement of Jap shipping from Japan has been suspended and additional merchant vessels are being requisitioned.

102. General Russell. We know all about that message, General. We were just wondering what there was in that message which indicated to you that there was a changed situation between the Japs and the Hawaiian Department.

[80] General McKee. Well, I would say the whole tenor of it. The whole message indicates that.

103. General Grunert. With reference to the messages which you refer to that went to Hawaii, do you know whether there were some naval messages that the naval authorities were directed to transmit to the Commanding General at Hawaii? Did such messages come to the War Plans Division, so that you would have such knowledge?

General McKee. Yes, sir. There was a message of, I believe, November 24, which was sent from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commanding Chief of the Pacific Fleet, in which it says:

The Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch and concurs and requests action addressed * * * inform senior Army officers their respective areas.

104. General Grunert. Does that also apply to the so-called “war warning” message of November 27?

General McKee. I believe that was a “war warning” message.

105. General Grunert. In that message does it actually use the words “war warning”?

General McKee. Not in this paraphrase of it, but there was a message sent, not the one I have here, but there was a message sent which began—

This is a war warning.

and the Commanding General of the Pacific Fleet was directed to inform the interested Army officers.

106. General Russell. Now, General, I think we can simplify all of these messages here and all the evidence about messages by one question. You are familiar with the document which was [82] prepared by General Gerow and submitted to the Roberts Commission?

General McKee. Yes, sir. I have a copy of it right here.
107. General Russell. Does that document contain all of the material messages going from the War Department to General Short, about which you know?

General McKee. Yes, sir.

108. General Russell. Now, there was a message which went out to General Short on the 27th of November, about which you know?

General McKee. Yes, sir.

109. General Russell. And it was signed by the Chief of Staff, or the name of the Chief of Staff was signed to it?

General McKee. I can’t answer that.

110. General Russell. Did you see the reply of General Short to that message?

General McKee. Not at the time. I did not see it until about the time of the Roberts Commission.

111. General Russell. From the 27th day of November until the 7th day of December, what did the War Plans Division know as to the alert which had been made effective in Oahu by General Short?

General McKee. I cannot answer that, sir, because I personally knew nothing of it. I knew nothing of the November 27th message, nor did I know anything of the reply that was received thereto. The message was prepared by General Gerow and Colonel Bundy, and the reply was received by General Gerow, and I was not informed.

112. General Frank. And yet you were in charge of the Hawaiian desk in the War Plans Division?

[82] General McKee. Yes, sir. I would like to say, however, that my duties did not involve plans and policies. That was a function of Colonel Bundy’s division. When that had been decided on, my particular group had to do with furnishing the material means, seeing that they got the material means.

113. General Russell. General, I want to ask you a question, now, which you may or may not be able to answer, but with the hope that you had some experience which might indicate to the Board just what was done under the condition. This joint plan provided for the close-in reconnaissance to be done by the Army, and for the distant reconnaissance to be done by the Navy; that is true, is it not?

General McKee. Yes, sir.

114. General Russell. Do you know what burden if any rested upon the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to initiate steps to see that both types of reconnaissance were in force if the situation demanded such reconnaissance?

General McKee. Well, there was a joint agreement between the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commanding General of the 14th Naval District, which set forth certain measures to be taken with regard to aircraft.

115. General Russell. I am just wondering whether or not this agreement between the Army and the Navy, out there, which stated that these measures for the defense of the Hawaiian frontier were to be effectuated on a cooperative basis, was the only way that they had to set things in motion.

General McKee. That is correct. There was no unity of command.

116. General Russell. And therefore anything that had to be [83] done had to be reached by mutual agreement, is that true?

General McKee. That is correct, sir.
117. General Russell, General, in one of these documents which I saw rather hurriedly there seems to be a statement that that cooperative plan shall remain in effect until something occurs, and I was not able to get it out of these documents, here, this morning. Do you remember about that?

General McKee. May I look at the document?

118. General Russell. Yes.

General McKee (reading):

When the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Naval Base Defense Officer (the Commandant of the 14th Naval District), agree that the threat of a hostile raid, or attack is sufficiently imminent to warrant such action, each commander will take such preliminary steps as are necessary to make available without delay to the other commander such proportion of the air forces at his disposal as the circumstances warrant in order that joint operations may be conducted in accordance with the following plans.

119. General Russell. The point is this, that the operation of the naval and Army forces out there in Hawaii was all to be done by agreement?

General McKee. That is correct, sir; but the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department had been given instructions by the Chief of Staff that they would get along, that the plans would be coordinated.

120. General Frank. What effect did that have on the Naval Commander out there?

[84] General McKee. The Naval Commander, sir, so far as I know, did not know about that letter. That was in a personal letter from the Chief of Staff to General Short, which told him the main thing was the protection of Pearl Harbor and the Fleet.

121. General Frank. But really, of what direct effect on the Naval Commander would have been instructions by General Marshall to the Army Commander?

General McKee. None, sir, because the Army Commander was under General Marshall.

122. General Russell. One other point, I want to clear up, General. You say that you never did see the SOP's that General Short prepared out there in the fall of 1941?

General McKee. I never did, sir, and as a matter of fact the record will show that they were never received in War Plans Division.

123. General Russell. Then the War Plans Division did not know what alert 1, or alert 2, or alert 3, was?

General McKee. So far as I know; no, sir. I certainly did not, and the record indicates that the SOP was never received in War Plans Division. How it got to the Chief of Staff I do not know. I rather assume that it got to him because there was a memorandum attached to it from General Arnold to the Chief of Staff, in which he drew attention to the use of the air-force personnel.

124. General Grunert. As a matter of fact, is it any of a higher commander's business to know just what means are employed to carry out the mission, unless it interferes with said mission? In other words, was the War Plans Division in the habit of calling for all the subordinate measures, were they furnished as a matter of course, or did the War Plans Division consider that did not particularly affect them?
General McKee. The War Plans Division was not particularly concerned with it. The Commanding General had been given a mission, and the means had been provided to carry out that mission.

125. General Grunert. In regard to the cooperation we have just been talking about, would the lack of cooperation on the part of one or the other be any justification for one or the other not carrying out his mission?

General McKee. No, sir.

126. General Russell. General McKee, in connection with these questions that General Grunert has asked you, I want to ask you a little bit about it. How did the War Plans Division consider from the standpoint of importance the Hawaiian defense command and its mission?

General McKee. It considered it all important. It realized that the loss of the fleet base, and the Fleet, itself, would put us in the predicament that they did put us in, in the Pacific.

127. General Russell. As a matter of fact, wasn't that Department very high on the priority list from the standpoint of material that was shipped out?

General McKee. Yes, sir; it was, particularly in such things as radar equipment, airplanes, antiaircraft artillery—those things that the War Department considered were essential to the most probable type of attack that would be expected to be delivered against the Hawaiian Department.

128. General Russell. The importance of the Hawaiian Department was so pronounced that it resulted, as you have testified already, in a considerable amount of correspondence between the Chief of Staff, himself, and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?

General McKee. That is correct, sir.

129. General Russell. The importance of the Hawaiian Department was so pronounced in the War Department that you did prepare this operations plan which goes somewhat into detail as to what is to be done out there in the defense of the Hawaiian Department, isn't that true?

General McKee. I don't recall that that goes into detail. It assigns a mission, a category defense, and I think sets up a troop basis.

130. General Russell. In all events it speaks for itself, does it not?

General McKee. Yes, sir.

131. General Frank. May I ask a question?

General Russell. Yes.

132. General Frank. In any event, this war plan would have been prepared, whether or not the situation with Japan was acute or not?

General McKee. That is correct, sir.

133. General Russell. You do not mean to testify that just as soon as you had prepared this plan and sent it out to General Short that you lost interest in the Hawaiian defense?

General McKee. Certainly not, sir. That was my particular interest.

134. General Russell. As a matter of fact, you had agencies set up over there in the War Plans Division to follow up these things, to see what was going on?

General McKee. That is correct, sir.
135. General Russell. And do you not think it was rather important for you people to know what your subordinate commander out there was doing in connection with the defense of that department?

General McKee. I think we did know, sir.

136. General Russell. Well, did you not say a moment ago that so far as you knew, in that critical period from November 27 to December 5, you did not know what disposition Short had made of his forces?

General McKee. I would like to remind you, sir, that I personally did not know about the radiogram of November 27. I did not know that this was a critical period. I am speaking personally, now.

137. General Russell. You heard General Gerow’s testimony before the Roberts Commission, did you not?

General McKee. Yes, sir.

138. General Russell. You know what he testified about that?

139. General Grunert. May I interject a question? From your duties in War Plans Division, and with the knowledge of conditions in the Hawaiian Defense Command, do you consider that that Command was pretty well implemented for Category D defense, or were there any grave deficiencies?

General McKee. Well, it was certainly the best equipped defense base that we had at that time. Except for airplanes, which were generally lacking, a few antiaircraft, some .50-caliber antiaircraft machine guns, and the completion of the installation of the fixed radar sets, they were well implemented, [88] extremely well.

140. General Frank. Relatively speaking, it was better equipped than any other department, is that correct?

General McKee. Yes, sir.

141. General Frank. Is that correct?

General McKee. In my opinion; yes, sir.

142. General Russell. I have no further questions.

143. General Grunert. Are there any other questions?

144. General Frank. I would like to ask some questions. To get back to the manner in which a decision would be made to carry out reconnaissance, for instance, it has been brought out that for the Army and Navy to act simultaneously on the inauguration of air reconnaissance, it was necessary for that to happen through cooperation?

General McKee. That is correct, sir.

145. General Frank. Therefore, if the Army Commander thought that reconnaissance should be inaugurated, unless the Naval Commander reached the same conclusion and took action, it would not necessarily be inaugurated, is that correct?

General McKee. No, sir; I see no reason why the Army Commander could not inaugurate reconnaissance on his own responsibility.

146. General Frank. All right.

General McKee. He had the means.

147. General Frank. Do you know that there was an agreement that the Navy would conduct distant reconnaissance and the Army would conduct close-in reconnaissance?

General McKee. That is correct, sir.
148. General Frank. Then if the Army Commander determined that [89] distant reconnaissance should be conducted, and the Naval Commander did not arrive at the same conclusion, do you think it was the duty of the Army Commander to conduct it, under the circumstances?

General McKee. Yes, sir. If the Naval Commander refused to do it and I felt that the security of Oahu depended upon it, I would certainly undertake to do it with the means at my disposal.

149. General Frank. If he conducts distant air reconnaissance, his carrying capacity is taken up with gasoline instead of bombs, and he finds something, what is he going to do about it?

General McKee. He could certainly have alerted his antiaircraft artillery, and the troops could have assumed their defense positions, if he had known about it ahead of time.

150. General Frank. What becomes of the whole general plan of coordinated action then between the Army and the Navy, if the Army dissipates its effort that it is going to coordinate with the Navy in a general plan?

General McKee. That is a very difficult question, sir. I see your point, but—

151. General Frank. The question is not difficult. Maybe the answer is.

General McKee. The answer is very difficult. I should say that it would depend upon how serious the Army Commander thought the threat was, and what lack of cooperation he obtained from the Navy. As far as I know there was no lack of cooperation. At least, he stated that in communications to the Chief of Staff.

152. General Frank. Nevertheless, reconnaissance was not conducted, was it?

General McKee. I do not know, sir.

153. General Grunert. It does not follow that the witness has to answer every question. If he has not had the opportunity to properly judge, he may or may not answer. He may say he prefers not to answer.

General McKee. I do not know whether a reconnaissance was made or not, sir. I am sure that the War Department thought it was being made, because it had been made at previous times when the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department had been advised of a critical situation.

154. General Frank. For the plan to work, both the Army and the Navy had to perform functions assigned?

General McKee. That is correct, sir.

155. General Frank. For the Army to conduct the close-in reconnaissance without the Navy's conducting distant reconnaissance would not have been particularly effective, is that correct?

General McKee. That is correct, sir.

156. General Grunert. Are there any further questions?


(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(The Board recessed from 10:20 a.m. to 11: a.m.)
(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. General, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?
   General Miles. Sherman Miles, Major General, Commanding 1st Service Command, Boston, Massachusetts.

2. General Grunert. General Miles, the Board, in an attempt to get at the facts, is looking into the War Department background and viewpoint prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. It is hoped that, because of your assignment as A. C. of S. G-2, at that time, you can throw some light on the subject. In order to cover so large a field in the limited time available, individual Board members have been assigned objectives or phases for special investigation, although the entire Board will pass upon the objectives and phases. General Russell has this particular phase. So he will lead in propounding the questions and the other members will assist in developing them. So I will turn you over to the mercies of General Russell.

3. General Russell. What was your assignment in the year 1941?
   General Miles. I was Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department.

4. General Russell. Can you remember approximately the date on which you entered upon that assignment?
   General Miles. May 1, 1940.

5. General Russell. When were you relieved or transferred from that assignment?
   General Miles. The end of January 1942.

6. General Russell. During that period of time you were actually the head of what we know as G-2 which embraced the Military Intelligence Division. Was that the name of it?
   General Miles. That was the official name—Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff.

7. General Russell. Briefly stated, General Miles, what were the functions of the G-2 section, including this Military Intelligence Division?
   General Miles. The Military Intelligence Division, General, was all-inclusive. It was the whole thing, not as it is now, broken and divided between G-2 and Military Intelligence Service. It was all one division, just as the Operations and Training Division, or the Personnel Division, War Plans Division, and so forth. I was head of the entire division, which, in turn, was divided into counter-intelligence, positive intelligence, and in turn that was divided geographically to cover the world, or as much as we could cover.

8. General Russell. Definitely, General Miles, as to the operations of your department related to the Japanese Government during your period of service there, what were you attempting to learn about the Japanese Government?
   General Miles. We were attempting to learn everything we could about the Japanese Government, and had been doing so, in fact, a great many years. It was only one of the nations which we were attempting to cover, to gather all possible information about. Our system was a running digest.
9. General Grunert. May I interrupt there? If anything which [93] you put into the record is of such a nature as might be of value to other nations now, I wish you would consider that and, if so, give us that information in closed session, so that it will not be disclosed to anybody who may be able to see this record. Do you see what I am getting at?

General Miles. Yes, sir; I understand.

This summary digest was maintained on the principal countries of the world. Such a system is no secret. It has been maintained by practically every government. It was a running digest covering the military side, the political side, the economic side, and the psychological side. All the information that ever came in from any country to G-2 was collated and put into this digest and sent out to various military attacks and G-2s, all the corps areas and overseas departments who were interested in a particular country, in the form of corrected loose-leaf, so that you had a running build-up constantly. This had been going on, to my knowledge, for thirty years. In addition to that, of course, we sent out bi-weekly, as I remember, military intelligence summaries, which were short documents of facts that we had gotten in in the last two or three days from all sorts of agencies that we had. I say all sorts, because we kept in very close touch with the State Department, the Department of Commerce, the Rockefeller people in South America, and, of course, our own military attacks and observers that we had throughout the world.

That, in general, was our system of getting information and disseminating it.

10. General Russell. Did the G-2 section, as such, have [94] personnel available for investigations in foreign fields in the year 1941?

General Miles. A limited personnel, General. We were building up. When I took over Military Intelligence in May of 1940 I remember there were 36 officers in the entire division. We built up rapidly to something over 400, with an equal proportion of clerical personnel. We built up very rapidly, as the war came nearer and nearer, our agencies in the field, field observers, military attachés. Our personnel was always limited. We did not have unlimited money or unlimited selection of officers, particularly officers. That was a time when the Army was building very rapidly. The natural inclination of a soldier is to go with troops and remain with troops. The general officers, of course, wanted the best men, naturally, and should have had them; and we did not have a free field for the selection of personnel, and quite rightly. We did the best we could with the personnel and the funds we had available.

11. General Russell. About when did this personnel reach its maximum development of 400?

General Miles. Well, it was increasing all the time I was there. I do not know. I imagine it continued to increase after I left. I am pretty sure it did. I cannot place any date on any maximum reached. 12. General Russell. Can you approximate the number of people who were available to you for service in Washington and throughout the country and in foreign fields, in October and November of 1941? [95] General Miles. General, I would not try to answer that question from my memory. The records are certainly available to you. I could not do it.
13. General Russell. General, a moment ago you referred to monthly or bi-monthly documents of some kind that were sent to the corps commanders and to the overseas departments. Did your office maintain copies of those reports?

General Miles. Oh, yes.

14. General Russell. Are they in the files now?

General Miles. I imagine they are, sir. They are permanent records of the Military Intelligence Division.

15. General Russell. There would be no reason to destroy them at all?

General Miles. Not that I know of.

16. General Russell. I want at this point to say that I have asked for a search of the records over there and have looked at the records, but did not discover copies of such reports, although specifically I have asked for such reports. I am giving you that, because it may be necessary for us to conduct a further search to locate, if possible, these documents.

Now, to discuss for a moment the sources of information which you have divulged already and to limit it to Japanese information, what sources of information were there in Japan in the fall of 1941 on which you as G-2 could rely as to activities of the Japanese at home and in home waters?

General Miles. Within the United States?

17. General Russell. No. I am now addressing myself to the situation in Japan and have asked what agencies or what sources existed in Japan upon which you could rely for information about Japanese activities at home and in home waters.

General Miles. I would say that by far the most important source was our Embassy in Tokyo. We had a very excellent Ambassador who had been there a number of years with a staff that had been there a good deal longer than that. We had, of course, used the military attaché and his assistants. The information which we could get on the military side from our military attaché and his assistants was of course very limited; the Japanese being extremely close-mouthed. But the Embassy itself was constantly sending in dispatches to the State Department—Mr. Grew, particularly—on the state of mind of the Japanese people and the probability of what they were going to do next, and so forth. We also, of course, had direct access, through our very close connection with the State Department, to what was transpiring in the negotiations in the fall of 1941 here in Washington. Aside from that, I do not think there were any important sources of information in Japan. We were getting a good deal of information from what might be called the borders; in other words, China, and even the part of the Continent occupied by the Japanese. The Koreans would get out once in a while and we would get some information in that way. We exchanged information very freely with the British and to a certain extent, with the Dutch. They were a little afraid to give us information, as I remember, but we were getting some.

18. General Russell. Did the British have any organization within the homeland of Japan which was watching the movement of their Army and Navy in the fall of 1941?

General Miles. I believe that they had about the same as we had. As to actually watching the movements of ships and troops,
it was necessarily a system that worked sometimes and did not work at other times. You might see the ships move or the troops move, or you might not.

19. General Russell. General Miles, is it true or not that from the State Department or from our Ambassador to Japan the information which we obtained related almost exclusively to the state of mind of the Japanese people toward the war and their enmity toward the United States?

General Miles. Are you putting that in the form of a question, sir?

20. General Russell. Yes. Is it true or not that that was the case?

General Miles. That was the Ambassador's principal concern, naturally. I would not say, from my memory of the information that we got from our Embassy, that that by any means covered the field.

21. General Russell. Do you remember a message from our Ambassador along in the fall of 1941, in which he summed up the situation and told the State Department to what extent they could rely upon him for information of troop movements, movements of the Navy, and so forth?

General Miles. I do not recall that particular message, General.

22. General Russell. Maybe I can refresh your memory. May I ask you this as a preliminary? Did you attend the conferences that were held by the Secretary of State, which he refers to as the War Councils, where he had ordinarily the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and some our high-ranking military and naval people in to discuss the Japanese situation?

General Miles. No, sir. I think only the Chief of Staff attended them.

23. General Russell. I refer particularly to this message which is contained in the State Department's book that they call the White Paper, which is a report from our Ambassador to Japan on the 17th day of November, I believe, 1941 (handing a book to the witness).

General Miles. What is the question, now, sir?

24. General Russell. When did you first know about that message?

General Miles. I don't remember, General; I can't answer that question.

25. General Frank. Did you know about it at all?

General Miles. I am not sure that I did. I think I did, because we had very close liaison with the State Department. I feel sure that I did; but, frankly, it is so obvious a message that the impression it gives me today is the same impression it gave me then: Yes, of course I know we can't count on it. How can we be sure that any group can tell us the movement of the Japanese fleet or army? We knew we could not.

26. General Russell. In other words, the information which you have testified that you had from Japan about what was going on over there was rather general and indefinite in its nature?

27. General Gruner. Unless we know about that message the record will not be intelligible. Is it going to be copied into the record?

28. General Russell. Yes. Your information about the activities in Japan in the fall of 1941 was very indefinite and general?

General Miles. Necessarily so.
29. General Russell. The message from Ambassador Grew in Japan to the Secretary of State for purposes of the record will be identified as a paraphrase of a telegram dated November 17, 1941, and it may be copied from page 788 of this White Paper entitled "Peace and War, United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941."

(Telegram from Ambassador Grew to Secretary of State, dated November 17, 1941, is as follows:)

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

(Telegram: Paraphrase)

Tokio, November 17, 1941—1 p. m.
(Received November 17—2:09 p. m.)

1814. Referring to Embassy's previous telegram No. 1736 of November 3, 3 p. m., final sentence, and emphasizing the need to guard against sudden Japanese naval or military actions in such areas as are not now involved in the Chinese theater of operations, I take into account the probability of the Japanese exploiting every possible tactical advantage, such as surprise and initiative. Accordingly you are advised of not placing the major responsibility in giving prior warning upon the Embassy staff, the naval and military attaches included, since in Japan there is extremely effective control over both primary and secondary military information. We would not expect to obtain any information in advance either from personal Japanese contacts or through the press; the observation of military movements is not possible by the few Americans remaining in the country, concentrated mostly in three cities (Tokyo, Yokohama, Kobe); and with American and other foreign shipping absent from adjacent waters the Japanese are assured of the ability to send without foreign observation their troop transports in various directions. Japanese troop concentrations were reported recently by American consuls in Manchuria and Formosa, while troop dispositions since last July's general mobilization have, according to all other indications available, been made with a view to enabling the carrying out of new operations on the shortest possible notice either in the Pacific southwest or in Siberia or in both.

We are fully aware that our present most important duty perhaps is to detect any premonitory signs of naval or military operations likely in areas mentioned above and every precaution is being taken to guard against surprise. The Embassy's field of naval or military observation is restricted almost literally to what could be seen with the naked eye, and this is negligible. Therefore, you are advised, from an abundance of caution, to discount as much as possible the likelihood of our ability to give substantial warning.

Grew.

30. General Russell. General Miles, referring to the statement which is contained in Ambassador Grew's message:

and with American and other foreign shipping absent from adjacent waters the Japanese are assured of the ability to send without foreign observation their troop transports in various directions.

As a matter of information, do you know why at that particular time there was an absence of American and foreign shipping in Japanese waters?

General Miles. No, sir. I do not remember knowing of any particular absence of American shipping from Japanese waters at that time. Of course we had had information for a great many years which had been considered in all of our war plans in Hawaii that there was a certain part of the Pacific Ocean that we called the "Vacant Sea" in which there are practically no ships and in which large movement of ships could occur without anybody seeing them. It was that part of the ocean between the great southern routes that go from
Hawaii to the coast of Japan and China, and the northern great circle routes that go near the Aleutians.

31. General Russell. The term which you used intrigues me. What was it you called it?

General Miles. I used to call it the "Vacant Sea."

32. General Russell. As applied to that part of the Pacific adjacent to the mandated islands, would you say that they were in the area of the "Vacant Sea" or not?

General Miles. No, sir. The southern trade routes, as I remember, from Hawaii to Yokohama, we will say, pass considerably north of most of the mandated islands, such as the Marianas. All the seas surrounding the mandated islands were, as you know, extremely difficult for us to penetrate and get any information on for other reasons.

33. General Russell. Why?

[102] General Miles. Because the Japanese would not allow us in there. You might sail through, but you would not see very much. That had existed for many years.

34. General Russell. Was there any restriction on Americans landing on those islands that were mandated to the Japanese?

General Miles. Absolutely, sir.

35. General Russell. Were Americans prohibited from landing in the mandated islands?

General Miles. Well, they did not say "Americans are prohibited," but Americans did not land. That was well known for years. No American warship went in there.

36. General Frank. Do you know of any American port or any point over which the United States had jurisdiction that excluded Jap vessels or Japanese nationals?

General Miles. No, sir.

37. General Russell. Do you know where there is any documentary evidence of the exclusion of Americans from the Japanese mandated islands?

General Miles. General, I would not know exactly where to put my hand on documentary evidence. It was one of the things perfectly well known to all of us in the Intelligence. I should think probably the Navy Department could aid you in that respect. I am pretty sure that the Navy Department several times tried to get ships in there.

38. General Grunert. As far as the so-called mandated island are concerned, they were sort of a blind spot for our Military Intelligence, were they?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

[103] 39. General Russell. That is exactly what I was trying to find out.

How far are the Marshall Islands from Honolulu?

General Miles. My recollection is, about 1,600 miles. I would not swear to it.

40. General Russell. General, were you acquainted with the plans for the defense of Pearl Harbor and the estimates in connection with the Japanese situation as to the probabilities of attack? Were all those things known to you at G-2?

General Miles. Rather intimately. I was G-3 of the Hawaiian Department from 1929 to 1931. I rewrote the war plan. I wrote the
general staff study and estimate of the situation, which was the “bible” at that time for some years. Then from 1934 to 1938 I was here in War Plans Division and was particularly charged with the three overseas departments, their projects and their plans. So, up to 1938, at least, and between 1929 and 1938, I was intimately acquainted with it.

41. General Russell. In our brief study of the plan generally and the evidence just given by you, there was considerable emphasis placed on a probability of an attack on Pearl Harbor by carrier-borne aircraft. During the year 1941 you were, of course, familiar with the estimate and the probabilities?

General Miles. Yes, sir.

42. General Russell. Did it occur to you as G–2 from what port or ports these carriers might depart on a mission of that sort?

General Miles. They might have departed on a mission from a great many ports. We did not know really what bases they had in the mandated islands, and obviously they could have departed [104] from almost any port in Japan, such as Kobe or Yokohama.

43. General Russell. You stated that you did not know what bases they had in the mandated islands?

General Miles. Very little information on bases in the mandated islands.

44. General Russell. As I recall, they acquired jurisdiction, such as they had over the mandated islands, as a result of the settlement at the end of the other war in 1918?

General Miles. That is correct.

45. General Russell. And in 1941 they had had approximately twenty years to develop their bases in the mandated islands, their ports and so forth. Was there any information in G–2 in 1941 as to what the Japanese had actually done by way of preparing ports and bases in any of the mandated islands?

General Miles. Very little and very general information. We knew that they were developing certain places, such as Palau and Truk particularly, and we suspected Saipan. We relied very largely on information in Military and Naval Intelligence. Taken together, it could not have been called any detailed or complete information of their possible bases in the mandated islands.

46. General Frank. Did you have anything on the Island of Jaluit?

General Miles. I do not remember what we had on Jaluit, but it was one of the islands that we used to discuss and suspect that they were developing.

47. General Russell. General Miles, in the fall of 1941 did you in G–2 have sufficient data on Japanese developments in the mandated islands to predicate an intelligent opinion as to the [105] possibilities of launching convoys from there which might have included aircraft carriers?

General Miles. I would say that positively we knew enough to form an estimate that such a thing was a strong possibility, not a probability; that they had the means. That they would do it is another matter. They had the means to do it. I would say that our estimate at the time was that it was very possible, if not probable, that they did have those means.

48. General Russell. Do you know whether or not the data on these developments on the mandated islands is a matter of record any place in the G–2 files?
General Miles. Oh, yes; we had files on them. We had maps and whatever we could get. The Office of Naval Intelligence had even more.

49. General Russell. Did those maps show the developments, or just show where the islands were?

General Miles. So far as possible we made charts of the islands from one source or another and plotted on those charts, both Naval Intelligence and ours, where we thought they were developing, from what information we could get from traveling natives or missionaries or what have you.

50. General Russell. I was asking you some questions a moment ago about the inhibition as to our going on those mandated islands. Were the inhibitions against going into the mandated islands only those of force or semi-force by the Japanese people who were there?

General Miles. That is what kept us away, General.

51. General Russell. They just would not let you go in?

[106] General Miles. They just would not let us go in. They had one excuse or another. I don't remember just exactly what they were; but the net result was that mighty few people got into the mandated islands.

52. General Russell. Did you attempt to send people from G-2 into the mandated islands in 1941?

General Miles. No, sir. I do not think any attempt had been made by G-2 for ten years. We knew we could not do it and get them out.

53. General Russell. Were there any restrictions imposed on G-2 from higher authority about attempting to get in there and develop that situation in the mandated islands?

General Miles. Not specifically the mandated islands; no, sir.

54. General Russell. But you did regard the geographic location of these mandated islands with respect to our naval base at Pearl Harbor as being rather material?

General Miles. Yes, I did, General; but, on the other hand, we knew perfectly well that Japan could attack the Hawaiian Islands without the use of the mandates. I remember very well writing one plan in which we developed the other side, based on a surprise attack launched from the mainland of Japan, with fast cruisers and carriers, carrying troops on their most rapid liners. We worked it up, just how they would take those liners off the route for one reason or another—this one to be repaired, and so forth—and suddenly launch this attack from the "Vacant Sea" and suddenly arrive in Honolulu. So the mandates were always a black shadow, but they were not the only means of attacking Hawaii, and we knew it as far back as the early 1930's.

55. General Russell. In those studies which were made by you, and others with which you may be familiar, did you ever consider steps which might be taken to discover in advance the mission and dispatch of these convoys to carry out that type of attack?

General Miles. We considered it, General, but, as Ambassador Grew says in that famous dispatch, "Don't rely on us from that point of view." It was much more an attack from the other side.

56. General Frank. What do you mean by that?

General Miles. I mean, from the Hawaiian side, particularly air reconnaissance and submarine reconnaissance, to detect any force coming in before they could actually attack. I recall particularly
during all of General Drum's command out there in the middle 1930s he was very much interested and was constantly sending in papers to War Plans and they were coming to my desk, involving the possibility of a screen of large bombers which would cover the entire enormous perimeter contained in those five big islands. That was a current matter almost. Then, of course, the submarine screen was another matter that was constantly discussed. We had about twenty submarines out there in the middle 1930s.

But, to answer your question more succinctly, I do not think any Intelligence officer ever thought that he could be sure of picking up a convoy or attack force or task force in Japan before it sailed and know where it was going. That was beyond our terms of efficiency.

[108] 57. General Russell. Or even the mandated islands?
General Miles. Rather less in the mandated islands.
58. General Russell. You had less chance there?
General Miles. Yes.
59. General Grunert. Would such a force moving from one of the mandated islands indicate where it was going? Would there be a clear indication that it was bound for Hawaii or elsewhere?
General Miles. It would be no indication at all where it was going, General.

(There was informal discussion off the record.)

60. General Russell. The G-2 people in their studies had to all intents and purposes eliminated investigations in Japan proper and other Japanese territory to determine probable action on the part of the Japanese Army and Navy?

General Miles. Oh, no, sir. We had not eliminated it. As Mr. Grew says, it was the principal task of the Embassy, particularly of the military and naval part of the Embassy. What I say is just what Mr. Grew says, that we never dreamed that we could rely on getting that information. It would have been almost a military intelligence miracle had we been able to spot a task force in forming and have known before it sailed where it was going.

61. General Russell. Now, General, if that be true, then the conclusion had been reached, so far as discovering task forces of any sort moving to the Hawaiian Islands, that the chief if not the sole reliance would have to be placed on reconnaissance agencies based on the islands or on United States possessions contiguous thereto?


62. General Russell. Do you recall when the last estimate of the situation was sent out to the Hawaiian Department from G-2?
63. General Frank. Prior to December 7?
64. General Russell. Yes; prior to December 7, 1941.

General Miles. General, I do not know that any estimate of the situation, if you are using that term strictly, was sent. What we sent were those corrected sheets of the digest on Japan from time to time, whenever we got the information, and copies of the bi-weekly summary. The estimate of the situation is for the information of the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War. G-2 is the G-2 of the General Staff. I am bringing up that point because I had to be very careful, and I think all G-2s of the General Staff have to be very careful that the information you give your Chief
is something which he must pass on from the command point of view. If that information is habitually sent out to the various overseas departments particularly, you run into the serious danger of telling the Lieutenant General commanding the Hawaiian Department, we will say, something that G-2 thinks which the Chief of Staff does not concur in, and forcing his hand or inducing him to take some action in which the Chief of Staff does not concur. In other words, you must be careful to keep out of the command channel. So you give your information, your summary, your estimate of the situation, to your Chief, and action must flow from the Chief through the command channels; and G-2 is not in the command channels.

[110] 65. General GRUNERT. Insofar as action is concerned on the information that is passed to the subordinate command, is that action then passed back through G-2, or does G-2 prepare it for the Chief of Staff insofar as it pertains to information?

General MILES. I do not know that I have your question clearly.

66. General GRUNERT. You have gotten information from various sources which influenced you to make an estimate of the situation, which you passed to the Chief of Staff. Now, there are parts of that information, if true, that certain command channels in the Philippines or Hawaii should get. Who insures that they get that information?

General MILES. As a routine matter, G-2 insures it. In other words, all information that pertained directly to the Hawaiian Department or to the Philippine Department that G-2 received, it insured that G-2 in that Department got it. That is exclusive, however, of any deductions in a very broad sense that G-2 of the War Department might draw which would induce action which, in other words, was a command proposition.

67. General GRUNERT. In other words, you give them the information, but you do not analyze it; or do you?

General MILES. Ordinarily you do not analyze it for him.

68. General FRANK. You gave information and interpretation only through command channels?

General MILES. Interpretation would certainly go only through command channels.

69. General GRUNERT. Any warning, then, should come from command channels rather than from G-2?

[117] General MILES. If it is warning that probably would result in action, yes, most definitely.

70. General RUSSELL. Your G-2 sent a message on November 27 out to G-2 of the Hawaiian Department?

General MILES. Yes; to all departments, as I remember.

71. General RUSSELL. Now, a few specific questions, General Miles, and I will be through:

On October 27, 1941, Brink reported to your office that there were two aircraft carriers that had been operating among the mandated islands, of which Kaga was one. Was Brink one of your operators?

General MILES. How is the name spelled?

72. General RUSSELL. B-r-i-n-k.

73. General GRUNERT. Was that not a Colonel Brink for a time in Singapore, and then he went to the Philippines?
General Miles. Yes; that was the man, I think.
74. General Russell. This was sent from the Philippines?
General Miles. Yes.
75. General Grunert. He was one of the staff in the office of the
A. C. of S., G-2, Philippine Department, and on my recommenda-
tion he was sent to Singapore to be directly under the War Depart-
ment there. That is why I recall a man named Brink.
76. General Russell. Do you have any recollection about that type
of Japanese aircraft carrier being in the mandated islands? Do you
have any independent recollection on that subject?
General Miles. I remember that the Japanese carriers were reported
in the mandated islands, but I would not be able to [113] pin
it down to any particular source.
77. General Russell. Would it be about that time?
General Miles. It was about that time.
78. General Russell. In the records some place we have discovered
evidence of a photographic mission by aircraft down into the man-
dated islands in late November or early December of 1941. Do you
have any independent recollection of that activity on our part?
General Miles. No, sir; I did not know we sent one.
79. General Russell. You were in touch in a general way with the
Navy at that time in obtaining information from them?
General Miles. I was intimately in touch with the Office of Naval
Intelligence.
80. General Russell. What did you know from the Navy about the
location and disposition of the Japanese fleet in late November and
early December? Do you remember?
General Miles. My recollection is that the Navy had informa-
tion of carriers in the mandates, and definitely of a movement of naval
vessels and transports, they thought, south through the China Sea in
the direction of Indo China and Thailand.
81. General Russell. What was your impression as to the knowledge
which the Navy had generally during the last six months before the
attack on Pearl Harbor of the location of the Jap Navy and various
types of craft that were in their Navy?
General Miles. Their information was very general and incomplete.
82. General Russell. General, when in your opinion did it [113]
become apparent that war with Japan was inevitable?
General Miles. On the 27th of November, when we learned that we
had practically given what might be considered or probably would
be considered by them an ultimatum to them—from then on I con-
sidered war as very probable if not inevitable.
83. General Russell. That was based almost exclusively on the
negotiations between the Japanese who were in Washington negoti-
ating with our State Department?
General Miles. Primarily on that. It was a build-up.
84. General Russell. In the message of November 27, which I will
not discuss with you in any great detail, there was a statement that
negotiations had practically ended. I am not quoting, but it said
substantially that—although there was a bare possibility that the
Japanese might come back for further negotiations. Do you remem-
ber that?
General Miles. That was in General Marshall's dispatch?
85. General Russell. Yes.
General Miles. I don't remember that; no.
86. General Russell. Let us assume that they did come back after November 27 and continued negotiations: Would that have affected your conclusions about the inevitability of war?
General Miles. Oh, yes.
87. General Russell. As a matter of fact, they were back on the 1st, 2nd, and 5th of December, were they not?
General Miles. The reply was not back, sir.
88. General Russell. I mean, the Japs came back and negotiated.
[114] General Miles. Oh, they continued to stay here and talk, but that all hinged, to my mind, on the reply or the position taken by the Japanese Government as a result of our paper on the 26th of November, I think it was. It was considered practically an ultimatum.
89. General Russell. I think that is all.
90. General Grunert. I have a few questions.
General Miles. I should like, if I may, to add a little bit. I am not quite sure of my answer there. I did not want to give the impression that I thought war was immediately inevitable. I thought that very definitely an action by Japan, a pretty radical action, would be taken almost at once; that that necessarily would be an overt and open attack on the United States. I didn't feel at all sure that war with Japan was practically inevitable any time. But there were a good many things Japan could have done, if she did break those negotiations, short of open war with the United States, and we were considering all of those matters.
91. General Russell. That suggests one other question: Did you know that there had been established by reference to the degrees of latitude and longitude lines beyond which, if Japan went with armed force out in the Pacific, the British, Dutch, and Americans would regard that as an act of war?
General Miles. Yes.
92. General Russell. Then you knew as G–2 that if certain things occurred, we, in association with those powers, might attack?
General Miles. Yes; certainly.
[115] 93. General Frank. You said you were not prevented specifically by higher authority from attempting to get information regarding the Japanese mandated islands. Was there any general prohibition in this regard? Was there a general attitude of "hands off"?
General Miles. Not specifically affecting the mandated islands. It was simply a question of whether you wanted to send a man to his almost certain death or not, and whether the information you expected to get out of it would be worth that risk. But there was no general or specific prohibition against my sending a man into the mandated islands if I could get him there. But I did not think I could get him in there and get him back alive.
94. General Grunert. Was there or was there not a fear on the part of all concerned that doing so and being picked up after having done so would offend the Japanese?
General Miles. Oh, it most certainly would. We would have had to disavow it and swear that we never sent him, and so forth. That is an old part of the game.

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95. General Frank. On November 27 there went out a message from G-2 of the War Department, which was your organization, saying:

Advise only Commanding General and Chief of Staff that it appears that conference with the Japanese has ended in an apparent deadlock. Acts of sabotage and espionage probable. Also probable that hostilities may begin.

Do you remember that message?

General Miles. Very well.

[116] 96. General Frank. You are familiar with the war plan as it applied to Honolulu, the Standing Operating Procedure?

General Miles. Yes; in a general way.

97. General Frank. Did not the provisions of that war plan and the Standing Operating Procedure provide for this defense against sabotage?

General Miles. Yes; it provided against all forms of attack, including sabotage.

98. General Frank. Why, then, was sabotage especially emphasized in that message?

General Miles. I will be very glad to answer that question, General, but my answer must be somewhat long.

In the summer of 1939 the President issued a directive to all bureaus and offices of the Government to keep out of antisabotage and antiespionage work, except those that were to do it all, F. B. I., O. N. I., and M. I. D. After I took M. I. D. in May of 1940, I began to build up the counter-intelligence part of it. I drafted a written agreement with F. B. I. and O. N. I. limiting our responsibilities under the President’s directive. It was then countersigned by the three Cabinet Ministers concerned. Then I drew up a counter-subversive system, and later a counter-intelligence plan, the first one we ever had. I met certain opposition among my colleagues, the other Assistant Chiefs of Staff, and I am relating it only to point out that by the summer of 1941 I had gotten myself in a position where it was definitely established that counter-subversive activity of all kinds was G-2’s responsibility and solely G-2’s responsibility. I shared the [117] responsibility for measures against an effort to attack by a possible enemy with Operations and with War Plans, because I was supposed to give the information on which their orders were based. But I shared with nobody the responsibility for counter-subversive measures, and therefore, when I found on the 27th of November that nothing was specifically said in General Marshall’s dispatch of that date, the war warning order, I felt it necessary to warn the G-2’s, not only the overseas department and later particularly in this country, but sent it to all of the corps area G-2’s, because we knew the build-up in this country very well. The F. B. I., the O. N. I., and my people, were very worried about what could be done in this country, particularly in the Air Force. General Arnold was very much worried, and that broke loose the next day and occasioned the further dispatch of November 28.

So that was the reason for the emphasis. The policy had already been laid down by General Marshall’s telegram. So I was simply backing up the policy of the Chief of Staff and emphasizing the form of attack for which I was most directly responsible at G-2.

99. General Frank. In the beginning of General Russell’s questions you gave an answer to the effect that as a result of your background
and experience you had felt a strong probability of an air raid or air attack on Honolulu. Is that correct?

General Miles. That was one of the methods of attack to which we were most vulnerable.

100. General Frank. At this time, we will say, December 1, 1941, what was your attitude as to the probability of such an [118] air attack?

General Miles. If the Japs attacked openly at all, and if their attack was made on Hawaii, I think I would have said on December 1, 1941, that an air attack on the installations and the fleet, although I did not actually know the ships were there in Pearl Harbor, was one of the most probable movements that the Japs would take.

101. General Frank. Since you went out of your way to caution them about sabotage, why did you not likewise go out of your way to caution them about the probability of an air attack?

General Miles. Because, General, all that had been covered in General Marshall's dispatch in which he specifically ordered such necessary reconnaissances—I remember the use of that word—to protect the Hawaiian Department against attack. And that was the only way—that, and of course radar—that it could have been countered.

102. General Frank. You knew that the following day General Arnold sent a message with respect to sabotage?

General Miles. Yes, indeed.

103. General Frank. Did the logic ever occur to you that as a result of emphasizing sabotage in a series of messages it might have the result of de-emphasizing something else?

General Miles. That had occurred to me. I very strongly objected to General Arnold's message on the basis, among other things, that I did not want to overemphasize sabotage and that I had already sent the day before a sufficient message to cover the question of sabotage.

104. General Frank. As hindsight, of course, and considering [119] the fact that provisions for all of these defenses were covered in the war plans and other documents, would not the following message have sufficed: "War imminent. Act accordingly."

General Miles. For me to send?

105. General Frank. No; for the War Department to have sent. That would not have emphasized nor de-emphasized anything, would it?

General Miles. I would prefer not to pass upon the Chief of Staff's wording in his message of November 27.

106. General Frank. There were six messages sent between November 16th and 28th. Four of them cautioned against provoking the Japs; three of them emphasized sabotage. Now, with respect to caution against provoking the Japs: while we were leaning over backward as a result of these cautions, what was the attitude of the Japanese, relatively speaking?

General Miles. Their attitude where, General? Here in Washington, in the negotiations?

107. General Frank. All over the world. Were they as particular about preventing any suspicion on our part as we were particular about trying to prevent any provocation on their part?

General Miles. Oh, no. They had been provocative for a great many years, particularly since they began their attack on China.
108. General Frank. Will you develop that in just a few words?

General Miles. I should say that the Japanese attack in Manchuria and later in China, which, after all, was the basis [120] of our diplomatic negotiations here in Washington in 1941, was the basic cause of it, was the beginning of a very provocative attitude on the part of the Japanese.

109. General Frank. What I am after is this: There was little or no attempt on the Japanese side to keep from provoking us, whereas there was every effort on the part of the Americans to keep from provoking the Japanese; is that correct?

General Miles. I should say as a general statement that that is very accurate, sir.

110. General Frank. I asked that of you because you should have information on that as the War Department G-2 at that time.

General Miles. Yes, sir; but I think it was very general information that at Shanghai and all through the Peiping episode, they had been very provocative, as we all knew; and it was the policy of our Government not to provoke war; to take a firm stand in a certain way, as you know, but not to provoke war with Japan. At least, so we read it.

111. General Frank. Do you think that we were leaning over backwards in that attitude?

General Miles. That is a very difficult question to answer, General. I simply say that our policy was to avoid any unnecessary provocative action.

[127] 112. General Frank. You said you objected to General Arnold’s message. To whom?

General Miles. To General Arnold, in the first place, and later, to General Scanlon. It was quite a long discussion, as I remember it.

113. General Frank. What were the circumstances under which your objection was finally overcome and the message sent?

General Miles. It had to go to the Deputy Chief of Staff, General Bryden. General Marshall was away. General Bryden did not want to decide it, either, very much. I objected strongly and was backed up by General Gerow, and our objections were on this line: (1) this antisabotage message had gone out; (2) that a message should not go to the air forces alone, but if sent at all, should go to the Commanding Generals for their air forces and for everybody else; and (3) that the message as originally drawn was very drastic. As you know very well, at that time, the Air Force had a lot of young men in command of fields and so forth, and a very drastic order, from General Arnold, particularly, to cargo planes, and so forth, might very well have resulted in somebody’s being shot.

I would also like to say, here, that General Arnold’s message was primarily addressed to the continental United States; he was thinking about that. What started him was the fact about seven planes arrived at one of your western fields—I think at Salt Lake—all with the same trouble, and from different depots, and he thought there was some real sabotage going on in this country. But, to go on with the story, we finally had to take it to the Deputy Chief of Staff, late that afternoon of the 28th. I don’t think it was decided until [122] about six o’clock. General Scanlon was present, presenting the Air side, and I think, General Gerow and General Gullion, Provost Marshal General; and General Bryden finally decided that it would be sent in
modified form; that is, not such drastic action to be taken against anybody who might climb over a fence; and that it would be sent to the Commanding Generals, and that the Air Corps might also if they desired send it direct under General Arnold's name to the Air Force, to the Air Commanders concerned; and that was the final decision.

114. General Frank. Now, another question that I am asking because G-2 might have drawn a conclusion on it: What was the attitude of the public toward the possibility of war at that time? Can you answer that?

General Miles. I can only give you my impression, that they were not nearly as much worried about it as they should have been. After all, it was only a few months past since we had saved the Army by one vote in the House of Representatives. You remember, I think it was in October 1941 that that vote was taken, and we just barely saved the Army at that time.

115. General Frank. What do you mean, “saved the Army”?  

General Miles. Well, you remember there was a bill, sir, to send back all the men that had been drafted, put them back on the reserve, or something like that.

116. General Russell. A bill to demobilize the National Guard.  

General Miles. To demobilize the National Guard—send the draftees back. The War Department was extremely worried about it.

117. General Frank. Aside from the people “top side” in the Army, can you give me an expression of what the attitude in the [123] Army was with respect to the possibility of war?

General Miles. Not accurately. I attended the North Carolina maneuvers, that November, preceding November, early preceding November, and I don’t remember to have heard the matter discussed. The Army in those days as you well remember, we all remember, was intensely busy in building itself and training and maneuvering and so forth, and I would not say the Army as a whole were much concerned as to where war was going to break if they could get their troops ready before the break.

118. General Frank. Do you think they felt that war was on the horizon?

General Miles. The Army?

119. General Frank. Yes.

General Miles. Yes, sir.

120. General Frank. All right.

General Miles. Not necessarily with Japan, but war was on the horizon.

121. General Frank. Did you know that there was a Japanese striking force consisting of several carriers and a couple of battleships and a submarine force in the Marshall Islands, in the vicinity of Jaluit, about the 1st of December?

General Miles. I knew that such a force had been reported about there, and about that time.

122. General Frank. Was that information given to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?

General Miles. I don’t know, sir. I do not remember.

123. General Frank. Have you any way of determining that?

General Miles. The records of the Military Intelligence Department undoubtedly will disclose it.
124. General Frank. If it were given?

General Miles. Yes, if it were given. I feel very sure that in one form or another he was informed of that report. I say "in one form or another" because one form might very well have been through Navy and Fleet.

125. General Frank. Information on the situation surrounding the Hawaiian Islands, you stated some time back, information as to the presence of hostile activity in the waters, would mainly be obtained through submarine reconnaissance and air reconnaissance?

General Miles. That is correct—and radar.

126. General Frank. And radar? Since the Navy is the only department that has submarines, and since also in the plan for air reconnaissance at Honolulu they were responsible for distant reconnaissance, it would appear then that it was the responsibility of the Navy to keep both the Army and the Navy in Honolulu advised and to provide protection against any kind of attack so far as reconnaissance could provide that, is that correct?

General Miles. So far as distance reconnaissance is concerned, they alone had the means of carrying it out.

127. General Frank. That is all I have.

General Gruentert. I want you to explain once more so I can get it clear in mind about the dissemination of information gathered by G-2, of the War Department, so I will put in various questions. You get information from the State Department, ONI, your own sources, and whatever other sources might become available to you. Now, when you get this information, who judges whether or not particular parts of that information [125] are of value and should be transmitted, for instance, to the commanding general of Hawaii?

General Miles. The first people who pass on it are the members of the section, the Geographical Section, which includes the country about which we have that information—the Japanese, we will say. Information would pass first through the Far Eastern Section, I think it was called at that time, under Colonel Bratton, of the Intelligence Subdivision of the Military Intelligence. That would then go to the Intelligence Division, itself, which collated all positive intelligence, dealt with all positive intelligence as distinguished from counter intelligence, the negative side, and would then be sent out.

If it was simply routine, the Chief in the Military Intelligence Division, G-2, would simply see it passing over his desk. If there were any question about it, it would be brought up through normal channels to the executive officer, who, if he did not feel competent to decide it, would take it up with G-2 men; and that was the method.

128. General Gruentert. If you were disseminating it, then, to the various commands, or any particular command, would it then pass directly from G-2 to such commander, and in what form?

General Miles. The normal form would be these semiweekly summaries. I mean that would be the routine. Then, any particular information of particular importance would be telegraphed out to those agencies concerned with that particular bit of information; in the case of Japan, to (certainly) the Philippines, to Hawaii, to Panama, to the West Coast, and so forth, right to our military attaché at China, to the G-2 of the foreign departments, or the corps areas.
129. General Grunert. But when you make an estimate of the situation, that then goes to be processed through War Plans Division, to the Chief of Staff?

General Miles. Yes.

130. General Grunert. Now, if there is any information to be passed out on that estimate, it then must be authorized for you to pass it out, or for them to pass it out directly to those concerned, is that right?

General Miles. Yes. It becomes more than information, then; it becomes an opinion of the War Department, a communication of the Chief of Staff.

131. General Grunert. All right. Now, the next question I have is one on which we will have to go back to the sabotage message. Was that sabotage message of November 27 O. K.'d by WPD, or the Chief of Staff, or whom? Or was it necessary to have that O. K.'d? Did you send it out directly to the G-2?

General Miles. It was not necessary for the Chief of Staff or his office to pass on it, since it simply carried out a policy already established by the previous messages of the same date, from General Marshall. I do remember, however, consulting, as I almost always did, War Plans, as they consulted me on messages, and I think it was General Gerow who suggested that I add to the message the G-2 was to inform the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff, only.

132. General Grunert. Did G-2 do its utmost to inform, by contact with the various agencies made available, so as to best advise the Chief of Staff and keep subordinate commands informed, and so that they could carry out their mission?

General Miles. I did not hear the first of your question, relative to the G-2.

133. General Grunert. Did G-2 do its utmost, so far as you could judge, to carry out its mission, in informing the Chief of Staff of everything they had got, making estimates, and passing down information they thought was pertinent?

General Miles. The answer to that is Yes.


General Miles. I might add, if I may, that we wrote so much that we got certain complaints—complaints that nobody could read all the stuff we turned out. We certainly tried to do whatever we could.

135. General Grunert. Did so many things go out at one time that the "low side" might have considered themselves as being informed to such a point of saturation that they did not pay much attention to the information they were getting? In other words, "crying wolf! wolf!" so that they became confused, or "fed up"?

General Miles. That could have been, sir.

136. General Grunert. Do you think that the G-2 message—we call it "the G-2 message," of November 27—and the sabotage message—we call that the "Arnold message," of the 28th, which was sent out under the Adjutant General's signature—did you consider whether or not they might be taken by the Command "down below" as modifying or changing the Chief of Staff's instructions of November 27?

General Miles. No, sir; I did not. The Chief of Staff's message of November 27 was a war-warning message, in my mind, all inclusive.
so far as different forms of attack or dangers might be considered, and my message of the same date in regard to sabotage was simply inviting the attention of the G-2, who was particularly charged with that, in each corps area and overseas department, to that particular form of danger.

137. General GRUNERT. There was no report from the recipients required?

General MILES. There was no report required.  

138. General GRUNERT. That is, to your message.  

General MILES. No answer to my message, of the 27th.  

139. General GRUNERT. No answer? But there was a report required by the Chief of Staff’s message of November 27?  

General MILES. That is true, sir.  

140. General GRUNERT. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department made his report to the Chief of Staff, presumably on the Chief of Staff’s message of November 27. Therein, he reported just the measures taken as to sabotage. Did you see that report?  

General MILES. I did not see that message—that answer, until after Pearl Harbor.  

141. General GRUNERT. I do not think of anything else. Does anybody else think of anything else?  

142. General FRANK. When General Grunert just asked you about the possibility of confusing those messages on sabotage, you replied from the point of view of the man at this end. Now, consider yourself for a moment as the man at the receiving end of those messages, not know who prepared them, nor anything about their source, but from the point of view of their coming from the War Department, and considering that as a single source: under those conditions, might it or might it not have been a little confusing?  

General MILES. It might have been, but I think the first message was signed “Marshall.”  

143. General FRANK. That is right.  

General MILES. That would be my answer.  

144. General FRANK. Now, the next question is: I asked you, in my questions a few minutes ago, as to whether or not you had sent any message to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department with respect to the presence in the Marshall Islands of this Japanese force. We have, we think, all the communications that went from the War Department to the Hawaiian Department, from the 16th of November until December 7. This Japanese force was not in the vicinity of Jaluit until about the 25th. In view of the critical stage of the situation, it would seem that that information was rather vital, as there is no record of its having been communicated. Is there any explanation of that?  

General MILES. I wouldn’t know what the explanation was, if it wasn’t communicated. If we had known at the time, as we probably did, that that information, coming from Navy, was being transmitted to the Fleet in Hawaii, to all of their naval vessels, it might very well have been that we considered that as sufficient, knowing that the two Intelligence branches, Army and Navy, were working in very close cooperation, we thought, everywhere—in Hawaii and the West Coast and in the Philippines, and so forth.
I am a little worried about that message, because I was told, this morning, by Military Intelligence, that there are numbered gaps in their files today, and they do not know where [130] those messages are. We hope you have them, but they do not know.

145. General Russell. We didn’t get them from G-2.

General Miles. How?

146. General Russell. We haven’t gotten anything from G-2.

147. General Frank. In the Roberts Commission interrogation of Colonel Fielder, who was G-2 in the Hawaiian Department—

General Miles. Yes, G-2.

148. General Frank. —he discloses that he was not, prior to December 7, getting this information from the Navy, in Honolulu. He was not getting it.

General Miles. He should have, of course.

149. General Frank. That is all.

150. General Grunert. One final question. In your experience as Staff Officer and as a Commander in the field, outside the War Department, would a message signed by Marshall carry more weight with you than one signed by the Adjutant General, or one signed by a Staff Officer?

General Miles. Very much more weight, General, particularly when it begins with some such phrase as “This is a war-warning message.”

151. General Grunert. Are there any other questions?

General Russell. What message did he ever send, beginning that way, General Miles?

General Miles. My impressions of the message of November 27, but I haven’t it before me.

152. General Grunert. There was one message starting out that way, but it happened to be a Navy message. This particular message from the Chief of Staff did not start out that way, [131] according to the record.

153. General Russell. Who was Creswell?

General Miles. Creswell? He was Military Attache in Japan.

154. General Russell. I want to go back to my Mandated Islands for a minute, General, because you have excited me a little bit. I want to get some description of those islands. Referring to the Marshall Islands, where these carriers are supposed to have assembled, that attacked, is there anybody on those islands except Japanese?

General Miles. Some natives there, I believe—a few, there.

155. General Russell. Are there towns and roads and those sorts of things there?

General Miles. The only so-called “civilized people” are the Japanese, there, and the others are natives of the Islands. They don’t live in towns, very much, I imagine. My information about the Mandated Islands is very slim, now, particularly now—

156. General Russell. There is no secret at all about the questions that I am asking, and what I am attempting to develop for my own satisfaction, in arriving at what happened at Pearl Harbor. They had everything on us, yet they sailed up and attacked us, and apparently today G-2 doesn’t know where they came from, or how many there were, or where they went to. We have not been able so far to
get any very intelligent information on what these convoys were like, if there were more than one. Do you have any ideas about that, the size of the attacking forces?

General Miles. Prior to the attack?

157. General Russell. No, since the attack. Have you gotten [132] information that led you to know how strong these convoys were that came in there, launching this attack?

General Miles. We have only general information, largely from Naval. It was supposed to be the KAGA and AKAGI, those two very large carriers of theirs, supported by probably some of their older battleships of the KONGO class—their four old battle cruisers; but I have no definite information.

158. General Russell. I think that is all.
159. General Grunert. Thank you, very much.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Whereupon, at 12:45 p. m., the Board recessed until 2 p. m.)

[132-A]  ADDENDUM TO GENERAL MILES’ TESTIMONY

(The following changes were suggested by General Miles in his letter of August 18, 1944, to General Grunert:)
Page 93, line 18; delete “thirty”; insert “twenty”.
Page 94, line 11; insert comma after word “selection”; delete words “of officers,”; insert “of” between words “particularly” and “officers.”
Page 94, line 14; delete “of course”; insert between words “officers?” and “wanted” “in the field”.
Page 94, line 15; insert period after word “them”; delete word “and” after word “them”; capitalize word “we”.
Page 98, line 18; insert word “probably” between words “is” and “the”.
Page 98, line 19; insert quotation mark between words “then” and “Yes”.
Page 98, line 20; delete word “it”; insert in lieu thereof “the Embassy”.
Page 98, line 21; insert quotation mark after “army?”.
Page 102, line 15; add after words “No, sir;” “except that late in ’41 steps were taken to prevent certain Japanese ships from passing through the Panama Canal”.
Page 103, line 13; insert word “and” between words “time” and “for”.
Page 104, line 18; delete words “in Military and”; substitute therefor “from”.
Page 104, line 20; delete words “any” and “their”.
[132-B]  Page 106, line 25; change “the route” to “their routes”.
Page 106, line 26; change last word on line “this” to “an”.
Page 106, line 27; insert comma after “Vacant Sea”; delete word “and”.
Page 107, line 9; delete word “famous”.
Page 107, line 10; delete “It was much more an” preceding word “attack”, substitute therefor “We”. Make balance of line read “attacked the problem from”.
Page 107, line 15; preceding “to” insert “by our people in Hawaii,”; change “they” to “it”.

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Page 107, line 17; insert "that" between "1930s" and "he"; insert words "in it." after word "interested"; delete word "and"; insert "He" before word "was"?
Page 107, line 18; insert comma after word "Plans".
Page 107, line 21; make balance of sentence read "containing the five big Hawaiian Islands."
Page 107, delete word "terms"; insert in lieu word "dreams".
Page 109, line 16. Insert period after word "careful"; delete "that"; capitalize "the" (last word on line).
Page 110, line 17. Delete word "very".
Page 110, line 19. Insert period after word "action"; make balance of line read, "The latter, in other words, is a command proposition."
Page 110, line 22; change word "him" to "them".
Page 113, line 4; delete words "to them" after word "ultimatum"; insert dashes after word "ultimatum".
[132-C] Page 113, line 5; after word "not" insert word "ultimately".
Page 113, line 26; insert word "Japanese" between "The" and "reply".
Page 114, line 2; change "that" to "it".
Page 114, line 3; change "our" to "the U. S."
Page 114, line 4; insert comma after word "was"; change "it" to "which".
Page 114, line 9; change "there" to "regarding inevitable war." Change "I did" to "I do".
Page 114, line 10; insert between words "thought" and "war" the words "on November 27th that".
Page 114, line 11; insert comma after word "that"; change "an" to "some".
Page 114, line 12; insert word "but" before "that".
Page 114, line 13; change "that" to "need not"; delete word "would".
Page 114, line 15; change "practically" to "immediately"; delete "But"; capitalize "there".
Page 114, line 16; change "did break those" to "broke her".
Page 114, line 17; insert "in Washington," between "negotiations" and "short".
Page 114, line 18; change "matters" to "possibilities".
Page 115, line 10; delete "but"; capitalize "there".
Page 115, line 13; change period to comma, and add "or get information from him while there."
Page 116, line 19; change "limiting" to "delimiting".
Page 116, line 22; after word "system" add "for the Army,"; change "counter-intelligence" to "counter-fifth-column".
Page 116, line 24; insert period after word "staff";
Page 116, line 25; change "it" to "this".
Page 117, line 1; change "effort to" to "overt".
Page 117, line 6; insert words "about sabotage" between words "said" and "in".
Page 117, line 8; insert word "of" between "only" and "the".
Page 117, line 9; make it read "departments but particularly those in this country. It was sent."
Page 117, line 13; change "in" to "to"
Page 117, line 14; insert period after "worried"; delete words "and that" and insert in lieu thereof "He".
Page 117, line 17; delete period after word "telegram" and add "of the 27th." Delete word "So".
Page 117, line 20; change "at" to "as", change period to comma, and add "and reiterating the possibility of open hostilities."
Page 118, line 4; insert words "Pearl Harbor" between "the" and "installations".
Page 118, line 5; after word "fleet", delete comma, insert parenthesis.
Page 118, line 6; after word "Harbor", delete comma, insert parenthesis.
Page 118, line 15; delete word "it", insert in lieu "such an attack".
Page 118, line 16; add new sentence, "My message also warned of possible hostilities".
Page 120, line 1; delete word "was".
[132-E] Page 121, line 11; insert period after "Gerow". Delete word "and". Capitalize "our".
Page 121, line 12; change "this" to "an".
Page 121, line 13; change "that a" to "the proposed".
Page 121, line 15; delete word "that".
Page 121, line 19; change "cargo" to "protect".
Page 122, line 3; change "Generals" to "General"; delete word "and".
Page 122, line 4; insert word "directing" between "not" and "such".
Page 122, line 5; delete "to be taken".
Page 122, line 6; delete "and" (first word).
Page 122, line 7; insert comma after "also"; insert comma after "desired".
Page 122, line 9; insert semicolon after "concerned"; delete "and".
Page 122, line 16; delete "past" between "months" and "since".
Page 122, line 25; insert word "and" between "Guard" and "send".
Page 123, line 3; delete "that November, preceding November,"; insert word "the" after "early."
Page 125, line 9; change "That" to "It".
Page 125, line 18; delete "man; and"; insert in lieu "himself." Capitalize "that".
Page 125, line 23; delete "I mean"; capitalize "that". Delete "Then"; capitalize "any".
Page 125, line 27; delete "and so forth,"; insert word [132-F] "possibly".
Page 125, line 28; delete word "right"; change "at" to "in"; delete comma; insert word "and" following word "China".
Page 125, line 29, line 29; delete "foreign departments, or the".
Page 126, line 20; make second word "date".
Page 126, line 22; insert period after "messages". Delete word "and".
Page 126, line 23; make it read: "that I add to the message that the G-2 were to inform their Commanding".
Page 126, line 24; make it read: "Generals and the Chiefs of Staff only."
Page 128, line 18; insert dashes after the word "answer"; delete comma.
Page 132, line 4; make it read: “from Naval Intelligence. The ships were supposed to be the KAGA and AKAGI, those”.

[133]

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Board at 2 p. m. continued the hearing of witnesses.)

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. RUSSELL A. OSMUN, CHIEF, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, WAR DEPARTMENT

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. General, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

2. General Gruner. General, the Board, in an attempt to get at the facts, is looking into the War Department background and viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. This includes an examination of pertinent available records. It is hoped that because of your assignment in the A. C. of S., G-2, War Department General Staff, you can throw some light on the subject. In order to cover so large a field in the limited time available, individual Board members have been assigned objectives and phases for special investigation, although the entire Board will pass upon all objectives and phases. General Russell has this particular phase, so he will lead in propounding questions, and the other members will assist in developing them.

3. General Russell. General Osmun, what is your present assignment?
   General Osmun. Chief Military Intelligence Service, sir.

   General Osmun. One of the two branches of the G-2 office.

5. General Russell. As such officer, are you acquainted with the files maintained by the office to which you are assigned?
   General Osmun. Yes, sir.

6. General Russell. Would there be contained in these files records or copies of messages, documents, and other memoranda which may have transpired between your Department and the Hawaiian Department in the year 1941?
   General Osmun. Yes, sir.

7. General Russell. Would there be contained in the same files records or copies of similar messages or other documents which might have been transferred from your Department to the Chief of Staff or other branches of the General Staff?
   General Osmun. Normally, yes, sir.

8. General Russell. General, did you at my request make a search of your files for the purpose of selecting such memoranda as are contained therein which relate to the Hawaiian Department in the year 1941?
   General Osmun. Yes, sir.

9. General Russell. Did you show such documents to me as you thought were pertinent?
General Osmun. I showed you all the documents we had found that were pertinent.

10. General Russell. Have you since collecting those documents found any other documents?

General Osmun. No, sir. May I amend that to say that we are making a continuing search, and if any other documents are found you will be notified. I don't expect to find any others.

11. General Russell. This morning in the testimony of General Miles—and I bring this to your attention because I did not know it when I was talking to you before—General Miles stated that there were periodic summaries prepared during the year 1941, as I now recall, one summary bi-weekly and another possibly bi-monthly, which were sent out to the Commanding Generals of the Service Corps and Departments. Did you, in your search of the records in your office, which search we have just referred to, discover copies of any such summaries?

General Osmun. No, sir; none of those were brought to my attention, and I do not think we found any. I asked General Miles about that, and he said that in most cases the summaries were prepared for the General Staff, because at that time the G-2, as explained to me by General Miles, was an Intelligence agency for the War Department, and that in certain cases, what you might term summaries were sent out from time to time, but those were not of the same character as what we would now call an estimate of the situation.

12. General Frank. In other words, there was information which would go to the Chief of Staff but it was not sent out to the theaters?

General Osmun. I understand so, sir; but I want to emphasize that I was not here at the time, and this is hearsay.

13. General Russell. How long have you been associated with the Division of Military Intelligence?

General Osmun. Since the winter of 1940–41, when I was sent temporarily to London as an observer for four months. I returned in March 1941, and after a few days went back to my normal duty in the Office of the Quartermaster General. A year later I was sent out to India and have been in Military Intelligence Service since.

14. General Russell. Do you know something of the history of the Military Intelligence Division over there?

General Osmun. Here in Washington?

15. General Russell. The general history of this Military Intelligence Division of the War Department.

General Osmun. Yes.

16. General Russell. Do you regard as adequate the means, including personnel, which have been placed at the disposal of that Department?

General Osmun. Absolutely not.

17. General Russell. Do you regard it as a badly neglected agency of the War Department in the past?

General Osmun. From the standpoint of military intelligence which could have been secured; yes.

18. General Russell. General, how familiar are you with the general geographical situation out in the South Pacific?

General Osmun. I know very little about it.
19. General Russell. What about the mandated islands? Do you know very much about those?
   General Osmun. Very little.
20. General Russell. Do you know anything about the Marshall Islands?
   General Osmun. No, sir.
21. General Russell. Do you know of any reason why Americans were not permitted to go on the Marshall Islands?
   General Osmun. I believe there was a stipulation in the mandate itself which was interpreted by the Japanese as forbidding foreigners to land without very severe restrictions.
22. General Russell. Have you ever seen that in the mandate document?
   General Osmun. No, sir; I have never seen the mandate.
23. General Russell. Suppose there had been available to G-2 adequate personnel: Do you believe they could have developed what was taking place in the mandated islands in November and December of 1941?
   General Osmun. I think, sir, that it goes a great deal deeper than that. We had a national psychology to contend with.
24. General Frank. Along what line?
   General Osmun. Lack of belief that we were in danger; disinclination to spend the tremendous sums of money that would be involved.
25. General Frank. Do you think that was reflected in the small margin by which Congress just prior to that had passed the Army bill?
   General Osmun. I will have to say, General, that I am not very much of a politician, and I would rather not express an opinion on that, because my opinion would be valueless. There was a lack of really trained Army officers available, and a general lack of comprehension at that time of the need for military intelligence as we have realized was necessary. I think if we go back to that time, we will remember that very few people thought there ever would be war with Japan. Most of our people felt quite secure in our inherent strength, and I think the Japanese bogey had been discussed so often that people had stopped paying much attention to it.
26. General Russell. General, I think those are all reasons why we could not get adequate support; but the question was rather a different question. If you had had adequate support and adequate personnel, what was to have prevented them from going out into that area and staying in touch with what was going on?
   General Osmun. That, again, is a rather difficult question to answer quickly. If we had had adequate personnel, obviously we might have had very much better information and probably we might have had enough information to have enabled us to have avoided what happened. It is a matter of estimate. If we had been perfectly prepared we would not have been surprised.
27. General Frank. Do you think that this emphasized effort to keep from offending the Japs when they were confronted with no such restriction imposed a handicap on our learning about their activities?
General Osmun. I do not think that I could answer that intelligently, General, because I had nothing to do with the Military Intelligence at that time except as an observer in this country. I do not know what the handicaps were and how much they handicapped the people that tried to get the information. I should say offhand that if we were handicapped and the others were free to do as they wanted, naturally we lost a great deal of information that otherwise could have been secured.

28. General Russell. If you find other documents and records along the line we have been questioning you about, will you advise us?

General Osmun. Yes, sir. We are looking for them.

[139] 29. General Frank. There are other agencies of the Government besides the Army and Navy that obtain information of various kinds, are there not?

General Osmun. Yes, sir.

30. General Frank. It would be advantageous if there were a plan for bringing all these agencies together periodically in each area, would it not?

General Osmun. Yes, sir.

31. General Frank. Do you consider that the bringing together of those agencies under the auspices of the Army and Navy could easily be accomplished?

General Osmun. May I answer that off the record?

32. General Frank. Yes.

(There was informal discussion off the record.)

General Osmun. I think that any loyal representative of the Government acting honestly with other similar persons can get the cooperation necessary in doing a good, businesslike job if he is given half a chance and has guts enough to do what he thinks is right.

33. General Frank. That will result in getting information that will redound to the best interests of our national defense?

General Osmun. Yes, sir. I have never found, in the two and a half years I was over there, any difficulty in dealing with anybody who was on the square as long as he realized that I was on the square and was interested only in stopping the war a few days sooner than it otherwise would stop.

34. General Frank. In the best interests of our United States effort?


35. General Frank. Then you believe that efforts should be made in these different areas to bring periodically together all American agencies concerned with gathering information?

General Osmun. Yes, sir.

36. General Grunert. Do you think that in such a combined intelligence organization, all the agencies concerned would cooperate, or would they be inclined to withhold information because of their "hush-hush" policy and the demand of secrecy, so that they would get so that they would not trust each other?

General Osmun. I think that is a question of personalities, and the only way I can answer it is to say that in my own recent experience overseas we had a number of individuals handling information from the very lowest to the highest degrees of security, and yet cooperating with the full understanding of each other's problems and, I believe, no loss of security.
37. General Frank. Would the fact that it is in the interest of the national effort to be paramount and overcome any minor prejudices that might exist?

General Osmun. At this time, undoubtedly, yes; but I think that in peace time much the same conditions would exist.

38. General Frank. As when?

General Osmun. As during war time, so far as the willingness to cooperate for the best interests of the Government is concerned.

39. General Frank. Then there is no point in mentioning peace time.

You have been searching recently for all communications that were sent from G–2 to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department between about the 15th of November and December 7 of 1941; is that correct?

General Osmun. Yes, sir.

40. General Frank. Have you found any communication which was sent to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department from G–2 or from the War Department that advised him that there was a Japanese force in the Marshall Islands that moved in there between the 25th and 30th of November?

General Osmun. If so they were in the notes that I gave to General Russell—I remember specifically that there was a message to the effect that the Japanese fleet had moved south in the general mandated area.

41. General Frank. It was in one of those radio messages sent between the 16th of November and the 7th of December?

General Osmun. I do not remember the date, sir. I say, if it is in any at all, it is in the batch of notes I gave to General Russell.

42. General Frank. You have given General Russell everything that you have found that was sent, have you not?

General Osmun. Yes, sir. We have given him everything we could. I was very definite that nothing was to be withheld from our records.

43. General Russell. I do not believe that in any of the memoranda you gave me there was a reference to the movement of Jap naval forces in the mandated area. I will say this: that the only messages that you gave me were those which the Board already had copies of.

44. General Grunert. Does it naturally follow that if there was such a force in or about the mandated islands at any particular time during that critical period, this was the force that made the attack on Hawaii?

General Osmun. No, sir.

45. General Grunert. I have one concluding question, to make sure that I understand the witness's remark about information summaries. General Miles, in his testimony, referred to summaries of information and estimates. Summaries were those documents prepared periodically and sent out as a matter of information, whereas estimates were those which were prepared for the Chief of Staff and the General Staff. Do I understand correctly that you did or not find any summaries of information on the Pacific situation along in 1941 that might or might not have been sent out to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?

General Osmun. That is correct, sir. I have not found any; but when I heard General Miles speak about it this morning I directed immediate search to find out if we had them.
I would like to enter in the record a fact which you gentlemen undoubtedly are aware of. That a number of Military Intelligence records undoubtedly were given to the Roberts Commission, and you have undoubtedly seen those.

46. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[143] TESTIMONY OF FRANCIS M. CAULFIELD, CHIEF CLERK, CENTRAL FILES, ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, WAR DEPARTMENT

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Will you state to the Board, Mr. Caulfield, your name, address, and occupation.

Mr. CAULFIELD. Francis M. Caulfield, Chief Clerk, Central Files, Adjutant General’s Office, War Department.

2. General GRUNERT. Mr. Caulfield, the Board is trying to get at the facts as to the Pearl Harbor attack, and is at present investigating the background, the viewpoints, and so forth, getting facts out of the War Department. That includes an examination of the pertinent available records, and we hope that from your position you will be able to tell us about the Adjutant General’s records. General Russell will lead, or propound the questions with reference thereto.

3. General RUSSELL. In your official capacity did you recently participate in a search of the records of the Adjutant General’s office, at my request?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes, I did. General.

4. General RUSSELL. And would you name the others in the Adjutant General’s Office who helped us in that search.

Mr. CAULFIELD. There was Colonel Sepulveda, and Mrs. Lillian K. Bull, and Mr. Joseph Yarborough. I cannot tell you the exact spelling of his name. And then the clerks in the Central Files and the Restricted Files, generally, search for indices.

5. General RUSSELL. Colonel Sepulveda was unable to attend the Board hearing, because he is not permitted to climb the steps?

Mr. CAULFIELD. That is correct, General.

6. General RUSSELL. You were second in charge of the search and the selection of material from the Adjutant General’s records?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes, sir.

7. General RUSSELL. Your directions were to make available to me as a member of this Board all data, all documents, memorandums, and so forth, which in any way related to the Hawaiian Department, for the year 1941?

Mr. CAULFIELD. That is correct, General.

8. General RUSSELL. Were all of those documents in the Adjutant General’s files, as just described, made available for me?

Mr. CAULFIELD. Yes; they were, General.

9. General RUSSELL. And the people whom you have just named rendered me all the help possible in going through these records and selecting those documents which I might think would be pertinent and of interest to the Board?
Mr. Caulfield. That is correct, General.
10. General Russell. I have no other questions.
11. General Grunert. I have no questions.
13. General Grunert. All right. Thank you, very much.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[145] TESTIMONY OF COLONEL CHARLES K. GAILEY, JR., EXECUTIVE OFFICER, OPERATIONS DIVISION, GENERAL STAFF, WAR DEPARTMENT

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Colonel Gailey, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.


2. General Grunert. Colonel Gailey, the Board, in attempting to get at the facts, is looking into the War Department background and viewpoint prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. This includes an examination of pertinent, available records. You have been called as a witness because of your familiarity with the records in so far as the office of OPD, War Department General Staff, is concerned, and General Russell will propound whatever questions there are. If there are any others, the other members of the Board will attempt to develop them.

3. General Russell. Colonel Gailey, recently, as a Member of this Board, I made a request on you for all documents, memorandums, other data, and files of the OPD, as they related to operations in the Hawaiian Department for the year 1941; is that true?

Colonel Gailey. I do not know whether it was in just exactly those words or not, sir, but I was instructed to help you out in any way we could, sir.

4. General Russell. I did submit to you a list of documents which we thought were in your office and ask that you produce [146] them for us?

Colonel Gailey. Yes, sir.

5. General Russell. You produced all of the documents which I requested, which were in your office?

Colonel Gailey. Yes, sir; I believe so. That was turned over to Mr. Bond, and I believe he got them all for you.

6. General Russell. And so far as you know, those are the only documents in your office which relate to the subjects that we are investigating in this matter?

Colonel Gailey. General, I did not check those lists of the files that you turned over, but I do believe that all the papers that pertain to this have been gotten together, I do not know whether at that time or at a later time. In what General North's outfit and you got together, and what Mr. Bond got together, I think you got it all, sir.

7. General Russell. In other words, you think the efforts of these three people have cleaned out your records of everything material to Pearl Harbor for the year 1941?
Colonel Gailey. Yes, sir; I do not think there is anything left.

8. General Russell. I want to make a statement in the record. I want to say that the documents which General North obtained have been made available to us.

Colonel Gailey. Yes, sir.

9. General Russell. And the Board has had the documents that Colonel Gailey made available.

Colonel Gailey. General, may I make another statement for the record? General Handy has issued instructions in the Operations Division that any thing this Board desires, they get, and we are to give you every aid and assistance in finding what you want that we can possibly give you.


11. General Frank. Have you any knowledge of any papers pertaining to the subject on which we are conducting an investigation, for which we have not asked?

Colonel Gailey. No, sir; I do not, General.

May I amend that, sir? I do not know of all the papers you have asked for, sir, but I do not know of any papers that are not covered in the three categories that I mentioned to General Russell.

12. General Frank. And that have been made available? Thanks.


(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

General Grunert. We are now going to other business.

(Thereupon, at 3:10 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
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PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 9, 1944
MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.

The Board at 9 a.m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.


Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, and Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

(Stephen S. Maxon, shorthand reporter, was sworn by the Recorder.)

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL H. H. ARNOLD, U. S. ARMY, WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. General, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.


2. General GRUNERT. General Arnold, the Board in an attempt to get at the facts, is looking into the War Department background and viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. It is hoped that because of your assignment with the Air Forces in Washington at that time you can throw some light on the subject.

In order to cover the large field in the limited time available, individual Board Members have been assigned objectives or phases for special investigations, although the entire Board will pass upon all objectives and phases. General Russell has this particular phase, so he will lead in propounding questions, and the other Members will assist in developing it; so I will turn you over to General Russell for the time being.

3. General RUSSELL. General Arnold, Saturday, we submitted to General White, for your attention, certain questions or subjects with the hope that they would give you an opportunity to refresh your mind and collect such data as you would want to answer those questions. It is my purpose to follow, in the main, the outline sent you on that day.

Would you please state, General Arnold, your official status during the year 1941.
General Arnold. I was Chief of Air Corps, until the 5th of May, 1941. I was Acting Deputy Chief of Staff, until the 19th of May 1941; Deputy Chief of Staff, to the balance of the year. I was Chief of the Army Air Forces, from the 6th of May 1941 to the balance of the year.

4. General Russell. Then, during November and December 1941, you were Deputy Chief of Staff and Commander of the Air Forces?

General Arnold. That is correct.

5. General Russell. General Arnold, were you familiar with the international situation in 1941 as it related to the Japanese Government?

General Arnold. That's a question of relativity. I was [150] as familiar as an officer in my position could have been. By that I mean there were certain things undoubtedly happening that I did not know about; there were certain other things happened that I did know about.

6. General Russell. General Arnold, in the critical months of 1941, if we may describe those late fall months of 1941 as "the critical months," you were Deputy Chief of Staff and Commander of the Air Forces. As Deputy Chief of Staff, you were next to the Chief of Staff of the Army, were you not?

General Arnold. Yes, sir.

7. General Grenier. May I interrupt? Were you the only Deputy, or were there other Deputies?

General Arnold. There were two other Deputies. There were General Bryden and General Moore. There were three Deputy Chiefs of Staff at that time.

8. General Russell. In the absence of General Marshall from Washington, which of the Deputies was senior and acting?

General Arnold. General Bryden.

9. General Russell. General Arnold, I think it would be helpful if you could enlarge on or maybe elucidate your answer to the effect that you knew some things, and some things you did not know.

General Arnold. Well. I don't want to complicate the situation, but there were certain ultrasecret things that obviously I knew nothing about. On the other hand, there were certain ultrasecret things that were brought to my attention. I did have access to all of the conferences of the G-2 Section. I did have daily conferences with the Chief of Staff. I also had my own A-2 Section, that brought me in information [151] as to what was going on; but after it was all over, I realized there were other things that had happened that I didn't know anything about.

10. General Russell. General Arnold, we have discovered in our investigation the existence of a "council of war," which apparently had its meetings over in the office of the Secretary of State. I believe General Marshall in his testimony stated that he and General Stark frequently attended those council meetings. Were you ever in on any of those council meetings?

General Arnold. I was never present at any of those meetings.

11. General Russell. When you say that after December 7 it developed that there were things about which you did not know, were any of those things developed in these council meetings that we are discussing?
General Arnold. I think they probably were.

12. General Russell. Generally, General Arnold, your information on the Japanese situation, in the late fall of 1941, indicated a tightening in the relationship or a continuing of the relationship; or, just what was the trend in our relations with Japan?

General Arnold. I think you can go back earlier. I think it became apparent as early as January 1941 that the relations were quite strained, and the various things that happened from then on through the year indicated that we knew that they were strained and we were taking necessary steps to do what we could to prepare for any eventuality that might occur, without causing an overt act against the Japanese.

For instance, it was always our endeavor to get as many airplanes as we could across to the Philippines, and in order to do that we had to, as you will know, open up an air route across the Pacific, which in those days was quite a task. We did succeed in opening up an air route, with the help of the Navy, by way of Midway and Wake, down through Rabaul, into Darwin, and up into the Philippines. After the route was established, then one of our worries was whether or not if the Japs did declare war or start activities against us, we could hold those airports open.

It was some time in the summer, for instance, that I talked with Admiral Stark, and he was very much worried about what the Japs were doing down in Truk and Jaluit. We knew they were doing something down there, we did not know what; so I made arrangements then that these planes that were going to the Philippines would fly off their course to take pictures of Jaluit and Truk. It was quite a difficult task in those days, because the distances were long, we had to have gasoline, and every time we put a camera in, every time you put extra ammunition in, every time you put guns in, it meant taking off something; and yet we needed those photographs badly.

Well, it was not until December, for instance, that we finally got those pictures, and then the planes that got the pictures were the last ones to land in the Philippines before the Japs attacked the Philippines, so what the photographs showed, we never found out.

I think it was the 17th of November. General George of my outfit, then Colonel George, wrote me a memorandum and said he was worried about the vulnerability of Wake and Midway, and asked me whether we couldn't do something about it, but in those days we were at peace, we couldn't take the actions that we took later, so that I was making a note of it and calling it to the attention of the War Department. There wasn't much we could do. We took it up with the Navy Department, but that was one of Navy's tasks in those days, and the Navy was putting in fields with us and for us. And as I remember it, they did send some garrisons out to Wake and Midway, maybe before and maybe after that; but we were worried—worried about losing those two islands.

Looking back on it, I am convinced now that we all assumed that the Japs would attack the Philippines. We were fairly sure that they would cut our air line, because they had to cut our air line to stop our heavy bombers from getting to the Philippines. We were pretty sure that they would attack Wake and Midway when they did attack. There was always the chance that they might attack Hawaii. Now,
against that, we had a very small air force. The planes that we had that we could use in those possessions effectively were in the hundreds and not in the thousands.

Simultaneously with that we were trying to build up an air force in the United States for any eventuality, and so the number of airplanes we could send would be numbered by the dozens; and every time you took an airplane away from the United States it meant that many less here to build up this Air Force that we knew that some time or other we would have to use.

I think that the Philippine Commander and the Hawaiian Commander were aware of the necessity for air, because they asked for airplanes. It was in August 1941 that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department approved a request for 180 B-17's. Now, we did not have 180 B-17's to give them, because at that time the total number of B-17's in the Army was only 109. He was asking for 180, so his request naturally could not be filled.

Prior to that, as early as February, we were trying to get P-40's out to the Hawaiian Department, and the Commanding General out there wanted additional fighter airplanes, because he quite obviously saw a possible use for them; so we went to the extent of getting and sending P-40's out there on carriers, to increase the number he had available.

So I think that there was a general acceptance of the possibility of Japanese aggression, certainly against the Philippines and against Wake and Midway, and possibly, against Hawaii.

13. General Russell. General Arnold, there were negotiations going on between representatives of the Japanese Government and the American Government, in 1941, about which you knew, I guess?

General Arnold. I knew the negotiations were going on; yes.

14. General Russell. Were you kept informed as to the developments in those negotiations?

General Arnold. Not to any 100 percent extent. In other words, I knew that on the 27th of November negotiations had broken down, apparently broken down, and the Chief of Staff sent a message to the Philippines and to the Hawaiian Department. He sent a warning message of them.

15. General Grunert. Do you feel that you were given sufficient information to carry on your job?

General Arnold. I feel I was, because I knew. With the general situation, I knew that, with the limited means at hand, somehow or other we had to do the impossible and get airplanes out to the Philippines and over to Honolulu. We didn't have the airplanes, so we did the best we could.

16. General Russell. General Arnold, to go back to this subject of the negotiations, the fact that those negotiations were occurring in no way hindered or delayed your efforts to get aircraft into the Pacific area?

General Arnold. As a matter of fact, on the contrary, we leaned over backwards to get them over, because somehow or other I personally never trusted the Japs very much.

17. General Russell. You had no faith in the good faith of the negotiations?

General Arnold. I had no faith at all in the negotiations.
18. General Russell. You stated a moment ago, General Arnold, that you knew something was going on in Truk and Jaluit. Generally, how far were those islands from Hawaii?

General Arnold. My recollection is that the distance from Wake to Rabaul is about 1400 miles—General Frank knows more about this than I do—and Truk and Jaluit were about two thirds the distance, one of them on the west side of our course about twenty miles, and the other on the east side of our course about sixty miles.

19. General Russell. Were those two islands in the mandated group?

General Arnold. Both were in the mandated group, I think.

20. General Russell. Then, some time in the fall of 1941, you discovered that something was happening out there?

General Arnold. Well, we knew that the Japs were doing something there. We knew they were building naval bases. Navy was worried about it, and we took it so seriously that I told my boys when they flew over there, or who were going to fly over there, that they would probably have a fight on their hands, and I cautioned them to have their machine guns, or load them, when they flew over those islands; so I knew we were going to have a fight on our hands.

21. General Russell. Did those developments, General Arnold, that you have just discussed, in your opinion constitute a threat to Midway and Wake and Hawaii?

General Arnold. In my opinion it was a direct threat against my airway across the Pacific, because it cut my airline in two.

22. General Russell. Were those three points, Hawaii, Midway, and Wake, all on your air route?

General Arnold. They were all on my airway route. My air route went from San Francisco to Hawaii, to Midway, to Wake, and then across all the mandated islands, to Rabaul, then across to Darwin and Australia, and up into the Philippines; and it was the only route we had, because the other route, we had no control over the islands. For instance, we would have liked very much at that time, as we have done since, to put a route down through Christmas or Canton, Samoa, and Fiji.

23. General Grunert. Let me interrupt. If the witness is giving any testimony that may be of value to the enemy in the future, anything planned, or something that they do not now know, I suggest we had better have a closed session and have such things explained to us, rather than putting it in the record, which may or may not get to other eyes than ours.

General Arnold. I think that is an excellent idea.

24. General Grunert. So, if you will keep that in mind as you go along, and if there is any such information that you think ought to be particularly guarded and not put into the record, then do not give it.

General Arnold. I am, along that line, a little bit doubtful about this photographic business being in your open record, because somebody may pick that up at a later date as an act of war, or aggression, or something.

25. General Russell. Unfortunately, if that is true, General Arnold, it is all through the record in the Roberts Commission proceedings, and in our record.

General Arnold. That is all right.

27. General Russell. That is where we got it, first.
The point, definitely, that I was attempting to establish, now, is whether or not it was a fact that the Air Corps people, your people, considered these developments in the mandated islands as a threat against Hawaii, Wake, and Midway?

General Arnold. Against Midway and Wake, certainly; and possibly, against Hawaii. Looking back on it now, I cannot remember that we were all so much worried about the immediate attack on Hawaii. It was always a possibility; but we all thought there certainly would be an attack against Midway and Wake.

[158] 28. General Russell. Your reasoning there, I assume, General Arnold, was predicated on the fact that Midway and Wake were nearer to these Japanese developments in the Mandate than was Hawaii?

General Arnold. That is right.

[159] 29. General Russell. General Arnold, were you at that time familiar with the plans for the operation of the Army Air Force in the Territory of Hawaii?

General Arnold. Yes; I was.

30. General Russell. Did it include information as to the cooperation between the Army and Navy Air Forces out there?

General Arnold. Yes.

31. General Russell. Did you consider those plans sound from the standpoint of air operation?

General Arnold. No. The Air Force never did consider those plans sound. We never considered any plans sound which did not give us full opportunity to use the heavy bombers and to get the most out of them; and we did not think that those plans permitted that. We figured that they were wasting the striking force on reconnaissance missions, so that when we had to use a striking force they would not be available.

32. General Russell. Did you know what the reconnaissance plan was?

General Arnold. I read it and my people studied it.

33. General Russell. It is true that the responsibility of the Army for reconnaissance ended with its inshore patrol?

General Arnold. The responsibility of the Army ended with the inshore patrol, but the Navy had the use of the Army heavy bombers for the long-range reconnaissance.

34. General Russell. If they required them?

General Arnold. And they did require them, because they did use them.

35. General Russell. When?

General Arnold. All during this period, prior to the Pearl Harbor attack and after Pearl Harbor.

[160] 36. General Russell. Are you certain about that, General Arnold?

General Arnold. Of course I cannot swear on a stack of Bibles that I do not make mistakes, but I have a distinct recollection from seeing letters from the Commanding General over there saying they were wasting their airplanes by using them on offshore patrols.

37. General Russell. Do you have any of those letters with you?
General Arnold. No; I have not.

38. General Russell. That is a point that has not yet been brought to the knowledge of the Board, and if we can get information on it it might be of assistance.

General Arnold. Let me withdraw that answer. Let me look up the letters that I have and see whether I can substantiate it. Certainly it was happening after Pearl Harbor. I think I had better look that up and get the facts before I make that statement. Certainly it happened after Pearl Harbor; and my impression is that I got a letter from Martin telling about the use of the airplanes that way, but I may be mistaken. One reason why I think maybe I am mistaken is because, looking back, I think they only had about 12 B-17s in Hawaii at that time. So I guess I am mistaken.

39. General Frank. 12 B-17s and 32 B-18s?

General Arnold. Yes, I guess I am mistaken. I guess they did not have enough to do it if they had wanted to.

40. General Russell. It was somewhat in conflict with other data which we had on that subject, and we just wanted to check it to eliminate any conflicts if possible.

General Arnold. You might eliminate that part of it, if you will.

41. General Russell. General Arnold, if the bombers were not being used for reconnaissance missions prior to December 7, 1941, would you now testify that the plans of operation of the Air Force, including cooperation with the Navy Air Force, were sound?

General Arnold. I still would not say they were sound, because there was a conflict of authority, a conflict of command, out there, that in our opinion never was straightened out. The Army responsibility, for instance, as outlined in joint action, was to provide and operate the mobile land and air forces required for the defense of the coast, aircraft operating in support of Pearl Harbor defenses, and general coastal frontier defense in support of or in lieu of naval forces.

The Navy responsibility was to conduct naval operations directed toward the defeat of any enemy force in the vicinity of the coast and to support the Army in repelling attacks on coastal objectives.

In our opinion, there never was any clear-cut line there as to the duties of the Army and the Navy as far as the air was concerned, because the air overlaps both.

It is awfully hard for an officer in the Air Force to determine whether he is operating in the direct defense of the coast or whether he is operating against the defeat of enemy forces in the vicinity of the coast. One of them is the Navy's responsibility and the other is the Army's responsibility; and the airplane is out 150 miles to sea and he cannot tell which he is doing.

42. General Grunert. If the Air Force under your direction did not think the plan was sound, what did you do about it?

General Arnold. We have always been objecting to those plans; we have been objecting for quite some time.

43. General Grunert. But you found obstacles that could not be overcome in order to get across what you air people thought was necessary?

General Arnold. No. I think that the Navy Department and the War Department did what they thought was best under the circumstances. I do not think it was possible to have any clear-cut chain of
command as long as everything was done by agreement instead of by direction. The Joint Board was an agreement Board; it was not a direction Board. If the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations agreed, then the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy signed the proceedings and everything was lovely; but if they disagreed, there was no possible way, without going to the President, to get a meeting of the minds. But I think this is the closest they could get under the then existing organization of the War and Navy Departments.

44. General Grunert. Even then you thought that certain of your equipment would be misused or not properly used?

General Arnold. Not properly used.

45. General Grunert. That has since been corrected, has it?

General Arnold. Yes, by having unity of command. That is what they should have had in the first place, and then you would get away from all this possibility of misunderstanding and misuse of equipment.

46. General Grunert. Under the circumstances you think, then, that a joint air operation plan was about the best that could have been done?

General Arnold. Under the organization, it was the best that could be done. I think the organization was faulty to that extent, however.

47. General Russell. Could you apply that defect in the organization to the scheme of reconnaissance out there where, under the plan to which you have just referred, the offshore patrol was for the Navy and the inshore patrol was for the Army?

General Arnold (reading):

When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, Army aircraft are made available. These aircraft will be under the tactical control of the naval commander directing search operations.

That means, then, that we once again take our heavy bombers, which are a striking force, and turn them over to the Navy to be used for reconnaissance purposes, which is not a proper employment of heavy bombers.

48. General Grunert. But this could only be done if agreed to by the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, and if he did not agree, then it could not be done.

General Arnold. It says that:

Joint air attacks on hostile vessels will be executed under tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army’s bombardment strength to participate in each mission, the force to remain available to the Navy, for repeated attacks if required, until completion of the mission.

The next one says:

When naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations, Army aircraft are made available.

I am not sure that that was ever clarified as to who determines when they are to be made available or the number to be made available.

49. General Grunert. Did you consider in this respect that the Navy under that plan was charged with what they call distant patrolling or reconnaissance and that the Army was not so charged?

General Arnold. I think that is sound; I think that is absolutely correct.
50. General Frank. You are familiar with the message that went out on November 27, signed "Marshall"?

General Arnold. Yes.

51. General Frank. In which he directed General Short to conduct such reconnaissance as he deemed necessary?

General Arnold. That is correct.

52. General Frank. The only reconnaissance for which General Short was directly responsible was inshore reconnaissance, according to the agreement between himself and the Navy. Is not that correct?

General Arnold. Rainbow 5 says:

Hold Oahu against attacks by land, sea, and air [165] forces, and against hostile sympathizers.

No strings attached. So Rainbow 5, as I understand, was in conflict with the joint agreement.

53. General Frank. What I am trying to do is to clarify this point that General Russell brought out.

General Arnold. In answer to you, General Frank, under Rainbow 5, and with the instructions received from General Marshall, the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, had sufficient authority to extend his reconnaissance anywhere he wanted to.

54. General Frank. General Short was given these instructions to conduct such reconnaissance as he deemed necessary. Let us assume that when he got those instructions, realizing that the Navy was responsible for distant reconnaissance, did he show that to the Navy?

General Arnold. That is to be assumed; yes.

55. General Frank. If the normal operation ensued and they followed the operation of the agreement under which the Navy was responsible for distant reconnaissance, who was responsible under this arrangement as to whether they would conduct distant reconnaissance or not?

General Arnold. Under the joint action it was Navy responsibility.

56. General Frank. That is what I am trying to get at. Notwithstanding the fact, when this order went to Short, if he still adhered to the agreement and the Navy did not see fit to conduct the reconnaissance, then the reconnaissance was not conducted. Is that correct?

[166] General Arnold. I think that follows.

57. General Grunert. May I interject this question: If the War Department, that phase of the War Department which has to do with air, knowing the air plan for the defense of Hawaii, intended in any message that went out to the Commanding General of Hawaii that he should conduct any reconnaissance except that which was provided for in the joint air operations, would the War Department naturally have said in this respect that the joint air agreement did not govern? Do you see what I mean?

General Arnold. I see what you mean, but I think you will find that the War Department has consistently refrained from trying to tell the theaters how to run their jobs. I as as an individual wrote quite frequently to General Martin. I called attention in certain cases to certain parts of the air plan out there that I did not agree with, but I always put it up to General Martin as something for him to
consider with the Navy and with the local authorities, and I never tried to tell General Martin how to run his show.

58. General Grunert. But here comes a directive from the War Department to the effect that there would be such reconnaissance and so forth, and they referred to air reconnaissance presumably. Naturally it would seem that the local Commander would consider that as referring to those reconnaissances as had been agreed upon.

General Arnold. That is right. I go right back to my former statement, that at that time we all considered an attack against Honolulu, as far as the air was concerned, a possibility. We did not think it would be as acute as an attack against Wake or Midway.

[167] 58. General Russell. General Arnold, I had a thought in the memorandum which we presented to you earlier expressed as requesting the conclusions which you had reached on the 28th day of November, 1941, as to the probability of an air attack on the installations at Oahu and the Navy by carrier-borne Japanese aircraft. I am not sure but what you have covered that in substance already, but I wonder whether or not you would be good enough to enlarge on that.

General Arnold. The best way I know how to answer that is that when I heard that the attack had been carried out, I was out on the West Coast.

Let me go back a little bit. I went out on the West Coast to expedite the departure of B-17s for the Phillipines, because I was sure in my own mind that if we could get enough of them out there we could make an attack on the Phillipines unsuccessful. We figured if we could get enough B-17s the Japs could not successfully attack the Phillipines. I went out to the West Coast to expedite the departure of some of them. I got to Hamilton Field—and, incidentally, they also on their way across from Wake to Rabaul were to take pictures of Truk and Jaluit. I talked to all the squadron commanders and the staff before they took off. I told them at that time that they might run into trouble. 'I told them that they should have heir guns ready and that they might have a fight on their hands. But I did not visualize the fight in Hawaii or this side of Hawaii; I visualized it somewhere on the other side of Hawaii.

60. General Russell. General Arnold, did that thought which you had about the probable place of attack out there cause you to send those bombers from the West Coast to Pearl Harbor unarmed?

General Arnold. They were armed.

61. General Russell. Did they have ammunition when they left the West Coast?

General Arnold. No, because at that time it was a question of gasoline or ammunition for that long 2400-mile hop. Obviously we made an error, an error in judgment. Somebody had to weigh the fact against their certainty of arriving there by providing sufficient gasoline against the probability of their using their machine guns and not getting there by carrying that extra ammunition. They had to weigh one against the other, and they decided against ammunition. So they did not take the ammunition, and they got there right in the middle of the Pearl Harbor attack.

62. General Russell. I was interested in your answer a moment ago that you were pressing to get B-17s to the Philippines because you had arrived at the conclusion that if you had enough there the Japs could
not attack the Philippines. Are you talking about air attacks or any sort of attacks?

General Arnold. Any sort of attacks. We believed if a convoy came down off the Phillipines we would have another Bismarck Sea, and we just anticipated the effectiveness of our bombers by about a year and a half.

63. General Russell. The effectiveness of your bombers, or the conception of their effectiveness?

General Arnold. We had the same idea; we have always believed we could do it.

64. General Russell. Did you not have the same bombers too?

[169] General Arnold. We had the same B-17’s.

65. General Russell. It came to pass, General Arnold, that on the 27th of November a message was sent by the Chief of Staff to these overseas departments and the West Coast Command. Were you familiar with that?

General Arnold. Yes.

66. General Russell. Were you in on the conferences which led to the sending of that message?

General Arnold. Yes.

67. General Russell. Do you remember whether or not you participated in framing that message?

General Arnold. I did not.

68. General Russell. You did see that message?

General Arnold. I saw the message; yes.

69. General Russell. Briefly, could you tell us what, in your mind, prompted the sending of that message?

General Arnold. I think it was the breakdown in the conference here in Washington with the Japanese.

70. General Russell. In other words, there were no hostile developments, or possibly I should say that there were no new Japanese movements in that immediate period around November 27 which caused the sending of that message?

General Arnold. Not so far as I know.

71. General Russell. And there were no developments which caused you to revise your thinking as to the probabilities of Japanese action?

General Arnold. Not so far as I know.

72. General Russell. Then it was confined almost exclusively to the fact that these negotiations were considered as about [170] at an end?

General Arnold. In my opinion—and I thought it was sound, because, as I said before, I never thought the negotiations would get anywhere.

73. General Russell. You do not know whether the Secretary of State had announced to the War and Navy Departments that those negotiations were about through?

General Arnold. I do not know that; no, sir.

74. General Russell. General Arnold, on the day following the sending of the message of the 27th, a message was sent by the Adjutant General which was copied into the memorandum that we sent to you two or three days ago, and I want to repeat that message here in the record.

70716—46—Ex. 145, vol. 1—8
(Message of November 28, 1941, is as follows:)

114 WAR KR 189 WD Prty
  Washn, D. C. 8:42P Nov. 28, 1941.

C G
Hawn Dept Pt Shafter T H

482 28th Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War Department paren see paragraph three MID SC thirty dash forty five and paren stop Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments comma property comma and equipment against sabotage comma protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage stop This does not repeat not mean that any [171] illegal measures are authorized stop Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm stop To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions.

You are familiar with that message, are you not?
  General ARNOLD. The message relative to sabotage?
  General RUSSELL. Yes. It is 482, and begins:

Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities.

  General ARNOLD. Yes. I am familiar with that.
  75. General RUSSELL. Was that message prepared under your supervision?
  General ARNOLD. I have got to go back into history to give you the background of that.

We had been having a lot of trouble with our airplanes all over the United States. We had been having trouble with them coming out of the factories, down at Savannah, and various other stations. We had had many accidents that we could not explain, and it looked to us as if there was sabotage. Just to what extent sabotage was taking place, I did not know. So we went through a period during the fall of 1941 when we were endeavoring to stop these unexplained accidents. In certain cases the finger pointed right directly at sabotage; in certain other cases, looking back on it now, I know it was inexperienced workmen who just could not do the job properly. But at that time we were so convinced that it was sabotage that we had sent—[172] sabotage messages all over the United States, to our factories, to our factory representatives, to all the training fields; and it was just an unfortunate occurrence that my sabotage message, that was brought to my attention by General Scanlon on the morning of the 28th of November, came up; and he asked me then to send this sabotage message to all stations of the Air Corps. He prepared a message and I started it through the machinery to send it out to all air stations, but as it went through, General Miles, who was then G-2, got hold of it and he said, "If you are going to send it to all the air stations you ought to send it to all Army stations throughout the world." We had quite a long discussion about it, and I withdrew from the discussion and left General Scanlon to carry on. Whether or not I actually saw the message as finally sent out, before it was sent, I do not know, but I certainly started it. I know that General Scanlon was present with General Miles when they had their discussion as to what the message should contain and the phraseology of it.
76. General Grunert. May I ask there if this message was directed particularly at Hawaii?
   General Arnold. It had no connection with conditions in Hawaii. It was an over-all message sent to all Army Air Force stations.

77. General Grunert. From your background it might appear that the result to be attained through that message would apply more to air fields in the United States than elsewhere.
   General Arnold. I would not have said that at the time, no, because at that time we were fearful of what might happen [173] in Hawaii, due to the Japanese who lived in Hawaii and who had had access to our air fields. We did not send it particularly to Hawaii. We sent the same thing to Panama, because we were having accidents down there too.

78. General Grunert. Do you know why the 28th was selected instead of the 26th or 24th or 29th? Was there anything particular to bring to mind that particular date?
   General Arnold. General Scanlon brought it to my attention. Just why he picked the 28th I do not know. It was gradually building up before we had talked to our various Commanders in the United States about sabotage. But why General Scanlon picked the 28th I do not know.

79. General Grunert. Then you do not know whether there is any connection between the Chief of Staff's message of November 27 and the G-2 message on sabotage and your message?
   General Arnold. I do not think there is any connection. As a matter of fact, I do not believe that General Scanlon knew of the Chief of Staff's message.

80. General Frank. In other words, it was a coincidence?
   [174] General Arnold. It is all coincidence. You have to bear in mind that for a lot of these things I am counting on my memory and I have given the story as best I remember it. In certain instances I have had a chance to refresh myself; in certain others I have not.

81. General Russell. General Arnold, from your reference to sabotage a moment ago and your subsequent explanation of that situation, I gathered the impression that you were referring to sabotage as you thought it might exist largely in the plants where your planes were being manufactured.
   General Arnold. Also in the operating bases.

   General Arnold. Because we knew that we were having these accidents in our operating bases, and we could not explain any of them.

83. General Russell. Now, to clarify your initial statements and those made in response to questions from members of the Board, your initial conception was to provide in this message of November 28th against damage to Air Corps material?
   General Arnold. That is right.

84. General Russell. It was converted into an over-all anti-sabotage message for all Army installations in this conference between you and General Scanlon, on the one part, and G-2 on the other?
   General Arnold. That is correct.

85. General Russell. General Grunert asked you about the fact that it was sent out to all of these installations throughout the world, practically, and hence had no particular reference to the Hawaiian De-
partment, to which, as I recall, you replied \[175\] that it did have reference to the Hawaiian Department, because you were apprehensive about the matériel in the Hawaiian Department.

General Arnold. Yes.

86. General Frank. The same as at all other stations in the world; that is correct, isn't it?

General Arnold. That is right; all stations in the world. I was worried about all of them.

87. General Russell. General Arnold, in this radiogram of November 28th, identified as 482, the language is used, "Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security," with certain cautions which follow. Do you have any recollection as to why that particular statement was placed in that message?

General Arnold. I was not present when the message was finally completed, but as an indication of our belief that there might be subversive activities in our Hawaiian fields I remember quite distinctly, when the first reports came in as to what had allegedly occurred at Hickam Field, and they were reports that afterwards I think were disproved, that stated that the Japs had deliberately run their dollies into the tails of our airplanes and had performed other activities of that character, why, we were only too ready to believe them. So that was in our minds undoubtedly at that time.

88. General Russell. The thing that is in the Board's mind at the moment is whether or not your limiting the activities to these protective measures affected General Short's thinking about what was to be done out there.

\[176\] General Arnold. Of course, I cannot answer that because through all this I have a continuous record of requests for airplanes against air attacks, more airplanes, more crews. "Get them over as fast as you can. Change the armament. Get these airplanes up to date against air attack." That whole thought, that thought goes through all the messages, all the letters that came back there for a period of the year starting with January 1941. So the thought that we had, the impression that it left in our mind, was that they were thinking of air attack.

89. General Russell. Well, to follow the questions——

90. General Grunert. I would like to ask a question on that, unless you are ready to continue on it.


92. General Grunert. That message 482 of November 28th which we have under discussion appeared to wind up with this statement:

This does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions. Do you know what that was intended to convey, whether or not that was intended as a caution to the effect that, although you must look after the sabotage, you must also look after other defensive measures? Do you know whether that was in your minds?

General Arnold. That was undoubtedly in our minds at that time.

93. General Grunert. I just wanted to put that in so as to complete the idea.

94. General Russell. You refer to "illegal measures" and enjoin against taking illegal measures in this.

\[177\] General Arnold. They were not my words.

95. General Russell. You do not know what that was?
General Arnold. They were G-2 words.

96. General Russell. You do not know what he meant?

General Arnold. I do not know what he meant, because I was not present when he put those in.

97. General Russell. General Arnold, it seems, then, that this message which you originally designed for the air people had grafted onto it by the G-2 Department other instructions which may or may not have resulted in some confusion in the message.

General Arnold. That may be. I am sorry that I was not present at the meeting where they drew up the message, so I could give what actually took place.

98. General Grunert. Do you think that General Scanlon would have answers to most of these questions? I believe you said that he was present.

General Arnold. General Bryden might be able to help out on them, or General Scanlon, because General Scanlon stood out for certain sentences to be included in the War Department message. I think that you might be able to get help from one or both of them.

99. General Russell. Did you see General Short's reply to that message of the 28th, General Arnold?

General Arnold. I saw General Short's reply.

100. General Grunert. Was the reply that you saw intended as a reply to this message or to the Chief of Staff's message of the 27th in which the report was called for?

[778] General Arnold. I think that he made a reply to the Chief of Staff's message which was different; I think it was a shorter message.


102. General Russell. As a matter of fact, General Arnold, General Short did reply and referred by number to this radio message 482. He did make a rather complete report on that, what he had done in response to the directions in message 482.

General Arnold. You see, at that time I was more interested in the air than I was in the rest of the Island because I thought that we had a big problem there, so the only thing I was interested in was getting a reply from Martin.

103. General Grunert. In General Short's reply to your message did he state, did he enumerate, any other measures than measures against sabotage that had been taken?

General Arnold. I do not remember that he did. I think it covered just sabotage; security and sabotage.

104. General Russell. Those are the only questions that I have.

105. General Grunert. Have you any questions, General Frank?

106. General Frank. Hawaii was on the priority list for the delivery of airplanes in '41, was it not?

General Arnold. It was. Second priority. Philippines first priority and Hawaii second priority.

107. General Frank. What was the state of transition from B-18s to B-17s in Hawaii? Do you remember?

General Arnold. I remember they were having a school out there at the time for this transition, and that we sent over some specially skilled personnel to help them out in their [779] B-17s, but what the exact status of the transition was I do not know.
108. General Frank. Generally do you know the state of training? General Arnold. We were always of the belief that the Hawaiian Air Force was probably better trained than any of our air forces. That is the impression we had here in Washington as a result of our inspections and due to the fact that they were always carrying out some form of mission simulating what they would do in active combat.

109. General Frank. What I was about to approach was this point, which your present answer seems to disclaim, namely, that because of the fact that they were charged with training a lot of crews to fly B-17s from California to Honolulu and then conduct a lot of transition training in Honolulu, and do certain training work in preparation for transferring squadrons to the Philippines, that perhaps they got themselves into a training state of mind rather than a war state of mind.

General Arnold. I wrote to General Martin, as I said, from time to time, and the establishment of a transition school in Hawaii was not done until we were assured that they would get more effective results by carrying this transition on in Hawaii than if it were done in the United States. In other words, we had no air force, as such, anywhere at that time. No matter where you had that training, it was going to disrupt something. Where could be put that training so it would interfere least with the creation of the small air force than we did have? And it looked to us as if they could carry on this transition in Hawaii and interfere less with the training than anywhere else because we would have the airplanes then available, in case of an emergency, where they would be most needed.

110. General Grunert. May I butt in there?

General Arnold. And at the same time we were able to take care of the transient heavy bombers that were going through.

111. General Grunert. Was there anything that occurred during the attack that reflected the training, whether or not they were trained or were not trained?

General Arnold. It is rather difficult to answer that question, because they didn't have a chance. Those who did have a chance—

112. General Grunert. That is all I wanted. I just wondered. They didn't have a chance to show it one way or another?

General Arnold. There were three pilots that I remember who had a chance, and they went down and took airplanes and went up and gave a good account of themselves, but they were the only three that I know that had a chance.

113. General Grunert. Yes.

114. General Frank. Had anything held up B-17 production that in any way had an effect on this situation?

General Arnold. No; we did not have the facilities to get the numbers that we wanted. If you will remember, at that time in our endeavor to get B-17s we had 90 in January, and by June the 90 was up to 109, and by November it had only gone up to 148. That was the total number of B-17s produced by the Boeing Company. We just did not have the productive capacity to get the numbers required.

115. General Frank. In answer to a question of General Russell, I think the tenor of the reply with respect to your thoughts on an attack on Hawaii was to the effect that it was possible but not considered probable at that time.
General Arnold. Not as probable as some others.


General Arnold. We always saw the probability, but not as probable as Wake, Midway, or the Philippines. The Philippines we knew were going to get attacked, in our own minds; we knew that.

117. General Frank. I would like to develop, if I can, from any point of view that you may have, with respect to the attitude of the public toward possible war that summer and fall. Do you think general public attitude was reflected in the congressional vote on the Army, when the Army bill was passed by one vote?

General Arnold. I have no doubt in my mind at all but what it was reflected. I think the public was very apathetic towards all wars.

118. General Frank. That is what I want.

Now, you had opportunities to come in contact with the Army, that is, the rank and file. Generally, what, in your opinion, was the attitude of the rank and file toward the possibility of war?

General Arnold. I think that the average Army officer thought it was coming. I do not think there is any question about that. It was just a question of time.

119. General Grunert. Was that instilled into the men? Were they war conscious, or were they apathetic to a certain extent?

[182] General Arnold. I do not believe that the enlisted men, certainly in the Air Force, were as war conscious as the officers, because we could not talk as openly to the enlisted men as we did to the officers. We had our officers' meetings; and, while we could not tell them everything we knew—just like it was out on the West Coast: I could not tell them everything we knew, but I told them enough so as to make them realize that the conditions were serious.

120. General Grunert. Do you know what that status was as far as the air force in Hawaii was concerned, officers and men? Had you any reflection of that through General Martin or otherwise?

General Arnold. I looked for some correspondence so as to refresh my memory on that, and I could not find it; so I am afraid that my hindsight there would indicate an impression that may not be justified.

121. General Grunert. But you have the impression that somewhere along the line correspondence was had on that subject?

General Arnold. Well, for instance—see if I can find the date in here (indicating). As early as March 31st they had a board out in Honolulu as to what might happen in case the Japanese did attack Pearl Harbor, and that was a board signed by Martin and Bellinger in which they outlined in that report pretty nearly what actually did happen. So there is no doubt in my mind that the people in Hawaii were thinking on the subject and giving it very serious thought.

[183] 122. General Grunert. Do you know, from any evidence available to you, whether or not the officers of the Air Force in Hawaii were kept informed of existing conditions, so as to develop a "war consciousness," as one might call it? In other words, you told us what you knew about the officers and the men. Now, how did that apply, in Hawaii? Was there anybody there to tell them, or were they told, do you know?

General Arnold. You see, I was over in Hawaii shortly before this, and at that time, one of the things I was doing was looking around with a view of trying to establish in my mind whether some of these
things were or were not being done; and I must say that at that time it was not as serious as it became later; but I was very well pleased with the way things were being carried on—the training and the building up of the facilities for the employment of their air arm, and the training, of course, including the instruction given to the individual enlisted men and their officers.

123. General Grunert. In that connection, do you thing there was a cry of "wolf! wolf!" too often, so as to get them into a frame of mind that they would say, "Oh, well! just another cry of 'wolf'!"?

General Arnold. I wouldn't know that. I was not close enough to them to get that impression.

124. General Grunert. Are there any other questions?

125. General Russell. General, you have made it very clear that in considering Japanese probabilities, it was your opinion that the attack would more probably come at Wake and Midway and the Philippines, which were nearer the Jap bases, than was Hawaii, and yet Hawaii had first priority on ships and other materiel. [184] Can you explain that?

126. General Arnold. In the Air Force it had second priority; the Philippines had first priority, Hawaii the second priority.

127. General Russell. I misunderstood you. I thought it was the other way around.

General Arnold. No.

128. General Grunert. I understand that it was first priority in most things, but on airplanes at that particular time, it was second priority; is that right?

General Arnold. That is right.

129. General Frank. I would like to ask a question here. Were you familiar with the fact that there was a Japanese force of carriers, submarines, battleships, and cruisers at Jaluit about the 1st of December? Did you have knowledge of that?

General Arnold. Well, that was included in one of the things that we were going to look for, when we sent these planes over. We were going to look to see if there were any indications of any Japanese concentrations or creation of facilities in these Caroline Islands, and we figured that by sending these airplanes out and diverting them from the course far enough we could find out. As far as I was concerned at that time, it was a rumor. We didn't know. We had heard rumors of it—it was all you got—that there were such concentrations. We did not know for sure.

130. General Frank. You did not know that the Navy knew?

General Arnold. No. Well, no; I didn't.

131. General Frank. I would like to emphasize again, the facility or difficulty with which operations might be initiated [185] through the cooperative basis on which they had to be accomplished at Honolulu. Will you just give us a short statement as to your opinion of that.

General Arnold. In my opinion—no, the opinion of the Air Forces—that was one of the main criticisms of all the plans that they had for the defense of the Hawaiian Islands. Everything was cooperation, without any direct responsibility that you get with unity of command, with one Commander who is responsible for employing the facilities at hand to carry out his mission.
132. General Frank. That is all.

General Arnold. I would like to make one request of the Board, if I may. I used the word “Eniwetok” when I should have said Jaluit. Those two places were Jaluit and Truk, not Eniwetok and Truk.

133. General Grunert. Make a note of that, please, and change it.

One last question: With respect to the subject just discussed, did that lack of what you considered proper cooperation in Hawaii reflect itself in the attack, as far as you know, from an air viewpoint?

General Arnold. In my opinion, the attack came so quickly and was so devastating in character that it never gave an opportunity to determine whether it was lack of unity of command or coordination, or what the trouble was.

134. General Grunert. But if there had been what you might term, or have termed, the proper coordination, then it might have reflected itself in the earlier stages, particularly in the reconnaissance?

[786] General Arnold. That is the only place where it had an opportunity to show itself, in view of the conditions under which the attack occurred.

135. General Grunert. Are there any further questions?

All right. Thank you very much. We appreciate your coming over here, and taking your time.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

**TESTIMONY OF COLONEL EDWARD F. FRENCH, SIGNAL CORPS, OFFICER IN CHARGE OF THE TRAFFIC OPERATION DIVISION, CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICE; WASHINGTON, D. C.**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

Colonel French. Edward F. French; Colonel, Signal Corps; officer in charge of the Traffic Operation Branch, Office of the Chief Signal Office, Washington, D. C.

2. General Grunert. I would also like to add to the advice given you by the Recorder relative to your rights under Article of War 24, a caution that in the event there is anything that is ultrasecrecr, that should not be placed in the record, before you answer the question, you may consult with the Board to see whether or not we should hear what you have to say in closed session. In other words, anything that might be of assistance to our enemy in the future.

Colonel French. Yes, sir.

3. General Grunert. It is not as to what has happened, unless it is of continuing nature.

This Board, in an attempt to get at the facts, is looking into the War Department background and viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. It is hoped that, because of your assignment, you can throw some light on the subject. The Board has divided the work so that the individual Members thereof have a special field of inquiry, although the Board passes on everything. So, General Russell will be the one that will propound the questions to you, with the other Members of the Board asking any they see fit, on that particular line on which you are to be a witness. I turn you over to General Russell.
4. General Russell. Colonel French, what were your duties on the 7th day of December, 1941?
Colonel French. I was officer in charge of the Traffic Division, and Officer in Charge of the War Department Signal Center, Washington, D. C.

5. General Russell. What if any responsibilities did you have on that day in selecting the means for the transmission of messages which reached the Center from the War Department?
Colonel French. I had alerted myself on December 7, knowing that it was a rather critical period, and I came to the office early on Sunday morning, making myself available should any unforeseen circumstance arise.

6. General Grunert. Why did you alert yourself on that particular morning? What was in the back of your mind as to the need, that caused you to be there that Sunday instead of the Sunday before, or the Sunday after?
Colonel French. I had, General, alerted myself some time before that. I had been in my office every Sunday, every day, for quite some time. As to the exact days, I cannot now recall, but I spent many days and many nights in my office, and signal center.

[788] 7. General Grunert. Might you have been influenced by what had passed through your office elsewhere as to conditions?
Colonel French. Yes, sir. The tempo was such in my office during that period that I felt that it demanded my attention.

8. General Russell. Colonel French, on the morning of December 7, 1941, in your official capacity over there, you could select the means or the method by which these messages would be sent?
Colonel French. Yes, sir.

9. General Russell. You had that within your jurisdiction?
Colonel French. That was my authority; yes, sir.

10. General Russell. That was your authority?
Colonel French. Yes, sir.

11. General Grunert. What means were available for transmission?
Colonel French. Sir?

12. General Grunert. What means were available for such transmission?
Colonel French. Well, the normal means available to us were the War Department radio net. You were speaking of Honolulu, now, sir, or of all?

13. General Grunert. Yes, you might give a general answer, and then, also, the special one on Hawaii and Honolulu. Did you have any other means besides radios?
Colonel French. Yes; I did.

14. General Grunert. The Transoceanic telephone service?
Colonel French. I had commercial facilities available.

I never did use Transoceanic telephone for such [789] service, at any time, prior or since.

15. General Frank. Isn't it available to you?
Colonel French. You might consider it available to me, General, but we had never exercised the practice of using Transoceanic.

18. General Grunert. Is it used from the other end?
Colonel French. Sir?
17. General GRUNERT. Is it used from the other end, to the War Department?

Colonel FRENCH. I could not say. It wasn’t used to the War Department Signal Center, sir.

18. General GRUNERT. Would you have known if it had been used, for instance, between the Chief of Staff and the Commanding General of Hawaii, or vice versa?

Colonel FRENCH. I would not know of that, General.

19. General GRUNERT. You would not know that?

Colonel FRENCH. I would not know. That would be entirely up to the Chief of Staff. I had no control over the Transoceanic facility.

20. General FRANK. Had you thought of it, you could have used it, however, is that correct?

Colonel FRENCH. Not in this instance; I could not have used it, General, because the message, the traffic, that was to be routed, was classified traffic, and would not be put over a voice radio.

21. General RUSSELL. Colonel French, on this morning of December 7, 1941, you received for transmission to certain of the overseas departments a message from the Chief of Staff, is that true?

[190] Colonel FRENCH. Yes, sir.

22. General RUSSELL. You have had occasion to testify about this message and its transmission, before?

Colonel FRENCH. Yes, sir; before the Roberts Commission, sir.

23. General RUSSELL. And hence you are entirely familiar with the message to which I refer?

Colonel FRENCH. Yes, sir.

24. General RUSSELL. Now, Colonel, can you recall the form in which you received that message?

Colonel FRENCH. Yes, sir.

25. General RUSSELL. Will you tell us just what that was. Had it been prepared in longhand, or had it been typewritten or what?

Colonel FRENCH. Colonel Bratton personally brought that message to the code room on the morning of December 7.

26. General GRUNERT. Who is Colonel Bratton?

Colonel FRENCH. Colonel Bratton is G-2. He is on General Miles’s staff as G-2 officer.

27. General RUSSELL. He is overseas.

Was it written out in longhand, or had it been typewritten?

Colonel FRENCH. I heard Colonel Bratton at the code room asking to be admitted, and my office was across the hall from there. I immediately got up from my desk and went to the code room, and Colonel Bratton was then inside the code room. He told me that he had this message that he wanted to get out in a hurry. I looked at the message with him. The receiving clerk had the message, there. Due to the difficulty in reading [191] the message, I told Colonel Bratton we should type the message up, which he agreed to, and I had that message typed in my office. That was to make sure that the code clerk would make no error. I had it typed for clarity, to make sure that there would be no error made.

28. General FRANK. How long did that take?

Colonel FRENCH. I couldn’t say, General, off-hand.

29. General FRANK. About?
Colonel French. I would say a few minutes, just to type this message off.

30. General Russell. Now, Colonel, we have gotten the form of the message, and I think we can develop the time element, step by step. Colonel French. Yes, sir.

31. General Russell. It came into your office written out in longhand?

Colonel French. Written in longhand.

32. General Russell. I believe it appears somewhere that it was in the Chief of Staff's handwriting.

Colonel French. It might have been.

33. General Russell. You do not know that?

Colonel French. I don't remember definitely.

34. General Russell. Have you any record to show the exact time that Colonel Bratton arrived in your office with that message?

Colonel French. No, sir; I haven't that time available to me. I put that time some place after 11:30 in the morning, when Colonel Bratton arrived there.

35. General Russell. The first thing that was done to that message was having it written on the typewriter, to be clear?


36. General Russell. And you say that just took a few minutes, because it was a relatively short message?

Colonel French. That is correct.

37. General Russell. When it had been copied on the typewriter, what happened to it?

Colonel French. When it was typed on the typewriter, we had Colonel Bratton authenticate it, as I recall. Colonel Bratton read it and authenticated the message. We then gave the message to the code clerk. I left Colonel Bratton, then, and went to the Signal Center, the operating room, to check on the facilities available; that is, as to what the atmospheric conditions were. In the morning, when I came in, the normal routine was to check the operating conditions in the office. They weren't any too satisfactory when I went out there.

38. General Grunert. Are you going to explain that, Colonel? Do you mean the atmospheric conditions, the sending equipment or the personnel?

Colonel French. The atmospheric conditions, the electrical—

39. General Frank. The interference?

Colonel French. The ether. Atmospheric—

40. General Frank. Static?

Colonel French. Static interference.

41. General Russell. So, now, you went to check the means available to you?

Colonel French. That's right, sir; and I checked Honolulu because that was the point where the message had to route, going to Manila and going to Honolulu proper. I found out [193] from the operator that we had been out of contact with Honolulu since about 10:20 that morning.

42. General Russell. Now, let us get clear on that. You were out of contact, with your radio?

Colonel French. Correct. That is, the interference was such at that time that we were more or less standing by, changing frequencies,
to see if we could get on a frequency that would get through that static; and that, according to my log, was around 10:20, sir.

43. General Frank. Washington time?

Colonel French. Yes, sir; Eastern Standard Time. That condition did not clear up, according to my log, until about 2:30 p.m. that afternoon.

44. General Russell. Was the effect, then, of the static condition that you are describing such as to rule out radio as a means of transmitting that message?

Colonel French. To a communication officer, yes, sir. I also observed that we were having difficulty in working San Francisco at that particular time. I hazily recall, now, it was around 11 o'clock or later that the log indicated that conditions to San Francisco were bad for transmission of messages.

45. General Russell. Now, how much time was consumed, Colonel, in this investigation of radio conditions?

Colonel French. I would say, just a few minutes, General. Time passes by, when you are under pressure, and I would say maybe three to four minutes. At that time, after I had checked the Honolulu channel and checked on the San Francisco channel, I immediately made up my mind to send this message via commercial means. That was the most expeditious way, in my judgment, to get that message to its destination.

46. General Russell. Will you describe for us at this point what commercial means were available to you.

Colonel French. We had facilities through the Western Union and through the Postal Telegraph. The commercial facilities into Honolulu, which is what you are interested in at this moment, were the RCA, the Mackay, and the Commercial Cable Company.

47. General Russell. Let us see what the RCA was.

Colonel French. I beg your pardon?

48. General Russell. What was the RCA?

Colonel French. The Radio Corporation of America radio facilities from San Francisco.

49. General Russell. So you had then, if I am correct on this assumption, the Western Union, the Postal, and the Radio Corporation of America?

Colonel French. Well, the Western Union worked with the RCA. That was their connecting link to Honolulu.

50. General Russell. Were any other commercial facilities available to you except those three?

Colonel French. No, sir. The Postal.

51. General Russell. Those three?

Colonel French. Really the fastest facility available to me was through the Postal or the Western Union.

52. General Grunert. Then as I understand it, you have air, wire, and telephone—air, telegraph, and telephone through the commercial lines; is that right?

Colonel French. In my office, General. We never used telephone to deliver a message to any of our insular possessions.

53. General Russell. Colonel, when you made this investigation, you reached a decision as to what means you would use?

Colonel French. Yes, sir; and I had to come to a hurried decision.

54. General Russell. And you decided on what?
Colonel French. I decided on sending the message via the Western Union.

55. General Russell. What steps did you take next?
Colonel French. I decided on the Western Union for the reason that when we were listening for the signals from Honolulu we observed Honolulu working San Francisco, so I deduced that the fastest way would be to turn it over to the Western Union and they would get it to San Francisco by quick dispatch. They had a tube connecting their office to the RCA. I was apprized of that. I knew that, because we had handled other messages that way at times. When we would have interference and had a message of any importance that was to be transmitted immediately, we would use the commercial facility; and that had been our practice.

56. General Russell. Then there were two links to it—you wired it out to San Francisco, Western Union, and there it was transmitted to Honolulu, RCA?
Colonel French. I immediately had the teletype operator in the signal center inform the Western Union that we would turn this message over to them. I then went back into the code room to check as to whether or not the message was then ready to be transmitted. I personally took the message out to the Signal Center and turned it over to the operator, there.

57. General Russell. When you went back into the code room, the message was or was not ready?
Colonel French. The message was ready.

58. General Russell. Do you have any record to indicate the exact time that you went back and found the message ready for sending?
Colonel French. No, sir. I did not have the exact time. I wasn’t checking the time that way, as to the exact time that I arrived back in the code room.

59. General Russell. What was the next step, after you discovered that the message had been encoded and was ready for transmission? What did you do next?
Colonel French. As I recall, Colonel Bratton was at the code room, and he asked me how long it would take to get that message transmitted, and I told him that it would take about 30 to 45 minutes to transmit that message to its destination.

60. General Russell. Now, Colonel, we are attempting to track you, to follow you along step by step. You had the message encoded, and then you sent it to Western Union?
Colonel French. Yes, sir.

61. General Russell. Did you get a receipt over at Western Union for it?
Colonel French. No, sir. When we transmit, the routine is that when the message comes into the code room, we place it in code, and then we send the coded message out to the Signal Center, and the code message is time-stamped and transmitted to the station concerned.

62. General Russell. The first time that any notation on this message was made as to time was when it reached the message center for delivery over to Western Union?
Colonel French. No. The original message as typed by Colonel Bratton was time-stamped in the code room.

63. General Russell. Do you know what that time-stamp was?
Colonel French. I do not recall.
64. General Russell. It would have been placed on the message at the time that it went from the typewriter to be coded?

Colonel French. To the code clerk; yes, sir.

65. General Russell. Could you by a search of the records of the War Department determine that exact time for us, Colonel?

Colonel French. No, sir; I cannot, for the reason that that message was turned back to the originator. We are concerned with the time of transmission of that message.

66. General Russell. So if there is a record showing that time stamp, it is not in your files, it is elsewhere?

Colonel French. It would be either in G–2 or in the OPD office.

67. General Russell. Now, do you have any record of the exact time of the dispatch of this message by Western Union to the west coast?

Colonel French. Yes, sir.

68. General Russell. What time was that?

Colonel French. That message was dispatched to the west coast for Honolulu at 12:01, Eastern Standard Time.

69. General Grunert. What is the difference in time between Eastern Standard Time and Honolulu time?

Colonel French. Five and a half hours.

70. General Grunert. If it is 12:01 here, what is it in Honolulu?

Colonel French. Five and a half hours, sir—that would have been 6:31.

71. General Russell. I have a statement before me, Colonel, which is substantially in line with the facts that you are testifying to at the moment. There is a little conflict, which might be adjusted; and may I read this to you?

Colonel French. Yes.


Colonel French. Yes, sir. That 12:01 was the time that the message was—we count that as "filed" in the Signal Center. The time that it was finished, with the transmission of that message to the Western Union, was 12:17 o'clock.

73. General Russell. Now, Colonel, do you have any data from which you can tell us the time of the receipt of that message at Honolulu?

Colonel French. On sending that message to Honolulu, we asked for reported-delivery on the message. The message was delivered—the message was received in the RCA office in Honolulu at 7:33 Honolulu time.

74. General Russell. It therefore took how long?

Colonel French. It took 46 minutes from the time the Western Union received that message, until they got it to Honolulu. That's creditable service.

75. General Russell. Now, let us assume this, Colonel, for the purpose of a hasty calculation, that Colonel Bratton reached your office at approximately 11:30 on that Sunday morning.
Colonel French. Yes, sir.

76. General Russell. You said it was 11:30 or shortly thereafter?
Colonel French. Yes, sir.

77. General Russell. Let us say it was dispatched at 12:01, which was 31 minutes after Bratton appeared at your office.
Colonel French. That's right—if he arrived at that time. That is a question, General, as to the time Colonel Bratton arrived at my office with that message. Colonel Bratton stated at one time that it was 12:50 when he filed that message with us, and I believe that 12:50 time Colonel Bratton had in mind was our preparation.

(Brief interruption.)

78. General Russell. If he came in, then, to review it, Colonel, at 11:30, and you got it away at 12:01, that was only 31 minutes?
Colonel French. Yes, sir.

79. General Russell. And it took 46 minutes to transmit it?
Colonel French. Yes, sir.

80. General Russell. So it reached Honolulu in 31 plus 46, or 77 minutes after Colonel Bratton reached your office?
Colonel French. On the assumption that Colonel Bratton arrived there, as you stated.

Colonel French. I say that it was my opinion in discussing this with Colonel Bratton that it was after 11:30, and also in discussing the matter with the officers in the Chief of Staff's office, that it was after 11:30 when he arrived there.

[200] 82. General Frank. Generally speaking, these assumptions are about correct; is that it?
Colonel French. Yes, sir; that is correct.

83. General Frank. All right.
Colonel French. Colonel Bratton was there during the greater portion of the time that the message was being prepared. He was very greatly exercised in getting it through, and he was in my office and saw the diligence that was exercised by us in getting that message prosecuted.

84. General Frank. All right.
Colonel French. No time was lost at all in getting that message prosecuted through my office.

85. General Grunert. Colonel, in your opinion, was that good time, excellent time, or unusually good time, to get the thing off, under the conditions?
Colonel French. That was unusually good time, General, because I was personally pushing the thing.

86. General Grunert. And had it been sent over your own radio net, about how much time would have been saved?
Colonel French. Well, I can give you an example. On the 27th of November there was a message filed in my office, of grave importance, to go to Honolulu, and it was received in my office at 6 p.m. It was encoded and sent to the Signal Center for transmission at 6:11. Due to the atmospheric conditions for transmission, the message had to be sent by hand. The time that it was received in Honolulu was 6:50. That was a short message.

87. General Russell. Now, Colonel, I want to develop another phase of this. You are acquainted with the time that reasonably
is required for decoding a message of this length, aren't you?

Colonel French. Yes, sir.

88. General Russell. About what time would the average personnel in the field, such as you might expect to find in Honolulu, require to decode this message, once it reached Honolulu?

Colonel French. Well, the actual work of decoding a message of that length would run somewheres between 10 to 15 minutes, on an average, in the system in which that was sent, the machine system.

89. General Russell. Then this message should have been decoded and intelligible in 77 minutes plus 15 minutes?

90. General Frank. Plus the time of getting it.

91. General Russell. Or, plus the delivery time out in Honolulu.

Colonel French. With all things being equal, that is true. If the message would arrive there in class A order, there were no gobbles in the message, the equipment was functioning well, and everything, and all operations clicked, I would say that that would be a good performance.

92. General Russell. Then a rather liberal estimate, from the time standpoint, would be that, from the moment when General Bratton appeared in your office with this message, until it would have been decoded and in the hands of the Commanding General, or the proper authority in Hawaii, would have been approximately an hour and a half?

93. General Grunert. I do not gather that. I gather that the hour and a half would include just the decoding of it at the other end, and not the delivery.

94. General Russell. I was just adding it all up.

95. General Grunert. We do not know anything about the conditions of delivery. On the record, I will ask you this question: Have you any record of the time it was actually received by the Commanding General, or one of his staff? Was there a receipt demanded for this?

Colonel French. Yes.

96. General Grunert. Or an acknowledgment from the Commanding General?

Colonel French. We asked for a receipt of delivery. In fact, we tried all day to get an acknowledgment of receipt on that message, from Honolulu, but things were cracking so fast from 7:30 in the morning on, and I kept pressing Honolulu, asking for the receipt of that message; but there were other things apparently of graver importance at that time, so that we couldn't get a prompt acknowledgment from Honolulu.

97. General Frank. Did you ever get one?

Colonel French. Yes, sir.

98. General Frank. What was that time?

Colonel French. The message, as I recall, was delivered to the Signal Center there in Honolulu at 11:45.

99. General Grunert. Do you mean to say there was from 7:33 to 11:45 before they decoded it and took it out to Shafter?

100. General Russell. No.

Colonel French. He was advised that it was delivered at 11:45, Honolulu time. That delay was due to the fact that the messenger was diverted from his course during the bombing.
101. General Grunert. Have you finished? I have one question, here, when you get through.


103. General Grunert. I understood you to say that you had radio contact with Honolulu up to about 10 a.m., Washington time, on December 7.

Colonel French. 10:20, General.

104. General Grunert. 10:20?

Colonel French. Yes, sir.

105. General Grunert. Had you been receiving things from Honolulu that morning?

Colonel French. Yes, sir. We exchanged traffic through the morning up to 10:30.

106. General Grunert. What would 10:20 Washington time be in Honolulu time. It would be before 5 a.m.?

Colonel French. It would be before 5 a.m.; yes, sir.

107. General Grunert. That is all I wanted. Has anyone else a question?

108. General Russell. I have no further questions.

109. General Frank. I would like to ask a question.

What type of communication does the FBI use in Hawaii, do you know?

Colonel French. I do not know. General, what type the FBI used.

110. General Frank. Do you ever ask the Navy to communicate messages for you?

Colonel French. Oh, yes.

111. General Frank. Did you ask them this morning?

Colonel French. No, sir.

112. General Frank. All right. Another thing. Was there any indication that the difficulty in transmission might have been caused by artificial means?

Colonel French. Interference?

113. General Frank. Yes.

Colonel French. No, sir. At that time of the year——

114. General Frank. That is all I want.

Colonel French. At that time of the year we were normally out of service with Honolulu between 11 and 1 o'clock. That is a matter of official record.

General Frank. Does the Navy have a more powerful radio than the Army, out to Honolulu?

115. Colonel French. Yes, at times they do use more power than we do; yes, indeed. But as a matter of practice, traffic going to Honolulu that we would want to expedite and I considered sending, we would not use the Navy. I considered the Navy, with relation to this message, but I know that it would have to be delivered from Pearl Harbor, up to Fort Shafter, and knowing the Navy condition is the same as ours, my judgment was, the fastest delivery for that message was by the commercial means.

116. General Frank. All right.

Colonel French. That was considered.

117. General Grunert. Are there any other questions?

118. General Russell. Colonel, you stated that you had no information about the transmission of information from here to Honolulu by telephone.
Colonel French. I do not quite get the question.

119. General Russell. You just did not use the telephone, at all? Colonel French. We never use the telephone to deliver messages out of the Signal Center; no, sir.

120. General Russell. The only thing you had was radio, and when it was out, you had to go elsewhere?

Colonel French. To a commercial wire. Now, if they wanted to use the telephone, that was up to the individuals, themselves, the Chief of Staff, or whoever the individual concerned, who would make personal calls, or official calls.

121. General Grunert. You had no authority to use the telephone, no matter what the urgency of the message might be?

Colonel French. No, I wouldn't say that, General; no, sir. I have authority—I assume authority for every available means of communication that might be available to get a message to its destination; but I would not have sent that message via telephone, because it was a classified message; and if I would attempt to have phoned the code groups out, it would have taken me longer, and then possibly there would have been a misunderstanding, as you know, in transmission of messages that distance.

122. General Grunert. Did it occur to you that the urgency of the message might require you or suggest to you that you ought to inquire whether or not you could send it in the clear by telephone?

Colonel French. Well, not sending messages in the clear by telephone. I didn't consider at all sending that message by telephone. I assumed that the proper way to handle that message was via the wire means.

123. General Grunert. Suppose you get information that somebody out here in St. Louis is going to shoot somebody else, and you know you may not get that message through in time to keep them from being shot, if you send it via radio, or if it is classified, and so forth. Who is the judge of whether or not to send that in the clear instead of by code, and so forth?

Colonel French. The writer of the message is responsible for the classification of the message, General.

124. General Grunert. And Bratton was informed that it would take about so long to get it over, and he did not say, "Get it out! Get it out over some other way!"—he was satisfied with what time was going to be consumed in transmitting it?

Colonel French. That was the means to transmit that message.

125. General Russell. Colonel, let us get this part clear. If a message comes to you classified, then you have got to send it in code?

Colonel French. I must send it in code; yes, sir. That is written in the regulations.

General Grunert. And you cannot send it in code over the telephone?

Colonel French. I cannot send it in code over the telephone with any great dispatch. It would be faster to handle it by wire than it would by telephone.

127. General Grunert. Are there any other questions? If not, thanks very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Whereupon, at 11:23 a.m., the Board recessed until 2 p.m.)
AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Board at 2 p. m. continued the hearing of witnesses.)

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. CHARLES D. HERRON, RETIRED

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. General, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

2. Colonel West. And your address is Washington, D. C.

3. General Grunert. General, the Board, in attempting to get at the facts, is looking into the War Department background and also the background in Hawaii, and also to get the viewpoints of those formerly in command and having knowledge of the facts, that is, both prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. It is hoped, because of your former assignment as Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, that you can throw some light on the subject. In order to cover the large field in the limited time we have, individual Board members have been assigned objectives and phases for special investigation, although the entire Board will pass on all objectives and phases. General Russell has the particular phase in which the investigation is being conducted now, so I shall ask him to lead in propounding the questions, and the other members will fill in and elaborate. General Russell.

4. General Russell. General Herron, when did you go on duty as the Commander of the Hawaiian Department?
   General Herron. In October 1937.

5. General Russell. And you were retired when?
   General Herron. In February of '41.

6. General Russell. During the time that you were there, General, I assume that you had your plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Department, including the Island of Oahu?
   General Herron. That is right.

7. General Russell. What did you regard as your principal mission as the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?
   General Herron. To make Pearl Harbor safe for the Navy.

8. General Russell. Did you have a prepared plan for the defense of the Island of Oahu during your tenure as Commanding General of the Department?

   General Herron. We did.

9. General Russell. Do you recall, General Herron, how that was designated—that plan—or what its title was?
   General Herron. No.

10. General Russell. Did it involve the employment of the means available to the Army along with those that were available to the Navy on the Island?
    General Herron. It did.

11. General Russell. General, the Hawaiian Department is associated with the 14th Naval District; is that true?
    General Herron. That is right; particularly for planning.

12. General Russell. Particularly for planning. It is also true that the Pacific fleet is based at Pearl Harbor, and this fact brings the
Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department in contact with the Commander of the Pacific fleet; is that true?

General Herron. That is right.

[260] 13. General Russell. Therefore there is a dual naval organization with which the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department deals?

General Herron. That is correct.

14. General Russell. During the time that you were in command of the Hawaiian Department, do you recall how many Commanders of the 14th Naval District were on duty?

General Herron. Two.

15. General Russell. Could you name those, General Herron?

General Herron. The man who was the senior man on this Navy Board.


General Herron. Admiral Murfin and Admiral Bloch.

17. General Russell. Now, did these two officers command the 14th Naval District?

General Herron. They did.

18. General Russell. During this same period that you were in command of the Hawaiian Department who commanded the Pacific fleet there?


19. General Russell. General, what was the plan in effect by which the combined forces of the Army and Navy were to be employed in this area? Or let me make the question maybe a little plainer: Was the plan of mutual cooperation or agreement for the employment of the forces in effect during the time you commanded the Hawaiian Department?

General Herron. Yes.

[270] 20. General Russell. As the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, therefore, you had no command function which you could exercise as such over the naval units in that area?

General Herron. No.

21. General Russell. Nor did the Naval Commanders have any such command over the Army?

General Herron. No.

22. General Russell. General Herron, during this period of time will you state briefly just what the relations were between you and these Commanders of the Fleet with respect to cooperation?

General Herron. The relations could not have been better at any time. However, they were much more productive of results toward the end of my regime than in the beginning.

23. General Russell. To what do you ascribe this development?

General Herron. To the fact that in the beginning we were able to obtain for the first time an agreement on joint action which covered the entire field under Admiral Murfin with the Navy. When Admiral Bloch came in he reviewed that and said he accepted it as a whole; he did not want any changes. So that we had an understood background on which to work, and the Navy Admirals were a high type of people.

Now, then, there was difficulty in working out the air cooperation because it was entirely new and because that was the only place the Army and Navy could really cooperate, in the air. The Navy was on
the water, the Army on the land, but in the air there was a place for cooperation, joint command, and so forth, and we had a good deal of trouble in arriving at some definite agreement about that.

24. General Russell. Did you, before being retired, effect a working agreement for the employment of the joint air forces out there which you considered effective?

General Herron. We effected that quite early, but by leaving some blank spaces; we did not put down in writing, for instance, who would command a joint expedition in the air, although we had something that sounded that way.

25. General Russell. General, there have developed in our investigation data about the plan for reconnaissance, the inshore patrol being maintained by the Army and the distant patrol by the Navy. Was that in effect prior to the time that you left Hawaii?

General Herron. It was. We made the agreement I think when General Frank was there. Is that right?

26. General Frank. That is right.

General Herron. Yes.

27. General Russell. You had occasion to inaugurate a search or patrol out there in the summer of 1940, didn’t you, in an alert which was in effect out there for some time during the summer and early fall of 1940?

General Herron. Will you ask me that question again?

28. General Russell. Did you, or not, have occasion to make effective this reconnaissance plan that I have just described, in the summer and early fall of 1940?

General Herron. Whenever we had a joint maneuver, and we began to have them in the summer and fall of 1940.

29. General Russell. Didn’t you have an alert in 1940?

General Herron. Oh, we had alerts, yes. We had an alert in May of 1940, a total alert on the part of the Army, but the Navy was not alerted at that time.

30. General Russell. Was the Navy alerted in June of 1940?

General Herron. Not the same time the Army was.

31. General Russell. General, what I am getting at—and we shall check on this alert in a little bit, because we did want to ask you some questions about it—what I am getting at is this: Was there at any time, during your period of service as the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, a situation where this system of reconnaissance was made effective?

General Herron. I hope General Frank will correct me in many of my statements about the air out there, but this division for reconnaissance purposes came about in this way: it was about that time that the Navy was getting very jealous of the Army flying over the water, and of course we had to fly over the water out there in order to go up and down the Islands.

Now, then, a reconnaissance such as we could perform with the number of planes we had, had no military importance except for this: it could scout for submarines, and the Navy were very anxious to have us watch the close-in waters for submarines. Well, now, in order to avoid coming to grips with the Navy definitely, we worded it that they would be responsible for distant reconnaissance, which of course
is logical, as they had the only planes that could go out and stay out; and in order to assure that we could fly over the water we put ourselves down for close-in reconnaissance, without defining that, but actually it amounted to trying to train our people to spot hostile submarines which came in close to shore. It had \[213\] no military significance otherwise.

32. General Russell. General, I have extracted here from one of the A. G. files the orders, messages, and so forth, which were interchanged between you and the War Department in the summer of 1940 which bear on this subject that we are discussing now, of reconnaissance. This file indicates that on the 17th of June you were directed to immediately alert your complete defensive organization to deal with possible trans-Pacific raid, to greatest extent possible without creating public hysteria or provoking curiosity of newspapers or alien agents, and so forth. Now, there were a number of messages that went back and forth. At one time you wrote General Marshall a letter, another time he answered that letter, and finally on this subject of reconnaissance, if I remember correctly,—

General Herron. Have you my file of personal letters to General Marshall? Is that what you refer to?

33. General Russell. I have a copy of it before me now, and your present testimony is not in conflict with, but it just doesn't dovetail in with, this file.

General Herron. Yes.

34. General Russell. Here is a letter of October 15, 1940, of which I shall have the copy in a moment. I think it was your letter to General Marshall.

General Herron. Yes.

35. General Russell. In which you said,

The Navy has resumed the outer air patrol at 180 miles, but has not asked us to take any measures.

General Herron. "Has not asked us"? Oh, yes. \[214\] 36. General Russell. (Reading:)

has not asked us to take any measures. Having no evidence of marked change in the situation and with an eye to the conservation of material I have not resumed the Army inner air patrol at 40 miles, nor the putting of the pursuit planes in the air at dawn.

We now have guards on utilities and highway patrols at times when they will observed. There are constantly small maneuvers (company) on the beaches. It is my guess, however, that the international situation drifts to the left and that precautions must increase.

Now, I was struck, in reading that file, General, with the fact that as late as October 15, 1940, the Navy was maintaining a distant patrol, and you had not resumed the inner air patrol. Now, we were wondering when this was taken off, and something of its history. Do you recall it now?

General Herron. The 40 miles was probably my personal directive to the Army only. I do not think I ever told the Navy how far out they should go; I was careful not to. Now, then, the patrol was put on on that maneuver or alert of June 15th. We put everybody on, did everything we could do, beginning on June 15, and kept them on about six weeks. At the end of that time it became apparent to me that the soldier on the beach was persuaded that
there were no Japanese out there. There weren't any planes in the sky or ships on the water or submarines underneath, and if they came the soldier wouldn't see them. He would go through the motions of being out there, and he would be on the job, but it is just not in flesh and blood to stand on tiptoe indefinitely.

Well, now, we had nothing more from the War Department. Nothing. Not another word. So on my own responsibility I withdrew the whole thing; called the alert off, and turned them to other things, in order that I might get them in a frame of mind whereby they would see something or hear something if they were put out on the beach. So that in the meantime I got what I wanted by putting out these battalions and companies in camp, to maneuver along the beach. They would be there, but I did not tell them they were on alert. Now, in a few weeks I called another alert, but I did not try to keep it six weeks again.

37. General Russell. Did you call the alert on your own motion, General, without anything from the War Department?

General Herron. From that time on, yes; after June 15th I never was ordered again by the War Department, but——

38. General Russell. Now may we go back for a minute in an attempt to develop the Navy end of this alert. Your alert originated from this June 17th message, 1940, where you were directed to alert your command against a trans-Pacific raid?

General Herron. That is right.

39. General Russell. Now I am merely giving you the date which we have to connect up the Navy's tie-in with this alert: It seems that on the 20th of June you wired the War Department that you had received theirs of June 19th in which you had been directed to ease up on the alert which had been ordered on June 17th, but you said,

Full aircraft and antiaircraft precautions will be continued with easing in other lines. Local publicity on maneuvers favorable and not excited.

[216] But I am attempting now to get the Navy tie-in to this, to see what happened.

On the 21st of June you wired the Chief of Staff this message:

In interpreting your cable consideration is given to the fact that Navy here has nothing from Navy Department regarding Alert. Navy now turning over to Army inshore aerial patrol in accordance with existing local joint agreement. Will not modify Army Air and Antiair Alert before Monday except on further advice from you.

On the following day General Strong signed a message for General Marshall in which he refers to your message of the 21st and says:

In view of present uncertainty instructions for the Navy other than local Naval Forces have not been determined. Continue your Alert in accordance with modifications directed in War Department Number 434.

Now, General Herron, the thing that we were getting at is this: You went on an alert on a War Department order on the 17th of June. Five days later, on the 22nd of June, it seems that the Navy had not been ordered on an alert and that you people knew nothing about what the Navy was doing; is that true?

General Herron. We knew they were not on an alert. They were in full conference between myself and the Navy on the spot there. Of course, it modified my opinion as to the urgency of the alert, that the Navy had not been alerted. It turned out afterwards to be a
drill, but we did not know that at the time. But imagining from the fact that the Navy was not alerted, I [217] thought it might be a drill.

40. General Russell. Then, as late as 1940, when an alert out in the Hawaiian Department was ordered, the War Department ordered the Army on an alert, and that did not in any way affect the Navy: they might or might not go on an alert?

General Herron. That is right.

41. General Grunert. May I interject there: Do you know whether or not the Navy queried the Navy Department as to the necessity of going on an alert because you were on one?

General Herron. They notified the Navy Department immediately. I immediately notified the Navy within the hour, showed them my message, and they notified the Navy Department, expecting orders, and stood by for them and did not get them.

42. General Russell. Then, as a generalization this is true, General Herron, that the War Department could order you to take action of some kind which might have been set forth in this joint agreement between the Army and Navy, but the Navy would not carry out its part in this given action unless and until it received an order from the Navy Department in Washington?

General Herron. Except on a joint maneuver. On a joint maneuver they carried out their part; otherwise not.

43. General Russell. Well, now let us apply that to that reconnaissance problem out there. You had the close-in reconnaissance, and the Navy the distant reconnaissance, under your agreement; that was true?

General Herron. That is right.

44. General Russell. Now, the Army ordered an alert. You went on the alert and established the inner patrol. The Navy received no orders from the Navy Department. Therefore, the [218] distant patrol did not become effective; is that true?

General Herron. At that time they had a distant patrol on all the time, as I remember it. We had great difficulty in finding out exactly what the Navy was doing. They were not very frank about the distant patrol, and we figured because they didn’t have very many planes to put out they didn’t want to confess that there were only one or two or three planes out in a day, so they did not tell us very fully how many they had out. I tried to find out indirectly, but I never did press the matter, and I never knew exactly what they were doing about the distant patrol.

45. General Grunert. Did you have any means for any distant patrol, if you saw fit to do such patrolling to accomplish your own mission?

General Herron. We had the old B-18, and General Frank and I were in full agreement that when a war came on we would do whatever we thought was necessary in the defense of the Island.

46. General Grunert. Yes.

General Herron. The joint agreement was so drawn that we could do it and not violate its terms. We could.

47. General Grunert. Well, let me put it this way: Here is the Hawaiian Command. It has a mission of protection. In order to get information as to what may be against you, you should first have
the direction from it is coming and where it is, and also know what is going around your shores, by your inshore patrol. You depend on the Navy, according to your agreement, for distant reconnaissance.

Now, then, was it your conception of your responsibilities to insure that such a distant reconnaissance was actually in being and, if it was not, to do your best toward doing your own distant reconnaissance?

General Herron. In time of peace I did not need to be absolutely sure. In time of war I did need to be sure. If I was not certain, I would use my own planes, and I thought that that term "close-in and distant patrolling" was a very elastic term; and, as I say, General Frank and I were in full agreement: we would go just as far as we thought it was necessary and our planes would allow us to in war.

48. General Grunert. Then, on an alert in time of peace, an alert ordered by the War Department, which presumably was in anticipation of what might happen, you did not think it was necessary to use any of your own means to go out beyond your inshore patrol?

General Herron. Well, my impression is that the 40 miles became about a hundred miles at that time, but that that is as far as we thought we ought to send the B-18s without a real reason. If one of them got down at sea there was very little means to take care of those people, and we would have a great deal of responsibility towards the parents of the men in it and towards the War Department if we sent them too far and too often.

49. General Grunert. All right; go ahead.

50. General Russell. I wish you would read the General my last question. I think he gave me some experience without answering it.

The Reporter (reading):

Now, the Army ordered an alert. You went on the alert and established the inner patrol. The Navy received no orders from the Navy Department. Therefore, the distant patrol did not become effective; is that true?

General Herron. My answer was that they had a distant patrol on at all times, as I remember.

51. General Russell. Would that be prior to this alert?

General Herron. Yes.

52. General Russell. Of June 18th?

General Herron. Is that right, that they had?

53. General Frank. I do not recall when they put that on. I know they put it on.

54. General Russell. Do you think it was on when you were relieved?

General Herron. Oh, yes. All that summer of 1940 I tried to find out details, exactly how many, but without results.

55. General Russell. Well, is it your impression that that distant patrol out there was maintained by the Navy constantly prior—

General Herron. Yes, every day.

56. General Russell. When did it begin?

57. General Frank. Don't know.

General Herron. No, we don't know when it began.

58. General Russell. You didn't know much about it?

General Herron. There when we first went out there the Navy did not trust us with very much. They told us very little, and we had to build that up.
59. General Grunert. You had doubts, though, about the efficiency of that patrol on 360 degree circle? Did you or did you not? [221] General Herron. It was physically impossible with the number of planes they had. We knew that. With the 50 planes they perhaps had and a million square miles, you cannot do it.

60. General Grunert. Then, it was a distant patrol, but its effectiveness was problematical.

61. General Russell. Now, that being the case, General Herron, what did you mean in your letter of October 15, 1940, in which you stated that the Navy had resumed the outer patrol?

General Herron. Presumably it had been off at some time. I do not remember more than that.

62. General Russell. When General Short came out there sometime in February, I believe, of 1941, so far as you know, this distant reconnaissance was being conducted by the Navy, in whatever manner it was being conducted?

General Herron. They assured us it was being, in very general terms.

63. General Russell. Yes. Now, as a result of naval activity or of the Naval Intelligence personnel, were you furnished periodically or frequently with the information which they obtained as to Japanese activities in the Hawaiian Department or in the Hawaiian frontier?

General Herron. Well, that also was a development. When we went out, when I first went there, the Army was not entrusted with any naval secrets. They did not give us anything. We had to work that thing through, and by the time I left them there was complete reciprocity on information the two services obtained.

64. General Russell. How frequently would you get a report on what they had discovered about the Japanese?


65. General Russell. You got that daily?

General Herron. Yes.

66. General Russell. Who was your G-2?

General Herron. Colonel Marsden.

67. General Russell. Do you know where he is now?

General Herron. He is out there as G-4.

68. General Grunert. As a matter of record, he is one of the witnesses that is scheduled to be called.

69. General Frank. May I interject this one question?

70. General Russell. Yes.

General Herron. May I add something to that?


General Herron. There is a man here now in this building named Bicknell who was an Assistant G-2. Colonel Bicknell.

72. General Grunert. Also for the record, he is another witness who will be called.

General Herron. All right.

73. General Frank. I would just like to ask one question.


75. General Frank. Do you feel confident that the information on Japanese operations that you got from the Navy was the full and complete information that they had available?

General Herron. Towards the end, yes.
76. General Russell. General Herron, did you have very intimate supervision of the Department out there in your command by the War Department.
General Herron. No.
77. General Russell. Did you have any trips of inspection by General Staff officers out to the Department while you were its Commander?
78. General Russell. Do you recall any others?
General Herron. Colonel Russell.
79. General Grunert. Colonel Russell was of the WPD, was he not; War Plans Division?
General Herron. Operations Division, yes.
80. General Grunert. Yes.
81. General Russell. On the question of the training of your troops, did you get any directives from the War Department?
General Herron. Yes, we got the perfunctory, once-a-year orders they sent out to the whole Army.
82. General Russell. What did they emphasize; do you recall?
General Herron. No.
83. General Russell. That was all I was going to have.
84. General Grunert. I might put in a few questions here. If they happen to touch what you are going into later, why, let me know.
When you turned over to General Short, I presume that you turned over all instructions, plans, orders, and files that would make your knowledge available to him so that he would carry on?
General Herron. I was very careful to do that.
85. General Grunert. Was there anything that you recall in your turning over to him that you spoke to him about particularly, either in cautioning, in calling attention to this or that, or what-not, that may occur to you now?
[224^] General Herron. Well, I spoke to him particularly, of course, about our Navy relations, our civilian relations, about the Japanese situation.
86. General Grunert. As to the Japanese situation, can you give us an idea of your size-up of the so-called Japanese situation, particularly as to their loyalty, as to their danger in the event of a war with Japan, as to their danger to your security or your carrying out your plans—along those lines?
General Herron. Well, perhaps the best answer is to say within the last few days that Hawaiian Japanese Battalion (Italy) has been cited by General Clark for distinguished conduct in battle and has over a thousand purple hearts, one battalion, plus medals of merit and distinguished service crosses: 14 distinguished service crosses.
Now, then, our investigation upon which our war plans were based was that that would be the situation in time of war, that the Japanese would turn out to be loyal. We did not know how many, but we were satisfied that at least 5 percent were committed to the American cause, either through conviction or by force or circumstances, such as being persona non grata to the Japanese Government. Another 5 percent we said would be irreconcilable, hostile to the United States. The other 90 percent, like anybody else, would sit on the fence until they saw which way the cat was going to jump.
Now, then, the percentage of loyal ones has turned out to be much larger than we anticipated. They have been proven in battle. We have no doubt about the leading young Japanese being pro-American and being able to control all the rest. They are not now and never were any menace to our security out there, and that is what we concluded, and we drew our war plans accordingly.

87. General GRUNERT. In that respect, what was your conclusion as to sabotage, to be expected and to be guarded against?

General Herron. We concluded there would not be any sabotage, and there was not; not one instance. General Frank got the Air Corps away from putting all their planes in the middle of the air fields, and built the first bunkers out in the bushes. Before, it was feared that they would get the airplanes. He went ahead and developed that. Had they been out in the bushes on December 7th the situation would have been quite different.

87. General GRUNERT. In that alert you mentioned I understood you to say there was an effort not to alarm the public. Did you consider that any of the alert measures that were taken under that alert alarmed the public?

General Herron. Yes. It was the first time that troops had been turned out for an alert with the ball ammunition; and the issue of ball ammunition and of ammunition to the Coast Artillery started everyone's imagination, and many people thought the Japanese Fleet was just off the coast. Some of the officers sent their families to the hills that night.

88. General GRUNERT. Since that alert, when you have had additional alerts, practice alerts, and so forth, were they under assumed war conditions with ball ammunition?

General Herron. Yes; from that time on.

89. General GRUNERT. Then, did those alerts after the first one alarm the public?

General Herron. No; never again.

90. General GRUNERT. Did any of those alerts disclose what your intention was in the line of just what you were going to do?

General Herron. We were very careful not to do the same thing twice out there in any maneuver or alert, except, of course, the anti-aircraft. We had to put them in about the same place.

91. General GRUNERT. The aircraft that you had during an alert was dispersed?

General Herron. Yes, sir; still further.

92. General GRUNERT. What various kinds of alerts did you have? Just one, or did you have a series of them in what you did in each alert?

General Herron. We had two series of alerts, because I felt the situation was tense.

93. General GRUNERT. Did you have Alert No. 1, in which you did certain things. Alert No. 2 in which you did certain things, and Alert No. 3 in which you did certain things, or were they just alerts?

General Herron. That was a refinement that the training men put over on General Short when he came out there. I told him I would not do any such thing. There was only one kind of alert, and that was a total alert, and then I would do it in accordance with the situation. But the training men liked refinements, as they recommended three kinds because the Navy had three kinds. But they did not get to the
real point of the thing. The Navy has three kinds, but the all-out alert is number one, always. Now they ease up into two and three; but these young men did not know that, and when Short came out they put over the three and got them reversed, so that Short went into the Number 1, which was sabotage. It did not seem to him a very important change, I don't suppose, and it turned out to be vital. It was too much of a refinement.

94. General Grunert. I understand you to say that your primary mission was the protection of the fleet when the fleet was in?

General Herron. Pearl Harbor and the fleet.

95. General Frank. I would like to ask one question right there. Your plans for meeting any situation in that department were sufficiently completely so that when they were made effective no additional instructions were necessary. Is that correct?

General Herron. That is correct.

96. General Frank. Therefore, if a critical situation should arise, all that you needed to have been told was "Situation critical. Act accordingly"?

General Herron. Alert. It would have been a mistake to have issued any orders. These several orders would have confused the thing if you had.

97. General Frank. There was no necessity for a special mention of sabotage or any other item, because all of those were taken care of in your war plans?

General Herron. That is correct.

98. General Russell. General Herron, I have made some more or less detailed investigation to determine the number of alerts in the Department from the date of this ordered alert of June 17th, 1940, until December 7th, 1941. You were in command from June, 1940, to February, 1941. Do you remember any alert that you had during that period except the one that we have discussed already?

General Herron. I cannot give you any data as to the number of the times.

99. General Russell. In a general way, is it your impression that prior to the Alert of June 17th, 1940, you had had other alerts?

General Herron. Yes.

100. General Russell. Had they been directed by the War Department because of some international situation, or had they been initiated by you as a matter of training?

General Herron. They were initiated by me as a matter of training.

101. General Russell. So far as you recall, therefore, during your entire tour of duty as the commanding general of that department, there was only one War Department ordered alert?

General Herron. I am quite sure that is the case.

102. General Russell. And you think that the alert had practically disappeared in October of 1940?

General Herron. I say, I took it off entirely in six weeks, and then put it back on again as soon as I thought the command could bear it.

103. General Russell. There was some discussion between you and General Marshall, by correspondence, as to the effect of alerts on the morale of the troops. Do you recall that?

General Herron. No.
104. General Grunert. I have one more question on alerts. The fact that you received a directive from the War Department to alert the command: Did that leave the impression in your mind that if anything serious happened in the future the War Department would direct you to go on the alert, or leave it to your judgment?

General Herron. I always felt that I was entirely responsible out there and I had better protect the island.

105. General Frank. I would like to ask you this question: In view of the fact that the Navy was not alerted during the Army alert in the summer of 1940, had there been occasion for real alarm, and had there been a Jap attack, what, in your opinion, would have been the result of the naval attitude?

General Herron. The Navy would unquestionably have gone on the alert had there been any evidence whatsoever. I had no evidence. I had only a War Department order.

106. General Frank. You did not know whether it was based on an impending threat, or not?

General Herron. No. It was a fair conclusion, though, that it was not, after a day or two when the Navy got no orders.


General Herron. That when the Navy did not get any orders, like ours, it was a fair conclusion that it was a drill and not based on an international situation. I can tell you—I think it is all right to—that General Marshall told me afterward that he got worried about the international situation personally, about that time. So it was a War Department function entirely.

108. General Grunert. During your tour as commanding General, Hawaiian Department, did you frequently or infrequently get information from the War Department as to the international situation, particularly as to the relationship between the United States and Japan?

General Herron. I got one such message, which was that Germany had marched into Poland in the fall of 1939. That is the only thing I ever got from the War Department.

109. General Grunert. Did you feel that it was necessary for you to have a fairly intimate picture of things happening in the Pacific and in the Far East in order for you to accomplish your mission?

General Herron. I felt that it would be a great help, but that I was condemned to go along in the dark as to that. I assumed the War Department had much more knowledge than I had, but I also assumed that what they had could not be very vital or they would tell me something.

110. General Frank. What would have been your reaction had you been told that there was a Japanese striking force of six carriers, two battleships, and a large number of submarines in the Marshalls about that time?

General Herron. I would have been very much alarmed by that message. The Navy Department sent out that there was a task force being formed in the islands; that there were two of them, one in the islands. They sent such a message in November, that there were two task forces forming up, one of which was in the mandated islands.
111. General Frank. In November of 1941?
General Herron. Yes, sir. I would have been very much alarmed by that.
112. General Frank. You say the Navy did send that?
General Herron. Yes; they sent it out to the Naval District. It is in the Roberts Report.
113. General Frank. Do you know whether or not it got to General Short?
General Herron. I do not know what got to General Short, except that his staff have told me that the Navy were quite meticulous about keeping us informed all that fall, and summer.
114. General Grunert. Up to the time you left, what was the sentiment or the sense of the people in the Army in Hawaii as to a sense of security? Did they feel that they were secure with the Navy in the harbor and the Army on the job, or did they feel a sense of insecurity? Were you able to judge that?
General Herron. The people who knew thought that we were fairly secure against any attack by surface ships, any attempt to land. We also knew, a very few people, General Frank and myself, perhaps, that an air force could come in and do damage. We hoped to be able to follow them out and destroy the carriers. But I do not think we had any idea that we could turn back an aerial attack entirely, for this reason: that the only anti-aircraft we had was that which was prepared against high-altitude bombing. We did not have the small-caliber stuff which you need to do anything about dive bombing. So we felt they could come in; that they would not come in there unless they had enough planes to overcome what planes we had.
115. General Grunert. Do you make a distinction between your protective measures when the fleet was in the harbor or when it was out at sea? In other words, did you feel more secure, as far as your command was concerned, when the fleet was in the harbor than when it was out? Did that ever come to your mind or did you ever base any decisions upon that?
General Herron. We assumed in all our planning that we would depend on our own resources. Anything the Navy gave us was so much velvet.
116. General Grunert. They you did not feel that you had to take any particular measures when the fleet was in than when it was out? Your measures were all-inclusive, whether the fleet was in or out. Is that the idea?
General Herron. They were the best we could do any time, whether the fleet was in or out.
117. General Grunert. Considering the air component of your command there, ordinarily what state of readiness did you demand of it, and in that state of readiness can you recall approximately what time it would take to get into the state of alert?
General Herron. There was a long period in which the Air Corps was undergoing a very great expansion, and the training problem was really uppermost. They had to train crews and they had to train technicians. They had to train air pilots and other flying people and their instructors, and each time they would get about ready, there would be a new expansion, and we would have to do it over again. There finally came a time—I don't remember when it was—when Gen-
eral Frank recommended to me that we go to bat; that we would have to do something like this, as I remember it: Put every man we had that could fly on a crew, regardless of his present duty. His school duty could not stop. So we organized all the flying crews we could with what personnel we had there and put them into the air and worked them. It was a make-shift, but it was the best we could do with the people we had and the planes we had.

118. General Russell. General Herron, I have two or three other details. I think General Grunert and General Frank have eliminated some of the notes I had, but I have just one or two questions on this reconnaissance matter.

You did not have any radar or any air-warning service?

General Herron. No, sir.

119. General Russell. If air patrolling was expanded about a hundred miles, then the possibility of an air attack developing and becoming effective in its operations was pretty large, since you did not have the means for such distant reconnaissance?

General Herron. If we spotted them a hundred miles out there would be no time to do anything.

120. General Russell. That is what I had in mind.

121. General Grunert. You did not have any radar or any air-warning service or interceptor command as such. Did you have Triple A. I. S. service for the antiaircraft?

General Herron. Yes.

122. General Grunert. You had that?

General Herron. Yes.

123. General Grunert. That would give a certain amount of warning to the antiaircraft itself?

General Herron. Yes, sir.

124. General Russell. The final subject that I have, General, is this: In the reports which this Board has seen on the attack of December 7th, 1941, it is stated almost uniformly, in all of those reports, that the nature of the attack indicated very clearly that the attacking force knew down to the minutest details where all of our matériel was, including our ships, airplanes and hangars. In other words, the Japanese Army and Navy had been completely advised about all of those things and had worked out this attack with very great detail. The question is this: Was there any way to have prevented the Japanese people from acquiring this intimate knowledge about our installations, equipment, matériel out there?

General Herron. No way. Hawaii, or Pearl Harbor, is a gold-fish bowl. We assumed that the only thing the Japanese did not know was how we would use our troops in the event of [234] attack. Everything else we assumed that they must know.

125. General Frank. I did not get an answer to a question that I asked a little while ago about the Army being on the alert and the Navy not being on the alert, and what would have been the situation had there been an attack. You stated that had there been war the Navy would have gone on the alert. What I was after was this: Let us assume that in 1940, when the Army was in that alert, that there was a real menace and that an attack had come similar to the one that came on December 7th with the Army on the alert and the Navy not. What do you think would have happened?
General Herron. Well, approximately what happened on December 7th. The dive bombers would have come in. The Army could not have stopped them with its three-inch guns posted up on the hills. They necessarily would bring more planes than we had. If we had 50 combat planes they would bring 150, surely.

126. General Grunert. You mean that the same consequences or consequences of a like or greater or less nature, because of what you have told us about what your being on the alert meant, such as dispersion of planes and certain protective measures that may not have applied to the alert that the Hawaiian Command was on on December 7th?

General Herron. I would like to repeat my answer. They would not have got anything like the number of our planes that they did get. They would have gotten the ships in the harbor. We would have knocked down a lot of their planes, their fighting planes, but I think their bombers could still have come in, enough of them to destroy those ships. That was what we were there for, to do defend the ships and the harbor. Whether or not we saved our own planes was not important relatively.

127. General Grunert. That there was not enough anti-aircraft in and around the harbor to have really denied the air to the Japanese bombers?

General Herron. There was not the right kind of anti-aircraft. It was small-caliber, quick-fire. At that time the small-caliber stuff was all going to England. This was quite proper, but erroneous.

128. General Grunert. If there are no more questions, let me say, General, that we are after facts, and any lead that we can get which would help us in determining the sources of facts is very much welcomed by the Board. Having had years of experience in that command, can you think of anything that you might add to your testimony which might be of assistance to the Board?

General Herron. I would like to make some comments on the Roberts Report. It is a very wonderful document and a great landmark in this thing, and a point of departure, so that it is bound to be influential. But I would like to say a few things about some of the conclusions in that report.


General Herron. I have here a newspaper copy of that report. One of their conclusions was that the orders given by the War Department and Navy Department made it obligatory upon the two commanders out there to confer, and they say:

These commanders failed to confer with respect to the warning orders issued on and after November 27th and to adopt and use existing plans to meet the emergency.

They say they failed to confer. Their own report says that on the 27th, the day after the orders came in, the order from the War Department and the one from the Navy Department, they did get together. That was Thursday. They also got together on Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday of the week the attack came. They got ahead and say that if the orders issued by the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations on November 27th had been
complied with certain things would have been done, and then they say:

None of these conditions was in fact inaugurated—
that is, alerts and so forth, of the right kind—
or maintained, for the reason that the responsible commanders failed to consult and cooperate as to necessary action based upon warning and to adopt measures enjoined by the orders given them by the chiefs of the Army and Navy commands in Washington.

That is, they say the responsible commanders failed to consult. Their own record shows that they consulted.

The report says they failed to cooperate. There is not the slightest evidence that there was any failure of cooperation between those two commanders in this whole Roberts Report; and everything that I have heard since leads me to believe that there was real cooperation between those commanders; that there was no hard feeling of any kind.

It says they failed to cooperate as to the necessary action based upon the warning. The necessary action was all written down in the joint agreement between the Army and Navy. I believe they called it a joint agreement. It says that they failed to adopt measures enjoined by the orders given them by the chiefs of the Army and Navy commands in Washington.

To go back to those two messages: Did they fail to obey [237] their orders? The Chief of Staff's message informed the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, that negotiations with Japan seems to have ended with little likelihood of their resumption, and went ahead and gave more information about the general situation. Also, that is the one that stated that it was very desirable that the Japs should commit the first overt act. The order which was given him was this: The message directed him, even prior to hostile action— and I think the words "hostile action" are very significant; they show that somebody assumed that the Japanese would declare war and then move out, because it does not make any sense in connection with a surprise attack to tell him to do something even prior to hostile action. It shows the frame of mind of the War Department, that the Japanese were going to declare war and then perhaps move out, but after they had declared war, apparently, he should undertake such reconnaissance and other measures which he deemed necessary. That is all the order he got—to undertake such reconnaissance and other measure as he deemed necessary. He did not disobey or fail to obey that order. So I think there is no ground for any criticism on that count.

The Navy message, which of course had a binding effect upon the Army, directed the Navy, after giving them a lot of information, to make defense deployment and preparations for carrying out war tests. That is the only order the Navy got. That bears on the accusation in here that those fellows failed to adopt measures enjoined by the orders given them.

Nothing was said in any order from either department about consulting and conferring; and they go ahead again and say that it was a dereliction of duty on the part of each of them—that is Kimmel and Short—not to consult and confer. It is conclu- [238] sive that they did consult and confer.
Some place else in this report they make it a point that they did not have any conference directed to the accomplishment of these orders. They had these four conferences, and apparently the agenda was in connection with the garrisoning by the Army for the relief of the Marines who were on some of those western islands. I think that was the agenda. But there is certainly no evidence that they ignored the message of the 27th.

As evidence that they did confer, it states here that General Short asked Captain McMorris, Operations man for the Navy, about the probability of an aerial attack, and McMorris said there was no probability of any such thing. So it would seem they were conferring on the probability of attack.

So that the report is not a hundred per cent. It goes ahead and discusses the state of mind of these people and says that the opinion prevailed in diplomatic, military and naval circles and the public press that any immediate attack by Japan would be in the Far East, though it says that the existence of such a view, however prevalent, did not relieve the commanders of responsibility for the protection of our most important outposts.

That is perfectly true. I agree with that. So that, in my opinion, these fellows were guilty. But beyond this general opinion, which was revealed in these messages—there was a message from Short—all those things worked on the people's frame of mind. I think that the War and Navy Department messages led them to believe that there was not to be any attack on Hawaii.

On November 24th, the Navy Department sent Kimmel this message:

[239] A surprise movement on the Philippine Islands or Guam is possible.

It seems to me that the obvious inference from that is, and what they didn't say is, that they believed an attack on Hawaii at least to be highly improbable. That was on November 24th that they told Kimmel that. That is bound to have some effect on the ordinary man that believes that God lives in the Navy Department and the War Department and who has not been on the outside and found out that it is the Devil.

On December 6th, the day before the attack, the Navy Department sent this message to the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet out there—and all this, of course, got to the Army, because the Navy showed it to them. The message said that naval commanders on outlying Pacific islands might be—and the words "might be" are in code—authorized to destroy confidential papers at that time or later under conditions of greater emergency.

That was on the day before. They were expecting a greater emergency some time later, but certainly not the next day. That had its influence, of course, on Kimmel and Short.

I quote this not because it bears on whether they were guilty or not, but on the degree of punishment of these fellows.

I would like to tell you something else off the record.

(Informal discussion off the record.)

130. General GRUNERT. Your comments regarding the Roberts Report—are they based on full knowledge of what that report contains, or how much knowledge of the Roberts Report had you when you made these conclusions as to the report?
General Herron. They are based entirely on a study of the [240] Roberts Report. I never had any access to the record.

131. General Grunert. If there are no further questions, we thank you very much for coming down.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[241] TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL PHILIP HAYES, U. S. ARMY; COMMANDING GENERAL, THIRD SERVICE COMMAND; BALTIMORE, MD.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. General, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

General Hayes. Philip Hayes; Major General, U. S. Army; Commanding General, Third Service Command; Baltimore, Md.

2. General Grunert. General, the Board, in attempting to get at this, is looking into the background and viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. It is hoped that because of your assignment in the Hawaiian Department, as Chief of Staff of that Department, you may be able to throw some light on the subject. In order to cover our large field in the limited time available, it has become necessary to assign members of the Board to particular fields of investigation, or special investigation, although the Board will pass on all the fields. This particular field, for the testimony we expect to get out of you, we have assigned to General Russell, and he will lead in propounding the questions, and other Members will ask such questions as they set fit. General Russell.

3. General Russell. General Hayes, you were Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Department in 1941?

General Hayes. Yes, sir; I was.

General Russell. How long prior to that had you occupied that position?

General Hayes. 1940. I was Acting, the latter part of 1939, when Osmun was not so well, and then, when I got the [242] place, early January, I think, 1940.

5. General Russell. You became the Chief of Staff?

General Hayes. Yes.

6. General Russell. When were you relieved from that assignment?

General Hayes. When I left Hawaii, officially, which was as I remember November 5, 1941. I went on leave, though, some time in the middle of October, prior to my departure, and ceased functioning as Chief of Staff some time in the middle part of October.

7. General Russell. 1941?

General Hayes. 1941.

8. General Russell. By whom were you succeeded as Chief of Staff?


9. General Russell. Had Phillips been on duty on the staff of the Commanding General out there prior to the time that he became Chief of Staff?

General Hayes. He was.

10. General Russell. In what capacity?
General Hayes. He was brought over there by General Short to succeed me as Chief of Staff, and so he was given a course of training in all the G positions, G-1, -2, -3, and -4, general supervisory training, and some of the other special staff positions, prior to the time he took over.

11. General Russell. Then you were on duty out there in the Hawaiian Department as a staff officer, either Assistant Chief of Staff or Chief of Staff, for about how long?

General Hayes. Four years.

[243] 12. General Russell. General, you had an opportunity during your period of service out there to deal with the Navy personnel which was on duty in Pearl Harbor and thereabout?

General Hayes. Yes, sir.

13. General Russell. That, I believe, is the 14th Naval District, and also the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet?

General Hayes. Originally it was the 14th Naval District—I am talking over the span of years that I was there—and then the Fleet was brought in there, and there were the ships afloat and the shore installation.

14. General Russell. Now, you say the Fleet was brought in there. Did that occur while you were on duty there? It had not been in there before?

General Hayes. Oh, yes.

15. General Russell. Now, about what time was that?

General Hayes. I don't remember exactly, but it seems to me about 1939. In the 1939 maneuvers, the Fleet which had been based on San Diego was brought over there, and Admiral Richardson was the CINCUS; and it remained there. Although it was still based on San Diego, there was a part of the fleet which was based on Honolulu or that district. That part of the Fleet as I remember it, was under Vice Admiral Adolphus Andrews, but the main part of the Fleet was there most of the time from there on.

16. General Russell. From 1939?

General Hayes. There still was the 14th Naval District and the Fleet; which were the ships afloat.

17. General Russell. But the Naval District had been there for a long while?

[244] General Hayes. That is correct; yes.

18. General Russell. And the only change in the Naval situation during the time that you were on duty in the period that you have described was this basing of a considerable part of the Pacific Fleet on Honolulu?

General Hayes. That is correct.

19. General Russell. Now, you had opportunity, I assume, to work in and out with a staff of the Commanders of both the District and the Fleet?

General Hayes. I did.

20. General Russell. What in general would you say about the spirit of cooperation which existed between the two services, Army and Navy, during this period that you were there?

General Hayes. Most cordial, and very marked in contrast to what it has been some other places; particularly noticeable there in its cordiality.
21. General Russell. General, we have been giving consideration to the plan.

22. General Frank. May I ask a question?


24. General Frank. Did it improve during this period?

General Hayes. During the four years, you mean?

25. General Frank. Yes.

General Hayes. Yes; I saw a gradual improvement from the time that General Moses and General Herron came. It got to a very high peak under Herron, but it maintained that same level.

26. General Russell. After General Short came out, you saw no change at all?

General Hayes. I saw no change.

27. General Russell. General we have been discussing with different witnesses and have been studying the plans for the defense of Oahu and the Naval base, there, at Honolulu, those critical installations on that island, with some considerable interest. Passing over the general questions, we will go to the details and discuss them with you.

We have been interested in this question of the reconnaissance that was set up between Army and Navy, under which the Navy was to do the distant reconnaissance and the Army the close-in reconnaissance. Do you have any recollection of that plan, of its general provisions?

General Hayes. Yes, sir; I do. That plan you are referring to was a Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, which was based on the theory that the outer reconnaissance should be the Navy and the defense of the land itself was the Army. To the best of my recollection the outer patrol was 300 or 350 miles around the Island, the Navy responsibility. In addition to that outer patrol there were "area forces," so to speak, Navy task forces, that covered in their movements certain directions from Oahu. There were some destroyers used also in addition to the Navy patrol planes.

The inner patrol was about fifty miles out. That was a Navy responsibility, with surface vessels with with air vessels. We reinforced the inner patrol with some of our air.

We had also an agreement with the Navy as to the joint use of Army and Navy, of air fields on Oahu, dependent upon this situation and the mission.

The land defense was a defense of the Army. In addition to that, the Navy had an antiaircraft defense in Pearl Harbor, which was combined land-and-boat or -ship, which tied in with our antiaircraft defense. There were several arguments as to the command of certain air ships, Navy or Army, according to the mission. That was worked out, though. And so the theory of the defense was—the outer defense, the Navy; land defense, the Army.

28. General Russell. General, we have attempted to visualize situations out there which might develop and have to be controlled or regulated by this cooperative-agreement idea under which your defense and reconnaissance operated. When did these patrol systems become effective? When were they actually carried on?

General Hayes. Do you refer to the time of day?
29. General Russell. No; I am referring now in period of time. Were they perpetual all the time you were out there? During the four years, was this patrolling going on?

General Hayes. No. Not all the time. They were developed largely during General Herron's period, and carried on from then. I forget the date that General Herron came out. My recollection is General Moses left about March 1, or something, the period in March 1938, and General Herron came out and became Commanding General; so from March 1938 on they were developed.

30. General Russell. Do you mean that during that period of time from 1938 until you left out there, in October 1941, every day, this patrolling, the distant patrolling and the near-in patrolling, was actually being conducted?

General Hayes. I couldn't say that. I said that was in the Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. I do know that [247] I spoke to General Herron and General Short, for them to check as to whether the outer patrol was on.

31. General Russell. Do you know whether they did make the check or not?

General Hayes. They did, numerous times. They were satisfied that it was, at the times that I asked them.

32. General Russell. Do you know, of your own knowledge, whether or not during this period that you have described, that outer patrol was actually taking place?

General Hayes. Oh. I knew that it was taking place: yes; but whether it was continual or whether it was spot patrols, or whether it was periodic patrols, I didn't know.

33. General Russell. In other words, you knew generally it was going on, but the details of it were unknown to you?

General Hayes. I do not remember the detail of it.

34. General Russell. How many ships were out, or where they went, on those things, you did not know?

General Hayes. No. I do remember that when we looked into it at various stages, the answer they gave seemed to be satisfactory.

35. General Russell. Now, let us discuss the inner patrol as conducted out there during your tour of duty, by Army people. About how continuous was that?

General Hayes. That patrol was not continuous. It was certain times of the day as I remember, largely at the dawn period, and after dawn, until seven or eight o'clock, practically every day, is my recollection of it. It is rather vague, but that is what I recollect.

36. General Russell. Do you think that that was in effect [248] in the fall of 1941 when you left out there. General?

General Hayes. I think it was in effect, yes. As to whether it was daily, I can't recollect.

37. General Russell. Now, General, as Chief of Staff you would have been acquainted with information which reached the Hawaiian Department from the War Department relating to our relations with the Japanese Government, wouldn't you?

General Hayes. I would have been; yes, sir.

38. General Russell. You would have known it?

General Hayes. Yes,
39. General Russell. Do you recall messages that reached you people out there, in 1940 and 1941, telling you about these relations between the Americans and the Japanese?

General Hayes. All these messages that centered on the Japanese came I believe after I left the Chief of Staff's office.

40. General Russell. You just do not recall any while you were there?

General Hayes. I recall one or two general ones, but none of these specific ones. The last message I remember as Chief of Staff was a message which came on a Saturday afternoon, authorizing the Department Commander to spend $6,000,000 at once for the development of the air fields along the southern route, namely, Christmas and Canton and Savaii and Fiji and those places, and stating that $5,000,000 more would be available if he needed it. That is the last message I remember, of that import.

41. General Russell. Was there any considerable supervision over activities of the Hawaiian Department by the War Department?

General Hayes. I think, as I remember, there was the usual supervision which you would expect in an island that far away. It appeared to me that the Department Commander was quite free, except on the question of materiel and equipment and monies available to do certain things; and that was natural at that time, because money was not so free.

42. General Russell. Did that pertain to the training of the troops in the Department, also?

General Hayes. It did.

43. General Frank. What do you mean? Did what pertain?

44. General Russell. This very general supervision as to training.

General Hayes. I guess I misunderstood your question, General. I thought that what you meant was, did that question of money affect the training.

45. General Russell. No, what I had in mind was this—whether or not they attempted, by memoranda, directives, tours of inspection, and so forth, to have any intimate supervision over your training.

General Hayes. No, sir.

46. General Russell. They did not?

General Hayes. No, sir.

47. General Russell. Now, we have been interested in this subject of alerts. Could you tell us the number of alerts that you can recall, which were initiated and carried through in the Hawaiian Department during your tour of duty there?

General Hayes. Yes, sir. Originally, under General Moses, there was what could be called an "alert." When General Herron came down, he concentrated on the alert phase, and, because an alert in time of peace may be annoying to a high commander, there was a general tendency by some of the general officers to want to have a different kind of alert, so that their men wouldn't be annoyed or harrassed. If, for example, they were going to have a certain kind of problem—well, we would leave the men in barracks, and we would not take them all out.

General Herron had one alert—battle-position alert, planes dispersed, observation facilities in position, antiaircraft in position, and
infantry and artillery in battle position. Then, when General Short came there, the question came up again, and he finally decided on three alerts—alerts 1, 2, and 3; 1 to be against sabotage, and in which everything was centered; 2, to have your observation out, your planes dispersed, antiaircraft in position, but infantry and artillery kept back at their base stations, their home stations; 3, everything in battle position, planes dispersed, observation out, antiaircraft in position, infantry and artillery in battle position.

48. General GRUNERT. Did No. 2 include dispersion of airplanes?

General HAYES. It is my recollection it did, General.

49. General RUSSELL. Now, General, may I summarize, merely for the purpose of accuracy. You testified that General Moses had one alert?

General HAYES. When I say Moses, it just occurred to me while I was talking; General Drum left in November 1937, as I remember it, and then General Moses was there from November 1937 until March 1938, and most of his regime was concerned with the Army-Navy—with the Navy maneuvers, and the joint Army and Navy maneuver period which started with preparation in November, and which culminated in a maneuver some time as I remember in March.

50. General RUSSELL. And I believe, then, you said that General Herron had one alert?

General HAYES. Yes.

51. General RUSSELL. That is, probably in the summer of 1940, called by the War Department; and then General Short—

General HAYES. No; the plan called for one. His plan called for one alert.

52. General GRUNERT. You mean one kind of alert, or one actual getting on the ground, being alerted?

General HAYES. Oh, no; there were several alerts, but one kind, one type of alert.

53. General RUSSELL. Do you remember how many times General Herron had his forces out actually on the ground for alerts in his regime?

General HAYES. There were several all-out department alerts; the number, I cannot remember.

54. General RUSSELL. But there were several?

General HAYES. Several.

55. General FRANK. Frequent?

General HAYES. “Frequent” is the word; yes.

56. General RUSSELL. Now, when General Short came along, did he have any alerts in either of the categories that you have described?

General HAYES. Yes, sir.

57. General RUSSELL. Do you recall when they were?

General HAYES. I recall one. I believe in September of 1941, we were notified by the State Department, with a 6-hour advance notice, that they were going to freeze the assets of the Japanese, and he went into alert 3, with all the troops out in position. The order came out, there was no disturbance of any kind, and he left them as I remember in maneuvers then for the purpose of not showing that it was an alert for that reason but that they were just out training, and they stayed out there for several days; then he called maneuvers off.
58. General GRUNERT. Just a minute, because I have something I want to connect up. Do you recall about what date that alert was called for, approximately?

[253] General HAYES. I do not remember the date, General, but—

59. General GRUNERT. What part of the month?
General HAYES. Well, if I could get the date of the Japanese ——
60. General RUSSELL. I will give it to you in just a minute.
Since we have gotten on the subject of dates, I have a very definite recollection that that notice came out some time in July about freezing their assets.

General HAYES. I think so too, probably.
61. General RUSSELL. And it was an embargo in its nature.
General HAYES. That is right. Around July 26, or something like that, is in my mind.

62. General GRUNERT. If that is the case, that alert could not have lasted into October or late in the fall, could it?

General HAYES. No.

63. General GRUNERT. I do not care to pursue it any further.
64. General RUSSELL. General, I have made a search for that alert, having in mind determining when it started and when it ended and what happened after it was over, but I can find no records in the War Department, to this time, even just one message, relating to that July alert.

65. General GRUNERT. It would be in the Hawaiian records, though, would it not?
General HAYES. It should be.
May I speak off the record here for a time?
General GRUNERT. Surely.
(Informal discussion off the record.)
66. General RUSSELL. Now, as you recall, just about how long was that alert in force, General?

[254] General HAYES. It was three or four days.
67. General RUSSELL. Was it an all-out alert or a limited alert?
General HAYES. All-out alert, and battle position and maneuver positions.

68. General FRANK. Will you please state the circumstances under which the alert was decided?

General HAYES. Sometime during that day the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department received notification from the War Department that the State Department had advised the War Department that it was intended six hours later to freeze the assets of the Japanese; that this notice was given six hours ahead of time, so that the Department Commander might make any necessary arrangements to meet the situation. G-2, other departments, and the F. B. I., Chief of the F. B. I. in Oahu, were called in, were informed, informed me that it looked very safe; nothing was expected to happen, to the best of their knowledge and information. I conveyed this information to General Short. He decided to go into maneuver positions which were the battle positions, had press releases made out so that they could be given to the evening paper, to the effect that the Hawaiian Department was taking the field for a 10-day maneuver period.
69. General Frank. This was an all-out alert?
   General Hayes. All-out. Accordingly the troops were put out, and nothing happened from the incident. The troops were out in the field, to my recollection, three or four days to carry on the idea, and then were called in. During this period [255] which was part of the defense plan, troops in armored cars or government vehicles were marched through the town so that they would be able to meet any Japanese situation, as well as the other battle positions out in the areas.

70. General Frank. I have no more questions.
71. General Russell. General, there was no other placing of the troops on the ground in alert positions by General Short except this one of which you have spoken?
   General Hayes. Oh, yes, there were others.
72. General Russell. When was that?
   General Hayes. I do not remember the dates, but they were regular maneuvers in the field.
73. General Russell. Do you refer now to those big maneuvers that were held in May?
   General Hayes. No, sir. I refer to other maneuvers. He usually had one large maneuver, and then during the year you had several maneuvers which covered the same idea but were not as extensive in situations. The big maneuver usually was joined in with the Navy in some way. My recollection is that troops were out in the field a great deal of the time.
74. General Russell. Now, during the year 1941 did you observe in Hawaii any indications that the relations between the Japanese Nation and the American Government were becoming more strained?
   General Hayes. If I had not known that they were, I am not certain that I would have noticed particularly. I did notice, though, that the new consul that they sent out there during that period was much higher than the type individual when it came to handling affairs, appeared to me to be a very high type [256] diplomatic individual.
75. General Grunert. Did not the press indicate that the relations between the two nations were changing?
   General Hayes. Oh, yes, sir; that is correct.
76. General Grunert. You meant official information; is that the idea?
   General Hayes. I also meant——
77. General Russell. I limited the question.
   General Hayes. I meant on the street.
78. General Russell. No. I limited that question. I had not gone into that. I asked you if there were any conditions in Hawaii itself which indicated it, and he answered it in a limited way. Now I was going into the other.
   You did state in your answer, however, General, that if you had not known that relations were becoming more strained you could not have gleamed it from the appearances in Hawaii?
   General Hayes. No. I was referring to the people on the street and to things like that.
79. General Russell. But you did know that they were becoming more strained?
General Hayes. Yes.

80. General Russell. And where did you get that information?

General Hayes. I got that from the papers and from the types of telegrams and radios that came into headquarters.

81. General Russell. Well, tell us about those radios and telegrams that came into headquarters.

General Hayes. Well, the general tenor of those telegrams was that, What did we want in those supplies? Or what did we want in these supplies? Indicating that the War Department was [257] interested in building up. This question of the radar, getting the money for the radar, the priorities on the radar system: the natural things that come in a situation like that.

82. General Russell. Largely on your projects for getting material?

General Hayes. That is right; and an increase in projects and an increase in money.

83. General Russell. I do not believe that I have anything else, General.

84. General Grunert. I have quite a number of questions here. Now that I realize how long General Hayes was with General Short as Chief of Staff, it brings up quite a number of questions here, which I shall try to get through as rapidly as possible.

From the time General Short took over, were there any particular changes that he made in the defensive measures or plan concerning defensive measures that General Herron had carried on?

General Hayes. Yes.

85. General Grunert. Will you outline those briefly?

General Hayes. As I remember, General Short initially was very much concerned about the outer islands, the other islands. He wanted some more troops out on the other islands. He felt that the other islands were outposts which, if he occupied, would enable him to slow up a major attack on Oahu. He concentrated on the building of airfields. The basic defense plan was not changed much, as I remember. The boundaries of the divisions, the north-and-south, on some of the Hawaiian Islands, were changed, but the theory of it—

[258] 86. General Frank. Boundaries between what?

General Hayes. Between sectors: north sector and south sector. But the theory of the defense, namely to hold the beaches lightly with a large mobile striking force, was kept by him.

87. General Grunert. Did he emphasize training more than General Herron did? In other words, was he primarily a training man?

General Hayes. He primarily was a training man.

88. General Grunert. Yes.

General Hayes. He was out a great deal of the time. I would often never see him until late in the afternoon.

89. General Grunert. Was there as much cooperation and coordination with the Navy, or more, after General Short took over, or what?

General Hayes. That is a difficult question to answer, for this reason: that General Herron was probably the most popular commander they had ever had out there. He was greatly admired, and they had deep affection for him. It is a personal thing. He knew the Admirals better than General Short did. Officially and in their dealings they went through the same steps.
90. General Frank. Who? That is General Short and General Herron?
  General Hayes. General Herron, yes. That was because General Short followed the policies which General Herron had established.
  General Frank. Yes.

[259] General Hayes. And that was once or twice a week either going one way across, and the General and Chief of Staff going over to call on the Admiral and Chief of Staff.

92. General Grunert. Do you recall a letter sent out by the Secretary of the Navy of January 24, 1941, regarding defensive measures in cooperation with the Navy, to make such measures effective, which the Secretary of War on February 7, 1941, sent out to the Commanding General of Hawaii? It referred particularly to taking effective measures so as to be prepared for any eventuality.
  General Hayes. I do not remember a specific letter. I do remember some letters along that line.

93. General Grunert. At about that time?
  General Hayes. About that time, yes, sir.

94. General Grunert. Then, you would not recall just what measures were taken in consequence of that letter?
  General Hayes. No, except during the period of three years there was an intense training program. It was on the increase all along.

95. General Grunert. As I recall that letter, it referred also to possibility of air raids and attacks.
  General Hayes. That is correct.

96. General Grunert. And that the measures to be taken were more in line with particularly guarding against such.
  General Hayes. That is correct.

97. General Grunert. Now, can you give us a little short idea of what you considered conditions in Hawaii to be from early February until you left? In other words, were they disturbed? Were there rumblings among the population? Was the command 

[260] afraid of sabotage, of upheavals of the population itself? Were the conditions between the military and naval and the civil population friendly or not so? In other words, general conditions as to the population, especially the Japanese population on the Island of Oahu.
  General Hayes. Yes, sir. First of all, as to the relationships with the Navy, it was most cordial. I never saw any incident in the higher echelon where there was not extreme cordiality.

98. General Grunert. Well, in that cordiality there was also efficiency in the exchange of information, and was it effective in order to allow you to do what was necessary to be done?
  General Hayes. There was a sort of an agreement that when anything came in that was important, that touched on a naval phase in any way, we would call up the Navy, and General Herron or General Short and myself would go over and see the Admiral, or the Admiral and his Chief of Staff would come over to see either General Herron or Short. I do not know the number of times that would happen, but it was two or three times at least every month.

99. General Grunert. Did that extend down to the staff echelons as well as the higher command, the G-2s, the G-3s corresponding?
  General Hayes. The G-2s and the O. N. Is were very close together. They transferred information one to the other continually. There
was liaison in the G-3. I would send an officer over, and our G-3 would go over and see their war plans. There was cooperation. It was there when I left.

[261] 100. General GRUNERT. How about confidence? General HAYES. Confidence in the individuals or confidence in the plan?

101. General GRUNERT. Confidence in either, as to their doing their respective job and playing a game with each other in the cooperative line.

General HAYES. I think there was confidence. You remember, during that period the joint action of the Army and Navy changed from paramount interests to cooperation, and we had a lot of conferences and discussions so that this cooperation would work, and during that period also the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was written.

102. General GRUNERT. All right; let us drop the subject of cooperation and coordination and go to the civilian personnel.

General HAYES. There was no particular evidence of there being any great strain that I saw.

103. General GRUNERT. How did you size up the Japanese element? As dangerous?

General HAYES. I sized it up this way: General Herron, based upon that action, picked out——

104. General FRANK. Based upon what?

General HAYES. Based upon General Herron’s action. I am going to tell you about it.

105. General FRANK. Yes.

General HAYES. He picked out something between fifty and a hundred of the very top civilians in Hawaii. Some had been there four years, and some had been there fifty years, many of them born there, and he asked them to give him their comments [262] on the Japanese. I think out of it the whole thing came, in general, that 10 percent were definitely loyal to the Emperor, that 10 percent probably were loyal to our country, that 80 percent you could not tell about: if the going was good for us, they would be with us; if the going was good for the Japanese, they would be with the Japanese. But none of these people would tell you that they really understood the Japanese; that they had the oriental veil that no occidental has ever been able to get through. I know that I went out with Japanese official parties and they were most cordial.

106. General GRUNERT. Well, now, from all this did you or the Commanders over there figure that sabotage was going to be one of their main troubles in the future if anything happened, or didn’t that overshadow other things that had to be done?

General HAYES. Sabotage, because of the uncertainty of the Japanese no one knew, was always possible and present in the thoughts.

107. General FRANK. And taken care of in the war plans?

General HAYES. That is correct.

108. General GRUNERT. And was that one of the reasons that they separated the alerts into 1, 2, and 3?

General HAYES. It may have been. That was not worked out by me.

109. General GRUNERT. That was not worked out by you?

General HAYES. No.
110. General Grunert. How did that come about? I understood General Herron to say that that was put across by the training people after he left.

General Hayes. After General Herron left. That is correct.

[263] 111. General Grunert. Because when General Herron was there he had the one kind of an alert.

General Hayes. That is my recollection.

112. General Grunert. That there were three types of alert?

General Hayes. General Short worked on that himself.

113. General Grunert. He worked on that himself?

General Hayes. With Colonel Phillips, the man who followed me.

114. General Grunert. All right: we shall go to another one.

General Hayes. I did not work on that.

115. General Frank. Was that in effect before you were relieved?

General Hayes. Oh, yes.

116. General Frank. The three types of alert?

General Hayes. Yes.

117. General Frank. Were in effect?

General Hayes. Yes.

118. General Frank. Before you went on leave to come back to the United States?

General Hayes. That is right.

119. General Grunert. Now I shall ask you a few questions on the subject of command and staff.

Was it normal for General Short, when he was in command, to consult with or have conferences with his senior commanders of the Department?

General Hayes. Yes, sir, it was.

120. General Grunert. Outside of actual maneuvers. And did he pass information to them as to conditions that he became aware of, and sought their advice or put propositions to them before [264] he made his decisions on the matter, or did he just rely on his staff?

General Hayes. No; I think from my recollection he conveyed the information and, when he felt it was necessary, asked them as well as his staff.

121. General Frank. How often did he see his main commanders?

General Herron saw them every week, didn’t he?

General Hayes. Yes.

122. General Frank. How often did General Short see them?

General Hayes. My recollection is that he saw them every week or two. He was very acute to this matter of training, and when you are acute on the subject of training you just have to see the commanders, and he saw them, not only the top but down below.

123. General Grunert. But then most of his conferences were on the subject of training?

General Hayes. No, sir; they were on the subject of air. That was quite a subject, the defense by air, and he saw the air commanders or commander quite often, the engineers on projects. He had a regular flow of staff officers.

124. General Grunert. Now, as to the question of staff, did you as Chief of Staff have frequent conferences with your General Staff heads?
General Hayes. Oh, I saw them every day and discussed.

125. General Grunert. And were they given responsibility and required to live up to it, or did they look to the high command, as the Chief of Staff or the Commanding General, to make most of their decisions, and then just follow them out, instead of making recommendations?

[265] General Hayes. I think they functioned as the General Staff officers should have functioned. You gave them the policy, and they functioned under those policies.

126. General Grunert. Do you care to express your opinion or judgment of the man who succeeded you? You need not answer if you do not desire to.

General Hayes. I would like to say this: I do not know as to his ability as a Chief of Staff. He was very much concerned with G-3. I think that was his trend.

127. General Frank. Do you feel that he had worked himself in to the position of Chief of Staff by the time of the Pearl Harbor attack?

General Hayes. I do not. That is an opinion.

128. General Russell. General, while we are on this subject of General Short as a trainer, do you think that he emphasized training to the point that it was a detriment to his mission, his defensive mission of protection of the fleet at Oahu?

General Hayes. No, sir. You could not read the defense plan and meet your mission without being intimately connected with the training end of it.

129. General Grunert. I would like to stop right here and take a recess of about a minute.

(A brief informal recess was taken.)

[266] 130. General Grunert. When you left the Department, about what was the state of the anti-aircraft defense system? Did you consider it in pretty good shape and efficient?

General Hayes. Yes; I did. I think it was in good shape and was a good plan. Furthermore, at that time there was not a great deal of anti-aircraft equipment in the whole Army. They needed more and they could not get it because it was not there. The plan for the defense was very well drawn out and sound. The coverage was excellent. Some of the material was not the most modern: That is my view.

131. General Frank. What, in your opinion, ever brought about the frame of mind that resulted in a decision to install Alert No. 1?

132. General Grunert. May I ask if by “install No. 1” you mean the classes of alert?

General Frank. Yes.

133. General Grunert. The question that General Frank has asked refers to the classes of alert, 1, 2 and 3, which was a change from what General Herron had.

General Hayes. Yes; I understand. I think the reason that he put in Class 1 Alert was that he felt that sabotage was always possible and probably present and dangerous.

134. General Frank. Had you ever discussed the reasons with him for that kind of an alert?
General Hayes. Yes, a couple of times; and then he took it up himself and worked with Phillips, to my recollection.

135. General Frank. On that I would like to ask you this: Since, in the situation in July of 1941, which was much less acute than this one, be installed an all-out alert, what do you think influenced him at this time to decide on the No. 1 Alert?

[267] General Hayes. "This time" being December 7?


General Hayes. I think, a radiogram which he probably received from some Washington source stressing sabotage.

137. General Frank. You were gone at the time?

General Hayes. I was gone at the time.

138. General Frank. The Navy had different classes of alert, did they not?

General Hayes. Yes; they had different alerts. What they were, in detail, I do not know.

139. General Frank. Are you conversant with whether or not Navy No. 1 Alert was an all-out alert?

General Hayes. I am not positive. I would not like to say at this time. I did know at the time, but it has escaped my memory.

140. General Frank. Do you know that there was an air estimate of the situation prepared and signed by Admiral Bellinger and General Martin?

General Hayes. Yes.

141. General Frank. That was during your time?

General Hayes. Yes.

142. General Frank. Do you remember the conclusion to which they came as to the most probable enemy action?

General Hayes. No.

143. General Frank. Do you remember whether or not they anticipated an air raid?

General Hayes. Yes.

144. General Frank. They did?

General Hayes. Yes.

[268] 145. General Frank. As the most probable enemy action?

General Hayes. As the most probable. And that was also the estimate of the situation of the Department. General Herron’s estimate, which was still in effect, as I remember, was that the most probable line of action was an air raid some time shortly after dawn. He did not name Sunday specifically.

146. General Frank. Were you surprised at that air raid?

General Hayes. On December 7th?

147. General Frank. Yes.

General Hayes. I was surprised, but I was not surprised in the form of the attack.

148. General Frank. Would you have anticipated it?

General Hayes. If I had been there?

149. General Frank. Yes.

General Hayes. Yes; I think that I would have done this: I would not have anticipated it, but I would have been prepared, as I was a disciple of one alert and everything out.

150. General Frank. Had you been the Chief of Staff would you have recommended an all-out alert?
General Hayes. Definitely.

151. General Frank. Here is another line of questions of which you may or may not have some knowledge. Do you have any knowledge concerning the failure of the contractors, the Hawaiian constructors, to complete the construction of the Hawaiian defense projects within the time prior to the 7th of December, 1941, which the contracting job orders required.

General Hayes. I do not remember the details of that at all.

152. General Frank. Do you remember any complaints having been made that the contractors were not completing their work on [269] time?

General Hayes. Yes. There were various projects. There was the tunnel project and various projects that pressure was put on. The one on which the most pressure was put, I think, was this radar.

153. General Frank. Who put the pressure on?

General Hayes. General Short.

154. General Grunert. On whom?

General Hayes. On the War Department.

155. General Grunert. Is that of record?

General Hayes. Oh, there must be a record of it. I know there were telegrams sent.

156. General Frank. Or did he not put the pressure on the contractor? Why on the War Department?

General Hayes. I think he put it on the contractor. And was told that he could not get this stuff; they said that he could not get priorities on materiel and things like that. Then he went to the War Department for help.

157. General Frank. After the contractor told him this, he then went to the War Department?

General Hayes. That is my recollection.

158. General Grunert. Who is directly supervising contracts?

General Hayes. At that time it was between the Colonel Lyman and Colonel Wyman. Wyman was the Division Engineer and Lyman was the Department Engineer.

159. General Grunert. Wyman was the Division Engineer?

General Hayes. Yes. And then it was headed up into G-4.

160. General Grunert. Did he put pressure through G-4 on Lyman or Wyman, the contractor, or how?

[270] General Hayes. I think he worked it through the offices; not the contractor himself.

161. General Frank. Who was G-4 at the time?

General Hayes. Bank or Marsden—I think Marsden was G-4. He is out in Hawaii still.

162. General Frank. Who was G-2?

General Hayes. Fielder. General Short brought Fielder down to relieve Marsden and put Marsden as G-4.

163. General Frank. Do you have any knowledge concerning delays with reference to underground gasoline storage facilities?

General Hayes. I have a definite recollection of it. The detail of it is not sufficient to give as evidence; but a great deal of time and thought was given to that by General Short.

164. General Frank. Prior to your departure was the aircraft warning system functioning?
General Hayes. Only on the Island of Oahu. There were no stations on Kauai, none on Molokai, none on Maui, and none on Hawaii, although all the stations had been recommended. Had been work done on them, but it was over a long period of time.

165. General Frank. The job orders called for those installations to have been completed before you left, did they not?

General Hayes. Oh, yes; June 30, August 30, September 30, and on; various changes.

166. General Frank. And the reason that they were not completed was because the contractor claiming that he was not able to get credit for material; is that correct?

General Hayes. Not only that. General Short sent many a radiogram and many letters trying to get this radar equipment in, and he was told that he could not get it, as I remember, because of priorities. Panama was first, the Philippines next—I don’t remember that; they were probably away down on the list. But the West Coast, second, and Hawaii third. The thing was delayed from time to time for various reasons, and one of them was that the stuff was not there and they could not get all the money at the time they wanted to get it; and many letters and telegrams were sent on that matter.

167. General Grunert. Did that mean the complete project, or did it refer to part of the project, such as roads or concrete work or radar itself, or what? Would you be able to testify on that particular subject?

General Hayes. These places were so out of the way, on the tops of isolated mountains, that in order to live there they had to have certain things, and in order to get things there they had to have certain roads built. Take Kawaiola and Waialee. They were very difficult places.

168. General Frank. Do you have any knowledge as to whether or not any military personnel neglected their duties relating to the contract?

General Hayes. For the radars?

169. General Frank. For the radars or for any of the construction.

General Hayes. No, sir.

170. General Frank. Was there any feeling to that effect?

General Hayes. Not to my knowledge. This radar business was pressing, pressing, pressing all the time to get it in, and they just could not get it in.

171. General Frank. Did you ever hear of a contractor by the name of Wilhelm Rohl?


172. General Frank. Did anything ever come up about his status?

General Hayes. Not while I was there. Afterwards I read about him. I only saw him once.

173. General Frank. You knew nothing about him while you were there?

General Hayes. No, sir. It came up just a month or so ago, in the paper, about Ted Wyman and Rohl together.

174. General Frank. I have no further questions.

175. General Grunert. Was the Interceptor Command organized before you went on leave from the Chief of Staff’s position?

General Hayes. It was organized and training was going on in an improvised way, with whatever equipment they had.
176. General Russell. Where did this man Ted Wyman come from? He was an Army man, was he not?

General Hayes. He was the Division Engineer.

177. General Russell. How long was he out there during your tour of duty?

General Hayes. A couple of years, I guess.

178. General Russell. He came out about two years before you left?

General Hayes. As I remember it.

179. General Russell. Was he charged immediately with the installation of this radar system and the supervision of its installation?

General Hayes. No.

180. General Russell. What was his relation to the radar system?

General Hayes. Well, in certain things as Division Engineer he functioned under the Chief of Engineers. In certain things he functioned under the Department Commander. He probably arranged the contract, to get it done and, after he got the machinery, constructed the thing. I forget the details of it, but that was the idea.

181. General Russell. What was the relation of the Department Commander to this project for the installation of the radar?

General Hayes. It was his responsibility. It was not the Chief of Engineers' responsibility. It is a tactical unit.

182. General Russell. Who made the initial contract for the installation of the permanent radar station?

General Hayes. I do not know.

183. General Frank. It was made by Wyman. I want to find out what right he had over the supervision of this station.

General Hayes. The tactical location and everything else was decided by him.

184. General Russell. Did he have anything to do with letting the contract, as to who was to build them?

General Hayes. I do not remember anything about that.

185. General Russell. Did you not know, as a matter of fact, that the contract was let in Washington to this man Rohl?

General Hayes. I read about it. I didn't know it at the time.

186. General Russell. Is it not true that the supervision of the installation was by this man Wyman, the District Engineer out there?

General Hayes. Yes. There was a joint action between the Department Engineer and the Division Engineer. Certain things the Division Engineer did for the Department Commander, and certain things he did for the Chief of Engineers.

187. General Russell. Who made the contract providing the period [274] in which these things would be set up?

General Hayes. That, as I recollect, came from Washington; and when the work did not meet the date Washington was contacted and it was put over to another date, a later date.

188. General Russell. All of which decision was made in Washington, independent of anything that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department did or could do?

General Hayes. I am not certain about that independence, except that pressure was put on the War Department.
189. General Russell. But the decisions were made in Washington?
General Hayes. That is my impression. But I think you can get all that from the engineers who worked on it.

190. General Grunert. If there are no further questions, we thank you for coming up, General.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Whereupon, at 5 o’clock p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
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FRIDAY, AUGUST 11, 1944
MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D.C.

The Board at 9 a.m., pursuant to recess on August 9, 1944, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.


Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, and Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder.

General Grunert. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. WALTER CAMPBELL SHORT, UNITED STATES ARMY, RETIRED (ACCOMPANIED BY HIS COUNSEL, BRIG. GEN. THOMAS H. GREEN, UNITED STATES ARMY)

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

General Short. Walter Campbell Short, Major General, United States Army, Retired. My number is O1621. I am living in Dallas, Texas. I am not stationed any place.

2. General Grunert. General, the order convening this Board requires it to ascertain and report the facts relating to the [277'] attack made by Japanese armed forces on the Territory of Hawaii on the 7th of December, 1941. You having been in command of the Hawaiian Department from the 8th of February to the 17th of December, 1941, have been ordered to appear as a witness before the Board; and the Board hopes to get at the facts from a consideration of your testimony, from that of other witnesses, and from that contained in documentary evidence.

You have already furnished the Board with a list of witnesses whom you believe have knowledge of facts pertinent to the issue. The Board hopes to be able to have all these witnesses testify.

The Board has been informed that the War Department has furnished you a copy of the records of the Roberts Commission, except certain exhibits which have been made available to you for examination. The Board made a study of those records and, as a result thereof, many of its questions are based on that study.

Have you a statement which you desire to submit to the Board?
General Short. Yes, sir. I would like to make an oral statement and then submit a statement in writing, with supporting documents.

3. General Grunert. If so, at the time you submit the statement in writing the Recorder will swear you to it so that that statement can be made a part of the record for the Board's consideration.

General Short. Yes, sir.

4. General Grunert. Will you please go ahead with your statement, and then I will lead in propounding questions to try to get at some of the facts under various objectives and phases.

General Short. I would like to state, in the first place, that I am just as interested as the Board in having all the facts uncovered. I believe I can only gain by having the Board get a full knowledge of everything leading up to the attack. I regret that I was not granted the privilege of having counsel present at the interrogation of all witnesses, because I think that things might have been brought out that might not be brought out without that. However, since that has been refused, I would like to have a copy of my own testimony before the Board, as soon as convenient after the meeting, and I would like, when the Board has completed its work, to have a complete copy of the record of the Board with an opportunity to go over it, so that I will know what has gone before. I believe that that request is reasonable.

(Informal discussion off the record.)

5. General Grunert. General Short, I do not think it is within the authority of the Board to make a decision as to whether or not the Board will furnish you such a copy, and the Board suggests that you make application to the War Department for such a copy.

General Short. Shall I proceed?


General Short. I would like to call the attention of the Board to the fact that I have had a copy of the record of the Roberts Commission only about a day and a half. I have been able to refresh my memory to a considerable extent, but it is barely possible, since it has been two years and eight months, that there might be some slight discrepancy in details between what I would say now and what I said then. I do not think it would be anything of any importance, but it is possible that some detail would escape my mind.

I would like to begin by reading the message that I got from the War Department on October 16. That was the first in this situation. It came through the Navy and is a paraphrase of the dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations.

(Message of October 16, 1941, is as follows:)

Japanese Cabinet resignation creates a grave situation. If a new Cabinet is formed it probably will be anti-American and strongly nationalistic. If the Konoye Cabinet remain it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the United States. Either way hostilities between Japan and Russia are strongly possible. Since Britain and the United States are held responsible by Japan for their present situation, there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers. In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions, including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative action against Japan.

General Grunert. What is the date of that?

General Short. October 16, 1941.

I would like to point out that the message says that hostilities between Japan and Russia are strongly possible, and that
there is a possibility of that situation between the United States and Japan. There is quite a distinction.

I also point out that they did not want me to do anything that would disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative action against Japan. That seemed to be a matter of considerable importance at that time.

There was nothing further of importance received on the question of Japan from then until the 27th day of November; and this is the wire that I had from the Chief of Staff. Incidentally, I want to call attention to the number of this particular radiogram. The number happens to be very important. 472 is the number. I would like to read it so that everybody will have it fresh in their minds.

(Radiogram dated November 27, 1941, is as follows:)

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes, with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue stop Japanese future action unpredictable and hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot repeat cannot be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.

That is a statement of a good deal of importance.

This policy should not repeat should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat not comma to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken.

That is a most important thing. They called on me for a report of measures taken.

Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow 5 so far as they pertain to Japan stop Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

There are several things that should be noted in this. The first is that Japan must take the first overt act; that the population in Hawaii must not be alarmed. In other words, there was still a hope in the minds of the War Department that differences might be composed, and they apparently wanted to be particularly careful not to add to the flames.

Undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.

I will take up in detail a little later the fact that long distance reconnaissance was definitely a function of the Navy; that the document had been signed by Admiral Bloch, Commanding the 14th Naval District, and myself, and had been approved by the Chief of Staff; so that the War Plans Division certainly should have known the definite provision in regard to reconnaissance.

We had only 12 bombers, 6 of which were out of commission, because we had stripped them to send other bombers to the Philippines, capable of long distance reconnaissance, so that all the ships that we could have sent out for a thousand miles and back were 6 flying fortresses, if we had been depending on our own reconnaissance. So it was a very much safer proposition to carry out the plan as agreed upon by the Navy, wherein all the long range reconnaissance of both the Army and Navy functioned under one plan, so that there would not be any duplication of reconnaissance and there would be
an undivided responsibility. So that the Navy definitely had the responsibility.

We thought when we drew up the plans on March 21, 1941—and, as I say, the Chief of Staff approved them, and I saw no reason for making any change and starting with my own reconnaissance, because I had received this radio I did not believe that the War Department wanted us to abrogate the agreement with the Navy and start out on our own. When I got this wire, in view of the last statement about disseminating it to as few officers as possible, I immediately talked it over with my Chief of Staff, who had been my G-3 up to a month before, and made the decision, after we had talked it over, to call Alert No. 1. I later communicated this dispatch to G-2 and to the echelon commanders. That same afternoon I talked the matter over with General Martin and General Burwell, and the contents of the message in general were sent to the two division commanders, the Infantry Division and the liaison officers. I did not at that time go further down in the list in disseminating the information.

[Copy]

3141 Southwestern Boulevard,
Dallas 5, Texas, No. 10, 1944.

Subject: Corrections in testimony.
To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board:
Page 282, line 21.—change “Burwell to Burgin.”

* * * * * * * * *

(8) Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

As to what this Alert No. 1 consisted of, we had three types of alert under our standing operational procedure. We had worked from July 14, when we brought out a tentative standing operational procedure; we worked over this very carefully with all of the echelon so as to get a reaction on every paragraph, got their recommendations, had repeated conferences, and on the 5th of November we put out the operating procedure. Our purpose in putting it out as an operating procedure was to get rid of a great amount of secrecy, so that each company commander, battalion commander, and regimental commander could know exactly what their functions were. As long as the document was considered highly secret, which it had been before, it was important to have everybody understand so that he could answer immediately to a separate order and know exactly and so that every unit would know exactly what its job was and could go to it without any confusion.

Our Alert No. 1 was a defense against sabotage, espionage, and subversive activities without any threat from the outside.

Alert No. 2 included all these sabotage measures in No. 1, and, in addition, defense against air attacks and surface and submarine attacks.

Alert No. 3 was a defense against an all-out attack, where everybody moved to their battle stations and carried out their duties as if there was a possible attempt at landing in sight.
In making up my mind as to which alert to use I was influenced by several things. In the first place, I knew from repeated conversations with the Navy that the Japanese naval vessels were supposed to be either in their home ports or proceeding to the south. They had no information indicating that any Japanese vessels were proceeding east. The nearest Japanese base to Hawaii was 2,100 miles. All of our information [284] indicated that the Japanese had no bomber that could take off from one of those land bases, bomb Hawaii, and return.

In addition to that, we had a large part of the United States Fleet at Honolulu. They constantly had used task forces, usually two, sometimes three. Those task forces had carriers with them; and the normal practice, as I understand it, was for the planes of the carrier force to scour the ocean 300 miles to each side. In other words, any carrier force had a real reconnaissance for a width of 600 miles. For the two you would have 1,200 miles of the ocean in the vicinity of those two forces well covered. If there were three you would have 1,800 miles.

In addition, the Navy had bases at Midway, Wake, Palmyra, and Johnston, and did certain reconnaissances from those islands. It cut down the flying hours very materially from what would have happened if they had tried to do it all from Honolulu.

I knew of these things, and it made me feel that the chance of an attack by air was very slight, or that it was highly improbable. I also had the expressed opinion on that day, the morning of the 27th, the day I received this wire, when I had been in conference with Admiral Kimmel in reference to reinforcing the garrisons of Wake and Midway by Army planes, a squadron at each place; but naturally, with the limited pursuit we had, if you reinforced Midway and Wake you would cut down your air defense in Honolulu. The question came up as to how serious was the need for pursuit for the immediate protection of Honolulu. Admiral Kimmel asked Captain McMorris, his operation officer, what he thought the changes of a [285] surprise attack on Honolulu were, and Captain McMorris replied, none.

I have in this supporting document an affidavit. I was accompanied at the conference by General Martin and Colonel Mollison. We were all present when this happened, and I have the affidavit of Colonel Mollison as to what was said.

Admiral Kimmel took no exception to the statement of Captain McMorris. As I remember, Admiral Bloch was there, and there seemed to be no difference of opinion at all. That was the existing opinion of Kimmel's staff, that there was practically no danger of a surprise attack by air on Honolulu.

In addition to that, it was a question of training. Alerts Nos. 2 and 3 would require so many men on duty. Alert No. 3 would take every man, practically, so it would eliminate any training. Alert No. 2 would practically put every man of the harbor defense, the antiaircraft, and the air on duties that would prohibit training. The situation in the air with regard to training was quite serious. We had been given the mission of ferrying B-17s to the Philippines. We had already sent, I think, two groups, one of 9 and one of 12. We had also sent some crews to San Francisco for the purpose of bringing them back to the Philippine Islands. We had only 6 flying fortresses
in commission to train all of these crews. If you remember, at that
time a flying fortress was relatively new and you could not just pick
up a pilot here and there and say he could fly a flying fortress. He
had to be stepped up. We had a bunch of the old obsolete B-18
bombers that were death traps if you put anybody in them to fight,
but it was one step in teaching a pilot how to handle larger ships.
They were put [286] on those. They were put on the A-20s for a little
time, and finally got to the B-17s. With the limited num-
ber of ships we had it took time to train these crews; not just the
pilots. In addition to that we had to train the bombardiers and the
gunners so that they could protect themselves from the Japanese
going over the mandated islands.

General Martin and I talked over the situation and we felt that we
should do nothing that would interfere with the training or the ferry-
ing group. The responsibility was definitely on the Hawaiian De-
partment. It was up to us to get the ships there and get them there
without loss; and we could do it if we started them out with untrained
crews.

That had a great deal to do with my decision to go into Alert No. 1
rather than Alert No. 2 or No. 3.

In addition, I would like to read the wire sent to the War
Department:

Re your radiogram 472—

That definitely tied it in with the wire which I had gotten
"Marshall" on the 27th. This was sent on the 27th within an hour
after I got the message. There should not be any question, if anybody
read this carefully, as to what radiogram it was replying to. I
definitely identify it as a reply to the radiogram in which he had told
me to report the action taken. This radiogram stated:

(Reply of Lt. Gen. Short on November 27, 1941, to message No. 472
from General Marshall on November 27, 1941, is as follows:)

Department alerted to prevent sabotage. Liaison with the Navy.

I am pointing out particularly the number of that message, [287]
because after I made that report to the War Department of exactly
what I was doing—that was on the 27th of November—I received
nothing from them until the 7th of December, after the attack, indi-
cating that they thought my action was not correct. They did not
come back and say, "Your sabotage arrangements are all right, but we
feel here that there is danger of additional hostile action, that you
ought to alert your command for an air attack or for possible attempts
at landing." They came back with nothing of that kind.

I could draw only one conclusion, and it was reinforced by a number
of other incidents that I will cover. I could draw only one conclu-
sion—that as far as the War Department was concerned they approved
of my action, because they had ten days after telling me to report to
tell me that they did not approve it.

[288] General Gerow, in his testimony before the Roberts Com-
mmission, stated that it was the function of his division in the War
Department, in the War Plans Division, the General Staff, to follow
up on that instruction that they had given him to report action, but
they didn't do it, and they didn't realize that this wire of mine was an
answer to their wire of the 27th, although I referred directly to the
wire. It could not have been an answer to anything else. So there was a period of ten days when the War Plans Division didn't even take the trouble to tell me I hadn't answered it. They apparently didn't know whether I had answered it or not, and I had answered it as specifically as I knew how.

To show that I was not the only one that considered attack by air on Honolulu improbable, General Marshall in his testimony before the Roberts Commission stated that he was surprised by the attack on Honolulu. He was asked by the Board why he didn't use the— I will come to that a little later, but I would like to bring it out at this time— why he did not use the scrambler telephone to send his message to me on December 7th. He said, Well, the time of getting connections across the Pacific was frequently considerable, that he did not consider it absolutely secret, and that if he had been going to use the telephone he would first of all have called the Philippines, which would have taken more time, because that was the point where he considered the great threat was.

In other words, he said frankly that he was surprised at the attack on Honolulu. That, along with the various other things that happened, which I shall take up, led me to believe [289] absolutely— at the time I didn't know of that, but I did know of the other things— that the War Department did not fear an attack on Honolulu from the air.

There is one other point that I had not covered in regard to ordering that Alert No. 1, was the fact that 37 percent of our population in Honolulu, in the Hawaiian Islands, approximately 160,000, was Japanese or Japanese-American. With a population of that size it made sabotage highly probable, with those thousands of— there were about 35,000 actual aliens, and it looked reasonable that some of those aliens would be in the employ of the Japanese Government and would attempt sabotage. Character of the population made it most important that we make every possible provision for action against sabotage.

There was another reason that was very important in determining whether we should go into Alert No. 2 or No. 1. We had bunkers built that we had built without money, with our engineer battalion, at Wheeler Field, for distributing our pursuit planes so in case of attack that they would not be so likely to suffer damage. Alert No. 2 provided that the pursuit planes should be distributed to their bunkers so as to avoid damage from hostile air attack.

Now, the two methods of handling your ships as regards safety were diametrically opposed. If you wanted to protect your ships from sabotage, you wanted them grouped; and what made it even more important was, we had not gotten fencing for fencing the fields, and we had not gotten flood lights. So if you scattered some 200 ships all over the landscape, you had to have men at every ship, enough men to protect the individual ship from sabotage, and it would have taken a very large part [290] of the Air Force to carry this out.

We had asked for money, for $240,000. I will get the date on that (referring to records). We asked for $240,000 on May 15. $102,000 was authorized on July 11, $91,000 on August 12. By the time we had the money, the fencing was not available locally, and we had to order it from the States. Getting it from the States, we had to get a priority,
first on the purchase and then on the question of ship space. It took about 15 weeks to get a priority. It took additional time then to get the priority on ship space. A result was that the District Engineer, who was responsible for putting in the manproof fence around the airfields, had not received any of this wire up to December 7. The Quartermaster had the responsibility for fencing in certain gasoline storage in the vicinity of Schofield and a few other things, and he had gotten a small amount, but he had beaten the District Engineer to the local supply and had gotten what there was, and it was just not available.

Now, that made the question of the dispersion of planes and the protection from sabotage all the more difficult. It looked as though up to the time we had the fencing, if we were trying to protect them from sabotage, we should group them at the various fields, distribute them by fields as much as we could, but group them where they could be held under very close observation. Colonel Burwell had been given the job by the Air Corps of making a very complete investigation and study of the question of sabotage, because it was a thing that was always possible and, particularly with the Air and the Hawaiian Air Depot, was most serious; and he had come out very strongly in his recommendations that in any alert against sabotage the planes should be grouped as closely as possible where there would not be any possibility of sabotage.

I would like to point out that the Hawaiian Department had no means in itself for obtaining information as to the movement of Japanese ships. We were dependent wholly upon the Navy getting our information through the 14th Naval District or receiving that information from the War Department. We had no agents in any part of the world except right in the Hawaiian Islands. That was the only place that we had agents for obtaining information. So we were necessarily dependent upon the Navy or the War Department for information as to movement of these ships.

And, as I have said before, the responsibility for the distant reconnaissance had been assumed by the Navy, which we all thought—and which apparently the War Department and Navy agreed with fully and approved the scheme—that they were the logical people, considering the means that they had, to have the responsibility for distant reconnaissance. This was drawn up in a very formal way and sent on to the War and Navy Departments for approval.

I will go into some detail on what was provided in this air because that was the most important place of cooperation between the two services. The command in Hawaii, as you all know, was exercised by cooperation and not by unity of command up to December 7. We agreed that the distant reconnaissance would be carried out by the Navy, that in case of a threat or of an actual attack, without waiting for any orders, that I [292] would make available to the Navy the greatest possible number of bombers. I would make the decision, but it was agreed and was in the written plan that was approved that that would be the maximum number that I could spare. There might be a situation where I would have to hold onto a few; that when that was done they were to be placed absolutely under the control of the Navy. They operated with Patwing 2. The Army gave them no missions. They received their orders from Patwing 2, they made
their reports to Patwing 2, and the thing happened automatically. We went into a maneuver, and it was provided that in case of an attack—we had started out with the idea that there would be a request. We found in our maneuvers—we were carrying on weekly exercises—that that was too slow, so we made it automatic: in case anything happened the Commander of the Army bombers reported immediately to Admiral Bellinger, who had Patwing 2, and was under his orders. There was a provision in this that at any time when there wasn't a maneuver, there wasn't an attack, there hadn't been an emergency agreed upon, that the Navy did not have sufficient force of long-range reconnaissance planes, that they could call upon the Army and that we would furnish strength according to what we had. That had been definitely agreed upon.

[COPY]

3141 SOUTHWESTERN BOULEVARD,       
Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 1944.

Subject: Corrections in testimony.
To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board:

* * * * * * * * * * *

Page 291, line 24, after “air” add “plan”.

* * * * * * * * * * *

/s/ Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

On the other hand, if there was any air action—defensive air action—over the Islands, then their fighters that could be made available, like the marine fighters that were stationed at Ewa Field and any carrier fighters that happened to be off their carrier and ashore, were to immediately pass to the control of the Army so that there would be a unified control of the fighters under the Army for fighting immediately over the Islands, and control by the Navy for distant reconnaissance. There was another provision that in case it was necessary to have fighter escorts for the bombers in attacking enemy vessels, that those fighter escorts would also pass to the control of the Navy. If they were going to make an attack on naval enemy vessels and called upon us for escorts, they passed to their command. We didn't hold any strings on them at all; we turned them over to them.

Now, these things had been maneuvered. We had at least one air exercise a week with the Navy from March on, so that it had been worked out until it functioned quite smoothly. That method had been followed from March 21st and was in effect on December 7th, and as far as I know it is still in effect. It may have been changed; I don't know.

On the 28th of November I received a message from the War Department that I would like to read: 482. I notice this is 482. Their one of the 27th was 472.

(Message, November 28, 1941, from Adjutant General to Lt. Gen. Short, is as follows:)

Critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War Depart-
ment (see paragraph 3 MID SC thirty dash forty five) stop. Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishment comma property comma and equipment against sabotage comma protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda and protection of all activities against espionage stop. [294] This does not repeat not mean that any illegal measures are authorized stop. Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm.

They are still wanting to do nothing, apparently, to alarm the Japanese public in Hawaii.

To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions.

Now, my wire in answer to 472 had been sent fairly early on the afternoon of the 27th. This was dated the 28th. There was no doubt in my mind but what they had my wire before this was sent, but apparently they didn’t take the trouble to check up and see that my wire was answering theirs—my radio—from what General Gerow stated in his testimony.

Now, when I got that, I prepared, in connection with G-2, an answer to the War Department. It just happened that we thought of these things months before and were able to answer them very completely.

This was sent on the 28th:

(Message, November 28, 1941, from Lt. Gen. Short to Adjutant General, is as follows:)

Re your radiogram four eight two twenty eighth comma full precautions are being taken against subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of War Department—

and giving the number of those paragraphs

and military establishments including personnel and [295] equipment stop As regards protection of vital installations outside of military reservations such as power plants, telephone exchanges and highway bridges comma this headquarters by confidential letter dated June nineteen nineteen forty one requested the Governor of the Territory to use the broad powers vested in him by section sixty seven of the Organic Act which provides comma that the Governor may call upon the commanders of military and naval forces of the United States in the Territory of Hawaii to prevent or suppress lawless violence comma invasion comma insurrection and so forth stop Pursuant to the authority stated the Governor on June twentieth confidentially made a formal written demand of this headquarters to furnish and continue to furnish such adequate protection as may be necessary to prevent sabotage comma and lawless violence in connection therewith comma being committed against vital installations and structures in the Territory stop Pursuant to the foregoing request appropriate military protection is now being afforded vital civilian installations stop In this connection comma at the instigation of this headquarters the City and County of Honolulu on June thirty one nineteen forty one enacted an ordinance which permits the Commanding General Hawaiian Department to close or restrict the use of and travel upon any highway within the City and County of Honolulu wherever the Commanding General deems such action necessary stop or in the interest of national [296] defense. The authority thus given has not been exercised. Relations with FBI and all other Federal and Territorial officials are and have been cordial and mutual cooperation has been given on all pertinent matters.

Now, they had stressed that we were not authorized, in view of their wire, to take any illegal measures, and I was being careful to show them that we were taking all the measures they wanted and that we were absolutely within our legal rights, because we had
thought back ahead as far back as June and arranged it. For the
last two years there had been a very considerable amount of the time
that the Army had had guards over bridges and water works, elec-
tric light plants, and so forth, and there was a possibility that some
sentry would shoot someone and he would have no defense. That had
prompted me to get this legal authority from the Governor, so the
Army would be fully protected. We would be within our legal
rights. And our relations with the Governor and with the Mayor
were such that we were able to accomplish this and to have them feel
that it was the thing to do. So we were able to answer the War De-
partment's message and state that we were wholly protected legally
in doing the things that we were doing.

And you notice in that message that it is all sabotage and subver-
sive activities and espionage; and, as I say, that message was sent
after my message should have been received, and undoubtedly after
my message was received. There was no doubt in my mind that they
were fully cognizant of my report of action taken when they sent
this message.

Now, to make it even stronger, you notice in this message [297]
they said they were sending identical messages to the air stations
direct, because they apparently wanted to be sure these measures
were put into effect at once. In other words, sabotage was terrifically
important to them.

General Martin got such a message from General Arnold, and he
answered even in more detail than I have, telling them exactly what
they were doing on all airfields. So they had answers from me and
from General Martin showing exactly what we were doing, in great
detail, and if they didn't know what we were doing it was simply
because they didn't read our messages. The information was defi-
nitely there.

Now, in addition to prescribing this Alert No. 1, I prescribed that
the Aircraft Warning Service would work definitely, as such, from
4 o'clock in the morning—from two hours before dawn to one hour
after dawn, which was practically from 4 to 7. This service was
very new. Along probably early in November we had received the
mobile sets. There was no fixed station that was in operation.

I might go into a little explanation there. The original plan as
drawn up provided for three fixed stations at very great altitude in
all cases: one at Kaala on the Island of Oahu, about the highest point
we could put it; one at Haleakala on the Island of Maui, about
10,000 feet high; and one at Kohee on the Island of Kauai, which was
very new. This increased the range of the stations very greatly, but
it also increased the difficulty of erection, because for the one at Kaala
all material had to be drawn by cable. We could not start any con-
struction at all until we got a cable that could be used to [298]
draw the material to the top of the mountain.

As I say, none of these fixed stations was in operation. We had
gotten, along in November, the mobile stations, and as soon as we
got them we started using them right away; and when this message
of the 27th came along, I prescribed that the Aircraft Warning
Service would function those hours. In addition to that, they had
their normal training. They trained then from 7 to 11, and they
had maintenance work, work of that kind, from 12 to 4.
Now, it turned out that we were putting a little bit too great a strain on this materiel, and later in the afternoon period we had three stations working from 11 to 1, and three working from 1 to 4, so that there was a little more chance for maintenance work and keeping them in shape. But that was the situation, and the Interceptor Command was working with them. We were trying to educate the Interceptor Command and the Aircraft Warning Service, and using this training period as an opportunity to give them work at what we considered the most dangerous time of the day. The Navy had a liaison officer functioning with this outfit.

I want to take up the question of conferences with the Navy, as there have been at times certain allegations that the Army and Navy didn't get together, didn't talk things over. You might think from some of the statements that we were almost utter strangers, and that was far from the fact. As a matter of fact, Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch and I were on extremely friendly terms personally and as well as having very frequent conferences officially. I think that Admiral Kimmel [299] and I played golf together an average of every other Sunday morning, and very frequently the Sunday mornings we didn't play golf he dropped over to my quarters; so that we really were in very close personal touch as well as officially.

On the 27th of November, the day this message came in, we had a conference for probably three hours that morning on the question of the reinforcement of the garrisons at Midway and Wake each by a squadron of Army pursuit planes. That was at the conference at which I told you a while ago that the Navy staff stated that they considered that there was practically no possibility of surprise attack on Hawaii. I would like to have you bear in mind that that was within three or four hours before I received this message from the War Department on the 27th, I had a very recent opinion from the Navy that they did not consider such attack probable. They had sources of information that I didn't have. With their task forces and their distant reconnaissance they had ways of obtaining information that I didn't have. There was every reason why I should accept their opinion as of value.

7. General Frank. I did not quite understand what you said there about information that the Navy had that you didn't have.

General Short. They had sources of information. They got continual information from the Navy Department as to location of Japanese ships. They had their task forces out constantly several hundred miles out from Honolulu, and spreading out with their air. aerial reconnaissance from the carrier. In other words, if there were Japanese ships roaming around the ocean there, they had a chance to pick them up, know they were there. If they didn't—couldn't stop them, they at least could be [300] expected, I thought, to get information of their presence, and I was sure they would tell me if they had any such information. Now, I had no sources of information comparable to that, and it was a natural thing that I should accept the opinion of the Navy on that particular subject.

[301] It seemed to be the best informed opinion that there was in the vicinity. There did not seem to be a divided opinion. So far as I could figure, the Staff of Admiral Kimmel accepted Captain McMorris's statement as their own comments.
8. General GRUNERT. When you get to a stopping point, at the end of any particular subject, we will have a short recess.

General SHORT. Let me take just about two minutes, and I will be there, I think.

Now, that was on the 27th of November. On the 1st, he and I both received radiograms, from the Navy and War Departments, relative to the possible relief of the Marines on Wake Island and Midway, so that they could be made available for landing parties; and we were called upon for our opinion. We had a long conference on the 1st. On the 2nd, he came, I think it was, to my quarters, with an 8-page letter that he had prepared, to the Navy Department, setting forth his views on that. We were both fully of the opinion that the relief should not take place until certain work was completed on the airfields at Wake and Midway. The civilian construction and the labor condition was quite complicated, the water proposition was very difficult at both places, and we both felt that it would be an advantage if they could delay their relief until that construction work was completed.

He brought this long letter, to the Navy Department, setting forth his views, to my quarters, as I remember, and read it to me, and we went over it; and I was in full accord with his views on the subject.

On the 3rd, we had another conference at his headquarters. After reading his letter. I had prepared my radiogram to the War Department, setting forth my views, which I say were practically in full accord with his on that, and we went over my radiogram and the radiogram he prepared for the Navy Department. There was one difference of opinion, there. He wanted definite unity of command on the outlying islands for the Navy, and I felt we should have the same type of command that we had on Hawaii, which was command by cooperation. I felt that as long as we had command by cooperation on Hawaii, it should extend to the subject garrisons; that if we wanted a unity of command on Hawaii, then naturally we would go to unity of command on the outlying islands. Each one of us stated his views on that subject fully to his own Department, so that there was no hard feeling about it. It was a perfectly cordial personal relation, and each one felt the other fellow should present his own views to the other Department, where there was a difference of opinion.

That went in on the 2nd. We also had orders to relieve the Navy garrison at Canton Island. They did not have much, and we had conferences that covered that to some extent, that morning, and then on the next day, Major Fleming, who was acting as my liaison with the Navy on all the matters with regard to the relief of the various garrisons on the islands, had a conference with Colonel Phythian, of the Marine Corps, with reference to procuring 5-inch Marine antiaircraft guns, because the Army had none, and we thought, in showing the outposts out as far as Canton, with a small garrison, it was important to have the best antiaircraft we could have.

I covered these conferences, because it shows you very definitely that our conferences were not infrequent, and that during this period of stress we were in almost daily conference, where, if at any time the Navy had had any piece of information about carriers, their presence, or that they could not be accounted for, I was sure that they would have told me.

During this period, the 27th to the 6th of December, they made no request for Army planes for long-distance reconnaissance, so I was
convinced that they either knew where the Japanese carriers were, or had enough information that they were not uneasy, and with the task forces that I knew they had out, that they felt they could handle the situation. I did not know in an official manner ordinarily when they were sending out task forces, but I usually knew informally; and I knew at that time they were preparing to send some new task forces out in the next two or three days; and I had gotten permission to send one of my assistant G-3's with the task force going to Johnston Island, because the Marines were going to carry out a landing exercise, and I particularly wanted our G-3 Section to observe exactly how it was done; so I did know that the Navy had out one task force, and were sending out two more; and I knew the approximate places they were going, so I had a good deal of personal information on what the reconnaissance could cover.

I think we can take a break, right there.

(Brief recess.)

9. General GRUNERT. All right. The Board will proceed.

General Short. Shall I go ahead with my talk?

10. General GRUNERT. Go ahead.

General Short. There were two incidents that happened prior to the attack, that convinced me fully that the War Department had no feeling that there was danger of Japanese air attack at Honolulu. On December 5, a B-24 arrived from the mainland. It came in with one .30-caliber gun and two .50-caliber guns in the tail. That is all the equipment it had, and it had no ammunition; but in spite of the fact that it came in that way, we had very specific instructions from the War Department as to how it was to be equipped when it left Honolulu to fly over and photograph Truk and Jaluit.

I will read you that message in a little while. This indicated to me, the way it came in and the way it was ordered to go out, that the War Department felt that there was no danger of an air attack on Honolulu, or between Honolulu and San Francisco, that the plane was safe, could be sent without ammunition, and that it was a greater hazard to carry that weight in ammunition than it was to take a chance of meeting the Japs without any ability to return their fire; but they did feel that when you hit the Mandate islands there was a real possibility of their being attacked from those land bases out there, and they gave positive instructions that they should be in shape to return the attack and not take a chance of being brought down without being able to fight back.

Now, I would like to read a message:

Reference two B dash twenty four airplanes for special photo mission stop it is desired that the pilots be instructed to photograph Truk Island in the Caroline Group Jaluit in the Marshall group stop visual reconnaissance should be made simultaneously stop information desired as to the number and location of naval vessels including submarines comma airfields comma aircraft comma guns comma barracks and camps stop Pilots should be warned islands strongly fortified and manned stop Photography and reconnaissance must be accomplished at high altitude and there must be no circling or remaining in the vicinity stop Avoid Orange aircraft by utilizing maximum altitude and speed stop Instruct crews if attacked by planes to use all means in their power for self-preservation stop The two pilots and co-pilots should be instructed to confer with Admiral Kimmel upon arrival at Honolulu to obtain his advice stop If distance from Wake and Jaluit to Moresby is too great comma suggest one B dash twenty four proceed from Wake to Jaluit and back to Wake comma then Philippines by usual route photographing Ponape while en route Moresby stop Advise pilots best time
of day for photographing Truk and Jaluit stop Upon arrival in Philippines two copies each of any photographs taken will be sent to General MacArthur comma Admiral Hart comma Admiral Kimmel comma the Chief of Naval Operations comma and the War Department stop Insure that both B dash twenty four airplanes be fully equipped with gun ammunition upon departure from Honolulu.

In other words, they show beyond any question that they considered it important to have them armed when they leave Honolulu and that they did not consider it important to have them armed up to Honolulu.

Along that same line, for two months, when we had been flying planes, B-17’s, to the Philippines, without any instructions from the War Department, I had personally seen that ships were armed, that everything was in readiness for self-defense, and I had personally instructed the leader of the group out there that he was to take no chances of being shot down by the Japs; if they approached him, and acted suspiciously, that he must not wait to let them get in the first shot, he was to protect himself. That had been going on for a couple of months, beyond Honolulu.

Now, when that wire was received, the planes were examined. We found that we could by robbing B-17’s get the guns to equip this B-24, and that we had the ammunition, without any trouble; but we did not have the adapters, and General Martin, commanding the Hawaiian Air Force, prepared a wire to the Chief of Air Corps, which was sent over his signature and mine, both, stating, requesting that the second B-24 bring the equipment for the first, that had been left behind, and that we were holding the first B-24 there until it was properly equipped before starting on its mission. It was there at the time of the attack, in a hangar, awaiting to be equipped, and it was destroyed. The other B-24 didn’t get in.

Now, that message, at least part of it, here, is of interest:

Strongly recommend—
This was after we had told them what wasn’t there in the way of equipment—

Strongly recommend that second B-24 bring necessary equipment from main-land for installation on both planes prior to departure from Hickam Field stop Plane being held here until satisfactorily armed stop Subject plane has no armorplate installation stop except for removal of passenger seats plane equipped as for ferry service North Atlantic.

We pointed out to them at that time the way they were sending the planes in.

The other incident which showed that up to the last minute the War Department considered that there was no danger whatever of attack between Honolulu and San Francisco was the fact that on the night of the 6th, 9:30 p.m., San Francisco time, 12:30 a.m. Eastern Standard Time, and 10:30 San Francisco time, or 1:30 a.m., on the 7th, on Eastern Standard Time, two groups of planes left Hamilton Field, six in each group, for the Philippine Islands. Those planes, when they came in, they came in during the first attack. They all arrived between 8 and 8:20. The first plane I think hit the landing mat about five minutes after eight, and the pilot was killed as they hit the landing mat. Four out of the eight planes—out of the 12—four of the 12 were destroyed. Those planes had no ammunition. The guns were all cosmolined. The guns had never been bore-sighted. If they could have shot anything, they couldn’t count on hitting anything. They had skeleton crews consisting of a pilot and a co-pilot, navigator, en-
engineer, and a radioman, so if they had had their guns all complete and their ammunition, they didn't have the crews to defend themselves, and this ceased to be a theory, it wasn't an academic question, because they came in right in the midst of the first Japanese attack, and they were unable to fire a shot, unable to defend themselves. The first man tried to land. Of course, they knew nothing of what was going on, because there hadn't been time to get anything to them. The first tried to land at Hickam Field, and they landed pretty much around Oahu, anywhere they could. Some landed at Bellows Field. I think there were at least four or five that landed at outlying fields. They didn't have enough gas to go to outlying islands, but it is perfectly evident to me that if the War Department expected an attack on the 7th of December, they wouldn't have started planes out from Hamilton field in that condition. It says to me very definitely that their estimate was exactly the same as mine, that they were not expecting an air attack on Honolulu, or there wouldn't be any excuse in the world for anybody authorizing planes to come in that condition. They felt that the hazard of carrying the extra weight in ammunition was greater than the hazard of a possible attack by Japanese. It turned out they were wrong. It meant very definitely, to me, that the War Department did not expect an attack that morning.

I would like to point out also that from November 28 up to December 7 I had not had one single word from the War Department on the situation. If there was any crisis in the situation, they had completely failed to inform me of it. If they thought there was a crisis, I felt that I would be informed, if there was any crisis in the situation at all, but there had been nothing for that period.

Now, apparently some time after those planes had left Hamilton Field in that condition, the War Department must have gotten some information that alarmed them, or that they felt that they ought to get to me as early as possible, and the Chief of Staff filed a message at 12:18 p.m., Washington time, December 7. That was 6:48 a.m., Honolulu time.

[309] General Short. Here is the message:

(Message of December 7, 1941, to Hawaiian Department, Ft. Shafter, T. H., Signed “Marshall”, is as follows:)

Japanese are presenting at one p. m. Eastern Standard Time today—
That would be 5½ hours earlier in Honolulu—

what amounts to an ultimatum. Also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately stop Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop Inform Naval authorities of this communication.

As I say, that was filed at 12:18. It was sent by commercial radio, the R. C. A. I did not know at that time why it was sent commercially. However, early that morning our radio had great difficulty keeping in communication through the War Department radio. Our set was a 10 k. g. set, not powerful like the Navy's or the R. C. A.; and things that I have seen in the Roberts report since indicate that the message was sent via R. C. A. because the War Department felt that it could not be gotten through on the War Department radio. It arrived in Honolulu at 7:33 a.m., December 7, Honolulu time. Just what happened right at that time, I am not sure, but the attack struck
within 22 minutes after, and it looks like what probably happened was that they did not get under way on the delivery until the attack struck, and they waited until the most serious part of the bombardment, practically all of it was over, and delivered the message to the Signal Office at 11:45 a.m. The attack had taken place at 7:55 a.m. The message was decoded and [310] delivered to the Adjutant General at 2:58 p.m., 7 hours and 3 minutes after the attack when we got this important piece of information. We had a scrambled phone that, ordinarily, you could get through in ten or fifteen minutes. It looks reasonable that they thought, even then, that if there was going to be a hostile attack, they would have tried to get it to us by more than one means of communication. General Marshall stated that the reason he did not telephone was that it took some time, that he had called the Philippines before he called Hawaii, and there was possibility of a leak which would embarrass the State Department. In other words, I think there was a feeling still at that time that secrecy was more important than the time element in getting the information to us as rapidly as possible. Whatever the reason was, we got that information seven hours after the attack. So it meant that at the time we were attacked we had no information from the War Department since November 28th. If they had used the scrambled phone and gotten it through in ten or fifteen minutes we would probably have gotten more of the import and a clearer-cut idea of the danger, from that message, and we would have had time to warm up the planes and get them in the air to meet any attack.

[Copy]

3141 Southwestern Boulevard,
Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 1944.

Subject: Corrections in testimony.
To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board:

   * * * * * *
   Page 310, line 9, change “had” to “would have”.
   * * * * * *

   /s/ Walter C. Short,
   WALTER C. SHORT,
   Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

[Copy]

3141 Southwestern Boulevard,
Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 1944.

Subject: Corrections in testimony.
To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board:

   * * * * * *
   Page 310, line 17, change “scrambled” to “scrambler”.
   * * * * * *

   /s/ Walter C. Short,
   WALTER C. SHORT,
   Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.
There were two things that took place that morning in addition to not getting the message to us that might have worked out to our very great advantage if they had been handled differently.

A two-man submarine got into Pearl Harbor. I think it probably was about 6:45 when we first got the first indication of it, and I think it was entered as about 7:12, or something like that, when the report was made; but at approximately 7:15 they could have reported to me that there had been a submarine attack. That would, under the conditions, have indicated to me that there was danger. The Navy did not visualize it as anything but a submarine attack. They considered that and sabotage their greatest danger; and it was Admiral Bloch's duty as Commander of the District to get that information to me right away. He stated to me in the presence of Secretary Knox that at the time he visualized it only as a submarine attack and was busy with that phase of it and just failed to notify me; that he could see then, after the fact, that he had been absolutely wrong, but that at the time the urgent necessity of getting the information to me had not—at any rate, I did not get the information until after the attack.

The other thing was that at 7:20—there had been an agreement on the part of the control officers of the Navy and Aircraft Warning Service Command and not to go through the training period on Sunday morning. They normally worked from 7 o'clock on to 4 as a training proposition, but they had agreed that they would not work that morning. However, Lieutenant Tyler, the officer in charge of the Interceptor station, remained at the station, and the station continued to work for practice. They picked up a considerable number of planes 132 miles out in a direction 3 degrees east of north. The observer did not know anything about any planes being out and got quite alarmed about it. He called the operator and got in contact with Lieutenant Tyler and the Lieutenant talked to them about it and got the report and made the decision that it was not of any importance. He had three reasons for that. In the first place, he thought it might be a task force, because that happened all the time. They picked them up from the station. He thought possibly it was a bombing mission from Hickam that had gone out. In the third place, what made him very positive that it was only friendly planes was the fact that he knew that a flight of B-17s was coming in from the mainland that morning. It turned out that that flight actually came in just five minutes behind those Japanese planes, and the direction from which they came in was just 3 degrees off of what the Japs came in. They came from straight north and the Japs came from 3 degrees east of north. So you can see that the Lieutenant had some grounds for feeling that it was just a routine friendly plane mission. He had been listening to Hawaiian music from 4 o'clock on, which practically always meant that they were bringing in a group of planes from the States, because they had no beam there and they used that for orientation, and he felt they were about due. They actually came in just five minutes later. If he had alerted the Interceptor Command there would have been time, if the pursuit squadrons had been alerted, to disperse the planes. There would not have been time to get them in the air. You could not have warmed them up and gotten them into the air on time, but the loss would have been greater—
11. General Frank. You say the loss would have been greater.

General Short. The loss would have been very greatly lessened.

12. General Grunert. We want the record clear. You mean the loss would have been greatly lessened? You said "greater."

[313] General Short. I meant to say, it would have made a great difference. What you have said is much better. It would have made a great difference in the loss. It probably would not have protected the battleships; it probably would not have protected the Hawaiian depot, because they would not have had time to get the planes in the air. But, on the other hand, our aircraft would have been more instantly ready for action. It would have been a question of split-seconds instead of minutes in getting into action.

When the attack took place at 7:55 on December 7th I was in my quarters. When I heard the first bomb explode I thought that the Navy was probably carrying out some exercises that either they had not told us about or that I had forgotten about. When the second explosion took place I was out on my back porch where I could get a look at Pearl Harbor, and I saw smoke rising, and I came to the conclusion that something was seriously wrong. The Chief of Staff, who lived next door, ran in the front door and called to me and said, "It is the real thing. We have just had a message from Hickam Field." That was probably two or three minutes after 8 when he came in and notified me. By 8:10 all major echelon commanders had been told to go into Alert No. 3, and everything was under way. The first plane of the enemy, I think, was brought down at five minutes after 8. So you can get an idea of the length of time it took to get into action. The antiaircraft had skeleton crews at all of their guns. They acted as crews to protect from sabotage, but there were enough men to fire the guns. They had the small arms ammunition at the guns. At the 3-inch guns they had ammunition very immediately accessible, sir, probably 55 yards, for all but four batteries. There were four batteries in position, but there was no place for storing ammunition except right out in the open; and when the alert went on, that did not look like the thing to do, so they did not have those guns working. The first 3-inch guns to get into action went into action at 8:15, and between 8:15 and 10 they were all put in readiness for action. Those last four batteries that did not have the ammunition drew it at 8:15, and the last one finished up at 10 a.m.

There is an exhibit here that shows when every battery was alerted, when it went into action; and the time that they went into action naturally varied, with whether or not they had a target. Some of them did not get targets until later in the morning, but they were ready to act and were alerted at the times given.

We had that morning the following planes: We had pursuit planes in commission, 80; pursuit planes out of commission, 69. They were in various stages of repair. Some may have been slightly out of commission, and so forth. But those that were actually available were put into the air at that time.

We had six reconnaissance planes in commission and seven out of commission. We had 39 bombers in commission and 33 out. Of those bombers the only ones available for a real mission were the six Flying Fortresses that were in commission, and the A-20's. I guess you
would consider those bombers, General Frank. We had a total of 10 A-20’s in commission and one out of commission. Then there were the old B-18’s that were not of any very great value.

To show what took place between then and the 20th, we had gotten our repair facilities, in spite of the very great damage done to the Hawaiian Air Depot, and within two or three days we [315] were repairing more planes than we were before, because the men worked 24 hours a day.

Immediately following the bombing it looked like the machinery was almost a total wreck. As a matter of fact, we salvaged between 80 and 85 per cent of the machines, so that we were able to get our repair facilities going very well. We had a new building that apparently the Japs had not identified as a repair shop, and we had gotten all of the new machinery probably within the week before, and we had not installed it yet. It was in the new building, not installed, and the old building, which they undoubtedly had spotted, was entirely demolished, and it looked like our machinery was all shot, but we were able to move about 80 per cent within the new building, and in a period of 24 hours we were getting along very well and the result was that on the 20th of December we had 61 pursuit planes actually in commission and we had 22 that could be repaired. It might take a few hours on some and a day on others.

As to reconnaissance planes, we had six in commission and two that could be repaired locally.

Of bombers we had 50 in commission and 13 could be repaired locally.

However, there had been 29 bombers received from the mainland. It was very unfortunate that of the B-17’s, four that came in from the States were destroyed, and there were only two that were serviceable out of our six that were in commission, so that we lost the six B-17’s, and for some reason the A-20’s escaped untouched. Apparently they were not conspicuous. So the greater part of our losses was the old B-18’s which we could afford better than anything else, and we were able in a few days to carry on our missions very well.

[316] As to what took place with the infantry outfits, as soon as they got the message for Alert No. 3 they turned out. The 24th Division turned out at 8:10 and returned the fire of the enemy planes, and at 8:30 they were moving out to their battle positions. The 25th Division was also moving out to their battle positions by 8:30. By 4 o’clock the 24th Division were all in battle positions and the 25th by 5 o’clock. They had to move pretty much all over the island. We also had a plan for the movement of troops to their positions in case of attack with a minimum of 200 yards between vehicles, because we did not want to take a chance of having a bunch of vehicles and having enormous losses from air attack. So, moving in that kind of formation naturally took longer. But they had drawn fire, and we had both divisions complete by 5 o’clock in the afternoon. The harbor troops had their ammunition immediately at hand and the antiaircraft had theirs very early.
 Subject: Corrections in testimony.
To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before
the Army Pearl Harbor Board:

Page 316, line 14, before word “fire” insert “one day’s”.

/s/ Walter C. Short.
WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

The civilian elements that we had been training worked extremely well. We had 16 surgical teams that we had organized among the
doctors on the Island. The first one of these teams reported to the
hospital at 9 o’clock. They made it an hour and five minutes. We
had 20 first-aid stations that were organized, with ambulances and
so forth. At 12 o’clock noon they started evacuating the women and
children from Hickam and Wheeler Fields and the harbor defense
positions that were in immediate danger, according to the plans that
had been drawn up, and they were located in school buildings at
Shafter, and the ordnance depot went into two underground rooms
that were being constructed at Shafter, one of which was for cold
storage, which was about finished, and those people were put in there
temporarily. The others went to schools, and all arrange-ments were made to set up cafeterias and issue blankets; and we got
them out of what looked like danger spots and sent them up to these
localities for two or three days, depending on how many slit trenches
were completed, and then they were allowed to return, and the slit
trenches were immediately available to their quarters so they could
get into them.

Subject: Corrections in testimony.
To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before
the Army Pearl Harbor Board:

Page 316, line 26,—after word “building” insert “period”.

/s/ Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

As soon as the attack took place G–2 and the F. B. I. started rounding
up enemy agents that they had listed. They had two lists, one of
people that were to be arrested immediately and thrown into a concentra-
tion camp, and the other a list of those to be held under observation.

Of those who were supposed to be thrown into concentration camp
that afternoon they had arrested all but four, four that they did not
find, and they got them the next day. They actually rounded up and
put over on Sand Island 370 Jap agents, 98 German agents, and 14
Italians.
Almost before the first attack was finished the 804th Engineers, which was a battalion of aviation engineers, started clearing the fields at Wheeler and Hickam, and the air men started pulling their planes and getting them together as rapidly as they could, and by 7:50 all the pursuit that was in condition to get into the air was put into the air. This pursuit actually brought down 10 Japanese planes. One brought down four, one brought down two, and the others were individual planes.

[Copy]

3141 Southwestern Boulevard,
Dallas 5, Texas, No. 10, 1944.

Subject: Corrections in testimony.
To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board:

Page 317, line 21,—change "7:50" to "8:50".

/s/ Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

I have in this report an exhibit showing exactly what batteries brought down enemy planes and what the Air Corps brought down. It shows 38. G-2 thought there was a possibility of 9 duplications. The Army brought down somewhere between 29 and 38 planes. It might have been 29; it might have been 38; [318] it might have been anything in between, because there was a number of planes brought down; and G-2 sifted the thing as carefully as possible and came to the conclusion that 29 was the minimum and 38 was the maximum of planes brought down.

The enemy planes were estimated to be somewhere between 160 and 180. In other words, we brought down somewhere between 15 and 20 per cent of the enemy planes, which I believe was a very good average in any place in the world. That percentage has not been exceeded very often, in spite of the fact that we were not instantly expecting fire attack. I think that the number of planes brought down by aircraft and antiaircraft fire is something that we need not be ashamed of. If we had known they were coming we probably would have gotten a greater percentage; but we might not get more, because it happens frequently that when flying over Europe they come back with less than 3 or 5 per cent loss.

[Copy]

3141 Southwestern Boulevard,
Dallas 5, Texas, No. 10, 1944.

Subject: Corrections in testimony.
To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board:

Page 318, line 10, change "fire" to "air".

/s/ Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

I got in touch with the Governor on the afternoon of the 7th and had a conference with him as to whether or not he should declare
martial law, and after talking it over from all angles he and I decided that we should delay martial law to give him a chance to put into effect the M-Day Bill. There were some features of the M-Day Bill—I will say that is the mobilization day bill that gave the governor the authority to create auxiliary police, home guards, auxiliary firemen and organize them, and all kinds of things. Some of those things had not been fully implemented. The Home Guards had not been called out. We felt that if we put martial law into effect immediately there was some question whether he could call them out, but delaying martial law until the next day would let him as the civil governor go ahead and implement that bill, and we would have a whole lot more to work with. So that was done. He put the basis of the M-Day Bill into effect on the 7th, and on the 8th he declared martial law and asked me to take over.

When that was done, the courts were closed, civilian officials were asked to continue on their jobs, and an advisory committee composed of the Governor as the head of it was organized, and a military commission was organized, and provost court was established. The sale of liquor was prohibited. Those were the important steps.

Almost before the bombing was over, the District Engineers had a gang of civilian workmen down at Hickam Field repairing the water lines and sewer pipes that were broken during the bombing. By that night I think we had water service, which was most important because we had, as you know to have been a fact, the aqua system of our gasoline floating on the water, and it was very inconvenient to try to use it without the water system open.

On the 8th, the morning of the 8th, I directed the District Engineer, who had a large organization, to take over all engineering supplies on the Island and to order all contractors to report to him to work under him, and take over all labor. We centralized the labor and materials in the District Engineer because he had a large organization. We let the Navy have from that pool what they had to have, and we also distributed material from that pool to the Department Engineer.

The Department Engineer was given the mission of field fortifications and anything that was to be done with troop labor. The District Engineer took over chiefly the construction of new airfields. We had had projects under way, or we had been trying to get money; we didn’t have them under way. We had the plans complete, and he started immediately on these new airfields all over the Island. We had constructed bunkers for pursuit planes. We had not constructed bunkers for the bomber planes down at Hickam because the character of the soil was such there, we had to build up. We could not dig down, and we did not have the heavy machinery necessary for doing that. He brought in these contractors, and by noon of the 8th he was in full swing at Kahuku putting in a new field, putting in bunkers at Hickam, starting expanding the field at Haleiwa, putting in a new field at Kipapa, and putting a temporary field on the golf course at Schofield.

The Department Engineer on the 8th distributed his materials and started troops on the field fortifications, and on the 9th he started making slit trenches in the parks, near school buildings, and near all
places where many people worked throughout the city, so that there would be air shelters as early as possible.

Up to the present time I have talked wholly of what was done immediately before the attack, practically from November 27th on. I would like to talk about the steps that I took to improve the fortifications on the Hawaiian Islands and to prepare the command for defense. I think that my work should be judged throughout the whole period that I was in command, from the 7th day of February until when I was relieved on December 16th.

I got there on the 5th, took over from General Herron, who left on the 7th, and by the 19th I had made a pretty thorough inspection or survey, and on the 19th I wrote a letter to the Chief of Staff outlining the things that I thought required immediate attention. I should like to go over some of those things.

First, the question of the cooperation of the Navy in getting more definite plans for our cooperation, like we did on that air. That was consummated by March 21st. That was something we could take care of very readily without money.

I took up the question of dispersion of planes for their protection, and putting the maintenance of the air underground. I took up the question of the antiaircraft defense. The garrisons of the Coast Artillery were such that almost all organizations had a dual function: they had to man harbor defenses, and they had to man antiaircraft defense. In other words, if they had an attack from the sea and the air at the same time, one of the two sets of equipment just could not be manned, and we felt that there should be enough troops there so that it would be possible to have at least one relief for both weapons.

There were certain things about the harbor defenses that apparently needed to be attended to. There was no protection for the gun crews at the harbor defenses, and that was gone into. The searchlights: we had a lot of old searchlights that were not modern, and that was taken up.

There had been relatively little done on roads and trails for the movement of reserves, and the Island is small enough that with suitable roads and trails we could move reserves very rapidly to any point. For instance, we completed one, changed one trail to a motor trail, where it had taken two hours and twenty minutes to move our reserves over the trail on foot, and after we had completed the trail we could move our reserves and occupy the points where the reserve was to go within twenty minutes. That shows the question of the time element that was important.

There had been no bombproofs or shelters for the various command posts except for the headquarters of the Department. It was felt that under present conditions it was not reasonable, where you could foresee where your command posts would be, not to give them protection for the command post and the communications.

Now, this letter was written to the Chief of Staff, and then as we got the estimates and the detail plans together they were sent in to the War Department. On September 10 we sent in complete plans for putting the maintenance for aircraft underground. Those came back on October 27 disapproved, stating that the amount of money involved, which was between three and four million dollars, was too great, and that they would not approve putting the maintenance underground,
I point out in this letter to them that the maintenance shop at Hickam Field stood up like a sore thumb: you could see it for ten or fifteen miles out, and that if we ever had an air attack it would be one of the first buildings to go, and which was very definitely proved to be true, and the maintenance was moved out soon after the attack. They started construction out in the gulches, ravines, and distributed the maintenance so it was not all in one place, could not be all destroyed at one time.

The field fortifications had never been properly camouflaged, and we made a careful estimate and put in for funds. The scheme was approved, but the funds had not been allotted. They were not available, apparently, and had not been allotted on December 7.

[324] We asked for $350,000 for roads and trails, and we got some of that and had done quite a bit of work on roads and trails for moving reserves before the attack took place.

We had asked—we made a study and showed them that it was necessary to have 180 B-17's for a proper reconnaissance in case the Navy was ever pulled out, and a correspondingly large number of pursuit planes. It was perfectly apparent that we could not accommodate those planes on the airfield we had, and we put in for authority to build ten additional airfields, and those fields were located: we were putting bombers on the outlying islands, making provisions for them so in case of an alarm we could move the bombers off of Hickam, disperse them to the outlying islands where we should not have so great losses. We were figuring on putting in fields at Barking Sands on Kauai, Burns Field on Kauai, Homestead Field on Molokai, Hilo and Morse Field on the Island of Hawaii, improve Bellows Field on Oahu, improve Haleiwa Field on Oahu, build a new field on the Island of Lanai, and a field at Parker’s Ranch on the Island of Oahu. We asked for a field at Kipapa on the Island of Oahu, but the War Department disapproved that and directed us to prepare plans for a field at Kahuiku. Those fields were all approved, but the funds had not been allotted, but we were able to go ahead and do a lot without funds.

The District Engineer worked very closely with the W. P. A., and we put up barracks on most of the outlying islands with W. P. A. money, some civilian labor, and some soldier labor, but we got them up and got started and were pretty well under way before we got any money from the War Department. We did not do anything until the plans had been approved, but when the plan [325] was approved we went ahead as far as we could go with W. P. A. funds and had quite a good start in that way.

There was another subject: that Kaneohe Bay had been quite highly developed by the Navy. Originally there had not been enough of a channel there for any of the boats to come in, so it was not any more dangerous than the rest of the east side of the Island, and they had dredged out Kaneohe Bay so that light cruisers could come in, and destroyers, without any difficulty. In other words, they had opened our back door just absolutely wide to an enemy.

Now, when that was first started the War Department or the Commander there, I am not sure which, stated that he did not raise any objection to this development, but he could not garrison it, could not defend it. Well, when I saw what the situation was, I decided that having guards at your front door and leaving the back door wide
open didn't offer very much protection, and I told the Navy I would take over the responsibility, and immediately notified the War Department of the situation, and they agreed to it, that the Army necessarily would have to take over the defense of Kaneohe Bay because it left the Island wide open otherwise, as it was not included in war garrison at all. War garrison at that time was set at 59,000, and we asked for an increase in the war garrison to 71,500 to take care of Kaneohe Bay and certain increases in the air. We had asked for increases in the Engineers for aviation purposes, and general service regiment for building roads and trails. We had gotten our increases allowed in the Engineers. We had been told that the increases for the air would not be allowed until limitation on the 59,000 war garrison was lifted.

So we were turned down on a number of things on the basis that they could not go beyond the 59,000.

I considered the airfields and the aircraft, probably the aircraft warning service, the most important of all projects that we had in the Islands. The War Department originally had agreed to furnish materials so we could have those completed by June 30th, but things were not coming along. I had almost weekly conferences with the District Engineer, who did all the aircraft warning work and all the airfield work; and Major Fleming, an engineer in my G-4 section, was my liaison officer with the District Engineer and could give many more of the details than I could, because he followed it. He was practically in daily conference with the District Engineer and the civil officer, but it became apparent that we were being slowed down terribly on that, and I sent a message that I would like to read, on the 10th of June. Here is a message I sent to the Adjutant General at that time:

(Message, June 10, 1941, LT. Gen. Short to Adjutant General, is as follows:)

Division Engineer San Francisco has informed me that the priority covering contract W dash four one four Engineer seven eight four with Interstate Equipment Corporation Elizabeth New Jersey is now A dash one dash G—

That means the priority number.

This contract is the one for furnishing all materials for cableway to Kaala aircraft warning station stop Motor and all electrical equipment sub contracted to General Electric stop Division Engineer states that [327] with this priority there is strong probability that delivery this electrical material to contractor will be delayed about fifteen weeks stop This Kaala station is the most important in aircraft warning system and early completion of this cableway is essential stop—

I want particularly to point out this last sentence:

I consider this aircraft warning service as the most important single project in this Department stop Strongly recommended that the War Department give all possible assistance to Chief of Engineers to have priority on this contract changed to A dash one dash B.

Now, I got a wire back from the Adjutant General:

(Message, June 26, 1941, Adjutant General to Lt. Gen. Short, is as follows:)

Re your radiogram three zero zero nine prior contract W dash four one four Engineers seven eight four Kaala aircraft warning station advanced to A dash one C

We asked for 1-B.

Chief of Engineers will instruct Division Engineer on procedure should results under this priority be unsatisfactory
Now, I wanted to point this out particularly because a committee of Congress, in investigating Colonel Wyman, stated that there had been no attempt by the Commanding General in Hawaii to speed up this contract. This is very plain what we had done, and the trouble as I had it at that time from the Chief of Engineers and from Major Fleming, who was my liaison, was the nonreceipt of material, and the priority system had [328] probably more to do with that than any one thing. This Kaala station, we couldn’t do a thing toward the construction there until we got that cable because everything had to be pulled up to the top of the mountain by cable. It was so steep you couldn’t get material of any weight up there any other way.

The priority proposition was very complicated. There was no one on the Island that was authorized to grant priorities. If a thing went in from the Government as a direct Government purchase, we could get the priority and get it through, but we were in the habit of buying a great deal of material locally for defense construction, and when those people ran out of supplies they could not replace them, and the only way they could get a replacement was to get us to get a priority for them. So you can see that it just slowed down all construction work if we had to wait for fifteen weeks for a priority to make the purchase, and then wait several weeks maybe for a priority to get it on the boat; and I asked them to establish an office of production management on the Island of Oahu that would handle that. They finally agreed to establish it, but it was never established during my time there. But I wanted to point that out as one of the serious difficulties in getting these air warning service stations constructed.

And the same way with all kinds of construction work. We finally got authority to build up a certain pool of lumber for the Quartermaster, no other articles but lumber. So that we were getting in additional troops, having to build barracks for new troops coming in. We were able to go ahead. The District [329] Engineer asked for a revolving fund of $1,000,000 to enable him to have supplies on hand when he got projects approved and money allotted. This was never given him, but $500,000 worth of material was purchased ahead of time from funds that the Chief of Engineers saw were going to be available, so the situation was remedied somewhat, but it was still very difficult at the time of the attack.

13. General GRUNERT. When you get to another place to pause, we shall have another recess.

General SHORT. All right. Right now.

14. General GRUNERT. Recess for five minutes, please.

(Thereupon there was a brief informal recess.)

[330] General SHORT. The construction of the ferrying route by the southern route to Australia, was one of the important things that came up. On the fourth of October, we got a wire from the War Department, saying that they wanted the northern route closed, so they would not have to use Midway and Wake, when it was constructed, and they wanted it constructed “in weeks, and not years.” That is the way it was put. That included Christmas Island, Canton Island, New Caledonia, Suva in the Fiji Islands, and Townsville, in Australia. Darwin was originally one of the places indicated, but that was then, I think, turned over to the Philippine Department. It was taken away from us.
There was no suitable places for landing grounded Army planes on these islands, so I got in touch with the Navy, made arrangements to get some large airplanes to take our engineers to these places, to make the survey, and waited, got no further instructions, sent two or three radios to the War Department. Apparently, we were all ready within a day or two, because Navy came through very nicely, with everything we needed to take Air groups there to make reconnaissances, but I heard nothing from the War Department, and I wired them, and I wired them two or three times, and we finally got authority on the 11th of November to go ahead. Apparently it had been held up while the State Department threshed out with England the permission to go ahead and build on these islands, because we claimed Canton and Christmas, and they also claimed Canton and Christmas, and so as I say we were delayed from the 4th of October till the 11th of November, before we got authority to proceed.

Between the 11th of November and the 25th of December, we [331] completed the landing of crews, so we could get the B-17s through to Australia, and a flight of three planes actually made the trip on December 28. There were great difficulties involved.

We had to bring machinery in from the States, and a lot of workmen in, from the States. Honolulu had been pretty well stripped of all heavy machinery, which slowed it down, and we divided the thing, so the work at Christmas Island was done by our engineers, the work at Canton was to be done by civilians. We had to finish it with engineers, because when the attack struck we had only two small water stills down there, in the storage, a few thousands of gallons of fresh water. We had large stills on the way, on the transport, and the Navy turned that transport back. We couldn't leave civilians there without water, to be possibly captured by the Japanese, because we had about 55 soldiers as I remember with the detail, so we sent the HALEAKALA, a boat we got from the Inter-Island Shipping Company, and took them off, and left the engineer, left the Army detachment there to finish, a thing which they succeeded in doing. I do not mean to present the idea that these were fine, finished airfields. They were strips into the prevailing wind, landing strips made out of coral, and we hadn't had time to surface them, but we actually got them through. The engineers made arrangements at the Fiji Islands with the New Zealand Government to do the work there, and made arrangements on New Caledonia to have the Australian Government do the work, because they were in control, and they were very fortunate at Townsville, Australia, because they got there and found the Australians had just completed a strip 3,500 feet long, and were going to move.

[332] They got in there, Saturday afternoon, and they were starting to move the machinery away, Monday morning, and made a contract right then and there, and we got that finished up in very short order. The result was we actually were able to put that into commission and fly planes over it on December 28. I have a letter here—I won't take the trouble to read it to you—a letter from General Arnold, stating he thought we had done the job in unbelievably short time, and it turned out to be most necessary, because the other route was absolutely out. Without that route, we would have been in very serious difficulty.
I took up—and you will find supporting letters in here; you will find letters to the Adjutant General, in a very great number of cases—increases of certain types of troops. That is especially true for the Air Corps, for the Coast Artillery, so as to have at least one relief for all their weapons, and for the engineers. Also, I got authority to change the old square division to two triangular divisions, and we put that into effect. The outlying islands had never been garrisoned. I sent on my own responsibility a battalion of National Guard to the Island of Hawaii, one to Kauai, one to Molokai, and one to Maui. We later got the approval of the War Department for expanding those garrisons and putting some artillery there.

What we were trying to do was to have enough on these important islands to put down any uprising of the Japanese population, and to prevent any small force from landing without opposition. We changed. When I got there, I found that their war plan was a highly secret order. You probably remember Field Order No. 1, General Frank. It meant that the subordinate officers couldn’t possibly know what to do, because it was so secret it was kept from them, and we decided to get out a standing operating procedure and separate all the strictly secret stuff and keep it out, so that every man in the outfit would know exactly what his mission was. We thought out this standing operating procedure after we had department maneuvers in May, and both maneuvers convinced us that the old field order just was not workable on account of the secret business. We brought out the standing operating procedure in July, worked at it, revising it in November; finally, on November 5, we put it out in its final form, and we furnished ten copies to the Navy at that time, so that they would know what our general plan of defense was.

The situation was such that I felt the time had arrived for the civil community to take an active interest in the defense of the island. I was asked to talk before the Chamber of Commerce on Army Day, April 6, 1941. I decided that that was a good time to launch this, so I would have the maximum publicity, have practically all the important business men in the islands there to talk to, and get the maximum amount of publicity from the papers.

I put up the proposition to them that there were certain things that were absolutely essential from the point of view of the civil community; first, production and storage of food. Hawaii has never been self-supporting from the point of view of food. It is not that the land is not productive, but that there has been more money in growing the pineapple and sugar than in growing things to eat—vegetables. There had been some work done for some time on planning, as to what could be grown. We got the plantation managers to agree to put in a certain number of things. One man would say he would try out so many acres of tomatoes; another one, so many acres of potatoes, and learn how to grow them in that climate and in that soil, and with the various bugs that attacked them. We carried on this work until we knew what we could do, and we had an estimate of the seeds required. We had an agreement from every big plantation owner in the Island that he would grow so many acres of such and such things, and we had a list of the light farm vehicles that would be needed in order to grow these things on the plantation.
That planning was done ahead of time. On the storage side, we thought that we should have a six-months supply on hand, there was relatively little storage space in Honolulu, and that we should get storage space constructed. Our estimates indicated that it would require about $2,500,000 to increase the storage of food to a six-months supply, and about $900,000 worth of feed for dairy cattle and poultry. We got the Governor to go after Mr. LaGuardia’s Defense Committee, to try to get the funds on that. We didn’t succeed, before December 7, but I think on December 17 that we got the funds that the Governor and Delegate King had been trying to get for us, so we had the thing under way, in that way.

The next thing I considered as of importance was the organization of the doctors and nurses. If they are not organized, in case of an emergency, they would probably be of very little help; and the Medical Association got squarely behind the project. They organized 16 surgical teams, 20 first-aid teams, and they had a considerable number of rehearsals and entered into it very enthusiastically and it paid big dividends on December 7, because they turned out and functioned almost like trained outfits, as a result.

We felt that we needed an auxiliary police force to assist in guarding the utilities, bridges, and so forth, so that the soldiers could be relieved for real fighting, in an emergency. After we got the M Day bill through, these forces were organized, and they turned out and manned the defenses on two or three different occasions, and proved to be quite valuable. We also had additional fire organizations, volunteer fire organizations, organized with the idea that if we got a bad fire from bombing we would be able to supplement the fire organization very largely. We tried to get a lot of additional hose and some additional fire engines out of LaGuardia’s Committee. We had not succeeded in getting them at the time of the attack.

We made plans. There are certain sections of Honolulu, especially adjacent to the water-front, where there is a storage of gasoline and oil and things of that kind that might start a terrific conflagration and that would certainly, if we ever go any shelling from a surface ship, it would certainly come in for its bombing, very likely too, from the air; and we drew a plan for the evacuation of all the women and children from those areas. We decided where we would locate camps to take care of them, and Colonel Lyman, the Department Engineer, drew up detail plans. After the M Day Bill was put into effect, on the 8th of December, the Governor was able to make funds available immediately, and we started the construction of those camps at once.

There was a limited amount of trucks, surgical dressings, and so forth, in the Island. We had built up some reserves in the Army, we had available for the Army itself. We couldn’t get from the War Department the funds that would be necessary to take care of the civil population in case that there were serious casualties that way. The Red Cross sent a representative out there. I had a good many conferences with him, and we persuaded them to establish a depot of $200,000 worth of Red Cross supplies. They were able to do it by a subterfuge of calling it a depot for the Far East, on the theory that it would be used for any emergency anywhere in the Far East, but we got it established, and we had a very great percentage of those supplies actually in the depot when the attack took place, so that that was extremely valuable, in taking care of the wounded, at that time.
We had made plans, a complete survey, for establishing hospitals at various places, including St. Louis College, and we actually set up that hospital. We had started, the day before. We had gotten authority to lease the buildings, and we had started setting up that hospital the day before, and we had it in full operation on the day of the attack. The two men that were probably most largely responsible for all the medical preparation were Colonel King, now General King, who was the Department Surgeon, and Colonel Fronck, the Reserve officer who had been provided us by the Regular Army, who was a surgeon in Honolulu. They had great enthusiasm and very considerable knowledge, and they did marvelous things, as it turned out.

I felt that my work in preparation for the civil community [337] was really one of the important parts of my job, because we got things where they functioned on the day of the attack, that just couldn't have functioned if we hadn't made these studies. There were some things we didn't complete. We had started an inventory of all of the food supplies on the Island. We expected to get it taken at the end of December. The merchants had agreed to do this without any expense. We had the plans all made. In the end, we took that inventory from the 8th to the 10th of December. Beginning the morning of the day after the attack, we made that inventory. We were able to tell the War Department exactly what was on hand in the Island, and where we had expected to have, and hoped to have, a 60-days supply, we found there was only 37, so we got the War Department to agree to ship a certain tonnage on, of food supplies, every week, so as to take care of the population and build up a reserve.

Again the Army was all right, we had our six-months supplies, and I had got some additional cold-storage at Schofield and was building an underground storage at Shafter, which was completed within a week after the attack; so the Army, just for taking care of itself, there was no difficulty, but there was serious difficulty from the point of view of the civil population.

Now, at the expense of boring you, I would like to read to you a letter that the Governor wrote to me, unsolicited, as a result of that work. It shows the attitude that the civil community had towards me. It reads:

Territory of Hawaii,
Executive Chambers, Honolulu
[338] 23 December 1941.

Lieutenant General Walter C. Short
Fort Shafter, T. H.

My Dear General Short: Having noted in the public press that an investigation is being made as to the military preparedness of the Army and Navy in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, I believe it appropriate that I make to you a statement as to the state of preparedness of the civil communities of these Islands for war when they were so insidiously and treacherously attacked on December 7, 1941.

The citizens of the Hawaiian Islands have always appreciated that these Islands were important to National Defense from a military standpoint, but it has been only since your arrival in these Islands on February 5, 1941, that it has been brought home to the civil population the importance of the part it would play in the event of a war in the Pacific. On December 7th, the citizens of these Islands met the hour of their test in such a manner as to make me proud to be the Chief Executive of these Islands. Your foresight in urging the population to prepare to meet the possible vicissitudes of war and the joint efforts of the Army and civil population in planning and preparing for this emergency was magnificently rewarded.

It may be of interest to point out in detail some of the plans and preparations which bore fruit on December 7, 1941:
(1) The enactment of the Hawaiian Defense Act by a special session of Legislature called for that purpose.

[339] That is what we call the "M Day Bill."

This legislation permits a mobilization of the entire civil economy of the Islands in the interest of National Defense or in the event of disaster. By virtue of this act, civilian defense was planned and many of its phases were brought to such a point of preparation that they were able to go into action immediately and to function effectively on December 7, 1941.

(2) The production and conservation of food: Householders were persistently urged to stock their shelves in canned food. It is estimated that this resulted in increasing the available food supply of the Hawaiian Islands by more than twenty percent. Federal appropriation was requested for procurement and storage for food reserve. This appropriation has, since December 7, 1941, been authorized. By agreement with plantation owners, plans were made for the procurement and storage of seed and the planting of certain large areas with quick growing food crops. Agreements were also made for the growing, in normal times, of those crops not usually grown in marketable quantities. In furtherance of this plan, the War Department was induced to permit the purchase of Island grown potatoes for the use of the Army although the price was above that of mainland potatoes. In anticipation of the receipt of reserve supplies of food asked for in the emergency, the Army supported a certificate of necessity for building an adequate warehouse to meet these needs. This warehouse is now available for the storage of food supply when it arrives.

[339] (3) The medical facilities for the care of the injured and wounded during any disaster was one of the first things accomplished by the civilians of these Islands for an emergency. This resulted in mobilizing the entire medical profession of the Islands with all its medical facilities. Approximately three thousand persons were given training and instruction in First-Aid as required by the Red Cross. The persons thus trained assisted in carrying out the arduous tasks of evacuation. Twenty First-Aid units were organized, each unit consisting of personnel of about one hundred and twenty. An ambulance corps of one hundred and forty improvised ambulances were organized. The performance of their tasks by these groups was one of the highlights of the civil defense efforts on December 7, 1941.

(4) Plans for the evacuation of women and children and the preparation of shelters for workers in essential industries had reached a high state of perfection on December 7, 1941, and the evacuation of women and children from areas attacked was accomplished in a most admirable manner.

(5) An auxiliary police force to guard utilities and to prevent sabotage was organized at an early date in our preparation and it was able to function instantly when called upon to do so on the morning of December 7th. The work of this force was exceptional and excellent.

(6) Legislation authorizing a home guard was enacted at the special session of the Territorial legislature. It was well planned and so organized that 1400 of such home guardsmen could and were placed on duty thereby relieving members of the Army for other military duty.

(7) There were many other matters too numerous to detail here which were planned and accomplished at your instigation. Important among these was the bringing home to the public the urgent necessity for cooperation and public service in times of emergency.

All of the foregoing required tremendous effort on the part of the local authorities, the citizenry and military authorities. All such efforts have been rewarded since December 7, 1941, in that Territorial and City Governments and all phases of the public welfare have overcome all obstacles and have operated smoothly as a direct result of prior planning and training.

It is my belief that the public has confidence in the military and civil authorities. The fact that the Japanese Government has seen fit to inflict a treacherous attack has not in any way diminished the faith of this community in your demonstrated abilities. I wish to state that the magnificent way in which the Territory of Hawaii met its problem in its crucial hour was in a large measure due to your foresight. I am deeply grateful for your efforts on behalf of the Territory.

You are at liberty to use this letter in any way which you see fit.

Very sincerely yours,

(s) J. B. POINDEXTER,
Governor of Hawaii.
I said that I felt that my work with the civil community was almost equally important with my work with the military as a preparation for defense; and I have here a much shorter letter that I would like to take your time to read. This letter is addressed to the President, from Honolulu.

(The letter from civilians of Honolulu to the President, dated December 22, 1941, is as follows:)

We, the undersigned, representing substantial business and social organizations in Hawaii, and having had for many years in many ways a vital interest in the armed forces stationed in Hawaii, do hereby wish to express our sincere appreciation of the services rendered to this Territory and to our Nation by Lieutenant General Walter C. Short.

We have found him at all times to be most cooperative and furthermore he has exercised a vigorous leadership in causing this community to prepare for an emergency such as exists at present. Almost a year ago he laid out a plan for this purpose and has taken all steps practicable toward carrying out such a plan.

General Short’s thorough foresight and his forceful presentation of his ideas to our “Territorial Legislature”, to our local officials, and to our community in general have been very largely responsible for (a) the enactment of a sound “M-Day” Bill; (b) for the provision of a Territorial Guard; (c) for the decision to increase stored food and to produce food; and (d) for the prevention of sabotage. He has shown a correct and sympathetic attitude toward the problems of the civil community in assuring cooperation of civilians.

He has maintained a high morale in his Command and has conducted “alerts” from time to time. He has proceeded with preparing his troops and with plans, now looking for financing from federal funds, for adequate and safe storage of sufficient supplies and equipment of all sorts for their use in a probable emergency.

We are encouraged by the fact that a committee has been appointed to go into various phases of the entire case, believing that the excellent men you have selected will render a just report, fair to all concerned.

Meanwhile, we wish to express to yourself and to all concerned our high esteem and our full confidence in the character and ability of General Walter C. Short as a citizen and as an officer, whatever his assignment may be.

This letter is prepared without the knowledge or consent of General Short or any other official, merely in our hope that no unwarranted discredit may accrue to the record of such a conscientious and able officer, through adverse publicity or otherwise. This concern is in no way lessened by our vital interest in the adequate defense of Hawaii and our Nation.

With very best respects and wishes, we are

Yours very truly.

The important part of this letter is the people who signed it.

The mayor of the City of Honolulu; the president of the Hawaiian Trust Company, Limited; the vice-president of Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd.; the president of the Oahu Railway & Land Co.; the president of Lewers & Cook, Ltd.; Assistant Food Administrator, O. C. D.; the Governor of Hawaii; the chief justice of the Supreme Court; the Director of Civilian Defense for Oahu; the President of Theo H. Davies & Co., Ltd.; Executive Vice-President, Bishop National of Hawaii and Honolulu; Executive Vice-President, Bishop Trust Co., Ltd.; Executive Vice-President, Hawaiian Sugar Planters Association; President, American Factors, Ltd.; Treasurer, American Factors, Ltd.; President, C. Brewer & Co., Ltd.; Trustee, Bernice P. Bishop Estate; Territorial Director of Civilian Defense; Manager, Merchandise Department, Alexander & Baldwin, Ltd.

Those of you who know Honolulu know that that list represents pretty nearly all the important business organizations in Honolulu, and it means much more than the same number of names would mean...
in any community in the United States. There is a closer organization over there. I read it as an indication of what the civil community thought of the work I had done.

That is all I have, except that I would like to present my conclusions and I would like to read them—a couple of pages—so as to give them rather exact instead of just speaking them, if that is satisfactory.

(The conclusions are as follows:)

1. The radiogram from the War Department through CINCUS Fleet of October 16th emphasized that measures taken by me during the grave situation of the Japanese negotiations should not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan.

The radiogram of November 27th reiterated that action should be carried out so as “not repeat not to disclose intent,” not alarm civil population, and avoid unnecessary publicity.

[345] When the War Department was notified that the Hawaiian Department was alerted against sabotage it not only did not indicate that the command should be alerted against a hostile surface, sub-surface, ground or air attack, but replied emphasizing the necessity for protection against sabotage and subversive measures. This, taken in connection with the two previous radiograms mentioned, indicated to me a tacit consent to the alert against sabotage ordered by the Hawaiian Department.

I would like to interpose there that General Gerow’s testimony before the Board showed that there had not been enough check made to even be aware that an answer had been received.

2. The Hawaiian Department is not provided with an agency for locating enemy ships in various parts of the world. Such information as it may acquire on this subject must be obtained from the Fourteenth Naval District or from the War Department.

The “Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaiian Coastal Frontier” placed upon the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District the responsibility for distance reconnaissance. Annex #7 to the “Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan” provides that when naval forces are insufficient for long distance patrol and search operations and army aircraft are made available, these will be under the tactical control of the naval command during search operations. That means that the army planes receive their missions and all instructions from the naval commander and carry out the search as he deems necessary in order to carry out his responsibility for distant reconnaissance.

[346] “During the period November 27th to December 6th, the Navy made no request for army planes to participate in distant reconnaissance. To me this meant that they had definite information of the location of enemy carriers or that the number unaccounted for was such that naval planes could make the necessary reconnaissance without assistance from the army. During this period I was in frequent conferences with the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Fleet and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, and at no time was anything said to indicate that they feared the possibility of an attack by the Japanese by air. In fact, the sentiment was expressed by a naval staff officer that there was no probability of such an attack. With a large part of the United States Navy in Hawaiian waters and with their sources of information, I was convinced that the Navy would be able either to intercept any carrier attempting to approach Oahu or at least to obtain such information from task forces or by reconnaissance as to make them aware of the presence of carriers in the Hawaiian waters and of the possibility of an air attack.

3. Action of the War Department on December 5th, and as late as 1:30 A.M., Eastern standard time, December 7th, in dispatching planes from the mainland to Honolulu without ammunition indicated that the War Department did not believe in the probability of an early Japanese attack upon Honolulu.

I might add there that General Marshall’s testimony stated frankly that the attack was a surprise to him, and he felt that the greatest threat was in the Philippine Islands.

[347] I felt that I had a right to expect the War Department to furnish me by the most rapid means possible information should a real crisis arise in
Japanese relations. I did not expect that when the crisis arose the desire for secrecy would be considered more important than the element of time. Had the message in regard to the Japanese ultimatum and the burning of their code machines been given me by telephone as an urgent message in the clear without loss of time for encoding and decoding, etc., I, in all probability, would have had approximately two hours in which to make detailed preparations to meet an immediate attack.

4. I feel that my work in the Hawaiian Department should be judged by my activities throughout the complete period from the assumption of command on February 7th until my relief upon December 16th. I believe that any careful examination of my work during that period will prove that I have worked very seriously at the job and have accomplished measures of very considerable importance. I do not see how I could better have carried out what appeared to be the desires of the War Department unless I was supposed to know more than the War Department about the danger of Japanese attack and more than the Navy Department about the location of the Japanese carriers. To have taken more steps in preparation against a Japanese attack than I did would certainly have alarmed the civil population and caused publicity contrary to War Department instructions. I do not believe that I should be found guilty even of an error in judgment because I did not have the vision to foresee that the War Department would not notify me of a crisis in the least possible time [348] and that the Navy with its large fleet in Hawaiian waters would not be able to carry out its mission of intercepting Japanese carriers, or at least detecting their presence in Hawaiian waters and informing me of the fact.

That concludes my statement, General.

15. General GRUNERT. Do I understand that in addition to that verbal statement you have a written statement?

General Short. I want to submit this (exhibiting). It has everything that I have covered in it except my statement with reference to the statement of General Marshall and of General Gerow, and it has supporting documents, the letters to the War Department requesting funds, requesting increases of certain troops, and authority to build air fields, and so forth, and the action of the War Department; and it is indexed, so that I think the Board without any difficulty can find anything it wants.

16. General GRUNERT. We will take a recess at this time until 2 o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 12: 18 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p. m.)

[349]

**Afternoon Session**

(The Board at 2 p. m. continued the hearing of witnesses.)

17. General GRUNERT. The Board will please come to order.

I understand that there is a list of names submitted by General Short of witnesses who possibly have knowledge of the facts. I understood from his adviser, General Green, that they had no particular reason to call these witnesses except that they thought they knew of the facts; but if there are any particular facts that General Short would like to have the Board look after and bring out by calling these witnesses, or when these witnesses appear before the Board, then I suggest that after each one of those names they list the points that they would like to have the Board inquire into. The Board will probably do so anyway, but in that way we shall be sure to cover the ground with respect to which General Short thinks they have knowledge of facts.

General Short. I think in all cases but probably one that the job that they are indicated as holding would indicate pretty clearly what you indicated. Now, Fleming, I think I just showed, was Assistant G-4, but he was my liaison man with the District Engineer for all the
work that he did for us for the ferrying group, and to a considerable extent after General Hayes left the Department he was my liaison man there.

18. General Grunert. I think that the Board gathered that through your statement this morning and would naturally cover those points.
   General Short. Yes.

19. General Grunert. But if you wish to give us a list of those points on which you suggest that the Board inquire into as far as that witness is concerned, I shall be glad to have you give a report of that.
   General Short. Yes. The others I think would just logically, from the jobs they had, inquire into the things that would be pertinent.

20. General Grunert. All right.

21. Colonel West. Do you swear that the contents of that file that you are about to introduce into evidence are true, to your best knowledge and belief, so help you God?
   General Short. Yes.

22. General Grunert. That written statement will be made a part of the record.

23. General Frank. Should it not be referred to as the exhibit so and so marked in such and such a manner?

24. Colonel West. I was simply trying to get away from making it an exhibit so that we would not have to make extra copies of it for every part of the record. I think if we can just incorporate it by reference in the record and say it was received and made a part of the file of the Board it would be preferable, sir.

   General Green. We can furnish them five copies of them when we get them.
   General Short. I can furnish that many.

[Copy]

3141 SOUTHWESTERN BOULEVARD,
Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 1944.

Subject: Corrections in testimony.
To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board:
   * * * * * * * * * * * *
   Page 350, line 25,—after word "can" insert "not".
   * * * * * * * * * * * *

   /s/ Walter C. Short
   WALTER C. SHORT,
   Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

26. Colonel West. Or we can make that an exhibit originally. I suggest, then, we mark this Exhibit 1.
   General Green. You mark it and give it back. I have to use it.

[351] 27. Colonel West. This is the first official exhibit, then, Exhibit No. 1.
   (Bound file of documents presented by General Short and sworn to by him was marked Exhibit 1 and received in evidence.)

28. General Grunert. All right; we shall proceed.
General Short's verbal statement has furnished answers to many of the questions the Board desired to propound. However, I shall proceed to open up the various topics on my agenda and review the questions I have on each such topic, changing some in the light of the knowledge gleaned, and adding others. Should I ask any that have been answered in the statement, the witness or members of the Board will please indicate that they have been so answered, so that we shall not waste time in repetition. When I have finished with each topic, after my own questions I will give each Board member an opportunity to question the witness on that topic before passing to the next.

General Short, will you please state the period during which you commanded the Hawaiian Department, and whom you succeeded in command?

General Short. I commanded the Hawaiian Department from February 7, 1941, to December 16, 1941. I succeeded Lieutenant General Charles D. Herron.

29. General Grunert. Will you also please state whether you know how you came to be selected for that command?

General Short. I was commanding the 1st Corps down at Columbia, South Carolina, and received a personal letter from the Chief of Staff stating that—I guess that was along about the middle of December—stating that he thought of detailing me to command the Hawaiian Department. It happened that my wife's father had been quite ill not so very long before, and she was rather anxious not to go outside of the country; so I wrote and said to the Chief of Staff if it were purely a routine assignment I would rather not have it, but if it were in the nature of anything unusual on account of world conditions, that naturally I would be glad to go, and he came back and said I would be sent.

30. General Grunert. Any questions on that particular phase?

(No response.)

Will you briefly state what instructions, if any, you received concerning the Hawaiian Department prior to assumption of command, particularly as to your mission and responsibilities, if that has not already been covered in your statement?

General Short. It has not. I came down to Washington just before leaving the East, I think about the, oh, first week in January, and I saw the Chief of Staff for a few minutes, but he did not go into particulars of my mission at all.

31. General Grunert. Any questions?

32. General Russell. Yes, I have some, General.

At that time, General Short, did you have a conference with the War Plans Division, as it was known at that time?

General Short. I spent two days around the War Department, and I had a considerable number of conferences, trying to find out what they had in the way of equipment, whether their equipment was modern, and, where it was not, when that we were going to get it. Things of that kind. But I remember I had a conference with General Spaatz about the air equipment over there. I had a conference with somebody who had been in Hawaii fairly recently, about the developing of air fields on the outlying islands. I had a conference with someone about the type of artillery that they had in
Hawaii. I think they still, as I remember, had some British 75s at that time.

I had a number of conferences of that kind trying to find out how the command was equipped and what the prospect was of getting more modern equipment. I do not remember the names of a lot of people. I think I talked with General Gerow, who was in the War Plans. I know I talked with General Spaatz, and it has been four years: I don't remember the other people I did talk with. It has been three years and probably eight months.

There is one thing I remember that I particularly talked with General Spaatz about, because he had just come back from England. I talked at considerable length with him about the question of dispersion and protection of airplanes, because we had not had an awful lot at that time in this country about it, and he was probably the best informed man we had.

33. General Russell. Did you know the mission of the Hawaiian Department at that time, General Short?

General Short. I think I did. I undoubtedly went over that with War Plans Division.

34. General Grunert. Will you briefly state what pertinent instructions, information, and so forth you received from your predecessor, particularly as to your missions and responsibilities?

General Short. He had a very considerable list of things that he thought it would be well—where he kept notes himself—would be well for me to talk to him about, and we spent pretty much the whole of an afternoon going over those points.

35. General Grunert. Were there any particular points that now occur to you that stand out in that turnover?

General Short. Well, I think probably the deficiencies in personnel and equipment, that he perhaps laid more emphasis on that than anything else, and there was a problem that I think had been making him think quite a bit, that at that time they were calling in the drafts, and the first draft ran about 66 or 67 percent Japanese, and I believe that the second draft had just come in at that time and that it was higher. I am quite sure that we called the third draft in later, which finally got up to 89 percent, but I think that that was one of the things that kind of worried General Herron a little bit about the assignment of those people and the employment of the National Guard, because the National Guard over there was just a cross section of the population: we had everything in the world.

36. General Frank. What was that?

General Short. The National Guard, which was called out in the Federal service. It was strictly a cross section of the population: Hawaiians, Chinese, Koreans, Japanese, and he was a little doubtful just to what extent we should put those people in various responsible positions.

37. General Grunert. General Short, do you recall a letter of February 7, '41, from the Chief of Staff in which he generally brings to your mind certain conditions about the Hawaiian Defense Command?

General Short. May I take a look at the letter, because it was not received on that date, and I do not recall it exactly by date.

38. General Grunert. It starts right there. It is rather a lengthy one (indicating).
General Short. Oh, yes. Yes, I recall that very well.

39. General Grunert. Was there anything in that letter that was new to you, that had not been referred to in your turnover by General Herron?

General Short. No. The one thing that that letter emphasized to me, I think more than anything else, was the necessity for the closest cooperation with the Navy. I think that that part of the letter impressed me more than anything else.

40. General Grunert. Do you recall this particular expression in that letter: “The risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid by air and by submarine constitute the real perils of the situation”?

General Short. I remember that letter and remember it generally. I do not remember just exactly the expression. I remember that those things were emphasized.

41. General Grunert. About that time or from that time on through the rest of the summer and into the fall, you have pretty well out-lined what steps you took toward improving the Hawaiian Department defenses, but were you at all deeply concerned as to or respecting the probability of an attack by an enemy air raid? If so, what did you do during the succeeding months to minimize the effect of such a raid if it occurred?

General Short. Because of the information I had from the Navy and the Navy strength that was there, I was not exercised at any one time as to the possibility of an immediate attack. I realized that there was a possibility of a considerable part of that navy being moved out at some time and that the danger would become very acute. With that in mind, I made a special effort to bring the antiair equipment up to date and to get enough coast artillery personnel that we would not have to have dual assignments and to get the aircraft warning service functioning. As I read to you this morning, I wired the War Department that I considered the aircraft warning the most important project in the whole Department.

42. General Russell. General, I do not want to crash in on your plan there, but General Short has just given an answer here that attracts attention to something that I do not recall having been in the record before.

General, you stated that you, visualizing a time when the Navy or a substantial part of it might be away from Pearl Harbor,—

General Short. Yes, sir.

43. General Russell. —that you emphasized then the perfection of your antiaircraft defense. What part was the Navy playing in the antiaircraft defense that might be dissipated by the Navy’s going away?

General Short. They had no landing fields closer than 2100 miles. They could not, with land planes, attack Honolulu at that time. They didn’t have planes. I figured as long as the Navy was there in such force that they could not bring the carriers into position from which they could attack the Island without the Navy either knowing where they were or getting enough information to know that they were somewhere in the vicinity; and with the Navy away, why, I realized that they could run carriers in, without any question, and make an attack.
44. General Russell. Well, I have read since lunch here an extract from this Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, in two paragraphs of which are outlined Army and Navy missions, and one of the Navy missions was attacking enemy naval forces. The thing that you are testifying about now is that you thought if the Navy was in there in carriers they would prevent carriers from approaching within—
   General Short. Striking distance.
45. General Russell. Striking distance?
   General Short. Yes, sir.
46. General Russell. I just wanted to clarify that.
47. General Frank. I would like to determine, upon what did you base that assumption? Did you believe that the presence of the fleet in being at Pearl Harbor constituted a security?
   General Short. It did, because they constantly had task forces out, and they had carriers with those task forces, and they spread their planes out from the task forces, and it seemed to me that there was every reasonable chance that they would discover enemy carriers or get enough information to know that they were dangerous.
48. General Frank. To get into your relations with the Navy: Did you feel that you always—
49. General Russell. Do you not have that somewhere?
50. General Grunert. That comes in a later topic, but you may develop these now if you do not go too deeply into it. Since you have already asked it, go ahead.
51. General Frank. Well, he has just given an answer that [358] opens up this.
52. General Grunert. Everything will open up everything else.
   Go ahead.
53. General Frank. It opens up this question.
   Will you please read the last thing I said, Mr. Reporter?
   (The pending unfinished question of General Frank, as above recorded, was read by the reporter.)
54. General Frank. Did you feel that you always had full information on what the Navy was doing?
   General Short. I would like to put it this way: I felt that Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch, either one, would have definitely given me anything that they thought had any bearing on my job; that if they were sure that it was an absolutely inside naval proposition that did not concern me in any way, they might not have given it to me. I do not know whether that is in answer to your question, but—
55. General Frank. The question as to whether or not you got the information was placed upon a trust that you had that they would have given it to you?
   General Short. Absolutely.
56. General Frank. If they in their judgment thought—
   General Short. Thought.
57. General Frank. —that you were interested?
   General Short. Thought it was of any value to me or that I was interested.
58. General Frank. Do you feel that you were secure in that?
   General Short. I do not know what other basis you could work on. I had no right to demand that they give me all information they had. [359] 59. General Frank. Did you know each time a task force went out?
General Short. Not officially. I think I most always did personally because I talked with Admiral Kimmel particularly. I saw more of him than I did of Admiral Bloch, and whenever I saw him, which was usually at least once a week, he told me what they were doing.

60. General Frank. A task force could have gone out and back in a period of a week, however, without your ever knowing anything about it?

General Short. Oh, yes, and they were sending—they had a task force out all the time, and it was a routine training with them. Of course, if we were putting on an air problem with them or if there was something like a marine landing, as I spoke of this morning, down at Johnston Island, they were telling me particularly about that because they would figure I would want to send someone.

61. General Frank. You did not constantly know where task forces were?

General Short. No, except as we happened to talk about it in a personal kind of a way.

62. General Frank. And by the same token you did not know how much of the perimeter of Honolulu was being covered, nor when any part of it was being covered?

General Short. Now, what do you mean by “perimeter”?

63. General Frank. The 360 degrees around Oahu.

General Short. No, I did not. I did not know exactly what the reconnaissance was. I did know in general terms that it was largely to the west. I think that they did most of their [360] task work to the west, from the north around to the west, to the south; that if you would go from a little bit east of Midway Island and draw your circle towards the west through Palmyra, Johnston, Canton, Christmas, that you would cover the area that they felt was most dangerous and that they operated in the most.

[361] 64. General Frank. Were you advised that there was a Japanese task force in the Marshalls, between the 25th and 30th of November?

General Short. No, sir. In fact, as I remember the thing, I was led to believe that there was a task force of Japanese out somewhere to the south of Japan, but not in those islands. My feeling was that it was more directed toward the Philippines.

65. General Frank. You had no knowledge?

General Short. At least, I don't remember that I had any. That is my recollection, that my information was that the Japanese ships were either in their home ports or had been sent to the south.

66. General Frank. Would you not have been concerned if you had gotten the information that there was a Japanese force——

General Short. In the mandated islands? Yes, yes.

67. General Frank. There was a piece of information that Navy had that they did not give you?

General Short. Yes, that may have happened. Did they have definite information to that effect, or was it rumor?

68. General Frank. It was information that is reported in the Roberts report, of which they were sufficiently confident to notify the Navy Department in Washington.

General Short. In a report from Kimmel, you mean, or from the Asiatic Fleet?

69. General Frank. From Kimmel to Washington.
General Short. To Washington? Well, I don’t remember it, if he gave it, and I think I would have remembered it, because I do remember that we talked about the location of the fleet during that period, and as I remember it, it was rumored that the Japanese ships were partly in their home ports, and that what were not there, they thought were proceeding to the south.

70. General Frank. The basis of your feeling of security then was the belief that the Navy was effectively at its job?

General Short. I would rather say, a confidence, than a belief—a confidence that they were working at their job and doing it effectively.

71. General Grunert. The next item I would like to ask some questions on is that of the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, which the Board understands was the basic plan for the defense of Hawaii. Did not that plan charge the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department with providing antiaircraft defense of Oahu, with particular attention to Pearl Harbor naval base and naval forces present?

General Short. I would say, with particular attention to the Pearl Harbor naval base. I don’t remember that it mentioned the naval ships present. I don’t know; it may; but I don’t remember that it does.

72. General Grunert. But that brings into question this: Did the Commanding General keep himself informed as to naval forces present? If not, why not? Part of that has been covered. Did you consider that your job in defending Pearl Harbor as a naval base was greater when the Fleet was present in the harbor, or when the major part was not in the harbor?

General Short. I would have considered that the task forces out lessened my job very greatly, because it made the danger of attack much less. That is, if they bottlenecked everything up in the harbor, that my job would be very much more difficult, because I wouldn’t count on the knowledge they would have, and their ability to stop carriers coming in.

73. General Frank. I would just like to clarify my own mind on what your inference, there, is. Do you mean by your answer that as a result of the task forces being out, you felt a certain security, in that they would have covered the area around, and therefore would have provided you with negative information that the enemy was not in the vicinity?

General Short. That was correct. I considered the task forces they had out at that time would cover 1,200 to 1,800 miles of ocean pretty thoroughly.

74. General Frank. That was all part of your confidence in the effectiveness of the Navy?

General Short. Yes. The more task forces they had out, the less they had to do with long-distance air reconnaissance.

75. General Grunert. Then you did not consider that you had to check up on the number of vessels in or out, or going in or out?

General Short. I would say frankly that I imagine that as a Senior Admiral, Kimmel would have resented it if I had tried to have him report every time a ship went in or out, and as I say, our relations were such that he gave me without any hesitancy any piece of information that he thought was of interest.
76. General Grunert. Of course, your control post must have known?

General Short. They did, in Hawaii; they knew before the attack. We had one officer, a "noncom," a lieutenant colonel—I have forgotten his name—Dingman, or something of that kind—and a sergeant, who were there, to work chiefly to learn how to work with the Navy on that, to see what the problem was, and whenever we had any kind of maneuver, then we increased that to three, so as to have a 24-hour shift, and during the day hours, that he would be on there, he would know what came out; but he wasn't there. One man couldn't be there 24 hours in the day, and we had only one, except during the periods of maneuvers.

77. General Grunert. I don't know what it was then, but now, in all these important harbors, there is an Army officer on duty 24 hours of the day, whose business it is to act in emergencies, in getting immediate connection with the commanding officer of the harbor defenses, and be particularly on the alert. All the harbor defense is particularly concerned whenever there is a convoy or a large number of ships in the harbor. Now, did that not appear necessary in 1941?

General Short. During the period that this officer was at the control post, he kept up that work with the harbor defense, to tell them whether they were ships that should be fired on or should not be fired on. Of course, after the December 7 attack, we had 24 hours a day of a Coast Artillery officer right there so that he would receive the maximum information, through the Navy, as to whether that was a friendly ship or not.

78. General Grunert. But up to that time it was not considered necessary?

General Short. The man, the one officer and one man were there to keep up this touch, and the training, and to keep the Coast Artillery in touch, so that there wouldn't be anything new when we did put on three in an emergency.


80. General Frank. There was a Japanese submarine that was attacked on information from the Navy, right there in the immediate vicinity of Pearl Harbor, on the morning of December 7?

General Short. Yes, sir.

81. General Frank. When were you advised of that?

General Short. I didn't know of it till after the attack. I don't think I knew it till the 8th.

82. General Frank. Until the 8th?

General Short. Yes. Of course, after the attack, why, it wasn't of any particular importance. I think it was the 8th when Admiral Kimmel himself told me about that.

83. General Frank. Knowledge of that would have been important?

General Short. Knowledge of that would have been very important, because if I had had it, about 7:15, I could have dispersed my planes. I couldn't have got them into the air, there wasn't time enough, long enough to get them into the air, but I could have dispersed them and lessened the losses.

They did not connect it with the general raid, they thought it was separate.
84. General Grunert. In protecting the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, which later referred to the protection of the naval and air base, it would appear that the idea of protecting that base is to protect what is inside of that. Now, I just ran across this paragraph, 17-a of this Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, which reads as follows:

The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, shall provide for—

a. The beach and land, seacoast and antiaircraft defense of OAHU with particular attention to the [366] PEARL HARBOR NAVAL BASE and naval forces present thereat, HONOLULU HARBOR, CITY OF HONOLULU, and the SCHOFIELD BARRACKS-WHEELER FIELD-LUALUAlei area.

General Short. That is the ammunition. I would like to expand.

85. General Grunert. That seems to emphasize the naval forces "present thereat."

General Short. I would like to expand on that a little. We hadn't gotten to the degree of coordination of antiaircraft fire where we took over the antiaircraft fire, or of the ships in the harbor. Now, that might come any time. With the Marines at Ewa, it came under air command. There were naval guns, and, through naval guns, the ships themselves, their antiaircraft facilities did not function under the antiaircraft commander.

86. General Grunert. That was not tied in with your antiaircraft defense?

General Short. No; we hadn't gotten that far in the coordination, and I think it would take some time to perfect it to the point where it would be possible.

87. General Frank. I would like to ask a question. Really, what is the difference in your employment and deployment, whether the Fleet is in or out?

General Short. There would be none, as far as our own guns were concerned, but if you bring in a lot of ships there with a great deal of antiaircraft on them, then if you were going to be a coordinated whole, it might affect your dispositions quite a little bit; but as I say, our coordination hadn't gotten to the point where that we were planning a control of [367] antiaircraft fire of the guns that were actually—of the ships that were actually anchored in the harbor.

88. General Frank. So far as your mobile antiaircraft artillery was concerned, it would go——

General Short. We made no changes. We were deployed so as to protect that basin, and the fact that there would be some additional antiaircraft fire from ships in there did not cause us to change any——

89. General Frank. When the Fleet was in?

General Short. —because we thought that the battle danger was greater with them in there, and it was also more dangerous to the enemy, and that there was also the possibility of doing more damage when they were in there, so it was better to have a greater volume of fire right there.

I do not know whether that answers your question, or not.

90. General Frank. And the employment of your aircraft was the same, or different?

General Short. It was the same.

91. General Frank. In both cases?

General Short. Yes, except that we would just add that much more antiaircraft from the ships that were actually there. They were, however, not controlled by us.
92. General Grunert. Under this Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, wasn't the Army charged with providing antiaircraft intelligence warning services, and the protection of landing fields and naval installations?

General Short. That is correct.

93. General Grunert. Also with the establishment of an inshore aerial patrol of the Oahu defensive coastal area, in cooperation with the Naval inshore patrol and the antiaircraft warning service for the Hawaiian Islands?

General Short. The only possible value of the inshore patrol, which extended not beyond 20 miles, was for picking up submarines. Any information on air that you got from a patrol at not more than 20 miles out would be worth so little that you might as well not have it.

94. General Grunert. But you were charged with—

General Short. We were charged with that, and as I say, it was of value chiefly as to submarines, and I might add, there, also, that while 20 miles was the limit on the thing, that most of the time our patrols were limited to 10 miles on account of having single-engine planes, and the Air felt that in peacetime they shouldn't take unnecessary risks in flying over the water.

95. General Grunert. We will come back again to this question of reconnaissance and inshore patrol, a little later. Are there any other questions? If not, I will go to the next subject.

It appears that on the 24th of January, 1941, the Secretary of the Navy wrote a letter to the Secretary of War, and he in his reply stated in effect that all the materiel for the antiaircraft or the air warning service would be there in Hawaii not later than June, 1941. This is the Secretary of War's reply of February 7, which, in paragraph 6, states:

I am forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making these measures effective.

[369] Do you recall that?

General Short. I recall that, very well, and we kept after it, trying to get—if you remember, this morning I read you a wire I sent, in June—I think, June 10—in which I told him that all this materiel was held up, and that, largely on account of the priority proposition, and trying to get the priority changed to 1-B. They advanced it to 1-C, but they never did advance it to 1-B.

96. General Grunert. That letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of War states in part as follows:

The dangers envisaged, in their order of importance and probability, are considered to be (1) air bombing attack, (2) air-torpedo-plane attack, (3) sabotage, (4) submarine attack, (5) mining, (6) bombardment by gunfire. Defense against all but the first two of these dangers appears to have been provided for satisfactorily.

What definite action was taken, as to taking effective measures? What dispositions were made, or plans revised, exercises held, or cooperation with the Navy, to look after those particular points which the Secretary of War had sent out and ordered or directed that action be taken? What was done following that?

General Short. In the first place, we kept hammering on that to get the weapons that had been allotted. For instance, we had 140 or 145 37-mm. guns we were supposed to get, but we never did get but
20, before December 7. We were supposed to get some more 90-mm. guns; we never got them. Now, that is on the question of equipment sought. We were also trying to get personnel, so we would not have to have dual assignments. Every Coast Artillery outfit practically had to use the same man to man the harbor defenses and antiaircraft. If you had an attack of both kinds at the same time, you couldn't possibly specify both means.

Now, on the question of using what we had—we had a minimum. From March 21, on, we had a minimum of one exercise a week between the Air of the Army and the Air of the Navy, and worked very hard at the question of coordination; and I think we learned a lot.

97. General Grunert. What measures would you say bore directly on these points made, particularly in preparation to combat an air attack?

General Short. First of all trying to get the equipment and personnel.

98. General Grunert. Equipment for what?

General Short. For the antiaircraft.


General Short. Equipment and personnel, they were. It was the aircraft and antiaircraft chiefly. We tried to get more pursuit planes. We tried to get more long-range bomber planes, so that we could give them assistance in the distant reconnaissance, and then we worked with them, as I say, at least once a week, learning how to work together.

100. General Grunert. Then the air warning service loomed largely?

General Short. I believe the General and I considered it the most important single project we had.

101. General Grunert. Then the interceptor command, which included the air warning service and the handling of the anti-

General Short. I might say that that question of interceptor command was a brand-new thing in the States. I think it was early fall before they went to that command in the States, and they had a school, and we sent two air people, General Davidson and another air officer, Colonel Powell, of the Signal Corps, and one of his officers, back, so as to try to institute the very latest thing out in interceptor command, because the idea was completely new. They ordered, first, two officers over there, and we wired and asked if we couldn't increase it to four so we would get the benefit of several points of view.

102. General Grunert. All right, we will develop that subject a little more, later. We will come first to the Joint Air Operations Agreement, of March 21, which is one I understand was in effect on December 7. Under that agreement was the Army charged with the tactical command of the defense of air operations over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu?

General Short. They were.

103. General Grunert. Was that agreement well understood by both the Army and the Navy?

General Short. Fully understood. It was maneuvered quite constantly.

104. General Grunert. I want to refer to one of the things brought out by your statement this morning—control of Army and Navy
planes over the sea and over the land. As I understood it, when they
functioned over the sea, the Navy controlled, and when they func-
tioned over the land, the land defense generally controlled?

[372] General Short. I wouldn’t say exactly that if they func-
tioned over water in the immediate vicinity of Oahu, then the Army
controlled; it was a question of whether you were sending out to some
distance to attack an enemy fleet; then it was definitely Navy. If
the enemy’s planes were coming in attacking Honolulu, our pursuit
might chase them 20 or 25 miles out there, but they would still be
under Army command.

105. General Grunert. What I am interested in is if you turned
them over to the Navy for attack outside, and then the force keeps
coming in, during that transition period, are they then turned back
to the Army for the main defense?

General Short. Well, if you visualize it, there would probably be
a period there when it would be pretty hard to say who was control-
lng. As I see the thing, what you have suggested would only take
place if the enemy licked the air forces sent out, and chased them
back in; and when the enemy followed them in there, naturally,
everything that the Army had would strike the enemy, and if there
was anything left of the pursuit planes that were being chased by
the enemy, I suppose sooner or later, in a reasonably short time, they
would get under control of the Army; but there would be a period
there where you probably would hardly know who was controlling a
particular squadron, if they were being chased.

106. General Grunert. That would seem to indicate to me that the
joint command would probably have solved the question better than
command by cooperation?

General Short. You mean unity of command?


General Short. Undoubtedly.

[373] 108. General Grunert. Was there anything in that joint
agreement, the Joint Air Operations Agreement, that provided who
would track planes from the time they attacked and left the land
defense and went back to their carriers? Whose job was that?

General Short. That was the Navy’s job. Now, I don’t know
whether the joint plan specifically words that, but it was thoroughly
understood that it was the Navy’s job; and, right during the attack,
General Martin called up and talked with Admiral Bellinger twice,
and asked for a specific mission for tracking, which way he wanted
him to go; and when he didn’t get it, he at 11:27 sent planes out on
his own mission, because he had not been assigned a mission, and he
had something they could use.

109. General Grunert. In that Joint Air Agreement, what was
the agreement about the reconnaissance?

General Short. The Navy were definitely responsible for distant
reconnaissance.

110. General Grunert. What did you understand “distant recon-
aissance” to mean?

General Short. Anything beyond the 20-mile zone.

111. General Grunert. And what means did the Navy have for
such distant reconnaissance, if the Navy should have happened to be
out?
General Short. There was a certain number of planes, squadrons that were assigned, that were not supposed to go out with the Fleet. Of course, that probably would be changed, as the Fleet had different missions, but we had talked over that a good deal, and they were trying, I think, to arrive at enough planes that they could always leave a certain number of \[374\] squadrons under the command of the 14th Naval District.

112. General Grunert. If you were not satisfied with the Navy distant reconnaissance, did you feel that it was your responsibility to do any such distant reconnaissance if it threatened your defense?

General Short. I had only six planes that I could have used for distant reconnaissance solely.

113. General Grunert. If you had had ample planes, would you have considered it your responsibility?

General Short. If I had had ample planes and felt that the Navy were not doing the job, undoubtedly I would have talked it over with them, and if they had refused to do the job under those conditions, I would have asked the War Department to abrogate the agreement, and go ahead and do it. We had made a very comprehensive study, because we visualized the Navy's being away to such an extent that we would have to take over the reconnaissance, and you probably have seen that study where we arrived at the conclusion we needed 180 Flying Fortresses, and it was a rather well done, rather scientific study, I thought, and the air people put a lot of thought on it.

114. General Grunert. Did your so-called "close-in" reconnaissance mean to you the inshore patrol?

General Short. That is what it would amount to; yes. We had a reconnaissance outfit at Bellows Field, and we put in a certain number of hours every day, training on reconnaissance; and they primarily did that.

115. General Grunert. What value was the inshore patrol to the Army as a defensive measure?

General Short. None, except for submarines that might come to the surface and shell some installation.

116. General Grunert. Did you know whether or not the Navy conducted its distant reconnaissance regularly, or spasmodically, or what?

General Short. I knew that they had these task forces out all the time, with carriers, and that as part of the task force exercise, they always sent the planes approximately 300 miles each way. I knew that they did a certain amount of patrolling from Midway and Wake and Johnston Island, and I didn't know specifically—I don't know that it was the same thing every day. I don't know what the variation was. I knew that they were doing that kind of work constantly.

117. General Grunert. Then you did not know whether the 360 degrees of the compass were covered that way?

General Short. I knew it couldn't be covered.

118. General Grunert. Could not be?

General Short. Could not be. Nobody had the navy force to cover it; it was impossible.

119. General Grunert. Then did you in the absence of information of any danger consider it necessary to assure yourself the Navy was giving the 360-degree coverage?
General Short. They couldn't. I was confident that they didn't have enough to do it. That was one reason we put in that study on the question of how many B-17's it would take to do the job, and that careful study made it perfectly plain that the combined Army and Navy didn't have anything like enough.

120. General Grunert. Then for your understanding, the Navy did not have enough to do its full job of distant reconnaissance, and you did not have enough to do anything on your own?

[376] General Short. That is correct. I had enough to assist them some, if they asked for it.

[377] 121. General Grunert. Outside of your knowing whether a task force was out or not, did the Navy keep you informed as to what distant reconnaissance they were making?

General Short. Not specifically. I knew they were making reconnaissance from Midway and Wake and Johnston, but I did not know exactly just when it was and what it consisted of. I knew they were making some all the time with their task forces.

122. General Frank. In the message of November 27, that War Department message signed "Marshall", you were directed to conduct such reconnaissance as you deemed necessary?

General Short. Yes, sir.

123. General Frank. Did you show that message to the naval commander?

General Short. I am quite sure I did; yes.

124. General Frank. Since, from the point of view of protection against air attack, close-in reconnaissance was ineffective without distant reconnaissance—

General Short (interposing). Ineffective in any case, I would say. It would be in just a few minutes from the time you discovered it.

125. General Frank. (continuing). —did not this order for you to conduct reconnaissance convey some sort of an obligation to the naval commander?

General Short. I will tell you what it conveyed to me, and that is that when that message was written whoever wrote it did not take into consideration or overlooked our definite agreement that the Navy was responsible for long-distance reconnaissance. It did not take that into consideration and did not take into consideration the fact that we had only six planes [378] that could do long-distance reconnaissance. So, no matter what I had tried to do would be apparently ineffectual. The only thing we could do was to count on the Navy, because they had practically everything there was to do it with.

126. General Frank. At this time the order had gone out; the fat was in the fire. Was there no reaction on the part of the naval commander to consider that he had some sort of an obligation to conduct some distant reconnaissance?

General Short. He got a message, I think, about the same time, that I am sure made him tighten up a little more, and he had three task forces out where he ordinarily had two; and I believe that they considered their task force was the best possible reconnaissance, because of the way that they fanned out with practically a 600-mile front for the task force.

127. General Frank. Here was this agreement for cooperative action. On whose shoulders was the responsibility to determine whether or not distant air reconnaissance should be carried out?
General Short. I would say it would be definitely on the Navy.

128. General Frank. Here was a situation in which an order went out from one of the two major national defense departments of the government, which ordered reconnaissance on the part of one which was the responsibility of the other, and that spirit of cooperation just did not take, did it?

General Short. No; I do not believe that is a correct way of putting it. I believe, frankly, that the man who wrote the wire just did not realize when he wrote it that the Navy were the responsible parties. He wrote it without any consideration of that or without any consideration of what we had to do the job with. The order could not be carried out. You could not [379] carry on any distant reconnaissance worthy of the name with six planes.

129. General Frank. But the Navy had some P. B. Y. boats?

General Short. It had lots of them. But I do not believe it was the intention of the War Department that we abrogate that agreement with the Navy; and as long as the agreement was not abrogated, then the responsibility for doing it was definitely on them.

130. General Grunert. Did not that message charge you with informing the Admiral of the Fleet of that message?

General Short. I furnished him a copy of the message.

131. General Grunert. At that time, did you make inquiries as to what reconnaissance was going to be made?

General Short. As I say, I talked things over with him that day and for several days, as to what task groups they were sending out for reconnaissance between those islands, but I did not pin him down and say, "Are you going to send a plane every hour? What is it going to search? How many degrees? How are you going to do your mission?" I did not ask him that.

132. General Grunert. For comparative purposes, in the Philippines we also had an agreement with the Navy for distant reconnaissance, and the two operations men got together and charted the entire section around Luzon, 360 degrees. They figured just how these long-range Navy planes would cover certain arcs, and what the Army planes would cover. It was practically identical with the Hawaiian situation. But you had no such arrangement, as far as Hawaii was concerned, for covering the entire perimeter in arcs?

General Short. Did you have an arrangement there whereby the Army planes were definitely under the command of the Navy [380] and the Navy assumed full responsibility?

133. General Grunert. We did not.

General Short. That seems to me to be the difference. They assumed a definite responsibility, and we passed the command of our reconnaissance planes whenever they called for it. We went definitely under their command, so that the planning of the sectors and what each squadron would search, and everything of that kind, was distinctly a naval job, and they had such a preponderance of power for the reconnaissance that it would not have looked very well for us to try to prescribe the reconnaissance when we had only a handful of planes.

134. General Grunert. In your message of November 27, you say, "Liaison with the Navy." Just what did you mean by that? How did that cover anything required by that particular message?
General Short. To my mind it meant very definitely keeping in touch with the Navy, knowing what information they had and what they were doing.

135. General Grunert. Did it indicate in any way that you expected the Navy to carry out its part of that agreement for long-distance reconnaissance?

General Short. Yes. Without any question, whether I had sent that or not, it would have affected it, because they had signed a definite agreement which was approved by the Navy as well as our Chief of Staff.

136. General Frank. Some time back in the testimony you stated that General Martin was in contact with Admiral Bellinger of the Naval Operations Office.

General Short. No; he was Commander of Patwing 2.

137. General Frank. I meant, naval air operations. You were asking if they had any information on the location of these [381] carriers?

General Short. Yes.

138. General Frank. And the Roberts report indicates that at 10:30 a.m. they did have information on the location of those carriers, that they had a bearing of some 357 degrees, or the reciprocal thereof, which is 178?

General Short. I think 178 was where they thought they were. But, as a matter of fact, Martin sent his planes to search, as I remember, from 165 to 190 or 195, something like that.

139. General Frank. With the Navy having search planes and the Army having at least two——

General Short (interposing). We had more than that. We had six that took off on November 27th.

[Copy]

3141 Southwestern Boulevard,
Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 1944.

Subject: Corrections in testimony.
To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board.

* * * * * * * * * *
Page 381, line 14, change "Nov. 27" to "Dec. 7".

* * * * * * * * * *

/s/ Walter C. Short
WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

140. General Frank. The perimeter of the 360 degrees was certainly reduced two points. That information was available; was that given by the Navy to the Army?

General Short. Before Martin sent the planes out, as I understand it, he had talked with Bellinger twice, but Bellinger apparently did not have enough information to give him a definite mission. He got some information from the Interceptor Command as to the direction that those planes had taken when they left. They may have changed their direction ten miles out. I think that caused him to take the
direction he did. I know one thing: There had been a report that there was a Japanese carrier some 40 or 50 miles off Barbers Point, and he sent out to investigate that at the same time. It was southwest of Barbers Point. It turned out not to be of any value. Later, after that mission was finished, there was apparently some little confusion. General Martin, I think, had the impression that they did not operate under the Navy until along about 2 o'clock. I do not know when it was, because the thing did not come up until it was too late for me to dig clear down into the files and verify which statement was correct.

141. General Russell. We have talked about prior-to-attack reconnaissance and a lot about pursuit after attack. General Grunert was discussing with you the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, where apparently the relations between the Army and Navy touching all these questions of reconnaissance and defense were set up and worked out? Is that correct?

General Short. That is correct.

142. General Russell. There is a statement in the official report of the Roberts Commission which is not entirely clear to me, in paragraph 5 of that report, and I will read the sentence.

(Excerpt from Roberts Commission report:)

This Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan——

I assume they are referring to this document (indicating)— was intended to become operative upon order of the War and Navy Departments or as agreed upon by the local commanders in the case of an emergency, a threat of hostile action, or the occurrence of war.

The plan itself says that this agreement shall take effect at once and will remain effective until notice in writing by either party of their renunciation in whole or in part.

My question is this: Was the Coastal Frontier Defense Plan effective from the date that you and Admiral Bloch signed it? Was it effective from then on, or did something have to happen thereafter to make it effective?

General Short. As a matter of fact, we put it into effect for training purposes right away, and forwarded it to Washington for approval, and it was approved. I think that the distinction was that in normal peace times, when there was no danger whatever, these things would not all be done, but we might agree any time during that period that we would go into a state of maneuver, and then they would all be done. If an emergency turned up they went into effect automatically.

143. General Grunert. Who determined the emergency?

General Short. Just like December 7—there was no argument that the emergency was there——

144. General Russell. I want to follow this thought, because I feel it was material in determining what was going on out there. Let us deal with prior hostile actions. There had been no attack. We had been discussing this question of reconnaissance, and you knew about naval reconnaissance at that time. Was it your impression, or not, General Short, that reconnaissance was constant from the day you reached Hawaii on February 7, 1941, until the attack on December 7, 1941?
General Short. I think that there was a very considerable amount of reconnaissance from February 7th, because they had been to a certain extent in a state of excitement out there for about two years. The Navy particularly had had an awful lot of warnings, and they were conducting their task force so as to give them training and reconnaissance all the time, and then when November 27 came along, Kimmel, as I understand it, tightened up his reconnaissance a very great deal.

145. General Russell. We would like to get some facts, because we have not gotten any, so far, in this connection on this reconnaissance by the Navy. Did your predecessor, who was General Herron, out there, discuss with you what reconnaissance was being carried on by the Navy when you arrived there?

[384] General Short. I do not remember that he did.

146. General Russell. Did he or not tell you that he had been making efforts for almost a year to determine what they were doing and had never found out?

General Short. He did not.

147. General Russell. From the time you went in there on February 7 down to December 7 you made no investigation to determine definitely who was out, as a matter of routine, did you?

General Short. I did not ask for any formal reports. As I say, I knew almost constantly what the Navy did have out.

148. General Russell. You did?

General Short. I knew almost constantly what they had out, because I saw Admiral Kimmel frequently. In fact, our relations were such that he always talked over what he did have out.

149. General Russell. What did he tell you with respect to your last conference with him, when reconnaissance was discussed, before December 7th, as to what he had out?

General Short. He told me what task force he was sending out. We looked on task forces as the best means of reconnaissance.

150. General Russell. So far as you know, then, prior to December 7, 1941, the only reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy was with the task forces that were out?

General Short. No. I knew they were sending planes out from Midway and Wake and Johnston all the time. I didn't know exactly what hours they were sending them out, but I knew they were making reconnaissance.

151. General Russell. Is this an accurate statement, then, that you did not know whether or not any distant reconnaissance [385] was being conducted from Oahu?

General Short. I would say that I knew that there was very little if any, because it was not an economical way to conduct it, with task force out on the island bases. When you consider the number of planes they had I do not think they were sending them a thousand miles and back.

152. General Russell. Your definite impression was that the only distant reconnaissance being conducted by the Navy under this agreement was that reconnaissance which was being conducted by task forces when they went out?

General Short. And from Midway, Johnston and Wake, and to a lesser extent, probably, from Panama.

153. General Russell. But none was going out from Oahu?
General Short. No; I don't think so, because it would have been a big waste of planes.

154. General Grunert. How much of the 360 degrees did those reconnaissance planes cover?

General Short. My opinion would be a little over 180.

155. General Grunert. And the task forces covered what?

General Short. I meant the task forces and the islands together. I could not say. Possibly Admiral Kimmel can tell you definitely. I do not think there was much reconnaissance east of Midway or Christmas. I may be wrong, but it was my impression that that was true.

156. General Frank. What about north of the Hawaiian group?

General Short. From Midway they went straight north. I do not think they went much east.

157. General Russell. In this November 27th conference did you know what task forces were out that day?

General Short. Yes.

[386] 158. General Russell. Definitely?

General Short. Yes; I knew what were out, and I got permission to send an officer with one force that was going out.

159. General Russell. Did you consider the task forces that were out or that were about to be sent out were adequate for the purpose?

General Short. It was almost all the Navy had except battleships. It was all the cruisers and most of the destroyers and all the carriers. So, whether it was adequate or not, it was all.

160. General Russell. Let me come back to this sentence that I read to you first, because I don't think there is information on this particular subject in the record, about when this was to become effective; that is, when this Coastal Frontier Defense was to become effective.

General Short. When we signed the agreement it was tentatively effective. Of course, it had to be approved by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, and we started carrying it out right away.

161. General Grunert. The operation become effective according to the terms of it. When approved, it made the plan effective. But the provisions of operating the long-distance reconnaissance provided therein did not become effective except during an emergency?

General Short. That is correct.

162. General Grunert. Who declared the emergency prior to when hostilities opened? When did it become effective?

General Short. As I say, it is my opinion, and I think you can verify the details by Admiral Kimmel, that probably for [387] almost two years—

163. General Grunert (interposing). It had been in effect?

General Short. As far as reconnaissance went, it has been in effect, because for a year before I got out there the Navy had been very keenly alive to the situation. I think that reconnaissance was about as effective as they thought they could make it for almost the whole of two years.

164. General Russell. I want to ask you one or two questions. You talked about when this plan became effective and that they were constantly conducting reconnaissance out there. Is it true or not that you were ordered into an alert prior to the alert of November 27, or did you go into an all-out alert prior to that?
General Short. We had it along in May as a matter of training.

165. General Russell. But that was not an order from higher authority?

General Short. No. We had never received an order from higher authority with reference to it, but there was no confusion of any kind as a result of having it. We had, I think, about 12 days of it at that time.

166. General Grunert. This joint air operations agreement was an agreement under the Joint Defense Plan?

General Short. Yes, sir.

167. General Grunert. It appears that there is an addendum No. 1 to the Joint Air Operations Agreement which is a joint estimate of the air action necessary, dated the 31st of March, 1941, and signed by General Martin and Admiral Bellinger. Were you informed of its provisions, particularly as to the estimated possible enemy action and the probability of a surprise [388] dawn air attack?

General Short. I undoubtedly went over all the details of that with General Martin before he and Admiral Bellinger read the agreement.

168. General Grunert. In paragraph III of that addendum it says:

(Paragraph III of Addendum No. 1 to the Joint Air Operations Agreement is as follows:)

(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:
1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the operating area.
2. A surprise attack on Oahu including ships and installations in Pearl Harbor.
3. A combination of these two.

Paragraph IV says, in part:

(Excerpt from paragraph IV of Addendum No. 1 to the Joint Air Operations Agreement is as follows:)

(a) Run daily patrols as far as possible to seaward through 360 degrees to reduce the probabilities of surface or air surprise.

Again, it comes back to reconnaissance. You consider that they did make such reconnaissance as the means allowed?

General Short. As far as possible I think they were employing all of their force.

169. General Grunert. You were fully aware, then, of the possible surprise air attack?

General Short. Oh, yes.

170. General Grunert. As to paragraph (4) of Section IV of that addendum, it reads in part as follows:

(Excerpt from paragraph (4) of section IV of addendum No. 1 is as follows:)

None of the above actions can be initiated by our [389] forces until an attack is known to be imminent or has occurred. On the other hand, when an attack develops, time will probably be vital and our actions must start with a minimum of delay. It therefore appears that task forces should be organized now, missions assigned, conditions of readiness defined and detailed plans prepared so that coordinated immediate action can be taken promptly by all elements when one of the visualized emergencies arises.

Did not the repeated warnings from the War Department and Navy Department indicate to you a like probability of the imminence of an attack under which you should have complied with paragraph (4) of Section IV of the addendum?
General Short. We had gone ahead and maneuvered, and we had it to where it was automatic in case anything happened. The man in charge of bombers reported. There was no order necessary. He just reported.

171. General Grunert. Then, what I gather from you is that all the plans were laid had the judgment been that such an attack was imminent?

General Short. Definitely.

172. General Grunert. As to Addendum II of that same Joint Air Agreement which describes the various states of readiness of planes, why, under the circumstances, with reference to Material Readiness E, which meant that aircraft would conduct routine operations for the purposes of this plan, were not the time and the hours prescribed?

General Short. Because we believed that the possibility of an air attack was remote, and apparently the Chief of Staff definitely believed the same thing in his testimony before the Roberts Commission, and we felt that we required all possible time for training in the Air Corps, because we had to prepare these teams for ferrying to the Philippines. Just as soon as we got a trained unit we lost it by transferring it to the Philippines.

General Grunert. Have the members of the Board any other questions on that phase?

173. General Frank. We return again to the point that you placed your abiding confidence in the belief that the Navy would give you warning of an attack?

General Short. Definitely.

174. General Frank. And as it worked out it would seem that your complete confidence in the Navy was optimistic?

General Short. That is true.

175. General Grunert. How did you size up conditions generally on the Island of Oahu from the time you took command until early in November when these things started to develop? By that I mean, the nature of the population, conditions as to internal trouble, conditions as to probable sabotage. Give us a picture of that which developed in your mind during that time.

General Short. It looked to me like with 37 per cent of the population Japanese or American-Japanese, 160,000, sabotage at least would be a very serious thing; that in case of war with Japan, if we were not alert to the extreme, we might have very serious things happen in our air and harbor defenses, particularly, and that if it got out of hand there was even a possibility of an uprising. I did not look on that as sure, but if we let it get out of hand there was a possibility. We devoted a great deal of energy to that; and I believe that had been true for years out there.

176. General Grunert. Did you inherit this feeling, or did it develop in your own mind as a result of your experience?

General Short. I am sure that my predecessor had the same feeling, and I take it that officers who had been there even earlier had the same feeling.

177. General Grunert. Did subsequent events show your fears were groundless?

General Short. It is hard to say, because we kept such a close line on it that it never had a chance to develop. What would have developed
if we had been careless about that side of the question, nobody knows.

178. General Grunert. Can you give us the line-up on that, as to what we might call personalities, in so far as you see fit? In the civil government was there any friction, any disagreement, any strong or weak characters that carried others with them one way or the other, or were there any such problems as that?

General Short. We had no friction at all. Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch and I were on extremely friendly terms. I believe Bellinger and Martin worked very closely together. They were the two that probably would have more to do with carrying out the agreement than anybody else. I do not think there was anything like that at all.

179. General Grunert. What about the governor and the F. B. I.? General Short. Just as an example, we thought we would be in a much better local status if we had the governor write us a letter requesting us to take over the guarding of all the roads, bridges, and so forth. He did so without any hesitation at all, and it put us in a better local status. As to the mayor, when we put the proposition up to him that there were a number of [393] roads along the seacoast which, if an emergency arose, we would have to close, he had an ordinance passed so that we had authority to close them whenever we deemed it was necessary for defense. As to the F. B. I., we were on very friendly terms. There was no friction anywhere between my headquarters and the Navy or the civilian officials.

180. General Grunert. So far as I can judge from your testimony, there were no particular obstacles placed in the way of defense by any particular persons or officials?

General Short. On the contrary, they helped out a great deal. We worked with the Territorial Road Commission, so that if we did not have the money and we needed a military road, they would frequently kick through with the money and do the work for us. That shows how we operated.

[393] 181. General Grunert. Now, during your regime there, were there any particular changes in missions or responsibilities from the time you took over up until you were relieved?

General Short. The biggest change was getting that coordination between the Army and Navy air, getting the responsibility for reconnaissance, and pinning the thing right down.

182. General Grunert. That is what I am going into now, the question of cooperation, coordination between the Army and Navy and civil agencies.

Will you describe the method of coordination that was employed in the Joint Coastal Defense Plan, what mutual cooperation existed between the Army and Navy prior to and on December 7th? You have touched on that in a number of places. Is there anything you can amplify on that?

General Short. Only, as I said, by people like Martin and Bellinger, who had to work together in case of emergency, working together, and we had these exercises a minimum of one a week, air exercises, where we had to work together, but having our coast—our harbor defense people have a man in the control post and work every day directly with the naval people there to know what boats were coming in, and to have them indicate whether they were targets, and every-
thing of that kind, and with the higher command I did most of that myself. When I first got there my Chief of Staff at that time, Phil Hayes, was on most excellent terms with the Navy, and I never went for a conference without taking him along, because that he had been doing an awful lot of liaison work, that he was there until about the first of November; and after that I largely took Major Fleming and the engineers with me, and I sometimes took General Martin and his Chief of Staff if there was an air proposition.

183. General Grunert. Would it be feasible for you to give the Board, for inclusion in the record, a list of the conferences you had with Admirals Kimmel and Bloch, as to dates and general subjects, as far as you can remember, between November 25th and December 7th?

General Short. On November 27th I had a conference with them with reference to the question of reinforcing the garrisons of Wake and Midway with a squadron each of Army pursuit planes. On December 1st I had a conference with them with reference to the relief—we had wires from Washington with reference to the relief of the marine garrisons by the Army.

On December 2nd Admiral Bloch was not with us. Admiral Kimmel came to my quarters with a long letter he had prepared covering the whole subject, and I went over it carefully with him; and then on December the 3rd we met again, and I had my radiograms ready for the War Department, and he had his. That was the last formal conference, I believe, that we had; that was December 3rd; but we had our subordinates: Fleming and Colonel Phyphffer had a conference on the 4th.

Now, I don't think on the 5th or 6th that we had any direct conference. My G-2 was in touch with O. N. I., I know, on those dates, but I think he was probably the only member of the staff.

184. General Grunert. That conference, the conference seemed to be more on the subject of what was to take place farther east. Now, as to both messages, one that the Navy received on the 27th and one you received on the 27th, were they a subject of a conference?

General Short. Not of a formal conference. We exchanged messages, undoubtely talked the thing over, but we didn't get together for a particular—each one knew what the—each one knew what—

185. General Grunert. Well, then, you refer to these conferences as formal conferences?

General Short. Those other conferences were where we had some particular subject we had to make a report to Washington on; we each one knew what the other fellow was doing in regard to those messages.

186. General Grunert. You had made a report on the November 27th message, to Washington

General Short. Of just what I was doing, and I did that before I saw Admiral Kimmel, because I did that within thirty minutes after the message came in.

187. General Grunert. Did you discuss with the Navy whether they considered your Army Alert No. 1 was sufficient?

General Short. I didn't ask them whether they considered it. I told them that is what we were on.
188. General GRUNERT. Did they know what the Army Alert No. 1 was?

General SHORT. They had ten copies that were furnished to them on November 5th.

189. General GRUNERT. Well, you and I know that when you get a big document, unless the subordinates dig out those things and say, "These are the important things," why, the high command has not the time to carefully peruse the document.

[396] General SHORT. I think the operations officer of the 14th Naval District did dig into it and knew what it meant.

190. General GRUNERT. The operations officer of the 14th Naval District?

General SHORT. 14th Naval District. I think so. I think that he knew what it meant.

191. General GRUNERT. Yes. Then we get into the subject of alerts a little later on, but in connection with this cooperation: Do you know of any misunderstanding as to the Navy No. 1 Alert and your No. 1 Alert, as not considering them the same?

General SHORT. Well, I think the Navy, as far as alerts for sabotage went, that they hadn't been off of it in two years, hardly. They had a terrifically tight antisabotage guard in the Navy Yard. They went so far that they would not employ any man of Japanese blood. He might have been an American citizen for two generations, but they would not let him in the Navy Yard. They went to greater extremes than we did.

192. General GRUNERT. It appears here from some evidence in the Roberts Commission report that Colonel Phillips, your Chief of Staff—he was Senior Army Member of the Local Joint Planning Committee since November 6th?

General SHORT. That is right.

193. General GRUNERT. He says that committee never met after communication of November 27. Had they been meeting periodically?

General SHORT. No. They met when there was something we thought a change—

194. General GRUNERT. Necessary?

[397] General SHORT. A change necessary. The last, the most important thing out there where there had been a great many meetings, was when we made that agreement in regard to the joint defense of air. Now, I do not know how many meetings they had at that time. They had any number of meetings. But it was the kind of a board that only met when there was something to take up in the nature of a change.

195. General GRUNERT. Nature of a change of existing plan, instructions?

General SHORT. That is right.

196. General GRUNERT. They did not meet when there was anything that might be in the offering?

General SHORT. No, sir.

197. General GRUNERT. Then you took care of that yourself, and you were accompanied—

General SHORT. I very largely did the liaison work with the Navy myself.

198. General GRUNERT. Did your aide accompany you?
General Short. The aide would usually accompany me. He frequently wasn’t in the conference, as I say; and as long as Hayes was my Chief of Staff, because of his experience of over two years with the Navy I took him with me always.

199. General Grunert. That was about up to October?

General Short. The first of November, and there was about a month after he left, and I usually had after that Martin, maybe Molison of the Air, and Fleming of the Engineers, who was may Assistant G-4, following a great many things the Navy were interested in.

200. General Grunert. Now, Admiral Kimmel, in the Roberts report, is reported to have claimed that the Navy was not informed that this Sergeant Lockhart picked up the approaching planes, and that this prevented the Navy from trailing them.

General Short. You mean?

201. General Grunert. What was the understanding as to how he should be informed, and so forth?

General Short. Well, as a matter of fact, the Army wasn’t in on that. I think that is the case he is talking about where they picked them up at 7:20 that morning and notified Lieutenant Tyler, who was the control officer, and he thought it meant nothing but the planes coming in from San Francisco, and he didn’t alert anybody. So the Navy were not alone in that.

202. General Grunert. Admiral Kimmel also claims here in his testimony that the furnished the Army information as to ships in and out of the harbor and that this had been done for months.

General Short. Well, as a matter of fact, I say, not 24 hours of the day, but we had this Lieutenant Colonel there, and he reported; he made a report to G-3, so during the period of the day that he was there we had the report constantly, and in any maneuver period we had it for 24 hours of the day, but I do not believe that we got it except when we had a liaison officer there. It wasn’t a liaison officer exactly; we didn’t call him “liaison.” He was on duty with the harbor control post, and during the hours that he was on duty we had a complete report. I do not think we had the complete report the other hours. I might be mistaken, but I don’t believe so.

203. General Frank. Would it have done you any good to have known how many ships were in there?

204. General Frank. But so far as any change in plans was concerned—

General Short. There was no change.

205. General Frank. It made no difference?

General Short. It was no change in plan. It was just simply a case that when there was an emergency you put three men in there and you had 24 hours a day in place of 8 hours a day.
206. General Grunert. Now, I am just trying to form a picture of the cooperation and the information which passed back and forth between the two commands, to see how that cooperation worked. Here are several questions I have along that line:

In this testimony before the Roberts Commission Admiral Kimmel claimed that he was never informed of the measures taken by the Army after the messages of November 27.

General Short. He was never probably given any formal notice. As I say, he and I talked together. I am sure he knew exactly what we were doing because we talked together there [400] hours that week.

207. General Grunert. And Admiral Bloch states he did not know that radars were not working all the time, nor anything about inshore aerial patrol.

General Short. Well, he may not have known, but they had a naval officer working with the Interceptor Command daily, and it was that naval officer’s job to transmit the information, whenever it was working, to the Navy. So I am sure that somebody in the Navy knew.

208. General Grunert. Here is one: that Admiral Bloch, although he talked to General Short many times after November 27th, was not informed that the Army was only altered to prevent sabotage. He learned differently only after the attack, that Army Alert No. 1 was the lowest and did not correspond with the Navy Alert No. 1, which was the highest.

General Short. He had ten copies. It was his operation officer that got ten copies of our Standing Operating Procedure on November 5th. If any of his staff officers took the trouble to read them, he should have known exactly what Alert No. 1 was, or if he had asked me. It never occurred to me that they didn’t understand our Alert No. 1, because we had furnished the copies with that specifically in view.

209. General Grunert. Here is one that may touch on cooperation with civil authorities. It is stated here that Mr. Angus Taylor, United States District Attorney, wanted to prosecute some Jap agents for failure to register under the Alien Registration Act, but General Short was opposed to this without giving them a notice so to do, claiming it would react unfavorably to his plan of trying to make friends and create [407] good relations amongst them.

Now, was that a question of cooperation or a question of judgment on one part or one side?

General Short. That was purely a question of judgment. The question came up. That law had been passed, as I remember, in ’39, and nobody in Honolulu, in the Hawaiian Islands, paid any attention to it. The law required the registration of alien agents, and after it had been going along for two years and nobody paying any attention to it at all, probably not—well, Shivers, an F. B. I. man, said he doubted if more than 10 percent of the agents knew they were ever supposed to register. He agreed with me, took the point of view that the fairest thing to do—that we weren’t wanting to create a lot of ill feeling, and if it ever came to a war we would have this Japanese population to handle; that we didn’t want to create disloyalty. We wanted to create as much loyalty as we could, and I had no objection to their arresting every one of them, but I said they ought to give them a period of ten days, or whatever
they wanted to, to register before, and announce it definitely, so all
that were not registered at the end of that period would be arrested
for not complying with the law.

The Navy and Taylor wanted to just go out and arrest them right
now. Shivers and I thought it was not a desirable thing to do,
and I radioed my opinion fully to the War Department, and the
War Department agreed a hundred percent with my stand on the
question. I wasn’t making any objection to his arresting them, but
as a matter of fair play and not to create a lot of disloyalty among
the Japanese-Americans who might be loyal, we didn’t want to make
it appear that we were just trying to soak [402] people who
might not know it.

210. General GRUNERT. In your testimony before the Roberts Com-
mission I have two points on cooperation.

211. General FRANK. May I? I would like to ask a question on
this thing.

212. General GRUNERT. Go ahead.

213. General FRANK. Those Japs under consideration for arrest
were nothing more or less than Japanese spies; isn’t that correct?

General SHORT. Some of them probably were. The chances are
that most of them were not. I think it would be more nearly meet-
ing the situation to say that they were largely propaganda agents.
They had, they called them, consular agents scattered all over.

214. General FRANK. They called them what?

General SHORT. Consular agents.

215. General FRANK. Oh, yes.

General SHORT. And the reason I say they were not to any large
extent spies because the Japanese paper there published a complete
list of them, so it was no trouble to get the list of them. What they
tried to do was to more or less control and influence the Japanese
population, and undoubtedly some of them were spies, and some of
them were perfectly innocent people that were just carrying out
propaganda.

216. General FRANK. To control the Japs?

General SHORT. Controlled by the Japanese consul.

217. General FRANK. They were trying to control them in what
direction?

General SHORT. Well, to keep them pro-Japanese, to bring [403]
them up as Japanese rather than just plain Americans, I think. That
would be my estimate of the situation.

218. General FRANK. That was an un-American activity, then, was
it not?

General SHORT. It was an un-American activity; there is no ques-
tion about it. I had no objection to the arrest, but the way the thing
had been conducted. I talked with Shivers. We had a complete list
of them. He said probably not more than 10 percent knew they were
violating the law.

219. General FRANK. And they had continued to undermine the
American Government for quite a period of time; isn’t that right?

General SHORT. Probably had.

220. General FRANK. And we had condoned it?

General SHORT. We had paid no attention to the law; we had done
nothing to enforce the law.
221. General Russell. I would like to ask a question or two on that.

What evidence did you have against any specific consular agent that he was undermining the American Government?

General Short. The F. B. I. kept a file on every one of those people, and the O. N. I. That was their job, and the way the things were delineated it was their job rather than the Army's in peace time.

222. General Russell. Did they, either of those agencies, indicate to you the name of one or more of these agents who had been in that specific job?

General Short. Oh, I know they had two lists; a list they called an A list that they thought were dangerous enough that in case of a war they should be confined at once, and we confined all of those.

223. General Russell. General Short, maybe I can't ask my questions correctly, but I am certainly not getting much of a specific answer. The thing I am attempting to show now is whether or not you were given evidence against specific people upon whom or against whom you could have brought prosecutions for un-American activities.

General Short. Let me put it this way: that any one individual that I wanted to know about, the F. B. I. and my G-2, if he had been implicated in anything, would have a record of him and would give it to me.

224. General Russell. And that record would indicate specific un-American acts?

General Short. Whether—if he had been in un-American acts, yes.

225. General Russell. And there were some who had been engaged in it, and you could have proved it?

General Short. In all probability.

226. General Russell. Yes. Now, then, General Short, if you had a list of these people published in a paper, what was to be accomplished by registration?

General Short. Well, it was a Federal law. There might have been a lot of agents that were not published in that list, don't you see. It was possible.


General Short. And there was a law making it an offense to be a foreign agent and not register, and it had been enforced I think in the States; it had never been enforced out there.

228. General Grunert. What authority did you have to enforce it? Wasn't that an F. B. I. matter?

General Short. That was F. B. I.

229. General Grunert. That was a Federal matter?

General Short. That was Department of Justice. Yes, it was just a question—the question came up I think probably—I don't know whether the Navy or the District Attorney brought it up, and I didn't think—I was afraid that the way they were going to do it that it would create a lot of disloyalty among the Japanese-American population and make it more difficult for us to handle the population. I had no objection to the arrest if they would make it perfectly plain to these people that they were supposed to register and if they didn't register by a certain date that they would arrest them all.
230. General Grunert. I have two more questions on this subject. We shall exhaust this subject and then we shall take a recess. If you have any more I think this subject of cooperation—

231. General Russell. I have two more.

232. General Grunert. Well, I will finish up these two, and then we shall finish your question and then take a recess.

In your testimony before the Roberts Commission there appears this expression: "The Navy was more secrecy minded."

General Short. I think that is strictly true.

233. General Grunert. Did that prevent them from giving you information that you should have had?

General Short. Well, I do not think it would have prevented them from giving me information that they thought I should have. It might prevent them from giving me information [406] that they thought was strictly of interest to the Navy and that they shouldn't give to anybody. Now, I think that they give much less to their staff than we do to ours. I think that is strictly true, that they have always held things more secret: the same thing would be more secret to them than to us.

234. General Grunert. But you still had confidence that they would pass to you what they thought you ought to have?

General Short. If they thought it was anything of genuine interest to me, I do not think there is any question but what they would give it to me.

235. General Grunert. The other one is this, to this effect: You stated that because of the restricted area of Pearl Harbor, whenever the fleet was in and naturally was huddled, that adequate protection from the air was almost impossible—complete protection, we will put it. Was this ever discussed with Admiral Kimmel or Bloch with a view to avoiding such huddling or making such a big target?

General Short. No, it was not. Now, I discussed it at some length with Admiral Standley on the Roberts Commission.

236. General Grunert. All right; go ahead with your question (addressing General Russell).

General Short. As a matter of fact, I think I remember Admiral Kimmel stating that any time that he thought there was any probability of an air attack he wanted to get everything out of the harbor. I think I remember his making that statement. You know the size of the harbor there, and I am quite sure that I remember his making that statement, that if at any time he was convinced there was danger of an air attack, that [407] he would want to move everything in the way of major ships out.

237. General Grunert. All right.

238. General Russell. General Short, you stated that you had very little time to read this Roberts report?

General Short. That is right.

239. General Russell. Have you read the testimony of your G-2, who I believe was named Fielder?

General Short. Yes, sir.

240. General Russell. Did you read that?

General Short. Yes, sir.

241. General Russell. Do you remember the statement in Colonel Fielder's testimony that prior to December 7th they never received
any reports giving you information on Japanese activities at all, where
the fleet was, and things of that sort?

General SHORT. I haven’t got the question now. That he never
received—?

242. General RUSSELL. Did you see where Colonel Fielder stated
that they did not get this enemy information or Japanese information
reports at all before December 7, 1941?

General SHORT. Oh, you mean ship movements? Wasn’t that
what—was that what you meant?

General RUSSELL. Well, I recall it.

General SHORT. I think that his statement was that we could not
get from the Navy reports of movements of Japanese ships prior to
December 7th, before December 7th, which I think is correct.

244. General RUSSELL. As I recall, Colonel Fielder’s testimony was
to the effect that this bureau in the Navy which corresponds to our
G-2 never gave them anything before December 7th.

[408] General SHORT. I am inclined to believe that if you will
look that up carefully that it was just in reference to Japanese ships.

245. General RUSSELL. Well, I will look it up during the recess.

General SHORT. Because they worked very closely as far as any
individuals went.

246. General RUSSELL. Well, I am not talking about any residents.
I am talking about the activity of the Japanese armed forces either—

General SHORT. Well, I think as far as the Japanese Fleet goes, that
he made that statement, that that is correct.

247. General RUSSELL. And you never saw any reports as to the
whereabouts of the Japanese ships?

General SHORT. All I got was by personal conversation with Ad-
miral Kimmel and—

248. General RUSSELL. And they did not send over reports?

General SHORT. No, we did not get reports.

249. General RUSSELL. All right.

General SHORT. But I got a great deal from personal conversation.

250. General RUSSELL. One other question on operations, the oper-
ations end: Your alerts were ordered by the War Department?

General SHORT. No, sir, not necessarily.

251. General RUSSELL. Could have been?

General SHORT. They could have been ordered.

252. General RUSSELL. Or you might have originated them?

General SHORT. Yes. The War Department never did order any
particular type of alert during my time.

[409] 253. General RUSSELL. But you had no jurisdiction at all
over ordering the Navy to go on alert?

General SHORT. Oh, no, none whatever.

254. General RUSSELL. So you could be on your highest form of
alert, and the Navy could be on no alert at all?

General SHORT. Just—yes.

255. General RUSSELL. That is all.

256. General FRANK. I would like to ask a couple of questions.

In cooperation with the Navy was there a preponderance of getting
along necessary on the part of the Army, or did you feel that the
Navy was meeting you fully half way?
General Short. I felt that they played the game pretty well. Really, I felt they played the game better than I had ever seen the Navy play the game.

257. General Frank. You have stated heretofore that you felt a certain degree of security because of your confidence about the effectiveness of naval protection. Do you now feel that you were overconfident about naval effectiveness?

General Short. Apparently they did not have enough to give complete protection, and they were giving protection in the sectors they thought most dangerous.

258. General Frank. Do you now feel that you perhaps had misplaced confidence in them?

General Short. I had too much confidence.

259. General Frank. Another thing: Do you now feel that the Navy withheld from you certain information that they had available that would have been invaluable to you?

General Short. I don't believe that they purposely withheld anything from me that they thought really concerned me.

260. General Frank. Don't you think that that information about the naval task force with carriers and submarines and battleships down in Jaluit would have vitally affected you?

General Short. Yes, possibly.

261. General Grunert. Did the Navy understand your mission and your responsibility sufficient to be able to be a good judge of what should be passed to you or what shouldn't be passed to you?

General Short. Oh, I think they did, definitely.

262. General Grunert. We shall take a ten-minute recess. We shall begin again directly after 4:15.

(Thereupon there was a brief informal recess.)

263. General Grunert. I have a question, here, on the so-called Plan for Air Defense of Oahu, submitted to the War Department on the 20th of August, 1941, by the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Forces, General Martin, through the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department. Did you know anything about that particular so-called "plan" of August 20?

General Short. Was that the plan for the searching of the 360-degree sector?


General Short. Oh, yes. I went over that in very great—

265. General Grunert. Did you concur in that plan?

General Short. I thought it was an excellent study.

266. General Grunert. Now, we go into these various messages. Do you admit having received from the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet a paraphrased dispatch on the 16th of October?

General Short. Yes, sir; that was the first message I read to you today.

267. General Grunert. That is the one which informed all concerned of "the existing grave situation," and which directed the Navy "to take due precautions" which would not "constitute provocative action against Japan." If so, what was your reaction thereto, and what precautions did you require of the Army, in view thereof?

General Short. We had had all the utilities guarded, all the bridges, and since we put out our guards on that account, in July, when
they closed the banks, and when we got that I just simply cautioned people that were responsible for that guarding to be unusually careful. We didn't go into any additional alert. It wasn't a formal alert, but we had all of [412] the utilities guarded, and we kept them guarded, since July.

268. General Grunert. Then this "grave situation," what did you interpret that to be? A grave situation?

General Short. You mean, in that?

269. General Grunert. In that particular message.

General Short. Well, if you read that message as a whole and not any one line of it you will see that they felt sure that Japan was going to attack Russia, but they thought it was only a possibility they might attack the United States and Great Britain. There was a strong possibility that they would attack Russia. It looked as if they thought something was going to happen, but they were not at all so sure we were going to be involved in the thing.

270. General Grunert. That was your interpretation?

General Short. That was my interpretation, considering the message as a whole; and that they didn't want to do anything to arouse Japan and make our situation worse with them.

271. General Grunert. Are there any questions?

272. General Russell. Yes; I want to follow up on that, on this one message; that is all.

General Short, the files in the Adjutant General's office indicate that the War Department did not agree with that Navy summary, and General Gerow recommended to the Chief of Staff that they send you another message in lieu of that one. The message recommended to be sent to you, by the War Department, was:

Tension between United States and Japan remains strained but no (repeat No) abrupt change in Japanese foreign policy appears imminent (end).

[413] That is according to this Adjutant General's file. That order or that statement was sent to you under "No. 266", radiogram No. 266. Do you recall that?

General Short. What was the date of that?


General Short. 18th?


General Short. That was two days after this Navy business?

275. General Russell. The War Department made a study. The War Plans Division made a study of this Navy message, and they disagreed with the situation?

General Short. I do not remember that. Apparently this naval message must have made more of an impression on me that that, that I got, because I had this definitely in mind and dug it out; and if I got it—I suppose, if they sent it, I got that message—but, as I say, the Navy message was stronger and it had made more of an impression.

276. General Russell. This is the message, and it is supposed to have been sent to you under "266," October 20.

General Short. October 20? It may have been, but you notice it let up. It let up on things, and I naturally would not remember that as I would one that tightened up.

277. General Russell. Are the records of these messages which came to you out there from the War Department now in the Hawaiian Department?
General Short. That is where they would be.
278. General Russell. Would they be available?
   General Short. They would be available.
279. General Russell. Therefore, if you received this message
   [414] 266, on October 20, saying that there was no change in
   Japanese foreign policy, it would be out there?
   General Short. It would be of record, out there; yes, sir; but I
   frankly do not happen to remember that.
280. General Russell. You do not remember?
   General Short. It may be because it was easing off.
281. General Grunert. The next message I wish to refer to is the
   message from the Navy to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific
   Fleet, November 24, 1941, in which it is stated as an opinion that—
   A surprise, aggressive movement in any direction is possible.
and in which it was directed not to—
precipitate Jap action
Was this information transmitted to you?
   General Short. I do not think I ever got that message.
282. General Russell. If you never got it, you cannot give us a
   reaction thereto?
   General Short. No; I don’t remember ever having seen that mes-
   sage. Now, it is an outside possibility.
283. General Grunert. You omitted mention of that message in
   your statement, so presumably—
   General Short. Now, I might have seen it, and we might not have
   had an official copy given to us, and I might have forgotten about
   it. Kimmel might have shown it to me and just handed it to me to
   look at, and taken it back, and I might not have remembered it; I
   don’t know, but I don’t think I have ever seen it.
284. General Russell. So far as you know, then, you didn’t
   [415] take any action on it?
   General Short. No.
285. General Russell. So far as the Army is concerned?
   General Short. No.
286. General Frank. Had it been made of record in your head-
   quarters, would you have known about it?
   General Short. Oh, if it had come to my headquarters, I am sure
   I would have seen it. I might not have remembered it, but I know I
   would have seen it if it came there, because those messages were brought
   to me immediately.
287. General Grunert. What was the procedure when the Navy
   over there received a message, and they transmitted information to
   you? Did they give you a paraphrased copy of it? Did they inform
   you by word of mouth, or is there a record of such messages as were
   transmitted to you in the headquarters of the Hawaiian Department?
   General Short. Normally they would send me, by an officer, a
   paraphrased copy, and if I were in my office it would be delivered
   to me personally; if not, it would be delivered to the Chief of Staff.
   Now, if it was something that Kimmel thought he ought to discuss with
   me immediately before he sent a message back to the Navy Department,
   he would probably call me up and ask me if I wouldn’t come over to
   his headquarters, and then he would read it to me, and we would dis-
   cuss it.
288. General GRUNERT. We go on to the next message, the Navy message to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, of November 27.

General Short. I feel sure that I have seen that message, although we could not find a copy of it in our headquarters, when we looked for it, for the Roberts Commission's report. That was during the period when I was down there at Kimmel's headquarters every day for three or four days, and in all probability he either read it to me, or I read it right there, because it is familiar to me; but we couldn't find a copy.

289. General FRANK. That is the one which says "This is a war warning."

General Short. "This is a war warning," yes.

290. General FRANK. And it anticipates attacks on Guam, the Philippine Islands, Thai, Kra Isthmus, and Borneo?

General Short. Yes.

291. General GRUNERT. The testimony before the Roberts Commission includes the testimony of Admiral Kimmel, in which he says he definitely remembers sending the "war warning" message to General Short. He says it seems that he handed it to him and discussed it with him in his own office.

General Short. I think, in Kimmel's office, rather than mine. I think there is no question but that I saw the telegram, that I saw the radiogram, but we did not find an official copy of it in our headquarters. There is no doubt in my mind but what I saw it.

292. General GRUNERT. What action did you take with regard to that message, as to the Army preparation?

General Short. On the same day, I had had this message from the Chief of Staff, and I took action on the Chief of Staff's message rather than on that message.

293. General GRUNERT. You did not consider the words "a war warning" as being of such nature as to require you to take more measures than you did?

[417] General Short. The Navy used that expression every once in a while in their messages.

294. General GRUNERT. Meaning what, thereby?

General Short. (Answer withdrawn by the witness.)

295. General GRUNERT. I will ask you that question. Do you mean it is in the line of "crying wolf! wolf!"?

General Short. To a certain extent; yes. That may not have been a fair answer.

296. General GRUNERT. Are there any questions about that message?

297. General FRANK. No.

298. General GRUNERT. We go to the next message, on which I have a number of questions, so I had better read them, one at a time, and you can answer them, one at a time.

It is the Chief of Staff's message of November 27 to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, in which, in part, the following information was furnished and directive given:

Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment.
And then, again—

If hostilities cannot (repeat Cannot) be avoided U. S. desires Japan commit first overt act. This policy should not (repeat Not) be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.

And then again—

Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not (repeat Not) to alarm the civil population or disclose intent.

If any of these questions were answered in your statement or in previous questions, here, we will just say “covered.”

What reconnaissances were made, and what other measures were taken? I think that has been answered.

General Short. That has been answered very fully.

299. General Grunert. What measures did the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department consider desirable, but that could not be taken without alarming the civil population or disclosing intent? In other words, did you consider that you wanted to take other measures, but you did not take them, because of the restrictions in that?

General Short. No, sir; I will say frankly that I did not believe, in view of all the information I had, that there would be an air attack there, so I didn’t—I didn’t want to go into alert No. 2.

300. General Grunert. If a defense against attack could not be undertaken before the commission by Japan of the first overt act, what preparatory measures could have been undertaken? Were such measures taken?

General Short. Of course, we could have done one or two things that could have been, the way it worked out, highly desirable. We could have gone into alert No. 2, that being an instant readiness for an air attack and a surface and a subsurface attack, or we could have gone into alert No. 3, under the guise of a maneuver, and moved everybody to battle positions. Either one would have been very desirable.

301. General Grunert. You were particularly informed—

This policy should not * * * be construed as restricting to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.

In your judgment, what action was necessary to insure your defense?

General Short: My judgment at the time was that while the hostilities might take place, the hostilities, in our case, would be in all probability sabotage, or possible uprisings; and I believe from the testimony of the Chief of Staff that he was thoroughly in accord with that opinion, himself.

302. General Grunert. My next few questions appear to have been answered, but I will put them in the record.

What report on the measures taken was submitted to the War Department? That has been answered.

General Short: Yes, but I think I would like to repeat that.

303. General Grunert. All right.

General Short. I refer, by number, Department radiogram, and identify very definitely their “radiogram No. So-and-So”—I think it was 472, received, alerted for sabotage, liaison with the Navy. In
other words, there should have been no possible misunderstanding to what message that referred, because it identified the War Department number.

304. General GRUNERT. Did the War Department have any comment to make on your report?

General SHORT. They never at any time admitted that they knew what I was doing, or that I was doing too much, or too little.

305. General GRUNERT. If not, did this lead you to believe that measures taken sufficed under existing conditions, [420] and that inasmuch as the War Department was cognizant of the situation, this relieved you of not taking additional defensive measures?

General SHORT. It lead me to believe that the War Department was 100% in accord with my belief, that they approved definitely of what I was doing.

306. General GRUNERT. Did you specifically query the War Department on this aspect?

General SHORT. No, I had reported on what I was doing, and I had no further comment for them, except on more sabotage. They came back, and I thought it was coming up after they had considered my message—it was the next day—going into detail on sabotage, stating that—

Be sure not to do anything illegal, etc.

And I went back and told them exactly what I was doing, and the legal authority I had for it.

307. General GRUNERT. Did you figure that the War Department had opportunity to get your report and then send the other message that you received? Was not this report submitted on the 28th, and did you not get the other message on the 28th?

General SHORT. No; my report was submitted on the 27th, and I would say that their message came in, as I remember, at 1:16 p.m., on the 27th. I think that we answered that message within 30 minutes.

308. General GRUNERT. But you do not know whether it is a fact or not that it was received?

General SHORT. I do not know whether it was actually delivered to them, but I frankly, from reading Gerow’s testimony, I think that the trouble came that nobody ever took the trouble [421] to follow up and see that I had made the report of action that they indicated, and that they didn’t check up and see the number of the radiogram that my report referred to. He states frankly that it was the duty of his division, and it wasn’t done.

309. General GRUNERT. I will ask if it is your testimony, that I recall, now, you never took into consideration whether or not to take any additional measures, and if you had taken such measures it might be against the desires of the War Department?

General SHORT. I think if I had done anything to alarm the Japanese population in Hawaii, it would have been decidedly against the desires of the War Department.

310. General GRUNERT. It never occurred to you, though, to ask the War Department whether or not you should take additional measures?
General Short. I had reported. They gave me a directive to report the action taken. I reported exactly the action I had taken, and I figured if they did not approve, that they would come right back and say so, or if they wanted me to do more; and they did come back, but it was just more sabotage, so I thought that they approved of what I was doing, but wanted to be 100% sure of the details.

311. General Grunert. Before I go into the next one, have you any questions, any of you?

312. General Russell. I think, at the end of your examination I will possibly want to ask General Short some questions about this War Department relation, but I do not think it is relevant to ask it at this point.

313. General Grunert. I have one separate subject, here— Influences of and conclusions from what I call the warning message, under which we can carry most everything in that line that comes up, that we have not covered before.


315. General Grunert. We go to the next one, the message from the Adjutant General, of November 28, 1941. This question of mine appears to have been answered. "Did you consider this message of the 28th as a reply to your report of the 28th?"

General Short. I very definitely did—my report of the 27th.

316. General Grunert. The 27th?

General Short. Yes, sir; I very definitely did.

317. General Grunert. We go to the next, the report of November 28, by the Commanding General. I still have November 28 as your report.

General Short. Well, there are two reports. I reported the action taken, on the 27th. They replied on the 28th, with all this business about sabotage, and I wrote another report, then, on the 28th, stating the legal authority that I was given, from the Governor, to do all these things, and from the Mayor of Honolulu.

318. General Grunert. And that was your report of the 28th to the message of the 28th.

General Short. That is correct; and my report of the 27th was to the message of the 27th. In other words, both messages were answered practically as soon as received.

319. General Grunert. And that just elaborated on your sabotage, on the measures taken?

320. General Short. And assuring them that I was not taking any illegal action, because they had been apparently worried about my doing things that would get the Army in bad with the civil authorities.

321. General Grunert. Now, there appear to be three messages here.

322. General Russell. General, before you go away from that message of the 28th, I have something with me.

General Short. I think you have the "work sheets."

322. General Russell. No, I have had this message checked, and I assumed that you would not remember it, but I am merely calling attention to it, so we will check it in Hawaii. There is a message which came out on the 28th, 484. Now, the message that General Grunert has just been asking you about is 482.

General Short. 482—that is right.
323. General Russell. This goes to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, and it is signed "Arnold," and stamped officially.

General Short. That is the one signed by Arnold. That is the one that went, practically identical to my message, that went to all the air stations.

324. General Russell. You see this one. 482, went to all the air stations. 484 did not go to the air stations. I just wondered if you have any point in getting 482.

General Short. Here is 482. It is the one that came to me, and it says at the end of it—

To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations, but this does not (repeat Not) affect your responsibility under existing [424] instructions.

Now, that is 482, according to my number. And this is the one that went—you see it is addressed "attention Commanding Air Forces." It went to Martin, it went to the air station, and he replied to him three or four days later in great detail.

325. General Grunert. I think the witness is right. That was the Philippine message.

326. General Russell. I do not think we ought to be partial to any of these messages. I think we ought to get them all in.

General Short. I have tried to keep straight on all of them.

327. General Grunert. We will go to the next one. It is a message of December 3, a Naval dispatch of December 3, 1941, from the Navy Department to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, to the effect that—

Information discloses evidence instructions were sent to various Japanese diplomatic and consular posts to destroy certain codes and ciphers and to burn certain documents.

Was this information transmitted to you?

General Short. I never saw that message.

328. General Grunert. There were some Navy messages in December?

General Short. I say I never saw it. I think it was quoted in the Roberts Commission's report when it came out, but up to that time I had never seen it.

[425] 329. General Grunert. There were also two messages, one dated December 4 and the other December 6, from the same source to the same person, regarding the destruction of their own confidential documents. Was that information transmitted to you?

General Short. It was not. I got no copy of it.

330. General Grunert. You had none of the information that was disclosed in those three messages?

General Short. No, sir.

331. General Grunert. Now, we get to the message of the Chief of Staff to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated December 7, 1941.

General Short. I can locate it for you, I am sure. It is on page 20.

332. General Grunert. It is the message from the Chief of Staff to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, December 7, 1941. I think you have given us full information as to that message, as to the time of its receipt and everything.
Is there anything further that you wish to add about that; or are there any questions that the Board has about that particular message? (No response.) There appear to be none.

I will ask you a question about that. In your testimony before the Roberts Commission you refered to a time-consuming code which might have been avoided, that is, the time-consuming part, by the use of the telephone. Had you or had the War Department been in the past, during your service over there, using that phone for highly-secret matters?

General Short. We used it for highly-important matters.

333. General Grunert. Do you consider, with reference to the message of December 7th, 1941, that the situation at the time [426] might have been aggravated had there been a leak in transmission had they used the phone?

General Short. I think the time element was the most important element in that situation.

334. General Grunert. Is this in retrospect?

General Short. I was going to say that if I had been sitting there in the position of the Chief of Staff I might have done just what he did. Apparently even at that late date they still thought that secrecy was more important than the time element, and they did not visualize any attack on Honolulu at that time.

335. General Grunert. We want to develop, if there is anything else to be brought out, the conclusions drawn from this series of messages.

General Short. I read those conclusions to you, if you remember, because I wanted to be very exact; and think that is as good a statement of the conclusions as I could make.

336. General Grunert. I will ask you some questions to see whether or not they have been covered and in order to get into the record why these messages served to emphasize danger from sabotage and why not the necessity of taking a state of war readiness, and why was not the subject of taking a state of war readiness considered. I think you have well covered the question of sabotage; but did it ever occur to you that the warnings in this information necessitated taking a state of war readiness as compared with a state of internal security readiness?

General Short. There were two things involved. One was the information that I had from the Navy as to what they knew about naval ships; and, as I say, my confidence that they could prevent the carriers from getting through. The other was the [427] insistence on the part of the War Department that the public must not be alarmed and that the intent must not be disclosed and that there must not be any provocative measures against Japan. I think if they had been convinced that something was absolutely imminent, the only thing they would be worried about would be my getting one hundred per cent ready. They would not have cared whether I alarmed the public or what I did so long as I got ready in the least possible time to meet the situation. If they had been expecting an air attack they would have said, "Alert for an air attack at once." I do not think they would have taken any chances.

337. General Grunert. To what extent did the Navy’s conclusion that Japanese carriers were still at home ports influence you to consider that Alert No. 1 was adequate?
General Short. From all we knew of their land planes, they could not make an attack from land bases; and if the carriers were so accounted for that they were not of danger to us, it looked as if we were safe from air attack.

338. General Grunert. What influenced you to believe that the chances of a raid out there, with the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor or thereabouts, were practical nil?

General Short. The Operations Officer had stated specifically in answer to a question of Admiral Kimmel that he considered that there was no chance of a surprise attack.

339. General Grunert. In view of the lack of definite knowledge as to the intentions of Japan, why were not measures taken to cover any eventuality?

General Short. If you had taken measures to meet any eventuality, you would have disregarded other parts of the message. They said, "Do not alarm the public. Do not disclose \([428]\) intent. Do nothing provocative to Japan."

340. General Grunert. Do you consider that taking defensive measures of any kind necessarily would disclose intent?

General Short. Under the strained relations, if we were moving live ammunition to all the guns—remember, in DeRussy everything was right under the eye of the public. Your guns were just in the middle of the city, and there is no question but that it would have given rise to a lot of speculation.

341. General Grunert. How would they know you had live ammunition?

General Short. We had antiaircraft guns there as close as from that window (indicating). If you put the ammunition out people walking along the sidewalk could read it on the boxes.

342. General Grunert. They knew that the army was kept over there to defend the island. Are they supposed to be impotent and not to be trusted to take ammunition out? I cannot understand the psychology.

General Short. Taking live ammunition out, I think, in a period of strained relations like that, is a very different thing from moving it in maneuvers or on target practice that everybody has been accustomed to.

343. General Grunert. You were over there with the intent of defending the island.

General Short. The papers were writing up the situation and they were writing scare headlines, and in combination it would have been just exactly what they told us not to do. They said not to alarm the public. If the War Department felt as you do about it I do not think they should have sent out any such instructions.

344. General Grunert. What ground had you to assume that the \([429]\) War Department messages regarding subversive activities and antisabotage and your reports thereon constituted adequate preparatory measures?

General Short. Because, having received my report as to exactly what I was doing, they had let ten days go by without ever telling me I was doing too much or too little.

345. General Grunert. Did you consider, having made this report and no reply having been received, that it absolved you against taking other measures?
General Short. I did. I thought they agreed with me a hundred percent. And there were other things that influenced me. I pointed out before certain planes coming in from the mainland without ammunition and with all guns cosmolined. I can see a definite argument that they did not consider any great danger in the situation.

346. General Grunert. To what extent, if any, did you develop a sense of security due to the opinion prevalent in diplomatic, military and naval circles and in the public press, that any immediate attack by Japan would be in the Far East? Was this justified from a military viewpoint?

General Short. I supposed that perhaps we had all been influenced over a period of years by the fact that our war plans had always been against an attack on the Philippine Islands. The war plans had not been built against an attack on Hawaii. I was very familiar with those plans. I had been in the far eastern section of G-2 for three years and had commanded one of those maneuver forces.

347. General Grunert. To what extent, if any, did the fact that they were planning to send Army troops to relieve marines in the mandates influence you as to your decision not to take any [430] greater defensive measures than you did?

General Short. That in itself would have had no effect. That would have indicated to me that they foresaw the possibility of using Marines for landing forces, and they wanted to get all the Marines where they would be available. It did not mean necessarily anything immediate; and, as a matter of fact, it was not exactly an order; it was a call for a recommendation, and Kimmel and I both recommended that it be put off until certain construction had been completed.

348. General Grunert. I think you have covered most of the rest of my questions. I may have one more. Did you not give thought, or did you give thought, to the policy of the Axis Powers to usually attack on Sundays and also to the fact that Japan usually attacks on declaration of war but not waiting until its opponent is advised of that declaration?

General Short. I fully expected Japan to attack, but I expected her to attack the Philippines on account of the presence of the fleet. I thought she would attack where she would not be confronted with so large forces.

349. General Frank. Of the 6 messages that were sent to you, three from the Navy and three from the Army, between November 16th and 28th, you seem to have been conversant with five of them. Four of them cautioned to be careful and not do anything that would provoke Japan. Three of them cautioned against sabotage. Was there any cumulative effect of this sabotage caution?

General Short. Undoubtedly it caused me to feel that the War Department agreed with my own judgment that the greatest danger was internal danger from the Japanese population.

350. General Frank. Did not the provisions of your war plans [431] and your standing operating procedure provide fully for defense against all situations?

General Short. It did. The three alerts made the thing very definitely provided for.
351. General Frank. Were not the provisions of your war plan and standing operation procedure known in the War Department?
General Short. Oh, yes.
352. General Grunert. You say, "Oh, yes." But what do you know about it?
General Short. They were reported on November 5. I do not know that anybody had read them.
353. General Grunert. We have had testimony to the effect that the War Plans Division representatives did not know the S. O. P.
General Short. That is quite possible; but they were forwarded to the War Department—just the same as the War Plans Division did not know that I made a report which they called for.
354. General Russell. Is there record of those S. O. P.'s having been forwarded to the War Department?
General Short. I think so. There would undoubtedly be a letter of transmittal.
355. General Grunert. Then are you of the opinion that they knew what was in your S. O. P. of the 5th of November and knew your classes of alerts?
General Short. When I sent the message I knew there was a possibility that the man who got the message would not know what Alert No. 1 was, so I said "Alert for sabotage." I did not use "Alert No. 1," because I thought the man who got the message might not have read the procedure and would have to look it up and spend some time; so I said "Alert for sabotage."

356. General Frank. Suppose that instead of all the provisions that were placed in these messages you had received one saying "War imminent. Act accordingly."
General Short. I, in all probability, would have gone to Alert No. 3.
357. General Frank. Why would you have gone to Alert No. 3 in the event of naval advice to the contrary?
General Short. That would have indicated at least that the War Department were 100 percent convinced that something had happened.
358. General Grunert. Then "War imminent" to the Navy did not mean the same that "War imminent" would have meant to you?
General Short. Absolutely not, because I knew that expression had been used frequently in naval messages.
359. General Frank. Now, with respect to the cautions against provoking the Japs, that was a national policy, was it not?
General Short. Apparently, yes, without exception.
360. General Frank. While we were refraining from provoking the Japs in general, what were they doing?
General Short. I would not know enough of all of their diplomatic circumstances to tell you, sir. They were apparently getting ready to make some preparations to attack, if that is what you mean.
361. General Frank. Do you not think that that was generally known?
General Short. You mean by our diplomats?
362. General Frank. Yes.
General Short. I do not know. After an event has happened many people profess to have known things that they did not know before.
363. General Frank. Were you not familiar with Mr. Grew's reports?

General Short. I have read his statement in the State Department White Paper. But the Grew report I think was ten months before.

364. General Frank. That indicated the attitude of the Japs, did it not?

General Short. Yes; but if it has been ten months or a year, they might come to the conclusion that Grew had been wrong.

365. General Frank. Further, you were familiar, were you not, with the activities of the Japanese agents attached to the consulate?

General Short. We felt sure that they were carrying on propaganda to have people keep their dual citizenship in place of renouncing it, and things of that kind.

366. General Grunert. Was there anything by way of indication in Honolulu or about Honolulu to the effect that they were arrogant, that they despised this nation because of what looked to be a weak-kneed policy of conciliation?

General Short. No; I would not say they were. At the time they closed all the Japanese bank accounts—I guess that was in July—there was a lot of uneasiness among the Japanese population, a very great deal of uneasiness, but I do not remember at any time any arrogant attitude on the part of the population.

367. General Frank. You do not seem to have a feeling that we were very restricted in our efforts or that we were impeded at all in taking full-out measures for national defense in our attitude of keeping from provoking the Japs?

368. General Grunert. If you had not received any message from the War Department, what would have been your action? What would you have done or not done?

General Short. We had been not quite on Alert No. 1 from July on, from the time the banks were closed. We were extremely watchful. I think in all probability we would have been on Alert No. 1 with a careful recheck of all our guards and strengthening where necessary.

369. General Grunert. But still you would not have gone beyond Alert No. 1?

General Short. No; I do not think we would, because, as I saw the thing, I did not visualize an air attack at that time.

370. General Frank. Had you been on sort of an alert ever since July?

General Short. At least half an alert. We had never taken the guards off of the highway bridges and utilities. Our guards along the waterfront were not nearly as strong as they were after November 27. We put out a lot of additional guards and checked on everything; and we had gotten all of the gasoline people, all of the public utility people, as early as July, to build man-proof fences and put flood lights around the properties so that we could guard them.
371. General Frank. Do you think that this continuous alert had been carried to such an extent that the command had become apathetic?

General Short. I do not, because when the attack occurred every-thing clicked. There was not any confusion of any kind. There was no delay, and the troops went into action as fast as anybody could expect them to.

372. General Frank. Do you recall ever seeing the order that called for the alert of the previous year, 1940?

General Short. You mean Field Order No. 1?

373. General Frank. No; the order that came from the War Department.

General Short. I think I knew about one that General Marshall sent out, and I did not tell them whether it was the real thing, or not. It stayed out for some time. I don’t remember the wording of the alert, but I knew about it; and they were kept on that alert, as I remember, for some time, not knowing whether it was drill or whether it was the real thing.

[Copy]

3141 Southwestern Boulevard,
Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 1944.

Subject: Corrections in testimony.
To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.
1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board:

Page 435, line 15, omit “I”.

/s/ Walter C. Short.
WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

374. General Frank. Did these caution messages have any effect on the full-out measures that you had taken?

General Short. They made us extremely cautious about everything possible pertaining to sabotage. We tightened up and it would have been very difficult for them to have gotten away with anything.

375. General Grunert. What, short of a War Department order to do so, would have caused you to take Alert No. 2 or No. 3?

General Short. If they had radioed me that they considered there was danger of an air attack we would have been in Alert No. 2 in three minutes. If they had wired me that they considered there was danger not only of an air attack but a possible attempt at landing, we would have been alerted just as fast, because we were so organized that all we had to do was to put Alert No. 2 in effect or Alert No. 3 in effect and there would be no delay and no confusion.

376. General Grunert. If you had never received what we called a G–2 sabotage alert and the so-called Arnold sabotage alert, would you still have gone under Alert No. 1?

General Short. I went on Alert No. 1 when I received the message from the Chief of Staff, because I thought it was the thing to do. If I had received nothing else and gotten no reply after making my report, I might have wondered more about it. But in view of the things that came afterward, and the planes that came in without ammunition, without preparation for defense, I was a hundred per cent convinced.
377. General Frank. I would like to develop this thought for just a minute. This is in consideration generally of military operations. In estimating the situation with which a military commander is confronted, our teachings in the military establishment generally have been along the lines of taking all information that is available, evaluating it and using it as a guide. Is that correct?

General Short. Yes.

378. General Frank. That is in accordance with our Leavenworth teaching, our war college teaching and out actual practice in the organization. Now, in coming to a decision on military disposition and general practice in the Army, Army teachings, as perhaps Army tradition, indicate that a commander should prepare for enemy action of what character?


379. General Frank. The worst. Now, can you tell me why that was not done in this instance?

General Short. Everything indicated to me that the War Department did not believe that there was going to be anything more than sabotage; and, as I have explained, we had a very serious training proposition with the Air Corps particularly, that if we went into Alert No. 2 or 3 instead of No. 1 at the time that we couldn’t meet the requirements on the Philippine ferrying business. Also the fact that they told me to report the action taken unquestionably had an influence because when I reported action taken and there was no comment that my action was too little or too much I was a hundred per cent convinced that they agreed with it. They had a lot more information than I had.

380. General Russell. General Short, before asking you some questions about the relations between the Hawaiian Department and the War Department, I want to come back to one thing that was brought up a little earlier in the afternoon, because it is going to be a very material issue here apparently, and that is the extent of the naval reconnaissance on the 27th of November and the days thereafter. I do not want to repeat the questions—

General Short. No.

381. General Russell. —— or to elicit the answers that have already taken place here this afternoon; but the statement which you made as to task forces which were acting at the same time as reconnaissance parties on which these planes were sent is in conflict with all of the other facts or statements that I know of about that situation.

[438] General Short. In other words, you do not believe the task forces were out.

382. General Russell. I have no personal belief about it.

General Short. No, but I mean your information doesn’t indicate——?

383. General Russell. My information is that there were a couple of task forces that had gone out to the east to leave some people on some islands. That is, as they were returning from this mission, the planes had been sent out.

384. General Frank. To the east or west?

385. General Russell. On that way (indicating); I don’t know which way that was.

General Short. I think I am correct in stating that there was one task force coming back in and that there were two going out, one going
towards Midway and one going to Johnston Island, that landed—I know in that case it landed just five minutes before the attack. It got the report of the attack in five minutes after they landed. I had a staff officer with that one, so I know in regard to that.

386. General Russell. As a matter of fact, General Short, it may come to pass that you will be back here tomorrow; and I think you will find, or you will find in this Roberts report a statement as to naval activity on December 7th, and I am merely suggesting that if you desire it might be well to check that and check that evidence which you have given this afternoon.

General Short. And I think it would be well to check specifically, if you have Admiral Kimmel, as to what task forces were out. I am quite convinced that there was one coming in and two going out.

387. General Russell. Your evidence was this afternoon that the Navy had out on reconnaissance all of its available—

General Short. I think they had every carrier.

388. General Russell. Every one.

General Short. I think there were only about two cruisers that were in the harbor and just a small number of destroyers. Their battleships were all in.


General Short. I think that is correct.

390. General Russell. You get the sense of the remarks that I am making?

General Short. Yes.

391. General Russell. My effort is to eliminate from this record every factual issue that it is possible to eliminate.

General Short. I have no worry of definitely saying that that was the case, but Admiral Kimmel could give you positive information on the subject. I think I am definitely correct, and I know that the one that went south to Johnston Island landed just five minutes before the attack, because I say I had a staff officer on it.

392. General Russell. Yes. Now, before we leave this subject of reconnaissance to determine what else could have been done that day, you had these people on from 4 until 7, on the radar?

General Short. That is right.

393. General Russell. There are statements in the record and facts as to how effective those radar training or mobile sets were, how far they would reach, and how accurately they operated. Now, how far could your radar detect the presence of aircraft?

General Short. That morning they actually detected it at 132 miles, apparently.

394. General Russell. Well, might it not be that they had taken off from a carrier which was 132 miles away?

General Short. They might have.

395. General Russell. Do you know, General Short, whether or not they would have detected aircraft any farther away than 130 miles?

General Short. In all probability not with our mobile stations. Now, we hoped, with those fixed stations that we were building up as high as 10,000 feet, eventually to get to 200 miles with those stations, 10,000 feet up. We didn’t figure that we could count on more
than 75 or a hundred miles under average conditions with the mobile stations. There are times when you get them farther.

396. General Russell. Therefore, the reconnaissance agency available to you that morning was limited in the detection of aircraft in the air to 130 miles or so?

General Short. That was as far as we could expect it, yes.

397. General Russell. The only other reconnaissance measure which you could have taken would have been in connection with the distant reconnaissance?

General Short. Distant reconnaissance.

398. General Frank. Something that you have to realize about the operation of radar is that radar will not operate over the curvature of the earth.

General Short. That is the reason for going up 10,000 feet.

399. General Frank. Also, the higher the aircraft is flying the further away it will pick it up, and also the higher the radar is above the sea level the further away it will pick it up.

400. General Russell. I understand all those factors, but the thing that I was attempting to develop was the strength of the radar instrument which you were operating.

General Short. I think that 132 miles is about as far as we could ever hope to get anything with those mobile sets.

401. General Russell. What I had in mind was whether or not they were to the radar world what the walkie-talkie was to our radio in the Army.

General Short. To a certain extent. They would not get the distance that the fixed stations would get.

402. General Grunert. What is the line of the rest of your questions?

403. General Russell. In the rest of my questions, I believe, except some miscellaneous, I am going to talk about or ask General Short some questions on what he knew about the general hostile situation.

404. General Grunert. I think we have gone about as far as we can today, and we shall start tomorrow morning on the rest of this agenda, in which we shall cover interceptor command, aircraft warning service, A. A. defense, in-shore patrol, command, and staff and so forth, and there will be an opportunity to get those questions in.

(Thereupon, at 5:25 p.m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
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SATURDAY, AUGUST 12, 1944

Testimony of—
Maj. Gen. Walter Campbell Short, United States Army, Retired—
Resumed.

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Extracts from Honolulu Newspapers

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1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.
The Board at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.


Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, and Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder.

General Grunert. The Board will come to order.

Colonel West. The witness is reminded that he is still under oath. It will not be necessary to repeat the oath.

General Grunert. We will take up the combination of Interceptor Commands and Air Warning Service.

General Russell. I have some questions that I did not finish yesterday.

General Grunert. Do you want to take them up on subjects that we went into yesterday?

General Russell. Yes.

General Grunert. All right. We will wait until General Russell finishes his questions, and take up the topics which I mentioned.

General Russell. General Short, when we left off yesterday we were discussing the reconnaissance which was being conducted by the Navy on the 6th and 7th of December. There seemed to be some confusion as to just what was being done. I have had an opportunity to check the Navy testimony on that. I thought it would be well to have our record clear on it if it could be made clear.

Captain DeLany of the Navy testified before the Roberts Commission. Did you know Captain DeLany?

General Short. Yes.

General Russell. He stated that certain of the Pacific Fleet was in Pearl Harbor, describing it as Task Force 1, giving the number of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers; also the ships of the base force.

[444]
with the Oregon as the flagship, and repair ships. Those were the ships at Pearl Harbor on the morning of the 7th?

General Short. Yes.

414. General Russell. He said that out was Task Force 8, the Enterprise with the addition of heavy cruisers and a squadron of destroyers; that they were approximately 200 miles west of Oahu.

415. General Frank. When?

[445] 416. General Russell. They were returning from an expedition to Wake Island where they had landed a squadron of Marines. That was on the night of December 6, 1941. It was from that point that the Enterprise sent 18 or 19 planes out on a definite reconnaissance mission. That is one of the forces. The second task force that was out was No. 12 in which was the Lexington. Is that a carrier?

General Short. That is a carrier.

417. General Russell. They were approximately 425 miles southeast of Midway?

General Short. Yes.

418. General Russell. And their principal mission was landing a squadron of Marine bombers on that island.

General Short. Did he not indicate that the men went out on this task force with planes?

419. General Russell. He makes no reference to any reconnaissance launched from the Lexington.

General Short. He might not, because, as I understand it, it was habitual.

420. General Russell. We will attempt to develop that; but I am attempting now to get the record straight.

Now, in addition to these 18 or 19 planes that had been sent out by Task Force 8 from the Enterprise, there were either three or four patrol planes carrying out the morning search required by the security order in the operated areas to the southward of Oahu?

General Short. Yes.

421. General Russell. Evidently they had their base at Pearl Harbor.

General Short. Did he say anything about any planes that went to Johnston Island and landed on Johnston Island five minutes before the Japs struck Pearl Harbor? The mission was commanded, as I remember, by Admiral Brown.

422. General Russell. Where is Johnston Island?

General Short. About 900 to 1100 miles southwest of Oahu. I think it is about 900 miles.

423. General Russell. We will check on that later.

General Short. I am so positive about it because I had a staff officer with them.

424. General Russell. Yesterday, General Short, you were asked a hypothetical question by General Frank which, in substance, was about this: Had you received a message on December 7 saying "War is imminent. Do the necessary," what would you have done? To that question you replied, "I would have gone into Alert 3."

General Short. I think I probably would if I had received such a message. Of course I did not receive it. It is purely hypothetical. It would be very difficult to say positively what I would or would not have done.
425. General Russell. In all the evidence which was adduced on yesterday the definite trend, if not the definite conclusion, could be reached that, based on the information which you had, you had no confusion in your thinking about the adequacy of going into an alert for sabotage?

General Short. That is correct.

426. General Russell. There was nothing left in your mind about that that was uncertain or indefinite.

General Short. That is correct.

427. General Russell. In your early testimony, however, you referred to the fact that when you received this very important message of November 27 you did reach the conclusion that the War Department thought that there was still some possibility of avoiding war with Japan?

General Short. I thought so from the caution about not taking any provocative measures against Japan and not alarming the public. To take the message of the 16th of October and the 27th of November together, they indicated to me that they were still hopeful of avoiding hostilities.

428. General Russell. Do you recall that in the message of November 27 and at the beginning of that message, there is language to the effect that there existed the barest possibility that the Japs might come back and offer to continue negotiations?

General Short. Yes.

429. General Russell. What effect on your thinking would the return of the Japanese and the resumption of negotiations have had?

General Short. That there was a possibility of arriving at something short of war.

430. General Russell. Did you have from the War Department, after the message of November 27, 1941, any further information as to the resumption of negotiations with the Japanese?

General Short. I had nothing. All I had from the War Department was the message of November 28 which went into detail about sabotage.

431. General Russell. From the press or any other source did you know that between November 27 and December 7 there were other negotiations between the Japanese representatives in Washington and our Government?

General Short. I am sure I knew whatever was in the papers. I habitually read them.

432. General Russell. If, then, as a matter of fact, the Japanese returned on the 1st, 2nd, or 5th of December, the chances are you knew about it?

General Short. I undoubtedly knew about it.

433. General Russell. Then the possibility that they might come back for other negotiations had become an actuality?

General Short. Yes.

434. General Russell. General Short, what if any information did you have from the War Department from the message in July 1941 to the message of October 16, 1941?

General Short. I do not remember anything outstanding. I have not dug into it, gotten out the messages and gone over them; but there was a break there where messages struck me as a very out-
standing piece of information in July, and the next serious one was October 16. Do not misunderstand me; there may have been others that I do not recall.

435. General Russell. During this period of time you did have some correspondence with General Marshall, did you not?

General Short. I possibly did, on the question of obtaining things for the Department. Just what correspondence I had directly with him at that time I do not recall.

436. General Russell. Did you have any messages from G-2 or other agencies of the War Department detailing or describing to you what was going on in our international relations with Japan?


437. General Russell. Were you told at some time in September 1941 that General Marshall and others who were in conference with the Secretary of State had decided that war with Japan was inevitable?

General Short. I do not think I ever knew of that conference.

438. General Russell. Did you know that the policy of the United States Government from some time in August or September of 1941 until the date of the attack was largely one of a delaying action, playing for time, with the realization that war with Japan was inevitable?

General Short. I think I knew at the time in an indefinite way. Later on I undoubtedly got that information when I read the State Department paper that came out a year or so afterwards.

439. General Russell. Did you know, General Short, as Commander of the Hawaiian Department, that we were negotiating with the British and Dutch about coordinated military action in the Pacific area?

General Short. I knew nothing that was not in the papers.

440. General Russell. Did you know that an agreement had been reached with all nations, the effect of which was that if the Japanese moved forces into Thailand west of 100 degrees east or south of 10 degrees north we would regard that as an act of war?

General Short. I did not.

441. General Russell. Nobody ever conveyed that information to you at all?

General Short. If it was not in the papers I did not know that; and I am sure I do not remember its being in the papers.

[445] 442. General Russell. You would hardly think that that information would be in the public press?

General Short. I would not expect it to be.

443. General Russell. General Short, suppose you had known this policy of the American Government and suppose that it was taken in association or in conference with those other powers, do you think you would have been in a better position to have estimated the situation on the 27th of November when it was brought to your attention that negotiations had practically ended?

General Short. I think it would have made me more conscious that war was practically unavoidable.

444. General Russell. And in reply to General Frank's question yesterday you stated that you would have gone into Alert No. 3 if you had known that war was unavoidable?

General Short. I do not think that is a good way of putting it. If I knew it was immediately imminent. Because it might be unavoid-
able and go along for a year, and you would not want to go into No. 3 and stay there. But if I had known it was immediately imminent, then I should think I would have gone into Alert No. 3.

445. General Russell. If you had known all these things and then it had been brought to your attention that these negotiations had about ended, would or not that have indicated to your mind the possible imminence of war?

General Short. It would have looked to me definite that the war was almost upon us.

446. General Russell. General Short did you know that on the [457] 26th of November the State Department handed to the Japanese representatives a memorandum which G-2 of the War Department at least considered as an ultimatum to the Japanese Government?

General Short. I knew nothing of anything of the kind until a year or so afterwards, whenever that State Department paper came out.

447. General Russell. Did you know on the 27th of November, when you received that message, that the Secretary of State had in a meeting on the 25th of November told the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and probably the Chief of Staff of the Army, and Admiral Stark, that the State Department had gone as far as it could in its negotiations with the Japanese and that the security of the nation was then in the hands of the armed forces?

General Short. I did not.

448. General Russell. Did you know that in January of 1941 Ambassador Grew made a report to the State Department or to the Secretary of State in which he stated that there were rumors in Japan that in event of trouble with America the Japs would attack Pearl Harbor?

General Short. At that time I was not in command; but I have known of that later, I think probably a year or so later. I do not think I knew anything about it at that time.

449. General Russell. Did you have any information in the period from November 27 to December 7, 1941, as to the disposition of the Japanese Fleet?

General Short. I am sure that I talked with Admiral Kimmel and, from the information, I thought that the Fleet was either in home ports or that a very considerable number [452] of Japanese ships had been sent south. As I remember, that was the gist of the thing. I know my impression was that they were moving more towards either the Malay Peninsula or the Philippines.

450. General Russell. What was your impression as to what the Fleet knew about the location of the Japanese Fleet and its various types of surface ships during the six months immediately preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor?

General Short. Admiral Bloch was in command of the District and kept a map locating as many as possible of the Japanese elements. I do not believe they felt that it was very complete or that it was accurate enough. I do not believe we were able to have agents in Japan accomplish much of anything. The means of obtaining information are not known to me.

451. General Russell. What type of ship would have been of more interest to you as the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department? I refer now to Japanese craft.

73716—46—Ex. 145, vol. 1—17
General Short. Carriers. Submarines would be second, probably.

452. General Russell. If you had known that during the last six months prior to December 7, 1941, the location of the carriers of the Japanese Fleet were unknown to our Navy for 112 out of 180 days, what effect would that have had?

General Short. It would undoubtedly have made me feel that the reports were far from complete.

May I ask, General Russell, whether you mean 112 days in a stretch, or two-thirds of the days just taking the calendar days, that they did not know where the ships were?


General Short. That might have a very different meaning. A ship might go from one harbor to another and there might be several days that they would not know anything about it except that it had left the previous harbor.

454. General Russell. The information seems to be that they were lost 12 periods and those 12 periods apparently aggregated 112 days.

Now, I have some miscellaneous questions and I shall be through.

It is your belief, as I remember, that information about the Japanese was conveyed to you in talks, informal talks, between you and the Navy Commanders?

General Short. Yes; almost wholly.

455. General Russell. Is it your opinion or not that unity of command would have been more effective than the cooperative agreement under which you and the Navy were working?

General Short. I think it would.

456. General Russell. With the lack of enemy information, General Short, and the possibility of confusion created by the messages which you received from Washington, and maybe looking back in retrospect, do you not think that the situation demanded vigorous action on your part?

General Short. Very definitely not, from the information I had.

457. General Russell. General Short, on the morning of December 7th the only screening or reconnaissance work that was being done was by the Navy?

[454] General Short. That is correct.

458. General Russell. You were there with the mission of protecting the Navy.

General Short. I might add one thing. From 4 to 7 we had our Aircraft Warning Service, which was practically the only thing the Army had for reconnaissance.

459. General Russell. A moment ago we were discussing what you would have done in event that you thought war was inevitable and imminent; and I have some recollection of a statement made by you on yesterday relating to a discussion with the Navy Commanders as to what they would have done with respect to dispersing the ships and moving them out of the harbor in the event of war.

General Short. I do not know whether it took place right at that time, but at some time I talked with Admiral Kimmel about the question of procedure in case of an air attack, and I very definitely had the idea that if he expected any immediate air attack he would clear
the harbor. Just when that conversation took place—we had so many—I would not know.

460. General Russell. Yesterday in your testimony, General Short, you made some comparison of the aircraft available to you for the protection of Pearl Harbor and the Island of Oahu, with the number of aircraft that came in from the Japanese carriers. I have some notes about it, but they are not very complete. Did you form any conclusion as to the relative strength of the aircraft available to you and that of the Japs that made the attack?

General Short. We thought that they had somewhere between 160 and 180 planes. I believe the Navy figured possibly a [455] larger number than that. We had 105 pursuit planes that were modern enough to fight. We had 6 flying fortresses that were capable of being used on a mission. We had 10 A-20's, 9 of which were in commission, that were good for a relatively short mission. We had quite a bunch, probably 50 of the B-18s. It would have been suicide to send men in them. They were not even fast enough to run away if he had an idea of doing nothing but going out and looking around and returning as soon as he had his information. I believe that is a correct statement, General Frank. They were so obsolescent that they were almost useless.

461. General Frank. It depends upon the point of view of the seriousness of the situation and how much you felt you wanted to pay for the information for which they went.

General Short. I did not mean I would not use anything in the world, no matter how obsolete; but they were not modern ships in any sense.

462. General Frank. No.

463. General Russell. You referred to the number of aircraft that were available there because of the presence of the Navy; I mean, Navy aircraft.

General Short. I might say that the ships that I gave you were not all. I think we had a total of 80 pursuit planes that were in commission. That includes some older types.

464. General Russell. I believe all those details are in your statement. I was just attempting to get your considered opinion as to the relative strength of the contesting air forces.

General Short. I do not believe we could have mustered as much strength in modern planes if we had everything we could have [456] put in the air. We would have been quite inferior to the Japanese.

465. General Russell. Do you include the Navy ships also?

General Short. That is another proposition. The Navy had a considerably greater number of reconnaissance planes than we had. My recollection is that it was something like 95 for reconnaissance.

466. General Russell. Whatever the relative strengths of the contesting forces may have been on the morning of December 7, 1941, had you been in Alert No. 3 the damage which was done to us out there may have been greatly lessened?

General Short. Yes. I do not believe that we could have kept those low-flying planes from getting in, because the antiaircraft was almost helpless against them. They came in extremely close
to the water. The estimates were anywhere from 10 feet to 200 feet above the water. I believe that antiaircraft men will tell you that that would be the most difficult target to handle; the angle changes so rapidly.

467. General Russell. Were those the ships that did the worst damage?

General Short. The torpedo planes, as I understand it, did the real damage. I think the real damage to the ships was practically all done in the first five or ten minutes of the action.

468 General Grunert. Will you please differentiate between ships of the air and ships of the Navy so that the record will show which is which?

General Short. I will say planes from now on.

469. General Russell. I believe you stated on yesterday that [457] there was no surprise that the Japs would attack without a declaration of war?

General Short. That is correct.

470. General Russell. Had there been any changes on the Island proper, under your command out there during the year 1941, which indicated the imminence of war?

General Short. I do not believe that there were any outward signs in the Japanese population. The only time that anything was definitely indicated was when they closed their accounts in the banks. There was a great deal of restlessness on that account. It practically stopped the business of the Japanese merchants. There was quite an upset at that time. I think it was more noticeable then than at any other time.

471. General Russell. Would it have been possible to have guarded your aircraft against sabotage even though it had been dispersed?

General Short. Yes; but it would have taken a very great number of men and it would have interfered very seriously with training. If we had had the fencing and the floodlights the number required would not have been so great.

472. General Russell. Were there not frequent arrivals of aircraft from the United States, in Oahu?

General Short. Not frequent arrivals. It was considered somewhat a perilous flight. We got in certain groups of flying fortresses and B-24's, the only time I remember flights coming all the way. When our pursuit planes were brought in they were brought in on carriers and took off in some instances and came in maybe the last 200 miles.

473. General Russell. General Short, were there any considerable number of visitations or inspection trips made by War [458] Department personnel out in your area in 1941?

General Short. There were several people that came out there.

474. General Russell. What was their purpose?

General Short. I took it that their purpose was to get a look at the status of things on the Island. As I remember, General Evans of the Air Corps came out and looked over things; and the Division Engineer from San Francisco came out and spent several days and inspected the Office of the District Engineer, because the District Engineer functioned directly under him.
Subject: Corrections in testimony.
To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board:

- Page 458, line 7, change “General Evans” to General Emmons.

/8/ Walter C. Short, Retired.

WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

475. General Grunert. Who was that?

General Short. Hannum. He came out and stayed several days and had two or three conferences with me at the end of his inspection. He came to tell me what he had found, and so forth.

476. General Russell. Did they bring you any details of the negotiations between the Japs and our Government?

General Short. No.

477. General Russell. On yesterday you discussed the necessity for arming and equipping these ships to fight, which were on the way to the Philippines, stopping off at Oahu. Where would they next stop to pick up gas?

General Short. They were flying then to Midway to Wake and from Wake to Port Moresby.

478. General Russell. Could they get gas at Midway?

General Short. Yes; they could get gas at Midway and at Wake and at Port Moresby; and then they landed up around Darwin.

479. General Russell. How far was it to Midway, the first stop for gas?

[459] General Short. I believe Midway is 1,100 miles. It is about 900 or 1,000 miles from there on to Wake, as I remember. The longest jump was from Wake to Port Moresby.

480. General Russell. There has been some discussion about what would have happened if you had had another hour and a half or two hours on the December 7 message. I want to ask you two or three questions now about the condition of readiness. At some place in the record we have seen that it would require four hours for you to have gotten your aircraft into the air ready to fight.

General Short. No. There is a type of alert where it would require it, but in a case of emergency, the very fact that the pursuit planes were actually in the air by 8:50 shows that they did not require four hours. It would take a little longer for the bombers, but they are not defensive planes. If they were going to load up with bombs it would take a little longer, but it would not take that much time. As a matter of fact, they were actually in the air at 11:27.

481. General Russell. The bombers?

General Short. Yes.

482. General Grunert. What was the idea of the 4-hour period?

General Short. On account of personnel. If you had a 4-minute, you had to have the personnel right at the planes. If you had a 30-minute, you had to have the men at the airfield. If you had 4 hours the crew members could be in their barracks.
483. General Grunert. Under your Alert No. 1 where were the men? General Short. In our Alert No. 1 the men that were required for guarding purposes were all definitely at their planes. The crews were not tied down.

484. General Grunert. Someone must have figured 4 hours. Why did they not make it 3 or 2? General Short. They had a 2 and they had a 4.

485. General Grunert. Individual planes could do some fighting, but organized fighting in the air would take how long? General Short. It actually took 55 minutes.

486. General Grunert. Were they organized to fight in the air, or was it individual fighting? General Short. It was largely individual. They took off in two or three, when they got to the field. Most of the officers were spending their nights in their own quarters at Schofield Barracks several miles away.

487. General Grunert. My understanding was that the 4-hour was for perfectly organized fighting in the air? General Short. By making it 4 hours it gave the possibility to the men going ahead with recreation and athletics without being worried about getting that alert. That could go right ahead with their normal functions. They might have been out on a problem where it would take them an hour to get back in.

488. General Grunert. Well, that was Alert No. 1, was it? General Short. Alert No. 1; they went right ahead with their training.


490. General Russell. General Short, a great deal has been said about the population of Oahu there, the Hawaiian Islands generally. How many Americans were there there? General Short. I think there were normally about 20,000, but of course there were at that time, with the armed services there, approximately close to probably fifty-seven, fifty-eight thousand Army personnel there, and I would say more than that of the Navy, that is, in and out with the Navy.

491. General Russell. People who resided there and who were not in the armed forces, there were about how many? General Short. Probably about 20,000, but there were a lot of defense workers. I expect the American population had been increased to 40,000 in that last year, but the normal population of Americans was rather small.

492. General Russell. General Short, on the 24th of January a letter originated in the office of the Secretary of the Navy that General Grunert examined you on yesterday. General Short. Yes, sir.

493. General Russell. The substance of the letter was that the Navy was very apprehensive about an air attack on the ships there at Hawaii. General Short. Yes, sir.

494. General Russell. Now, in late November, early December, when you had the conference at which it was stated that the
possibility of an attack of that sort at Oahu was nil—Do you recall that?

General Short, Yes.

495. General Russell. Can you account for the change in the attitude of the Navy personnel between this date of January and late November toward an air attack?

General Short. One was an attack and the other was a surprise attack. The question there was whether a surprise attack.

496. General Russell. The question where?

General Short. The question November 27 was the question whether surprise attack was possible.

497. General Russell. Well, you do not think that the letter of January 24th related to a surprise attack?

General Short. It might have related to either one, but I mean the apprehension of the Navy about getting our antiaircraft and our pursuit defense built up was not just for surprise attack but for any kind of an attack. The Japanese might have attacked them in superior force. You see, their Navy had been reduced by sending certain elements to the Atlantic Fleet, and they might have been subject to an attack any time, and if it were reduced too much they might have been worried about being attacked by superior force, in which case the air business would have been serious. They were, I think, interested not just from the point of view of surprise attack but of always having proper antiaircraft defense.

498. General Russell. You think that the general interest inspired the letter of January 24?

General Short. I think so.

[463] 499. General Grunert. Before you leave that subject: Was there a sentiment in the Army and Navy in Hawaii from about January 1, '41, to July, we will say, in which they seemed to fear action by Japan against Pearl Harbor, and then from July on they seemed to have more of a sense of security and did not appear to be so alarmed about the Japanese attacking Pearl Harbor? Did you have any knowledge of any such sentiment?

General Short. I don't think so. They were pushing us all the time on the question of antiaircraft defense and air—and pursuit defense.

500. General Frank. Who was pushing you?

General Short. The Navy. They were always talking to me about the desirability of getting everything that we had coming to us in the way of antiaircraft guns and getting better guns. They thought our 3-inch equipment was not satisfactory, and we were supposed to get some new 90-millimeter guns which we never got. They felt that our old 3-inch equipment was decidedly inferior to their antiaircraft guns, and they were anxious to have us build up our antiaircraft to the latest type, with sufficient numbers.

501. General Grunert. In February 1941 Admiral Kimmel is alleged to have been astounded at the existing weaknesses of the Pearl Harbor defenses.

General Short. That inspection was made before I got there. I know about it.

502. General Grunert. And he is supposed to have pointed out the inadequacy of antiaircraft guns, the obsolescence of land-based
aircraft, the lack of aircraft detectors. Now, was that cured so that the sentiment was different after about the middle of the year, or what?

General Short. Well, we were definitely—we had hoped to have the antiaircraft warning service, the material delivered by June 30th. That was the original plan. The Navy probably felt better because funds had been allotted for that purpose, and there was a definite—we were definitely trying to get it installed.

503. General Grunert. But as far as you know there was no real change in sentiment throughout the year?

General Short. I think the change was that they thought that we were putting more emphasis on it than had been put on it previously, that they had a little more feeling of confidence that we were going in a period of a few months to be better prepared.

504. General Russell. I have one more miscellaneous question: General Short, this subject of the creation of this Board, of the proper procedure by the War Department, was on debate in the Congress. A Representative of one of the States made the argument or took the position that on the 6th day of December at about noon an intelligence officer from your staff brought to your quarters a deciphered message which had been intercepted. As I recall, it was a telephone conversation between some Jap at Oahu and some Japanese official on the homeland. The Congressman charged that you were engaged in some sort of social activity and cursed this officer out and ran him out of the quarters. I do not know that you will come back before this Board, and I am bringing that representation to your attention now for any remark that you would like to make about that.

General Short. Colonel Bicknell brought that message to me at about 7 o'clock, I would say sometime around between 6:30 and 7 o'clock, on the evening of the 6th. Colonel Fielder—I don't know whether he came with Bicknell or whether I sent for him, but we went—the three of us went over it together, and we were frankly unable to get anything definite out of it. I have read it again since I have been here, and in the light of all events that have taken place it would be very difficult for me to interpret it today and say, This means so and so.

505. General Grunert. Do you mean the message was so garbled that you couldn't understand it?

General Short. No. It was such general talk that it could mean anything, and that the only way that you could possibly know what it could mean would be if you knew that the individuals had agreed ahead of time. There were certain words in that; in the light of everything that has happened, there is a possibility that certain flowers meant certain types of ships, and that we don't know, but at the time neither Bicknell nor Fielder had a suggestion as to the possible meaning of it. If they had had a month to work on it and had gotten something further, maybe they could. But nobody was able to say, Well, that means so and so.

506. General Grunert. As I recall this Congressman's statement, he stated something to the effect that you cursed this officer who brought the message, and practically threw him out.

General Short. Bicknell is in town. I think you could verify that very simply by having him.
507. General Grunert. We shall go into that, but while you are here and the subject was brought up—

[466] General Short. He came, and, as I say, Fielder either came with him or I sent for Fielder, and the three of us read it, and Bicknell had had more time looking over the message than anybody else, and we first asked him if he had any interpretation he could make, and he didn’t have, and Fielder didn’t have, and I frankly couldn’t interpret it.

508. General Frank. Is there or is there not any basis of fact in the report?

General Short. There is absolutely no basis of fact, except that the report was made to me.

509. General Grunert. Such a report?

General Short. And it was discussed with Bicknell, who was the contact officer, and with Fielder, who was my G-2, and we all admitted we couldn’t interpret it. Now, as I say, they might have come back if nothing had happened: the next week or ten days they probably would have come back with some kind of a possible interpretation, might not have come back with one that they felt was positive, but Bicknell was suspicious because he knew something of the man who did the talking, and he was suspicious on that point. He said that it just didn’t look right to him, that he couldn’t make an interpretation of it.

510. General Russell. That is all the questions I have.

511. General Grunert. I have one more question before we go to the next two topics.

General Short. I might add there that there wasn’t any social function going on at my house, or anything, at the time that he came there. Just the three of us were in on the thing.

512. General Grunert. As to your possible knowledge of the imminence of war with Japan, had you been reading the Honolulu [467] Advertiser?

General Short. I read the Honolulu papers carefully.

513. General Grunert. I quote extracts here on which I would like to question you:

(Extracts from Honolulu newspapers were read as follows:)

Headline, page 1, Sunday, 30th of November, ’41: Japanese nation ready, may strike over week end.

General Short. That is November 30th?

514. General Grunert. 30th of November, 1941:

Japanese May Strike Over Week End
Kurusu bluntly warned nation ready for battle

Then, another headline, page 1, Monday, 1st of December:

Hull, Kurusu in crucial meeting today
Some unofficial quarters asserted that Japanese Premier General Tojo’s speech on Saturday indicated that Japan may possibly have decided upon war.

Did such articles like that give you pause for thought as to the possible imminence of war?

General Short. Undoubtedly, but I didn’t look on those things as authentic, as coming from the State Department.

515. General Grunert. Now, a Mr. Raymond Coll, C-o-l-l, Hawaiian newspaper editor, is quoted by a Washington newspaper
shortly after submission of the Roberts report January 24, '42, in substance that General Short and Admiral Kimmel had made clear by their utterances before December 7, '41, the probability and the imminence of a Japanese attack at an early date. Is that true?

General Short. I wouldn't say that, at an early date. [468] We had both made repeated talks as to the necessity for the civil community preparing for war. My first talk was on Army Day on April 6. I had pounded at them to get them to provide production, storage of food, to organize their doctors, and to organize an auxiliary police force, auxiliary firemen. It wasn't preparation for war tomorrow, but it was getting the community organized so that if anything did happen there wouldn't be confusion, that there would be efficiency. That had been going on—I started April 6.

516. General Grunert. And when was your most recent talk before December 7 in that way?

General Short. I do not think that I had made a public talk for some time. I could not say what date, but the one talk where that I got the whole thing before the community and got their interest and got a very considerable action was on April 6, and we had kept on pushing the thing from April the 6th on.

517. General Grunert. Your G-2, Colonel Fielder, also made some talks?

General Short. Colonel Fielder in the last month or six weeks made a considerable number of talks, made talks in different islands.

518. General Grunert. All right. We shall go ahead with the two topics.

519. General Frank. I have some questions.

520. General Grunert. Have you some questions before you want to open up the other two topics?

521. General Frank. I have some questions about this that we have been talking about.

522. General Grunert. Go ahead. Finish that, and then we shall take up the other.

523. General Frank. Did you say that you saw the message from the Navy of November 27th?

General Short. I am sure I did, although we could not find the official copy in the files.

524. General Frank. In that message was the statement generally along the line, "An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai, or the Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo is indicated by the number, equipment, and organization of Japanese task forces"?

General Short. Yes, sir; I remember that.

525. General Frank. What was your reaction?

General Short. My reaction naturally from that was that if there was an attack going to take place it would more likely fall on the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, or that neighborhood over there than at Honolulu; that our hostilities in all probability would be in the nature of sabotage or uprisings, but in any event that—

526. General Frank. In other words, that led you away from the thought of an attack on Honolulu?

General Short. Very definitely.

527. General Frank. Did you consider the Aircraft Warning Service a form of reconnaissance?
General Short. The best, the only form the Army had of real reconnaissance.

528. General Frank. Well, then, since that War Department message of November 27th directed reconnaissance, why didn't you make the Aircraft Warning Service reconnaissance more extensive?

General Short. It was very, very new. We had very few trained men. We made it definite for what we considered the most dangerous period, and they carried on—that was from 4 to 7, and they carried on training from 7 to 11 and from 1 to 4. The last period was largely maintenance. We were working the men a good—a very large number of hours, because it was practically one relief for the thing.

529. General Frank. However, after the December 7th attack they went on a 24-hour basis?

General Short. You can work men 24 hours when you are at war. You can't in peace times continue to work 24 hours indefinitely.

530. General Frank. On the other hand, a year before that, in the alert that ran from June through to August, they were—

General Short. They didn't have any Aircraft Warning Service.

531. General Frank. I know, but they were on a full-out 24-hour basis at that time so far as working 24 hours was concerned.

General Short. On maneuvers you expect to. We did that in May. We had the whole command out, and they worked without regard to hours, but you can't do it indefinitely.

532. General Frank. Did you confer with your staff relative to the probability of an air attack?

General Short. When I got that message my Chief of Staff and I talked over carefully what alert we should go into. He had just finished a month before being G-3, and we talked over what alert we thought was essential, and I had the G-2 in and talked with him, and I think he agreed fully with me that that was our danger. I did not talk it over with the other members of the staff aside from G-2 and G-3. I talked it over, not asking whether they thought there would be an air attack, but I talked to the echelon commanders, particularly I think General Martin of the Air and General Burgin of the Coast Artillery. I think I personally gave them the messages and talked about what we wanted done. And I talked with General Murray. He had control of most of the sabotage in the Honolulu area, and I imagine that I had at least four or five conferences with him in the next week, because we were having a very complete check made by him personally of the guarding of the waterfront and everything of that kind, and we ran into some things that we thought had not been as completely done as they should be, and we made a very considerable number of changes.

533. General Frank. All right. Now, you have given considerable testimony about how you arrived at your conclusion of the adequateness of Alert No. 1, and in general may we say that you came to this conclusion as a result of your faith in the effectiveness of naval operations and the influence of naval opinion and to a certain extent of the line of thought as a result of what was contained in messages between the 16th of November and the 27th?

General Short. Yes, sir. And that was later confirmed by, may I add, actions of the War Department in not replying to my message
and stating they wanted more, and in sending planes in without any ammunition.

534. General Frank. All right. Did you feel that the wording of messages coming in there to you indicated an effort toward a supervisory control?

General Short. I thought that it indicated very definitely two things: that they wanted me to be extremely careful and not have an incident with the Japanese population that would arouse Japan, and the other thing was not to violate territorial laws in my eagerness to carry out defensive measures.

535. General Frank. The question has arisen in the minds of the Board as to why, when that air estimate anticipated just exactly what happened, steps were not taken to meet it. I assume that the answer—

General Short. You mean the estimate of the year—you mean the year before?


General Short. Oh.

537. General Frank. Of 1941.

General Short. Yes.

538. General Frank. I assume the answer is the answer that you gave to the question asked just two or three questions back.

General Short. Yes.

539. General Frank. How long previous to November '41 was daily reconnaissance performed by the Army?

General Short. We had a reconnaissance squadron stationed at Bellows Field that had a regular training program providing for so many hours of reconnaissance daily. They were the ones that performed it. It was a daily training proposition really. They performed this reconnaissance as part of the training of their squadron daily.

540. General Frank. Was this going on in November '41?

General Short. Yes, sir, this was going on. I think you may somewhere have maybe the program of Bellows Field which would show you just exactly what they were carrying on just in their daily training.

541. General Frank. But this was not being carried on on the morning of—

General Short. Not then on that morning, because it was Sunday morning.

542. General Frank. Yes. That was a form of reconnaissance?

General Short. It was very definitely reconnaissance.

543. General Frank. That you were carrying on?

General Short. But it was of no particular value where air was concerned, not like the Aircraft Warning Service. It actually would have been of real value only against submarines, as I see it.

544. General Frank. All right.

545. General Grunert. That was the only reconnaissance mission that those training planes had, was it not?

General Short. Yes, the close-in reconnaissance; go out 20 miles.

546. General Grunert. Were they armed, and did they have ammunition?

General Short. They did not.
547. General Frank. Did you have an official arrangement for systematic furnishing of information to your headquarters from the Navy?

General Short. The G-2 and O. N. I. were in constant touch, and they had a teletype circuit that they and the F. B. I. were on. [477]

That worked both ways, so they could instantly exchange information. We were not getting routine daily reports of the O. N. I.

548. General Frank. What I am trying to arrive at is this: You, through your testimony, have stated that in your personal contacts with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch you were advised at intervals with respect to when task forces went out, but I am trying to make it appear in the record that there was no official arrangement for that kind of information to come into your headquarters.

General Short. No, there were no written reports being transmitted every day to us as to exactly what was being done, until after the attack. That went into effect right away on December 7.

549. General Frank. Not only that, but you may or may not have known when task forces went out; is that correct?

General Short. Yes, I think I probably always knew what they did have out: I mean, in general terms; I may not have known the exact number of ships, but I always knew in general terms what was out.

550. General Frank. Did you always know where they were?

General Short. In general locations, probably whether they were going towards Canton, whether they were going towards Wake, whether they were going towards Midway.

551. General Frank. How often did they go into the area north and east of Oahu?

General Short. They constantly had them out.

552. General Frank. In the north and east?

[475] General Short. Largely north. North and west, you mean?

553. General Frank. No. I mean north and east.

General Short. Oh, you mean to the east of Midway?

554. General Frank. No. I mean straight north and northeast of Oahu.

General Short. I don’t think that they—I think they went straight north quite a bit. I don’t think they went east to any considerable extent, that they considered that the area to the west was more dangerous and that the great part of their work was done there.

555. General Gruner. Their task forces, the directions that they went, got to be sort of routine, so that Japanese agents could have been aware that they seldom went to the north and east?

General Short. I don’t—I never knew the exact courses that the task forces traveled on. I knew where they wound up, but when they were going to Wake Island I didn’t know whether they shot out this way for a few hundred miles and then this way (indicating). I never did know their courses.

556. General Frank. The manner in which this information came into Army hands, namely, that it was given in more or less of a personal manner to you, did not made it readily available to your staff for planning purposes, did it?

General Short. No, except that if I had gotten anything of prime importance I naturally would have called in G-2.
557. General Grunert. Then there were no periodic meetings—
General Short. No periodic.

558. General Grunert. —between the Army and Navy representatives to interchange information or say, "There is nothing doing [476] today," or what?
General Short. There was practically—there was daily contact between O. N. I. and G-2, and, as I say, with the teletype they could exchange messages just any minute.

559. General Frank. I know, but the O. N. I. never gave to your G-2 any information about these task forces?
General Short. No, they did not, not until after December 7.

560. General Frank. Now let us get back to the method of dispersion and protection. Had the bombers at Hickam Field been dispersed, either with or without bunkers, and had the crews at critical hours or in emergency manned the machine guns in the airplanes, that would have furnished a defense against attack from the air as well as against an attack by saboteurs on the ground, would it not?
General Short. To a very limited extent. You probably know better than I to what range that you would expect them to be effective. My understanding is that they don't count on the .30 caliber in a fight much beyond a hundred yards, or the .50 caliber something like two hundred yards. Is that correct?

561. General Frank. Well, that is correct, but at the height at which the Jap planes were attacking the fields that morning those machine guns certainly would have been effective?
General Short. They probably would have had some effect.

562. General Frank. And just that method that we were recounting was used the year before?
General Short. Yes, sir. Now, I'll tell you, our main—with the heavy bombers our idea was to disperse to the outlying islands. That was what we were working towards. We couldn't [477] disperse at Hickam Field; the character of the ground was such that you couldn't roll the heavy bombers off of the apron and count on getting them out. When we finally got where we could disperse them, we had to build bunkers above the ground, because you couldn't dig down on account of the water, and you had to build runways that were macadam to a certain extent, and the ground was of such a nature that you couldn't just run them out promiscuously over the ground.

563. General Frank. You are talking about the B-17s?
General Short. Yes.

564. General Frank. But you had only 12 of those?
General Short. That is correct.

565. General Frank. Out on that morning?
General Short. That is correct.

566. General Frank. Now let us pursue this defense against sabotage a little further. Hickam Field was not very extensive?
General Short. No, not very great.

567. General Frank. It was bounded by the water on the south and by the channel and the Navy on the west. There was a plan the year previous to place barbed wire along the exposed boundary to the north and east of the field, clear the space in front of the barbed wire, and enfilade it with machine guns.

General Short. We had put in in May for money for wire for fencing the fields and enfilading the fields. We finally got the money in
September, and on account of the priority proposition, because the material was not available locally, we had not gotten the material at the time of the attack.

568. General Frank. For the fence.

General Short. Yes.

[478] 569 General Grunert. Had you got any other material?

General Short. What?

570. General Grunert. Did you have barbed wire?

General Short. The amount of barbed wire in Honolulu at that time was, I would say, extremely limited. The supplies had been used up there, and the merchants couldn't get anything without priorities, so anything in the construction line was extremely difficult to get.

571. General Grunert. If they defended that way in 1940, was that just a plan?

General Short. That was '41. That was just a plan, if you are talking about that. They didn't have that.

572. General Frank. Yes. A certain amount of barbed wire was put in place, and the Engineers, in that warehouse at Kamehameha, had a certain supply of barbed wire?

General Short. We had a certain supply of barbed wire, but that wasn't what they were trying to fence with, that barbed wire. We had rolls of that we were using for field fortification work. We had dumps established on that, but that was not what the air people wanted for fencing the fields. They wanted a——

573. General Frank. Well, it was not a question of using it for fencing, but it was a question of using it as protection against people coming in for sabotage.

General Short. I see.

574. General Frank. Then, there was an officer by the name of Lord, of the Corps of Engineers, who designed an armored machine gun box, and we actually installed one and put machine guns in it, at the angle at the northeast side of Hickam so that it [479] enfiladed the area in front of the barbed wire.

General Short. We had regular ground defense organized. We had infantry organizations detailed to assist in that ground defense. We had a battalion of 500 airmen trained by infantry officers for that ground defense.

575. General Grunert. Then, the reason you bunched the airplanes on Hickam is that there was not room to spread them, or what?

General Short. Two reasons. The first reason was that the question of sabotage was, we figured, very much safer, and, as I told you in my testimony, Colonel Burwell had made a very detailed investigation for the Air Corps and very strongly recommended that they be grouped.

576. General Grunert. Well, could they have been dispersed despite Burwell's report?

General Short. The heavy ones could not. The flying fortresses could not have been moved off on account of the nature of the ground.

577. General Grunert. What proportion were they of the rest of the planes?

General Short. They were the valuable portion, you might say.

578. General Grunert. How many? What percentage?
General Short. I think there were 12 of those and I think about 54 of the old B-18s, but they were worth decidedly more than all of the B-18s. And there were some A-20s. There were 10 A-20s, and the A-20s weren't touched in the attack.

579. General Frank. As a matter of fact, the B-17s could have been placed on the runways other than the north-and-south runway, because that was done before, and if necessary they could have taken off in a light cross wind, because that north-and-south runway was used about 80 percent of the time.

General Short. Yes. Of course, the more you scattered them the more difficult was your protection.

580. General Grunert. Were these planes on all the fields, as I say, bunched on your order, or on the judgment of the commanding officer of the field?

General Short. They were definitely—it was provided in Alert No. 1. We had given serious consideration to that. As I say, we had had this very elaborate study made, and Alert No. 1—we had decided very definitely that it was advantageous to disperse them by fields as much as possible, but to group them on any particular field.

581. General Frank. How was it anticipated that a sabotage would be accomplished?

General Short. In any possible way.

582. General Frank. Well, what?

General Short. We figured that there were enough alien Japanese on the Island.

583. General Frank. Hand grenades or hand bombs?

General Short. I wouldn't—you can just visualize anything you want to, anything from having a man in the Hawaiian Depot that was working on motors put emery in the motors, or anything. There were all types of possible sabotage.

584. General Frank. As a matter of fact, if you bunch them all together and somebody heaves a hand grenade or a bomb in there, he destroys not one but several.

General Short. Yes, but if you have them grouped it doesn't take very many men to be sure that nobody can get close enough to heave in. That was the idea.

585. General Frank. Then, furthermore, if a fire is started and they are all bunched together, it is almost impossible to get in there through the heat and get those that are not yet affected away, and while they are all bunched together you can't man the machine guns on the inferior ones and have them as positive machine gun defense against the people advancing across the airfield.

General Short. We were not counting on—we were counting on the machine guns mounted on the ground for that defense. That is a strange thing: at Kaneohe Bay all of their planes that were dispersed were destroyed without exception, and the ones that were grouped on the landing aprons were very largely saved. They were damaged to some extent, but very largely saved, and the others were all destroyed.

586. General Frank. Were the machine guns in the airplanes manned?

General Short. I don't know. I don't image they were, but I don't know.
587. General Frank. Another thing: there were a certain number
of Air Corps men that were excess at the time because you didn’t have
enough available equipment.
General Short. That is correct.
588. General Grunert. These planes at Kaneohe Bay, what planes
were they? Navy?
General Short. Navy planes.
589. General Grunert. It would appear that the Japanese came
over to cripple the Navy more than the Army. Would it have been
possible that they selected those targets which would cripple
the Navy and keep the Navy from going to the Far East? In other
words, did it appear possible their objectives were Navy objectives
more than Army objectives?
General Short. No. The ones I was pointing out that were not
destroyed there were also naval planes that were up on the landing
field and on the apron, and their losses among them were not so very
great, but my understanding is that in the group that were dispersed
every single plane was lost.

590. General Frank. It would have been possible, because there were excess men in the Air Force, to have dispersed them,
and to have had the men protect the perimeter of the flying field and
thus have been protected by dispersion from both air attack and
sabotage?
General Short. Yes.
591. General Frank. But that comes to a question of judgment?
General Short. And also a question that, you see those men were
not just sitting there doing nothing, they were all being trained for
some job, and if you stayed on this Alert No. 1 for a month and
kept those men all around the perimeter of the airfield, you couldn’t
do anything else with them.
592. General Frank. Were your personnel being trained to ferry
planes to the Philippines?
General Short. They were. We were definitely responsible for
the ferrying of the planes to the Philippines.
593. General Frank. How much did that interfere with your training
for your own war effort?
General Short. It meant that as far as the B–17’s were concerned
we had to have all of our B–17’s constantly on work training those
crews, and, to make it worse, to keep those planes, we didn’t have
spare parts for B–17’s, and to keep them going to the Philippines,
we had to rob six of our planes of parts to keep the others going;
and our orders were such that we felt that our first mission there was
to shove the planes to the Philippines, so we took the parts from six
of our planes, to keep the others going.
594. General Frank. We had testimony that we read in the Roberts Report that Admiral Bloch, and I am not so sure about Admiral Kimmel, but Admiral Bloch is distinctly of the impression
that the aircraft warning service was in continual operation. What
led him to that conclusion?
General Short. I don’t know.
595. General Frank. Had you reported?
General Short. No. I had not. They should have known what
was going on. They had a Naval liaison officer in our G–3 section
who knew exactly what was being done, and he should have kept
them, the right man, informed of details. Lieutenant Burr, of the Navy, was on duty as liaison officer with the G-3 for the express purpose of keeping Navy informed.

596. General Frank. Here are two letters, one of which is of the 19th of June, that you sent to Admiral Bloch:

It is anticipated that the Army Aircraft Warning Service will be placed in operation in the near future. Due to interest expressed by the Navy radio operators in the Army equipment, I will cause arrangements to be effected to afford such naval personnel as you may desire to inspect the Army.

That is one. Is that correct?

General Short. Now, I must say that we went further than that. They had a man, a Commander Taylor, who was supposed to be quite an expert.

597. General Frank. Yes.

General Short. And he assisted us in getting the thing under way; so there were at least two naval officers who should have known exactly what was going on.

598. General Frank. You remember writing this letter?

General Short. I remember the letter; yes.

599. General Frank. And here is a letter.

General Short. Now, may I say, there, that originally the War Department had stated that we would get delivery of the Aircraft Warning Service materiel by June 30. We didn't get it, but that was their original hope.

600. General Frank. Then, on the 5th of August there is another letter, in which you stated:

The Army's Aircraft Warning facilities for the Hawaiian Department are rapidly approaching completion.

General Short. We hoped, we kept hoping all the time they would get that materiel in, and they approved the priority, and they didn't give it as good a priority as we asked for, but they improved it, and said that if that did not produce it, the Chief of Engineers would act.

601. General Frank. This quotation from a letter of August 5 is from a letter that you wrote to Admiral Kimmel?

General Short. Yes.

602. General Frank. Do you think that these two letters, and especially this last one, led the Navy to a conclusion as to the operating effectiveness of the AWS?

General Short. It was done to try to keep them informed of the situation, and what we expected. You will notice, in neither one of the letters did I tell them that we had it, but we were hopeful, when I wrote those letters, and they were so interested that I was trying to keep them informed.

603. General Frank. You stated that you didn't expect an air attack; is that correct?

General Short. That is correct.

604. General Frank. Now, with respect to that do you want to make any differentiation between an air attack as a part of a general attack, and an air raid, a hit-and-run proposition?

General Short. I didn't expect either one, frankly, with the information I had.

605. General Frank. All right.
606. General Russell. Two or three things, very briefly, General. There was some discussion about this reconnaissance which was being conducted by Army personnel as part of the training, from one of those airfields.

General Short. Yes.

607. General Russell. General Short, when you went out to the Department and took command, were those reconnaissances being made as part of training the men?

General Short. I think in all probability they were, although Bellows Field, at the time I took command, was relatively little developed. We had developed Bellows Field and were using it much more, but I think they had the same small squadron of reconnaissance planes, and were working on the training of it, probably from Wheeler Field.

608. General Russell. Do you know whether or not it is true that in the year 1940 the Department was ordered under an alert from the War Department, and that in the fall of 1940 the War Department directed General Herron, the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, to discontinue these reconnaissances, except as part of this training?

General Short. I do not know, sir.

609. General Russell. You would not know, then, whether that was set up under War Department order by Herron and carried on under you, or not?

General Short. I do not know.

610. General Russell. General, a great deal has been said about this November 27 message, and the failure of those men who were on the radar that morning, when they detected the presence of the incoming aircraft, to report it. Did the provision in the November 27 order, that you would disseminate this highly secret information to the minimum number of officers, in your opinion prevent you from passing it down, so that the officer in the control office that morning, or the central information office, could have had it?

General Short. I wouldn't have expected him to have it. He was just one of a number of young officers that were being trained in there. He had only been in there a few days.

611. General Russell. It is quite obvious that if he and the man on the radar had had the information that an attack might come, they would not have been so complacent.

General Short. Possibly not, but I think his complacency was based on his knowledge of our own planes that were coming in.

612. General Russell. A great deal has been said about the installation of the permanent radar stations out there. Who made the contact for the installations of those?

General Short. The district engineer.

613. General Frank. Colonel Wyman?

General Short. Colonel Wyman.

614. General Russell. Upon whom was it necessary for you to rely in order to hasten the installation of those radar stations?

General Short. As far as the work went, it was necessary to call upon the contracts of Colonel Wyman. On the other hand, we had to get back to getting materiel. I do not think he was responsible for the materiel. I do not believe that his contracts had anything to do with obtaining the electrical materiel and things of that kind.
615. General Russell. Upon whom was the responsibility for obtaining that electrical materiel?

General Short. I think that the Signal Corps, in the United States, had ordered those. I think I am correct. I may be wrong about it, but that is my feeling, that the Signal Corps in all probability bought those.

616. General Russell. Was that an agency over which you had control?

General Short. No control, whatever. All I could do was to cable the War Department, radio the War Department and ask them to try to speed things up. Yesterday, you remember, I read you a wire to the War Department, June 10.


General Short. And I asked for a change of priorities so as to get the things. I do not know definitely who purchased that materiel, but it was Signal Corps materiel, so I assume that they did.

(Brief recess.)

618. General Grunert. The Board will come to order.

General Short, I have a number of questions here on the Interceptor Command, and on an activity of that Command, the Air Warning Service. I will ask those on the Interceptor Command as such, first.

On the 5th of November, 1941, I understand you put out an SOP, and in that SOP it referred to an Interceptor Command. Was that an Interceptor Command actually organized and in being on December 7?

General Short. It was actually functioning, but I would say that it wasn't definitely put in. It was actually functioning, but the Aircraft Warning Service had not definitely been put under the command, as a command of the Interceptor Command. It was in the process of formation.

619. General Grunert. My understanding of an interceptor command is that it has the Air Warning Service as one of its primary functions, and it also has the fighter aircraft, and it has control of the antiaircraft.

General Short. That's correct.

620. General Grunert. Is that the conception of that?

General Short. May I explain that at that time the idea was quite new, and we had sent General Davidson and Colonel Powell and two subordinate officers to the school in the States, and they got back, I believe, about the 4th or 5th of December, and we were waiting on their return, to be sure we were fully—we had put this, what we thought was correct, in the Standing Operating Procedure, and we were waiting on their return to put it in effect, when they would know exactly what the War Department was doing in the mainland.

621. General Grunert. When did they return?

General Short. I think it was about the 4th or 5th of December. They had been back only a day or two.

622. General Grunert. And General Davidson was in command of the Interceptor Command?

General Short. He was the one who was to—he was in command of the pursuit, and in all this exercise we had been carrying on; it was functioning under him, but the actual command of these units had not been turned over to him, on December 7.
623. General Grunert. Then there was no Interceptor Command, as such, with a commander?

General Short. You might say that, formally, but it was all working just as if it existed. We were trying to get to the point where we thought we could issue the order.

624. General Grunert. Well, the order was issued?

General Short. But not made—that part of that Standing Operating Procedure was more or less suspended till we got General Davidson and Colonel Powell’s opinion.

625. General Grunert. Then the component parts of the Interceptor Command were in existence and functioning, but not the Interceptor Command, as a whole?

General Short. They were functioning together, you might say, cooperating and coordinating, but had not been placed definitely under Davidson’s command.

626. General Grunert. And tests and practices were conducted of component parts, but not as a whole?

General Short. Yes, they were conducted as a whole, but the question of being absolutely under his command, the order had not been issued.

627. General Grunert. Then, was there Navy representation, there? Did you participate in tests and practices?

General Short. I am of the opinion that they were there. Whether they were there constantly, I don’t know, but the provision was for them, and we had had this Naval Commander Taylor working with them, and I believe it was about the 24th of November that we had asked the Navy, through him; had him request the Navy to have officers there to work with us, as early as possible.

628. General Grunert. There was an actual information center organized, was there?

General Short. Oh; yes; there was an actual information center organized, and it was working daily. It was working just the same as it would have worked if the definite order was issued.

629. General Grunert. Who had charge of that?

General Short. Well, you had your aircraft warning service, there; you had your control officer, who was actually in charge of the functioning of it.

630. General Grunert. Who was he?

General Short. We was General Davidson’s recommendation—I mean, General Davidson’s representative.

631. General Grunert. Who had charge of the center?

General Short. When it was functioning, the control officer had charge.

632. General Grunert. Who was the control officer?

General Short. I was just trying to think of the Major’s name. It was an Air Corps Major that was representing General Davidson.

633. General Grunert. Was his name Bergquist?

General Short. I think so, I think so; and General Davidson, himself, was there a great deal of the time.

634. General Grunert. Then it seems to me that it was understood that Davidson, some time in the future, was to have this, and during the present, had an interest in being there. Did he?
General Short. Yes, sir; very definitely, he knew he was going to get it, and that it was just dependent on when he said he was ready.

635. General Grunert. Where did the Signal Officer, Colonel Powell, come in?

General Short. Powell? Well, I should say he was responsible for the technical functioning of all the stations, and the transmission of the information to the control room.

636. General Grunert. But he was not in control of the information center?

General Short. No. I would say that Bergquist was more in charge of the whole thing than Colonel Powell.

637. General Grunert. What was Bergquist’s relationship to General Davidson?

General Short. He was General Davidson’s man. He was his representative.

638. General Grunert. Then, as far as you know, there were some naval officers interested in the thing, but whether they had actually been detailed, there—

General Short. We had made the request, and Commander Taylor was working all the time with the outfit. Now, whether they had actually sent these people that we had asked to have sent, I don’t know. I was through the place two or three times, and it may be that if Taylor was there, that I thought of him as the Naval representative.

639. General Grunert. Was the Navy kept informed of its status all through this organizing state, so that they knew what to depend upon, and what its status was?

General Short. We had two officers. We had one officer, Lieutenant Burr, who was the liaison man with the G-3, whose duty was solely to keep Navy informed of what we were doing. Then, we had the other man, who was Taylor, that he was there to help us, because he was an expert on the thing. It wasn’t primarily his duty to keep the Navy informed. It was Burr’s duty to keep the Navy informed. I think, however, that Taylor probably did keep them informed, to a considerable extent.

640. General Grunert. Then, whether the Navy was informed as to its status, was a question of whether Commander Taylor or Lieutenant Burr—

General Short. Burr, particularly. Whether Burr did the job he was detailed for—

641. General Grunert. He was detailed under what?

General Short. G-3. He was supposed to know everything, and he sat in on everything that G-3 had.

642. General Grunert. So far as you know, there was no Navy man actually detailed as part of the information center?

General Short. I frankly do not know definitely. I know the request was made, and I was of the opinion that it was being carried out; but I can’t say, definitely.

643. General Grunert. Part of the testimony before the Roberts Commission stated:

General Short testified that there were naval officers at the information center, but Admiral Kimmel stated that no naval officer had ever been detailed to the Air Warning Service Center, to keep the Navy advised.
General Short. Well, as I say, I couldn’t say definitely. I know
the request had been made, that it was contemplated, and I thought it
had been carried out.

644. General GRUNERT. Now, referring to the testimony before
[494] the Roberts Commission:

General Short admitted that at the time of the attack the Interceptor Com-
mand had not a definite organization and that he didn’t know for sure whether
the Navy knew this.

I think you have covered that.

General Short. That is correct. They should have known from
Burr. Whether they did, I don’t know.

645. General GRUNERT. Then, there is a statement here in that rec-
ord which states:

The Air Force merely cooperated on its own hook.

meaning that they cooperated, when they saw fit, or if they saw fit?

General Short. No, they always had a control officer there.

646. General GRUNERT. Then, I have a note here to the effect the
Interceptor Command was actually activated December 17.

General Short. I think that is probably correct, that that was the
date when that official order was put out.

647. General GRUNERT. Now, as to the Air Warning Service, will
you tell us what that consisted of, and what it was intended to consist of,
and what was actually in being in the latter part of November and
early in December.

General Short. It was intended to consist of the pursuit command,
which was two groups. I think, of seven squadrons.

648. General GRUNERT. I am talking about the Air Warning Service.

General Short. Oh, I thought you meant the Interceptor Command.


General Short. The Air Warning Service, we actually had mobile
stations. We had no fixed station that was able to function.

650. General GRUNERT. How many fixed stations were there to be,
and how many mobile stations were there to be?

General Short. In the original plan, there were to be three fixed sta-
tions. Then that was switched, and Burr changed that, at a later date,
and increased the number to six.

[Copy]

3141 Southwestern Boulevard,
Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 1944.

Subject: Correction in testimony.
To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the
Army Pearl Harbor Board:

*   *   *   *   *   *   *
Page 495, lines 8 and 9 omit “and Burr changed that”.

*   *   *   *   *   *   *

/s/ Walter C. Short,
WALTER C. SHORT,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

651. General GRUNERT. When was that?

General Short. Oh, I don’t know. I think that may have been some
time along—well, maybe as late as September, and we were to have six
mobile stations, and I am inclined to believe—I am not sure whether the parts for all of those mobile stations had arrived, or whether we were able to operate only three. I am not definite on the number that we were actually able to operate.

[496] 652. General Grunert. Then there were supposed to be six permanent and six mobile?

General Short. Six mobile and six permanent; that is right.

653. General Grunert. Now we shall take the permanent. How many permanent were there actually operating or in condition to operate?

General Short. None.

654. General Grunert. None. Of the mobile stations how many were operating or able to operate?

General Short. I am inclined to think that the parts had arrived for all of them. I don't know. I visited in that period of ten days, I think, three of the stations. I can't say definitely whether all six were operating or not.

655. General Grunert. What seemed to delay first the mobile stations? What delayed their installation?

General Short. The question of electrical equipment.

656. General Grunert. Electrical equipment?

General Short. Obtaining the electrical equipment. We had been promised it by June 30.

657. General Grunert. They needed no particular construction?

General Short. No.

658. General Grunert. Except access to the station?

General Short. That was it. The construction that they required could be done without any great amount of material, because—

659. General Grunert. When the Secretary of War told the Secretary of the Navy in February of '41 that all material for the air warning system would be over there by June, what [497] did he mean?

General Short. I think that he expected—

660. General Grunert. For all stations?

General Short. I think that he expected it for all stations.

661. General Grunert. But you said that there were to be three permanent.

General Short. Yes. Well, I mean at the time he made the statement he would have expected to have the material there for three fixed, and as it existed.

662. General Grunert. For the project as it existed?

General Short. As it existed, and then it was changed.

663. General Grunert. Then he expected to have the material over there for six mobile and three permanent?

General Short. Finally, but when he wrote the letter I would say three fixed and six mobile.

664. General Grunert. All right. Now, why didn't he get the material there? What were the conditions in June when the Navy had a right to expect that the Army had its stuff over there?

General Short. As I read you a wire yesterday of June 10 I sent to the Adjutant General stating that the electrical equipment and the cables for the construction had not been obtained, and apparently a priority was holding it up.
665. General GRUNERT. Well, now, as to the permanent stations, what was short there? Why didn’t—

General SHORT. Well, the first thing that was short on Kaala, which was possibly the most important permanent station, was the cable.

666. General GRUNERT. The cable.

[498] General SHORT. We couldn’t even start.

667 General GRUNERT. You told us that.

General SHORT. We couldn’t even start construction because the only way to get the material up on top of the mountain was by cable.

668. General GRUNERT. Was all other material present except the cable?

General SHORT. Oh, no, no. As a matter of fact, on December 7th you didn’t have material for the fixed stations. I think maybe that it was largely there except motors.

669. General GRUNERT. Then, the shortage of equipment applied to both of them?

General SHORT. I do not remember the details of just what parts of the equipment, but I know that the equipment for the fixed stations had not been completed at that time.

670. General GRUNERT. Now, in what way were the fixed stations different from the mobile?

General SHORT. They were much more powerful stations.

671. General GRUNERT. More powerful. How were they run, by generated electricity or by gas, gas machine, or what?

General SHORT. I think that we had contracts for the public utility companies to run wires so we could use current generated in that way, and then we had motors so in case that went out we could have an alternative.

672. General GRUNERT. Yes. But it was not until June that you started to get after the War Department?

General SHORT. That is right.

673. General GRUNERT. What happened between February and June?

[499] General SHORT. They agreed—we had been told they would arrive by June 30th. We weren’t really expecting them until right at the end of June, and we didn’t find out until early in June that they were not going to get there, and when we did I sent the wire.

674. General GRUNERT. When did they actually get all the equipment, if ever, before you left?

General SHORT. They did not. I think we got practically all of the equipment for the mobile stations along maybe the last week in October or the first week in November, because we set them up as soon as we got them.

675. General GRUNERT. Then, all the mobile stations should have been working on December 7?

General SHORT. I am under the impression that we had the mobile equipment. Now, there may be one or two that had not been completely set up.

676. General GRUNERT. But how about the equipment for the permanent ones?

General SHORT. I am sure that it had not all arrived.

677. General GRUNERT. So you couldn’t operate anything on account of the lack of equipment?
General Short. Lack of equipment as far as permanent ones.

678. General Grunert. And you didn't have all the stuff to put on the inaccessible places, so it was not so much the question of roads and cables to get the whole thing working, if you didn't have all that equipment?

General Short. No, only that we were particularly anxious to get the construction work all done so when the equipment arrived there would be no additional delay.

[500] 679. General Grunert. Then, there was a combination, as I see it: the lack of equipment and the lack of materials to construct cables to get the equipment—to put them in these permanent stations.

General Short. That is correct.

680. General Grunert. After June 10th when again did you go after the War Department or anybody else?

General Short. I kept in constant touch with the exact status of the construction of the fixed stations by—I had a liaison officer, Major Fleming in the Engineers, who was in almost daily touch with the District Engineers and reported to me on the status of construction.

681. General Grunert. You used Fleming as your liaison with the District Engineer?

General Short. With the District Engineer. He was an engineer and was one of the Assistant G-4, and he was almost in daily touch with the District Engineer in regard to construction of airfields, aircraft warning service, and certain construction for storage of ammunition up in the vicinity of Scosfield.

682. General Grunert. Was the District Engineer under you?

General Short. He was not.

683. General Grunert. Was he not placed under you along toward the fall sometime?

General Short. He was not. He came under me with everything else on December 7th, or December 8th; when the martial law was declared, why, naturally he came under me.

684. General Grunert. And to whom did he look for instructions, and how far could you push him?

[501] General Short. I'll tell you how they worked. Traditionally, you know, all field fortifications have been carried out by the Engineers, all airfield construction. He was made responsible for that by the War Department, and for the construction of these aircraft warning stations, and I might say also for the construction of bombproofs. If we had a project like bombproofing a headquarters or providing for gasoline storage, ammunition storage, I talked over with responsible people what they thought we ought to have. If it were a question of providing—now, the heavy seacoast guns over there, none of them had any protection for personnel. In that case I would talk it over with the Chief of the Coast Artillery, General Burgin, have Fleming in on it, have him draw up roughly what we were after. Then the District Engineer would put his engineers and his draftsmen on the thing and draw up detailed plans, and then we would have a conference with the District Engineer, with Fleming and Burgin, say, and go over the detail plans. If they appeared to be fully what we wanted, the approval was given to the plan.

685. General Grunert. You approved the plan?
General Short. Approved the plan, and then he got the money from the Chief of Engineers in Washington.

686. General Grunert. Who decided on when such and such a thing had to be in?

General Short. We made the decision as to when we wanted it in. Of course, you couldn't make a decision that it had to be in because you didn't know how long it was going to take to get the money and you didn't know how long it was going to take to get the material.

687. General Grunert. Well, at certain times all these contracts were let and had a completion date at least estimated.

General Short. I think most all—

688. General Grunert. Who estimated that?

General Short. Most all the contracts, that would have been done by the dates of the needing. Most all of the contracts of the District Engineer I think had been let before my arrival. He was working on those same contracts. Now, some—

689. General Grunert. You were interested in getting these defense contracts completed as of the date of completion?

General Short. That is right, and I had—

690. General Grunert. Who extended the date from time to time? Did you?

General Short. Often it was force of circumstances, that it was impossible to get the material, that there wasn't any question of anybody extending it; it just was an impossibility. I had a conference—

691. General Grunert. From whom did you get reports that it was impossible to get the material?

General Short. I had a conference on an average of every week or ten days with the District Engineer.

692. General Grunert. From the District Engineer you got the information?

General Short. From the District Engineer and with Major Fleming present. He kept me—I probably saw Fleming almost every day and talked over some of these things with him, and, as I say, the District Engineer came in and made a report of progress probably every week or ten days and went into his difficulties, whatever they were.

693. General Grunert. If they were not satisfied with that progress, what was your recourse?

General Short. To wire the War Department.

694. General Grunert. And you did that once in June?

General Short. I did that.

695. General Grunert. On the air warning stuff?

General Short. I did.

696. General Grunert. Did you make any other complaints to the War Department as to lack of material?

General Short. I did. The other complaint, the other things—well, for instance, the airfields were not going as fast as I wanted them, but it was a question of allotment of funds. I was trying constantly to get the allotment of funds. We couldn't do anything until we got it. We had the approval of the project, but we didn't have the funds, actual funds, in most cases.
697. General GRUNERT. Were you responsible for getting the things, or was the District Engineer?
   General SHORT. I was responsible for getting projects approved and the amount approved, and the funds then were transmitted to the District Engineer.

698. General GRUNERT. But as far as the air warning service is concerned, it wasn't a question of funds?
   General SHORT. No, it was not.

699. General GRUNERT. It was a question of getting the air warning service completed as quickly as possible?
   General SHORT. That is correct.

700. General GRUNERT. And you found that the material was not [504] going in as you desired or thought it should, so you complained to the War Department?
   General SHORT. The report that the District Engineer had from the Division Engineer in San Francisco, he was advised by the Division Engineer that there was going to be a very considerable delay on account of priorities. He felt apparently that if we could get the War Department to step up our priority, that we would get it very much faster, and that is what prompted that.

701. General GRUNERT. And that contractor was dependent upon the Army getting priorities for him?
   General SHORT. Very definitely. That is the only way. That is the only way you could get any priority.

702. General GRUNERT. And as far as you know there was no fault or delay on the part of the contractor?
   General SHORT. I don't know of any delay on his part.

703. General GRUNERT. Well, now, after June 10th when you made your complaint, did you then think that everything was O. K., that they would do it when they could, or didn't you needle them again?
   General SHORT. As I say, I had a conference and got a report of progress probably on an average of every week or ten days, a personal conference, and if there was anything we felt could be pushed faster we tried to have it done.

704. General GRUNERT. Did you feel it was necessary to go after the War Department again?
   General SHORT. We did—not on those particular things. Often we could get something speeded up by a conference with the District Engineers.

[505]

705. General GRUNERT. Were you satisfied with the progress made?
   General SHORT. I wasn't satisfied. I wasn't satisfied very frequently with the progress made.

706. General GRUNERT. Well, here is from June to December, a matter of nearly six months, and still the thing is not completed.
   General SHORT. It took about fifteen weeks to get a priority through.

707. General GRUNERT. Well, you were put on a higher priority then?
   General SHORT. Yes, but we never did get on—now, the Navy were on an A-1. We never—and I tried to get this put on a 1-B, and they put it on a 1-C.

708. General GRUNERT. You were very much concerned about this air warning service?
General Short. I was very much concerned.

709. General Grunert. That was really your No. 1 priority construction?

General Short. That was. It was the thing I looked on as probably the most essential thing.

710. General Grunert. Was it important enough to bring it to the personal attention of the Chief of Staff?

General Short. I had written a letter about the whole thing to Chief of Staff sometime earlier, on that. I did bring the question of priority to the attention of the Deputy Chief of Staff, of the whole priority, and I got some help from General Moore, who was the Deputy Chief of Staff. I did not get what I asked for, but I got some decided help as a result of my direct [506] communication with him, not on this, but I got authority for creating a lumber pile so we could have some lumber on hand to build barracks, and we got a certain amount of hardware material that the District Engineer was going to need; that they built up the thing ahead of time. But I would say the Deputy Chief of Staff had more to do with helping us on that than anybody else.

[507] 711. General Grunert. Now, I think you referred to this in your testimony before: General Short wrote Admiral Kimmel June 19th that air warning service would be in operation in the near future. Against on August 5, '41, that the air warning service was rapidly nearing completion.

When did it actually get in operation? That has been answered.

General Short. That is about the first week in November.

712. General Grunert. Why the delay? In other words, now here you write the Navy on the 19th, "near future"; on August 5th, "and rapidly nearing completion". Then from August 5th to December 7th, September, October, November, four months, the thing isn't completed yet. And did you again notify the Navy that you were in error or mistaken about the near completion?

General Short. They, I am sure, they were. We at least had one of their officers who was helping set up the whole thing and knew the exact status of the thing. Now, I don't think I wrote another letter to them on that. I undoubtedly talked to them about it, because that project was very dear to their hearts. They were terribly interested in it.

713. General Grunert. Captain DeLany knew the air warning service was very unsatisfactory. I say we found that out from Captain DeLany. And then again it says, "General Short said his S. O. P. on November 5, '41, was issued as an accomplished procedure." Evidently the—

General Short. It was with regard to everything except the Interceptor Command.

714. General Grunert. Everything but that point.

Again referring to the Roberts Commission: General Short states that it would have made no difference in his plan if he [508] had been furnished with all the materials needed; also that if his radars had all been completed he would still have been operating them the same way he was doing December 7th, '41. I just have a question here of why. You mean by that that you would have been operating just during those same morning hours?
General Short. In all probability my estimate of the situation was such that I didn’t think it required a 24-hour operation of them.

715. General Grunert. Do you suppose it was general knowledge that you were operating just between those hours; general knowledge to the public, or that the Japanese agents could have gotten that information?

General Short. Japanese agents; it would have been possible for them to get that information.

716. General Grunert. Would you suppose that would have influenced them to attack after they presumed that the radar, the air warning service, had quit for the day?

General Short. I have no way of knowing.

717. General Grunert. I have a note here that the air warning service, the mobile unit training, had been in training since November 1st. Do you consider that the mobile units actually installed were capable of operating on December 7th to a reasonable degree of efficiency?

General Short. I think that the men were not experts, but I think they were getting trained to the point where they could do pretty well.

718. General Grunert. And then it was just a question of their operating on that particular day and that particular time?

General Short. Yes, sir.

719. General Grunert. I have exhausted my questions on this [509] interceptor and air warning, on which you undoubtedly have a number of questions. I yield to you next.

720. General Frank. I would like to bring out in a little greater detail some facts about the equipment furnished and that needed. With respect to equipment furnished, is it a fact that, so far as the radar themselves were concerned, you had three heavy radar sets complete and six mobile sets complete?

General Short. I am of the opinion that we did not have the motors. Now, Colonel Powell would be very much safer on that answer than I would be.

721. General Frank. You mean the motor generators?

General Short. Yes.

722. General Frank. Well, if they were hooked up with commercial current, then you didn’t need them?

General Short. You wouldn’t have had to have them. You do need them so that if anything went wrong with the current.

723. General Frank. For reserve?

General Short. Yes. But, as I say, that is a feeling I have, but I wouldn’t be safe.

724. General Frank. Well, what I am getting at is this: from the point of view of the Secretary of War when he made the statement that this material would be furnished in June or about.

General Short. It definitely was not. The material I am sure didn’t get there until about November 1st. He thought it would. I was told by the War Department, as I remember, that by June 30th, we would have everything.

725. General Frank. I have a signed letter here from the Signal Corps which, in answer to some questions that we asked, states as follows: “All components of one SCR 271 set were turned [510] over by the Signal Corps to the Quartermaster for shipment on the 26th of May.”
General Short. All components?
726. General Frank. Of one.
General Short. Of one set?
727. General Frank. Yes.
General Short. Well, now, that is a——
728. General Frank. Now, just a minute. "All components of two
SCR 271 were turned over for shipment on the 26th of June, one month
later."
General Short. Yes.
729. General Frank. So there were three sets?
General Short. Yes. Now, you have got to figure they have got
to get priority to ship them.
730. General Frank. Now; five SCR 270, which are the mobile sets,
were delivered to the Quartermaster for shipment on the 22nd of July.
General Short. Yes.
731. General Frank. It is not so material about the mobile sets
because along in November you had the mobile sets and they were
functioning.
General Short. Yes, they were functioning, and I think——
732. General Frank. All I wanted to bring out is this: that it was
not a question as to whether or not you had the radar equipment on
hand. It was a question of having the installation in which you
were going to put it in shape so that you could erect the radar on that
installation.

[511] General Short. In at least one case the question of a
collar was involved.
733. General Grunert. Do I understand, then, that all the perma-
nent radar equipment to be installed in permanent stations was in
Hawaii and available, except some parts that were still missing?
General Short. I think some of the parts were missing. I would
not know definitely. The only safe way would be to call Colonel
Powell or someone directly responsible. But this letter that they had
shipped the equipment would not necessarily mean that it all ar-
rived. If one part failed to arrive it would have prevented the use
of the system.
734. General Frank. The shortage of equipment to build roads, to
build emplacements in these sites after you got to them over the roads,
was really what was holding up the installation and operation of the
permanent stations. Is that correct?
General Short. I believe that the roads and the buildings, except
at Kaala were pretty well completed. That is just memory. I have
no statement as to just the degree. We got reports of the degree of
completion; but I believe that on the island of Maui the Haleakala
Station was actually on. I believe that the road construction had
been done.
735. General Grunert. Where would such reports be available for
the record?
General Short. I think that the District Engineer and the Depart-
ment Signal Officer would both know definitely the status.
736. General Frank. As a matter of fact, are you really conversant
with those details?
General Short. No. I knew generally, but as to exactly what had
been received I would not know.
737. General Grunert. We will develop that later. We want to find out how much you know, so that if there are some of these questions that you cannot answer you can say so. We have other ways of getting the information.

General Short. I would not know except in a general way.

738. General Frank. May we have a copy of the June 10th message?

General Short. It is in this book, 1–E.

739. General Frank. May we also have copies of the letters in which you asked for priorities?

General Short. Yes.

740. General Frank. As a matter of fact, while the A. W. S. system was not completed, with full advantage of the power available and the distance obtainable by the permanent station, nevertheless the A. W. S. system was operative with mobile sets up to a distance of about 130 miles. Is not that correct?

General Short. That is correct. You could not count on 130 miles, but under favorable conditions you would get it.

741. General Frank. I bring that out to clarify something that General Grunert spoke about.

Have you any information to give or comments to make relative to the failure of any contractors on the Hawaiian construction to complete their work?

General Short. I do not believe that the District Engineer ever reported to me that the contractor had fallen down on his job. I think most of the reports he made to me was as to the inability to get materials so that he could push the contractor.

742. General Frank. Have you any information as to whether or not any military personnel neglected duties relating to the Hawaiian construction contract?

743. General Short. I have none.

744. General Frank. Do you have any information to give to the Board on a Mr. Wilhelm Rohl, a German contractor who operated in Hawaii?

General Short. I have never even heard his name until a few months ago.

745. General Frank. Were you in any way familiar with the Hawaiian defense contract that was let by Colonel Theodore Wyman to The Hawaiian Constructors?

General Short. It was let before my arrival in the Islands. I knew that generally The Hawaiian Constructors were doing the work there, but I was not at all familiar with the details. I might state that when Colonel Hannum came out from San Francisco he went over the work that Colonel Wyman was doing, and after he had made an inspection of the office and the work he came to my office and made a report to me of what he had found, and seemed to be thoroughly satisfied with the conditions that he had found.

746. General Frank. Are you familiar as to whether there were any parts missing on the radar, or were they parts of generator sets?

General Short. I could not say definitely. I had the feeling that generator sets were missing, but I might be wrong. I am sure that they were not complete.

747. General Frank. Yesterday in your testimony you gave some information relative to the state of training of bombardment. That
was only part of the force that was there available. What was the state of training with respect to your fighter aviation units?

General Short. We had a bunch of new aviators sent over that had just completed their primary training. I think it was 200 hours. None of them had flown the P-40, a much faster ship than the training ship. As I remember, the air people stepped them up gradually by putting them on the P-36. I think they may have flown the A-20's before they went to the P-40's; but it was a gradual proposition of getting the pilots where they were safe to fly the plane, and then they were given gunnery, probably, after they had reached that stage.

747. General Frank. Did you anticipate 24-hour use of the aircraft warning service just as soon as your permanent stations were installed?

General Short. Any time that the situation demanded.

748. General Frank. If the equipment could stand it was there any point in not operating it if a critical situation existed?

General Short. If a critical situation existed, unquestionably; but as a peace-time proposition if there was any critical situation I do not know whether you would operate it 24 hours a day, or not. We had not had the experience.

749. General Grunert. Did you not, in answer to my question, state that it would not have made any difference whether all equipment was there and all stations in, that you would have done the same?

General Short. With the estimate I had of the situation, that is correct.

750. General Frank. Who determined the hours of operation of the A. W. S. sets, from 5 to 7?

General Short. In the morning or the afternoon?

751. General Frank. In the morning.

General Short. 4 to 7?

752. General Frank. Yes.

General Short. I made the determination, because all of our studies indicated that they were the most dangerous hours, that if carrier planes were going to attack they would come in so that when they returned to their carriers—they would not want to return before daylight, because they would not dare to turn on lights for landing on their carriers. They would run in as close as they could so as to get there near dawn, do their bombing and go back and make a landing on their carriers. If you will take that study about the 180 B-17's, that is gone into very fully as to the different distances.

753. General Grunert. Then there must have been in your mind some idea that there might be some little danger of it actually happening in those hours, or was it just for practice in order that they might get used to those hours?

General Short. If there was going to be any danger, definitely that would be the dangerous time; and also I wanted them to get accustomed to working, so that in critical periods they would be thoroughly familiar with the conditions during that time.

754. General Frank. This No. 1 Alert at this time anticipated that pilots would be available to fly their aircraft within what length of time?
General Short. Four hours, I think. That was not a question of being able to put a plane in the air in four hours, but it was a question of making the personnel available.

755. General Frank. In other words, you depended on four hours? General Short. No. That would be the maximum time. As a matter of fact, the conditions were such there that 50 per cent of the personnel, I would say, or more, were always there, unless they were out on a problem or maneuvers.

[516] 756. General Frank. Generally an optimistic estimate of the range at which the radar was effective was about 130 miles? General Short. That is really better than we estimate. I think we estimated 75 to 100 miles. It is just like anything else. There were times when they were perfect.

757. General Frank. That would enable an approaching force to get in there well within a half hour? General Short. Yes.

758. General Frank. Considering that pilots were not to be alerted except on a four-hour basis and with most everybody else having a day off on Sunday, why was the A. W. S. operated at all on Sunday? General Short. Largely because it was new and they needed training in it more than any other element of the command.

759. General Frank. When we speak of the A. W. S. we really mean construction of the information center and the establishment of communications between the radar station and that center? General Short. And the operation of the radar station; yes.

760. General Gruentert. Also communication between the center and the command?

General Short. Any communications; yes.

761. General Frank. All communications.

General Short. Yes.

762. General Frank. Why was it put under the Signal Corps?

General Short. All that technical work had to be done by the Signal Corps.

763. General Frank. Why was not the control of its installation placed under the Air Force who were going to operate it?

[517] General Short. At that time we did not think that the technical training of the Air Corps had progressed to a point where we could count on performance. We thought it was a little better if the Signal Corps man felt that he had control up to the time he said his operators were in shape to turn over, and things would go along a little faster. It might have been wrong.

764. General Frank. It strikes me that right within the Army itself you had a situation between the Air Force and the Signal Corps where this A. W. S. was operating on a cooperative basis rather than on a positive command basis.

General Short. Because it had not reached a state of training where we thought it could work to the best advantage.

765. General Frank. But if the vast proportion of the people concerned with its operation were Air Force people—

General Short (interposing). Not the technical operation. The operation of the communications and the radar system is definitely for the Signal Corps.

766. General Frank. But the moment it became operative it came under the control of the Air Force?
General Short. Yes.

767. General Frank. Why not put it under control of the Air Force in the first place?

General Short. Because the Signal Corps thought they could train them faster to where they were better technical men than if it were put under the Air Force.

768. General Frank. Generally in the United States these installations were put under the supervision of the Air Force Interceptor Commander.

General Short. The actual installation?

769. General Frank. Yes.

General Short. We fully intended, as you notice from our standing operating procedure, to have them operated by the Air Corps, but the building up of the stations and all of the technical work we looked upon as a Signal Corps matter.

770. General Grunert. When they operated during maneuvers and tests with the Navy, I understood from my reading that the information center and such warning service as was in existence actually operated with the Navy during some of those maneuvers and tests. Who operated the system then?

General Short. We did not have a system formally set up until—well, it was pretty close to November 27th.

771. General Grunert. Somebody operated it during maneuvers?

General Short. The Signal Corps undoubtedly operated it.

772. General Grunert. Colonel Powell?

General Short. Yes. We had not built the control station at that time.

773. General Grunert. This youngster, Lieutenant Tyler, who apparently in the information center or the control center, whatever you may have called it—I understood from your testimony that you considered him as in charge there at the time; is that right?

General Short. I did. He was the control officer who was there.

774. General Grunert. Under whose direction was he then functioning?

General Short. Under General Davidson's, the actual command for all operating purposes. It was operating the same as it would have been if General Davidson had been actually placed in command.

775. General Grunert. Then it was by and with his consent that he was doing what he was doing, and not by order?

General Short. General Davidson; yes; and he understood that it would be by order as soon as it got to the point where he and Colonel Powell thought it would be proper.

776. General Grunert. The next two subjects, Antiaircraft Defense, and Inshore Aerial Patrol, I think we have covered, unless either one of you has any particular question that has not been covered on those two subjects. If not, I will go to the next subject, Command and Staff. I have some general questions here that I would like to pound.

Were conferences held by you or your Chief of Staff with the principal subordinate commanders wherein they were kept informed of the situation and, in turn, informed you of the measures taken by them to meet such situations?

General Short. We had a conference normally on Saturday morning.
777. General Grunert. Normally once a week?
    General Short. Yes, sir.
778. General Grunert. Were subordinate commanders informed
    of the imminent approach of probable hostilities set forth in the
    messages received late in November and early in December?
    General Short. G-2 and G-3 and the Chief of Staff were. Whether
    all of the subordinate members of the staff were, I am not sure.
    779. General Grunert. Were discussions had as to measures to be
    adopted in preparation for such an eventuality?
    General Short. My discussions on that were confined to G-2, G-3,
    and the Chief of Staff and the Echelon Command.

[Copy]

3141 SOUTHWESTERN BOULEVARD,
    Dallas, 5, Texas, No. 10, 1944.

Subject: Corrections in testimony.
To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.
    1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before
the Army Pearl Harbor Board:

* * * * * * * * * * *

Page 519, line 29, change “command” to “commanders”.

* * * * * * * * * * *

/s/ Walter C. Short,
    WALTER C. SHORT,
    Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

780. General Frank. Who were the echelon commanders?
    [520] General Short. An Air Corps officer, General Martin,
    General Burgin, and the two division commanders.
781. General Grunert. In the weekly conferences, when the ques-
    tion of a plan or order came up, such as your S. O. P. of November 5,
    was that generally discussed?
    General Short. Whoever was responsible for the development of
    that would conduct a discussion and would outline what was being
    done, the state of it, and ask for questions. It would depend on what
    the type of project was, what staff officer would have it.
782. General Grunert. With whom did you discuss or from whom
    did you seek advice as to whether or not you should put your com-
    mand in Alert 1, 2 or 3? Mind you, I do not mean after you would
    make a decision, but to get information.
    General Short. The Chief of Staff and the G-2, and General Mar-
    tin. I think I talked more at length with him, because he had that
    ferrying business, and he and I talked at considerable length on that.
783. General Grunert. When you received the message of Novem-
    ber 27th from the Chief of Staff, how long was it before you decided
    upon what alert to adopt?
    General Short. I decided in a very few minutes, because if I wanted
    to go further, all I had to do was to say “Go into Alert No. 2 or Alert
    No. 3.”
784. General Grunert. Then this long conversation with General
    Martin was a build-up before that?
    General Short. No. I talked to him. I had him over within
    probably an hour after I had made the decision and talked it over
    with him that same afternoon; and I think I talked with General
    Burgin that same afternoon. I talked with General
Murray on several occasions, because he had the most serious part of that sabotage work.

General Grunert. That was after the decision was made?

General Short. Yes.

876. General Grunert. Did you then consider that they had the right to argue whether or not that was the best for their command? Or did you change your decision, or was it an accomplished fact?

General Short. As a matter of fact, I believe General Burgin felt that we might go successively into 2 and 3 and go into a maneuver like we had in May.

877. General Grunert. You and I will know that it is not a good thing to have a round robin to get a bunch of opinions, or the opinion of a group, on which to make a decision, except to seek advice. But after a decision is made, then everybody carries it out without question, and a great many of them feel probably that they have no more say after the decision is made.

General Short. I do not believe that my higher echelon commanders or my staff felt that way about it. If they had any suggestions which they thought were important I am sure they would have made them.

878. General Grunert. You feel, then, that your subordinate commanders and your staff felt free to come to you if they thought that you may have been mistaken in what you did from the information you had?

General Short. I am sure they would.

879. General Grunert. Were those commanders and staff officers informed about the other information you had received from the Navy concerning what we might call the critical period, or were they only informed of the November 27th information?

[522] General Short. I am quite sure that they were all informed of the July business and were all informed of the October 16 and November 27th information. Between that I do not remember anything of sufficient importance from the Navy to give to them in detail. I may have talked casually about it.

790. General Grunert. The notes on the testimony before the Roberts Commission indicates that General Wilson, commanding the 24th Division, was never called in conference or consulted regarding the warning message of November 27th.

General Short. Did he say he got it from the Division Officer?

791. General Grunert. He said he was never consulted.

General Short. He had the north sector where the anti-sabotage work was not nearly as serious. While I had repeated conferences with Murray, I may not have had any with Wilson.

792. General Grunert. Wilson thought the Navy had an inshore and offshore patrol. Why was he not instructed and informed?

General Short. His job was quite different from that of the other divisions. While I had repeated conferences with Murray, and I had Murray personally inspect every post and he came back to me with recommendations and made a lot of changes——

793. General Grunert (interposing). That was in connection with your Alert 1?

General Short. Yes.
794. General Grunert. But in connection with the possibility of his giving advice as to any other alert, he, Wilson, did not have any information?

General Short. I did not have any conference with him as to whether he wanted to advise me as to something different.

795. General Grunert. Colonel Fielder says he discussed the [523] possibility of an attack with the Commanding General in a purely academic way. I do not quite understand how there is anything academic about discussing the possibility of an attack.

General Short. I do not. We discussed the possibility, probably because he was G-2 and was supposed to have some information.

796. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not your Chief of Staff and your G-2 agreed that you had pulled the right alert?

General Short. I am sure they both fully agreed.

797. General Grunert. General Murray, when he got Alert No. 1, was not informed as to the seriousness of the existing situation, no intimidation, nothing, although he talked to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, several times between November 27 and December 7. Why was he not informed?

General Short. I am sure he had all the information that I did. I may not have given him the idea that we were going out in the midst of an attack the next day. That may be what he means. But he probably had as much conversation with General Murray about what we were doing as anybody in the command, because he made a tremendous amount of changes.

[Copy]

3141 Southwestern Boulevard,
Dallas, Tex., No. 10, 1944.

Subject: Corrections in testimony.
To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board:

* * * * * * *

Page 523, line 19, —change “but he” to “but I”.

* * * * * * *

/s/ Walter C. Short,
Walter C. Short,
Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

798. General Grunert. I think he refers not to Alert No. 1, but to the general situation and the knowledge you had.

General Short. I am sure he knew the contents of the message. But I did not go down and talk over with him what his opinion was as to whether the message meant they were going to attack or whether he would expect at attack.

799. General Grunert. General Burgin did not know the Interceptor Command under General Davidson was not working. He thought it was, because it had been for drill.

[524] General Short. That is what I say. It was actually operating, but had not been officially organized.

800. General Grunert. You had a conference once a week. What did you confer on if it were not what the condition of things was
and what should or should not be done, and so forth? I do not know whether this is the truth, but that it what is in the record, and we will question about it.

General Short: Undoubtedly that is correct. Burgin was not in on the weekly conferences. I did confer with the staff.

801. General Grunert. Then the weekly conference was a staff conference and not a conference with subordinate commanders?

General Short. No. We had a conference with subordinate commanders on irregular occasions, whenever there was something we thought we should take up with them.

802. General Grunert. When you wanted to talk to your commanders about anything you had a special conference and not a periodical one?

General Short. That is correct. I had them very often, one at a time, because they were problems that might be different.

[525] General Grunert. "Lt. Col. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, informed the staff at a meeting on December 6 that the Japs were burning papers on December 5. Says it meant that war was imminent, to him." Do he so inform his Chief of Staff or his Commanding General? If so, what conclusions were reached with regard to it?

General Short. I am sure he didn't inform me. I don't know whether he informed the G-2 of it. On the other hand, we burnt similar messages every day, so I don't think Colonel Fielder would have thought so much of it.

804. General Grunert. But this seems to intimate that a member of your staff, or assistant to a head of your staff, thought that war was imminent.

General Short. Well, he was decidedly less experienced than Fielder. He was a Reserve Officer, and he might have taken that burning of messages as a good deal more serious, and may have been overlooking the fact that we burn similar messages constantly.

805. General Grunert. That may have been an afterthought with him, for all I know.

General Short. Yes.

806. General Grunert. But that was in the record.

General Short. It may have been.

807. General Grunert. And General Martin did not seem to know that the Interceptor Command was not activated until December 17.

General Short. Well, the fact was it was actually operating, and there was such a technical difference, there that apparently Bergin and Martin, neither one realized it hadn't gone out as an order. It was actually operating daily.

[526] 808. General Grunert. General Rudolph, the Commanding General of the Bombers, stated that had he had any intimation of preceding trouble his planes would not have been bunched or concentrated but would have been ready for the air. Then, in parenthesis, "especially on a Sunday morning." Was he not informed by the Commanding General, or the Commanding General of the Air Forces, of the warnings of the immediate past?

General Short. I went over the thing very fully with General Martin, talked over with him at as great length as anybody. I would imagine that he talked with his subordinate commanders.
809. General GRUNERT. There is in the record somewhere, I believe, that General Martin sent two telegrams, to General Davidson, absolutely telling him to bunch his airplanes.

810. General FRANK. One, from Martin, and one from the Department?

811. General GRUNERT. I meant that Martin sent one, and he received another one, presumably from the Department, to that effect.

General SHORT. The Standing Operating Procedure definitely provided for distributing by airfield, but grouping them all on the individual airfield.

812. General GRUNERT. I wondered why, in view of the Standing Operating Procedure, these telegrams on this particular thing were necessary?

General SHORT. I do not know they were sent.

813. General GRUNERT. Was there some argument about whether to do it or not?

General SHORT. General Davidson might have asked the [527] question; I don’t know. Now, I will tell you one thing that might have caused it. We were having an exercise, maybe a month or so before that, and I got up to Wheeler Field along about 11 o’clock at night and found that their planes had not been distributed in the bunker, and that gasoline had not been put in the bunkers, and that ammunition had not been put in the bunkers, and the situation was such that it should have been, in this maneuver; and that might have caused somebody to ask the question. I did not know that that had taken place.

814. General GRUNERT. That is all I have on that particular subject. Do any questions occur to any one of you two, on what I call the “command” subject?

I have one question, or a small series of questions, here, on alerts. The points that you seemed to dwell upon in your testimony before the Roberts Commission as the reasons for alert 1, and not 2 and 3, are briefly summarized as follows: Strong possibility of sabotage, no definite information to indicate an attack by air. Under alert 2, some bombers would have had to go to other Island. No fence for the airfields available. The difficulty of constructing the bunkers on Hickam Field. The interference with training, particularly aircraft ferrying training. Under alert 2, the aircraft would have been placed where it could not continue its proper training.

If any of these are incorrect, will you so inform me.

Are those the ones?

General SHORT. That is correct.

815. General GRUNERT. Have any of the other Members any questions to ask on the subject of alerts?

The next subject I have is “defensive and protective [528] measures.” A great many of these questions have been answered, but I would like to go over those that I have, to make sure that I haven’t missed any points that I particularly wanted to have brought out.

In the Roberts Report it referred to a deficiency of matériel. What particular deficiency was there that interfered with the taking of appropriate defense measures, with the means available? Did the deficiency of any matériel prevent you from taking whatever measures were possible with what you had?
General SHORT. No, but it would not have been as effective as it would have been if we had all of the matériel.

816. General GRUNERT. Generally, how would increasing the defense measures curtail the training or virtually suspend same?

General SHORT. If Alert No. 3 had been ordered, practically every man in the Department would have gone to his field positions, and all training would have stopped.

817. General GRUNERT. Did Alert No. 2—

General SHORT. Alert No. 2 would have practically stopped the training of the Air Corps and the Antiaircraft Corps. It would not have interfered seriously with the training of the infantry divisions.

818. General GRUNERT. Did you have any provisions in Alert No. 2, where only a certain part of each squadron was to be alerted, and the rest would come in?

General SHORT. When we went to the No. 2, we put all of the Air, all of the antiaircraft, definitely on the alert, and all of the harbor defense.

819. General GRUNERT. While on the subject of alerts, when you took over, I understand there was just one class of alert [529] that covered everything to be done; and some time after you took over, you established 1, 2, and 3. What was the purpose in establishing three classes of alert and not continuing what had been done in the past?

General SHORT. What had been done in the past was done by what they call Field Order No. 1, which was highly secret, so nobody knew what his job was, and when anything went into effect there had to be all kinds of long-winded orders issued, causing delay and confusion, and what we were trying to do was to eliminate all the secret stuff from the standing operating procedure and get it so that we could actually use any alert against any situation without confusion, and as promptly as possible. That was the basic reason for it.

820. General GRUNERT. Of course, then, it is a question of judgment as to what alert to adopt, the decision to be made at that time. Had you had only one alert. Would you then have alerted yourself?

General SHORT. If you had nothing but alert 3, you probably would have gone to alert 3, but if it be provided that every time there was any kind of an alarm, that you went into your field positions, you would probably have turned out the whole command.

821. General GRUNERT. There appear to have been some actions taken and orders issued since December 7; for instance, at Wheeler Field, by the Commanding Officer, pertaining to chemical air attack, on December 9; air-raid instructions, on December 7; distribution of Claxon horns for air-raid-warning systems; after attack, practiced air-raid for Honolulu, December 9, and the exchange of old gas masks for new, December 9.

[530] Are these indications that no such, or inadequate, instructions regarding these measures were issued prior to December 7? General SHORT. It simply means that we learned that certain parts of our plan we thought necessary to improve or change. Now, we, on the Claxons, were trying sirens, or Claxons, to make them for the City of Honolulu, that could be heard; and we had been expecting to get them. We hadn't got them. When this thing came on, we issued the best thing we had to them.
822. General Grunert. Somewhere in the report it shows that some Army officer's wife stated that she did not know what was to be done in case of an air raid, and that she had never been told what to do; whether to go out—she did not say this, but the intimation was—whether to go out and jump into a slit trench, or whether to go to a certain place for shelter.

Were those matters covered prior to December 7?

General Short. We had a plan for evacuation of all the women and children from the affected area. We did not have trenches constructed, as we did, later. Beginning on the 8th of December, we actually dug the trenches on the lawns of the officers' quarters. We did not have them at that time. We had the plan for the evacuation, and the evacuation started according to plan at 12 o'clock, noon, and they were moved to school buildings, or cafeterias were set up, cots and blankets issued, and that all existed by a plan and was carried out by the civil community.

823. General Grunert. Were there any black-out regulations in effect?

[537] General Short. We had had two or three black-out alerts with the civil community.

824. General Grunert. In the testimony of General Burgin, it was reported that he stated to the effect that he believed General Short counted on the Navy for warning from sea approach—that is, Navy scouting—and that Short expressed himself forcibly that no enemy ships could get close enough to land a plane. Why this belief?

General Short. I believed that the Navy would be able—

825. General Grunert. Your confidence in the Navy?

General Short. In my confidence in the Navy.

826. General Grunert. Then there is an expression attributed to you, which you are quoted as having said—

Frankly, I was more serious about training rather than expecting anything to happen at that time.

Why this, in view of the messages received?

General Short. What I meant by that was, on an air attack, in view of the information that the Navy had given me that the Japanese fleet were proceeding to the south, and all, I foresaw a possible attack on the Philippine Islands, but did not think we would have anything besides sabotage and possible uprisings.

827. General Grunert. "General Short issued orders for a practice air-raid on December 10; instructions for protective measures in Honolulu, December 9; and an SOP on defense against a gas attack, and a bulletin of information for the conduct of families in an air-raid, Dec. 7." Were no such instructions issued prior to the attack?

General Short. We had had practice alerts with the civil [532] community. I couldn't have issued orders to the civil community until we were under martial law.

828. General Frank. May I ask a question, now?

829. General Grunert. All right. Go ahead. I have three more, here, when I get around to it.

830. General Frank. They had instructions, issued in the studies by the Office of Civilian Defense?

General Short. I say we had alerts in the civil community, and the Governor put out instructions, and it was all done at our inspection. It wasn't a question of our issuing them orders.
Subject: Corrections in testimony.

To: President, Army Pearl Harbor Board.

1. I request that the following corrections be made in my testimony before the Army Pearl Harbor Board:

   Page 532, line 10,—change "inspection" to "suggestion".

   /s/ Walter C. Short
   
   Walter C. Short,
   Major General, U. S. Army, Retired.

831. General Grunert. Under Alert No. 2, "ammunition would have been at the guns. However, this would have alarmed the public, contrary to War Department instructions." I am quoting this from a statement which you made, somewhere in the Roberts Commission report. I will read that again:

   Under Alert No. 2, ammunition would have been at the guns. However, this would have alarmed the public, contrary to War Department instructions.

   Why should this have alarmed the public?

   General Short. Because it was something we never did. Now, the small-arms ammunition was for protection against sabotage, because all of the guards and everybody of that kind was armed with small-arms ammunition; but we never moved out loaded ammunition to those guns that were set up right in the City.

832. General Grunert. Did it ever occur to you that it might have been a good thing to have done that with a daily routine, about once a week, and so forth?

833. General Grunert. Did you consider the War Department instructions mandatory on this subject, even if it jeopardized your defense?

   General Short. No, not if it definitely jeopardized my defense, and if I had thought there was going to be an air attack, everything would have been out there.

834. General Grunert. "If so, why didn’t you ask the War Department to O. K. your going on Alert No. 2?"

   General Short. I didn’t believe so, and they knew I was on Alert No. 1, and didn’t tell me I was wrong. They had known, for ten days.

835. General Frank. Might it not have been a good idea from the very start to have gone into the field periodically with real ammunition, as a maneuver measure, and that would have eliminated drawing attention to it?

   General Short. I think that everyone who has ever done any maneuvering realizes that one of the things you always do on maneuvers is to inspect very carefully and make the officer sign a certificate that there is no live ammunition there, because you don’t want to kill the people in maneuvers. I have never been in a maneuver in my life that I didn’t require certificates from battalion commanders that there was no live ammunition there.

836. General Russell. General Short, suppose that every week you had taken all your people and give them live ammunition and run
them out to these gun positions: what effect would that have had in developing a "wolf! wolf!" spirit, that has [534] been discussed here quite frequently?

General Short. Well, I am sure that they would have thought it was very unnecessary.

837. General Russell. That is all.

838. General Grunert. One question, here. Somewhere in my notes, here. I have something to the effect that your Chief of Staff, Colonel Phillips, stated that he was not informed as to what took place at your conferences with the Admiral. Did you keep him informed, or did you discuss with him what happened?

General Short. Anything of any importance, I am sure I discussed with him. We were on a very friendly personal basis, and I am sure that if I picked up any piece of information that I thought was of any importance—and I know that I talked to him about certain task forces, because when it came to sending an officer along, why, he would be the one that would get out the order.

839. General Frank. May I ask a question?

Might he have come to that conclusion through the absence of information that even you didn’t have?

General Short. He might have. I don’t believe that he intended to indicate that I withheld information from him.

840. General Grunert. Vice Admiral Pye, U. S. Navy, stated before the Roberts Commission that after he took command, after December 17, he called in General Emmons, and they really got together on inshore and distant patrolling.

General Short. He had unity of command.

841. General Grunert. The officer states that “now” this is done. Does that mean that there was no real getting together prior to that? [535] General Short. No, but it means that beginning December 17 there was unity of command. He could call up General Emmons and order him to do things, and that the situation was completely changed with reference to the command.

842. General Grunert. He states “they really got together,” meaning, “They have now really got together for cooperation.”

General Short. You had passed from cooperation to unity of command.

843. General Grunert. Then does that lead you to believe that you two couldn’t get together, without the unity of command?

General Short. We could get together. I am satisfied unity of command would always be more successful than cooperation.

844. General Grunert. What struck me was that “they really got together,” meaning that in a sense they didn’t get together, before.

General Short. The point of view with the fellow that’s in command, when he is in command of the whole thing, would always be, I think, that he could control things better.

845. General Grunert. I have this question: What evacuation provisions under alert 2 were there? Were there any evacuation provisions under that alert?

General Short. We had elaborate evacuation plans, to be carried out by the committees in town. They would not be carried out till the notice was given for them to be carried out. They were not just developed as part of any one plan.
846. General Grunert. Then in your verbal statement to the Board at the beginning of the hearings, here, I gathered that there was a spurt in construction after December 7, compared to delays prior thereto. How did that come about?

General Short. They gave me a "blank check."

847. General Grunert. A "blank check"? But your materials, your priorities, and your shipments, and everything?

General Short. Yes, but we also took over all the material on the Island, no matter who had it. If we needed it, we took it.

848. General Grunert. Then there was material on the Island that could possibly have been used before, had you been able to get it?

General Short. There may have been in the hands of plantations certain material which we could have used. There may have been, in the hands of certain contractors; and beginning the 8th of December the district engineer was ordered to take over all construction material and take over all contractors with their machinery, for war. In other words, the situation was so changed that we could take anything that was in the Island, no matter whether the man wanted to give it up or not.

849. General Grunert. Now, the question is whether to continue. I do not think I have many more questions, here, but I will check them over. This is on the state of readiness of aircraft, which probably has been covered, but I want to check it. The questions under that topic have all been covered. I go to the next one, incidents during the attack.

Was the attack of December 7 a complete surprise to you?

General Short. It was.

850. General Grunert. Were you informed of the sinking of one submarine at about 6:45 a.m., December 7, in the prohibited area off Pearl Harbor?

General Short. I was not. I didn't know about it, until the following day.

851. General Grunert. At what time on December 7 did you realize an attack was on?

General Short. Practically, when the first bomb dropped, about 7:55. I was not sure till two or three minutes later, when the second one was dropped, and I ran out and looked; and at 8:03 my Chief of Staff came in a minute or two afterwards, ran into my house and said he had messages from Hickam and Wheeler, practically the same thing.

852. General Grunert. What Naval support was rendered the Army in its mission of securing Pearl Harbor against hostile attack, on December 7? What did they do to help?

General Short. All of their ships that were in there, as I understand it, did antiaircraft fire, and the Marines had certain antiaircraft installations at Ewa Field, and went into action.

853. General Grunert. This was all part of the plan for defense under your tactical control?

General Short. Yes, sir. Of course, now, the guns on the ships were not under my tactical control.

854. General Grunert. They had not been worked into the scheme of protection?
General Short. No. 10: we had not gone that far with the cooperation. All of the naval and marine guns ashore operated under our antiaircraft, but the guns on the ship did not.

855. General Grunert. What firing they did aboard those ships during the attack was on their own?

[558] General Short. It was on their own.

856. General Grunert. And did they appear to be surprised, also?

General Short. I think they were as much surprised. They had, I believe, skeleton crews on their guns, and I believe that possibly two guns on each battleship had full crews—two .50-caliber guns. That is just memory. It may be inaccurate.

857. General Grunert. Under the special items I have two questions. Did anything provide for the restriction of military personnel under your various classes of alerts?

General Short. We had certain battalions, of which every man was held right in camp, and there was motor transportation there to move those battalions; and, of course, the personnel that was on guard over these various installations were definitely restricted.

858. General Grunert. Let me put it in the line of social gathering.

General Short. There were no restrictions at all except for the people who were on duty.

859. General Grunert. There were no restrictions on social gatherings, under Alert No. 1?

General Short. No, sir.

860. General Grunert. How about 2, and 3?

General Short. We had not, definitely, but with Alert No. 3, every officer would have been on duty. And there could not have been any social gathering. On Alert No. 2, it would have been possible for officers of the infantry division to have attended a social function.

861. General Grunert. I have no further questions. Has either [539] of you any questions on any subject?

862. General Russell. I just have two or three brief ones. Is General Short's report on this action of December 7 in that file, there, as a part of it?

General Short. It is. The first 50 pages of this report is a statement. First of events leading up—


General Short. —and then of the events that took place, and then later on the things, the steps I had taken to improve the defenses and to improve the possibility of correct action by the civil community.

864. General Russell. Now, did the Navy have a Pearl Harbor only two carriers, the Lexington and the Enterprise?

General Short. They had not a single carrier in Pearl Harbor that morning.

865. General Russell. I mean if they had all been in, were only two carriers based at Pearl Harbor?

General Short. I believe that you are right. But I wouldn't be a hundred per cent positive. But I know there was no carrier in there.

866. General Russell. That is all.

General Short. There may have been one. There may have been one other. The Lexington and the Enterprise. Was there a carrier called the P-a-t-r-o-n by any chance?

867. General Russell. I didn't see a record of it anywhere.
General Short. I know the LEXINGTON and the ENTERPRISE were there, and I am not sure whether there was anything else or not. Of course, you understand the cruisers carried a certain number of planes, so that if a task force was out there was a certain number of planes available for reconnaissance even if they did not have a carrier.

868. General GRUNERT. General, do you wish to make any additional statement in view of what has transpired during your hearing?

General Short. I do not believe that I do, sir.

869. General GRUNERT. Do you wish to appear again before the [541] Board for a rehearing or for such questions as the Board might have as it develops testimony?

General Short. If the Board feels that it has developed things that require my testimony, I do.

870. General GRUNERT. Would it be more convenient to you to come to San Francisco in the last week in September, or Washington the first week in October?

General Short. I am about half way. It wouldn't matter very much.

871. General GRUNERT. Then if the Recorder gets in touch with you upon our return to San Francisco from Hawaii, we can determine where to give you an additional hearing.

General Short. Yes. Whatever place the Board would desire me. I can be there because the difference in time would be very little.

872. General GRUNERT. All right. The Board thanks you for coming up and giving us your testimony.

General Short. I thank the Board for very courteous treatment.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 12:35 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
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MONDAY, AUGUST 14, 1944

MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.

The Board at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on Saturday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.


Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, and Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder.

General Grunert. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. JOHN J. KINGMAN, U. S. ARMY
(RETIRED)

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. General Kingman, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.


2. General Grunert. General, the Board, in attempting to get at the facts, is looking into the War Department background, to get what information may be gleaned here in the War Department as to matters which related to the Hawaiian Department. It is hoped that because of your assignment at the time of the attack on Hawaii and prior thereto, you can give us some facts that will help us in what we are concerned with and doing.

In order to cover the large field in the short time we have available, I have had to parcel out special investigations to individual Members of the Board, although the entire Board will pass on all the subjects; so General Frank has drawn this special line of investigation, and I will ask General Frank to lead in propounding the questions. Then, if General Russell or I have anything to ask in addition thereto, we will do so. General Frank.

3. General Frank. On what duty were you, in 1941?

General Kingman. I was Assistant to the Chief of Engineers.

4. General Frank. In that capacity, what were your responsibilities?

General Kingman. I had under my supervision six sections of the office of the Chief of Engineers. They were the Military Personnel
section, the Railway section, the Intelligence section; what had been called the "Construction" section, later for a short time called the "Fortification" section, and the Operations and Training section. The other, I cannot think of at the moment.

5. General Frank. Did you have anything to do with the processing of contracts?

General Kingman. No. I used to sign the papers sometimes, when General Schley, the Chief of Engineers, was absent.

6. General Frank. In your capacity as Assistant Chief to the Chief of Engineers, and in your capacity in accordance with the duties that were assigned to you, would you have had any information relative to the failure of any contractors on Hawaiian projects to complete their work on time?

General Kingman. None, whatever; no, sir.

7. General Frank. Did you have any such information?

General Kingman. I did not.

8. General Frank. The several sections that you have referred to were in that part of the office over which you had supervision?

General Kingman. Yes; that is right.

General Frank. Did a German by the name of Hans Wilhelm Rohl ever come to your attention?

General Kingman. I never met him, that I know of; but I knew that there was a man named Rohl, I didn't know the rest of his name, who was a member of a firm of contractors in southern California, that had the contract for the Los Angeles breakwater.

9. General Frank. On August 28, 1941, you signed a letter requesting action on Rohl's citizenship papers, of which this is reported as a copy; is that correct?

General Kingman. I think that is correct; yes, sir.

10. General Frank. Why was this request made by you?

General Kingman. It was signed by me as a routine matter. I have looked the matter up in the last two days. I have here a photo-static copy of the file-copy of that letter, with the initials of the officials who prepared the letter for signature.

11. General Frank. Who were they?

General Kingman. I find that the letter was drafted by an employee named Benjamin L. Stilphen, who was then in the Contracts and Claims Branch, Office of Chief of Engineers. Later, he was commissioned in November, and I learned Saturday [546] that he has been either retired or discharged for physical disability, and is now somewhere in New York City. This letter was initialed in the ordinary routine, and, as you see here, I find those initials "F. T. J." By looking in the telephone book of the War Department, I was able to locate that man as now Major Frederick T. Johnson. I talked with him, and he gave me the information about the letter having been drafted by this man Stilphen.

The final initialing was by Colonel Earl E. Gesler, who was the head of the Finance Section, Office, Chief of Engineers. I have no personal knowledge as to why the letter was initiated.

12. General Frank. Whose initials are those, directly under the signature?

General Kingman. Colonel Gesler's. He is now division engineer of the Middle Atlantic Division, in Baltimore.
13. Colonel West. May I ask at this stage that, if that photostatic letter has been received in evidence, we have the reporter mark it "Exhibit 2," for purposes of identification.

14. Major Clausen. It has been. It is Exhibit 2. (The letter of August 28, 1941, is as follows:)

WAR DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS,
Washington, August 28, 1941.

LEMUEL B. SCHOFIELD,
Special Assistant, Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization,
Office of the Attorney General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

DEAR MR. SCHOFIELD: [547] The Hawaiian Constructors, a joint venture consisting of the W. E. Callahan Construction Co., Los Angeles, Calif.; Rohl-Connolly Co., San Francisco and Los Angeles, Calif.; Gunther & Shirley Co., Los Angeles, Calif., and Ralph E. Woolley, contractor of Honolulu, T. H., are working on very important defense construction at Honolulu, T. H., pursuant to Engineer Corps Contract No. 2-414-eng-602.

Mr. H. W. Rohl, 8519 Hollywood Boulevard, Los Angeles, Calif., one of the principal stockholders of the Rohl-Connolly Co., applied to the United States district court at Los Angeles, Calif., on January 15, 1941, for his final citizenship papers which have not, as yet, been issued. Mr. Rohl is possessed of outstanding ability, excellent judgment, and resourcefulness for the management of difficult construction work. Some of the outstanding work performed by Mr. Rohl was the construction of the Los Angeles-Long Beach detached breakwater, the construction of the Headgate Dam at Parker, Ariz., for the Indian Service, and miscellaneous dams, tunnels, and other heavy construction in the State of California. To date, Mr. Rohl's valuable services have not been available for Government defense projects because of his alien status.

The services of Mr. Rohl are of vital importance to the expeditious completion of the aforementioned defense construction project because of his peculiar qualifications and scarcity of qualified supervisory personnel. It is the understanding of this office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States is beyond question. It is therefore requested that the granting of Mr. Rohl's final citizenship papers be [548] expedited.

Your consideration and cooperation will be very much appreciated.

Very respectfully,

JOHN J. KINGMAN,
Brigadier General,
Acting Chief of Engineers.

15. General Frank. Do you know why this request was made to hurry his citizenship papers?

General Kingman. Well, I know that it had something to do with the work going on in the Hawaiian Islands. That is stated in the letter.

16. General Frank. Did you know Rohl?

General Kingman. I don't think I ever met him. When I was Division Engineer in San Francisco, his company had the contract on the Los Angeles breakwater, and I inspected the work on two or three occasions, but so far as I can recall I never met Rohl. I might possibly have met him, without recalling it.

17. General Frank. What was the general reputation of that firm?

General Kingman. They were supposed to be very good contractors. They did a good job on that breakwater. That is the only contract that they had, that I ever had anything to do with.

18. General Frank. With so many firms in the United States whose members were reputable, "1000%" citizens, why were you pressing the case of Rohl, a German citizen?

General Kingman. I didn't know he was a German citizen.

19. General Frank. You signed this letter?
General Kingman. Nothing says that he is a German citizen in that.

20. General Frank. In order to get citizenship, he certainly had to be something besides an American?

General Kingman. Well, he might have been anything, belonged to any nationality, other than the United States.

21. General Frank. As long as you were signing the letter, did not your curiosity lead you to question the nationality from which he was changing?

General Kingman. There was nothing in that letter that aroused any misgivings in my mind as to the propriety of signing it. I didn’t question it, at all.

22. General Frank. You, therefore, did not know that he was a German citizen?

General Kingman. I certainly did not.

23. General Frank. At this time, the war in Europe was on, was it not?

General Kingman. Oh, yes! We were not in it.

24. General Frank. However, our sympathies certainly were not neutral, were they?

General Kingman. Evidently not!

25. General Frank. And yet, here was a man whose citizenship papers you were trying to expedite, and it never occurred to you as to what his original nationality was?

General Kingman. No; it did not.

26. General Frank. Did you know Colonel Theodore Wyman?

General Kingman. Oh, yes; I knew him.

27. General Frank. Did you know anything about his personal association with Rohl?

General Kingman. No, no; nothing.

28. General Frank. You knew nothing as to whether a friendship existed there, or what those personal relationships were?

General Kingman. No; I knew nothing about that.

29. General Frank. It seems a little difficult for me, in view of the upset in world relations at that time, to reconcile how these steps could have been taken to get a man by the name of Rohl citizenship, without being interested to the extent of wanting to know what his original nationality was. Does it not seem peculiar to you that, on the verge of war with Germany, the office of the Corps of Engineers was trying to clear a German citizen for naturalization, so as to give him war contracts?

General Kingman. Of course, we knew nothing about his nationality; at least, I knew nothing about it.

30. General Frank. Certainly somebody in the Corps of Engineers had to know something about his nationality, or he would not have been asking for citizen papers.

General Kingman. I don’t know what other people may have known about it. I doubt if they knew that he was a German.

31. General Frank. When a man makes application for citizenship, he certainly has to state his original allegiance?

General Kingman. Well, I presume he must have stated that to the court. I dare say the FBI and the Department of Justice knew about it, but the Corps of Engineers, I don’t think had been fur-
nished any information that would arouse any misgivings whatever in regard to the man's nationality.

32. General Frank. In any event, you were not familiar with it?

[551] General Kingman. I knew nothing whatever about it. I was merely acting for the Chief of Engineers in signing a great many papers; and I signed this one, in the absence of the Chief of Engineers.

33. General Frank. Are you familiar with the negotiations for a contract dated the 20th of December 1940 with the Hawaiian Constructors for defense projects in Hawaii?

General Kingman. No, sir.

34. General Frank. Do you know anything concerning the failure of those contractors to complete the construction of the defense projects?

General Kingman. No, sir. I thought they had probably done pretty well, from what I heard.

35. General Frank. Do you have any knowledge concerning whether any military personnel neglected their duties relating to that contract?

General Kingman. No; I have no knowledge. A day or two ago, I received a letter that might be of interest to this Board. I do not know whether it is proper for me to submit it, or not.

36. General Frank. That is all right.

General Kingman. It is from a man that worked for me on Corregidor some thirty-odd years ago, when we were building the fortifications of Corregidor.

37. General Frank. To what does the letter refer?

General Kingman. It refers to Colonel Wyman. I do not know whether it is proper to submit it, or not.

38. General Frank. During that period of Wyman's life does this come in?


39. General Frank. What was your assignment on the 20th of December 1940? Were you Assistant Chief of Engineers?

General Kingman. Yes, sir.

40. General Frank. And you had the same responsibilities on the 20th of December as you enumerated at the beginning of this interrogation?

General Kingman. That is correct. That did not include anything to do with making the construction contracts. The Supply Section came under me, too.

41. General Frank. Did you know during any of this period that Hans Wilhelm Rohl had been under investigation by a Government agency for suspicious activities?

General Kingman. I did not.

42. General Frank. What if any measures should have been taken by the personnel of the Corps of Engineers for the protection of the Government against contracting with a person having such a record?

General Kingman. If they had any reason to question his loyalty, they should have reported him to the FBI for investigation, I should think.

43. General Frank. Who, in the office of the Corps of Engineers, was responsible for looking into a man's reputation, who was handling Government contracts through the engineers? Who was responsible for it, in the office of the Corps of Engineers?
General Kingman. I don't believe I can answer that question.

44. General Frank. You signed this letter that you presented [553] to the Board?

General Kingman. Yes, sir.

45. General Frank. You stated you were not familiar with the details. Somebody in that office certainly had to be familiar with the details and responsible for the facts in the letter. Who was that?

General Kingman. That would have been Colonel Gesler, with relation to contracts. He was the one who finally initialed this letter.

46. General Frank. In what part of the office did he serve?

General Kingman. He was head of the Finance Section.

47. General Frank. Did not the Intelligence Section or the Personnel Section come into this, at some place?

General Kingman. No; none whatever. They wouldn't have known anything about it.

48. General Frank. Do you mean to say, if there was a question relative to the suspicious activities of an individual with whom the Corps of Engineers was doing business, the espionage or counter-espionage agency would not have been concerned with it?

General Kingman. That would have been G-2, not the engineers.

49. General Frank. The engineers were the people who had the direct contact with this man?

General Kingman. That is correct.

50. General Frank. Wouldn't they have reported it?

General Kingman. I don't think they had anything to report—as far as I know.

51. General Frank. You are familiar with the Espionage Act [554] of the 28th of March 1940, are you?

General Kingman. Yes, sir. I have had no contact with it, at all; no duties in connection with it.

52. General Frank. Give us a short résumé of that, will you, Major Clausen?

53. Major Clausen. Yes. This act forbids the employment of aliens upon a government contract, or making aliens aware of the details of a government contract dealing with national defense. It is a penal offence to so do.

General Kingman. I had nothing to do with making these contracts.

54. General Frank. Did you ever receive any notice of any reports concerning activities in Hawaii of Colonel Wyman that were were derogatory to Colonel Wyman?

General Kingman. I never did; no. I wouldn't have received them, any way.

55. General Frank. Who would have received them?

General Kingman. I think General Robins would have received them.

56. Major Clausen. May I interrupt to say that the Espionage Act to which my attention was invited was set forth by the War Department in Circular 121, in 1940, and then distributed to war installations of the War Department.

57. General Frank. In your capacity as assistant to the Chief of Engineers, did you have anything to do with the assignment of personnel?

General Kingman. Yes, sir.
58. General Frank. Would you know when an officer was relieved for inefficiency?

[555] General Kingman. Oh, yes!

59. General Frank. Was Colonel Wyman relieved for inefficiency, from Hawaii?

General Kingman. Well, that was after I retired, I believe, that he was relieved from Hawaii.

60. General Frank. Were you familiar with the Canal project?

General Kingman. In a general way, in the way everyone of us is.

61. General Frank. With respect to this letter that you have about Colonel Wyman, what is the tenor of it?

General Kingman. It is a personal letter to me from a man I knew years ago, and in it he mentions what happened on the 7th of December 1941. I don't know whether this Board would like to look at it informally or not.

62. General Russell. Was this man Sisson, about whom you are talking, and from whom you received that letter, a great big, tall fellow?

General Kingman. Yes.

63. General Russell. Do you know anything of his history in the States?

General Kingman. I know that after he worked for the Engineer Department in the Philippines, at the time I knew him, from 1907 to 1910, he went into private practice, I think, for about twenty years, as an engineer. Then, as I recall it, about 1930 or 1931 he came back to the Engineer Department and worked in the Ohio Valley Division; I think, most of the time in the Huntington District.

64. General Russell. I am only interested in the period, General, when he was not with the Government, but was out as a private engineer. Do you know where he was located during that period?

General Kingman. I remember he wrote me that he was in Canada a part of the time.

65. General Russell. Do you know whether he went into the southern part of the United States?

General Kingman. No; I do not.

66. General Russell. His name is George A. Sisson?

General Kingman. Sisson.

67. General Russell. That is all.

[557] 68. General Frank. Will you read that part of the letter which is pertinent?

General Kingman. The letter is dated Honolulu, T. H., 17 July 1944, contains the following:

Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., U. S. A., was District Engineer here during the most strenuous period and really got things done. He was a real hustler. Unfortunately, it looks as though someone in Washington has been trying to make a goat of him. The statement that recently appeared in the papers that he was drunk on the morning of December 7, 1941, was absolutely false. I was Area Engineer of the 2nd Field Area with my office at Hickam Field, which, as you no doubt know, adjoins Pearl Harbor. The Jap planes attacked Hickam at the same time others hit Pearl Harbor. We had a crew working that morning and as soon as the attack started an assistant of mine rushed to the phone and tried to call Lieutenant Colonel B. L. Robinson at his residence to inform him of the attack, however that line was busy. He then called Colonel Wyman at his residence. Colonel Wyman answered the phone and was in good condition.
I have talked to employees who were in the district office when he arrived shortly afterwards and they stated that he was entirely sober. Colonel Wyman, being the go-getter that he is, naturally has stepped on various toes at times, but he was the man who really got work accomplished. As a matter of fact, he impressed me as being the coolest, most capable officer here at the time of the "blitz." Wyman, like others, has some faults, but neglecting his duty was not one of them.

He had made a rather unfortunate choice of the contractors who secured the fixed-fee contract. I understand that on the Coast the firms that went in and formed the Hawaiian Constructors were reliable firms. The trouble was that they sent their scrub team over here. However, in spite of that they accomplished a lot of work.

69. General Frank. Of course, it must be realized that that is not sworn testimony; it is simply an expression of opinion. Nor is it known how familiar the writer was with the situation where Wyman was on that morning, because his only contact with Wyman was by telephone; that is correct, isn't it?

General Kingman. That is correct, yes.

70. General Frank. Yes. So that first paragraph is more or less in the category of hearsay?

General Kingman. I should say entirely.

71. General Frank. All right.

72. General Grunert. Who was Chief Engineer at the time you were Assistant Chief?


73. General Grunert. When you testified as to the number of activities in the Engineer office of which you had charge, you said the construction section. Did that construction section have anything to do with the letting of contracts?

General Kingman. When the contracts were let by the necessary engineer they were then forwarded through the Division Engineer to the Office of Chief of Engineers if it was a large enough contract to require the approval of the Chief of Engineers, and were handled by the finance section. That is where this letter with reference to Rohl was prepared.

74. General Grunert. Did you have anything to do with the checking of the progress under the contracts where they led to construction?

General Kingman. My construction section did on fortification work.

75. General Grunert. Would construction under the Air Warning Service come under fortification work?

General Kingman. It did for a time under this construction section.

76. General Grunert. Did you know how things were progressing in Hawaii? The contracts referred to the defense projects in Hawaii, including the one of the Air Warning Service.

General Kingman. No, I did not.

77. General Grunert. You did not know anything about those?

General Kingman. No.

78. General Grunert. And it was not part of your duties to check that up to see whether the contract was progressing, to see whether it should be done away with? Or, in other words, you did not know anything about that contract?

General Kingman. No.

79. General Grunert. Now, what were the regulations as to the checking of contractors? Here, as I understand, the District Engi-
neer awarded a contract to a contractor or to a number of contractors. Whose business is it to check as to the reliability of said contractors? Is it the District Engineer's? Is it the finance section? Or is it nobody's business?

General KINGMAN. Well, it would be primarily the District Engineer, and finally the checking would be done in this finance section handling contracts in the office of the Chief of Engineers.

80. General GRUNERT. Then, it was up to the finance section of the Chief of Engineers office to check on the District Engineer?

General KINGMAN. That organization has been—I am speaking of the organization as it was at that time.

81. General GRUNERT. Yes.

General KINGMAN. It has been so modified since my retirement that I cannot tell you about the way it is today.

82. General GRUNERT. Well, what I am trying to get at is this: Who was responsible that the German citizen was awarded a defense contract?

General KINGMAN. Well, I think someone else could answer that question a great deal better than I can, because I had no supervision over this contract.

83. General GRUNERT. That is what I am trying to get at. Who, in your opinion, could answer that line of questions?

General KINGMAN. I think General Reybold or General Robins could answer that much better than I could.

84. General GRUNERT. Now, you signed the letter urging the expediting of citizenship to this man Rohl. You say you signed as a matter of form or routine. Had you signed similar letters to get citizenship for other people or hurry them up, or was this the only case that you remember?

[560] General KINGMAN. I think that is the only case I ever handled—I ever signed as Acting Chief of Engineers.

85. General GRUNERT. Then, you did not think, inasmuch as no other cases that you knew of had gone through, that you should look at it and make inquiries about it? Did it strike you as anything unusual?

General KINGMAN. None whatever. As I have stated before, there was nothing in the circumstances which aroused any misgiving on my part.

86. General GRUNERT. Then, it was the custom in the Chief Engineer's office to sign most everything proposed by some other section or that responsible head; is that the general idea of it? I will not say signed everything, but you put your signature to a letter proposed by, initialed by, so and so; that means you trust him that that is all right?

General KINGMAN. Yes, sir.

87. General GRUNERT. You did not think you had to go into it any further, even though it may have referred to something that might have caused suspicion otherwise?

General KINGMAN. So far as I knew at that time, this was a very unimportant matter.

88. General GRUNERT. You say you think the Board can get the best evidence as to the letting of contracts, and so forth, from the officer who was then finance officer of the Chief of Engineers office?

General KINGMAN. Yes, sir.

89. General FRANK. What was his name?
90. General Grunert. How is Wyman considered as an officer among his fellow officers?
   General Kingman. Well, he is considered one of the most efficient officers on construction that we have in the Corps of Engineers.
91. General Grunert. What is he, dynamic?
   General Kingman. Very dynamic.
92. General Grunert. Or what is known as a go-getter?
   General Kingman. Absolutely.
93. General Grunert. Has he been in trouble before because of that go-getting attitude? Do you know?
   General Kingman. Well, he sometimes would ride a little roughshod over people, and they did not like it.
94. General Grunert. Generally, what were the reports on him prior to your retirement, that you know of officially, as having charge of that part of the office?
   General Kingman. He was rated as a superior officer.
95. General Grunert. One other question I have: While you knew Rohl in California and I believe had awarded a contract to his firm, was there any inclination on his part to try to entertain you?
   General Kingman. So far as I know, I never personally met Mr. Rohl.
96. General Grunert. As far as you know there was no attempt on his part to get in your good graces by social entertainment?
   General Kingman. None whatever.
97. General Grunert. I have no further questions.
98. General Russell. Did you have any?
100. General Russell. I have some, from these notes that I have here:
   General, you stated that when this letter, the mimeographed copy of which has been furnished the Board, was submitted to you for signature there was nothing in it that indicated to you something out of the ordinary?
   General Kingman. That is correct.
101. General Russell. In that letter there is a sentence that, "To this date Mr. Rohl's valuable services have not been available for Government defense projects because of his alien status." That sentence was in there, and that did not indicate to you that his status was about to be changed so that he could get information on our defense projects?
   General Kingman. I don't know whether I get the import of that question exactly.
102. General Russell. This letter was for the purpose of changing his status from that of a foreigner to that of an American.
   General Kingman. Yes.
103. General Russell. And the purpose of it was to enable him to do defense project work.
   General Kingman. Yes.
104. General Russell. Did that not indicate to your mind immediately, General, that some investigation of that sort of thing should be made by the Corps of Engineers before they placed their stamp of approval on this proposed changed status?
General Kingman. No, it did not. This man had been doing work for the Corps of Engineers for several years.

105. General Russell. Well, now, this job that he had done out on the West Coast under your supervision, at Los Angeles, I [564] believe—did that come in the category of a defense project?

General Kingman. No; it was building a breakwater there.

106. General Russell. So far as you knew, therefore, this was the first time that a foreigner with the name of Rohl was going to participate in a defense project?

General Kingman. That is correct, yes.

107. General Russell. Now, you say that you did not know what nationality Rohl was. Did that name indicate anything to you?

General Kingman. Not a thing, no.

108. General Russell. At that time, General, was it difficult to get competent contracting firms to do the work that the Engineers wanted done for the Government?

General Kingman. I had nothing to do with that, but I think it probably was pretty difficult to get them at the outlying places where we were doing work, remote portions of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

109. General Russell. Then, in these areas that you last described you did have difficulties in getting contracting firms to go there to do the work?

General Kingman. Well, as I say, I had nothing to do with this.

110. General Russell. You just do not know?

General Kingman. I do not know.

111. General Russell. Now, in reply to some question that was asked by General Frank you stated that you thought the contractors had "done pretty well," if I recall your language, out at Hawaii. I wanted to ask you now, was it generally considered in the Office of the Chief of Engineers that satisfactory progress was being made by the firms who were [565] doing the work out at Hawaii in the year 1941?

General Kingman. I do not know the answer to that.

112. General Russell. Well, what did you mean a moment ago when you said you thought the contractors had done pretty well at Hawaii?

General Kingman. Well, that was just the impression that I had gotten, from no direct connection with the work.

113. General Frank. Casual conversation?

General Kingman. Just casual conversation without any knowledge of the details.

114. General Russell. But you are not in position now to testify whether or not they had done pretty well out there?

General Kingman. No.

115. General Russell. When was this breakwater work done at Los Angeles?

General Kingman. Well, it was started, as I recall it, about September 1936.

116. General Russell. And finished when?

General Kingman. It might have been in '38 or '39; I am not sure.

117. General Russell. General, do you know whether or not the request made in this letter of August 28, '41, for speeding up action on Rohl's naturalization application originated in the Office of the Chief of Engineers or out on the West Coast?
General Kingman. I found nothing in the file to indicate where it originated, but I think probably that General Robins or Colonel Gesler could give evidence on that point.

118. General Russell. You were fairly well acquainted with the Office of the Chief of Engineers in Washington here at that time, [566] were you not?

General Kingman. Yes.

119. General Russell. Would there have been any reason for anyone in this office here to have known of the filing of Rohl’s application for naturalization or the progress which had been made on it unless such person or persons in the Office of the Chief of Engineers had been told by someone who was on the scene where the naturalization application was pending?

General Kingman. I would say no.

120. General Russell. The logical conclusion, therefore, is that the interest of the Engineer Corps was first developed elsewhere than in the Office of the Engineers here?

General Kingman. I would say that probably this was initiated by the District Engineer, Colonel Wyman.

121. General Russell. Were you more or less familiar, General, with the agencies available to the Engineer Corps for expediting work on contracts such as that which was being done at Hawaii? Do you know the machinery that was used by the Engineers to hurry along work on the contracts?

General Kingman. Well, there was no machinery that I know of other than the offices of the District Engineer and the Division Engineer concerned.

122. General Russell. Who were where the work was being done?

General Kingman. Yes.

[567] 123. General Russell. These contracts were being executed in Oahu. What authority did the Commander of the Hawaiian Department have over that work?

General Kingman. I do not know.

124. General Russell. Were you not Assistant to the Chief of Engineers at that time?

General Kingman. Yes. I may have known at that time. If I did, I have forgotten now.

125. General Russell. That is all I have to ask.

126. General Frank. Were you acquainted with any employees or officials of the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization?

General Kingman. No, sir.

127. General Frank. This letter, then was brought to you to sign purely in your capacity as Assistant to the Chief of Engineers?

General Kingman. As Acting Chief of Engineers.

128. General Frank. Will you differentiate briefly between defense projects and other projects?

General Kingman. Defense projects would be those that related to the national defense.

129. General Frank. The Rohl firm had a contract with the Corps of Engineers prior to the time that they were considered for defense projects. What I am trying to bring out is, what kind of projects were they working on before they were considered for defense projects?
General Kingman. The only contract that I know of that they had was this one on the breakwater at Los Angeles.

130. General Frank. What kind of a project do you call that?
General Kingman. A river and harbor project.

[568] 131. General Frank. As distinguished from a defense project?
General Kingman. Absolutely.

132. General Frank. That is what I am after. I have nothing further.

133. General Grunert. There appears to be nothing further, General. Thank you very much for coming.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. EUGENE REYBOLD, CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, UNITED STATES ARMY (ACCOMPANIED BY DOUGLAS I. McKay, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, AND MAJOR LUE LOZIER, J. A. G., ASSIGNED TO THE OFFICE OF CHIEF OF ENGINEERS)

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?
General Reybold. Eugene Reybold—R-e-y-b-o-l-d; Major General, Chief of Engineers; stationed in Washington, D. C.

2. Colonel West. For the purposes of the record will you also please state the names and connections of the gentlemen who are accompanying you?
General Reybold. Mr. Douglas I. McKay, Special Assistant to the Chief of Engineers, and Major Lue Lozier, J. A. G., assigned to the Office of Chief of Engineers.

3. General Grunert. General, the Board is attempting to get at the facts about the attack on Hawaii, and we are now looking into the War Department background, together with all the information we can get that refers to conditions in Hawaii prior [569] to and during the attack. So we have called you in the hope that we will get some information that will lead us to facts or that you will give us facts on which to make a report and judge what to recommend. In order to cover the large field in the limited time we have available, individual Board members have been assigned objectives or phases for special investigation, although the Board itself will pass on all phases. General Frank has been assigned this particular phase, and I am going to ask him to lead in propounding the questions, and the other Board members will fill in and develop the subject.

4. General Frank. What was your assignment during the years 1940 and 1941?
General Reybold. Up until August 1940, I was the Division Engineer.

5. General Frank. Where?
General Reybold. At Little Rock, in the United States Engineers Department, and on about August 1st I was assigned as Acting G-4 of the War Department.
6. General Frank. That is, in 1940?
   General Reybold. That is 1940. On October 1, 1941, I was appointed Chief of Engineers. So I served as G-4 of the War Department from the period of about August 1—I think it was August 4, to be specific—until September 30, 1941.

7. General Frank. We are interested in the progress of certain construction projects in Hawaii as identified by job order which cover the construction of certain aircraft warning service installations in Hawaii. We are desirous of getting information on the progress or lack of progress of that construction. Are you familiar with those details?

   [570] General Reybold. I am not familiar with those details, although I have made some examination of the records existing in the Office of the Chief of Engineers.

8. General Frank. Was there some delay in the construction of the aircraft warning service projects?
   General Reybold. Apparently the initial job orders issued in connection with three fixed stations were issued in June of 1941. To be specific, permit me to refer to Job Order 23.1 under date of June 18, 1941.

9. General Frank. All right.
   General Reybold. That job order provides for A. W. S. camp, utilities, and fence, Kokee Road, and was to have commenced on June 23, 1941, with an estimated date of completion set as September 23, 1941.

10. General Frank. The completion date was September 23?
    General Reybold. Yes.

    General Reybold. I have a record here which I cannot reconcile, identified as Job Order 23.1 Revised, dated December 17, 1941, entitled A. W. S. base camp and field station. It is not in exact agreement with the project title of 23.1 referred to a moment ago. It is dated December 17, 1941. But subsequent information was obtained through a telegram received from the District Engineer in Honolulu on June 26, 1944, fixing the date of completion as 31 December, 1941, indicating further in this telegram that the time of completion was changed to that date under date of November 30, 1941.

   [571] 12. General Frank. What was the cause of these delays?
    General Reybold. All that I can do at the moment is to generalize on those delays and to quote from the same telegram referred to a moment ago as having been received from the District Engineer at Honolulu.

13. General Frank. In 1944?
    General Reybold. Yes. I quote now from that telegram in response to inquiry of my office:
    (Excerpt from telegram of June 26, 1944, is as follows:)

    Chronological sequence causing delay in construction cannot be given. Stop. Causes of delay can be attributed to the following: numerous changes in plan by issuing agency, difficulty in procuring special items of Signal Corps buildings and structures from the Mainland, critical situation in shipping facilities, radar equipment required for the operation of stations was to be furnished by Signal Corps and was late in arriving at its destination in the Islands, inclement weather conditions in the vicinity of stations during construction period delayed work to some extent stop
14. General Grunert. Like all generalizations, they do not state anything in particular as to any one of the delays mentioned there?

General Reybold. That is correct.

15. General Frank. Do you have any first-hand information with respect to the causes for those delays, or has all this information been obtained by you from some members of your [572] organization?

General Reybold. That is correct. All the information I have is obtained from the records and from these few telegrams that have been dispatched to our present District Engineer in Honolulu.

16. General Frank. Therefore, this information that we are obtaining is repeated information taken from original records that are elsewhere?

General Reybold. That is correct.

17. General Frank. Where are these original records?

General Reybold. In the Office of the District Engineer in Honolulu; and perhaps some of the original copies are on file in our own office.

18. General Frank. Are there people on duty now in Honolulu who are conversant with those original records?

General Reybold. I would judge that the present District Engineer, with the assistance of some of his division employees who have been on duty there since the period under discussion, would be able to furnish valuable information.

19. General Frank. I am interested not only in this Job Order 23.1; I am interested in Job Order No. 23 which has to do with the construction of a road, with addendum 1, 2, and 3, and Job Order 23-1. I am interested in Job Order 41, which has to do with the construction of a road on Haleakala, and addendum 1, 2, and 3. I am interested in Job Order No. 2.1 which covers an access road from Kolekole Pass to the proposed site of the cableway at Kaala; Job Order No. 2 covers the construction of the cableway itself; Job Order 2.2 which covers the construction [573] of the A. S. W. camp and installation on the top of Kaala; also Job Order 46, which later was suspended, covering the road, buildings, and so forth, on the top of Mauna Loa. Then, in addition, I am interested in Job Order 20.1 covering the construction, including the fabrication and installation, of 12 50,000-gallon gasoline storage tanks; Job Order 20.120 covering 6 50,000-gallon gasoline tanks; Job Order No. 20.130 covering 12 50,000-gallon tanks; Job Order 25: construct, fabricate and install 9 50,000-gallon gasoline storage tanks, the first addendum thereto; and Job Order 21.1 covering 9 50,000-gallon storage tanks, and certain others.

The point arises that all the information that we would get from you is information that you have collected from original sources, when those original sources would be available to us. Is that correct?

General Reybold. That is correct.

20. General Frank. Therefore I question the advisability of pursuing the details of this matter further with the Chief of Engineers, when we are going into the original records in Honolulu.


22. General Russell. I have just one question on that point.

General, I listened to your description of what happened to this initial job order 23.1. I may be mistaken, but I gathered the im-
pression that some of the information which you gave us as to delays was gathered from original memoranda or data in the Office of the Chief of Engineers here in Washington?

General Reybold. No, sir. That information came to us in the form of a telegram which was in response to a telegram [574] that we had sent to our District Engineer at Honolulu under date of 19 June, 1944; and I will be glad to submit this as part of the record, and the response, which speaks for itself; both our telegram and the reply.

23. General Russell. That is the second record to which you referred, the 1944 telegram, and the reply thereto, about which there was no confusion. But earlier, and in the beginning, you read to us some other papers which you had in your hand, giving us the history of the postponements of 23.1 which involved work on the A. W. S. station, and I was wondering if all that data was collected from the Hawaiian office or if some of it was gotten out of the Engineer’s office here.

General Reybold. What I have said up to this time has been taken from the job order records of No. 23.1 and the telegram received from our District Engineer.

24. General Russell. All those records on 23.1 came from Hawaii?

General Reybold. Yes.

[575] 25. General Frank. Do you have a monthly progress report that you require be sent into your office from your district engineers?

General Reybold. At that time we had a report generally known throughout the service as a “monthly report of operations,” and those reports are on file in our office.

26. General Frank. Would they cover these job-orders in which we are interested?

General Reybold. Only in a general way.

27. General Frank. We will give you references to these job-orders and ask, if you please, that you forward us copies of the progress reports on these jobs, through to the completion of the project.

General Reybold. We will be very glad to give you whatever records we have in that respect. I should like to add that in our search of these records, the report of operations for the month of November, in connection with the storage tanks referred to, is missing from our files.

28. General Frank. Are you familiar with the negotiations for a contract, W-414-eng-602, dated the 20th of December, 1940, with the Hawaiian Constructors, for defense projects in Hawaii?

General Reybold. Only as I have examined to some limited extent the contract on file in the office of the Chief of Engineers.

29. General Frank. That was before you were directly associated with the Corps of Engineers?

General Reybold. Yes, sir. I was not appointed until October 1, 1941.

[576] 30. General Frank. Are you at all conversant with the case of Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

General Reybold. Only as I have read in the papers and heard over the radio, and in connection with the report of the Military Affairs Committee of the House, and what we might term the “squadroom talk.” I never met the gentleman, to my knowledge.
31. General Frank. Do you know whether or not he is at the moment a government contractor?

General Reybold. I do not.

32. General Grunert. Could he be, without your knowledge?

General Reybold. He might be.

33. General Frank. After all the investigation that has gone on with respect to his firm, wouldn't it have been normal for you to have had an investigation in your own establishment, to have uncovered that?

General Reybold. It might well have been.

34. General Frank. Whose responsibility is that?

General Reybold. That's perhaps the responsibility of the Chief of Engineers, but we have pretty close watch on those things through the office of the Provost Marshal General, and through G-2, and through the Service Command headquarters, in this country; and of course any individual leaving these shores for a foreign nation is very carefully investigated prior to his departure.

35. General Frank. However, foreign agents have methods of communicating their information without they themselves leaving the country; that is correct?

General Reybold. Oh, yes.

36. General Frank. Have you any personal or official knowledge of the reliability of one Rohl?

General Reybold. I know nothing about the individual, personally. Going back to contracts, if they be a fixed-fee contract, we have a Contract Advisory Committee sitting in our office, which looks into the ability to perform, and the financial responsibility of every contractor, before we award a contract; and that is equally true of course of a lump-sum contract; we examine very carefully into those features.

37. General Frank. What did you call that agency?


38. General Frank. Did that exist at the time this contract was let?

General Reybold. That existed, and I have been told—I can't vouch for this—that this particular contract, at the time of its award, was referred to that Contract Advisory Committee for its approval prior to the award.

39. General Frank. Do you know who comprised that committee at that time?

General Reybold. I could readily get that: Mr. Blossom, Mr. Harvey, Mr. Dresser, Mr. Talow, now a Colonel in the Army, and Mr. A. L. Sherman.

40. General Frank. You are conversant with the Espionage Act that requires contractors receiving defense-project contracts to be citizens of the United States?

General Reybold. I am not familiar with it, but I judge that that's so, all right.

41. General Frank. Well, that is a law.


42. General Frank. I am just developing this as a background for the next question. Whose responsibility would it be to check as to whether or not a contractor was a citizen of the United States?

General Reybold. That would be the responsibility of everyone in connection with the award of a contract. By that I mean if a contract be under consideration for award in a district, the district engineer,
and, in turn, if it came forward, the division engineer; and if again it required the approval of the Chief of Engineers, it would be the responsibility of the Office of the Chief of Engineers.

43. General GRUNERT. Is that all set forth in regulations and instructions, or is it just understood?

General REYBOLD. I think that is generally understood.

44. General FRANK. So far as you know, then, there is nothing specific in the regulations about that?

General REYBOLD. Nothing specific, but here is a copy of a letter which may be of interest to the Board, under date of December 12, 1941. The subject is "Counter Subversive System." It is addressed to "The Commanding Generals, All Corps Areas; and The Chief of Engineers." With your permission, I will read it. It is brief.

45. General FRANK. Proceed.

General REYBOLD (reading):

1. Reference is made to the Counter Subversive System which was inaugurated by the Construction Division of the Quartermaster Corps at the time that the Construction Division was under the jurisdiction of the Quartermaster General.

2. In view of the fact that the Construction Division has recently been placed under the jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers, it is directed that the Counter Subversive System referred to in paragraph 1 above be maintained by the Corps of Engineers, and that it continue to function under the control of Corps Area Commanders in accordance with the provisions of Counter Subversive Instructions.

By order of the Secretary of War:

E. S. ADAMS
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

46. General FRANK. Are you conversant with the fact that the firm of Rohl-Connolly Co. had a contract for building a breakwater in Los Angeles?

General REYBOLD. Only by hearsay.

47. General FRANK. In a situation like that, and in accordance with this system, as outlined in that letter you just read, will you explain how that counterespionage system would work in determining any questionable activities of Mr. Rohl?

General REYBOLD. Our people in our district maintain very close contact of course with the Service Command Headquarters, their subversive people, the G-2 people. They, at the Corps Areas or Service Command headquarters, know what is going on in the line of Federal work throughout their respective commands, I judge, under the terms of this letter, and we in turn have an Intelligence Section in our own office which maintains very close contact with the activities of our office, and, in turn, with the G-2, and with the Provost Marshal General.

48. General FRANK. Is there a clean-cut line of operation, or is it of nebulous positiveness as to the manner in which it works?

General REYBOLD. There is nothing positive on the books, to my knowledge, as to a requirement as to looking into the loyalty of a contractor, prior to Pearl Harbor.

49. General FRANK. What if any orders of the Corps of Engineers required that the loyalty and background of proposed contractors be investigated before a contract was awarded?

General REYBOLD. We say, none as to loyalty. As to background, it was the duty of the Corps of Engineers to be informed about and be
satisfied with the experience, ability to perform, and financial responsibility of its contractors.

At the time, preceding the award of this contract there was no occasion for the Chief of Engineers to suspect or doubt the loyalty of any member of the contracting group. Had there been, the matter would have been reported to G–2 for appropriate attention. As of 20 December 1940, and before, G–2 was the sole agency within the War Department charged with the duty of reporting on and conducting investigations into matters pertaining to loyalty.

50. General Russell, General, was that the 20th of December, 1940, or 1941?

General Reybold. That was 1940. That was the time of the letting of the basic contract, General.

51. General Frank. In the case of Rohl, are you conversant with the personal relationship of Colonel Theodore Wyman and Rohl?

General Reybold. Nothing more than what I have heard, and read in testimony.

52. General Frank. You have gathered from that testimony that Rohl and Wyman were intimate or casual friends?

General Reybold. I would say that they were pretty close friends.

53. General Frank. In a situation like that, where the friendship was so close between the man letting the contract and the man receiving it, a situation could exist where there could be some question about the loyalty of the man receiving the contract, and the system which was implemented for determining that being distributed among the Corps of Engineers, the Corps Area Commander, the FBI, the G–2 of the War Department, that system might be so diversified as to prevent its ever being picked up; is that correct?

General Reybold. It might be.

54. General Frank. Therefore, might it not be logical to draw the conclusion that the system for determining this was rather loose?

General Reybold. I would say Yes.

55. General Frank. I think we will go back and take the questions that we sent over to you, ask you those questions, and proceed with the development in accordance with the answers that have been prepared in your office. Just give me a general answer to these questions, and then I can pursue that later, in view of our understanding.

General Reybold. All right.

56. General Frank. As of the 7th of December, what was the state of completion of the work on each item contemplated by Contract No. W–414–eng–602?

General Reybold. Our records are not clear, and I would suggest that that information be obtained in detail from the district office in Honolulu.

57. General Frank. That office has the original records?

General Reybold. It has the original records.

58. General Frank. The next question: When was the work on each item commenced?

General Reybold. The same answer as (a).

59. General Frank. What were the number and locations of the permanent aircraft warning stations included within the work of the contract?
General REYBOLD. The original contract, dated 20 December, 1940, and approved by the Under Secretary of War, 3 January 1941, did not specify the number nor the site locations. It provided:

Warning service stations at locations to be determined, specified in Article I, 1.

Article I, 1B:

Aircraft warning service stations on the Islands of Oahu, Hawaii; Maui and Kauai, involving certain installations, including buildings, roads, trails, cable-ways, haulage ways and other structures appurtenant to aircraft warning service, as directed by the Contracting Officer.

As of the date of the contract, the War Department had authorized the construction of the following:

(a) Three fixed stations, as follows:
   Mt. Kaala on Oahu
   Haleakala on Maui
   Kokee on Kauai

(b) Seven mobile stations.

(c) One information center at Fort Shafter.

There is a lot more to this. I do not know whether you want to hear all this stuff, or not. We have got an awful lot of stuff in here. It is a sort of summation of that contract.

60. General GRUNERT. Let us put it in the record. Go ahead. We may need it, later on.

61. General FRANK. Go ahead.

General REYBOLD. On the 21 April 1941, the District Engineer submitted revised detail cost estimates on the original program, increasing the estimated costs from $505,000 to $890,804. On 24 May 1941 this office requested allotment of additional funds for this work of $385,804. On 8 July 1941 the District Engineer submitted additional data regarding costs requested by the Chief Signal Officer 10 June 1941.

The War Department of 8 July 1941 authorized general changes in the program, including the addition of three more fixed stations (at Pahoa on Hawaii, Opana on Oahu, and Manawahua on Oahu) and the reduction of the number of mobile stations from seven to six (eliminating the Mauna Loa station and changing the location of some of the other mobile stations), and requesting estimates of cost and report on locations.

The requested estimates of cost and report were forwarded by the District Engineer 18 September 1941, and were forwarded by this office 3 October 1941 to the Adjutant General through the Chief Signal Officer. The Secretary of War approved the revised Hawaiian aircraft warning service program on 4 December 1941, before which date no construction could have been started on the additional work covered by the revised program, nor job orders thereon issued to the contractor.

Accordingly, "the number and location of the permanent aircraft warning stations included within the work of the contract" on 7 December 1941 were the three fixed stations and the information center described in subparagraph (4) above, approved by the Secretary of War 4 December 1941.

62. General GRUNERT. May I develop that a little more? I did not quite understand from the reading of that. It seems the original contracts were awarded. Then they kept changing or asking for
more money, and this went on from early in '41 until December '41. What was actually completed in the contract, or are all these pertaining to the same contract that were not completed or only partially completed? I do not get a clear picture of what was done except that they kept asking for something else.

[585] In other words, is there any clear-cut thing there to show, This was a contract to so and so; they did so and so on it by such and such a time?

We shall have to take each one of these contracts, it seems to me, and follow it up as to what was done with it. If it was revised, who asked that it be revised? Who approved the revision? How much did it cost? Was there money available? Were the materials available? and all that. Otherwise I do not get a clear picture of it at all. It seems building the Air Warning Service was just not done during that year, and we want to find out why.

63. General Frank. Well, I can explain that.

64. General Grunert. Can you?

65. General Frank. To this extent. There was a master contract made, and that did not cover the specific projects. As a project came up, then that particular project was covered by a job order which became a part of the master contract, and those projects as covered by these specific job orders were the things to which I referred when I first started questioning the Chief of Engineers.

66. General Grunert. That is just what I want to get in the record, so it will be intelligible to the laymen who will have to study the thing.

67. General Frank. And we have here a complete record of the commencement date, the estimated date of completion, and the various revised dates, and the addendum to the original job orders in each instance.

68. General Grunert. All right, fine. Now, what can we get from the present witness that will help us toward a better [586] understanding of that when we get to the source of the record?

69. General Frank. That I think will be brought out as we ask these questions.

70. General Grunert. All right; go ahead, then.

General Reynolds. Without putting this on the record unless you want it there, General, that is a little confusing. I know this thing is confusing to me too. But what had been done up to this date when I quit reading there was to develop facts; that although there were numerous plans in the mill over there being considered, quite a program: Navy, Army, and everything else, what you are trying to get at here was as of December the 7th what might have been completed in the nature of these air warning stations. Now, that is what you want to do, and I developed down to the fact that there were three of them firmly on the books, even though you will find later that that developed into six fixed stations, six movable stations, and one communications center.

71. General Grunert. You see what I want: when the record is completed I want to be able to read it and study the record. Now, what have we got? What facts have we? When we put in a report, we cannot bear out all this unless we have something in the record to show for it, and this talk off the record will not help us a bit when it comes to thinking back on it.
General Reybold. Yes.

72. General Grunert. What I want to do is to get this in the record so we can study the record and come to conclusions and piece it out by additional testimony where necessary.

General Reybold. Well, the last paragraph I wrote there finally concludes those three stations.

73. General Frank. All right. That is in answer to what question, now?

General Reybold. That was c. That was 2 c.

74. General Frank. All right. Now, what were the number and location of the underground gasoline storage tanks included within the work of the contract?

General Reybold. We cannot answer that from the records on file in the Office of the Chief of Engineers.

75. General Grunert. Can you suggest where we can find information on that subject?

General Reybold. That information can be obtained from the District Engineer in Honolulu, who has the original records.

76. General Frank. Which if any of these facilities were completed as of the 7th of December, '41?

General Reybold. None, except at least one mobile station with the smaller type tower affixed to a truck, was in operation in a temporary location in the vicinity of Pearl Harbor. As to the status of completion of the three fixed stations and the information center on 30 November 1941, see Inclosures 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.

Now, that is these things [indicating].

77. General Frank. What do those inclosures show?

General Reybold. They show the status of completion as of November 30, 1941, of the three fixed air warning stations that had been approved for construction, and the information center.

78. General Frank. In answer to the original question, “which if any of these facilities were completed as of the 7th of December, 1941?” what is your answer?

General Reybold. None insofar as the fixed stations are concerned. [588]

79. General Frank. What was the status of completion of the information center?

General Reybold. 72 percent on November 30, 1941.

80. General Frank. Do you have information there on the percentage of completion of the fixed stations? They were three in number, were they not?

General Reybold. Mt. Kaala: the project as a whole was 50 percent completed, the access road was 97 percent completed, and the cableway 20 percent completed.

Haleakala: project as a whole, 96.4 percent; access road, 100 percent; power building, 60 percent; barracks and communications building, 99.9 percent complete; detector building and tower, 95 percent complete.

Kokee: project as a whole was 50 percent completed; access road, 86 percent; power building, 57 percent; barracks and communications building, 70 percent; detector building and tower, 84 percent.

81. General Frank. In answer to the following question, “What was the time fixed by the contract and the job orders for completion of
82. General Frank. In the delays in completing the facilities what were the causes?

General Reybold. I could give you no further information on that question than that read from a telegram received from the District Engineer.

83. General Frank. In Honolulu?


84. General Frank. Therefore, that information should be available to us in Honolulu?

General Reybold. Correct.

85. General Frank. Do you know whether or not protests as to the delays were made to the contractors?

General Reybold. I do not.

86. General Frank. Do you know whether or not your office was advised with respect to the delays?

General Reybold. I do not.

87. General Frank. Have you any information as to any of the delays for which the contractors were responsible?

General Reybold. I have no such information.

88. General Frank. Do you have any information as to any delays for which the Government was responsible?

General Reybold. In general terms, it is known that the following constitute certain sources of delay: (a) Numerous changes in plans by the using agency.

89. General Frank. What do you mean by "the using agency"?

General Reybold. Signal Corps if they were going to operate these installations.

90. General Frank. Or the Aircraft Warning Service?

General Reybold. Or the Aircraft Warning Service, wherever that belongs.

91. General Frank. All right.

General Reybold. (b) Difficulty in procuring special items of Signal Corps buildings and structures from mainland.

92. General Frank. What do you mean by "special items"?

General Reybold. Well, special items of Air Corps [590] installations and everything, you might say, in connection with building materials, with perhaps the exception of rock. Crushed rock did not have to be shipped over from the United States.

93. General Frank. Well, I am trying to be a little more specific there as to exactly the things to which you refer. Will you state that again, please?

General Reybold. Difficulty in procuring special items of Signal Corps buildings and structures from the United States. Those steel towers were fabricated in the United States.

94. General Frank. Do you really know whether or not the non-receipt of those in Honolulu held up construction? Do you really know that?

General Reybold. Specifically I do not.

95. General Frank. All right. Proceed with the answer.

General Reybold. I know in general terms also, there was a critical situation in shipping facilities, but nothing specific. I am told that
radar equipment required for the operation of the aircraft warning service stations was to be furnished by the Signal Corps and was late in arriving at the destination in the Islands.

96. General Frank. May I ask a question right there: The foundations on which to install this permanent equipment could have been put in prior to the arrival of this equipment?

General Reybold. If the location had been definitely fixed.

97. General Frank. If the location had been fixed and if the plans had been furnished you?

General Reybold. That is correct.

98. General Frank. Therefore, the nonarrival of the radar [591] equipment itself need not have held up preparatory construction?

General Reybold. No, not preparatory construction, if the plans and the location were at hand.


General Reybold. Labor shortage and special difficulty in securing competent, experienced supervisory personnel.

Earl er competition for labor, and supply priorities, between the different agencies of the Government engaged in the defense program.

And to some limited extent, which I think you could write off, inclement weather, because they will have that under any contract, but is merely reported from over there. Inclement weather is the last thing.

100. General Frank. This answer that you have given is all the information you have as to the causes of the delay in the installation of this equipment?

General Rey bold. That is all that we have.

101. General Frank. What equipment was furnished for the installation and the facilities for the underground gasoline storage tanks?

General Reybold. We have no answer to that question yet, but are continuing our search of the files.

102. General Frank. Where is information more readily available on that?

General Reybold. In the office of the District Engineer at Honolulu.

103. General Frank. Do you know when this equipment was delivered in the Hawaiian Islands?

General Reybold. I do not.

[592] 104. General Frank. Do you know from whom this equipment was received?

General Reybold. I do not.

105. General Frank. What was the chain of command, so far as the District Engineer in Hawai i was concerned, from the commencement of the work under the contract and down to the 7th of December?

General Reybold. The District Engineer reported to the Division Engineer, and he, the Division Engineer, in turn reported to the Chief of Engineers.

106. General Frank. The District Engineer in this instance was Colonel Wyman in Honolulu?

General Reybold. That is correct. General Hannum at San Francisco was the Division Engineer.

107. General Frank. What if any responsibility had the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department in this instance?
General REYBOLD. Would you state that again?

108. General FRANK. What if any responsibility did the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department have with respect to this construction?

General REYBOLD. He had nothing to do with the actual operations, except of course the District Engineer had the closest contact with him; but I would judge that in the planning for these installations which we are discussing here he would have a very great responsibility in determining the number and locations of the installations.

109. General FRANK. What I am after is: To what extent would it have been possible for him to have taken steps to have expedited [593] work on any project in a contract?

General REYBOLD. He might well have gone first to our District Engineer; and if he did not obtain the results I am sure that a communication either with the Division Engineer or with the Chief of Engineers would have brought forth results.

110. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not that was done?

General REYBOLD. I do not.

111. General FRANK. Will it be possible for you to furnish the names and locations of military personnel and supervisory civilian employees of the Corps of Engineers who were on duty in Hawaii during this period?

General REYBOLD. I have here the record of military personnel on duty at the time under consideration, but have not a list of the civilian personnel.

112. General FRANK. It is the supervisory civilian personnel we want. I would rather change that to supervisory civilian personnel.

General REYBOLD. I would suggest that the supervisory personnel be obtained from the office of the District Engineer in Honolulu. Now, would you prefer that we wire and get that for you? We probably could.

113. General GRUNERT. It is up to you.

114. General FRANK. Yes, we would like to have that list available prior to going there, so that we shall know where they are. It may be necessary to contact some of them in the United States.

115. General GRUNERT. We shall take a recess for five minutes.

(Thereupon there was a brief informal recess.)

116. General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

117. General FRANK. I should like to have this list of names included in the record, but I should like to have after each name the position that he held.

118. General REYBOLD. We shall be glad to furnish that information.

(List of names furnished by General REYBOLD is as follows:)

(Original transcript does not contain above-mentioned list.)

119. General FRANK. Who was the contracting officer with respect to the mentioned contract during this period?

General REYBOLD. Colonel Theodore Wyman.

120. General Frank. What were the duties of the District Engineer and the contracting officer with respect to this mentioned contract?

General REYBOLD. Could I go back and add to that other question? You asked who was the contracting officer. I think we should clear up one point in there that you may want to follow up.

121. General FRANK. Yes?
General Reybold. I said, Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., signed the original contract and Supplements Nos. 2 to 10, both inclusive, and Change Orders Nos. 1 to 6, both inclusive, as contracting officer. These covered the period from 20 December 1940 to 29 November 1941. Colonel (now Brigadier General, Retired) Warren T. Hannum, then Division Engineer, South Pacific Division, signed Supplement No. 1 as contracting officer. Supplements and Change Orders numbered higher than 10 and 6, respectively, bear dates "after Pearl Harbor."

And then in answer to the question, "What were the duties of the District Engineer and the contracting officer with respect to the mentioned contract?" the answer: To administer and exercise general supervision over the performance of the contract.

122. General Frank. What if any orders of the Corps of Engineers prohibited the acceptance by the District Engineer and the contracting officer of favors or gifts from contractors?

[597] General Reybold. Reference is made to Army Regulations 600–10, 6 December 1939, which was in effect during this period. Also to the following provisions of Orders and Regulations, Corps of Engineers, dated 15 January 1939:

Par. 17 (c), Officers of the Corps of Engineers shall not engage in any work outside the duties officially assigned to them that may interfere with the performance of their official duties or conflict with the duties assigned to the Corps of Engineers and they shall not, without the prior assent of the Chief of Engineers and the Secretary of War, accept compensation for services from any State, municipality, corporation, or person that has any interest that touches on the duties of the Corps of Engineers.

Par. 17 (d). Receipt by officers of pay from State or private interests for services rendered in connection with the supervision of expenditure of funds contributed toward river and harbor improvements is not authorized.

Par. 1039.8 (c). The practice of receiving presents from persons not in the Military Establishment or in the employ of the Government in recognition of services rendered, through not expressly forbidden, is opposed to the spirit of the statute and for that reason is not approved by the department.

123. General Frank. Will you state generally from your memory the provisions of Army Regulation 600–10?

General Reybold. That general paragraph forbids the [598] acceptance of gifts.

124. General Frank. You may get it and read the language into the record later.

Would you consider frequent companionship with, frequent entertainment by, and association with a contractor by a District Engineer as being in compliance with these general provisions?

General Reybold. Personally I have always tried to avoid that sort of thing, and I think you have got to know your contractors. There are contractors who couldn't buy me a sandwich, and there are other contractors who, out of mere courtesy, could buy me a sandwich so to speak. In this particular instance it is apparent to me that there was too much familiarity between the contracting officer and the contractor, only as I observed from what I have heard and what I have read, and from no first-hand information that I have ever observed.

125. General Frank. What if any orders of the Corps of Engineers required that the loyalty and background of proposed contractors be investigated before a contract was awarded?

General Reybold. None as to loyalty. At the time preceding the awarding of this contract there was no occasion for the Chief of
Engineers to suspect or doubt the loyalty of any member of the contracting group. Had there been, the matter would have been reported to G-2 for appropriate attention. As of 20 December 1940, and before, G-2 was the sole agency within the War Department charged with the duty of reporting on and conducting investigations into matters pertaining to loyalty.

128. General Frank. Has that procedure been changed in any way since December 7th?

General Reybold. Loyalty investigations now rest with the Office of the Provost Marshal General.

127. General Frank. Do you consider the present system is sufficiently watertight?

General Reybold. I believe it is now, perhaps more as a result of the investigation concerning this man Rohl than ever before.

128. General Frank. This still depends upon each of the various agents concerned doing his part as he sees it in making the necessary reports?

General Reybold. That is correct.

129. General Frank. It does not specifically require an investigation into loyalty; it is a question of a man’s individual interpretation of his duties?

General Reybold. I would say you are correct insofar as contracts within continental United States are concerned, but on the other hand I do believe that contractors going into our outlying possessions, and particularly to foreign countries, would be very, very carefully surveyed.

130. General Frank. Do you feel that there is still room for improvement of the system of checking on these people?

General Reybold. It could be strengthened.

131. General Frank. Who was responsible for investigating the loyalty and background of the contractors in this mentioned contract?

General Reybold. I would say initially the contracting officer.

[600] 132. General Frank. Who was?

General Reybold. Who was Colonel Theodore Wyman.

133. General Frank. What reports with respect to the loyalty and background of Hans Wilhelm Rohl, of the Rohl-Connolly Company were received by the contracting officer, the District Engineer, the Division Engineer, and the Chief of Engineers before this contract was awarded?

General Reybold. None as to loyalty so far as the Chief of Engineers was concerned.

134. General Frank. What attempts were made to get such reports?

General Reybold. None by the Office of the Chief of Engineers.

135. General Frank. What if any complaints or derogatory remarks as to performance by the contractors were received by the contracting officer, the District Engineer, the Division Engineer, or the Chief of Engineers before the 7th of December, ’41?

General Reybold. None insofar as the Chief of Engineers is concerned.

136. General Frank. If there were complaints, none of them got as high as the Office of the Chief of Engineers?
General Reybold. To the best of my knowledge, that answer is correct.

137. General Frank. In your testimony covering any orders prohibiting the acceptance by the District Engineer of favors or gifts you referred to Army Regulation 600–10. Can you give me the provisions of that Army Regulation?

General Reybold (reading):

It is impossible to enumerate all of the various outside activities and interests to which these regulations refer. The following examples may be regarded as typical:

138. General Frank. Are you reading from the Army Regulation?

General Reybold. Yes, and the one to which I referred a few moments ago.

139. General Frank. Yes.

General Reybold. That is all in quotation except, "and the one to which I referred a minute ago." I mention (a):

Acceptance by an officer of a substantial loan or gift or any emolument from a person or firm with whom it is the officer's duty as an agent of the Government to carry on negotiations.

[602] 140. General Frank. Have you any knowledge concerning whether any military personnel neglected duties relating to this contract?

General Reybold. None to my knowledge.

141. General Frank. Have you any knowledge as to whether there was any neglect of duty by not properly investigating the loyalty of Hans Wilhelm Rohl prior to the award of the contract?

General Reybold. I would say there was none.

142. General Frank. Have you any information as to whether or not there was neglect of duty by not supervising properly the performance of the contractor's work?

General Reybold. None, to my knowledge.

143. General Frank. You have already stated that so far as you know there was no informing of higher authority of delays and deficiencies.

General Reybold. I have here a telegram received from the Hawaiian Department, addressed to the Adjutant General, under date of June 11, 1941.

(Telegram dated June 11, 1941, from Hawaiian Department to the Adjutant General, is as follows.)

I have been informed by the Division Engineer, San Francisco, that A–1–G is the priority covering contract W–414 Engineer 784 with Interstate Equipment Corporation, Elizabeth, New Jersey, materials for cableway to Kaala aircraft warning station covered by this contract. General Electric has subcontract for motor and all electrical equipment. According to Division Engineer a delay of about fifteen weeks in the delivery of this electrical material to contractor is strongly probable under its priority. As this Kaala station is most important in our aircraft warning system it is essential that this cableway be completed early. In this Department this aircraft service is considered to be the most important single project. War Department assistance to District Engineer to have priority of this contract changed to A–1–B is strongly recommended.

To which this office replied, under date of June 17, 1941, to the Adjutant General, under the heading of Second Indorsement:
(Telegram dated June 17, 1941, from Chief of Engineers to the Adjutant General, is as follows:)

1. By telephonic conversation with the Priorities Committee, Army and Navy Munitions Board, a rating of A–I–C was authorized.

2. The contractor should contact his suppliers to determine if satisfactory delivery can be made with this rating. If not, he should contact other sources for early delivery.

3. In the event further assistance is requested instructions in circular letter Finance No. 144 should be followed.

144. General Frank. Do you know the outcome of that?

General Reybold. I do not, without further search of the records.

145. General Frank. In any event, it was not sufficiently advanced to enable the cableway to be constructed and the aircraft warning system to be erected on Mt. Kaala prior to December 7. That is correct, is it not?

General Reybold. To my knowledge, that is correct.

146. General Frank. Did you know the outcome of that?

General Reybold. No.

147. General Frank. [604] May I interject a question there? I presume, with reference to raising the priority, it was raised when you put it in 1–C. What does that mean in actual weeks’ saving between one priority and the other, normally?

General Reybold. I would never be able to answer that.

148. General Frank. Why was it put in 1–C if it did not make any difference?

General Reybold. It would perhaps enable the manufacturer to secure components at an earlier date than he would otherwise have secured under the former priority.

149. General Frank. To your knowledge, what information was given Colonel Wyman to complete these defense projects as speedily as possible?

General Reybold. None from my office, to my knowledge. The presume, with reference to raising the priority, it was raised when ment Commander.

150. General Frank. What were the functions of the position which you occupied on the 20th of December, 1940, with respect to this contract referred to above?

General Reybold. I was G–4 of the War Department.

151. General Frank. Did you have any responsibility in that capacity for this contract?

General Reybold. Unquestionably there was something concerning that matter that passed through G–4. What it was I do not remem ber at the moment.

152. General Frank. It was a matter of policy rather than one of operation?

General Reybold. Yes, indeed.

153. General Frank. Have you any memory of anything passing through G–4 with respect to this contract at that time?

General Reybold. I have a faint recollection of some difficulty in fixing upon the location of some of the aircraft warning station sites.

154. General Frank. Was that some difficulty that you were hav ing with the Department of the Interior?

General Reybold. Yes. That was mixed up in the affair. I think the Secretary of the Interior was very insistent upon having locations of roads and the character of the buildings that were to be installed
on his reservation placed before him for approval, or his representatives.

154. General Frank. Do you know whether or not that held up the work?

General Reybold. I do not.

155. General Frank. Can you find out?

General Reybold. I think you would have to obtain that from the District Engineer’s office in Honolulu, because evidence would have to be weighed as to whether fixing upon the location or the receipt of the last piece of material and equipment to be installed would be a governing factor.

156. General Grunert. There is a question that I want to ask there: Could a contract have been let without the location having been fixed? In other words, if there was any delay would it have been before the contract was let, or would that keep the contract from being let until there was a determination?

General Reybold. Not in this kind of a contract, General. This is a so-called fixed-fee contract, and its terms are very flexible. I might refer, perhaps, to what General Frank stated [606] in one of his opening remarks, that the contract is very general in nature, and the work was specified by job orders; and until one of those job orders was issued there could be nothing specific concerning any individual item.

157. General Frank. You read a radiogram from the Hawaiian Department asking for a change in priority. Do you have any other examples or instances in which there was complaint made or help asked for from Hawaii to assist in completing those projects in Hawaii?

General Reybold. I have nothing insofar as our search of the records has revealed to the moment. We are continuing our search, and anything brought to light will be furnished to the Board.

158. General Frank. Will you give us negative as well as positive information on that?

General Reybold. Yes.

159. General Frank. So that if you do not find anything we will be so advised?

General Reybold. Yes; I will be glad to do so.

160. General Frank. What means did the District Engineer, Colonel Wyman, have to prod or drive the contractor or to bring pressure to bear so that the work would be completed within the time specified?

General Reybold. He had full authority.

161. General Frank. What could he have done if the contractor were not working as fast as he thought he should?

General Reybold. He could have urged him verbally, urged him in writing, and advised him that the contract would be canceled unless he took steps to expedite it.

[607] 162. General Frank. This question has been answered piecemeal. I will ask it again. What if any measures should have been taken by personnel of the Corps of Engineers for the protection of the Government against contracting with a person having a record like that of Hans Wilhelm Rohl? What measures should have been taken?
General Reybold. It is a difficult question to answer. If the character of the individual had in some manner been brought to the attention of the Corps of Engineers, unquestionably the investigation would have gone deeper; but under the circumstances there was no reason to believe at that time, as far as I know, that the individual was a dangerous character. I am told, although I have not looked up the records, that he had done work for us on a breakwater somewhere on the Pacific Coast and that his services were satisfactory.

163. General Frank. He had been under investigation by the F. B. I., had he not?

General Reybold. Not to our knowledge.

164. General Frank. That, in turn, indicates looseness in the general system, does it not?

General Reybold. Perhaps so; yes.

165. General Frank. What if any rules or regulations did Colonel Wyman violate in event that he, having been informed that Rohl was an alien, discussed with him details of a secret defense project contract?

General Reybold. What did he violate?

166. General Frank. Yes.

General Reybold. I would say, the rules of good judgment and common sense.

[608] 167. General Frank. Is there any written regulation or specific document that covers that?

General Reybold. AR 380-5, to safeguard military information, certainly covers it.

168. General Grunert. When was that published?


169. General Frank. Did you ever receive notice or have knowledge of any reports concerning the activities of Colonel Wyman in Hawaii that were derogatory to Colonel Wyman?

General Reybold. No; I never had any such report.

170. General Frank. Were you Chief of Engineers when he was relieved from Hawaii?

General Reybold. Yes.

171. General Frank. Did you ever receive notice or have knowledge of a report dated the 14th of February, 1942, by an Army officer to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, to the effect that Colonel Wyman should be relieved as District Engineer for inefficiency?

General Reybold. I do not recall any such thing. There may be something like that in the record.

172. General Frank. When Colonel Wyman was relieved as District Engineer what were the circumstances?

General Reybold. I believe that that was done after we had decentralized completely all engineer work to the Department Commander; and that was done by an order or circular letter of the Adjutant General of the Army under date of February 28, 1942.

173. General Frank. Do you know whether or not the question of Wyman’s efficiency entered into the matter?

General Reybold. No. I do know this, that the Department Engineer, who was Colonel Lyman at that time, either wrote a personal letter to me or to somebody in my office indicating that he
could get along without Wyman over there, or perhaps better without him. I am just stating from memory.

174. General Frank. Do you have a copy of that letter? General Reybold. I do not know. I will have to look it up.

175. General Frank. Please look it up and let us have a copy of it if it is available.

General Reybold. Yes, sir.

176. General Grunert. Colonel Lyman is deceased, is he not?

General Reybold. That is correct, sir.

177. General Frank. Are you conversant with any Inspector General's report on Colonel Wyman's operations as District Engineer in Hawaii?

General Reybold. Some time after Wyman was brought back to this country and was then in charge of the Canal project, and as a result of some reports received from that project, together with some reports that had been received through a Congressman—I think it was Representative Thomason of Texas—in which a contractor by the name of McKee was registering some violent complaints about Wyman and his activities in Hawaii, I asked for an Inspector General to look into the matter, and a Colonel Hunt investigated the activities in Alaska on the Canal project, and I think he extended his investigation to Hawaii, but to what extent I do not remember. There is a report from the Inspector General on file that perhaps is available.

178. General Frank. For the purposes of the record I will state [610] that we have accessible Colonel Hunt's report on that investigation, and we are calling Colonel Hunt as a witness before the Board.

Do you have any memory of what the conclusions were of that investigation?

General Reybold. To the effect that Colonel Wyman should not be placed in charge. I do not know whether it said "of public works," or "civil works," or "large public works;" but the conclusion was that he should not be placed in charge of large work in connection with our works program, or words to that effect. I would rather get the record on that.

179. General Frank. Has he been so placed since that time?

General Reybold. Since the receipt of that report?

180. General Frank. Yes.

General Reybold. No; he has not. He has been in command of a general service regiment.

181. General Frank. With respect to the assignment of Colonel Wyman on the Canal project, what if anything do you know concerning a contract or contracts awarded to Rohl's firm on this project?

General Reybold. I do not think that Rohl has ever been on that project, although, in connection with an extension of the Alaskan highway from Hanes, I believe it is called, down near Skagway to a point somewhere north and west of Whitehorse, a contract was let with Foley Brothers, and then I believe that certain equipment which belongs to the Rohl-Connolly organization, was either brought on the job or an attempt made to negotiate for that equipment. There was some connection in the contract between Foley Brothers and this particular strip of road to [611] which I refer.

182. General Frank. Was this during your regime as Chief of Engineers?
General Reybold. Yes.

183. General Frank. Were you conversant at that time with the Wyman-Rohl contract and intimacy?

General Reybold. I would have to look up that contract. I do not know whether Rohl's name appears in it or not, but I have my doubts whether it appears. I think it was something that was brought to my attention after that.

184. General Frank. Has there ever been in your mind any suspicion about the association between Rohl and Wyman?

General Reybold. Not a bit, not in my mind.

185. General Frank. Does there now exist any suspicion?

General Reybold. Not in my mind. He is the most indiscreet man that I ever knew. I would put it that way. I do not know Wyman, but——

186. General Frank. Who was indiscreet?

General Reybold. Wyman, in his business transactions. I do not know the man very well, but he is known to me as a "go-getter." In what he does on the side he evidently is very, very indiscreet.

187. General Frank. When was Colonel Wyman relieved from his assignment to the Canol project?

General Reybold. It was prior to Hunt's investigation.

188. General Frank. Will you provide that particular information with the particulars surrounding his relief in detail?

General Reybold. Yes.

189. General Frank. You have a Colonel Horowitz?

General Reybold. Yes. [612]

190. General Frank. Colonel Horowitz made an investigation of that situation, did he not?

General Reybold. He made an investigation of the progress of construction in what we called our Northwest Division, and his report was very derogatory concerning Wyman in his treatment of personnel and other matters.

191. General Grunert. Is that report available?

General Reybold. I think it is.

192. General Grunert. Do you have a copy of it?

193. Major Clausen. We have a copy, sir.

194. General Frank. What if anything did you have to do with Colonel Wyman's first assignment?

General Reybold. I had all to do with it. I relieved him from service in the Northwest Service Command and sent him to a general service regiment.

195. General Frank. Do you know what has been the nature of his services in that regiment?

General Reybold. No; I do not. It was trained at Camp Claibourne, Louisiana, and later went to England, and I do not know just exactly the service of either himself or his regiment from that date.

196. General Frank. Do you have anything in addition to the answers to the questions I have asked you that you want to state to the Board with respect to this situation?

General Reybold. I have nothing further to state to the Board.

197. General Grunert. General Russell, have you any questions?

[613] 198. General Russell. Reference has been made to the elasticity of this basic contract under which the work was to be done at Honolulu. I have gotten the impression, General, that
you entered into a contract in which you paid the contractor for whatever he did plus some profit.

General Reybold. Plus a fixed fee; yes.

199. General Russell. You could do anything out there that you wanted to do under this basic contract?

General Reybold. That is correct.

200. General Grunert. As I understand it, then, this basic contract was awarded in December of 1940, and under that basic contract there were a number of subcontracts which resulted in job orders, so-called. A job order specifies the actual date of completion?

General Reybold. Yes.

201. General Grunert. Why the constant revision and constant changes of the estimated date of completion? Was there anything anywhere along the line that pinned down the contractor to finish the work in a specified time?

General Reybold. Only by the issuance of the job order. You will find instances in which the job order was revised.

202. General Grunert. Who had the authority to revise it?

General Reybold. That is all in the hands of the contracting officer and the District Engineer, who, in this case, were one and the same.

203. General Grunert. Then if you have contracts which are not on a fixed-fee basis, and are flexible, the contractor must live up to it more than in the case of the other kind?

General Reybold. Yes, sir. If you have what we term a [614] firm contract or a lump-sum contract, the time for completion is definitely specified. But frequently in cases of those contracts there are delays that cannot be charged to the contractor, and then the contracting officer, after hearing the evidence, may supplement that contract and extend the time of completion.

204. General Grunert. Then it is within the judgment of the District Engineer or the one who awarded the contract?

General Reybold. Yes.

205. General Grunert. It can go on ad infinitum, as far as he is concerned, if he believes that it is justified?

General Reybold. He could, but in some cases he may have to refer the contract to his higher echelon, the Division Engineer, or over to the Chief of Engineers for approval of these extensions.

206. General Grunert. What I am getting at is the picture, as you see it, just as well as the Board is trying to look at it. Almost a year had gone by from the time they started the Air Warning Service over there, and to complete these stations a lot of construction had to take place, a lot of material had to be furnished. Then came along, in June, definite contracts, and they were delayed and delayed or revised until the attack on Pearl Harbor. The Board must find the facts in the case and must render a report on who is responsible for these delays. Were they acts of God? Were they created by man, or what? So far as you know, the Chief of Engineers Office had no control over those delays?

General Reybold. No, except that a report may have [615] reached our office to give help.
207. General Grunert. The only report you received to give help was that one of June 11; and you gave such help as you could under the circumstances?

General Reybold. Yes. There may be others in our records, but I cannot tell you until our search is more complete.

208. General Grunert. I wish that search would be as complete as possible, because I think a great deal depends on whether or not those who were on the ground and howled to be given help could have done something themselves.

209. General Frank. The establishment of priorities might have had some very potent effects on this construction. Is that correct?

General Reybold. Yes. But if I may say this to the Board, upon the conclusion of the Board’s detailed investigation in the field you may be able to pick up some leads that would be beneficial to us in running down what we did do over here in response to certain requests that perhaps we will not find in our records.

210. General Grunert. General Short in his testimony referred to a message he sent to the Adjutant General complaining about this fifteen weeks’ delay before he could get any cable over there; and so the action taken here to help in that particular instance ought to be pretty well traced if we can possibly do it.

What is this system of priorities? Will you explain to the Board the system of priorities and who makes them and who can change them so that you could get something done more quickly and get things done in the time in which they ought to be done?

211. General Grunert. Priority on materials, priority on shipping, priority on raw materials, or what?

General Reybold. Mostly on manufactured goods.

212. General Grunert. If it were a question of cable, what would that mean?

General Reybold. That would mean that perhaps the Navy was in for a vast quantity of cable, that the Maritime Commission might be in for a vast quantity of cable, and the Signal Corps might be in for a vast quantity of cable.

213. General Grunert. At that time, if that were the case, and he asked for priorities, say, on getting cable, whose business was it to represent to the Army and Navy Munitions Board the urgency of sending that cable to the District Engineer over there so he could satisfy the Commanding General?

General Reybold. In the first place, the Commanding General over there would make his request, and it was up to us to transmit that right over to the War Department, which we did promptly, and get it before the Army and Navy Munitions Board; and probably some of our people over there appeared in person to try to get it.

214. General Grunert. Presumably it was done because you changed the priority?
General Reybold. Yes.

215. General Grunert. Was there any follow-up on this?
General Reybold. I cannot say at the moment.

216. General Grunert. You do not know whether he complained again or whether your office on its own hook followed up to see whether or not what you had arranged had actually been acceded to?
General Reybold. I am certain of a follow-up in our office, because that is one thing that we do pay particular attention to.

217. General Grunert. Suppose this priority is granted: Who determines whether or not there is shipping space to get the cable to him? Where does that come in?
General Reybold. Through the Transportation Corps.

218. General Grunert. They had their priority question?
General Reybold. In that particular case I think General Hannum, our Division Engineer out there, did a mighty good job. He was right behind all those shipments, and I might say also in representing Wyman in this country in procurement of materials needed for that vast job over there.

219. General Grunert. If you as an engineer had been in Wyman's shoes over there and had a job to do—I as Commanding General and you as District Engineer. Suppose I should say, "Here, Reybold, I have got to get those stations in. My whole plan depends on it. I have got to get them in in a hurry. You have the contracts." What could you do or what would you have done to put those things through?

[618] General Reybold. I certainly would have prepared a telegram for the signature of the Commanding General to the War Department with all the power I could put behind it.

220. General Grunert. And if you did not get action you would do it again?
General Reybold. Yes.

221. General Grunert. Until you were told to stop?
General Reybold. That is right.

222. General Russell. Suppose you had a different sort of engineer out there, a go-getter type, who thinks that the Commanding General doesn't know what it is all about, anyway, and he doesn't follow up. What could the Commanding General do about it?
General Reybold. What I would do would be to report him over here to the Chief of Staff and have him kicked out of there.

223. General Russell. Would you go over to the War Department?
General Reybold. Yes. Any Department Commander who sent anything to me and said, "You have a District Engineer who is not playing the game with me,"—he would be out of there on the next boat, as far as I am concerned.

224. General Russell. You have made rather a careful search and you have not found one line from Wyman about any other delays out there?
General Reybold. We have not found anything here so far. Hannum was doing everything in the world for Lyman at that time. I do not know about telephone calls.

225. General Grunert. Right on that line: You referred to Wyman as a go-getter. Go-getters usually take the sort of [619] action that you say you think you would take. Why, then, all these delays?
Can you put your finger on why there was a delay at least from June
to December? Have you tried to analyze that in your own mind as
to what caused these delays, priorities, materials, conniving, or what?

General Reybold. I think a combination of factors, General. I am
only giving my opinion, because I have tried to wade into this the same
as you gentlemen have. But I think one of the great delays was inde-
cision as to location, indecision as to how many of these air warning
stations should be adopted in their program.

226. General Grunert. Who makes that decision?

General Reybold. I should think all the planning was done by the
Commanding General and his Department Engineer. He had a De-
partment Engineer. They did the planning; also G-4.

227. General Grunert. The Commanding General would have to
approve those plans and any changes in them before they were ever
adopted as a job order?

General Reybold. All that planning would come up to a certain
point, and when concluded it would be turned over to the District En-
gineer, who was Wyman. If all I hear about Wyman is true—and I
know very little about Wyman personally; I had never served with
him; but all through the whole Corps of Engineers, if you wanted
somebody to go get somebody to do something, they would have selected
Wyman. He is a go-getter. How much his ears were knocked back
by the high command over there I do not know; but I do not think
there is anybody that can knock his ears back if he has materials in
there to do a job.

[620] 228. General Grunert. Then he was really selected for
this job because of that reputation? Is that the reason he was
selected for successive large construction jobs that involved go-getters
to get things done?

[621] General Reybold. He was, in connection with the Fort
Peck dam. Now, whether he was sent to Hawaii for that purpose, I am
inclined to think that he was due for foreign service and was sent to
Hawaii under the old "foreign service plan."

229. General Russell. Is there any evidence in your records indicat-
ing that this delay could in any way be attributed to slow operations on
the part of the contractor?

General Reybold. No, sir.

230. General Russell. There is no evidence, therefore, that indicates
that he "drug his feet" at all?

General Reybold. No, sir.

231. General Russell. In the event he was operating rather slowly,
do you think the fact that Wyman may have been under some sort of
obligation to the contractor because of extensive entertainment might
have prevented Wyman from "pinning back the ears" of that con-
tractor?

General Reybold. Oh, I would doubt that! I think Wyman is the
type of man that would really "kick anybody down" to accomplish his
mission of construction work.

232. General Russell. Notwithstanding the fact that he may have
been on a liquor party with a man whose "ears" he was going to "pin
back," for three or four days prior to that?

General Reybold. Absolutely.

233. General Russell. It would have no effect on him, at all?
General Reybold. No, sir; I do not think it would have a bit of effect on him.

234. General Russell. And yet you have never served with Wyman?
General Reybold. I have never served with him.

235. General Russell. And all of your opinion of Wyman has been [623] formed on these reports about his disposition as a "go-getter"?
General Reybold. That is correct; by very reliable officers in the Corps of Engineers.

236. General Russell. Let us go back to the time you made your basic contract in December 1940. Were you furnished at that time with any plan by the tactical command out there as to what they wanted done with respect to an air warning service? I do not care to go into the details of the plan. I am attempting to find out if the tactical people gave you a plan in 1940.
General Reybold. Only from hearsay. Have you had Colonel Fleming before the Board?

General Reybold. Have you listed him?

238. General Frank. Yes.
General Reybold. I would judge that he would give you a very good explanation.

239. General Russell. Was or not this establishment of an air warning service out there an integral part of the job that these people were employed to do?
General Reybold. Yes, indeed! This is incorporated right in the contract, isn't it?

240. General Russell. Can you tell us how much of these funds that were being allotted for your Hawaiian Department contract were going to be expended on this air-warning-service installation?
General Reybold. I couldn't tell you, unless they came in [623] with a separate project, for approval.

241. General Russell. The point I make is this, General—that the engineers in the Chief of Engineers' office did not make the contract and agree to pay that man an approximate sum of money for an air-warning service, unless you knew something about the nature of the service, did you?

General Reybold. That's correct. The original contract on that must be based on some sort of estimate; otherwise you couldn't determine his fixed fee.

242. General Russell. And that estimate was based on a plan for the establishment of an air-warning service?

General Reybold. Unquestionably, as one of the items.

243. General Russell. Do you know how much of a change occurred in that plan between that date and June?
General Reybold. No, sir.

244. General Russell. And yet you testify that in your opinion the change in the plan by the tactical command was the prime factor in working delay out there?
General Reybold. No, I didn't testify definitely.

245. General Russell. I will ask two or three more questions along this line. General, you do not know now how many changes occurred on the part of the tactical commander between December 1940 and June 1941, as to the establishment of this air-warning service?
General Reybold. No.
246. General Russell. That would be a matter of record entirely?
General Reybold. I would think so, yes.
247. General Russell. And the facts would have to be obtained elsewhere?

248. General Russell. But when you let your initial contract in December 1940, it was based on a definite plan for the establishment of an air-warning service out in Hawaii?
General Reybold. That is correct.
249. General Russell. And therefore the tactical people, who had been in there before, had worked out a plan for that system, and it was in existence in December 1940?
General Reybold. Must have been; yes,
250. General Russell. And there is, in the Engineer's office, in Honolulu, a record of all of these changes that had been proposed by the tactical commander between 1940 and the date of the completion of the air-warning service?
General Reybold. Must be.
251. General Russell. And we can get that out there?
General Reybold. That's correct, sir.
252. General Russell. And so far as you know, that is the only place?
General Reybold. That is correct.
253. General Russell. You referred to the mobile stations, a moment ago, and it is your opinion that the engineers had something to do with the construction of those stations?
General Reybold. I think we would have built the shelters and roads into the stations, of course.
254. General Russell. Whatever the causes may have been, General, not one of these fixed or permanent stations in connection with the air-warning service had been completed on December 7, 1941?
General Reybold. That's correct, although the report [625] that we had from the field indicated that one of those stations was fairly well completed on November 30.
255. General Grunert. If not complete, could they have been operated, do you know?
General Reybold. I don't know.
256. General Russell. I was going to ask this question in connection with that same thought: If they had not been completed, the engineer people or the contracting people were there, engaged in completing it?
General Reybold. I can't answer that question.
257. General Russell. Isn't it true that the tactical commander would have been prevented from moving in and taking over those installations and beginning their operation, until the work had been completed and had been approved and accepted by the engineers?
General Reybold. That isn't true in all instances, General, because we have now in our program, and even during the big program in this country, what we term "beneficial occupancy," when the using agencies did move in prior to positive, absolute, 100% completion.
258. General Russell. You do not know whether this system of "beneficial occupancy," was in effect as respects those permanent radar stations in Hawaii on the 7th of December, 1941?
General REYBOLD. I do not.

259. General RUSSELL. Is there anywhere that we could determine whether or not negotiations for that “beneficial occupancy” had been initiated, and the result thereof?

General REYBOLD. Only on the ground, in Hawaii.

260. General RUSSELL. I think we have discussed quite freely [636] with you the opinion which you have of Wyman, and the sources from which you got your information on which to base that opinion. Now, General, you testified rather vigorously a while ago as to his efficiency out there in Hawaii. Was that opinion of Wyman changed in any way by virtue of Hunt’s report?

General REYBOLD. I really couldn’t say. I glanced over that report, General, but I would have to go back and read it. I really don’t know. I suppose that assisted him in the formulation of his judgment that never again should this man be placed on a big job of construction and responsibility where he is dealing with contractors.

261. General RUSSELL. You were charged then with the responsibility of arriving at a conclusion about whether or not you would take him off that sort of work, were you not?

General REYBOLD. When I got Hunt’s report?

262. General RUSSELL. Yes.

General REYBOLD. I had him off before that, I think.

263. General RUSSELL. What had happened, General, that made you change your opinion of Wyman as an outstanding “go getter,” especially fitted for the big stuff out in Hawaii, taking him off and sending him to a service regiment? What were your mental processes?

General REYBOLD. My mental processes were, even though he is a “go-getter,” he just makes too damned much trouble for me to be bothered with that kind of people. I can find other people who don’t make all that kind of mess, who will go and do a job. Now, that’s the whole thing, in a nutshell.

264. General RUSSELL. Let us sum it up: He could do his job, but he carried a mess along with it?

[627] General REYBOLD. That’s right.

265. General RUSSELL. And you wanted somebody who would do the job and leave the mess at home?

General REYBOLD. That’s right.

266. General RUSSELL. So you put him in the service regiment? Now, what would be your definition of the “mess” that he made?

General REYBOLD. Oh, complaints—complaints from his subordinates—and of course these things that have come up in connection with this contract—that’s enough for me. I said the man is indiscreet, and I would say that he is exceedingly indiscreet in his dealings with contractors who are doing work for the Government, if it all be true—“if it all be true.”

267. General RUSSELL. You believed in the reality of those charges or the truthfulness of those charges to the extent that you decided to relieve him from that sort of work, didn’t you?

General REYBOLD. Yes, sir.

268. General FRANK. I would like to ask a question, there. You are his direct superior?

General REYBOLD. That’s right.
269. General Frank. In the face of all this indiscretion, have you ever had it investigated, as his superior, with a view to determining whether or not he should be disciplined?

General Reybold. That’s the reason I sent Hunt up there, or asked the Inspector General to send an inspector up there.

270. General Frank. If that be the case, then why were not Hunt’s conclusions pursued more vigorously and more intimately?

General Reybold. There was nothing in Hunt’s recommendation, to my knowledge, that this man should be brought to trial, or anything.

[628]

271. General Russell. I have no more questions.

272. General Grunert. I have a few questions to clear up, here. Are delays such as appear to have occurred in these contracts in Hawaii normal under a fixed-fee contract? In other words, do a lot of these contracts hang over, change, and one thing and another, so that when you figure on something’s being done in about three months it usually takes about six or nine?

General Reybold. No, sir; that’s not common.

273. General Grunert. That is not common?

General Reybold. No, sir.

274. General Grunert. The causes that you stated that might have caused delay, here, are those causes common to contracts, as a rule—priorities, and inclement weather, and those that you enumerated? Are those particular to that Hawaiian bunch of contracts?

General Reybold. They may apply, of course, anywhere, but I think that that group of generalities mentioned by me on more than one occasion this morning might well bear further investigation to get down to some of the details. Any contractor on a job, or we in preparing our plans and specifications and our estimates, and the time of completion, of course, take into consideration weather conditions. If you start a job, in other words, in a northern territory in November, you know that you are going to get into difficulties of weather, but if you start to build in northern New York in May, you have the season ahead of you and you know your weather pretty well.

275. General Grunert. Usually in making an estimate of the situation, which is true about your estimate of the date of completion of the contract, do not the experienced engineers [629] take that into consideration? They make estimates, and then they have to reestimate, and sometimes do it a third time? Is that normal in a series of contracts, or is that quite abnormal?

General Reybold. It is abnormal, and every contract, in the conduct of its prosecution, would have to be considered on its own merits, and even every one of these job-orders that you have under consideration here will have to be considered on its own merits.

276. General Grunert. When it gets to the place where a district engineer doesn’t think his contractors are coming across, can he not abrogate that contract, can he not give it to somebody else, and get the job done?

General Reybold. Yes, sir; yes, sir.

277. General Grunert. And none of that was done in this case, apparently?

General Reybold. I don’t know whether it was or not. I doubt it.

278. General Grunert. I do not know of any. We have not gone
into it thoroughly yet, but I do not know of any case where they say, "You haven't done this job; we give it to somebody else"; but that is done, not infrequently, is it?

General REYBOLD. Oh, it is very seldom that we have to come to that; once in a while.

279. General GRUNERT. What conditions require or demand that, or you do take it out of their hands and do it yourself, or get somebody else to contract?

General REYBOLD. A breach of contract, or a man who doesn't progress, doesn't show that he has made any [630] effort to progress, he hasn't brought any additional equipment on, as required or as requested by us, and we have played along with him and tried to be square — then we notify him that he is done, or that if he isn't going to come across within 30 days we are going to take his contract away from him.

280. General GRUNERT. Then it is usually a question of good will and intent, to a great extent?

General REYBOLD. Yes, sir.

281. General GRUNERT. I think Wyman was decorated with some sort of decoration. Was that done through your office? If so, for what reason?

General REYBOLD. That was done on the recommendation of General Hannum, and I think it was for his work in relation to the construction of those "stepping-stone" airfields, if I remember correctly. We have a record on that.

282. General GRUNERT. You mean that would be beyond Hawaii?

General REYBOLD. Yes, sir.

283. General GRUNERT. On the way out to the Far East?

General REYBOLD. Yes, sir.

284. General GRUNERT. He was given what — the Legion of Honor, or the Legion of Merit?

General REYBOLD. He was given a Distinguished Service Medal. I will check on that. Maybe you would like to have the citation, General, and the recommendation upon which it was based, for your record.

285. General FRANK. Yes.

286. General GRUNERT. Together with the time it was actually recommended.

287. General FRANK. Yes — and the time it was awarded.

[631] 288. General GRUNERT. One more question. I think it will probably be of value in checking. This Advisory Committee that investigates contracts and one thing and another — is there a chairman of that Advisory Committee, and do you recall who was Chairman?

General REYBOLD. We can find that out.

289. General FRANK. I want the name of the one single individual who is best qualified to give us information on what went on in the Contract Advisory Committee in the fall of 1940. Can you give us that name, now?

General REYBOLD. Will you let me find out? I know what you want.

290. General FRANK. You will advise us with respect to that name?

General REYBOLD. I will.

291. General GRUNERT. Are there any other questions?
292. General Frank. You called this contract a “cost-plus-fixed-fee” contract?

General Reybold. That is right.

293. General Frank. And in this type of contract there usually is no penalty clause?

General Reybold. No, there is no penalty clause.

294. General Frank. In a fixed contract, there is a penalty clause, as a rule, in which event, if the contract is not finished on time, through the fault of the contractor, he pays a penalty?

General Reybold. That is correct.

295. General Frank. That is one of the disadvantages of this type of contract, is it not?

General Reybold. It is; but I doubt whether you could ever have gotten anybody to go over there on a lump-sum basis, with so many unknowns attached to a contract, and get it under way. There was no other way in God’s world of prosecuting a contract such as this, except under this cost-plus-a-fixed-fee basis.

296. General Frank. Who presented the case of the War Department to the Priorities Board in order to get a high priority for material for the War Department?

General Reybold. We will have to furnish that information later, General.

297. General Frank. What I am after is this: How was its strategical urgency represented to the Priorities Board?

General Reybold. I couldn't answer that, unless these individual—I cannot answer that question.

298. General Frank. This thought enters into this situation: it is, that here was a highly important strategical project that was not finished in time, so that the permanent aircraft warning service was effective on December 7. It is possibly conceivable that direct responsibility can be traced back to the failure to give sufficiently high priority to the materiel going into that project, is it not?

General Reybold. It is possible.

299. General Frank. Therefore, the details following through to the conclusion of that priority’s being established is something in which we are interested, do you see?

General Reybold. Yes, indeed; and I would suggest that the records of our Division Office at San Francisco, and Colonel Hannum, be consulted very freely in those matters, particularly in connection with shipping facilities to Hawaii at that time.

300. General Frank. Another thing on which I would like to ask you to make a record is to give us as complete a list as possible from your point of view of possible reasons of delays that contributed to the delay in finishing this work at Hawaii.

General Reybold. You want that for the record, or just possible delays that we might think of, over in our office?

301. General Frank. I would like to have you, within the next day or two, send us a written statement of those, will you please?

General Reybold. I would be glad to do so, and that will relate also to our Division Office?

302. General Frank. Yes.

General Reybold. In San Francisco?

303. General Frank. Yes.
What do you know about disciplinary action of Wyman as the result of the Dawson Creek explosion? Are you familiar with that?

General REYBOLD. I am familiar with it to the extent that there was an explosion. It might be well to have General Worsham of our present office over here, who was in command.

304. General GRUNERT. He was your District Engineer in charge?

General REYBOLD. He was the District Engineer, at that time.

305. General FRANK. Do you know whether or not there was any disciplinary action taken against Wyman?

General REYBOLD. Not to my knowledge.

306. General FRANK. That is what I am interested in.

General REYBOLD. There is a report. Somebody certainly made a report on that thing, whether it was our fire-fighting people or whether it was the Provost Marshal General, or the FBI, or what went up there. It was on Canadian territory.

307. General FRANK. You would have a report of disciplinary action under the 104th Article of War, would you not?

General REYBOLD. Oh, yes.

308. General FRANK. By and large—and I have brought this out before, in testimony—the general system of information with respect to personnel, activities, G–2 information, and so forth, as it relates to contracts, is not so clean-cut, would you say?

General REYBOLD. It is not.

309. General FRANK. I have nothing further.

310. General GRUNERT. General Russell?

311. General RUSSELL. No.

312. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much, General. We took quite a bit of your time.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

General GRUNERT. The Board will recess until 2 o'clock.

(Thereupon, at 1 o'clock p. m., a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p. m.)

[635]

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Board at 2 o'clock p. m. continued the hearing of witnesses.)

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL JULIAN L. SCHLEY, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The witness was sworn by the recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

General SCHLEY. Julian L. Schley, Major General, United States Army, Retired; called back to active service. My address is 8881 Department of Commerce Building, Washington, D. C.

2. General GRUNERT. General, the Board is after facts and, in view of the position held by you leading up to and during the Pearl Harbor attack, we hope that you have some facts that will help us to get down to the bottom of the real picture and throw some light
on the subject. It is a large field that we have to cover, and we have a limited time in which to cover it. So we have parcelled out the special investigation fields to members of the Board. The entire Board will pass on everything for each field, but one member is particularly looking after certain lines. So General Frank will prod the questions at this time and General Russell and I will interject when we think something needs elaboration.

3. General Frank. On what duty were you in December, 1940?

General Schley. I was Chief of Engineers, United States Army.

4. General Frank. When did your tour in that job start and end?

General Schley. It started about September of 1937 and [636] ended, so far as my official duties were concerned, on September 8, 1941, when I entered on a leave of absence.

5. General Frank. What were your responsibilities with respect to contracts which were entered into by the personnel of the Corps of Engineers?

General Schley. In a normal case, in normal times, I was the last authority which signed contracts when they came to me for signature. Some of them did and some did not. In the case, however, of those which pertained to cost-plus-a-fee which the office had entered into in considerable quantities in the latter part of 1940, because of the amount of work then in progress, I signed the papers, but they had to be reviewed and signed again as final authority by the Under Secretary of War. The difference between the ordinary contract and these cost-plus-a-fee contracts I will be glad to explain if you are interested.

6. General Grunert. Yes; I would like to hear your explanation.

General Schley. The usual method of our entering into contracts for ordinary work is to advertise for bids, which is common in all government work, and to award the bid to the lowest responsible bidder. That is the usual government system and it is well adapted to our government. It gives all contractors opportunity and prevents partiality as well as giving opportunity. For two reasons that is not applicable under some conditions. Those two reasons generally are that if the specifications and drawings are not complete and, therefore, what you are advertising for bids on is not definite, then a cost-plus-a-fee contract will allow you to start work right away, and the designing merely goes along with the work. The second reason for resorting to that is the failure of contractors to meet [637] competition. Both of those were true in the emergency period of our building, because there were hardly enough contractors so that the competition was not real competition. Also, we were starting construction at the earliest possible time. So, for both those reasons the United States turned to cost-plus-a-fee contracts, and that was the system which was rather closely held in hand by the Under Secretary of War who gave directions as to how it would be proceeded with.

7. General Grunert. Then the latter class, the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee, would appear to get the quickest action and it would be more flexible; is that right?

General Schley. Yes. A cost-plus-a-fee contract is almost like a government representative doing the work himself. He uses the contractor's personnel and his labor and his plant as he sees fit to use it.
In the firm bid contract form in open competition there are two particular things the contractor bids on. After he reads and fully understands the specifications and the terms of the proposed contract he bids on the cost he is willing to be paid for doing the work; second, the time at which it will be done. That time is often stated in the contract. He therefore binds himself to do those two things; finish at the date set and to be paid this fixed amount of money. In order to do that he must know very definitely the work to be done.

8. General GRUNERT. Would the straight contract as distinguished from the cost-plus-a-fee not encourage more responsible bidders, more reliable firms, to carry it out than the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee?

General SCHLEY. No. I think that that is not true. In fact, I would not say the opposite is true, but there is a tendency in that direction. The private owner of property seldom advertises broadly for bids, because he only wants to consider contractors of reputation whom he knows or about whom he can get information. He might ask selected ones to bid against each other. Irresponsible men often bid, and the government has to determine which man is responsible. So you do not necessarily get a better man by competition. You often get a man who has not the plant, who has not the knowledge or the financial responsibility. You have got to guard against awarding it to him, to the low man who has those characteristics. When you have a cost-plus-a-fee bid you must have some very good system of preventing the contract being given at the end to a poor contractor.

9. General GRUNERT. Under which system do you get more knowledge of the contractor; or are they about equal in that respect?

General SCHLEY. I do not know that I would say there is much difference there. You do not offer it to the man who is a poor contractor.

10. General FRANK. On the other hand, in a fixed-fee contract you generally have a penalty clause?

General SCHLEY. For time.

11. General FRANK. In the cost-plus contract you have no penalty clause?

General SCHLEY. That is correct.

12. General FRANK. Therefore you have something very definite to which to hold the man in the fixed-fee contract?

General SCHLEY. Yes. And if you have all your specifications and drawings made so that what you are advertising to be done is very definite, and you have real competition among the bidders, that is the normal way and the best way, all things considered.

13. General FRANK. Are you familiar with the negotiations for the basic contract which is designated by W-414-Eng-602 dated 20 December, 1940, which was the basic contract for the construction of defense projects in the Hawaiian Islands with the Hawaiian Constructors for defense projects in Hawaii?

General SCHLEY. I am familiar with only what the records show in the office of the Chief of Engineers, because I do not remember the contract specifically, personally. I had occasion to examine the records when the Military Affairs Committee was looking into the matter about four months ago, so that I am now fairly familiar with the contract and what the record shows as to the steps leading up to it.
14. General Frank. Could you give us your background on that? General Schley. I have some notes on the subject which came from the records in the office of the Chief of Engineers which I will refer to.

15. General Frank. You were Chief of Engineers at the time, were you not?
General Schley. That is correct.

16. General Frank. And this contract came to you for approval?
General Schley. It came to me for approval or, you might say, for recommendation to the Under Secretary of War for his approval.

17. General Frank. After you signed it, it then went on up to the Under Secretary of War who, in turn, approved it?
General Schley. That is correct.

18. General Frank. Will you proceed, then, with your discussion of the contract?

[640] General Schley. I might preface this by saying that in my department the selection of the contracting firm originally was done in the field by the District Engineer, and we attempted to keep that practice, and all during the time I was in the office we felt that our men in the field, who had certain districts to work in and who had been in there for some time, knew the contractors in that area. Therefore, the recommendation initially came in from the District Engineer recommending that a certain contractor be given a certain award, a certain contract. However, we had to get permission first to use the cost-plus-a-fee system. The records show that application for approval of a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee form of construction contract was submitted on the 14th of December, 1940, by Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., who was at that time District Engineer of the Hawaiian District, and it was forwarded by first endorsement the same day from the Division Engineer, Colonel J. G. Matheson, Engineer, United States Army.

If you do not know the organization, I will be glad to explain the districts and divisions.

There were 40-odd districts into which the country was divided, and again grouped into about 11 engineer divisions.

19. General Frank. Where was Wyman?
General Schley. In Honolulu.

20. General Frank. Where was Matheson?
General Schley. In San Francisco.

21. General Frank. How did that contract get Wyman's and Matheson's signature on the same day?
General Schley. Evidently they were together on that date in conference, or otherwise; I do not know. My record here does not show whether that was in San Francisco or not that the two [641] were together.

That organization was one of our permanent organizations, because the Corps of Engineers has public works to do, which are civil engineering construction, as well as some military construction. At this stage we were in process of taking over additional construction. We had had only sea-coast fortifications, and at this time we had been given fairly recently construction at Air Corps stations in addition, and we were in process of taking that over from the Quartermaster.

22. General Frank. You were given the construction of other than Air Corps stations, were you not?
General Schley. Not until about eight months later, I think. On December 18 a letter to the Assistant Secretary of War was written by Lieutenant Colonel Earl E. Gesler, Corps of Engineers, Finance Section, in the office of the Chief of Engineers, requesting authority for use of the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee form of contract. This was approved by the Under Secretary of War by first endorsement December 20, 1940, stating that the Secretary of War had determined that it was necessary to enter into a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract for construction and gave authority to enter into negotiations, the contractor selected and the contractor's fee being subject to approval by the Under Secretary of War.

General Frank. May we have a copy of that submitted to us for our record?

General Schley. Those are in the office of the Chief of Engineers which I have no connection with.

I might explain at that point that there were two features which the Under Secretary of War watched particularly in the case of these contracts. The first, for very evident reasons, was the contracting firms which we selected; and one of the things, of course, which he watched was to see that we used impartiality and used what he called local contractors. For instance, for work in Baltimore, if possible the contract would be awarded to a Maryland contractor.

Second, it was to see that the fixed fee was not excessive. He did not want the fees to climb to unreasonable figures.

On December 26, 1940, Colonel Gesler sent a memorandum to me, General Schley, Chief of Engineers, and copy of contract dated December 20 between the United States and The Hawaiian Constructors.

On December 28 Colonel Gesler sent a memorandum to Commissioner Knudson requesting clearance for the award of contract M-414-902. This was approved by Commissioner Knudson on December 30, 1940.

On December 28 Colonel Gesler sent a letter to the Under Secretary of War transmitting the contract and giving certain information concerning it. This was approved by Mr. Patterson, Under Secretary, under date of January 3, 1941, subject to my signing the contract.

24. General Frank. That is the history of the contract?

General Schley. Yes.

25. General Russell. General, you said that the Under Secretary of War insisted on a local contractor, where possible, being given the contract. Was that the sole limitation imposed upon the Division Engineer in proposing the contractor or group of contractors for a specified job?

General Schley. No; I would say that the contractor had to be otherwise acceptable.

26. General Russell. Let us assume that the contractor, whose name was submitted to the War Department, was otherwise acceptable and was also a local contractor. Then the discretion of the Division Engineer in making the selection was rather broad?

General Schley. Of course, his selection was only a recommendation. He did the original selecting and that was subject thereafter to review by all the agencies which reviewed it. In this case it was Mr. Knudson's office and, later, our office and, later, the Under Secretary of War's office.
27. General Russell. As a matter of fact, General, for that recommendation to have been disapproved it would have been necessary for one or more of the reviewing authorities to have established some factual basis for disapproving the recommendation?

General Schley. Yes. Yet, I can tell you what the practice was, perhaps at that time, certainly later. When Mr. Knudson's office was taken by another office it was called the Construction Advisory Board. It was located in the Quartermaster General's office. It must have been established at a later time, because Knudson originally had the authority, and later it was this board. At the time this board was functioning I happen to remember they built up what you might call a panel of acceptable contractors in reputation, through good work they had done or through recommendations of responsible people.

28. General Russell. Let me approach my question, then, from the other side. What effect, if any, did the recommendation of a contractor by the Division Engineer have?

General Schley. First the district and then reviewed by the Division Engineer.

29. General Russell. I am talking about the Division Engineer.

General Schley. I would say that outside of a place like [644] the Hawaiian Islands, where probably the number of contractors is limited, I assume that in a State his judgment would be pretty sound. At least, I would so consider it in my office. Presumably he knew and was dealing with men he knew the reputation of. There, of course, conditions are different because it is a smaller place and there are fewer contractors to select from.

30. General Russell. Then would it be an accurate generalization to say that the recommendation of the District Engineer was presumptively sound and must be overcome by the introduction of some factual situation?

General Schley. I would not say there is a presumption in that case, because if our office knew nothing at all about the man we would write back and say, "Tell us more about it."

31. General Russell. Did your office place upon the District Engineer the burden of showing that the man or the firm that he had recommended was capable of carrying out the contract?

General Schley. I would say that the recommendation initially would cause him to assume that obligation initially.

32. General Grunert. How many District Engineers have you ever turned down on a recommended contractor?

General Schley. That is something I cannot say.

33. General Grunert. From your memory were there many or were there any?

General Schley. We have had very few such up to this period of time. Yes; I can say we have.

34. General Frank. You have what?

General Schley. We have turned down men recommended by District Engineers.

35. General Grunert. Has the Under Secretary of War turned [645] you down on any of your recommendations?

General Schley. I would say that he had, definitely, and also this Advisory Board.

36. General Grunert. On what ground?
General Schley. Often it was because he felt that there was a contractor in the State, when we had selected one outside the State, feeling that there was no available one in the State.

Another case was where the Advisory Board set up by the Quartermaster General's office would come back itself if they did not have the contractor on the list.

37. General Grunert. Suppose a contractor was recommended and they had no information on him; they did not have him on their approved list: Who would do what in the line of finding out whether he was any good and whether or not he should be given any contract?

General Schley. This Advisory Board—naturally I remember more cases because it was in effect longer—called on our office and said, "This contractor is not on our list"; and the obligation was on us to show that it was a proper award to make.

38. General Russell. Generally, if a contractor was well located geographically, and on the list, the District Engineer approved him or you would approve him?

General Schley. Yes; and sometimes we found if he was on the Board's list before we approved. Sometimes I will say that a name would come in that we did not know ourselves in our office; we had no record of it. We would go over to the Board and say, "Is this contractor on your list?" They would say, "Yes, he is on our list." And we would recommend him if he was recommended by the district and the division and the board said he was a good man.

[646] 39. General Frank. Do you know anything about the availability of contractors for work in Hawaii at the time this contract was let?

General Schley. The contractors resident there?

40. General Frank. Yes.

General Schley. I do not.

41. General Frank. Contractors resident there or contractors from the United States who had offices and organizations there?

General Schley. No, sir; I do not.

42. General Frank. Do you know whether or not there were sufficient contractors on the spot in Honolulu to handle this situation?

General Schley. No, I do not.

43. General Frank. Do you know how the particular list of contractors who comprised The Hawaiian Constructors was determined?

General Schley. No; I do not.

44. General Frank. This was done while you were Chief of Engineers?

General Schley. That is correct.

45. General Frank. On whom did you depend to determine these details?

General Schley. The District Engineer in the field, in the first instance; the Division Engineer, who was his next superior, in the second instance.

46. General Frank. Who was that?

General Schley. In this case, J. G. Matheson, of San Francisco.

47. General Frank. And Wyman was the District Engineer in Honolulu?

General Schley. Yes. Third, I looked directly to the man in charge of the branch in my office which handled this work.
His name was Brigadier General Thomas M. Robins. He, in turn, was held responsible for all of our construction work along this particular line; that is, the awarding part of it and the drafting of the contracts. Lieutenant Colonel Earl E. Gesler, whose name I have given you before——

48. General Frank. He was the finance man?

General Schley. The finance man and contract man in the office. He, in turn, had Major James B. Newman, Jr., since he had other forms of contract than this, in charge for him in that part of his office. He was succeeded on June 4, 1941, by another man whose name I can give you if you want it.

49. General Frank. Therefore the chain of events went from Newman to Gesler to Robins to you?

General Schley. And Robins had this man working on it.

50. General Frank. And then down on the other side to Matheson to Wyman?

General Schley. I do not understand that step.

51. General Frank. To the division to the district?

General Schley. For the command function?

52. General Frank. Yes.

General Schley. The command function was from me or Robins, who was my assistant, to Matheson to Wyman; that is correct.

53. General Frank. Were you at that time aware that there was a contractor being considered by the name of Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

General Schley. No; I was not.

54. General Frank. Did you ever hear of the firm of Rohl & Connolly?

General Schley. No, sir.

I might add, if it is of interest to you, that I know the other two firms, Gunther-Shirley Company and Callahan Company.

55. General Frank. Were you familiar with the name of McKee?

General Schley. McKee? I do not know that name.

56. General Frank. Robert McKee Company?

General Schley. No.

57. General Frank. Since you were not aware of the existence of one Hans Wilhelm Rohl it naturally follows that you did not know that he was a German agent. Was it the responsibility of the contracting officer, Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., who was also the District Engineer, to check as to whether or not a contractor was a citizen of the United States?

General Schley. I do not know that there was anything in the written instructions so requiring, but I would assume that he would make recommendations for a contractor considering his qualifications in all regards. I would assume that he would not limit his consideration of the qualifications of the contractor in any regard.

58. General Frank. What was the status of the world at that time with respect to the conduct of war?

General Schley. Well, the stage of the war was such that France had fallen; and I do not remember just exactly beyond that point what the stage was. But that fixes it fairly well.

59. General Frank. Britain, France, and Germany were at war?

General Schley. Yes.
60. General Frank. Would you say that the United States at that time had very definite sympathies?

General Schley. By that you mean, public opinion as judged through the press?

61. General Frank. Yes.

General Schley. Yes; I think there is no question that we [649] had.

62. General Frank. Where were those sympathies?

General Schley. Those sympathies were with the Allied forces.

63. General Frank. With the war raging in Europe and with American sympathies being with the Allies, do you think it a smart move to consider a German agent a qualified contracting agent to handle American defense projects?

General Schley. I might say that all defense projects have that difficulty, which relate not only to the contractor but to the overseers, the superintendents, the foremen and the workmen. One of the very serious problems in our work in this country often was to have those confidential things such as plans, known to as few people as possible, and only to those that you could trust, if possible. So that it applies not only to the contractor; it applies to the foremen as well and almost to the workmen, because I assume that the best position for a man to get into is in one of these workmen’s jobs if he is seeking information.

In order to deal with that we have in many cases—I might say, in most cases—done the work by the form which we call hired labor, ourselves hiring the labor, instead of letting it out to contractors. So I would say that that question is everpresent in dealing with fortifications. It not only goes to the contractor but to the foremen, the superintendent and the workmen.

84. General Frank. Did the Corps of Engineers at that time have any policy with respect to this question?

General Schley. I would say that the policy has always been to have those things known to as few people as possible. [650] and to have responsible people connected with them in defense work.

65. General Frank. Was there any policy with respect to an alien being taken into confidence on a construction project?

General Schley. I do not remember in any written instructions anything which bears on the contractor himself or any of the employees, but I would say that it is generally understood that caution is to be exercised in keeping this secret information as confidential as possible.

66. General Frank. What was the date of the contract, again?

General Schley. December 20 was the date of the signing by the Secretary of War.

67. General Frank. Are you conversant with the espionage act of March 28, 1940?

General Schley. I do not know whether I know it by that name. Undoubtedly I do know it.

68. General Frank. Which forbade the hiring or the awarding to an alien of contracts?

General Schley. Yes.

69. General Frank. Was it the responsibility of the contract officer, Colonel Wyman, to check as to whether or not Rohl was a citizen?
General Schley. As to whether the law would require him to so report I do not know, but I would say that his natural requirement, outside of what the law may be, would be to look into things of that kind which might have an adverse effect on information being gotten abroad.

70. General Frank. There is a law, and there should be some method in any organization in carrying it out, a responsibility at the start, at a point of contact some place. If it did not [651] start with the award it should start at the determination of the responsibility for checking citizenship.

General Schley. I would say that the responsibility for enforcement of the law in our work starts in the field and starts with us; it starts with both ends. It is everywhere.

71. General Frank. Here is a specific instance. Where does the responsibility start to determine the citizenship of one Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

General Schley. In this case the question of responsibility would start with the man in the field, because he made the initial recommendation.

72. General Frank. And that was one Colonel Wyman?

General Schley. He made the recommendation from the field.

73. General Frank. Do you have any information concerning the failure of The Hawaiian Constructors to complete construction of the defense projects within the times and in the manner prescribed prior to the 7th of December, 1941, as required by the job orders?

General Schley. No; I have not. I attempted to make such a comparison, because the Military Affairs Committee of the House asked questions along that line. At that time only limited material was available. Some had been gotten from the Hawaiian Islands, but not all; some was found in the office of the Chief of Engineers here, bearing on the subject.

74. General Frank. Where would that information be available?

General Schley. I understand that all those job orders—and, by the way, I have now seen them all, but I have not seen all the progress reports—I understand that all those job orders were sent from the Hawaiian Islands to the Chief of Engineers' office in Washington, and I have seen them all, but I was unable [652] to tie them in to progress reports, because I could not get all the progress reports. I was able to see enough of it to get an idea of how the thing went, how it proceeded.

75. General Frank. The original information would be available in the office of the District Engineer, would it not?

General Schley. Yes. It ought to be of record now in the office of the Chief of Engineers, and I do not doubt that a group of men assigned to that investigation could unearth it. But here is one thing that I suggest you bear in mind, and that is that the contract being a cost-plus-a-fee contract, not only was the work to be done indefinite to commence with, but changes were made as the work progressed, many, many, many changes.

76. General Frank. The job orders will cover that, will they not?

General Schley. Yes. Additions to the work were naturally given priorities, either before or after something else. So I would say that whether a particular thing was pressed to completion, comparing its
priority with other work which was to be done, would depend on three things, as I have thought the thing through. The first is the importance placed on it by the contracting officer, Wyman, in connection with the whole job to be done; second, since it is defense work it is in a strategically important place. The third would be the availability of the material or plans to do the job.

77. General Frank. And, fourth, priorities on the equipment and transportation?

General Schley. Yes. But I was thinking only of the factual things. The thing must have relative importance in the mind of the man who is performing the work; that is, the District Engineer. So all those things probably have a bearing.

[653] And you must remember that whereas the original contract said 6 months the contractor specifically reserved protection against the local stand that the work was to be done in 6 months. I explained that to the Committee over and over again. You will find that the times of completion were advanced, and sometimes additional work was thrown in. Instead of one road there would be two roads. Instead of 1,700 feet of track it would be 3,600 feet of track. Therefore it is important to get the man who knows those things to see what influence they had, and also the people who knew what materials were available.

[654] 78. General Frank. What I am getting at is, the logical place in which to look for those where there is a greater number of people conversant with the details is in the office of the District Engineer in Honolulu now?

General Schley. I am not sure but what those records have been now sent here. I would search here first, and insofar as the personnel are concerned I think you will have to consult those who were in the Engineers at the time.

79. General Frank. Which includes?

General Schley. Colonel Wyman and his assistants.

80. General Frank. What is your knowledge in this connection especially concerning delays in constructing facilities for the air raid warning system and the underground gasoline storage tanks?

General Schley. I have no knowledge of that.

81. General Frank. What knowledge do you have concerning whether any military personnel neglected duties relating to the contract?

General Schley. I have none.

82. General Frank. You would not know whether they failed by not investigating properly, prior to the award of the contract, the loyalty of Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

General Schley. No, I do not.

83. General Frank. By not supervising properly the performance of the contractors' work?

General Schley. I do not.

84. General Frank. By not informing higher authority of delays and deficiencies?


85. General Frank. Did any complaints come in that came to your notice?
General Schley. None during the time I occupied the position, which was up until September 8th.

86. General Frank. To your knowledge, what information was given Colonel Wyman to complete these defense projects as speedily as possible?

General Schley. That I have no knowledge of.

87. General Frank. On December 20, 1940, you were the Chief of Engineers?

General Schley. That is correct.

88. General Frank. You have stated your responsibilities with respect to this contract previously in the testimony; did you not?

General Schley. The testimony here?

89. General Frank. Yes.

General Schley. I think so.

90. General Frank. Well, if not, will you state the function of your position with respect to the contract?

General Schley. I would say that I assumed responsibility when I signed it, and I would say that I had the responsibility of its execution, all of course as the head of a large organization which was carrying on the expenditure of vast sums of money, and presumably there would be brought to my attention the things which I needed to know which didn't normally come to my attention, and I made an effort to inspect a great deal of the work going on. I did not get to the Hawaiian Islands to inspect that work.

[656] 91. General Frank. Did you receive any communications from the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, or from Colonel Wyman requesting that you assist in speeding up materials for the work or assist in obtaining higher priority on materials for the work?

General Schley. No, but that does not mean that the Office of Chief of Engineers did not. Their records will have to be examined to determine that.

92. General Frank. What was the responsibility of the District Engineer, Colonel Wyman, to prod the contractors so that the work would proceed more rapidly?

General Schley. I would say that it was very great, much greater in the case of a cost-plus-fee contract than in the normal firm-price contract, because time is not stated as a part of the contract, and therefore it is up to him to drive the parts which need to be driven.

93. General Frank. Did you know on 20 December 1940 or at any time that Hans Wilhelm Rohl was then or had been under investigation by government agency for suspicious activities?

General Schley. No, I did not even know the name before this matter came up.

94. General Frank. What if any measures should have been taken by the personnel of the Corps of Engineers for the protection of the Government against contracting with a person having such a record?

General Schley. I do not know what that record is, and for that reason it is difficult for me to answer the hypothetical question, but I would say that we should know, [657] and so should the reviewing board know—who was particularly charged with that work of reviewing the contractors—they should all know that they were acceptable in all senses.
95. General Frank. This is a procedure that is not specified but which you leave to the good judgment of the District Engineer; is that correct?

General Schley. No, I am not sure that it is not specified. I do not recall specific instructions to the effect. I do not recall them at this time, and they may or may not have been in existence. If there were not, however, I would say that at this time there was an obligation to watch those things.

96. General Frank. If it were not picked up by the District Engineer, was there any general understanding that things like that should have been watched for and picked up by the Division Engineer?

General Schley. Not specifically. I would say that the entire review should have been made by everyone through whose hands these things passed and who recommended that the award be made. There were no different instructions to the District Engineer than to the Division Engineer. Instructions of that kind would be general.

97. General Frank. The placing of definite responsibility was rather loose, then?

General Schley. I would not say so, no. I say any such instructions are general rather than specific as to individuals. Now, in the Office of the Chief of Engineers I would say yes, there was a definite place for those things to be looked for.

98. General Frank. Where was that?

General Schley. I would say it is in this organization here [referring to papers].

99. General Frank. Was that in Newman's office under Robins?

General Schley. Yes, I would say that it is.

100. General Frank. Or is it under Gesler?

General Schley. Well, they all have exactly the same function, one reporting to the other: Newman initially, Gesler next, and Robins third and myself fourth.

101. General Frank. But you did not have any instructions how to pointedly look for this sort of thing?

General Schley. Well, that may have been. I cannot recall it. I do not recall it at this time.

102. General Frank. Do you not think that you would remember it, in view of this Rohl case, had a situation like that existed?

General Schley. You see, the Rohl case has been recounted to me only four months ago, so this is a brand-new thought. I had no idea of a Rohl case in those days when we were issuing instructions, so the two would not associate themselves naturally in my mind.

103. General Frank. Did you have any instructions in the Corps of Engineers with respect to discussing with an enemy alien details of a defense project?

General Schley. Well, I would say that such a thing would be entirely unnecessary. There may have been such instructions, but general instructions would cover any such matter as that.

104. General Frank. Army Regulations would cover that?

General Schley. Yes, and the fact that all those plans and all those specifications are marked at least "Restricted"; and, as I have told you a moment ago, it goes down much further [above] than the contractor himself. The foreman is a very dangerous man because he is one of many who are on the job.
105. General Grunert. How can a contractor intelligently bid on or prepare to execute a contract unless he knows about that contract? General Schley. Oh, he knows about the contract.

106. General Grunert. Well, do you not have to give him a certain amount of restricted information in order for him to intelligently bid or prepare himself? General Schley. I do not know what this man knew, but I would say—when I say “this man” I mean these men, because there were at least six members of the contracting firms. Those men need not have known, in order to accept this contract, anything more than was in the contract itself, I would say, because it is not a firm bid. They are not going to be paid that sum of money which you see in that contract, a million and-odd dollars. They are going to be paid on a scale of reimbursement to themselves plus a fee. The Government pays all costs, and in addition to that the contractor gets a fee. So this estimate in here is nothing but something to give the contractor an idea of the magnitude of the work and the amount of money he is going to get, because it is within a percent of that is the way you arrive at your fixed fee, a rough percent. So I would say that reading that contract alone, now a wise contractor wants usually to see the site. By that I mean he wants to see what the unloading facilities are at the place where his stuff is coming in; he wants to see what the local conditions with respect to labor are, whether labor is plentiful [660] or whether it is expensive. But that is in the firm bid. Many take much bigger chances on making a bid on cost plus a fee because all costs are paid by the Government, the materials bought or furnished by the Government, the labor rolls, pay rolls.

107. General Frank. Here in this contract is a fixed fee of $52,220. General Schley. I would say that is the only thing in the contract that is fixed.

108. General Frank. What is the theory of putting that amount of fixed fee in the contract? General Schley. Because that is what the contractor is going to get over and above his costs, and all he is going to get, and he will take the contract or refuse it very largely on what that sum is. That is the profit that is in it for him.

109. General Grunert. No matter what might be developed later on under the contract? General Schley. Oh, no. Additional work added by a supplemental agreement usually adds to the fixed fee, because that is more than he expected to undertake.

110. General Grunert. Well, this contract originally started about a million and went up about thirty million, didn’t it? General Schley. I think even bigger than that. At the time I left it had grown to about forty million, I think.

111. General Grunert. It seemed rather strange that they would all get together here in Washington to lobby through a contract in which they were obviously going to divide $52,000, didn’t it? You need not answer that; it is just a remark.

112. General Frank. Did you ever receive notice or knowledge [667] of any reports concerning the activities of Colonel Wyman in Hawaii which was derogatory to Colonel Wyman? General Schley. No, I did not, that I recall.
113. General Frank. Did you ever receive notice or knowledge of a report dated the 14th of February, '42? That was after you left?

General Schley. February '42 I had left the service over a year and a half.

114. General Frank. Oh, yes. When you left the service Colonel Wyman was still on duty in Honolulu?

General Schley. So far as I recall, he was.

General Frank. Have you anything further that is pertinent to the case that you would like to state to the Board?

General Schley. You might want to know the work which was taken over by the Corps of Engineers in order to see where this came in the procedure. On November 20, 1940, the Air Corps station work was assigned to the Corps of Engineers. At that time it was in progress under the Quartermaster General's Office. Instructions were issued that the work would be taken over by job by job in order not to cause any interruption of the progress, so that it took quite a while before the entire work was turned over. This contract, therefore, came within that period, and we were setting up—at that time we were preparing for this vast amount of work which was on the way, and it was immediately placed under the same part of General Robins' office in which our civil works had been.

115. General Frank. That is, this Hawaiian defense project was placed there?

General Schley. No. I am speaking of the Air Corps station work, which was new work for us to be doing. All construction work of the Army was turned over to us December 16, 1941, according to the record, which was after I left the service. Those dates you might want to have in mind.

You might also wish to have in mind, if you go into it further, there was another branch of our office which was interested in this contract, and that is the part which had always existed and which handled seacoast fortification work. It was called the fortification section and came not under the civil construction division, of which General Robins was the head, but came under the military division of which Brigadier General John J. Kingman was the head; and therefore you will find progress reports on this contract here in those two parts of the office. You will find something in the fortification section, the progress reports, on the seacoast fortification part of the work, and that on the airfields and other things you will find under the civil division part of the office.

I can give you some idea of how the work was added. Jobs were added over and above apparently what the contract called for originally; and a job on Wheeler Field to construct reinforced concrete, bombproof ammunition and storage structures, for instance, dated February 24, 1941 (that is one of the early job orders) called for three bombproof ammunition storage magazines, each of 30,000 cubic feet capacity. What was called Addendum No. 2, of May 26, 1941, added two more. There is a job order which presumably was based on one of the general provisions in the contract which started out to be a smaller figure. Addenda Nos. 3 and 4 provided for additional work in this same job order. Addendum No. 5, of July 1, 1941, called for four more bombproof ammunition storage magazines, each 30,000 cubic feet, over and above what I have just mentioned. Ad-
dendum No. 6, of August 14, ’41, called for two more of 5,000 and three of 10,000. Addendum No. 7 called for four of 5,000 cubic feet each.

116. General Frank. All those additions, however, do not preclude the necessity of requiring a termination date on the completion of construction of the first three?

General Schley. I would say that, as I have found in the job orders, they all read—they all have their own estimate of time. And that is another thing I think you would be interested in knowing. Each job order had an estimated time for completion, and this additional work was added to each job order.


General Schley. Unquestionably their time was extended, and perhaps those were placed ahead of something which had already been started, some other job order which was considered less important. So I think it is going to be quite an undertaking to see how those estimated times of completion were changed as the work went on, because so much work was added as the job proceeded, and the contract itself provides for additions, specifically so states.

118. General Grunert. Have you any questions, General Russell?


General, I believe that the operations in the Chief of Engineers Office have been described to us fairly definitely, but I wanted to ask this question: There was no plan or no individual or individuals in the Office of the Chief of Engineers discharging the function of checking the individuals, the members of firms, the stockholders and officers of corporations who might be seeking Government contracts, to determine their nationality, status of citizenship, or past criminal record?

General Schley. No. And I hope you won’t take my failure to recollect specific instructions in existence at the time to be the final answer of the Office of Chief of Engineers on the subject. I hope that you will ask the Office to provide you with information which would be more definite than my recollection of it is.

120. General Russell. It comes to pass, therefore, that if an investigation touching these questions of citizenship, prior individual records as to criminality, and so forth, were to be made at the instigation of the Office of the Chief of Engineers, it would be because in some way information might reach your office indicating that those subjects should be investigated?

General Schley. Well, you are carrying on now, I think, if I may say so, the same thought you originally expressed, and I am in hopes that you will have the record searched to see what the instructions were at that time on the subject.

121. General Russell. I have no further questions.

122. General Grunert. Who selected Wyman for the post as District Engineer in Hawaii? Do you know?

General Schley. No, I do not, but we had a personnel section which operated under General Kingman, that is, the office of personnel section; and, this being work which was under General Robins, I do not doubt that both of them knew. I knew that he was going to go there from Los Angeles where he had been before.

123. General Grunert. Did you know Wyman?

General Schley. Very well.
124. General Grunert. What did you think of him?

General Schley. I first met Wyman in the last war, which was when he came into the service, and I met him then as an Officer of an engineering combat battalion that was with the Second Division, Engineers of the Second Division, and he was a very excellent man. If I remember correctly he is a graduate of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and he has a very fine technical knowledge of engineering. He has a reputation of being a very hard driver, that is, of piling pressure on to do things on a large scale and do them fast.

In Los Angeles he had a very, very big job before he left there, that he was on the very, very big flood-control project which was to try to protect the town of Los Angeles and the valuable property which has been built there in a very unwise location, against those torrential floods, which the Federal Government undertook to participate in. That was a very big job and one which a great many private interests were involved in, because it stepped on many toes; it took property under Government authority to seize property for such construction work. It ran into bridges, change of bridges, railroad bridges of private railroads as well as the county bridges. So it was a very difficult, very ticklish job.

I might say that he steam-rolled a great deal of it, and we had to sort of deal with the local people in more diplomatic ways than he often did, but I think they appreciated his work [666] very much because they asked for his retention there although he had been there more than our usual tour. We usually did not keep a man more than four years at one of those public works jobs because we wanted him to get broader training and we wanted him not to get his roots too deep in the local soil. He must perfect his federal apprenticeship, so we usually change him every four years. My recollection is that he was there five because of the importance of that work. I have confidence in him, in his integrity and in his driving ability.

125. General Grunert. It would seem to me that this step-by-step processing of a contract, for instance from Newman to Gesler to you to the Under Secretary—is it possible that each one of you depended upon the one step below doing all the necessary work regarding the contract and then did not consider that these various higher echelons had any responsibility regarding that contract, and therefore passing the buck down to the lowest man, who seems to be Newman here, as far as the Chief of Engineers Office is concerned?

General Schley. I do not think so. I think it is very much like a military command, and I think it probably has evolved from the fact that there are military men connected with it. I would say that Gesler did look to Newman because Newman was the original one in that scale, and I would say similarly Robins and I looked to Gesler. But that is true of all organizations.

126. General Grunert. But there was no particular one that said, "It is your duty to go and contact the F. B. I. to see if they have anything against this man?" was there?

General Schley. I would say that Newman is the man who [667] had to satisfy himself concerning the contractor, first. Perhaps Gesler would accept his recommendation unless there was something on the face of it. But you must remember that we had those other reviews which were set up particularly for the purpose.
127. General Grunert. What is the advisory board that I hear about? What do they do?

General Schley. The advisory board was set up by Mr. Patterson, Under Secretary, and it was set up in the Quartermaster General's Office, but all of us looked on it as Mr. Patterson's board.

128. General Grunert. Well, they were supposed to look into things to satisfy Mr. Patterson?

General Schley. Its purpose was, I would say, primarily to pass on the contractor, since it was not usually a government firm.

129. General Grunert. Did they have a preferred list of contractors or an eligible list, or what?

General Schley. They had a list of those whom they had already looked into sufficiently to put them on their panel.

130. General Grunert. Do you know whether Rohl was on this list?

General Schley. No, I have no knowledge. In fact, this did not go to that board for review, because that board apparently was not acting on our cases at the time. It went to Knudsen. I explained that a little bit earlier.

131. General Grunert. But it seems to me I read in the Congressional report on this thing, or that Committee of Congress that made a report of it in September, to the effect that there were three or four of them, including Colonel Wyman, who came to Washington to put this contract through. Now, what is the necessity of anybody coming to Washington with your scheme of contract? Is that usually done with some contracts or all of them, or what?

General Schley. The field man comes rather frequently for conference on almost anything.

132. General Grunert. Does he bring the prospective contractors with him to sell themselves, or why did they have to come to Washington?

General Schley. I do not know the circumstances of the trip that you speak of, but I would say it is not infrequent for the District Engineer to come in. He would come in for conferences often.

133. General Grunert. I can imagine that. Then, you know nothing about that particular, what you might call a lobby group or an explanatory group, or what, that came here?

General Schley. No, I do not know.

134. General Grunert. Do you know of anybody who would know about that particular? Would Robins know anything about that? Would Gesler know anything about that?

General Schley. I would say that Robins would be very apt to know. Newman certainly would know, and Gesler might.

135. General Grunert. Any other questions?

136. General Frank. Did you have any discussion concerning this contract with a man by the name of Grafe?

General Schley. Not before it was awarded. I know Grafe personally. I have heard him speak of his government contracts in general, I don't doubt, since that time, and he may have mentioned it, but I had no conversation with him that I can recall about this contract before its award.

137. General Frank. Do you know Mr. Connolly, who is an associate of Rohl's?
General Schley. I have tried to place him, and I can call up the Office of Chief of Engineers to have them refresh my memory on some Connollys that I do know, to see if this was one of them. His name does not suggest anyone offhand.

138. General Frank. Did you discuss this contract with Grafe?

General Schley. No; I do not remember any mention of it at all by anyone to me before it was executed.

139. General Frank. Or Martin?

General Schley. I do not know Martin.

140. Major Clausen. This Connolly is Tom Connolly of San Francisco.

General Schley. I know Grafe. I used to know a Shirley. As a matter of fact, Shirley and I used to know, who is now dead, the contractor whom Grafe was with.

141. General Grunert. Thank you very much, General. We appreciate your coming in and helping us out here. What we are after is information and facts, and I think that you have been of considerable help to us.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

142. General Grunert. The Board will take a recess of 5 minutes and then proceed with the next witness.

(Thereupon there was a brief informal recess.)

[670] TESTIMONY OF MAJ. GEN. ROGER B. CALTON, ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. General, will you please state to the Board your name, grade, organization, and station?


2. General Grunert. General, this Board is making an attempt to get at the facts, as far as we can, in and around the War Department as to matters prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. We hope that in the position you occupy you can help us out in telling us about matters pertaining to the Signal Corps. In the large field we cover in the limited time, we have divided special investigation amongst the three of us, although the entire Board will pass on all matters. The special investigation on which you are to be a witness is under General Frank, who will lead in, propounding the questions, and the other members will ask such additional questions as they see fit. General Frank.

3. General Frank. Will you repeat, please, your present assignment?

General Colton. I am Chief of the Engineering and Technical Service, Signal Corps, in the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Army Service Forces, War Department, Washington, D. C. That means that I am in charge of research and development for the Signal Corps at the present time.

4. General Frank. What is your responsibility with respect to radar equipment?
General Colton. What is it now?

5. General Frank. Yes.

6. General Frank. Who was responsible for research and development of radar equipment in the fall of 1940?

General Colton. I was directly responsible for research and development of ground radar equipment. At the time I was director of the Signal Corps Laboratory at Fort Monmouth, New Jersey. The officer in charge in Washington in the fall of 1940 was, as I recall it, Colonel Hugh Mitchell. The officer in charge at Wright Field for airborne, if my recollection serves me correctly, was Colonel Gardner, now General Gardner.

You said 1940, did you not?

7. General Frank. Yes; fall of 1940.

8. General Frank. Are you conversant with the plan for the location of permanent radar in the Hawaiian Islands?

General Colton. Only through having read the Board reports and War Department actions. The Board report I refer to is the report of the Board of Officers that recommended the locations, and that was a local Board in Hawaii.

9. General Frank. Can you tell us what were the number and location of the permanent aircraft warning stations contemplated for the Hawaiian Islands to complete a phase of Contract No. W-414-Eng-602?

General Colton. The number and location of permanent aircraft warning stations originally contemplated for the Hawaiian Islands were three 271 and 271-A fixed stations and five SCR-270 mobile stations. The three fixed stations 271 and 271-A were planned to be located at Kaala, Kokee, and Haleakala. Three of the five mobile stations were planned to be located at Nuuanu Pali, Manawahua, and Mauna Loa. The other two mobile stations were designated as roving stations. There is no record of the Corps of Engineers’ contract W-414-Engineering-602 in the files of the Chief Signal Officer, and I have no familiarity with it.

10. General Frank. What equipment was to be furnished by the Signal Corps?

General Colton. The equipment to be furnished by the Signal Corps was three fixed stations 271 delivered complete with shelter, except for the concrete foundation of the shelter, and also five mobile radar stations 270 to be delivered complete and ready for operation.

11. General Frank. What priority was placed upon this equipment?

General Colton. The War Department, under date of March 10, 1941, set the priority for the delivery of radio sets 270, 271, and 271-A as indicated in inclosure 1 to the document that I furnished the Board, and I have a copy here.

12. General Frank. Please state that as a part of your answer. General Colton. Please state the priority?

13. General Frank. Yes, giving the dates on which each of those three sets was to be made available for delivery to Honolulu.
General Colton. For Hawaii two 271's were originally scheduled to be shipped from the United States during March.


General Colton. March 1941. And one 271-A was also scheduled to be shipped during March.

15. General Frank. Of 1941?

General Colton. Of 1941. That priority was set up by the War Department under date of the 10th of March.

16. General Frank. We have then two 271 sets for Hawaii for March, and one 271-A, in March?

General Colton. That was the schedule. That was a shipment schedule, General.

17. General Frank. Is that a shipment schedule, or is that the date on which it was turned over to the Quartermaster?

General Colton. That is the date on which it was to be turned over to the Quartermaster for shipment.

18. General Frank. Whether or not it was shipped in that month is something we will have to determine from the Quartermaster. That provides for the three sets?

General Colton. Yes. That was the War Department schedule, General. They were not actually shipped, then.

19. General Frank. That was the War Department priority?

General Colton. Yes.

20. General Frank. Two 271's, in March, and one 271-A, in March?

General Colton. Yes. And I might point out that Panama was scheduled to get two sets. We are just pointing out the priority. I might put it this way: They were the third and fourth and fifth sets—the third, fourth, and fifth sets off the production line.

21. General Frank. All right. Now, let us come down to the 270 sets, which are the mobile sets they were scheduled to get. Look at April and May.

General Colton. April and May, yes. They were scheduled to have one turned over to the Quartermaster for shipment, in April, and four to be turned over to the Quartermaster for shipment in May.

22. General Frank. That made a total of five mobile and three permanent or stationary sets?

General Colton. Yes, sir.

23. General Frank. How did such priority compare with similar equipment furnished at about the same time to installations in the Philippines and Panama?

General Colton. Under the priority furnished by the War Department under date of March 10, as I have already stated, Hawaii was scheduled to get the third, fourth, and fifth sets; Panama was scheduled to get the first and second sets.

24. General Frank. All right. Thank you.

General Colton. That is as regards the fixed stations.

As regards the mobile stations, the relative priorities were, two to the 1st Air Warning Company; one to the Signal Corps Laboratories; one to the 1st Air Warning Company; four to the 1st Air Warning Company; one to Hawaii; two to Fort Monmouth; and then four to Hawaii, completing the priority on that schedule as it stood as of that time.

25. General Frank. When was the Hawaiian radar equipment actually delivered to the Quartermaster for shipment?
General Colton. The Hawaiian radar equipment was delivered as follows, to the Quartermaster, for shipment: All components of one 271-A were turned over by the Signal Corps to the Quartermaster Corps for shipment by 26 May 1941. All components of two SCR-271s were turned over to the Quartermaster Corps for shipment by 26 June 1941. Foundation plans were furnished in advance of the above dates.

The five mobile stations, SCR-270, were delivered to the Quartermaster Corps for shipment on 22 July 1941, together [676] with one additional mobile station, which had in the meantime been authorized by the War Department for the Hawaiian Department. I would like to say in this connection it should be noted that three additional fixed stations for Hawaii were authorized by the War Department 28 May 1941, for inclusion by the Chief Signal Officer, in a supplemental estimate for fiscal year 1942.

26. General Frank. Since they were not authorized until the 28th of May 1941, to be put in the 1942 fiscal year supplemental estimates, when might it be expected that those three additional would become available?

General Colton. Normally it would be nine months to a year. The reason I mentioned that was that I believe they were placed on the priority schedule, and my recollection is that owing to having some money left over, we placed the order in advance.

27. General Frank. They, however, would not be ready until 1943? General Colton. I would think that would be the case—1942.

28. General Frank. All right, 1942.

General Colton. To be ready in 1942.

29. General Frank. Now, when these were delivered, you say they included “all components.” Does that mean that that included the towers?

General Colton. Yes, sir; that included the towers.

30. General Frank. Did it include the generator sets?

General Colton. It included generator sets.

31. General Frank. What about extra tubes?

[677] General Colton. It included the extra tubes. Of course, they were not contemplated. It was not contemplated that tubes were to be furnished for the entire life, but spare tubes were furnished.

32. General Frank. For about how long?

General Colton. I don’t recall the exact basis, but on a basis that we would be able to keep them in operation continuously, should the need come.

33. General Frank. After they once went into operation?

General Colton. Yes.

34. General Frank. Was the equipment ready for installation when delivered?

General Colton. The equipment was ready for installation when delivered. May I go back a moment, General? You asked me only about the fixed stations, previously? You haven’t asked me as to the readiness of the mobile station.

35. General Frank. Will you state as to the readiness?

General Colton. The previous testimony related to the fixed stations. The mobile stations were delivered complete and ready for operation.

36. General Frank. In other words, they could be taken off the boat, deployed, and operated?
General Colton. Yes, sir.

37. General Frank. Did they have their generator sets with them?

General Colton. Yes, sir. The dates that I give, here, are the dates shown by our records for the shipment of the last component.

38. General Frank. If there were delays in furnishing the equipment, what were the causes?

General Colton. The delay in delivery of equipment was caused principally by lack of sufficiently high priorities, by which I mean the manufacturing or production facilities. Up until later than the 11th of July 1941, aircraft detection equipment had a preference rating no higher than A-1-B, whereas at that time there existed higher preference ratings, AA, and A-1-A.

39. General Frank. Were protests as to delays made to the manufacturer? Was higher authority informed of the delays?

General Colton. Protests as to delay were made to the manufacturer, and representations were made to higher authority to obtain higher preference rating. Higher authority was informed of the delay.

40. General Grunert. In that, I understand that you mean the delay in turning them over to the Quartermaster, but these are the final dates you gave us, on which they turned them over to the Quartermaster. It included the delay?

General Colton. The dates I gave you are the dates of actually turning them over to the Quartermaster for shipment. The delays I refer to are the delays in manufacture.

41. General Grunert. Prior to those dates?

General Colton. Prior to those dates; yes, sir.

42. General Frank. Was any equipment originally intended for the Hawaiian Islands diverted elsewhere? If so, by whose authority?

General Colton. Equipment originally intended for the Hawaiian Department was diverted elsewhere by order of the Secretary of War from time to time. The most significant change [679] is that furnished in a document which I have presented to the Board and which is marked "Enclosure 2," dated the 28th of May, 1941. That is a new priority list.

43. General Frank. Do you have it, there?

General Colton. I think I have it right here, General. Yes, I have that with me, a copy of it.

44. General Frank. Will you read it? Read the letter.

General Colton. An "Immediate-action letter," 28th of May, 1941; subject, "Aircraft warning service for the United States Overseas Departments and Bases":

To the Chief Signal Officer:

The enclosed copy of a Priorities and Delivery Schedule SCR-270-A and 271 radio sets, approved May 21, 1941, is forwarded to you for your information and necessary action. You will note that a considerable amount of modification of existing contracts in order to provide the proper type of set may be required. You will note that there are now authorized for production and installation in the United States and overseas a total of 218 long-range detectors, instead of the number authorized in the schedule dated April 5, 1941, and approved April 11, 1941.

It is desired that you take the necessary action to include in supplemental estimate, fiscal year 1942, sufficient funds to finance the enlarged program, subject to a limitation of $20,000,000, in addition to such funds as are now available to you.
It is further desired that every effort be made to expedite delivery of the sets listed in the attached schedule, as an urgent need exists for this equipment [680] the various defense and base commands and mobile units concerned.

By order of the Secretary of War:

(s) D. R. Van Sickler, Adjutant General.

1 Enclosure, Priority and Delivery Schedule for SCR 270 and 271 Radio Sets.

Do you wish me to read the priorities?

45. General Frank. Will you state the manner in which this changed the priorities?

General Colton. On the 271, I find no change in the first three.

46. General Frank. In other words, the new priority list made no change in the first three sets going to Hawaii; they still go to Hawaii, in March 1941?

General Colton. That is correct.

47. General Frank. They were the fixed stations?

General Colton. They were the fixed station.

Now, the priority for the mobile stations is now given as two to the 1st Air Warning Company.

48. General Frank. Let us stick to Honolulu. State it this way: In the previous priority, one mobile set went to Honolulu, in April, and four, in May?

General Colton. That is correct, sir.

49. General Frank. The new priority puts six mobile sets in June?

General Colton. Six mobile sets are set up for June.

50. General Frank. And two additional fixed sets, in June 1941, and an additional set, in July 1941?

[681] General Colton. That is correct, sir.

51. General Frank. That makes a total of six fixed sets and six mobile sets destined for Honolulu?

General Colton. That is correct.

52. General Frank. And you have already testified that three fixed sets were turned over to the Quartermaster for shipment, one in May and two in June of 1941, and five mobile sets were turned over to the Quartermaster for shipment the 22nd of July 1941; is that correct?

General Colton. Yes, sir; except that one additional mobile station was also turned over on the 22nd of July, making the total of six.

53. General Frank. That would make the correction of six mobile stations that were turned over in July?

General Colton. Yes. In preparing to give my testimony here, I do not believe I looked into that addition of three, because I understood the question to be about the original plan, and it did not appear to me to be material to the issue, because the fixed stations, even the first three, did not seem to have been—

54. General Frank. We have not pursued it so far as the second three were concerned, because we did not have the first three installed.

55. General Russell. Was it clear a while ago that these three fixed sets were not going out there, the last three fixed sets, until 1942?

General Colton. No, no. You see, that depends; if they are set up in the budget, to be purchased out of funds to be obtained by budgetary methods, and you do not make any diversions, [682] then you wouldn't get them until 1942; but the War Department made a diversion there, you see, which would make them come off the line, accord-
ing to the best information, at the date at which the War Department published this document. They would come off the line at the time that the War Department stated, and would be diverted there.

56. General Frank. This new priority list that we just got through reading furnished all the sets in 1941.

57. General Grunert. Therefore, naturally, I want to know, were they prepared for shipment, or not, before Pearl Harbor?

General Colton. I didn't look into the files to determine that question, General.

58. General Frank. Proceed with the remainder of the answer to the question that I asked you, which was: Was any equipment originally intended for the Hawaiian Islands diverted elsewhere; if so, by whose authority?

General Colton. As I have stated, that most significant change in the priority list was the one furnished by the War Department, date 28 May 1941, which we have just referred to. This record is from the office of the Chief Signal Officer, which indicates that that priority list remained in force until after the Pearl Harbor attack on the 7th of December 1941.

During this period, some diversions were made, upon the authority of the War Department, from the priority list. However, the only significant diversion as regards the Hawaiian situation was the diversion of seven mobile radio sets, SCR 270, to the 1st Aircraft Warning Company, to replace early production models that had been in the hands of that organization for a period of nearly one year.

[63] 59. General Grunert. May I ask where the 1st Aircraft Warning Company was? They were not in Hawaii, were they?

General Colton. No.

60. General Frank. If you will just wait a minute, we will tell you that.

61. General Grunert. That has been referred to several times, and I still do not know where it is.

62. General Frank. We will tell you, here, in just a second.

63. General Grunert. All right.

General Colton. The records of the office of the Chief Signal Officer in this connection are merely as follows. The first paragraph, I quote from memory, from the file in the office of the Chief Signal Officer:

The 1st Aircraft Warning Company has been made a part of the Gray force. The War Department has directed that the 1st Aircraft Warning Company be prepared to furnish long-range warning service and be prepared to embark for an overseas point by June 10, 1941.

Accordingly, seven radio sets, SCR 270–B, were issued to the 1st Aircraft Warning Company, early in June 1941, to replace the early production SCR–270–A radio sets then in the hands of that organization; and since these early-production sets were not deemed to be suitable for shipment to Hawaii, there was a resulting delay of approximately one month in the shipment of the mobile SCR–270 sets to the Hawaiian Department; and no record has been found in the files of the Chief Signal Officer to indicate the person in the War Department who conveyed to the Chief Signal Officer the above authority for diversion.

Does that answer your question, General?
64. General Grunert. Yes, it answers mine, but I am still assured that there were six mobile sets turned over to the Quartermaster, the 22nd of July. They were not diverted, were they?

General Colton. No; they would just have gotten there a month earlier, if it had not been for this diversion.

65. General Grunert. That is all.

66. General Russell. I think we are going all around the patch. What I am trying to find out is, when did we send some stuff to Hawaii?

67. General Frank. He cannot tell us that. All he can tell us is that it was turned over to the Quartermaster, and I have got to get it from another agency as to when it was shipped.

68. General Grunert. All right, but is or not the Signal Corps responsible for delivery to the Hawaiian destination?

General Colton. No, sir.

69. General Russell. Is it the evidence now that this part that you gave them—six, on July 22—you immediately took them back and gave them to the 1st Company?

General Colton. No, no.

70. General Grunert. That is what I want to get straightened out.

General Colton. I was asked, first, when were they delivered to the Quartermaster for shipment? and I gave that date, which I believe was July 22—wasn't it?

71. General Frank. Yes.

General Colton. Then I was asked about a question of diversion, and how it affected this situation. I state, in effect, that some sets were diverted to another organization, and if they had not been so diverted, Hawaii would have gotten their six sets in June instead of in July.

72. General Grunert. That is, they may have been turned over to the Quartermaster in June?

General Colton. I say they would have been turned over. That should have been corrected. Hawaii wouldn't have gotten them, but they would have been turned over to the Quartermaster for shipment to Hawaii in June instead of July.

73. General Russell. All this evidence now, about diversions does not affect the finality of the testimony that the Signal Corps turned over to the Quartermaster on the 22nd of July six 270 mobile sets for Hawaii?

General Colton. That is right.

74. General Russell. And it never did take them back?

General Colton. That is right.

75. General Russell. All right.

76. Major Clausen. Plus the fixed stations.

77. General Russell. There has been no diversion evidence about them.

78. General Frank. When was the filter information center constructed?

General Colton. No information could be found in the files of the Chief Signal Officer to show the date the filter information center was constructed.

79. General Frank. For the information of the record, that was accomplished by the district engineer in Honolulu, under the supervi-
sion of the Department's Signal Officer, and we will get information on that when we get to Honolulu.

80. General Grunert. May I ask you at this time what particular installation, matériel, and so forth, was furnished for the station, and when was that turned over? Was that part of this shipment?

81. General Frank. That is my next question.

82. General Grunert. Go ahead. I thought you had finished this.

83. General Frank. No.

When was the equipment for the information center furnished?

84. General Frank. Therefore they were equipped with the necessary equipment and in operation in November of 1941?

General Colton. Yes, sir; and I may say that I have at one time or another seen pictures of the installation, but I have no information as to exact dates.

85. General Frank. In the absence of the installation of the permanent stations, were there portable stations to your knowledge?

General Colton. General, may I complete my answer to that information question?

86. General Frank. Yes; go ahead.

General Colton. The document that I refer to is a memorandum to me from Lieutenant Colonel Powell who was Department Signal Officer of the Hawaiian Department. Colonel Powell had flown into Washington and came to my office. I asked him to write the memorandum on the 14th of November, 1941, it being a matter of interest to the Signal Corps as regards the performance of equipment.

87. General Frank. I ask him to write the memorandum on the 14th of November, 1941, it being a matter of interest to the Signal Corps as regards the performance of equipment.

88. General Frank. Is that the document you are referring to?

General Colton. Yes, sir. I am referring to that document.

Memorandum for: Colonel Colton, Chief, Materiel Branch.

In recent exercises held in the Hawaiian Department, the operation of the radio set SCR-270 was found to be very satisfactory. This exercise was started approximately 4:30 in the morning and with three radio sets in operation. We noted when the planes took off from the airplane carrier in the oscilloscope. We determined this distance to be approximately 80 miles, due to the fact that the planes would circle around waiting the assemblage of the remainder from the carrier.

As soon as the planes were assembled, they proceeded towards Hawaii. This was very easily determined and within six minutes, the pursuit craft were notified and they took off and intercepted the incoming bombers at approximately 30 miles from Pearl Harbor.

It was a very interesting exercise. All the general officers present were highly pleased with the proceedings of the radio direction finding sets and the personnel associated with the information centers.

We have had very little trouble with the operations of these sets. When the fixed stations are installed in the higher mountains surrounding Hawaii, we expect to have as good an air warning system available for use as is now operat-
ing for the British on their tight little island, as their situation is approximately the same as ours is on Hawaii.

C. A. Powell,
Lt. Col., Signal Corps,
Department Signal Officer, Hawaiian Department.

[689] This document, which was dictated to my stenographer and signed by Colonel Powell, indicates that the information centers were in operation on November 14. As I say, I have seen pictures of them.

87. General Grunert. Was there more than one?
General Colton. I have only seen the picture of one center. He speaks of information centers. It is possible that that might be a little stretching. I think there was probably really one main information center.

88. General Frank. What is the range of a set of this type at Honolulu?
General Colton. The range, as you know, General, varies with circumstances; but considering the tactical dispositions used by aircraft at the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, I think it would be rated normally at something better than 100 miles, and with the different tactics that are employed the range would be somewhat less, probably, for the sea-shore sites. I would say that properly in place, though, corresponding sets today are still rated at 100 miles. That is a nominal rating. It depends somewhat on circumstances.

89. General Frank. Judging purely from the point of view of the power and assuming that the aircraft has sufficient altitude to pick it up at the full extremity of the power range?
General Colton. Under those conditions it developed a range of 120 miles, and it met those military characteristics on every official test.

90. General Frank. What is the range of the 271?
General Colton. There is no difference in the range of the two sets if they are installed at the same height above sea-level; that is, there is no difference between the 271 and [690] the 270 in range if the antenna is the same height above sea level or the ground plane.

91. General Frank. Explain briefly, will you, the effect of having your towers at a higher elevation on the ground and the effect of airplanes coming in at different altitudes?
General Colton. The height of the antenna of a radar set above the ground gives two different effects: One is that the higher the antenna is above the ground for the ground plane, or if the plane in which you are interested is relatively close to the sea, one effect is that the height above the plane increases what is called the line of sight distance. That is, the distance which you can see.

92. General Frank. What kind of sight are you talking about? Radio sight?
General Colton. No; visual sight. Therefore, since radio waves follow somewhat the line of sight, you get an increased range somewhat.

There is another intricate reflection effect that keeps the radar set down closer to visual line of sight the higher you put it up; so, as a matter of fact, the effect of increasing the height of the antenna is to increase the range of detection of the target airplane.

Does that answer your question?
93. General Frank. Yes.

General Colton. It will also increase at a given range in height of the radar set and will enable you to detect airplanes closer to the surface of the water. The higher the antenna above the surface of the water the closer to the water at a given range can you detect the presence of an airplane.

94. General Frank. Will radar detect beyond a tangent with [691] the surface of the earth? Does the curvature of the earth have anything to do with it?

General Colton. Yes. The curvature of the earth has a great deal to do with it. Radar sets of the types that we refer to here, the earlier radar sets, 270 and 271—I think they were the only radar sets in those days in existence anywhere in the world—would not detect below the tangent. They would not go around the curvature of the earth.

95. General Grunert. The net result is that the reason they used the permanent one was so that they could put up a higher antenna. Is that the main reason?

General Colton. The stated reason given to me when we were developing the set was that they could have better housing and servicing arrangements. The height of the antenna would not come in to any extent on the 271's that were scheduled for Hawaii, though some advantage could have been obtained from the height of the antenna on the 271-A, because on the 271-A the antenna was, as I recall it, 100 feet high, and there would have been some advantage there.

96. General Grunert. The general effect was that you could get the same thing out of the 270 mobile as you could out of the permanent, approximately?

General Colton. Yes. I would rather have the 270 mobile in Hawaii.

97. General Frank. I would like to ask another question.

General Colton. Might I just go back and answer General Grunert's question? If you have a low, flat shoreline, if you have a 271-A with a hundred-foot tower, three times the height of the 270, it is advantageous. If you are on an island and if you can crawl up the side of the mountain the 270 is just as [692] good, because the difference of a few feet in a thousand feet is immaterial.

Does that answer your question?

98. General Grunert. It covers it.

99. General Frank. Let us assume that your set is in place and one airplane is coming in a thousand feet off the water and another airplane is coming in 10,000 feet off the water. Is there any difference in the distances at which each can be detected?

General Colton. Yes. The one coming in at 10,000 feet off the water would be detected perhaps two or three times as far if in ordinary locations. In fact, I believe almost any location, because the one that is 1,000 feet off the water drops below the tangent of the earth’s surface sooner than the one that is 10,000 feet off, and when it drops below the tangent it positively cannot be detected by the 270 except under the most abnormal climatic conditions.

100. General Frank. You stated that the range of the 270 was something like from 100 to 120 miles.
General Colton. Under the conditions you gave me, an airplane flying at 10,000 feet; yes.

101. General Frank. You just got through stating that the difference in the range at which these two airplanes, one at a thousand feet and one at 10,000 feet, could be detected, was that the one at 10,000 feet could be detected at about three times further.

General Colton. I said, with the ordinary location.

102. General Frank. Does that increase the range any? General Colton. Will which increase it?

103. General Frank. The altitude of the airplane?

[693] General Colton. The altitude of the airplane only increases the range by bringing it well above the line of vision.

104. General Frank. The 130 miles is still the maximum range?

General Colton. I said 120 was the military characteristic range, and I considered that. May I say that you get very freak results occasionally, but the 120 is a good average maximum range, and it stood up under that.

105. General Grunert. That does not mean that you can get three times 120 miles with planes at 10,000 feet?

General Colton. No. At 10,000 feet you would get 120 miles; but if the plane was at 50 feet you would have to have a very, very high antenna site to get him at all.

May I say that it is rather immaterial whether the plane is at 10,000 feet or whether your detecting spot is at 10,000 feet. If one is low and the other is high it reverses the situation. You get similar range effects.

106. General Frank. In the absence of the permanent system, were there portable stations? If so, in what quantities? When were they set up, and where?

General Colton. In so far as the Signal Corps is concerned, the permanent system was operated in Hawaii sufficiently in advance of the attack on Pearl Harbor to have been placed in efficient operation by that date. The portable stations originally contemplated were also on hand, and it may be concluded that those portable systems provided an adequate aircraft warning service, in view of the fact that adequate warning of the impending attack was furnished by this equipment on the 7th of December, 1941.

In this connection I have a copy of a letter from the Signal Officer, dated December 31, 1941, which I will now read.

[694] (Letter dated December 31, 1941, from Lieutenant Colonel C. A. Powell to the Chief Signal Officer, Washington, D. C., is as follows:)

Subject: Aircraft Warning Service.
To: Chief Signal Officer, Washington, D. C.

1. Inasmuch as five out of six radio sets SCR 270 were operating from 4:00 to 7:00 A. M. on December 7, 1941, and one station, namely the Opana station, remained in operation thereafter until 7:39 A. M., it is believed that the following two inclosures may be of some interest:

2. Inclosure No. 1 is a composite based on the written records of ranges and azimuths kept at the following stations: KOKO HEAD, KAAWA, OPAHA, KAWAILOA, and FORT SHAFTER. Attention is invited to the close agreement of data secured on aircraft north of OAHU between 6:48 and 6:54 A. M.

3. Inclosure No. 2 is the graphical record made on the OPAHA station plotting board. This record discloses the period covered in Inclosure No. 1 and subsequent hours of December 7, 1941. Attention is invited to the plot begin-
ning at 7:02 A.M. near the top of the chart and ending at 7:39 A.M. as it developed that this was the hostile fight which attacked PEARL HARBOR at 8:10 A.M.

/s/C. A. Powell,
Lt. Col., Signal Corps,
Signal Officer.

(Letter dated December 31, 1941, from Lieutenant Colonel C. A. Powell to the Chief Signal Officer, Washington, D. C., was marked Exhibit 3 and received in evidence.)

[695] Two charts are enclosed, of which I have photostat copies here. I may say that the originals, as I recall it, were black on white photostats and I had these photostat copies made (indicating). I have not been able to locate the originals, but I know these to be correct copies.

107. General Frank. We will incorporate them into the record.

General Colton. I might have add that you have asked me what the locations of the stations were. The question can be answered by looking at these charts on which the locations are given.

(Chart of detector station records was marked Exhibit 3–A and received in evidence.)

(Chart showing plots of airplane flights was marked Exhibit 3–B and received in evidence.)

108. General Frank. Have you any record to indicate the location at which the 270 stations had been set up and were operating on the morning of December 7, 1941?

General Colton. I have a record that shows five detector stations were located at Kaawa, Opana, Kawaiola, Shafter and Koko Head. Those were the stations that were in operation on the 7th of December, 1941.

109. General Frank. What permanent and what temporary radar stations were in position or available for installation on the 20th of November, 1941?

General Colton. Three primary and six mobile radar stations were in position or available for installation by the 20th of November, 1941, and five mobile stations were actually in operation from 0400 to 0700 on the 7th of December, 1941, of which one station, namely, the Opana station, remained in operation thereafter until 0743.

[696] 110. General Russell. General, you testified a little while ago that this radar equipment, so far as you knew, was the only such equipment in the world at that time?

General Colton. No, I said that at that time there was essentially no equipment of higher frequency. I probably expressed it, that would detect airplanes at a lower altitude. In other words, all radar stations as of that date were the same frequency, approximately. Since that time we have gone into lots of radar equipment which is much better and of much higher frequency and picks up airplanes at lower altitude. But I thought that the Board was concerned with conditions as they existed at that time.

111. General Russell. This equipment that was sent out to Hawaii and the Panama Canal, and wherever else it was sent, was the first equipment of that type that had reached those destinations, so far as you know? Let us confine it to Hawaii.

General Colton. As to Hawaii; yes.

112. General Russell. It was necessary, therefore, to train the personnel out there to operate this equipment, was it not?
General Colton. Yes; I would say it was.

113. General Russell. It was a new thing?
General Colton. It was new to them.
114. General Russell. That is all.
115. General Grunert. There appearing to be no further questions, we thank you very much for helping us out.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[697] TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL THOMAS M. ROBINS, UNITED STATES ARMY, DEPUTY CHIEF OF ENGINEERS (ACCOMPANIED BY DOUGLAS I. McKay, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE CHIEF OF ENGINEERS.)

(The witness was sworn by the recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Will you state to the Board your name, grade, organization, and station?
General Robins. Thomas M. Robins, Major General, United States Army; Deputy Chief of Engineers.

2. General Grunert. General, this Board is after facts. It is required to go into facts of which you may have knowledge because of your position in the Chief of Engineer's office. We hope that you can throw some light on the subject.
General Frank will lead in the questioning, because we have divided the field into various parts so as to cover the ground as quickly as possible. The other members of the Board will ask some questions to help get an understanding of what is brought out. So, General Frank will lead in propounding the questions.

3. General Frank. What position did you hold in the fall of 1940?
General Robins. I was Assistant Chief of Engineers in charge of civil works. We also had at that time taken over in my Construction Division of Civil Works, airport construction or a large part of it.

4. General Frank. By civil works, you mean construction other than defense projects?
General Robins. That is correct. We had at that time two divisions, so to speak, in the office of the Chief of Engineers, a military division and a civil division.

[698] 5. General Frank. And you had charge of the civil division?
General Robins. I had charge of the civil division; but we had also taken over quite a large part of the Air Corps program, as you may recall, from the Quartermaster, and were carrying that on under my direction. That did not apply until about October, 1941, on the work in Hawaii.

6. General Frank. Are you familiar with the negotiations for contract 414–Eng–602, dated the 20th of December, 1940?
General Robins. Not the negotiations.

7. General Frank. Are you familiar with the contract with the Hawaiian Constructors, for defense projects in Hawaii?
General Robins. Yes.

8. General Frank. Will you state generally to the Board the manner in which you are familiar with it?
General Robins. It was brought to my attention as a matter of course in the office of the Chief of Engineers because the Contracts and Claims Section was operating under my direction, and it came up in this way, that the Chief Engineer at Honolulu, Colonel Wyman, came to Washington and recommended that the contract for this work in question be made with Callahan and Rohl and Connolly; and I was familiar to this extent, that those contractors were cleared through the O. P. M. and that the Contract Advisory Board was consulted and I knew that the contract at that time was in the amount of something over a million dollars. That is about the extent of what I had to do with it at that time.

9. General Frank. Who is O. P. M.?

General Robins. The Office of Production Management, which succeeded the O. E. M. At that time all contractors had to be cleared with them.

10. General Frank. Do you remember the date of this contract?

General Robins. My recollection is it was December 20, 1940.

11. General Frank. That is correct. Do you know that Rohl and Connolly constituted a firm, one of those contractors?

General Robins. Yes.

12. General Frank. Did you know Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

General Robins. I did not know him personally. I knew of his firm. I have known of his firm for quite a few years.

13. General Frank. Did you know that he was a German alien?

General Robins. No.

14. General Frank. What machinery have you in the Engineer Corps for determining the reliability and loyalty of contractors?

General Robins. Well, we always investigate the experience and the ability and the financial responsibility of contractors as a matter of course, as a matter of orders and regulations.

15. General Frank. What about the loyalty?

General Robins. Loyalty is a matter which we have never been charged specifically with investigating.

16. General Frank. Then, you can pick up any contractor who has produced good results from the construction point of view and give him a contract, if he has done good work, irrespective of his loyalty?

General Robins. We cannot do that under the law at the present time.

17. General Frank. What would have stopped you at that time?

General Robins. Well, at that time, as I understand the law at that time, you could not communicate any classified information to an alien.

18. General Frank. Do you remember when the Espionage Act was passed?

General Robins. I do not know just which act you are referring to, General.

19. General Frank. War Department Circular 121, the Espionage Act was the 28th of March, 1940. This was prior to the letting of this contract.

General Robins. Yes, that date is prior to the letting of the contract.

20. General Frank. And the provisions of the Espionage Act prohibit the letting of a defense work contract to an alien.
General Robins. I am not familiar with that.

21. General Frank. You are not now familiar with it?

General Robins. I do not know it as an Espionage Act. My understanding was that the first War Powers Act, which revived the old Trading With The Enemy Act, which was passed shortly after Pearl Harbor, forbids the awarding of a contract to an enemy alien.

I stated that, as I understood the law at the time that this contract was let, an alien could not be given any information in connection with a contract that was considered classified, but as I recollect that law it said nothing about the awarding of contracts. As far as that is concerned, none of us knew that Rohl was an enemy or an alien at that time. He was not an enemy alien. He was an alien, but we did not know it.

22. General Frank. What do you mean by "none of us knew"?

General Robins. Anyone that I know of that had anything to do with negotiating that contract in the office of the Chief of Engineers.

23. General Frank. Well, some people knew it, because we have documentary evidence to the effect that it was known that he was an alien.

General Robins. Oh, that was true. The first I knew of it I think was along in June or July when he applied for citizen-ship.

24. General Frank. It was necessary for him to be a citizen for his company to be awarded a defense contract; is that correct?

General Robins. No. I do not understand it that way. He could not take any active part in the contract or he could not be given any classified information, and he did not take any active part in the contract until he was made a citizen.

25. General Frank. If he had been given any information on the details of the defense contracts in Honolulu prior to his having been naturalized, that would have been in violation of the Army regulations which prohibit disclosing of secret information?

General Robins. I understand it would be in violation of the law to give him any.

26. General Frank. So any information that he got prior to his becoming a citizen, the man who gave it to him was culpable; is that correct, if he got it?

General Robins. Well I can answer that this way: that anyone knowing that any Army officer or anybody having anything to do with it that knew that he was an alien, that gave him that information, was certainly culpable, law or no law.

27. General Frank. All right. Do you know whether or not Rohl took any active part in the contract?

General Robins. It is my understanding that he took no active part in the contract whatever until after he was made a citizen, which was some time in September, 1941. He most certainly took no part in the negotiations of the contract, because I was familiar with that.

28. General Frank. Did a representative of his company take—

General Robins. No. The man that carried out the negotiations and who had the power of attorney to do so was Mr. Paul Grafe, who was the vice-president of the Callahan Construction Company.
29. General Frank. Do you remember ever meeting Mr. Connolly, who was a member of the firm of Rohl-Connolly?

General Robins. Yes, sir, I remember Mr. Connolly.

30. General Frank. Did you have negotiations with them prior to the time that Rohl became a citizen?

General Robins. You mean in connection with this contract?


General Robins. I did not conduct the negotiations for this contract, but to the best of my knowledge and understanding the negotiations were carried out entirely with Mr. Grafe. Now, Mr. Connolly was in town at that time, but Mr. Grafe represented The Hawaiian Constructors in negotiating that contract.

32. General Frank. Did you talk with Mr. Grafe?

General Robins. About this contract?

33. General Frank. Yes.

General Robins. Yes, he came in to see me and talked about it in a very general way.

34. General Frank. Did you talk to a Mr. Martin about some negotiations?

General Robins. Not about the negotiations. The first time that I remember seeing Mr. Martin is when he came in at the time that Rohl was trying to get his citizenship, and I think about the time that a letter was written from the office of the Chief of Engineers signed by General Kingman, Acting Chief of Engineers, requesting that the citizenship proceedings be expedited.

35. General Frank. What was your responsibility with respect to contracts in the office of the Chief of Engineers at this time?

General Robins. Well, I was responsible for all the construction contracts particularly for work which was under me and generally for the conduct of the Contracts and Claims Division of the office. This particular contract, the work at that time was under the military side of the office and not under me.

36. General Frank. You stated, or I get it by inference, that notwithstanding the fact that Rohl as an alien should not be given secret information, nevertheless it was all right to give it to his firm; is that correct?

General Robins. The way I stated that, I think, General, was that anyone that knew he was an alien—as far as I know, no detailed information was given to Mr. Rohl until after he was naturalized and went over to Hawaii. At the time the contract was negotiated I most certainly did not know that he was not a citizen of the United States, and I do not think anyone in the Chief's office that had anything to do with the negotiations knew that. Rohl and Connolly were well-known and reputable contractors out there on the West Coast, with a reputation for doing work as quickly and as cheaply as any other contractors on the coast.

37. General Frank. Well, somewhere in the scheme of organization of an astute outfit it strikes me that there should be some sort of machinery for determining the background of people with whom the government is making contracts. Was there such a system in the Engineer Corps setup at that time?

General Robins. There was as far as everything in connection with a contractor was concerned except the question
of loyalty; there was no machinery, never has been any; it never has been considered the duty of the Chief of the Branch of Technical Service, as they call it now, to conduct a G-2 investigation.

38. General Frank. Well, is there any machinery now for determining that before the Chief of Engineers lets a contract?

General Robins. Yes; as I understand it, now there is. We are required to report to the G-2 before we disclose any classified information in regard to the letting of a contract and, after a contract is let, to report that the contract has been let to such-and-such a firm, giving the names of the people involved.

39. General Frank. Was there any arrangement in 1940 to refer the contractors' names to G-2 to find out any background on them?

General Robins. Not to my knowledge.

40. General Frank. In other words, the question of loyalty never occurred; it was simply a question of efficiency?

General Robins. Yes, that generally. Of course, before the war the question of loyalty went along severally, without saying, in connection with the responsibility of the man.

41. General Frank. When were you aware that Hans Wilhelm Rohl was an alien?

General Robins. As I remember, it was some time in June, 1941, when the District Engineer wrote in and requested that the office of the Chief of Engineers request the proper authorities to expedite his becoming a citizen so that he could go to Honolulu and help to manage the work there.

42. General Frank. At that time was there any check-up made \[706\] with the F. B. I. or any other agency to find out if he had a background?

General Robins. As I recollect it, it was the understanding of the Acting Chief of Engineers that the F. B. I. knew all about this application for citizenship and had cleared it.

43. General Frank. That was an understanding. Was there any actual determination of fact on it?

General Robins. I could not answer that question, General, because I did not handle the details of that. My recollection is that that was stated in a letter. What it was based on, I do not know.

44. General Frank. This letter which is quoted in the Interim Report of the Committee on Military Affairs, House of Representatives, seventy-eighth Congress, second session, pursuant to House Resolution 30, as the copy of General Kingman's letter, next to the last paragraph says:

It is the understanding of this office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States is beyond question.

Do you know of any positive efforts that were made to determine that?

General Robins. No, I do not know what that statement was based on because I did not draft the letter and I did not pursue that any further. I assume that if a man was going up for citizenship he would not be granted citizenship unless his loyalty was investigated and found all right. In other words, it would seem to me that if he was granted citizenship there would not be any question about his loyalty.

45. General Frank. Well, this is before the court now. That is what this letter was, to go up before the Special Assistant to the Bureau of 70716—46—Ex. 145, vol. 1—23
Immigration and Naturalization, and here is a statement of the Acting Chief of Engineers: "It is the understanding that Mr. Rohl's loyalty is beyond question." I am trying to find out, from where did they determine that understanding.

General Robins. Well, I cannot answer that question, because I do not know.

46. General Frank. Furthermore, this letter is under date of August 28, 1941, and the contract in question is under date of the 20th of December, 1940, and this letter states that this group of contractors "are working on very important defense construction." Therefore the contract was let to this group of contractors that constituted The Hawaiian Constructors and included Rohl's firm while he still was a German alien.

General Robins. That is correct. He took no active part in the contract. He was not an officer of the Rohl and Connolly Company.

47. General Frank. Rohl was not an officer of the Rohl-Connolly Company?

General Robins. No. Connolly was president of the company.

48. General Frank. What check did you make that he took no part in the operation of the organization?

General Robins. Well, I know that Mr. Paul Grafe went to Hawaii and managed the—took charge of the contract operations there, and that Rohl did not go to Hawaii until he was naturalized.

49. General Frank. Do you know of any communication or do you know of any actual effort expended from any place in the Corps of Engineers to find out anything about Rohl's background?

General Robins. About everything connected with his ability to execute that contract. I know of no investigation that was made to find out whether he was a citizen of the United States or not, or whether he was loyal or anything of that kind.

50. General Frank. Who was the man in charge of your Finance and Contract Section at that time?


51. General Frank. That is right; Colonel Gesler. I take it from the information that we have had up until now that Colonel Gesler was the man responsible for writing that letter asking that Rohl's citizenship papers be expedited. He should be able to shed some light on this?

General Robins. I think he could, yes, sir.

52. General Frank. Was it the responsibility of the contracting officer, Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., who was also the District Engineer in Hawaii, to check as to whether Rohl was a citizen?

General Robins. It was, under the law, if he was going to give Mr. Rohl any information whatever in regard to the classified parts of the contract.

53. General Frank. Do you know anything concerning the failure of The Hawaiian Constructors to complete construction of the defense projects within the times indicated prior to the 7th of December, '41, prior to the time indicated on the job orders?

General Robins. I have no information on that except the reports that came in as to the status of completion.

54. General Frank. Do you have any information as to whether or not those reports indicated delays?
General Robins. Those reports showed incomplete status on many items of the contract.

55. General Frank. Do you remember anything about the aircraft warning system?

General Robins. My recollection is that there were three of those permanent stations under construction, none of which was entirely complete. One of them was about 80 or 90 percent complete, and the others a less percentage complete.

56. General Frank. Do you remember what was holding them up?

General Robins. I have no direct information as to what held them up. I know what was claimed in a general way. One thing was the delay in determining the locations, delay in approval of plans.

57. General Frank. Approval of what plans?

General Robins. That is, plans for the layout and the foundations, and so forth. Also it was common knowledge that there was great difficulty in getting men, equipment, and materials. That condition prevailed in the Hawaiian Islands throughout the whole time of the contract.

58. General Frank. What is there about the plans of a permanent radar set that would require change? The towers are already fabricated and fit a fixed-dimensional foundation, and the other stuff is all fixed. What could change about it?

General Robins. Well, I think there was quite an argument, you might say, General, about whether the stations were to be fixed or movable and just what was to be done. Of course, the foundation, the construction work on one of those stations is very simple, once you have got the foundation layout for the tower and also for the power plant building or anything else.

59. General Frank. Well, they determined ahead of time that there were three of them that were to be permanent. Therefore there was no question about the fixed nature of those plans, was there?

General Robins. Well, I would hate to answer directly on that. If I might suggest, that the Board would find the best and most accurate information on the details as to the delays right there in the Honolulu office.

60. General Frank. You just got through saying that one of the delays was incident to the change in plans, and I wondered when you stated that if you knew what any of those changes in plans were.

General Robins. No, sir, I do not, because, as I say, that work was handled up until a very short time before Pearl Harbor in the planning stage by the construction section of the Chief of Engineers' office, which was not under me.

61. General Frank. I see. In any event, you think that more accurate and detailed information would be available in the district office in Honolulu?

General Robins. Yes, sir. I think that is the only way you would get at the real facts as to what they had at the time the work orders were issued, and so forth.

62. General Frank. A copy of the job orders has been sent in from the district office to the Office of the Corps of Engineers, Honolulu? Was that the original set, or is there still a copy of the job orders and the contract in Honolulu?

General Robins. I am sure the original is in Honolulu.
63. General Frank. What knowledge do you have concerning whether any military personnel neglected duties relating to the contract? Have you any?

General Robins. No, sir.

64. General Frank. Have you any information as to whether or not there was any appeal to higher authority relative to delays and deficiencies?

General Robins. No, I know of none.

65. General Frank. By the District Engineer?

General Robins. There were many requests for expediting materials and equipment and things of that kind that went on continuously. Whether you would call that an appeal or not, I do not know.

66. General Frank. Can you put your finger on any of those?

General Robins. No, I cannot. I imagine I can go to the files and pull out a lot of them, because it was a fight to get anything done at that time. There was a great deal of work going on in Hawaii. The Navy was doing a lot of work over there, and there was one continual fight to recruit people and to get equipment and get materials and get shipping space.

67. General Frank. Can you get in your records and give us a list of those appeals that were made, those requests? [712] We would like to have them to indicate the effort that was made to eliminate delays as they existed in this contract.

[713] General Robins. I would be very glad to have the files examined.

68. General Frank. But you state that there were a large number of such messages. I would like to get copies of them. Will you have that looked up, and furnish a set of those to the Board?

General Robins. Yes, sir; I will.

69. General Frank. Will you make a note of it, so we won't miss it?

General Robins. Yes, sir.

70. General Frank. To your knowledge, what information was given Wyman relative to completing these defense projects as speedily as possible?

General Robins. No, I have no direct knowledge on that.

71. General Frank. What were the functions of the position you occupied on the 20th of December 1940, with respect to the contract to which we are referring?

General Robins. The only responsibility I had was as to the qualifications of the contractor, seeing that they were cleared by proper authorities, and the fee that was charged.

72. General Frank. And the “clearing by the proper authorities” took into consideration, so far as you considered at that time, only his ability and general reputation for doing good work; it did not bring up the question of loyalty?

General Robins. No, sir. Of course, we didn't know at that time, and don't know yet, what the OPM clearance covered, but we were required to report everyone and get a clearance from them before we could go ahead. It might well be that some investigations other than those of just pure ability, [714] experience, and so forth, were carried out, there, but we certainly did not consider it the duty of the Office of the Chief of Engineers to investigate the citizenship and loyalty of the contractor.
73. General Frank. If every other office connected with it had the same attitude, then nobody looked it up.

General Robins. As it stands, now, we are not supposed to make the investigation, General. That is for G-2 and the FBI.

74. General Frank. Somebody has to make it, though?

General Robins. Well, I imagine that the G-2 at that time was supposed to be keeping track of those kinds of things.

75. General Frank. Do you have any memory of any request from the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, or from Colonel Wyman, requesting that you assist in speeding up materials for the work, or assist in obtaining a higher priority on materials for the work?

General Robins. I know that there was a lot of that done. I can't quote here any specific instances.

76. General Frank. Are you sure that there was a lot of it done?

General Robins. Yes, I am.

77. General Frank. All right. You are going to furnish us with such copies of that as you can find.

Did you know on the 20th of December that Rohl was then or had been under investigation by a government agency for suspicious activities?

General Robins. No, sir.

78. General Frank. What if any measures should have been taken by personnel of the Corps of Engineers for the protection of the Government against contracting with a person having such a record?

General Robins. As far as awarding the contract was concerned, legally I don't think there was any obligation on the office of the Chief of Engineers to investigate. As far as furnishing anyone in the firm with any classified information, then I presume the contracting officer was bound to investigate.

79. General Frank. I think I asked you this, before: Right now, who is responsible for looking into the loyalty and integrity of your contractors?


80. General Frank. Do you have a fixed manner in which they are requested to do that?

General Robins. Yes, sir; we are supposed to, before any information is disclosed, secret information, in any way preliminary to making a contract, we are to clear with G-2 on the people that are going to be taken into confidence.

81. General Frank. There is a positive system for accomplishing that?

General Robins. Yes; but that was put into effect in 1943.

82. General Frank. What if any rules or regulations of the Corps of Engineers did Colonel Wyman violate in the event he, having been informed that Rohl was a German alien, discussed with him details of the secret contract?

General Robins. As far as I know, it has been some time since I checked over all the orders and regulations of the Chief of Engineers. I don't think there is anything in the orders and regulations on that subject.

83. General Frank. In other words, it is all in Army reg-
General Robins. Well, if it is in Army regulations, then it is in O&R of the Chief of Engineers, because that specifically calls attention to all pertinent provisions of the Army regulations.

84. General Frank. Did you ever receive notice or knowledge of any reports concerning the activities of Colonel Wyman in Hawaii which were derogatory to him?

General Robins. I never received any official reports; no.

85. General Frank. Did you ever receive any reports with respect to his intimate association with Rohl?

General Robins. Not any official reports; no, sir.

86. General Frank. Did you ever receive any reports?

General Robins. Letters were written to the Chief of Engineers after the investigation made out in California by a committee of the legislature of California, in which many allegations were made against Wyman in the connection you mention.

87. General Frank. What date was that?

General Robins. It was in 1943, I think. It was during 1943.

88. General Frank. Did you ever receive notice or have knowledge of a report dated the 14th of February 1942, by an Army officer to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, to the effect that Colonel Wyman should be relieved as district engineer for gross inefficiency?

General Robins. No, sir.

89. General Frank. Are you familiar with the details surrounding Colonel Wyman’s relief as district engineer in Hawaii?

General Robins. I am not. I know that there was some correspondence between the Department Engineer and the Office of the Chief of Engineers to the effect that Colonel Wyman could be released, and that he was released, but I was not directly connected with the personnel of the branch office of the Chief of Engineers.

90. General Frank. Do you know whether copies of that correspondence are available?

General Robins. I do not know. I imagine that they are.

91. General Frank. Will you make an investigation of that and furnish the Board with those copies, please.

Did you have anything to do with the assignment of Colonel Wyman to the Canal project?

General Robins. Yes, sir. He was assigned there on my recommendation.

92. General Frank. Let us have the background of that.

General Robins. The Canal project was dumped into my lap one morning and had to be done in six months, and I went over all the available engineer officers that could be assigned to duty at that project, and I though Wyman was the best man available to go up there and push it through.

93. General Frank. Why was he relieved from Honolulu?

General Robins. I couldn’t answer that question specifically. My understanding was that the Department Engineer, General Lyman, wanted to have him relieved, but it was not my understanding that he was relieved for inefficiency.

94. General Frank. There has been reported in the congressional investigation a background of association between Rohl and Wyman. Over a period of years, in Los Angeles, a determined
effort was made by Wyman to have Rohl's citizenship hastened; a
determined effort by Wyman to have Rohl-Connolly established in
Honolulu. There has been testimony with respect to the close per-
sonal relations of Rohl and Wyman even in Honolulu; and do you
mean to say that this went on over a period of several years, and no
information on it ever infiltrated into the Engineer headquarters in
Washington?

General Robins. It certainly did not get to me. And I knew noth-
ing about Rohl—I knew that Rohl-Connolly had contracts with the
Engineer Department in Los Angeles and vicinity, but I knew nothing
of Wyman's social relations or personal relations with Rohl, whatever;
it was none of my business.

95. General Frank. Do you know anything relative to Wyman's
activities in awarding contracts to Rohl's firm in the Canal project?

General Robins. Yes, sir; I do. That was in connection with what
we called the Hanes cut-off road. Foley Brothers was the firm
selected for that contract, and Wyman wanted Rohl-Connolly in
it only to get the floating equipment that Rohl and Connolly owned,
and which was coming off the job down in Los Angeles; the Los
Angeles breakwater. Wyman told me that, himself.

96. General Frank. There never seemed to be any question in your
mind over the fact that, where Wyman went, there went Rohl and
Connolly, also.

General Robins. No, I never—the only place he ever went was from Los Angeles to Hawaii, up to that time.

97. General Frank. And from Hawaii to Alaska?

General Robins. Yes; but this was only a very small part of the
work up in the Pacific Northwest, and I asked Wyman why he wanted
Rohl and Connolly, and he gave me that as a reason, and it was under-
stood that Mr. Rohl—by that time, this investigation had started on
Mr. Rohl, and it was understood by all concerned that Mr. Rohl would
not go on the work or have anything to do with the management, that
Foley Brothers would handle the contract, all Rohl had was an interest
in it on account of his equipment. Mr. Rohl never had anything to
do with the management of that contract in any way, shape, or form.

98. General Frank. You seem to exclude Rohl from this Alaskan
venture. However, he walked in so far as reward was concerned, in
the fees for the use of his equipment, certainly?

General Robins. Certainly. He was a stockholder in Rohl-Con-
nolly Co., and he got his share of the rentals, because it was his equip-
ment.

99. General Frank. That is "the fly in the ointment," so to speak,
Isn't it?

General Robins. Oh, I wouldn't think so. We were desperate for
the equipment. We had to have it. That was the only place we could
get it. There certainly was nothing dishonest, or no question of any
classified information, or anything of that kind.

100. General Frank. Did you receive notice and knowledge of any
reports concerning the activities of Colonel Wyman on the Canal
project that were derogatory to him?

General Robins. Well, the first report that I saw was the
so-called "Horowitz Report." I would say that was derogatory to
him. That was a report made by Colonel Horowitz to Colonel Strong.
Colonel Horowitz was on duty under Colonel Strong, who was in charge of the construction division, and Colonel Horowitz' duties were to go around and inspect all the projects.

101. General Frank. Do you know anything about the Dawson Creek explosion?

General Robins. Yes, I know they had an explosion and killed a lot of people.

102. General Frank. Was there any action taken with respect to it?

General Robins. There was a very thorough investigation made of that.

103. General Frank. Nobody responsible?

General Robins. The responsibility was fixed on—to a certain extent, the contractor was mainly responsible.

104. General Frank. That is, Foley?

General Robins. No, no. No, that was—I have forgotten. There was a contractor that had the contract with the telephone line, Miller Brothers. I think. Foley had nothing in the world to do with it; neither did Mr. Rohl.

105. General Frank. What was Wyman's relation to this?

General Robins. Wyman was division engineer, at the time, and in charge of all the work up there.

106. General Frank. Did he have any responsibility with respect to this Dawson Creek explosion?

General Robins. He had general responsibility, as division engineer. My recollection is that the responsibility, as far as the Government was concerned, was narrowed down to Wyman's executive officer. Wyman was absent at the time. He was out on the job somewhere, and Colonel Woodbury and—I am not certain; I think, the district engineer, and some of the inspectors. Colonel Woodbury was reprimanded as a result of the investigation.

107. General Frank. Why was Colonel Wyman relieved from his assignment to the Canol project? Can you state the circumstances surrounding that?

General Robins. From my point of view, because he didn't seem to be able to administer the job in the way it should be administered.

108. General Frank. Was it for inefficiency?

General Robins. In many ways, he was very efficient. In getting work done, and shoving the work and everything, he was very efficient. He was not efficient in keeping a smooth-running organization and keeping all the administrative matters under control and coordinated.

109. General Frank. How did his administration of the Canol project compare with his administration in Honolulu?

General Robins. I am not intimately acquainted with his administration in Honolulu, except I know that he got a tremendous amount of work done over there. He did the same thing on the Canol project.

110. General Frank. Did you have anything to do with Colonel Wyman's present assignment?

General Robins. No.

111. General Frank. You did recommend him for the Canol assignment?

General Robins. I did.
112. General Frank. Have you anything further, with respect to this case, that you would like to state to the Board?

General Robins. No, sir. I don't think so. I have simply covered about everything I could testify on.

113. General Frank. I would like to ask you one question about something we were talking about, some time back. Did you talk with Mr. Connolly relative to the negotiations for this contract?

General Robins. No, sir; I did not. The only man I talked to was Grafe.

114. General Frank. Are your initials on this Exhibit 2?

General Robins. No; I don't see them.

115. General Grunert. Have you any questions, General Russell?

116. General Russell. General, when this contract was negotiated and entered into on the 20th of December 1940, I believe you state that Wyman came in to Washington, then?

General Robins. Yes; he came in. That was customary. When he had negotiated a fixed-fee contract, the district engineer came in ordinarily and sat right down and participated in the negotiations, because he was the man that had to administer the contract.

17. General Russell. Was there a group of people who came in with Wyman, representing these contractors?

General Robins. So far as I know, Mr. Grafe, I know, represented him. He had the power of attorney, and he signed the contract. Whether he had any lawyers or not, I don't know, because, as I said before, I didn't participate personally in the negotiations.

118. General Russell. As you recollect, it was only Wyman and Grafe who were in here when that contract was signed?

General Robins. I know that they were both here; yes.

119. General Russell. You do not remember anybody else?

General Robins. Mr. Connolly might have been in town. I think Mr. Connolly was in town, at the time.

120. General Russell. But only Grafe and Wyman made—

General Robins. Grafe and Wyman, so far as I know, were the only ones.

121. General Russell. Who was Martin?

General Robins. Martin is a lawyer and an attorney who has represented Rohl-Connolly.

122. General Russell. As I understood your testimony this man Martin came to the Chief of Engineer's office, and it was through his activity that this letter which is known as Exhibit 2 now, and is the letter in which the Engineer's office here in Washington asked that action on Rohl's application for citizenship be expedited, was written? Now, is it true that Martin is the man who came in and had that letter written and executed?

General Robins. Mr. Martin came in, in that matter. As I recollect it, Colonel Wyman wrote a letter, an official letter to the Chief of Engineers, asking that such a letter as this be written, and that this Mr. Martin came to Washington along with that, and came to the office, because he knew that letter was coming in, and that Mr. Martin presented all the detailed information, a great deal of which later came out in the court.
123. General Russell. Do we have a copy of the Wyman letter to the Chief of Engineers, asking for the expediting of the application of Rohl to become a citizen?

General Robins. I think we can get that out of the files.

124. General Russell. Have you any work-sheet down there on which are contained any data that Martin gave you about Rohl?

General Robins. I have not.

125. General Russell. Is there a file down there on this expediting of Rohl's application?

General Robins. I have never seen the file. A copy of the letter of course is in the file.

126. General Russell. Would you have your records searched to determine that?

General Robins. I will be glad to do that.

127. General Russell. There were a number of contractors who organized themselves into a group for the completion of this work on Oahu; is that right?

General Robins. Yes; there were several firms.

128. General Russell. One of them was this Rohl-Connolly Company; is that right?

General Robins. That is right.

129. General Russell. So far as you know, Rohl was not an officer of the Rohl-Connolly Company, was he?

General Robins. No. Connolly was president of the Rohl-Connolly Company.

130. General Russell. His only relation to that company, so far as you know, was that of a stockholder?

General Robins. My understanding is that before it entered into this contract—all this I found out afterward—Rohl gave up any position in the company as an officer and Connolly took over as president.

131. General Russell. Rohl-Connolly was a corporation?

General Robins. Yes.

132. General Russell. Did this man Rohl have any interest in any of the other companies or associated companies in doing war work?

General Robins. So far as I know, he had none.

133. General Russell. So far as you know, the only relation that Rohl had to those organizations was as a stockholder in the Rohl-Connolly Company?

General Robins. Up to the time he was naturalized.

134. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not Rohl had any official position in the Rohl-Connolly Company prior to getting this contract of December 20? Does it appear to you that he just stepped out from that knowing that he should not be officiating as an officer of that company when they were engaged in a defense project?

General Robins. Yes. He was an officer of the company before that.

135. General Grunert. It appears that he just stepped down well knowing that he should not stay in there on that sort of work until he became a citizen?

General Robins. Oh, yes; I do not think there is any question about that.
136. General Grunert. Who selected Wyman to go out to Hawaii?
General Robins. I think Colonel Wyman went to Hawaii with troops and was stationed at Schofield Barracks. I have no personal knowledge of the circumstances but I know that the District Engineer was sent home and Wyman was right there and he was detailed on that job.

137. General Grunert. From what you know of his work in Hawaii—I believe you said something about the good work he had done out there, so you selected him to go to the Canol Project—what is there of record to show the good work he had done out there?
General Robins. I think he had done a tremendous amount of work very quickly in connection with the chain of airfields which were put in just before Pearl Harbor; and he certainly did [727] a tremendous amount of work after Pearl Harbor.

138. General Grunert. Before 1941 the air warning service was not completed and a number of defense projects were not completed anywhere near to the estimated completion date. Was that considered good work?
General Robins. I think he did lots of other work over there, General. You will find a considerable quantity. The aircraft warning service, from a construction standpoint, amounted to very little except getting into the locations.

139. General Grunert. What was the basis of his getting the Distinguished Service medal?
General Robins. My understanding is that the citation mentioned particularly his work on the Island Airfields.

140. General Grunert. Who recommended him?
General Robins. I think that Colonel Hannum did; also the Division Engineer recommended him.

141. General Grunert. Then, so far as you remember the citation, it was mainly about the work after December 7; did he work on the chain of airports or what?
General Robins. My recollection is that the work on the chain of airfields was what you might call the outstanding feature of the citation. I do not think it excluded any work he might have done.

142. General Grunert. We are quite a bit concerned about the efforts made by all those concerned, particularly from the Hawaiian end, about getting these defense projects, particularly the air warning service projects, stepped up; so I wish you would exert the greatest effort in seeing what the records of the Engineer's Office can give us as to any complaints, requests for help to get those projects through, and so forth, and getting [728] higher priority in procuring materials and getting prompt shipments, and things of that sort. I think it would help the Board a great deal if you could give us the history of that as shown by the records.

General Robins. Very well, sir. We will get everything we can. I am sure the Board can get a great deal of that in Honolulu in the District Office. Their files are not quite as voluminous as ours. We will get everything we can.

143. General Frank. You stated that Wyman did outstanding work in Honolulu by completing certain projects other than those we have mentioned. The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department has stated that the project that was on first priority in the Hawaiian
Islands was the aircraft warning service project. If Wyman was so good at getting results, it would seem that he ought to have gotten results on the project of first priority. Would you not think so?

General Robins. Yes; I would think so. I do not know the reasons for his lack of progress on these A. W. S. stations.

144. General Grunert. There appearing to be no further questions, the Board thanks you for giving us your time and helping us out.

General Robins. I was very glad to do so.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 5:44 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
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PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

TUESDAY, AUGUST 15, 1944

MUNITIONS BUILDINGS,
Washington, D. C.

The Board at 9:35 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.


Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

(Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., was sworn as Executive Officer to the Board.)

General Grunert. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL ROBERT B. RICHARDS, GENERAL STAFF CORPS, FINANCE OFFICER, A. C. OF S., G-2, WAR DEPARTMENT

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Colonel Richards. Robert B. Richards, Colonel, General Staff Corps, Finance Officer, A. C. of S., G-2, War Department.

2. General Grunert. Colonel, the Board is after facts, and a representative of your particular section of the War Department we think should have some facts that we want; and General Russell will lead in propounding the questions on the subject on which we expect to get facts from you.

3. General Russell. Colonel, what was your assignment on July 1, 1940?

Colonel Richards. I was Finance Officer, G-2.

4. General Russell. Have you been on that assignment continuously since that date?

Colonel Richards. July 1, 1940? I have. I was assigned to that duty about the 23rd of November, 1939.

5. General Russell. Have you been on that assignment continuously since November 23, 1939?

Colonel Richards. I have.

6. General Russell. Colonel, the subject which we want to develop by your testimony is the funds made available to the Assistant Chief
of Staff, G–2, for the employment of special operators for investigations and the proportions of those funds which were made available to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department for the employment of special operators. I will ask you whether or not these funds to which I have just referred result from Congressional appropriations that are a matter of public record.

Colonel Richards. They are the result of Congressional appropriations which are a matter of public record.

7. General Russell. Hence there is nothing which you might give us in your testimony about appropriations of these funds which would not be a matter of public record?

Colonel Richards. No, sir; there is not.

[732] 8. General Russell. First, we will direct our attention to the appropriation for the period July 1, 1940, to June 30, 1941. Will you please state to the Board the amount appropriated for hiring of special personnel by A. C. of S., G–2, for that period?

Colonel Richards. The appropriation, titled Miscellaneous Expenses, Military Intelligence Activities, Army, in the appropriation act of the fiscal year 1941 carries language which makes it available for all purposes of military intelligence, which includes other objects than the actual hire of, for example, investigation personnel. However, the military appropriation act, which was signed on the 13th of June, 1940, was for $125,000. Subsequent to that the second deficiency appropriation act, signed on the 27th of June, 1940, carried an addition to this military intelligence appropriation of $135,000. Then the third supplementary appropriation act, signed on the 8th of October, 1940, carried a further addition to the same portion of the 1941 appropriation act of $100,000; making a total of $360,000, which was available for miscellaneous expenses requisite for and incident to the military intelligence activities of the Army and maintenance of military attaches at the United States Embassies and Legations abroad, including the purchase of law books, maps, professional books of reference, and subscriptions to newspapers and periodicals, for the hire of interpreters, special agents, and guides, and for such other purposes as the Secretary of War may deem proper.

The balance of that appropriation act is not particularly germane, and is outlined in the published act.


Colonel Richards. By an allotment to the A. C. of S., G–2, of the funds and the suballotment by him to other agencies of the Army.

10. General Russell. Was it necessary to account for those funds?

Colonel Richards. Yes, sir, except that these funds may be expended upon confidential voucher which has the approval of the Secretary of War and the details of such expenditures are not disclosed upon the face of the voucher nor the attached documents which, with ordinary vouchers, go to the General Accounting Office.

11. General Russell. Were allotments made from that fund to the Hawaiian Department for the fiscal year 1941?

Colonel Richards. Yes, sir.

12. General Russell. Can you tell us briefly the total amount that was allotted and any directions that were given as to its expenditure?

Colonel Richards. On the 25th of July, 1940—and, parenthetically,
I might explain that although that appropriation was available from the 1st of July, the actual allotments sometimes are not made until after the 1st of July to us, and we do not make them to, for instance, the Hawaiian Department, until after the 1st of July, but often advise other agencies to whom we are allotting that the allotment is being made and they have the authority to expend it prior to the actual receipt of this document, which is War Department Form 23. So, on the 25th of July, we allotted to the A. C. of S., G-2, Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, T. H., the sum of $6,060 from the appropriation miscellaneous expenses, military intelligence activities, Army, fiscal year 1941. The limitation placed upon this sum of $6,060 is carried in the language of the allotting document, Form 23, which reads as follows:

(Excerpt from Form 23 is as follows:)

For the maintenance of intelligence work, including the hire of civilian personnel, not to exceed $3,000 for the year. $6,000.

I might explain, however, that the limitation of $3,060 for the year was placed upon the amount which could be expended for the hire of clerical personnel out of the total of $6,060; thus leaving for other purposes than the hire of civilian personnel, $3,000.

13. General Frank. The $6,060 was for the period from the 1st of July, 1940, to the 30th of June, 1941?

Colonel Richards. That is correct, sir.

14. General Frank. Was this $6,060 to cover the normal routine expenses of clerical personnel permanently assigned to the G-2 office?

Colonel Richards. No, sir. The clerical personnel permanently assigned to the G-2 office were drawn from the station complement assigned to the Hawaiian Department, and additional clerks were authorized to be paid for from this appropriation who were engaged at least 50 percent of their time on counter-intelligence work.

15. General Frank. Why do you call them clerks?

Colonel Richards. They were civilian clerks, sir. They were not enlisted investigators.

16. General Frank. I know; but why call them clerks at all? They really were investigators, were they not?

Colonel Richards. No, sir. I might explain that investigations which were being carried on required a great amount of clerical personnel to type the necessary reports, and, for example, later we estimated that it took one clerk for each three investigators. Reports were sent to O. N. I., F. B. I., and other agencies.

17. General Frank. Were some of these investigators civilian investigators?

Colonel Richards. That I do not know, sir. The clerks were civilian clerks and were not investigators.

18. General Frank. If they had had some civilian investigators and $3,000 was to be paid for clerks, it certainly does not leave very much money to be spent for investigative purposes in Hawaii, does it?

Colonel Richards. No, sir. I might explain, however, that additions were made, if I may continue with the further allotments which were made.

On November 15 an increase was made to the previous allotment of $1,500, "Increase to cover intelligence activities as per recent radio from this office."
19. General Grunert. Do I understand, then, that $1,500 was for use in addition to the $3,000 for other purposes than additional clerks?

Colonel Richards. Yes, sir; because in this allotment of $1,500 no mention was made of any increased authority so far as clerks were concerned. Therefore the original limitation placed upon the Hawaiian Department in the first allotment [736] would hold, namely, that they were not to spend more than $3,060 during the fiscal year.

20. General Russell. To hurry along, Colonel, because I have gone over the figures, it came to pass that you sent those people $7,500 out there for the fiscal year 1941, and toward the end of that fiscal year they turned back to you $424.79?

Colonel Richards. $424.79 was returned from the Hawaiian Department.

21. General Russell. So that the Hawaiian Department in the fiscal year 1941 had $7,500 of these funds and used slightly more than $7,000 of them?

Colonel Richards. That is correct, sir.

22. General Russell. And a limitation on clerk hire of $3,000 was placed on the expenditure of the funds?

Colonel Richards. $3,060; yes, sir.

23. General Russell. Let us talk about the last six months of 1941.

General Grunert. Is that the fiscal year or the calendar year?

24. General Russell. The calendar year, up to the 7th of December when the attack was made on Pearl Harbor. The record which you have shown me, Colonel, indicates that an initial appropriation to A. C. of S., G-2, for the fiscal year 1942 was $640,000. Is that true?

Colonel Richards. That is correct.

25. General Russell. And the appropriation act itself was signed on the 30th of June, 1941?

Colonel Richards. Yes, sir.

26. General Russell. And that, by a supplementary appropriation act which was signed on the 17th of December, 1941, was increased to $239,000?

Colonel Richards. Increased by $239,000.

27. General Russell. Then for that period, July 1st to December 1st, 1941, there was available for this fund $640,000?

Colonel Richards. That should be stated from July 1st to and including December 17. The supplementary appropriation act was not signed until the 17th of December.

28. General Russell. Of that money, how much was made available to the Hawaiian Department prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Colonel Richards. On the 16th of July, 1941, we allotted to the Hawaiian Department $8,320 for the first and second quarters. The allotment in the previous year was made for the total year, but this was $8,320 for the first and second quarters.

29. General Russell. So they had $8,640 made available to them for the first six months?

Colonel Richards. $8,320.

30. General Russell. Can you tell us right quickly how much of that could be expended on clerk hire?

[737] Colonel Richards. $2,430 during the half year. The limitation placed upon them for clerk hire was for the full year, of not to exceed $4,860, therefore dividing that by two to arrive at the figure of $2,430.
31. General Russell. Now, Colonel, a question or two about the general purposes for which this money was appropriated. I will ask you whether or not it was to be for the hire of special operators to secure information in different parts of the world that the War Depart might be interested in.

Colonel Richards. Aside from the limitations which were placed upon the expenditure of these funds by the appropriation act, I cannot answer that question, sir. It is a G-2 policy matter. However, it has come under my observation that these funds were spent, have been spent, for the hire of agents, reimbursement to individuals giving or selling information.

32. General Russell. There is reference in the appropriation act to expenditures in connection with our foreign embassies. Was it for the upkeep of the normal costs of those embassies that this money was expended?

Colonel Richards. No, sir. The portion which was expended out of this appropriation by our military attaches at foreign embassies and legations was for, in the main, military attaché maintenance allowance which was used for official entertainment and for compensation for the necessary front which the military attaché had to maintain. Also, the military attaché was usually authorized not to exceed a small amount for the purchase of information.

33. General Russell. I think that is all I have.

34. General Grunert. I do not see just what we have gotten, and I would like to develop the thing a little further, and take Hawaii, for instance. For 1940 and 1941 up to December 7, what total amount of money was available to the Commanding General over there through his G-2 to get information that he could not get otherwise? As I understand it here, approximately $4,500 plus $6,390; approximately $10,000; is that right?

Colonel Richards. If I may make a calculation here, $10,310.

35. General Grunert. Now, what was that command over there? Did that just take in the Hawaiian Islands themselves, or any outlying islands outside of the Hawaiian group itself?

Colonel Richards. That I do not know, sir.

36. General Grunert. You do not know. Now, of these comparatively large amounts for military intelligence activities of the Army of $360,000 and $640,000, was some of that turned back to the Treasury at the end of the year, or was it all expended? I do not care about the particular amounts, but was a percentage of it turned back? If so, the approximate percentage?

Colonel Richards. That figure I cannot tell you, sir. It is on record with the Purchase Office of the War Department.

37. General Grunert. According to your memory was it 5 percent, 10 percent, or what?

Colonel Richards. I think, sir, that comparatively little of the fiscal year 1941 appropriation was turned back. You understand that these funds are allotted to a great many agencies. Each one of those agencies wishes to have sufficient funds to take care of all of their obligations. Thereby, at the end of the fiscal year these turnbacks of many small amounts foot up to a considerable amount.

38. General Grunert. Did the A. C. of S., G-2, and the War Department General Staff attempt to get more funds than were given to them? Do you know?
Colonel Richards. I do not believe that in the fiscal year 1941 the A. C. of S., G–2, made any request for more than the $360,000 which was appropriated for his purposes. However, in the fiscal year '42 we had in progress prior to Pearl Harbor the appropriation act of $239,000, and also at approximately that same time an appropriation act of $1,343,000 which was not signed until April 28, 1942.

39. General Grunert. Do you know whether these additional amounts were requested for a particular purpose or to supplement these various allotments that are usually given out?

Colonel Richards. For many particular purposes. The appropriation act is defended in detail for such and such items.

40. General Grunert. Do you know whether any of those pertained to an attempt to get more information about the situation in the Far East, particularly in the mandated islands?

Colonel Richards. I have no such information; no, sir.

41. General Russell. Colonel, you have testified that in the fiscal year 1941 $360,000 was made available to G–2 under the appropriation act which you have already described. Do you know how much of that money was used by G–2 to hire special operators to procure information, or for the purchase of \[747\] information?

Colonel Richards. No, sir.

42. General Russell. Is there any way that you can determine that amount?

Colonel Richards. No, sir. The records are in the offices to which the funds were allotted.

43. General Russell. None of that money, then, was expended for the employment of special operators or to purchase information by the G–2 section directly?

Colonel Richards. That I cannot be sure of, sir.

44. General Russell. Would you follow up this line of investigation we have indicated and advise us at your convenience as to what you discover?

Colonel Richards. That, sir, you want for specifically the Hawaiian Department, or the Army as a whole?

45. General Russell. Both if we can get it.

Colonel Richards. The activities of G–2 included all the corps areas, the departments, and our overseas offices.

46. General Russell. Could you get both for us: Hawaiian Department and the summation of the expenditures as a whole for those two purposes?

Colonel Richards. I will attempt to.

47. General Grunert. Would the same thing apply to the $640,000, fiscal year 1942, or half of that fiscal year?

48. General Russell. Yes, it would. I am just wondering if we were getting into trouble and if there is a lot of confusion in our records. I do not know. Would you make the same search with respect to the $640,000 for the period July 1st— \[748\] December 17, 1941?

49. General Grunert. 7th; not the 17th.

50. General Russell. They got some money on the 17th.

51. General Grunert. All right.

52. General Russell. They used up the $640,000 by December 16th.

Colonel Richards. Yes, sir.
53. General Grunert. I would like to develop just one more point. I believe you said you did not know just to what extent the Hawaiian Department extended in the use of this so-called G-2 money, whether it extended outside of the actual Hawaiian group or not.

Colonel Richards. No, sir, I do not know the limitations that were then placed upon the activities of the Hawaiian Department.

54. General Grunert. Was there any allotment of funds to any agency that would or could cover the mandated islands?

Colonel Richards. That I do not know, sir. I have no recollection.

55. General Grunert. Do you know if any activities were carried on directly by G-2 that covered matters that did not pertain to any particular department or corps area in which these funds were allotted?

Colonel Richards. I have no such knowledge, sir, no.

56. General Frank. May I ask a question now: Do you have any information as to how these United States appropriations compare with funds appropriated for similar purposes by England, Russia, Germany?

Colonel Richards. No, sir.

[743] General Frank. Japan?

Colonel Richards. No, sir.

58. General Frank. Have you any way of looking that up?

Colonel Richards. I think that some of our records might show, but I can assure you that the information that we had from Japan and Germany would not show any breakdown for military intelligence.

59. General Frank. Well, the G-2 Department was out there for the purpose of getting information. Suppose you look and find out if they got any information along the line of the question that I just asked; will you, please?

Colonel Richards. Yes, sir.

60. General Frank. All right.

Colonel Richards. You would like England, Russia, Japan, and Germany?

61. General Frank. Yes. Just make a comparison to see what they were spending to get information on world situations.

Now, we will say that the Hawaiian Department was given $16,000 for a year, and that out of that they were authorized to spend about $5,000 for the year for extra clerks.

Colonel Richards. Correct.

62. General Frank. That left $11,000 for agents for investigative work?

Colonel Richards. Yes, sir.

63. General Frank. About what do they pay those agents?

Colonel Richards. I do not know, sir.

64. General Frank. Well, were they hired—do they pay $2,000, $3,000, or what?

[744] Colonel Richards. I do not know, sir.

65. General Frank. Well, we shall assume that they pay them $2,500, and that would give them $11,000, we will say five agents.

Colonel Richards. On that basis, yes, sir.

66. General Frank. Roughly speaking. We have, I think, from the Roberts Commission a report to the effect that there were attached to the Japanese Consulate in Honolulu something like 80 Japanese
agents gathering information on us in the Hawaiian Islands. It varied from time to time, as I understand, but the figure 80 seems to hang in my mind. Now, on the relative basis it would seem that a lot greater effort was being taken by Japan in going out after and getting information than was evidenced, as least by the money spent, by the United States.

Colonel Richards. May I explain, sir, that the enlisted investigators, Corps of Intelligence Police, were paid from pay of the Army, and only such civilian investigators as might be hired were paid from these allotted funds, in addition to which certain extraordinary expenses of the enlisted investigators might be paid. Therefore, the measure—

67. General Frank. Might be paid from where?
Colonel Richards. From these same funds.
68. General Frank. Other than these?
Colonel Richards. No, sir. From these funds.
69. General Frank. Yes?
Colonel Richards. In other words if they had, as you suggest, five civilian agents, or say four civilian agents, they [745] may have had a great many enlisted agents who were paid from pay of the Army, and only their extraordinary expenses in connection with their investigations would be paid from these funds.

70. General Frank. Do you know how many enlisted agents they had in Honolulu?
Colonel Richards. I do not; no, sir. It is a matter of record, however, I believe.
71. General Frank. That is all.
72. General Russell. That is all I have.
73. General Grunert. All right, Colonel. Thank you very much for coming.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL JOHN A. HUNT, I. G. D.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?
Colonel Hunt. John A. Hunt, Colonel, I. G. D. Serial number?
2. Colonel West. No, sir; we do not particularly need that. War Department?
Colonel Hunt. That is right.
3. Colonel West. You are on duty in the Inspector General's Office?
4. Colonel West. War Department, Washington, D. C.
5. General Grunert. Colonel, the Board is after facts both [746] as to the War Department background and viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack, and anything that may have a bearing thereon. We have asked you to come up here to tell us about some records and to give us such other information as you may have that will lead us to the facts if we do not develop the facts from you. General Frank will lead in propounding these questions, and the Board will fill out where they see fit.
Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir.
6. General Frank. Colonel Hunt, were you chaged with making an investigation of Colonel Wyman?

Colonel Hunt. I was, yes, sir.

7. General Frank. At what time did you start on this? How long did it take?

Colonel Hunt. It started about the middle of April, as I recall it, 1943, and took about two months, I believe, to complete. I did not check on the period, but I understand that the Board has a copy of my report, and the period is indicated there.

8. General Frank. Is this a copy of your report (indicating)? Will you identify it?

Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir; that is my report.

9. General Frank. That is your report?

Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir.

10. General Frank. And the supporting papers comprise sworn testimony that you took in the case?

Colonel Hunt. That is right, and documentary exhibits.

11. General Frank. Will you state to the Board the conclusion, [747] the recommendations at which you arrived?

Colonel Hunt. Only the recommendations?


(Recommendations of Colonel Hunt in re-investigating of Colonel Wyman are as follows:)

Colonel Hunt. I recommended:

a. That in the future, Colonel Wyman be not entrusted with the direction of expensive public works involving the administration of contracts.

b. That the recovery from the Hawaiian Contracting Company of $9,100 paid them for obsolete, worn-out and useless equipment be promptly initiated.

c. That in the renegotiation of Contract W-414-Eng-602, full consideration be given the fact that a substantial part of the $123,411 paid the Hawaiian Constructors on the one percent per month equipment recapture provision was a profit over and above the fixed fee stipulated.

13. General Frank. Will you state to the Board the instructions that you received with respect to making this investigation?

Colonel Hunt. I suppose you would like to have that checked with the record?

14. General Frank. That is right. What was the purpose of the investigation?

(Excerpt from report of Colonel Hunt in re-investigation of Colonel Wyman is as follows:)

Colonel Hunt (reading):

That part of the investigation conducted in [748] Hawaii had to do with the administration of construction work in the Hawaiian Department by Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., CE, and was based originally upon the complaint of Mr. Robert E. McKee, a contractor of El Paso, Texas and Los Angeles, California, transmitted by letter dated 1 March 1943, to the Honorable R. E. Thomason, Member of the House of Representatives from Texas. This complaint inclosed newspaper clippings which strongly implied that Colonel Wyman had accepted lavish entertainment from Mr. Hans Wilhelm Rohl, a contractor of Los Angeles, California, who lately headed the Hawaiian Constructors, a group of contractors acting as co-adventurers under a contract covering construction works in Hawaii and in the South Pacific Area of considerable magnitude. It was implied that the award of that contract and the virtual elimination of Mr. McKee and other independent contractors) from participation in War Department construction in the Hawaiian Islands, excepting as subcontractors arose from the friendly relations existing between Mr. Rohl and Colonel Wyman, rather than from
consideration of the Government's best interests. Mr. McKee's letter also stated that according to rumor, Colonel Wyman was inebriated most of the time.

That in substance is the origin of my investigation of Colonel Wyman.

15. General Frank. All right. Now will you read to the Board your conclusions as a result of your investigation?

[742] Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir. And in so doing I believe it would probably be pertinent to indicate that in the course of the investigation certain additional allegations arose, conclusions respecting which are a part of the detailed conclusions included in my report.

16. General Frank. All right.

(Conclusions of Colonel Hunt in re investigation of Colonel Wyman are as follows:)

a. During the years 1936–1939, Colonel Wyman, as District Engineer, Los Angeles, maintained a close personal friendship, as distinguished from a business friendship, with Mr. Hans Wilhelm Rohl, which was inappropriate on the part of a United States Army officer administering costly works on which the said Mr. Rohl was engaged as contractor. This relationship extended so far beyond the need for ordinary cordial business relation as to give rise to such presumptions of impropriety as formed, in part, the basis of this investigation. In maintaining that relationship, Colonel Wyman was not sufficiently mindful of that unquestionable reputation for integrity and impartiality which it was the duty of a man in his position to cultivate at all times.

b. The flattery of Colonel Wyman personally and professionally, which was bestowed upon him by his wealthy associate, Mr. Rohl, evoked in Colonel Wyman so complete a confidence in the former as to lead him to an unwise acceptance of Mr. Rohl's judgment and [750] advice during their subsequent association in Hawaii. He thereby relinquished to some extent that independence of judgment required of an officer in charge of the Government's interests, as indicated in his too ready acceptance of Mr. Rohl's recommendations relating to equipment purchases and appraisals.

c. It is not established that the relationship in question had a direct bearing upon the exclusion, excepting as subcontractors, of Mr. Robert E. McKee or other independent contractors from participation in construction work in Hawaii, after the attack on Pearl Harbor. The available evidence is to the effect that an honest decision had been reached that singleness of management was imperative and that the conduct of business through a single control agency, such as the Hawaiian Constructors, met that requirement, where other arrangements would not.

d. Charges that Colonel Wyman was drunk a large part of the time in Hawaii are not supported by the facts. The evidence indicates that the close personal friendship between Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl continued after Mr. Rohl arrived in Hawaii, and there, as in California, gave rise to undesirable comment, but that while they occupied adjoining rooms in the Pleasanton Hotel occasionally there were appropriate reasons in justification thereof.

e. Colonel Wyman did not act in the Government's best interest when in purchasing Rohl-Connolly equipment [751] at a cost of $166,423.17 against the appraised value of $131,411.03, he failed to fully justify for the record, the payment of the larger of the two amounts. There is no definite proof that any dishonesty was involved, nor that the Government was charged more for the equipment than its true worth.

f. Colonel Wyman did not act in the Government's best interests in the purchase of equipment from the Hawaiian Contracting Company at a cost of $150,000, in that he based that payment upon a prejudiced appraisal, and failed to take such action as would insure that the equipment purchased was actually required, was in good condition and useable and was worth the amount paid. As a result of this failure, the United States paid $9,100 for equipment which was not required, was obsolete and was not useable.

g. The inefficiencies charged to the management of construction matters in Hawaii actually existed, but it is impossible to determine the extent to which such conditions were due to acts or omissions by Colonel Wyman, if at all. The various types of inefficiency were inherent in the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee form of
contract and in surrounding conditions over which the District Engineer had no control. It is not at all clear that they progressed further under Colonel Wyman than they would have under any other management.

h. The payment of the one percent per month of rental, over the net value of equipment, upon its recapture, was not a violation of the contract, despite the fact that it represented some profit to the contractor in excess of the stipulated fee.

I. The chartering of the yacht Vega, so far as Colonel Wyman was concerned, was honestly initiated. There is no ground for the charge that the vessel was unsuited for the use for which it was chartered.

j. Colonel Wyman's attitude toward many subordinate officers and toward many of the civilian key employees of various contractors—

I would like to say that the remaining conclusions relate to Colonel Wyman's work in Alaska, and ask if the Board wants that.

17. General GRUNERT. I think we had better hear all the conclusions so that we can judge whether there is anything that refers to those points that we are looking into.

Colonel HUNT. Yes, sir.

Resuming the reading of my conclusions where I left off:

in the Northwest Engineer Division, was characterized by an undesirable aloofness and by such a manner of disdain, superiority, lack of consideration and at times of humiliating treatment as to alienate that wholesome respect which it is the duty of any officer to encourage and foster, to the detriment of morale and performance.

k. Colonel Wyman gave inadequate attention to important administrative functions relating to the work of the Northwest Engineer Division, specifically the proper organization of his own forces, the delegation to them of specific responsibilities and commensurate authority in connection therewith, and the proper correlation of Engineer and Contractor forces. This failure contributed largely to the growth of a chaotic and confused condition in the administration and operation of contracts. The presence on his staff of two officers specially skilled in organization and administration was not an acceptable explanation of this inattention on his part to one of his most important duties.

l. Living quarters for the personnel of the Northwest Division office were unconscionably extravagant, considering the temporary use contemplated. This waste was a direct result of Colonel Wyman's inattention to the administrative phases of his duties.

m. The charge that Colonel Wyman procured the employment of his wife at a substantial salary for unimportant duties is untrue.

n. The faults herein assessed against Colonel Wyman cannot be charged to lack of devotion to duty nor to lack of energy in the performance of duty, in both of which respects he acted commendably. These faults must be charged to personal characteristics contributing to a poorly balanced appreciation of the human aspects of large endeavor and the necessity of recognizing and attending to the larger details of administration. Possessing these characteristics, Colonel Wyman is considered to be poorly adapted to the supervision of large construction projects.

18. General FRANK. Will you state, if you can, as the result of your investigation, what was the nature of the advice that Wyman got from Rohl.

Colonel HUNT. I can recall having in mind, in the writing of that report, or in the making of that investigation, no specific advice. I do know that Colonel Wyman claimed that Mr. Rohl was a man of vast experience in heavy contracting work, particularly excavation. I believe I recall that Colonel Wyman indicated that he relied somewhat on Mr. Rohl's advice with respect to "mining operations," meaning by that excavation in rock; and also with respect to where heavy construction equipment might be located, obtainable for that work.
19. **General Frank.** Did this advice redound to the advantage of Rohl?

Colonel Hunt. I am sure that I could find no case in which it did, unless it had to do with the chartering of Mr. Rohl's or his wife's yacht VEGA, but inasmuch as that yacht was chartered to the Government for a consideration of $1.00 a year, together with the understanding that the Government would stand the cost of any modifications to the boat, and the cost of replacing it in its original condition when they got through using it, I think that there was no personal consideration redounding to the benefit of Mr. Rohl.

20. **General Frank.** Did these provisions with respect to putting the boat back in shape result in any appreciable amount of money being paid to Rohl for that purpose?

Colonel Hunt. As I recall it, the matter, at the time I was making the investigation, was in the hands of the division engineer at San Francisco. I talked with General Hannum and [755] his assistants, and my recollection is that the entire cost of the chartering of the boat and of its maintenance during the period of its charter was $37,000.

21. **General Frank.** Do you consider that a reasonable amount?

Colonel Hunt. There were items of that cost that I didn't consider reasonable.

22. **General Frank.** Do you remember what they were?

Colonel Hunt. I recall that one of them was a matter of white uniforms for the crew.

23. **General Frank.** What period of time did this $37,000 cover?

Colonel Hunt. The vessel was chartered early in October 1941, as I recall it, and was in Hawaii until some time early in March 1942, at which time it was ordered returned to the mainland and the charter terminated.

24. **General Frank.** Do you know whether or not it was used?

Colonel Hunt. I do not think that it ever performed any of the functions for which it was chartered.

25. **General Frank.** Then it turned out to be an extravagance?

Colonel Hunt. "Hind-sight" extravagance; yes, sir; although I believe, in all fairness, the fact might be considered that this vessel could have performed the function of sailing to the islands east and south of Hawaii where they proposed to study the possibility of building additional air bases, and that it could do that without oil; also I think it is fair to consider the fact that any vessel at that time was a pretty hard thing to get hold of. The Navy had gobbled up a great many of them. I believe that if the thing had been done as originally conceived, as I see that conception, it would not have been a disadvantageous arrangement for the [756] Government.

26. **General Grunert.** Was there anything during your investigation which disclosed that Wyman used this vessel for other purposes than originally intended, and was there anything in the evidence to show that he used it for his own personal use and not official?

Colonel Hunt. There was not. I believe that the testimony taken by me does not include anything on that subject. My idea in that matter was that it would be a waste of time, since I had made informal inquiries of a vast number of people, a great number of people, about that boat, and nowhere could I get even the slightest hint that it had been used for any purpose whatsoever after getting to Hawaii.
27. General Grunert. Do you know whether, in accepting boats at a nominal rate such as a dollar a year, it is usual to include in that agreement that the boat be put back in the same shape as that in which it was accepted?

Colonel Hunt. That is true; yes, sir. That is customary.

28. General Frank. Will you briefly give us the history of the purchase of Rohl’s equipment, and the difference of opinion with respect to the price that the Government was to pay for it, including Parker’s appraisal of it, and the amount that eventually was paid.

Colonel Hunt. I believe you are asking me something, there, General, that I can very easily get confused and tangled up about, unless I refer to the record.

29. General Frank. You know the information that I am after?

Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir.

30. General Frank. You may refer to your supporting papers.

[757] Colonel Hunt. Some time just prior to the 9th of December, 1941, the need for more construction equipment became evident as increased operations to the south of Hawaii became necessary. Colonel Wyman knew that the Rohl-Connolly Company owned certain equipment which was then idle at the Caddoa project, in Colorado. He made arrangements with the Rohl-Connolly people whereby this equipment would be shipped to Los Angeles, there overhauled, and then transshipped to Canton Island, Christmas Island, and other points in the Pacific.

Apparently a great deal of that arrangement was verbal, and no written instructions covering such an agreement were found. Efforts to trace the movements of the equipment failed, although it was determined that some reached Canton Island, some was en route to Christmas Island on the 7th of December, when the ship which was carrying it was diverted by Navy orders. Some of it reached Honolulu.

By a letter dated the 11th of March 1942, which was signed by Mr. Rohl on behalf of the Hawaiian Constructors, he requested the district engineer to purchase certain listed equipment from the Rohl-Connolly Company. The records of the district engineer’s office were in a state of rather terrible confusion, and the exact items of equipment included in the original verbal agreement could not be identified. However, there was a list of specific items referred to by Mr. Rohl in his letter of the 11th of March, and they had been appraised by Mr. M. G. Parker, a civilian employee of the district engineer. He reported, on his findings, a value of $131,411.03. That was done by letter dated the 11th of March 1942.

On the 12th of March, Mr. Parker was ordered to report [758] to Colonel Wyman’s operations officer, who was Colonel B. L. Robinson. According to Mr. Parker’s testimony, Colonel Robinson referred to a table, at which were sitting Mr. Rohl, Mr. Ralph E. Woolly, and Mr. H. P. Benson. The latter two had been taken in as co-adventurers along with the Rohl-Connolly Company and others of the Hawaiian Constructors. A discussion was held in which apparently Mr. Rohl attempted to convince Mr. Parker that his appraisal was wrong, that it was too low. Mr. Parker, however, refused to recede from his stand and continued to claim that the fair value of the equipment was only $131,411.03, as he originally stated.

In talking to Mr. Woolly and Mr. Benson, separately, they both testified that they had no part in that discussion. Colonel Wyman
expressed complete ignorance of the fact that they had had such a
discussion. However, on the 13th of March, which I believe was
two days before he left the Islands, Colonel Wyman directed the
Hawaiian Constructors to purchase the equipment at the exact price
named by Mr. Rohl. Colonel Wyman's subordinates went through
with that purchase and paid the price asked by Mr. Rohl.

31. General Frank. Just a minute. Who purchased the equip-
ment?

Colonel Hunt. Colonel Wyman's subordinates.

32. General Frank. Did the Hawaiian Constructors purchase the
equipment?

Colonel Hunt. They purchased it on behalf of the Government;
yes, sir.

33. General Frank. The Hawaiian Constructors purchased this
equipment for the Government?

[759] Colonel Hunt. That is right.

34. General Russell. What was that price, again?

Colonel Hunt. $166,423.17. General Frank, I would like to say,
here, that the statement last made is correct to the best of my
memory. I believe that at the time this purchase was made, the
purchase order was actually issued in the name of the Hawaiian
Constructors; but under the contract, which required them to pur-
chase all necessary material and equipment, they were also required
to maintain records of the possession of the equipment, and later
to turn them over to the Government. I know that the engineers
disbursed the money for that purchase, but whether that was a
disbursement in reimbursement of the contracting company or a
direct reimbursement of Rohl-Connolly, I could not be positive
now. It may be that the purchase orders are in here as exhibits.
If that is the case, I think they would illustrate that. I think it
is immaterial, because it was bought either by the Constructors or
by the district engineer's own forces.

35. General Frank. It was being paid for, however, by Govern-
ment money?

Colonel Hunt. By Government money; that is right.

36. General Frank. And the payment of the advanced price was
directed by Wyman?

Colonel Hunt. That is right.

37. General Frank. And he had authority to do so?

Colonel Hunt. That is true; yes, sir.

38. General Frank. Are there any other questions on that?

General Grunert. Not on that; no.

39. General Frank. In your conclusions and in speaking of the
[760] association of Rohl and Wyman, you stated that there
was some criticism of their living in adjoining rooms at the
Pleasanton Hotel in Honolulu, but that there was justification for it.
What was that justification?

Colonel Hunt. This all occurred after the 7th of December, I
believe, at which time Mr. Rohl was the general manager of that
contracting organization, or occupied the top position, although that
may not have been his exact title. Colonel Wyman, as district en-
gineer, was the top Government man in connection with that con-
tract; in other words, their being together was a necessary part of
the contractual relation whereby the two top men of the respective
contracting parties had to deal daily and almost momentarily, on
large changes to the original contract, as they came up. I do not
believe that my report indicated that there was any truth to the
expression used in the allegation, that Mr. Rohl and Colonel Wyman
“lived” in adjoining rooms.

It developed during the testimony that was taken there that
Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl probably on a limited number of
occasions after working all night and all day did not depart to
their respective homes, wherever they may have been. I believe
that Colonel Wyman’s was in the Pleasanton Hotel. Mr. Rohl’s
was elsewhere. He lived with a Mr. Winne; but, having spent all
of the day and most of the night at actual work—and I was
thoroughly satisfied that that was the case—Mr. Rohl merely and
probably bunked in a room adjoining the one in which Colonel
Wyman bunked, for a brief period of sleep, until work started the
following day.

40. General Frank. Another statement in your conclusion—
[?61] conclusion “G” as I remember it—is that there were inefficien-
cies over which the district engineer had no control.

Colonel Hunt. That is right.

41. General Frank. Why?

Colonel Hunt. Well, if the Commanding General of the Hawaiian
Department had directed that steps be taken immediately to build a
runway or a landing strip at a point where there then was none, the
lack of ability to go out and rent the best type of equipment for it, to
take the time to secure competitive bids, to take the time to have it
sent over from the mainland on some slow ship because the freight
rate was low, and the inability to shop around and select and eliminate
until you had only the most efficient of the available workers—all of
that would represent waste which was unavoidable either on the part
of Colonel Wyman or any other man; and it was inefficiencies of that
nature, which were totally unavoidable, to which I had reference in
this conclusion.

42. General Frank. This investigation of yours was primarily as a
result of a letter that was written by McKee?

Colonel Hunt. That is true.

43. General Frank. Are you conversant with the general reputa-
tion of the McKee firm?

Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir; I am. I have known them for years.

44. General Frank. Do you know and are you conversant with the
reliability and the efficiency of the work performed by the McKee
firm?

Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir; I believe I am, about as well as anybody.

45. General Frank. What was that reputation?

[?62] Colonel Hunt. He had a reputation, and with me it was
more than a reputation because I had administered contracts which he
had performed, but he had the reputation of being a thoroughly hon-
est and highly efficient contractor, who performed his work for the
Government at prices low enough to win the dislike of competing con-
tractors; in time, rapid enough to be a source of great satisfaction to
the Army—that is, that part of the Army that was interested—and
with an attitude toward his work such that should any failure develop
even long after the period of its guarantee had expired, he would come
back and rectify it without cost to the Government.
I believe in all respects the War Department agencies in contact with Mr. McKee in any way agreed that he was a very fine, very up-
standing, honest, efficient contractor.

46. General Frank. Highly reputable?
Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir.

47. General Frank. Previous witnesses before this Board have indicated that there was a scarcity of reputable contractors, in Hawaii. Mr. McKee had an organization in Hawaii about the time these Hawaiian Constructors were organized, did he not?
Colonel Hunt. He did; yes, sir.

48. General Frank. Were there any other contractors in Honolulu who were there, available, who held good reputations, who were not included in the Hawaiian Constructors organization?
Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir; there were.

49. General Frank. Who were they?
Colonel Hunt. E. E. Black, an individual as distinguished from a company or a partnership, was a very substantial contractor, and he could have undertaken projects such as were later done over there, after December 7, running into several millions of dollars, I feel quite certain.

50. General Frank. Were there any others?
Colonel Hunt. There were a number of others who were considerably smaller. One I believe was W. S. Ching, a Chinese contractor; but I do know that he had some good construction equipment. He had a very good organization, although not a large one, and he was well adapted to take on, oh, any project such as the development of Bellows Field. I feel very sure that if they could have taken that man in and told him, "We want you to build this—can you do it?" he would have said "Yes," and he would have done so with complete satisfaction to the Army.

51. General Frank. How did it happen that these people were not given an opportunity to participate?
Colonel Hunt. Colonel Wyman claims that they were given such an opportunity. I could not find any evidence of that either in the files of the district engineer's office, which would not indicate very much, because the files were so terribly disrupted, nor from questioning people who should have been in a position to know, like Colonel Wyman's chief clerk, Mr. Chew; but I did talk to the various contractors, and when I asked them if they had been approached by Colonel Wyman with a view to their taking over some part of the work that was then in view, as I recall it, every one of them indicated that they had never been approached by Colonel Wyman with such a view.

[764] 52. General Frank. Yet he went out of his way to go over and bring the Rohl-Connolly firm into Honolulu when, prior to his interest in them, they had never built anything in Honolulu. Is that correct?
Colonel Hunt. Part of that is correct. Just how much Colonel Wyman went out of his way I do not know. As near as I can determine from the record—I am sure this part of it is quite correct—General Hannum, the Division Engineer in San Francisco, was convinced of the fact that some large cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contractor was the sort of an outfit that ought to do that job. The contract was
signed right here in the Chief of Engineers Office in Washington; and I do know that other contractors had been called upon by General Hannum to come in and bid, and they indicated that they were interested. Just how far afield Colonel Wyman and General Hannum went to talk to other possible bidders and contractors I do not know.

There was very little record kept; there was no record whatever kept of the minutes of negotiations by which the contract finally was entered into, either here in Washington, San Francisco or elsewhere. All that could be done was to rely on memory; and as near as I could make out it was probably Wyman's recommendation, with approval—although I could not prove that. I believe that it was more than just the elimination of other contractors as unfit that resulted in Rohl-Connolly going over there and heading up that organization.

53. General Frank. In your investigation did you run across any difficulties between the McKee Company and Wyman?

Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir; I did.

54. General Frank. What were they?

[765] Colonel Hunt. I believe there was none until after the attack, on December 7; but at that time a number of contracts that Mr. McKee and his outfit had under way were terminated or, rather, suspended, in their then incomplete state of completion.

55. General Frank. By Wyman?

Colonel Hunt. By order of the Department Commander as given to Wyman and by him given to the McKee forces. Thereafter Wyman, wanting to get into the one big contractors' organization all of the available talent, asked Mr. McKee's representatives to come in as part of the Hawaiian Constructors on a sort of subcontract basis, and there was a great deal of discussion over that. There was even a little difference of opinion between several of the top men of Mr. McKee's organization then in Hawaii. At any rate, Mr. McKee presented the idea of himself, a successful independent contractor, being handed anything so humiliating to him, as he would see it, as a subordinate position in another man's outfit. He declined to do it, although he offered to do anything that the Government over there might see fit to ask him to do otherwise, and without any regard to cost or profit.

56. General Frank. Did the proposition anticipate his coming in on a lower level than Rohl and Connolly and the rest of them?

Colonel Hunt. If he had come in as a subcontractor he would have been on a lower level. But if he had come in as an associate contractor, as a co-adventurer, he would have had a say in the organization's business in proportion to the amount of capital he put in.

57. General Frank. But he was not given opportunity to come [766] in as a co-adventurer; is that right?

Colonel Hunt. That, according to Mr. McKee's statement, is correct.

58. General Frank. For purposes of the record and to indicate your own background as a basis for expressing an opinion, I would like to have you state for the record how you came to be familiar with contracting facilities in Honolulu. What had been your experience in Honolulu prior to this time?
Colonel Hunt. I see the object of the question. Before 1917 I had earned my living in the construction industry in various capacities, from pushing a wheelbarrow up to superintendent of construction. In 1917, after enlistment, I was placed in a construction organization of the Construction Division of the Army and I remained in that as constructing quartermaster or utilities officer at various posts and then until July 1940, when I was assigned to the Inspector General's Office, and in the course of such duties I was constructing quartermaster at Hickam Field, Hawaii, from early in 1938 to June 1940.

59. General Frank. In that capacity you became familiar with contractors and methods of construction in general in the Hawaiian Islands?

Colonel Hunt. That is true; yes.

60. General Frank. All right.

61. General Russell. Colonel, I have noticed with some interest your testimony about the association between Rohl and Wyman out there, especially that part of your testimony which described their bunking near each other when they were rather [767] weary after a lot of hard work. I rather got the idea that Rohl was a high-pressure man and worked very hard on the Islands.

Colonel Hunt. That part of my testimony related only to a question having to do with their occupying adjoining rooms in the Pleasonton Hotel for a brief period. Aside from that brief period I was not asked. A great deal was said about Mr. Rohl’s work or lack of attention to work.

62. General Russell. Definitely, what was that?

Colonel Hunt. Mr. Rohl, while living at the Moana Hotel, during the earlier part of his presence in Hawaii—

63. General Russell. Prior to December 7, 1941?

Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir—according to witnesses that I interrogated over there, was, on various occasions, filthy drunk and for rather extended periods of time.

64. General Frank. Who was this?

Colonel Hunt. Hans Wilhelm Rohl. And as to Mr. Rohl’s activity in supervising the work, I believe that the testimony that I took over there convinced me that until the attack on Pearl Harbor he did not contribute much; that he was pretty drunk a large part of the time.

65. General Russell. Do you remember about when he went out there, Colonel?

Colonel Hunt. He did not go out there until after he received his citizenship papers, and that was September 15, 1941, I believe. I believe that immediately thereafter he went over there.

66. General Russell. In the application for citizenship and in the endorsement which the Chief of Engineers gave to him in [763] connection with that application, as I recall the reason for the interest of the Engineers in having him made an American citizen, it was to make it possible for him to go out there to the Islands and exert his executive capacity in connection with hastening the work out there.

Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir; I believe that is true.

67. General Russell. Your conclusions, based on the evidence which you took, indicate that the reasons for his going out there were not any too good; is that so?

68. General Frank. Were not fulfilled, you mean?
Colonel Hunt. Of course I cannot answer for the actual intention that was in Colonel Wyman’s mind. Colonel Wyman testified that he got him out there because of his executive ability, because the work was not going any too well, and he was positive that when Rohl got over there he would get things going. I believe that in that opinion Colonel Wyman and the next top man of the Rohl-Connolly Company, Mr. Paul Grafe—or, rather, he was of the Callahan Construction Company, but Paul Grafe believed that that was all “eye wash”; that he was not being delayed; he was doing all he could and all anybody else could.

69. General Russell. Are the names of the witnesses from whom you obtained the evidence as to Rohl’s conduct prior to December 7 in this record which you have on the table?

Colonel Hunt. Yes. There is a list of witnesses there appended as a part of this report, and all witnesses that were interviewed upon the record. I talked to a great many other people informally concerning these matters, and if they [769] obviously could contribute nothing to the record, I did not take their sworn testimony.

70. General Russell. Passing from Rohl’s executive ability, you gave an answer earlier in your testimony to the effect that there were delays in the Hawaiian construction which were necessarily incident to any undertaking or construction project under the form of contract prevailing in Hawaii at that time. Will you develop that for us?

Colonel Hunt. I believe that the General put a narrower view on what I had to say than I meant to convey. It was not due to the fact that it was a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee type of contract that these delays and inefficiencies occurred. Had they had a fixed-price contract I believe the same thing would have resulted, the same inefficiencies and delays, because the contractor, knowing the consequences of the demand for speed, would have had to protect himself in his bid by adding unknown costs so that he would not go broke giving the Government something for which he would not get enough money to pay the costs.

71. General Russell. I did place that sort of construction on your answer. Let us take for a moment the type of contract under which those partners were operating out there. Is it your opinion, based on the investigation which you made, that delays in the work did occur?

Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir; some delays did occur, undoubtedly.

72. General Russell. Can you assign any reasons for those delays?

[770] Colonel Hunt. Well, one of the reasons that I have already touched upon was the fact that when they ordered equipment over there it was on the high seas, some of it, on the day of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Some of it was ordered back to the mainland by the Navy. Now, whatever work it was planned to do, that particular equipment must have been delayed by the delay in the delivery of the equipment that was going to be used in the work.

73. General Russell. I think my question probably was unfortunate, in view of the issue here, and was probably too broad, and I will ask the question in another way.

Do you believe that any of the delays which existed or that you discovered out there were the result of the inattention or drunkenness of this man Rohl?
Colonel Hunt. I have no cause to believe that that was the case after my investigation. No, sir; I do not.

74. General Russell. Did you have any evidence that there were any positive acts on the part of this man Rohl which had for their purpose delaying the construction work in Hawaii?

Colonel Hunt. No, sir. On the contrary, I believe the testimony that I have bearing on that at all, either directly or indirectly, was to the effect that whenever Mr. Rohl was active he was very active, and that he tolerated no argument on anybody's part, and he tolerated no excuses. That was the general reputation of the man, as I got it, relating to the times when he was sober and attending to business.

75. General Russell. Let us pass to the period following December 7.

[771] 76. General Grunert. May I put in a question there?


78. General Grunert. When Rohl was incapacitated or partially so, on account of his personal habits, do you know whether or not the work slackened or stopped because of such incapacity?

Colonel Hunt. No, sir. I do not know that.

78. General Grunert. There is an intimation that when Rohl was on the job and sober, he was a go-getter, and was a driver, and so forth. Does that mean that when he was not so on the job the work was delayed and waited for him to again get in such capacity, or what?

Colonel Hunt. I did not mean to give any impression of that nature. I do not believe that to be the case. I found no evidence that such was the case. I found plenty of evidence to the effect that whether Rohl was there or not in an advisory capacity primarily, it was Wyman's purpose to drive everybody, even to the point of driving them crazy. He was a driver; there is no doubt about that. I doubt very much if there is anything in the record or any testimony anywhere to the effect that Mr. Rohl's condition of sobriety or lack of it at any time over there had any delaying effect on any part of the work. That is my opinion of it.

80. General Grunert. So, as far as it came to your attention during your investigation, you did not run across any delays that you attributed to Rohl's intention to cause such delay so as to handicap the work in its ultimate completion or as to the date of completion?

[772] Colonel Hunt. No, sir; I did not.

81. General Grunert. Had other contractors been on the job, in your opinion, from what you have learned, would they have had the same labor troubles, the same troubles in getting priorities on materials, the same troubles about getting priorities on shipments, and so forth, or do you have any reason to believe that others could have gotten materials more quickly and have done the job more quickly?

Colonel Hunt. I doubt very much if any other contractor over there would have had any better luck with priorities or shipments than the contracting company that had the work in charge.

82. General Grunert. If any local contractors had been given contracts, did they have any equipment or material locally that could have been used on the contract that were denied to the Hawaiian Constructors who did the job?

Colonel Hunt. I do not believe they had any equipment that would have been denied to the Hawaiian Constructors.
83. General Grunert. How about material that the Hawaiian Constructors had to get from the States? Did local contractors have any such material on hand?

Colonel Hunt. No, sir; I am sure they did not, because the materials that had to come from the States would not be material that they would carry in stock.

84. General Grunert. A great deal of the material did have to come from the States, in your opinion?

Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir, and would have in any event, regardless of who the contractor may have been. The Hawaiian [773] Constructors came into existence over there early in the year 1941 at a time when the amount of work contemplated to be done was only a matter of a million or a little over a million dollars. It was known at that time by the Corps of Engineers that additional work was coming up, but to what extent additional work was coming up I doubt if anybody knew, since the bulk of it came up after the attack. But I have no doubt—to finish the answer to the original question—that had Colonel Wyman so desired he could have made far greater use of the local contractors, their personnel and organizations, or their equipment, than was done.

85. General Grunert. And if he had done so, have you reached the conclusion or have you considered whether or not that would have sped the completion date?

Colonel Hunt. General, that question is so broad that I do not think any man on earth could ever answer it. It involves a philosophy of management, the difference between cost-plus work and bid-price work. My own way of attempting a job of that nature would have been very, very different from Colonel Wyman's. At the time I was there—and I left in 1940—I knew that the volume of work then on hand was creating a labor problem. Before that labor problem ever arose I was very keenly aware of it, because we were about to do work which, when I estimated it and estimated the labor required, I saw that there was more work than there was labor to do it. The Navy was doing a lot of work, and I did not want to be left there in a difficult position and, for that reason, extended myself to the limit that I could go within the law and regulations to get all of the local contractors corralled and working [774] on our work so that we would have available their equipment, their technical supervision, and their labor. I believe that that could have been extended; and I know that in the middle of 1941 there had been a great decline in the total volume of Army work under way. Seen in that light, if I had had the work to do that had then been given to the District Engineer to do, I would have bent every effort to get these good lump-sum contractors at work on lump-sum work, so that there would not have been involved at that time, unless over my dead body, any cost-plus-fixed-fee contract. As to what score I would have made by using my method as compared with the score that Wyman made using his method, I am not the proper referee.

General Grunert. During your investigation did you happen to find out much, if anything, about the contract that covered construction connected with the Air Warning Service? Do you know whether that was considered on a high priority, or did you find out much, if anything, about that particular phase of the contract?
Colonel Hunt. I found out initially nothing about that particular phase. It was entirely apart from instructions under which I was working, and in the course of that investigation no hint of anything in connection with that work ever reached my ears. Therefore I had no allegation to justify my investigation of that angle. I was interested in it, of course, and talked outside of office hours with friends of mine over there, as a matter of curiosity, and I seem to recall some comment by somebody to the effect that there was a great deal of difficulty in getting over there men who were sufficiently familiar with the work to do it properly, and also some difficulty in getting over the equipment that was involved in the work. That was wholly unofficial. Technical equipment to be used in the warning service system.

87. General Grunert. Were the personnel you referred to, by "technical equipment," to operate such a system or to set it up?

Colonel Hunt. No, I believe not. As I recall it, it was persons who were familiar with the assembly of various parts of a warning unit, how it was to be put together in a proper way and function properly.

88. General Frank. This was largely hearsay evidence, however, on your part, wasn't it?

Colonel Hunt. That is true. However, I believe that it was Colonel H. B. Nurse from whom I got that information. I would not even be positive of that, because it was not in the scope of my investigation and was purely personal interest.

89. General Grunert. That finishes my line. You may continue with yours.

90. General Russell. Just one other question, Colonel. I want to go back to this period following December 7 where apparently Wyman and Rohl worked long hours and very hard. Was that the impression that you had conveyed or attempted to convey earlier in your testimony?

Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir, as a part of an answer to some other question probably; but to put it directly, I will say that I was very definitely convinced by a great deal of testimony, by people who knew, that Mr. Rohl and Colonel Wyman, his operations officer Colonel Robinson, Colonel Howard Nurse, and other top men in that construction organization did work what would amount to two full ordinary days every day for rather prolonged periods. I was particularly interested in the last five days that Wyman was there. It had been alleged before the Tenney Committee (as a matter of fact, it was a matter of sworn testimony before the Tenney Committee) that Wyman lay dead drunk in the Pleasanton Hotel for the last five days he was there. Well, one of the allegations I was investigating had to do with the statement that Wyman was inebriated most or at least a large part of the time over there. I was very careful to find out what happened, and I was absolutely convinced, and I think anybody who wishes to look at the record thoroughly will be convinced, that Rohl and particularly Wyman worked indefatigably during those five days. I could find nobody to indicate that he had been drunk at any time during those five days. I saw the physical evidence of the work that he did, the letters that he wrote, the directives that he had started long before but had not completed and which he then completed, which must have taken his very careful and concentrated attention for long, long hours. Really I am amazed at the amount of work that that man
did during those five days, and if he was drunk he was certainly an amazing man.

91. General Russell. Now, in order to get the record straight, Colonel, you referred to doing two days' work almost every day, by Rohl and Wyman. I will ask you whether or not that description refers to the period after December 7, 1941.

Colonel Hunt. It does; yes, sir. I know that he kept two shifts of office personnel.

92. General Russell. It does not refer to the period prior to December 7, 1941?

Colonel Hunt. As I stated it, it does not.


Colonel Hunt. That may have been done before December 7; I do not know. I doubt it, but I did not mean to indicate it had been done.

94. General Russell. All right; that is all.

95. General Grunert. Any further questions?

96. General Frank. Did you investigate Wyman's conduct with respect to the use of liquor while you were over there?

Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir; I did.

97. General Frank. What were your general conclusions on that?

Colonel Hunt. My general conclusion was that he was a two-fisted drinker and that he drank on every appropriate occasion for drinking, and some that were not appropriate, but that he did not get drunk, I mean to the point of being visibly drunk to an observer.

98. General Frank. Did it interfere with his work?

Colonel Hunt. I feel quite certain that it did not.

99. General Frank. At any time?

Colonel Hunt. Yes, sir. I was unable to unearth a single instance in which that man interrupted or delayed or slowed down his work as a consequence of drinking.

100. General Grunert. Do you know whether the drinking that he did do incapacitated him from using good judgment in doing that work?

Colonel Hunt. Well, sir, I think the man used some excusable judgment, but whether that was due to any liquor he drank or the mental constitution of the man, I do not know. I considered that he considered himself a Napoleon of construction and industry, and was intolerant of other people's views; his alone were good. Now, whether that was a matter of an exalted ego that had always been there, or of an exalted ego inspired by liquor, I do not know. I rather think that it was constitutional with the man, and I doubt if his drinking had much to do with it.

101. General Frank. That is all.

102. General Grunert. There appear no further questions. Thank you very much for the giving of your time and helping us out. (The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

TESTIMONY OF CASE B. RAFTER, WASHINGTON, D. C.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Will you state to the Board your name, address, and occupation, please?
Mr. Rafter. Case B. Rafter, 2434 Thirty-ninth Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C. I am a project manager at the Veterans' Administration, Construction Service.

2. General Grunert. Mr. Rafter, the Board wants facts, and I believe you have some facts about records that we would like to get.

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

3. General Grunert. Are you going to ask the questions, General Frank?


5. General Grunert. The Assistant Recorder will ask you some questions about some records which I wish you would tell us about.

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

6. Major Clausen. Mr. Rafter, your superior is Colonel Tripp?

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

7. Major Clausen. And your services were made available to the Board for the purpose of analyzing the job orders and the contract with which we are concerned?

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

8. Major Clausen. And in pursuance of that you have selected from the various job orders those that pertain to the air raid warning system?

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

9. Major Clausen. The underground gasoline storage tanks and certain other installations in the Hawaiian Islands; is that correct?

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

10. Major Clausen. You have prepared for us and the Board summaries of these various job orders which I hold here in my hand; is that correct?

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

11. Major Clausen. Now, so that the Board may know, what has been your schooling in doing work of this kind?

Mr. Rafter. I have been in construction work since graduation from Lehigh University in 1913, and for the past 13 years I have been with the Veterans Administration, Construction Service. Prior to that I was in private practice [780] as a consulting engineer on construction work.

12. Major Clausen. Now, Mr. Rafter, without taking each one of these up separately, I am going to ask you whether the summary that is attached to the respective job orders correctly sets forth the information that has been received from the job orders.

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir. That is a summary of the information given in the job orders, and it sets forth the items which General Frank asked to have listed as shown on the front of each summary.

13. Major Clausen. Would you just take one (this is the Mt. Kaala having to do with the air raid warning system) and indicate to the Board just what you have done with regard to that particular Mt. Kaala project, and I do not think we shall have to go through the rest.

Mr. Rafter. This job order where the job orders were numbered——

14. General Frank. What job order is this?

Mr. Rafter. Oh, I see: the United States Engineer Office of Honolulu issued job orders under Contract No. W-414-Eng-602, and this particular contract covered construction of aircraft warning system;
and job order No. 1 was a proceed order to construct 9,000 feet of access road from Kolekole Pass Road to the proposed site of the cableway at Mt. Kaala, and then under direction I put down the estimated cost.

15. **General Frank.** Which you got from the job order?

Mr. Rafter. Which I got from the job order, our addenda thereto, the commencement date, the estimated date of completion, and the name of the supervisor or, in case he was not named, [781] his title, as the Area Engineer of the 3rd Field Area in this case was J. J. Kestly.

16. **Major Clausen.** These various job orders to which you refer are the job orders that were handed you by General Frank and myself?

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

17. **Major Clausen.** These job orders (indicating)?

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

18. **Major Clausen.** And in turn, for the information of the Board, we have a whole file drawer full of them, but these are the ones that we selected as bearing upon the matters in which the Board is interested.

Mr. Rafter. May I amplify my answer, in that I went through the files too, to see if there were any other job orders pertaining to these subjects which have not been given me. I found none.

19. **Major Clausen.** Mr. Rafter, I hand you the summary concerning Mt. Kaala and ask you, did you prepare that summary from the job orders that are attached to that summary?

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

20. **Major Clausen.** And it is all correct, is it?

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

21. **Major Clausen.** That refers to Job Orders 2.1, 2.0, and 2.2; is that correct?

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

22. **Major Clausen.** All right. We will suggest that this will be the exhibit next in order, which would be No. 4.

Colonel West. The reporter will please mark the document Exhibit No. 4.

[782] (Summary of job orders in re Mt. Kaala was marked Exhibit No. 4 and received in evidence.)

23. **Major Clausen.** Now, Mr. Rafter, I show you the summary referring to the Kokee air raid warning system which refers to Job Orders 23.0, 23.1, and ask you, did you prepare that summary from those job orders?

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

24. **Major Clausen.** And the summary is correct, is it, from the information?

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

25. **Major Clausen.** All right. We offer this as exhibit next in order.

26. **Colonel West.** These are all related. We may make this 4-A.

27. **Major Clausen.** All right, sir.

(Summary of job orders in re Kokee was marked Exhibit No. 4-A and received in evidence.)

28. **Major Clausen.** Now, Mr. Rafter, I show you the summary referring to the Haleakala air raid warning system which covers
Job Order 41.0, and ask you whether the summary is correct and refers to that job order.

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir, it does.

29. Major Clausen. I ask that this be marked 4–B.

(Summary of job order in re Haleakala was marked Exhibit No. 4–B and received in evidence.)

30. Major Clausen. Now I show you the summary referring to the Mauna Loa air raid warning system, referring to Job Order 46.0, and ask you if you prepared that summary from that job order.

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

783 31. Major Clausen. Correct, is it?

Mr. Rafter. That is correct.

32. Major Clausen. I ask that this be marked 4–C.

(Summary of job order in re Mauna Loa was marked Exhibit No. 4–C and received in evidence.)

33. Major Clausen. I show you the summary referring to the Bellows Field underground gasoline storage tanks and Job Orders 20.1, 20.120, 20.130. In addition to that you have affixed Job Orders 20.140 and 20.150. Did you prepare that summary?

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

34. Major Clausen. Referring to those job orders?

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

35. Major Clausen. And the information on there is correct?

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

36. Major Clausen. I ask that this be marked as the next exhibit.

(Summary of job orders in re Bellows Field, etc., was marked Exhibit No. 4–D and received in evidence.)

37. Major Clausen. This (indicating) is the summary referring to the underground gasoline storage tanks for Barking Sands, Job Order 21.1. Did you prepare that summary from that job order?

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

38. Major Clausen. And is it correct?

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

39. Major Clausen. I ask that that be marked as the exhibit next in order.

784 (Summary of job order in re Barking Sands was marked Exhibit No. 4–E and received in evidence.)

40. Major Clausen. This is the summary referring to Morse Field underground gasoline storage tanks, Job Order 25.0 [indicating]. Did you prepare that summary?

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

41. Major Clausen. Referring to that job order, and is it correct?

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

42. Major Clausen. I ask that that be marked the exhibit next in order.

(Summary of job order in re Morse Field was marked Exhibit No. 4–F and received in evidence.)

43. Major Clausen. I show you this summary referring to Wheeler Field bombproof ammunition storage structures, Job Order 5.0, and ask you whether you prepared that summary from that job order.

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

44. Major Clausen. That is correct, is it?

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.
45. Major Clausen. I ask that this be marked the next exhibit.
(Summary of job order in re Wheeler Field was marked Exhibit No. 4-G and received in evidence.)

46. Major Clausen. Hickam Field is this next summary that I show you, referring to magazines, Job Orders 7.0, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, and ask whether you prepared that summary.

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

47. Major Clausen. Referring to those job orders?

[785] Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

48. Major Clausen. You got that information from them, and is it correct?

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

49. Major Clausen. I ask that this be marked the next exhibit.
(Summary of job orders in re Hickam Field was marked Exhibit No. 4-H and received in evidence.)

50. Major Clausen. This (indicating) is the Punchbowl fire control station, summary Job Order 14.0: I ask you whether you prepared that summary.

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

51. Major Clausen. From that job order, is that correct?

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

52. Major Clausen. And the information on there is correct?

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

53. Major Clausen. I ask that be marked the next exhibit.
(Summary of job order in re Punchbowl was marked Exhibit No. 4-I and received in evidence.)

54. Major Clausen. This is Diamond Head fire control station Job Order 15.0 (indicating). Did you prepare that summary?

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

55. Major Clausen. Based on that job order?

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

56. Major Clausen. And it is correct, is it?

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

57. Major Clausen. I ask that be marked as the next exhibit.
(Summary of job order in re Diamond Head was marked Exhibit No. 4-J and received in evidence.)

[786] 58. Major Clausen. And this is Kawailoa Camp, powerhouse, Job Order 13.0. Did you prepare that summary?

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

59. Major Clausen. Referring to that job order?

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

60. Major Clausen. And is that information correct?

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

61. Major Clausen. From the job order?

Mr. Rafter. From the job order.

62. Major Clausen. I ask that be marked as the next exhibit.
(Summary of job order in re Kawailoa Camp was marked Exhibit No. 4-K and received in evidence.)

63. Major Clausen. This (indicating) is the Fort Shafter radio transmitter station, Job Order 17.0. Did you prepare that summary on that job order?

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

64. Major Clausen. And the information is correct as taken from the job order?
Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

65. Major Clausen. I ask that be marked as the next exhibit.
   (Summary of job order in re Fort Shafter was marked Exhibit No. 4-L and received in evidence.)

66. Major Clausen. Hickam Field: armament, fire control, supply and repair building, Job Order 29.0. Did you prepare that summary from that job order?

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

67. Major Clausen. And it is correct, is it, as taken from the job order?

[?8?] Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

68. Major Clausen. I ask that be marked as the next exhibit.
   (Summary of job order in re Hickam Field was marked Exhibit No. 4-M and received in evidence.)

69. Major Clausen. This is Fort Kamehameha, Job Order 24.0. Did you prepare this summary?

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

70. Major Clausen. And it is correct as taken from the same?

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir.

71. Major Clausen. All right.
   (Summary of job order in re Fort Kamehameha was marked Exhibit No. 4-N and received in evidence.)

72. Major Clausen. Now, with regard to completion dates, Mr. Rafter, did you prepare, for the House Committee on Military Affairs, a study which is set forth on pages 39 and 40, giving various estimated dates of completion, by dates and percentages, which I hand you?

Mr. Rafter. Yes, sir, I prepared the original.

73. Major Clausen. And from where did you get the information to prepare the data which are set forth in that document?

Mr. Rafter. That information was supplied to the Committee; it was at the office of the Committee on Military Affairs, supplied by the Army Engineer Office.

Pardon me. Shall I go into detail, just what the sources were?

74. Major Clausen. I would like you to do that.

Mr. Rafter. The percentage dates, the estimated dates set forth in these sheets, that I was asked to go through the [788] records and find the percentage which was complete at the date set forth, and also the percentage completion reported of December 1st. The reason for selecting December 1st, the reports were made monthly and they were made up in order to establish the amount of fee due the contractor, so that that would be paid him, and it was paid on the percentage of completion of the work; and I went through the file in the same manner in which I went through to arrive at these summaries and got these figures off and tabulated them, and this schedule was made up from that information.

[789] 75. General Frank. The job-orders from which you made these reports that have just been submitted in evidence were from the official files of the Corps of Engineers, is that correct?

Mr. Rafter. They were so stated, in the letter of transmission, sir.

76. General Frank. So they constitute authentic records of the job-orders, which really were the contract for doing the work in Hawaii?
Mr. Rafter. May I explain and amplify the answer? The contracts set forth certain work to be done in a certain time, after order to proceed was given. The job-order constitutes the order to proceed and describes the work to be done under that order.

77. Major Clausen. I think it might be advisable to offer in evidence this summary, contained on pages 39 and 40 of this House Military Affairs Committee Report. Unless there is objection, I will ask that it be marked as Exhibit 5, that being just the summary.
(The Summary referred to was marked as Exhibit 5, and received in evidence.)

78. General Grunert. Are there any further questions?
General Frank. No.
79. General Grunert. There being no further questions, thank you very much for coming over here to help us.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Whereupon, at 12:25 o'clock p. m., the Board recessed until 2 o'clock p. m.)

[790] AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Board, at 2 o'clock p. m., continued the hearing of witnesses.)

TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. JAMES A. MOLLISON, MOBILE AIR SERVICE COMMAND, MOBILE, ALA.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. General, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.
General Mollison. Brigadier General James A. Mollison, Mobile Air Service Command; Mobile, Ala.

2. General Grunert. General, the Board is attempting to get at the facts and viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. We hope from your testimony to get some leads, or to throw some light on this subject. With that in view, I have a few questions to ask you, and then I think General Frank has a few that relate to some special subjects which he is investigating.

Will you tell me what your position was in Hawaii in 1941?
General Mollison. I was Chief of Staff of the 7th Air Force.

3. General Grunert. And who was in command of that Air Force?
General Mollison. General Frederick L. Martin.

4. General Grunert. In the Roberts Commission report there is one statement to the effect that General Short says he talked with Admiral Kimmel and Admiral Bloch for two or three hours on November 27, and that General Martin and his Chief of Staff, Colonel Mollison, were there.

General Mollison. That is true, sir.

5. General Grunert. Can you from your memory tell us about what happened during that 2- or 3-hour conference? What was talked about? What did they confer on?
General Mollison. The purpose of the conference was to show the Navy the radiogram that General Short had received from the War Department, and to discuss with them their plans, and to inform them of the plans of the Army.
6. General GRUNERT. Do you recall just what Admiral Kimmel or Admiral Bloch told General Short, General Martin, and yourself, as to their plan?

General MOLLISON. I don’t believe I can give a verbatim report on that. It generally dealt with the provisions of the radios, which consisted of advising that war was imminent, that we should be particularly watchful for acts of sabotage, that nothing should be done to excite the civil population; under no circumstances were we to commit the first overt act. Considerable of this conversation had a bearing on Army planes that were supposed to be sent to Wake, P-40s, and from the general tenor of thing it appears that the Army had offered the use of these P-40s at Wake.

We had at the time discussions as to how they could be landed, from carriers, and so forth, put them off of carriers some 200 miles at sea. The one point was brought up—in fact, I brought it up—that sending our P-40s to Wake was contrary to our mission, which was the defense of Oahu. I recall distinctly one piece of conversation between Admiral Kimmel and, at that time, Captain McWilliams, who was Plans Officer.

7. General FRANK. Was it not McMorris?

General MOLLISON. No, McMorris is a different man. This is either Williams or McWilliams, who was the Chief of Plans [792] for Admiral Kimmel; and in sort of glossing over that reason for keeping P-40s, Admiral Kimmel asked this chap, “What do you think the chances of a surprise attack on Oahu would be?” and this chap stood up and said, “None, Admiral—none!”

8. General GRUNERT. The evidence that we have had before us so far indicates that that was Captain McMorris, who gave that information to the conferees at that time.

General MOLLISON. I may be wrong on that, General, but it seems to me that it was either Williams or McWilliams.

9. General GRUNERT. I think it might be well if I read you this message of November 27, in order to refresh your mind, and then ask some questions concerning those things about the message that might have been discussed. The message, under date of November 27, reads as follows:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot (repeat Not) be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not comma (repeat not comma) be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not comma repeat Not comma to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five [793] so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

(signed) MARSHALL.

Did they discuss under that what action both the Navy and the Army were going to take?

General MOLLISON. I know that Rainbow 5 was discussed at the time. That is 2½ years ago, and it is a little bit difficult for me to remember the exact statements that were made.
10. General Grunert. Did General Short explain to Admiral Kimmel what his decision was, and what action the Army was going to take?

General Mollison. I don't believe he did, at that time. General. My recollection of that is that we went back to Department Headquarters, and there, General Short made the decision that we were going on alert No. 2, as provided by SOP, Hawaiian Department.

11. General Grunert. Alert No. 2, or No. 1?

General Mollison. Alert No. 2.

12. General Grunert. I think probably your memory does not serve you correctly, because they went on alert No. 1. What was the alert that they went on? What did that encompass?

General Mollison. That was the antisabotage alert.

13. General Grunert. That happens to be alert No. 1. Was the question of the reconnaissance to be undertaken discussed?

General Mollison. I don't recall that it was, General.

14. General Grunert. Aside from that opinion or judgment expressed by the staff officer of the Navy, to Admiral Kimmel, that the possibility or probability of a surprise attack was practically nil, was there any discussion about a possible air attack?

General Mollison. There was none, that I recall. No. I don't recall any discussion about any surprise air attack. We had been training for that, for some period of time, but I don't recall that that was discussed.

15. General Grunert. You stated that after the conference, General Short went back to his headquarters and there made the decision to go on the alert against sabotage?

General Mollison. Yes, sir.

16. General Grunert. Was there any other discussion as to whether or not to go on any other alert—for instance, No. 2, that envisaged air attack, or No. 3, that envisaged an all-out attack?

General Mollison. No, sir. No, sir; I don't recall any discussion of that kind.

17. General Grunert. On behalf of General Martin or yourself, was there any question in your mind as to whether or not other measures than going on a sabotage alert should be taken?

General Mollison. No, sir. I recall stating to General Martin on our way back to Hickam Field that under the circumstances it appeared to me that General Short had made a very good decision.

18. General Grunert. Were you aware of any other messages that had been received prior to that, through the Naval sources, as to what might be considered a warning of things that might come?

General Mollison. Only this general talk. In fact, there were several messages in connection with increasing the defenses of Wake and Midway.

19. General Grunert. Did you have any knowledge of a message on the same date, November 27, received by the Navy, which said, "This is a war warning"?

General Mollison. Yes, sir. The Navy read that to us.

20. General Grunert. Was that discussed on that same day?

General Mollison. That was.

21. General Grunert. What was their conclusion as to the "war warning" message? that it was not a war warning for Hawaii?

General Mollison. I think that they considered it a war warning,
but for some unknown reason—that is, I can’t say “for some unknown reason,” but it is unknown to me—something came out, that there was an attack expected against Malaya, on December 2.

22. General Grunert. But it did not occur to any of you, at that conference—or did it?—that that war warning message, in connection with the Chief of Staff’s message, constituted a warning to you people in Hawaii to be prepared for anything, not only sabotage but for anything else?

General Mollison. It could not be construed as anything else but a war-warning message, there is no question about that.

23. General Grunert. What did “war warning” mean to you?

General Mollison. That means that a state of war practically exists, or, if it does not exist, it was imminent. However, the information that our A-2 was getting daily from this Naval Intelligence Commander Layton, indicated that they were pretty well convinced that they had the location of every Japanese ship. In fact, if that statement was made once to me it was made a half a dozen times.

24. General Frank. Did the Navy give you those locations?

General Mollison. No.

25. General Frank. Or did they just tell you that they had it?

General Mollison. They said they knew where they were located.

26. General Grunert. Then in your own mind, did you have every confidence in the Navy to the effect that if anything was coming near Hawaii, you would be duly informed?

General Mollison. Yes, indeed! They were also charged with offshore patrol, which was supposed to give us warning in plenty of time, in the event that anything was moving in.

27. General Grunert. As far as the Air Force Command was concerned, under alert No. 1, the sabotage alert, how much time under that alert would it take you then to go to another alert and be ready to take the air to fight?

General Mollison. That could be done inside of an hour, to get the planes in dispersed position. They would not all be. We wouldn’t be armed with our bombs in that length of time, but we could get them all to the dispersed position. I should say it would take two to three hours to arm the planes and have them on their way.

28. General Grunert. Then as far as you were concerned, you thought that the alert for sabotage was sufficient?

General Mollison. I thought it was a good decision, General, because we were very short of experienced troops in our air force. We had under this SOP certain positions that we had to guard—down-town, and so forth—which had been modified somewhat; but if we had to take up positions, guard the bridges and the electric plants and the waterworks, and so forth, it would have left us in pretty bad shape; and if you could move all of your stuff in, it appeared to me that it was a much better plan than dispersing your airplanes all over the different airdromes; and I think it was a good plan, with the instructions that we had.

29. General Grunert. Now, either one of you go ahead, if anything occurs to you. I did not know how far this subject might lead.

Had you not gone on alert No. 1, what would have been your condition to meet an attack?

General Mollison. I do not think it would have been a bit better, with the exception of the fact that they disabled a good many planes
on the ground that perhaps might have been unhurt or undamaged if we had had them in dispersed position.

30. General GRUNETT. But ordinarily, without going on alert No. 2, would your planes have been more dispersed than when you went on alert No. 1?

General MOLLISON. No, no.

31. General GRUNETT. Would they have been less concentrated than they were under alert No. 1?

General MOLLISON. No; that was just the place. They had them on the ramps tied down in their normal positions.

32. General GRUNETT. What did the SOP require of you in the line of taking care of your own, if not instructed to go on alert No. 1? In other words, there was Field Manual 100-5, I [798] believe, that made each separate Commander responsible for his own safety, including danger from the air?

General MOLLISON. Well, that is very true. We would have had these planes in dispersed position, which would have required—oh, I would say it would take about, perhaps five times the number of guards to properly safeguard them from sabotage. They would have been safer from air attack.

33. General GRUNETT. Hasn't each plane a ground crew?

General MOLLISON. That is true.

34. General GRUNETT. Ordinarily, is it the responsibility of the ground crew to take care of that plane, under all circumstances?

General MOLLISON. That's true, General. They are supposed to maintain them and furnish incidental protection to them, but that would mean that you would have to keep these people on the go 24 hours a day, which is hardly practicable; so you would have to have in addition to the combat crews and the maintenance crews, additional guards.

35. General GRUNETT. Were not the fields themselves normally fairly well protected against sabotage?

General MOLLISON. No, they were not. There were no perimeter fences. We had a little strip of barbed wire, which we got through a fluke, around the perimeter; or the vulnerable perimeter of Hickam Field. Wheeler Field was wide open, as well as Bellows. They didn't have man-proof fences or even barbed wire around either of the other two fields.

36. General GRUNETT. General Russell?

37. General RUSSELL. General, in the interest of clarity in the record, I wanted to ask some questions, here, about the [799] time required to get your fighter planes in the air and to engage the enemy. On this day, December 7, 1941, were the weapons in your fighter planes?

General MOLLISON. Yes, indeed!

38. General RUSSELL. Was there any ammunition in your fighter planes?

General MOLLISON. In some of them; not in all of them.

39. General RUSSELL. What is your estimate of the time that would have been required to have gotten the ammunition into all of the planes, or do you have that data?
General Mollison. I haven't that data. I can say this, that within eleven minutes after the members got to some of the planes, they were in the air.

40. General Russell. We have had testimony to the effect that if the personnel was at the plane, then the plane could have been gotten into the air in four minutes.

General Mollison. That's true; I think you can "scramble" your planes in four minutes.

41. General Russell. We have also had testimony to the effect that if you had the personnel at the airfield, but not in the planes, it would have required thirty minutes to have gotten the planes in the air.

General Mollison. That is about right.

42. General Russell. Then, we have had testimony to the effect that if the troops were away from the field, offices, and headquarters, and the troops, in the quarters, or with routine training in progress, or with recreation in progress, to have gotten that personnel to the field and into the planes would have required four hours, and to have gotten the [800] planes into the air?

General Mollison. Well, that is normal procedure for us. We feel that, either on the 30-minute alert, the 1-hour alert, or the 4-hour alert.

43. General Russell. Then is it true, General, that in estimating the time element to get your planes in the air and in contact with hostile aircraft or other targets, there would have been two factors, out there—the time to get your personnel to the plane, and, second, the time to get the ammunition into the plane?

General Mollison. Well, I don't think that that would normally hold, General. You have certain planes that are on the alert. That means, ready to go, right now. Other planes are on 2-hours notice; others, on 4-hour notice. Those that are supposed to go, right now, are supposed to be ready, with everything.

44. General Grunert. Is that normal, to have some ready all the time?

General Mollison. Oh, yes, yes; indeed!

45. General Grunert. Were they set aside, or were they grouped with the rest of them?

General Mollison. Generally, they do that by squadrons, General. The squadron is on the alert. That's the "alert squadron" or the "alert squadrons." Certain ones of them are given a little more relaxation, to be ready after two hours, and others, four hours.

46. General Grunert. Did these alerted planes in each squadron get in the air and put up a fight?

General Mollison. No, sir! The only place that we got [801] in the air came from a field that the Japs didn't know we had—Haleiwa. There were several that tried to take off from Bellows, but they were shot down on the take-off. These planes were over the fields before anybody knew that they were coming. The first that I knew of it was when the bombs were dropping.

47. General Russell. General, I have been attempting to recreate, or to create, in my mind, the picture of Oahu, had General Short elected, on the 27th day of November, to have gone to alert 2; which, as I understand alert 2, provided for the men to be at the planes, with the ammunition in the planes, ready to go, to repel a surprise air attack.
48. General Frank. I think that is alert 3.
49. General Russell. As I understood, it was 2. I may be confused on it, as I understood, alert 2 provided against an air attack; but let us assume we had gone to 3, in order that you could have been in position to have met the surprise attack that did come in, there. This message came on the morning of November 27, that General Grunert discussed with you. The attack was made on the morning of December 7, which was nine or ten days later. Now, to have remained on the major alert, from the Air Force standpoint, with the men at the planes, for a period of ten days, what sort of tax on your personnel would that have been?

General Mollison. Oh, it is difficult, it is really difficult, to keep your people constantly on the alert for that period of time; and frankly, we didn’t have the people over there at that time, in either pilots or in maintenance crews, to keep them on the alert all that time.

[802] 50. General Grunert. What was done after December 7th? Were they not then on alert all the time?

General Mollison. They were, indeed; but we had to break the period and put a lesser number of planes available for the alert for the first three days, until Wednesday I should say, because nobody got any sleep and they were all completely worn out by Wednesday and Thursday, and we had to revamp and revise the whole scheme.

51. General Russell. Did I understand you to say that in revamping the scheme you reduced the number of planes that were on the major alert?

General Mollison. Yes.

52. General Russell. And thereby gave some of the personnel time off?

General Mollison. A chance to rest.

53. General Grunert. Then, Alert No. 2 did not visualize what you had to do after December 7. In other words, it did not visualize that the alert might last for a considerable length of time, and therefore you had to get up a scheme that you could carry into effect effectively.

General Mollison. That is right.

54. General Grunert. Alert No. 2 is primarily against an air raid, whereas No. 3 combines with No. 2 in getting the infantry out. That is the primary difference, it is not?

General Mollison. Yes, sir.

[803] 55. General Grunert. And Alert No. 2 did visualize an air attack?

General Mollison. Yes, sir.

56. General Frank. Did General Martin have any conversation with Short relative to the type of alert on that morning that you went back to General Short’s office and to the Navy?

General Mollison. Yes, sir.

57. General Frank. What were General Martin’s comments to General Short on that?

General Mollison. The decision was made by General Short. The first we knew of it we were out in General Hayes’ office, and they came out and said we would go on this alert.

58. General Frank. Was this before General Martin had any conversation with him about the alert whatever?
General Mollison. He had had no conversation other than this general conversation over at the Navy Yard.

59. General Frank. Was General Martin in full agreement with this No. 1 Alert?

General Mollison. Yes; I think he was.

60. General Frank. That carried with it some sort of a conviction that there was not going to be an air attack?

General Mollison. That is right, too.

61. General Frank. Was that the general feeling?

General Mollison. That was the general feeling.

62. General Frank. How far down?

General Mollison. I should say, through all the echelons. Nobody in Hawaii felt that there would be a surprise attack on Hawaii.

63. General Frank. What led you into that frame of mind?

General Mollison. I think, the confidence and optimism of the Navy more than anything else.

64. General Frank. That had to be supplemented by your belief in the effectiveness of the Navy for you to have had a similar feeling?

General Mollison. That is very true.

65. General Frank. Did you have confidence in the effectiveness of the Navy?

General Mollison. I had this confidence, General, that if they knew the location of every ship of the Japanese Fleet we would certainly have sufficient warning before there would be a surprise attack.

66. General Frank. Had they assured you that they did know the position of all the ships of the Japanese Fleet?

General Mollison. Yes, sir.

67. General Frank. That is all that you had—just the general information that they had the information?

General Mollison. That is correct.

68. General Frank. You did not yourself know where these Jap ships were, did you?

General Mollison. We had asked many questions of the Naval Intelligence which they were very chary about supplying to us, stating that this was information that they knew about and that were not in a position to pass out any details. That occurred not only as to the location of the Japanese Fleet, but on many other items.

69. General Frank. Who in particular gave you the assurance that you were so well covered by the Navy?

General Mollison. Colonel Rayley was our A-2 at that time. He was working directly with Commander Layton, who was the Naval Intelligence Officer.

70. General Frank. Layton, of the Navy, was the man who gave you the assurance that they knew what they were doing?

General Mollison. Yes, sir.

71. General Frank. Did you by any chance know that between the 25th and the 30th of November there was a Japanese task force down in the Marshall Islands?

General Mollison. No, sir; I did not.

72. General Frank. Commander Layton did not tell you about that?

General Mollison. No, sir. I am sure he did not tell Rayley or anybody else, because that is the first time I have ever heard that mentioned.
73. General Frank. What would have been your feeling had you known that there was a Japanese task force at Jaluit?
General Mollison. I would have had an entirely different idea of the whole picture. That is within striking distance of Hawaii. I think we would have tightened up our belts considerably.

74. General Frank. You knew that the Navy was sending out task forces from time to time?
General Mollison. Yes, sir.

75. General Frank. Did you know when they went out?
General Mollison. No, sir.

76. General Frank. Did you by any chance know where they went?
General Mollison. No, sir.

77. General Frank. You mentioned some time back something about there being air troops on guard at installations down town.
General Mollison. We had certain obligations to fulfill as far as policing and guarding was concerned, in the first [806] Police District of Honolulu.

78. General Frank. At the same time you stated that you were short of trained troops to accomplish the air work that was necessary at your air station?
General Mollison. That is right.

79. General Frank. How did it happen that you could spare troops for ground guard duty downtown?
General Mollison. We could not, General.

80. General Frank. Who made that decision?
General Mollison. That was General Short's decision.

81. General Frank. How many troops were involved?
General Mollison. Total Air Force troops?

82. General Frank. Yes,
General Mollison. Approximately 7,500.

83. General Frank. 7,500 were turned over for ground duty?
General Mollison. No, sir; 3 battalions of 500 men each.

84. General Frank. 1,500?
General Mollison. Yes, sir.

85. General Grunert. Was this normal procedure or under Alert 1?
General Mollison. That was under Alert 1.

86. General Frank. Let us get to this massing of planes on the apron. At Hickam Field you had about 36 P-18's and about 12 B-17's?
General Mollison. Six B-17's in commission; six out of commission.

87. General Frank. There were 12 dispersed?
General Mollison. You might say 10, General, because there were two that were pretty well cannibalized. I do not think you could have moved them.

88. General Frank. There was room at Hickam Field to have dispersed that number of planes?
General Mollison. Plenty of room.

89. General Frank. You had barbed wire along the north stretch and down to John Roger Airport?
General Mollison. That is correct.

90. General Frank. You had machine guns enfilading the area in front of the barbed wire?
General Mollison. Yes, sir.
91. General Frank. Had you dispersed your planes and put the crews sleeping in the planes, with machine-gun ammunition at the guns, so that in case of attack the guns in the planes could have been manned, the ground and air crews could have taken care of those planes by having the men sleep in the vicinity of the planes, could they not?

General Mollison. I do not believe, General, that that would have been considered an adequate defense. I would not consider it so.

92. General Frank. If the planes had been dispersed the machine guns in the planes could have been used for the ground defense as well as air defense in case of attack?

General Mollison. That is true.

93. General Frank. And the barbed wire entanglement with the machine-gun defense covering the front of it would have deterred saboteurs from coming onto the field, would it not?

General Mollison. It would deter them, yes; but it would not stop them.

94. General Frank. Had you had Hickam Field's proportion of the ground personnel that was downtown guarding streets to have protected Hickam Field, it would have been possible, even from your point of view, to have dispersed the planes and still have [308] protection?

General Mollison. I think I have given a misconception of the things. On this particular alert our troops were not pulled out. On the next alert that would have been given they were supposed to be pulled out.

95. General Frank. What do you mean by “pulled out”?

General Mollison. Pulled out away from the Air Force to take over this policing of the First Police District.

96. General Frank. You had these troops then?

General Mollison. We had them. That is one reason why I thought it was a good alert. We were left with all our people.

97. General Frank. Then you had people that could have been made available to have protected your perimeter?

General Mollison. That is true.

98. General Frank. You did not have to worry about the Navy side?

General Mollison. No, sir.

99. General Frank. And you did not have to worry about the Pearl Harbor entrance side?

General Mollison. No, sir.

100. General Frank. You did not have to worry about the Kamehameha side?

General Mollison. That is a pretty wide open field.

101. General Frank. Kamehameha could have taken care of it, though?

General Mollison. Yes, sir.

102. General Frank. So that left you only the narrow strip at the east end and the north side which had barbed wire?

General Mollison. All this area that comes right up through this slough [indicating on map]. All of this was wide [309] open. And as to this point below Kamehameha, there is not a thing down there to keep people from infiltrating across there. (indicating)
The wire only went down perhaps half a mile beyond the limits of our field.

103. General Frank. You still would have preferred to have had your planes destroyed there than to have had them dispersed and taken care of this way, then, I take it?

General Mollison. I think that every man weighs those things in the balance. If he felt that there was an air attack coming, certainly the planes would have been dispersed. If he feels that with 40 percent of the population of the place in which he is living are potential enemies, he will take steps to guard his property against sabotage. And that was our reasoning—to be particularly watchful for sabotage; and we felt that if war was declared or started by either side, the first things that would be done would be acts of sabotage by the nationals that were living in Oahu.

104. General Frank. Did the contents of these messages have any influence upon your estimate of the immediate presence of hostile activities? Do you remember reading the messages?

General Mollison. Yes.

105. General Frank. Do you remember the contents of them?

General Mollison. I remember them generally. I knew them quite well at that time; but I do not believe that anyone felt either in the Army or Navy that in the event war was declared the first push would be across the Pacific. We were pretty well sold on an attack against Malaya.

106. General Frank. The Navy, you felt, had implicit confidence in themselves to be able to give warning of an impending attack?

General Mollison. Yes, sir.

107. General Frank. And that confidence was relayed rather completely to members of the Army?

General Mollison. Yes, sir.

108. General Frank. Are you conversant with the estimate of the situation that was prepared and signed by General Martin and Admiral Bellinger?

General Mollison. Yes, sir: I am generally familiar with it, but it would be hard for me to quote it at the present time.

109. General Frank. You remember the estimate of the situation described and anticipated just exactly what happened in this attack?

General Mollison. We had been working on that for months, General.

110. General Frank. If you anticipated and described it in your estimate of the situation, why was it that you did not give it sole consideration when you were notified that it was a war warning?

General Mollison. Well, here is a part that I can speak only for myself on, because I do not know that General Martin felt the same as I did. We had this offshore patrol, P. T. Y.'s going out every morning just at the crack of dawn, supposedly taking care of all of the offshore patrol. Their warning in the event that anything was coming in could have reached us in sufficient time so that we could have moved our airplanes around in any way we saw fit.

111. General Frank. You were conversant with the fact, however, that they did not have enough P. B. Y.'s to cover Oahu by 360 degrees?

General Mollison. That is very true, sir; but they were not attempting it by 360 degrees.
112. General Frank. Then why did you feel such security?
   General Mollison. That was supplemented, of course, by carriers
   that were out on patrol. However, we did not know where they were
   patrolling or what areas they were covering.

113. General Frank. Then, just on the assurance of the Navy you
   were blindly confident that they were “delivering the goods”?
   General Mollison. That is about what it amounts to. We were all
   so sold on the idea that the Navy had this picture, and that with the
   fleet in Pearl Harbor they would not dare to attack.

114. General Frank. Do you believe that the presence of the fleet
   in being at Pearl Harbor, with the traditional strategic defense that
   that offered, contributed in any way to the complacency that existed?
   General Mollison. I do not doubt at all but what it contributed to
   an erroneous feeling of safety on the part of the Army.

115. General Frank. Was there a reconnaissance squadron at Bell-
   lows Field?
   General Mollison. Yes, sir.

116. General Frank. How often did it conduct reconnaissance?
   General Mollison. I should say, daily, General.

117. General Frank. Was that for reconnaissance purposes or train-
   ing purposes, or both?
   General Mollison. Both.

118. General Frank. Did it operate on Sundays?
   General Mollison. Not to my knowledge. I am sure it did
   [872] not. It may have on this Sunday, but I doubt very much
   if it did.

119. General Frank. What did you have by way of reconnaissance
   in addition to this reconnaissance squadron at Bellows Field?
   General Mollison. The only thing that we had in the way of recon-
   naissance was occasional missions of B-18’s within the inshore patrol
   area.

120. General Frank. Would you have considered an advisory mili-
   tary mission to have sent B-18’s to be used on patrol where they would
   have contacted Japanese Zeros?
   General Mollison. No, sir. That is suicide. Is just no defense
   against any reasonable fighter plane.

121. General Frank. In a B-18?
   General Mollison. That is right. Of course, they were not used
   for that, General. They were used only for the inshore patrol, which
   is within 20 miles of Oahu.

122. General Grunert. What were they reconnoitering for?
   General Mollison. Submarines.

123. General Grunert. Were they armed?
   General Mollison. Yes, sir; but their armament is so small they
   had practically nothing.

124. General Frank. That is, practically nothing in the light of
   present day armament of modern bombers?
   General Mollison. That is true.

125. General Grunert. You are speaking of both B-18’s and recon-
   naissance planes?
   General Mollison. That is true.

126. General Frank. What was the reconnaissance plane.
   General Mollison. C-47.
127. General Frank. That is a single engine airplane?


128. General Frank. Even prior to the message of November 27 reconnaissance was conducted by the Hawaiian Department?

General Mollison. Yes, sir.

129. General Frank. And that continued?

General Mollison. Swede Munson came over to see us about this and I complained bitterly about using B-18's on this reconnaissance. In the first place, it is a very bad airplane for that purpose. You should be able to see directly down, and with your B-18 it is pretty hard to pick up anything in the water. You are looking at an angle.

130. General Frank. A man in the nose could see straight down?

General Mollison. Yes; but he is the only one. By the time he looks for about an hour his eyes begin getting pretty fuzzy, if he is really looking hard. I thought perhaps there were other types of planes that might be made available that could be used to better purpose on this inshore patrol.

131. General Frank. With respect to the aircraft warning service, are you conversant with that?

General Mollison. Yes, generally speaking.

132. General Frank. Who was the main authority on the location of the permanent sites?

General Mollison. The main authority on that was Colonel Powell.

133. General Frank. The plan for the defense of the island with 271's, or permanent installations, called for three, one on Kaala, on Haleakala and one on Kokee. Do you remember when they were received in the Hawaiian Department?

General Mollison. I cannot remember exactly. It was in the spring of 1941 some time.

[814] 134. General Frank. Spring or summer?

General Mollison. Not before spring; I know that.

135. General Frank. Do you remember when the mobile sets, the 270's were received?

General Mollison. I could not give you any exact time on it, but it was about that time.

136. General Frank. The mobile sets were deployed and operated General Mollison. Not very effective. I do not think any of our on maneuvers or on exercises prior to the December 7th attack?

General Mollison. Yes.

137. General Frank. Was their operation effective?

General Mollison. Not very effective. I do not think any of our radar over there was worth much.

138. General Frank. What do you mean by "not worth much"? Compared with what?

General Mollison. We were getting so many fixed echoes on them, or echoes of some kind, that they got to seeing airplanes all over the place when no airplanes were in the air. Apparently they did not know enough about the installation of them or the operation to leave anybody with any confidence in them.

139. General Frank. Who made these reports to you with respect to the unsatisfactoriness of these sets?

General Mollison. Generally, my conversation with Powell on them. You see, they had been turned over to us, to the Air Force at
the time the war started. There was a lot of bickering and wrangling about the things. Our Signal Officer attempted to take hold of them and he could not, and Powell did not want to give them up, and he did not, and so forth.

140. General Frank. Here is a chart which is already part of the record of the Board (handing chart to the witness), which shows how the radar picked up the incoming attack and followed [815] it in. That would indicate a degree of effectiveness, would it not?

General Mollison. Do we have a scale on this, General, showing the distances?

141. General Frank. That is about 120 miles.

General Mollison. I would be inclined to think, and I always have thought, that that was our own B-17’s coming in. I cannot prove that to you, but that is my feeling.

142. General Frank. The radio stations were in operation, were they not?

General Mollison. Yes, sir.

143. General Frank. If the radio stations were in operation did not the B-17’s coming in have radio equipment so that they could hold on to the radio?

General Mollison. Yes, sir; but some of them came in from just exactly that direction (indicating).

144. General Frank. Do you know whether or not there was any dissatisfaction with respect to the rapidity with which the radio stations were being built?

General Mollison. I do not think it was expressed at any time over there in my presence, General. They were having difficulty with one of them, but that was in the getting of some equipment to put the elevator in up there.

General Frank. A cableway?

General Mollison. Yes, sir.

146. General Frank. Were there any underground gasoline tanks at Bellows Field?

General Mollison. There were none of sufficient size to amount to anything.

147. General Frank. There was gasoline storage over there, however?

General Mollison. Yes, sir; that is right. Later on we put in quite an extensive underground system at Bellows, after the war started.

148. General Frank. Do you know whether or not on the morning of December 7th a lack of gasoline prevented any take-offs?

General Mollison. At Bellows?

149. General Frank. Yes.

General Mollison. No, sir, I do not. I could not subscribe to that, because there were only about three planes that tried to get off over there, and they were promptly shot down on take-off. Kaneohe and Bellows were hit just about at the same time, these planes right above them.

150. General Frank. Have you any information other than that that has been brought out that is pertinent to the situation, that you can offer to the Board?

General Mollison. I saw the number of planes that were wrecked over on Ford Island after the attack was over, and it looked to me
as though that was every PBY that was in the Department; and, while I could not swear to it, I do not think any PBYs went out that morning for offshore patrol, and I think that that had quite a bearing on the whole thing if it is true that those PBYs did not go out that morning.

151. General Frank. Do you know whether or not it was habitual [817] for them to go out every morning?

General Mollison. Yes, sir. They took off right by my quarters, General, about 5:30 to 6 o'clock in the morning. On this particular morning I did not hear them, but sometime you get in the habit of this noise and it doesn't disturb you, but I don't believe—I didn't see any PBYs trying to come back in during or after the attack.

152. General Frank. Did the Navy prior to this time habitually conduct reconnaissance on Sunday mornings?

General Mollison. I could not say as to that, sir.

153. General Grunert. When they do go out, do they cover all the directions of the compass?

General Mollison. I think that they were covering in sectors of somewhere in the neighborhood of 140 degrees.

154. General Grunert. Did that include the arc in which the attack was made?

General Mollison. Yes, sir. Almost all of our plans were worked out on patrolling this area to be able to pick up anything suspicious at the 600-mile limit, and we figured on normal carrier speeds and plane speeds, that if we could get them at the 600-mile limit we could be ready for them by the time they came into Hawaii. With an 800-mile limit you were just that much more better off; if you have any kind of visibility at all, you ought to be able to pick up anything that is in there in force.

155. General Grunert. Even if you were in a concentrated position on the field, such as Alert No. 1 carried, you could have gotten in the air if you had picked them up at 600 miles?

General Mollison. Yes, sir.

[818] 156. General Grunert. I want to clear up one point. I understood you to say that if you were in Alert No. 1 your men were all present, and if you had been in Alert 2 there would have been a number of them off in civil communities doing guard work; is that right?

General Mollison. Yes, sir; that was the plan, that we had trained some of these 500-man battalions of ours to go into different locations for the defense of Oahu.

(Excerpts from standing operating procedure of November 5, 1941, were read, as follows:)

157. General Grunert. I want to read to you the pertinent parts of the S. O. P. of the 5th of November on this subject.

Paragraph 6 states:

Security.—Every unit is responsible for its security at all times from hostile ground or air forces. See paragraphs 233 to 273, inclusive, FM 100-5.

That is under the subject of "General."

"Alerts," 14 a: Alert 1:

This alert is a defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings within the islands, with no threat from without.
And under paragraph f of "Alerts":

The Hawaiian Air Force will:
(1) Protect all vital installations on posts on Oahu garrisoned by air forces.
(2) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 14 g.

[819] 14 g reads as follows:

The District Commanders, assisted by the air corps detachments within the districts, will:
Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, and maintain order in the civil community.

Therefore, under Alert No. 1 you would have had that distribution, and maintained order in the civil community.

Now, Alert 2:

This alert is applicable to a condition more serious than Alert No. 1. Security against attacks from hostile, sub-surface, surface, and aircraft, in addition to defense against acts of sabotage and uprisings, is provided.

Under that, in paragraph f:

The Hawaiian Air Force will:
(1) Maintain aircraft and crews in condition of readiness as directed by this headquarters. See paragraph 17.
(2) Release without delay all pursuit aircraft to the Interceptor Command.
(3) Prepare aircraft for dispatch to fields on outlying islands and upon arrival thereat, disperse on fields.
(4) Disperse bombers with crews.
(5) Disperse pursuit planes with crews to bunkers.
(6) Protect all vital installations on posts on Oahu garrisoned by air forces.
(7) Assist in defense of air fields on outlying [820] islands by cooperation of local base detachments with District Commanders. See paragraph 15 g.

15 g provides:

The District Commanders, assisted by the air corps troops detachments within the districts, will:
Defend the air fields and vital installations thereat against acts of sabotage, hostile attacks, and maintain order in the civil community.

Therefore, that direction about maintaining order in civil communities is applicable both to 1 and 2.

General Mollison. That is right.

158. General Grunert. So in either case, following these instructions, you would have had some air corps troops in civil communities, and not only in one case or the other, but in both cases? That is the point I want to get straightened out.

General Mollison. That is right. That is true on the outlying islands, General. That is all that applies to. Before, we were supposed to take over these specified spots in Honolulu, but I think that was changed just before the—what is the date of that, General? Is that November?

159. General Grunert. November 5, 1941.

General Mollison. I believe that was changed.

160. General Grunert. Which was supposed to be the "bible" at that time.

General Mollison. That is right.

161. General Grunert. You interpreted, then, this, "The District Commanders, assisted by the air corps troop detachments within the districts, will maintain order in the civil community"—you interpreted that to mean just on outlying islands?
General Mollison. Yes, sir; that is the way I interpreted that.

162. General Grunert. But that is under both 1 and 2, so it would be under sabotage alert and alert against air raid.

General Mollison. That is right.

163. General Grunert. I interpret that to mean on Oahu as well as outlying islands. But, as you say, you may have received different instructions; I do not know.

164. General Russell. Did you actually have these three battalions out on this alert that was begun on November 27th?

General Mollison. No, sir; we did not.

165. General Frank. You said that under normal conditions you had a certain number of the planes in each squadron, or certain squadrons that were designated as alert squadrons?

General Mollison. That would not be under normal; that was under alert conditions, I should have said, General: under conditions of alert.

166. General Grunert. But not under conditions of Alert 1?

General Mollison. Yes, sir.

167. General Grunert. Sabotage?

General Mollison. Yes, sir. There were alert squadrons, alert crews.

168. General Frank. How long did it take you to get those planes off the ground in case of emergency?

General Mollison. Those were supposed to be ready to go in thirty minutes, General. You see, that is Alert A or Condition of Readiness A.

169. General Frank. Where did the crews sleep?

General Mollison. The crews slept in tents or huts adjacent to the planes when the bombers were in dispersed position. When they were on the line they slept in the operations rooms and hangars.

170. General Frank. Is that where the pilots also slept?

General Mollison. Yes, sir.

171. General Frank. So there were certain pilots and crews sleeping on the line?

General Mollison. Yes, sir. May I add that that could not help matters at all that morning during the attack because these things were on everybody before there was a possibility of doing anything about it; they were just going down the line.

172. General Russell. The 4-minute alert would not have helped you, would it, General?

General Mollison. A 5-second alert would not have helped, because if they are on top of you you can't take a plane off without being shot down if you have got a bunch of Zeros sitting up there waiting for you to take off.

173. General Grunert. Then, the only effect, as far as I can gather from your testimony, is that the difference between Alerts Nos. 1 and 2 as to protection against what happened, would have been a certain amount of dispersion?

General Mollison. That is all. It would not have helped a bit, unless you had warning of from 30 minutes to two hours before these people are going to attack you, because when they are sitting up there looking down your throat you can't take an airplane off the ground.
174. General Grunert. Then, your only source of warning would have been the air warning service or information from the Navy; is that correct?

[823] General Mollison. Yes, sir, that is true.

175. General Grunert. Or possibly such as your own inshore reconnaissance might have given had it been in the air?

General Mollison. Well, that would not do any good because, you see, that is limited to 20 miles from the shore line. Inshore patrol is absolutely valueless to you because by the time you radio a message in, that 20 miles is covered by a Zero in about five minutes.

176. General Grunert. Of course, they can see farther; if they are out 20 miles they can probably see what? 50 or 60 more?

General Mollison. It is all according to your altitude and your visibility. I would say generally you can see about 10 to 12 miles. If you see airplanes in the air 10 to 12 miles away you are doing very well.

177. General Grunert. Are there any other questions?

178. General Russell. Yes; I have two or three, very briefly.

Were you out there in 1940?

General Mollison. Yes, sir.

179. General Russell. You recall the alert which was an all-out alert that was instituted about the 17th day of June, 1940?

General Mollison. Yes, sir.

180. General Russell. That alert just dwindled out, didn’t it?

General Mollison. It did.

181. General Russell. Now, along at the tail end of that alert and probably in the fall do you recall an order to the Air Force which required reconnaissance for this inshore patrol only as a matter of training?

General Mollison. I do not recall that now.

[824] 182. General Russell. Do you know, General, whether or not beginning there sometime in October, as I remember, of 1940 and extending on till the time of this attack on December 7, ’41, that the air people, the air forces, did maintain an inshore patrol largely as a matter of training?

General Mollison. That would be a token payment only.

183. General Russell. I was interested in the testimony which you gave a moment ago about the planes on Ford Island. I have never served over there, and have labored somewhat under a handicap here. Where is Ford Island?

General Mollison. This is Ford Island here (indicating on map).

184. General Russell. I looked all over those maps and I could not find it.

185. General Grunert. The place you indicated is practically in the middle of Pearl Harbor?

General Mollison. Yes, sir. It used to be our old Luke Field, but we turned it over to the Navy completely.

186. General Russell. Do you know how many planes the naval people had in there, General?

General Mollison. Well, I talked to Captain Davis, the aviation officer on Admiral Kimmel’s staff, and I had the impression that he had somewhere in the neighborhood of 100 PBYs.

187. General Russell. Was that a fighting plane or a reconnaissance plane, or what is it?
General Mollison. It is a reconnaissance plane.

188. General Russell. Purely a reconnaissance plane?

[825] General Mollison. Long-range patrol bomber; that is what it is.

189. General Grunert. Did that pertain to the fleet or to the District?

General Mollison. That was the District. This is under the District, Patwing 2 and Patwing 1.

190. General Grunert. Patwing what?

General Mollison. I think they turned them over to the Fleet at some time. It was either just before or just after the war started; I think it was just after the war started.

191. General Grunert. What do the letters p-a-t mean?

General Mollison. Patrol wing. "Pat" is patrol.

192. General Grunert. Patrol?

General Mollison. P-a-t is for patrol; yes, sir.

193. General Russell. General, how many other types of aircraft did the naval people have there at Pearl Harbor at the time of this attack?

General Mollison. I would not know, General. They had several other types there, but I wouldn't even know how to—

194. General Russell. Where were they? On the carriers or cruisers or where?

General Mollison. Well, of course they have the carrier type planes and their cruiser type planes. They had also some of the smaller utility planes as well.

195. General Russell. I was attempting to develop, and probably I should ask it that way, the effective fighting force that the Navy had in aircraft out there?

General Mollison. Well, they had one squadron of marine fighters, which I think was the one that was sent to Midway [826] and to Wake in place of our P-40s, and that is about all they had land-based. They had them at Ewa for a while.

196. General Russell. Something has been said in the testimony here to the effect that the Navy had some of its planes dispersed and they were all destroyed.

General Mollison. Well, they hit Ewa, of course, and they hit Kaneohe. I think they destroyed almost everything at Kaneohe.

197. General Russell. You do not know whether those were dispersed or not?

General Mollison. I do not think they were dispersed.

198. General Russell. You say you heard these PBYs going out on this morning patrol. How many did they send out ordinarily?

General Mollison. Oh, it would be an estimate, but I should say about 25 or 30.

199. General Russell. Now, a moment ago, in reply to a question from General Frank, you stated that you could not prove it but you had a pretty strong idea that planes that were followed in the morning of the attack were our planes, by that AWS station.

General Mollison. Well, this lad that landed—I can't remember his name but we can get it from the records over there—that landed at Kahuku, he came in from almost directly on that course at just about that time. I think General Landon's course was considerably north of
Oahu, and he turned almost directly south. There were several that I talked to that seemed to think that that is just about the direction that they came from.

[827] 200. General Russell. The Navy had a lot of new tanks out there for storing oil or gas, did they not? Do you know about that?

General Mollison. No, sir, I do not know.

201. General Russell. You have no information?

General Mollison. I have no information on it.

202. General Russell. I think that is all.

203. General Grunert. These planes of ours that came from Hamilton Field to Honolulu or Oahu, I understand they came in groups of six each. Did all the first group get there?

General Mollison. No, sir. They started out with 12 planes, General, and I had a call about midnight from Colonel Howard Ramey. He said, "Don't look for 12. Look for 11 planes." One of them turned back and landed at Hamilton Field about midnight, midnight of our time, so he was only probably out or gone an hour. So they took off at intervals of perhaps 10 minutes, and they started in arriving in Oahu just about 8 to 8:15. I called the tower at 7:45 and asked if they had made any contact or had heard anything of our B-17s, and they told me that they were in contact with some of them but the static was so bad that they could not make out what they were trying to say.

204. General Grunert. You do not know how many planes were supposed to be in the Japanese attack that hit there about that time from that particular direction?

General Mollison. From the number of planes that were over Hickam Field on that first wave I should say that there were somewhere between 60 and 80. That is just my estimate.

205. General Grunert. Would not the Air Warning Service radar show the difference between 11 planes and 50 planes coming from [828] approximately the same direction?

General Mollison. I do not believe they can, General, at a distance.

206. General Frank. Another thing about this, these B-17's were arriving singly; they were not arriving in a formation.

General Mollison. That is right.

207. General Frank. If they arrived in the manner in which they departed from Hamilton Field, they would arrive at about ten-minute intervals.

General Mollison. Yes. Well, there were several of them that came in there right together, General, at about 8 to 8:15.

208. General Frank. In formation?

General Mollison. Well, they were not in formation, but they were pretty close together. They made a pass at Landon as he was coming over Bellows, just about Bellows Field, and this doctor that he had with him, who was killed, thought that that was somebody trying to play, and he got up there in one of his blisters and got this camera out, and this Jap just took off as if he were being shot at. But there were about three or four planes that landed about the time that Landon did, and of course Landon's plane was hit just as it hit the runway, and they happened to hit him right in the pyrotechnic compartment, and he just burned in two and the tail stayed here and the
front end rolled on up here (indicating). We saved all the engines on that one, but the medico was killed. And there were several others that these Jap planes made a pass at, but they got away. They could move away from them: they had enough speed to get away from them.

209. General GRUNERT. General, what is the estimate now by [829] the air people as to the number of hostile aircraft participating in that attack?

General MOLLISON. Well, my own estimate on the thing, which most of the Army people seem to agree with, was about 180 planes total. It may have run a little higher than that or a little less, but you see these high-altitude horizontal bombers going by you in 9-ship formations, and you see all of these zeros and dive bombers and your torpedo bombers; it looked to me as though there were probably 180 to 200 planes.

210. General RUSSELL. Suppose that you people had had ample warning of the approach of these hostile aircraft but there had been no interference with their take-off from the points from which they did depart; did you have any defensive means to have repelled the attack of dive bombers on the naval craft, navel ships?

General Mollison. Oh, I think we could have done a lot of damage to them. I think that we could have kept almost all of those slow-moving torpedo bombers out. Those things were just like shooting fish; they were going along at, I should say, a hundred and ten miles an hour. They didn't look to me as though they were a bit faster than that. The dive bombers were faster. They were probably 160 to 170. And the zero, the little fighter, was a good fast airplane.

211. General RUSSELL. What type of aircraft produced the great damage to our naval ships?

General MOLLISON. The torpedo bomber was the one that caused the most damage to the largest number of ships. The most positive damage that was done was done by high-altitude horizontal bombing on the battleship Arizona. They just [830] happened to get some lucky hits down the stack of the Arizona, and she went up.

212. General RUSSELL. Those were the people who were 10,000 feet up?

General MOLLISON. They were, I should say, between eight and ten thousand feet. All of our antiaircraft was hitting way below and behind these planes.

213. General RUSSELL. The question the General has stated is that if ample warning of the attack had been given the effect of the attack could have been greatly minimized, if not completely eliminated.

General MOLLISON. I think there is no doubt about that. If we could have put 50 fighters in the air that morning and we could have if we had had ample warning—I do not think we could have done a thing against them offensively as far as their carriers were concerned; we did not have the type of aircraft with which to do it. But we could certainly have raised Cain with their formations that came in if we had 50 fighters in the air.

214. General RUSSELL. And you had more than 50 fighters available?

General MOLLISON. We had 105; 103 P-40s and we had something like 22 P-36s, but, strangely enough, that P-36 would not have been any good at all, but the chap in the P-36 did shoot down one plane. We had about 14 fighters in the air that morning, total.
215. General Russell. How did the Japs happen to miss on one airfield? General Mollison. The Haleiwa does not look like an airfield, General. You would guess a long time before you would [831] think that it was one, and these people were over there for maneuvers and gunnery practice, and of course the Japs didn't know they were there.

216. General Russell. That is all.

217. General Grunert. Have you any further questions? 
(No response.)
There appear to be no further questions. Thank you very much for coming up.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

218. General Grunert. We shall take a five-minute recess.
(Thereupon there was a brief informal recess.)

[832] TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. W. E. FARTHING, 07122, ATLANTIC OVERSEAS SERVICE COMMAND, PORT OF NEWARK; NEWARK, N. J.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. General, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

General Farthing. William E. Farthing, 07122, Atlantic Overseas Air Service Command, Port of Newark; Newark, N. J.

2. General Grunert. General, this Board is after facts and also after the background and viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. Particularly, I want to develop what you know about the attack, the conditions prior thereto, in your assigned position. What were you, and what were your duties in Hawaii, late in 1941?

General Farthing. I was Commanding Officer at Hickam Field.

3. General Grunert. As Commanding Officer of Hickam Field, what did you do at Hickam Field in compliance with this paragraph of the Standing Operating Procedure of the Hawaiian Department?

6. Security.—Every unit is responsible for its security at all times from hostile ground or air forces. (See Paragraphs 233–273, inclusive, FM–100–5).

General Farthing. We took the necessary steps to prevent sabotage of our equipment.

4. General Grunert. Will you explain to me what weapons and ammunition you had for defense, particularly against aircraft; and what other protective measures, such as air-raid shelters, or slit trenches, or fire-fighting measures. If so, was there an SOP on it? Also tell us how your defense tied in with the [833] general antiaircraft defense of the Department.

General Farthing. I was Base Commander of Hickam Field, and had taken command on the 27th day of November, the Tactical Commander being General Rudolph. As Base Commander I had the housekeeping of the field, not the tactical defense of the field. As a Base Commander we drew the airplanes in at night, and we would put a guard around them and lights around them, and there was a perimeter, a guard.
5. General Frank. It was a perimeter guard around the perimeter of what—the airplanes, or the field.

General Farthing. Of the airfield—of both places. That guard was under Colonel Herman. We had some few machine guns. We had no antiaircraft artillery, and at the time of the attack, to the best of my memory, there were no slit trenches.

6. General Grunert. There was no antiaircraft defense of the field?

General Farthing. The antiaircraft defense of the field was a part of the antiaircraft defense of the Hawaiian Islands.

7. General Grunert. Of the area?

General Farthing. Of the area.

8. General Grunert. But you did have the machine guns set up for local defense?

General Farthing. We had some machine guns. Some of the machine guns were sighted for the defense of the airplanes. The Air Corps did have some few machine guns in its table of organization, and those guns were used, were out. Most of the machine guns as I remember were sighted for the defense of the airplanes against sabotage.

9. General Frank. Were they on mounts so that they could be [834] used for either air or ground defense?

General Farthing. I don’t remember. I think they were on the ground, and they were not sighted as for air defense. We were defending against sabotage and not air attack.

10. General Grunert. If you had not been put on alert No. 1 what would have been your defense normally of Hickam Field?

General Farthing. We would have dispersed our aircraft over the field.

11. General Grunert. But how about your weapons? How would you have used them?

General Farthing. The weapons were on the airplanes, of course. Some of them are capable of being sighted for anti-aircraft fire. The Air Corps didn’t have very many machine guns for that purpose; some few .50s—I have forgotten the exact number.

12. General Grunert. Outside of the actual crew and the ground crew for the plane, did you have a guard for the station, itself, which handled the various sorts of weapons for defensive purposes?

General Farthing. Yes, we had a guard for the field itself, as a part of the base command.

13. General Grunert. What did that consist of?

General Farthing. I have forgotten the exact numbers, but about 300 men, I believe it was, that we had taken from the other air units there. We had no defense command, set up as such, that was organized as such.

14. General Grunert. What were these 200-odd men doing, normally?

General Farthing. They were the post guard.

[835] 15. General Grunert. They were armed with machine guns, were they?

General Farthing. No, they were not. They were armed with pistols.

16. General Grunert. Were there any machine guns available to them?

General Farthing. No.
17. General Grunert. Ordinarily, the Standing Operating Procedure is the type of instruction that tells people what to do under various circumstances. Now, what were the orders of this guard in the line of defense? What did they have to do? How did they defend the Post, or how were they supposed to defend the post?

General Farthing. There was a plan in existence. These guards were on their posts, the regular plan for the guard.

18. General Grunert. Was most of the guard for materiel, or how much of it should be used for actual defense?

General Farthing. The guards for the materiel were furnished by the tactical units. They guarded their own materiel.

19. General Grunert. And you had 200 men that could be used for defensive purposes?

General Farthing. No, sir, General. They were the guards. They were the guards that were used for the guarding of the Post and the patrolling of the Post, and so forth. I am wrong—wait a minute. At that time we had taken 500 men from the tactical commands and had trained them into detachments. That was done prior to the time that I was Base Commander.

[836] To get my story clear, I had better start back. When I went to Hawaii, I was Commander of the 5th Group, a heavy bombardment outfit. It was under the command of General Frank. In September I left Hickam Field and went over and took command of Bellows Field on the east side of the Island, and I was there until November 27th. Then I was brought back to command Hickam Field. Prior to the time that I left Hickam Field, the tactical units, they had taken these people out of the tactical units and had trained them for defense duties, and I think there were something like 500 of them, and they have positions to go, and they did have these places, and on top of the hangars were part of them. Out in the fields they had machine-gun places.

20. General Grunert. They could be used against ground or air attack?

General Farthing. Yes, sir; that is correct. I was wrong before. I was talking about the other boys.

21. General Grunert. How did they perform when the attack came on?

General Farthing. I couldn’t answer that question. When the attack came on, I was in the tower and in position to have observed that, and I saw the attack start. I was waiting in the tower to receive that reconnaissance squadron from Hawaii that had been following the flight across the ocean, till 12 o’clock, and it was due in between 5:30 and 6, and I went down to the tower with Colonel Chaney Bert- holf, to see that it was received.

I saw the attack start, saw it coming in, saw it develop, and took most of it. The attack—but that is volunteering [837] information. I will go back to your question.

The airplanes were flying all over the field. There was a lot of firing. Now, as to exactly what the effect of that firing was, I couldn’t tell you. Within a short time, not too short, an hour’s time, antiaircraft artillery did arrive at the Post, and there was much firing.

22. General Grunert. When you took over, what protective measures did you find there? Did they have any air-raid shelters?
General Farthing. No.
23. General Grunert. Were there any slit trenches? Were there any fire-fighting measures, in case of an attack? Generally, what were those conditions in that line?

General Farthing. They were building some, getting ready to build some revetments for the airplanes.

24. General Grunert. That is what they call "bunkers"?

25. General Grunert. There were women and children on the Post, were there not?
General Farthing. That is right.

26. General Grunert. What measures were taken for those, in case of emergency? What were the plans for taking care of them and protecting them?

General Farthing. There was a plan, the "Hawaiian Plan." I have forgotten exactly what it was, at this time.

27. General Grunert. But what was done right after the attack, in that line?

General Farthing. As quick as I got back, we got all the women and children off the Post and sent them into the hills.

[838] 28. General Grunert. Was that according to plan?
General Farthing. No, sir. That was not according to plan.

29. General Grunert. What protective measures were taken as an afterthought, after the attack, to avoid anything like that happening again?

General Farthing. The guard—everything—our whole idea there was, we thought it was going to be sabotage, and we expected the natives to rise up and come in. The heavy guard was put around the perimeter, and a guard put around; there were cane fields, one side, very close, and that part of the field had heavy guards around.

30. General Grunert. Did they construct any air-raid shelters afterward?

General Farthing. Yes.

31. General Grunert. Did they dig any slit trenches?

General Farthing. Yes. We used every entrenching, ditch-digging machine we could get.

32. General Grunert. Do you know why those measures had not been taken before, instead of afterward?

General Farthing. We did not expect an attack.

33. General Grunert. True, you did not expect it, because you put on a sabotage alert; but ordinarily, for self-defense, suppose they put you on No. 2, or No. 3 alert, then what? You could not do that overnight. You could not prepare yourself in a short time. Just because you were not alerted 2, or 3, you were just alerted for sabotage, then these measures were taken afterwards. It would appear that they should have been taken before.

[839] General Farthing. That is correct; they should have been.

34. General Grunert. They were not taken?

General Farthing. They were not taken.

35. General Grunert. Who was in command of the field, before?

Who was the Base Commander before you?

General Farthing. General Rudolph.
36. General GRUNERT. At the time of the attack, Rudolph was in charge of the command of the tactical bombers?

General FAR THING. On the wing; yes, sir.

37. General GRUNERT. Whose responsibility was it to have these measures taken for the general protection of the field—the Base Commander, or the Tactical Commander, or both, or what?

General FAR THING. We were a part of the Hawaiian Air Force. By that answer I am not trying to escape any responsibility on my part.

38. General GRUNERT. But you took over, November 27?

General FAR THING. Yes, sir.

39. General GRUNERT. Prior to that, General Rudolph was in command?

General FAR THING. Yes, sir.

40. General GRUNERT. Then, after you took over, you were still under Rudolph’s command, or were you a separate command, directly under General Martin?

General FAR THING. I was under General Martin, sir.

41. General GRUNERT. Are there any questions?

42. General RUSSELL. General, the answer you gave a minute ago indicated that after this attack had developed at Hickam Field, antiaircraft artillery arrived.

General FAR THING. It did.

43. General GRUNERT. Where did it come from?

General FAR THING. It happened to be that there was a Major of the Antiaircraft Field Artillery spending the night on the Post, and he spent the night with Colonel Bertholf. I can’t recall his name. He was there when the attack occurred, and he went to the phone and ordered his battalion ready and to move immediately, and he met them and brought them into the field.

4. General RUSSELL. Where did they come from?

General FAR THING. They came from Shafter.

45. General GRUNERT. Was there an antiaircraft position on or near the field, that was in the general scheme of antiaircraft protection, that he could occupy that position, or was he doing that on his own, or what, do you know?

General FAR THING. I think that he was according to plan.

46. General RUSSELL. They came back for two additional attacks after this Major got in there with his antiaircraft?

General FAR THING. No, I didn’t say that. I said that the antiaircraft arrived later. Exactly when that antiaircraft arrived, I do not know.

47. General RUSSELL. But you did say that there was considerable shooting after it got there?

General FAR THING. I said there was considerable shooting after the attack started, and shooting after. There was shooting during the attack.

48. General RUSSELL. Did this man get there in time to get in on the shooting? That is the part I wanted to clear up.

General FAR THING. I think he did. I am not certain on that point.

49. General RUSSELL. That is all.

50. General GRUNERT. Have you any questions, General Frank?

51. General FRANK. Yes. It was not an easy thing to dig trenches at Hickam Field?
General Farthing. Hickam Field is on a coral foundation, filled, and you can't dig with a shovel, you have to dig with power equipment, or with the "bulldozer." We dug a lot of them.

52. General Frank. With mechanical, compressed-air equipment?
   General Farthing. Mechanical; that's correct.

53. General Grunert. Then the slit trenches as such were practically out?
   General Farthing. They were out, sir. You couldn't dig them overnight.

54. General Grunert. In lieu thereof, you would have to put up revetments to afford protection. would you?
   General Farthing. Hickam Field was just a very few feet above the water, and when you dug down any distance at all you got into the water, and when we had to put our revetments up for our bunkers, for our airplanes, we had to bring the dirt in.

55. General Grunert. The same thing would apply if you had individual protection?
   General Farthing. Yes, sir; if you dug down, you would go into the water.

56. General Frank. You stated a little while ago that you did not anticipate the attack.
   General Farthing. No; I did not anticipate a bombing attack.

57. General Frank. Why?
   General Farthing. I had just completed a study, a short time before. Until we had gone into the thing and gotten the [842] Post—the G-2, anyway, had—where the Navy said that they knew where everyone of the ships were, we constantly were on the alert, or off the alert. Every time they said that they had lost a carrier, or lost a battleship, and every time they lost a Japanese ship of any type, we went on the alert until that was located.

58. General Grunert. You mean, lost track of them?
   General Farthing. Yes, sir; and for the whole period, there, we were on alert, or off the alert—just one endless thing; part of the time sleeping under the wings of the airplanes, or with everybody on alert. It was a continuous thing.

59. General Frank. You felt confident, then, that you were secure in the protection of the Navy?
   General Farthing. No, sir.

60. General Frank. Then why did you think that there would not be an airplane attack?
   General Farthing. I didn't think that we had enough equipment over there to be confident of it. It was a daring plan that was carried out. It was not according to the information furnished us, which was supposed to have been reliable, that there was nothing in the vicinity, that they knew where it all was.

61. General Frank. Then you did have confidence in the Navy?
   General Farthing. I have never had confidence in the Navy!

62. General Frank. What led you to the belief that there would not be an attack? There must be some logic behind it.
   General Farthing. Yes. This is not Monday, but it is Tuesday; and I am a "Monday man" of the quarterbacks—I now know that I was wrong.

[843] 63. General Frank. You were wrong?
General Farthing. I was wrong. Anybody that thought we would not be attacked by the Japanese Air were wrong; circumstances proved that.

64. General Frank. You still have not answered why you believed that you would not be attacked.

General Farthing. I didn’t think they could do it. I didn’t think they had that ability. I thought, I really thought, that we knew where most of their carriers were. I personally thought they knew where most of them were, although prior to this time I wrote and conducted a map maneuver, just shortly after you left, where we pulled this same thing that they did on us, and then we talked it all out and had a big critique about it, and General Herron; one of his last official things before he left. General Martin had just taken over. General Ryan, then Colonel Ryan, was his Chief of Staff. We let the ships come in with carriers just like that, and did the same thing, in a maneuver, and handled our Air Force, too, to try to counter it; and we sent our troops out and took their positions.

65. General Frank. What really led you to the conclusion that there could not be an attack was, in the first place, that you did not think that the Japs could do it, because you believed you were sufficiently well protected by the Navy?

General Farthing. That is right.

66. General Frank. Is that correct?

General Farthing. Yes, sir.

67. General Frank. I am having a hard time getting that. Who, in the Navy, told you that they knew where the Japanese naval [844] craft were?

General Farthing. I can’t quite answer your question as to that. I don’t remember who told me, but the Navy has their information service—I mean their G-2—and in making this study, we made these investigations, and they said that they knew where they were.

68. General Frank. How close would the Japanese carrier force have to be for you to be apprehensive about it?

General Farthing. 900 miles. If they were coming in, 900 miles, we would be in danger. We should be apprehensive if you don’t know where they are, any time that you lose track of it.

69. General Frank. Do you believe it was reasonable to be apprehensive, if they had discovered a Japanese force at Jaluit in the Marshalls?

General Farthing. I think we should be very apprehensive. That is a little bit beyond that range.

70. General Frank. Do you think that the presence of the Japanese carrier force in the Marshalls, at Jaluit, would have been reason to be very apprehensive?

General Farthing. That wasn’t its normal station.

[845] General Frank. The Navy did not turn loose any information with reference to a Jap force of several carriers, between the 25th and 30th of November?

General Farthing. If they did, sir, it would have gone into the tactical command, and I was not told about it.

72. General Frank. These maneuvers of which you spoke just a few minutes ago—when were they held? In the spring of 1941?
General Farthing. You can help me refresh my memory on that. Martin got there at what time?
73. General Frank. He got there in November.
General Farthing. They were held before Christmas, then.
74. General Frank. Before Christmas of 1940?
General Farthing. Yes, sir. That was one of the first jobs I had to do.
75. General Frank. Did you disperse your airplanes during that maneuver?
General Farthing. Yes, sir. General Street was my assistant, and General Walker, deceased, was my other assistant. We drew the whole thing up.
76. General Frank. Did the Navy ever tell you, or did it come to your attention, anything about the frequency with which they sent out task forces?
General Farthing. They sent them out frequently. When I was tactical commander we were all the time going out trying to locate them. That was a regular occurrence.
77. General Frank. But when they went out on reconnaissance to determine the location of any Japanese craft, did they ever tell you where they went?
General Farthing. No, sir; they did not. I do not know that answer.
846 78. General Frank. Did any information sent over by the Navy ever reach your A-2 in your group?
General Farthing. No, sir.
79. General Frank. Do you know how many planes there were in the Japanese attacking force, as an estimate?
General Farthing. I do not. I would say there were something like a hundred. They came over in many waves. Would you care for me to tell you exactly what I saw from the tower?
General Farthing. We were at the tower watching for this reconnaissance squadron to come in. It was a little late.
81. General Frank. A reconnaissance squadron of B-17’s?
General Farthing. Yes, sir; 13 of them coming in. They missed the island. Part of them, of course, were chased in by the Japs. They came in on the beam. While we were in the tower we saw many Navy ships, or what we took to be Navy ships, flying off the island and coming around to the Navy base to the east of the island, and we heard a bunch of airplanes diving in, coming from about 10,000 feet with the clouds. We knew they were not Army planes, and we thought it must be Marines. They dived down on Pearl Harbor. I saw a black object leave the first and hit with an explosion. The first airplane turned its wings up and I could see the Rising Sun on its wings. That airplane immediately came to Hickam Field. I was in the tower. Colonel Bertholf gave the alarm at that time. When he went down to give the alarm I went down from the tower and arrived just after this airplane was coming up at about 25 feet, firing 25-mm. cannon, and he hit No. 3 motor on a B-17 and set it afire. The burning oil dropped down on the rubber tires. He set some B-18’s afire at the same time. The planes were so [847] close together that you could not taxi them out. They tried to get
them in as small bunches as they could, with lights under them. They caught fire. The Jap went off and turned and came back. I was the only person out on the mat at that time. They turned and came back across the field and fired at me, and there were other airplanes coming in at the same time. About that time another airplane came in with bombs. He came in from Kam and started bombing the roadside. There were no bombs—I think I am correct in this—that were dropped on the flying field proper. That had a very important bearing on what we did afterwards, because they made no effort to destroy our landing field; and all the hangars that were bombed were the roadside hangars. We were continually getting machine gun bullets of all the planes that dropped their bombs on Pearl Harbor.

After this attack was over, then came the torpedo attack. The ships were not too fast; they leisurely came in over Kam across our field. They went to the Navy from the vicinity of our main gate, very, very low, and dropped their torpedoes. We got their machine gun bullets, too.

Then came a high level attack. Throughout this whole attack there were airplanes at high altitudes, and they bombed Pearl Harbor; and at the same time this one was going on—

82. General Grunert. This high-level attack?

General Farthing. Yes—a low-level attack came in against Hickam. This was the principal bombing attack at Hickam, and it started from Kam. While on the mat I saw the commanding officer of the 38th Reconnaissance Squadron. He was shot down and landed right on our mat. His co-pilot ran to him and the following Jap ship killed them. He failed to pull up and hit the ground, crushing his belly tank. He had given the ship the motor. I was close enough to see its numbers. Later on that ship was brought back into the field. It had crashed into the mountains.

After this attack was over I caused a survey to be made of the field and every bomb crater to be plotted. The location did not make sense to us; so we figured that if we put it on some of our old maps they might make sense. Going back about two years we found a set of blueprints that they fit. It showed that the last two hangars were not built and that the control tower was an officers' club. The control tower got no fire and the last two hangars got none. All the rest of the hangars were shot at. So that, in my mind, dates their information. Every bomb that they place definitely had its target, and the man knew where it was going to be put. The attack was made so low that there was no possibility of missing. They just flew right above the buildings and turned loose. They learned something that we had not learned—that if you hit your objective you do not have any splinters.

83. General Grunert. If there are no further questions, we thank you very much, General.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
TESTIMONY OF H. RALPH BURTON, GENERAL COUNSEL FOR THE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, WASHINGTON, D. C. (ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN H. WEINER, INVESTIGATOR FOR THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS AND RICHARD WINFREY)

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Will you state to the Board your name, address and occupation?

[849] Mr. Burton. H. Ralph Burton. I am general counsel for the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives and, in such capacity, I have charge of investigations conducted by the Committee under H. R. Resolution 30.

2. General Grunert. Mr. Burton, the Board is after facts and wants to get a background on the various things that it has been charged to do. One of those is to look into such phases of the interim report of the House that may have connections with the attack on Pearl Harbor. With that in view, we thought it would be wise for the Board to have you give us such background so that we could more intelligently approach the problem with which we are charged. Major Clausen, who has been detailed as Assistant Recorder to the Board, having a greater knowledge of what has gone before in connection with this particular phase, will lead in propounding the questions, and then the other members of the Board will fill in with such questions as occur to us.

3. Major Clausen. You are an attorney at law?

Mr. Burton. Yes, sir.

4. Major Clausen. And you have practiced in Washington how many years, sir?

Mr. Burton. Since 1908.

5. Major Clausen. As a matter of fact, you were born in Washington; is that correct?

Mr. Burton. I was; yes, sir.

6. Major Clausen. You are the general counsel for the House Military Affairs Committee?

Mr. Burton. That is right.

7. Major Clausen. And have been for what period of time?

Mr. Burton. I can only approximate that, sir—about two [850] years.

8. Major Clausen. Before that time you have investigated for the Senate and the House, on occasions, with regard to other committees?

Mr. Burton. Yes, sir. I was with the Senate Campaign Expenditures Committee in 1908 and conducted investigations in Kentucky, Arkansas, North Dakota, Maryland, Indiana, and other States that I do not now recall.

I might very briefly add that subsequent to that I was with the Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives and conducted an investigation into W. P. A. activities in New York City and New York State. Later I was with the Senate Campaign Expenditures Committee, in 1940, and conducted investigations in a number of different States.
9. **Major Clausen.** You have shown me heretofore in your office various documents which back up the Committee's report. I wonder if you will produce at this time the volume which contains certain exhibits consisting of affidavits, interviews, and, I believe, in part, some testimony?

Mr. Burton. Yes, sir.

10. **Major Clausen.** In addition to that volume you also showed me other volumes. I will commence with this particular document (indicating). I believe that has as its first exhibit an affidavit dated the 18th of December, 1943, by Alice Anstey. Is that correct?

Mr. Burton. Yes, sir.

11. **Major Clausen.** For the information of the Board, the documents in this volume that Mr. Burton is now examining are set forth on Exhibit A of the study which I have made and which has already been submitted to members of the Board.

[851] There are various ways to proceed. I might ask Mr. Burton to read portions of the documents or the whole of the documents, or it might be that we can take the volume, if Mr. Burton will make it available, and read it at our leisure later on. Whichever way the Board wishes to proceed I will follow.

There were some of these documents, for example the first affidavit that I just referred to, which I have on my list, and there is one which pertains to the activities of Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl at the Biltmore Hotel in Los Angeles. The next is on a different subject and so forth. The third statement in there is the statement of Mr. Connolly, a partner of Mr. Rohl.

Mr. Burton. That is an important statement.

12. **Major Clausen.** For example, the 15th document in there is the interview of John N. Martin. Mr. Burton could read these statements into the record now—I think they are all pertinent—or, if you wish, you could consider them read.

[852] (Excerpts from order appointing Army Pearl Harbor Board were read, as follows:)

13. **General Grunert.** Mr. Burton, this Board was appointed to ascertain and report the facts relating to the attack made by Japanese armed forces upon the Territory of Hawaii on the 7th of December, 1941, and to make such recommendations as it may deem proper. That order was amended to include:

will consider the phases which related to the Pearl Harbor Disaster of the report of the House Military Affairs Committee, as directed by the Acting Secretary of War in his memorandum for the Judge Advocate General, 12 July 1944.

Memorandum for the Judge Advocate General of July 12 reads as follows:

(Memorandum for the Judge Advocate General, July 12, 1944, by Acting Secretary of War, was read as follows:)

Subject: Report of House Military Affairs Committee alleging neglect and misconduct of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., and others, concerning Hawaiian and Canadian Defense Projects.

1. The recommendations contained in paragraph 5 of the memorandum dated July 10, 1944, of Major Henry C. Clausen, J. A. G. D., to Mr. Amberg, Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, on the above subject, are approved. Major Clausen is directed to continue his investigation of the above matter and to co-
operate with the House Military Affairs Committee in its investigation of this matter in the way described in paragraph 5 of Major Clausen's memorandum.

2. Immediately upon the appointment of a board of officers pursuant to Public Law 339, 78th Congress, to investigate the facts surrounding the Pearl Harbor [852-A] catastrophe, the phases of the present matter relating thereto will be referred to such board for investigation and such other action as may be proper under the directive appointing such board. As it is understood Major Clausen will be detailed as assistant recorder of this board, he will continue in that capacity to coordinate the activities referred to paragraph 1 hereof with the activities of the Pearl Harbor board in the present case.

(Signed) Robert P. Patterson,
Acting Secretary of War.

[853] That, then, limits this Board to those phases which related to the Pearl Harbor Disaster of the report of the House Military Affairs Committee, and we do not want to wander afield in that report, and we would like to have you understand on behalf of the House Committee that we shall only go into such phases as are related there to Colonel Wyman. We have power to ask for witnesses, but we have no power to demand them nor to subpoena witnesses. So we want you to realize, please, the limitations of this Board: as much as we can find out of the matters which relate to the Pearl Harbor Disaster, yes. Wherever any information is contained in your investigation that will throw light on those phases that pertain to the Pearl Harbor Disaster we consider it our duty to go into it. Except for those phases, we shall not. I do not consider that the Board's duty is to complete your investigation insofar as Hawaii is concerned. There are probably many things that the House Committee would go into that do not pertain directly to those phases. So we do not want you to expect too much of this Board in the line of developing matters that do not pertain to the Pearl Harbor Disaster.

Now, anything you may have there that will bear directly on the phases which we are charged with going into, we should have, and those matters that are extraneous to that particular mission, we have no power to go into, and our report will probably not cover such other phases.

Now, with that in view we would like to have any background that will assist us in going into those phases. I just wanted you to understand thoroughly the limitations of our Board and what we are charged with. That is why I wanted to get that [854] part in the record.

14. Major Clausen. Mr. Burton, will you just give a statement with such references to the basis for the statement as you deem pertinent, please?

Mr. Burton. Sometime early in 1943 it came to the attention of the Committee on Military Affairs that a contract had been entered into between the War Department and the group of contractors known as the Hawaiian Constructors, and that the dominant company was the Rohl-Connolly Company of Los Angeles, California; that the dominant factor with the Rohl-Connolly Company was Hans Wilhelm Rohl, who at the time the contract was signed on December 21, 1940, was an unnaturalized German alien. That aroused the interest of the Committee, and when certain other information was brought to our attention coming from various confidential sources, I was instructed to proceed with an investigation and instructed to ascertain the facts
surrounding the awarding of that contract and what took place in reference to it afterward.

I ascertained definitely that there was a contract entered into between the Hawaiian Constructors, composed of the Rohl-Connolly Company, the Gunther & Shirley Company, and the W. E. Callahan Company; that that contract was entered into on December 21, 1940. It was recommended and negotiated by Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., who had been instructed by General Hannum, then Colonel Hannum, to come to the mainland from Hawaii to negotiate the contracts for defense projects for the Territory of Hawaii.

I then began to look into the background of Hans Wilhelm Rohl, and I found that he came to this country in 1913 from Germany, that he was born and educated in Germany; that although he had several times filed—at least once filed—application for naturalization papers, he had never pursued it; that he had represented himself on various occasions as a citizen of the United States, particularly in income tax returns; and I then called upon the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization to supply me with a complete record of Hans Wilhelm Rohl, which they did, and I would like to submit for the record the letter from the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, which is contained in the document before me, if it is approved by the Board.

15. General Frank. How long is it?

Mr. Burton. It is four single-space printed pages altogether, including the statements which were submitted by the Bureau at the time that Hans Wilhelm Rohl’s case was heard on September 15, 1941.

16. General Frank. Can you give us a digest of it here now?

Mr. Burton. I think so, sir.

The records show that Hans Wilhelm Rohl, who sometimes signs the translated name of John William Rohl, did reside at 8159 Hollywood Boulevard, Los Angeles, California. He filed a petition for naturalization in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California on March 10, 1941. That was under the provisions of Section 310 of the Nationality Act of 1940. I will say, without reading, that that permitted him to file a petition upon the ground that he was married to an American citizen, and it very much short-cut the final granting of the petition and did not require the usual period of five years.

[856] In that petition he stated that he was a contractor, that he was born at Lubeck, Germany, on September 29, 1886, and that he was of the German race and German nationality. He alleged that on August 26, 1925, at San Francisco he was married, that the name of his wife was Floy Edith, that she was born in Iola, Kansas, on October 27, 1890, and that she then resided with him.

This petition also showed that he had lived with a woman prior to that, as his common-law wife, by whom he had several children; that he entered into an agreement to take care of the children before he married his present wife.

17. General Frank. But all of these things do not affect the consideration of the Pearl Harbor situation?

Mr. Burton. Well, it is very difficult, sir, to eliminate all of these. I am going to tell in a very few words the rest of this.
The petition, as you will see when you read it, referred to a number of exits and entries into the United States of which there is no record. It shows that he bought several yachts, and finally owned the Vega, and then the reports goes on to show that he did appear in Court on September 15, 1941, and that then he was admitted to citizenship in the Federal Court.

I think it should be mentioned here that there is in the record a letter from John J. Kingman, Brigadier General, dated August 28, 1941, urging the admission.

18. General Frank. We are familiar with that.
Mr. Burton. You are familiar with that; yes, sir.

19. General Russell. I believe you said, Mr. Burton, it would not trouble you to be interrupted.

(Excerpt from letter of Brigadier General John J. Kingman was read as follows:)

20. General Russell. There is in the letter of General Kingman a statement,

It is the understanding of this office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States is beyond question.

The committee has been concerned somewhat as to what facts or representations were made to these people about that, and we have not developed that as yet. We may be able to develop it on our own account, but I am asking you if you have made any investigation to determine upon what facts that statement was made.

Mr. Burton. I have not inquired of General Kingman because he has not been before the committee, and I have been unable to elicit from any of the witnesses with whom we have talked any recollection of Hans Wilhelm Rohl at all.

21. General Russell. Definitely, what we had in mind was who conveyed to the Chief of Engineers' office here any statements as to Rohl's loyalty to the United States, and we wondered if your investigation had explored that.

Mr. Burton. I have talked with a number of officers, among them General Schley and I think it is Colonel Gesler, and others I don't recall right now, in an effort to ascertain what they could tell us about the negotiations leading up to this contract and the inquiries conducted by the Engineers' office as to Hans Wilhelm Rohl, but so far that has drawn a blank.

22. General Grunert. In your investigation did the name of one Martin come up?

Mr. Burton. In the investigation the name of John Martin, attorney for Hans Wilhelm Rohl, came up.

[858] 23. General Grunert. Does it show anywhere in your investigation that he came to the Chief of Engineers' office advocating the naturalization of Rohl?

Mr. Burton. No, sir, not in our investigation.

24. General Grunert. And you do not know, as far as he is concerned, whether he, Martin, had anything to do with this statement?

Mr. Burton. No, sir, I do not know. I know that we asked General Schley, who was the Chief of Engineers at that time, if he could recall any of the details concerning the negotiations, but he could not.
25. General Russell. We have gone over that ground very thoroughly, Mr. Burton, and we were hoping that maybe you had discovered something that we had not. Apparently not.

26. Major Clausen. May I ask Mr. Burton to turn to that volume if he wants to, and there is a statement in there by John M. Martin; whether there is anything in that statement on the subject, particularly a statement about arranging for that letter from General John J. Kingman referred to on page 5 of the committee's report.

Mr. Burton. I do not see, unless I do not read it properly.

27. Major Clausen. Let me see the statement.

28. General Russell. While probably we shall have it after a little, you seem to have no independent recollection of it, and I do not see why we should disturb you.

Mr. Burton. As I remember it, Mr. Martin told me, either in this statement of record or off the record, that General Kingman did write such a letter, but I think that is all that he told me about it. I then made inquiries from the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization and obtained a copy of the letter which is in the report.


Mr. Burton. No disturbance at all, sir.

30. General Grunert. I wanted to get that point straightened out anyway; I had some questions. Will you proceed?

31. Major Clausen. It is right here, sir.

32. General Frank. We want to clear this up on Martin.

33. Major Clausen. There is a reference right at the bottom of this page over here where he saw General Robins and General Kingman.

Mr. Burton. As I say, if it is in here, why, then——

34. General Frank. Will you identify the paper, first?

Mr. Burton. This is the record of an interview dated February 3, 1944, at which there were present Herman J. Galloway of the firm of King & King, lawyers, John M. Martin, H. Ralph Burton, and Joseph G. Colgan; and on page 6 Mr. Martin, speaking, said:

(Excerpts from report of interview of February 3, 1944, of John M. Martin were read as follows:)

I advised Mr. Rohl he shouldn't attempt to assume responsibility for a secret project at a time when he wasn't a citizen of the United States. Mr. Rohl asked me if I would explain to General Robins why Mr. Rohl was not obeying that request of Colonel Wyman. I told him I would and I think there was a lapse of probably several months. Other subsequent requests had been made by Colonel Wyman who apparently was rowing with Paul Grafe, in which Rohl was again requested to come to the Islands and it drifted along until about August 1941 when I had come to Washington and handed to General Robins a photostatic order directing that Rohl go to the Islands and I believe that Colonel Lorence and a civilian attorney for the Chief of Engineers named Stelphen were there. It is my recollection that General Kingman, who was then Acting Chief of Engineers, was brought into the discussion and that Kingman thereupon wrote a letter to Mr. Schofield.

And then he says:

Was it Schofield? The letter was dated about August 28, 1941, and Mr. Schofield was head of the Department of Immigration in which General Kingman stated that there could be no question of Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States; that his services were badly needed in the islands; and that he understood he had a petition pending with the court in Los Angeles for his natu
35. Major Clausen. There are other pertinent references in that statement to December, 1940, that the Board might want to consider at another time.

36. General Russell. Well, as I got that, Mr. Burton, as I heard the reading of that, it is a memorandum which purports to set forth the substance of a conference between these people who are named, and states rather emphatically that General Kingman came into that conference and as a result of his participation in the conference he wrote a letter to Mr. Schofield. Now, is that what that says?

37. Major Clausen. That is what it says; yes, sir.

38. General Russell. That is what I thought.

39. Major Clausen. We have arranged to follow that up, sir.

[861] General Russell. All right.

40. Major Clausen. And was that a sworn statement or a signed statement of Mr. Martin?

Mr. Burton. This statement of Martin's is one that was—I don't recall whether it is signed or initialed by Martin.

41. Major Clausen. Pardon the interruption. I just wanted to call attention to the fact, I recall having read it and it is my memorandum. I think you might proceed at the point that you were going.

Mr. Burton. After finding out about the background of Mr. Rohl and the things which I have just mentioned to the Board, it seemed to me very pertinent to ascertain as much as possible about the relationship of Rohl and Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., so I began inquiries in the city of Los Angeles. John H. Weiner of our staff went to Los Angeles for that purpose, following leads which I gave him, these having been received by the committee from varied sources.

[862] And one of the first affidavits he obtained is that of Alice Anstey. I can read just a part of that, and then with the permission of the Board, submit that for the record. She states that she lives in Los Angeles, and that she had been employed as a hotel maid by the Biltmore Hotel for 15 years, and was still employed in that capacity. During the last four years, she has been working on the ninth floor, where there are apartments, as well as suites. I will now quote:

I first saw Hans Wilhelm Rohl about four years ago, when he used to occupy Apartment Z. He usually would have dinner at about 8:30 P. M. About four years ago last February, I know Rohl gave a big dinner party in Apartment Z, and I know the man whose picture you now show me was present. (John H. Weiner shows picture of Theodore Wyman, Jr., to affiant, with Wyman's name covered). I don't recall any other men at that party except Rohl and Wyman, who became extremely drunk. The liquor was brought up there by the case. During the course of the evening there were about 20 young girls who kept coming in and out of the apartment all evening, and the party was still in progress when I left to go off duty at about 10:30 p.m. The girls appeared to be cheap, commercial party girls of the type that frequent the Main Street bars and night places.

After this first party, I saw Rohl and Wyman on a great many occasions when they had wild drinking parties of the same general type. The same cheap-looking type of young girls paraded in and out all evening.

I will just read extracts, if that is what the Board [863] approves.

At these subsequent parties, there would usually be four or five girls during the evening. While the parties were under way, I could never get into the
bedrooms because they were always locked. Mr. Rohl always called Wyman "Ted" or "Teddy." On each and every occasion when these parties occurred, I have seen girls sitting on Rohl’s lap and Wyman’s lap, and all the indications that would naturally lead me to believe that these girls were simply being hired to cater to the sexual whims of the two men, because different girls were used from time to time, and as I was maid on that floor, I went in to take fresh supplies of towels and had ample opportunity to observe what went on.

That is signed "Alice Anstey," on December 18, 1943.

I now read from an affidavit of one Juanita Blackwell:

Juanita Blackwell, first being duly sworn, deposes and says:

I went to work for Hans W. Rohl approximately 16 years ago, on Rodeo Drive in Beverly Hills, then to Shaddow Place, then to the Talmadge Apartments, then to their present residence. I was cook and cared for the house. At 8159 Hollywood Boulevard, Theodore Wyman, Jr., was a guest. Mr. Rohl often spoke of Wyman when we were living in the Talmadge Apartments in about 1936. It was shortly after we had moved from the Apartments that Mr. Rohl took Dr. Lewis and his wife on a cruise aboard the yacht "Vega," to the Hawaiian Islands. Major Wyman never remained overnight. He usually discussed business with [864] Mr. Rohl during these visits, and used to stay for dinner. Every other day or so Major Wyman would telephone Mr. Rohl, and I would answer the phone, and he would, of course, tell me who he was. Major Wyman frequently was driven to the Rohl residence by a soldier in an army car.

Werner Plack used to telephone infrequently, would ask for Mr. Rohl, and would, of course, tell me his name when I answered the telephone.

Many times after Wyman went to Honolulu, he and Mr. Rohl would talk for quite a long time on the long-distance telephone, and I have heard Rohl swear at him during these conversations. Rohl certainly wasn't afraid of Mr. Wyman at all. During these long-distance conversations Wyman and Rohl would discuss business, and I heard Rohl speak of hangars, runways, and landing-fields. Mr. Paul Grafe also used to telephone Mr. Rohl from Honolulu about business, too.

I would like to make a statement at this point about this affidavit. This affidavit was taken in the presence of John A. Weiner and W. Bruce Pine, a resident of Los Angeles, a man of considerable means, who became very much interested in the investigation concerning Pearl Harbor, but who was associated principally with what is known as the Tenney Committee, or Joint Fact-Finding Committee of the California Legislature. And the affidavit was subscribed and sworn to before R. E. Combs, who was the counsel for that State Fact-Finding Committee on un-American Activities, and as such authorized by the legislature of California to take acknowledgments as a notary.

At a later date, in order to get probably a little better-written affidavit—this is written in longhand—and for certain [865] other reasons, I asked Mr. Weiner to get a second affidavit and to have it acknowledged before another notary, who had taken other affidavits. He did go out to take that affidavit, but because the notary was not present, I did not use that affidavit, Mr. Weiner took it to the notary who was accustomed to taking acknowledgments—I am speaking of the second affidavit—and because it was practically a duplicate of this affidavit, she took the acknowledgment, but when I heard that she was not present I rejected that affidavit and kept the original one, even though it was handwritten and on foolscap paper.

I say that because it is very possible that some witness may bring in a copy of the second affidavit and attempt to confuse the Board; but this is the exact explanation, and this is the original affidavit, and the one which is used in the report.

I think it might be well at this point to say to the Board that we have original copies of telephone slips, which show the conversations
between Hans Wilhelm Rohl and Colonel Wyman, the length of the conversation, the dates, and the other details of a telephone ticket. With the Board's approval, I would like to submit these photostats of those tickets for the use of the Board.

42. Major Clausen. Just one question: Do some of these reflect telephone conversations between Colonel Wyman, in Honolulu, and Mr. Rohl, in Los Angeles, during the early part of 1941?

Mr. Burton. They do. Originals of these photostats are in the committee files, and at any time, if the Board would like to have them exhibited, we would be very glad to do so.

I think at this point we should refer to other affidavits just briefly, on the relationship between Rohl and Wyman. I \[866\] quote now from an affidavit of Cyril J. Harrington, of Los Angeles, California, who was employed by the Biltmore Hotel from September 20, 1936, to November 5, 1940, as house officer. He states that he knows Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., and while at the Biltmore Hotel he had occasion to meet him and Hans Wilhelm Rohl, whom he also knew. I now quote from the affidavit:

Question. Do you know of your own knowledge if Mr. Rohl had, from time to time, been a guest at the hotel?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Would Mr. Rohl retain a room or a suite?
Answer. It would be a suite or apartment—an apartment, if available.
Question. Did you develop quite an acquaintance with Mr. Rohl?
Answer. Yes.
Question. For that reason, you had many opportunities to visit his suite?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Did you ever see Colonel Wyman there?
Answer. Yes.
Question. What would usually be the condition of Mr. Rohl and Colonel Wyman on your visits?
Answer. I would say that Rohl, most of the time, was apparently drinking. Of course there was always liquor there and usually Rohl and Wyman would be in conversation.

Question. Have you ever seen girls in Mr. Rohl's suite or apartment?
Answer. Numerous times—many times.

\[867\] Question. Would these parties last late?
Answer. Yes, because I didn't go on duty until 11:30 p.m.

Question. Do you know Mr. Svendrup?
Answer. Yes.

Question. Will you please state the time or times that you saw Mr. Svendrup, while he was registered at the hotel, in the company of Mr. Rohl or Colonel Wyman?

I think I should state here that Svendrup is Lief J. Svendrup, now Colonel Svendrup, of the Engineer Corps of the United States Army. Colonel Svendrup was a member of the firm of Svendrup & Parcells, Architectural Engineers, St. Louis, Mo. That firm received a great many contracts from Colonel Wyman in connection with architectural engineering in Hawaii and in the Pacific Islands. There will be more brought out in the report, but I mention that now in order to identify Colonel Svendrup.

Answer. Mr. Svendrup was in Mr. Rohl's apartment and he called requesting that his suite be cleaned during his absence. Ray Moore, handyman around the hotel, was sent to Svendrup's room to clean it and he found a purse. Ray Moore called me and I found approximately $3 in the purse, and I knew that Mr. Svendrup and the girls were visiting in Mr. Rohl's apartment. I took the purse to Rohl's apartment and turned it over to them and Svendrup was very much perturbed, saying that I should have left the purse in his room and that

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I should not touch anything in the room. At this point, Mr. Rohl ordered Mr. Svendrup to leave his apartment and go back to his own room and take his girl friend. Mr. Rohl resented the fact that Mr. Svendrup talked to me the way he did.

[868] Question. Did Mr. Svendrup leave and take his girl friend?
Answer. I don’t know that he left at that moment, but he did leave shortly thereafter.

Question. Had you seen these girls around the hotel previously?
Answer. Yes, three or four times.

Question. What would you say the occupation of these girls might be?
Answer. My opinion is that they were good-time girls. I had seen them in the rooms of Rohl and Svendrup at different times.

Question. Did you ever see Colonel Wyman in Svendrup’s apartment?
Answer. To the best of my knowledge, I only saw him there once.

Question. Do you recall about what time it was?
Answer. About 7 a.m.

Question. Had he been there all night?
Answer. Apparently.

Question. What was his condition?
Answer. He had been drinking. Of course, I wasn’t employed at the hotel at this time, but I had been at the hotel the night before and had met Svendrup who had told me to be at his apartment at 7 the next morning, stating that he wanted to talk to Mr. Rohl about a position I was to get in Honolulu and the reason I had to be there so early was because Svendrup told me he was leaving the city early.

[869] That affidavit is signed by Cyril J. Harrington and acknowledged before a notary on December 22, 1943.

I read now from the affidavit of Mrs. Gertrude Marcus:

I reside at 2007 W. Third Street, Los Angeles; have been employed for the last 17 years by the Biltmore Hotel, Los Angeles; for the last four years have been desk clerk assigned to the ninth floor.

I have known Hans Wilhelm Rohl for several years as a patron; he most usually requested quarters on my floor, since one of the suites has a refrigerator. He most always was drunk, and it was a common practice for him to have cheap-looking girls visiting him; they would stop at my desk for directions, but after a while they got wise and came up the back elevator.

His male companion on these parties was the man whose picture Mr. Weiner showed me. Mr. Rohl would sometimes call him “Ted” and sometimes “Mr. Smith.” I now know his name is Colonel Wyman, but I have not seen him recently. When Wyman and Rohl would leave together, they would be prettily “plastered.” When Mr. Rohl was here about a month ago the bellboy, Charles Hays, said:

“You ought to see how Rohl is bleeding; you know he was operated on for gall bladder.”

That was signed before a notary public, December 24, 1943, by Mrs. Gertrude Marcus.

I read from an affidavit of Lt. L. M. Staub, Los Angeles, Calif., U.S. Naval Reserve:

I first met Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., about 1938: I have seen him on H. W. Rohl’s yacht, the VEGA, four [870] or five times, and on each and every occasion Wyman was so drunk that he was utterly obnoxious and incapable of transacting any business; when I was first introduced to him, Colonel Wyman criticized my appearance and was very insulting to me; he would pour whisky on the floor and drop his burning cigarettes on the carpet.

Mrs. Floy Rohl—

That is Mrs. Hans Wilhelm Rohl—

once stated to me that she didn’t like Wyman, but that H. W. Rohl, her husband, had to tolerate him for business reasons.

I was acquainted with Werner Plack, having met him in about 1935 or 1936, and know that he spent most of his time at Gert Von Gundhardt’s home in Beverly Hills. Plack also told me that he visited at Frank Morgan’s home in Beverly Hills.
That was signed on the 24th of December, 1943, by L. M. Staub. I think it should be stated for the record, here, that Werner Plack was a German official, that he was connected with the German Consulate in Los Angeles, and evidently moved about quite a bit in social circles in Los Angeles. An examination of the files at the State Department by the Committee showed that he left California with a number of other Nazi representatives in 1940, that they went by way of Japan, and that certain documents were taken from them by the FBI and returned to them on their departure from Japan. There isn’t any question, from the inquiries which were made by the committee, that he was a Nazi official.

This is a statement of Emil Zucca, of San Bernardino, Calif. He was interviewed by John H. Weiner, investigator for the committee. He states that his name is Emil Zucca, that he resides in San Bernardino, Calif., is employed by the San Bernardino Air Service Command as Senior Aircraft Mechanic, and that he was an employee of the U. S. Engineer Department, South Pacific Division, Los Angeles, and that his duties were those of chauffeur, assigned to Major Theodore Wyman, Jr.; that he started in February 1936 and worked until 1942, and drove for Major Wyman for 3 years and 7 months, and that it was a government car he drove.

He states that he was acquainted with the first Mrs. Wyman, Ella Wyman, and the second Mrs. Wyman, Ruth Wyman, and that he knows Hans Wilhelm Rohl; had occasion to drive Major Wyman in the evenings and early mornings. I will now quote:

Q. Did you ever have occasions to drive Major Wyman to the Biltmore Hotel?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What would be these occasions?
A. On different occasions, I have gone to Mr. Rohl’s apartment to take Major Wyman cigarettes, and his brief case—on occasions.
Q. Who would be in the apartment on these occasions?
A. Mr. Rohl, Major Wyman, sometimes would be alone; and on other occasions, there would be Mr. Svendrup, and Paul Grafe.
Q. As a rule, would you have to wait for Major Wyman?
A. Yes.

Q. How late, if you remember, would you have to wait for him on some occasions?
A. Oh, anywhere from 9 until 2.
Q. Where would you then take him?
A. Home.
Q. Do you remember the address?
A. 221 Woodruff, West Los Angeles.
Q. It was also customary, was it not, for you also to drive Major Wyman and his friends around to the various night clubs?
A. I have, on occasion. Yes.
Q. Please name some of the night clubs that you have taken Major Wyman and his guests.
A. Earl Carroll’s, Cafe La Maze, Little Jane Jones’ Club, the Trocadero, and the Ambassador Hotel.
Q. Who would usually be along on these parties?
A. Mr. Rohl, Major Wyman, Mr. Svendrup, Captain George Withers, Captain Clatterbos, Paul Grafe. There was also one man whose name I don’t remember—medium build.
Q. On these trips, Mr. Zucca, you always used the government car, did you not?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Would you then have to wait until the party was over and take them home?
A. Most of the time.
Q. How late would you have to wait to take the parties home?
A. Around midnight or one o'clock.

Q. But there have been occasions that you just took out Mr. Rohl and Major Wyman to the same type of places?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Would you be paid extra for this work?
A. Occasionally I received a tip.

Q. Please state the various night clubs or country clubs where you took Mr. and Mrs. Rohl and Major and Mrs. Wyman?
A. The Bel-Air Country Club, Different hotels. It is impossible for me to remember all the names.

That is the end of the quotation, there.

He also states that he took Mrs. Wyman shopping, and they used the government car for that purpose; he gives the names of the various banks where he took Major Wyman or Mrs. Wyman. I quote again:

Q. On your visit to Mr. Rohl's apartment in the hotel, while Major Wyman and these men were there, did you see evidences of liquor?
A. I have, on occasions.
Q. Have you ever driven Major Wyman down to the Los Angeles Yacht Club?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know who he was to meet there?
A. I presume, Mr. Rohl.
Q. Have you ever been on the VEGA?
A. No, but I have seen it.
Q. Have you ever taken Major Wyman from the hotel to homes other than his own?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know whose homes you took him to?
A. I drove him to Mr. Rohl's home, and Captain Clatterbos' home, and Captain Withers'. Those are the only ones that I recall.

Following the development of these facts, I thought it advisable to make inquiries of those who were connected in a business way with Mr. Rohl, so we sought an interview with Mr. T. E. Connolly, his partner, and that interview was held by Mr. Weiner, December 11, 1943. The statement is signed by T. E. Connolly, but not acknowledged. It is witnessed by John H. Wyman.

In this, Mr. Connolly states: That he lives in San Francisco; that he first met H. W. Rohl some time prior to 1925, he does not remember the exact date, or circumstances; that he knows Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., and that he does not recall the year and date, but he first met him when he came to Los Angeles as a Captain of the U. S. Army Engineers, and was in charge of construction activities in that area.

Now, I will quote:

Q. Do you remember who introduced you to him?
A. It was very possible that I introduced myself. If a formal introduction was arranged, I don't think that was so. I would rather say that I went over there to get some plans or offer a bid. I certainly met him in his office in an official capacity.

Q. In other words, it is possible that you went over to discuss with him contracts, and so forth?
A. Certainly. I have done that many times.

Q. It is a fact, it is not, that you are a stockholder in the Rohl-Connolly Co., a Nevada corporation [875] doing business in California?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where is the principal place of business?
A. Los Angeles, Calif.

Q. Wasn't it formed in 1932 by Frank S. Cliff, F. E. Leader, and a man named Peterson? Who are these gentlemen?
A. I don't know. Of course, it was formed in Nevada—they may be the attorneys, those must be the qualifying directors—absolutely unknown to me.
Q. Isn't the corporation's principal place of business 511 N. Carson Street, Carson City, Nevada?
A. It might be so recorded, but our principal place of operations has been Los Angeles.

Q. Didn't the California Commissioner of Corporations in May of 1932 issue a permit for the sale of 40,000 shares of the capital stock of the concern to H. W. Rohl, Irma Dickey and yourself?
A. If so, I don't think that was acted upon. My recollection is there is only 20,000 shares out.

I will stop the quotation there, and merely state that there were some questions following, that had to do with the corporation.

43. General Frank. Did you ever look up to find out who owned that stock?
Mr. Burton. Yes, sir; it is all a matter of record, here. I mean we have a full record of the ownership.

44. Major Clausen. Doesn't Mr. Connolly state, or Mr. Martin?
Mr. Burton. I think it is Martin in his interview that [876] gives that.

45. Major Clausen. Martin gives all those facts.

[877] Mr. Burton. I quote again:

Question. Did Rohl ever state to you that he knew Wyman prior to meeting you?
Answer. No, sir.

Question. Was it your general custom to confer with Rohl from time to time on important projects in which your firm was engaged?
Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Are you acquainted with General Virgil Lee Peterson of Washington, D. C.?
Answer. I met General Peterson, who was then Colonel Peterson, when he was in charge of the Los Angeles District when we bid our first section of the Los Angeles-Long Beach breakwater.

Question. Were you in Washington on December 18, 1940?
Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Were you in Washington on January 17, 1941?
Answer. I was there on the evening of that day. I was in a plane from Los Angeles to Washington during the day January 17th.

Question. Were you in Washington, January 21, 1941?
Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. While you were in Washington on these dates, Mr. Connolly, isn't it a fact that you were there discussing the contracts that you had in the Hawaiian Islands?
Answer. No, sir. When I was there in December we were discussing the Hawaiian contracts. When I was there on January 17th to appear before the naval board on January 18th regarding the building of naval bases and Bermuda installations was mentioned, but we had gone there to try and obtain construction of a dry dock at San Diego. We prepared questionnaires and on January 22nd we appeared before the naval board and made our submission regarding the construction of the dry dock at San Diego and refused our consideration of any work in Bermuda or Newfoundland.

Question. While you were in Washington, did you receive any long distance calls from Mr. Rohl?
Answer. Whether I received them or not—I talked to him. If I didn't receive them, I made them.

Question. During your visits to Washington to either negotiate or conclude government contracts for your firm for installation of fortifications in the Hawaiian Islands, Mr. Rohl called you in Washington?

Answer. I had telephonic communications with Mr. Rohl when I was in Washington concerning these contracts. Whether he called or I called, I cannot state, but we did have telephone conversations.

Question. Regarding the contracts?
Answer. Yes. The first knowledge I had of a potential contract in the Hawaiian Islands was on Monday, December 16, 1940, when I was called in Denver, Colo-
rado by Mr. Rohl from San Francisco who stated that Colonel Wyman was here from the Hawaiian Islands seeking contractors to perform certain work over there and that he, Rohl, wished me to meet a certain plane at Cheyenne and go on east with Colonel Wyman and endeavor to get the contracts. I asked what type of contracts they were and Rohl answered that the Colonel would explain that to me. I was unable to get on a plane at Cheyenne so I flew to Chicago and got on a plane with Colonel Wyman and flew from Chicago down to Washington. We went to the Carlton Hotel where we could get no rooms and we were expecting Mr. Paul Grafe. He had not arrived so we occupied his room.

I met John Martin, Mr. Rohl's attorney, who told me he was in Washington in the interests of acquiring citizenship or further citizenship applications for Mr. H. W. Rohl. When I thought that there was a likelihood that we would acquire the contract I further thought that I should have Mr. Rohl resign as an officer of the Rohl-Connolly Co. and substitute myself and so I phoned him and it was so done, and he was neither officer nor a director of the Rohl-Connolly Co. until after he obtained his naturalization papers.

Question. In other words, Mr. Connolly, at your insistence he resigned as an officer or a director of the company?
Answer. That's right.
Question. But he still retained his stock?
Answer. That is right.
Question. Subsequent to receiving the contract for the Hawaiian Islands, did Mr. Rohl discuss with you the nature of the contract, etc.?
Answer. No. There was no detailed discussion of this contract at all. Personally I never saw a written description of it or a blueprint on any part of it. Rohl and I discussed the necessary financial arrangements, advancement of money, because after all we were financing this. We were building certain airfields. We knew what that meant, just simply movement of materials and stabilization of a base without a blueprint at all. We were told to run a 7500 runway we knew what it takes.

Question. But it would be most usual for him to discuss with you the nature and type of contract that you received for the Hawaiian Islands?
Answer. Yes. I don't doubt but what we mentioned building an airport there. I don't think that we ever got into some of these installations out there, I don't think Rohl and I ever discussed anything of that nature. We talked of those warning stations because I was curious as to what they were. That's all that I know that we ever got into any detail about.

Question. I believe that's all, Mr. Connolly.

46. General Grunert. It seems to me that everything I have heard so far I have read before. Apparently it was all referred to in this report. Is it not wasting your time and ours to reread these things? If you just tell us about what the gist is, and then refer to the evidence, that can be made available.

Mr. Burton. Yes, sir. The reason I read some in full was that they are not quoted in full in the report. Some things have been left out. But I would like to submit it for the record.

47. General Grunert. If the documents are submitted for the record we must study the record, anyway. I have gotten a very good idea by just reading this report. If there is anything additional to be pointed out that we can go into ourselves, it would probably save your time and our time if you did not have to read such lengthy papers, if they are available for us to go over.

48. Major Clausen. The next document is one that I think is quoted in the report. The following one is an interview with Colonel Gesler.

49. General Grunert. That is new to me.

50. Major Clausen. I would suggest that Mr. Burton read that, if he will.

There is a certain affidavit here, and it might be well for the Board to hear it before we proceed with other testimony by the witness.
51. General Grunert. How long is it going to take to finish it?
52. Major Clausen. It will take some time, sir.
Mr. Burton. Which document do you have in mind?
53. Major Clausen. The next is Colonel Gesler. It follows the statement of Mr. Foley which follows Mr. Connolly's statement.
Mr. Burton. Here is the Foley statement and here is the Gesler statement (producing documents).
54. General Grunert. Are these things to be made available for the Board?
Mr. Burton. Yes, sir; this entire book (indicating).
55. General Grunert. Then, of what value is Mr. Burton's evidence except to give us a narrative form that we cannot get out of the evidence shown to the Board?
56. General Russell. I was wondering if Mr. Burton had gone out to Hawaii and got any evidence about what developed out there as a result of these relations. We are interested in that. I have not seen anything on that.
57. General Grunert. If we can get from Mr. Burton anything that is not contained in the documentary evidence that we can read and digest, or if he has any particular thing that he wants to call our attention to, without consuming much time, he may do so.
Mr. Burton. I submitted a request to the War Department for permission to send a member of our staff to Hawaii, and that he be furnished transportation, indicating that we would like transportation by air; and it was my intention to send a member of the staff who was an engineer and an accountant. The answer came, first, that they refused permission. Later on the request was renewed, and permission was granted for a staff representative to go by water to Hawaii. It was then too late, for a number of reasons, to accept that. It would require too long a time for a man to go by such transportation. So we never did send a representative to Hawaii. However, I called for copies of the contracts. There was a basic contract, the one that was signed on December 21, 1940, and there have been 53 supplements following that. The first 43 supplements have to do largely with construction. Those running from 44 to 50, if I remember correctly, or 51, were subsequently eliminated. Supplements 52 and 53 had to do with contract termination and final settlement.
I examined these contracts very carefully and then concluded to obtain the services of an engineer, and I made a request for Mr. Case B. Rafter, of the Veterans Bureau, whom I knew to be a qualified engineer and to have been an engineer officer in the First World War. After he had analyzed these contracts I then asked him if he would specify just what, documents should be called for in order to determine the character of performance of those contracts. I then prepared a letter to the War Department and called for the documents that were necessary. They were analyzed. The results are shown in the report, and I believe that the Board is well acquainted with what the job orders and the progress charts show. I will be very glad to state what I know about it if you care to have me do so.
58. General Grunert. I believe, General Frank, that you have all that information and will follow it up to a conclusion.
59. General Frank. At Honolulu.
Mr. Burton. I think it might be well for me to state, gentlemen, that I made a number of inquiries relative to warning stations. The results of them are not of record in detail, because they consisted of conversations. I finally reached the conclusion that there was a vast difference between what might be termed a temporary aircraft warning station and a permanent warning station. I know the committee supports me in this, that the difference between the permanent air raid warning station and the temporary one is that the permanent station has more complete service so far as electrical equipment is concerned; that it has 24-hour personnel assigned to it; that it is usually located in a strategic position, such as high elevation, and that, above all, it has telephone communication, in this case, to every part of the Islands, so that instant warning could be given. I think it is unnecessary to say to you gentlemen that the higher the elevation the wider is the range; and I think you will find in the testimony that the stations which were to be placed in the most strategic positions were the ones that were the farthest from completion. That is the reason why it was felt that had the contractors been required to complete the contract for air raid warning stations and for gasoline storage tanks within the time specified in the contract, the basic contract of December 21, 1940, the Army would have been in better position to defend Pearl Harbor at the time of its attack, because it would have been warned of the approach of planes and gasoline would have been accessible.

As the reports will show, the completion date was repeatedly moved up by the engineer. As a matter of fact, the job orders to begin construction of the air raid warning stations—some of them were not issued until nearly six months after the original contract, and that was the time when this contract should have been completed.

There were 24 gasoline storage tanks to be completed, if I remember correctly, and there were not any of them completed.

60. General Frank. Did your committee have any information to the effect that aircraft operations were held up or prevented because of the lack of installation of any underground storage tanks? Did you have any information of flights which were prevented from taking off because of the lack of those tanks?

Mr. Burton. There was some testimony by Robert Hoffman to that effect, and the transcript of record will be submitted for the use of the Board.

61. General Gruenert. Do you have him on your list?

62. Major Clausen. He is supposed to be in Mexico. The testimony that is referred to is on my list and is in one of the documents that I want Mr. Burton to read.

63. General Gruenert. Do you contemplate putting his testimony in as an exhibit to the record?

64. Major Clausen. I was going to take this up in order. After Mr. Burton concludes his statement I would like to ask him for specific documents and then put the documents in as exhibits so that we will have them in continuity.

65. General Gruenert. That will not require him to read them, will it?


67. General Russell. I was very much interested in the last statement, because I think Mr. Burton's line of reasoning is following along
the same channels that the Board has been following in the last two or three days. But I was particularly anxious to know whether or not the committee had gathered specific evidence indicating that the delays out there were caused by those contractors of whom he states that this man Rohl was the dominant personality and apparently dominated the entire situation. We had arrived, Mr. Burton, at somewhat the same general conclusions, or were thinking along the same lines that you are.

68. General GRUNERT. We have not arrived at any definite conclusions as yet. These are just objectives to be investigated so as to give us data on which to arrive at conclusions.

69. General RUSSELL. But we were following the same train of thought. What we were attempting to ascertain was whether or not you had any specific evidence.

Mr. BURTON. There are two affidavits, one by King and the other by Wickiser, which I think are very definite evidence of delay and inefficiency and indifference on the part of the contractors and of the engineers in charge.

70. General GRUNERT. That will also be covered by you, will it?

71. Major CLAUSEN. Yes, sir. They are on General Frank's list.

Mr. BURTON. They are included in this volume which I am submitting to the Board.

72. General GRUNERT. Mr. Burton, do you wish to continue your statement, or has your statement been concluded, and may we develop it further by questioning?

Mr. BURTON. I think I have covered the principal points and that anything else could be very easily brought out by questioning. I will be glad to answer your questions.

73. General GRUNERT. Then I will give General Russell and General Frank a chance to ask such questions as occur to them now.

74. General RUSSELL. I think I have no questions.

75. General FRANK. The history of the job orders, in so far as we have been able to pursue them here, has indicated that the work on the job orders was not concluded on the estimated completion date. Was your committee enabled to determine the cause of the delay? Did they know whether or not priorities interfered? Did they know whether or not shipping was available? Did they know whether or not materials could be obtained or whether there was any delay in obtaining them?

Mr. BURTON. I made a special inquiry of the War Department as to whether or not any complaint had ever been made on the part of the Engineer Corps of the Army about the delays, and the answer was in the negative, that they had not. There has been no evidence submitted by the War Department one way or the other about either the lack of materials or the difficulty in obtaining them. I submitted to them a direct question as to when the instruments for the air raid warning stations had been received on the Island, and that question they have never answered. I had in mind, too, that there might have been some delay, but there has never been any evidence submitted to the committee nor any evidence developed by the committee, so far as that is concerned. I think it would be a matter of judicial notice on the part of the committee that anything required by the Army for national defense would receive the highest priority,
and that instruments for aircraft warning stations would be brought by air if necessary.

76. General Frank. They are too big.

77. General Grunert. All those phases will be gone into. Inquiries are already started and will be prosecuted to completion. That is why your testimony is of such value to us, to give us leads and to show us how much of the ground has been covered by the committee.

Mr. Burton. I have, since this report was filed, obtained a complete list of all of the equipment which was purchased by the Hawaiian Constructors, amounting to pretty close to $2,000,000 worth, if I remember correctly, leased by the government and then recaptured; and there was evidently no difficulty about getting all of that heavy equipment to Hawaii. So that it would seem rather unreasonable that the equipment for permanent aircraft warning stations could not be received on time.

78. General Frank. I have no further questions.

79. General Grunert. Will you, Major Clausen, continue your development of this matter, and then the Board will determine whether there are any additional questions.

80. Major Clausen. May the record show that Mr. Burton hands me this volume from which he has read affidavits and statements which are contained in my Exhibit A to the memorandum from Mr. Amberg, dated July 10.

I offer this volume as our Exhibit No. 6.

(Volume entitled “Exhibits Rohl-Wyman Contracts” was marked Exhibit No. 6 and received in evidence.)

I will ask Mr. Burton to hand me the transcript of hearings before the California State Legislature’s Joint Fact Finding [888] Committee on UnAmerican Activities in the Matter of Hans Wilhelm Rohl.

May the record show that Mr. Burton has handed me the transcript referred to, and I offer it as our Exhibit 7.

(Transcript of hearings before the California State Legislature’s Joint Fact Finding Committee on UnAmerican Activities was marked Exhibit No. 7 and received in evidence.)

I will ask Mr. Burton to hand me the testimony of Robert Hoffman before the House Committee on Military Affairs, given on 24 January, 1944, which includes his statement of 29 April, 1942, which has been referred to in the testimony.

May the record show that Mr. Burton hands me two transcripts, Volumes 49 and 50, of testimony given on January 24 and 27, 1944, by Robert Hoffman, and a copy of a statement by Robert Hoffman, Area Superintendent, Fifth Field Area, Bellows Field, dated 29 April, 1942, which I offer as Exhibits.

(Volume 49 of testimony of Robert Hoffman before House Committee on Military Affairs was marked Exhibit 8 and received in evidence.)

(Volume 50 of testimony of Robert Hoffman before House Committee on Military Affairs was marked Exhibit 8-A and received in evidence.)

(Copy of statement by Robert Hoffman dated April 29, 1942, was marked Exhibit 8-B and received in evidence.)
Will you hand me the statement of the witness Olsen made in December, 1943?

Mr. Burton. I will have to have photostats made of that. You can mark it as submitted, and I will send it to you tomorrow.

81. Major Clausen. May the record show that the witness hands [889] me the original of this statement of Olsen, dated the 19th of December, 1943, and I ask that it be received as Exhibit No. 9.

(Original of statement of Olsen dated December 19, 1943, was not marked but was received in evidence as Exhibit 9.)

Will you hand me the transcript of the testimony of George H. Moody.

Let the record show that the witness has handed me transcript of interview of George H. Moody dated April 4, 1944, which we offer as Exhibit 10.

(Original transcript of interview of George H. Moody, dated April 4, 1944, was not marked, but was received in evidence as Exhibit No. 10.)

May I have the two volumes of testimony of Major General Julian L. Schley given before the House Military Affairs Committee on 9 February, 1944, and 4 May, 1944.

May the record show that the witness has handed me these two volumes which we offer in evidence.

(Two volumes of testimony of Major General Julian L. Schley, respectively dated February 9, 1944, and May 4, 1944, were respectively marked Exhibit No. 11 and Exhibit No. 11-A and received in evidence.)

I now ask for the folder of the Hotel Biltmore records showing the withdrawals of funds and accounts of Colonel Wyman and Hans Wilhelm Rohl.

Mr. Burton. You can enter them and I will see that copies are supplied to you.

82. Major Clausen. May the record show that the witness has handed me a folder containing the records to which I have referred, and I will offer it as our Exhibit 12.

[890] (Folder of Hotel Biltmore records was marked Exhibit No. 12 and received in evidence.)

Will you hand me the statement of Colonel Wyman with regard to having never trusted Rohl, because of having sold out his country, and so forth?

Mr. Burton. I have that here. I will have to make a copy of that and give it to you.

83. Major Clausen. May the record show that the witness has handed me this statement which is indicated as a lead, and we offer this one page. I do not know what the rest of the document is.

84. Colonel West. Can you describe that a little more particularly?

85. Major Clausen. Yes. It is a statement to the effect that there has been an admission by Colonel Wyman that he made while drunk or had been drinking with some people in the spring of 1942, to the effect that he should never have trusted Rohl; that Rohl sold out our country to his German friends and that what he should do is to take his service revolver and go out and shoot Rohl and then shoot himself.

(Statement of Colonel Wyman with regard to Hans Wilhelm Rohl was not marked, but was received in evidence as Exhibit No. 13.)
The documents that you have now handed me are photostatic copies of telephone calls?

Mr. Burton. These (indicating) are the telephone calls between Rohl and Wyman from Honolulu to Los Angeles.

86. Major Clausen. Do you have sets of telephone calls of Mr. Rohl to Washington during December, 1940?

Mr. Burton. They will appear on the Biltmore photostats.

[891] 87. Major Clausen. I see. In other words, the folder you have already handed me. Are there any of these others——

Mr. Burton. Now, just off the record.
(There was colloquy off the record.)

88. Major Clausen. Well, then, for the present purposes, you have handed me an envelope with some stubs of telephone calls.

Mr. Burton. They are photostats of original telephone tickets, record slips.

89. Major Clausen. All right, sir. We offer these as our exhibit next in order.

(Envelope containing telephone record slips was marked Exhibit No. 14 and received in evidence.)

Mr. Burton. I submit as an exhibit photostat copies of the accounts of Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., and Paul Grafe at the Carlton Hotel in December of 1940, showing that a bill amounting to $16.50 of Colonel Theodore Wyman was charged to the account of Paul Grafe and later paid by Paul Grafe, who was the attorney in fact for the three companies participating in the Hawaiian Constructors and who was the representative of the Hawaiian Constructors in Hawaii later.

90. General Frank. May I ask a question there: Did you take any steps to find out whether or not at a later date Grafe was reimbursed by Wyman for his share of the bill?

Mr. Burton. No, sir, I did not, but that is set forth in the Interim Report of the Committee which was filed on June 14, 1944, and to this date there has been no denial.

91. General Russell. Has any investigation been made of this Colonel Wyman’s income tax returns and bank accounts to determine whether or not he flourished at any period during his [892] late years?

Mr. Burton. A rather complete investigation of Colonel Wyman’s bank account was made by the Committee, and photostat copies of what was found are in the Committee files, and photostat copies of those will be submitted to the Board if desired. They do not show any unreasonable affluence at any time, although it is very evident from the accounts and from a general survey of what Colonel Wyman spent that he could not have stayed within a Major’s income.

92. General Grunert. Does that show whether he had any outside income outside of his Army pay?

Mr. Burton. Quite the contrary, sir, because when he purchased a house and it became necessary for him to make a payment, he cashed a bonus certificate. Pardon me. Is that what it is at the Veterans Administration?

93. Major Clausen. I think so.

Mr. Burton. A bonus certificate.

94. Major Clausen. Or insurance.
Mr. Burton. And he received some insurance, in order to make up the amount necessary to pay on the house, and he also borrowed $500 from an individual in order to make up the full amount.

95. Major Clausen. Do you want to tell the Board anything about large withdrawals of cash by Mr. Rohl from the hotel, running as high as $5,000 a month?

Mr. Burton. The records of the Biltmore Hotel indicate that Rohl was in the habit of drawing very large sums of money in cash at the desk in the Biltmore Hotel. For instance, on November 28, 1942, he drew $500, on the 30th of December he [893] drew $300, February 28 he drew a thousand dollars, and March 23 he withdrew $300, 7th of July, $500, and so on, running through his account over quite a long period and beginning in 1941.

96. General Frank. Do you think those are excessive amounts for a man to draw who is worth a million dollars?

Mr. Burton. I would say they were rather large amounts to go to the hotel desk and draw in cash, and evidently they were drawn during the periods when these parties were being held.

97. General Frank. It certainly indicates his credit was good.

Mr. Burton. There isn't any question about Mr. Rohl's credit. He has had enough Government contracts, and if you would follow through, as I have, the payments to him and the settlements that have been made to him, you would not wonder that he had all the money he needs.

98. General Frank. That is correct. But his financial standing is such that perhaps his drawing a $300 check was like my drawing a $3 check.

Mr. Burton. Well, you understand, General, that this is not from the bank.


Mr. Burton. That these are: he walks up to the desk on the 5th of November and draws a thousand dollars, and four days later five hundred, and a few days later two hundred and fifty, and a little while later five hundred?

100. General Frank. Yes, but as long as he had the money to pay it, how is that incriminatory?

[894] Mr. Burton. It is not, sir. There is no allegation so far as the Committee is concerned that there is anything criminal on the part of anyone, and the entire report is for the purpose of bringing to the attention of the public and the War Department the relationship which was cultivated by Mr. Rohl for Colonel Wyman over a long period of time, and that as a result of that cultivation of relationship, of relations, between Mr. Rohl, who was a contractor seeking Government contracts, and Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr., who was an engineer who had the contracts, who was in a position to give the contracts, and to show that the contracts were given to Mr. Rohl's companies as against the whole field—that is the purpose of the report; and that he was a German alien, General, at the time.

101. General Frank. I know. We know all this.

Mr. Burton. Yes, sir.

102. General Frank. We know all this.

Mr. Burton. But I am just answering you why we filed the report.

103. General Frank. But I am trying to tie a fact with some definite
connection with Wyman. Now, has there been followed any connection between these withdrawals of money by Rohl to Wyman?

[896] Mr. Burton. No, sir, but I would venture that if Mr. Rohl wanted to give any money to Colonel Wyman he would not do so by check.

104. General Frank. That is very true, but a man is not convicted on inference; he is convicted on fact.

Mr. Burton. That is true, sir, but there is no attempt on the part of the committee to convict anybody. The committee is a fact-finding committee and has no other jurisdiction, but when it gathers facts of this kind which, taken together, present a quick picture which is dubious at least, all it can do is to put those facts together with a degree of continuity and coordination and relationship so that the War Department can at least deduce that all is not just as it should be and proceed with its investigation as it should do. That is all the committee can do. It has no power to convict; it has no power to render an opinion, or rather, to render a verdict or a judgment. It does not attempt to do that, sir. Only presents the facts as it finds them.

105. General Russell. Mr. Burton, I may be mistaken in following the statement that you made some time earlier. We were discussing the delay out in Hawaii.

Mr. Burton. The what, sir?

106. General Russell. Some delay in the work in Hawaii which might result from this man Rohl’s association with the work out there. As I recall, you stated that there were these general deductions that we did discuss, and then you made some statement about having talked with a number of people, and I think it was in connection with this possible delay in Hawaii.

Mr. Burton. I think you refer to my having stated that I talked with a number of persons about the difference between a permanent air raid warning station and a temporary one.


Mr. Burton. As to its efficiency and its value so far as receiving the warning and communicating it to the various military posts is concerned.

108. General Russell. Well, possibly that was the follow-up on that.

109. General Grunert. Are there any other questions? (No response.)

Mr. Burton, the Board very much appreciates the leads you have given it in what the committee has done with a view to paving the way where we can do as we are required to do so. We thank you for coming down and helping us out and being so generous with your records.

Mr. Burton. Well, on behalf of the committee, sir, I want to say, and in behalf of the chairman, Mr. May, I wish to say, that they were very definite in their desire, in their expressions of desire, to cooperate with the Board, and instructed me to submit any evidence which was in the files of the committee that the Board might desire to have.
110. General Grunert. All right. Thank you very much. As I have tried to make clear to you, so that the committee would also have that understanding, we are limited as to our scope and limited as to our time. I believe you understood that, Mr. Burton.

Mr. Burton. Yes, sir; I appreciate that very much.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 6:25 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
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Col. Eugene B. Walker, Coast Artillery Corps, United States Army 965

DOCUMENTS

Excerpts from construction contract 958

1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 16, 1944

MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.

The Board, at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.


Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General Grunert. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM BRYDEN, U. S. REGULAR ARMY; SEPARATIONS BOARD; WASHINGTON, D. C.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

Colonel West. General, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

General Bryden. William Bryden, Major General, U. S. Regular Army; stationed here in Washington, on duty in the Secretary of War’s Separations Board.

2. General Grunert. General, the Board, in an attempt to get at the facts, is looking into the War Department background and viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. It is hoped that, because of your assignment at that time, as Deputy Chief of Staff, you can throw some light on the subject. In order to cover so large a field in the limited time available, individual Board Members have been assigned objectives or phases for special investigation, although the entire Board will pass on all objectives and phases. General Russell has this particular phase, so he will lead in propounding the questions, and the other Members of the Board will assist him in developing it. So I turn you over to General Russell.

3. General Russell. General Bryden, what was your assignment in November and December 1941?

General Bryden. Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army.

4. General Russell. How many Deputy Chiefs of Staff were on duty at that time?

General Bryden. I think Gen. R. C. Moore was the additional Deputy at that time, and whether or not General Arnold had been designated as another Deputy, I do not remember. He was designated at some time.
5. General Russell. Were you Senior among these Deputy Chiefs of Staff?

General Bryden. I was considered as such, although Moore antedated me by a day or so, I think, in promotion.

6. General Russell. The point at issue is: Who was Acting Chief of Staff in the absence of the Chief from Washington?

General Bryden. Yes, I was, when the Chief went away.

7. General Russell. Was that true on the 27th and 28th days of November 1941, that you would act as Chief of Staff in the event General Marshall was away?


8. General Russell. Do you recall whether or not General Marshall was away on the 27th of November 1941?

General Bryden. No, I don’t remember.

9. General Russell. General, I believe that it has been testified by General Marshall that he left Washington, on the afternoon of November 26, and was in the Carolina maneuvers on the 27th of November. If that testimony is true, then you would have been Acting Chief of Staff, on the 27th. On that day, a message was sent out to General Short, of the Hawaiian Department, which message is being investigated by the Board. It contained certain enemy information and certain directives or instructions to General Short. Are you familiar with that message?

General Bryden. No, I don’t remember the message.

10. General Russell. In the testimony of General Gerow, before the Roberts Commission, he stated that it was prepared by himself and a Colonel Bundy, and thereafter, a conference was had on that message. He names, as people at the conference, the Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy, and Admiral Stark. The Board was anxious to know whether or not you were at that conference?

General Bryden. I don’t remember being at any such conference as that.

11. General Russell. If a message, later on that day of November 27, 1941, was sent to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, signed “Marshall,” and if General Marshall was away from Washington at that time, should you have seen that message, or did it lie within the power of General Gerow [901] to send it out, without submitting it to you?

General Bryden. I had not been concerned with any such messages before, and he might have shown it to me, or he might not. He could have sent it on his own authority from General Marshall, if he had such authority.

12. General Russell. That is the point—do you know whether or not he had such authority?

General Bryden. No, I don’t know. General Marshall dealt, very frequently, directly with the War Plans Division; in fact, with all the G’s.

13. General Russell. Would you say, or not, that there was vested in General Gerow, as Chief of the War Plans Division, authority to send messages over the signature of General Marshall, without the necessity of discussing such messages with General Marshall, or, in his absence, with the Acting Chief of Staff?
General Bryden. For sending them without, if General Marshall were present he undoubtedly would have taken them up with him, although I am not familiar with just how General Marshall worked with the War Plans Division in such cases. As I say, he worked directly with them. In case General Marshall were away and any question would come up in Gerow's mind, whether or not to send it, he probably would have seen me about it; but if he felt that he had authority to send it, he would have sent it, if General Marshall had told him.

14. General Russell. The answer, therefore, to the question which I asked, as to whether or not Gerow, as Chief of the War Plans Division, had authority to sign General Marshall's name to messages, is, that you do not know?

[902] General Bryden. I don't know what instructions General Marshall may have given him.

15. General Russell. You knew of no such general instructions as that?

General Bryden. No.

16. General Russell. General Bryden, I will show you the original message, to see if, by reference to it, you can refresh your memory and tell us whether or not you saw that message before it was sent.

17. General Frank. Is that the original War Department message of November 27?


General Bryden. It is so dated.

I don't remember whether I saw that before, or not, whether I had seen it before, or not. You see, I wasn't working on those subjects at all, and if it was shown to me, at the time General Marshall was out, I may have seen it; I may not have seen it; I can't say, now.

19. General Russell. Did you have certain limits on your activities there, or was a certain part of the work assigned to you?

General Bryden. Well, I carried on the routine work, you might say, of the War Department, and that concerned with mobilization in this continental United States, with the exception of the supply end of it, which was handled by General Moore, as Deputy; and General Arnold handled the Air part of it. That was the way of dividing it, when they had the three of us as Deputies.

20. General Russell. It may have been, then, that General [903] Marshall left some specific directions with General Gerow, under which he was acting at the time that this message was prepared and sent?

General Bryden. He undoubtedly must have, because it was nothing that I had a part in working up, and if it was shown to me while General Marshall was away, it didn't make any particular impression upon me.

21. General Russell. Now, General, the message which you have just read, being No. 472, dated November 27, 1941, directed the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department to report measures taken. On the same day, November 27, 1941, a message was received from General Short, addressed to the Chief of Staff, in which he stated that the Department had been alerted to prevent sabotage, and liaison with the Navy had been established.

I want to show you that message from General Short. It has endorsed on it the initials of Secretary of War Stimson, then it has a
stamp, "Noted: Chief of Staff," and under that, "Noted: War Plans Division, LTG"—General Gerow. Do you remember seeing that report as it passed through the office of the Chief of Staff?

General Bryden. No; I do not remember seeing this.

22. General Russell. Were you familiar with the practice, if in fact there was such a practice, in the office of the Chief of Staff, by which his stamp was placed on papers?

General Bryden. The stamp was placed on there when a paper had been shown to him. That's what that stamp would mean to me.

23. General Russell. It indicates that General Marshall had seen the report?

General Bryden. Yes.

24. General Russell. But you did not see this?

General Bryden. I don't remember it, now.

25. General Grunert. By whom is that stamp usually placed on there? by Marshall, himself, or by his secretary?

General Bryden. No, he wouldn't put it on, himself, but some of the secretaries outside, or—I imagine there are several of those stamps around there; there used to be six—put on by some clerk.

26. General Grunert. When he sees a thing in person, does he initial it, as a rule, do you know?

General Bryden. I think he usually does.

27. General Grunert. Do his initials appear on that particular message?

General Bryden. No; I don't see them. I don't know that—that stamp might not have been placed on there until after he had seen it. I don't know when it was put on.

28. General Russell. General Bryden, the fact that I, at least, was attempting to establish, is whether or not it was the practice for papers to be stamped this way, which the Chief of Staff had not seen.

General Bryden. Well, they were not supposed to be, because that is supposed to mean to the Office that he has seen it. Now, whether anybody was using that stamp loosely or not, I can't say.

29. General Frank. May I ask a question? Was it the normal practice to sign a message "Marshall" and send it out, when he wasn't in the office, as on this occasion?

General Bryden. Yes. I think so, as long as he was in the country, within close touch.

30. General Frank. In other words, we will assume that General Gerow prepared this message. It was a vital wartime message, and it was perfectly normal for this message to have been signed "Marshall"?

General Bryden. Yes.

31. General Frank. And sent out, without his ever having seen it?

General Bryden. I think so; yes.

32. General Frank. All right.

33. General Grunert. Does the signature that appears on the message signify anything? For instance, if a message is signed by the name of the Adjutant General, or the name of the Chief of Staff, does the name of the Chief of Staff signify anything in the importance of the message, or what was the practice?

General Bryden. Well, I think that, to my mind, a message signed by "Marshall" would be considered of more importance than one
signed by the Adjutant General, especially in a case of instructions to commanders.

34. General **Grenert.** But there were instructions given to the Commanders, such as a Department Commander, that were signed by the Adjutant General, were there not?

General **Bryden.** There must have been.

35. General **Russell.** General Bryden, do you recall having had to do with any other messages that went out to General Short, on or about the 27th or 28th?

General **Bryden.** No; I don’t remember any.

[906] 36. General **Russell.** And thus it is a fair generalization to say that those matters which were handled between the War Department and the Hawaiian Department on the 27th and 28th of November were not brought to your attention, and you did not participate in them?

General **Bryden.** I don’t remember participating in the making up of those messages, and whether or not they were shown to me before they went out, I don’t remember, but normally the War Plans Division worked directly with the Chief of Staff on such matters, and he might not have felt it necessary to bring them to me, because I wouldn’t have known the background, or couldn’t have helped him.

37. General **Russell.** You were more or less acquainted with the details of the situation in the Far East, were you not?

General **Bryden.** No, I was not. I didn’t see any secret communications they had with reference to the situation out there. I was concerned with things in this country.

38. General **Russell.** I think those are all the questions I have on that subject.

General Bryden, on the 28th of November, a message was sent by the Adjutant General to various installations throughout continental United States, and some overseas installations, in which Commanders were directed to take precautions against sabotage, and in which security was stressed. There were directions in this message that no illegal measures should be taken, and that such measures as were taken would be limited to security. To connect the message up a little further, historically, it was proposed by General Arnold, for the Air Corps, submitted to G-2, and some discussions took place between Air **[907]** Corps representatives and officers in the office of G-2. The question now is, did you participate in any of the conferences leading up to and which resulted in sending the message which I have briefly described?

General **Bryden.** I don’t remember any such conference, but, if there had been a disagreement between the Air Forces and G-2 in the wording, they might have brought it to me and I might have participated. I can’t remember at this time.

39. General **Russell.** It might be helpful if you could read that message, which is numbered 482, dated the 28th of November, directed to the Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, Territory of Hawaii, and signed “Adams.”

General **Bryden.** I do not remember whether I saw that when it went out, before it went out, or not.
40. General Russell. You do not remember any discussions with these Generals whose names have been given as having prepared the message?

General Bryden. I don’t remember; but, as I say, it is quite possible that if there had been a disagreement on the wording, they might have brought it down to my office and we decided on the wording, although I do not remember. Normally, I was not working on those subjects, and it would not necessarily have come through me.

41. General Russell. As a matter of fact, General, if you had not been shown the confidential data relating to our relations in the Pacific, you would not have been in a position to pass very intelligently on these questions?

General Bryden. No, no; it would have been just a question of getting the wording so it was clear, or something [908] of that kind, and getting a compromise solution between the two people concerned, to get the message out. No, I didn’t have the information for background on those things.

42. General Russell. That is all.

43. General Grunert. There is a subject in which the Board is interested, on which you might be able to throw some light and that is the state of mind of the War Department regarding the possibility or probability of an attack on Hawaii, late in November, or early in December. In other words, do you know whether or not the War Department thought that such an attack was highly improbable, and whether or not that attack came as a surprise to the higher-ups in the War Department?

General Bryden. Those communications, which were secret, were kept pretty tight. I never saw them, and the matter would not have been discussed in my office. Personally, the attack on Hawaii was a surprise to me. I had no information upon which to go, to presume that there was going to be one.

44. General Grunert. Are there any other questions?

45. General Frank. Do you feel that that was the general state of mind of the people with whom you were associated in the War Department?

General Bryden. I think that with the people in my echelon, lower down, who were not engaged in that particular work, that was probably the idea; but as to the people that were concerned with working on that subject and had access to whatever secret files there were, I don’t know what their state of mind was.

46. General Frank. In other words, they did not expect a Japanese attack at that time on the Island of Oahu?

General Bryden. I cannot say what other people might have thought.

47. General Frank. But that was your feeling about it?

General Bryden. Personally, it was a surprise to me when it was pulled off; but those secret communications were kept very tight.

48. General Grunert. There appearing to be no other questions, thank you for coming up and assisting us.

General Bryden. I am afraid I am not much help.

49. General Grunert. Our next witness is scheduled for 11 o’clock.

(Brief recess.)
TESTIMONY OF COLONEL ERLE M. WILSON,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Colonel, would you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?
   Colonel Wilson. Erle M. Wilson, Infantry, Retired, on active duty, Washington, D.C.

2. General Grunert. Colonel, the Board is after facts, that is, prior and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. It is hoped, because of your assignment in Hawaii at that time, that you can throw some light on the subject.

   What was your assignment during 1941 up to and possibly including December 7, 1941?
   Colonel Wilson. I had two assignments. First, I was Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Division, which was inactivated October 1st.

3. General Frank. The year?
   Colonel Wilson. 1941. After that I became Commanding Officer at Schofield Barracks, from October 1, 1941, until February 17, '42. I had had a prior tour of duty in Hawaii from July '36 to July '38. I arrived in Hawaii September '40.

4. General Grunert. Then, you were Post Commander of Schofield Barracks. What was Schofield Barracks used for? What did the garrison consist of?
   Colonel Wilson. That is a matter of record, of course, but from memory I can only tell you generally.

5. General Grunert. Generally speaking, what was at Schofield Barracks?
   Colonel Wilson. It was the home station of the new 24th and 25th Divisions and certain other troops which just prior to December 7 and after December 7 were arriving there in considerable numbers.

6. General Grunert. Where was it located with respect to Honolulu?
   Colonel Wilson. About 18 or 20 miles to Honolulu, up towards the north shore, in the generally central part of the Island and on the plateau between the north and south shores.

7. General Grunert. Then, the garrison there had a number of tactical units who had separate commanders, over whom you had no control, or the troops you had no control over; is that right?
   Colonel Wilson. Yes.

8. General Grunert. Who were they, the higher commanders?
   Colonel Wilson. The 24th Division was commanded by General Durwood Wilson, the 25th Division by General Maxwell Murray.

9. General Grunert. Then you had the post activities not connected with tactical command; is that correct?
   Colonel Wilson. The only tactical functions that I had were the interior guard of the post and post facilities; close-in guard, they call it.

11. General Grunert. Of Schofield Barracks proper; that is right. Now, in that defense what plan of defense was there? Did you have an S. O. P. showing what should be done in an emergency or an attack?

[912] Colonel Wilson. Oh, yes. That was really routine. They went into that, oh, in various maneuvers while we were over there.

12. General Grunert. What was your condition as to preparedness to meet any attack, in the defense of that post? Just what were some of the provisions for such defense?

Colonel Wilson. Well, a battalion of one of the divisions, I forget which now, but the battalions alternated from time to time, were assigned to that duty.

13. General Grunert. What preparations were there made in the line of air raid shelters or slit trenches or special measures regarding fire fighting? Were there any special measures or what were the instructions regarding those things that are necessary for a defense in case of an air raid?

Colonel Wilson. For fire fighting we had the ordinary fire equipment there at Schofield Barracks which was considerable, consisted of a number of vehicles and engines. I forget; I couldn't name that equipment, but it was considerable: the average equipment of a post that size. And then the force they employed there: it was a fire chief and, oh, half a dozen employees, civilian employees; and then in addition to that that was augmented by the assignment of a number of the internees. We operated an internment or a selective service training. Trainees I should have said. And the fire department was augmented by the detail from time to time of, oh, 50 or 60 of those boys.

14. General Grunert. What preparations were there in the line of defense against an air attack?

Colonel Wilson. Machine gun emplacements on the roofs of [913] various barracks throughout the post. There were some emplacements located at the best positions.

15. General Grunert. Were there any air raid shelters, as such?

Colonel Wilson. Yes.

16. General Grunert. What were they? Any special construction?

Colonel Wilson. Special trench, trench construction. It was varied.

17. General Grunert. Is that in the line of slit trenches, or what?

Colonel Wilson. In some cases, yes; I remember one place distinctly where there was a slit trench dug and machine guns mounted, sand-bagged.

18. General Grunert. What were the instructions about the non-combatant population of Schofield? What were they to do in case of an air raid? What were the instructions in that respect?

Colonel Wilson. Well, only the general instructions that were provided for their evacuation to Honolulu.

19. General Grunert. And there were provisions to evacuate the noncombatant personnel from Schofield to Honolulu?


20. General Frank. This was on the assumption, however, that you would have some notice of an impending crisis?

Colonel Wilson. That is right.
21. General Frank. And upon such notice, that you would accomplish this?
Colonel Wilson. That is right.

[914] 22. General Grunert. Did you anticipate the possibility of an air raid?
Colonel Wilson. I don't think it was; I did not personally. I think that I am no exception in rather feeling that we would have an hour or more's notice of an impending attack.

23. General Grunert. Where were you to get that notice?
Colonel Wilson. From the department headquarters.

24. General Grunert. The department. Were you actually raided at Schofield?

25. General Grunert. And were there some casualties there?
Colonel Wilson. No casualties. I don't know why. I have often marveled at it.

26. General Grunert. In the defensive measures had there been practice and drills in taking defense positions against aircraft?
Colonel Wilson. Oh, yes. Machine guns were firing on the planes within, I would say, a very few minutes.

27. General Grunert. What measures did you take after December 7th that had not been taken prior to December 7th?
Colonel Wilson. On December the 7th we began to dig slit trenches, and slit trenches were dug.

28. General Grunert. Then, there were no slit trenches before that?
Colonel Wilson. No slit trenches dug before December 7.

29. General Grunert. Before that: Were there air raid shelters before that?
Colonel Wilson. Only at machine gun positions; that is all;

[915] the ones that I mentioned.

30. General Grunert. Then, why did they take these measures afterward and not before December 7th? Who ordered such measures taken?
Colonel Wilson. I do not remember that.

31. General Grunert. You do not know who ordered the measures?
Colonel Wilson. I do not remember whether it was taken on my initiative or whether we received orders from headquarters. I cannot remember that. I know it was done.

32. General Grunert. Are you familiar with the provisions of Field Manual 10-5 which charged each such camp, post, and station with its own security?
Colonel Wilson. Yes, I think I am.

33. General Grunert. Then, there were measures taken after December 7, '41, which were considered necessary for defense, which were not taken prior thereto?
Colonel Wilson. Yes.

34. General Grunert. Did that indicate that there appeared to be more danger after December 7th than there was before or on December 7th?
Colonel Wilson. Well, their need was a great deal more apparent after December 7th than it was prior to December 7th.

35. General Grunert. Then, it seems to indicate that the powers that be, whoever ordered the measures taken after December 7th, were
more conscious of the necessity of such measures than they were before.

Colonel Wilson. I presume that is a fact.

36. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not some of these [916] instructions for measures to be taken after December 7 came from the department?

Colonel Wilson. I could not answer that. I think, however, it would be a matter of record.

37. General Grunert. Has the Board any questions?

38. General Russell. Colonel, I understood an answer a moment ago to one of General Grunert's questions by you was to the effect that the machine guns fired in a few minutes after the planes appeared.

Colonel Wilson. Yes, sir.

39. General Russell. You are discussing now the machine guns which were—

Colonel Wilson. Right around Schofield Barracks.

40. General Russell. Just in the perimeter?

Colonel Wilson. Yes.

41. General Russell. Within the realm and scope of your fire?

Colonel Wilson. Yes.

42. General Russell. Those machine guns were under your control and manned by post complement personnel?

Colonel Wilson. Well, yes, they were. They were manned by certain guard, the interior guard.

43. General Russell. It was a function of the interior guard, then, to man these antiaircraft machine guns?

Colonel Wilson. In the immediate vicinity.

44. General Russell. In the immediate vicinity, yes. Was any damage done to the Japanese aircraft by your machine guns?

Colonel Wilson. Yes, there was some. One aircraft was hit and grounded and burned near the deep well that is over in [917] the outskirts of Wahiawa.

45. General Russell. Was considerable damage done to the post?

Colonel Wilson. To the post?

46. General Russell. By this attack, Jap plane attack.

Colonel Wilson. Schofield Barracks proper, no. I would say not. There were several motor vehicles hit. Every high ranking officer's house was either bombed or machine-gunned. My own, for instance, I live—I don't know whether you are familiar with Schofield Barracks or not, but those of you who are, there were three houses in the generals' loop. I lived in one, the aide lived on the other flank, and the old Division Commander lived in the center one. Apparently his set of quarters was aimed at but was not hit. There was a bomb landed in front of my set of quarters, which was right next door, about 75 feet from the house, I guess. Fragments of the bomb went into the house, and a number of machine-gun bullets were found later in the roof of my set of quarters. They, a few days after, had a rain, and they sent a man up on the roof to repair the roof, and he came down with a pocketful of machine-gun bullets, fragments. The aide's house on the other side was hit. Trees in the yard were hit by shell fragments and machine-gun bullets. The foliage of the planting around my house was clipped off in some places like you had taken a pair of shears. We didn't notice it for several days after, until the branches began to wilt.
47. General Russell. What conclusions if any were drawn by the military personnel at the barracks as to the information which the invading force had of installation on the barracks, at Schofield Barracks?

[918] Colonel Wilson. I don't know; that is the only indication that I have. I believe that they knew quite well where the high ranking officers lived.


Colonel Wilson. About the only measures that were taken after December 7 that were not taken before December 7 were the digging of slit trenches.

49. General Russell. After the attack everybody was a little more conscious of the possibility of an attack?

Colonel Wilson. There is no question about that.

50. General Frank. At the time of this attack what was the status of defense with respect to the existence of an alert? Were you on some sort of an alert?

Colonel Wilson. We were on what was called an alert against sabotage. I think it was Alert No. 1; but that is a matter of record. That identifies the alert we were on.

51. General Frank. To what extent were you familiar with the acuteness or tenseness of the international situation between the United States and Japan?

Colonel Wilson. Well, not to any particular extent. The division commanders had been warned, I know.

52. General Frank. Had been warned about what?

Colonel Wilson. About the tenseness of the international situation. I know they had been called to headquarters and had been warned about the tenseness of the situation.

53. General Frank. Had you been advised that war was probable?

Colonel Wilson. I knew generally that it was; yes.

54. General Frank. You felt that war with Japan was imminent?

Colonel Wilson. I think we were notified. It is very difficult for me to separate just what was in mind on December 7th from what thoughts I had on the subject since December 7th. Any evidence I am giving you now I give with that thought in mind.

We had general information that things were not going any too well in Washington, and I think there was some caution about not taking any action that might bring on international complications. There was that feeling.

55. General Frank. Did you feel that an acute situation existed?

Colonel Wilson. Yes, I did. I felt that we were getting into fairly deep water; but I did not feel that the situation was nearly as acute as it was. I do not know whether that is much help or not.

56. General Frank. Since you had been ordered into an alert against sabotage you must have felt that there was some tenseness about the situation?

Colonel Wilson. Oh, yes; that is right. There was a tenseness. Everybody had a tenseness.

57. General Frank. If acts of sabotage were about to take place, an act of sabotage would be an act of war, would it not?

Colonel Wilson. Yes.
58. General Frank. Then, if there were about to be an act of war take place, it was about to be manifested by an attack some place. Did you not feel that way?
Colonel Wilson. The attack came as a distinct surprise to me—if that is what you are trying to get.

59. General Frank. If that attack came as a distinct surprise did you not feel that war with Japan was in the offing?
Colonel Wilson. My first sensation on December 7, which may have something to do with my answer to your question, was that General Short had sprung a surprise maneuver on us, because we were used to being alerted over there; an alert was a routine matter over there.

60. General Frank. If General Short had sprung—

61. General Russell. I think you ought to let the Colonel follow out that line of thought. I think the witness is entitled to finish his answer, in fairness to the witness.

Colonel Wilson. I am in the hands of the Board.

62. General Frank. Would you mind letting me handle the answers to my questions, please?

63. General Russell. I think the witness ought to be protected.

64. General Grunert. Complete your answer to the last question. Read the last question and answer, Mr. Reporter.

(The question and answer referred to were read by the reporter, as above recorded.)

65. General Grunert. Did you complete your answer?

Colonel Wilson. I was going to add to that, that just previous to that I had knowledge that some arrangements were being made to acquire some pineapple land between Wheeler Field and Waianae Range for maneuver purposes. I had no knowledge that the arrangements had been consummated. When the first bomb dropped it was about eight o'clock. I jumped out of my bed. I had been in bed two days with a cold and was just feeling sorry for myself and was going to hole in and have Sunday in bed. But I jumped out of my bed and looked out the front window where I could see toward the Waianae Mountains, and I saw a stick of bombs falling from a plane. My first impression was, "My God! They are getting too close to Wheeler Field." That was when I thought, Well, the land deal has gone through and a surprise maneuver or an alert has been ordered. They are getting too close to Wheeler Field. Then, when the bombs landed and the smoke rose I could see they were on Wheeler Field; and then I turned to my wife and said, "This is the real thing."

I believe that every military-minded person or generally informed person felt that war was imminent.

66. General Frank. Will you go back to my former question, Mr. Reporter, and read it.

(The reporter read as follows:)

If that attack came as a distinct surprise did you not feel that war with Japan was in the offing?

Colonel Wilson. I feel that every person who was military-minded or who was generally informed felt that war was impending.

67. General Frank. Did you or did you not know that there had been some warning messages received from the War Department?
Colonel Wilson. I knew through hearsay that one warning message had been received.

68. General Frank. As a student of military history were you familiar with the manner in which Japan had traditionally started wars, namely, by attacking and having the attack constitute a declaration of war?

Colonel Wilson. Yes. That is the way they began the war with Russia.

[923] .

69. General Frank. If war with Japan were imminent, where did you think the initial attack was going to be made?

Colonel Wilson. This is only my opinion, but I thought probably they would hit the Philippines.

70. General Frank. This is opinion, of course, and I realize that, but in preparing for any emergency the commander in any theater in any area is responsible for the steps taken for defense. In determining the steps to be taken he assembles all the information that is available and, in one way or another, establishes an estimate of the situation. That is traditional in military procedure, is it not?

Colonel Wilson. That is right.

71. General Frank. Then, having determined the situation, he makes his decision. In making that decision it is normal for him to determine the steps that the enemy can take against him. Is that correct?

Colonel Wilson. That is the first thing you would consider in an estimate of the situation.

72. General Frank. The steps that the enemy can take against him?

Colonel Wilson. Yes, sir.

73. General Frank. And in making preparations to meet the steps that the enemy can take against him, our military teachings and practice generally lead us to take what steps—steps to meet what situation with respect to the enemy?

Colonel Wilson. To counter the most dangerous steps that the enemy may take.

74. General Frank. That is exactly what I am after.

Colonel Wilson. Let me add to that. That is what was [924] done, to my knowledge, from 1936 to 1938, and from 1940 to 1941, while I was over there, and just what you have said resulted in the various defense plans that were made for the defense of Oahu upon which all of the maneuvers over there during those periods, to my knowledge, were based. That is exactly what was the basis of those defense plans.

75. General Frank. In this situation what was the most dangerous thing that the enemy could do to the force in Oahu? Was it this attack or something similar to it?

Colonel Wilson. Yes; but the nature of the attack I do not think was as well defined prior to the attack as it was on December 7th or 8th.

76. General Frank. The point I am trying to make is this: Normal military preparations call for determining the most dangerous thing that the enemy can pull and then taking steps to meet it; is not that a fact?

Colonel Wilson. That is correct.
77. General Frank. Was that done in this case?
Colonel Wilson. Yes; I think it was. I think the precautions that were determined by the best minds in Oahu, to my knowledge, from 1936 to 1940, were taken.

78. General Frank. If steps had been taken to have met this kind of a raid that happened, would not an alert where fighter planes would have been immediately available to take off provided better protection?
Colonel Wilson. I have always wondered why there were not planes in the air. I thought it was common procedure always to have planes in the air, and especially the dawn patrol. I do not know whether there were or not, of my own knowledge.

79. General Frank. Do you know what Alert 3 would have provided?
Colonel Wilson. Only very generally. The men would have physically been in their battle positions and physically been on their arms and had their ammunition with them, and a certain quota of ammunition in position.

80. General Frank. And the planes would have been dispersed and ready to take off?
Colonel Wilson. That is right; and I think there would have been planes in the air.

81. General Frank. That would have been a more effective defense, would it not?
Colonel Wilson. In my opinion, yes.

82. General Frank. That would have been a measure to meet the worst thing that the Japs could have done?
Colonel Wilson. If in the judgment of the Commander that was his estimate of the situation, it would have been.

83. General Frank. But an alert purely against sabotage and not against such an attack did not provide against the most dangerous action of the enemy, did it?
Colonel Wilson. As it proved; looking at it with hindsight, I would say it did not.

84. General Frank. That is all.
85. General Russell. I think there is something in the record that should be straightened out. General Frank asked you if an act of sabotage was not an act of war, and you replied yes.
Colonel Wilson. I would like to change that reply. No.

86. General Russell. I wanted to give you an opportunity to do that.
Colonel Wilson. Yes; I would like to change that reply to “No,” because we were constantly on the qui vive for sabotage, regularly so, and we could not tell whether it was an effort for sabotage or whether it was just some crank. I know that sometime before December 7 there were some cases. The Catholic Chapel was desecrated, and we did not know whether that was sabotage or not. I do know that there were some rumors from Wheeler Field that we took seriously enough to put our G–2s on, where it was thought that there was an effort made to tamper with the gasoline in some places. I do not know whether that ever materialized or not, but I know we took all the steps that were available to use in G–2 to try to deal with it, such as setting traps for them and that sort of thing.
87. General Russell. Acts of sabotage on the part of individuals connected directly with the Japanese Government would be an act of war?

Colonel Wilson. That is correct.

88. General Frank. Do you think that an act of sabotage that could be connected with the Japanese Government would be an indication of impending war?

Colonel Wilson. I think the question is hypothetical. I think that you have got to have it definitely determined whether or not the Japanese Nation is connected with it. That is just what we were trying to determine over there for some time. We had our facilities right on the heels of some very suspicious things that were happening over there on the [927] defense positions and all sorts of places. My G-2 talked with me over several occurrences that were quite suspicious. We came near capturing a civilian. We did not get close enough to get him, but we came very near getting him.

89. General Frank. What had he done?

Colonel Wilson. Just acting suspicious around gun positions up on the north shore, enough to excite suspicion. I think there is no question but what there were spies over there, and that is generally admitted. We thought we were right behind one, and I believe we were. What we would have done with him if we had gotten him I do not know.

90. General Grunert. Were you surprised when you went on Alert No. 1 that it was not No. 2 or No. 3?

Colonel Wilson. No, sir.

91. General Grunert. In view of the information you had as to the tenseness of the situation, from at least one warning message that you referred to, were you not surprised that they did not take an alert of greater protection than No. 1?

Colonel Wilson. No. I was not surprised at all, because I felt that the powers that be were being informed of the situation to a much greater degree than I was. Certainly I had no direct line of information. I had to look to the department heads for my information.

92. General Grunert. One more question. How frequently did the department staff come to Schofield to look into the defense measures taken for local protection, if at all?

Colonel Wilson. The department staff were frequent visitors at Schofield.

93. General Grunert. Did they examine into your plans?

Colonel Wilson. Oh, yes.

94. General Grunert. Did they test out those plans as to whether or not they were workable?

Colonel Wilson. Yes, they did. General Short arrived over there about in the spring, I think it was, of 1941. It is hard to tell. There are no seasons over there, and there is nothing to tie to; but it was early in 1941. As soon as he got over there he was very active. He made an intensive active study of the defenses of the Island, to orient himself, I am quite certain. Prior to General Short's designation there had been a continuity of command in the department commanding generals. For instance, I went through a period with General Drum, who was relieved by General Moses, and General Moses having had a tour in command of the division there, he was relieved by Gen-

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eral Herron who, in turn, had commanded the division just previously. So there was a continuity of thought and a chain of command. General Wilson, who, following that scheme out, would have been in command of the department, was over age and was retired. So General Short was sent over. So, after this intense period of orientation—I judge that is what it was—he made frequent visits all around. His staff did the same thing. Then there was a period through which the defense plan was translated into standard procedure, and that consumed some time.

95. General GRUNET. You were there, then, during the time that they had just one type of alert, and did not have three?

Colonel Wilson. Yes, sir.

[929] 96. General GRUNET. And then later, after General Short came, they had three types of alert, Nos. 1, 2, and 3?

Colonel Wilson. Yes, sir.

97. General GRUNET. Which do you think answered the purposes of defense the better: the 1 type or the 3 type?

Colonel Wilson. That is a question purely of opinion. I think they both were adequate.

98. General GRUNET. If you had been alerted at all under the No. 1 type of alert would you have gone into all-out alert?

Colonel Wilson. Yes, sir.

99. General GRUNET. And under the No. 3 it was a question of decision as to who ordered it?

Colonel Wilson. Yes, sir.

100. General GRUNET. Do you have anything else that you desire to offer to the Board which may be of help to it? If so, you may proceed.

Colonel Wilson. Shortly following General Short's arrival over there was the regular time for the annual maneuvers. Those maneuvers were held, but they differed from the ordinary maneuver in this respect. The period that was assigned to the regiments and brigades to take regimental and brigade maneuvers was assigned to the actual construction of defenses. They did not have the maneuvers. They dug where they thought the various defenses should be located. The locations of these defenses were verified. They were all prescribed by the plan of defense, and they were verified by intensive reconnaissances on the part of the department staff, division staffs, and the commanders determined their locations. The first period of the maneuver was devoted to digging. The [930] only maneuver period that was used in the ordinary sense was taken advantage of to test out, actually test out, those various positions. The digging could not be completed in the time specified, but at the conclusion of the maneuver General Short ordered that this digging was to be continued until completed, regardless of other duties. That was given first priority.

In the construction over there I noted a vast improvement, in my estimation, in the defenses of the Island. When I got back there in 1940 changes had been made in the plan, which change, I thought, in my own estimation, was an important change.

When General Short came and went through this period of digging, the Army reserve supply of sand bags, wire, and that sort of thing—certain parts—began to get pretty scarce. General Short
was able to do a great deal; I think he was in position to do more than any other department commander, because of the fact that things were getting easier to get. He turned out this war reserve and augmented it by the purchase of sugar sacks, and even went to the extreme of using refuse, crushed cane stalks, and that sort of thing, to see whether they would do for revetment, and absolutely denuded all of the dumps over there from Pearl Harbor, Schofield Barracks, and all of the Army posts, in search of revetment material. Things were not as easy to get as they are now. They were not allowed to dig every place, because many of the smaller works are in people's front yard and occupy ground used for sugar land and pineapple land and that sort of thing, and there was a great deal of opposition to that on the part of the Big Five and the owners of the properties. But arrangements were immediately instituted to get that land, and they were more or less successful in some of that.

From then until the time I left over there on February 17 they were still perfecting many of these defense works, and I am sure that General Emmons continued that when he came on, on December 15, or whenever it was.

101. General GRUNET. All right, Colonel. Thank you very much for coming over and helping us out.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 12:05 p.m. a recess was taken until 2 o'clock of the same day.)

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AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Board, at 2:25 o'clock, p.m., continued the hearing of witnesses.)

General GRUNET. The witness has arrived. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL EARL E.GESLER, CORPS OF ENGINEERS;
DIVISION ENGINEER, MIDDLE ATLANTIC DIVISION; BALTIMORE, MD.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. General GRUNET. Colonel, the Board, in attempting to get at the facts, is looking into the War Department background and viewpoint prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. We hope that you can throw some light on the situation because of your assignment in Washington in 1940 and possibly in 1941. General Frank will lead for the Board in propounding the questions, and the Board will supplement his inquiry. General Frank.

2. General FRANK. Colonel Gesler, on what duty were you, on or about 20th of December, 1940?

Colonel GESLER. I was Chief of the Finance Section, Office of the Chief of Engineers.

3. General FRANK. What were your duties at that time?

Colonel GESLER. As Chief of the Finance Section, I reported to General Robins, and had charge of activities in finance accounting, auditing, cost accounting, civilian personnel, and contracts and claims.
4. General Frank. Do you remember a contract identified as W-414-eng-602, which was drawn with the Hawaiian Constructors, which was the base contract for certain defense contracts for the Hawaiian Islands, at that time?

Colonel Gesler. I remember there was such a contract. I would have to refresh my memory, though, to talk in detail about it.

5. General Frank. That contract was consummated in Washington on December 20, 1940. Did you participate in the final drawing up of that contract?

Colonel Gesler. No, sir; not in the preparation of the contract, itself.

6. General Frank. Well, did you have anything to do with it?

Colonel Gesler. My duties required the review of the contract after it had been prepared and before submitting to the Chief of Engineers for approval.

7. General Frank. Do you remember having conferences with any of the contractor personnel that were interested in the contract?

Colonel Gesler. No, sir.

8. General Frank. Do you remember meeting a Mr. Paul Grafe?

Colonel Gesler. I do not remember meeting him. It is possible I met him, but I never conducted any business with him.

9. General Frank. Do you remember ever meeting Mr. Martin, who was an attorney for one Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Colonel Gesler. I don’t remember.

10. General Frank. Did you ever meet Mr. Rohl?

Colonel Gesler. No, sir.

11. General Frank. Did you ever meet Mr. Connolly, of the Rohl-Connolly Company?

Colonel Gesler. No, sir. The same remark applies to those. I might have met them, but I have never conducted any business with them.

12. General Frank. And there is nothing about those names that brings back any memory of having done business with them, at that time?

Colonel Gesler. Not from business. I know their names, because of their association with the contract.

13. General Frank. Exactly what did you do with respect to the contract?

Colonel Gesler. I examined what my assistants had done, to see that the proper people had seen it, and checked it over generally to see that it conformed to policy and principle.

14. General Frank. Do you remember of a letter having been written in your section about expediting the citizenship papers of one Mr. Rohl?

Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.

15. General Frank. Here is a photostat copy of that letter that was written. It has already been introduced as evidence. Will you look at that and tell me if that is the letter to which you refer?

Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.

16. General Frank. Are those your initials at the bottom, there?

Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.

17. General Frank. I suggest you read it, to yourself, there, in order to refresh your memory.
You have a memory of that letter, now, do you?
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir; I remember it.
18. General Frank. You will notice, down in next to the last para-
graph, it states:

[935] It is the understanding of this office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the
United States is beyond question.

On what was that based?
Colonel Gesler. I can only give you general impressions on that,
now, sir. That letter was prepared by a lawyer on my staff.
19. General Frank. What is his name?
Colonel Gesler. Mr. Stilphen.
20. General Frank. Where is he, now?
Colonel Gesler. The last I heard, he was retired from the Navy as
a commander—Benjamin L. Stilphen. I think I discussed it with
him. I know I discussed it with someone, at the time, and I believe
Mr. Stilphen discussed it also probably with that gentleman to whom
it is addressed, in the Department of Justice. We were not taking
the attitude that we were certifying to his "loyalty," I believe it is,
but rather that that information was in the Department of Justice.
They had been investigating him in connection with his final clearance
or final papers, and that therefore what we requested was that he
would have those papers expedited.
21. General Frank. Colonel, this sentence reads:

It is the understanding of this office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States
is beyond question.

"This office," in this instance, is the Office of the Chief of Engineers,
and this letter was signed by General Kingman, as Acting Chief of
Engineers; and General Kingman, before this Board the other day,
referred to you as the officer under whose immediate jurisdiction the
letter had been prepared.
Colonel Gesler. That's right. It was prepared by Mr. [936]
Stilphen, on my staff.
22. General Frank. Whose immediate responsibility was it that the
statements in this letter were according to fact?
Colonel Gesler. I initiated it. I believe it is according to fact, there; yes, sir.
23. General Frank. It was your responsibility, then?
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.
24. General Frank. What background did you have for making this
statement about Rohl's loyalty?
Colonel Gesler. I am not saying anything about his loyalty. I re-
peat, the information we got I believe was based on a telephone con-
versation between Mr. Stilphen and the Department of Justice, and the
purpose of this letter was to ask them to hurry up on the handling of the
case, with the information they had, and it was our understanding as
the result of that conversation that there wasn't any question about
his loyalty at the time.
25. General Frank. Now, wait a minute. This letter is not written
to the Department of Justice. It is written to the Bureau of Immigra-
tion and Naturalization, asking them to expedite the issuance of Mr.
Rohl's citizenship papers.
Colonel Gesler. Well, that's my error, then. It is this Department I am referring to.

26. General Frank. And this statement in this letter, prepared under your jurisdiction, is:

It is the understanding of this office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty to the United States is beyond question.

Now, there seems to be a finality about that, does there not?

Colonel Gesler. In my opinion it is, as I stated, that [937] it did not represent a separate investigation by our office; otherwise, we would have said so.

27. General Frank. Did Rohl or any agent of his see Stilphen prior to or during the writing of this letter?

Colonel Gesler. I doubt it.

28. General Frank. Did you ever know a Mr. Martin, who was Rohl's attorney?

Colonel Gesler. I don't remember him; no, sir.

29. General Frank. Mr. Stilphen was a civilian?

Colonel Gesler. At that time; yes, sir.

30. General Frank. What responsibility did he have?

Colonel Gesler. Well, he was in charge principally of labor-relations cases in the Contracts and Claims branch, particularly those cases under the Bacon-Davis Act, and this seemed to be more or less his type of work and involved contacts which he had, and therefore he handled it.

31. General Frank. Did you ever have any other instances of trying to give a foreigner citizenship so that you could give him Government business?

Colonel Gesler. I don't believe so. I don't remember any. May I correct that statement, just a little bit, though, General? We were not trying to give him citizenship. We were asking this Department to expedite their action on it, whether positive or negative.

32. General Frank. I think the witness is mistaken.

Read paragraph 2 of that letter.

Colonel Gesler. All right.

33. General Frank. And read the last sentence of paragraph 3.

Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.

34. General Frank. What you are asking for is the expediting of positive action on that, is it not?

Colonel Gesler. That's the tenor of the letter; yes, sir.

35. General Frank. Then you were trying to get citizenship for this man so you could give him Government business?

Colonel Gesler. That's right. He couldn't do that business in Hawaii without his citizenship papers.

36. General Frank. Is it within your power to throw any light on the background that you got for this statement about his loyalty being beyond question?

Colonel Gesler. Well, at this time, the only impression I have is that Mr. Stilphen discussed it with this Department. I believe we also had a letter addressed to us from the Pacific Division, asking us to assist in processing, getting the Department of Immigration and Naturalization to expedite the case.

37. General Frank. Do you think you could locate that letter?

Colonel Gesler. No, sir; I don't believe I can. I know they have searched for it over in the Chief of Engineers' Office, and it has not
been found, and I say that is my impression. I might even be wrong, there.

38. General Frank. Who would have written such a letter?
Colonel Gesler. The division engineer of the Pacific Division, Colonel Hannum.

39. General Frank. Where did Stilphen come from?
Colonel Gesler. I can’t answer that, sir. He is in this general locality, I believe.

40. General Frank. Was he an American citizen?
Colonel Gesler. I believe he was; yes, sir.

41. General Frank. Did General Newman (then Major Newman) have anything to do with this letter?
Colonel Gesler. Possibly. I don’t know. He was busy on other things, and it’s a possibility he didn’t see it.

42. General Frank. Recently, have you investigated the circumstances surrounding the writing of this letter?
Colonel Gesler. I have discussed it with the Office, Chief of Engineers, and I was told they couldn’t find anything else in the file concerning this letter.

43. General Frank. Who told you that?
Colonel Gesler. Mr. McKay—Mr. Douglas McKay.

44. General Frank. You said you checked the contract to see if it conformed to policy. What policy?
Colonel Gesler. The use of the “cost-plus-fixed-fee” contract, a War Department policy in existence at that time, including the question of fees involved, and the general nature of the clauses which were required under statute and War Department regulation.

45. General Frank. What subordinates of yours worked on the contract, whose work you checked; do you remember?
Colonel Gesler. I don’t remember. In the normal course of work, Major Newman would be that one. He was the Chief of that Contracts and Claims branch.

46. General Frank. Was there any question, as you remember, about the contract, when they came?
Colonel Gesler. No, sir.

47. General Frank. Do you know whether or not Mr. Stilphen was acquainted with Hans Wilhelm Rohl?
Colonel Gesler. I don’t know, but I wouldn’t think he had any connection with him.

48. General Frank. Do you know whether or not Mr. Stilphen knew Mr. John Martin, who was Mr. Rohl’s attorney?
Colonel Gesler. I doubt it.

49. General Frank. Do you know whether or not Mr. John Martin had any contact with Mr. Stilphen prior to Stilphen’s preparing this letter?
Colonel Gesler. I don’t know.

50. General Frank. Was there nothing unusual about a German alien’s getting citizenship so that he could be given Government business, that would require you to look into this situation to a greater extent?
Colonel Gesler. The only purpose of getting his citizenship papers was to permit him personally to go to Hawaii to supervise some of the work. I do not believe there was any government policy which pre-
vented award of contracts to domestic corporations, some of whose officers might have been aliens.

51. General Frank. I think at that time Mr. Rohl was, or he just had been, president and principal stockholder in that organization, so he was not a casual member of it.

Colonel Gesler. I understand that’s the case, yes, sir—prior to this particular contract.

52. General Frank. I have no further questions.

53. General Grunert. I have one, here. Did you expect that letter that was signed by General Kingman to influence the immigration authorities either toward actually granting the citizenship or toward merely expediting action thereon?

Colonel Gesler. Well, that’s hard to say, General.

54. General Grunert. Why was the letter written?

Colonel Gesler. To get action on it so that we could use him, or else learn definitely he was not going to be available.

55. General Grunert. If that letter had not been written, would there been a delay? Do you know whether there would have been a delay in getting that citizenship, or whether there would have been a question about giving it to him?

Colonel Gesler. I do know that it had been pending for some time.

56. General Grunert. In other words, can you tell us whether or not a letter from the Office of the Chief of Engineers would assist in influencing those who granted him citizenship?

Colonel Gesler. I do not believe so. I believe they would use independent judgment, there, sir.

57. General Grunert. You do not think, then, the letter would have any influence? If so, why was the letter written?

Colonel Gesler. To ask them to give it attention and get it through just as soon as possible. It was holding up work in the Hawaiian Islands. As Mr. Rohl was known to be a very fine operator, as that letter indicated, and if his services with his company were to be of any value, he should have gone over.

58. General Grunert. Well, was the contract not progressing rapidly enough? He at that time apparently was not an active official in the company operating in Hawaii. Did you have any reports that the progress on the contract was slow, or could not proceed without him?

Colonel Gesler. I can’t answer that from the record, [942] General, but I believe that was the general impression.

59. General Grunert. I have no further questions.

60. General Frank. You stated that the process of obtaining citizenship for Rohl had been pending for some time?

Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.

61. General Frank. Do you know why it had been pending for some time?

Colonel Gesler. No, sir; except I have read your report, there, that would indicate that there were certain things which the Immigration authorities were aware of.

62. General Frank. In the face of that, do you think that there was sufficient investigation made of him to warrant the writing of this letter?
Colonel Gesler. Well, in my opinion, the letter, itself, was not advancing any theory of the War Department, or giving any information which the Immigration Department didn't have better already.

63. General Frank. Then why did you write that letter?

Colonel Gesler. To ask them to hurry it up. The naturalization was being made by that Department. They had all the information. There was nothing which we would require, provided he were made a full citizen. That, in itself, would establish his qualification.

64. General Frank. Then why were you giving it your moral support?

It is the understanding of this office that Mr. Rohl's loyalty is beyond question.

Colonel Gesler. That was our general understanding.

65. General Frank. What steps did you take to find out?

[943] Colonel Gesler. We had no other steps, except this informal conversation which I believe Mr. Stilphen had with the Immigration Bureau.

66. General Frank. You do not know?

Colonel Gesler. No, sir.

67. General Frank. Yet you initialed the letter as giving it authenticity from your section?

Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir; because after discussion with him, I was satisfied that it was all right.

68. General Grunert. In this conversation that he had with the immigration authorities, did they ask him to present such a letter? Evidently, you had a conversation with them over the phone. Why wasn't that sufficient, without the letter? Or did they want it backed up by a letter from the Chief of Engineers? Do you remember whether that conversation included that?

Colonel Gesler. I really don't remember, but that's a logical conclusion, General.

69. General Grunert. Nothing more.

70. General Russell. You discussed Mr. Rohl, a moment ago, Colonel, stating that he was regarded as a good operator.

Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.

71. General Russell. Did you know that, when you initialed the letter seeking to hasten his citizenship application?

Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.

72. General Russell. And that letter was written, as I recall, in August 1941, this letter that we are discussing.

Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.

73. General Russell. Now, how long had you had the information that Mr. Rohl was a good operator?

Colonel Gesler. Well, I personally never had had any relations with that contracting firm, but I knew of the reputation of it along the Pacific Coast.

74. General Russell. And that reputation had existed in the Office of the Chief of Engineers over some years?

Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.

75. General Russell. And you knew then that this man, Rohl, was the dominant character in that operation?

Colonel Gesler. That was my impression; yes, sir.
76. General Russell. Now, I believe you say that your responsibility in connection with the execution of contracts, of which this is a type, was to check largely for form.

Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.

77. General Russell. The substance of the contract, including the negotiations and the compliance with the specifications, and things of that type, was the function of some other division or section of the Chief of Engineers' Office?

Colonel Gesler. Well, in a very general way, I checked the terms of the contract, what the Government was getting out of it, but I had legal assistants to take care of the details.

78. General Russell. It came to you as a completed, executed contract?

Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.

79. General Russell. And before it became effective and binding on the Government, it had to have your approval?

Colonel Gesler. Well, the approval of the Chief of Engineers; and he approved it, on my recommendation, as a rule.

80. General Russell. Do you know where this contract is signed, on behalf of the Hawaiian Constructors?

81. Major Clausen. That is four pages from the last.

82. General Frank. "Paul Grafe."

83. General Russell. It was signed by a man named Grafe?

Colonel Gesler. Just one individual.


Colonel Gesler. Well, it is not exceptional to have one individual authorized to sign for two or three companies. That can be arranged, and, I believe, it must have been arranged in that case.

85. General Russell. Did you consider it as extraordinary that Hawaiian Constructors would appear, and then one of the group, to-wit, the W. E. Callahan Construction Co., and that the other two of the group, to-wit, Gunther & Shirley Co., and the Rohl-Connolly Co., and Ralph E. Woolley, three of them, were left off of this execution, or were left off of the part of the contract in which the execution occurs?

Colonel Gesler. I don't quite understand. You mean the question about its being complete?

86. General Russell. In the recitation at the beginning of the contract it is "Hawaiian Constructors," and these other people are given under there as constituting the Hawaiian Constructors.

Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.

87. General Russell. I am just wondering now if in checking the form of this contract you concluded that the Hawaiian [946] Constructors had any legal existence, at all.

Colonel Gesler. Well, we determined that, before it was signed, I am sure.

88. General Russell. Apparently, if "Hawaiian Constructors" was neither a partnership nor a corporation nor an individual, the Government was signing a contract with some non-existent something.

Colonel Gesler. It is a co-adventure, and we have handled those.

89. General Russell. You know what it takes to constitute a valid contract, do you not?
Colonel Gesler. I think so.
90. General Russell. The Contractor is the Hawaiian Constructors. They consist of Callahan—there is your legal entity?
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.
91. General Russell. Gunther & Shirley Co. is a legal entity; Rohl-Connolly Co. is a legal entity, and Ralph E. Woolley is an individual. Now, when the contract is executed, it is executed in the name of the Hawaiian Constructors. Immediately under that is one of the entities comprising that, the Callahan Construction Company, as a contractor, signed by Paul Grafe; but it occurs to me as rather peculiar that the contract should not have been executed in the name of the people who were parties to it. I am asking these questions without being thoroughly cognizant of all of the terms of the contract, just drawing the conclusion from those things that I have seen on the contract.
Colonel Gesler. I know that practice has been followed, and the principal purpose is to avoid delay in getting many signatures on one instrument; and it is arranged by some separate paper which gives this individual authority to sign for each of them.
92. General Russell. Now, I take the position, or I am asking you if it is true, that the Rohl-Connolly Company is not bound by that contract as it was executed there on the 21st day of December, 1940.
Colonel Gesler. Well, that is a legal opinion, General. I am not a lawyer, but in my opinion, however, I think it is all right.
93. General Russell. Didn't you have some lawyers on your staff?
Colonel Gesler. Oh, yes. They checked it.
94. General Russell. And approved it as to form?
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.
95. General Russell. Do you happen to know whether the power of attorney for this man Grafe to sign for whomever he did sign for, is in this file?
Colonel Gesler. It must be somewhere, the General Accounting Office or anywhere else.
96. General Russell. Now, Colonel, did you know the Callahan Construction Company?
Colonel Gesler. Only by name, sir.
97. General Russell. You knew nothing of their responsibility or reputation as operators?
Colonel Gesler. Well, except in a general way; I knew they had been large contractors on the West Coast.
98. General Russell. Similarly with the Gunther-Shirley Company?
Colonel Gesler. Which one, sir?
Colonel Gesler. I don't know that name, really.
100. General Russell. Or Ralph E. Woolly; do you know anything about him?
Colonel Gesler. No, sir.
101. General Russell. In this entire group of the Hawaiian Constructors the one firm or corporation which stood out as operators on its reputation in the Office of the Chief of Engineers was the Rohl-Connolly Company; is that true?
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.
102. General Russell. And the dominant factor in the Rohl-Connolly Company was a man named Rohl; did you know that then?

Colonel Gesler. I cannot say I knew that much in detail.

103. General Russell. Yes. Now, Colonel, did Rohl come to Washington when this contract was made?

Colonel Gesler. I understand he did.

104. General Russell. Did you see him?

Colonel Gesler. No, sir.

105. General Russell. Have you ever seen him?

Colonel Gesler. Not to my knowledge.

106. General Russell. In answer to a question by General Frank a little while ago, you stated that you knew that it was contrary to law to grant or to give to a nonresident alien work on a defense project.

Colonel Gesler. That is not exactly what I said, General.

107. General Russell. Well, what did you say?

Colonel Gesler. I said that there was nothing in the law which prevented awarding a contract to a domestic corporation some of whose officers may be alien.

108. General Russell. Yes. Well, now I will ask you the other question: Did you know that it was contrary to law to give to [950] an individual who was a nonresident alien a contract to do defensive work, work on defensive projects?

Colonel Gesler. I believe that is true, yes, sir.

109. General Russell. I am asking you what you knew about it at the time of the execution of this contract on December 20, 1940.

Colonel Gesler. I am trying to express it as what I knew in 1940. I think that is what I knew then.

110. General Russell. All right. You knew two things then: that you could not give the sort of work that was going to be done under this contract to a nonresident, or to an alien; you knew that?

Colonel Gesler. As a contractor.

111. General Russell. As a contractor. But you knew that you could give it to a corporation in which he was an not officer but was a stockholder?

Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir. We do that all the time.

112. General Russell. You have contracts that you grant to corporations with alien stockholders?

Colonel Gesler. We never question stockholders in corporations.

113. General Russell. Did it occur to you as peculiar that Rohl was no longer an officer in the Rohl-Connolly Company when you gave this contract?

Colonel Gesler. I do not believe I knew that at the time, sir.

114. General Russell. Well, did you know Rohl was an alien then?

Colonel Gesler. No, sir.

[957] 115. General Russell. When did you first——

Colonel Gesler. That question never came up. I don’t remember now that I had any knowledge of it, that it meant anything at the time.

116. General Russell. Now, just as a matter of policy down in the Engineers Office, would it make any difference in granting to a corporation a contract if you knew that the president of that corporation and the dominant figure in that corporation was an alien?
Colonel Gesler. It probably would now. In 1940 that question was never raised.

117. General Russell. I want to get clear on this, Colonel. In 1940, had it been known that Mr. Rohl was continuing as president of the Rohl-Connolly Company, the dominant factor, the principal operator in that corporation, seeking to get a contract to do defensive work in Hawaii, you would have granted it to the corporation?

Colonel Gesler. I believe we would at that time. Not only that, but you remember that all contractors at that time were cleared by two War Department boards here, the Construction Advisory Committee in the Office of Quartermaster General at that time, and another board; I have forgotten the exact title of it. I know Mr. Harrison is a member of it. General Harrison.

118. General Russell. Now, isn't it true that General Knudsen was clearing those contracts then?

Colonel Gesler. He probably was too. There was a time when he was doing it.

[952] 119. General Russell. I want to go back to the execution of this contract for a minute, Colonel. Were you present when it was signed?

Colonel Gesler. By General Schley, you mean?

120. General Russell. No. When it was signed by this man Grafe.

Colonel Gesler. I don't remember; no reason why I should have been present.

121. General Russell. I want your opinion on the form of the execution. It occurs to me on a second reading that the name of W. E. Callahan Construction Company was written and then stricken from the contract (handing document to witness). Does it appear that way to you?

Colonel Gesler. It looks like that on the photostat. You would have to see the original to see what that really was, I believe, sir.

122. General Russell. If that is true, what occurred was that this term "Hawaiian Constructors" was written on the typewriter; thereunder was written, "W. E. Callahan Construction Company," which appears on the second line in describing the contractors, and then that was written out.

Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.

123. General Russell. For some reason. So it left only the Hawaiian Constructors there. Now, you believe that this letter here originated as the result of a request from the field?

Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir. And I think it was a written request, although I am also under the impression I had a telephone call from the West Coast.

124. General Russell. Do you think it came from—was he [953] Colonel Hannum at that time?

Colonel Gesler. Yes.

125. General Russell. From Colonel Hannum or from Colonel Wyman?

Colonel Gesler. I believe Wyman was in Hawaii at the time. I believe it must have been Colonel Hannum.

126. General Russell. Colonel Hannum. Do you remember whether about this time this man Martin, who was an attorney for the Rohl interests, was in Washington?
Colonel Gesler. I have heard he was, but I don't remember Mr. Martin at all.

127. General Russell. He did not come into your section about that time?

Colonel Gesler. Not that I remember, no, sir.

128. General Russell. You could not state definitely whether this letter of request for hastening Rohl's citizenship papers was brought into your office or into the Office of the Chief of Engineers by this man Martin?

Colonel Gesler. I do not know. I do not believe it could have been, though.

129. General Russell. You think it reached you through the mail?

Colonel Gesler. As I remember, it was the regular mail.

130. General Russell. Reached you through the mail?

Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.

131. General Russell. We are interested in this man who did the operating in your branch in connection with promoting this citizenship application. His name was Stilphen?

[954] Colonel Gesler. Stilphen, S-t-i-l-p-h-e-n. He was acting under my instructions. He was not promoting it, I wouldn’t say, sir.

132. General Russell. He did the actual work in connection with it?

Colonel Gesler. Yes.

133. General Russell. And, you think, rang up these people, or a Mr. Schofield who had to do with them?

Colonel Gesler. Yes.

134. General Russell. Now, Colonel, after all is said and done, did it occur to you as being a matter which deserved the most serious consideration by the Chief of Engineers, having a man who had been in this country for a number of years, to promote his application for citizenship in order that he might go into work which was very important from the defensive standpoint?

Colonel Gesler. My impression there, sir, is that this was his third and last paper. He had been in the country some time; he had done some very fine contracting work; he could help us in the present contract by his presence in Hawaii, and his citizenship was being held up only on a technicality that should be cleared promptly so that he could be put to work.

135. General Russell. With the risk of repetition in the record, I want to propound the question which General Grunert asked you a little while ago: There was a definite impression, then, in the Office of the Chief of Engineers that the work out there in Hawaii was lagging and needed attention?

Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir. I cannot say that from any recorded progress, but we were attempting to help any [955] contractor, any District Engineer, in those days, who needed help and asked for it.

136. General Russell. I think you ran around me a little bit, Colonel. I am asking not about your general policy of helping the engineer in the field. I am asking about this specific case. Was there such lagging or such delay out there that you felt called upon to sign this letter upon a telephone conversation, making the German available to go out there? Didn’t that indicate that there was pretty bad lagging in Hawaii?
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir; that is what it indicates, and that must have been the story. I don't recall definitely what the story was, but it must have been that there was need for expedition.

137. General Russell. And it indicates that the Hawaiian Constructors needed very badly the driving power of this German, Rohl? Colonel Gesler. That is right.

138. General Russell. I believe that is all.

139. General Grunert. Are there any other questions?

140. General Frank. Just a minute. Did you ever serve on the Pacific Coast with the Engineers?

Colonel Gesler. No, sir. I visited the Pacific Coast but never served there.

141. General Frank. You did not know Rohl?

Colonel Gesler. No, sir.

142. General Frank. With respect to this Paul Grafe signing the contract, some one individual had to be designated to sign the contract?

Colonel Gesler. That is true, unless all of them signed.

143. General Frank. Yes. And normally it would be a man who was interested in the firms constituting the Hawaiian Constructors?

Colonel Gesler. Well, not only that one line; it would have to be interested in all of them, the Hawaiian Constructors as a separate group, yes.

144. General Frank. Yes, but the point I am trying to make is, if he didn't belong to the Callahan firm he would have belonged to some other firm?

Colonel Gesler. He would have belonged to one of those firms listed, yes.

145. General Frank. What is Stilphen's first name and present address?

Colonel Gesler. It is Benjamin L. Stilphen. I do not know his present address. The last I heard he was in New York.

146. General Russell. Colonel, there have just been called to my attention certain changes in this contract of December 20, 1940, where the initials P. G. and T. W. appear. A hasty survey indicates that that is true in some five places here on two pages. Was it possible for this contract to be amended in the field by the District Engineer T. W.?

Colonel Gesler. The minor amendments could have been made before it was finally filed.

147. General Russell. I do not get what you mean, "before it was finally filed."

Colonel Gesler. Before it was finally filed with the General Accounting Office.

148. General Russell. Now, this became a binding contract upon the Government and the Hawaiian Constructors on the date of its execution?

Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.

149. General Russell. Thereafter Wyman representing the Government, and the proper party representing the Hawaiian Constructors, could amend this contract without reference to Washington?
Colonel Gesler. I didn't mean that, sir. Those amendments, initials were made undoubtedly before they were sent in to the Chief's office for distribution.

130. General Russell. Before the execution?
Colonel Gesler. Before distribution. Our procedure then was to have the main contract signed, and if there were only minor amendments the Chief of Engineers would approve it, but in our instructions to the field we would point out that minor irregularities should be corrected. Those irregularities are corrected and initialed, and all the copies required in Washington were processed through the Office of the Chief of Engineers. We sent the one on to the General Accounting Office. Those initials should have been added, of course, before the original signature, but it could have been done the other way too.

131. General Russell. Where was this contract prepared?
Colonel Gesler. I understand it was prepared in Washington, sir.

132. General Russell. In Washington?
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.

133. General Russell. So as a matter of fact wasn't there quite a group of people who came into Washington about the 1953 time that this contract was made, in connection with promoting the interests of the Hawaiian Constructors and giving the contract?
Colonel Gesler. I believe there was, yes, sir.

(Excerpts from construction contract were read as follows:)

134. General Russell. Here is the first one. I will read it merely as an example:

Rent actually paid by the contractor at rates not to exceed those approved by the contracting office.

Now, that is the changed contract?
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.

135. General Russell. I am merely exploring the contract on the spot, as it were.

Now, the language which has been stricken was, mentioned in the schedule of rental rates to Appendix B hereto attached and made a part hereof, except as hereinafter set forth.

Now, to get just what Wyman was doing to this contract possibly we had better read the unamended contract and then read the amendment and see the difference. The unamended contract, prior to the time that Wyman initialed it, was in this language:

Rent actually paid by the contractor at rates not to exceed those mentioned in the schedule of rental rates in Appendix B hereto attached and made a part hereof, except as hereinafter set forth.

Now, as amended it reads this way:

Rental actually paid by the contractor at rates not to exceed those approved by the contracting officer.

Now, isn't the effect of that amendment to abolish the rates established in the appendix, as qualified, and make Wyman the contracting officer, the judge as to what rates would be paid?
Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.

136. General Russell. In other words, Wyman amended the contract so he could change the price of rentals at least?
Colonel Gesler. Well, he amended the contract by the authority of the Chief of Engineers, though, sir.
157. General Russell. Where would that authority be?
Colonel Gesler. The signature of the Chief of Engineers on approval indicates that it has been approved.
158. General Russell. Where is that old contract?
159. General Frank. The changes in the contract put power in Wyman to determine rates and compensation of the contractor, didn’t they?
Colonel Gesler. To put what is that again, sir?
160. General Frank. Gave Wyman the power to determine rates and compensation to the contractor?
Colonel Gesler. That is right; yes, sir.
161. General Russell. Now, Colonel, to go back to what we were talking about, the approval by the Chief of Engineers of these changes, I am not sure that what you exhibited to me approved such changes as are initialled here. Will you go back and explain that to us, please, sir?
Colonel Gesler. The instrument as it stands, I believe, [960] is a proper legal document, and it shows approval by the Chief of Engineers of everything in there, these changes.
162. General Russell. Now, the Chief of Engineers could not approve a change before it was made, could he?
Colonel Gesler. Well, not exactly that, sir, but we indicate the changes which will be required before it will be accepted by the Office Chief of Engineers. This change is not necessarily one that Wyman himself wanted. What you read first there is the standard form of contract which they had in those days and applicable to work in this country. For some reason it was probably understood that that clause would not be practical for work in Hawaii, so that alternate phrase was inserted. Since the standard form was changed—I believe this is probably a mimeographed form that was changed—it required initial.
163. General Grunert. Why didn’t the Chief of Engineers initial the change? He signed the contract, didn’t he?
Colonel Gesler. Well, he only approves it; he doesn’t initial every change.
164. General Grunert. Only approves it?
Colonel Gesler. The Chief of Engineers only approves the entire contract. His name appears only once.
165. General Russell. Colonel, the thing we are attempting to get in the record, and I don’t think there should be any equivocation about it—I mean by that, I don’t think there should be confusion about it—it was possible and it did happen that this man Wyman took that contract, made changes in it, initialled it, and thereby made those changes effective as between him and the other contractors, between the Government [967] and the contracting parties, didn’t he?
Colonel Gesler. That is impossible without the knowledge of the Chief of Engineers, sir.
166. General Russell. How did the Chief of Engineers come to know that Wyman had made these changes in that contract?
Colonel Gesler. Our procedure provided either that this was fixed up before General Schley signed it or, if there were some very minor changes which were called for, to save sending papers back and forth to the field several times, by administrative direction in our endorsement to the field we indicated the changes which would be required,
and those changes were put in there and initialed by the parties in the field and returned to our office before we distributed it. That did not become a proper contract until it was ready for distribution to the General Accounting Office.

167. General Russell. Now, let us be careful. Is it your testimony now that before one of these changes was made, before any one of them was made by Wyman, that he had directions from the Chief of Engineers to make that change?

Colonel Gesler. Either directions or approval of the Chief of Engineers to make it.

168. General Russell. Is the approval or direction attached to this contract?

Colonel Gesler. It is indicated by the document itself, sir, because the Chief of Engineers has approved it.

169. General Russell. Where?

Colonel Gesler. Just the mere fact that the Chief of Engineers' signature is there, I believe, also covers everything that is above it.

[962] 170. General Russell. When was the Chief of Engineers' signature placed on that contract?

Colonel Gesler. December 28, I believe it is, 1940.

171. General Russell. December 28. The contract was signed December 20th, 21st. Now, had that contract gone to the field and had these changes made with Wyman's initials and come back here and then approved by the Chief of Engineers?

Colonel Gesler. That is possible, unless it were made here in Washington, as I believe it was, in which case all those changes were prepared and initialed before it was submitted to General Schley.

172. General Russell. All right. Now, the final question that I want to ask you is this: Is it your evidence that Wyman was without authority to change and initial this contract and thereby make it effective as against the Government?

Colonel Gesler. That is true; he is without authority on his own responsibility.

173. General Russell. And each specific change has been approved by the Chief of Engineers?

Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir.

174. General Russell. Do you regard the approval of the contract on the 28th day of December, 1940, by the Chief of Engineers as that approval?

Colonel Gesler. Yes, sir; approval of everything in the contract.

175. General Russell. Changes made thereafter, what would be their status?

Colonel Gesler. Unless he had been directed to make changes by the Chief of Engineers before returning the contract [963] for final distribution, no such change could be made. It would have required a change order or supplemental agreement.

176. General Russell. Would there be in the files of the Engineers this correspondence granting to Wyman authority to make changes in the contract?

Colonel Gesler. If that was what was required, there would be. I suspect that the contract was negotiated in Washington and all those changes were inserted before it was submitted for approval.

177. General Russell. Was Wyman here?
Colonel Gesler. I understand he was.

178. General Russell. Why were Wyman's initials put on there if the Chief of Engineers was going to approve the changed contract?

Colonel Gesler. Because Colonel Wyman was the contracting officer. Both the contracting officer and the contractor have to initial all changes.

179. General Grunert. It shows here that on behalf of the United States of America Theodore Wyman signed the contract and Paul Grafe signed the contract. Then it was approved by the Chief of Engineers. So Wyman represented the United States in making the contract. I didn't know that.

180. General Russell. I knew that and was not surprised about it, but what I was interested in was whether or not after he got into the field he could continue to contract with these people without reference to the Chief of Engineers Office.

181. General Grunert. I presume that the changes made here and initialed by the two contracting parties, Wyman and Grafe, were made prior to the approval of the Chief of Engineers?

[964] Colonel Gesler. That is right.

182. General Grunert. That is the assumption?

Colonel Gesler. That is right.

183. General Grunert. If any changes were made after that approval, unless the Chief of Engineers authorized such changes to be made, in a document so stating, it would not have been according to Hoyle; is that right?

Colonel Gesler. That is correct.

184. General Frank. As a matter of fact, we have testimony from witnesses from the Office of Chief of Engineers that Wyman was in here when the contract was signed.

185. General Russell. Yes; the Colonel said he was.

186. General Frank. Furthermore, I think that we shall find that there were 53 supplements to this contract, 53 supplemental agreements.

187. General Grunert. This is just the basic contract.

188. General Russell. You wanted to know where and when those changes were made.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[965] TESTIMONY OF COLONEL EUGENE B. WALKER, COAST ARTILLERY CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The witness was sworn by the recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Colonel Walker. Eugene B. Walker; Colonel, Coast Artillery Corps; at present on duty with Army Ground Forces, as Editor of the Coast Artillery Journal.

2. General Grunert. Colonel, the Board is endeavoring to get at facts, both as to the background and what led up to the Pearl Harbor attack; in fact, about the attack itself. Because of your assignment in Hawaii it has called you as a witness with the hope that you can throw some light on the subject. Just what was your assignment in Hawaii during 1941?
Colonel Walker. I was commanding officer of the harbor defenses at Pearl Harbor.


Colonel Walker. It included Fort Barrett, Fort Weaver, and Fort Kamehameha, with outlying observation posts around the entire perimeter of the Island, with the exception of one end on the north coast which had not been fully developed. That is it, in general.

4. General Grunert. During what period was this; what dates?

Colonel Walker. From the date I arrived there, which was in October, until I left in April, 1942.

5. General Grunert. Who was your immediate superior?


6. General Grunert. Who was your immediate superior just prior to Pearl Harbor? Or is he still your immediate superior?

Colonel Walker. No, sir; he had departed just shortly before that; and at that time, General Burgin. I have forgotten his first name.

7. General Grunert. What was his position?

Colonel Walker. At that time he was commanding officer of the Coast Artillery Brigade and operating directly under the Department.

8. General Grunert. Then you, as commanding officer of the harbor defenses, were directly under General Burgin?

Colonel Walker. Yes, sir.

9. General Frank. How do you spell that name?

Colonel Walker. I think it is B-e-r-g-u-n.

10. General Grunert. It is B-u-r-g-i-n.

What light can you throw on the state of the defenses of your command about the latter part of November or early in December in the line of preparedness to defend your command from outside aggression, just generally speaking? I will develop the subject a little more later on.

Colonel Walker. As far as training was concerned, I would say they were excellent and superior; that is, in the tactical and technical training with their weapons as coast artillerymen.

11. General Grunert. Did that include antiaircraft weapons?

Colonel Walker. I do not remember the inclusive dates, but for a while we had dual assignments in certain of the batteries. The battery at Fort Barrett and Fort Weaver had 12-inch barbette guns and had dual assignments. We were very short of personnel. In case of a major air threat we were to drop the sea coast batteries and run to the antiaircraft batteries and man those. If the sea coast threat was the major threat we would drop the antiaircraft and man the sea coast batteries. However, the antiaircraft defense was taken out from under the coast defense and operated under its own personnel.

12. General Grunert. Then you no longer had command of it from approximately what time in 1941, prior to or after November 27?

Colonel Walker. I would say it was prior to November 27 that the antiaircraft command was turned over. I do not recall the date.

13. General Grunert. Then you no longer had that dual mission?

Colonel Walker. I did not.

14. General Grunert. Then you cannot give me any information as to the preparedness of the antiaircraft batteries themselves?
Colonel Walker. I was only indirectly concerned with observing them as they were on my own post.

15. General Grunert. Under you, you had various posts and post commanders; is that right?

Colonel Walker. They were not posts in the full sense of the word; that is, they did not have the staff that we normally expect on a post, of Adjutant General, Quartermaster, and so on. They were sub-posts under me as artillery commands only. For instance, at Fort Barrett they had a six-inch gun battery. Commanding there was the senior officer present. He had no administrative duties other than those devolving on a commander. We supplied ammunition, and so on. The same as Fort Weaver.

16. General Grunert. In addition to your duties as harbor defense commander, you were a post commander also?

Colonel Walker. I was.

17. General Grunert. Of which post?

Colonel Walker. Fort Kamehameha.

18. General Grunert. Can you tell me now about the posts in general under your supervision, and particularly about Fort Kamehameha, as to its state of preparedness to defend itself from the air and the ground, and what measures were taken to assure that defense?

Colonel Walker. The only protection we had against air attack was the antiaircraft batteries which were located on our post, and the .50-caliber machine guns which were manned by one of the batteries. At that time we only had, as I remember five .50-caliber machine guns available.

19. General Grunert. Was that for the entire harbor defenses or for your particular post?

Colonel Walker. For the entire harbor defense. We were very short.

20. General Grunert. Had you received any Department instruction—and by that I mean Hawaiian Department instruction—as to the measures you should take in preparation for defense, or was that left to you to take such measures as you saw fit?

Colonel Walker. That was left to me. I recall no order at that time giving any requirement or direction about preparation for defense against air attack.

21. General Grunert. After the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7th did you receive such instructions; and, if so, what, generally, did they cover?

Colonel Walker. What instructions I received would have come down through the Coast Artillery brigade; and I recall no specific instructions, but merely general instructions to guard our own installations and to prepare ourselves to resist, with the batteries we had, against air attack.

22. General Grunert. Had you, prior to December 7 or thereafter, constructed or provided for air raid shelters for the protection of personnel, or slit trenches or any other measures, including the evacuation of personnel, in the line of protective measures?

Colonel Walker. I cannot remember the date when we dug trenches. I feel sure that no trenches were dug prior to December 7. That was done after December 7.
23. General Grunert. Then you did not consider it necessary in your own command to take particular steps in the protection of your command and the noncombatants in your command; or did you?

Colonel Walker. We had made plans for taking care of the noncombatants on the post itself. There had been no plans either by other commands or our own for evacuating, although I understood that plans had been discussed of making some central camp to take care of them. But nothing had been done. Our plans were to take all the noncombatants, in case of a surprise, and put them in a mortar battery, which was the only protection we had at Fort Kam, or evacuate them into the interior parts of the Island.

24. General Grunert. How was that plan carried out during the attack? First, tell me this: Were you attacked?

Colonel Walker. Well, I will modify what I have to say on that. I was not actually on the post during the air attack; I was up in the Waianae Range, in the Waianae pocket, so that what I can state with regard to the attack is what I observed when I returned to the post.

The fort itself had not been attacked. There had been some minor damage done. One bomb had hit in the road, a small bomb, and made a hole probably four inches deep and a foot and a half across. Another one had hit the eaves of my quarters but had done no damage. It was hard to find even where the fragments had gone. Otherwise, I do not think any of the damage that occurred was due to hostile action. There was damage in one of the barracks and in one of the sets of quarters, but I think that was due to antiaircraft fire by naval personnel.

25. General Frank. Were your quarters the only quarters on the post that were hit?

Colonel Walker. Yes; and that was a small bomb that hit the eaves and burst right in the patio. There was no mark. One of the fragments went into the kitchen and lodged in the ice box. That was the only one I could find.

26. General Grunert. So far as you were concerned, was this attack on December 7 a surprise to you?

Colonel Walker. Yes, in the fact that it occurred just as it did. I will go back and say this, that we had discussed the thing in the family in a sort of joking way, but, at the same time, with a little seriousness behind it, in June. The Honolulu paper had a weather report, and even back as far as June there was a remark in the paper—we cut it out—I have it at home—to the effect that "We hope if the Japanese ever attack they will attack some day other than Wednesday or week-ends." And at home we said we agreed with that thoroughly. We agreed that if an attack came it should come on a Sunday. Of course, we did not select the Sunday for that. But the attack itself, of course, was a big surprise to everybody, because we could not believe that our sources of information were so meager that we would not have knowledge of the approach of any hostile fleet.

27. General Grunert. What information did you have and what sources of information could you expect information from?

Colonel Walker. The only sources we had were through official channels, and none was forthcoming as regards that attack until the attack was delivered.
28. General GRUNERT. Did General Burgin ever discuss the possibility or probability of an attack, or did he transmit or inform you of any warning or information that had been received in late November or early December?

Colonel WALKER. I was present at a conference in which it was stated that the situation was serious and that we would go on alert, as I remember, No. 3, which was merely a sabotage alert in which we were to protect our installations within the Island.

29. General GRUNERT. Are you sure it was No. 3 or might it have been No. 1?

Colonel WALKER. I think at one time it was No. 1, and then later on it was changed to No. 3; but whatever the number was, it was a sabotage alert against internal sabotage and not against external violence.

30. General GRUNERT. In view of the information you had, were you surprised that they should go on just a sabotage alert and not on one of greater gravity?

Colonel WALKER. Yes; I was; but I thought that the situation was justified from the fact that sources of information must have been open to the Navy, with its surface and sub-surface ships, and to the War and State Departments. I presumed it was information which made the situation secure so far as we were concerned. So that none of us expected the attack when it came.

31. General GRUNERT. Did you know that in such a situation, in view of the lack of information, or no information, the defense command should be prepared to meet the gravest emergency?

Colonel WALKER. That I presume is theoretical and ideal.

32. General GRUNERT. Thank you very much for coming down, Colonel.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
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THURSDAY, AUGUST 17, 1944

MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.

The Board at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.


Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General GRUNERT. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF LT. COL. H. E. BROOKS, REPLACEMENT SCHOOL COMMAND, BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?


2. General GRUNERT. Colonel, the Board is after facts relating to the background and viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. Because of your assignment in [975] Hawaii we thought that you might have information or leads that would assist the Board in its mission.

Tell us, first, what your assignment was in Hawaii in 1941.

Colonel Brooks. In 1941 I was Battery Commander, Battery A, 15th Field Artillery Battalion, in the 24th Division, the streamlined division.

3. General GRUNERT. Stationed where?

Colonel Brooks. Schofield Barracks.

4. General GRUNERT. Between what dates were you at Schofield Barracks?

Colonel Brooks. From July—I do not remember the exact date in July, but somewhere around the middle of July 1941—until the war broke out; and although Schofield Barracks was my station, from that time on I was actually out in the woods until about the 18th of August, 1942.
5. General Grunert. Then you were present during the attack on December 7, 1941?
   Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir.
6. General Grunert. You were actually at Schofield Barracks?
   Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir.
7. General Grunert. Can you tell the Board the feeling among the junior officers as to the imminence of war in the latter part of November or early December? What was the impression among the junior officers?
   Colonel Brooks. I do not think they realized that the war was about to happen, sir. That is, not the fact; that is the impression.
8. General Grunert. What did you have to base such an opinion upon?
   Colonel Brooks. The fact that they did not talk about it very much. If there was an impression that there would be a war, I believe, sir, it would be this way, that they felt that a war was coming on, but they did not know how soon, and I do not believe any of us felt that Hawaii would be hit at that time.
9. General Grunert. What was the particular assignment of your battery in the defense of Schofield or in the defense of the Island of Oahu?
   Colonel Brooks. We had the mission of going north, back from the north shore, and we had a battery position selected and we were to stay in that position and to fire upon the beaches and a short distance out to sea.
10. General Grunert. What was the armament of your battalion?
   Colonel Brooks. At that time we had British 75 guns. Four of those were to be separated from my battery and assigned to the infantry for direct fire, and four were to be retained by my battery and were to be used in ordinary field artillery missions back 3,000 yards, approximately, from the shore, so as to protect the landing beaches.
11. General Grunert. Tell me what you know of the classes of alerts that were in effect at the time.
   Colonel Brooks. The alert that was in effect at the time—I do not know the exact number of it, but it was an alert to prevent sabotage, and it entailed having guards around cable stations, around planes at the airfields, and around installations around the post and about the post that might be military objectives.
   To go further on that, I believe it was 50 percent of the officers that had to be on the post at all times. However, we were all on the post and all our guns and ammunition, and so forth, were on the post.
12. General Grunert. What provisions had been made or what instructions existed as to the actual defense and protection of Schofield Barracks itself?
   Colonel Brooks. That I am not positive of, sir, because I was not detailed on that. My mission was to go into the field, away from Schofield Barracks, and protect the short.
13. General Grunert. Were you married and did you have a family?
   Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir.
14. General Grunert. Where were they?
Colonel Brooks. They were at Schofield Barracks with me.
15. General Grunert. Did they know what to do in case of attack?
Colonel Brooks. My wife knew she had to go to the hospital and
have a baby right away.
16. General Grunert. I mean, for her own protection against bombing or an attack on the post.
Colonel Brooks. No, sir; there was no provision.
17. General Grunert. Did they have any air raid shelters?
Colonel Brooks. No, sir.
18. General Grunert. Any slit trenches?
Colonel Brooks. No, sir.
19. General Grunert. Any scheme to go to the hills in a hurry?
Colonel Brooks. They may have had that scheme worked out, sir.
I did not know about it. They probably did.
[978] 20. General Grunert. If anything broke and you left to
go to your position, your family would not have known exactly what
to do?
Colonel Brooks. Well, sir, they had the plan worked out, evidently,
because they took care of that when it happened. I went out into the
field, but there were officers detailed to take care of the families, and
they took them and put them in concrete buildings, on the ground
floor.
21. General Grunert. That had been worked out beforehand?
Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir. However, I had no knowledge of it. It
was taken care of as soon as this happened.
22. General Grunert. It was taken care of, but the information was
evidently not given to the families to know just what to do when it
happened, without being told afterwards?
Colonel Brooks. That is right, sir.
23. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not any other pro-
tective measures were taken after December 7 that had not been taken
before?
Colonel Brooks. Many measures were taken afterwards away from
the post. First, they strung barbed wire, dug foxholes, dug gun em-
placements. That had not been done before. Some had been, but very
few; and the ones that were dug in could not be used, in many cases,
because they were in the wrong places.
24. General Grunert. You and your family had no fears of attack
at that time?
Colonel Brooks. Not on Hawaii; I can say that.
25. General Grunert. You mean, the Island of Oahu?
Colonel Brooks. We were too dumb to realize that they might hit
the Island, sir. I think there was a feeling that [979] war was
imminent, but not at Hawaii.
26. General Frank. I would like to go back to the answer that you
gave in which you stated or inferred that one reason you did not feel
that war was imminent was because there was no conversation about
it among the senior officers.
Colonel Brooks. No, sir; the junior officers.
27. General Frank. Did you hear any conversation among the senior
officers?
Colonel Brooks. Not about war in Hawaii, sir. We did talk about
war being imminent, yes, sir; but not about war being imminent in
Hawaii.
28. General Frank. You say "we talked about it." Whom do you mean?

Colonel Brooks. Junior officers, sir.

29. General Frank. What contact did you have with the senior officers? Did they advise you or analyze the situation for you in any way?

Colonel Brooks. No, sir, not more than you would get in casual conversation. We had our standing operating procedures, however, in case of war, so that we should know exactly what to do with our equipment and where we would go when we occupied the positions.

30. General Frank. There was no attempt on the part of the top control to develop or instill a war attitude?

Colonel Brooks. I believe you are correct, sir; I think you are very correct there.

31. General Frank. Did you know that the period in late November and early December was a very critical international period between the United States and Japan?

Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir.

32. General Frank. You realized that?

Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir; I did, because I read Time magazine.

33. General Frank. The junior group generally realized it?

Colonel Brooks. I believe so. Maybe I have not made myself clear, sir. I believe the junior group realized that war was imminent, because we of course read magazines. However, they did not believe in any case that Hawaii would be involved.

34. General Frank. Why did your conclusions lead you to believe that Hawaii would not be involved?

Colonel Brooks. The reason for that, sir, was that it just did not come up. We did not believe that the Japanese would come that far. Our idea was that the attack would be made in the Far East. We seemed too far away from Japan. We at that time had the idea that Japan was not much of a nation.

35. General Frank. Let us go back a moment. We had a pretty good-sized force in Hawaii, did we not?

Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir.

36. General Frank. All arms of the Ground Army, all components of the Air Force, and all components of the Fleet?

Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir.

General Frank. And you had a lot of plans for the defense of Oahu?

Colonel Brooks Yes, sir.

37. General Frank. Did you ever stop to think, in the presence of all that background, that there must have been some sort of an apprehension among the high command of an attack on the Island?

Colonel Brooks. It was not evident, sir, to the junior officers. If there was apprehension it was not made evident to us. As a matter of fact, it was just the other way. As you know, sir, someone said that the Air Corps could stop any Japs that were coming in, and also the Coast Artillery, I believe—No, it was the Air Corps and the Navy. That came out in the papers over there. I think that is the evidence which tended to make people too complacent, perhaps. It seems as if we were well set up and that no attack would be made on the Island of
Oahu. Perhaps we thought this, sir, that if war started, eventually they might hit Hawaii, but that did not seem to be the first focal point, and we did not believe it would be.

38. General Frank. There was nothing said or done to develop a war-mindedness in the command?

Colonel Brooks. That is right, sir.

39. General Frank. Do you think that would help?

Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir.

40. General Frank. In what way?

Colonel Brooks. Well, sir, we went ahead and did our work in the morning, the normal work, and that included regular drill, going out in near-by areas, and mock problems, and so forth; but there was no digging in, no warlike attitude in the division. In most cases the men were put on fatigue duties in the afternoon. We retained most of our non-coms. We had to give them schools of some sort. We did not have any working force; we had no one to work with, but we would give the non-coms some sort of gunnery schools. But there was no warlike attitude. It was just a peacetime attitude that we had all the time. In fact, because it was in the tropics we did very little work in the afternoon. It was just the opposite of a warlike attitude.

41. General Grunert. The actual things that went on in the military line would be like anything in the United States?

Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir.

42. General Frank. Did you have any blackouts?

Colonel Brooks. Not before the attack, sir, I do not believe—Yes, they did, sir. They had a few alerts and they had a few blackouts. Just for a short time they had some practice blackouts; I remember now.

43. General Frank. Do you remember when they were?

Colonel Brooks. No, sir, I do not, very well. I think they happened three or four times for a few hours each.

44. General Frank. However, you knew what to do in case of a blackout?

Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir; we all knew what to do. The families were told about it, too.

45. General Russell. Colonel, what was your grade?

Colonel Brooks. I was a permanent Captain, sir.

46. General Russell. Commanding this battery?

Colonel Brooks. Battery A of the 15th Battalion, Field Artillery. We had British 75s.

47. General Russell. The estimate that was placed on the part they would play in case of an invasion was rather a third-line defense?

Colonel Brooks. Apparently, from what the papers said that came out over there, the Air Corps would be our first-line, the Navy the second, and ground troops the third.

48. General Russell. You were getting all your military information of what was going to happen from the newspapers?

Colonel Brooks. We did get our broad picture from them; yes.

49. General Russell. The battalion commander, the regimental commander, and the high officers did not tell you that, did they?
Colonel Brooks. Sir, I went up to my battalion commander a few times and talked this over. I knew my battalion commander fairly well, and he seemed to have about the same information as I had.

50. General Russell. Were there any rumors among the junior officers on the battalion level or company level that the negotiations between the Japanese Ambassador and his representatives in Washington and our Government were rapidly deteriorating in late November or early December, 1941?

Colonel Brooks. I think there was probably some small talk on that, sir; just what we got from newspapers and things.

51. General Russell. But through military channels nothing was brought to your attention or to the attention of the other junior officers about these negotiations?

Colonel Brooks. No, sir.

52. General Russell. But the public effect of the negotiations between the two governments, and thereafter the possibility of war—none of that came from official sources at all?

Colonel Brooks. No, sir. The only thing that was done [984] there was that we were called in and told the classes of alerts and what to do in case of various types of alert. We were given those instructions thoroughly. Those were part of our standing operating procedure. We did have that down, but as to the talk, no, we did not get it.


Colonel Brooks. Oh, yes, sir; many of them.

54. General Russell. Colonel, you have testified that no information reached you from official sources indicating just what was going on in our relations with Japan, or nothing was done to inculcate into the minds of the junior officers the war spirit. You were very definite about that?

Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir.

55. General Russell. Did anything reach you from official sources which impressed on the junior officers the necessity for being very careful not to offend the Japanese population or do anything which might disclose to them that you thought war might be probable?

Colonel Brooks. The only thing that came up, sir, in regard to us and the Japanese, was that we were told to be very careful of any military information, to see that our family and ourself did not repeat any information we might happen to have, in the presence of the Japanese, as a number of the families had Japanese servants, and there were Japanese servants at the club; and we did have that down. That was the only thing that came up with us in our relations with the Japanese.

56. General Russell. But there were no instructions issued down, that told the junior officers to tread softly in their relations with the Japanese?

Colonel Brooks. No, sir.

57. General Russell. There was a feeling of security among the junior officers that any attack which the Japs might [986] attempt to launch against Oahu could be successfully met by the Air Forces of the Navy?
Colonel Brooks. I probably gave a little wrong impression, there. That's what the papers said. I don't believe that came up. I know that a few of the junior officers, at least, believed that we should have more field training and get our positions prepared. Now, I do not believe that was for the protection of Hawaii, though. I am a little confused, there. I think we did not feel that there would be an attack on Hawaii, but we felt we should have more war training and be going out into the fields more; but I believe we probably thought, if we had thought about it at all, that probably the Air Corps and the Navy would stop them, or at least give us sufficient time so that we would be ready for them.

58. General Russell. How far were your defensive gun positions from the barracks?

Colonel Brooks. Just about twenty miles, sir.

59. General Russell. You were motor-drawn at that time?

Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir. We had been issued a number of new GMC trucks. They had just been broken in. In addition, we had most of our old Dodges, so we were well taken care of as far as motor vehicles were concerned.

60. General Russell. How long did it take you after the attack on December 7 to get into position?

Colonel Brooks. We didn't leave the post until about 12 noon.

61. General Frank. Where, on that map, was your battery position?

Colonel Brooks. There (indicating) is Schofield Barracks. [987] This is the Ashley Station road. Up in here you can see Kawaiola Camp and Waimea Camp. My position was just opposite Waimea Camp, up in here; this being Schofield Barracks.

62. General Russell. Now, when you left Schofield Barracks at noon that day, how long did it take you to get into position and get ready to fire?

Colonel Brooks. To get really ready to fire, sir, it took me, I would say, about 4½ hours, for this reason: There was no road to my position. It had been selected just a few days before. I had taken my battery out to see the position, on foot, and I had surveyed the position in about two days before. I had gone out in the afternoon and taken my noncommissioned officers and surveyed the position in, so we knew that road, but there was no road to the position. I had to go ahead with my trucks, and just dig a road out as I went along; and so that is why it took me about 4½ hours before I was ready to fire. I had the first gun in position in about an hour and a half to two hours.

63. General Russell. Had you never been in a maneuver prior to December 7, in which your battery discharged its mission in connection with the defense of Oahu?

Colonel Brooks. We had gone out a number of times, sir, and occupied what was then our normal position, and assimilated fire missions. We couldn't fire at that time from those positions, because of safety regulations, but we did occupy positions. It just happened, in this case, that I had been given a new position just before that time. My old position was still there, and could have been occupied.

64. General Russell. How far was it from the new position? [988]

Colonel Brooks. The old position was about 3 miles from the new position, sir.
65. General Russell. Had this change in your position for the defensive mission been a part of a reworking of the entire defensive plan, or was the change applicable only to your battery?

Colonel Brooks. I think probably it was a change of position for the artillery of that division.

66. General Russell. Involving all elements of the artillery?

Colonel Brooks. Of the 24th Division. There were a few changes made, sir, but I believe that they had gone over that plan for the artillery, and so on; and the Battalion Commander and I went out on reconnaissance. We were told to find the best positions, so that's why I think it was part of a general artillery plan of the division. We went out and found this position in, just before Pearl Harbor, and I immediately went to work and orientated my men as to where it was and as to where all the installations would be, and went out and surveyed it right away—and very fortunately! because Pearl Harbor happened before we expected anything.

67. General Russell. How many times had you taken your battery into the old positions that you expected to occupy prior to this change in position?

Colonel Brooks. I imagine a half a dozen times, sir. They knew them thoroughly, and they could have functioned at night, right away, in the old position.

68. General Russell. You made some suggestion a moment ago, Colonel, that in your opinion other maneuvers, or more maneuvers, looking to the defense of Oahu, would have been beneficial to the organizations, there.

[989] Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir. Here is the reason for that: I was trying to bring out a point, sir. We did not expect Hawaii to be attacked, but we realized that war was imminent. We felt we needed more training so that we could properly conduct a war.

69. General Russell. Just what type of training, Colonel?

Colonel Brooks. War training, sir, to get out into the field. We were having plenty of gun drill and things around the barracks, but we didn't get into the field enough.

70. General Russell. You mean, for maneuvers involving the tactical employment of the artillery?

Colonel Brooks. Out in the field; yes.

71. General Russell. Now, you state, Colonel, that you were out in the woods with your battery, from December 7 until you were relieved from duty, as I understood your evidence.

Colonel Brooks. Well, sir, until I was relieved as a Battery Commander, sir. I was in this position, moved to one other position, and then I was put on a battalion staff; but I was in the woods all the time; yes, sir.

72. General Russell. The point I was attempting to develop is this—that after the attack of December 7, and until you left Hawaii, your division was out in defensive positions?

Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir; all the time.

73. General Russell. You remained out there all the time?

Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir.

74. General Russell. And that was for how long, after December 7?

Colonel Brooks. I left about the 18th, I believe it was, of August, sir, and it was still out there then.
75. General Russell. Now, Colonel, between the date of November 27 and December 7, if you can fix that time definitely; if not, we will say from the middle of November until the attack, was there any change at all in your operations?

Colonel Brooks. Just the alert, sir, that we were put on.

76. General Russell. And that was when? On or about the 27th?

Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir; on or about; some time around there. Now, these figures I gave you, about 50% of the officers staying on the Post, may have been wrong; it may have been that 90% had to stay on; but I knew that a certain percentage had to stay on the Post at all times, and that was part of our alert plan.

77. General Russell. To what extent did this sabotage alert affect or interfere with your normal training, such as it was at that time?

Colonel Brooks. It did not interfere at all, sir. We went right ahead with the training, and if we had to go off the Post that was all right, because we had our guns and everything with us.

78. General Russell. I think those are the only questions I have. That is all.

79. General Grunert. On this selection of a new position, was it normal to select new positions from time to time, in order that, in case the old positions might have been located by Japanese agents, the new positions would have been available, or were these new positions selected because they gave a better field of fire and gave you a better chance to carry out your mission?

Colonel Brooks. Well, sir, I think we would call this more or less a continuing process. Occasionally we would go out on trips with the Battalion Commander, or without him, and the Battalion Commander would go out by himself, and we would search the area for battery positions. We had to do that in many cases where we could not occupy the positions, because, as you know, many of them, much of the land was field—sugar cane and pineapple and things like that—and we couldn’t go through those areas. However, we could select battery positions that we might occupy in the future, and we did that; and it just happened that in the first field, on one of these trips, we found this very fine location for a battery position, the Battalion Commander and myself. We immediately made arrangements to use it, although I doubt that we would have been able to use it in peacetime, because they would not let us. That is why we could not build the road. We had to go through private property.

80. General Frank. From time to time, the crops would change, and you had to change your plans accordingly, is that correct?

Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir. Very fortunately, this position we selected, being a very fine one, did not depend upon the crops, sir. This was one of the few that it wouldn’t make any difference whether the cane was there or cut down.

81. General Grunert. I have one more question. I believe you stated, or you gave me the impression, that you got most of your information about the international situation and the imminence of war from the papers.

Colonel Brooks. And magazines; yes, sir.

82. General Grunert. It was stated that in one of the Hawaiian papers, on November 30, there appeared a big headline to the effect that there might be an attack on Hawaii within the next week;
which is practically what happened. Do you happen to recall that scare headline?

Colonel Brooks. I don’t recall that one, sir, but I realized that things like that had been said. I don’t believe any of us realized how true that was.

83. General Frank. Did you know how naval operations fitted into the defense picture?

Colonel Brooks. No, sir; just in a very general way. No, sir; I didn’t know that.

84. General Frank. Was there some understanding or belief with respect to that?

Colonel Brooks. I understand only, sir, that the Navy made their patrols, and they had one third of their force at sea at all times. I did know, because I talked to some naval officers.

85. General Frank. Was there some understanding or belief among the rank and file of the officers, that the naval patrols were sufficiently effective, that you could expect a warning of an impending attack?

Colonel Brooks. No, sir; I didn’t ever believe that, sir.

86. General Frank. Did you think you would get some sort of warning before an attack came?

Colonel Brooks. I will say I would think that there would be a good chance of that, but not definite; no, sir.

87. General Frank. I am trying to analyze a little bit this statement that you made in which you said that you just didn’t ever think that there would be an attack on Oahu.

Colonel Brooks. An original attack; that’s right sir. [993] We thought if there was an attack it would be made somewhere else, first, and might develop to Hawaii. We did not realize the initial attack. In other words, we felt we had plenty of time to prepare the ground defenses, if we thought much about it, at all, but because of the fact the attack would be made somewhere else, first: That was perhaps the prevailing thought, there; and, as I say, that is just an impression. I may be wrong, but I think that is the way most of them thought.

88. General Frank. For the air defense, was your aviation operating? They had to have some sort of warning?

Colonel Brooks. We knew of their patrol, sir. We saw these PBYs flying around on their regular patrol, and we knew that they made these dawn patrols all the time.

89. General Frank. Did you see those? You felt that they were going out almost daily?

Colonel Brooks. Yes, sir. Yes, sir. We had been told they were. That is, not officially, but I had been told. I talked to the aviators. We all swam at the same pool, and so forth, and they talked about their dawn patrols, these PBYs, and how they went around there. In fact, the lieutenants were very sure that nothing could happen, because they had their PBYs out there.

90. General Grunert. What was the feeling about Sundays? Was that an off day for everybody?

Colonel Brooks. We didn’t work. We would play tennis and various other things. Yes, sir; it was.

91. General Grunert. Did you see any PBYs making reconnaissances on Sunday?
Colonel Brooks. I saw planes flying, many a Sunday; yes, sir.

92. General Grunert. Did you see any flying, that Sunday, December 7?

Colonel Brooks. Not before that time. The first plane—well, I wasn’t out, sir; I wouldn’t know. I didn’t come out until I heard some explosions and looked out; and they were Jap planes that I saw.

93. General Grunert. Are there any other questions? There appear to be none. Thank you very much for coming up and giving us what you know about that picture.

We will meet again in about ten minutes, when the next witness comes.

(Brief recess.)

STATEMENT OF SERGEANT GEORGE E. ELLIOTT, HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, STATION COMPLEMENT; CAMP LEE, VA.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Sergeant, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.


2. General Grunert. Sergeant, this Board is attempting to get at the facts, both as to what happened before and as to what led up to Pearl Harbor. Through a study of the congressional hearings on a resolution which indirectly brought this Board into being, we found, there, a reference to your name and your assignment in Hawaii at the time, and we understood from that reference that you, at the time, were connected with the Air Warning Service, and probably were with Sergeant Lockard at the radar station known as Opana.

Sergeant Elliott. That is right, sir.

3. General Grunert. So we asked you to come up here to tell us about that, and to answer our questions concerning it.

Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.

4. General Grunert. General Frank will ask you some questions, and we hope to get at some facts through those questions.

Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir. Sir, I would like to make one correction. Sergeant Lockard was not a Sergeant at the time. He was a private.

5. General Grunert. He was a private, at the time?

Sergeant Elliott. At the time of Pearl Harbor; yes, sir.

6. General Grunert. All right.

7. General Frank. Sergeant, what was your rank, on the morning of December 7, 1941?

Sergeant Elliott. I was a private, sir.

8. General Frank. To what organization did you belong?


9. General Frank. What were your duties on that morning?

Sergeant Elliott. That particular morning, we had a problem, and my duties were to plot the approach of targets that we picked up on
our detector—to plot them and send them in to our information center.

10. General Frank. Let us be a little more specific as to what your duties were. Did you operate the machine called the oscilloscope?

Sergeant Elliott. No, sir; I did not.

11. General Frank. You were the plotter?

Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.

12. General Frank. From whom did you get your information, to make your plots?

Sergeant Elliott. I received information from Private Lockard, as to the plots I would make.

13. General Frank. How much training had you had?

Sergeant Elliott. I had two weeks' training on plotting, at that particular time.

14. General Frank. Did your assignment require you to have any technical knowledge of the operation of the radar equipment?

Sergeant Elliott. No, sir; it did not. I might add, sir, that having technical knowledge would make one a better operator.

15. General Frank. But it did not affect your plotting?

Sergeant Elliott. No, sir.

16. General Frank. How frequently had you been on this duty?

Sergeant Elliott. Well, sir, I had only been on it the two weeks previous to Pearl Harbor.

17. General Frank. How many times had you been doing this work?

Sergeant Elliott. I might clear that up, sir, by saying that I had only been in the outfit for about three months, and actually, on a detector, I had only had about two weeks, actually, in operation.

18. General Frank. As a plotter?

Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir. The other time was spent in setting up the unit and doing regular company duty, previously to that.

19. General Frank. Prior to the morning in question, how much activity had you had in the operation of the station? How much daily activity had you had, early in the morning?

Sergeant Elliott. Well, sir, I didn't operate every day, but at that time we were operating three hours a day.

20. General Frank. On the days on which you operated, how much activity did you have early in the morning?

Sergeant Elliott. Sir, do you mean as to the targets that were received?

21. General Frank. Yes, as to the number of planes that were out, that you picked up.

Sergeant Elliott. Well, sir, I don't exactly remember.

22. General Frank. What I am trying to ascertain is whether, on the morning of December 7, there was more activity than usual, or whether there was less activity than usual; or was it average?

Sergeant Elliott. Well, sir, during our problem, on Sunday, there was practically no activity, at all.

23. General Frank. Prior to this time?

Sergeant Elliott. Prior to 7 o'clock; yes, sir. We had no plots to send in to our information center, and had no targets.

24. General Frank. That is, on this morning of December 7?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir. Previously, on days before that, there were, I would say, probably around 25 targets sent in. I don't remember for sure, but just a guess.

25. General Frank. That is, on weekdays?

Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.

[998] 26. General Frank. There was general conversation around the operating room as to the manner and the satisfactoriness of the operation of the set, was there?

Sergeant Elliott. No, sir; the set was operating satisfactorily during the problem. However, we had had trouble with the oil pump on the generator, previously; that is, the day before Pearl Harbor; and from the time we reported on the air, which was about 4:15 in the morning, till 7 o'clock, we had no discrepancies in operation.

[999] 27. General Grunert. Was that oil pump just a temporary disability?

Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.

28. General Grunert. That could easily be fixed and was fixed?

Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.

29. General Frank. That was an oil pump on the engine of your generating set?

Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir, on the engine, to generate power.

30. General Frank. Yes. How did your communications work between your radar set and the information center?

Sergeant Elliott. Very well, sir. We had direct communication. We had two lines of communication. We had a tactical line on which we sent the plots in directly to the information center, and we also had an administrative line.

31. General Frank. Did you communicate the plotted positions?

Sergeant Elliott. Yes.

32. General Frank. Or did somebody else do that?

Sergeant Elliott. Well, sir, at that time there were no plots to send in, as I remember.

33. General Frank. But when there were plots to send in, you did that?

Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir. The plotter has the head set that is connected with the information center.

34. General Frank. There were no difficulties with your 270 radar set on that morning?

Sergeant Elliott. None that I know of, sir.

35. General Frank. All right. It was operated by motor generator rather than by commercial current?

Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.

36. General Frank. Had your motor generator been working all right except for that oil pump trouble the day before?

Sergeant Elliott. Previously, yes, sir.

37. General Frank. Do you know whether or not that were plenty of spare parts and spare tubes for the set?

Sergeant Elliott. That, I am sure there were, sir.

38. General Frank. Did you consider the set dependable?

Sergeant Elliott. Very much, sir.

39. General Frank. Where was the location of the set at Opana Point with respect to the Kahuku Point radio station?
Sergeant Elliott. I believe, sir, it was between two and three miles.
40. General Frank. Back toward the hills?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.
41. General Frank. Was it on an elevation so that the line of sight was above the Kahuku Point radio towers?
Sergeant Elliott. I believe it was, sir. Yes, sir. It was 526 feet above sea level.
42. General Frank. All right. There was no interference with the Kahuku Point radio station, with the operation of the set?
Sergeant Elliott. That, sir, I can't answer that, although there may possibly have been, at that particular azimuth.
43. General Frank. Who was operating the set?
Sergeant Elliott. At what time, sir?
44. General Frank. Who was operating the set when you first [1001] picked up any planes? You stated that it was very quiet and you didn't pick up any airplanes prior to about 7 o'clock?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.
45. General Frank. And who was operating the set when you did pick up some airplanes?
Sergeant Elliott. Well, that, sir, is: after our problem was over at 7 o'clock, I was to get further instruction in the operation of the oscilloscope, and at that time I was at the controls. However, Lockard was instructing me as to the different echoes that I would see, and it was at that time that the flight was noticed by Private Lockard.
46. General Frank. Well, when he first noticed the flight did he take over the operation of the oscilloscope, or did he leave you with it?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir; he took over the operation of the oscilloscope because it was just something completely out of the ordinary.
47. General Frank. And unusual?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.
48. General Frank. All right. And you remember about what time that was?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir; by our clock at the unit it was two minutes after seven.
49. General Frank. Was a plotting made of the planes that they picked up?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir. After insisting for quite some time on my part, there was a plot made.
50. General Frank. Well, who made the plots?
Sergeant Elliott. I made the plots, sir, and sent them [1002] in. I spoke to the switchboard operator at the information center. I spoke over the administrative telephone line.
51. General Frank. Will you look at that (indicating)? Is that a copy of your plot sheet?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir; this one starting here (indicating a plot).
52. General Frank. You made that on this morning?
Sergeant Elliott. This one particular flight, yes, sir. The others were entered after this particular flight was marked.
53. General Frank. And after you went off duty?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.
54. General Frank. We shall mark that as the next exhibit and put it in the record.

Please have the record show that this is the same plotting sheet to which General Colton referred in his testimony, and the witness has testified that he made the plot starting from north of Oahu at 7:02 a.m. and extending down to 7:30 a.m.

(Radar plotting sheet of December 7, 1941, was marked Exhibit No. 15 and received in evidence.)

55. General Frank. Will you please give a description of the sequence of events as they developed from the time you picked up that flight coming in?

Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir. After picking up the flight Private Lockard took over the controls of the oscilloscope. I went to the plotting table and asked Private Lockard to give me a target on it, which he did. After getting the plot I suggested that we send it in to our information centers; and since our problem had been over at 7 o'clock, Private Lockard looked at me and laughed and told me I was crazy for wanting to send in that reading.

56. General Frank. Why?

Sergeant Elliott. That I do not know, sir. I presume, sir, that it was because our problem had been over at 7 o'clock. But I kept talking about the plot and sending it in; and, as an example, I stated that even if it was the Navy planes coming in, that if the Army was to send up interceptors to intercept those planes it would make a fine problem. And finally, after talking about it for a while, why, he told me to go ahead and send it in if I wanted to, which I did.

I called the information center on the administrative line and spoke to the switchboard operation at the information center, who was Corporal McDonald. He was Private McDonald at that time. I explained to him what we had picked up, and he stated that he didn't know what to do about it, as there wasn't anybody at the information center. I asked him to get somebody that would know what to do. So with that we hung up.

Later, Private McDonald called back to the unit. At this time Private Lockard answered the phone, and he spoke to the officer referred to in the Roberts report; and the information given Lockard—it was told to me through Lockard—was to forget it; and after he was given that information to forget it, he wanted to shut the unit down.

57. General Frank. Who wanted to shut it down?

Sergeant Elliott. Private Lockard wanted to shut the unit down, and since I was to get the instruction on it I wanted to continue operation. Finally, after insisting on that, we did continue the flight and completing the flight on this chart which you have just shown me before, sir, and we followed the flight all the way in until it was approximately 15 or 25 miles from the Island of Oahu, and the flight was lost. It was lost due to technical reasons, that it was an impossibility to detect it any further.

The oscilloscope, from the beam that is sent out, has a back echo, and at that particular spot the oscilloscope is blank, and it is impossible to pick up any flight whatsoever at that particular point, and that was as far as we could follow the flight, and at approximately
7:39 is when we started to shut down the unit, and at 7:45 our truck came from our camp (incidentally, which was nine miles away from the unit) to pick us up to take us to breakfast, and upon arriving at the camp, why, we had found out what had happened at Pearl Harbor.

58. General Frank. What had happened?
Sergeant Elliott. Well, the Japanese had struck, sir.

59. General Frank. Did you make any attempt to look for the planes in the direction in which they had come in on your plot from the Opana position?
Sergeant Elliott. No, sir.

60. General Frank. You didn’t have any suspicion?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.

61. General Frank. That they were Japanese planes?
Sergeant Elliott. Well, at the time, no, sir, we didn’t have any suspicion they were Japanese planes, although it was just something out of the ordinary and did create a curiosity in us; and, however, we did, as I remember it now, go outside of the unit, and tried to see planes from our location at the [1005] unit, although we couldn’t see any.

62. General Frank. Well, if there was no suspicion of their being Japanese planes, and you wanted to get instruction in the operation of the oscilloscope, why did Lockard take it away from you?
Sergeant Elliott. Well, that, sir, I do not know, because I never went back to the oscilloscope until after.

63. General Frank. If it was instruction that you were after, that was a right good opportunity to get it, wasn’t it?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir. Incidentally, sir, the reason why I could not get the instruction during the problem was the fact that it would take an experienced man to operate that unit and pick up those flights efficiently. But I was just as pleased, sir, to be able to plot it, because it actually was the first flight that was out at that distance that I was able to plot.

64. General Frank. How far out did you pick it up; do you remember?
Sergeant Elliott. Well, at the very beginning, sir, it was 137 miles.

65. General Grunert. Are there any questions?
66. General Russell. Sergeant, was there any interruption in the operation of the oscilloscope that morning?
Sergeant Elliott. None that I know of, sir.

67. General Russell. Then, it would be a legitimate conclusion that just as soon as these planes came within range you would pick them up?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.

68. General Russell. The point I was attempting to make [1006] definite is that there wasn’t any period of time there between the end of the problem and your continued practice when the oscilloscope was not functioning.

Sergeant Elliott. No, sir, there was no time. I am sure there wasn’t. Another point, sir, that I might bring out, our clock at the unit I said showed 7:02 at the time that we sent in the first plot. However, when I was ordered, over the plotting set while we were operating the problem, to shut down, the time by the clock there
was 6:54, and I can't remember as to whether we had made any time check whatsoever that morning.

69. General Russell. Now, Sergeant, had you been on any Sunday problem prior to this morning of December 7th?
Sergeant Elliott. I really can't recall whether I was, sir. I don't believe so.

70. General Russell. Could you tell the Board on how many problems you had been, on any days prior to December 7, 1941?
Sergeant Elliott. I believe, sir, that that actually was the first problem that I had been on, although I had operated.

71. General Russell. At this same station?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.

72. General Russell. Well, about how many other mornings had you operated?
Sergeant Elliott. Well, the only time that I operated, sir, was when I was having regular instruction after the operating time of the problem.

73. General Russell. Then, that would be after 7 o'clock?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.

74. General Russell. Early in your testimony you referred to the fact that on other occasions—I believe you described those occasions as ordinary days.
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.

75. General Russell. —you would pick up as many as 25 targets?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.

76. General Russell. Had that been true on all of the other occasions when you had been receiving instruction out there?

77. General Russell. Do you know what those targets were that you had picked up on these other days?
Sergeant Elliott. Well, no, sir, other than that they were just routine flights and planes in the air.

78. General Russell. About how long were those periods when you would pick up as many as 25 targets?
Sergeant Elliott. Well, sir, I would say that was within a 2- or 3-hour period.

79. General Russell. Beginning after 7 o'clock each time?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.

80. General Russell. Then, you had not been on one of the operating sets prior to 7 o'clock before this morning of December 7th?
Sergeant Elliott. No, sir. My memory isn't quite clear on that, but I don't believe I was, sir.

81. General Frank. But you had been a plotter?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir, I had been a plotter.

82. General Russell. Do you know why you were sent out on this particular Sunday morning, Sergeant?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir. We were sent out there on Saturday afternoon. We were sent out there for the purpose of—well, at that time during peacetime it wasn't guarding the unit, although we had a firearm out there; we had a .45 pistol and I believe it was seven rounds of ammunition, but the purpose in our being out there was just to be on the unit in case any prowlers or anyone should come around. It wasn't a regular guard post or a walking post or
anything of that nature, but it did call for two men to be present at all times at the unit.

83. General Russell. The equipment was left out there continuously, then?

Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.

84. General Russell. Your presence was antisabotage, was it?

Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.

85. General Russell. Now, how long had that set been in at this point, if you know?

Sergeant Elliott. We had started putting it in, sir, about two weeks before Pearl Harbor. No, sir. We moved out to that location in November, the early part of November, and setting up the unit took about two weeks, and the other two weeks was previous to Pearl Harbor.

86. General Russell. Now, how long had you been with this signal outfit?

Sergeant Elliott. Well, just a period of three months before Pearl Harbor, sir.

87. General Russell. Do you recall when the first mobile sets were received and installed?

Sergeant Elliott. That, sir, I couldn’t answer, as I was \[1009\] in the Air Corps at that time, and when I was transferred to the signal company, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii, they had already had some of their location picked out and other units in operation.

88. General Russell. When was that?

Sergeant Elliott. Well, upon my transfer it was the 15th of September in ’40, sir; ’41.

89. General Russell. When you were transferred over to the signal outfit from the Air Corps—I want to get this definite and know that you are accurate in the statement—some locations had been selected and some of the units were in operation?

Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir; they were.

90. General Russell. And that was in September?

Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.

91. General Russell. Sergeant, in reporting these flights or targets that you had discovered out there on ordinary days, did you know or were you told what any of these flights were?

Sergeant Elliott. I don’t quite get your point, sir. You mean?

92. General Russell. You discovered the flights after 7 o’clock?

Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.

93. General Russell. Every target that you had discovered or worked out here before had been after 7 o’clock in the morning?

Sergeant Elliott. I am sure it was, yes, sir.

94. General Russell. And this is the first target that you had ever discovered before 7 o’clock, because it was the first time you had been on duty before 7 o’clock?

Sergeant Elliott. You are referring, sir, to the enemy \[1010\] planes that we picked up on the morning of the 7th?


Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir; I think it was shortly after 7 o’clock, sir.

96. General Russell. Yes, but prior to this morning you had never been on duty before 7 o’clock?
Sergeant Elliott. I am sure that I wasn’t sir.
97. General Frank. Do you mean that this is the first time that you ever went on duty around 4 o’clock?
Sergeant Elliott. I am sure it was; yes, sir.
98. General Frank. Well, what time were you on duty this morning?
Sergeant Elliott. You see, sir, we were on duty from 4 until 7 operating the unit, but we had been out at the station since Saturday afternoon at 12 o’clock, the day before Sunday.
99. General Frank. Do you know whether or not this unit was operated daily?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir, it was.
100. General Frank. Starting at what time?
Sergeant Elliott. Well, at that time I don’t remember, sir, just how long we had been operating from 4 to 7. I don’t believe it was long. But that was the operating time that we had been operating.
101. General Frank. From 4 to 7?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.
102. General Frank. But you had not been out there before at 4 o’clock?
103. General Frank. Were you a regular plotter?
Sergeant Elliott. No, sir; still in the process of learning. This covers a period of two weeks that I learned the plotter’s duty. This two weeks’ time, sir, was during the daytime when there was no problem scheduled where it called for experienced men to be operating.
104. General Frank. Oh. Well, then, you were not the regularly assigned plotter? You just happened to be there getting instruction; is that correct?
Sergeant Elliott. Well, I had had my instruction; I was a qualified plotter at that time.
105. General Frank. But you were not the regular, assigned plotter for that station; is that correct?
Sergeant Elliott. Well, no, sir. We never actually had a regular, assigned plotter, sir. The men that had the duty were just men that were assigned. They may not be assigned at the same time each time they were assigned. It was just those that were called to make up a crew for the particular time that we operated. We didn’t have enough men to make complete groups.
106. General Frank. I have nothing further.
[1012] 107. Colonel Grunert. The problems you referred to were the exercises between 4 and 7 each morning; is that correct?
Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir.
108. General Grunert. The rest of the day was spent in instruction and training, quite often spent on the set; not particularly engaged in trying to get any particular thing out of the air or any problem out of the air?
Sergeant Elliott. No, sir; other than just for purposes of training.
109. General Grunert. As a plotter at the radar station it was none of your business to be informed as to what was in the air, whether Navy, Marine, or Army craft?
Sergeant Elliott. No, sir.
110. General Grunert. You plotted everything you found there?
Sergeant Elliott. That is right, sir.

111. General Grunert. And sent that to the information center, and it was their business to know what was in the air, whether it was friendly or enemy craft?

Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir. At the information center, sir, they had officers from the Navy, the Army, the Coast Artillery, and so forth, and Air Corps officers, and so forth, and they all had information as to the flights that their particular branch was sending out. But after that is plotted on the plotting table, any flight that they cannot account for, any one of the different branches, it is considered an enemy plane. That was the procedure. We were never notified out there as to what the target was that we had picked up.

112. General Grunert. Can you tell from the radar how many planes there are in a certain flight?

Sergeant Elliott. No, sir.

113. General Grunert. Can you tell whether there are a lot of planes or just one?

Sergeant Elliott. In the case of the morning of the 7th, when there was such a large flight, we knew it was a large flight.

114. General Grunert. How did you know it was a large flight if the machine did not tell you?

Sergeant Elliott. Just by the appearance on the oscilloscope, sir.

115. General Grunert. Then you can tell whether it is a volume of planes or a single plane?

Sergeant Elliott. Yes, sir. At particular distances, sir, if there was only one or a few planes we could tell they were only a few. However, if there is a large number of planes we could tell that there was a large number of planes and know that it was not just a few.

116. General Grunert. Do you suppose that that is what excited Lockard when the machine showed there was a large number of planes and he took it over for himself?

Sergeant Elliott. Sir, as to exactly what happened there: The oscilloscope has a main pulse. That main pulse to the extreme left is the zero point in the mileage scale; and what Lockard thought that morning was that the mileage scale was off, and he went to check it from the main pulse and found that what he thought was the main pulse was this flight, and he checked it and rechecked it and found that it was not the main pulse; that it was actually a flight. It was from then on that Private Lockard operated.

117. General Grunert. One more question: Did you know anything about some bombers or planes expected from the mainland on that morning?

Sergeant Elliott. No, sir; we did not know that. I did not know it at that time.

118. General Grunert. Thank you very much for coming up, Sergeant, and giving us that information.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

TESTIMONY OF FIRST LT. JOSEPH L. LOCKARD, SIGNAL CORPS, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?
2. General Grunert. The Board is trying to get at the facts about what happened before or just prior to and leading up to the attack on Hawaii. We understand, from reports of the Roberts Commission, that you have information that will be of assistance to the Board, particularly as to what happened at the radar station, known, I believe, as Opana; and that you have some information about the information center of the air warning system in Hawaii at that time. In your testimony please be careful to give us what you actually remember of that time, and not colored by what has happened since.

[1015] Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir.
3. General Grunert. General Frank will propound the questions.
4. General Frank. What was your rank on the morning of December 7, 1941?
   Lieutenant Lockard. I was a third-class specialist, sir.
5. General Frank. A private?
   Lieutenant Lockard. Under the old specialist system I had a third-class specialist rating.
6. General Frank. To what organization did you belong at that time?
   Lieutenant Lockard. S. C., A. W., H.—Signal Corps, Aircraft Warning, Hawaii, was all the designation we knew at that time.
7. General Frank. What were your duties on that morning? Did you have any regularly assigned duties?
   Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir. Under the hours we were working at that time, Sundays and holidays called for operation from 4 until 7 o’clock; that is, a.m. I was assigned, and Private Elliott and myself were sent to operate the station for that particular Sunday, those particular hours.
8. General Frank. How long had you been on duty with that station?
   Lieutenant Lockard. We moved that station from Schofield Barracks and set it up around Thanksgiving time. I cannot give you the exact date.
9. General Frank. Was it in September or October?
   Lieutenant Lockard. It was in November. It had formerly been set up in Schofield, and they were planning a more appropriate coverage with the equipment.
10. General Frank. Do you remember when those sets arrived from the mainland?
   Lieutenant Lockard. I cannot be exactly definite about that. It was the latter part of July or the first part of August. That is the first I knew.
11. General Frank. That is the best your memory serves you?
   Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir.
12. General Frank. How long had you been there?
   Lieutenant Lockard. I landed there on the 10th of December, 1940.
13. General Frank. How long had you been on this type of work?
   Lieutenant Lockard. Since we had the equipment.
14. General Frank. How much training had you had?
Lieutenant Lockard. As far as any school was concerned, we did not have any.

15. General Frank. How did you get your instruction?
Lieutenant Lockard. Instruction was by actual work with the equipment.

16. General Frank. Somebody must have explained it to you.
Lieutenant Lockard. Well, sir, there were three or four that knew the equipment, and they trained the rest of the crews in the operation of it.

17. General Frank. At Schofield Barracks?
Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir.

18. General Frank. When did you start on this work?
Lieutenant Lockard. You mean, on operation?


20. General Frank. You had been in training and operating it since August?
Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir.

21. General Frank. The set itself had been set up and in condition to be operated for how long?
Lieutenant Lockard. This particular set?

22. General Frank. Yes; up until the 7th of December.
Lieutenant Lockard. The one at Opana?

23. General Frank. Yes. Lieutenant Lockard. We installed it right around Thanksgiving, in November, and of course it was in operation from then on.

24. General Frank. Had they had some exercises or maneuvers along the first part of November in which they used this set?
Lieutenant Lockard. I do not know whether they had maneuvers. I know we were making special tracks.

25. General Frank. Were you the regular assigned operator of the set, or only one of several who operated the set?
Lieutenant Lockard. Well, sir, that particular unit had a crew of six.

26. General Frank. Six operators, or six total?
Lieutenant Lockard. Total, sir.

27. General Frank. How many operators?
Lieutenant Lockard. They were all operators and everything else too.

28. General Frank. You were all under training for those jobs?
Lieutenant Lockard. Well, sir, at that time we were getting in some more men from other units whom we were supposed to train to the extent of our knowledge.

29. General Frank. Was the set operating efficiently?
Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir; it had been said before that it was the best operating set of the seven that we had.

30. General Frank. How did your communications work from the radar site at Opana to the information center?
Lieutenant Lockard. They seemed to work all right, sir.

31. General Frank. No difficulty?
Lieutenant Lockard. No, sir; we had field wire down to the highway where it tied in with one of the cables.

32. General Frank. Did you have any difficulty with the 270 radar set itself?
Lieutenant Lockard. At that time?
33. General Frank. Yes.
Lieutenant Lockard. Well, minor difficulties: yes, sir. It was rather a crude set, and there were certain little things that they probably had not been able to see beforehand which made operation a little difficult at times.
34. General Frank. You are saying it was a rather crude set?
Lieutenant Lockard. I did not mean it exactly that way, sir.
35. General Frank. That is in the light of your having seen much better sets in the meantime, is it not?
Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir.
36. General Frank. At the time you were operating it you thought it was a pretty good set, did you not?
Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir.
37. General Frank. Was it operated by commercial current or [1019] by current from the motor generator?
Lieutenant Lockard. We had commercial power installed when we first went there. When we first went up there to that site we were operating off LeRoys, but shortly after that we got commercial power.
38. General Frank. Shortly after what?
Lieutenant Lockard. Shortly after we were completely set up.
39. General Frank. On what date were you completely set up?
Lieutenant Lockard. Around Thanksgiving.
40. General Frank. On December 7 was the set being operated by commercial current or current from a motor generator?
Lieutenant Lockard. Commercial current.
41. General Frank. Sergeant Elliott was a witness here a few minutes ago, and he stated that they had some trouble with the set the day before. That would be on the 6th of December. He said the oil pump went out on the motor generator.
Lieutenant Lockard. Oh, yes, sir. I think it was the battery generator; I am not sure. I cannot say for sure, sir, which it was.
42. General Frank. What I am trying to get at is this: Were you operating with a motor generator or were you using commercial current?
Lieutenant Lockard. We had to run the generator; we had to keep it in operating condition. We had to run it every day.
43. General Frank. But it was not in continuous operation, was it?
Lieutenant Lockard. No, sir.
44. General Frank. Did you have plenty of spare parts and spare tubes for your radar sets?
Lieutenant Lockard. No, sir; we did not. Some of the most essential parts were rather scarce on the Island, such as the rectifier tubes and transmitter tubes.
45. General Frank. Did you ever have to put the set out of commission for lack of spare parts or for lack of tubes?
Lieutenant Lockard. We did not put it out of commission, sir. We had a rectifier tube go out on us, and we ran it on one rectifier tube, which it will do. You only get about 6 kva out of it, but it did give us some operation until we could get down to Kawela and get a tube.
46. General Frank. There were spare parts and tubes on the Island, were there not?
Lieutenant Lockard. I do not know, sir. All I know is that we did not have one. There was some sort of an arrangement whereby, if the tubes went out, as they went out the stations that were least important would be shut down and those other stations would use their tubes.

47. General Frank. Let us get back to another question I asked you. Did you ever have to close down that station or that set because of the lack of spare parts or tubes? Do you remember?

Lieutenant Lockard. I do not think I can truthfully say one way or the other, sir.

48. General Frank. You do not remember, that is, ever having been closed down for lack of spare parts or tubes?

Lieutenant Lockard. No, sir.

49. General Frank. Or do you?

[1022] Lieutenant Lockard. I cannot say, sir.

50. General Frank. You do not remember?

Lieutenant Lockard. No, sir.

51. General Frank. Did you consider the set a dependable set?

Lieutenant Lockard. At that time?

52. General Frank. Yes, of course.

Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir; I thought it was pretty good. I think everybody else did.

53. General Frank. How high above sea level was the site on which the set was installed?

Lieutenant Lockard. 230 feet, sir.

54. General Frank. Was that high enough to get it above the Kahuku Point radio tower?

Lieutenant Lockard. Do you mean above the towers themselves?

55. General Frank. Yes. Was there anything in front of you to blanket the set?

Lieutenant Lockard. Directly in front?

56. General Frank. Any place in front of you, that would blanket the set.

Lieutenant Lockard. Well, sir, we had back and side echoes, no matter which way the antenna was pointing, and it would produce a dead area approximately, bearing upon the azimuth, from 14 to 22 miles. It would strike the mountains around us and cause this area of deadness.

57. General Frank. But the Kahuku Point radio towers did not blanket your set, did they?

[1022] Lieutenant Lockard. Not that I can remember, sir.

58. General Frank. Did the location of the set at Opana Point result in any unusual radio phenomena?

Lieutenant Lockard. About the only thing that would be unusual about it was our reception. Most of the men were in accord that it probably was the best site they had.

59. General Frank. Was there any interference from planes taking off from the Kahuku Field?

Lieutenant Lockard. Not any interference; no, sir.

60. General Frank. That was right in front of you, was it not?

Lieutenant Lockard. No, sir; it was not right in front of us. My geography is a little hazy.

61. General Frank. It was in your line or sight, was it not?

Lieutenant Lockard. May I look on the map?

62. General Frank. Yes.
Lieutenant Lockard (after referring to map). I cannot recall its presenting us with any problem.

63. General Frank. You were at the set on the morning of December 7, were you?

Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir.

64. General Frank. When did you go there?

Lieutenant Lockard. We went up the night before.

65. General Frank. Did the set start operating on the morning of December 7th?

Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir. We started operation.

66. General Frank. What time?

Lieutenant Lockard. Around four o'clock.

General Frank. Who operated the set? Who was at the oscilloscope?

Lieutenant Lockard. I was.

68. General Frank. From what time until what time?

Lieutenant Lockard. The whole period.

69. General Frank. When did you start?

Lieutenant Lockard. At what time?

70. General Frank. Yes.

Lieutenant Lockard. Around four o'clock.

71. General Frank. What was picked up that morning and at what times, so far as your memory will serve you?

Lieutenant Lockard. It was a rather dull morning. There was not much activity.

72. General Frank. Up until what time? Did you pick up any planes before seven o'clock?

Lieutenant Lockard. If we did, sir, it was one or two or a small number.

73. General Frank. When did you pick up this flight that was coming in from the north?

Lieutenant Lockard. Around 7:02.

74. General Frank. What were the circumstances surrounding the situation as it existed? Were you at the oscilloscope, or was Elliott?

Lieutenant Lockard. I was still at the oscilloscope, sir. We were going to close down, but we figured that we might as well play around, because the truck had not come in yet to take us back for chow. So I was just checking the adjustments and was going to let Elliott operate them a while. He had not been in the outfit very long; he was a new man with us. I was going to let him operate. To me it looked like two main pulses. That is why I thought there was something wrong with the equipment, and I was checking to see if there was anything wrong. Apparently there was not.

75. General Frank. Proceed and tell us what happened.

Lieutenant Lockard. Well, I showed it to Elliott. I fooled around some more trying to determine exactly whether it was something coming in or whether it was a defect in the equipment, and finally decided that it must be a flight of some sort. Since it was the only activity we had had that morning, I decided to plot it. Elliott plotted it.

76. General Frank. Who did the plotting?

Lieutenant Lockard. Elliott. We picked it up at 136 miles, and when it got to 132 we called the information center—it was just a few
minutes after seven—and there was no one. I knew the switchboard operator there, and I asked if there was anyone around.

77. General Frank. You called the information center, or did the other man?

[1025] Lieutenant Lockard. No, sir. I was watching the track, and he made the phone call, and the switchboard operator told us there was no one around; so we asked him to look around; and, contrary to regulations, he left the switchboard and looked, and he found someone; but first, we told him about what we had, and he told this individual.

78. General Frank. Do you know who that was?
Lieutenant Lockard. No, sir; I had never seen him.
79. General Frank. You do not know whom he told?
Lieutenant Lockard. I know his name. I think I know his name.
80. General Frank. What was it?
Lieutenant Lockard. Miller. I believe he was a liaison officer.
81. General Frank. Miller, or Twler?
Lieutenant Lockard. The best that I can remember, sir, it was Miller.

82. General Frank. All right.
Lieutenant Lockard. This individual—well, the switchboard operator came back and said that, "O. K.—it's all right," something to that effect. I can't tell you the conversation any more, because I haven't too good a memory; and we insisted—I asked—
83. General Frank. You insisted what?
Lieutenant Lockard. I asked the switchboard operator if I couldn't speak to this person; which I did; and I gave him all the information that we had—the direction, the mileage, and the apparent size of whatever it was; and that was about the end of it, right there.

[1026] 84. General Frank. What did he tell you?
Lieutenant Lockard. Well—
85. General Grunert. You are not incriminating anybody. Tell us. What did he tell you? Did he say, "Forget it," or that it did not amount to anything, or what?
Lieutenant Lockard. Something to that effect. I mean, "O. K."
86. General Frank. Did he tell you to forget it, or what did he say?
Lieutenant Lockard. Well, he didn't—he wasn't very committal. He just said, "O. K.," or something to that effect—"You needn't"—
87. General Frank. When you picked it up and had followed it, so that it had come from 137 or thereabouts down to a shorter distance from the sight, what did the oscilloscope show? Did it show that it was a single plane, or that it was a large group of planes? What was your interpretation of it?
Lieutenant Lockard. Well, sir, it was the largest group I had ever seen on the oscilloscope. It looked, as I said, like a main pulse, and that is why I was confused, at first, as to whether it was a flight or not. I had never seen one. It maybe was the exceptional reception in that particular spot, but it still produced the largest echo on the scope that I had seen.
88. General Frank. Did you tell the man, then, at the information center, that it looked like an unusually large number of planes?
Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir.
89. General Frank. And that didn’t seem to excite him in any [1027] way?

Lieutenant Lockard. No, sir.

90. General Frank. What followed from then on? Did you continue?

Lieutenant Lockard. Well, sir, we went as far as we thought was reasonably safe in our argument.

91. General Frank. What do you mean? In your argument with whom? With the man at the information center?

Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir.

92. General Frank. All right.

Lieutenant Lockard. Then we continued to follow the flight, and to plot it, till it got within about 22 miles—20 to 22 miles of the Island, at which time we lost it in this blacked-out area. Then we proceeded to close down the station and go back to Kawaiola for breakfast. The truck had arrived—or, had not arrived, yet, but there was nothing else working.

93. General Frank. There were no additional targets in the distance behind that, were there? Do you remember whether or not you attempted to find out if there were any additional planes in the distance?

Lieutenant Lockard. Well, we more or less concentrated on this one flight. We looked around a little, but as I recall, I don’t believe we noticed anything else. We would have plotted it, I believe, if we had.

94. General Frank. Do you remember whether you attempted to find out if there were any more coming in?

Lieutenant Lockard. Oh, we looked around somewhat.

95. General Frank. Would you know the plot if you saw it? I show you Exhibit 15. Is that the plot of the planes coming [1028] in, that morning? I refer to the one starting at the top, at 7:02. Did you see the plot, that morning, that Private Elliott was making?

Lieutenant Lockard. I glanced at it, sir; but I didn’t give it any particular—

96. General Frank. Attention?

Lieutenant Lockard. —attention; no, sir.

97. General Frank. And you would not remember whether or not that was the plot, then?

Lieutenant Lockard. This plot (indicating)? Well, I know it is the plot.

98. General Frank. The witness identifies the plot in this Exhibit 15.

When did you find out that there had been an air attack on Pearl Harbor?

Lieutenant Lockard. When we got to Kawaiola, sir.

99. General Frank. Did you connect the air attack on Pearl Harbor with this flight that you had traced in?

Lieutenant Lockard. Almost immediately. Sergeant Elliott and myself almost simultaneously seemed to connect it with what we had previously picked up.

100. General Frank. Did you go back to the station?

Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir; immediately. We passed the rest of our crew, going to the station, as we were coming back. They had all their field equipment, and we blew the horn for them to stop,
but they paid no attention, they kept right on going; so we thought something was queer, but we had no idea what it was until we got to Kualoa.

101. General Frank. As soon as you got breakfast, you went back to Opana?

Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir.

102. General Frank. Was the set operated the rest of the morning?

Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir; it was operated from then on.

103. General Frank. When did you act as an operator after that? Did you act as an operator any more that morning, or do you not remember?

Lieutenant Lockard. I went up and operated in my regular shift, then.

104. General Frank. When did your shift start, do you remember?

Lieutenant Lockard. Well, sir, each group had four hours on, and—let's see—we were divided into three groups, four hours on and eight hours off; but we had four hours on the 'scope, then four hours guard, then we had four hours off.

105. General Frank. Did you operate that again, that morning?

Lieutenant Lockard. I didn't operate it in the morning; no, sir.

106. General Grunert. Are there any other questions?

107. General Russell. How long were you out there, Lieutenant, after December 7?

Lieutenant Lockard. I left, the 22nd of February, sir.

108. General Russell. Did you continue in the work with radar, from then on?

Lieutenant Lockard. Up till about two weeks, three weeks, before I left; we got seventy some men in our camp area, there, which was an old, deserted pineapple plantation. There was Sergeant Hilton—

109. General Russell. That is not of very much interest, Lieutenant. I just wondered if you stayed on radar from then on until you left.

Lieutenant Lockard. I was; yes.

110. General Russell. Do you remember receiving, out there, thereafter, or prior to the time that you left, any of those permanent radar sets?

Lieutenant Lockard. The radar permanent, 271?

111. General Russell. The 271s?

Lieutenant Lockard. I know they were putting one at—I am not quite certain, sir. They were taking them out, taking the equipment out of the vans, and making permanent installations out of them. They had that pretty well accomplished when I left Opana.

112. General Russell. 271s? Did you operate a 271 before you left, out there?

Lieutenant Lockard. No, sir.

113. General Russell. Have you remained in radar work until now?

Lieutenant Lockard. No, sir.

114. General Russell. You quit radar work when you left the Island?

Lieutenant Lockard. It amounts to that, sir.
115. General Russell. Some time prior to December 7, you testified as far back as August, these mobile sets had been set up and had been operated at different points on the Island?
Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir.
116. General Russell. You had been on duty with them constantly, or considerably?
Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir.

[1031] 117. General Russell. You had tracked flights of planes previously?
Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir.
118. General Russell. Had you been on duty, on Sunday mornings, prior to December 7, 1941?
Lieutenant Lockard. I may have been, sir. There was no—I can't say definitely.
119. General Russell. You cannot remember that? Now, had you been on duty prior to December 7, 1941, between 4 and 7 a. m., on any morning?
Lieutenant Lockard. I don't believe so, sir.
120. General Russell. Do you think that this is the only morning that you had ever been on between 4 and 7 o'clock?
Lieutenant Lockard. As nearly as I can recall.
121. General Russell. You had been on, on other mornings, after 7 o'clock in the morning?
Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir; we started out at 7 in the morning, on weekdays.
122. General Russell. Did you pick up a lot of targets on these other mornings, after 7 o'clock?
Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir; we usually had quite a bit of activity.
123. General Russell. What was that activity, do you know?
Lieutenant Lockard. The purpose of it?
Lieutenant Lockard. Well, there was a patrol that used to fly.
125. General Russell. A patrol?
Lieutenant Lockard. The CLIPPER we used to track all the [1032] time.
126. General Russell. You followed the patrols and CLIPPERS. Now, what else?
Lieutenant Lockard. The practicing aircraft, which may fly to another island, or around the immediate vicinity.
127. General Russell. How far out would you follow these patrols?
Lieutenant Lockard. Until we lost them, sir.
128. General Russell. How far would that be?
Lieutenant Lockard. It varied anywhere from 60 to 110, 120 miles, depending upon their altitude over the water.
129. General Russell. Were these mobile sets set up with cover and camouflage?
Lieutenant Lockard. No, sir. They had started sandbagging them. They didn't start that, though, until after the war started.
130. General Russell. On this particular morning, Lieutenant, did you pick up any patrol aircraft at all, on the morning of December 7?
Lieutenant Lockard. Not that I could identify as such. There may have been.
131. General Russell. Did you pick up any flight, from 4 o’clock that morning until you came off at 7:42 or 7:43, whenever you did come off?
132. General Frank. That was going away from the Island?
   Lieutenant Lockard. That was going away? Not that I can remember.
133. General Russell. As nearly as you recall, the only flight that you picked up, on this morning, was this one flight that you have described to us?
   Lieutenant Lockard. The question was asked, before, and as near as I can remember, there may have been one or two flights.
134. General Grunert. If there were, they were recorded, were they? Were they plotted and sent in to the information center?
   Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir.
135. General Grunert. And they should be of record there, if those records have been kept?
   Lieutenant Lockard. Yes, sir.
136. General Russell. But you have no independent recollection?
   Lieutenant Lockard. I can’t remember, sir.
137. General Russell. I have one more question. Lieutenant, you were at that time a noncommissioned officer, were you?
   Lieutenant Lockard. On the 7th, sir?
   Lieutenant Lockard. I was not a noncommissioned officer, sir. I was in charge of my particular shift. I had a “third-class, specialist.”
139. General Russell. You knew nothing about the imminence of war, and you had not been directed to be on the lookout for Japanese or other hostile planes in that vicinity?
   Lieutenant Lockard. No, sir.
140. General Russell. In other words, you were not “in the know”?
   Lieutenant Lockard. I was not “in the know.”
141. General Grunert. All right. Are there any other questions? Thank you very much. We appreciate your coming up here to help us out.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
142. General Grunert. The Board will take up other work, now, until the witness comes, at 2 o’clock.
   (Thereupon, at 11:18 o’clock a. m., a recess was taken until 2 o’clock p. m.)

[1035] AFTERNOON SESSION

(The Board at 2 p. m. continued the hearing of witnesses.)

TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM S. PYE, UNITED STATES NAVY, RETIRED

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)
1. Colonel West. Admiral, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?
   Admiral Pye. William S. Pye, Vice Admiral, United States Navy, Retired; at present on active duty as President of the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island.
2. General Grunert. Admiral, the Board, in an attempt to get at facts, is looking into the background and viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. It is hoped that because of your assignment with the Pacific Fleet, I understand, in 1941, you can throw some light upon the subject. Our inquiries are limited to a large extent to any happenings that pertain to the Army, and with that in view we shall go ahead on some of the questions that have come up in our study of the Roberts Commission report, together with what testimony we have had heretofore.

Will you please state to the Board just what your position was with the Pacific Fleet, giving the dates, from any time in 1941 up to and including December 7?

Admiral Pye. On January 31, 1941, I was appointed Commander Battle Force, United States Pacific Fleet, having been for the year previous Commander Battleships. I was still acting in this capacity and, as such, second in command of the Fleet on December 7. In a previous order issued by the [1036] Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet primarily concerning operations I was also detailed as Commander Task Force 1.

3. General Grunert. During the latter part of 1941, we will say from about the middle of November until the attack on December 7, the Fleet was based on Honolulu, Pearl Harbor, was it?

Admiral Pye. It was so based, but a large part of the Fleet was at sea during a portion of this period.

4. General Grunert. That Fleet I understand at that time had three task forces.

Admiral Pye. Yes, sir.

5. General Grunert. In any of this testimony you give, Admiral, if that testimony would be of value to the enemy in future operations, I wish you would bring that to our attention before you put it in the record. All this will be secret, of course, but the more we can guard that the better, by having conversation off the record if necessary. I just thought I would bring that to your attention. I do not think anything will come up, but it may.

Admiral Pye. I do not consider that it would be of any advantage to a future enemy or to the present enemies in this war.

6. General Grunert. Now, were these three task forces in and out of Pearl Harbor from time to time during that latter period?

Admiral Pye. Yes, sir. The schedule as arranged was that one task force was at sea practically all the time, that is, one of the three task forces, leaving a period normally of about eight days at sea and about fourteen days in port. The [1037] task forces were organized primarily for training purposes.

Task Force 1, which I commanded, consisted of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, and the primary mission of the commander of this task force was the development and practice in tactics for the conduct of a major action. The schedule usually provided that one of the other two task forces was at sea with me for one or two days of the period my task force was at sea, in order that we might have more forces for the conduct of tactical exercises.

Task Force 2 comprised carriers, cruisers, and destroyers. This task force was primarily to train in the use of carrier-based aviation. The 3d Task Force consisted of one battleship division, the heavy
cruisers of the Fleet, and one squadron of destroyers. Their task was primarily to train for the work of reconnaissance for which the cruisers were designed.

7. General GRUNERT. How about aircraft carriers? Were they part of the task force or assigned to task forces?

Admiral Pye. As I said, sir, the aircraft carriers were part of Task Force 2.

8. General GRUNERT. Task Force 2?

Admiral Pye. Yes, sir. And their principal mission was the training of the carrier-based aviation, but we worked that in such a way that when my task force was out I would have the carrier force with them, Task Force 2, maybe one or two days so that we could work the carriers in with the battleships. The next time I would go out I would have the cruisers with me one day out of the time, in order to work the cruisers in. Usually at some period in each six weeks the schedule was so arranged [1038] that all task forces would be at sea simultaneously for exercise and fleet evolutions.

9. General GRUNERT. There were, I understand, three of such aircraft carriers, were there?

Admiral Pye. On December 7 there were actually only two in the force, the sum total of which comprised the third. One, assigned to the task force, was on the West Coast under overhaul.

10. General GRUNERT. Have you any knowledge of the responsibility for and the scheme of distant reconnaissance as far as the plans for defense of Hawaii were concerned? In other words, who was charged with that distant reconnaissance? Was it the Fleet Commander or the Naval District Commander?

Admiral Pye. I should prefer not to give my opinion on that, as I was never in a position to be concerned with it. The base defense, including the reconnaissance which was by aircraft under the base defense officer, was entirely an independent command.

11. General GRUNERT. When these task forces went out did they do any reconnoitering of their own as a general security measure, or just for the problems you were then engaged in?

Admiral Pye. Depending upon the nature of the operations, the battleships and heavy cruisers carried observation planes. These planes were used at times for reconnaissance work, but most of the time for training in connection with the actual operations being performed by the vessels of the task force, either as gunnery observation or antisubmarine observation or in exercises that were of that particular nature.

12. General GRUNERT. Then, they appeared to be primarily [1039] for your own purposes?

Admiral Pye. For our own purposes. A reconnaissance was carried out over the operating areas by the patrol planes.

13. General GRUNERT. The PBYs were long-distance patrol aircraft?

Admiral Pye. Yes, sir. There were no PBYs under my command.

14. General GRUNERT. And do you know whether or not the PBYs pertained to the Naval District Commanders?

Admiral Pye. Yes, sir.

15. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether the Naval District Commander, in his scheme of distant reconnaissance, considered the
areas operated in or occupied by the task forces as being reconnoitered to the extent that he would not have to cover that same ground, or same sea?

Admiral Pye. I think that he did feel that he should cover the same ground with the available aircraft of the patrol type, and the areas in which the Fleet units were operating were patrolled by PBYs, patrol aircraft, within the reasonable limits of the available aircraft.

16. General Gruner. Do you know whether this was a rather constant patrolling, or periodic?

Admiral Pye. I believe it was constant within the limits of the aircraft available; usually a morning patrol and, if aircraft were available, an evening patrol.

17. General Gruner. Would it have been reasonable to assume, in the areas in which a task force operated, that the enemy could not well approach with aircraft carriers to make an [1040] attack on the mainland?

Admiral Pye. I think there was no particular reason to believe that those areas would have been more useful to an enemy than other areas in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands. I think it should be recalled that we were not in a state of war and that the patrol was primarily to determine the possible presence of submarines.

18. General Gruner. Then, the patrol was primarily for submarine?

Admiral Pye. Yes, sir.

19. General Gruner. And if we were not in a state of war, what danger was there from submarines?

Admiral Pye. I will explain the difference there. An attack by a submarine, if fired when the submarine is submerged and the submarine is not definitely sighted, cannot be proven. If attacks had been made by submarines, and the submarine not sighted or sunk or captured, there would have been no way for us to prove definitely that it was not an internal explosion in the ship rather than a torpedo. In addition to that there was always the possibility that German crews might man Japanese submarines or might, in the last analysis, even bring their submarines to the Hawaiian Islands in order to try to force us into war. It was therefore considered that the possibility of submarine attack was greater than any other form of attack, of which the nature could not be uncertain.

20. General Gruner. Admiral, were you acquainted with or informed of the message from the Navy Department to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet on November 27 which started out by saying, “This is a war warning,” and which was [1041] directed to be transmitted to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department? Were you generally acquainted with that message?

Admiral Pye. I was at sea with my task force at the time this message was received by the Commander-in-Chief. I should like it to be noted that this message had two addressees: Commander-in-Chief Asiatic Fleet as well as Commander-in-Chief United States Fleet. Upon the receipt of that message my Commander-in-Chief informed me by radio that there was possible danger of attack, and to take all essential measures for the defense of my task force at sea. These measures were fully carried out, and my task force returned to port on Thursday. I have to check whether that is about the 29th. Have you any dates there?
21. General GRUNERT. I might be able to find it in your testimony.
Admiral Pye. I think it was two days later, having exercised all possible precautions against attack during the period we were at sea.
(Excerpt from testimony of Admiral Pye before the Roberts Commission is as follows:)
22. General GRUNERT. Your testimony here in the Roberts report says,
I was cognizant of it after it had been received for about four days. My task force was at sea at that time.
Will you proceed?
Admiral Pye. Well, I was going on to explain that. It was received by him, as I recall it, by the 27th; I think that was Tuesday. On a Thursday I returned to port with my task force, but I was not informed of this message until the following Saturday. That was four days, as I recall it, from the time it was received. On that Saturday morning I was not called to see the Chief of Staff, but I went to see him in relation to some work to be undertaken during the following week, and was shown this message.
23. General FRANK. May I ask just a question there?
24. General GRUNERT. Go ahead.
25. General FRANK. While you were still at sea with your task force, however, you were warned of a tense situation?
Admiral Pye. I cannot tell you the exact message—I have no copy of it—but the implication to me and to my staff was that there was great danger of a submarine attack. We had had during the period of operation there several occasions in which destroyers picked up contacts which they thought might be enemy submarines. There were definite rules for procedure when those contacts were made, and it was my impression, until I saw the message on the following Saturday, that the nature of the information was similar to that which on several occasions before had been the cause of instructions to take particular care concerning enemy submarines.
26. General GRUNERT. Did you consider your task force in less danger while in the harbor or while out at sea?
Admiral Pye. Much less danger in port, primarily because there could be no submarine attack while we were in port, with the entrance to the channel guarded by nets and patrol craft.
27. General GRUNERT. Then, it would appear from what testimony we have had to date that the Army was sabotage-minded and the Navy may have been submarine-minded.
Admiral Pye. I think there is no question but what the Navy was submarine-minded.
28. General GRUNERT. Now, while your vessels are in port, on what do you depend for warning as to the imminence of an attack by air?
Admiral Pye. The instructions in force under our base defense order issued by the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet stated that the commander of the base defense, the Commandant of the 14th Naval District, would advise the senior officer embarked as to the condition of readiness to be maintained.
29. General FRANK. That is the condition of readiness of the Fleet units?
Admiral Pye. Of the antiaircraft battery in the Fleet, yes.
30. General Grunert. Were the batteries aboard your vessels integrated in the antiaircraft defense on short, do you know, at that time?

Admiral Pye. I should say not; only to this extent; that we anticipated receiving from the shore the necessary warnings. There were orders to maintain certain guns manned, ready for action, and certain sectors assigned to the ships in port which they were particularly to guard against attack.

31. General Grunert. Then, you looked to the 14th Naval District and to the Army to give you warning of the approach of aircraft?

Admiral Pye. We did.

32. General Grunert. What at that time was your understanding as to the ability to give you such warning?

Admiral Pye. It was as my understanding that the Army had many observation posts in the periphery of the Island from which it would be possible to sight any approaching aircraft, and that we in the ships in port could certainly count on from three to five minutes' warning of any possible aviation attack. We had had air-raid drills in which the notice of the approach of aircraft had always been received from the Commandant of the 14th Naval District. This was the standard practice.

33. General Grunert. You received that information from the 14th Naval District?

Admiral Pye. Yes, sir.

34. General Grunert. You had no means of getting it directly from the Army air warning system?

Admiral Pye. No, sir.

35. General Grunert. You do not know where the 14th Naval District got its information?

Admiral Pye. No, sir; I should prefer not to answer any questions with relation to that.

36. General Grunert. Did you understand that these observation posts were ground observation posts: that was as distinguished from the radar system of observation?

Admiral Pye. Up to the time of the attack my only knowledge as regards the Army radar was that the installation was in progress and that various Army personnel were being trained in the radar in the ships.

37. General Grunert. This information that you got through drills and practice, from the 14th Naval District, do you know where that came from, whether from the Army air warning system or from these ground observation posts?

Admiral Pye. I cannot tell you, sir.

38. General Frank. May I ask a question?

Admiral Pye. Yes.

39. General Frank. You said that the Army personnel was getting training in the radar in the ships. You mean in the Naval craft?

Admiral Pye. Yes. We had a radar for some time in the ships. In order to facilitate this training, we had offered the services to train the radar personnel in the ships.

40. General Grunert. You took over command of the Pacific Fleet after the attack, didn't you, a little later?

Admiral Pye. Yes, sir; I think it was the 13th of December, and retained it for two weeks until Admiral Nimitz arrived.
42. General GRUNERT. Did you receive any such warning on December 7 as to the incoming Japanese planes?
Admiral PYE. I was not on board my flagship on the morning of December 7 until about 8:40. My Chief of Staff, however, reported to me that no such warning had been received.

43. General GRUNERT. Since December 7 has the same system of having task forces go out, or certain ones in and certain ones out, been kept up, or after the attack did they keep them out of the harbor most of the time?
Admiral PYE. They were kept out of the harbor fairly continuously for a period of about two weeks until it became fairly certain that the attacking force had retired from the immediate area. From that time on it became absolutely essential to permit the task forces to remain in port for periods up to a week or ten days in order properly to overhaul their material and receive supplies.

44. General GRUNERT. Do you know anything else that might assist the Board in getting facts about the Army that you would like to tell us, any leads on anything? We are after facts and we want to find out where they exist.
Admiral PYE. May I express personal opinions?

45. General GRUNERT. Absolutely.
Admiral PYE. I have served three times on the Joint Army and Navy Planning Committee. I served on the first Joint Army and Navy Planning Committee that was ever formed, which was in 1919. I served again from 1924 to 1927 on that committee. I was director of War Plans of the Navy in 1934 and Assistant Chief of Naval Operations and, as such, a member of the Joint Board from 1935 to 1937. I assisted in the first write-up of joint Army and Navy action in 1925, and again in 1935 I assisted in revising it. I have always been a great believer in unity of command and, in all these periods, continuously attempted to obtain a definite statement that in time of war the Hawaiian Islands would be put under unity of command. That was brought up before the Joint Board on several occasions, but we were never able to obtain a definite plan and put it into effect in advance of an act of war. I consider that the mutual cooperation which was in effect on December 7 was possibly as good as the Departments might have had reason to expect. I believe that there was very little difference between Admiral Kimmel and General Short as to their respective functions. Admiral Kimmel and his predecessor, Admiral Richardson, and, in fact, I think possibly all their predecessors in the Pacific, appeared to be of the opinion that a war in the Pacific could be fought from a ship as headquarters. I for many years had been constantly opposed to that idea and had continuously advocated that they recognize that in a war on the Pacific the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet would be merely a deputy of the Chief of Naval Operations in the Pacific Area. I had so advised Admiral Richardson while he was in command and advised him to move ashore and get at least one Army officer on his staff. He was relieved shortly thereafter, and when Admiral Kimmel took command I advised him the same thing. After about two or three months in command he became convinced that even with the approach of war he could not handle the necessary communications and the many details from the PENNSYLVANIA as his headquarters. He thereafter
moved his headquarters to the Submarine Base, and I became primarily responsible, as the senior officer afloat, for the training of the fleet. That was my particular function, to which I devoted all my time. I feel that the moving of the Commander-in-Chief's headquarters ashore greatly facilitated the cooperation between General Short and Admiral Kimmel, and that by Admiral Kimmel's direct order assigning the Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District as Base Defense Officer he definitely assigned further responsibility for coordination with the Army in matters affecting base defense. Admiral Kimmel also, with General Short's concurrence, did much to improve the cooperation between the respective air forces.

I should say, then, that in my opinion had unity of command been put into effect at least six months earlier, the coordination of forces would have been better, and I believe that the system of receiving intelligence would have been coordinated so that one officer, the officer exercising unity of command, would have been the sole receiver of intelligence from the two departments.

In other words, I think that the thing that was done immediately upon the outbreak of war should have been done at least six months earlier.

46. General Grunert. Assuming that they had unity of command, just what is in your mind when you say conditions could have been improved? You mentioned intelligence. Is there anything else beside intelligence, or is that the main thing that would have been improved?

Admiral Pye. I think it would have forced the two Departments to have gotten closer together had they had one man to deal with out there. In my opinion, the dealing of the naval officer with the Navy Department and the Army officer with the War Department left many things that could not be transmitted each to the other, and that consequently neither the General nor the Admiral was fully conversant with the situation as it appeared in Washington. I do not believe that the War Department and the Navy Department themselves had a common understanding of the situation. I think that had they had unity of command it would have forced the adoption of the system of the joint chiefs of staff of the Army and Navy and we would have had a better understanding of the situation.

47. General Grunert. Then the instruction to the Army or the Navy officer who had command under unity of command would stem from a joint source here, which would have been the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and not from their respective Chiefs of Staff or the Chief of Naval Operations?

Admiral Pye. Of course, the Joint Board was supposed to have a function. Along that line they could make recommendations which, if approved by the Secretaries, went into effect.

48. General Grunert. Still, on November 27 a message went to the Navy and on November 27 a message went to the Army. If there had been unity of command there ought to have been one message to the Commander-in-Chief over there?

Admiral Pye. Those two messages—I never saw the Army message until after December 7th—certainly gave entirely different implications.
49. General Grunert. It was testified before this Board that a war warning to the Navy did not carry with it the import that, if they had used the same wording, it would carry to the Army. In other words, was that term used more frequently in the Navy?

Admiral Pye. I do not think that the term had any peculiar significance. It was not a standard term; but as early as the Secretary of Navy's visit to the fleet in September, 1940, when he first came out there, he was always telling us that we were going to have war. On several occasions other messages came which indicated a very serious situation, and yet nothing happened. The reason that I put in my statement that that dispatch had a multiple addressee is that it affected the Asiatic Fleet. A war warning would have a broader application, due to the necessity for neutrality.

There was no question in our minds but what there was danger of war, but there was not necessarily danger of war between Japan and the United States. Yet, as applied to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, with his fleet, even though we remained neutral, he had certain duties that he must carry out and must recognize the nature of the situation. To my mind the words "war warning" meant nothing really significant, when everybody knew that there was danger of war. The implication to the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic, to my mind, was much more important than it was to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. Had the message stated "War with Japan appears imminent", there [1050] could have been no misunderstanding.

50. General Frank. Were you familiar, Admiral, with the arrangements for reconnaissance that had been worked out by the joint agreement between the two commanders?

Admiral Pye. Not sufficiently to be able to give any testimony with regard to it. My particular work was in training the fleet, and particularly the task force we had, and I had my hands full doing that. There are officers whose testimony would be much more accurate along that line than mine would be.

51. General Grunert. May I put a question in there in order that I may better understand the organization in the Navy? Take the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet: When that fleet, or part of it, is in the Fourteenth Naval District, is the Fourteenth Naval District then directly under the Commander-in-Chief, or if he goes out, is it under the Commander-in-Chief? I do not quite understand the relationship between the district and the fleet.

Admiral Pye. The District's only responsibility in regard to the fleet is in assisting in its entry and sorties from home. They provide an air cover and antisubmarine local units of minesweepers, and everything like that. As soon as the fleet gets out of the channel, it becomes a responsibility of the Task Force Commander. The Commander-in-Chief when he was afloat oftentimes would not take tactical command. Several times he did operate in the task force of which I had command; and before he had gone ashore permanently I was commander of the task force and had full tactical control. He would issue no orders whatsoever unless he returned it to himself by signalling "Commander-in-Chief now assumes tactical control." The minute the units [1051] get outside of the channel, the tactical control is in the task force commander.
52. General GRUNERT. The Admiral of the fleet being ashore and the District commander being ashore, in this system of cooperation and coordination it is then up to the Army commander to coordinate with both of them, or has he one naval man to look to for that cooperation for the Navy?

Admiral PYE. I should say he would have two functions.

53. General GRUNERT. Where is the division of functions, as far as the Navy is concerned between the Admiral of the fleet and the Admiral of the District?

Admiral PYE. Just about the same, I should say, as it probably is between General Eisenhower and General Bradley. The Commander-in-Chief is the over-all man for policies, organization, and general directions.

54. General FRANK. Even when the fleet was in Pearl Harbor and was under the shelter of the District commander, the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet would still have commanded his fleet?

Admiral PYE. The trouble is that Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet is a misnomer. If you will try to think of it, as to his functions and duty, as actually Deputy Chief of Naval Operations in the Pacific, because the fleet has been broken up into units so that no one can command them. Each task force commander is given an order before he goes out on a mission, as to what he has to do, and he is responsible for doing that.

At the time that we had these exercises, frequently those forces would be put under me, as I mentioned, for further training, such as the training of the air force. I was the one that did it. Although I was not Commander-in-Chief of the fleet, [1052] I was in command of all those forces at sea, and once or twice, even when the Commander-in-Chief went out with us, he simply rode around and I acted as tactical commander. The title of Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet was all right before the war. He was afloat. But the minute he moved ashore he really became Deputy Chief of Naval Operations.

55. General GRUNERT. There were two commanders ashore that the Army commander had to cooperate with?

Admiral PYE. I should say that the Commander-in-Chief, as regards policies, and the Commander of the Naval District as regards coordination of activities.

56. General GRUNERT. But he looked to both of them apparently to get information.

Admiral PYE. You mean, the Commander-in-Chief looked to both of them?

57. General GRUNERT. No; the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department looked to both of them to get information. They both had information services, did they not?

Admiral PYE. Yes; but the information service of the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District was a comparatively local service, whereas the intelligence service of the Commander-in-Chief was a broad picture.

58. General GRUNERT. When the Commander-in-Chief was afloat and went out, how then did the Army get information from that intelligence service?

Admiral PYE. That is one reason it would not work, and nobody else could get it—because oftentimes you have to have radio silence.
When they could send things to him he could not send anything back without giving away his position. That is the reason why many of us fully realized within the last 20 [1053] years that in a war in the Pacific the man that was going in over-all control out there had to be ashore where he could receive communications and where he could send them and where he could have a place and staff big enough to handle the work. There is not on board ship adequate space for the commander of a force of that nature.

59. General GRUNERT. Then there could have been times when intelligence that the Navy had could not be transmitted to the Army promptly or at all?

Admiral Pye. I think that would have been, of course, entirely up to the Commander-in-Chief, if they were at sea, as to whether he desired to break radio silence. If he thought it was of sufficient importance to break radio silence it could unquestionably have gotten to him. In addition to that, most information that came from the Navy Department came multiple addressed to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. I presume he had orders to keep the General informed of what he had received.

60. General GRUNERT. If the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet were out with his staff, including his intelligence, then the source for the Army to look to was the District?

Admiral Pye. After he realized the difficulties that were going to be attendant on carrying out operations in the Pacific he immediately, after he moved ashore, enlarged his staff, and when he went to sea after that he took only about four of his staff officers with him in the ship and left the others ashore.

61. General GRUNERT. You being the first naval witness who has appeared here, we are likely to go far afield in getting our information from you.

62. General FRANK. I think I asked you the question, when I [1054] started, Admiral, if you were familiar with the agreement between the Army commander and the Navy commander out there with respect to the responsibility for reconnaissance.

Admiral Pye. It was two years and eight months ago; and whether I knew that before December 7th or not I do not know, but I certainly knew it on December 7th.

63. General FRANK. You were familiar with the fact that in accordance with that agreement the Navy took over responsibility for distant reconnaissance?

Admiral Pye. Yes.

64. General FRANK. And the Army conducted close-in reconnaissance which extended not more than about 30 miles from shore?

Admiral Pye. Yes.

65. General FRANK. It therefore was the responsibility of the Navy to give information of any source beyond a distance of about 30 miles?

Admiral Pye. I should say you could interpret it that way.

66. General GRUNERT. We might say, aside from the Army's own way of getting information through its own facilities, meaning radar.

67. General FRANK. I would like to develop a little bit for our own information the naval reconnaissance system. The Navy were sending out task forces continuously, were they not?

Admiral Pye. Yes.
68. General Frank. They were under the commander of the fleet? Admiral Pye. They were operating under orders from him, each, however, when at sea, directly under the responsibility of the task force commander.

69. General Frank. But the task force commander's immediate superior was the fleet commander at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Pye. The Commander-in-Chief; yes.

70. General Frank. And in addition, the Navy was conducting a patrol with P. B. Y. boats?

Admiral Pye. That is correct.

71. General Frank. And they were under the District commander?

Admiral Pye. They were under the District commander; yes.

72. General Frank. What I would like to find out if I can is this: Did you depend primarily on P. B. Y. reconnaissance for the purpose of information and security against hostile attack, or primarily on surface reconnaissance of the task forces, or both? Do you see what I am trying to get?

Admiral Pye. I see what you are trying to get, but I think you are assuming that a condition of war existed, whereas it did not. I do not feel that there was any set definite reconnaissance against hostile attack other than observation to determine if possible the presence of enemy submarines. But you have right here Admiral Bloch, who was the Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District, and Admiral Bellinger, who is available, as commander of the air force.

73. General Grunert. You are the first one from the Navy that has appeared before us here.

Admiral Pye. If you want to go into details on that, you have witnesses available who are more capable of giving you information than I am, because, as I say, I was not primarily concerned with that part of it.

74. General Frank. In view of the fact that the Navy was responsible for this distant reconnaissance and in view of the fact that you have just stated that you thought that unity of command would have helped this situation, I would like to ask if there was any set definite reconnaissance against hostile attack other than observation to determine if possible the presence of enemy submarines. But you have right here Admiral Bloch, who was the Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District, and Admiral Bellinger, who is available, as commander of the air force.

Admiral Pye. Only insofar as I feel quite convinced that had there been unity of command there the two departments also would have been better coordinated in the materiel and forces which they made available to their respective commanders; and in addition, there were available in Pearl Harbor several squadrons of B-24's which were perfectly capable of assisting the Navy and did assist the Navy from December 7th on, in making reconnaissance flights. These, though, were not used before December 7th because of the contention of the Air Force Commander that they were inadequately trained for long-distance reconnaissance.

75. General Frank. That is, the Navy air force commander?

Admiral Pye. The Army Air Force Commander. These were B-24's.

76. General Frank. The Army had B-24's?

Admiral Pye. Yes. You better check that up; but I am quite certain that there were some there that were not used.
77. General Frank. I think the testimony indicates that they had something like 8 or 10 B-17's.
Admiral Pye. It was B-17's, not B-24's.
78. General Frank. Admiral, you made a point of the fact that war had not been declared.
Admiral Pye. That is correct.
79. General Frank. And we were still at peace. Do you know whether or not the officers of the Navy generally were familiar with the warning messages that had been sent from Washington to the fleet commander about the critical situation and imminence of war?
[1057] Admiral Pye. I do not know to what extent the Commander-in-Chief had informed other responsible Commanders.
80. General Frank. What I am leading to is, what in your opinion was the frame of mind of the rank and file with respect to the immediate possibility of war, as to an immediate attack? Were they war-minded, at that time?
Admiral Pye. I should say no, they were not. I think their reason for this was due to the attitude taken by both the War and Navy Departments in respect to the requests for additional forces for the Pacific. Although, as early as April 1941, the situation was said to be serious, in June of the same year the Navy Department detached from the Pacific Fleet one battleship division, one light cruiser division, and two destroyer divisions, to send into the Atlantic. It hardly seemed to the Commanders in the Pacific that if the situation was as bad as it was said to be, that was the time to be moving a large portion of our Fleet into the Atlantic, when the British Fleet, itself, was many times superior to the available German ships.
During this same period it became most difficult for the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet to obtain patrol planes or even to obtain carrier planes, and, up to December 7, not even all of the carriers were equipped with their normal number of planes.
81. General Frank. That is, with their full complement?
Admiral Pye. Their full complement. They did not have them. All of these failures to indicate the importance, by acts rather than by words, I feel quite certain, led to the almost uniform opinion that while war probably was in the offing, if it came, it would be upon the initiative of the United States.
82. General Frank. Were you familiar with the fact that, along somewhere between the 25th of November and the 1st of December, the Navy knew there was a Japanese task force at Jaluit?
Admiral Pye. I never have heard that.
83. General Frank. You did not know that?
Admiral Pye. No.
84. General Frank. And at that time you were second in command of the Fleet?
Admiral Pye. I do not know whether the Commander-in-Chief knew it, or not. I don't recall its ever having been mentioned to me.
85. General Frank. I have nothing further.
Admiral Pye. There is one point that I would like to make, just as long as this is a general discussion of the thing.
There are quite a few people who seem to feel that the situation in Honolulu was quite similar to that which existed at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, at Port Arthur. I would just like to point out that there were several differences in the situations.
In the first place, even at Port Arthur, the Japanese had broken off diplomatic relations with the Russians, on February 6, two days before the attack at Port Arthur, and, in the letter breaking off those diplomatic relations, they informed the Russian Government that they reserved the right to take such independent action as they might deem necessary, or words [1059] to that effect. In other words, adequate notice was given, both of the fact that the negotiations were at an end, and that the Japanese Government intended to take independent action.

The second great difference was, that the Japanese, in order to obtain their objective, had to land in Korea, or in the vicinity of Port Arthur. The only forces which could oppose these landings effectively were the Russian ships in Port Arthur and at Chinnampo. Therefore, the attack on the fleet was a necessary and decisive tactical victory, which led to a favorable strategic situation; whereas the attack on the United States Fleet at Pearl Harbor, although a tactical victory, was the worst thing that they could do, from the point of the long or broad strategical point of view, because it aroused the United States in a way in which no other action could have done. With the very uncertain political situation existing in the United States previous to December 7, it is quite possible that had the Japanese avoided attacking the Fleet in Honolulu or the Philippines, many months would have gone by before the United States would actually have entered the war.

It was also different in this respect, that under the conditions existing in the Philippines and in the Australian and New Zealand areas, in regard to fuel oil, it would have been impossible for the United States Fleet to operate in the vicinity of the Philippine Islands in such a way as to have assisted in its defense.

The fact that they did attack our Fleet was to my mind the biggest psychological blunder that any nation ever made, [1069] because it united our Nation in the war effort to an extent which made their ultimate victory impossible.

86. General GRUNERT. In that line, do you think it was necessary to have a disaster? If the attack had not been so successful as it was but had just been an attack with a certain amount of damage, do you think that it would have aroused the Nation to the extent necessary to make that a strategical error?

Admiral PYE. In all probability. I am not stating that we had to lose all those ships, in order to have that effect. I do consider, though, judging it from the point of view of enemy intentions, that it was a capability, but it was not one which one would normally anticipate their using if their psychology was the same as ours. I cannot conceive that we would have done such a thing, even from the point of view of its ill effect on the ultimate results of the war.

87. General GRUNERT. We are delighted to get all this, but possibly General Russell has some things more to the point.

88. General RUSSELL. There are two or three subjects I wanted to develop.

Admiral, in your appearance before the Roberts Commission, you discussed this subject of obtaining information on the movements of the Japanese Fleet and possible Japanese action at a distance away from Honolulu, in the Mandate Islands, and in the homelands of the Japanese, and you expressed, there, the sentiment or the belief
that it was a great handicap to the American operations, not to know what was going on in the Mandate and in the Japanese homeland.

Admiral Pye. It has been two years and eight months since that testimony, General!

[1061] 89. General Russell. Well, let us get out of that meeting and get back to the Pacific, and see what we can work out.

Admiral Pye. Was that in relation to our inability to visit those islands during that long period in which they were preparing their defenses?

90. General Russell. Yes. This approaches this particular problem from another angle entirely.

Is it true, or not, that if a Japanese convoy in which there might be as many as six carriers should get to within a distance from which planes could be launched for an attack on the Hawaiian Islands, is it not true that reaching that point with a relatively large number of carriers and fighter planes would insure more or less a successful operation to the Japanese?

Admiral Pye. You mean under the conditions that existed in so far as defense is concerned, on December 7?

91. General Russell. Under the conditions that existed at Honolulu, if they could get to within 200 to 300 miles of the Islands with 175 to 200 planes on six carriers, and could launch those before being discovered, is it not a fact that they might expect a reasonable degree of success from that operation?

Admiral Pye. Yes; I think so.

92. General Russell. Then is it not true, Admiral, that there was placed upon the Navy a very serious burden or mission of preventing a convoy of that kind from reaching a point from which this attack could be launched?

Admiral Pye. That also is true on the assumption that you are anticipating such an attack, and that you have adequate material with which to do it. I tried to point out that I believe the minds of the military people in Honolulu were exactly the same as it was in Washington. I do not believe the people in Washington expected the attack any more than the people in Honolulu.

93. General Russell. Do you mean to say, Admiral, therefore, that the reason a convoy of that sort was permitted by the Navy to reach a point so near Hawaii was because you just did not expect that sort of convoy to come there?

Admiral Pye. I don't think we could have stopped it, General, if we had expected it, because there were not enough planes available, and for a month, the Commander-in-Chief had been trying to get more planes, so that, if the situation did arise, he would have enough; but there certainly were not enough, there, for several months.

After the attack, when we did try to extend the air patrol out to 800 miles, we did not have planes enough. We could not get planes enough to be sure that every sector was covered. We on all occasions had to use short-range planes for anywhere from a third to a half of the circle. Admiral Bellinger can give you the figures as to the required number of planes to complete such a reconnaissance each day, but it was far in excess of what the Navy had available on December 7.
94. General Russell. Then as the situation existed in November, from the standpoint of equipment and matériel, it could have been reasonably anticipated that the Japanese could reach, with a convoy, a point near enough to Pearl Harbor to enable them to launch this attack?
Admiral Pye. Anticipated as a thing they didn’t do.

95. General Russell. I do not think we are talking about the same thing, Admiral. You state it was impossible to have detected such a convoy moving to within striking distance of the Hawaiian Islands, because you just did not have the reconnaissance means to search it out and locate it?
Admiral Pye. No, General, I did not say it was impossible, had you happened to send out your reconnaissance planes that were available in that particular area. I said that there were an inadequate number of planes to assure that all the areas from which such an attack could be made were covered.

96. General Russell. Then we come back to my question: Everybody in the conferences between the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department and the Commanding General of the Pacific Fleet, in their estimate of Japanese possibilities and probabilities, must have known that it was barely possible, but not probable, that the Japanese could get within striking distance of us, and we would not have known?
Admiral Pye. My personal opinion is in accord with yours; but as long as you have both of those gentlemen available for witnesses, I think you should ask them.

97. General Russell. Admiral, you were commanding that Fleet, out there, at the time, and, later, you became the Commander of everything out there, did you not?
Admiral Pye. I was not in command of anything that pertained to the reconnaissance. I had nothing whatsoever to do with it.

98. General Russell. When you put your ships into the Port at Pearl Harbor, you did not lose interest in the possibility of their being destroyed, I am sure.

[1064] Admiral Pye. I didn’t lose interest in that. I lost confidence in the people whose job it was.

99. General Russell. Whose job was it?
Admiral Pye. The Commander in charge of the Pacific Fleet, of course, had the overall responsibility, so far as the activities of naval forces were concerned. The Commandant of the 14th Naval District was in charge of all of the activities of the planes, including the available patrol planes. Under him was Admiral Bellinger, Commander of that portion of the Naval Air Force based on the shore. Those are the three who had direct responsibility for the reconnaissance.

100. General Russell. Now, Admiral, to return to the possibility of the Japanese attack, do you think it was important, in determining what the Japanese might do, for the Navy or the Army, one or both, to have conducted rather active reconnaissance in the mandated islands?
Admiral Pye. Under the conditions that were existing at the time, no. I think that such an effort could or may have been made by the direct order of the Navy Department, but it might reasonably have been interpreted by the Japanese as an act of war.
101. General Russell. Why would looking at what was going on in the mandated islands by us have been an act of war?

Admiral Pye. Primarily, because of the fact that for fifteen or twenty years the Navy Department had asked the State Department to get the Japanese permission for some of our ships to visit the Mandate Islands, and those requests had been constantly refused by the Japanese Government; and even at the time of the search for Amelia Earhart, they became very much put out because some of our planes entered that general area.

102. General Russell. Admiral, in your appearance before the Roberts Commission, you testified, discussing the Mandates:

We had certain free ports, but Admiral Standley can verify that when we tried to get ships in there, we didn’t have any luck. They were “free ports,” but not to us.

Admiral Pye. That is correct. According to the treaty under which the mandates were given to Japan, we had the right to visit those places, but the State Department never stood up to our rights, and always, when a request was made for permission, it was turned down—time after time.

103. General Russell. So as a fact, Admiral, it had come to pass that in those months prior to December 7, 1941, because of the experiences which you have just narrated, the Navy made no effort to determine what was going on in the mandated islands?

Admiral Pye. To the best of my knowledge, no particular efforts were made, with the exception, which I would like to have verified by Admiral Bellinger, that, on several occasions, I believe we did get the Pan American people to get off their course a little bit to see what they could see on their way down to Guam; but we never got very much from it.

104. General Russell. In your testimony, discussing this matter with General Grunert or with General Frank, you stated that you needed three to five minutes’ notice of the approach of a hostile air force. In estimating this time requirement, did you have in mind the condition of readiness of your ships, on the morning of December 7?

Admiral Pye. Yes. The Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet had issued an order. I could not state the date, but it was early in the spring of 1941, he issued an order that certain antiaircraft guns should be manned, ready for action. That number was for two 5-inch guns and two machine guns on each capital ship. These guns and their control were manned in this respect, that the crews were on deck though not immediately at the guns, and were allowed to perform duty in the immediate vicinity of their guns. The ammunition for the guns was in ready boxes on the same deck, so that they were brought into action in a very short period of time. It was estimated that all of the ships had their guns operating in less than five minutes: some of them, much earlier.

105. General Russell. Now, one other subject, Admiral. You state that on the 27th of November, or thereabout, with your task force at sea, you received an order from the Commander-in-Chief, directing that you take some action; and I believe that in your testimony before the Roberts Commission you referred to that as “going onto No. 3” defense, that was the lowest of the three. Do you recall that?

Admiral Pye. No, I don’t recall that.
106. General Russell. I hand you the record of your testimony, and I will ask you to state whether or not that refreshes your recollection on that matter.

Admiral Pye. That condition 3, it is true, is the lowest condition of readiness, but that is a condition which applies to the ships at sea and it is not the same as this condition of readiness of the base. Condition 1 is the "all battle stations [1067] manned;" condition 2 required half of the battle stations to be manned, including the main battery; and condition 3 required antiaircraft defense, but it did not require the main battery to go in.

107. General Russell. This was not particularly familiar to me, and I am asking now if it was this defense 3 which you went into as a result of the message of November 27?

Admiral Pye. Yes.

108. General Russell. And that was "antiair?"

Admiral Pye. "Antiair;" and of course those are doubling up their guns, and constitute for the most part the same defense against submarines, if you get a chance to shoot at them, although your primary defense against submarines of course is the destroyer torpedo, itself; but that is true, so far as the battleships are concerned.

109. General Russell. Admiral Pye, up to the time that an approaching attacking force reached the limit of the reconnaissance of the Army forces, the task or the job of discovering and attacking that force was the mission of the Navy, was it not?

Admiral Pye. Yes, I think that can be stated.

110. General Russell. That is all.

Admiral Pye. There is one thing along that line, though, that I think should be definitely pointed out—that the Army observation posts are fixed posts, supposed to be constantly manned, whereas reconnaissance by airplanes is not a permanent thing, and it can only be carried out to the limit of the facilities immediately available.

111. General Grunert. I have one more question.

On the assumption that the attack, under the conditions [1068] in consideration of the means available, could not have been prevented, is it not reasonable to assume that with adequate preparedness measures the enemy carriers after the attack could have been located and destroyed?

Admiral Pye. Hardly, within the capacity of the forces available. I think he stated the number of B-17s was something like eight or ten, and the number of Navy patrol planes was practically nil; after the attack. It was a very great question whether, even if the force could have been located, it could have been seriously damaged.

[1069] 112. General Grunert. The reason I put that question is that we have had some testimony or something read to the effect that various ones were being blamed for not back-tracking these returning attacking planes; and if nothing could be done about it, what is the use of back-tracking them?

Admiral Pye. There were other forces at sea: the two carriers of Task Force 2 which was several hundred miles to the westward of Pearl Harbor on the morning of this attack. One of those carriers had been out to Midway to put in some marine fighting planes, and the other one had been to Wake. Had we been able to locate the Japanese force of ships after the attack, it is quite possible that these two carriers would have been able to intercept them. One of the car-
riers did send up her planes for a complete reconnaissance, and late in the afternoon one of the planes reported contact with an enemy carrier. Upon receiving this report all bomber and torpedo planes of the carrier were launched to make the attack, but they found that the report was erroneous and the object which had been reported was in effect a low cloud on the horizon, rather than an enemy carrier.

Up to this time not many attempts had been made to land bombers and torpedo planes on board ship after dark, and these planes, when it was discovered that there really was no enemy there, were ordered to proceed to Pearl Harbor, and that is the group which, you may receive testimony, was fired upon by our own ships as they came in that night.

113. General GRUNERT. Are there any more questions?
114. General FRANK. Admiral, I take it from your testimony that you did not anticipate this attack, that it was a surprise.

[1076] Admiral PYE. It was.

115. General FRANK. Was that generally the situation among officers in the Navy?

Admiral PYE. I think so.

116. General FRANK. Another thing I gathered was that, from your viewpoint, the Navy did not have adequate means to prevent a surprise.

Admiral PYE. I believe that to be true, yes. In confirmation of my previous statement that I thought the attitude of the officers of the Fleet was just about the same as the attitude of the War and Navy Departments. I happened to be the first person to meet Secretary Knox upon his arrival in the Hawaiian Islands about the 10th of December, and the first thing he said to me was, "No one in Washington expected such an attack—even Kelly Turner." Admiral Kelly Turner was in the War Plans Division, was the most aggressive-minded of all. I believe that to be confirmation of the situation as it existed here in the Departments, and I do not think it was very far different than what existed in the Fleet.

117. General GRUNERT. Admiral, thank you very much. We appreciate your coming over.

Admiral PYE. Thank you, sir.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

[1071] TESTIMONY OF COMMANDER WILLIAM E. G. TAYLOR, QUONSET NAVAL AIR STATION, CHARLESTOWN, R. I.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel WEST. Commander, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Commander TAYLOR. Commander William E. G. Taylor, attached to the staff of Commander Fleet Air, Quonset Naval Air Station, Charlestown, Rhode Island.

2. General GRUNERT. Commander, this Board is making an attempt to get at the facts as to the background and what led up to and what happened in the attack at Hawaii. Through reading of the Roberts Commission report we assume that you have some facts that will be of value to us, primarily along the line of your assistance to the Army, your being loaned to the Army, I believe, to assist in putting in the air warning service and toward the interceptor command.
Commander Taylor. Yes, sir.
3. General Grunert. And General Frank will lead in propounding the questions, and the other members will try to keep from butting in until he gets through, but then we shall expand on it if necessary.
4. General Frank. To what organization in the Navy did you belong in October, November, December of 1941?
   Commander Taylor. I was attached to the Bureau of Aeronautics and was on temporary duty with Admiral Halsey's staff.
5. General Frank. You were associated with the Army in Honolulu, in Hawaii, in the establishment of the aircraft [1072] warning service, were you not?
   Commander Taylor. Yes, sir, at the request of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force.
6. General Frank. Were you over there for full time or part time, or just what was the arrangement?
   Commander Taylor. The arrangement was verbal and informal. I was told to report to Interceptor Command by Admiral Kimmel's staff, and I worked with them full time there.
7. General Frank. With whom particularly did you work in association over there?
   Commander Taylor. I worked very closely with the Operations Officer of the Interceptor Command; his name was Captain—
8. General Frank. Bergquist?
   Commander Taylor. Bergquist; yes, sir.
9. General Frank. Tindal also?
   Commander Taylor. Yes, sir.
10. General Grunert. Captain Powell?
    Commander Taylor. There was one Captain of the Signal Corps whose name I can't recall. Is that he?
11. General Frank. Powell,
    Commander Taylor. Captain Powell.
12. Major Clausen. He is a Colonel now.
    Commander Taylor. He may be.
13. General Frank. He was then Captain, now Colonel, Powell.
    Commander Taylor. Yes, sir.
14. General Frank. When did you go over to assist the air force?
    Commander Taylor. It was somewhere in the second week of [1073] November, sir. I am not sure of my dates.
15. General Frank. At that time had the permanent radar sets, the 271s, arrived?
    Commander Taylor. No, sir. They had, I think it was, five 270s around the Island, no 271s. They were on their way; they had not arrived.
16. General Frank. I see. Where was the information center? Shafter?
    Commander Taylor. The information center was off the reservation at Shafter. They had set up a special temporary information center.
17. General Frank. Just where was it? Underground? Above-ground?
    Commander Taylor. No, sir; this was above-ground, across the main road from Shafter, a temporary wooden house.
18. General Frank. Over in the antiaircraft cantonment?
    Commander Taylor. No, sir; it was, I thought, a special cantonment of its own.
19. General Frank. They did have a certain number of 270 sets? Commander Taylor. Yes, they had five, as I remember.

20. General Frank. They had been placed in position?
Commander Taylor. When I joined the Interceptor Command they were in position. They had just been sighted. They had crews who were just learning to operate them. The communication lines were either all in, between the radar sets themselves and the information center, or were within the next few days; and there were a combination of either commercial land lines or Signal Corps field lines that were laid in.

21. General Frank. So that they could be operated with commercial current?[1074]
Commander Taylor. Yes, sir.

22. General Frank. All of them?
Commander Taylor. There were all in. Within 2 or 3 days of the time I got there there were communications established between the sets themselves and the communication center.

23. General Frank. And could they all be operated with commercial current?
Commander Taylor. That I do not know, sir. I think they were almost all operated at that time with auxiliary power.

24. General Frank. Yes. When was the first test at which time an effort was made to determine whether or not they could operate as a system, an integrated system?
Commander Taylor. There was never a complete test run, sir. until after the attack, because we never had all the positions manned. We had practice tests; I don't remember from what date.

25. General Frank. That is what I mean.
Commander Taylor. I can approximate it from the date of a meeting that I have the briefs of here (referring to papers).

On the 24th of November we had a meeting consisting of Colonel Murphy, Acting Signal Officer of the Hawaiian Department; Lieutenant Commander Coe, from Patrol Wing 2; Major Tindal, 18th Bombardment Wing; myself; Captain Bergquist, 14th Pursuit Wing; Lieutenant White, Signal Corps, Hawaiian Department; Lieutenant Harville, 53rd Coast Artillery; and Lieutenant Thomas, 86th Observation Squadron (Support Command).

At the time of this meeting on 24 November the five 270s were operating with a skeleton crew. Communication lines were[1075] established between the 270s and the information center itself, but there were no communication lines from the information center itself to the various outlying activities.

26. General Frank. That is, to the operating?
Commander Taylor. The operating. They had one main line to the switchboard at Wheeler Field, but the other lines were not in. They had positions for all of the liaison officers.

27. General Frank. There were no lines in to the Navy and to the Anticraft and to Hickam Field, and so forth?
Commander Taylor. No, sir. We had, I think, a sufficient number of plotters to man two watches only, who were untrained, and the number one object was to get those men to start training at once.

The first difficulty we found with the setup at the information center was, it was too large for the area that we could cope with. In
other words, it was set up very much like the Boston or the New York information center, which is a general air warning system rather than a combination air warning system and interception system. The main plotting table had the—I think they had a radius of roughly 200 miles, which was well outside of the radar search area. The plotting table itself was too small in scale to make interceptions on; so that we first of all had to make an overlay on a smaller scale of the Oahu area, and I imagine that it took something in the neighborhood of another week after 24 November before we got the new overlay painted on the table and got the plotters in for our first practice. From that time on were spent as much time plotting the aircraft in the vicinity, [1076] giving the plotters practice, giving the radar operators at the different 270s practice. We went to each one of the 270s in turn and discussed the method of reporting to the information center.

28. General Frank. Were positive, vigorous efforts being made to train as rapidly as possible all of the people concerned with the operation of the A. W. S.?

Commander Taylor. As much as then Captain Paul Bergquist and myself could do. We had to spend a great deal of time in conferences with practically every activity in Hawaii, trying to get a general liaison between all of the activities that were being tied in with the information center, and to get the manpower to run it.

29. General Frank. Were the plotters enlisted or civilian?

Commander Taylor. They were enlisted, sir.

30. General Frank. Was any effort made to get girls?

Commander Taylor. Not at that time, sir. I do not think the question of bringing in girls had come up at that point.

31. General Grunert. I am afraid I shall have to butt in here with one thing. I am afraid I will miss the opportunity.

Had you known that war was in the offing or that the enemy might strike early in December, by working day and night or what was necessary to get that thing in shape, could it have been in shape?

Commander Taylor. Yes, sir. In this brief here we figure that if we had the manpower and the effort behind it we could have had the information center going satisfactorily within two weeks' time. There was only one weak point.

32. General Frank. Within two weeks' time from when?

[1077] Commander Taylor. From the date of this conference, which was on 24 November.

33. General Frank. That would have put the ultimate date when?

34. General Russell. December 5th.

35. General Frank. With respect to this meeting that you had for the purpose of organizing the details of the A. W. S. and coordinating its activities, will you give us a resume of what was covered at that meeting?

Commander Taylor. Yes, sir. It was decided that, although considerable equipment was on order and planned for the operation of the information center, the equipment would not be available for some time to come. Therefore every effort should be made to make the best use of the equipment on hand by the proper coordination of all various military and naval and civilian activities and equipment.
36. General Frank. What equipment was it that was not going to be available?

Commander Taylor. It was mainly the proper permanent communications system for the air warning system, the permanent derax stations, the permanent communication lines, and mainly the physical communications throughout the radar equipment.

It was felt that the information center could be made to function adequately within the next two weeks. We found after that, after this, to qualify it, that that would be except for the air-to-ground radio communications. We learned that we could not keep contact with the fighter aircraft more than five miles offshore with the communication equipment we had at that time.

37. General Frank. That was for intercepts?

[1078] Commander Taylor. Yes, sir. It was agreed that the function of the Information Center was of sufficient importance that the watch officers representing the various activities in this area should be carefully selected as principal, rather than excess officers, when assigned. In other words, they were willing to give us their excess officers if they could find them, but we wanted principal officers.

38. General Frank. You wanted good ones?

Commander Taylor. Yes, sir. It was felt that intelligence and training in the Information Center, rather than age, rank and experience, would be desirable in the selection of these officers.

It was realized that a great deal of detail work is necessary to get the Information Center coordinated with outlying activities. It was therefore desirable to have the Information Center manned at the earliest possible moment so that all hands would be trained.

It was felt that the then present mobile R. D. F. equipment was not all that might be hoped for, and it was agreed that the antiaircraft equipment might be tied in to it.

It was brought out that considerable confusion during recent exercises had been caused by the great number of airplanes operating around the Island at all times. They were not identified. It was felt that this could be brought under control in three ways:

(a) By having all aircraft flights reported to the Information Center by parent units through their Operations Rooms.
(b) By enforcing the Aircraft Approach Procedure.
(c) By requiring all planes approaching the Island of Oahu to report their position at least 60 miles at sea, before [1079] coming in.

39. General Frank. In other words, to bring them under permissive control of the Interceptor Command?

Commander Taylor. Yes, sir. There was no other means of identifying him.

In this connection, it was brought out that the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, had ordered radio silence of all aircraft during joint exercises. It was suggested that this be discussed with the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, for decision as to the value of radio silence as security.

The question of IFF was raised as a possible solution to eliminate confusion in determining whether aircraft approaching the Island were friend or foe.
40. **General Frank.** "IFF" means Identification, Friend or Foe?
**Commander Taylor.** Yes, sir. It was realized that it would be a very long time before all aircraft could be equipped with IFF, in addition to which it was believed that the present IFF did not operate on all these RDF frequencies, and it was therefore decided that this was not a reliable solution for some time to come.

It was brought out that considerable equipment had been withdrawn from the Interceptor Command and the Hawaiian Air Force for the use of the Ferry Command. This was mainly radio equipment.

41. **General Frank.** I do not believe it is quite plain about IFF. Will you explain that very briefly as to the use of IFF so as to clear up the fact that through IFF you could identify the airplanes?
**Commander Taylor.** The airborne IFF is an electrical transmitting device used for the purpose of identifying friendly aircraft. In November, 1941, there were several various types of IFF in use, each one taking a special type of interrogating or challenging device.

It was decided of value to investigate the possibility of using the Information Center to operate Ferry Command, to eliminate any duplication and make available as much of this equipment as possible.

42. **General Frank.** What was the nature of the equipment?
**Commander Taylor.** It was mainly radio equipment powerful enough to operate the device offshore. It also had direction-finding equipment.

43. **General Grunert.** By whose authority was this equipment so changed?
**Commander Taylor.** I do not really know who did it, sir.

44. **General Grunert.** You do not know whether it was the Commanding General of the Air Force or the Commanding General of the Department?
**Commander Taylor.** No, sir. I do remember that at that time the Ferry Command enjoyed a very powerful and secret position and was able to get better equipment and that the Interceptor Command was not.

Without knowing all of the details of the Ferry Command's problems, the possibility of using the Information Center for this purpose was not clear. However, it was felt that the Information Center was probably better equipped to handle Ferry Command flights. In this connection it was brought out that Ferry Command operations are carried on under conditions of great secrecy. This was held to be no obstacle, as the Information Center could be operated with the greatest degree of security at all times.

43. **The questions of gun control of ships in the harbor during air raids was discussed, and it was decided that this question should be taken up with the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet.**

It was felt that the air-to-ground radio equipment at present available was not the best that could be hoped for, and it was therefore decided to investigate the possibility of utilizing other Army, Navy, Coast Guard or civilian radio facilities in the event of an emergency, if not at present.
As there had been some difficulties in the procedure for requesting telephone circuits for the Information Center, that is, requests had to be made of each of the many activities on the far end of the circuits, this question was presented to Colonel Murphy. Colonel Murphy agreed that all requests for circuits should and could be made by the Information Center.

It was agreed that all air-to-ground and air-to-ship radio procedure, of fighters at least, should be standardized. In view of a recent Bureau of Aeronautics, Navy Department letter to this effect, it was believed that all naval fighter squadrons were using the British system.

It was decided that communications liaison was vitally important and therefore all activities should be approached with a view of coordinating communications facilities to the best advantage of all concerned.

It was decided to investigate the probability or possibility of using naval ship-board radar to supplement the land-based RDF under all conditions of emergency; also to determine the most efficient method of communications between the Ships Warning Net and the Information Center.

45. General Frank. Generally speaking, what was the situation [1082] with respect to equipment and training, on December 7, with respect to the A. W. S.?

Commander Taylor. On December 7 the plotters were reasonably well trained to watch and able to do checking without any controller on the plane. The only source of controllers we could find was to see the Squadron Commander of the Pursuit Squadrons at Wheeler Field. They were themselves very busy training their squadrons and had just received new, green pilots and were trying to get them into shape and, therefore, could not spend much time learning their complicated organization. We had no liaison people to man any of the positions. Therefore none of them were trained.

46. General Frank. What about equipment?

Commander Taylor. The equipment itself? On December 7 all the communication lines were in; the radar stations; the Derax equipment was working satisfactorily enough to give air warning and possibly to make interceptions. The air-to-ground radio equipment was not satisfactory for interception work, but it was possible that enough advance information could be given to pilots so that they could come back without being intercepted.

47. General Frank. The radio equipment that would have enabled control through interception a reasonable distance offshore had been given to the Ferry Command?

Commander Taylor. Yes, sir.

48. General Frank. What was the situation with respect to the supply of spare parts and spare tubes for the radar equipment?

Commander Taylor. That I do not know, sir. The Derax station seemed to be operating satisfactorily during the periods we were operating. There were a few Marines Corps 270's on the Island, which we later got hold of and put into place the train- [1083] ing. We put one of them actually into operation. They had some source of supply there. I do not know how great their source of materials and supplies was at the time.
49. General Frank. Generally speaking, then, the situation with respect to the organization and operation of the A. W. S. system was that it was about two weeks off?

Commander Taylor. Two weeks off. The only thing that was not carried through after this meeting to bring the thing into operation at the end of two weeks was the manpower to operate it.

50. General Frank. And the training of that manpower?

Commander Taylor. And the training of the manpower; yes, sir.

51. General Frank. Do you feel that under the circumstances it was proceeding under normal conditions in a satisfactory manner?

Commander Taylor. Not entirely, sir. We had a great deal of difficulty getting the proper impetus to get any material or personnel. We had nobody to head it up, and we ourselves then did not carry enough power to get the equipment and get the manpower we wanted.

52. General Frank. Was that because that at that time it was operating under both the Signal Corps and the Air Corps?

Commander Taylor. That could be, sir, except that the two junior officers of the Signal Corps and the Air Force were both working very closely together; but it was never headed enough by enough power to give it impetus so they could get it going.

53. General Frank. What about General Davidson?

Commander Taylor. He was in the United States the early part of the time. I do not remember what date he got back to Hawaii.

54. General Frank. I think it was the fifth.

Commander Taylor. The fifth of what?

55. General Frank. December.

Commander Taylor. It was pretty late by that time.

56. General Frank. What was the general attitude toward the necessity for use of this against the enemy?

Commander Taylor. I do not think that anybody except possibly officers Bergquist and Powell, who had been to the Information Center School at Mitchel Field, realized exactly how important it was. It was something new. They did not understand a great deal about it; and it was sort of a foster child at that time, we felt.

57. General Frank. Was there any feeling among the rank and file as to the immediate possibility of war?

Commander Taylor. It is very hard to recall. You would find that quite a good deal of it with the young aviators and with some staff officers, but each department had some special job they were preparing for, and this was a sideline. As an example, the Bomber Command, air support, or antiaircraft would be mainly concerned with training and the Information Center was another thing that took more of their manpower and more of their time.

58. General Frank. The time had not arrived when the aircraft warning service and the Information Center were ready to go into operation on a regular schedule; is that correct?

Commander Taylor. Yes, sir.

59. General Frank. It had not?

Commander Taylor. No, sir.

60. General Frank. Did you know that on the morning of December 7 a flight offshore a distance of about 130 miles had been picked up by the Opana Station?
Commander Taylor. I knew that afterwards; yes, sir. I did not get to the Information Center that morning until about 8:30 or 9 o'clock.

61. General Frank. The report on that flight was made to the Information Center, but because of the fact that it was on a training basis rather than on a regular operating basis, the people to handle it were not there, and they had not even been regularly assigned to the organization. Is that correct?

Commander Taylor. Yes, sir. There ordinarily would be just a skeleton crew, a house-cleaning crew after 7 o'clock, because of instructions which came, which I understood General Short gave, to operate the Derax station only between 0400 and 0700, and the flight was picked up after that time by an operator that was operating the equipment in violation of orders, and the officer who picked up the information in the Information Center was a Squadron Commander serving his first tour of duty and he knew nothing about the set-up in any sense of the word. In addition to that, it would be impossible for anybody to decide whether a flight picked up 130 miles away was a Japanese attack, one of our own carrier groups coming in, or a flight of bombers from the United States. As a matter of fact, one of them did come in at the same time and just added to the confusion. If we had had the information center completely manned there would have been some method of identification. Anybody could have told what that flight was.

62. General Grunert. I believe that in your testimony before the Roberts Commission you said something to the same effect, that this flight, if it was made, would not have meant anything to you?

Commander Taylor. Yes, sir.

63. General Grunert. Was it not sufficiently organized at that time so that the representatives of the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Corps knew what flights they had in the air and could tell whether or not the interception of the flight meant that that was one of theirs?

Commander Taylor. No, sir. At the time of the attack we had no liaison officers for the different aviation activities at all, and there was no liaison between their own operations and the Information Center. There was no procedure or system of identification established.

64. General Grunert. You were talking about your conference. This conference was held about November 24?

Commander Taylor. Yes, sir.

65. General Grunert. Why was it not held on August 24 or September 10? Why November 24? Why did they wait that long to hold a conference on this important matter?

Commander Taylor. I do not know, sir. I called this conference.

66. General Grunert. When did they call on the Navy to give them assistance?

Commander Taylor. I think, not more than a week before that, sir.

67. General Grunert. Then you had no connection with it before about the middle of November, at the earliest?

Commander Taylor. No, sir.
68. General Grunert. And then you did not know what should have been done or what might have been done before you got there? [1087] Commander Taylor. No, sir. As a matter of fact, when I arrived I went straight to Wheeler Field, and the Information Center itself had just been completed. It was a question of two or three days one side or the other.

69. General Grunert. Who did you find there that knew enough about it to take action before you got there?

Commander Taylor. There were only two officers, Captain Powell and Captain Bergquist who had been through the Information Center School of Mitchel Field. But that school was at that time fairly sketchy for the scope of the work they had to accomplish.

70. General Grunert. Then it would not have made much difference if all the material had been on hand and all the stations ready; there was no personnel to actually organize it and operate it?

Commander Taylor. No sir.

71. General Grunert. What caused you to say you would be ready in two weeks? Was there any one cause that determined two weeks? Why not ten days? Why not five days? [1088] Commander Taylor. We took a wrong figure. We probably could have had it going in two weeks or ten days, probably less. It is mainly a question of the minimum time we thought we could train people in order to get it going. In two weeks it would have meant a great deal of improvising.

72. General Grunert. But if somebody came down there and said, "We have got to get this thing going; anything is liable to pop any minute," you might have shortened up the time?

Commander Taylor. I think that both Bergquist and Powell had that attitude, but, unfortunately, we could not get that much interest out of the people we dealt with.

73. General Grunert. Could not Bergquist or Powell, or you, as far as the Navy was concerned, have had access to the Chief of Staff and said, "The most important thing is lagging; we have got to get it operating"?

Commander Taylor. We saw every Chief of Staff, but we found that somebody else was always responsible.

74. General Grunert. So they were not sufficiently impressed to make this their business or push it in comparison with all the other things they had to do?

Commander Taylor. No, sir. They lacked the powerful backing to get it going.

75. General Grunert. General Short expressed himself as most concerned about getting this in. It seems to me, if you had approached him, he would have been able to do something about it. Do you know whether or not permanent radar equipment had been on the Island awaiting construction projects, such as roads, cables, and so forth? [1089] Commander Taylor. It could be, sir, but not according to the Signal Corps. My information is from the Signal Corps officers on the station.

76. General Grunert. You could not have operated those permanent ones, anyway, unless they were in position?

Commander Taylor. No, sir.
77. General GRUNERT. There were no naval officers attached to that center at that time, were there?
   Commander TAYLOR. No, sir.
78. General FRANK. Other than yourself?
   Commander TAYLOR. I was just loaned to help set it up.
79. General GRUNERT. There was one remark that set me back when I saw it in your testimony. You said you never saw Short. Was he not the Commanding General and was he not around there?
   Commander TAYLOR. I saw his Chief of Staff. I saw his Operations Officer. We were very closely tied in with his staff and the Air Force staff.
80. General GRUNERT. You also were afraid it was breaking down, and I think you said you changed to the auxiliary power equipment?
   Commander TAYLOR. I did not say that, did I, sir?
81. General GRUNERT. It states in the record that the auxiliary power equipment was breaking down, and General Short’s order was that the operation should be from 4 to 7 in the morning.
   They did not install the commercial power?
   Commander TAYLOR. I had forgotten that. I do not remember it now, sir.

[1090] 82. General GRUNERT. You did operate with the auxiliary power?
   Commander TAYLOR. I know we operated with auxiliary power in at least three of the places, because there were no land lines out there.
83. General GRUNERT. I understand from your testimony that the permanent sets were the same as the mobile sets?
   Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir.
84. General GRUNERT. And it was some time before commercial power would be put in. Was there no commercial power hook-up for radio stations at that time?
   Commander TAYLOR. No, sir.
85. General GRUNERT. You said that telephone equipment had not arrived from the United States and that it would take two weeks to a month. That was equipment in addition to the complete radar itself?
   Commander TAYLOR. That was the permanent telephone equipment necessary for intercommunication within the information center itself.
86. General GRUNERT. Could not that equipment have been taken out of some less important place and used?
   Commander TAYLOR. The equipment we were using was more or less the last war type, field service equipment which, although not perfect, could be made to work.
87. General GRUNERT. Were you aiming at the ultimate, or only the best of what you had?
   Commander TAYLOR. We were improvising; we had to improvise.
88. General RUSSELL. Where had you gotten your experience?
   Commander TAYLOR. My experience, General, was mainly from the point of view of a fighter pilot, two years in England, one year with the British Navy, and one year with the Air Force.
89. General RUSSELL. In the American Army this was a new development, was it not?
   Commander TAYLOR. Yes, sir.
90. General Russell: And the only people you found around the Hawaiian Islands who were capable, from the standpoint of training, to carry on, were those two men whose names you gave?
   Commander Taylor. Yes, sir.
91. General Russell. Did you know that General Davidson, together with other officers, had been sent to the mainland to study this very thing and work out plans to set up what you were working out when you got there?
   Commander Taylor. Yes, sir; I did know that.
92. General Russell. There was not very much impetus at all being given to the establishment of this center until you arrived on the scene and organized it?
   Commander Taylor. No, sir.
93. General Russell. So far as you know, everything was awaiting the return of General Davidson?
   Commander Taylor. I would like to qualify that, sir, because the impetus was actually supplied, what there was it, by Colonel Bergquist, at whose request I was loaned from the Navy.
94. General Russell. You were sent up there simply because you knew the subject and they did not?
   Commander Taylor. Yes, sir; at the request of Captain [1092] Bergquist.
95. General Russell. It has occurred to me in reading the testimony that General Grunert referred to, and in hearing your testimony this afternoon, that you have taken the position that a condition precedent to the successful operation of this system in picking up enemy planes at sea was the existence of some means for identifying aircraft?
   Commander Taylor. I do not understand your question.
96. General Russell. In other words, if you picked up ships and did not know whether they were friendly or hostile, the information was of little value?
   Commander Taylor. That is correct.
97. General Russell. You did state that there was a type of equipment by which this could be done?
   Commander Taylor. Yes, sir.
98. General Russell. Do you know when that equipment reached the Hawaiian Department?
   Commander Taylor. The equipment at that time was of two or three different types, so that it would be of very little value. The Army was sure that the equipment could be delivered from the Army equipment, but it would not work the Navy equipment, and vice versa.
99. General Russell. How long did you stay out there?
   Commander Taylor. I was out there for four months, November to February.
100. General Russell. When you left in February had equipment for identification purposes been received in the Islands?
   Commander Taylor. No, sir.
[1093] 101. General Russell. It had not been?
   Commander Taylor. No, sir.
102. General Russell. Therefore in February you did not have a satisfactory air warning service out there?
   Commander Taylor. No, sir.
103. General Grunert. Was it not possible in the information center, through organization and having liaison officers there, to know what was in the air, after it was well organized?  
Commander Taylor. Yes, sir. That was organized and did work once the emergency was there.  
104. General Russell. The people who were to give the information indicated by General Grunert could only give you information on their planes, the ones they knew about, could they not?  
Commander Taylor. Yes; but we had to get all the activities together and get some coordination. We could not get them together.  
[1094] 105. General Grunert. Could there be any friendly planes that somebody did not know about?  
Commander Taylor. Occasionally, after the attack, when we had the identification system; but occasionally a friendly airplane would come in, in violation of the proper approach system, and they would then send an interceptor out to intercept it. In any case, we did not let it come in, and we would not use the air-raid siren ordinarily. It was not working 100%, but it worked very satisfactorily.  
106. General Russell. It was not essential?  
Commander Taylor. No, sir; it was not essential.  
107. General Russell. All right. I asked you if it was essential, and you said Yes.  
Commander Taylor. I am sorry, sir.  
108. General Frank. As a matter of fact, that is true, even in England, where it is very highly organized?  
Commander Taylor. Even now, it doesn't work.  
109. General Russell. That is all I have.  
110. General Grunert. Is there anything else?  
111. General Frank. No.  
112. General Grunert. Thank you, Commander. We appreciate your coming in and helping us out.  
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)  
(Brief recess.)  

[1095] TESTIMONY OF LT. COL. KERMIT A. TYLER,  
AIR CORPS, ORLANDO, FLA., ARMY AIR FORCE BOARD  

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)  
1. General Grunert. Colonel, the Board is trying to get at the facts; that is, as to things leading up to what happened at Pearl Harbor. We asked you to come here because of your assignment to duty the day of the attack, with reference to the Air Warning Service, or the information center of the Interceptor Command. General Frank will lead in propounding the questions, and then the other members of the Board will fill in wherever they see fit. General Frank.  
2. General Frank. What was your assignment?  
Colonel Tyler. My duty on that morning was "pursuit officer." That was the assignment that was written on the order assigning.  
3. General Frank. I know, but on what duty were you? What was your permanent assignment at that time?  
Colonel Tyler. I was second ranking officer in the 78th Pursuit Squadron. It was then "pursuit", now "fighter".
4. General Frank. How long had you been in Honolulu?
    Colonel Tyler. On that duty, sir?

5. General Tyler. No. When did you arrive in the Hawaiian Islands?
    Colonel Tyler. On the 22nd of February 1941, sir.

6. General Frank. You had been there about six months?
    Colonel Tyler. More than that, sir; almost ten months.

7. General Frank. They had a practice of sending officers down to
    the information center, to break them in in the various duties to
    which they would be assigned, when the information [1096]
    center became operative, is that correct?
    Colonel Tyler. Sir, I believe that that was the intention, on the
    morning of the 7th, when I was assigned, there. I had been assigned
    there, one previous date, but there was only one other person there
    besides myself, and that was the telephone operator.

8. General Frank. So you got little or no instruction on the previous
    date?
    Colonel Tyler. That is right, sir. I had, however, been through
    the information center, once before. They took a tour of officers.

9. General Frank. Were you familiar with the detailed operation
    of the information center?
    Colonel Tyler. Well, I understood how the thing worked; yes,
    sir. I think I understood it quite well.

10. General Frank. Had you any instructions on the duties
    of a pursuit officer in the information center?
    Colonel Tyler. I had no instruction before I went on this first
    tour of duty. At that time I reported for duty, and, there being only
    a telephone operator and myself, I called the operations officer, then
    Major Bergquist, now Colonel Bergquist, and asked him what my
    duties were, then, because, obviously, it seemed to me, I had no
    reason to be there, if there wasn't an operator there.

11. General Grunert. May I interrupt, here? Will you explain
    what a "pursuit officer in an information center" is? I know what
    a control officer is, but just what is a "pursuit officer in an
    information center"?
    Colonel Tyler. At that time, the pursuit officer's duty [1097]
    was to assist the controller in actually controlling the planes in the
    air. The pursuit officer is the one who would give the actual
    instruction of the fighter planes after they were ordered off. A controller's
    job, however, was to order the planes off.

12. General Frank. To be a little more specific, when an enemy
    plane was sighted, instructions were issued from the information
    center to provide what—an interception?
    Colonel Tyler. The instruction that would come to me would be
    from the controller, to order a certain number of flights off, from
    such and such a squadron.

13. General Frank. To accomplish what?
    Colonel Tyler. To take off and make interception.

14. General Frank. And from the time that they left the ground
    until the interception was made, who was giving them instructions?
    Colonel Tyler. That was the pursuit officer's duty, sir, except at
    such time as the controller might.

15. General Grunert. That is what I wanted in the record.
General Frank. So on this morning, you were assigned there for instructional purposes, to learn about being a pursuit officer?

Colonel Tyler. Yes, sir.

16. General Frank. Who was there, this morning, to teach you anything about that?

Colonel Tyler. I was the senior—in fact, I was the only officer there, and all that I could learn would be what I would learn by observing. By that I mean, there were about five or six plotters placing the plots (arrows) on the board, and there was a—

17. General Frank. Was it a very well organized activity for the purpose of giving you instruction?

Colonel Tyler. I would say that the previous tour that I had through the information center was clear enough in giving me a set-up of the thing, but actually, there being no officers there to identify plots, nor no senior controller there, then, I wouldn't say that I was very well instructed that morning.

18. General Frank. All right. Was the aircraft warning service, including the information center, operating that morning?

Colonel Tyler. Yes, sir; it was.

19. General Frank. Were there any plots made on the board prior to 7 o'clock?

Colonel Tyler. I am quite sure there were, sir. There were a number of plots around the Island. As to whether they were just before 7, or started appearing about 7, I am not certain as to that.

20. General Frank. Do you remember the occasion on which a flight from the north was picked up by the Opana station?

Colonel Tyler. Yes, sir.

21. General Frank. You remember that?

Colonel Tyler. Yes, sir.

22. General Frank. Will you give us the circumstances surrounding that? Can you give us a narrative concerning it?

Colonel Tyler. Just as a matter of interest, I saw this lad who was keeping the historical record. There is a record made of every plot that comes into the station, and I had not yet observed that activity, so I went over to see what he was doing, and it happened to be just about 7 o'clock, or roughly thereabout; and he had these plots out probably 130 miles, which I looked at, and there were other plots on the board at that time. It was just about 7, or a little bit after, I think, and then, right at 7 o'clock, all the people who were in the information center, except the telephone operator, folded up their equipment and left. There were just the operator and myself again; and about 7:15, the radar operator from Opana called the telephone operator to say that he had a larger plot than he had ever seen before, on his 'scope, and the telephone operator relayed the call to me; so I took the call, and, inasmuch as I had no means of identifying friendly plots from enemy, nor was I led to believe that there would be any occasion to do so, I told him not to worry about it.

And the next warning I had was about 5 after 8, when we received a call that there was an attack on.

23. General Frank. What did you assume this was that was coming in? It might have been what?

Colonel Tyler. As far as I was concerned, it could. I thought it most probable that it would be the B-17's which were coming from the mainland.
24. General Frank. You knew there was a flight of B-17s due in? Colonel Tyler. I didn't have official information. You see, I had a friend who was a bomber pilot, and he told me, any time that they play this Hawaiian music all night long, it is a very good indication that our B-17s were coming over from the mainland, because they use it for homing; and when I [1100] had reported for duty at 4 o'clock in the morning, I listened to this Hawaiian music all the way into town, and so I figured then that we had a flight of B-17s coming in; so that came to my mind as soon as I got this call from him.

25. General Frank. Did you give any thought to the fact that it might be planes from a navy carrier? Colonel Tyler. Yes, sir. In fact, I thought that was just about an equal probability of the two.

26. General Frank. What did you do, from then on? Colonel Tyler. Well, there was nothing to do between the call, until the attack came.

27. General Frank. Where were you when the attack came? Colonel Tyler. I was awaiting relief. I was due at 8 o'clock to be relieved, and there being nothing going on, I just stepped outside of the door. There was an outside door, there, and I got a breath of fresh air, and I actually saw the planes coming down on Pearl Harbor; but even then, I thought they were Navy planes; and I saw antiaircraft shooting, which I thought was practicing antiaircraft.

28. General Frank. The last connection that you had with this station was when you told the operator up at Opana to "forget it," so to speak? Colonel Tyler. Yes, sir.

29. General Russell. How long had you been in the Air Corps, then, Colonel? Colonel Tyler. I was first commissioned in 1937. I had it, just a little over four years, sir, at that time.


31. General Russell. And you knew that the pursuit officer in that information center was there to get planes in the air, to intercept incoming hostile planes if they appeared, did you? Colonel Tyler. Yes, sir.

32. General Russell. And you knew the only thing you had to do was to get in touch with the people who could put those planes up, isn't that true? Colonel Tyler. That is not exactly true, sir, because we had nothing on the alert. We had no planes.

33. General Russell. Well, if you had had some planes on the alert, then your job was to call for the commander of those planes and tell him, "Here come some enemy planes—go get them!" Wasn't that your job, as the pursuit officer? Colonel Tyler. That would be my job if I had any way of telling. There was no means of identifying.

34. General Russell. There seemed to be a lot of mystery about a pursuit officer and your not being trained as a pursuit officer, and I am trying to see if I can solve that mystery. You had a telephone
in that place, on which you could talk to the commanders of the aircraft on the Islands?

Colonel Tyler. Well, my next higher, the first one there called would have been Major Bergquist. I would have called him in his quarters, I presume.

35. General Russell. Then he was to tell the people to get into the planes and go get the enemy?

Colonel Tyler. That was his duty; yes, sir.

36. General Russell. So it was a rather simple job, after all, wasn't it, Colonel?

[1102] Colonel Tyler. That's right; it would have been.

37. General Russell. The only mystery about it was the fact that you did not know that there were any Jap planes coming in, there?

Colonel Tyler. Yes, sir.

38. General Russell. And you had the information from this boy at the Opana radar station that he had picked up the biggest flight that he had ever picked up, is that right?

Colonel Tyler. Yes, sir.

39. General Russell. Did he appear somewhat excited over the flight that was coming in?

Colonel Tyler. I would say that he seemed more than normal. Of course, I didn't know the fellow up there, but he seemed—I would say he was interested in it, all right, sir.

40. General Russell. He had found something out there, that had impressed him to quite an extent?

Colonel Tyler. Yes, sir.

41. General Russell. And you said, "Don't worry about it—don't bother"? That was your decision, is that right?

Colonel Tyler. Yes, sir.

42. General Russell. Now, to go back to these other people who had been there, and who had folded up and gone away at 7 o'clock. It was their job, as I understand this information center, to evaluate the incoming information?

Colonel Tyler. No, sir; their job was to present it to the Board for evaluation by them.

43. General Russell. Who was the man, there, to evaluate that information?

Colonel Tyler. The Navy liaison officer and the bomber [1103] liaison officers.

44. General Russell. They were the people who would evaluate any information from one of these operating stations out on the Island?

Colonel Tyler. Yes, sir.

45. General Russell. Were they there at all, that morning?

Colonel Tyler. No, sir.

46. General Russell. They never had been?

Colonel Tyler. No, sir.

47. General Russell. So there wasn't anybody there whose job it was, or whose duty it was, to evaluate this incoming information?

Colonel Tyler. That's right, sir.

48. General Russell. Well, why were you up there, at all?

Colonel Tyler. Sir, I really don't know.

49. General Russell. You were not to go into action as the pursuit officer, until these other people, who were going to evaluate the in-
formation, had evaluated it and told you that hostile aircraft was en route to the Island; that is the situation, isn't it?

Colonel Tyler. That is right, sir.

50. General Russell. Therefore, it wasn't your job to evaluate this information, at all?

Colonel Tyler. No, sir; it wasn't.

51. General Russell. I was interested, merely as a matter of information, in what you said as to the report of this chap out at that station, that he had "a big" something, and I missed that part.

Colonel Tyler. I don't know whether he said "a large [1104] flight of planes," or "an indication," or "a large blip on his radar." That is the word that is used, and that I have used considerably, since then, so I am not sure whether he said "blip."

52. General Russell. "A large blip" indicated a lot of planes?

Colonel Tyler. Yes, sir. It means one and the same thing, sir.

53. General Russell. That is all.

54. General Grunert. You say you were detailed to go up there as a pursuit officer, and you were to remain until 8 o'clock. Was it normal to relieve officers at 8 o'clock, or was that the end of the tour?

Colonel Tyler. There was a schedule made out. I think that information center was manned from the preceding Wednesday, and I know it was manned during all off-duty periods, and on holidays, starting at 4 a.m. I believe that there were officers on duty from 4 a.m. till 7 or 8 o'clock every day.

55. General Grunert. Every day? But that was the end of that tour for that day?

Colonel Tyler. Well, on Sunday, this being a holiday, then there was an officer who was due to relieve me.

56. General Grunert. There was an officer due to relieve you?

Colonel Tyler. Yes.

57. General Grunert. At 8 o'clock?

Colonel Tyler. Yes, sir.

58. General Grunert. He did not show up, did he?

Colonel Tyler. No, sir; I didn't see him.

59. General Grunert. But the rest of the personnel of the [1105] center left at 7?

Colonel Tyler. Yes, sir.

60. General Grunert. And there was nothing for you to do, there, between 7 and 8, but twiddle your thumbs?

Colonel Tyler. No, sir; there was nothing to do.

61. General Grunert. Then it appears that the organization seemed to be faulty, and its instruction faulty, and there seemed to be a lack of organization and common sense and reason on this. You went up there to do duty as a pursuit officer in the information center. There was nobody to do the work with, because the controller was not there, and the Navy Liaison man wasn't there, and probably some others were missing, so you couldn't do your duty, as a pursuit officer, because there was nobody to do duty with; and then, at the end of the tour, at 7 o'clock, everybody disappeared except the telephone operator and you; and the telephone operator remainder there for apparently no reason. You had no particular duty, did you?

Colonel Tyler. No, sir; we hadn't.
62. General Grunert. It seems all "cock-eyed", to me—and that, on the record, too.
Are there any other questions? Thank you very much for coming.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)
(Thereupon, at 5 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day, and proceeded to other business.)
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FRIDAY, AUGUST 18, 1944

MUNITIONS BUILDING, Washington, D.C.

The Board, at 9 a.m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.


Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General Grunert. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL WALTER C. PHILLIPS, CHIEF OF STAFF CORPS

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

Colonel Phillips. Walter C. Phillips, Colonel, General Staff Corps; serial number 07314. I am now G-3 in General Stilwell's staff, Myitkyina, North Burma.

2. General Grunert. Colonel Phillips, what was your position and assignment in the Hawaiian Defense Command, December 7, 1941?

Colonel Phillips. I was Chief of Staff, sir.

3. General Grunert. How long had you been Chief of Staff?

Colonel Phillips. I became Chief of Staff on November 5, that year.

4. General Grunert. You had served on the Hawaiian Department Staff prior to that, had you?

Colonel Phillips. That is right; yes, sir. I was G-3.

5. General Grunert. For how long?

Colonel Phillips. I believe, sir, I arrived in Hawaii in March of that year, and I had rotated through the various staff sections, in order to become thoroughly acquainted with the General Staff's set-up. I had been in G-3, I believe, since July of that year.

6. General Grunert. Then General Short really brought you over there to groom you to become Chief of Staff, did he?

Colonel Phillips. That is correct.
7. General Grunert. What was your military background prior to your going to Hawaii, in which you became qualified to become a Department Chief of Staff?

Colonel Phillips. I had been G-3 of the First Division—I came from the First Division—for about three years prior to going there.

8. General Frank. Where was that?

Colonel Phillips. At New York; Fort Hamilton, N. Y. I had just completed the first two Army maneuvers, and the maneuver in Louisiana. We moved the First Division to Fort Benning.

9. General Grunert. And in what capacity?


10. General Grunert. Had you had any G-1, -2, and -4 [1109] experience?

Colonel Phillips. I had had G-2 experience here in the War Department, and also I was Assistant G-2 in the Ninth Division in the last World War. I have also had G-4 experience; not G-1, except Adjutant of a Regiment.

11. General Grunert. The relation of a Chief of Staff to a Commanding General is that of “right-hand bower,” his advisor, his confidential assistant?

Colonel Phillips. That is correct.

12. General Grunert. The Board, by the study of documents and the hearing of testimony, has gotten a pretty thorough and broad picture, and also has gotten considerable details of various parts of that picture. With your help we hope to round out that picture, develop new facts, and possibly get some new leads to other facts. This morning I am going to approach the bringing out of this testimony in a bit different manner. Instead of asking questions about the component parts, I will take the problem as a whole and then take it apart, to see how it “ticks.”

The Hawaiian Islands, on account of their location, constitute a strategic outpost for the United States. They lie across any path of attack against our west coast and against the Panama Canal, and they also afford a base for offensive action; hence they are of great importance. And, in that the Hawaiian Islands are an outpost, and an important one, they in the past have had high priority in getting equipment, matériel, and personnel, in preparing them for defense.

We started in with a Joint Army and Navy Plan made here in Washington, then that was followed by a Joint Army and Navy [1110] Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. You know of that?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir; I was familiar with that.

13. General Grunert. That plan was supplemented by a Joint Air Operation Plan. Now, why is the Army in this outpost? What is its primary mission? Can you tell me the primary mission of the Army in Hawaii?

Colonel Phillips. General, I would like to introduce, right now, the fact that it has been two years and a half since I have read those plans, and all that I can state in the way of anything concrete or definite from those plans is from memory.

14. General Grunert. I will attempt to help you out. Is it your remembrance of that mission that it is “to protect Pearl Harbor naval and air base, the installations thereat, and the ships therein?”
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir; that sounds very familiar. I believe that is correct.

15. General Grunert. Now, suppose we attempt to break this down into what they are out there to defend against. First, you might say, an attack from within; next, an attack from the air; then, next, surface attack, or a combination. Hence, probably that is why they had three alerts—No. 1, against attack from within, in the line of sabotage; No. 2, against air plus sabotage; and No. 3, against surface, air, and sabotage?

Colonel Phillips. That is right.

16. General Grunert. You recall those three alerts?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. I wrote the Standing Operating Procedure on that, sir.

17. General Grunert. Now, the first, “against attack from [1111] within,” mainly sabotage, apparently was well covered. They were alerted against sabotage, and so far there has been no evidence of sabotage at that time.

As to the third, “against surface attack, or a combination, sabotage, air, and surface,” there appeared to be no threat.

That leaves the second, which I might break down again into three parts: The defense against an air attack. That, I will break down into information, air (meaning air forces), and antiaircraft; and permeating all three of these there would be the cooperation and coordination with the Navy.

So the nubbin of this whole thing appears to be, Why Alert 1 and not Alert 2? We will start with that and its many related matters, and my first question will be, Why was Alert No. 1 chosen, and why not Alert No. 2?

Colonel Phillips. As I recall—I say, General, I have no notes, have kept no file or anything on this, whatsoever, it is purely from memory over a period of 2½ years—as I recall, November 27th, we received a message at the headquarters, to the effect that we would take provisions to prevent sabotage. There was a possibility of sabotage, with 165,000 Japanese in the Territory, and the alert, No. 1, or the sabotage alert, seemed to be just the thing required. It was the General’s opinion at that time.

As soon as we got the message, we had a staff meeting.

18. General Grunert. Let me identify this message. Is that the message from the Chief of Staff, or the so-called “G-2” message to your G-2 over there? I can refresh your memory by reading you this message. This is a message from the Chief of Staff to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, [1112] 27 November 1941:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot (repeat NOT) be avoided, United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not (repeat NOT) be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not (repeat NOT) to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out tasks assigned in Rainbow Five as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit discussion of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.
Was that the message which you got?
Colonel Phillips. That is correct.
19. General Grunert. Now, that message has nothing in it about sabotage?
Colonel Phillips. No, sir.
20. General Grunert. But the sabotage alert was decided on?
Colonel Phillips. The sabotage alert was taken up as, at that time, deemed sufficient; and it was a very simple matter to change from one to the other. It was merely adding more troops.
21. General Grunert. Were you present at the conference that they had on this message with the Navy, do you recall?
Colonel Phillips. I was not, sir.
22. General Grunert. Do you know how soon after that conference the report was made on the action taken?
Colonel Phillips. I cannot say. I am under the impression that it was very shortly thereafter. I mean that day or, at the latest, the next. I am not sure.
23. General Grunert. But when the Commanding General returned from his conference with the Navy, the testimony before the Roberts Commission appears to show that he called you in and the decision was made to adopt Alert No. 1, the sabotage alert.
Colonel Phillips. That is correct.
24. General Grunert. Was there anybody else in on that at the time they had the discussion?
Colonel Phillips. I informed the heads of the General Staff sections.
25. General Grunert. You informed them?
Colonel Phillips. No, we had a little informal meeting in my office.
26. General Grunert. Prior to the decision?
Colonel Phillips. Not prior to the decision; no, sir. We were announcing the decision.
27. General Grunert. When the decision was made?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
28. General Grunert. How about the other Commanders, such as the Antiaircraft, the Air, the Division Commanders? Did they confer before or after the decision was made?
Colonel Phillips. I cannot say as to that, sir.
29. General Grunert. But you do recall the conference with the Commanding General, in which that decision was made?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
30. General Grunert. Was anybody present except you and the Commanding General, then?
Colonel Phillips. I cannot say as to that. I believe the General Staff section heads were there. I am not positive about that.
31. General Grunert. Then it was just a question of judgment as to which alert to take up at that particular time?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
32. General Grunert. And you say that you could have changed to the other two alerts in a short time?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir; a very short time.
43. General Grunert. Was there any discussion as to the other two alerts?
Colonel Phillips. I cannot say definitely as to that, sir, but I believe there was.

44. General Grunert. During that discussion, or prior to the Commanding General’s making his decision, was there any expression of reasons for making that decision? If there was any discussion or any question as to whether or not it should go into 1, 2, or 3, then there must have been something argued, or else he just made the bald decision that he would go into the sabotage alert, without any discussion.

Colonel Phillips. General, I cannot say. Those notes and the records of that were very clear to me 2½ years ago, but I just cannot say at this time. I can’t give you those details. I don’t remember.

45. General Grunert. Do you recall having received or having [1116] gotten information from the Navy on that same date, November 27, as to a message received from the Navy Department to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, which message started out to the effect that “This is a war warning,” and it wound up by saying, “Transmit this information to the Army”?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. That message was received by the General, and I believe it was read to us all. I am not positive about that, though.

46. General Grunert. I will read that, so as to put it in the record, and so it can be considered. This is a paraphrase of the dispatch:

Chief of Naval Operations, to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, November 27.

Consider this dispatch a war warning. Negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thal, or Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out all tasks assigned in WPL—46 only. Guam, Samoa, and the continental districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by War Department. Inform Naval District and Army authorities. British to be informed by SPENAVO.

Now, the only reference to sabotage in either of those messages is in this message, here, in which it states: [1116] “Guam, Samoa, and the continental Districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage.” You recall that message, and that the Army was informed?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.

47. General Grunert. And also, on that same date, there was a G–2 message from the War Department G–2 to G–2 of the Hawaiian Department. That related primarily to sabotage?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.

48. General Grunert. Do you know when that was received?

Colonel Phillips. I can’t say the hour. As I recall, it was the same day.

49. General Grunert. The same day? But the decision on the sabotage alert was made as a result of the conference on the two messages that I have read?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.

50. General Grunert. Right after that?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir: I believe that is correct.
51. General Grunert. Does any Member of the Board want to develop the alert question any further?

What can you tell us about the state of mind of the Army and Navy, particularly the higher commanders and staff, as to the probability of possibility of imminence of war?

Colonel Phillips. In my opinion, General, we were all thoroughly alert and fully conscious of the possibility, the Navy as well as the Army. I do not speak for the Navy.

52. General Grunert. Did you expect an attack on Hawaii?

Colonel Phillips. Did I?

53. General Grunert. Yes. You had better tell me what you expected, and not talk for the rest.

[1117] Colonel Phillips. I was fully aware of the possibility of such a thing. It struck me as possible.

54. General Grunert. But still you concurred with the decision of the Commanding General as to alerts, that the alert against sabotage was the proper one?

Colonel Phillips. That was his decision, sir. We discussed the thing, as I recall, quite fully.

55. General Grunert. You discussed the pros and cons? Can you tell me the pros and cons of the discussion?

Colonel Phillips. I cannot tell you the details of that discussion: it is just too long ago.

56. General Grunert. All right. General Russell.

57. General Russell. When you were discussing these probable enemy actions or hostile actions which the Japanese might inaugurate, which led you to this No. 1 Alert, did you tell General Grunert, a little while ago, that you had both General Marshall's message of the 27th and the Navy message of the 27th before you?

Colonel Phillips. If I did that, I cannot be positive that that was the case. I cannot be positive about the naval message. We knew of the naval message, but whether we had General Marshall's here, and the naval message here [indicating, at his right and at his left]. at that time, I cannot say.

58. General Russell. How long did it take you and General Short to analyze this Marshall message on the 27th, if you did analyze it?

Colonel Phillips. I can't tell you about that. sir. You want facts. Those are details, sir, that I had: two years and a half ago, but I do not retain them. I have made no notes. [1118] I have no file, and I do not know.

59. General Russell. Now, Colonel, is it not a fact that very shortly thereafter, certainly within ten days, you had a very destructive attack out there?

Colonel Phillips. That is right.

60. General Russell. Is it not a fact that the selection of Alert No. 1, and ordering the department into that alert, contributed largely to the destructiveness of that attack? Is the question clear to you?

Colonel Phillips. No.

61. General Russell. Suppose you had adopted Alert No. 3 instead of Alert No. 1, would you not have been in a much better position to repel that attack on the morning of December 7?
Colonel Phillips. It is a matter of opinion, sir; I don’t know. I would say I don’t know about that; it is purely a matter of assumption.

62. General Russell. You have no idea now about whether No. 3 would have been a more effective alert than No. 1?

Colonel Phillips. From the results we obtained that morning, during the attack, with the number of planes that were shot down, the estimated number of course, we thought we had done a very good job. No. 3 alert, or the entire all-out alert, was ordered, immediately, and it would be a matter of assumption to say what alert. I don’t know.

[1119] 63. General Russell. I am afraid I am branching out too far at this place in our investigation.

Now, when General Short analyzed this message of the 27th, do you recall your discussing the possibilities of the ending of negotiations here in Washington on the international situation, and its relation to the imminence of war?

Colonel Phillips. I am sure that was discussed.

64. General Russell. What was said?

Colonel Phillips. I cannot say.

65. General Russell. Were you out there when the Japs came in and launched that attack?

Colonel Phillips. I most assuredly was, sir.

66. General Russell. How does it come to pass, then, if you had such a vivid and depressing experience shortly thereafter, that it did not leave on your memory some impression as to what went before?

Colonel Phillips. General, I had it very clearly at that time. I stated a while ago, sir, that much has intervened. I have been very busy for the last two years and a half, and those details of the discussion or the documents that we had at that time were directly in front of me, and what the details of that discussion were at that particular time I am unable to say right now specifically.

67. General Russell. I know, Colonel, but since that time it has not been so very easy for Pearl Harbor and the incidents leading up to Pearl Harbor to get away from you, has it?

Colonel Phillips. No, sir. Not very easy; no, sir. But, sir, you are asking specific, definite questions which I am unable to answer from memory.

[1120] 68. General Russell. Well, you have no way to refresh your memory?

Colonel Phillips. No, sir, I have no notes.

69. General Frank. Have you any notes any place in the world, on this subject?

Colonel Phillips. No, sir.

70. General Frank. Did you ever have any?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.

71. General Frank. What did you do with them?

Colonel Phillips. I left Hawaii, sir; they are in the file. You will doubtless find a complete story in the file in Hawaii. We had quite a line-up of testimony for the Roberts Commission, before whom I appeared at that time.

72. General Russell. Colonel, I will ask you whether or not the contents of this critical message of November 27 from the Chief of Staff were passed on to anyone other than to you and General Short.
Colonel Phillips. It was passed on to the General Staff section chiefs, as I recall it, sir.
73. General Russell. Are you positive about that?
   Colonel Phillips. I think so.
74. General Russell. Do you think you read or showed this message to G-2, for example?
   Colonel Phillips. I think so; G-1, 2, 3, and 4.
75. General Russell. Now, was any injunction issued then as to the dissemination of the information in that message on down to these Commanders, the Division Commanders and the Antiaircraft, the Air Commander?
   Colonel Phillips. The General handled that himself. [1121] directly, and I definitely instructed the section chiefs that it was highly confidential and that it would go no further.
76. General Russell. Therefore, you have no information as to whether these interested commanders knew of this message and its contents?
   Colonel Phillips. Except, I have no definite information right now if they did.
77. General Russell. But it was treated as a highly confidential document, and you instructed these General Staff officers not to divulge its contents?
   Colonel Phillips. That is right.
78. General Russell. And so far as you know they were the only people to whom the contents of this message were given?
   Colonel Phillips. As far as I know, sir.
79. General Russell. Have you any questions, General?
80. General Frank. Yes.
   Are you a product of the Army school system?
81. General Frank. Well, then you are familiar with the method of estimating the situation?
   Colonel Phillips. That is right; yes, sir.
82. General Frank. And determining action to take; is that correct?
   Colonel Phillips. That is correct; yes, sir.
83. General Frank. In estimating the situation and determining action to take, what is the procedure?
   Colonel Phillips. Well, of course it is all in the book.
84. General Frank. I want you to tell me.
   Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. You estimate the situation. [1122] of course: the enemy's capabilities, what he has, what it is possible for him to do, with your means at hand and his means, and after a general, thorough discussion and or a consideration, I mean, you arrive at a definite decision so far as you possibly can, considering the capabilities, your means, and so forth.
85. General Frank. What do you consider with respect to the enemy?
   Colonel Phillips. His capabilities and the means, the means available to him, as far as you can.
86. General Frank. To do what? The means to what?
   Colonel Phillips. His means that he has to attack or do the worst to you that he possibly can.
87. General Frank. Now you are getting down to it: to do the worst that he can to you.
Colonel Phillips. That is right.
88. General Frank. And in coming to your decision of steps to be taken, what action do you assume the enemy will take?
Colonel Phillips. The worst action.
89. General Frank. The worst action?
Colonel Phillips. Absolutely.
90. General Frank. You were Chief of Staff to General Short?
Colonel Phillips. That is correct.
91. General Frank. You were his adviser?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir, in that capacity.
92. General Frank. When this question came up of action to be taken, as a result of these messages of November 27, was there an estimate of the situation considered at that time?
Colonel Phillips. I think there was, sir; certainly no written estimate. There was no written estimate prepared, but of course we would naturally form an estimate, make an estimate of the situation, any phases of the situation.
93. General Frank. This was one of the most critical situations with which you had been confronted?
Colonel Phillips. That is correct.
94. General Frank. When these messages arrived, did you advise the Commander of various steps that the Japs might take, and did you give him any advice on the things that you considered necessary by way of action that should be taken by the Commanding General?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir; that was thoroughly discussed at the time, but the detail of that—certainly the advice I was capable of giving was included in the discussion.
95. General Frank. Did you concur with the Commanding General, or did you specially recommend Alert No. 1?
Colonel Phillips. I most assuredly concurred after his decision was made.
96. General Frank. Prior to his decision did you recommend it?
Colonel Phillips. Prior to his decision, as I recall, sir, all angles of the situation were discussed and gone into rather very thoroughly. Very thoroughly. Three alerts were discussed, possibility, the capabilities of the enemy, and a decision was arrived at after, I should say, a very thorough estimate of every phase of the situation.
97. General Frank. As vital as that has been to the American public and as prominent as it has been before the people, do you mean to say you have forgotten what you thought about it at that time?
Colonel Phillips. I haven't forgotten, sir. I haven't forgotten, but I cannot recall specific questions that you ask which require a yes or no answer. I cannot go into that that thoroughly.
98. General Frank. Have you forgotten whether or not you considered the No. 1 Alert satisfactory?
Colonel Phillips. That was satisfactory, sir. The sabotage alert was adopted by the General, and I concurred.
99. General Frank. What advice did you give him on it?
Colonel Phillips. General, I cannot say specifically, other than the general discussion which we covered in discussing the entire situation. I advised him as to the possibility, and the possibility of an attack—of course it was possible—and we went into the thing, the pros and cons, very thoroughly, but specifically I cannot say.
100. General Frank. You stated a minute ago that the normal procedure for a Commander in meeting a military situation is to make an estimate of the situation, consider the worst thing that the enemy can do to you, and make your decision to meet it.

Colonel Phillips. That is correct.

101. General Frank. Do you feel that that was done in this case?

Colonel Phillips. The worst thing that the enemy could do was certainly considered. That was the possibility of an attack on the Hawaiian Islands. But that was the worst possible thing that could occur.

102. General Frank. You haven’t answered my question.


103. General Frank. Do you consider that steps were taken to meet the worst situation with which the Japs could confront you?

[1125] Colonel Phillips. I am thinking now in retrospect. I am going back from here. That is a very difficult question to answer, sir. At the time the General made a decision to put in the sabotage alert I thoroughly agreed with it.

104. General Frank. You just will not answer that question, will you?

Colonel Phillips. I can’t answer it specifically, sir.

105. General Frank. Do you mean to tell me that, had Alert No. 3 been in effect, the damage would have been as great as it was?

Colonel Phillips. It is a matter of assumption. I don’t know. I am not in position to say.

106. General Frank. You were Chief of Staff, weren’t you?

Colonel Phillips. Exactly.

107. General Frank. How long would it have taken the planes to have gotten into the air had they been on No. 3 Alert?

Colonel Phillips. I can’t say as to that. It wouldn’t have taken as long as it did take, of course.

108. General Frank. It would take about five to seven minutes?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.

109. General Frank. And if the fighters could have gotten in the air, around 80 of them, to have met this attack, do you think it would have been as devastating as it was?

Colonel Phillips. Undoubtedly not.

110. General Frank. All right. Then, had you made the decision to go on No. 3 Alert instead of on No. 1 Alert, you would have been in a better position to have met this, the worst type of attack that could have happened under the circumstances; is that correct?

[1126] Colonel Phillips. I would say perhaps you are right, sir.

111. General Frank. Yes. All right. Then, you did not follow the normal procedure in assuming the worst thing that the enemy could do, and meet it, did you?

Colonel Phillips. In making the estimate of the situation we considered the worst that the enemy could do, yes, sir.

112. General Frank. Well, you didn’t take steps to meet it, though?

Colonel Phillips. That’s——

113. General Frank. Did you?

Colonel Phillips. The sabotage alert was put in by the General, sir, in the situation.
114. General Frank. I know all this.
Colonel Phillips. Yes.
115. General Frank. But in considering the worst thing that the enemy could do, which was an attack of this kind, you did not take steps to meet it, did you?
Colonel Phillips. At that time it was the—it was our decision—
116. General Frank. I know what your decision was.
117. General Frank. You tell me you are a graduate of Leavenworth?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
118. General Frank. You are a part of the school system?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
119. General Frank. You know the theory of arriving at these decisions?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.

[1127] 120. General Frank. Either you know or you don’t.
Colonel Phillips. Sir?
121. General Frank. Did you or did you not take steps to meet the worst situation that the Japs could bring against you?
How long did it take the airplanes to get in the air, all massed on the apron as they were, from a No. 1 Alert?
Colonel Phillips. I don’t know about that, sir. It would take some time.
122. General Frank. It says from two to four hours.
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. Well, I don’t know about that.
123. General Frank. And in this situation you needed to get them in the air within a matter of a few minutes?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
124. General Frank. Therefore, did you take the best measures to meet this attack by prescribing No. 1 Alert?
Colonel Phillips. Apparently not, according to that. That was—the No. 1 Alert—
125. General Frank. We know what the No. 1 Alert was.
Colonel Phillips. Yes.
126. General Frank. Do you know what it was?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
127. General Frank. Do you know what No. 3 Alert was?
Colonel Phillips. I think so, yes, sir.
128. General Frank. Had No. 3 Alert been in effect, your fighter planes could have gotten off in a matter of five or seven minutes?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.

[1128] 129. General Frank. They could have met the attack?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
130. General Frank. Therefore, you would have taken steps to have met this, the worst situation that the enemy could bring against you?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
131. General Frank. And you didn’t do it, did you?
Colonel Phillips. Subsequent messages—
132. General Frank. Now wait a minute. You didn’t do it, did you?
Colonel Phillips. Not at that particular time, sir.
133. General Frank. No.
Colonel Phillips. No, sir.
134. General Frank. Well, that is the time that I am talking about, is that particular time.
Colonel Phillips. The subsequent message from G–2 seemed to confirm our action as what was required. That had a great deal of weight in confirming the action that the General had taken at that time.
135. General Frank. Yes, but you did not follow all this Leavensworth teaching that you were talking about here a little while ago, did you?
Colonel Phillips. That is correct, sir.
136. General Frank. Now, did you consider a Jap attack of this nature possible?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
137. General Frank. Did you consider it probable?
138. General Frank. What was your attitude toward such a possibility? Why was it not probable?
Colonel Phillips. Due to the distance.
139. General Frank. From where?
Colonel Phillips. From Japan; the fact that we had our Navy there, and many aspects of the thing, many facts that we had at hand, including those that I have mentioned, induced me to believe that an attack was, of course, possible, but not immediately probable. I discussed——
140. General Frank. Did you so advise General Short?
Colonel Phillips. No, sir; I did not. This is when I first went to Hawaii. I made my decision—I made my estimate of the situation as a G–3 at that time in regard to the possibility of the attack, the probability.
141. General Frank. Did you so advise General Short at that time?
Colonel Phillips. I advised him that the attack was possible.
142. General Frank. Well, did you advise him that it was not probable?
Colonel Phillips. I did not.
143. General Frank. You weren’t very positive as a Chief of Staff, were you?
Colonel Phillips. I tried to be, sir.
144. General Frank. Is your memory in general, good or bad?
Colonel Phillips. Fairly good.
145. General Frank. In making your estimate as to whether this attack was probable or not, what information did you have from the Navy?
Colonel Phillips. I can’t say definitely what information we had at that time or that I had myself in my estimate. I had the plans available, and in my office as G–3 there was a naval officer there that was a liaison man with the Navy, and we discussed the plans. I discussed it with the staff as——this is prior to my taking over the position of Chief of Staff—as G–3. I discussed it with the Navy staff, and we had conferences back and forth very frequently, the chief thing being to acquaint me thoroughly with the situation in Hawaii.
146. General Frank. I have no further questions at this time.

147. General Grunert. I would like to have some more information about the discussion which led up to the decision to adopt the sabotage alert and not the alert which would be defense against air, or the all-out alert. Now, probably I can refresh your mind a bit by giving you a concise summary of General Short's conclusions as to the radiogram of November 27.

He dwelt on not disclosing intent, not alarming the public, avoiding publicity. In his report to the Chief of Staff's message of November 27, which was sent from Hawaii that same afternoon of November 27, he dwelt on the fact that the War Department did not indicate other action except sabotage, which he considered as tacit consent to the report. And again he dwelt upon: He must obtain information from the Navy, that the Navy was responsible for distant reconnaissance, that the Navy feared no Jap attack nor a probable attack, that he had confidence in the Navy, that planes were sent, presumably by the War Department, from the mainland without ammunition, that the attack was a surprise to the Chief of Staff of the Army, that he received no oceanic telephone warning from the War Department, that the War Department failed to notify him, and [1131]

that the Navy failed to give him information.

Now, with those leads, can you refresh your memory as to what the discussion was?

Suppose we take "disclose intent." Was that discussed as to whether or not, if you took a more vigorous and more protective alert than Alert No. 1, sabotage, that that might disclose intent? If so, what was in your mind or the mind at the conference, that any more vigorous action might disclose intent or alarm the public? Do you recall anything on those subjects?

Colonel Phillips. Well, the G-2 message subsequent to this time prior—

148. General Grunert. Yes, but the decision was made on the Chief of Staff's message.

Colonel Phillips. Exactly. I do not know what the General refers to in that.

148. General Grunert. Well, the report rendered by the War Department—did you or the General expect the War Department to come back and tell you what to do?

Colonel Phillips. Not at all, but we—the General, after receiving the subsequent report from the War Department, and the G-2, assuming that that was official, took that as tacit approval of his action.

150. General Grunert. Then, you mean that G-2 report or the message to G-2 over there was taken as an indication of the War Department's tacit approval of your going on a No. 1 Alert, sabotage?

Colonel Phillips. Sabotage alert, yes, sir; that was the General's opinion.

[1132] 151. General Grunert. Were you influenced, in the advice you gave to the Commanding General on the subject of what alert to take, by any way the Navy looked at this?

Colonel Phillips. I was not at the time, sir.

152. General Grunert. Did you have confidence in the Navy as to their protective measures as far as keeping anybody away from the Islands that you had to defend was concerned?
Colonel Phillips. I did. I had absolute confidence in them. 153. General Grunert. What was that based upon? Colonel Phillips. Knowledge of their plans, and various and sundry discussions with various and sundry members of their staff. 154. General Grunert. Knowledge of their plans? Colonel Phillips. I was convinced that they were on the job. 155. General Grunert. I realize now that you cannot remember details—I don't expect you to—but I expect you to remember the larger events and generally what happened, and why. Was it your understanding that the Navy did not fear any attack or did not expect any attack, did not consider it probable? Colonel Phillips. It was not. 156. General Grunert. At the time the decision was made to go into an alert for sabotage and not one of the other alerts which would have been more protection against an air attack, the planes coming from the mainland with no ammunition—was that brought up in discussion to decide what alert to go on? Colonel Phillips. I am not sure that that was discussed at that time, sir, the planes. That was a routine—

[1133] 157. General Grunert. Was the command war conscious, or peace-minded, or both? Colonel Phillips. I think they were thoroughly war conscious, sir. 158. General Grunert. But you evidently thought war was in the distant future sometime? Colonel Phillips. Some did, perhaps; I did not. 159. General Grunert. You apparently were more afraid of sabotage and attack from within than from without? Colonel Phillips. That is true. We had reorganized the entire Army garrison. The old Hawaiian Division had been broken down, as I recall, in October. In September we had reorganized and made two divisions, filling up all divisions and getting replacements, filling up the units; and that was occupying a great deal of our time, thought, and effort; and preparation for war and defense of the Island. We were doing everything possible. 160. General Grunert. The preparation was for war in the distant future, and not right around the corner, was it not? Colonel Phillips. Just as rapidly as we could prepare. 161. General Grunert. It has been brought out that there was considerable training activity and preparation taking place; but we are on the subject of why an alert against sabotage when there were warnings of not only a possible but almost a probable attack, and still the mind over there appeared to dwell only on sabotage at that particular time. Can you think of anything else that may throw light on this subject? Colonel Phillips. We had 165,000 Japanese there. 162. General Grunert. Had they been perpetrating acts of sabotage? Were they not sort of a bugaboo? You were afraid that something was going to happen, but you did not know what, and because there were a lot of Japanese nationals there you were afraid that they might turn you out of house and home? Colonel Phillips. It was believed that they were the most probable danger.
163. General Grunert. If you had gone on Alert 2, defense against air, which included defense against sabotage, or if you had gone on Alert 3, which is an all-out defense, that also would have included defense against an air attack and against attack on the Island under the surface. That also includes sabotage, does it not?

Colonel Phillips. That is right.

164. General Grunert. It would appear that you reached the decision or opinion, or at least concurred in the decision to take just the alert against sabotage. Why? Mainly because you thought it would interfere with training?

Colonel Phillips. That was one matter that was considered. That entered into the decision.

165. General Grunert. The interference with training was mainly against training of what? Air?

Colonel Phillips. Training of air, training of ground troops; training units to operate as a triangular division.

166. General Grunert. Did not training against sabotage take more ground troops than ordinarily?

Colonel Phillips. Yes; that in itself.

167. General Grunert. I am just trying to see how you argued yourself into a certain frame of mind so that you would give the advice that you gave, if you did, or that you would concur.

Colonel Phillips. That is correct.

168. General Grunert. But apparently you had nothing to argue about except what was in favor of what was decided.

Colonel Phillips. As I said a while ago, sir, all phases of the situation were discussed and considered at the time, as I recall.

169. General Grunert. That is what I am trying to get. What were the phases?

Colonel Phillips. Training; the presence of Japanese—those were two of them, at least—and the possibility of attack was positively discussed.

170. General Frank. What kind of attack?

Colonel Phillips. Landing, which was of first importance to us.

171. General Frank. What do you mean by “landing”?

Colonel Phillips. Landing in the invasion of Oahu.

172. General Frank. Was it not well known that since the European War started many landings were preceded by an air attack?

Colonel Phillips. That was discussed also.

173. General Frank. If you were apprehensive about landing, why were you not also apprehensive about an air attack?

Colonel Phillips. That was discussed at the time, sir.

174. General Frank. What were your responsibilities as Chief of Staff? Let us get down to the basis of this thing.

Colonel Phillips. Those were prescribed.

175. General Frank. You were Chief of Staff, were you not?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
176. General Frank. What were your responsibilities?
Colonel Phillips. I was to coordinate all staff activities, advise the General of everything that was going on in his command, and be as near to the General as I possibly could in thought and action, where possible.

177. General Frank. And to advise him and to take responsibility for advising him?
Colonel Phillips. Exactly.

178. General Frank. Therefore you did have some responsibility, did you not?

179. General Frank. Did you ever, during the time that you were Chief of Staff, make any positive recommendations to him?
Colonel Phillips. I am sure I have, sir.

180. General Frank. Did you make any positive recommendations to him with respect to what the action should be to meet this particular crisis that was shown to be developing by the messages of November 27?
Colonel Phillips. I cannot say as to that, sir. I am positive that I discussed all angles of the situation, or as many as we had at hand there; everything that we had in mind and at hand. The possibilities of the entire situation were thoroughly discussed with the General, the pros and cons, as I have said before. As to what specific recommendations I made to him, I merely brought to his attention the possibilities of attack, the reasons for this, that, and the other thing. We discussed it thoroughly, and the General arrived at his decision to go the sabotage alert.

181. General Frank. With or without your assistance?
Colonel Phillips. Of course he had my assistance, as I was discussing it with him; but the workings of his mind, how they went on, sir, I cannot say. Whether it was with my assistance or not, he was my Commanding General and he made his own decisions.

182. General Grunert. Was he inclined to encourage advice and argument from his staff officers, or was he inclined to make decisions without seeking such advice and opinions?
Colonel Phillips. He made decisions at times, sir, on his own. At other times my opinion was requested and the opinions of various staff officers. We had frequent staff meetings.

183. General Grunert. Did you, prior to this discussion with him, consult the General Staff heads, particularly G-2 and G-3, for their opinion and their advice and their information, so as to give you something on which to base yours?
Colonel Phillips. That was a running affair, General, from day to day. We kept very close staff connections there.

184. General Grunert. But here comes a radiogram from the Chief of Staff that has certain directives, certain warnings, certain instructions in it, that could not have been discussed in the ordinary routine. I know it is routine, and it ought to be, in a staff, to do those things. But here is something that comes up like this radiogram, and you would immediately summon the members of the staff, G-2, G-3, and what-not, and get the latest information and get their advice from every angle. Was that done?
Colonel Phillips. We did that immediately, sir.
185. General Grunert. Immediately?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.

186. General Frank. What period of time was consumed in making this decision?
Colonel Phillips. I cannot say as to that.

187. General Frank. Was it two hours or five minutes?
Colonel Phillips. Oh, no; it was perhaps an hour and a half. There was thorough discussion. I do not know how long, now.

188. General Frank. After the attack, by whom and when was the all-out Alert No. 3 ordered on December 7?
Colonel Phillips. The General ordered the all-out alert at about 8 o'clock. It was immediately after the attack. 7:58, as I recall, was the time of the dropping of the first bomb.

189. General Frank. Did you, all the time you were Chief of Staff, ever make a decision without referring it to the General?
Colonel Phillips. On major matters, no.

190. General Frank. On what sort of matters would it have been possible for you to make a decision?
Colonel Phillips. Any minor staff matter, sir.

191. General Frank. Such as?
Colonel Phillips. All personnel matters. Everything came through the headquarters. Ordinary personnel matters, transferring small units from this station to that station.

192. General Frank. Like an Adjutant could make?
Colonel Phillips. Well, something similar to that.

193. General Frank. What was your last answer?
Colonel Phillips. Something similar.

194. General Frank. As Chief of Staff what steps did you take to see that the actions ordered by General Short pursuant to the radiogram of November 27 were carried out? Do you know what was in that radiogram?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. I had my G-2 and G-3, G-3 particularly, turn out his entire office to see that the alert for sabotage was put into effect. He inspected the positions that were afterwards occupied. They remained there for daily inspection from that time on.

195. General Frank. You had antiaircraft available in the Hawaiian Department?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.

196. General Frank. Air force?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.

197. General Frank. Aircraft warning service?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.

198. General Frank. To what extent did you use those units in any sabotage activities when they were sent there and primarily trained for antiaircraft purposes, for fighting in the air, and the aircraft warning service for detecting units coming in from the sea? How did you use them for antisyabotage?
Colonel Phillips. I am not sure of the detail of that, sir. The antisyabotage consisted mostly of ground forces.

199. General Frank. As a matter of fact, it would have been very easy to have carried on this antisyabotage activity and, at the same time, have used the antiaircraft and air force and air warn-
ing service on an active alert so as to have been prepared for this air attack, would it not?

Colonel Phillips. Yes. I am sure that could be done.

200. General Frank. Did you think of that, as Chief of Staff, and so advise the Commanding General?

Colonel Phillips. It was Alert No. 2, as I recall.

201. General Frank. And Alert No. 3?

Colonel Phillips. And 3, where most of those units were used. Yes, sir; that was discussed.

202. General Frank. How did you advise your Commanding General with respect to that?

Colonel Phillips. It was covered in the selection of the alert by the General, what we covered in Alert No. 2, what we covered in Alert No. 3, the number of troops out and required under those alerts. We went into more or less detail.

203. General Frank. Each time you come back and revert to what was done by the General.

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.

204. General Frank. We are particularly interested in things that were done by the Chief of Staff, right now.

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.

205. General Frank. Did you not feel that you had some responsibility?

Colonel Phillips. I did, very much, sir.

206. General Frank. This message of November 27 carried the instruction—

Take such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary.

[1141] What reconnaissance was ordered?

Colonel Phillips. I do not recall that any reconnaissance was ordered, sir.

207. General Frank. Did you have any reconnaissance squadrons?

Colonel Phillips. In the Air Corps?

208. General Frank. Yes.

Colonel Phillips. We had some heavy bombers used for patrolling. According to the naval plan they were turned over to the Navy for distant patrolling.

209. General Frank. Did you not have a reconnaissance squadron at Bellows Field?

Colonel Phillips. P-40?

210. General Frank. No. O-47s, I think they were.

Colonel Phillips. I am not positive about that, sir. The Air Corps, under General Martin, handled that.

211. General Frank. Was there any report made to you with respect to instructions for carrying out the directives in the radiogram of November 27? Did you require reports to be made to you on the instructions that you gave?

Colonel Phillips. As to putting on the sabotage alert, most assuredly, sir.

212. General Frank. Is that the only thing you did—just order a sabotage alert in answer to that message?

Colonel Phillips. We required ordinary staff reports. We required reports from the units, and also, as I said, the positions were in-
spected, the troops were inspected on position. They were there for 24 hours.

213. General Frank. I asked you this: Did the order to institute Alert No. 1 comprise the only thing you did in compliance with \[1142\] the direction in that radiogram?

Colonel Phillips. That was one thing we did, sir. I cannot recall. I do not understand your question exactly. We required reports. Alert No. 1 was instituted and put into effect. I required reports when they occupied positions. We inspected the positions to see that the General's decision for the institution of Alert No. 1 was carried out to the letter.

214. General Grunert. I believe you stated that the message received by your G-2 you considered as sort of a tactic approval by the War Department of the action taken under the Chief of Staff's message of November 27?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.

215. General Grunert. Is not a G-2 message a sort of staff communication which is not considered as a command decision?

Colonel Phillips. It might be so considered. However, coming from the War Department we considered it came with authority.

216. General Grunert. With reference to the attack by air and the alert taken to meet the attack, I broke that down into the necessity of having information, which includes a number of points. It includes your air warning service, and then the next breakdown would be air, and antiaircraft. Those are the three principal means of defense against air attack. That all integrated into an interceptor command when and if established. Now I want to see what condition they were in had they been ordered into Alert 2.

What was the condition of the information service as far as the air warning service was concerned? What was the condition of that to function for such an alert?

\[1142\] Colonel Phillips. We were merely starting that, sir.

217. General Grunert. Why were you merely starting it, when back in February 1941 air attacks were visualized by the Secretary of the Navy and concurred in by the Secretary of War; and the Commanding General out there was instructed to get together with the Navy and take as rapid action as possible and be prepared for such an attack, and it was stated that by June the air warning equipment would be there to be installed? Do you know when it arrived?

Colonel Phillips. I do not.

218. General Grunert. Do you know what action was taken from time to time to speed up that very necessary element of defense?

Colonel Phillips. I know that all possible staff action was being taken, through the Signal Corps people as well as the Air, to speed the installation.

219. General Grunert. Do you know how many times the Commanding General took it up with the War Department, if ever?

Colonel Phillips. I do not.

220. General Grunert. Is not that part of the Chief of Staff's business, to advise the Commanding General of delay and advise action to overcome delay, especially in such an important thing as the air warning system whose function is to detect incoming aircraft so that you could defend against them?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir; that is correct.

221. General Grunert. Whose particular business was it in your staff to look after that phase of it?

Colonel Phillips. The Signal people. The Engineers were installing it, and the Signal people were providing equipment.

222. General Grunert. How about your general staff? The general staff supervises the activities of all those things that pertain to certain functions. What general staff officer should have gotten on their necks and pushed it through?

Colonel Phillips. It was a G-4 proposition, and also G-3.

223. General Grunert. G-4, in the line of getting materiel, and so forth; and G-3, in the line of getting the thing in operation?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.

224. General Grunert. Did they come to you and tell you, "This thing is not going rapidly enough. We are not getting material. We can't get this thing started."

Colonel Phillips. That was done; yes, sir. At various and sundry times we discussed the matter. There were many things being pushed at that time in the Hawaiian Department.

225. General Grunert. But this was one of the most important?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.

226. General Grunert. And the most important thing should be pushed the hardest and the most often. Of course all those things were discussed, but what was done? Did you go to the Commanding General and impress him with the seriousness of this matter?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.

227. General Grunert. Did you prepare radiograms for the War Department and the Chief of Engineers, or what-not, in pushing it?

Colonel Phillips. That is a matter of record, sir. I am not sure what specific action was taken.

228. General Grunert. Do you know when the majority of the equipment arrived? Do you know who was put in charge of the actual installation? Do you know what the progress was from month to month?

Colonel Phillips. I cannot say now, sir. That is also in the record, I am sure.

229. General Grunert. We will go to the next subject. I believe you told me that you had a hand in or supervised the preparation of the S. O. P. of November 5?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.

230. General Grunert. In which you outlined what would be done under certain circumstances, what this alert was, what that alert was, and so forth?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.

231. General Grunert. And in which, tentatively at least, you established an interceptor command. Also, in Alert No. 1, the sabotage alert, it provided that the planes be concentrated, presumably to better guard them?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.

232. General Grunert. That particular phase of it comes in strongly, because the airplanes were bunched and many of them were destroyed by fire of weapons and by fire itself. What discussion was had of the subject of dispersion or concentration? Why did you say
they should be concentrated instead of dispersed so as to give them more protection?

Colonel Phillips. The concentration was done to provide or allow for an easier method of guarding them.

233. General Grunert. An easier method?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, and for fewer troops. Not easy in that respect, General, but for fewer troops. We did not have sufficient troops at that time to even fill the units.

234. General Grunert. You appear to have had sufficient troops to order the Air Force to provide guards for civil installations.

Colonel Phillips. That was because we did not have sufficient troops to provide for guarding other units.

235. General Grunert. Did you have sufficient infantry at Schofield? You were strictly on a sabotage alert. Did you not have sufficient infantry at Schofield that, for the time being, was not so necessary as the Air Force? We will take it for granted that the Air Force should be trained.

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.

236. General Grunert. Trained to do various things, trained to be able to man their equipment so as to have protection against attack?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.

237. General Grunert. But still you provide in the SOP that the Air Force troops shall be used for guarding and taking care of the civil population?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.

238. General Grunert. You have elements that would not be necessary in Alert No. 1, because they do not come, practically, until Alert No. 3, except so far as sabotage is concerned?

Colonel Phillips. That is right.

239. General Grunert. There was no reason for using the troops that you were trying to get ready, that you were trying to train, and use those for sabotage purposes?

Colonel Phillips. That is right.

240. General Grunert. Did the Air Force Commander protest, do you recall, that part of the SOP? Was he in on it, in making it up?

Colonel Phillips. I am sure he was in on the discussion before the adoption of that. That was, as I recall, the decision of the Commanding General, that the Air Force assist.

241. General Grunert. Presumably, that decision must have been based on there being sufficient Air Forces to do their own work and that work in addition.

Colonel Phillips. I cannot say as to that.

242. General Grunert. As to antiaircraft, in that scheme of defense, especially in Alert 2, defense against an air attack, how were the antiaircraft positions? Were they pretty well distributed in and around Pearl Harbor, on the perimeter?

Colonel Phillips. They were; yes, sir.

243. General Grunert. Why would it have alarmed the public by allowing those forces to have live ammunition where they could grab it and get to work? That was brought up in the testimony, and I want to get your slant on it. Why couldn’t they have been trained from time to time to make that a routine affair to have ammunition at their emplacements where their guns were, instead of having to
lug it from some distant place and thereby delay their putting fire on incoming aircraft? Had it ever been thought of that you should deceive the public by having the stuff in a truck nearby, or by having it camouflaged as "beans" or anything else? Did those things never occur, in the line of avoiding alarming the public, instead of placing uncased, live ammunition right next to the guns? Those things were possible, were they?

Colonel Phillips. They were possible; yes, sir.

244. General Grunert. Then, mainly, the idea of not having the live ammunition close to the guns themselves was a question of alarming the public, showing intent, is that it?

Colonel Phillips. That perhaps was the chief reason.

245. General Grunert. Were you not also afraid, and did you not always have in the back of your mind, "Sabotage! They are liable to sabotage! They are liable to do this to the guns! They are liable to do this to the ammunition! or what not?"

Colonel Phillips. I do not believe that was true.

246. General Grunert. Were you not sabotage-minded, and not war-minded?

Colonel Phillips. I do not think so, entirely, sir. I do not think that is entirely correct.

247. General Grunert. If you were war-minded, where did you think an attack was going to come?

Colonel Phillips. Well, our mission was to defend Oahu [1149] from attack. The attack was coming on Oahu, if it came at all—the possibility.

248. General Frank. Then why in the world did you not prepare for an attack?

Colonel Phillips. That was considered.

249. General Frank. What did you think you had? You had some 8-inch guns, and you had some British 75s, and you had a lot of infantry around there?

Colonel Phillips. Yes.

250. General Frank. You had those 8-inch guns and the British 75s, and all your infantry mortars, and the AWS system, and the bombers, and the fighter planes, and your antiaircraft shore defense batteries—and you think that was all put there against sabotage, do you?

Colonel Phillips. No, sir. That was for Alert 3, sir.

251. General Frank. You say you were war-minded?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.

252. General Frank. And you had all these facilities to prepare for a war situation, and yet you did not prepare for a war situation, did you?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.

253. General Frank. Did you?

Colonel Phillips. Well, we adopted a sabotage alert, sir.

254. General Frank. That is not a war situation?

Colonel Phillips. No.

255. General Frank. It is a local sabotage?

Colonel Phillips. That is right.

256. General Frank. In this message of November 27, it says:

The United States desires Japan to commit the first [1150] overt act.
Did you give any consideration to what that meant?
Colonel Phillips. Oh, yes; yes, sir.

257. General Frank. All right—what was it?
Colonel Phillips. Well, just exactly what it said—just exactly what it said.

258. General Frank. I know that is what it said. What was the consideration that you gave to it?

259. General Grunert. In other words, what was your conclusion as to what it meant?
Colonel Phillips. Well, that brought up the possibility of the attack, of course, on Oahu, but it was considered to be, by the General, not probable.

260. General Frank. What did you think about it—you, as the Chief of Staff, one of whose duties it was to advise him? What did you think about it?
Colonel Phillips. At that time, I agreed with the General, sir, thoroughly.

261. General Frank. You agreed with him, but did you advise him?
Colonel Phillips. I did.

262. General Frank. What did you tell him?
Colonel Phillips. I told him of the possibility of an attack.

263. General Frank. And what? What was the result of your consideration of this statement in the message:

The United States desires Japan to commit the first overt act.

Colonel Phillips. Well, of course, we considered at that time, as I recall the attack, an attack on the Philippines was most likely.

264. General Frank. In other words, you did not expect war in Oahu?
Colonel Phillips. Possible, but not probable.

265. General Frank. You thought it was not probable?
Colonel Phillips. I agreed. I brought the possibility of attack on Oahu to the General.

266. General Frank. Yes?
Colonel Phillips. In his opinion, it was not probable.

267. General Frank. What was your opinion?
Colonel Phillips. My opinion was that it was not probable, at that time agreeing with him.

268. General Frank. All right. Did he agree with you?
Colonel Phillips. I don’t know.

269. General Frank. Did he have a chance?
Colonel Phillips. Did he have a chance?

270. General Frank. Yes. Did you present him with an opinion, so it was possible for him to agree with you?
Colonel Phillips. I gave him no definite opinions.

271. General Frank. Yet that was your duty as Chief of Staff, was it not?
Colonel Phillips. Exactly; if he desired it.

272. General Frank. Now, there is another statement, referring to the words of the message.

The United States desires Japan to commit the first overt act, which says:
This policy should not be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.

Now, any alert except No. 1 would have pursued a course of action that would not so completely have jeopardized the defense against air attack, would it not?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, I believe so.

273. General Frank. Did you analyze the statements in this message of November 27?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. As I recall, they were all gone over very thoroughly and an effort made at least to analyze them.

274. General Frank. I would like at some time in these proceedings to go into this AWS.

275. General Grunert. All right, you may go into it now.

276. General Frank. Was the aircraft warning system operative on December 7?

Colonel Phillips. Not entirely so.

277. General Frank. What do you mean by that?

Colonel Phillips. On December 7, as I recall, we had one mobile station operating on a schedule, chiefly for instructional purposes, instructing operators.

278. General Frank. Are you sure about your information, now?

Colonel Phillips. The record of that is also in Hawaii, sir. I am not positive about this. It is purely from memory. I recall we had one station called the Opana station, on northern Oahu, operating that morning. I am not positive about that.

279. General Frank. Well, did you not have a series of portable radar, identified as 270 sets, that were in position around the Island?

Colonel Phillips. I think that was subsequent to December 7.

280. General Frank. Had you not an exercise in which the aircraft warning service participated?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. These were mobile sets, however.

281. General Frank. I know that.

Colonel Phillips. We had no permanent installations at that time.

282. General Frank. But your mobile sets?

Colonel Phillips. Mobile sets; yes, sir.

283. General Frank. How many of those did you have operating, do you know?

Colonel Phillips. I am not sure about that.

284. General Frank. Do you know when they arrived?

Colonel Phillips. I do not.

285. General Frank. Do you know anything about whether or not there was any delay in the installation of your permanent sets by the contractors?

Colonel Phillips. I knew nothing at all about that, sir.

286. General Frank. Do you remember whether or not there were any complaints made about delays?

Colonel Phillips. I do not.

287. General Frank. Do you know whether or not there were any contractors under suspicion for holding up completion of the work?

Colonel Phillips. There were none to my knowledge.

288. General Frank. What was the state of training of the personnel for operating the information center and the radar stations?
Colonel Phillips. At that time?


Colonel Phillips. I should say it was very mediocre. Every effort was being made to improve the situation.

290. General Frank. Was sufficient personnel available and trained for the continuous use of the AWS with portable stations on December 7?

Colonel Phillips. I cannot say as to that, whether there was sufficient personnel. As I recall, there was insufficient personnel, trained personnel. We were making every effort to train them.

291. General Frank. Were you familiar with the hours of operation of the AWS?

Colonel Phillips. I don't recall the schedule that they were operating on at that time. It was more a training schedule than anything else.

292. General Frank. It was not operated with any consideration of protecting the Island against an air attack?

Colonel Phillips. It was a training schedule, due to the fact that we did not have adequate trained personnel.

293. General Frank. Did it start operating on December 7? Was it operating on December 8?

Colonel Phillips. I feel sure it was.

294. General Frank. Then it could have been operating on December 6, could it not?


295. General Frank. Who directed the specific hours of operation, do you know?

Colonel Phillips. I believe General Davidson, of the Air; I am not sure.

296. General Frank. Our information indicates that those instructions came from the Office of the Chief of Staff of the Hawaiian Department.

Colonel Phillips. I am not sure about that. That is also in the record. It was operating under the Signal Officer, and with the Air, under General Davidson. Now, who gave the instructions, I do not know.

297. General Frank. General Davidson had just returned, on December 5, from a trip to the United States, had he not?

Colonel Phillips. I do not know about that, sir.

298. General Frank. He had not been present, until December 5, since the radar equipment had become operative in the Department?

Colonel Phillips. I don't recall that, sir.

299. General Frank. Who, if anybody, had been following this AWS project and using pressure to complete it?

Colonel Phillips. Signal Officer Colonel Powell.

300. General Frank. Had any information been given out indicating a necessity for readiness of that at any particular time?

Colonel Phillips. I do not know.

301. General Grunert. Was not the Navy much concerned in getting that thing started, and did they not put that up to the Army to push it along?
Colonel Phillips. I cannot say as to that, sir.

302. General Frank. Did you know whether or not there was a Commander Taylor loaned by the Navy to the Army to help them?

Colonel Phillips. I knew Commander Taylor.

[1156] 303. General Frank. You knew he was assisting the Army to install this station, did you not?

Colonel Phillips. I believe I recall him; yes, sir.

304. General Frank. In the operation of the AWS after the attack was there any evidence of an effort on the part of the local Japanese radio stations to conduct “jamming” activities that interfered with the operation of the AWS?

Colonel Phillips. I do not believe there was, certainly not reported to me.

305. General Frank. Do you know? It was not reported to you?

Colonel Phillips. It was not reported to me.

306. General Frank. Do you have any knowledge concerning the failure of the contractor, Hawaiian Constructors, to complete construction of the defense projects within the time limits prescribed?

Colonel Phillips. I do not.

307. General Frank. Do you have any knowledge concerning the air-raid warning system’s not having been completed on schedule?

Colonel Phillips. I do not.

308. General Frank. Do you have any knowledge as to whether any military personnel neglected their duty relating to this contract?

Colonel Phillips. I don’t.

309. General Frank. Was any pressure given by Hawaiian Department headquarters to the district engineer to complete these defense projects as speedily as possible?

Colonel Phillips. I recall no specific pressure.

310. General Frank. Did you have any relations with Colonel Wyman?

[1157] Colonel Phillips. He was the district engineer?

311. General Frank. Did you have any relations with him?

Colonel Phillips. I knew him quite well.

312. General Frank. Still, did you have any official relations with him?

Colonel Phillips. I did not, except to be acquainted with the various projects that he was installing, and the airfields, and so forth, he was building. He worked directly with General Short.

313. General Frank. He did not coordinate his activities with the Chief of Staff, at all?


314. General Frank. Did you read the Air estimate prepared by General Martin and Admiral Bellinger?

Colonel Phillips. I do not recall. Undoubtedly I did. I can’t say definitely.

315. General Frank. It was submitted to the Department. It is a thing of a tactical and strategical nature?

Colonel Phillips. That is right.

316. General Frank. And if you had been going through the General Staff positions out there is certainly ought to have come to your attention.
Colonel Phillips. I don't know the date that that was submitted, and I cannot say whether I even saw it. I wasn't, I don't believe, in the position of Chief of Staff at that time. I am not sure.

317. General Frank. Prior to that time, however, you had been in the position of G-3?


[1158] 318. General Frank. You should have known what the plans were for the defense?

Colonel Phillips. Yes: I undoubtedly saw it. I can't say.

319. General Frank. You do not remember ever having seen such a document?

Colonel Phillips. I cannot say definitely that I have ever seen it.

320. General Frank. You have no memory of it?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, I do have a memory of it. I remember it, but I can't say specifically what date, or that I have definitely read it. I feel sure that I have.

321. General Frank. Those things usually are prepared as a guide or advice, and to point attention to the possibilities of development, are they not?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.

322. General Frank. That estimate anticipated an air attack by the Japs exactly along the lines and in the manner in which it happened, and since that was a part of the evidence in the files of the Hawaiian Department, it constituted a recommendation for the defensive action to be taken in a critical situation, did it not?

Colonel Phillips. Yes; undoubtedly.

323. General Frank. Shouldn't you then, as Chief of Staff, have been conscious of it?

Colonel Phillips. I undoubtedly should have known of it, but I must say again that I cannot recall ever having seen it.

324. General Frank. And yet it was one of the outstanding plans, which, if carried out, would have prevented this catastrophe. And you don't remember it?

[1159] Colonel Phillips. I don't think that I have seen it, sir. I don't believe I was in, as Chief of Staff, at that time. There was some other staff capacity. I don't recall that I have ever seen it, sir.

325. General Frank. It still was a part of the plans for the defense of the Island?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.

326. General Frank. How often had you had alerts in the Department?

Colonel Phillips. I believe, while I was there we had three maneuvers, and, I believe, two alerts; I am not sure; maybe more.

327. General Frank. Did you have any blackouts?

Colonel Phillips. I believe we did.

328. General Frank. You don't remember?

Colonel Phillips. I am not positive about that.

329. General Frank. Had your alerts and maneuvers come sufficiently frequent to have become monotonous?

Colonel Phillips. Not at all; they were highly instructive.

330. General Frank. In dealing with the different commands, and considering the probabilities of attack, was air attack ever emphasized to you or to General Short?

Colonel Phillips. The possibility of air attack? Yes, sir.
331. General Frank. And you concluded that it was possible, but not probable, is that correct?

Colonel Phillips. Possible, possible, an air attack.

332. General Frank. You concluded it was possible but not probable, is that what you concluded?


333. General Frank. And that was your conclusion?

Colonel Phillips. Agreement with the General.

334. General Grunert. We have another witness coming at 11 o'clock. I suggest we dismiss this witness, at present, and recall him; and as we have an extra hour this afternoon, we will recall him at 4 o'clock. The Board will recess. We will dismiss this witness, and request him to return at 4 o'clock.

(Brief recess.)

(The witness was excused until 4 o'clock p. m., with the request that he return at that time for further questioning.)

[1161] TESTIMONY OF FULTON LEWIS, JR., WASHINGTON, D. C.

(Accompanied by Fred Morrison)

(Theodore A. Huntley, Major, A. C., Bureau of Public Relations, entered the hearing room.)

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Mr. Lewis, will you state to the Board your name, address, and occupation?

Mr. Lewis. Fulton Lewis, Jr., Mutual Broadcasting System. Business address?

2. Colonel West. That is right.

Mr. Lewis. 1627 K Street, Washington, D. C.; radio news reporter.

3. General Grunert. Mr. Lewis, it came to the Board's attention that some time in the past you, as a radio news commentator, I think they called it, put out a series of broadcasts in which you reviewed the activities or some activities in Hawaii that concerned one Colonel Theodore Wyman. Unfortunately I never heard it, but it was called to my attention, and I asked the Board whether or not by having you in to testify before the Board we might get leads whereby we can get facts. That is the reason we requested that you come, to see if you could give us facts that we may not know and give us leads to facts that we may be able to get in our investigation, and you were kind enough to come up here.

So I shall ask General Frank to lead in propounding the questions, because this subject is so broad and our time is so limited that it is necessary to sort of parcel these special [1162] investigations out to members of the Board, although the entire Board will pass on all questions.

One more thing before going ahead: we, of course, shall want you to consider this as absolutely confidential, and not use it in any of your future work or make any mention of your having been here unless you get the P. R. O. War Department O. K. on mentioning that you have been a witness.

Mr. Lewis. All right, sir.
4. General GRUNERT. And anything that occurs here, to not mention it, because we have no authority to make this public. I think you understand that.

Mr. LEWIS. I understand it perfectly, sir.

5. General GRUNERT. A Board member also suggested that I acquaint you with how this matter came up before this Board. This Board is a fact-finding body insofar as the attack on Hawaii is concerned. We had no sooner gotten started on that than we had added to us another burden, that of looking into so much of the so-called Wyman case as might have a bearing on the attack on Pearl Harbor.

So we were directed to consider the interim report of the House of Representatives and take that and go into such phases thereof as pertain to the attack on Pearl Harbor. So we shall be a fact-finding board insofar as the so-called Wyman case pertains to the attack on Pearl Harbor, and no further.

Mr. LEWIS. And your interest in any testimony that I might have confines itself to the connections of Wyman or anyone else in the Pearl Harbor picture?

6. General GRUNERT. In the Pearl Harbor picture, plus possibly a bit of background that leads up to that Pearl Harbor [1163] picture, but nothing subsequent thereto.

Mr. LEWIS. All right.

7. General FRANK. Also, we are interested in the possible results of any of the association of Wyman and one Hans Wilhelm Rohl that might have affected construction work in Hawaii. As General Grunert has said, this is a Board investigating the circumstances surrounding Pearl Harbor.

Mr. LEWIS. That is right.

8. General FRANK. Therefore, in considering this we are trying to confine our consideration to those phases of the Wyman case that affect the Pearl Harbor situation.

With that as a background, will you give us a statement telling us information along the line that we have just indicated?

Mr. LEWIS. General Frank, my first knowledge of the name Hans Wilhelm Rohl, which led subsequently to my investigations and reporting on the subject of not only Mr. Rohl but Colonel Wyman, came as a result of a news broadcast I did in the latter part of October 1943, October of last year, at which time I made a factual report of certain investigations and hearings by the Truman Investigating Committee into the Canadian Canol project.

The next day I received a telephone call from a young man by the name of Bruce Pine who lived in Beverly Hills, California, who is an investigator at a dollar a year, I believe, a gentleman who is very well to do and who had contributed his services as a patriotic service to the so-called Tenney Investigating Committee of the Legislature of the State of California.

[1164] Mr. Pine asked me if the contractors on the Canol project included any of certain names, they being Rohl, Paul Grafe, Bechtel, or Callahan, and I didn’t know. I contacted the Truman Committee and found out that they did contain certain of those names, they being Callahan and Bechtel and Grafe (Grafe being Callahan) the Callahan Company.

I then called Mr. Pine back and told him that they did, and he said that in that event he believed that he had some very valuable further
information on the subject; that the Tenney Investigating Committee had brought out in the course of hearings some months previous there-to information which the press had rather spurned and for some reason or other had never published except in a most desultory way, and the news had never been carried on the national news services at all.

That was on Tuesday before Thanksgiving of last year, and the following day Mr. Morrison and I set out for Los Angeles, and we arrived there on Sunday. We spent all day Sunday and all of a subsequent week in a very, very intensive review and study of the hearings and the testimony that had been adduced before this Tenney Investigating Committee, and throughout that week I reported over the air what had been found out.

That is the background. I give it to you to show you how I got into it.

Obviously, at that stage of the game it was almost impossible for us to do any personal investigation; we had to confine ourselves very largely to the Tenney report. Subsequent thereto, however, we both of us did a very considerable amount of personal investigation. I think it is unnecessary here to [1165] clutter the record with any summarization of what I reported in those broadcasts, because we have the exact transcripts of them here, sir; unless you feel otherwise. I shall be perfectly glad—

9. General Frank. You have transcripts that you will make available to us?

Mr. Lewis. Yes, sir; you may have the exact transcript of all those records. And of course, as you know, the complete transcript of all the hearings of the Tenney Committee is available to you. You probably have them. Therefore it seems unnecessary to merely repeat and paraphrase my paraphrasing of the certain essential parts of the Tenney Committee report.

As we went on through this procedure, as we presented these reports over the air, there began to come in an immediate flow of reports, letters, tips of all conceivable kinds from all over the State of California and all over the West, for that matter: individuals who said that they had worked on the Hawaiian projects, people who knew Rohl and who knew Wyman, people particularly in Southern California and in Beverly Hills and in the movie colony who had known these two characters, who had seen them around, because in their days when they were in Los Angeles they did considerable drinking and peregrination around the night clubs and the fast spots of Hollywood and the Los Angeles area.

George Murphy, a movie actor, was one who reported having seen the two together on many occasions. Bruce Pine himself had known Hansie Rohl, as they called him, and had known Wyman. There were many parties that Mr. Rohl had put on at which [1166] Colonel Wyman was present, and we gathered a general series of first-hand reports from the people who had been on those parties. It seemed unnecessary to use that material in the broadcast, because essentially their testimony was that Colonel Wyman was a very heavy drinker and so was Mr. Rohl, and they were just usual stories of wild parties, and I saw no reason to clutter up the radio broadcast with such material as that. Insofar as it was possible we tried to either trace down ourselves or turn over to the Military Affairs Committee of the House of Repre-
sentatives, who in the meantime had sent an investigator there, all of
the letters and all of the leads that came in to us through the mail or
through telephone conversations or through telegrams. We have
here a file of letters, telegrams, and so forth. These two folders here
comprise our complete permanent file except for just straight fan mail,
which I am sure the committee would not want. It is a pile this high
(indicating), and it doesn't contribute anything.

These two folders and the envelope there I think comprise essen-
tially the important material that we received other than that which
we turned over to the Military Affairs Committee. I am delighted
for this Board to have the benefit of everything there is in here. I
would want the file protected; I mean, so far as I am concerned I would
want it available to me for my own future reference, but it can be all
photostated, or if there is any way that the Board can take them and
use them on loan, I am delighted to have you do that.

There may be still further leads in those letters that you would want
to trace down. The way in which the Military Affairs Committee got into it was that after the second of these broadcasts I
had communicated voluntarily on my part with Senator Truman be-
fore I went out there, telling him what I was going to do and suggest-
ing that I would be delighted to make any reports to him that he might
want, and suggesting that he may not need any. I had no idea whether
the story was going to materialize into anything, and that perhaps
Fred and I were just going out on a wild goose chase as you frequently
do in news work.

Then after we got out there, after the second broadcast, or perhaps
even the first. I received a telephone call from the counsel of the Mili-
tary Affairs Committee staying that he was very much interested and
was sending an investigator out there Mr. John Weiner, who did arrive
about Wednesday or Thursday, and I assume that Mr. Weiner either
will be or has been called before this committee. He made a very
extensive personal investigation of the matter.

10. General Frank. May I ask a question there?
Mr. Lewis. Yes. And if I am not carrying a train that you want,
by all means guide me.

11. General Frank. In your perusal of this did you ever run across
the name of Werner Plack?
Mr. Lewis. I did, sir.

12. General Frank. Any information that you have, will you please
include it?

Mr. Lewis. In these broadcasts there is mention of Werner Plack, as
you will see. We were told by Mr. Pine—I think he had several other
friends there who also corroborated this—that Rohl and Werner Plack
had been very close and intimate friends, that they had been seen to-
gether at night clubs on frequent occasions. The Tenney Committee was never able to get any admission out of Rohl
that he had known Werner Plack. I think, as a matter of fact, he
denied it, although these witnesses specifically stated that he had been
present.

Now, there was Harry Flannery of the Columbia Broadcasting
System, who had been in Germany just prior to the war; a very re-
liable radio news reporter, by the way. He had been in Germany
just prior to the war. He was one of the last of the correspondents
to leave Berlin, and he reports that Werner Plack came back to Berlin after having left the West Coast and the associations of Rohl. He had stopped at Hawaii on the way out, had then stopped at Japan, and then had gone on into Germany; that when he got back to Berlin—it seems that Mr. Plack was somewhat of an addict to these spirituous liquors—that when he got back to Berlin, however, despite his ardent use of alcohol, he was given a job in the foreign office, and the correspondents there were rather amazed at the importance that the German Government seemed to attach to him.

That was all purely circumstantial. We had no facilities for investigating it further. But we were informed by the Committee representatives out there that Mr. Plack's effects had been searched by the F. B. I. a couple of times on the way across, and I believe some seizures had been made.

That is about all the light, sir, that I can throw on the matter of Werner Plack. Within my own conviction and from the people that I talked to in Southern California, Mr. Rohl's testimony to the contrary notwithstanding, I personally am satisfied Mr. Rohl did know Mr. Werner Plack and knew him quite [1163] well, and they were more or less frequent drinking companions and night club companions.

13. General Frank. Were you able to draw any conclusions as a result of your investigation, from the governmental official point of view, that the association of Wyman and Rohl was not a healthy one?

Mr. Lewis. Oh, yes, sir; unquestionably, I should have said. I should say it was a most unhealthy, and not only that, a most unsavory one. Here was a picture of an Army officer who had control of the award of contracts, and very important contracts, vital contracts. There were plenty of contractors, and excellent ones, on the West Coast, just as good, with just as fine standing and just as fine records of performance, and in most cases far better than Hans Wilhelm Rohl.

Here was a personal association—a pickled personal association so to speak—between an Army officer who had control of the award of these contracts, and the contractor. The fact remains that there were plenty of other contractors on the West Coast about whom there was no question of their fidelity, about whom there was no question of their sobriety, about whom there was no question as to their nationality and their allegiance; and as against that, for some still unexplained reason, the Government officer in charge of the award of these contracts continued to have only one person, and that was a man who even at that time was not even a naturalized American citizen, who was a German alien, and who had had an opportunity since 1924 to become a naturalized American citizen if he had any loyalty to this country. And Mr. Morrison reminds me, a very outspoken critic of democratic processes, a violent critic [1170] of the President. There are others who are, but it comes with far less grace from a German alien at a time when the country is distinctly at odds with Germany than it does from American citizens, and I have yet to hear an American citizen say any of the things about the President that Mr. Rohl is reported as having said.

14. General Grunert. Have you read the interim report of the Committee on Military Affairs of the House of Representatives on their investigation?
Mr. Lewis. I cannot say, sir, that I have read every word of it. I am familiar with the contents of it.

15. General Grunert. Much of what you have been telling us is just the line along which their report seems to go.

Mr. Lewis. Exactly, sir.

16. General Grunert. I was wondering, if you had read it, whether there were any particular points that will elaborate on what they report, or any new points that they possibly did not touch upon. Do you know whether your news reports bring that to light? Of course, we have not read them.

Mr. Lewis. My news reports at that time, sir, are almost—oh, I think entirely embodied in the report. I do not think there is any information that we had originally in the original series of stories that we did that is not contained in this report.

There is one phase of this question that I do not think is quite completely covered in that report. Are you familiar with the name of Robert Hoffman?

17. General Frank. Yes.

18. General Grunert. The name appears among those, and also his evidence is shown in this report. That is all we know about it, and we hope if he can be located that he will be a witness.

19. General Frank. He is the man who is now in Mexico City.

Mr. Lewis. Yes, sir.

20. Major Clausen. Sir, we have his testimony given before the Committee.

21. General Grunert. We also have all the records that the House Committee has, which we have not yet been able to examine thoroughly.

Mr. Lewis. If that is the case, I rather assume that you have all the information about Mr. Hoffman that I have. Mr. Morrison and I went to Mexico City. Mr. Hoffman was rather an elusive and mysterious figure in this case. He first came to light in an anonymous telegram that was sent to the Tenney Committee, and that telegram said, "If you want the full background story and the complete story about the Pearl Harbor contracts, get hold of Bob Hoffman. He knows it all and will spill his guts," or words to that effect.

They couldn’t find out who Bob Hoffman was or where he was or anything else, and efforts were made to trace the telegram back. We couldn’t find out who had sent the telegram, but the telegraph office that sent the telegram said that at the same time another telegram had been sent by the same individual to Mr. Paul Grafe, and that telegram was signed by the same name and told Paul Grafe that they had just tipped the Tenney Committee to find Bob Hoffman. It would seem to have been a bit of needling on the part of someone.

But subsequently we still couldn’t—neither the Tenney Committee nor I or Fred could find out who Mr. Hoffman was. We subsequently got a letter signed by the same initials as had sent the telegram, a mere fan letter to me in Washington, saying that there was one person who could tell the whole story on this; he was a very fine person, that he had been superintendent in charge of construction; telling about his background, his past experience, and so forth, and his name was Robert Hoffman, and that I would find him in Mexico City at such and such an address.
Mr. Morrison and I got on an airplane and went to Mexico City and did find him there and persuaded him to come back and testify before the Military Affairs Committee of the House.

Incidentally, there is one thing that I do not believe came out in his testimony before the Committee. He said that he was asked to make a report as to his personal opinions and his personal impressions of the performance of Colonel Wyman and the contract procedure at Pearl Harbor, that he made this report, turned it in to Army sources, and that some Army officer subsequently came to him and said that the report was not satisfactory and it couldn't be in the files of the Army.

Now, the anonymous letter that I received said that one copy of that report was still in Hoffman's hands and it was in a trunk in Los Angeles. That is one of the chief reasons that Mr. Morrison and I went to Southern California—to Mexico City. Hoffman said that there was such a report, that he had made it, that he had been told that the report should not be in the Army's files. He said it was a very critical report, and we [1173] finally persuaded him to go by way of Los Angeles on his way to Washington and to get the copy of the report and bring it here, and I believe he turned it over to—he made it available, at any rate, to the House Military Affairs Committee.

I do not want to editorialize and I do not want to give second-hand opinions. The counsel for the committee said that he was rather disappointed when he went over the report because he didn't find anything of particular importance in it, even though he got some engineers to survey it, and they couldn't find anything of particular importance in it.

22. General Frank. Did your investigations at any time indicate, as a matter of fact, whether any advantage accrued to Wyman through this association?

Mr. Lewis. To this extent, sir; we never were able to attain the slightest evidence of any kind that any financial benefit, any actual payments, any bribes, or anything of the sort had ever been paid to Colonel Wyman. I would like Mr. Morrison to express his own personal opinion on this, because this is opinion that you are asking for, and on this point I am merely giving my opinion. So far as I am concerned, I saw no concurrent circumstantial evidence to that effect. In other words, if a person is receiving bribes he is likely to live in a very much more profligate manner than he would if he is still living on his own salary, but there was no evidence that I was able to pick up that any such thing had happened. It unquestionably is true in my mind that Colonel Wyman received tremendous social benefits and tremendous emoluments of luxurious living. He was kept in liquor; many, many favors [1174] and courtesies, if you will. Such emoluments were certainly bestowed upon him in a most generous and lavish manner.

After all, sir, if you were in Hawaii in the early days of the war, when we were so short of ships and whatnot that we could hardly protect ourselves, and you were a little short of the liquor that you liked, and a yacht under escort came all the way from San Francisco to Hawaii, and its sole cargo was liquor—that, after all, is something of an emolument.
23. General Frank. Did your delving into this situation result in any lead that would indicate any effort to delay the construction for which the Rohl Company had contracts? It is leads that we are after.

Mr. Lewis. Hoffman’s testimony and his information are material which, to me at least, are grounds for tremendous suspicion. That would be, in my language, a lead that we would have followed up had there been any way for us to follow it up.

24. General Frank. Hoffman is the main lead along that line?

Mr. Lewis. Yes, sir; and these various individuals who had charge of laying runways and tearing them up and relaying them and tearing them up again, and building hills and cutting them down, and then building them up again and cutting them down.

May I enlarge just one sentence, sir? To me, as a reporter, the preponderance of that evidence indicated that either there was the grossest sort of mismanagement and misdirection or that Rohl possibly was using Wyman as a dupe to deliberately delay the performance, or both.

25. General Frank. Is there any evidence as to whether through the alleged inebriated nature of that association they caused any delay in the construction?

Mr. Lewis. Yes, sir. From Hoffman’s testimony and from the testimony of the other people who were first-hand witnesses on the scene there seems to be no question, in my mind, as to that.

26. General Frank. Did you get any information on the result of any of Plack’s operations?

Mr. Lewis. No, sir. Plack still remains the mysterious figure; Plack still remains an amiable, almost always inebriated picture of a fat German who loves to live well and who was either a very stupid oaf or a very clever individual, one of the two.

27. General Frank. Did you ever meet him?

Mr. Lewis. I never did.

28. General Frank. As to this association of Rohl and Wyman, do you have any impression of over how long a period it extended?

Mr. Lewis. That is all in the record, sir; either 1935 or late 1934, when Wyman was first sent to Southern California in charge of that district. It began at that time. Rohl’s first big contract, and the one that he made his first stake on, was the Long Beach breakwater, and that contract was awarded to him by Wyman.

29. General Frank. What I am getting around to is this: To your knowledge, this association had been continuing over a period of several years?

Mr. Lewis. Oh, yes; continuing consistently.

30. General Frank. Do you know whether or not it had ever come to the attention of any of Wyman’s superiors?

Mr. Lewis. I do not know, sir; nor do I know whether Wyman’s escapes had ever come to the attention of his superiors.

[1176] As of what date? I am not sure that I got your question quite right.

31. General Frank. As of any date, up to the point of your investigation.

Mr. Lewis. Yes, Oh, yes. I think there was definite evidence that Wyman’s condition in Hawaii had come to the attention of superior officers, and in Washington.

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32. General Frank. Have you anything to indicate that his superiors were conversant with this, and what action they took, if any? Mr. Lewis. I have not; and I do not know to what extent they were conversant with the details. I do not think there is any evidence in the record to show.

33. General Frank. Have you any information as to the date on which Plack left the United States and when he reached Berlin? Mr. Lewis. I can dig it out for you, sir. It is in these files here (indicating). It was before Pearl Harbor, a considerable period of time before that, and before Germany’s attack on Russia. It was a good long time.

34. Major Clausen. Mr. Lewis, you said that Rohl had a chance, since 1924, to become a United States citizen. Should that be 1913, sir.

Mr. Lewis. Well, I would say yes. I was thinking about 1924 as the time when he went back. I think it was 1924 that he went back to Germany and came back. I should say 1913; yes.

35. Major Clausen. Have you any leads or information concerning a Mr. Enright?

Mr. Lewis. The name does not click with me.

[1177] Major Clausen. Could you make a search of your office mail andfan mail to see if possibly you had received a communication from a Mr. Enright?

Mr. Lewis. Yes, sir. Can you give me his first name?

37. Major Clausen. I believe it is William Henry.

Mr. Lewis. Those were not the initials on that communication to which I have referred. - I do not know him.

38. Major Clausen. Do you know anything of the activities of Mr. Rohl during the first World War?

Mr. Lewis. I do not.

39. Major Clausen. Did you get any leads on his possible activities during that time?

Mr. Lewis. Not that I remember. I have no recollection of ever having heard about it.

40. General Grunert. The F. B. I. investigated him. The records there might show.

41. General Frank. Do you know whether or not Plack passed through Hawaii while Wyman and Rohl were there, or before?

Mr. Lewis. He passed through before they went in on this particular series of contracts. It was some months before that. Wyman and Rohl may have been there incidentally. Rohl was going to Hawaii on pleasure visits. I could not say about that. That is a matter of dates, and I am rusty on them.

42. General Frank. May we have those papers (indicating) to put in evidence?

(The witness handed two volumes of correspondence to Major Clausen.)

43. Major Clausen. At this time we offer as Exhibit No. 16 the broadcasts that have been identified by Mr. Lewis.

ADDENDA

The Board at a meeting on 13 October, 1944, decided that Exhibits Nos. 16, 17, and 18, having served their desired purpose of furnishing
leads to evidence, directed that the mentioned Exhibits be withdrawn from the record and returned to the witness who furnished them, Mr. Fulton Lewis, Jr., by the Assistant Recorder.

44. Major Clausen. At this time we offer in evidence the folder that Mr. Lewis has identified as the Canol Project folder, subject to the elimination of any unnecessary documents.

(Documents selected from folder of documents relating to the Canol Project were marked Exhibit No. 17 and received in evidence.)

45. General Frank. Have you anything further, Mr. Lewis, that you want to submit?

Mr. Lewis. This (indicating) is a folder of notes, letters, memorandums, and references from the personal files of my own office in regard to Colonel Wyman and Mr. Rohl and the projects in which they were involved.

46. Major Clausen. I offer this file in evidence as Exhibit No. 18, on the same basis as that on which Exhibit No. 17 was offered.

(Documents selected from personal files of the witness were marked Exhibit No. 18 and received in evidence).

47. General Frank. Have you anything further, Mr. Lewis?

Mr. Lewis. I was just asking Mr. Morrison if there is anything that comes to his mind.

There is one thing that did not appear in the record, a very small matter, perhaps, in a way. Perhaps it would not be germane because it was a relationship subsequently on Colonel Wyman's part to the Canadian Project, and not out in Hawaii.

48. Major Clausen. Unless it is related indirectly.

Mr. Lewis. I will be glad to tell it to you.

49. General Frank. Suppose you narrate it.

[1178] Mr. Lewis. Mr. Hoffman told Mr. Morrison and told me that—

50. General Frank. Mr. Morrison is your associate?

Mr. Lewis. Yes, sir; he is my associate. It was in Mexico City. He told us that a Mr. Turnbull, of Cleveland, who was one of the consultants on the Canadian Project—and let me interject here that this was apropos a question that we asked similar to the one you have asked, as to whether or not there was any evidence of Colonel Wyman's accepting any specific emoluments—that Mr. Turnbull, of Cleveland, who was one of the consultants on the Canadian Project, had come to him and had said that he certainly would like to do something for Colonel Wyman, but he did not know what to do, and Mr. Hoffman said that that was entirely up to Mr. Turnbull; it was not his affair. The net result of it was that Mr. Turnbull gave Colonel Wyman's wife a very handsome mink coat.

I do not know whether that is of any interest to you or not. The two cases, the Hawaiian contracts and the Canadian contracts on which both of these people worked, are so interwoven in my mind, as the reporter who worked on them, that it is difficult for me to extricate them for your individual purposes.

51. General Frank. Is that the Turnbull Engineering Co. of Cleveland?

Mr. Lewis. Yes, sir.
52. General Russell. Mr. Lewis, when you went west did you make any investigation of these other corporations and individuals who have been identified as of the Hawaiian Constructors? I will name them so that you may refresh your memory:

W. E. Callahan Construction Company; Gunther & Shirley; Ralph E. Woolley.

[1180] Did you make any investigation of those people in connection with your western visit?

Mr. Lewis. Yes, sir. I did not make any investigation of Woolley, but I investigated Gunther and Shirley and the Callahan Construction Company. Mr. Callahan was a very distinguished and much respected citizen of Dallas, Texas; in fact, I knew him. I had the pleasure of meeting him several times there. I believe that Mr. Grafe was his son-in-law, or some relative—his son-in-law, I think. I think Mr. Grafe married Mr. Callahan's daughter. Mr. Callahan had in recent years turned the company over to Mr. Grafe, who was a comparatively young man and was trying to build the company up. He seemed to be trying to get what business he could get.

I also investigated the Gunther & Shirley Company. I found that they all had their offices on the same floor of the same building. Mr. Morrison went down there personally and looked it over. Perhaps he could answer the question better, General, than I could, in so far as that specific phase is concerned.

53. General Russell. There was a definite question to which I was attempting to get an answer, and that is that if you did make an investigation of these other contracting parties, state whether or not those people professionally and financially could have carried on this work irrespective of the association of the Rohl-Connolly Company with The Hawaiian Constructors.

Mr. Lewis. I am afraid I am incompetent to answer that question, except by way of an impression, if that is all right. My impression is that they were certainly competent to carry it on.

54. General Russell. It is in the record that this man Rohl [1181] did not go out to Hawaii until September, and that some time in August Army authorities intervened to hasten his citizenship application on the theory that Rohl's driving power and his capacity as an executive were needed to hasten along this construction work in Hawaii.

The questions which I have asked you heretofore were largely intended to determine whether or not it was necessary to have Rohl out there at that time, and I was wondering whether or not you developed that there were people among those other contractors who could have carried on the work out there without Rohl.

Mr. Lewis. I think there is no question of that, sir. The simple fact remains that when they had the Canadian jobs to do they were able to find contractors that were competent to do it. Rohl was brought in merely as a very, very secondary sub-contractor and only because Colonel Wyman insisted that he be brought in, even then.

55. General Grunert. The contract had been let and was being executed in Hawaii. The idea was that apparently things were not going along as they should, so they demanded that Rohl come out and push things. It was not a question of getting other contractors, was it?
Mr. Lewis. I think you will find that they began trying to push things for Rohl at the particular time that the contract was let. They did not have time to find out when they began pushing Rohl's citizenship whether the contract was going along satisfactorily or not.

56. General Russell. I am going another step in the Hawaiian end of this situation. If the Callahan Company, the Gunther & Shirkey Company, or whoever was operating for them, and Ralph [1182] E. Woolley, as an individual, were all out there participating in the construction work in Hawaii, I have been wondering just how this man Rohl, from an operating base on the west coast, could dominate that situation to the point that those three other contractors would delay the work out in Hawaii from the time they went to work until Rohl got out there in September.

Mr. Lewis. I could not look into their minds, sir; I cannot answer that factually. I can only give you my own deduction.

57. General Russell. Do you think that those other contractors were the type of people that would permit Rohl to stay in Los Angeles and cause them to tear up and rebuild runways and things of that sort in order to slow down the construction work in Hawaii?

Mr. Lewis. Rohl unquestionably was the dominant figure in The Hawaiian Constructors.

58. General Russell. We are talking about two things all in one sentence. The Hawaiian Constructors was a group of contractors. The Rohl-Connolly Company was a corporation. You have hit on the very part of the information that I am attempting to get. Did Rohl dominate The Hawaiian Constructors, or did he dominate the Rohl-Connolly Company?

Mr. Lewis. From the evidence we have, and all of the testimony and all of the interviews we have, there is no question about the fact that Rohl dominated both the Rohl-Connolly Company and The Hawaiian Constructors, through his association with Wyman. He was the contact man; he was the person who was close to the Colonel in charge.

59. General Russell. Mr. Lewis has gone through the Tenney investigation in California and the investigation by the Con-[1183] gressional Committee here, and he has been out there and made a first-hand investigation of these other people, and I think it is extremely material to have in the record his impression of those people, such as the relation between Rohl and Wyman. All of those things I think are equally material in determining the major issue here.

Did Rohl's association with that outfit slow down construction in Hawaii?

Mr. Lewis. Will you, so that I may answer your question and give you exactly what you want, ask it a little more specifically, General?

60. General Russell. I thought I had asked the question, but I will repeat it so that there can be no doubt.

[1184] Do you think, based on your investigation and what you know of Callahan Construction Co., Gunther & Shirley Co., and Ralph E. Woolley, that Rohl could have dominated those other contractors to the point that they would have delayed the work which they were doing for the Government on the defensive projects in Hawaii?
Mr. Lewis. If I may insert, there, "delayed, for one reason or another," I would be delighted to answer that question specifically. I don't want this answer to imply any final conviction on my part as to whether Rohl deliberately, from a sell-out-of-the-United-States standpoint, delayed those projects, or whether he delayed them in order to build up a high-cost job; because that, I don't know, and I am no one to pass judgment; but allowing the benefit of that doubt, my answer, sir, is that there isn't the slightest question in my mind at all that Rohl dominated these two concerns; first, the Rohl-Connelly Company, and then the Hawaiian Constructors, to the extent that he could do anything—he could have them do anything he wanted to do out there.

61. General Russell. And he could do that by telephoning from Los Angeles?

Mr. Lewis. Yes, he could do that by telephoning from Los Angeles; and the record shows that there were repeated telephone calls all through the summer and the early fall between Rohl and the project out in Hawaii, despite the provisions of law to the contrary.

62. General Gruner. Do I gather from your last answer that in your own mind you are convinced there were delays?

Mr. Lewis. Yes, sir; unnecessary delays.

[1185] 63. General Gruner. From the information that you have?

Mr. Lewis. Yes, sir.

64. General Gruner. From your viewpoint, without positively knowing all about what might have caused them?

Mr. Lewis. That is right—from the information that I have.

65. General Frank. And all that information has been made available to us?

Mr. Lewis. All that is still in my hands, all that I haven't already turned over to the Military Affairs Committee of the House for their purposes; which of course is still available to you through them.

66. General Gruner. Mr. Lewis, I assume that you gather information primarily for news purposes?

Mr. Lewis. That is correct, sir; solely for news purposes.

67. General Gruner. We must have evidence of facts on which conclusions can be drawn, for possible recommendations.

We appreciate your assistance in giving us a picture, and the data from which we may adduce evidence, or have a lead toward that goal.

Mr. Lewis. Thank you, sir.

68. General Gruner. We thank you for coming, and appreciate it very much.

Mr. Lewis. If there is anything further I can do, I would be delighted to do so.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 12:18 p.m., a recess was taken until 2 o'clock p.m.)
(The Board at 2 p. m. continued the hearing of witnesses.)

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL KENNETH P. BERGQUIST, A. U. S., WASHINGTON, D. C.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?
   Colonel BERGQUIST. Kenneth P. Bergquist, Colonel, A. U. S., with the Army Air Forces; Executive Officer to the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Operations, Commitments, and Requirements.

2. Colonel West. That is Washington, D. C.
   Colonel BERGQUIST. Washington, D. C.?

3. General GRUNERT. Colonel, the Board is attempting to get at the facts as to the background and the viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack and also during the attack itself. We hope that you can throw some light on the subject and the position and assignment you occupied while in Hawaii during the latter part of the year 1941. General Frank will conduct the hearing, and the other members will ask such questions as they deem necessary to help develop the subject. General Frank.

4. General FRANK. On what duty were you in the latter part of November and the first part of December 1941?
   Colonel BERGQUIST. I was Operations Officer of what was then known as the Hawaiian Interceptor Command.

5. General FRANK. Of what did the Interceptor Command consist?
   Colonel BERGQUIST. It consisted of the two fighter groups, and later on it had operational control over all the air warning service.

6. General FRANK. Just at that time the Signal Officer was in charge of the A. W. S.?
   Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

7. General FRANK. But you were working in there and using it?
   Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

8. General FRANK. On a sort of cooperative basis?
   Colonel BERGQUIST. Yes, sir.

9. General FRANK. What were the number and locations of the permanent A. W. S. stations?
   Colonel BERGQUIST. Before the 7th, sir? Before the 7th of December?

10. General FRANK. Yes.
   Colonel BERGQUIST. I don't know for sure now. I can't recall exactly, but if my memory is correct I believe we did not have any permanent radar stations set up at that time; they were all mobile.

11. General FRANK. Do you know what the locations were in which the permanent sets were to be installed?
   Colonel BERGQUIST. I will give it as well as I can remember, from my memory of it. I believe one was to be at Kokee over on Kauai, as a permanent installation. One was to be up on a point on the northern shore of Kauai: Kilauea, was it?
Colonel Bergquist. Kilauea Point. I am not sure; I believe that
was to be perhaps a mobile one. We were to put [1188] one on
top of Kaala in Hawaii, which is the highest point in Hawaii.

Colonel Bergquist. I mean on Oahu, yes, sir. We were to put one
up on near Kahuku Point, just back of Kahuku Point on some high
ground. I have forgotten what we called that location. We were to
put one on Mokapu Point. That is the point near Kaneohe Bay, as
distinguished from Makapuu Point.

14. General Frank. One is Mokapu, and the other is Makapuu.
Colonel Bergquist. That is right. This is Mokapu.
We were to put one back up from Barbers Point. Now, I don’t recall
very well which were to be mobile and which were to be fixed. I believe
I do have a chart which would indicate it to me, in my files.

15. General Frank. When they were going to put three fixed ones
up, where were the three fixed ones going to be?
Colonel Bergquist. One on Kaala, one on Haleakala, and one on
Kokee.

16. General Frank. That is right. You stated that none of those
sets was yet installed on the 7th of December?
Colonel Bergquist. As far as I know, that is correct, sir.

17. General Frank. Had they arrived in the Department?
Colonel Bergquist. I don’t think so, sir. I don’t recall. I didn’t
check on that.

18. General Frank. Do you know?
Colonel Bergquist. I do not know.

19. General Frank. Did you have any 270 mobile sets in the Depart-
ment at that time?


20. General Frank. How many? You had at least how many?
Colonel Bergquist. We had at least five.

21. General Frank. When did they arrive?
Colonel Bergquist. Oh, I would say about July or August of 1941,
as far as I can recall.

22. General Frank. When were they set up and operating?
Colonel Bergquist. Well, as I recall, I think it was in perhaps July.
They may have arrived a little sooner than July, but I believe it was
approximately July or August when I conducted the first practice
runs with two sets, one of which we had operating over at Waianae,
and the other of which we had operating at Haleiwa, but I can’t recall
the exact date, sir.

23. General Frank. All right. But did you have an exercise in
which you had four or five of them operating later in the fall?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.

24. General Frank. When was that?
Colonel Bergquist. That was——

25. General Frank. In November?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir; in November we did that.

26. General Frank. Will you look at that chart showing the Island
of Oahu with those crosses on it (handing chart to the witness)? Was
the location of those crosses generally the points where the mobile
sets were set up?
Colonel Bergquist. That is correct, sir.

27. General Frank. Well, will you state about where those were?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir. We had one at Haleiwa, [1190] one at Kahuku Point, one at Kaala, and one at Koko Head, and one back up in the rear of Fort Shafter.

28. General Frank. All right. Were they effective?
Colonel Bergquist. They were effective to a degree. We had not calibrated them all. There were a considerable number of loopholes, as we found out later when we did attempt to calibrate them, to find out every weakness we could about them. But they were effective to a fair degree.

29. General Frank. How far?
Colonel Bergquist. I would say a maximum range of approximately 130 miles.

30. General Frank. That might vary more or less under different conditions?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.

31. General Frank. All right.
Colonel Bergquist. And also with respect to the altitude of the target.

32. General Frank. How were they operated? By motor generator sets or by commercial electricity?
Colonel Bergquist. No, sir; at that time we were still operating them with the motor generator set, and we were attempting to get commercial lines put in.

33. General Frank. Did you have plenty of spare parts and tubes?
Colonel Bergquist. I do not know the exact situation of that, sir.

34. General Frank. Were you ever held up in operations for lack of spare parts?
Colonel Bergquist. As I recall, I believe we were.

[1191] 35. General Frank. To any extent?
Colonel Bergquist. No, sir. No, I would say not, offhand. It is not clear in my memory.

36. General Frank. Was your information center organized?
Colonel Bergquist. No, sir.

37. General Frank. Was it operative?
Colonel Bergquist. No, sir, it was not operative as an information center should be.

38. General Frank. Could it have been used?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.

39. General Frank. Actually was it used on December 8?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.

40. General Russell. 7th?

41. General Frank. As a matter of fact, it did get some information on December 7th, didn't it?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.

42. General Frank. Will you make a statement to the Board covering generally the state of training of the men assigned to the Aircraft Warning Service both for operation of the radar sets and for operation of the information center?
Colonel Bergquist. Well, I think we had had the sets operating in practice a sufficient length of time so that the radar scope operators that we had were fairly well trained. We had plotters and information
center personnel of the Signal Corps fairly well trained. I was in the process of training what I called pursuit officers, which is one of the positions on the board—on the control platform, that is—by running a roster of the fighter pilots in the Interceptor Command in order to do two things: to both train them to function as pursuit officers on the control board and to acquaint them with the workings of the board in order to better carry out instructions that they received from the board on flying missions. The only controllers that we had, we considered, that could operate, that were trained sufficiently, were myself, Major Tindal—I mean Colonel Tindal; he was a Major at that time—and I did have with me at that time Commander William E. G. Taylor of the Navy. The other positions on the control platform, we did have an antiaircraft liaison officer, and had conducted problems with them so that they were in a fair state of training. We had not been able to get the Navy liaison officers assigned, so there was no one trained in that. The same applies to the bomber command liaison, the liaison officers with the Hawaiian Department headquarters.

43. General Frank. What about civilian defense?
Colonel Bergquist. And also the civilian defense.

44. General Grunert. What was the second one you named after the Navy? Navy, headquarters, civilian defense, and what was the fourth one?
Colonel Bergquist. The bomber command. We were making all efforts to get the people assigned to man all these positions in order that I could train them and thus operate. We had a conference on the 24th of November, of which I have the notes, in which we had representatives from the Department Signal Office, Colonel Murphy I believe; we had Commander Coe from the Navy, who was then Operations Officer for Patwing 2, I believe it was; and we had Commander Tetley and a couple of other officers. I forgot their names; I can't recall now. But at that time we brought out the fact that we wanted to get it on 24-hour operation as soon as possible. We asked that the Navy take the matter up immediately to get their liaison officers, and that the other agencies do likewise.

45. General Frank. To whom was that communicated?
Colonel Bergquist. This was to be handled by each of the representatives whom we had there, to be handled verbally with their own organization to get it. There were no requests put through in writing that I recall.

46. General Frank. Did you get any results out of this thing?
Colonel Bergquist. After the 7th, sir.

47. General Frank. You got no results before the 7th?
Colonel Bergquist. That is right, sir.

48. General Frank. And the 7th was just about two weeks later, wasn't it?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir. If you like, I can—

49. General Frank. How much cooperation did you get from the Department headquarters?
Colonel Bergquist. You want my opinion on that, sir?

50. General Frank. Yes.
Colonel Bergquist. Very little. I would like to state that perhaps the main reason for lack of cooperation from mostly the higher headquarters was a lack of education as to what air defense was and what it could do and what the setup could do.

51. General Frank. Were you having difficulty putting your [1194] program through?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.

52. General Frank. What was the nature of that difficulty?
Colonel Bergquist. Getting the radar stations set up and operating.

53. General Frank. You mean the permanent ones?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir; the permanent as well as the necessary power and facilities for the mobile ones.

54. General Frank. That is the commercial power for the mobile ones?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir; getting the proper interest by the various agencies that had to cooperate with us on setting up and making this go; such as furnishing liaison officers, getting them to agree to putting operational control in our hands, in the hands of the Interceptor Command in the person of the controller to operate all the various agencies involved, such as the antiaircraft not only of the Army but of the Navy in Pearl Harbor, and controlling all the radio stations, commercial radio stations, controlling the movements of all aircraft; not so much to the exact telling of them what to do—for instance, the bombers—but to insure that they abide by the principles that we operated under, in that we would know at all times where they were so that we could filter out any plots that we received.

55. General Frank. No only who they were but where they were?
Colonel Bergquist. That is right, sir.

56. General Frank. With whom were you having difficulty putting this across?
[1195] Colonel Bergquist. All the Signal Corps activity was mostly handled—as far as I was concerned, my contacts were mainly with Colonel Tetley, occasionally with Colonel Murphy.

57. General Frank. He is now deceased?
Colonel Bergquist. That is right, sir. And occasionally with Colonel Powell, the Department Signal Officer.

58. General Frank. Who was your Commander at that time?
Colonel Bergquist. General Davidson.

59. General Frank. Where was he?
Colonel Bergquist. At Wheeler Field.

60. General Frank. Was he at Wheeler Field in November?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir. I was too.

61. General Frank. Well, when did he come back to the United States?
Colonel Bergquist. He didn’t come back to the United States until——

62. General Frank. Didn’t he come back to the United States for a course of instruction?
Colonel Bergquist. He came back to observe a maneuver, as I recall now; that is right. And I believe he arrived back in Hawaii on the 5th of December, just in time to be there.

63. General Frank. Well, did you ever make representations to him of the difficulties that you were having?
Colonel Bergquist. Occasionally, yes, sir. I tried to do most of this work of getting this up by verbal contacts and plugging along by myself, which was perhaps a lack of knowledge on my part; experience, rather.

64. General Frank. Was the fact that this was not progressing satisfactorily ever taken up with Department headquarters to [1196] get some backing on it?

Colonel Bergquist. As I recall, I do not know definitely but I believe that General Martin had some discussions on it with the Department headquarters.

65. General Frank. Get any results?

Colonel Bergquist. Very little as far as I could determine. One of the big arguments was: we wanted to take over the radar stations and get them set up and operating. The Signal Corps said no, that was their job; they wanted to set them up and get them operating and then turn them over to us for our operational control. The Department headquarters decided in favor of the Signal Corps.

66. General Frank. Do you think that that delayed the ultimate completion of the system?

Colonel Bergquist. My personal opinion is that it did.

67. General Frank. By how much?

Colonel Bergquist. I don't know, sir.

68. General Frank. Well by five days, two months, or what?

Colonel Bergquist. Oh, I would say perhaps a month, thirty days.

69. General Frank. About a month. All right.

What was the status of training of the enlisted personnel in the information center and in the radar sets, or was that under the Signal Corps?

Colonel Bergquist. That was under the Signal Corps, sir.

70. General Frank. Well, are you conversant with the status of training?

Colonel Bergquist. I can only judge by the results we [1197] obtained and from the operations which I was directly connected with, and my opinion on that is that they were fairly well trained at that stage of the game.

71. General Frank. How many did you have? What I mean by that, could you operate three shifts? Did you operate three shifts after December 7th?

Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.

72. General Frank. Well, the proof of the pudding is in the eating of it.

Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir; we did, but we were short. As I recall now, we were short of operators, trained operators, and some of the boys were ruining their eyes because we had to keep them on too long. I recall that now very clearly, that we were short of trained operators.

73. General Frank. Were you having any trouble with your gasoline engines, power engines, folding up?

Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.

74. General Frank. Well, was it just ordinary engine trouble which was repairable in a short length of time, or was it serious trouble? [1198]

Colonel Bergquist. I think it was rather serious. In fact, as I recall, the design of the engine was not quite what it should
have been and was not able to hold up in the continuous operation that
was required.
75. General Frank. Where were you on the morning of December 7?
76. General Grunert. May I interrupt right there?
77. General Frank. Certainly.
78. General Grunert. I have an extract here from the Roberts
Commission report in which it appears that you stated that you
wanted to have 24-hour service by November 24, that the mobile units
could have stood it; the main failure was not the detector but the
gas engine running them; had sufficient personnel to run 24 hours
and could have run even with the gas engine failure.
I just wanted to recall that to your mind. That was the testimony
you gave while it was still fresh in your mind.
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir. We were having trouble with the
engine, and I think my statement in there was correct, that we could
have operated. Some of our stations may have gone out but still
others could be operated.
79. General Frank. Where were you on the morning of December
7th?
Colonel Bergquist. At 7:55, sir, I was in bed.
80. General Grunert. A. M. or P. M.?
Colonel Bergquist. A. M., sir.
81. General Frank. What were the hours of operation of the
A. W. S. at that time?
Colonel Bergquist. At that time, in accordance with an order that
the air warning signal officer had received, as I understood it, from Department Headquarters, they were to operate the
detector stations from 4 to 7 in the morning.
82. General Frank. Had you ever made any recommendation with
respect to the hours of operation?
Colonel Bergquist. Only from a training point of view.
83. General Frank. Not from an operating point of view?
Colonel Bergquist. No; not from a warning point of view.
84. General Frank. There was an officer there by the name of
Tyler; was there not?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
85. General Frank. How did he happen to be there?
Colonel Bergquist. He was on the roster of officers which I made
up and had at the Information Center. The primary purpose was
to train this officer to be a pursuit officer, to acquaint him with the
system, and to be on hand during the time that the warning sta-
tions were operating. When I was informed that they had received
orders to operate the stations from 4 to 7, I took it upon myself to
have an officer down there, because I could see no reason why they
should just operate the station and not do anything with the infor-
mation that they got. So I did have an officer there each morning.
My schedule was from 4 to 8, or the first watch.
86. General Frank. Did you take any steps to give them any
instructions as to their duties?
Colonel Bergquist. My only instructions to them, as I recall, were
that the main purpose was to go down there and to learn as much
as they could about the setup during the time they were on. I do
not recall specifically whether I pointed my finger at them and said, "Call me if anything comes up", but I had it in the back of my mind that if they got into trouble they should call me.

87. General Frank. We had Lieutenant Tyler up here before the Board. He was the only officer down there, I think, on the morning of December 7.

Colonel Bergquist. I believe he was; yes, sir.

88. General Frank. And the nature of his duties and responsibilities was pretty vague in his mind.

Since you were sending officers down there to become familiar with the system and to teach them to be pursuit officers, why did you not make a regular scheduled course of instruction to teach them about the system and give them a regular course of instruction on the duties and responsibilities of being pursuit officers?

Colonel Bergquist. I ran a school in October, sir. We began a school in October. I have the outline of that in my briefcase. I called it the Air Defense School, in which I included as many of the pursuit officers as I could. I also had Marine Corps officers in this school.

89. General Frank. Had Lieutenant Tyler been a member of that?

Colonel Bergquist. I do not recall whether he had or not, but I think he was. I do not recall definitely whether he was or not, but I think he was.

90. General Frank. For the Army Air Force were you carrying the load in an effort to get this thing in shape and operating?

Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.

91. General Frank. Aside from what the Signal Corps was doing?

Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.

92. General Frank. Did you receive any complaints, or did you have any complaints about the tardiness in the construction of these permanent sets and the failure of the constructors to get them finished on time?

Colonel Bergquist. Yes, I did; I was continually harping to the Signal Corps people to get the stations up and get them operating. I do not know of having put anything down in writing on it.

93. General Frank. You made your complaints to the Signal Corps?

Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.

94. General Frank. Did you ever make any complaints to your own immediate headquarters through channels?

Colonel Bergquist. Verbally, I kept General Davidson informed as to what I was doing.

95. General Frank. Do you know whether or not he followed it up and made any official complaints?

Colonel Bergquist. I do not recall. I also worked through our own headquarters on Signal Corps matters with Colonel Hoppough, in the Air Force Headquarters.

96. General Frank. Did you ever find out who was responsible for delays?

Colonel Bergquist. No, sir.

97. General Frank. You know that there were some delays, do you not?

Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
98. General Frank. Was the communication between the radar sets and the Information Center satisfactory?
Colonel Bergquist. It was not good. Those on Oahu, where you could connect them up by telephone, were fairly good. Those on the other islands, where you had to rely on radio, were fair and improved greatly when we installed the F.M.'s, which was after December 7th.
[1202] 99. General Grunert. Were there five mobile sets on Oahu?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
100. General Grunert. I have not heard any evidence yet that there were any in active operation.
Colonel Bergquist. That is right, sir. Before the 7th of December there were not, as I recall.
101. General Frank. Could hostile planes have been detected from any direction coming into Oahu?
Colonel Bergquist. No, sir. There were some blank spaces.
102. General Frank. In what direction?
Colonel Bergquist. I would say generally north of Molokai, about due east of Makapuu Point in a sector of about 20 degrees, perhaps. That was pretty much of a blank space. As I say, we had not had all those sets calibrated before the 7th, and we did not go definitely into the blank spaces. I am speaking now of what I found out afterwards when we did get them all set up and operating and began running checks on the stations.
103. General Frank. You state that the Signal Officer was responsible for installing the equipment and training the Signal Corps personnel?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir; that is my understanding.
104. General Frank. And then turning it over to the Air Force?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
105. General Frank. At the same time you were charged with the control of such operation as was incident to the training of your fighters, working with the A.W.S.?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
106. General Frank. Was there ever any confusion because of this dual control?
Colonel Bergquist. No, sir. I do not remember that I ever received any orders to do it. We just went ahead and did it. Colonel Tetley and I worked together very well. I think that if anyone built the whole business up it was Tetley and I; and we just went ahead and worked, and worked out our problems. He was very much interested in radar. I was very much interested in the whole system of getting the devices set up and handling problems, and we just went ahead and set up schedules and worked out problems and went ahead with our training.
107. General Frank. Did you ever get any of the permanent sets in place and operating before you left?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir. I believe the one at Halakeala was put in and operating.
108. General Frank. What was the difference between the permanent set and the mobile set at that time?
Colonel Bergquist. There was practically no difference, only one was on a fixed base and the other on a mobile base.
109. General Frank. What was the advantage of the fixed station?
Colonel Bergquist. The advantage of the fixed station was that you could construct it in a more inaccessible place, and I think you could perhaps get it calibrated more accurately.

110. General Frank. You could get it higher so that you had less interference?
Colonel Bergquist. That is correct. I am not too well acquainted, or I do not recall now the technical differences. I think I knew them at one time, but I have forgotten them now.

111. General Frank. What was your feeling with respect to the probability of an air attack at that time? Were you surprised?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir; I was surprised.

112. General Frank. Did you think an air attack was probable?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.

113. General Frank. You thought it was probable?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir; I thought it was. Generally, my view was that it was probable. That is why I was trying to get the thing operating on a 24-hour basis if I could.

114. General Frank. Did you know at that time that there was a tense situation existing between the United States and Japan?
Colonel Bergquist. I did not know it was as tense as I do now. I did not realize it was that tense.

115. General Frank. Was there any information passed down from higher military authorities at that time with respect to that period being an acute period?
Colonel Bergquist. Not that I know of, sir.

116. General Frank. With respect to this alert, what is your point of view with respect to the advantages, so far as protection of airplanes against sabotage is concerned, of an alert where the planes were all massed on an apron as compared with dispersing the planes reasonably with the crews sleeping in the vicinity?
Colonel Bergquist. Well, if it was a matter of guarding the airplanes, it naturally is much easier to have them all together there. You do not have to have so many guards, particularly if the crews are not going to sleep with the airplanes, which they were not required to do at that time. If you have them dispersed with the crews actually at their alert huts, as we call them, then I believe that you would have sufficient guards to prevent sabotage, although a determined saboteur would have a much easier time if the airplanes were dispersed, because he could come in out of the bushes near the edge of the field.

117. General Frank. You do not have to disperse them all right around the edge of the field.
Colonel Bergquist. No. That is where we had our dispersal point set up at that time, right back off the edge so we could operate from any position.

118. General Frank. It would have been possible, however, to have provided a reasonable amount of defense against a saboteur and still have had the planes dispersed?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.

119. General Frank. It would have been possible to have had the crews sleeping in the vicinity, would it not?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
120. General Russell. You stated that you went on duty 24 hours a day with the Interceptor Command as of December 8th?
Colonel Bergquist. As of December 7th.
121. General Russell. After the attack on December 7th.
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
122. General Russell. Did it function fairly well?
Colonel Bergquist. It took a few days, sir, to get everybody in there operating and get a roster going and get the people there trained.
123. General Russell. How many days?
Colonel Bergquist. I do not recall, sir.
124. General Russell. A week?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir; I would say probably a week.
125. General Russell. Was the problem to get them in or to get them trained, after December 7?
Colonel Bergquist. The first problem was to get them there.
126. General Russell. How long did that take?
Colonel Bergquist. As I recall, it only took me a day or [1206] two to do that. After the 7th I just had to snap my fingers and I got what I wanted.
127. General Russell. You had your Information Center, and then your stations in the field?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
128. General Russell. Roughly, those were the two groupings of operations?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
129. General Russell. You had no trouble on December 7 about the training of the people at the operational stations in the field; you had trained those people, had you not?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir; they were fairly well trained.
130. General Russell. Now, with reference to the Information Center, I have got the impression that you had a pursuit officer at one part of the Center, and then you had another group there which I understand consisted of the liaison officers for these organizations and the control officer you referred to. Is that correct?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.
131. General Russell. Who else?
Colonel Bergquist. May I have permission to show you a diagram?
132. General Russell. No; I do not want to get confused. I am trying to get straightened out. I know these diagrams.
Colonel Bergquist. This diagram will show you the exact people.
133. General Russell. Leave it out and us look at it. You had these control officers and this pursuit officer. Those were your commissioned people; is that right?[1207] Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir; a controller and a pursuit officer; and we had two antiaircraft men. One controls the searchlight and one controls the guns. Then we had a Navy liaison officer and a bomber command liaison officer. All those were commissioned officers. Then we had a Hawaiian Department Headquarters liaison officer.
134. General Russell. What training did these liaison men have to have?
Colonel Bergquist. I had to train them on the job.
135. General Russell. But what did they have to do?
Colonel Bergquist. The antiaircraft officer—

136. General Russell. Is he a liaison officer?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir, in that he advises and suggests actions to the controller. The controller is the boss, however. He tells him when certain areas are released from antiaircraft fire.

137. General Russell. He is just an ordinary liaison officer?
138. General Frank. No; he is not. He is not supposed to be. He is specially trained in the system to function in accordance with the method of operating. You cannot take any “bohunk” and put him in there and expect to get the desired results.

139. General Grunert. One just hangs around and gets something to transmit, but these liaison officers in the Information Center have almost a constant job of transmitting information from the Control Officer; is that right?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.

140. General Frank. They were operators.
Colonel Bergquist. Another important thing he does is this: The antiaircraft have stations all around Oahu, so they have a lot of men who are lookouts and who send in information if they see an airplane, a submarine, or anything else. In other words, they are feeding information which also comes in through this liaison officer into the controller.

141. General Russell. I think I know what a liaison officer is. Now, who was the controller?
Colonel Bergquist. The controllers were the ones I had selected and had to train on the job to be controllers. I was the first controller.

142. General Russell. Where were you going to get them? All from the Air Corps?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.

143. General Russell. It was the Air Corps’ job to select them and train them?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.

144. General Russell. And you did not have to go any further than that to get them?
Colonel Bergquist. No, sir.

145. General Russell. These other people who were liaison officers: You went to the heads of the respective branches to get them, including the Navy?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.

146. General Russell. That gives us the big picture at the Information Center?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.

147. General Russell. In about a week you were able to train them and get them going?
Colonel Bergquist. I believe so.

148. General Russell. The problem up until then had been getting people into this place?

[1209] Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir. I had been sent to the Air Defense School, at Mitchel Field, in April of 1941.

149. General Russell. Who sent you there—the Air people or the Hawaiian Department?
Colonel Bergquist. It came as an order from headquarters here in Washington, I believe. They set up a school and got people from all
over, from Hawaii, Panama, and all the continental air forces. They went to Mitchel Field to be instructed in the air defense system which had been developed by the First Fighter Command as a result of their operations and training in England; and that was the system then that was put in all over. These people went from the school out to the continental air forces; some went out to the Philippines and to the south Pacific; and Colonel Tetley went back out to Hawaii.

150. General Russell. When did you get there?
Colonel Bergquist. I left there on March 17 and arrived back on April 15.

151. General Russell. When was the order for you to go over and take charge of this Information Center issued in Hawaii?
Colonel Bergquist. I did not quite get your question.

152. General Russell. When you got back out there in April, did you immediately go on duty with this outfit?
Colonel Bergquist. No, sir.

153. General Russell. How long thereafter was it before you went on duty?
Colonel Bergquist. May I just recite what I did? I got back there in April and was placed on approximately two weeks special duty to write up a report on what should be done in Hawaii. I did that and submitted it, and I have never seen it since. I do not know whether you have it, or not. I was then [1210] issued orders that I was relieved to go back to normal duty. I was at that time still supposed to be in command of a fighter squadron. That was about in May, the first part of May. About the 22nd of May we started the Hawaiian Department maneuvers. I was with my squadron that morning ready to start operating with my squadron when about 10 o'clock I was called up to the Group Headquarters and asked to take control of operating the device. I relinquished command to my next senior in the squadron and went up and set up what was perhaps the first Information Center. It was not much, because I set it up in one hour. It was not really an information center; it was a fighter control center. I than operated during maneuvers that way.

154. General Russell. All of the people that operated there were Air Force people?
Colonel Bergquist. That is right, sir. After the maneuvers I was then assigned to the Wing as Assistant Operations Officer. I then began building on my own hook a little information center in the base of the headquarters building at Wheeler Field. I wanted to get something started so that we would have some kind of an information center going in case of attack. That was my idea. We set up this little information center down in the basement. It was not really authorized. We had an awful time trying to get equipment for it; but by the usual methods of chiseling here and there I got the stuff and that was when I had my first contact with actually putting something in writing, because I put in a request for some headsets for the controller and the pursuit officer to use, and got an indorsement back from headquarters of the Air Force asking me by what right I was setting up an information center. I mean, this was addressed to the commander, of course. They said I could not have the equipment.

[1211] I wrote up a 2-page endorsement for General Davidson to sign, which he did, which explained the position, that we had
one, that was the only one that was ready to operate, such as it was, and they also stated in their letter from the headquarters of the Air Forces that the Signal Corps was setting up an information center, and I knew that that one wasn't going to be ready for about six months, so that was my first contact I had with writing, and they did approve then my going ahead with this, and that was my first opening wedge to have a chance to educate headquarters, the Air Forces, at all, as to just what it was all about, and especially the Signal Officer, Colonel Hoppough.

Then I attempted this: We ran experiments down there, ran problems, with our fighters. I sent out airplanes to act as target airplanes. I worked with Colonel Tetley at that time, and we had two of his sets up, and we began working problems.

155. General Grunert. Who was Tetley?

Colonel Bergquist. Tetley was in the Signal Corps, in the Department Signal Office, and was in charge of the radar. In fact, at that time I believe he was still up at Schofield Barracks in charge of this little plotting outfit they were training as plotters, and getting these radars set up.

156. General Russell. When did you amalgamate those operations, yours and Tetley's?

Colonel Bergquist. That's right. Well, then we began. Tetley then told me that they had finally gotten an authorization to build an information center down near Fort Shafter. I then worked with him, and I drew up the design for the information center, and the Signal Corps went ahead and built it. Then, I guess it was probably in November, when we finally got the thing built and began putting in our communications into it. I am trying to get to your original question of when I took over. Actually, it wasn't until the 7th of December, maybe the 8th. You can say the 7th, because I went down there on the 7th, and, from then on, operated.

157. General Russell. When did you move physically into this new building, which was completed in November?

Colonel Bergquist. We completed it in November, and we began running practice problems. In other words, we would go down there and open it up and operate it, to train and qualify them.

158. General Russell. But you were merely representing the Air Forces, then?

Colonel Bergquist. That's right. Then, we actually moved our headquarters down in December, after we started operating.

159. General Russell. I want to connect up one link that is missing in my mind; it may be, in the record. When you went to this school, in April, I believe I asked you, but I do not remember the answer, were you sent there as a representative of the Hawaiian Department or by the Air Forces, or was that an Air Force school, or what sort of school was it?

Colonel Bergquist. It was an Air Force school. We did represent the Hawaiian Department. It was the Hawaiian Department issued the orders.

160. General Russell. Were all those in that school Air Force people?

Colonel Bergquist. No, sir; there were some Signal Corps and antiaircraft people.
161. General *Russell*. Now, Colonel, the problem out there was to take away from these various branches those elements which were going to operate as part of this entire whole that we are discussing, now; is that true? You got some people from the Navy, some from the antiaircraft people, and some from other services, there?

Colonel *Bergquist*. That was a small part. They had to furnish a liaison officer, but they also had to agree to the method of operation, whereby I had control.

162. General *Russell*. And that placed the command of relatively large elements of the Navy and of the other branches under the command of this coordinator?

Colonel *Bergquist*. The controller; yes, sir.

163. General *Russell*. You stated a moment ago that there was opposition to turning over the command of these units to this central commander, who would have been General Davidson?

Colonel *Bergquist*. Yes, sir.

164. General *Russell*. That is one of the problems you had?

Colonel *Bergquist*. That was one of the problems; yes, sir.

165. General *Russell*. And in so far as the naval elements went, that was a matter of cooperation, because there was not unity of command?

Colonel *Bergquist*. Yes, sir.

166. General *Russell*. Now, radar, as I understand your testimony, was more or less new, at the time?

Colonel *Bergquist*. Very much so; yes, sir.

167. General *Russell*. These sets which arrived out there some time in the summer of July, August, or September, whenever they did arrive, were the first to appear on the Island?

[1214] Colonel *Bergquist*. Yes, sir.

168. General *Russell*. And it was necessary to start training from the ground up?

Colonel *Bergquist*. Yes, sir.

169. General *Russell*. Most of the training of operating personnel for the field stations was done by the Signal Corps?

Colonel *Bergquist*. That is right, sir.

170. General *Russell*. Did Colonel Tetley "play ball," out there, with you?

Colonel *Bergquist*. Colonel Tetley? Yes, sir—to the utmost.

171. General *Russell*. And I believe he was finally on the Staff of the Department?

Colonel *Bergquist*. Yes, sir.

172. General *Russell*. And he represented the Department Commander in the development of the Interceptor Command?

Colonel *Bergquist*. Yes, sir.

173. General *Russell*. One other question. We are now dealing, Colonel, with a good deal of philosophy, apparently. Had you had a complete set-up, with all of the people trained, and all of the command chain established, if they had been off duty beginning at 7 o'clock that morning, they would not have been helpful in this situation?

Colonel *Bergquist*. That's right; but your supposition that we had everybody, and had them all trained, would mean that we would be operating 24 hours a day.
174. General Russell. I am bringing a supposition in, too, that they were all in bed, after 7 o'clock that morning, and it would have been to no effect?

Colonel Bergquist. Well, if they had been, yes; but as I stated, on this conference we had on the 24th of November, I wanted to get them on 24-hour duty.

175. General Russell. That is all.

176. General Grunert. Did the lack of progress in getting the information started stem into the lack of being air-warning-service-minded, in the high command, do you suppose; or what?

Colonel Bergquist. I think that was the trouble, to a great extent.

177. General Grunert. We hear the expression quite frequently among the witnesses that they “made all efforts” to do so-and-so. Apparently the all-out effort they made after December 7 amounted to something because there was unity of purpose after that, caused by the attack.

Colonel Bergquist. That is right; yes, sir.

178. General Grunert. Apparently, before that, there was not the realization of the necessity nor the unity of purpose to push the things through that there was after December 7. Was Davidson air-warning-service-minded?

Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir; I believe he was.

179. General Grunert. Was Rudolph so minded?

Colonel Bergquist. Perhaps to less extent. I do not think so. I think they say, in that, he was not.

180. General Grunert. He was the liaison officer, up there?

Colonel Bergquist. That is right. He was not educated into what it could do and what it meant. There was a stock phrase that I got from him.

181. General Grunert. Whose business was it to put this thing across, in the line of education? Was that Davidson? Was it Martin? Somebody had to educate the Department Commander and his staff, so that it could be pushed. Or was it the Departmental Commander’s Signal Officer who should have been the air-warning-service man?

Colonel Bergquist. I believe, sir, it should have started with the report that Colonel Tindal and myself drew up when we got back, and turned in to the Air Force Headquarters.

182. General Grunert. Then it would appear that sending you two to the United States to go to a school was just another school detail, but when you came back and put in your report, there was nothing happened for several months?

Colonel Bergquist. That is right, sir.

183. General Frank. What did you say General Rudolph’s stock phrase was?

Colonel Bergquist. I was trying to get the liaison officers, and the stock phrase was, and the answer was, they “couldn’t be spared.”

184. General Grunert. There appears to have been issued on the 5th of November an SOP in which there was set up an Interceptor Command. Now, somebody had sold it to the Department Commander and to the Staff that got up this SOP that they put in there—

There will be an Interceptor Command
and they stated, I think, as I remember it, what it was; and it was well stated.

Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.

185. General Grunert. But it was not implemented until, really, December 7?

Colonel Bergquist. That is right, sir.

186. General Frank. It really was not effective until December 17, was it?

Colonel Bergquist. The name was changed from—let's see—[1217] "The Hawaiian Interceptor Command"—that is right; I believe it was the 17th of December that it was officially changed from the Wing designation to the Interceptor Command designation.

187. General Grunert. But this November 5 SOP, when you read it, looks as if this goes into effect as soon as that order is received; and it appears, according to the testimony, to have misled the Navy into thinking that it was in being, when it was not really activated. Although it did operate December 7, it was not really activated finally until December 17.

Now, do you suppose some of that delay was caused by a sort of little jealousy between the Air Corps and the Signal Corps as to the Signal Corps' giving up something?

Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir; I believe that contributed to it.

188. General Grunert. Or was it because they did not think the Air Corps, being a new and growing branch, was to be trusted with something as important as that; or was it a combination of that?

Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.

189. General Grunert. Tell me about Tetley.

Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir.

190. General Grunert. We are going to have Powell as a witness, but Tetley had not come into the picture, so far as I have seen. Who can give us the best information on the Signal Corps end of this Air Warning Service? * * * On the record, again:

Do you know anything about the sites for the permanent radar? Have you been on those sites? Do you know what [1216] difficulties there may be in getting to them, doing the construction work, and installing the permanent radar sets?

Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir; I do. I was on the Board that selected the sites.

191. General Grunert. Do you know of any physical reason why those sites should not have been prepared prior to December 7, even if you did not have the permanent radar equipment? I mean, as to access to the sites, and the roads. In one place, they had a cable with which to haul stuff up to the top side.

Colonel Bergquist. I believe that some of those sites that we selected were very inaccessible and would require considerable time to put the stuff up in there. I am not in a position, I do not know enough of the facts or the engineering data, to know whether or not it could have been done before December 7.

192. General Grunert. I have forgotten whether you said they were there when they were completed, or not; but when the impetus was back of it, after December 7, the dirt started to fly and they got there, did they, or didn't they?
Colonel Bergquist. Well, you might say Yes, but they had started on the work before, and there were just men finishing it up. Now, naturally everyone was working a little harder after that, and perhaps it did get done a little faster.

193. General Grunert. Are there any other questions?

What happened to that report which you made when you came back from the school?

Colonel Bergquist. It was turned in to the Air Force Headquarters, and I have not seen it, since.

195. General Russell. You do not know where it went from there?
Colonel Bergquist. No, sir.

196. General Russell. Do you know who wrote the SOP section for this Interceptor Command?
Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir. If I recall correctly, Colonel Paul was the Air Corps Liaison Officer, in the G-3, the Hawaiian Department, at that time, when that was written up. He had received considerable information on what an “interceptor command” was and what it did, from me, as well as information through the normal channels, because Colonel Paul was the Operations Officer of the Fighter Wing at Wheeler Field, and I was his assistant from May through September.

197. General Russell. Did he write that SOP section?
Colonel Bergquist. I am not sure; but I think he did.

198. General Russell. When were the selections for the permanent radar sites made?

199. General Frank. Were preparations made for the selection of those sites back in 1939?

Colonel Bergquist. No, sir; not that I know of. I didn’t know what a radar was until I came back from the school, in 1941.

200. General Frank. Of 1940?

Colonel Bergquist. I wasn’t acquainted with that, sir.

201. General Russell. When did your group make these selections?

Colonel Bergquist. We made selections during the midsummer, I believe, of 1941, and then I believe they had to go back to the War Department for approval, and I don’t know what the final date was when that actually was approved.

202. General Russell. Were they eventually installed at the sites that your group selected?

Colonel Bergquist. Yes, sir; I believe most of them were.

203. General Grunert. Thank you very much for helping us.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Brief recess.)

[1231] TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. JACOB H. RUDOLPH, RETIRED, MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. General, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

General Rudolph. Jacob H. Rudolph, Brigadier General of the Army, Retired. I am at my home now.
2. Colonel West. Is that in Washington?

3. General Grunert. General, this Board is attempting to get at the facts and looking into the background and viewpoints prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack and what happened there; and in view of your assignment at the time as Commanding General of a bomber wing—was it?
   General Rudolph. 18th Bombardment Wing.

4. General Grunert. Of a bombardment wing. —we thought you could throw some light upon the subject.

Now, we have developed this subject considerably, so we are piecing out to a great extent, and so I will ask you some definite questions on what I gleaned mainly from the Roberts Commission report together with the testimony that has been brought out so far.

Your assignment was what while you were on duty in Hawaii?
   General Rudolph. At that particular time I was just Commanding General of the Bombardment Wing; I had nothing to do with the post or any housekeeping duties.

5. General Grunert. You were tactical commander, then?
   General Rudolph. Yes, sir.

6. [1222] General Grunert. Then, you will not know anything about the security measures that were taken at the post? You had nothing to do with that?
   General Rudolph. Well, I wouldn't say that I didn't know anything about it, because I did see the preparations, but it did not come directly under me.

7. General Grunert. It is stated in the testimony here that, about the measures taken for protection of materiel and personnel after the attack, there were certain measures taken, and it states: similarly measures were taken by General Rudolph at Hickam Field since December 7th as to blackout instructions, the issue of gas masks and sirens for air raid alarms, also regarding cooperation with the Navy on patrol.

Does that intimate that the things done at Hickam Field had not been done prior to December 7th, and this was something new? They were just starting in to wake up and do things?
   General Rudolph. No. We had quite a series of alerts when everybody would be confined to the field, when all the combat crews would sleep right in the hangars. This was before December 7th.

8. General Frank. May I interrupt? You say "we." Do you mean—
   General Rudolph. I mean the 18th Bombardment Wing, by "we."

9. General Frank. Was this alert just in the 18th Bombardment Wing, or the whole Department?
   General Rudolph. Well, the whole Department. I beg your pardon. The whole Department, yes.

10. General Grunert. Now, what is that reference there: [1223] "also regarding cooperation with the Navy on patrols after December 7th?"
   General Rudolph. Well, after December 7th the Navy took us over body and soul.

11. General Grunert. And used you on distant patrol?
General Rudolph. We did exactly as they ordered us to. We were part of their naval air force so to speak.

12. General Grunert. Prior to that had there been any bombardment used for patrolling purposes?

General Rudolph. Not in the way it was used after December 7. Now, we had many maneuvers with the Navy, and I will say here before you gentlemen that they gave me the UTAH for three solid months, to bomb night and day, and they had a big teakwood covering, superstructure, that covered the whole deck; and as far as bombing practice is concerned, I don't think any bombardment wing in the whole air force had as fine practice as the 18th Bombardment Wing. We had many maneuvers. I sat in time and again with the naval officers there on maneuvers, and we worked with them. I thought the cooperation was very good.

13. General Grunert. From an air point of view it is not considered good practice to use bombers on reconnaissance missions, is it?

General Rudolph. Well, at that time we had one squadron that was called a reconnaissance squadron, as a part of the wing. That was the organization.


15. General Frank. What kind of airplanes?

[1224] General Rudolph. We had B-17s and B-18s.

16. General Grunert. Now, while your bombers were in training did they have any reconnaissance mission prior to December 7th?

General Rudolph. Yes, one squadron had a considerable amount of reconnaissance training.

17. General Grunert. And was that worked into daily reconnaissance of certain areas, or was it just training?

General Rudolph. That was just training. We didn't cover the 360 degrees prior to December 7th as we did after, when the Navy took us over, but we did go out to Midway, we did go out to Wake, we went to Palmyra, we went to Christmas, on reconnaissance missions.

18. General Frank. Before December 7th?

General Rudolph. Oh, yes.

19. General Grunert. On definite assigned reconnaissance missions? Who made those assignments?

General Rudolph. I had to get the squadron ready that went to the Philippines in September, and they had to know their navigation training combined with reconnaissance in those long overwater flights getting them ready to go to the Philippine Islands.

20. General Grunert. Then that was just a matter of training? It was not, then, a definite reconnaissance mission, was it? What I mean is now, the understanding that I have is that the Navy was charged with distant reconnaissance.


21. General Grunert. And any mission that you had for distant reconnaissance should have been assigned by the Navy?

General Rudolph. That is right.

[1225] 22. General Grunert. So that was not an assigned reconnaissance mission as such.

General Rudolph. I understand you now.
23. General Grunert. Now, when those bombers went out training toward the latter part of '41, were they armed and prepared to protect themselves?

General Rudolph. Some were and some were not.

24. General Grunert. What was the theory back of that, or what were the instructions? You gave them to them. Was there any fear of an attack or a possible interference while they were on such training mission, that they might have to take care of themselves?

General Rudolph. We had no such feeling, but there were some of the B-17s that came over without guns, and we had to fly them without guns until the guns arrived. Then we put those on to train the men in holding against the blast of the ship in flight.

25. General Grunert. I have a question here: Were the commanders of major units—and by major units I mean such commanders as General Martin of the Hawaiian Air Force, yourself of the Bomber Command, Davidson of the Interceptor Command, Burgin of the Antiaircraft, and so on. Were the commanders of such major units kept informed of the War and Navy Department so-called warning messages that were received? Were you kept so informed?

General Rudolph. Personally I was informed of nothing. I don't know about General Martin.

26. General Grunert. Even up to the day of the attack?

General Rudolph. I know nothing of the others, but certainly no one gave me any information of the condition of affairs.

27. General Frank. May I ask a question?


29. General Frank. Did you have no information that the Department Commander had received notice of a critical situation existing?

General Rudolph. If I did, I do not recall it.

30. General Frank. There was nothing communicated down to the lower echelons?

General Rudolph. I am honest in my statement that if it was communicated to me I have forgotten it.

31. General Frank. You were placed on an alert?

General Rudolph. Many times.

32. General Frank. Well, on the 27th of November?

General Rudolph. Well, I couldn't remember definitely, we had so many of them.

33. General Frank. Well, the last alert before December 7th? You were on an alert on December 7th, Alert No. 1, for sabotage?

General Rudolph. That is right.

34. General Frank. Well, what was your reaction to that alert at that time?

General Rudolph. I don't know just what you want.

35. General Frank. Well, did you feel that there was real cause for it, or it was just another alert?

General Rudolph. Oh, no, no. We thought it was just another one. We had had so many of them that throughout my command there was a feeling that it was getting rather binding, one alert after another, and we didn't know the underlying reason for all the alerts because no one pointed out to me personally that the conditions were very critical.
36. General Grunert. Now, this is a general question to see what the form of command in the Department was. Were conferences held by the Commanding General of the Department or his Chief of Staff of the principal subordinate commanders wherein they were kept informed of the situation and in turn informed their commanding generals of the measures taken by them to meet such situation?

I will read the whole thing to give you the idea:

Were subordinate commanders informed of the imminent approach of probable hostilities as set forth in messages received late in November and early in December?

Were discussions held as to measures to be adopted in preparation for any such eventualities?

Were they questioned as to the adequacy of plans, S.O.P.s, and so forth?

Was the question of the type of alert to be taken discussed with them?

Were reports from them required as to their respective states of readiness to meet any anticipated eventualities?

In general, were such conferences held in the interests of keeping commanders informed, for the issuance of understandable instructions, and the preparation of adequate defenses?

General Rudolph. We did have conferences over at Fort Shafter. I attended quite a few of them.

37. General Grunert. Do you recall what those conferences were about toward the latter part of November or early in December, if any were held during that period?

General Rudolph. Well, we had to explain our training, what we were doing, and the type of airplanes we had; but I don't remember that the seriousness was brought out at any of these conferences or that we were particularly enjoined relative to taking every possible measure for the protection of our equipment.

38. General Grunert. You have testified that you don't recall having been informed as to anything particularly alarming, or information of the international situation along about that time, so evidently, if that were the case, in the conference you had at that time it was not impressed on your mind.

General Rudolph. That is very true. Now, we did have many other conferences, of course, with General Martin. There was a scheduled weekly or bi-weekly conference.

39. General Grunert. Did he bring forth any such situation?

General Rudolph. If he did, he failed to impress me with the seriousness, because I do not recall that. We had, sir, a great many conferences on the squadron going to the Philippines, and its training and getting it ready. We sent a squadron along in the fall, I think September, the last of September or early October.

40. General Grunert. I see here that you stated before the Roberts Commission something to the effect that you had no information as to the existing serious international situation. Evidently that was fresh in your mind at that time when you testified there.

General Rudolph. Much more so then than now.

41. General Grunert. Now, on the 27th of November, '41, the Department Commander ordered the Command to go into an alert known as No. 1, which is what they call the sabotage alert, and in that
alert under the instructions as I understand them airplanes on airfields were bunched, presumably in order to require a lesser number of guards to protect them from sabotage. Do you recall those instructions and that you bunched your airplanes for that purpose?

General Rudolph. Very definitely. It was very specific, to protect against sabotage from within, with no thought of an attack from without. We were directed to bunch them as tightly as we could and to throw out various different lines of resistance from that rectangle of airplanes, so that small hand bombs and what-not could not be tossed into this assembly of airplanes.

42. General Grunert. Those were definite orders. If you had been on your own, as I might call it, left to use your own judgment, would that have been the best method to handle your planes against sabotage?

General Rudolph. It doesn’t appear so now.

43. General Grunert. How were you as to personnel? Could you have distributed them and still have protected them against sabotage?

General Rudolph. We would have had roving patrols—

44. General Grunert. It might not have given the same protection?

General Rudolph. —on concentric lines of approach, [1230] instead of a lot of fixed points.

45. General Grunert. Did you have sufficient area in which to disperse your planes in case they had not been ordered bunched?

General Rudolph. We had a good big area which we used immediately after we were bombed.

46. General Grunert. Now, in the Roberts report you stated as follows. I have a note which says, “That he had had no intimation of preceding trouble, and if he had then his planes would not have been bunched or concentrated, but would have been ready for any emergency, especially on a Sunday morning.”

I have a question: Did not the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, or the Commanding General, Hawaiian Air Force, inform you of warnings that had been received in the immediate past? It all goes back to almost the same line of questioning.

General Rudolph. If they did, they failed to impress me with the seriousness of it.

47. General Grunert. Now, as to concentration versus dispersion, how much more personnel would have been required had you dispersed your planes in order to guard them against sabotage? Would it have been 10 percent more, 20 percent, or what?

General Rudolph. Well, with our moving, and roving patrols I think I had personnel enough to take care of aircraft I had, because I was nowhere near up to strength. Nowhere near.

48. General Frank. Up to strength in what? Personnel or aircraft?

General Rudolph. Aircraft. You see, we never filled up the group to the number of the airplanes it should have had; [1231] I mean the wing.

49. General Grunert. Go ahead, General Frank.

50. General Frank. You had been reading the papers, the Hawaiian papers, newspapers?

General Rudolph. The little Hawaiian Advertiser.
51. General Frank. They were giving you certain information about the Japanese conferences being held in Washington, between our Government and the Japanese representatives?

General Rudolph. True.

52. General Frank. There were things coming out in the headlines of the papers which indicated this sort of situation. Did that tend to build up any apprehension about the situation?

General Rudolph. If it did, it never came to my attention officially. It was not discussed among us.

53. General Frank. I don't mean officially. I mean did it instill any apprehension in you personally? Was there a reaction in your mind about the newspaper headlines?

General Rudolph. There may have been a reaction.

54. General Frank. Well, did you discount it to a certain extent because you had not received anything officially?

General Rudolph. It didn't strike me as very forcibly alarming.

55. General Frank. All right. Now, can you tell me, did you anticipate an air attack?

General Rudolph. I did not.

56. General Frank. Why didn't you anticipate it? Let us have the reasons.

General Rudolph. Well, I guess I felt like a great many others did, that Japan would never dare to.

[1232] 57. General Frank. Well, what built up that state of mind? That is what I am after. Whose responsibility was it to give you a warning of an approach from a distance?

General Rudolph. It certainly should have come from higher authority.

58. General Frank. Well, was it the Army or the Navy?

General Rudolph. I say the Navy, because they had the long range patrol boats.

59. General Frank. To your knowledge were they conducting patrols constantly?

General Rudolph. On that particular Sunday morning I understood they didn't have a boat out—an airplane, seaplane.

60. General Frank. But generally were they more or less continuously conducting reconnaissance to some distance?

General Rudolph. To some distance.

61. General Frank. Do you know what that was?

General Rudolph. I don't think they ever went over 200, 250 miles.

62. General Frank. Did you have any confidence in the positive security that the Navy furnished?

General Rudolph. Not with those old slow-going boats they had.

63. General Frank. Did you feel that they had positive means to give you adequate warning?

General Rudolph. They could within their range of those boats.

64. General Frank. Had they been out?

General Rudolph. Had they been out, certainly, 250, 300 miles.

[1233] 65. General Frank. But you understand that they were not out on that morning?

General Rudolph. So I was informed.

66. General Grunert. If they had been patrolling they could not have covered 360 degrees, could they?
General **Rudolph.** Certainly not. They could not cover it when they took everything I had.

67. General **Frank.** What was it operated to build up this frame of mind that led you to the belief that “it can’t happen here”?

General **Rudolph.** I guess I was like a great many others. I never thought Japan would dare to do it.

68. General **Russell.** You understand they did not have a boat out?

General **Rudolph.** That was the report there at that time.

69. General **Grunert.** When you speak of boats, you mean flying boats?

General **Rudolph.** The P.B.Y.’s.

70. General **Russell.** Where did you get this report?

General **Rudolph.** It was common. They were all bunched right on the apron at Pearl Harbor, and they got every one of them.

71. General **Grunert.** On Ford Island?

General **Rudolph.** Yes; just like mine were caught, only they were worse off; they did not save any of them.

72. General **Russell.** Was that just common talk?

General **Rudolph.** Yes; that there was not a P.B.Y. out.

73. General **Russell.** Can you recall any specific Navy man who told you that?

General **Rudolph.** No, sir; I cannot. I will qualify that. Later on I had a liaison officer with them all the time, and he [1234] reported to me. They were changing frequently; I do not know which one it was. But one of those liaison officers said they did not have any patrol out on that Sunday morning.

74. General **Grunert.** Do you know whether or not it was hearsay?

General **Rudolph.** He worked right with them all the time.

75. General **Grunert.** Before December 7th?

General **Rudolph.** Some before and all the time after.

76. General **Grunert.** What was his name?

General **Rudolph.** I do not remember now. I tried to think of it. I had several of them. I used to rotate them, so I do not remember just who was the liaison officer, because we used to rotate them for experience.

77. General **Russell.** General Rudolph, after this attack or this series of attacks on the morning of December 7, did you visit Ford Island in Pearl Harbor?

General **Rudolph.** I do not remember definitely how soon after, but every officer of my wing visited Pearl Harbor and saw all the battleships on the bottom and turned upside down, and the P.B.Y.’s burned up on the apron of Ford Island.

78. General **Russell.** You, along with your officers, went there and personally saw just what you have described?

General **Rudolph.** Yes.

79. General **Russell.** Based on the P.B.Y.’s that you saw on the apron of the field at Ford Island, what was the conclusion reached by you as to the number of P.B.Y.’s out on reconnaissance on the morning of December 7, 1941?

General **Rudolph.** There could have been precious few, because, if my memory serves me correctly, there were about 20-odd P.B.Y.’s
burned up and that was most of the airplanes they had for patrolling.

80. General Russell. Did they not have as many as a 100 P.B.Y.'s on Ford Island?

General Rudolph. I do not think they had at that time. They brought over a lot right after that, when they started the 360-degree patrolling.

81. General Frank. Were you familiar with the aircraft warning service and the Information Center?

General Rudolph. I had quite a bit of contact with them after; not much before. I did work a lot with the antiaircraft, Colonel Burgin's outfit. We worked a lot with him.

82. General Frank. But you had no bombardment liaison officers in training for the Information Center prior to December 7?

General Rudolph. If I did, I do not recall them. He may have had some one individual on that work, but I know it was emphasized decidedly afterwards.

83. General Frank. Prior to December 7 were you very familiar with the details of the aircraft warning service?

General Rudolph. No; I was not.

84. General Frank. Had there been any effort on the part of the top command to explain its operations to you or to the officers in general?

General Rudolph. We did have at the point just east of Honolulu harbor—before we got the B-18's we had to dip the wing of the old B-17 three times to let them know we were friendly aircraft.

85. General Frank. But you did not know anything about the details and method of operation of the Information Center?

General Rudolph. No; I did not.

There is one thing I would like to say, General. We were having a course in the identification of aircraft by a naval officer who taught at the tactical school after Browning. I have forgotten his name. But he gave me two afternoons a week on his own time. At four o'clock when his day's work was over, they let him come over, after his day's work was done, and every one of my younger officers who had never had that course were having that course of instruction by this Navy officer in the identification of our battleships, naval vessels of all kinds, and the Japanese vessels.

86. General Grunert. That had no connection with the air warning service?


87. General Frank. What was the state of training of your combat crews?

General Rudolph. Of course, we were shy of .50 caliber guns in the beginning; and the first lower turret on the B-17 never did work. They had to throw it out because dirt would get under the collector ring and short-circuit it, and they had to throw them all away. They did not prove feasible.

88. General Frank. Let us get back to the training of the crews.

General Rudolph. It was the gunners that we were trying to train. I do not think any wing had the opportunity to train that the 18th Bombardment did, for we bombed three months, night and day, against
a moving battleship, and the pilot never knew which way the skipper was going to kick the rudder.

89. General Frank. There has been some testimony before the Board to the effect that there was difficulty in completing the training of the crews to fly the B-17's.

General Rudolph. Not the pilots; the co-pilot and engineer. [1237] The gunners were the ones who did not have training in gunnery.

90. General Frank. You had plenty of pilots, did you?

General Rudolph. I only had a few ships. I had more pilots than I had airplanes. We were flying that Sunday morning, or we were getting ready to fly, some of the youngsters who had not finished B-18 training. That is how they happened to kill 22 in one hangar and cut the legs off the other two. There were 24 in one hangar getting the ships out. They were due out at 8 o'clock, and a little before 8 the Japanese attacked and killed 22 outright. They were going up at 8 for one extra hour. All you have to do is to look at the record and see the number of hours they were flying.

91. General Frank. The squadron that was sent to the Philippines in September still left you plenty of trained personnel?

General Rudolph. Of course I must be honest and say that I picked the best of the whole wing to go in that squadron, the pick of the whole wing.

92. General Frank. But you were not handicapped in your operations from lack of trained people except gunners?

General Rudolph. No; we were not. We went to San Francisco and ferried them over. We brought them over and we did not lose a ship.

93. General Grunert. One of the reasons given for going on Alert 1, the sabotage alert, instead of a more protective alert, such as 2 or 3, was that if they had gone on 2 or 3 it would have taken Air Corps personnel away from their training, especially those who were being trained to take B-17's, I believe, to the Philippines. So we got the impression that that training was for the purpose of getting enough of them trained to put on the B-17's to take them across. That is the reason [1238] for our interest in knowing about this particular training.

General Rudolph. I would like to qualify that just a little. That was my first priority, to get that squadron ready for the Philippines. Everything else was secondary.

94. General Grunert. What squadron was that?

General Rudolph. The one that was selected to go to the Philippine Islands with the B-17's.

95. General Frank. But you had others that were going to this school later on?

General Rudolph. Yes. It could not help but hurt, because I picked the best out of the wing. You could not help but hurt your command, picking out the best of the wing. That was a crack outfit. We kept right on training. All you have to do is to look at the records of the training hours. They were piling up hundreds of hours.

96. General Grunert. How much would you have been handicapped had you gone on Alert No. 2, which was against air attack, plus sabo-
tage? How much would it have handicapped you in carrying out the mission you had of training crews to take the B-17's across?

General Rudolph. I was never one to believe much in being handicapped. We had a first priority and we were going to shove it through. If we had changed to another alert we would have changed the guard system. They would not have so much fixed; we would have had much more roving. There was a lot of growling and grumbling about this and that. It never made much of an impression on me. I felt we should work hard. This was long before any threat at all.

97. General Grunert. How much would that sort of an alert, Alert No. 2, which is the alert against an air attack, have retarded your training? What training could you have done while on such an alert?

General Rudolph. We could go right ahead flying. We were flying on all the alerts. But the crews slept right in the hangar. We went on with our flying training. Some of the ground men had to watch the ships. We had to take members of the crew and rotate them. We had to keep one man on every airplane, just the way they are doing now.

98. General Frank. Alert 2 or 3 would not have impeded your training in any way?

General Rudolph. If it had, it would not have been such that I would have been crying over it at all. We would have gone ahead with the training.

99. General Grunert. How much did Alert 3 after December 7 handicap your training?

General Rudolph. They trained all the time, night and day. Every ship we could get into the air would be out, and they came in at all hours of the night to the limit of their gas capacity. We lost one or two.

100. General Grunert. And they kept it up right along?

General Rudolph. Until I left there in February. We could never keep enough in the air to satisfy the Navy, because those youngsters were burning up tires faster than they could ship them over to us, and they were comparatively new ships. Additional parts were coming out, but they were not coming over to us. The Navy was displeased at times, I know, because I could not get enough parts to keep more planes in the air. We would rob one and get five going, in spite of General Martin's orders not to. He came over and said, "I can see that you have to do it."

101. General Grunert. Thank you very much. We appreciate your coming here to help us out.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL WALTER C. PHILLIPS, CHIEF OF STAFF CORPS—Resumed

235. Colonel West. The witness is reminded that he is still under oath. It will not be necessary to repeat it.

336. General Grunert. Colonel, I have a few subjects that I want you to open up, and then I want to skip around here and there to check up on some facts stated in the Roberts Commission Report.
On the subject of Coordination and Cooperation, were there any staff meetings between the Navy and the Army? I do not mean, between the two commanders, but between you as Chief of Staff and the corresponding officer of the Navy and members of the Army Staff and members of the Navy Staff.

Colonel Phillips. Not a meeting as a whole; no, sir. Individually, yes, sir.

337. General Grunert. Was the fleet staff ashore or afloat?
Colonel Phillips. I believe they were ashore. They had headquarters ashore, I believe.

338. General Grunert. Then the District staff was ashore?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir; Admiral Bloch’s staff.

339. General Grunert. With which did you have the most business, the fleet or the district?
Colonel Phillips. We worked with both staffs, sir. I do not know which we had the most to do with. The fleet was out a good deal. I would expect, perhaps, we had the most to do with the district staff.

340. General Grunert. In the testimony before the Roberts Commission you stated that you never consulted the Navy between November 27 and December 7; you never asked the Navy regarding their distant reconnaissance, and you never knew whether the fleet was in or out. Is that still your recollection?
Colonel Phillips. After November 27?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir. But I do not recall that testimony, sir. It must have been correct if I stated it at that time.

342. General Grunert. Admiral Kimmel testified that he received no information from the Army regarding measures taken by the Army after November 27, presumably as a result of the Chief of Staff’s message of November 27. Do you know anything about that?
Colonel Phillips. I have always been under the impression that General Short advised the Navy as to everything we had done.

343. General Grunert. Admiral Bloch, the District Commander, says he did not know anything regarding the Army inshore air patrol, whether it was actually patrolling, or not. He also stated that he did not know what Alert 1 meant. He thought Alert 1, which is antisabotage, but did not know whether it meant the same as the Navy’s Alert 1 which corresponded to the Army’s all-out alert, No. 3. He apparently did not know that.

Colonel Phillips. We had a naval officer on duty on our staff, G-3, whose sole duty it was to inform the Navy of everything, particularly of an operational nature.

344. General Grunert. What was his name?

345. General Grunert. Did you figure that anything the Navy should know as far as the Army was concerned would be transmitted to the Navy by your liaison officer?

[1248] Colonel Phillips. That was my understanding. I thought that was his job; I believe it was. We had also an officer from G-3 Coast Artillery Corps. I cannot recall his name, because they were changed from time to time, and at the same time he was on duty with the Navy. That was their daily task.
346. General Grunert. Did this subject ever come up for discussion or consideration? There being two Navy staffs, the fleet and the district, and an Army staff in the same general locality, that they should establish joint headquarters and cooperate by close association? Did that ever come up?

Colonel Phillips. For discussion? Not to my knowledge, on my tour of duty, sir.

347. General Grunert. It never occurred to any of you to get closer cooperation. It would seem as if that would be about the closest you could get.

Colonel Phillips. Yes; it certainly would be.

348. General Grunert. You recall S. O. P. No. 5 which described the various alerts and other things. I believe you said you had a hand in getting it up?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.

349. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not the Navy was supplied with that S. O. P.? Was it informed as to its contents?

Colonel Phillips. I feel sure that it was; yes, sir.

350. General Grunert. It appears here that your G-2 on December 6th reported in a staff meeting that the Japanese Consulate was burning papers, and he said that no attention was paid to his report. That is according to the Roberts Commission report. We have not seen him yet. Do you recall a report to that effect?


351. General Grunert. He said no attention was paid to it. What did you do about it?

Colonel Phillips. I cannot deny his statement, but it is not correct. The General was informed of that situation, and it was given much consideration as to the reasons for that.

352. General Grunert. Do you know the conclusions reached as to that information? This was on December 6th. What did the Commanding General decide? That the information was of no particular significance?

Colonel Phillips. I do not recall the decision on that. He was informed of it.

353. General Grunert. Do you recall what you thought of it at that time?

Colonel Phillips. It was far from routine. It was a matter that of course increased our apprehension.

354. General Grunert. I have some questions as to your handling of the staff. Did you hold staff meetings?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.

355. General Grunert. How often did you hold them? Were they periodic, or when needed, or what?

Colonel Phillips. I had a staff meeting of the general staff and of administrative staff heads every week, and we had staff meetings of the general staff heads—we were all in the same building, and they oftentimes occurred two or three or four times a day, for that matter.

356. General Grunert. Was each staff head required to perform his assigned functions without special dictation from higher up? In other words, were they given a job and were they then free to do it, or were they told what to do frequently?
Colonel Phillips. No, sir; they were given a job and they did it.

357. General Grunert. Did the heads of the general staff sections have access to the Commanding General on special occasions, if necessary?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir; at any time.

358. General Grunert. Did they make use of that frequently?
Colonel Phillips. They did.

359. General Grunert. Was the G-2 required to submit periodic estimates of the situation?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.

360. General Grunert. After November 27 were they increasing or were they just as they had been before?
Colonel Phillips. I cannot say as to that.

361. General Frank. Were there any regular G-2 estimates of the situation prepared by your G-2?
Colonel Phillips. I am positive there were; yes. I may be wrong on that, but I do not believe, sir, we had regular G-2 periodical reports.

362. General Grunert. Who had general supervision, so far as the Hawaiian Department was concerned, concerning air warning signal installations?
Colonel Phillips. The District Engineer, I believe.

363. General Grunert. Do you mean the Department Engineer?
Colonel Phillips. It was the District Engineer, Colonel Wyman at that time.

364. General Grunert. I mean, as to the radar installations of the air warning service. Who had charge of that?
Colonel Phillips. The District Engineer, I believe.

365. General Grunert. Are you sure that your Signal Officer did not have charge of it?
Colonel Phillips. The Signal Officer had general supervision. He was supplying the equipment; but the exact arrangement between the two I cannot state now. I have known it, but I do not recall it now.

366. General Grunert. What section of the General Staff had supervision of constructions in which the Commanding General was particularly interested? In other words, when the Commanding General wanted to follow up constructions, on whom did he depend; what staff member?

367. General Grunert. What was his name?
Colonel Phillips. Marsden, who was the Signal Officer.

368. General Grunert. Had the Commanding General expressed any anxiety concerning the air warning service and the progress being made on its installation?
Colonel Phillips. I believe he did. I cannot recall definitely.

369. General Grunert. Who in the Staff contacted and followed up the work of the district engineer on matters that were vital to the defense? Was there any particular member of the staff charged with that?
Colonel Phillips. G-4 was charged with construction work, in that, and G-3, of course, inspected the progress on such work as fortifications.
370. General Grunert. What staff inspections and observations were there of tests, tactical maneuvers, defense preparation, follow-up of orders and SOP, on the subject of defense?

Colonel Phillips. We had, I believe a total of three maneuvers during my time in the Territory, and that was of course all with the idea of improving the state of training, with the object of defense of Oahu.

371. General Grunert. Did the Staff spend most of its time at headquarters, or most of the time out among troops and installations?

Colonel Phillips. In the field entirely, the large maneuver.

372. General Grunert. Entirely? You mean at maneuvers?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.

373. General Grunert. I mean generally.

Colonel Phillips. Generally, we were; particularly G-3 was out of the office much of the time. G-3 was assisting us. We had assistance for that.

374. General Grunert. How about you? Did you get out much?

Colonel Phillips. I did.

375. General Grunert. Or, was the Commanding General out most of the time, and you, in most of the time?

Colonel Phillips. In my capacity as G-3, sir.

376. General Grunert. As Chief of Staff, Colonel Phillips. As Chief of Staff? I didn’t get out a great deal as Chief of Staff. It was rather exceptional that I got out of the office.

377. General Grunert. Was the General Staff called upon, or free to advise as to defense measures and means, as to their contact with it, and so forth?

Colonel Phillips. They were free to advise, at any time; yes, sir; had access to the General at all times.

378. General Grunert. Now, on the subject of cooperation, Admiral Pye testified. He said that after he became Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet—this was after December 7—he said, speaking about himself and Emmons:

“We really got together.”

Now, there is an intimation, there, that there wasn’t sufficient “getting together” prior to December 7.

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.

379. General Grunert. How long did you remain as Chief of Staff, after December 7?

Colonel Phillips. Till December 18. I was Deputy Chief of Staff, thereafter, under General Emmons, at his request, for ten months.

380. General Frank. Who was Chief of Staff?

Colonel Phillips. Colonel Collins was Chief of Staff. He relieved me at the time that General Emmons came.

381. General Grunert. General Emmons brought him as Chief of Staff?

Colonel Phillips. He brought him as Chief of Staff, December 18. He was later relieved, during my tour, by General Boyd.

382. General Frank. In your testimony you have stated that there was an interchange of information between General Short and various officers of the Navy?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
383. General Frank. Did you, as Chief of Staff, have any system for checking the interchange of information between General Short and the Naval top command, so that there would be some official record of it?

Colonel Phillips. I did not, sir. I did not. General Short and Admiral Kimmel were very friendly, on friendly terms. Admiral Kimmel’s family I believe was not present in Oahu, and he would call on the Shorts, officially, I know. The General has called me in, once or twice, in the evenings—when he would come socially. They would start official conversations. They also played golf infrequently. I have played, making up a foursome, once or twice.

384. General Frank. But still there was no record to indicate what exchange of information there was?

Colonel Phillips. That is correct.

385. General Frank. Whatever exchange of information there was, it did the command no good, because it didn’t get down into the Staff?

Colonel Phillips. Ordinarily, the General would inform the staff—myself, as well as the Staff.

386. General Frank. He would inform you of what?

[1240] Colonel Phillips. As to the outcome of his conferences.

387. General Frank. Well, what about this information that he exchanged with Admiral Kimmel on all these occasions?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir; sometimes we were informed of their conferences; other times, I don’t know.

388. General Frank. As a matter of fact, you do not know how much you were informed, and how much you were not, do you, if you didn’t keep any record of it?

Colonel Phillips. That is true, we had no record. We had no system of making records, at all, in regard to the exchange of information between the Staffs.

389. General Frank. You stated that the engineers were charged with the installation of that equipment. As a matter of fact, the Signal Corps had the technicians, and the only technicians, who were familiar with that technical equipment, and who could install it?

Colonel Phillips. That is correct; yes, sir.

390. General Frank. And therefore, in order to get it straight in the record, the engineers constructed the installations of buildings, and the foundations, and so forth?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.

391. General Frank. And the Signal Corps made the technical installation of the technical equipment, is that correct?

Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir; I think that is right.

392. General Frank. Now, there was some kind of operating order.

393. General Grunert. I have it, here. I can ask that question, because I have the name and everything, right here.

394. General Frank. All right. Go ahead.

395. General Grunert. The record of the Roberts Commission [1250] shows that you were Senior Army Member of the Local Joint Planning Committee, since November 6; is that right?

Colonel Phillips. That is right; by virtue of office; by virtue of being Chief of Staff.
396. General Grunert. All right. Now, go ahead.
397. General Frank. What were the duties of that Board?
Colonel Phillips. As I understood it, sir—
398. General Frank. You were head of it.
Colonel Phillips. That is right. And my duties were passed on to me by Colonel "Phil" Hayes, whom I relieved, and it was a joint board to consider any changes or modifications of the plans that were then in existence.
399. General Frank. Concerning what?
Colonel Phillips. The Joint Army and Navy—
400. General Frank. Cooperation?
Colonel Phillips. —cooperation; yes, sir.
401. General Frank. Here was a time when a crises was about to take place. Was there any meeting of that Board held?
Colonel Phillips. We never convened the Board, so far as I know, during my time.
402. General Frank. And yet, here was a situation that arose, when you had a war warning?
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
403. General Frank. And hostilities were about to commence; and you still had no meeting of the Board?
Colonel Phillips. I do not believe the Board met. I am sure the Board never convened with me as head of the Board. The matter was taken up at the time.
404. General Frank. You were responsible for calling the meetings [1251] of the Board, weren't you?
Colonel Phillips. At the direction of the General; yes, sir; and that matter was taken up at the time.
405. General Frank. Now, why do you always reason back, and side-step the General? Why don't you back him up, instead of stepping out from under him?
Colonel Phillips. I want to back him up, sir.
406. General Frank. All right.
Colonel Phillips. I did, from the very beginning. I am sorry I gave that impression.
407. General Frank. All right.
408. General Grunert. May I interpose, here, to suggest, that committee may have been the same as the committee I have now in the Eastern Defense Command. That committee is called upon when any changes of any sort in the plans or agreements between the Army and Navy are up for consideration. The duties do not pertain to cooperation except when one party or the other proposes some change in the then existing set-up.
Colonel Phillips. Yes, sir.
409. General Russell. I want to ask one question. This morning, you testified, Colonel, that you served in the First Division, for a time?
Colonel Phillips. That is right.
410. General Russell. That was as G-3?
Colonel Phillips. That is right.
411. General Russell. Was General Short the Commanding General of the First Division during any of that period of time?
Colonel Phillips. He was.
412. General Russell. For about how long?

Colonel Phillips. I should say, about the first year and a half of my service, there; perhaps the first, maybe two years; I am not positive.

413. General Russell. Then, for about a year and a half or two years, you served in the same division with General Short, as his G-3?

Colonel Phillips. That is right.

414. General Russell. That is all.

415. General Grunert. Are there any other questions? There appear to be none.

Thank you very much for helping us out.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 4:42 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day, and proceeded to other business.)
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PROCEEDINGS OF ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

SATURDAY, AUGUST 19, 1944

MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.

The Board at 9 a.m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.


Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General Grunert. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL ROBERT J. FLEMING, JR., CORPS OF ENGINEERS, UNITED STATES ARMY

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?


2. General Grunert. Colonel, the Board is after facts, both as to what happened before and what happened at the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, on December 7. Through the testimony [1255] that the Board has had, your name came up as having occupied a position and as having been liaison officer for General Short in connection with certain construction work, and so forth. So we want you to throw some light on this subject; and General Frank will propound the questions and the other members of the Board will later question you.

3. General Frank. On what duty were you in November and December, 1941?

Colonel Fleming. I was on the General Staff at that time, sir. I was placed on the General Staff in August 1941, ostensibly in the G-4 section. Actually I did very, very little formal G-4 work, but, under then Colonel Hayes, who was Chief of Staff, I was given more or less of a special section on all Army construction work, the planning phase of it and the supervision of the execution.

If I may go into a little bit of the development of this, the Corps of Engineers took over from the Constructing Quartermaster the construction on airfields. At that time the Engineers had no staff engineer set up in the air force units. At that particular time I was Assistant Department Engineer.
4. General Frank. Assistant to Colonel Lyman?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir; the Department Engineer being a dual assignment. Colonel Lyman was Department Engineer in name, but was Regimental Commander of the 3rd Engineers at Schofield Barracks.

5. General Grunert. How do you spell his name?

Colonel Fleming. L-y-m-a-n. That is L. K. Lyman, who died in September of 1942.

[1256] He was at Schofield Barracks and spent all his time out there. I was Engineer representative at headquarters. When this transfer of Air Force construction engineers took place there was no Air Force Engineer, and at that time I was made, in addition to all my other work, what amounted to Air Force Engineer on the planning phase of it, and the job developed from that, sir.

6. General Frank. Let me hook you into the Air Force phase of this matter. As Air Force Engineer did you work as adviser to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force?

Colonel Fleming. No, sir. General Ryan was the Chief of Staff of the Air Force when this started, and General Flood was the G-4 of the Air Force, and on all the planning between the Engineers and the Air Force people the three of us, General Ryan, General Flood and myself, used to act together. I would find out what they wanted from an Air Force standpoint and work out the preliminary plans and take them down to the District Engineer in Honolulu and the thing from the engineering standpoint would then be planned.

7. General Frank. What I am trying to clear up is this: You said you were the Air Force Engineer. What you meant was that you were the Engineer on the staff of the Department Commander handling Air Force construction projects?

Colonel Fleming. That is right. There was no Air Force Engineer, sir, until later on.

In the development, due to the shortage of engineers over there, this thing developed so that eventually General Short pulled me out of the Department Engineer’s office and had my [1257] orders extended to stay over there and, under Colonel Hayes, Chief of Staff at that time, I headed up more or less a special section on the staff which handled all sorts of construction matters for the Department Commander. It also developed into the handling of all Navy liaison matters as related to construction, because before the war began there was a tremendous increase in the construction program over there, and the Army and Navy found themselves competing for workmen. The Navy was bringing them in on one boat and we would be bringing them in on another boat, and there was a tremendous amount of potential conflict between the two services on matters of wage rates, conditions of employment, and such things as that.

So that is how this job developed, sir. Ostensibly I was a member of the G-4 section but actually never did any G-4 work.

8. General Frank. Were you a member of the group that selected the sites for the permanent Aircraft Warning Service?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. That started, I think, about February of 1940, and the first board on that consisted of Colonel Van Deusen, now General Van Deusen, of the Signal Corps, who was Hawaiian Department Signal Officer. General Lynn of the Air Force, I think
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. We had very little information; no one had any information about the technical aspects of this A. W. S. equipment, and the only information we had from the War Department was that Hawaii would be allotted, depending on what the board finally recommended, about eight of these sets. That was their tentative study on the matter. We were also told that the characteristics of this device were that it was more or less a beam line of sight proposition. It went out the same way that light did, but not the same wave lengths, and therefore the range that it would be effective would depend entirely upon the height of the station. Of course you know that horizon distance is the function of the height above sea level. The range at that time was supposed to be 90 miles, and the Signal Corps had promised that it would be developed up to a range of about 120 to 140 miles. So our instructions were to locate feasible locations for it and, of course, since the range depended upon altitude, to pick those places as high up as we could get them.

The only site on the Island of Oahu which met those considerations was on top of Mt. Kaala; and we got into a terrific argument with various people around there because they said it was feasibly uneconomical to get up on top of that mountain. But we finally got that through in the board.

The next primary one would have been on top of Haleakala. On the Island of Hawaii there were to be two stations, and we recommended one at Mauna Loa, on the upper slopes of the military camp on Pahoa; one at a place called Kokee, and another one on Oahu at Pali; another one on Maui on the road leading up to Haleakala.

10. General Frank. That finally resolved itself down, in 1941, into how many main stations?

Colonel Fleming. Three. They had another board. They came in and reviewed it. They learned more about this thing. It resolved itself into the main stations being at Kokee, Kaala, and Haleakala, one on Hawaii at a place called Pahoa, and another one about 20 miles north of Morse Field. In addition, they had mobile stations put in at various other places to cover the spread.

11. General Frank. At that time there were allotted to the Hawaiian Department how many fixed stations?

Colonel Fleming. The one at Kokee was to be fixed. There were four, sir.

12. General Frank. There were four sites picked, but how many sets were allotted at that time?

Colonel Fleming. None, sir. I do not think any were over there.

13. General Frank. At what time?

Colonel Fleming. To the best of my recollection—I was not in on the Signal Corps end of it—I do not think any of the fixed equipment was delivered until well after October of 1941.

14. General Frank. Do you remember that it did arrive?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir; it did arrive. Whether it was all there or not I do not know; but I base the statement that it did arrive on remembering that the power unit that the Signal Corps supplied was
an old power unit that somebody picked up, and it only operated on white gasoline. I remember before the war we were having a lot of discussions around about these power units. If anybody would buy anything they expected it to operate on white gasoline. We finally got that changed by going out through Engineer channels and buying some Diesel 25-kw sets.

15. General Frank. Do you remember when the 270 mobile sets arrived?

Colonel Fleming. I would not be sure of the dates, but they were there on the Island at least four months before the war started.

16. General Frank. Before December 7?

Colonel Fleming. Yes; because they were playing around with them at that time, and I remember having seen one of them.

17. General Frank. They arrived, then, about in July?

Colonel Fleming. About then; yes, sir.

18. General Frank. Do you remember about contracts having been let for the construction of base camp facilities for Kokee, Kaala, and Haleakala? If so, will you discuss the accessory work that had to be done, such as roads leading into the sites, cableways, who received the contracts, and any changes that were made in the contracts, and the necessity therefor? Do you have sufficient memory of the situation to discuss that?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir; I think I have.

At Kaala, in order to get on top of the mountain, it was necessary to build a cableway which was about 7,000 feet long. This (indicating on map) is the Kolekole Pass Road, and right here (indicating) the road took off at Firebreak. The top of Mt. Kaala is here (indicating), and from a point about here on the map—this is about an inch and a half on the map—we had to build a cableway, and the only place was about 1,500 feet. It was probably about 1,900 feet from this point up to the top. That cableway had to be designed to carry a ton per hour, and we had to build a road from this point (indicating) all the way around in through there (indicating). It was a rather difficult range. The trail wound around, and over here (indicating) we improved that Firebreak trail. One of the points that delayed it a little bit was the fact that this take-off point of the cableway was right at Schofield Barracks artillery range, and there was much discussion about where we would locate this take-off point and whether it would interfere with artillery fire. So, finally we had to guarantee to them that we would put this in beyond their target limit and then splinter-proof the installation so that there would be no damage. The cableway having been selected and designed, had to be procured, and about that time steel was critical, and it took some time to get it over there. This material started arriving for the cableway sometime in October 1941. To the best of my knowledge the thing was not finished before the war, although it was well under construction. I base that statement on the fact that there was a very bad accident that occurred on this cableway, killing about three or four men at the upper terminus, and I think that happened along about in February or March, 1942. At that time it was in operation. It took a considerable amount of time to build it, so I would say it was about half or 75 percent completed at the time the war started.
19. General Frank. Aside from the delay in procuring the material, in your argument with the Artillery about its interfering with their range, was there any other delay? Was there any delay in building the road along the Firebreak road?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. This is entirely a matter of opinion, but I think that the people who executed this went in [1262] built a much more elaborate road than would have been necessary.

20. General Frank. Do you remember who had the contract for that particular installation?

Colonel Fleming. I do not believe there was a special contract for that, sir. I would like to go into the contract if I may, sir.

The Engineers took over this work and it was decided to open up a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract. The reason for having a cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract at that time was that the restrictions on Government procurement were so rigid that we could not get anything done in a hurry. That was the experience all over the country. In buying equipment, for example, the contractor could buy the equipment, just exactly what we needed, and have it delivered to the Engineers somewhere in about ten or fifteen days, and we could get it on a rental-purchase agreement. If we had to do it otherwise, we would have been restricted to certain kinds of equipment and surrounded with a lot of red tape. So the Engineers and the Constructing Quartermasters went into these contracts all over the country. To the best of my knowledge I think that the contract that the Engineers had over there was a blanket contract; that the cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract entered into by the District Engineer’s Office and approved directly by the Chief of Engineer’s Office was a blanket contract which covered not only this aircraft warning project but all other engineering work that we had to do over there.

21. General Frank. We have had a history of that and an explanation of it before the Board. It was a blanket contract, and then specific contracts were covered by job orders?

[1263] Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir; job orders under this contract.

22. General Frank. The blanket contract was made with the Hawaiian Constructors?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.

23. General Frank. There were various firms who were co-adventurers in the Hawaiian Constructors, were there not?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.

24. General Frank. And those firms were the W. E. Callahan Company, Gunther & Shirley, the Rohl-Connolly Company, and Ralph E. Woolley?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.

25. General Frank. When a job order was drawn up do you know whether or not that job order was given to the Hawaiian Constructors as one organization, or whether the job order was given so that some one of these firms was responsible for the construction as a firm?

Colonel Fleming. I have no definite knowledge of that, sir. I had nothing to do with the execution and operation of the contract. But the best of my information, from talking with other people that did, is that it was given to the Hawaiian Constructors as a firm and not sublet.
26. General Frank. You do not know how the determination was made as to exactly who was going to do what work?

Colonel Fleming. It was more or less dependent upon the character of the work, sir.

27. General Frank. Do you know what contractor was on this road and cableway construction going into Kaala?

Colonel Fleming. The details of it, no, sir. I just know that the Hawaiian Constructors did the work. There was [1264] a subcontract let on the cableway.

28. General Frank. To whom?

Colonel Fleming. I believe, the Roebling Wire & Cable Company; but it could have been some of those special cableway people. General Electric makes them, and Roebling makes them.

29. General Grunert. Do I understand that the subcontractor was to furnish the material but not to do the work?

Colonel Fleming. In this particular case, General, the cableway was a separate thing, but you had to hire a special engineer to do it. The people who furnished the material sent over engineers to supervise the work.

30. General Frank. Do you know when this station was finished?

Colonel Fleming. It was never finished, sir, to the best of my knowledge. I left Hawaii in September 1943, and up to that time it had never been used as an aircraft warning station. That was not due to the incompleteness of the facilities, but after we got this station in operation we found out that the preliminary information we had had from the Signal Corps technical people that the range depended on the height was in error, apparently. It would get out to the horizon the higher we got it, but when you got up into higher altitudes there was too much interference. When we put it up on one of these high mountains, instead of picking up an airplane or ship at sea, it would pick up to many reflections from secondary waves from the surrounding terrain. The station at Haleakala was completed first, and they took a mobile station up there, one of these Army portable units.

31. General Frank. The 270s?

[1265] Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. They tried that for a while, and that did not work well. So they then installed all of the fixed equipment. There was a great argument about that fixed equipment on Mt. Haleakala, by the way. The board never wanted it. We wanted a mobile set there. When they got that over there the Signal Corps worked and worked and worked; they had special radar people over. They would come back from England; and then they had some people called electronics experts who came out and talked very wisely about this thing, but they could never get the station to work. The reason for that was that the station at Haleakala was right up on Kolekole Peak.

[1266] 32. General Frank. There was already a road up there, wasn't there?

Colonel Fleming. There was a road up to the observation tower, sir, and then we had to build a road that was about a mile long up on top of that one little knob that stuck up. The elevation on this knob was ten twenty-five, and there was another one over here ten fourteen or something like that. But anyway, this station, you could ac-
tually see the horizon from this point all the way around except for being blanketed by the high ground on the Island of Molokai; so the only dead space theoretically on the station was a little core that came out along through there (indicating) and went up the windward side of Oahu.

Theoretically, then, this station up here (indicating) was ideal. You could go up there and you could use this in any direction, almost 360 degrees traverse on that thing. But it never worked out, because—I am not an expert on radar, but what the Signal Corps explained to me was that when your main beam that went out this way there was an auxiliary beam that went out of this thing; another node went out of this thing, and that one went out to the rear from this antenna, and as this thing swung around in trying to pick up a plane, say in this direction (indicating), these auxiliary beams would pick up these high mountains on the Island of Hawaii, and there was so much difference in the terrain between this one little bump up here on Haleakala and these high mountains out in here (indicating) that as that thing swung around and the secondary beams picked up these, what the Signal Corps call echoes, they could never chart them into the oscilloscope on this device: [1267] they could never get them entered in there as standard interferences and eliminate them.

So as a result of that they finally decided to abandon the station on Haleakala; and just on a guess that they would find the same condition on Mt. Kaala, they never put the aircraft warning station up there. The decision on Kaala and also on Haleakala to abandon those was also based upon the fact that they had developed a supplemental communications equipment which was a direct-talking telephone system to pursue planes, and also a very ultrahigh-frequency telephone communication between the various islands, and both of these places became key points in the communications network; and, as the Signal Corps and the authorities apparently wanted them for that purpose, why, neither of them was ever used as an aircraft warning station.

33. General Frank. So that the money expended to develop them did bear fruit because, while they were not used as radar stations, they were used as communication centers?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. In fact, the people told me that the development of those as communication centers, as far as fighter control and also talking back and forth for permanent use, was probably much more valuable than radar; that the radar could pick the stuff up by duplicating a station down below, but you wouldn't be able to duplicate them for communications.

34. General Frank. All right. Did you have any direct contact with Colonel Theodore Wyman, Jr.?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.

35. General Frank. Did you have any complaints to make with respect to delay in construction?

Colonel Fleming. On this particular project, sir?

36. General Frank. On any defense project. Did you have any complaints to make with respect to delays in construction of the A. W. S. system any place, at any time?

Colonel Fleming. What do you mean by “complaints,” sir?

37. General Frank. Complaints. Well, did you consider that any part of this construction was being unnecessarily delayed?
Colonel Fleming. By the constructing people, sir?
38. General Frank. Yes, sir.
Colonel Fleming. No, sir. I knew the factors which were facing those people and the things that they were—the things that all of us were trying to do in spite of delays. Some of those things, for example, were the Army-Navy competition. As far as labor was concerned it was a sellers' market; we were importing labor as fast as we could. We had a terrible time with the Engineers, the Army Engineers, and the Navy public works people; we had a terrible time building up organizations to do this work.
39. General Frank. Do you feel that there were delays that in normal times could have been eliminated?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
40. General Frank. Will you make a list of those?
Colonel Fleming. Well, one I think was the procurement—
41. General Frank. Take your time there and enumerate them, and then we will put them in the record.
Colonel Fleming. One was the procurement of labor; two was procurement of materials; three were transportation.
42. General Frank. From the mainland?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir; transportation trans-Pacific. Four I think was this question of priorities back on the mainland, and five was the question of approvals.
43. General Frank. Where and by whom?
Colonel Fleming. By the War Department, sir.
44. General Frank. Were there delays in those approvals?
Colonel Fleming. To those of us sitting out there, we thought there were, yes, sir.
45. General Frank. Were complaints made to the headquarters who had those approvals in hand?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
46. General Frank. Complaints were made?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
47. General Frank. When you made complaints did you get action?
Colonel Fleming. In the majority of cases, yes, sir.
48. General Frank. Well, then the delays in approvals were not so serious? Or were they?
Colonel Fleming. I think they were, sir, some of them. I mean that is just a worm's-eye opinion, sir. For one thing, let us take the case of Haleakalā. That station was located in a national park. We had to get on top of this mountain, which unfortunately was the most visible thing in the national park, and there was a long delay in there about getting the right of entry.
49. General Frank. From whom?
Colonel Fleming. From the National Park Service, sir.
50. General Frank. Department of Parks?
Colonel Fleming. Department of the Interior.
51. General Frank. Who was Secretary of the Interior? Do you remember?
Colonel Fleming. Mr. Ickes, sir. The local man out there in charge of that park was a man named Wingate. Mr. Wingate.
52. General Frank. He was in charge of all national parks in the Hawaiian Islands?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir; the one on Haleakala and then the one down in—

53. General Frank. At Hawaii?

Colonel Fleming. The one down at Hawaii. There had been a considerable amount of contacts back and forth with Mr. Wingate by the Army. For instance, the Air Corps wanted a bombing range down at what is known as the Kau Desert down in the Island of Hawaii, right in through here (indicating on map). I think that all this area is just absolutely worthless as far as anything except scenery is concerned. It wasn't very good for scenery because there were no roads into it.

54. General Frank. They were all old lava beds?

Colonel Fleming. All old lava beds. You couldn't go through there. I think you could walk through there. And I remember before the war we were trying to get that bombing range in there from the National Park Service and had a tremendous amount of difficulty on that. I don't think we ever did get it, unless we got it with so many restrictions that we couldn't use it.

But when we wanted to get in Haleakala, when we wanted to start work up there, the question immediately came up as to what damage this installation was going to do to the scenery in view of the Hawaii National Park. And that started before General Herron left the Islands, and he left in February 1941, I think; February or early March; and we wrote letters back and forth about this thing and tried to get Mr. Wingate to agree. [1271] and every time we would write Mr. Wingate a letter he would apparently refer it back to his people in Washington, and it dragged on and on, and the only commitment we could get was that we would have to design this station completely and submit all plans, architectural drawings of the buildings, and everything like that to Mr. Wingate, who would then forward them to the National Park Service people so they could pass on them from an architectural standpoint.

Well, obviously, if we were trying to build something in a hurry we couldn't wait around until the National Park Service approved these plans from an architectural standpoint. So we finally resolved that argument: I remember General Short sent a special telegram (it was one of these "eyes alone" telegrams) to General Marshall asking him to please secure the necessary permits to proceed with the construction of that station; and as a result of that appeal, why, we got authority to go into Haleakala and start work building the road and constructing buildings and submit the plans later on; that we would guarantee to make the buildings look like what the Park Service wanted us to, provided we could put the buildings where we wanted to.

55. General Grunerz. When did you get that permission?

Colonel Fleming. I don't remember, General. I think to the best of my knowledge it was sometime after General Short got there, and he arrived in February. I think that exchange of radios probably took place about in, oh, I would say in May of 1941, because I remember I had to explain this thing in great detail to General Short, to give him all the background and show to him that we had exhausted the local possibility of getting the thing done, before he would sign the radio.

[1272] 56. General Frank. What about Kokee?
Colonel Fleming. Kokee we didn’t have any trouble with, sir. That is on the Island of Kauai, and it was located, fortunately, in territorial land. We had excellent relationships with the Territorial Department of Forestry. I think it was, controlled it.

57. General Frank. Was there any delay in the construction of that once the job order was let?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.

58. General Frank. What was it?
Colonel Fleming. The delay on that was that originally the fixed stations—and this is the reason we didn’t like the fixed stations, sir—the fixed stations were supposed to be built with the detector building and the detector tower, the antenna gadget, all in the same building. In other words, the framework for the building was made sufficiently strong to hold this tower up on the top. Well, in furnishing the first people in this board we had no idea—we suspect that nobody else had any idea—how this thing was going to work. We thought we might have to move it maybe a hundred feet or a couple of hundred feet in various directions to get the best place to locate it. Also we had no detailed plans for the footings of the supports for this tower. The buildings sort of stuck up like this, of course, with the tower coming out where my pencil does (indicating), and that building and the tower were supported by heavy steel members inside of the building.

The only thing we had was the location of where the tower was, on the top of the building, and where the concrete [1273] foundations would have to go to support this structure. Of course, in building construction we have to have a lot more detailed information than that. You have got to either have your detail design of the footings of that tower so you can cast your bolts in the concrete when you pour it, or else you have got to have a template accompanying this thing.

Right in the middle of that one they found out that this gadget would not measure height or something on approaching planes, as I recall it, with the tower which was only 35 feet high, so they increased—

59. General Frank. What do you mean by “this gadget”? What gadget? The tower?
Colonel Fleming. The radar, sir.

60. General Frank. The radar?
Colonel Fleming. The radar.

61. General Frank. The oscilloscope?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.

So they increased the height of the antenna to a hundred-foot tower at this one particular station. And I don’t know how long it took us to get the actual detailed design of the footings of that tower so we could start pouring that concrete. I remember that there was a lot of correspondence back and forth about that, trying to find out just exactly how that tower should be poured and what the relationship between the tower and the buildings was going to be after the hundred-foot tower was decided on.

62. General Frank. Who determined those details that you needed to make this change in construction that was causing [1274] the delay?
Colonel Fleming. That was done somewhere in this country, sir.

63. General Frank. What branch of the service? Signal Corps?

Colonel Fleming. Signal Corps; yes, sir.

64. General Frank. It was the Signal Corps' responsibility to prepare the plans and specifications on which you should proceed with the construction?

Colonel Fleming. It was our responsibility, sir, for preparing the—rather, the Engineers'. I was the General Staff Officer, but it was the Engineers' responsibility for designing the buildings in the thing and making all the layout except for this one building, the detector building.

65. General Frank. Yes.

Colonel Fleming. That was a specially screened building. The Signal Corps furnished the tower and all the equipment that is in it, furnished everything complete for it.

66. General Frank. Well, who was responsible for the plans that caused the delay?

Colonel Fleming. I think the Signal Corps was, sir.

67. General Frank. All right. Now, you have told us about the delays at Kokee and the delays at Kaala and the delays at Haleakula. In any of these delays were the contractors in any way responsible for those or any other delays?

Colonel Fleming. I don't think so, sir. There may have been inefficiencies in management which would decrease the speed at which the work was going on, but I don't think there were any particular delays that the contractor had to do with. [1275] For example, the contractor couldn't proceed with that Kaala cableway until the thing had been designed and he was told where to put it.

68. General Frank. Did you have any delays in getting plans from the Engineers?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.

69. General Frank. Where?

Colonel Fleming. On that Kaala cableway.

70. General Frank. What Engineers?

Colonel Fleming. That was the District Engineer down at Kam in Honolulu, sir.

71. General Frank. Well, give us the background of it.

Colonel Fleming. Well, I just thought in there that I remember on that one particular thing that we had given them from our preliminary design dope what we wanted. We wanted a cableway which would haul about a ton every hour up this inclined railway.

72. General Frank. How much of a concentrated load would it carry?

Colonel Fleming. I think the ultimate in load on that, sir, was 1,500 pounds, but I am not sure. I remember in order to get this equipment up over the cableway it had to be broken down into loads which didn't exceed a certain amount; I think that figure is 1,500 pounds. The rate of flow was a ton per hour up it.

73. General Frank. Well, get back to this delay in plans caused by the Engineer Office.

Colonel Fleming. Well, after we gave them this original [1276] dope it seems to me, just as I recall it, that the experts to design this thing, after we gave them the starting point, the terminal point, and
the rate at which we wanted it to go in—that the experts to actually do the design work were not called in as soon as they could have been.

74. General Frank. Do you know the intervening period there between the time that you gave them your requirements and the time the experts were called in?

Colonel Fleming. I don’t remember, sir. I remember that we reconnoitered there.

75. General Frank. What?

Colonel Fleming. We reconnoitered that route, sir, and got everybody to agree to it. Colonel Van Deusen and I reconnoitered that thing in, oh, I would say along about July or August of 1940.

76. General Frank. Did that District Engineer’s office, because of the nature of its operations cause any other delays?

Colonel Fleming. I don’t think so, sir. As I mentioned before, I think that the quality of the road that they put in from this point out on Kolekole Road until they got around to the take-off point was—it was a much finer road than the needs required. That delayed it a little bit.

77. General Frank. Were you ever in the District Engineer’s Office?

Colonel Fleming. No, sir.

78. General Frank. You were never in his office?

Colonel Fleming. Did I ever work there, sir?

79. General Frank. No. Did you ever visit it? Did you ever go there?

Colonel Fleming. Oh, yes, sir. I was down there about, I would say, on the average of four or five times a week.

80. General Frank. Was it well organized?

Colonel Fleming. I think so, yes, sir.

81. General Frank. In your opinion? Orderly?

Colonel Fleming. Before the war, yes, sir. It was located in two places. Before the war it was located down at Pier No. 2 in Honolulu, and the top floor of the Alexander Young Building. It was orderly and appeared to be well organized. The clerks, for example, the Civil Service clerks they had over there, a large number were Chinese. They had Chinese stenographers, Chinese-Hawaiian stenographers, and I think it was efficiently and well organized.

82. General Frank. Did you know Colonel Wyman?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.

83. General Frank. Very well?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.

84. General Frank. Did you get along well with him?

Colonel Fleming. Officially, sir?

85. General Frank. Yes.

Colonel Fleming. Well, I was in a very peculiar spot. As I said before, the Department Engineer was Colonel Lyman, A. K. B. Lyman; and the District Engineer from about—I don’t know when he went down there, sir. I don’t remember whether it was in August—

86. General Frank. What do you mean, “he went down there”? Was he on duty up in the Engineer Regiment?

[1277] Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. Wyman came over there originally and went to duty at Schofield Barracks. I believe that he was at Schofield in the 3rd Engineers when Colonel Lyman arrived in
the Department. I am pretty sure he was; I think he was out there under Colonel Hodges, and Lyman and Wyman had known each other before, and when Colonel Lyman arrived over there to take command of the regiment, why, I remember all of us junior officers were sort of laughing about this thing.

87. General Frank. Why?

Colonel Fleming. Well, because they didn't get along so well together, and we more or less had a pool up as to how long Wyman would stay on the regiment, how long it would take him to get out from under Colonel Lyman, and it didn't take him very long. I think he went down to become District Engineer in Honolulu about, oh, somewhere around September of 1940. Colonel Lyman arrived in Hawaii about in June of 1940.

Well, that, frankly, as far as the Engineers were concerned, put me on the spot because Lyman was ostensibly my boss, although he didn't get down there very often, and Wyman down in the District Engineer's Office, and there was supposed to be cooperation between the Department Engineer, of course, and the District Engineer. Well, I found myself the middleman in a feud, and that lasted for quite some time. So I say I know Colonel Wyman very well. I have known him since 1934.

88. General Frank. Did that feud result in any delays?

Colonel Fleming. Oh, it would certainly prolong discussions, General. There happened to be another Engineer officer down on duty, down on the District Engineer's, who was Wyman's executive officer.

89. General Frank. Who was that?

Colonel Fleming. A man named Robinson, sir. Bernard L. Robinson. He went out to Australia, and he is out there now. He has been out there ever since shortly after the war began.

90. General Frank. What about him?

Colonel Fleming. Well, I know Robbie very well. In fact, we had been fairly intimate when we were younger. And he would get the job of listening to the feud from the Wyman side, and I would listen to it from the Lyman side, and occasionally we would switch and get caught in this thing, but Robbie and I were working back and forth on the thing. Now, as I say, it delayed things because I think there was an undue amount of time taken up while we heard what the difficulties with the other party in the feud were, but at the same time it didn't—it was just one of those situations that we were in, sir.

91. General Frank. Was there any relationship between Robinson and Wyman?

Colonel Fleming. Robinson was Wyman's immediate subordinate, sir.

92. General Frank. No. I am talking about personal relationship. Was one of them somebody's brother-in-law?

Colonel Fleming. No, sir. Robinson married a girl from Spokane.

93. General Frank. Robinson was not Wyman's brother-in-law?

Colonel Fleming. No, sir.

94. General Frank. How long did this feud last?

Colonel Fleming. Until Colonel Wyman's relief from the Department, sir.

95. General Frank. Until Colonel Wyman's relief?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. They remained in that position of Department Engineer and District Engineer until about—well, I would say about March or April of 1942.

96. General Frank. When did Wyman leave there?
Colonel Fleming. About April of 1942, sir.

97. General Frank. What caused his relief? Do you know?
Colonel Fleming. General Emmons had been over there long enough then to size up the situation very well, and I just think he got a little bit annoyed at the situation, and he decided that one of the two of them would have to leave the Islands for the peace of mind of everybody concerned, and Wyman was relieved at that particular time.

98. General Frank. How did it come to be Wyman instead of Lyman that left? Do you know?
Colonel Fleming. Well, Wyman is not the world's greatest diplomat, sir. He is a bull in a china shop, and he zigged when he should have zagged more than once. He just got himself crosswise in an awful hurry.

99. General Frank. Did this relationship between Lyman and Wyman ever come to General Short's attention?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.

100. General Frank. Did he ever have a conference with them to try to straighten it out?
Colonel Fleming. I don't know whether he had a conference or not, sir, whether he had them both in. I know that just [1281] before the war started—I have a remembrance there it was just before the war started, General Short called me in one day and asked me about this thing and what I thought about each one of the two officers, and frankly I demurred on answering his question and told him that I didn't think it was up to my place to criticize my superiors, and so he told me that he had been talking it over with both officers and knew that I had a pretty fair knowledge of both of them, and wanted to get a private opinion, which I gave to him. Now, that would indicate to me that General Short was cognizant of the situation and was trying to straighten it out. This was just before the war started.

[1282] 101. General Frank. Do you know whether or not he did anything about it?
Colonel Fleming. I am pretty sure he talked to both of them, sir. I don't think he ever took any official action. He may have written some personal letters back to people in the War Department requesting changes, or something like that; but I don't know.

102. General Frank. What was your personal opinion that was given to Short?
Colonel Fleming. To the best of my recollection, sir, I told both General Short and Colonel Hayes that Wyman had a reputation of getting the work done, but that he was about the most impossible persons personally that we had in the engineers; that he was just one of those people who made everybody mad at him being always—he was just a "bull in a china shop."

103. General Frank. You say that General Short had a talk with Wyman and with Lyman?
Colonel Fleming. I assume that he did, sir, because I know he asked me my opinion, because he was very cognizant. He was apparently
cognizant of the difficulties between the two of them, these personal
difficulties, and had apparently given enough thought to it that he
called in a very junior officer to ask him his opinion. He asked me
my opinion of both of them.

104. General Frank. Well, he called you in with little considera-
tion of your being a junior officer, but because of your position and of
your intimate knowledge, as his representative dealing with the two
of them; isn't that correct?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. I remember at the beginning of the
conversation I told him that I thought it was putting me in a rather
embarrassing position, because I was discussing my superiors.

105. General Frank. How long had General Short known of this
feud, do you know?

Colonel Fleming. I would say it got very bad, sir, oh, around the
1st of November, 1941.

106. General Frank. Do you know of any specific projects that were
held up as a result of this feud?

Colonel Fleming. No, sir; I don't think any were held up as a result
of it. I think that the only thing it resulted in was making my work
and making Colonel Robinson's work a lot more difficult than it other-
wise would have been.

107. General Frank. Were you on friendly terms with Wyman?

Colonel Fleming. Not socially, sir. I was, officially, and I think I
got along with him well.

108. General Frank. What was his reputation?

Colonel Fleming. Socially, sir?


Colonel Fleming. Well, his reputation socially, sir, just wasn't good.
He had the reputation of being a person who was absolutely without
any polish. When he went to a party you always felt rather embar-
rassed for what might happen next, and I think all of the engineer
officers over there at that particular time avoided contact socially as
much as we could.

110. General Frank. What was his reputation with respect to
drinking?

Colonel Fleming. He has had a very bad reputation for drinking,
sir. I would like to amplify that statement, however. I think that
was one of the reasons why Wyman got out of the Third Engineers.
Lyman had had previous knowledge of Wyman's drinking. Of course everybody else had, too. We knew he liked to
"hoist one" every once in a while, but I think that Lyman must have
found Wyman with too much aboard one time and just gave him hell.
I know that Colonel Lyman told me that he had discussed it with
Colonel Wyman, and that Wyman had signed the pledge. I think he
had enough on him that he just about had to.

Well, to the best of my recollection, then, sir, when he came down
from Schofield to Honolulu, frankly, I do not know whether he ever
drank to excess or not, because we weren't with him socially, and we
were not on the same kind of parties, and I think, however, he had
pretty well laid off the heavy drinking by that time—as far as his re-
putation was concerned.
111. General Frank. As the result of your having been down there so frequently, did it ever occur to you that his drinking was interfering with the performance of his duty?

Colonel Fleming. I don't think so, General.

112. General Frank. Not at any time during the period that he was over there?

Colonel Fleming. Before the war, sir?

113. General Frank. At any time during the period.

Colonel Fleming. I don't recall any time at which I could say that Colonel Wyman's drinking was affecting his duties.

114. General Frank. When was this discussion about signing the pledge?

Colonel Fleming. That was about—oh, around about October or November 1940, sir.

115. General Frank. 1940?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.

116. General Frank. That was the year before Pearl Harbor.

[1285] Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. It was about the time that Wyman was relieved from the Third Engineers and sent down to Honolulu as the district engineer, down there.

117. General Grunert. When you say "the pledge," you mean a pledge not to drink to excess, or what?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir; a pledge not to drink to excess, sir. Don't you know?

Colonel Fleming. I don't know, sir.

119. General Grunert. I wanted to get it in the record, as to what a "pledge" is, that was all. It referred to drinking.

Colonel Fleming. All I know is that Colonel Lyman told me that

118. General Frank. Not to drink, or not to drink to excess? Or he had this discussion with Colonel Wyman, and that he thought that he would stop drinking to excess.

120. General Frank. Do you know whether or not General Short knew about this?

Colonel Fleming. No, sir; I don't think he did, sir. That happened before General Short came over there, and Wyman stayed pretty well "up to the pole," sir, until after the war began. That is the best of my knowledge. I never saw him on any "wild toots," and I never heard of him being on, and I think he was fairly well "up to the pole," until after the war started.

121. General Frank. And after the war started, what?

Colonel Fleming. Well, I was at one party out at General Tincher's quarters, when there was some liquor going around.

122. General Frank. And what?

Colonel Fleming. And that was just shortly before Wyman

[1286] was relieved, sir.

123. General Frank. Did he become intoxicated, in your opinion?

Colonel Fleming. He had too much to drink, sir, and made some very regrettable statements, which caused certain newly arrived Air Generals to get extremely irked at the engineers, I remember.

124. General Frank. Who were those Generals?

Colonel Fleming. It was General Hale, sir, and it was a welcoming party for General Hale.

125. General Frank. Do you remember what those statements were?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.

126. General Frank. What were they?

Colonel Fleming. The party was called, sir, to celebrate the opening of the ferry project, this southern airways route to Australia, and Wyman ended up by making some "crack" indicating that the engineers were the only outfit in the Army, and that any time General Hale got in trouble with his new command, why, just to call on Colonel Wyman, and he would come over and help him, and run it for him. Well, I don't think Colonel Hale appreciated it very much, and neither did I, because I was trying to stop the conversation.

The only members present at that party, sir, were—General Tincher and Colonel Mollison gave the party, and what they wanted it for was to get General Hale and Colonel Wyman together, and they used this excuse of completing the southern airways route. I think General Tincher had just about come back from the inspection of it at that time, and the people present were General Tincher, Colonel Mollison, who was the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, General Hale, General Tincher's aide [1287] and myself.

127. General Frank. Now, during the period that you were over there, did you ever run onto a man by the name of Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. I had known Mr. Rohl by reputation only, sir, and to the best of my knowledge I never met him before the war started. The executive officer of the Hawaiian Constructors Contracting Company—

128. General Frank. What was—?

Colonel Fleming. —who was a man naved Paul Grafe—G-r-a-e-f-e—and I met Mr. Grafe several times at—oh, just the usual backyard barbecue party. I thing he was at a couple that the Robinsons gave. My wife and I and the Robinsons were fairly—we got to know each other fairly well.

129. General Frank. The Robinsons now lived up in the Nuuanu Valley?

Colonel Fleming. No, sir; the Robinsons lived on Kahala, and we lived on Kaimuka, fairly close together, so it was one of those arrangements where we would get together and we played bridge in the evening, stuff like that; and I met Grafe a couple of times over there at the Robinsons'. They had backyard barbecues at which they cooked steaks on the fire.

130. General Frank. Grafe was a member of what firm?

Colonel Fleming. I don't know, sir. I think that he belonged to the Callahan outfit, although that is just my recollection of it; but as far as I knew, Grafe was the man who was chairman of that executive committee until—well, after the war started. I don't know when he disappeared, and I never saw Mr. Rohl until—I had heard about him, but I didn't [1288] meet him until after the war.

131. General Frank. After the war?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.

132. General Frank. Was he in Honolulu?

Colonel Fleming. He had been in Honolulu prior to that, sir. I know he was there in October.
133. General Frank. You said you had heard of him, by reputation. What was that reputation?
Colonel Fleming. Just as the Rohl-Connolly Constructing Corporation, sir, and a rather prominent contractor.
134. General Frank. Did you know anything about him, other than his being President of that organization?
Colonel Fleming. No, sir.
135. General Frank. Did you ever meet him?
Colonel Fleming. I met him, after the war, sir.
136. General Frank. How did you come to meet him?
Colonel Fleming. In the course of my business down there with the district engineer's office, I met him several times, and my attention was particularly called to Mr. Rohl, I think it was—well, near, probably around February 1942. No, it was earlier than that, sir. He had been back to the mainland. He had been back and forth, and Colonel Wyman was trying to get him an air priority on a CLIPPER to come back to Honolulu, and the first time Mr. Rohl was ever particularly brought to my consciousness was the fact when Wyman called me up this one time and wanted some help in getting Mr. Rohl a priority back on the CLIPPER, and he rather emphatically stated his case and told me I had better, a damned sight, get the priority on the CLIPPER out of the Navy. The Navy, by the way, was controlling priorities on the CLIPPER. They didn't know who Mr. Rohl was, and they had a lot of people they wanted to bring back. That was, I think, in early January or February 1942, the first time I particularly came to know of Rohl.
137. General Frank. What was the relationship between Rohl and Wyman? Was there any relationship?
Colonel Fleming. I only am familiar with that by hearsay, sir.
138. General Frank. Well, what is your hearsay?
Colonel Fleming. There has been a lot of discussion in the engineers, sir, for years, on the fact that a lot of people have always believed that Colonel Wyman was a little bit too familiar with the contractors.
139. General Frank. With the contractors?
Colonel Fleming. With contractors on these various jobs, sir. He had been district engineer in Kansas City, and from there he went out to Los Angeles. I was in Los Angeles at the same time that Colonel Wyman was. He was the district engineer in Los Angeles. The engineers were running the relief business out there. General Donald H. Connolly was then Lieutenant Colonel, and was the administrator of the Works Progress Administration in southern California. We were sent out there for four months' temporary duty.
140. General Frank. Were you with General Connolly?
Colonel Fleming. I was with General Connolly, with the WPA, sir. We stayed there for 3½ years, and I left there to go to Hawaii. Wyman came over about a year later. I know that in Los Angeles there had been discussions. I heard that from General Connolly, that they didn't get along very well in the relationship with contracting people. They thought that he had too many social relationships with the various contractors on the jobs.
141. General Frank. What was the reputation of that social relationship between Wyman and Rohl in Honolulu?
Colonel Fleming. I don’t know what it was before the war, sir.

142. General Frank. What was it after the war?

Colonel Fleming. After the war—well, I think after the war a lot of people thought that they were together too much of the time.

143. General Frank. Were they drinking?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.

144. General Frank. To excess?

Colonel Fleming. I don’t know, sir. I never saw them.

145. General Frank. What were the reports circulating about that drinking?

Colonel Fleming. Oh, there were all sorts of reports circulated about it, sir, but I think everybody in the Territory was mad at Colonel Wyman, about that time.

146. General Frank. Everybody was what?

Colonel Fleming. Was mad at Colonel Wyman.

147. General Frank. Well, let us get back to what were the reports about that drinking.

Colonel Fleming. There were rumors that there was excessive drinking going on. Personally, outside of that one time that I thought Wyman had too much, when he was talking to General Hale, I personally never saw him.

148. General Frank. About how many times did you ever come in [1297] contact with him?

Colonel Fleming. I think prior to the war, sir, when he came over there, that was about a year and a half, from the summer of 1940 until December. I don’t believe I saw Colonel Wyman socially at a party more than five times, in all that time, with the one at Schofield, I remember, and there was another one down-town, and we gave a cocktail party at our house one time and invited them, but I would believe five times would be the limit.

149. General Frank. Were these five large or small affairs?

Colonel Fleming. Mostly large, sir.

150. General Frank. Was Rohl at any of these parties?

Colonel Fleming. Not that I know of, sir. To the best of my knowledge I never met Rohl until after the war started.

151. General Frank. Did you ever meet him at a party?

Colonel Fleming. After the war?

152. General Frank. Yes.

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.

153. General Frank. You met Rohl at a party?

Colonel Fleming. I met Rohl at a party, after the war; yes, sir.

154. General Frank. How often?

Colonel Fleming. He was going back and forth between there and the mainland quite frequently, sir. I remember particularly seeing him at a party down at the Pleasanton Hotel. I also saw him again the night that Colonel Wyman left. We had a farewell “luau” party, and I saw Mr. Rohl at that.

155. General Frank. At the Willows?

Colonel Fleming. No, sir; it was at the Pleasanton, which [1292] is a hotel up near Punahou.

156. General Frank. When the Hawaiian Constructors first started to operate, who was the representative between the Hawaiian Constructors and the District Engineer?
Colonel Fleming. There were two of them, sir. There was Mr. Grafe, who was chairman of this executive board, and the man by the name of Middleton, I believe, who was more or less a local manager, personnel manager, in Honolulu.

157. General Frank. Did Mr. Rohl ever come into a dominant position in Hawaiian Constructors?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.

158. General Frank. When?
Colonel Fleming. After the war, sir, to the best of my knowledge. He may have had the controlling interest, and Grafe may have been just his man over there; I don't know; but I do know that after the war started, Rohl—this thing was apparently a syndicate, sir, and I think Rohl had a very large interest in the syndicate. Grafe may have been an employee. I don't know, when he went in, whether he was or not; but after the war started, Grafe more or less disappeared from this executive-committee business. I don't know where he went, and Rohl came over and sat down right there in Hawaii and was more or less the contractors' man, the one with final authority.

159. General Frank. Did Rohl have an office near Wyman's?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir; the contractors had a building in the Puuhale campus. The engineers took over the Puuhale school and, the entire area, as I was advised, and one of the buildings on Puuhale campus was an office of this Hawaiian Constructors.

[1293] 160. General Frank. Was there anything ever said about Wyman's leaning on Rohl for advice, or about Rohl's having special influence with Wyman on construction projects, that you learned?
Colonel Fleming. I think there was plenty said about it, sir; but I don't know whether there was any truth to it, or not.

161. General Frank. Well, what was being said?
Colonel Fleming. Well, there was a lot of talk about it, but generally—

162. General Frank. What was it? What was the tenor of it?
Colonel Fleming. The tenor of that talk was that Rohl, over there, as a local man in the Hawaiian Constructors, would have to approve of one of these projects, or approve of some of the questions before the Hawaiian Constructors would start pushing it. Now, unless you knew the set-up, sir, it would be difficult to explain what it was. The personnel, for example, would be hired by the Hawaiian Constructors. The Government was paying all of the pay roll of that outfit except for certain key individuals; and all their laborers, and everything like that, were actually paid directly on a government pay roll. The Government paid directly all the bills for purchases of materials on this contract, and bills would have to be certified by the Hawaiian Constructors, and then they would have to be approved by the contracting officer; and the rumors, the talk was to the effect that Mr. Rohl was the boss man, or, over there in the Hawaiian Constructors, he was actually running the show.

163. General Frank. How was he running it. Was he having an undue influence on Wyman?
Colonel Fleming. I don't think so, sir. I don't know. I wasn't around him, but I know Colonel Wyman.

164. General Frank. What was your feeling, and what was the general feeling with relation to the question as to whether or not the
association of Rohl and Wyman was a healthful one for the Government?

Colonel Fleming. It was entirely personal, General, but I felt that it was not a healthful one.

165. General Frank. That it was not a healthful one?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.

166. General Frank. Why?
Colonel Fleming. Well, I just don't believe that in—I was trained in the engineers by officers with a little bit different viewpoint.

167. General Frank. With higher standards, you mean?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir—General Larkin and General Connelly—and I know darned well that neither one of those two would have been so intimate with one of their contractors.

168. General Frank. Was there any indication at any time of any graft or illegal profit?

Colonel Fleming. On the Hawaiian Constructors, sir?

169. General Frank. Yes, sir.

Colonel Fleming. I don't think so, sir. I think there were indications of an awful lot of inefficiency in the set-up. That is a fault which is inherent in those “cost-plus-fixed-fee” contracts. They were grand things, and they were very necessary for the progress of work, as long as we had a big job to do. If we had a lot of big construction work, like building an [1295] airport, that organization could have done it. It was to our advantage, to the Government’s advantage, to have that contract, just to avoid this business of the “red tape,” that we never could have gotten this work done if we had been hampered by all the procurement regulations.

The minute that our work in Hawaii changed from concentrating on several, but still a relatively small number, of large projects, and our engineering work over there shifted to doing at one time and pushing a lot of small jobs all over the Island, and trying to get them all pushed at the same time, then that contract I believe became inherently—it became inherently inefficient, because those people down there among the contractors’ employees, they just weren’t interested in it. For instance, we, from a military engineering standpoint, would be trying to get a water line, just a 3/4-inch water line, run off to some company, to furnish them water, and trying to get these contractors to do it. They wouldn’t do it. All this little, small, piddling stuff that they couldn’t go out and make a big organization of, was neglected. They still wanted to do the big contracting jobs, but of course we didn’t have many of that kind of work after that, and there was a whole lot of little jobs being pushed and rushed just as fast as we could do it, and that organization wasn’t suited. The minute it became that sort of program, then the contractor was out of the picture—should have been out of the picture.

1296] 170. General Frank. A cost-plus contract, therefore, requires more than the usual reliance upon the honesty of the contractor?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, I think it does, sir. The contractor is not spending his own money. He does not get cost plus a percentage. This was cost plus a flat fee. In a cost plus percentage I do not think there is any tendency to be dishonest unless there is a hook-up between the contractor and one of the purchasing people. But there is cer-
tainly not the care in operating under these contracts as there would be if the contractor were spending his own money.

171. General Frank. Was Wyman having difficulty with Grafe?
Colonel Fleming. I do not know, sir; I was never close enough to see. I do not think he was.

172. General Frank. Do you know of any rumors that Wyman wanted Rohl in Hawaii because Wyman was rowing with Grafe?
Colonel Fleming. No, sir; I do not know anything about that.

173. General Frank. What was Rohl's reputation for drinking?
Colonel Fleming. He had a pretty good reputation too, sir.

174. General Grunert. A pretty good reputation or a pretty bad reputation?
Colonel Fleming. He had a pretty good reputation for his capacity. He could take on quite a bit.

175. General Frank. Did it incapacitate him?
Colonel Fleming. I never knew him well enough to find out.

176. General Frank. Were there any rumors as to his being inac-

capacitated prior to December 7th because of his drinking?
[1297] Colonel Fleming. I never heard any, sir. I did not know him before December 7th.

177. General Frank. Do you know whether or not Rohl and Wyman lived anywhere near each other?
Colonel Fleming. No, sir. Wyman at that time lived in the Nuvanu Valley.

178. General Frank. Do you know whether or not they had ad-

joining rooms at the Pleasanton Hotel?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. They did that, I think, after the war started.

179. General Frank. Did the Army take over the Pleasanton Hotel?
Colonel Fleming. No, sir. That was another thing that we got into trouble about. that Pleasanton Hotel, more trouble than anything I know about. Actually it was taken over by the Hawaiian Constructors. They took it over to provide living accommodations for certain of their employees. The hotel was owned by a Jap family. I would call it in those days a second-class hotel, right near the Napua.

180. General Frank. Diagonally across?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. The Hawaiian Constructors took over the hotel for the benefit of their employees, and then they ran a cafe in the place and rented out rooms to Army officers who had been evacuated from their houses. Wyman's room and Rohl's room were not absolutely adjacent. They were on the second floor of the hotel, and Wyman had a room in one corner and Rohl one in the other corner, and between the two were two rooms that they used as offices. I would say the [1298] entrances of the rooms were maybe 75 feet apart. They were the only two people in that particular section of the building. Colonel Robinson had another room on that floor, but he was in the back.

The Pleasanton Hotel is just one of those things. It was a swell idea; the contractor had to take care of his employees, and that, under the terms of the contract, I think, was one of the things that was reimbursable as far as the Government was concerned. But the
Government got into the hotel business indirectly by paying the bills of the Hawaiian Constructors. There have been more investigations into that hotel than anything I know of.

181. General Frank. Do you know anything about the results of those investigations?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. One of the results was that General Emmons took it up and they changed a lot of the setups down there and found a lot of details that the Constructors were doing which did not agree with Army regulations, and a lot of expenditures being made and receipts not being collected, and the usual deficiencies that you would expect to find when a bunch of people like that go into the hotel business without any regard to Army regulations.

182. General Frank. Was Rowe there?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir; he was the Inspector General at that time. Colonel Ely, or Colonel Baldwin—I think it was Colonel Ely, who was the Department finance officer—put in all these transfers. One of the transfers was made after the war started. Mixed up in the transfers was Quartermaster work for the Engineers, and the Quartermaster trying to back up their accounts, and also a transfer in the Engineers' disbursement system. Up to that time the Engineers had always done their own financing, but in this streamlining business they transferred all the financing over to the finance people. These arguments came up because the new disbursing officer would not pay the bills. I am pretty sure Colonel Ely was the finance officer. That is where the thing started.

183. General Frank. Do you know where Rohl was between the 6th and 8th of December?
Colonel Fleming. No, sir.

[1300] 184. General Frank. When the war started was there any change in the method of handling the contracts; do you know?
Colonel Fleming. Not in the contracts, sir. I don't know about the method of handling the contracts, sir. There was a very definite change in the Engineer setup; yes, sir.

185. General Frank. What was it?
Colonel Fleming. Colonel Lyman then had been spending more and more time at Shafter. I was pulled out of the Department Engineer Office, as I said, in August of 1941, and from that time on Colonel Lyman began spending more and more time at Fort Shafter, and in all the war plans immediately on the outbreak of the war, why, the Department Engineer would assume control over all construction work in the Department.

186. General Frank. Because they were principally defense projects?
Colonel Fleming. Defense projects then; yes, sir. So General Short immediately authorized us to put that into effect.

187. General Frank. To put what into effect?
Colonel Fleming. The previous organization, sir, which set the Department Engineer up as the ruling boss of everything, of all these military construction and all civilian construction under him, or rather, civilian-executed construction; and the District Engineer became a subordinate of the Department Engineer.

188. General Frank. That was starting when?
Colonel Fleming. It was as of December 7th, sir.
189. General Frank. Then on December 7th Wyman became a subordinate of Lyman?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. I dictated the order, and I think on the 7th or the 8th, as soon as we could get around to it, we formalized it. And, however, the District Engineer was a part of the Engineer Department setup.

190. General Frank. What Engineer Department?

Colonel Fleming. The Engineer Department, sir; I mean that the Engineer Department is organized under the Corps of Engineers. The Chief of Engineers is the head of it, and he has these Division Engineers all around the country, and District Engineers under the Division Engineers. Now, Wyman's immediate superior was the Division Engineer in San Francisco, and he was never under the command of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department. His orders were to just cooperate with him. That same setup was true in Panama. It wasn't true in the Philippines. In the Philippines the Department Engineer was actually the District Engineer also.

So, while over there in Hawaii in putting into effect this war plan Wyman came under Lyman, it was not a complete command arrangement because Wyman was still responsible through his Engineer Department channels, through the Division Engineer, and back to the Chief of Engineers, and that was not finally changed until about March of 1942 when the War Department issued instructions that all Engineers in the theaters of operations would be directly under the Commanding Generals of that, and they wiped out the Engineer Department channels at that particular time, and it was at that time that Colonel Wyman was relieved. General Emmons decided that since he had orders to consolidate the thing and he could pick—the orders were, or the instructions from the War Department were, when that thing came out, that by statute—certain things by statute have to be done by a person called the District Engineer. Those are rivers and harbors projects and flood-control projects, and on those two particular things the Chief of Engineers is directly responsible to Congress, not through the War Department; he is more or less separate from the War Department. And when the order came out the Chief of Engineers—or rather, the War Department stated that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department would pick his Engineer and that the Chief of Engineers would then turn around and make whoever the Commanding General picked—would make him the District Engineer so he could continue handling these purely—

191. General Frank. Statutory projects?

Colonel Fleming. Statutory projects. And it was at that time that Wyman was relieved and sent back to the mainland, and I think that was about in March. There was about a three months' time, sir, that—

192. General Frank. That was in March?

Colonel Fleming. That is right.

193. General Frank. However, immediately after December 7th the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department issued orders to bring the District Engineer under the Department Engineer?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
194. General Frank. He did that without any authority from the mainland?
Colonel Fleming. Without any direct authority; no, sir. However, that was part of the Hawaiian Department Defense Plan, or whatever it was; I forget the name of it.

[1304] 195. General Frank. Could that have been done prior to December 7th?
Colonel Fleming. I don't know, sir. I think that if the question had ever been raised possibly the War Department would have approved it. I don't think that they would have changed the relationship between the District Engineer, the Division Engineer, and the Chief of Engineers prior to the war because I said it took them from December until sometime in March to make that change. Wyman, even after the war started, was still getting instructions direct through his Engineer channels. There was one project before the war, the only project to the best of my knowledge—there was only one project for which the Commanding General was made directly responsible, and that was for the construction of what I call the ferry project, and that is the construction of this chain of air bases from Hawaii to the Philippines, and in that—

196. General Grunert. May I develop that a little bit?
197. General Frank. Just let me ask one question.
Go ahead. You were going to say something.
Colonel Fleming. In that project the directive came out stating that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department was responsible for all the construction down to and including Australia. The Commanding General of the Philippine Department was responsible for all construction north of Australia and into the Philippines. And our instructions in Hawaii were that the District Engineer had been given orders by the Chief of Engineers to place himself at the disposal of the Commanding General for that one project.

198. General Frank. When war started—that was from December 7th on—did all contracts merge in the Hawaiian Constructors on recommendation of Colonel Wyman?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.
199. General Frank. That was a change, then?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir, it was a change.
200. General Frank. What did that change involve?
Colonel Fleming. At that time, sir, I said we were taking over the Quartermaster work. Now, my memory is not entirely clear on all of these things. We had taken over all of their contracts before the war which had to do with Air Corps construction on air force posts. The next thing we took over was the work of the Quartermaster as far as rentals, leases, and utilities; and then the next thing which was transferred, and we got orders on this transfer I think just before the war—I may have had my chronology or my time a little bit wrong here, but just before the war we got orders to take over all other Constructing Quartermaster's contracts. There was a lot of them going on. There was a big housing program for the increase in the antiaircraft garrison. There were several permanent projects under construction; two great big barracks at Fort Shafter, I remember. And when that turnover occurred the war
came along then and of course added to the difficulties of transferring these things from the Quartermasters over to the Engineers.

Certain types of projects were stopped. We stopped all of the permanent type of construction and continued the temporary types of construction; and on the termination of contracts the work of certain of these old Constructing Quartermaster contractors was just stopped. The other work, in order to— [1305] well, I don't know why it was done, but anyway the other temporary type of work was eventually closed out under the contracts which had previously been in force, and some of it was picked up by the Hawaiian Constructors. I do not think, sir, that it was a question of actually transferring a job from the Quartermaster contractor over to these Hawaiian Constructors. As I recall the thing, we stopped practically all of them, and they were all stopped for about, oh, I would say anywhere from two to three months, and then the picture clarified. We went back and picked up some of them again, see; so when they picked them up the Hawaiian Constructors picked them up rather than the old Quartermaster contractors.

201. General Frank. All right.

202. General Grunert. When the District Engineer was placed under the Department Engineer as of December 7, was that part of the approved war plan, that that would be done in time of war?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. That was in the Engineer Plan; I don't know whether the Mobilization Plan or the Hawaiian Department Defense Project.

203. General Grunert. I see. For all purposes except those determined by law, which required a decision in Washington and which was made a directive after the war started?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir; made about March 1942. Later than that: about March or April.

204. General Grunert. Then, even if the Department Commander was merely concerned about construction projects during the [1306] imminence of war, that could not have been done except by Washington?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir; it would have required War Department approval, sir.

205. General Grunert. Had that approval been requested?

Colonel Fleming. No, sir. I am sure I would have known had it been requested. It had not been requested.

206. General Frank. Now, there was something brought out about the general knowledge of Colonel Wyman's constant and intimate association with Mr. Rohl over a period of years.

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.

207. General Frank. You knew about that?

Colonel Fleming. I didn't know about it, sir, until after the war occurred. I never met Mr. Rohl before the war. I went back afterward and talked to my friend Colonel Robinson down there; and just chewing—well, just gossiping the way people will, I then found out that this Rohl-Connolly Corporation I think is a Los Angeles corporation.

208. General Frank. Yes.

Colonel Fleming. And apparently there had been plenty of relationships between Mr. Rohl and Colonel Wyman when Wyman was the District Engineer in Los Angeles, but when I was in Los An-
geles with General Connolly we had no relationship with the district office other than furnishing them relief labor. They were our biggest customer actually for the employment of labor in the Los Angeles metropolitan area.

209. General Frank. Well, you had known of this personal association from the time that you had been in Southern California with Connolly?

[1307] Colonel Fleming. Not with Mr. Rohl, sir.

210. General Frank. You didn't?

Colonel Fleming. Not with Mr. Rohl as an individual, sir. I think I said a little while ago that I had personal knowledge that in my opinion Colonel Wyman associated too much with contractors.

211. General Frank. Oh, yes.

Colonel Fleming. I didn't intend to convey the impression that I knew about any relationship with Mr. Rohl and Colonel Wyman prior to that time.

212. General Frank. After December 7th was there any talk or discussion about the association of Wyman and Rohl?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir, there was plenty of—

213. General Frank. Did you have something further to say?

Colonel Fleming. I was just going to explain that statement, sir.


Colonel Fleming. There was plenty of talk about it, sir. That is when I first got to know Mr. Rohl. As I said, the first time I knew anything about Mr. Rohl was when I was getting in that airplane priority, trying to, out of the Navy. But there was a lot of discussion, and I think that was one of the reasons why General Emmons finally decided—when this unification of the Engineer setup was made, why, he finally decided to request Colonel Wyman’s relief.

215. General Frank. Was there any curiosity or wonderment as to why higher authority allowed this intimate association of Rohl and Wyman to continue?

Colonel Fleming. I don’t think so, sir. Rohl was not a [1308] well known figure in Hawaii until after the war started. As I said, there was this investigation of the Pleasanton Hotel business, for example. Well, that brought out a lot. That made General Emmons rather concerned about the whole situation, to put it mildly; and later on there was the incident of the famous yacht VEGA, and about that time I think that—I don’t believe that General Emmons ever wrote to the War Department asking for Wyman’s relief, but I know that he talked it over with Lyman and that Lyman wrote a personal letter to the Chief of Engineer’s Office stating that General Emmons considered Wyman to be no longer officially welcome, and suggesting they get him out. He was relieved on that then, and that all happened just about the time this unification business came down.

216. General Frank. What do you know about the VEGA?

Colonel Fleming. I was introduced to the VEGA very sharply and abruptly, sir. There is another VEGA. To make my story clear in this thing, there are two ships called the VEGA. One of them is this yacht, and the other VEGA is a Navy supply ship called—well, like the SIRIUS and that crowd, we had it over there in Hawaii before the war.

217. General Frank. I would like to know about this yacht.
Colonel Fleming. The yacht VEGA? Well, I never heard of the yacht VEGA until suddenly General Emmons called me in one day and wanted to know what I knew about the VEGA, and I told him the VEGA just arrived in the last convoy and it was towing over a dredge that belonged to us, and the General told me that maybe I had better go down and look at the VEGA. So I went down [1309] and took a look at the VEGA and it was this yacht. It was about a 75- or 80-foot yacht, sailboat.

Well, I had seen the names on the convoy list, and I used to keep General Emmons advised as to what was coming in in the convoy, and this thing was in a very slow convoy, a 4-knot convoy, and we had been having arrangement with the Navy to get a dredge towed over from San Francisco or San Diego or some place like that, and the Navy had been planning on towing this dredge with their boat, the VEGA, which is a supply ship. When I saw the name of the VEGA in the convoy list it never occurred to me to investigate what the VEGA was; I thought it was this supply ship.

Well, apparently at that time we had not completed but at least opened for traffic this southern route of airways. Those things all ran down from Hawaii here, or rather Oahu—the Island of Christmas on this may would be right up in here (indicating)—to Christmas and Palmyra. The next jump down was to Canton here, then down to Nandi and Suva, which is right there (indicating) : New Caledonia. Our field in Australia was at Townsville. We had finished that thing, but there was a rather defensive attitude in the whole Pacific at this particular time, and they were afraid particularly that the field at Canton would be knocked out and the one at Fiji would be taken out. So they wanted to get a still further south air route which would be farther away from the Jap bases, and the only way of doing that—the map is not complete, but south of Christmas there is another island called Penrhyn, and another south of that called Aitutaki, and by going a jump [1310] to those two we could then jump from there down to Tonga and into New Zealand and into Australia that way. That was the southern and easternmost airline.

They wanted somebody to go down and make a survey of this particular route. Apparently Colonel Wyman had decided he needed a boat for it, and the boat that they selected to bring over to Hawaii to make this survey, for the survey party, and put them on, was this yacht VEGA.

Now, the VEGA didn’t officially belong to Mr. Rohl; it belonged to Mrs. Rohl. It was registered in her name. And it came over in this convoy, this 4-knot convoy, and suddenly appeared in Honolulu, and I don’t think General Emmons knew anything about it. Nobody had said anything to him about it. I didn’t know the thing was coming over. As a matter of fact, I didn’t know it until General Emmons chased me down to look at this VEGA that was supposed to be towing over a dredge, and here it was this 80- or 100-foot yacht.

Well, the deal on the thing was that Mrs. Rohl would rent that to the Hawaiian Constructors for one dollar per year, and the Hawaiian Constructors would then hire the crew and pay the insurance and pay the operating expense, of course all this expense being reimbursable by the Government because all of their expenses were reimbursable by the Government on this cost-plus-fixed-fee contract; and
the Hawaiian Constructors in turn would rent this boat to the Government for this tour around these islands, Penrhyn and Aitutaki and down in through that area.

When General Emmons found out about that he was really irate, and not only ordered the contract or agreement with the Hawaiian Constructors for the yacht be terminated but ordered that it be sent back to the mainland by the next available convoy, and refused to authorize any of the expenses for it, and the yacht left about—well, I think it was over there for about two weeks, sir, tied up at one of the piers in Honolulu. It was that yacht incident and a few other things that I had in mind when I said there had been quite a bit of discussion about the relationships.

218. General Frank. Was the yacht ever used?
Colonel Fleming. No, sir.

219. General Frank. Did they every have any parties on the yacht?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir; I think they had several parties on the yacht. I never went to them.

220. General Frank. Who had the parties?
Colonel Fleming. I think Mr. Rohl had them, sir.

221. General Frank. What was the cargo when it came over?
Colonel Fleming. Well, it had quite a lot of stuff on it, sir. There were several cases of liquor aboard.

222. General Frank. Had a good cargo of liquor?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.

223. General Frank. Was that part of the stocking of the boat or was that a consignment? Do you know?
Colonel Fleming. It wasn't consigned to anybody, sir; it was just—it wasn't stocking for the boat, no, sir. I never saw the boat unloaded, but from what I hear they had cases of liquor in about every available place they could stick it on the boat. I don't know how much there was, but there was a considerable amount of liquor came in on that ship, and it wasn't a cargo vessel, sir.

[1312]

224. General Frank. I know.
Colonel Fleming. It was purely a pleasure vessel. As I get the story all the staterooms were filled with the stuff, and every place they could stick it on board.

225. General Frank. Have you anything else that concerns the operations of the Hawaiian Constructors, Colonel Wyman's operations and behavior, or anything about Rohl that you can state to the Board that has not been brought out?
Colonel Fleming. I would like to bring out the fact that I don't think that that contract when it was entered into, the Hawaiian Constructors' contract, was ever approved or referred to the military people over in Hawaii. I think that was an arrangement directly between the Engineer in Hawaii, going right back to Engineer Department channels, and was approved in the Chief of Engineer's Office.

226. General Grunert. You mean the basic contract?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. Now, the War Department ordered, on all of these cost-plus-fixed-fee contracts, a running inspection by an Inspector General, and I remember that the Hawaiian Department was ordered to put an Inspector General on the routine checking and—well, you couldn't call it an audit, but it was a routine check of that contract, and we had one officer specially detailed in
our Inspector General's Department before the war for that purpose. To the best of my knowledge I don't believe that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department had anything officially to do with the operation of that contract until after the Engineer channels were completely eliminated and the whole thing was put under his command, because I remember after that time these change orders used to come up and we would have to analyze those, the change orders and the additions, eliminations, and things like that, in the contract.

227. General Frank. Was there any inspection, either from the Division Engineer's Office or from the Chief of Engineer's Office here in Washington, of the activities of the District Engineer in Honolulu?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.

228. General Frank. Who made those?

Colonel Fleming. General Hannum, sir—Warren T. Hannum—was the division engineer in San Francisco, and I know that General Hannum was over in Hawaii several times before the war started.

229. General Frank. Did anybody from Washington ever come out to look over the activities?

Colonel Fleming. I don't remember, sir. There may have been, but I really don't remember.

230. General Frank. After the Department Commander took over the control of the district engineers, did that result in considerably closer supervision and a general tightening up on the activities?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. That resulted, as you say, in closer control and tightening up; and also, you might say, as a development of time, there had grown up this feeling among several of us who had anything to do with it, that that contract should have been terminated. The actual termination work on the contract was started by Colonel Lyman after Wyman's relief and return to the mainland. For instance, they cut out more and more their work on the small jobs and started to do those by force-account directly. The big jobs were not terminated, however, and the contractors were still on that. Lyman was working along this line, when he died very suddenly. He died; I don't remember whether it was in August or September, 1942. He had just been nominated to be BG, and it was announced—he was a Hawaiian, of course; he was born in the Island of Hawaii—and he went down to Hawaii on a Friday on an inspection trip, and this thing was published while he was down at his "old hometown" island. Well, of course it was quite a celebration. He had had a pretty bad heart, anyway. He came back and died Sunday night or Monday morning, I don't know which; so he was starting on that at the time of his death.

231. General Frank. Who was Wyman's successor, when he left?

Colonel Fleming. Wyman's successor was Lyman, sir.

232. General Frank. Oh, Lyman took over?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. They just abolished, sir, the district engineer, completely, and General Emmons cut Lyman in on the whole works, and so Lyman went down there and started running that contract.

233. General Gruner. They did the same thing they did in the Philippines, where the Department engineer was the officer and the district engineer.
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. And Lyman, as I say, was put right in the middle of this thing. General Kramer came over, some time after that, and Kramer finally closed out those contracts, oh, I think about—he got there and got onto his job and onto the details of it very hurriedly, and they were closed out either late in 1942 or early in 1943, sir.

234. General Frank. Do you know what were the regulations about bringing liquor into Hawaii?

Colonel Fleming. I do not know that there were any regulations about bringing it in, sir.

235. General Frank. You do not know?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. I know I don't think there were any regulations about bringing it in. Hawaii was being run by the Military Governor. We didn't have anything such as import requirements, or anything like that. There was an office set up under the Military Governor. They called it, down there, the "Division of Priorities and Planning," I think, and it was run by an Army officer, and he had the job of determining. From the Hawaiian Department we allotted tonnage. We worked under a system of allocations, and figured out, and got word from San Francisco, how much tonnage was going to be available for the next succeeding month, or their best "horseback estimate" of that. We then allocated to the various supply branches the amount of tonnage that they could have coming over there, and also allocated to the civilians what amount they could have. The loading, back in San Francisco, was then controlled by the allocations which we made. The civilian allocations were controlled, the sub-allotments were controlled by this Division of Planning and Priorities, under the office of the Military Governor, and he issued the actual shipping permits.

236. General Grunert. Who was the Military Governor?

Colonel Fleming. General Emmons was the Military Governor. General Emmons' organization over there, sir, after he got there, he had a "three-cornered hat." He was the Office of Military Governor, and General Green was the executive down there. He was also the Tactical Commander, and he had a command post there, where the Chief of Staff was located, and then he was the Administrative and Base Commander for the Hawaiian Department, and that was run as what we called a "rear echelon department headquarters," and G-4, and G-1 section was back there; and the other people were up in this tunnel; and General Emmons as an individual headed each one of those sections; but there wasn't a close—the tactical side of the [1317] picture knew nothing at all about the Military Governor's picture, and he didn't have an awful lot to do with us, back in the supply end of Supply and Construction.

237. General Grunert. How do you suppose, if it was handled on a tonnage basis, and if it was not authorized by a priority, that liquor was put aboard the VEGA and brought over to Hawaii?

Colonel Fleming. Because the priority, sir, only applied to ships which were loaded under the supervision of the General commanding the port of embarkation. That is why I said I knew particularly there was no prohibition against bringing or shipping liquor in. I don't think they violated any law by bringing it in, because the tonnage wasn't under our control. However, there were no other imports of
liquor into the Department at that time, except what the Navy was bringing over.

238. General Frank. All right.

239. General Grunert. General Russell, have you some questions?

240. General Russell. Assuming, Colonel, that it had been desired to concentrate on the completion of these Air Warning Service stations, what would have been necessary, to have gotten additional people to work on them?

241. General Frank. Would additional people have expedited it, or would it have required something else?

Colonel Fleming. Not on those three projects—the ones you have been talking about. I do not think additional people would have expedited it.

242. General Russell. I will enlarge the question, then. What would have expedited work on those stations?

Colonel Fleming. Faster work on the design of that cable, in the erection of it. We couldn't do anything at the top of the mountain, sir, until we got the cable.

243. General Russell. Is it true or not, Colonel, that after these three permanent stations that had been selected, and which you described in considerable detail, had been completed, it was discovered that all three were impracticable as radar stations?

Colonel Fleming. No, sir. We discovered that one of them was impractical. That was the one at Haleakala. To the best of my knowledge, when I left there that was the only place that they had actually tested the equipment in, and discarded it; and on the basis of the results at Haleakala, the Air Force, who at that time had taken over the radar system, decided they did not want them to do the same monkeying around with a station on Mt. Kaala. However, a station at Kokee was put into operation and always operated, and they never had any trouble with that.

244. General Russell. Now, I wanted to get some dates in connection with this Lyman-Wyman feud, if I could. Wyman was under Lyman, so long as Wyman was in the Hawaiian Department, under Department command?

Colonel Fleming. No, sir; no, sir. Wyman came over to Hawaii, to the best of my knowledge, about in November 1939. He went out to the regiment at Schofield Barracks and served out there.

245. General Frank. Commanded by whom?

Colonel Fleming. Commanded by Colonel Hodges. Colonel Lyman came over to relieve Hodges in July 1940. That is when we were betting how long the relationship would continue. I think then that Wyman went down to take over the district down in Honolulu about in November 1940. So he was probably under Lyman's command, oh, for possibly three months, out at Schofield barracks. Then, when he went down to be the district engineer, Colonel Lyman had no more to do with him officially—I mean he wasn't under his command; they were in a cooperating relationship—up until December 7; and after the declaration of war, then, by just issuing an order putting the war plan into effect, Wyman then became a subordinate to Lyman again.
246. General Russell. But all of this time you were in the Hawaiian Department, and you and Lyman had substantially the same relation to Wyman?

Colonel Fleming. I do not understand your question, sir.

247. General Russell. And during all that time, you were representing the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department in the supervision of construction, there, to the extent that he could supervise it, and you and Lyman therefore had substantially the same relation toward Wyman; that is, just a cooperative relationship?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. My relationship with Wyman was not the same as Lyman’s relationship to Wyman, because, while ostensibly up until August 1941 I was the Assistant Department Engineer, and supposed to be working for Colonel Lyman, actually I did all my work directly for the Commanding General of the Department. That was both for General Herron and General Short, and it continued.

248. General Russell. General Short and General Herron relied on you for their contacts with Wyman much more than they relied on Lyman, is that right?

Colonel Fleming. On the detail of the contracts? Yes, sir; [1320] because Lyman wasn’t at the headquarters daily, I know, until after I got relieved from the Engineer Office in August 1941.

249. General Russell. Now, I think General Grunert asked some question a little while ago about whether or not the Hawaiian Commander made a request to have the district engineer placed under his control, prior to December 7, 1941.

Colonel Fleming. I am sure he did not, sir.

250. General Russell. Do you know whether any such relationship as that existed in the Army before December 7, 1941?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir; it did. There was one place only, and that was in the Philippine Department of the foreign service departments, at that time. We had the three—Panama, Hawaii, and the Philippines. In Panama there was no district engineer. The engineers ran the Panama Canal. The Governor of the Panama Canal was the engineer officer. The Governor of the Panama Canal and the engineer for maintenance down there were not under the control of the Commanding General of the Panama Department, until there was some slight difference developed, there. I don’t remember when it was. I wasn’t in Panama, although I remember some talk about it. In the Philippines, there was no river-and-harbor work under the American Government. There was some being done under the Philippine Government, and we had engineer officers over there who had been loaned to the Philippine Government. One of them was General Clay, who is now over here in the Service Forces; and General Casey went out to the Philippines to replace General Clay, I think, shortly before the war; but those were loans to the Philippine Government.

The only work that was in the Philippine Department, [1321] by the Federal Government, all our work for which the engineers were responsible, by statute or law or Army regulations, was the maintenance and repair and construction of fortifications; so there was no district engineer over there. The Department engineer was representing not only the Commanding General but also the Chief of Engineers in the discharge of it.
In Hawaii we had a district engineer's office. We were different from the other two.

251. General Russell. Was that because of the difference in the character of the work to be done there?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir; there had always been, since Honolulu was one of our major American ports, there had always been a district, a river-and-harbor district, in Honolulu; at least back since the last war, at any rate.

252. General Frank. In other words, the organization there was just the same as if it had been a part of the mainland of the United States?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. The organization was exactly the same as if it had been San Francisco, sir, with the Department Headquarters sitting at the Presidio, and the district engineer for San Francisco, doing cooperative work for him, but not under the command of the General.

253. General Russell. And that maintenance of a separate engineering office, under a division engineer, was dictated by the character of the work that was to be done?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. It was the result of parallelizing the organization over there which had been in existence on the mainland.

254. General Grunert. However, most of these contracts that [1322] we had been speaking about during 1941 were defense contracts, in which the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department was most definitely concerned, and it might have been expedient or desirable on his part to have more of a direct control over the district engineer?

Colonel Fleming. It might have been; yes, sir.

255. General Russell. In your contacts with the Department Commander out there, did you tell him that the delays were occurring in that construction work because of this feud between Lyman and Wyman?

Colonel Fleming. I think I did.

256. General Russell. Did you not testify in answer to a question by General Frank that no delays were occurring on that account?

Colonel Fleming. I testified to General Frank, sir, that I don't think any delays were occurring in the prosecution of the work. I may misunderstand your question to me. I undoubtedly discussed the thing with General Short and told him that we were having a lot of trouble on account of this feud.

257. General Russell. That was about when, that you and Short were talking?

Colonel Fleming. I would say somewhere between, oh, the 1st of November and the beginning of the war, sir, because it was after the development of this ferry project, this southern airways route over to the Philippines.

58. General Russell. You had not discussed the interference with the work, if any existed, because of the Lyman and Wyman feud, prior to November 1, 1941, with General Short?

Colonel Fleming. I don't think so, sir.

[1323] 259. General Russell. You were his representative, were you, not, in supervising the details of construction?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir; I think I was.
260. General Russell. You thought no situation had arisen, prior to November 1, 1941, therefore, which required your going to General Short about it?

Colonel Fleming. No, sir; because up to that time Colonel Lyman had not been down there, sir. You see, I had been running the engineer office, sitting right at Fort Shafter, since July 1, 1939. I was not pulled out of that office and placed on the General Staff, until, I would say, about August 1941. About that time, in August 1941, that is when Colonel Lyman started coming down there more.

261. General Grunert. From where?

Colonel Fleming. From Schofield barracks, sir. He maintained his residence at Schofield barracks, and continued in command of the Third Engineers. He still had a dual assignment. He was the division engineer, out there, and lived out there. Now, there was an officer came over and replaced me in the engineer office. Obviously, so much of this work depended upon knowing who said what, to whom, some time ago; so when I went up on this station, although my position changed, and my title changed, I was still doing essentially the same kind of work, and instead of going into the G-4 office, where I think—I don't know what General Short intended on this thing—at least that is where I was assigned—I never did any G-4 work at all. I kept tied up with the special stuff.

Now, it took between about August and, I say the date was November—it may have been in October somewhere, along in there—[1324] for Colonel Lyman to come down and start picking up. It took him about that long to get onto all this background stuff, and also for the thing to develop to the point where, instead of cooperating like this, they were now swinging around, and this fuel was coming around in its infancy.

262. General Russell. That was some time in October or November, 1941?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. I remember we had the discussion. General Short and I had a discussion, when he asked me frankly what my opinion of the two of them was, and the only way I can date it now, sir, is by knowing it was some time after we started building that air route. We got the directive to build that air route to the South Pacific. Up to that time, I went in to see General Short only when the Chief of Staff told me to go in and take a paper in to be signed. After that time, I don't know, I guess I was up there.

263. General Russell. You talked about this man Grafe.

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.

264. General Russell. He dominated the situation out there until Rohl came out?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.

265. General Russell. What was your impression of that man as an executive of the contracting group?

Colonel Fleming. I don't know enough about him officially to have an opinion of him as an engineer.

266. General Russell. I was not talking particularly about his technical ability, but about his ability to get work done, as an executive. Was he a strong man, or a weak man? How did he impress you?
[1325] Colonel Fleming. My impression, there, sir, would be, I would say, negative.

267. General Russell. That he was of the negative type?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. I don't think he was particularly a strong man. I don't know enough about him to say, as an individual, but just from meeting him at these casual parties. I don't think he was a man that would get up and hammer on the desk, and stuff like that.

268. General Russell. He was entirely different from Rohl and Wyman—very cool?

Colonel Fleming. He was entirely different from Wyman. Rohl, I think, was very positive, but Rohl was never brusque. He was never rude.

269. General Russell. This contract grew considerably, and much work was being done under it, after December 7, that was not contemplated when the basic contract was signed in December 1940, isn't that true, Colonel?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.

270. General Russell. Did those people continue to operate on this fixed-fee basis afterwards?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir; but their fee was reduced.

271. General Russell. Where was the contract on the fees made—out there, or here in Washington?

Colonel Fleming. The initial fee, sir, was made here in Washington, or wherever it was, whatever channel it went through. After the termination of that engineer department or engineer channel relationship between the district engineer, out there, and the chief of engineers, in Washington, then all the changes in that contract began coming through the Department [1326]. Commander, through command channels; and every time an addition or a change order or something like that was made in this particular contract, which increased the total value of the work to be done, or estimated value of the work to be done, then there had to be a readjudication of the fee to be paid, and that fee was on a sliding scale—the more of the work, the less the percent.

272. General Russell. To one of General Frank's questions, the effect of which question was,

Did you think that Wyman was influenced by Rohl?

as I recall, you began to answer that question in substantially this language:

I don't think that Colonel Wyman was influenced by Rohl.

You hesitated, and another question on another subject was answered, and I am not sure that that full answer has been gotten into the record. Now, what is your impression of the influencing of Wyman by Rohl?

Colonel Fleming. I do not have any direct knowledge of the relationships between Wyman and Rohl. I started to answer General Frank's question. I think it was a question with a connotation as to whether that influence had resulted in any delay, sir. I can answer it that way. I do not think that the relationship between Wyman and Rohl resulted specifically, or that as a result of that specific thing, there were delays in that contract, in the prosecution of the work.

In the other question, I think somebody asked me what my general
opinion of that relationship was. I can say this, that I do not believe that that relationship ever should have existed. I do not think it was the kind of relationship that a [1327] contracting officer should have with a contractor.

273. General Russell. That is all.

274. General Grunert. In your position, representing the Department Commander, you could just cooperate and coordinate, but you could not direct; is that right?

Colonel Fleming. That is correct; yes, sir.

275. General Grunert. You were really a liaison officer, to find out what was going on, and you could not tell them what to do, even if you found out something was not going according to the Department Commander’s wishes?

Colonel Fleming. I could report that to the Department Commander, sir.

276. General Grunert. Were there any such times that you found out things were being delayed or not pushed, that you did make such reports to the Department Commander?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.

277. General Grunert. Do you remember any particular occasion, any particular type of work, or any particular work order?

Colonel Fleming. No, sir; I don’t remember the particulars. I remember one thing, I got involved in an argument with the district engineer’s office on the design of some fortification structures, on which I did not agree with their design.

278. General Grunert. Were there any occasions where you had to make such a report to him regarding the installations pertaining to the Air Warning Service?

Colonel Fleming. About delays in the district engineer’s office, sir?

279. General Grunert. Delays in construction, so as to get that Air Warning Service in shape to operate?

[1328] Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir; I think there were. There were some cases undoubtedly in there, which I reported. The one thing I do remember as a specific instance, sir, was the question of that road. I still maintain that the road they built from that Kolekole road around the firebreak, there, was a highway with banked curves and a grade limited to 4 percent, and we didn’t need anything like that. The rate that the stuff could be delivered by the cable way, as long as it worked on that trail, there, we could have hauled it up there. The specifications on that road were entirely much more refined than the job required.

[1329] 280. General Grunert. Did General Short give you any particular instructions which evidenced his concern about the slowness in getting that construction work that pertained to the Air Warning Service done and getting the system started?

Colonel Fleming. Specifically, I do not remember the General ever having mentioned that particular project, sir. I do know that we kept for him and he used to look through in detail a series of charts which showed the exact status of all these projects as closely as we could find out.

281. General Grunert. All those construction projects had to do with defense. Did General Short ever discuss with you anything to
the effect that “We have got to get these things completed; the international situation is tightening up”?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.

282. General Grunert. What did you then attempt to do to expedite these things?

Colonel Fleming. I used to run the inspections. That is why I used to be down at the District Engineer’s Office four or five times a week.

283. General Grunert. Did these people work every day? Did they work Sundays?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.

284. General Grunert. And at nights?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.

285. General Grunert. Did they have double shifts in order to try to get these things completed?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir; most of them. We had double-shift work, and finally pushed it into three-shift work.

[1330] 286. General Grunert. This was prior to December 7?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. Construction work at night on a thing like that is very inefficient, unless you have all the lights in the world; and we did not. I can tell you this, sir, that as far as being emphatic in speeding some of these things up, I think that that was General Short’s main interest over there.

287. General Grunert. And then, when things were not apparently speeded up, what action did he take?

Colonel Fleming. He used to call on Colonel Wyman.

288. General Grunert. And then what?

Colonel Fleming. He usually got action.

289. General Grunert. The action that was gotten was satisfactory to General Short and, in your opinion from an engineer’s viewpoint, was satisfactory as to progress?

Colonel Fleming. We are talking about this particular project, sir?

290. General Grunert. I am talking primarily about the defense construction, particularly the air warning service construction, prior to December 7.

Colonel Fleming. Particularly the air warning service?


Colonel Fleming. The air warning system has received a lot of publicity lately in the papers; but that project was only one of the very small things we were doing over there. Certainly General Short never mentioned it to me, and I don’t recall his having called me in and saying anything about this particular thing, without at the same time bringing in another project, because, coupled with the air warning system [1331] was also the development of other defense projects in the Islands. The main one was the development of airfields, sir. At the beginning of the war there was only one airfield in the entire Hawaiian Department from which a bombardment plane could operate. That was also true on the day of December 7th. There was only one runway in the entire Department from which a B-17 could take off, and that was at Hickam Field. On the afternoon of Thursday, following December 7, whatever date that may be, they had a 5,000-foot runway at Bellows Field, on a field which was never authorized or approved by the War Department.
292. General GRUNERT. When was that started?
Colonel FLEMING. That was started long before the war, sir. In
August, I would say, 1940.
293. General GRUNERT. It appears that as far as the rapidity of
construction work on defense projects was concerned, they did a great
deal more in less time after December 7 than they did before. Is that
your experience?
Colonel FLEMING. No, sir.
294. General GRUNERT. It is not?
Colonel FLEMING. No, sir. I think they did a lot more before De-

cember 7th. They caught up some places after December 7th.
295. General GRUNERT. In the record somewhere we have had testi-
mony, or intimation at least, that there were changes made. For in-
stance, somebody said something about the tearing up of runways and
their relocation elsewhere, which caused delay. Do you recall any-
thing of that sort?
Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.
296. General GRUNERT. How did that come about?
[1332] Colonel FLEMING. I would like, before answering that
question, to expand somewhat on my preceding answer.
297. General GRUNERT. If it is pertinent to the issue. We do not
want to learn all that you know about the Engineers in the Hawaiian
Department in the last two or three years. But if it is pertinent to
the question I asked you, you may proceed.
Colonel FLEMING. I would like to state this: You asked me if
General Short had ever been satisfied with the progress that had
been made, and I asked you if you referred specifically to this par-
ticular project.
298. General GRUNERT. I referred more to the progress of the
work.
Colonel FLEMING. I do not think that General Short ever was satis-
ified with the progress that was being made. He was continually push-
ing all the time on those projects. I would also like to state, sir, as
far as this particular project that we have been talking about is con-
cerned, the aircraft warning project, that I do not remember his having
singled that particular one out. He was always on me about all the
work, the airfields, and that matter, and various other jobs we had.
299. General GRUNERT. Was he on the neck of the War Department
where help could be obtained from this end?
Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. We wrote letter after letter from the
Hawaiian Department trying to get approval of the project for addi-
tional airfields. We were told time and time again that we would
get money appropriated for ten additional airfields in the Hawaiian
Department.
[1333] 300. General GRUNERT. When you did not get quick ac-
tion by letter, did you cable and radio?
Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. We telegraphed. They kept promising
that it would be in the supply bill.
301. General GRUNERT. Is there any record of those communica-
tions and those radiograms?
Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. There are records in the Hawaiian
Department.
302. General Grunert. They ought to be available in the Hawaiian Department?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.

303. General Grunert. Now, we go back to the question of the intimation we have had to the effect that runways were built and then they would tear them up and start another. Do you have any information on that?

[1334] Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. That actually happened in an airfield up at Mokuleia. The day that General Emmons arrived there, sir, we took him out—he was interested in airfields, and we took him out and said, “Here is a swell place to build an airfield.” He said, “All right. Go to work.” So we started it. We built it in an awful hurry. After it was built it was found that the drainage conditions through there (indicating on map) were very bad. They actually used it for three months before the drainage started interfering with it.

304. General Grunert. That was used after December 7th?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.

305. General Grunert. How about prior to December 7th?

Colonel Fleming. Prior to December 7 the only airfield we had started on, we did not have any funds for. General Short started to build this at Bellows Field. It is located right here (indicating on map). We improved it without any War Department approval. That is why I say that the only runway, the second runway in the Department, that could be utilized had been started prior to December 7 and was ready five days afterward.

306. General Grunert. The intimation is that somebody did not use good judgment in doing this and it was all love's labor lost, and they had to tear it up and start somewhere else, as if somebody was doing that so as to cause intentional delay. Do you know anything about that?

Colonel Fleming. I do not know of any such instance. The only runway that we were working on before the war, to the best of my knowledge, was this one right here (indicating) at Bellows Field. We were also doing a little work down at South Cape.

[1335] 307. General Grunert. You stated that delays were due to labor?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.

308. General Grunert. How could such delays due to labor be avoided? Could they have used engineer troops in lieu of other labor, because of the shortage of labor?

Colonel Fleming. We were using all the engineer troops we had available, sir. We had written to the War Department and asked them to send over additional engineer troops, because it was our opinion that in training the Army back on the mainland they would go through and just get training, but over in Hawaii we could actually use them on work projects.

309. General Grunert. You asked for them. Did you get them or did you not?

Colonel Fleming. We got one battalion of aviation engineers.

310. General Grunert. Let us take it seriatim. With reference to materials, who obtained materials? Who was responsible for getting materials? Was the District Engineer responsible for that?
Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir. The District Engineer bought those materials through this cost-plus-a-fixed-fee contract. The Procurement Office was operated in San Francisco, and I believe it was operated by the Division Engineer’s office.

311. General Grunert. Did the Division Engineer, so far as you know, use due diligence in going after materials and pushing to try to get them?

Colonel Fleming. I think he did; yes, sir.

312. General Grunert. Do you think we could get more information on that subject from the Division Engineer’s office in San Francisco?

[1336] Colonel Fleming. I think you will have access to the files, sir, showing constant telephone calls and radiograms.

313. General Grunert. As to transportation, who was responsible for shipping delays, if there were any? Who handled that matter? Where was it handled—in Washington, San Francisco, or where?

Colonel Fleming. I think that was handled through the Division Engineer’s office in San Francisco, arranging for space on any kind of vessel he could get.

314. General Grunert. Then we can get more detailed information from the Division Engineer’s office in San Francisco?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.

315. General Grunert. Now, as to priorities. Who prescribed the priorities and who could change them?

Colonel Fleming. I meant by priorities the old system of priorities that the Office of Production Management had.

316. General Grunert. They prescribed them, and you got them through the Chief of Engineers’ office?

Colonel Fleming. It was a purchase priority. You could get a priority A–1 or A–1–j.

317. General Grunert. If they made any change it had to come through the Chief of Engineers?

Colonel Fleming. We could write up priorities over there. We had a priority assigned to the project. We could then write a purchase order or a purchase certificate, citing the priority number of the project. I blame priorities for some of the delays, because it got the point under O. P. M. that everything became an A–1 priority, and while you could write them you could not buy anything with them.

[1337] 318. General Grunert. Did the government as represented by the District Engineer have to get materials for the contractor, or what was the contractor’s responsibility in getting materials to work with?

Colonel Fleming. Actually, sir, most of the procurement, or a large part of it, was done by Engineer channels. The Engineers would go out and purchase ordinary materials, like cement, asphalt, and stuff like that. The contractor purchased the machinery. Where we had to advertise for bids and give specifications and all that sort of thing he purchased the material, and he would turn around and rent it on a rental-purchase agreement. If they needed a certain piece of machinery for a job, the contractor would get it and rent it to the government on his rental-purchase agreement. Lumber, for example, was bought direct by the government.
319. General Grunert. Where did the delay come in? In what the contractor got or what the government got for the contractor?

Colonel Fleming. The delay came in, on those materials, sir, through the fact that everybody was trying to get materials. Materials were awfully short. For some time, as I recall it, before the war we were constantly in a state of emergency because we were always lending lumber to the natives. The natives would run out of it and borrow from us, and we would run out and borrow it back from the natives, because we could not get it over there fast enough.

320. General Grunert. Do you know anything that would indicate that the contractors as such delayed completion of these projects through their failure in getting materials?

Colonel Fleming. No, sir.

321. General Grunert. You have nothing on that?

Colonel Fleming. No, sir.

[1338] 322. General Grunert. Or as to delay due to approval? That means the approval of those work sheets or job orders under the general contract.

Colonel Fleming. No, sir. You mean, delays in approval by the War Department?

323. General Grunert. Delays in the time it took from the time you sent your requests in to the time they got back.

Colonel Fleming. I am not talking about the contract, sir. I am just saying that there were a lot of things that the people in Hawaii knew should be done, which had been planned for years, and we had been talking about them, and we would never get authority from the War Department to proceed.

May I expand a little on that, sir?

324. General Grunert. Expand, but make it a general expansion.

Colonel Fleming. On the airfield project, we knew we needed a field on the Island of Kauai. On the Island of Oahu we had one runway that could take a bombing plane. That was Hickam Field. But there was so much dirt kicked up that it ruined the motors all the time. We had a field on Molokai, but no gasoline storage. The Municipal-Territorial Airport was a Navy and Army development, and we had no authority to proceed on that. We finally got authority through the Civil Aeronautics Authority. On the Island of Hawaii we had three fields.

325. General Grunert. I understand you had a number of projects; but was it mainly a matter of money?

Colonel Fleming. I think it was mainly, sir, not money, because they were all the time throwing money around. I think it was mainly that Hawaii itself had a low priority compared with the Philippines and Panama, sir.

[1339] 326. General Grunert. For what?

Colonel Fleming. For construction work.

327. General Grunert. This is the first time I have heard—I do not know about the other members of the Board—that Hawaii was not on the highest priority, and that the only thing that was a lower priority as compared with the Philippines was the matter of getting some B-17's ferried across.

Colonel Fleming. I do not know, sir, whether anyone else had a higher priority, but we started work on those 10 airfields, and with all
the money the government was spending we never did get any statement that that money was included and we never got any appropriation. General Short authorized me to go ahead with two projects, on his own authorization, using other money.

328. General GRUNERT. Did he ever put someone in a plane and send him over here and tell him to find out whether the War Department understood the problem, why they could not get action on these things, whether it was a question of money or whether it was a question of understanding what was needed, or not? Or was everybody content with just writing letters?

Colonel FLEMING. I do not know, sir. I was not high enough in the hierarchy to know about that.

329. General GRUNERT. Now I want to open up one or two other subjects.

As to this feud which has been mentioned: Did they delay getting action in the line of approval or in the line of cooperation, or in the line of getting work started? Did it delay progress in the work because of the fact that the Department Engineer and the District Engineer did not like each other?

Colonel FLEMING. I do not think it delayed the work, sir. [1340] I answered General Russell that I thought it made my work actually more difficult.

330. General GRUNERT. You testified something to the effect that Rohl, as head of The Hawaiian Constructors or one of their principal officers, had to approve what The Hawaiian Constructors did, how they pushed the work, or something like that. Do you know of any evidence to the effect that Rohl purposely delayed the prosecution of the work?

Colonel FLEMING. I have no knowledge of it.

331. General GRUNERT. Do you have any suspicion that he did?

Colonel FLEMING. No, sir. I think there was a lot of difficulty in dealing with them, but I do not think there was any delay caused.

332. General GRUNERT. Do you know that a congressional investigation committee intimates in its report that such was the case, that Rohl, through pressure, attempted to delay or did delay defense projects in Hawaii?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes; I know that. I was interviewed by that committee.

333. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not, during your time over there, he did or did not?

Colonel FLEMING. I have no knowledge of whether he did or did not. My opinion is that he did not.

334. General GRUNERT. Were there many changes that were made that would interrupt the progress of a project, for instance, by having to use the machinery or materials on another project?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

335. General GRUNERT. That would cause delay in getting the original project done?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

[1347] 336. General GRUNERT. Who was responsible for such changes?

Colonel FLEMING. I will say, just the run of events, sir. For example, to take one thing: I know there was a lot of publicity about
the Bellows Field paving job. We had a lot of asphalt plants over there to pave the field. The rock supply ran out and we could not get any more rock around there, so we had to open up another quarry some place else, near Wheeler Field. We had a delay while we moved the asphalt plant over to Wheeler Field.

337. General GRUNERT. You spoke of a comparatively long delay where authority from Washington had to be procured in order for you to construct something in connection with a park system. Was that delay material in eventually getting the installation in the place you wanted it?

Colonel FLEMING. No, sir.

338. General GRUNERT. In other words, was there somebody to blame here who prevented the Hawaiian Department from doing something in the defense line that was material to the Pearl Harbor disaster?

Colonel FLEMING. No, sir. The particular place I am talking about, they found that that particular radar set never would work.

339. General GRUNERT. Did they know at the time that the delay took place that it definitely would not work?

Colonel FLEMING. No, sir.

340. General GRUNERT. I am interested in the estimated dates of completion. I find in the record that there is a job order saying that the estimated date of completion will be about six months hence, and that is extended about three months more. What generally, was the reason for those extensions, generally speaking?

Colonel FLEMING. The question of materials was one, sir. Take the Bellows Field runway: We had a joint contract with the rock quarry out there, the Navy and the Army, the Navy developing Kaneohe air base and the Army developing Bellows Field.

341. General GRUNERT. It is quite natural under that sort of a contract and job order to have some delay, is it not?

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir. On another big project for gasoline storage we changed the design.

342. General GRUNERT. Have you ever thought that if you had been District Engineer and had had this construction work to do, you or anyone else of good engineering ability could have done a better job than was done, or a quicker job than was done?

Colonel FLEMING. That is a difficult question to answer, sir.

343. General GRUNERT. It is a matter of opinion. If you answer it yes, I will ask you why.

Colonel FLEMING. I do not have ability as an engineer. I am a very junior officer. I think that if somebody with ability as an engineer had been District Engineer and could have been quick to find out what the military side of the picture had been, I think some of the things might have been speeded up a little bit.

344. General GRUNERT. Here was Wyman, who, from what we can find out, was what was known as a "go-getter" and the Chief of Engineers' office apparently thought highly of his ability to get things done.

Colonel FLEMING. Yes, sir.

345. General GRUNERT. Here he was. Unless there was something that delayed him, why could somebody else do a better job than he did if a better job could be done?
Colonel Fleming. Sir, somebody with equal engineering ability could have at times been more cooperative with other people.

346. General Grunert. Then, in your opinion, it was not his engineering ability; it was his lack of being able to get along with other people?

Colonel Fleming. Yes, sir.

347. General Grunert. That answers my question. Thank you very much. We appreciate your coming.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 12:26 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
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PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD

MONDAY, AUGUST 21, 1944

MUNITIONS BUILDING,
Washington, D. C.

The Board, at 9 a.m., pursuant to recess on Saturday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, President of the Board, presiding.


Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder; Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder; and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General Grunert. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL DURWARD S. WILSON, COMMANDING SOUTHEASTERN SECTOR, EASTERN DEFENSE COMMAND, RALEIGH, N. C.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. General, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.


2. General Grunert. General, the Board is after facts, as to what took place both before and during the Pearl Harbor attack. We hope that because of your assignment in Hawaii in 1941, and during the attack, you may be able to throw some light on the subject.

Just what was your assignment, position, and station, while in Hawaii in 1941?

General Wilson. On October 1, 1941, the Twenty-Fourth Infantry Division was organized, and I took command of that. Prior to that time, in 1941, I had been commanding the Twenty-First Infantry Brigade, and at the time of the Japanese attack, I was in command of the Twenty-Fourth Infantry Division.

3. General Grunert. That was stationed where?

General Wilson. At Schofield Barracks.

4. General Grunert. Was that an independent tactical command, directly under the Department Commander, or was it under someone else?

General Wilson. Directly under the Department Commander, sir.

5. General Grunert. Then you were, as Commanding General of
the Twenty-Fourth Infantry Division, directly under General Short, the Department Commander?

General Wilson. Yes, sir.

6. General Grunert. Were the Commanders of major units—and by “major units” I mean your unit—kept informed of the War Department and Navy Department messages, that you might call warning messages, that came to the Department, from about November 24 to about December 6?

General Wilson. Yes, sir.

7. General Grunert. You were informed of their contents?

General Wilson. I was informed. Now, I cannot state that I was informed of all of them, because I do not know what the Department Commander received, but I distinctly remember, on [1347] about the 29th of November, General Short sent an officer courier out to Schofield Barracks, who orally delivered a message to me.

8. General Grunert. Do you recall that message?

General Wilson. Yes, sir; the purport of it. It was, that information had been received from the War Department that negotiations with the Japanese had reached a deadlock, and that our Government would take no aggressive action; in other words, to use a slang expression, they would “stand pat,” and await whatever action the Japanese took.

9. General Grunert. That was the gist of it? This is the Chief of Staff’s message to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, November 27, 1941. I want you to listen to it carefully, because I am going to ask you questions about it, as to whether or not you knew of the contents of this message, and whether or not this is the message to which the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department probably referred:

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes, with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable, but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnoissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out [1348] so as not, repeat not, to alarm the civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five as far as they pertain to Japan. Limit discussion of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

Is that the gist of what was given to you?

General Wilson. Yes, sir. The message as delivered to me did not cover as many details, as I remember it, as are given there; but the purport was in general as you have indicated, there.

10. General Grunert. Do you recall whether the message said, or whether you were informed, that—

If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act?

General Wilson. I think so, sir. My recollection is that if there was any action taken, they preferred to let Japan commit the first act.

11. General Grunert. And did you know anything about this particular phrase?

This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.
General Wilson. General, I cannot state about that.

12. General GRUNERT. See if this is approximately the idea that was conveyed to you:

The negotiations have practically fallen by the wayside. Now, we just have to sit back and wait, until Japan commits the first overt act.

General Wilson. To wait. In other words, not necessarily that Japan would do it, but that if a hostile act was going to be committed, we were to allow the Japanese to do it first.

13. General GRUNERT. Do you remember whether or not you were directed to take any reconnaissance or any other measures in preparing for the future, as a result of that particular message?

General Wilson. No, sir; not as a result of that particular message; but we had plans that had been formulated in advance of that, and we were working at all times under one of the alerts.

14. General GRUNERT. Do you recall having received, or did the Commanding General of the Department transmit to you, information about a Navy message received on the same day, which was passed to him, in which occurred the phrase—

Consider this dispatch a war warning?

General Wilson. No, sir; I did not receive that information.

15. General GRUNERT. I will read the rest of that Navy dispatch, because I want to find out whether or not the gist of it was transmitted to you, or whether or not it may have been that the information transmitted to you was intended to cover both these messages received. This dispatch of November 27, 1941, from the Navy to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, reads as follows:

Consider this dispatch a war warning. The negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition against either Philippines, Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula, or possibly Borneo, is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46 only. Guam, Samoa, and continental districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Inform naval districts and Army authorities. British to be informed by SPENOVA.

Did you get any information along those lines?

General Wilson. No, sir; information in reference to that message was not furnished to me.

16. General GRUNERT. When was your command alerted as against sabotage? That was the No. 1 alert.

General Wilson. I cannot remember, General, just when that took place. We had been under an alert for some time prior to December 7, and at the time of the Japanese attack, we had been functioning under the sabotage alert, for some time.

17. General GRUNERT. In view of the information you had, did you consider that a sabotage alert covered the ground demanded, or possibly indicated, by the warnings received?

General Wilson. In so far as we were concerned, I felt that it did, because our measures primarily consisted of the guarding of bridges and the patrolling of our sector; and by those means; plus the plan which had been prepared for the defense, we were in a position to
occupy our defensive positions in a very short period of time.

18. General Grunert. What was that short period of time, approximately?

General Wilson. Well, a few hours, sir.

19. General Grunert. And how much of that plan did you carry out during the attack?

General Wilson. Oh, we actually moved into position, just as soon as the Japanese attacked. And I had estimated that with the air patrols—I didn't know what they were, but with the air patrols and the naval inshore and offshore patrols, it would be impossible for the Japanese to make a land attack suddenly; and since our plans had all been perfected and our emplacements actually constructed, on December 7, we had machine-gun emplacements constructed all over the northern sector and the southern sector. We had done that in the period between May and December; so, in so far as our troops were concerned, I felt that with the patrol action we were taking, that was all that was essential.

20. General Grunert. You had nothing to do with the Air?

General Wilson. No.

21. General Grunert. Or with the anti-Air?

General Wilson. No, sir.

(Brief recess.)

22. General Grunert. The Board will come to order.

Then, as I understand you, you were not particularly concerned about any immediate danger because your part in the defense of the Islands, the part of your unit, consisted in taking positions to ward off a surface attack; is that right?

General Wilson. That is right; yes, sir.

23. General Grunert. And therefore an alert position at that time seemed to be all right to you?

General Wilson. Yes, sir.

24. General Grunert. That is, alert position against sabotage at that time seemed to be all right to you?

General Wilson. In other words, General, I personally did not feel that it was necessary for us to go out under Alert 3, which would have been to go out, occupy our positions, and stay constantly in the field. With our patrols and the feeling that in case of a land attack we would most certainly have some warning and we would be able to occupy our positions well ahead of time, I did not feel that it was essential.

25. General Grunert. What was the basis of your expecting warning? Where was it to come from, in what form was it to be, and approximately what time would it take to get it to you?

General Wilson. You mean warning as to a condition, a change in alert? From Department Headquarters, sir?

26. General Grunert. Yes, but you said you felt that you would get that notice.

General Wilson. Yes.

27. General Grunert. Now, did you know of your own knowledge whether or not there was actual distant reconnaissance, whether there was actual information being received from the Navy?

General Wilson. I did not, sir.
28. General Grunert. You did not?
General Wilson. I assumed that it was in effect. I was not informed on it.

29. General Grunert. You assumed that everything was being done, that you would get ample warning from the Department in order to be able to carry out your assigned mission.

General Wilson. That is right; yes, sir.

30. General Grunert. Now, normally what was the status of the ammunition as to your troops, as to its availability, as to what was in the hands of the troops; and if you didn't have enough in the hands of your troops how were you going to get it, to turn out in a hurry?

General Wilson. The infantry ammunition, General, as nearly as I can remember, we had a sufficient amount on hand readily accessible for the troops to take right into the field. The artillery had a limited amount, but I remember distinctly that on December the 7th after we went in the field we continued to haul ammunition. There was no difficulty at all in supply features; that had been arranged so that we could promptly get it. But it takes a considerable period of time to put in an adequate amount of artillery ammunition in field positions.

31. General Grunert. Now, your unit, the 24th Infantry Division, was a triangular division, was it?

General Wilson. That is right; yes, sir.

32. General Grunert. And its component parts consisted of infantry and artillery, and anything else? What calibers of artillery?


33. General Grunert. 105s. You had nothing to do with defense against air except you own local troops?

General Wilson. That is right. We had some 75s also that we used for beach defense.

34. General Grunert. Then, by the time you got to your assigned position could you then have gotten the ammunition from the source it was supposed to come from to the positions in order to fire when you were in position with your artillery?

General Wilson. Initially, yes.

35. General Grunert. Initially.

General Wilson. We would have taken it right out with us. But I mean, to lay in the supply that you would want in defense, you had to continue to haul ammunition. We did actually continue hauling.

36. General Grunert. And you do not think the ammunition situation as far as your division was concerned proved to be acute in any way?

General Wilson. No, sir.

37. General Grunert. Or might have been acute had there been a real surface attack?

General Wilson. Well, General, had the Japanese been able to make a land attack without our knowing a thing until they landed, I still think that we would have been able to meet the situation, but it is entirely possible that—I can't conceive of that situation, though, such a situation happening, their coming in, even with the events as they did happen; I can't conceive of a land attack being made until we knew, without our knowing a thing about it.

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38. General Frank. Did you conceive of this air attack happening?


39. General Grunert. That seemed to be beyond the conception of most everybody.

What is the difference between an air attack and a surface attack, in the line of your getting more advanced notice?

General Wilson. Well, of course, in order to bring troops in, surface troops, it takes ships to bring them in, and they come in more slowly, whereas planes can come in from a distance and make an air raid in a very short period of time.

40. General Grunert. There was no attempt made, was there, during this air raid to land any troops of any kind?

General Wilson. No, sir. It might be interesting in that connection, sir, to state that as soon as we got wind of this attack by the bombing, my Chief of Staff, who got to the command post a few minutes ahead of time—we both, of course, as soon as the attack started, went to the command post, and he immediately gave directions for the troops to move into the field. We didn't wait then for instructions from Department Headquarters. However, instructions from Department Headquarters did come in a very short period of time, that we would go into Alert No. 3, which was an all-out defense.

41. General Grunert. As far as you were concerned, did it make any difference in carrying out your mission or in minimizing the danger to your command whether they had been on Alert 2 or 3?

42. General Grunert. Was your ammunition assigned to your division?

General Wilson. I don't really think so, General.

43. General Grunert. Now, as to whether or not you were kept informed or sufficiently informed, were conferences held by the Commanding General or his Chief of Staff with the principal subordinate commanders wherein they were kept informed of the situation and in turn took measures to meet such situation? In other words, what was the scheme of informing the Commanding Generals of large subordinate units, and how was it done, not this particular time but generally about that time?

General Wilson. I understand, sir. General, it is very difficult for me to remember. I know after Pearl Harbor that there were several conferences of senior commanders at Department Headquarters. I cannot state that conferences of division commanders were not held prior to Pearl Harbor. The best I can state is, at this particular time I cannot remember conferences that were held. In other words, we knew what the alerts were, and there were certain things laid down that we were to carry out during those alerts, and we had quite elaborate maneuvers. We worked constantly from May. Up until May we had no fortifications, infantry fortifications, in Hawaii. General Short started us in in May during the department maneuvers digging in, and we continued that right up to December the 7th and of course after that added to it. So that at the time of the attack infantry machine gun emplacements and other type automatic weapon emplacements were actually constructed. We had no money to do it with. We went to the salvage yards and got all the material we
could, but we actually had them, and General Short personally made
inspection of them, and I have talked to General Short, but I cannot
remember specifically conferences that were held. But I do remember
this officer courier coming out to see me personally in the evening on
about the 27th, 28th, or 29th: I cannot remember the exact date.
44. General GRUNERT. Well, the fact that an officer courier came
out to you to convey this message to you would sort of indicate that
you had not attended a conference on that subject, would it not?
General Wilson. Oh, I am sure we didn’t have any conference in
reference to this message. No, sir, we did not. The information I
gained was, just as I indicated, through an officer courier who gave
it to me by word of mouth.
45. General GRUNERT. Then, you were not in on any discussion as
to whether to take Alert 1, 2, or 3, or what?
General Wilson. No, sir. That was decided by the Department
Commander.
46. General GRUNERT. Were you in on any discussions as to the
adequacy of the plans or the S. O. P. that they put out, or did you get
the thing as an accomplished fact without having been consulted about
the terms of plans and S. O. P.s?
General Wilson. No, not in reference to the S. O. P.s. I have talked
to General Short about the plans, because at the time the northern
sector, for which I was responsible, was in my opinion very, very weak,
and I used to talk to General Short about it. I talked to him about it
at times, and he said that [1358] he realized it but the troops
were just not available. Our regiments were under strength, and some
had to be held in central reserve.
47. General GRUNERT. Now, in your testimony before the Roberts
Commission it is recorded that you stated that you had never been
called into conference or consultation regarding the warning message
of November 27th.
General Wilson. That is right, sir.
48. General GRUNERT. Also that you felt safe because of the patrol
system, knew nothing about it, that you thought the Navy had an
inshore and offshore patrol, and the Navy had an inshore and offshore
patrol?
General Wilson. I did think so, sir.
49. General GRUNERT. Yes. You thought then that if all these things
were working that you should get ample information in order to carry
out your part of the mission?
General Wilson. Yes, sir.
50. General GRUNERT. Have you any questions?
51. General FRANK. Yes.
Were you there when General Herron was in command?
General Wilson. Yes, a short time. General Herron left a few
months after I arrived.
52. General FRANK. Did you know of the arrangement he had for
having a meeting every week with the next layer of his commanders?
General Wilson. I am not certain. It seems to me I do remember—
I, of course, was a subordinate then and not directly under him—
it seems to me I do remember that the then Division Commander
of the Hawaiian Division did go down for a conference [1359]
with him once a week.
53. General Frank. Every Monday?
   General Wilson. That is right.
54. General Frank. What I am trying to arrive at: Was there any such arrangement that General Short had? When the Hawaiian Division that was there when General Herron was there was later split up, it became two divisions?
   General Wilson. That is right.
55. General Frank. And at that time, instead of there being one commander at Schofield, there were two commanders of which you were one?
   General Wilson. Two tactical commanders; that is correct.
56. General Frank. Was there any arrangement whereby every week you had a conference with the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?
   General Wilson. There was not.
57. General Frank. Or did you go to him regularly in any interval of time?
   General Wilson. No, I did not. You see, there was only a period there of two months after the first of October to the first of December when I was an independent commander under General Short. I have a vague impression that prior to that time General Short did hold meetings similar to those that General Herron held, but after the Hawaiian Division was split up into two triangular divisions, I do not remember; I am certain that there was no specified period of time when we went down: I am sure, though, that during the period of time between October the first and December there must have been at least one occasion on which I did attend a conference at General Short’s headquarters.
58. General Frank. Did you have any antiaircraft weapons in the division?
   General Wilson. Well, we had only the normal .50 caliber machine guns and .30 caliber machine guns. We had some of those for antiaircraft purposes.
59. General Frank. Were they in position on the morning of December 7th?
   General Wilson. No, not in the division.
60. General Frank. Sabotage alert would not require them to be in position?
   General Wilson. That is right.
61. General Frank. How long did it take you to get into your field positions?
   General Wilson. Well, that is rather difficult to say.
62. General Frank. Well, about how long?
   General Wilson. I would say three or four hours for all of the troops to get out.
63. General Frank. Being a lower echelon, you assumed that thorough and efficient efforts were being made to provide you with any adequate warning?
   General Wilson. That is correct.
64. General Frank. When the air attack came without warning, what was your reaction?
General Wilson. Well, one of great surprise that the Japanese could have gotten in for an air attack without our having some warning of it. That was followed by immediate action to get our troops out.

65. General Grunert. If you had your units in your battle positions under Alert 3 when the air raid took place, what could you have done toward stopping that raid or minimizing its effect?

General Wilson. In my opinion, General, nothing.

66. General Grunert. That is because you were an infantry division and really had defensive positions to repel a surface attack, was it?

General Wilson. That is right, sir. And the reason we went out was, we didn’t know but what this air attack was preliminary to a surface attack, so we wanted to get into position promptly. But had we been in position, I think we would have gained nothing.

67. General Grunert. What was your state of mind as to the probability or possibility of an attack on the Island by either air or surface or a combined attack by Japan on the Island of Oahu at about that time it did happen?

General Wilson. I did not think it would take place, sir.

68. General Grunert. What governed that line of thinking?

General Wilson. Well, that was mainly from my feeling about the big picture. I did not think for a moment Japan would attack the United States. That was my personal opinion.

69. General Grunert. But the Island of Oahu and that group of islands is an outpost to protect the mainland, isn’t it?

General Wilson. Yes, sir.

70. General Grunert. And on an outpost our teachings have always been that we must be on the alert no matter whether they are asleep at home or not.

General Wilson. Yes, sir.

71. General Grunert. In other words, an outpost is out there in order that people at home can go to sleep.

General Wilson. And our plans were complete for the all-out attack by the Japanese. Of course we were quite weak in strength, but complete plans had been perfected.

72. General Grunert. Well, plans, of course, are good if you implement them; if you don’t, they are not worth a damn. Now, suppose you had gone into Alert 2 or 3; then they might have had some chance of warding off this attack, might they not?

General Wilson. Well, General, I can only express my personal opinion about the other activities or the other defensive measures.

73. General Grunert. You were not concerned in Alert 2 except that it meant sabotage also?

General Wilson. That is correct.

74. General Grunert. But you were concerned in Alert No. 3?

General Wilson. Yes, sir.

75. General Grunert. And if they didn’t go into Alert No. 3 it really didn’t make much difference to you except you had to take care of sabotage; is that correct?

General Wilson. Well, I wouldn’t say it didn’t make any difference to me. I mean, insofar as the accomplishment of my mission was concerned, I felt that the measures that had been taken were adequate. I still feel so, insofar as I am concerned.
76. General Grunert. Have you ever asked yourself that, had you been Commander of the Department, you would have taken Alert 1, 2, or 3, or what you would have done?

General Wilson. Well, I'll tell you, I would not—I mean [1363] I have, of course, thought about that, but I don't know just exactly what information General Short had.

77. General Grunert. Then, it would have depended on the information he had. But if you knew that war was imminent or suspected, as an outpost weren't you supposed to be prepared to meet any emergency, even if you had no information?

General Wilson. Yes, sir. Of course, it is very easy, sort of as hindsight, to say it would have been much better if I had planes.

78. General Grunert. Looking forward to what your command may be in the future, and if you are given no information, you must be prepared to meet what?

General Wilson. Meet any situation, of course.

79. General Grunert. That is not hindsight; that is looking forward.

General Wilson. No, but I meant just talking now as we look back on this situation.

80. General Grunert. But that is a military axiom.


82. General Russell. Do you recall any information which was brought to your attention, General, in the middle of October relating to the relations between the Japanese Government and the American Government?

General Wilson. I do not.

83. General Russell. You had become a Division Commander [1364] about October 1?

General Wilson. October 1st; that is right.

84. General Russell. So you were under the immediate command of the Department Commander from that time. Had you been on alerts prior to November 27th, '41?

General Wilson. Oh, yes. I couldn't tell you just how far back, General, we had been on one of the alerts, but for some time prior to the attack.

85. General Russell. Prior to the alert which was in force at the date of the attack, had there been any other alerts out there in which you had participated?

General Wilson. I know we had had patrols out and we had been guarding bridges for quite a while prior to the attack by the Japanese, and my impression is that at one time—I am not quite certain—at one time the air force had their planes spread out, but at the time of the attack, as you know, we were functioning directly under a sabotage alert.

86. General Russell. Was there anything on the Island, the conduct of the native Japanese people or anything else, which indicated to you that the relations between the Japanese Government and the American Government were growing more tense: if as a matter of fact it was growing more tense?

General Wilson. No, not in reference to the Japanese population.
87. General Russell. General, I rather got the impression from the replies that you made to General Grunert's questions that you were somewhat familiar with the general situation, and from that you had made a deduction that an attack on Oahu or any [1365] island in the Hawaiian group probably would not occur.

General Wilson. That was just my personal opinion.

88. General Russell. Well, now, what do you mean by familiarity with the general situation? What do you mean by "general situation"?

General Wilson. Well, I meant the over-all picture, that I didn't feel that the Japanese were strong enough to go to war with the United States.

89. General Russell. In other words, on the morning of December 7th prior to this attack by the Japs you didn't believe that war was imminent?

General Wilson. No, I did not. However, I would like for it to be made clear here that insofar as the operation of my division was concerned we were prepared to meet any eventuality, because we had our plans complete, we had practiced them. We had had maneuvers in which we moved troops from one place to another. We had the emplacements constructed, range cards prepared. In other words, we were ready to meet any eventuality.

90. General Russell. But the information which was brought to your attention by the courier in late November was not of such nature as to change your thinking about the general situation and to convince you or to lead you to think that war might be imminent?

General Wilson. No, I didn't think so.

91. General Russell. General, you had considerable experience from the time that you went out with the troops of the divisions, first the Hawaiian Division and then later as the commander of [1366] one of the triangular divisions. Were new troops constantly coming into those divisions, or was the personnel fairly fixed all along?

General Wilson. The personnel was pretty well fixed.

92. General Russell. From the beginning?

General Wilson. From the time I arrived there; and of course we had good men going back to the United States and a certain number of men replacing them, and officers, too; but in general, to answer your question, our troops were well trained, we thought. That is, our organization was.

93. General Russell. You did not have any big burden of recruit training during that period of time?

General Wilson. No, sir.

94. General Russell. If you had gone on Alert No. 3 in the spring of 1941, the time you went out there, and remained on it until December 1941, what effect on the morale and training of the troops do you think that would have had?

General Wilson. It would have had a very adverse effect. We found that after December 7th our troops were in the field and stayed in the field constantly, and we soon found that the troops were getting rusty in their training. That was brought to the Department Commander's attention, and by and by a scheme was arrived at to use certain battalions from his reserve—the 34th Infantry was available—that would come in and take over a battalion sector and let us bring that battalion back into Schofield and put them in training.
again. Also, it was a fine morale factor, too, in that they got a chance to get hot baths in barracks, and have some recreation, and so on. But the principal thing was that training suffered by virtue of the fact that out there in the field they were digging and perfecting dug- [1367] outs for themselves, construction work, and so on, and the training suffered.

95. General GRUNERT. What training was there to suffer?

General WILSON. All of the technique, General. They even got to the point where they got rusty on the use of their weapons, because, while they were out there and had their weapons in position, the ammunition question was quite acute then so that we could not get it for firing purposes, and they needed to be whipped back into shape.

96. General GRUNERT. Could they not have done that part of it while they were in position?

General WILSON. They were constantly in position in small groups. We would have them on the firing line. There were a number of machine gun emplacements with three or four men there constantly, day and night, on the alert, and we put so many men on that type of work that it had a decided adverse effect on training.

97. General GRUNERT. That is what you were out there for, to be in that sort of work. Of course it interferes with nicely-planned training where all conditions are what they ought to be. But from December 7th they had to carry on, and I presume they are still carrying on to a great extent.

General WILSON. We did as much training as we could, but nothing like as much as we needed. While we had the installations for the weapons, we had no quarters for our men.

98. General GRUNERT. That is not supposed to be a hardship, is it?

General WILSON. If you have troops and put them in the field and keep them constantly there, rained upon, and so on, you know, of course, that it is going to have an effect.

[1368] 99. General GRUNERT. Unless they actually have a chance to do some fighting?

General WILSON. That is right. Actual work along that line was started as soon as possible.

100. General RUSSELL. General Grunert has discussed with you the wisdom of regarding Hawaii and the other islands as an outpost to protect the western coast and the necessity for being constantly on the alert out there, to accomplish the maximum and to meet the worst. If that policy had been followed from the beginning of 1940 until December, 1941, with the troops constantly on the alert for two years waiting for an enemy which did not come, and being deprived of the type of training about which you have been speaking, what effect on the command's morale and state of efficiency would such a long and continuous alert have had?

General WILSON. I just answered that, General, for a shorter period. Of course, for a longer period it would have the same effect, an adverse effect.

101. General GRUNERT. Would it have been necessary to have all the troops always in position? Why could they not have been elereted without always occupying positions or without a hundred per cent being in position?
General Wilson. They probably could have, sir.

102. General Grunert. Could they not have been alerted with one-third of them in position and thus have taken away the strain and the effect on training and morale? I realize that you cannot keep troops in one place doing the same thing over and over again. But that is why we have senior officers; they have to look at those things and do what they can with what they have.

[1369] General Wilson. General, we did do that during our training periods. For instance, in May, 1941, when we had our Department maneuvers, General Short very definitely and deliberately made them very strenuous. He felt—and I think he is right—that prior to that time our maneuvers had not been strenuous enough; and we had maneuvers of the strenuous type. Following that, up and until December 7, we had our groups occupy their sectors as part of their training for short periods of time.

103. General Russell. Could you have operated under Alert No. 3 with only a third of your people in the field?

General Wilson. No.

104. General Russell. In other words, if you had to become effective to the maximum you had to turn out the entire personnel?

General Wilson. Yes, General, because the sectors were so big and the strength of the troops in my sector, the northern sector, at the time of the attack was, in my opinion, too small; but it was the best that could be done under the circumstances.

105. General Grunert. What information did you get from the local newspapers or newscasts or broadcasts from the United States about the state of international relations between the United States and Japan during this so-called critical period from about November 24 to December 7? Did you not get any information?

General Wilson. Oh, yes. I read the papers, sir, and listened to broadcasts.

106. General Grunert. But they did not impress on you that war was imminent?

General Wilson. No, General.

107. General Grunert. Or did they impress you that there might [1370] be war, but it would not come to you?

General Wilson. I have to be honest about it. I did not feel that the Japanese would attack the United States.

108. General Grunert. But, still, that was what we were in being for—to be prepared in case they did.

General Wilson. I would like to make one thing clear in that connection. That was my personal opinion. Of course I was working under a directive from Department Headquarters, and I wish to repeat that I did not go on my personal opinion. In other words, being a soldier, I realized that we had to be prepared for any eventuality.

109. General Grunert. You considered yourself pretty well prepared as far as your own unit was concerned?

General Wilson. Yes. In so far as the troops we had were available I felt that we were ready to meet any eventuality.

110. General Frank. In the message of November 27 from the War Department to General Short is this statement:

There measures should be carried out so as not to alarm the civil population.
Was anything said to you about that?
General Wilson. Yes; I remember that.
111. General Frank. You remember it?
General Wilson. I remember something about in whatever measures we took to avoid alarming the civil population.
112. General Frank. We have a file of Honolulu papers in the office, and there have been copied the headlines from Sunday, the 30th of November, through to Sunday, the 7th of December. Read just the first line under each date heading, please, to refresh your memory. Read the top line on each one (handing papers to the witness).


113. General Frank. Those headlines read, consecutively from the 30th of November to December 7:

Japanese May Strike Over Weekend.
The next day:
Hull, Kurusu in Crucial Meeting Today.
On Tuesday:
Japan Still Hopeful of Making Peace With U. S.
Wednesday:
Huge Pincer Attack on United States by Japan, France Predicted.
The fifth of December:
Pacific Zero Hour Near; Japan Answers U. S. Today.
The sixth of December:
America Expected to Reject Japan's Reply on Indo-China.
Another headline on the same day:
Japanese Navy Moving South.
Again on Saturday, the 6th:
Detailed Plans Completed for M-day Setup.
Sunday, the 7th of December:
F. D. R. Will Send Message to Emperor on War Crisis.

As a result of those newspaper headlines is it or is it not your opinion that the civil population were somewhat stirred up?
General Wilson. Oh, Yes.
114. General Frank. Through the newspaper headlines generally the civil population had been alarmed, then, had they not?
General Wilson. I think so.
115. General Frank. If they were already alarmed through the [1372] newspaper headlines, what advantage did the military people have in playing down the situation?
General Wilson. I am not in position to answer that. In other words, the message that came to General Short telling him to avoid stirring up the civil population—I don't know. They sought, perhaps, to make the situation as easy as possible and not stir things up. But what I think of it is immaterial, of course. These instructions were given by higher authority.
116. General Frank. The civil population was already stirred up?
117. General Frank. While the commercial newspapers were stirring up the population, do you think, or have you any opinion, as to whether this attitude that the military establishment had had any effect of any sort in calming the military population?

General Wilson. I do not quite understand your question.

118. General Frank. While the newspapers were stirring up the pot, do you think that the military efforts were influential in calming them?

General Wilson. They may have had some effect on it.

119. General Frank. Did the absence of any information coming from higher authority to you on this situation, when there was so much comment in the newspapers, cause any reaction on your part?

General Wilson. Oh, yes. I thought about the matter, of course, as a commander having the responsibility for a sector; but, as I have stated before, I felt that the plans that we had made, with the troops we had available, enabled us to meet any situation that might arise as well as we could with the number [1373] of troops we had. I would have felt much better at that time had we had more troops.

120. General Frank. What was the state of mind of the rank and file of the military personnel with respect to the probability of war?

General Wilson. It would be very difficult for me to express an opinion on that. My impression at this stage, after three years, more or less, is that a great many people felt that while the situation was critical, the Japanese probably would not attack the United States.

121. Major Clausen. May the record show that the witness has been reading from a document consisting of three pages, headed "Items Appearing in the Honolulu Advertiser," which we offer in evidence as Exhibit 19.

(Document headed "Items Appearing in the Honolulu Advertiser" was marked Exhibit No. 19 and received in evidence.)

122. General Russell. General Frank has read to you certain headlines that purport to have appeared in one of the local papers in Honolulu beginning Sunday, November 30th, and extending through December 7th. This paper is identified on the document from which you read as The Honolulu Advertiser. It is my impression, based on certain facts which have developed during the investigation, that The Honolulu Advertiser was the big paper out there?

General Wilson. That is right.

123. General Russell. And it had a larger circulation, probably reached more people on the island, than any other periodical or publication there; is that true?

General Wilson. I imagine it did. It was one of the leading papers there.

124. General Frank. Was it a morning or afternoon paper?

General Wilson. A morning paper, as I remember it.

125. General Frank. Was there an afternoon paper?

General Wilson. I have forgotten—yes; they had a morning and an afternoon paper.

126. General Frank. Was that The Star Bulletin?

General Wilson. I am not certain.

127. General Frank. The Star Bulletin had a large circulation, too, did it not?

General Wilson. Yes.
128. General Russell. General, the effect, as you told General Frank, on the population, including the Japanese elements of the population, of these headlines, was to make them conscious of the fact that the relations between the Japanese Government and the American Government were becoming more critical or were not entirely all that could be desired. I believe you told General Frank also that the effect of these news items on the population was to more or less excite them or stir them up?

General Wilson. I would imagine so. That is only an opinion.

129. General Russell. It is not based on facts, but is just an assumption from a process of reasoning?

General Wilson. Yes.

130. General Russell. If the Japanese elements on the island which the Department was instructed not to excite were already war conscious, do you think that manning the guns, hauling out live ammunition and turning out all the troops to a position of readiness to avert whatever might come along would have added to the excitement and the tenseness of the local situation, or [1375] would it have had some opposite effect?

General Wilson. I think it probably would.

131. General Russell. Would what?

General Wilson. Would have added to it.

132. General Russell. Which would have been to an extent in violation of the order to avoid alarming the civil population?

General Wilson. I do not personally think that, General. You have got to use your own discretion about the application of that provision on exciting the population. In other words—and this is my opinion—if the Department Commander felt that the situation justified going into Alert 3 and moving his troops into the field, he would have ignored the possibility of exciting the civilians.

133. General Russell. You, then, take the position that it might not have added to the excitement, but a situation might have arisen where going into Alert No. 3 was more important than refraining from alarming the population?

General Wilson. That is right.

134. General Russell. With reference to this injunction about not disclosing intent, a situation might have risen where it was better to disclose intent and take positive action?

General Wilson. Yes. But I do not think they had to disclose intent by occupying the positions, and so on.

135. General Russell. Based on your experience out there, General, what is the meaning in this message of the words "Do not disclose intent"?

General Wilson. I would like, if I might, to have that message read again.

136. General Grunert. You may read it for yourself. It starts at the bottom of the page (handing a paper to the witness).

[1376] General Wilson. I do not know how to answer that question about intent, unless it has reference to our putting into effect a full defensive organization. But surely the Department Commander, if, as I said before, he felt it was necessary to go into Alert 3, would not let the alarming of the civil population or the intent to take defensive measures against outward attack interfere with his doing it.
137. General Russell. Since we are speculating; General, suppose you had received a message in which, prior to hostilities, you were told that you should carry out any measures that you deemed necessary, referring specifically to reconnaissance as one of those measures, but that they should not be carried out so as to alarm the civil population: What, in your opinion, would that injunction to carry out the measures so as not to alarm the civilian population have meant?

General Wilson. Well, for me to attempt to interpret a message that came from higher authority, of course I—might have one idea and you might have another; but there is a possible restriction there, you might say a theoretical restriction against General Short doing what he thinks he ought to do.

138. General Grunert. Had you been commander and had you received that message, what would be your mental reaction to what was required?

General Wilson. My idea of what they meant is not to go into an all-out defense; in other words, make such reconnaissance you need, but hold your troops more or less intact so as to avoid alarming the population and to avoid knowledge that you had gone into a full defense.

139. General Grunert. How do you, then, interpret this:

[1377] This policy should not repeat not be construed as restricting you to a course of action which might jeopardize your defense.

General Wilson. General, in other words, that message, to me, is telling him at one time don't do so-and-so, but of course we don't want to restrict your action. In other words, that is somewhat inconsistent, and I think General Short should have been free to do whatever was necessary.

140. General Grunert. If there were inconsistencies did not that leave him free to do what he thought was necessary?

General Wilson. I would think so, sir; yes.

141. General Grunert. In other words, you got do's and you got don't's, and therefore in the last analysis you had to decide?

General Wilson. Yes.

142. General Russell. General, this message deals with what is to be done in the event of hostilities, and says:

If hostilities cannot be avoided, the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act.

143. General Grunert called your attention to the fact that that is not to be required to the point where it restricts defense, that is, in the event of hostilities; that we must not commit the first overt act. You were out there and cognizant of the situation and knew what was going on. What do you think that meant?

General Wilson. I think that means definitely that we should not go seeking the Japs out and attacking them by air or surface or whatnot.

144. General Russell. Do you think it was necessary to tell the Department Commander not to start a war on Japan?

[1378] General Wilson. The impression I gained when that message was given to me was that it was simply informative, that our government had decided that, not that they had expected anybody out there to do it, but to let them know what the policy of the government was.
145. General **Russell**. Did it impress you when the courier officer came to you that the main reason for moving out was the breakdown in the negotiations between the Japanese Government and our government?

General **Wilson**. Yes, and to inform General Short of the situation and alert him.

146. General **Russell**. The alerting was necessary because of the breakdown in the negotiations between the two governments?

General **Wilson**. Yes.

147. General **Russell**. General Frank has read to you these headlines from the Honolulu Advertiser. Did they not indicate very clearly that the negotiations were being continued after this message was received?

General **Wilson**. Oh, yes; and it was definitely understood that a representative of the Japanese Government was on his way to Washington, and later arrived in Washington, and, if I remember correctly, he was supposed to have been in discussion with the President when the attack took place.

[1379] 148. General **Russell**. General, was the normal chain of command, by which you were advised of the enemy situation, through the Hawaiian Department, or through the **ADVERTISER**?

General **Wilson**. Well, of course, the Department Commander kept us informed.

149. General **Russell**. That is all.

150. General **Frank**. We have, here, a résumé of the headlines in the Honolulu **STAR-BULLETIN**, from the 29th of November through to the 6th of December, copied from a file of Honolulu papers that we have here in the office. Those headlines read as follows:

Saturday, 29 November:
U. S. Waits Japan Reply.

Monday, 1 December:
U. S. Army Alerted in Manila, Singapore Mobilizing as War Tension Grows.

Monday, 1 December, again:
Japan Envoys Resume Talks Amid Tension.

Monday, 1 December, again:
War Fears Grow in Philippines.

Thursday, 4 December:
Japan Spurns U. S. Program.

Saturday, 6 December:
Singapore on War Footing.

Saturday, 6 December:
New Peace Effort Urged in Tokyo.

Saturday, 6 December:
Civilians Urged to Leave Manila.

151. **Major Clausen**. We offer, as the exhibit next in order, 19-A, this document from which General Frank just read, consisting of two pages.

(The résumé of headlines referred to, was marked as Exhibit 19-A, and was received in evidence.)
[1380] 152. General Frank. Do you remember generally having read those items?

General Wilson. I am not certain that I read those particular items. I certainly read the papers during that period.

153. General Frank. You remember having gained the impression that they convey?

General Wilson. I can't remember the impressions given by any specific paper, but I read them at the time and I probably read that, because my impression is that I took both the morning and the afternoon papers.

154. General Frank. Do you remember generally having gained the impression that those headlines convey?

General Wilson. Yes.

155. General Grunert. General, in the last analysis, is it not true that if Alert 2 or Alert 3 had been ordered it would have at least minimized the effects of the attack?

General Wilson. General, my impression is that we were operating under Alert No. 2. As I remember it, protection from sabotage was Alert 2. That is the one under which we were operating, as I remember it.—Was it 1?

156. General Grunert. That was really Alert No. 1. The alerts, as they ran, were:

No. 1 was the so-called "sabotage alert."
No. 2 was, to be prepared for Air attack, plus sabotage.
No. 3 was, to be prepared against surface attack, air attack, and sabotage, or the "all-out" defense.

General Wilson. I see. Well, I don't think there is any question, General, but what, had we been under Alert 2 or [1381] Alert 3, it would have minimized our losses. I think that is obvious.

157. General Grunert. That is primarily because you then would have been more ready to repel an air attack?

General Wilson. That is right. The planes would have been scattered, for instance.

158. General Grunert. There appear to be no more questions. Thank you for coming down.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

159. General Grunert. We will go, now, to other business.

(Thereupon, at 10:40 a.m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the morning, and proceeded to other business.)

**AFTERNOON SESSION**

(The Board, at 2 o'clock p.m., continued the hearing of witnesses.)

General Grunert. The Board will come to order.

**TESTIMONY OF BRIG. GEN. ROLAND WALSH, ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES; COMMANDING GENERAL, PHILADELPHIA QUARTERMASTER DEPOT**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. General, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station,
General Walsh. Roland Walsh, Brigadier General, A. U. S.; Commanding General, Philadelphia Quartermaster Depot.

2. General Grunert. General, the Board is after facts, both as to background and viewpoints, prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack. We hope that because of your assignment [1382] in Hawaii in 1941 you may throw some light on the situation or may give us some leads from which we can develop more facts.

What was your assignment in Hawaii, in 1941?

General Walsh. I was commanding the Hawaiian Quartermaster Depot. That included the post of Fort Armstrong.

3. General Grunert. What defensive measures against air attack, or any other sort of attack, were prescribed for Fort Armstrong?

General Walsh. We were on an alert on the 7th, and had been, for about ten days. As I remember it, it was what we called the “No. 1 Alert” against sabotage.

4. General Grunert. Now, what protective measures had you taken, or what measures were prescribed, at Fort Armstrong, to protect your own garrison, under the Field Manual 100-5, which, in effect, says that each command shall take care of itself?

General Walsh. Of course, my troops, as you understand, were Quartermaster troops. There were two truck companies and two maintenance companies; one light company and one heavy. Most of my people were civilians—I am answering this question by a little preliminary—and in an alert, all we could do was to put on additional sentries, and have cars move around, or trucks, with men armed on them, that would go around the warehouses and around the Post. We had no equipment for antiaircraft.

5. General Grunert. You had no defensive equipment for antiaircraft? Did you have any other means of protection outside of small arms?

General Walsh. No other equipment, whatsoever.

6. General Grunert. Was there any plan prescribed, either by [1383] the Department or by the command, that would inform the personnel of the command just what to do in the event of any kind of alert?

General Walsh. We had a regular “SOP”, as they called it—a Standing Operating Procedure.

7. General Grunert. Was that your own, or was that the Department’s?

General Walsh. That was my own plan. It was drawn up, of course, under orders from the Department, but it was my own plan.

8. General Grunert. What were some of those measures that you took, that that SOP required?

General Walsh. As I mentioned before, it was a question of putting the additional sentries on.

9. General Grunert. But how about the noncombatants on the Post? What did they do? How were they protected?

General Walsh. There was no real plan to take care of the noncombatants on the Post. There were very few, of course.

10. General Grunert. Did they have air-raid shelters?

General Walsh. They had no air-raid shelter. Fortunately, at my post we had a battery tiernen, which is an old mine-defense battery, two 3-inch guns, and in there, of course, there was some pro-
tection against bombs. This place was ordinarily used as a mortuary, but it could be and was used as a shelter against bombs.

11. General GRUNERT. Of their own volition, or according to plan? 
General WALSH. Of their own volition.

12. General GRUNERT. There were no slit trenches? 
[1884] General WALSH. No trenches. 

13. General GRUNERT. Could they have been dug on the Post? 
General WALSH. Yes, sir.

14. General GRUNERT. Did your protective measures, such as your warehouses, and so forth, envisage any additional fire hazards that should have been planned for, and that you did plan for? 
General WALSH. We had pretty good protection against fire. We had sand at some places. We had our own fire engine, just one, but for the depot we had one fire engine, and it was tried out very frequently, and we could get to a fire in just a few moments.

15. General GRUNERT. Was there any thought in your mind as to whether an attack was probable or possible, or not to be expected? 
General WALSH. If you want to complete my ideas on it, I was more afraid of sabotage, myself, than anything else; and of course, being an officer responsible for government property, and having but a few troops under me, all that I could do was to protect against sabotage.

16. General GRUNERT. Were you kept informed of the international situation, or were you given any information that was sent to the Commanding General of Hawaii, that might show the existing condition, along the latter part of November and in December? 
General WALSH. That is a pretty hard question for me to answer. I, of course, felt the tension, and I was informed of the growing tension, and the need to be more and more on the alert.

[1885] 17. General GRUNERT. How did you get that information—from the newspapers, from official sources, or what? 
General WALSH. We were told, about November 27, I should say, to be on a very strict alert.

18. General GRUNERT. By a “strict alert,” you mean what? 
General WALSH. I meant an alert against sabotage.

19. General GRUNERT. Then everybody seemed to be sabotage-minded but not actually warminded, is that true? 
General WALSH. I do not know exactly what you mean by the “war- minded.”

20. General GRUNERT. In other words, you did anticipate and had instructions to be sure to guard against sabotage, but you did not envisage anything beyond sabotage, did you? 
General WALSH. That is correct.

21. General GRUNERT. What was your source of official information? With what section of the General Staff did you deal? 
General WALSH. It usually came to me from the Department Quartermaster.

22. General FRANK. Who was that? 
General WALSH. Colonel William R. White, now Brigadier General.

23. General GRUNERT. Have you any questions? Is there anything else, General, any information you have that might give us leads or throw some light on our mission to find out what happened prior to and during the attack? We want to exhaust every possible source,
and so we took a chance on your having some information which you might impart to us.

General Walsh. I don't think that I have anything that would assist you.

24. General Frank. Were you totally surprised by the attacks?

General Walsh. Yes.

25. General Frank. Did you have the least conception that there would be such an attack?

General Walsh. I did not.

26. General Frank. Did you feel a tension in the international situation at that time?

General Walsh. Very definitely.

27. General Frank. What caused it?

General Walsh. One of the outstanding things that caused it was the Japanese ships' not putting into Hawaii any more. That, to me, was a definite sign that the tension had increased considerably.

28. General Frank. Do you remember the newspapers, about that time?

General Walsh. Well, I can't say that I remember anything specific about that.

29. General Frank. What I am trying to bring out is whether or not this tension was caused by information that you got through official sources or through other than official sources.

General Walsh. It was from both; both the newspapers, and information that came from the headquarters.

30. General Frank. And from your general observations of the Port?

General Walsh. Yes.

31. General Grunert. When did the Japanese ships cease coming into the harbor, approximately, do you remember? Was it in the summer, or in the fall?

[1387] General Walsh. I would say it was about two months before. That is a very rough estimate—about two months before.

32. General Grunert. Prior to that they made regular stops in there?

General Walsh. That is correct.

33. General Grunert. Does anybody else think of anything? That appears to be all. Thank you very much.

General Walsh: Thank you.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.

(There was a brief recess.)

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL RUSSELL C. THROCKMORTON, INFANTRY, CAMP BRECKINRIDGE, KENTUCKY

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?


2. General Grunert. Colonel, the Board is after facts, and you, having been a general staff officer of the Hawaiian Department
General Staff in 1941, may help us in developing facts and giving us leads as to where we can probably dig up some more.

What was your assignment in 1941? And give us the dates.

Colonel Throckmorton. My assignments in 1941 from July 28—well, General, may I give you my entire General Staff history, because from July 9, 1940, I was G-4.

3. General Grunert. Of what?

[1388] Colonel Throckmorton. Of the Hawaiian Department, and then on September 16, 1940, I became G-3 of the Hawaiian Department, and then on July 28 I became G-1 of the Hawaiian Department.

4. General Frank. Still 1940?

Colonel Throckmorton. 1942.

5. General Russell. 1941.

Colonel Throckmorton. From July 9 to September 16 I was G-4. From September 16 to July 28, 1941, I was G—July 9 to September 16 I was G-3, and from September 16 to July 28 I was G-1.

6. General Frank. But you left out the years there.

Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir.

7. General Frank. That is rather confusing.

8. General Grunert. Yes. Go over that again and give the year each time.

Colonel Throckmorton. From July 9, 1940, until September 16, 1940, I was G-4, and from September 16, 1940, until July 28, 1941, I was G-3, and from July 28 until departure from Hawaii May 24 I was G-1.

9. General Grunert. May 24, 1942?

Colonel Throckmorton. 1942.

10. General Grunert. I think you were G-1, then, from September of 1941 until May of 1942; is that right?

Colonel Throckmorton. Well, approximately so, General. Actually it was from July 28, 1941.

11. General Frank. And what was your assignment just prior to the G-1 assignment?

Colonel Throckmorton. I was the G-3 for a period of ten [1389] months from September 16, 1940, to July 28, 1941.

12. General Grunert. Were you the Assistant Chief of Staff G-3 and the Assistant Chief of Staff G-1, or were you the Assistant to the Assistant Chief of Staff?

Colonel Throckmorton. I was Assistant Chief of Staff G-4, G-3, and G-1.

13. General Grunert. Then, you served under two Chiefs of Staff, did you?

Colonel Throckmorton. That is correct, sir.

14. General Grunert. The first one being Colonel Hayes and the second one Colonel Phillips?

Colonel Throckmorton. And then even a third, General. I served under General (now General, then Colonel) Joseph Collins.

15. General Grunert. While Colonel Phillips was Chief of Staff did he hold any staff conferences?

Colonel Throckmorton. On Saturday mornings there was a general meeting. It was standing operating procedure that a staff conference would be called on Saturday mornings at 8 o'clock, and all
staff members contributed items that might be of interest to the staff in general. That included the special staff as well. That was a carry-over from a policy Colonel Hayes, now General Hayes, followed.

16. General Grunert. And that was a routine matter to have a staff meeting once a week?
Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir.

17. General Grunert. Did you have any particular staff meeting on November 27th or thereabouts? Were there any special staff meetings outside the routine in the latter part [1390] of November and early in December?
Colonel Throckmorton. Not to my knowledge, as a result of that radio which we received on November 27. However, I as an individual was informed of its content by Colonel Phillips. Now, as to whether or not he held subsequent staff meetings relative to it, I am unable to say.

18. General Grunert. And you do not know how many were so informed as you were informed?
Colonel Throckmorton. I do not, sir.

19. General Grunert. That message of November 27th ended up with the following sentence:
(Excerpt from radio message of November 27, 1941, is as follows:)
Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

Then, you do not know how many officers were so informed on that directive, do you?
Colonel Throckmorton. No, sir, I do not, but it appeared to be common knowledge among staff officers who should know about such things.

20. General Grunert. What was your particular interest in that message? As G–1?
Colonel Throckmorton. My particular interest was the strength of the Department. Our authorized war garrison at that time, as I remember the figures now—I may be in error one way or another—was 194,000, and we had not approached those figures at that time. that strength.

21. General Grunert. Then, this message was just of information for you? You had no particular specific duties [1391] there-under; is that right?
Colonel Throckmorton. That is correct, sir.

22. General Grunert. Now, to go back about how that staff was handled: Were you allowed a free hand in following out your duties in G–1? By “a free hand” I mean were you required to perform your assigned duties without specific dictation or numbered instruction as to just how you should do it?
Colonel Throckmorton. As long as general policies had been established I felt that I had a free hand, though I was inclined at all times to keep the General Staff informed of what actions I had taken.

23. General Grunert. Did you have access to the Commanding General when you thought it was necessary that you bring something to his particular attention?
Colonel Throckmorton. I never had the feeling that I thought I was withheld from seeing the Commanding General. That question
has never occurred to me, but it seems now that if I had asked to see
the Commanding General I would have been permitted to have seen
him.

24. General Grunert. As G–3 and following then as G–1, did you
have any particular occasions to confer with the naval staff of the
District or of the Fleet on any particular things?

Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir. When I took over the duties of
G–3, the framework for the joint agreement had tentatively been de-
cided upon by my predecessor representing the Army, Colonel Carl
Banks. Having taken over my duties as G–3, I followed through the
joint agreement to its completeness and finally its signature by all
people concerned, that is, both the Navy and the Army.

[1393] 25. General Grunert. Who relieved you as G–4?

Colonel Throckmorton. There was an interchange in those two
staff sections: Colonel Banks was G–3; he became G–4, and I became
G–3.

26. General Grunert. Then when you were relieved as G–3, who
became G–3?

Colonel Throckmorton. Colonel Phillips.

27. General Grunert. Phillips?

Colonel Throckmorton. For a short period of time.

28. General Grunert. And then who followed him?

Colonel Throckmorton. Colonel William Donegan.

29. General Grunert. Then, you were in G–3 during the time of the
preparation of the Hawaiian joint coastal frontier defense plan?

Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir.

30. General Grunert. And were you also G–3 when the joint air
operations agreement with the two addendums was put into effect?

Colonel Throckmorton. As I remember it, the joint air was a part
of the joint Army-Navy agreement.

31. General Grunert. It was a part of that?

Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir. That is, my memory places it so.

32. General Grunert. Was the General Staff called upon or free
to advise the Chief of Staff and the Commanding General as to the
defense means and measures and as to their accuracy?

Colonel Throckmorton. I should say so, General. General Short
for the most part took the initiative on that sort of thing; and so that
I should say that there was considerable. [1393] liaison between
the Staff and the General.

33. General Grunert. Were you present at the discussion, if there
was a discussion, as to what should be done under the Chief of Staff’s
message of November 27th?

Colonel Throckmorton. I was not, sir. I was informed of the
decision that had been made.

34. General Grunert. That was to what effect?

Colonel Throckmorton. That was that we would assume defen-
sive measures under Standing Operating Procedure No. 1, which was
sabotage defense.

35. General Grunert. Had you previously been kept pretty well
informed of the international situation, particularly that which dealt
with the negotiations with Japan?

Colonel Throckmorton. I believe so. I remember that I was per-
sonally interested in it and by means of press and radio, and so on,
kept myself informed; and such secret documents as came through I perused and kept myself informed. I believe I did.

38. General GRUNERT. Did you know or have you seen or been informed of the message of November 27th that came to the Navy, and in that message it was directed the Army be informed, and the message started out to the effect that, "This is a war warning"? Do you remember that?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. I cannot testify to that personally, General. I heard that such a message was received by the Navy, but I neither saw it nor was I officially informed of it.

37. General GRUNERT. From what you did learn from these various sources, and having been G-3 and having been concerned [1394] in the various plans, did you think the decision to go on Alert No. 1 filled the bill?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. In view of one provision of the message which came to the Army on November 27, I felt that General Short's decision in that case was more or less restricted to a sabotage status, a defense-against-sabotage status.

38. General GRUNERT. What gave you that impression? What particular part of the message gave you that impression?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. As I remember it, there was a statement made in it that no measure would be taken which might arouse local apprehension, or something to that effect. Then, too, having read over the plans for the defense of the Hawaiian Department for a number of years, there crept into all the plans references to periods or a period of strained relationship. Perhaps some of us were indoctrinated with that. So that when the message on November 27th came, I know myself I felt that, Here is a period of strained relationship, and particularly after the caution in the radio that no action would be taken which might arouse public apprehension.

38. General FRANK. In other words, they were preparing for war in accordance with a pattern; is that right?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Well, I apply that to myself only, General, and not to any of my contemporaries. If they felt as I did, I don't know. I speak only for myself, sir.

40. General GRUNERT. I shall refresh your memory on this message of the 27th of November, '41. This says:

[1395] (Radio message of November 27, 1941, is as follows:)

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

That states in there:

If hostilities cannot be avoided, United States desires Japan to commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense.
Did it ever occur to you that just going on alert against sabotage, doing that and nothing more, might jeopardize the defense.

Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir; I can see how it would.

[1296] 41. General Frank. The answer is not quite clear to me.

42. General Grunert. I understood the answer to be——

43. General Frank. He can see how it would. How would what do what?

Colonel Throckmorton. How that a sabotage alert only would jeopardize the defense of the Hawaiian Islands under the provisions of that radio.

44. General Frank. All right.

45. General Grunert. Then, it appears that over there you all were sabotage-minded but hardly war-minded; is that about a correct statement?

Colonel Throckmorton. I can speak only for myself, General, and I must say that I felt that that statement in that radio fitted right into the old doctrine which permeated practically all of the plans.

46. General Grunert. But there was nothing in the message about sabotage?

Colonel Throckmorton. No, sir, there isn't, but it would seem to have gone any further than we did might have violated the provisions in there that nothing would be done which might—to quote the radio, in the presence of that.

47. General Grunert. What measures in that respect would in your opinion have alarmed the public if you took Alert 2 or Alert 3? Where would the alarm of the public come in?

Colonel Throckmorton. Well, it would have required more movement of troops to have gone into the next phase.

48. General Grunert. Had not troops been moving right along?

49. General Frank. I didn't get the answer to the question [1397] before. Would the reporter read it, please?

The Reporter (reading):

General Grunert. But there was nothing in the message about sabotage?

Colonel Throckmorton. No, sir, there isn't, but it would seem to have gone any further than we did might have violated the provisions in there that nothing would be done which might—to quote the radio, in the presence of that.

50. General Frank. That left the answer in the air.

51. General Grunert. To quote that part of the radio, that referred to what?

52. General Frank. Yes.

Colonel Throckmorton. That referred to the alarm or the apprehension. I am not choosing the words of the text there; that is all; because I don't know them.

53. General Frank. The alarm or apprehension of the civilian population; is that what you mean?

Colonel Throckmorton. Yes.

54. General Frank. All right.

55. General Grunert. All right. Now would you read the last that you have, Mr. Reporter?

The Reporter (reading):

General Grunert. What measures in that respect would in your opinion have alarmed the public if you took Alert 2 or Alert 3? Where would the alarm of the public come in?
Colonel Throckmorton. Well, it would have required more movement of troops to have gone into the next phase.

General Grunert. Had not troops been moving right along?

56. General Grunert. Had not troops been moving right along during maneuvers?

Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir, they had.

57. General Grunert. Did that alarm the public whenever the troops moved?

Colonel Throckmorton. Apparently not. But to have gone into their next phase from the status we had at the time the radio was received would have meant the occupation of gun positions, antiaircraft gun positions, the dispersion of planes on the field; but aside from that, under the standing operating procedures the Department was just about as well prepared for the defense of the Island as it could otherwise have been.

58. General Grunert. If you had gone into Alert 2, for instance, that Alert 2 covered preparations to meet an air attack; it also covered sabotage?

Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir; it was a continuation.

59. General Grunert. Continuation, yes. Then, the alarming of the public or the fear of alarming the public or aggravating a situation appeared to be uppermost in your mind, at least?

Colonel Throckmorton. Well, General, as I observe it now, I believe that in trying to turn over in my mind the cause or the basis for General Shorts decision, it was based on that; I would have thought it was based on that, though I never discussed it with him. Being a G-1, I had no occasion to discuss it with him.

60. General Grunert. I was banking on your past knowledge of G-3 more than your present knowledge of G-1, as to whether or not you considered that that filled the bill.

Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir.

61. General Grunert. (Addressing Board Members). Have you any questions?

Colonel Throckmorton. May I answer that more fully General?

General Grunert. All right.

62. Colonel Throckmorton. At any time I didn't question it. Of course, in the light of subsequent events I realize that it was wrong.

63. General Frank. Were you reading the newspapers along about then?

Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir.

64. General Frank. Were not the newspapers carrying plenty of headlines to alarm the public with respect to the situation?

Colonel Throckmorton. I think they were, General; yes, sir.

65. General Frank. Well, the civil population already was aroused, then, wasn't it?

Colonel Throckmorton. I quite agree with you, sir.

66. General Frank. Well, was there any point in taking military measures to calm them down?

Colonel Throckmorton. Nothing had happened or they had committed no overt act which indicated that there was any required at that time.

67. General Russell. Colonel, you were there when the attack occurred; is that true?
Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir.

68. General Russell. You had been G-3 for a time, and gone from that office into G-1, and you were serving as G-1 at the moment of the attack?

Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir.

69. General Russell. Did you observe the operations of the troops in and about Honolulu at the time of the attack?

Colonel Throckmorton. At the time of the attack?

70. General Russell. Yes, and subsequent, shortly thereafter?

Colonel Throckmorton. No, sir, I did not, because I was tied down to my desk pretty well, handling personnel matters. We were very short of officers to carry out a 24-hour tour, and it was necessary to get sufficient reserve officers immediately available, called to active duty, and fit them into places where they were best qualified to serve; and the late afternoon of the day of the attack General Short gave me a directive to have all the women and children evacuated from the posts of Hickam Field, Wheeler Field, and Schofield Barracks, and that that would be accomplished by Monday morning.

[1401]

71. General Russell. Did you have plans for that prior to the attack?

Colonel Throckmorton. There was a plan being worked up by Colonel Lyman, the Department Engineer, that had not been delegated to me as my responsibility, but I believe that the basis for that was the fact that it required considerable public relationship, and Colonel Lyman being native-born and a native Hawaiian, the General probably thought best to turn that job over to him, the formulation of the evacuation plan. It was not completed, however, when the attack took place. Such plans as we actually carried into effect to get the women and children off to those posts were done almost on the spot.

72. General Russell. When did the preparation of this plan for the evacuation of the women and children begin?

Colonel Throckmorton. I cannot answer that, General, but I can say that I heard it discussed some three or four months prior to the date of attack.

73. General Russell. General Grumert talked to you about the message which is identified as the message of November 27, and you seemed to understand the message that he was talking about?

Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir.

74. General Russell. I do not know that I followed your answers well in that connection. There is one sentence in that message as to what was to be done before hostile Japanese action, and only one. It says:

Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary, but these measures should be carried out so as not to alarm the population.

And then it says to report the action taken. The other says [1402] to report measures taken. Those two sentences seem to relate to what went on prior to Japanese action.

You said that there was tensesness, and you thought that during this state of tensesness antisabotage was what was indicated. Is that right?
Colonel THROCKMORTON. The term used, General, was "a period of strained relationship." That is the term that was used throughout all the plans.

75. General RUSSELL. Even in the "prior to hostile action" sentence there is a statement emphasizing reconnaissance measures. Did you interpret these restrictions or limitations as in any way limiting action of the Department Commander about reconnaissance measures?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. As a matter of fact, General, I did not give that particular point consideration, but I do not believe now that it shou'd.

76. General RUSSELL. You had been G-3?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Yes, sir. I think perhaps, General, if I may digress here a bit, that if I had still been G-3 and had had access to a copy of that radio, with the privilege of sitting down and studying it, I might have come to a different conclusion. It was almost wholly a G-3 problem. That did not mean that I was not interested at all; but when I heard about it I was given the message and I read it over once, maybe twice—I have forgotten; it has been so long ago—and then I did not have an opportunity, though I suppose I could, if I had asked for it, to read it again. But I do not believe that I read it again. I remember that the Chief of Staff sent for me and informed me of the receipt of it and let me read it. Whether I read it once or read it twice, I at least did not [1403] digest it. And then he told me of the decision of the Department Commander.

77. General FRANK. The decision had already been made before you read the message?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. It had already been made; yes, sir. I believe that because I was not intimately concerned with it, perhaps, I was not taken into the picture too much, except just in an informative way.

78. General GRUNERT. Can you think of anything else that would, through your long and varied experience with the general staff in the Hawaiian Department throw more light on the situation? Have you anything in mind that you think the Board ought to know or ought to consider, from such experience?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Yes, sir; I have.

79. General GRUNERT. Will you tell us, please?

Colonel THROCKMORTON. Though I do not think it would have affected the final outcome of what took place, as I feel that there was a state of frustration, at least in my own mind, due to the fact that in October of 1941—and the attack took place only two months later—the Hawaiian Division, the old square division, was reorganized from a square division to two triangular divisions, the 24th and 25th. That was done from forces immediately available. This took place when I was G-3. Every attempt was made by General Short to triangulate the old square division into two, and it finally got down to the point where the War Department granted him authority, but would not give him additional troops. I felt that it was poor judgment to skeletonize those two divisions in order to create the two divisions. I felt that our mission in Hawaii could be well and efficiently performed under the old setup, perhaps more [1404] efficiently performed. With war imminent it hardly gave an opportunity for
the troops of the new divisions to get oriented or settled down, and particularly when there was such a tremendous shortage of strength within the two. The defense of the Island did not require a war maneuver except for local reserves, or perhaps one general reserve; so that the benefit of having two triangular divisions was defeated, it seems to me. I think that it was a poor choice at that particular time. I think the decision was made, however, before General Short ever reached Hawaii, and I think he was encouraged by his Chief of Staff.

80. General FRANK. Which one?
Colonel THROCKMORTON. Colonel Phillips.
Then there was another thing that took place about that time of which I disapproved, though not violently, but as much as I thought I dared.
When Colonel Phillips came to Hawaii there was no vacancy for him in a position where General Short apparently wanted to use him.

81. General FRANK. Which was that?
Colonel THROCKMORTON. He was sent in as my assistant in the G-3 office. Not as such; that is, the orders did not read that way, but we looked on him as sort of a tactical aide. I felt that he spoke the General's mind.
The first thing, or one of the early things, that he wanted to do was to change Field Order No. 1, which in itself was the standing operating procedure. F. O. No. 1 was based on the thought of some of the best military brains we had ever had in Hawaii. I am sure that it dated back to the time of General Drum, General Connor, maybe, General William R. Smith, down through, perhaps, General Bryant Wells' time. It was in the [2405] process of modification or, rather, revision, to bring it up to date when I took over the G-3 office, and I remember that I completed the job. I felt that to throw that out at that particular time was a bad idea, because everyone was so familiar with the old F. O. No. 1; and the talking point or argument of the Chief of Staff was that they wanted standing operating procedures. In my opinion and in the opinion of everyone to whom I talked F. O. No. 1 was a standard operating procedure, though it was not called that; but in effect, it was.

82. General GRUNERT. And that Chief of Staff was Colonel Hayes?
Colonel THROCKMORTON. No. That was Colonel Phillips.

83. General GRUNERT. You started out talking about his coming in as assistant to you.
Colonel THROCKMORTON. If I may go back, General: Colonel Phillips as the General's representative in the G-3's office, awaiting Colonel Phillip Hayes' departure as Chief of Staff. Colonel Hayes' department was delayed somewhat, and for a considerable period of time; and during that period Colonel Adam E. Potts, who was the then G-1, left the Department headquarters, and I took over his job.

84. General FRANK. As what?
Colonel THROCKMORTON. As G-1; whereupon Colonel Phillips went up to become Chief of Staff, and one of my other assistants, Colonel William E. Donegan, became the G-3.

85. General FRANK. Was not Colonel Phillips G-3?
Colonel THROCKMORTON. He was, for a very short period of time, General. From the time I went into the G-1 office until Colonel Hayes left, he was G-3.
86. General Frank. About how long?

[1406] Colonel Throckmorton. I would be guessing, sir, but it would be about two months.

87. General Frank. Will you proceed with the development of F. O. No. 1?

Colonel Throckmorton. I do not believe I know just what your question is, General. Proceed with the development of it?

88. General Frank. Yes. Or had you finished?

Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir; I thought I had completed that picture.

89. General Grunert. Then I will develop it somewhat. It was Field Order No. 1 that you considered just about the right thing at the right time, but instead of having Field Order No. 1 they go out some standing operating procedures. Under Field Order No. 1 were there three types of alert?

Colonel Throckmorton. Three types of alert; yes, sir.

90. General Grunert. Suppose Field Order No. 1 had been in existence and in force as of December 7: Would it have made any difference?

Colonel Throckmorton. It would not have affected the decision made.

91. General Frank. There would have been only one type of alert in effect, and therefore the aircraft would have been alerted to meet an attack.

92. General Grunert. That is what I expected his answer to be, but he told that under Field Order No. 1 there were three types.

Colonel Throckmorton. As I remember the old field order, the first phase was that of alert; that is, sabotage alertness.

93. General Frank. Are you sure about that?

Colonel Throckmorton. As I say, General, as I remember it.

[1407] It has been a long time ago.

94. General Grunert. Then you do not recall the S. O. P. that brought three kinds of alert into existence. We were given to understand that formerly there was one type of alert, and one only; there was no sabotage, no air, no surface; it was all just one alert, to get out and be ready for business. Then they came along with three types of alert. You do not know just when they came in, do you?

Colonel Throckmorton. This is the first thought that I have given this particular question for a long time, General. I hate to discuss things that I do not remember and am not too sure of; but now that you have brought up the point, there was a phase in the field order—I believe it was the white phase—which had to do with security against riots and that sort of thing. So that what you say may well be true, sir. It had been so long ago that I do not remember.

The reason that I brought the point up of changing F. O. No. 1 was because at that particular time I thought it was a bad idea to change over when everyone was familiar and indoctrinated with Field Order No. 1. It seemed quite a useless thing to do.

95. General Grunert. Now, taking a square division and making two triangular divisions of it—that did not seem to make any difference as far as just what happened on December 7 was concerned, did it?
Colonel Throckmorton. No, sir; I cannot say that it did.

96. General Grunert. Again, these shifts in the general staff: Was there any ill feeling about the shifts taking place? Was the staff a united and working staff, or did it have a few cliques in it and a little bitterness? I am just wondering whether that was actually the fact, or not.

Colonel Throckmorton. There was no feeling on my part when Colonel Banks was interchanged with me, and I am sure that there was none on his part. We both agreed that it was just "one of those things", and we made no attempt to try to figure out why.

97. General Grunert. Was it General Short's policy to switch his general staff heads periodically?

Colonel Throckmorton. No, sir; not as a routine matter, not as a matter of education of individuals.

98. General Grunert. I gather from what you have told us that he brought with him one Phillips whom he was going to place, presumably later on, as chief of staff, and he eventually did so?

Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir.

99. General Grunert. And in the meantime he used him as assistant G-3?

Colonel Throckmorton. That is correct, sir.

100. General Grunert. And then when the opportunity came he made him Chief of Staff?

Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir.

101. General Grunert. Would you care to express your opinion on Phillips as Chief of Staff as compared with other chiefs of staff under whom you have served?

Colonel Throckmorton. I never at any time, General, felt that Colonel Phillips was qualified to perform those important duties. I felt that he neither had the temperament nor the sense of judgment nor, perhaps, the basic knowledge; and I am frank to say that I never had a great deal of respect for him in his capacity as chief of staff, as compared with Colonel Hayes and others of my acquaintance.

102. General Frank. Who had been chiefs of staff?

Colonel Throckmorton. Who had been chiefs of staff; yes, sir.

103. General Frank. The fact has not come out yet that General Grunert started after; which is this: Was that general staff a happy family?

Colonel Throckmorton. I would say it was, General, for the most part. Of course, on every staff you have little differences of opinion, but they are just a daily routine. There was nothing deep-rooted, as I remember. When Colonel Hayes was Chief of Staff he insisted always that we get along, and I think we did. I think we harmonized beautifully, and I think Colonel Hayes will feel that we did. Such disharmony as existed under Phillips I do not think was of a serious enough nature to have affected what happened on December 7. I mean, it was not to the extent that anyone failed to give their cooperation, and so on.

104. General Grunert. Did the cooperation of the Navy suffer, or was there any change from the time that Phillips took over as compared with when Hayes was in there?
Colonel Throckmorton. I had very little, if any, opportunity while I was G–1 to observe the relationship between the Navy and the Army staffs. I can speak only of when I was G–3, and I feel that there was complete liaison between our G–3 office and the Operations office of the Navy. There was a time when considerable pressure had to be brought to get the Navy to sit down at a table with us and actually put the framework of the joint agreement into writing and then get Admiral Bloch to sign it. Captain Gill—I do not remember his first name or [1410] middle initial—was the Operations Officer.

105. General Frank. For the Fourteenth Naval District?
Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir. I felt many times that he vacillated to the extent that one day General Herron asked me when I was going to get the joint agreement signed, and I told him how many times I had been down, and that the next time that I went I expected to make the proposal that the Army write the agreement, and then submit it to the Navy to see if we could not hasten things. When I made the proposal to Captain Gill he was delighted. So the Army wrote the agreement without the aid of the Navy and I took it down and, with just a few minor changes, Admiral Bloch signed it, General Herron having signed it previously.

106. General Grunert. In thorough agreement with its terms?
Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir.
107. General Grunert. It was not a question of disagreeing on terms, but just a question of somebody doing the work. Was that it?
Colonel Throckmorton. That was the idea.

108. General Frank. Did the Army on its own initiative put the provision in that joint agreement to turn all its heavy bombardment over to the Navy?
Colonel Throckmorton. That was approved by the Department Commander.

109. General Frank. The Army did that on its own initiative before it ever went to the Navy?
Colonel Throckmorton. There had been a long period of discussion about the provisions of the joint agreement, and when it was finally written it was written to conform with what all concerned seemed to have agreed upon. The Navy was rather hard [1411] to get anything out of in those days, General.

110. General Grunert. Have you any knowledge of the amount of information received from Naval Intelligence? You had never been 1–2 or had any connection with them?
Colonel Throckmorton. No, sir; I have no knowledge of that.

111. General Grunert. What did the staff think of Colonel Fielder, the G–2?
Colonel Throckmorton. I can only speak for myself, General. I felt that they had a better G–2 in Colonel Marsden than they did in Colonel Fielder.

112. General Grunert. Tell us about Colonel Donegan, who was G–3 at the time the attack took place and shortly before that. Will he be a good source of information for the Board?
Colonel Throckmorton. I think he will be a very good source.

113. General Grunert. Marsden was G–4. You thought highly of him, did you?
Colonel Throckmorton. Very highly.
114. General Grunert. You knew them both quite intimately, did you not?
Colonel Throckmorton. I knew all the members of the staff rather intimately.
115. General Grunert. Did you know one Colonel Wyman, District Engineer, intimately?
Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir; I did.
116. General Russell. Did you know the Assistant G-2, Colonel Bicknell?
Colonel Throckmorton. Yes, sir; I knew him quite well.
117. General Russell. Did you rate him along with Marsden?
Colonel Throckmorton. I thought he was a capable man. I would not rate him with Marsden.
118. General Russell. A safe, sound fellow?
Colonel Throckmorton. I think so; yes, sir. I think he made Marsden an excellent assistant.
119. General Russell. As G-2?
Colonel Throckmorton. As Assistant G-2. He stayed on with Fielder, after Fielder took over.
120. General Grunert. Do you think of anything else that might assist the Board, now that we have opened up your mind a little bit here and there?
Colonel Throckmorton. General, those are the only two items that I feel morally obliged to report to the Board, those that I have told you about.
121. General Grunert. There appears to be no more questions. We thank you very much.
(The witness was excused with the usual admonition)

[1413] TESTIMONY OF COLONEL GEORGE W. BICKNELL, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, G-2, M. I. S.; WASHINGTON, D. C.

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Colonel, will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

2. General Grunert. Colonel, the Board is after facts and leads in this matter, and from one thing in the report of the Roberts Commission, here, I decided that I wanted to ask you on that subject. There may be others, as they develop, and I hope you can give us some leads. This particular thing referred to the time that you were Assistant G-2 of the Hawaiian Department. Were you such?
Colonel Bicknell. Yes.
3. General Grunert. Between what dates?
Colonel Bicknell. I was Assistant G-2 of the Hawaiian Department in charge of counter intelligence, from October 1940 until April 1943.

General Grunert. And, just prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, and during, and shortly after that, who was your immediate chief?
Colonel BICKNELL. Colonel Fielder, Department G-2.

5. General GRUNERT. There is shown, here, in the Roberts report, a statement to the effect that Lt. Col. Bicknell, Assistant G-2, head of the Hawaiian Department, informed the staff, at a meeting on December 6, 1941, that the Japs were burning papers on December 5, 1941, saying it meant to him [1414] that war was imminent. Do you recall that testimony that you gave to the Roberts Commission?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

6. General GRUNERT. Now, as to that, tell us about what happened at that staff meeting—who was present, and just what was the information, and what happened about that information, if anything.

Colonel BICKNELL. There was a practice in the Hawaiian Department of General Short's having a meeting of his entire staff, including his special staff, every Saturday morning, at which time any points of information or of interest that had occurred during the past week, were brought up for discussion for the benefit of the staff. General Short did not attend those meetings, but his Chief of Staff, Colonel Phillips, officiated, and on that morning of December 6 I did make the statement that I had received information to the effect that the Japanese consuls were burning their papers; and to me that had very serious intent; it would at least show that something was about to happen, somewhere.

That statement was made before all of the staff officers; and as to what happened to it, after that, I don't know.

General GRUNERT. Was your immediate chief there, Colonel Fielder?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

8. General GRUNERT. Did he discuss it with you afterwards? Did he go into it, do you know: as to whether or not what you had heard was a fact, or had anything to back it up?

Colonel BICKNELL. Not to my recollection.

9. General GRUNERT. Was there any discussion of it while [1415] in the staff meeting?

Colonel BICKNELL. No, sir.

10. General GRUNERT. Then it was just a routine report that apparently was not taken seriously at the time?

Colonel BICKNELL. It was just that—just a routine report.

11. General GRUNERT. No one said, "We burn papers every day—why shouldn't the Japanese consul burn any papers"?

Colonel BICKNELL. Didn't raise any discussion; no, sir.

12. General GRUNERT. Can you give us any more of an insight into just what that information was that you got? What sort of papers were they burning? Who found them burning papers, and so forth?

Colonel BICKNELL. The information came to me through the FBI.

13. General GRUNERT. From whom, in the FBI?

Colonel BICKNELL. The Chief of the—a special agent in charge of FBI in Honolulu, Mr. Shivers, out there.

14. General GRUNERT. Mr. Shivers gave you that information?

Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.

15. General GRUNERT. Why did he give it to you and not to Fielder, directly?
Colonel Bicknell. Because the set-up was that I handled all matters pertaining to counter-intelligence. They were handled by me, and we had our offices—

16. General Grunert. Did Mr. Shivers express himself as to what he thought the intent or the seriousness of this was?

Colonel Bicknell. Well, he made the same statement to me that I had made, that this looked as though something was about [1416] to happen pretty soon.

17. General Grunert. And did you tell him that you were going to take it up with the staff?

Colonel Bicknell. Yes, sir.

18. General Grunert. Did he afterwards ask you what happened when you took it up with them, or didn’t it come up again?

Colonel Bicknell. I don’t think that came up again. That ended it.

19. General Grunert. All right. Are there any questions on that particular phase?

20. General Russell. Did you talk to Colonel Fielder about this report from the FBI before you went to the staff meeting?

Colonel Bicknell. No, sir.

21. General Russell. Did you talk to him after you came back?

Colonel Bicknell. No, sir.

22. General Russell. Was your office with Fielder?

Colonel Bicknell. My office was not located physically with Colonel Fielder’s. Mine was located down-town in the same building with the FBI, in adjoining offices, and all of our counter-intelligence activities were handled in that downtown office, commonly known in those days as “the contact office,” and was not at Department headquarters.

23. General Frank. Did you wear a uniform, or civilian clothes?

Colonel Bicknell. Civilian clothes.

24. General Russell. Did you come immediately from your downtown office to this staff meeting?

Colonel Bicknell. Yes, sir.

25. General Russell. So there was no occasion for you to [1417] talk to Colonel Fielder about it?

Colonel Bicknell. No, sir.

26. General Russell. Do you know whether or not the burning of papers by the Japanese people in their consulate was something unusual?

Colonel Bicknell. Yes, sir.

27. General Russell. And with no evidence prior thereto of their having burned papers?

Colonel Bicknell. Yes, sir.

28. General Russell. That is all.

29. General Grunert. On another occasion, did you take a message to General Short, something similar to this message, to his house?

Colonel Bicknell. Yes, sir.

30. General Grunert. Tell us about that occasion, and what happened.

Colonel Bicknell. About 4 o’clock on Saturday afternoon, December 6, Mr. Shivers, of the FBI, telephoned to me at my home and said that he had something of immediate importance, and asked me
to come to town as soon as possible. I went to Honolulu immediately. I did not even stop to change clothes.

31. General Frank. Where did you live?

Colonel Bicknell. At Aeia Heights. And Mr. Shivers handed me a transcript of a telephone conversation which had taken place between one Doctor Mori, a Japanese dentist in Honolulu, and a correspondent of a newspaper in Tokyo. This telephone call had originated in Tokyo, and Mrs. Mori, Doctor Mori's wife, had done most of the talking. This call had been intercepted by the FBI, transcribed on records, and had taken place some time [1448] during the early morning of December 5. The records had been translated from Japanese into English; and had not been completed until Saturday afternoon.

This conversation, to me, was very irregular and highly suspicious. They asked questions regarding the flying conditions that day. They asked whether or not any planes were flying at night, whether the searchlights were turned on during the night flights, how many soldiers were seen around town. Were there many ships in Pearl Harbor? and many other points. I don't remember all of them at the present time. And then suddenly in the midst of this conversation the party in Tokyo asked Mrs. Mori, "What flowers are blooming in Hawaii, today?" Mrs. Mori said, "Poinsettias and hibiscus." Then there was considerable discussion by the party in Tokyo as to how poinsettias could be blooming in Hawaii today? They could understand the hibiscus, but the poinsettias—that was a very strange thing to them.

Then the conversation went on with more details regarding the weather; and after reading this message it was impossible to properly evaluate it. I just received it. Just from my G-2 sense, it sounded to me as though there was something very significant about this; so I phoned to Colonel Fielder, it then being about 5 or 5:15, and told him that it was very necessary that I come and see him, with General Short, immediately, that I had something that I considered to be of the utmost importance.

Colonel Fielder called me back and said that he and General Short were going to dinner to Schofield Barracks, and they were [1419] all ready to go, and the thing had better wait until tomorrow; and I stated that I thought it was too important to wait until tomorrow, I had to see them, right now! So I was finally told that if I could get out there in ten minutes, they would wait; and I made it in ten minutes, and I handed this message to General Short, and Colonel Fielder also read it; and I stated, at the time, that I could not evaluate the message, it was new, but it was highly suspicious, and it had to me every indication that something was "in the wind." I didn't have any idea what, but from an intelligence angle I did feel that the message did have some portent in it which we were not able at the moment either to unravel or decipher.

Both Colonel Fielder and General Short seemed to feel that I was rather perhaps too "intelligence conscious," and that this message was quite, quite in order, that it did describe the situation in Hawaii as it was, and that possibly there was nothing very much to be excited about in the content of the message; and that was all that happened to it.
32. General Grunert. In the hearing before the House on the
resolution which called for investigation by the Army and Navy, if
I recall it correctly, there was a statement made that when this mes-
sage was delivered to General Short’s house there was a party going
on, and that General Short “cussed out” the messenger and practically
threw him out. Is there any truth in that?
Colonel Bicknell. That is absolutely untrue.
33. General Grunert. How long was this message? Was it of
considerable length?
Colonel Bicknell. It was of some considerable length. [1420]
I don’t remember exactly the length, but I, off-hand, would say that
it ran about, if I am not mistaken, five or six pages of double-space
typewriting.
34. General Grunert. Did General Short and Colonel Fielder go
into a huddle, to discuss each part of this message?
Colonel Bicknell. No, sir.
35. General Grunert. Or did they look at it in a hurry and then
“beat it” to their party?
Colonel Bicknell. They read it through. General Short said that
he thought it was quite an ordinary message, he didn’t see that there
was anything very bad about it; and then they handed it back to me,
and went their way.
36. General Grunert. At any time afterwards, before the attack
occurred, was that message called for again, and examined, or studied?
Colonel Bicknell. Not to my knowledge; and I had it with me.
37. General Grunert. Are there any questions on that phase?
38. General Russell. I have two or three.
Did you and General Short and Colonel Fielder go over to Fielder’s
office to look at that message, or where did you go, to look at it?
Colonel Bicknell. No, sir; we went to General Short’s house.
No, I beg your pardon—it was Colonel Fielder’s house, because they
lived next door; and General Short came to Colonel Fielder’s house.
39. General Russell. Oh, Short came over to Fielder’s house, did he?
Colonel Bicknell. They are right side-by-side, the [1421]
three of them.
40. General Russell. The three of you did not get together and
go over to Fielder’s office, at headquarters, and talk about it?
Colonel Bicknell. No, sir.
41. General Russell. How long did the conference last, in which
this message was considered, Colonel?
Colonel Bicknell. The actual telephone conversation?
42. General Russell. No. After you got in touch with Fielder and
Short, how long did you people consider this message, before they
handed it back to you and went their way?
Colonel Bicknell. Oh, maybe five minutes.
43. General Russell. Not over five minutes?
Colonel Bicknell. I shouldn’t say so.
44. General Russell. You were very closely in touch with the FBI?
Colonel Bicknell. Yes, sir.
45. General Russell. You were then the military representative of
the Department to whom messages from the FBI would have been
given?
Colonel Bicknell. Yes, sir.
46. General Russell. And you were in there for some months prior to December 7?
Colonel Bicknell. Yes, sir.
47. General Russell. You were there in that connection, and making contact with the Army?
Colonel Bicknell. Yes, sir.
48. General Russell. Now, Colonel, consider carefully this answer. Tell us whether or not, prior to December 7, you [1422] received from the representatives of the FBI other messages relating to information which the FBI had intercepted on telephone or radio calls to Japan—stolen information from telephone calls.
Colonel Bicknell. To the best of my knowledge, I can't remember but one other instance, and that did not in any way enter into the national security picture. It was simply on an individual case of a suspect, where some information had been picked up from an intercepted telephone conversation.
49. General Russell. Do you remember a message which reached the Hawaiian Department some time after the attack out there, in which there were certain signs and symbols that the Japanese used?
Colonel Bicknell. That was not a telephone message, sir. That was a radio message. That was a message that we seized on the morning of December 7, after the war had started. I went down and commandeered the files of the Radio Corporation of America for all messages which had been sent by the Japanese consul to points in Japan, and all messages he had received from Japan, and there was a sheaf, a large number of radio messages, all in code, which we obtained. Those were taken out to the Field Intelligence Officer, and he had made some progress on breaking the Japanese code, and one of those messages was the one to which you refer, in which there was mention of the same case that I mentioned before, the Otto Kuhn case, where Kuhn had arranged this system of prearranged signals which he had given to the Japanese consulate, and they had in turn transmitted it to Japan, as a suggestion from Kuhn as to how information could be sent from the Island.
50. General Frank. To whom?
[1423] Colonel Bicknell. To anyone offshore.
51. General Frank. Who was Kuhn?
Colonel Bicknell. Otto Kuhn is the German who is now sentenced to life imprisonment on this case, an espionage case; a German resident, down there at Lanikai.
52. General Frank. Was he a citizen?
Colonel Bicknell. No, sir. But that didn't come from the FBI, sir. That came through the messages which were intercepted, copies of messages which the Japanese had sent, and it was decoded by the Navy Intelligence people.
53. General Russell. Colonel, all of these messages in this group that you are talking about now were messages that had been sent previously, of which copies had been retained by the Japs and not destroyed, and you seized them after the war started?
Colonel Bicknell. We got some of those that we grabbed, and we also subpoenaed or demanded the actual carbon copies of messages on file with the Radio Corporation of America which had been trans-
mitted for the Japanese; so that we had not only those in the material which came from the Japanese consulate, and in which we found a portion of a code book; there was enough material to add to what the Navy already had to make possible the decipherment of these messages.

54. General Russell. Where are those messages now, do you know?

Colonel Bicknell. There is quite a file of them. The FBI has a complete file.

55. General Frank. Where?

Colonel Bicknell. The OWI has a complete file, too.

[1424] 56. General Frank. Where, in the FBI Department?

Colonel Bicknell. I imagine they have them here, sir. We also have them. They were in my files in Honolulu when I left.

57. General Russell. Do you think we should be able to get our hands on those translated messages when we get out there?

Colonel Bicknell. Yes, sir; yes, sir.

58. General Russell. Now, Colonel, so far as you know, however, and I go back to that question, this one message here is the only one that had been delivered to you by the FBI prior to the attack on December 7?

Colonel Bicknell. Yes, sir.

59. General Russell. Will you glance over the message, a copy of which I have just handed you, and identify that, if possible, as the message about which you have testified, or state that it is not that message?

Colonel Bicknell. Yes, sir; I think this is the message.

60. General Russell. Did you tell General Short what you thought that message meant?

Colonel Bicknell. I told him, sir, that I couldn't evaluate the message. I had the paper in my hand.

61. General Russell. I believe you testified that you could not.

Now, in the light of the subsequent history out there, referring to this conversation about "flowers," have you reached any conclusions as to what might have been meant by the two types of flowers that were blooming there, and the expression of surprise by the man in the homeland as to one type of flower being in bloom?

[1425] Colonel Bicknell. I have reached a theory, as it might be called. I don't think we will ever know the answer, unless, after this war is over, we get the story from the Japanese; but one "hypothesis", I might call it, hit me in the eye, and the thing that impressed me more than anything else were these "poinsettias" and "hibiscus." My wife tells me that, on the morning of December 7, when I stood on the lanai, watching this attack, she asked me, the next time I saw her, some week later, she said, "What in the world were you mumbling about these 'poinsettias and hibiscus' while all this fighting was going on?" It suddenly came to me—again, this has nothing to base it on, but the fact that the "poinsettias" and the "hibiscus" might have been types of "ships". The cruisers were all in, that morning, or a large proportion of the cruisers were in, as well as the battleships, but no carriers were present. Now, a Navy man might say, "Why are those cruisers there, and no carrier? It doesn't make sense." That was perhaps to some extent corroborated by the information which was contained in the submarine data which was obtained after this
submarine had been sunk at Pearl Harbor, in which they had marks on their chart, their observations that they had taken, and it confirmed the fact that no carriers were in Pearl Harbor on the morning of the attack.

As I say, that is simply a thought, there is nothing that I can tie it up to and say it is true, but that thought did run through my mind.

62. General Russell. Now, Colonel, this transcript of the telephone conversation has written on it, with red pencil, here:

[1426] Of December 3, 1941, between a citizen in Honolulu and a military or a naval officer in Tokyo; translated, and available to military, until * * *
December 3, 1944.

There is something there that is illegible.

Now, this attack occurred on the morning of the 7th, and this conversation took place on December 3; is that true?

Colonel Bicknell. That I won't say. I don't remember enough about it to be sure of the dates.

63. General Russell. You cannot identify it? That would be about four days?

Colonel Bicknell. Four days.

64. General Russell. That is, between the date of this and the time the planes arrived at Honolulu?

Colonel Bicknell. Yes, sir.

65. General Russell. Colonel, without divulging any of the secret means used to get this message, would you explain to the Board why this type of message, which now seems to have been a very important one, should have been selected and picked up? Was it a matter of accident, in the operations, out there?

Colonel Bicknell. You mean the actual picking up of that particular message?

66. General Russell. Yes. Were there other messages, and was this selected by the FBI because they considered it more pertinent or material than other messages?

Colonel Bicknell. No, sir; I think that that was due to the fact that they were just getting into a position where they were technically able to do it. This was one of the first really successful intercepts of that type.

67. General Russell. Had they been making efforts prior thereto, to intercept those messages?

Colonel Bicknell. Such efforts had been made; yes, sir.

68. General Russell. Thereafter, between December 3 and December 7, 1941, no other important message was picked up?

Colonel Bicknell. No, sir.

69. General Russell. Were those efforts continued, from December 3 on to December 7?

Colonel Bicknell. Yes, sir; not only that, but I also supplemented them with my own; and I am positive that nothing came out of the consulate by talking, from that date on.

70. General Russell. A lot of this message, as a matter of fact, Colonel, was perfectly inane, innocuous, and meaningless!

Colonel Bicknell. Yes, sir. There is one part that it might be of interest to bear in mind about that message. I think that General Short asked me about that, afterward, and that was the fact that he brought out, that this message, this conversation, took place between
Tokyo and Hawaii. I reminded the General that that was quite true, and that this message was also “scrambled,” but the Japanese had the “unscrambler” in Tokyo to “unscramble” this commercial message, and there is no reason to believe that they didn’t have another “unscrambler” aboard any task force that might be in the vicinity, which was perfectly able to intercept that message and withdraw from it any information which would be of use to them.

71. General Russell. Do you know whether or not there have been any other studies made of this message, except the one made by you, in an effort to determine what it meant?

Colonel Bicknell. I don’t believe there are, sir; not to my knowledge.

[1428] 72. General Russell. I want to identify for the purpose of the record this message about which we have questioned the Colonel.

(Discussion off the record.)

[1429] 73. General Frank. Are you through?

General Russell. Yes.

74. General Frank. Was this conversation radio or cable?

Colonel Bicknell. Radio telephone.

75. General Frank. Radio telephone?

Colonel Bicknell. Yes, sir.

76. General Frank. It could have been picked up, then, by stations at less distance from Honolulu than Tokyo?

Colonel Bicknell. True.

77. General Frank. Following the attack was this message evaluated further to tie into the attack? You said you talked to General Short about it another time?

Colonel Bicknell. Yes, we talked about the message, and he said, “Well, Bicknell, you couldn’t prove anything by that, that it meant anything.”

“Well,” I said, “I still can’t prove anything by it. I can’t prove anything now, and we never will be able to.”

78. General Frank. You never did evaluate the message fully?

Colonel Bicknell. Couldn’t. There wasn’t any—enough to be done; no, sir.

79. General Frank. Yes. Now, down there in your capacity as contact officer did you ever run across a Mr. Hans Wilhelm Rohl?

Colonel Bicknell. Oh, yes.

80. General Frank. Did you ever determine whether Rohl knew this man Kuhn or not?

Colonel Bicknell. He did not know him.

81. General Frank. He did not know him?

Colonel Bicknell. No, sir.

82. General Frank. What is the story on the information that you had on Rohl?

[1430] Colonel Bicknell. To the best of all the investigations that we carried out on Rohl, plus those that the F. B. I. carried out in Hawaii, Rohl was a no-good drunkard but had committed no subversive acts that we could discover, or took no subversive action at all. He was badly mixed up in irregularities, and the case was turned over by me to the Inspector General for handling in his office, as it was not a subversive case.

83. General Frank. What kind of irregularities?
Colonel BICKNELL. Mostly financial, together with a Department Engineer and the contractors, and all mixed up in funny business.
84. General FRANK. Did you ever run across a Werner Plack?
Colonel BICKNELL. Werner Plack? I don’t remember.
85. General FRANK. P-l-a-c-k.
Colonel BICKNELL. No, sir; I don’t remember.
86. General FRANK. If he had shown up in the investigating activities, would there be a record of him in Honolulu?
Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir; he would be in the card file.
87. General FRANK. You stated that Rohl’s drinking activities were well known to you?
Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.
88. General FRANK. Did you know Wyman?
Colonel BICKNELL. Yes, sir.
89. General FRANK. What was his reputation with respect to drinking?
Colonel BICKNELL. I never knew at any time of Colonel Wyman or General Wyman ever being addicted to drinking.
90. General FRANK. Not Lyman.
Colonel BICKNELL. Wyman.
91. General FRANK. Wyman?
[1137] Colonel BICKNELL. Yes; Ted Wyman.
92. General FRANK. As a matter of fact, your assignment had principally to do with civilian activities?
Colonel BICKNELL. Civilian and subversive activity; yes, sir.
93. General FRANK. Yes.
Colonel BICKNELL. The only dealings I ever had with General Wyman when we—
94. General FRANK. Colonel Wyman.
Colonel BICKNELL. Colonel Wyman at that time—suspected sabotage of a dredge down there. That was the only time I came in contact with him.
95. General FRANK. What did you find out about that?
Colonel BICKNELL. Well, he ordered us off the job and said he wouldn’t have any G-2 investigation of it.
96. General FRANK. Colonel Wyman?
Colonel BICKNELL. That is right.
97. General FRANK. Who directed you to go on the job?
Colonel BICKNELL. I went on the job because it was sabotage and it fell under our jurisdiction for subversive activities.
98. General FRANK. Well, did you go to Department headquarters to get authority to go back on again?
Colonel BICKNELL. I reported it to the Department headquarters.
99. General FRANK. To whom in Department headquarters?
Colonel BICKNELL. Fielder. Colonel Fielder.
100. General FRANK. What was done about it?
Colonel BICKNELL. The matter was referred to Washington.
101. General FRANK. And what happened to it?
Colonel BICKNELL. Eventually two months later we got the [1132] case back and we were told to reopen it, and we told them it was too late, too cold; we couldn’t do anything two months afterward.
102. General Grunert. Why was it necessary to refer that case to Washington?
Colonel Bicknell. Because the Department Engineer—
103. General Grunert. District Engineer?
Colonel Bicknell. —was not under the jurisdiction of the Department commander.
104. General Frank. I have nothing further.
General Grunert. I have one more subject here:
The Board heard something about a report that you are alleged to have made or information gathered about certain social activities in or about Honolulu or the Hawaiian Department which, so far as I can gather, you were going to send to the United States, but you had trouble in getting it out of the Department. What is that all about?
Colonel Bicknell. I don't quite understand, sir.
105. General Grunert. Unless my information is not accurate, I understand that there was some sort of a report on social activities in Honolulu or the Hawaiian Department that you attempted to get out; why, I don't know, but you had trouble in getting it out, and finally you mailed it to yourself and in that way got it out. What is that all about, or is that news to you?
Colonel Bicknell. That is a brand new one to me, never heard of it before.
106. General Grunert. Then we shall drop this question. I know nothing else about it, but your name was mentioned as probably being the one. You know nothing about it?
[1433] Colonel Bicknell. No, sir.
107. General Grunert. Well, neither do I.
Are there any other questions?
108. General Frank. Do you know anything as to whether Rohl's use of intoxicating liquor incapacitated him to do his work?
Colonel Bicknell. It did.
109. General Frank. It did?
Colonel Bicknell. There were many days I tried to get him at the office; we couldn't even get him out of the hotel; he was just—
110. General Grunert. Well, did that stop the work or delay the work, or just incapacitate him personally?
Colonel Bicknell. That incapacitated him personally. As to what it did—
111. General Grunert. But the work went on apparently?
Colonel Bicknell. The work went on.
112. General Grunert. As far as you know.
113. Major Clausen. General Frank has asked that I ask a few questions.
When did you first receive that information?
Colonel Bicknell. Which information?
Colonel Bicknell. Oh, this case came up early in '42, I believe, when we got on Rohl's trail for—I can't remember the dates, but when he finally got—he had made the statement that he was an American citizen, and I asked the F. B. I. to check the veracity of that statement. We found that he was not an American citizen, and then shortly after that his citizenship did come through in San Francisco, and I tried to get him into the office to have talks with him, and that was
when I ran into [1434] this difficulty about his drinking, because he just was in no condition to get him in anywhere.

115. General Frank. Where did he live?
Colonel Bicknell. He lived out at the Moana Hotel.

116. Major Clausen. Did you see him before the 7th of December: Rohl?
Colonel Bicknell. Never even knew the man before the 7th of December.

117. Major Clausen. And the information you had about his not being a citizen was received after?
Colonel Bicknell. Yes, sir. It came up in the course of our checking up on all Germans to see what their status was after the war started.

118. Major Clausen. Had you known theretofore that he was a German?
Colonel Bicknell. I knew that he was either a naturalized American or was—I knew he was German born.

119. Major Clausen. Did he talk with a German accent?
Colonel Bicknell. I don’t think I ever heard him talk normally; I don’t know what accent he had. He was usually pretty well under the influence when I did see him, and I didn’t notice any accent at that time.

120. Major Clausen. During, extending over what period of time was he in this drunken condition?
Colonel Bicknell. Oh, he didn’t go out for a week or ten days at a time.

121. General Frank. After December 7th?
Colonel Bicknell. Oh, yes.

122. Major Clausen. And this was over what period of time?
Colonel Bicknell. Oh, I should say we were interested in [1435] the case for a matter of a couple months.

123. Major Clausen. And during that whole time he was in that condition?
Colonel Bicknell. Well, he wasn’t in that condition during the entire time, but there would be spells of a week or ten days, and maybe a week he would be all right, but most of my information about him came through one of the local contractors who was very closely connected with Rohl, and I would ask him in what condition he was and whether it was worth while calling him up, and he would say yes or no.

124. General Frank. Who was that?
Colonel Bicknell. Ralph Woolley.

125. Major Clausen. Did this condition continue then during this period of the same two months after the 7th of December?
Colonel Bicknell. That was the time that I was interested in it, that it was so.

126. Major Clausen. Did you make a report to the Department concerning it?
Colonel Bicknell. Did what?

127. Major Clausen. Did you make a report to your Department concerning the drinking?
Colonel Bicknell. No reason to.
128. General Frank. Didn’t he head up the Hawaiian Constructors?
Colonel Bicknell. Yes.
129. General Frank. He was responsible for their getting the work out?
Colonel Bicknell. The work was going on. It was not dependent on Rohl’s ability to do any work as to whether the job progressed or not. He had plenty of other people there [1436] that were carrying on the work.
130. Major Clausen. Did you meet a Colonel Hunt of the I. G. when he made an investigation in Hawaii?
Colonel Bicknell. I don’t remember that name.
131. Major Clausen. That is all.
132. General Grunert. Anything further? (No response.)
Is there anything that occurs to you that you can tell the Board so as to throw more light on the situation in Hawaii prior to and leading up to the Pearl Harbor attack that might give us leads or give us more information on the subject? In other words, something in your mind that you can tell us that we have not brought out by actual questions?
[1437] Colonel Bicknell. I think there is one thought that should be borne in mind throughout as having a great bearing on our activities in Hawaii, that being the fact that we had a very limited view of this entire picture, and the only picture that we could draw on the larger international situation was what meager bits of information we could pick up from sources in Hawaii or sources coming to Hawaii; and to make any evaluation of a situation as serious as this without the benefit of at least all of the story which was available in Washington was an extremely difficult job.
133. General Grunert. Then, I assume that you didn’t get periodic information from G-2 sources in Washington that would assist you in your work; is that a correct assumption?
Colonel Bicknell. There was never enough information from Washington as to what was going on in the other theaters other than the Hawaiian theater. We had very little that came to us on the activities in Manila, that is, the intelligence activities.
134. General Grunert. What information would you have liked to have had if you could have said, Give me information on this or that?
Colonel Bicknell. I would have liked to have known more information about the sudden cessation of Japanese shipping in the Pacific.
135. General Grunert. Whereabouts particularly in the Pacific?
Colonel Bicknell. We knew, of course, that they were not coming into Hawaii, but I would like to have known whether or not the Japanese shipping to South America had either stopped [1438] entirely or had diminished or was discontinued.
136. General Grunert. Did it ever occur to you that you might get that if you asked for it?
Colonel Bicknell. I think that request was made.
137. General Grunert. Through Fielder?
Colonel Bicknell. No, sir. That request was made by the F. B. I.
138. General Grunert. To their F. B. I. sources here, presumably?
Colonel Bicknell. Yes, sir.
139. General Grunert. To their F. B. I. sources in Washington?
Colonel Bicknell. There is one great advantage in speaking of
this F. B. I. business in Hawaii that might give a little better picture
of our activities.

140. General Frank. One advantage or disadvantage?
Colonel Bicknell. One great advantage, was the fact that when
the F. B. I. came to Hawaii in '39 I was then in civilian capacity but
still greatly interested in G-2 from the last war, and I worked with
Mr. Shivers on the establishment of his outfit down there, and he was
very gracious in taking the suggestions as to the method of building
up his system in Hawaii, and I worked on the basis that if war ever
came it would be absolutely imperative that we be able to have complete
coordination between the investigative agencies of the War Depart-
ment, the F. B. I., and O. N. I.; and going on duty in 1940 we instituted
a series of weekly conferences that were attended every week by the
District Intelligence Officer of the Navy, by Mr. Shivers of the F. B. L,
and myself; and all of the [1439] information and all of the
methods of obtaining information and all the plans were coordinated
between the three agencies long before there was any direct evidence
of hostilities coming out to Hawaii.

It was done so completely that even our plans for the seizure of
suspect aliens and Japanese had been completed and was filed, copies
sent to Washington, early in November under three alternate plans.
Plan 3 was put into effect at 3 o'clock on the afternoon of December
7th and was completed by midnight. The contact office of the Army
had been placed physically in the same building with the F. B. I.,
in adjacent offices, and with the declaration of martial law the F. B. I.
became a portion our Intelligence. Under martial law it became a
part of G-2 to all intents and purposes, their people working with me
and for me, and we immediately augmented our counter-intelligence
staff by taking over the F. B. I. in toto. So that it was often very
possible to get more information through the F. B. I. due to the fact
that they had almost daily telephone conversations with Washington;
and if we wanted something in a hurry it was possible to get it—the
F. B. I. to call Washington and get it by phone, whereas the Army
radio circuits were so cluttered up that if we sent a radio we wouldn't
get an answer for three or four days.

141. General Frank. Did the Army ever give you any information
after you asked for it?
Colonel Bicknell. Well, we didn't get any great amount that I
could find. There is a record in Hawaii; I believe it is early in No-

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there were some forty copies distributed to the Army, the Navy, and the F. B. I.

144. General Grunert. Those were your personal summaries, or who else collaborated with you in making such summaries?

Colonel Bicknell. They were the collaboration of my officers and noncommissioned officers. I had one noncommissioned officer who had a great deal of experience with Japanese and spoke the language fluently. I had two Japanese officers who were very good. And also this information was always worked out in collaboration with the F. B. I.

145. General Frank. How many civilians did you have working in your office for you?

Colonel Bicknell. You mean civilians as such?

146. General Frank. Yes.

Colonel Bicknell. Of C. I. G., men in civilian clothes?

147. General Frank. No; I am talking about civilians now, first. [1447] Colonel Bicknell. Oh, about eight.

148. General Frank. How many military personnel, total, did you have working for you in your counter-intelligence work?

Colonel Bicknell. In December, on the morning of December 7th I believe I had 39.

149. General Frank. That made a total, civilian and military of?

Colonel Bicknell. 47.

150. General Frank. 47.

Colonel Bicknell. 48. That figure later went up to around 125.

151. General Grunert. That appears to close the subject, unless you can remember something else that you think might help us.

Colonel Bicknell. I think that perhaps a careful examination of the G-2 files or the counter-intelligence files in Hawaii might be worth while.

152. General Grunert. And how much of a job would that be?

Colonel Bicknell. I don’t know the condition of the files now, but I would say it would probably be maybe three or four hours’ work.

153. General Russell. Where would these files be, Colonel?

Colonel Bicknell. They would be in the Dillingham Building.

154. General Russell. Downtown?

Colonel Bicknell. Yes, sir.

155. General Russell. They would not be at the G-2 office in Hawaii?

Colonel Bicknell. No, sir;

156. General Russell. Do you know who is out there operating [1442] that office now?

Colonel Bicknell. I believe there is a Major Meurlott, M-e-u-r-l-o-t-t.

157. General Russell. How long would it take to go through them if we had them? Are there a lot of them? That is what I was after.

Colonel Bicknell. A lot of them. Practically all of the information that is in those files, of importance, is also in the F. B. I. files here. I don’t know whether you have access to those.

158. General Russell. That is all I have to ask.

159. General Grunert. There appear to be no more questions. Thank you very much, Colonel.
(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

General GRUNERT. We have a letter from General Miles under date of 18 August 1944, in reference to his testimony of 8 August 1944, starting on page 91, which will be marked Exhibit No. 20.

(Letter of August 18, 1944, from General Miles to General Grunert was marked Exhibit No. 20, and received in evidence.)

(Addendum to General Miles' testimony will be found on page 132-A.)

(Thereupon, at 5:40 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)
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TUESDAY, AUGUST 22, 1944

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DOCUMENTS

Navy Message of October 16, 1941 ........................................ 1503-A
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EXHIBITS

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1 Pages referred to are represented by italic figures enclosed by brackets and indicate pages of original transcript of proceedings.
The Board at 9 a. m., pursuant to recess on yesterday, conducted the hearing of witnesses, Lt. Gen. George Grunert, president of the Board, presiding.


Present also: Colonel Charles W. West, Recorder, Major Henry C. Clausen, Assistant Recorder, and Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, Jr., Executive Officer.

General Grunert. The Board will come to order.

TESTIMONY OF COLONEL LOUIS W. TRUMAN, CHIEF OF STAFF, 84TH DIVISION, CAMP CLAIBORNE, LOUISIANA

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Will you state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station?

Colonel Truman. Louis W. Truman, Colonel, Chief of Staff, 84th Division, Camp Claiborne, Louisiana.

2. General Grunert. Colonel, the Board is after facts about what happened prior to and during the attack on Pearl Harbor, and we hope that through your assignment at that time you may possibly give us some facts or give us some leads toward other facts.

What was your assignment while you were on duty in Hawaii in 1941?

Colonel Truman. I was assigned as Aide to Lieutenant General Short. On the 1st of March, 1941. I arrived in Hawaii on the 28th of February, 1941, and from that time until the 28th of February, 1942, I was assigned as Aide-de-camp. I returned to the mainland with General Short on the 12th day of January, 1942.

3. General Grunert. Is it true that he always took you with him when he went to have conferences with the Navy?

Colonel Truman. It is true, sir. I can remember no time that General Short went to a conference without my going along. I will say this, however, that I did not sit in on the conferences. I went with him to all Navy conferences and usually stayed out with the flag lieutenant.

4. General Grunert. Then you do not know what they conferred about?
Colonel Truman. I do not, sir.

5. General Grunert. Where were these conferences usually held?
Colonel Truman. The conferences were held in Admiral Kimmel's office at Pearl Harbor, as well as at Admiral Bloch's office.

6. General Grunert. Their offices ashore?
Colonel Truman. Their offices ashore; that is right, sir.

7. General Grunert. And you were not in on the conferences?

[1446] 8. Colonel Truman. I was not, sir.
General Grunert. Were you informed of what took place at the conferences?

Colonel Truman. Only one time, and that was when they were planning a photographic mission over the Marshall Islands.

9. General Grunert. That was the only time he discussed with you what took place at the conferences?
Colonel Truman. That is correct, sir.

10. General Grunert. How frequent were those conferences; do you recall?
Colonel Truman. I have been trying to remember that, sir. I would have to give an educated guess, because I have no way of telling. From the time that the radiogram was received, either on the 27th or 28th of November—I do not remember the exact date—there were conferences held in Admiral Kimmel's office at which General Short attended and, as I remember, he took his G-3 or his Chief of Staff with him. These conferences, one in particular, I remember, lasted well over an hour. That was in Admiral Kimmel's personal office. I remember that Captain Smith, the Chief of Staff of Admiral Kimmel, was in on that conference, as well as other officers.

11. General Grunert. Do you recall whether General Martin was there?
Colonel Truman. I believe that he was; yes, sir. I believe he was. To the best of my recollection, I believe that he was, sir.

12. General Grunert. Was it your understanding that that conference was being held to discuss messages received either [1447] by the Navy or General Short as to the situation over there at that time?
Colonel Truman. I cannot definitely state exactly what the purpose of the meeting was. It was my understanding at the time, though, that it was for the purpose of conferring on such a matter; yes, sir. But for me to state definitely that it was called for that purpose, I cannot do that; I do not remember. It was my understanding, though, that they were conferring on that matter. I do not know what went on inside the room, sir.

13. General Grunert. Do you recall how many conferences, either of General Short with Admiral Kimmel or of General Short with Admiral Bloch, were held after the November 27th conference up to the date of the attack?
Colonel Truman. For me to state definitely, sir, I cannot, sir. I believe there was more than one; I believe there were about three. But if I may state this: that when the Roberts Commission was coming over there, Colonel Fleming and I sat down and prepared a statement for General Short, and in that statement are the times and the dates that these conferences were held. I cannot state definitely.
believe there was more than one. I do not believe there were more than three.

14. General Grunert. Did General Short and Admiral Kimmel, or General Short and Admiral Bloch, get together frequently, aside from those formal conferences?

Colonel Truman. Yes, sir. They played golf numerous times on Sunday mornings.

15. General Grunert. All three of them?

[1448] Colonel Truman. At one time I believe Admiral Bloch and Admiral Kimmel played golf with General Short. I am certain that Admiral Bloch played golf with General Short on Sunday mornings more than once. I know that Admiral Kimmel played golf with General Short on Sunday mornings, because I was a member of the foursome. The relations between General Short and Admiral Kimmel were always friendly, and the same as far as Admiral Bloch was concerned. As far as I can determine—and I have thought over it many times since then—there were never any strained relations between them; none whatsoever, sir, that I could determine.

16. General Grunert. We had hoped that you knew something about what took place in those conferences; but apparently you do not.

Colonel Truman. No, sir; I do not.

17. General Grunert. Is there anything relating to this matter that you think might be of assistance to the Board or that you would like to bring to the Board's attention?

Colonel Truman. The only thing that I can state, sir, is that as far as I can determine, and as far as I know, there were no strained relations between the Army and Navy in Hawaii. I believe—this is my own personal opinion—that they got together.

18. General Grunert. Were you in a position to know to what extent they got together?

Colonel Truman. None more than I believe that had there been any strained relations I would certainly have known about it, sir.

19. General Grunert. Outside of wanting to know, of course, [1449] how they got along, we would like to know how much getting along was being done.

Colonel Truman. I cannot state that, sir; I do not know.

20. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not they had frequent conferences between the respective staffs?

Colonel Truman. They had a liaison officer over at Department Headquarters practically all the time.

21. General Grunert. Do you know whether or not they had frequent or infrequent gatherings of the various members of the staff to discuss this or that?

Colonel Truman. It is my opinion that the gatherings were between General Short and Admiral Kimmel. With him, of course, at different times was General Martin, the Air Commander over there, sir.

22. General Grunert. Do you know anything about a discussion that took place, if one did take place, as to what type of alert to take as a result of this message of November 27?

Colonel Truman. There was a meeting in the office of the Chief of Staff around two-thirty on the day that that message was received.
At that time the members of the General Staff and Special Staff were there. I was present.

23. General Frank. This was on Saturday?
Colonel Truman. As soon as they received the message, sir.

24. General Grunert. It was after the receipt of that message?
Colonel Truman. Yes, sir.

25. General Grunert. Was it after the conference had been held with the Navy?
Colonel Truman. That, sir, I cannot say; I do not remember.

Colonel Truman. The General and Special Staffs were notified of the seriousness or, rather, of the strained relations, and at that time it was decided that Alert No. 1 would be put into effect.

27. General Grunert. Was General Short present at that conference?
Colonel Truman. I believe he was, sir. He might have been in the other room. Again I will have to state that it is rather hazy in my mind.

28. General Grunert. Was there a discussion about what measures should be taken, or was it just an announcement of the decision?
Colonel Truman. An announcement of the decision, as I remember it, sir.

29. General Grunert. This staff meeting was an announcement of the decision?
Colonel Truman. That is right, sir.

30. General Frank. It was not a discussion as to what they should do?
Colonel Truman. I believe they had a discussion before I got there, sir. When I arrived they were giving their decision. I am sure there must have been a staff meeting before.

31. General Grunert. You do not know whether there was any discussion about the type of alert?
Colonel Truman. I am sure there was not, sir. I will have to admit that my knowledge of exactly what these meetings were concerned with—I did not get in on any of them, except [1451] that I do know that there were meetings held between the Army and Navy, between General Short and Admiral Kimmel, and between General Short and Admiral Bloch.

32. General Frank. I would like to ask a couple of questions. Did Admirals Kimmel and Bloch ever come over to General Short’s headquarters for conference?
Colonel Truman. Yes, sir; reasonably frequently, sir. I would say once every week or two weeks. There were numerous times when they came over to the Shafter headquarters, as well as General Short going over to Pearl Harbor to Admiral Bloch’s and Admiral Kimmel’s offices.

33. General Frank. Who was the naval liaison officer at Department Headquarters? Was it Lieutenant Burr?
Colonel Truman. Yes, sir.

34. General Frank. Did you know him?
Colonel Truman. Reasonably well; yes, sir.

35. General Frank. Was he an active, alert, “go-getting” liaison officer, or was his presence over there more in the nature of a token?
Colonel Truman. I do not believe it was taken at all. When we were on the maneuvers he was quite active. I don't believe he was a "deadhead."

36. General Frank. He was sufficiently active so that he was alive to things that were happening to such an extent that you feel he would go out of his way to see that the Navy got everything that happened at Department Headquarters?

Colonel Truman. I think so, sir; and I also think that the G-3 would have thrown him out if he had not been.

[1452] 37. General Frank. What G-3?

Colonel Truman. Colonel Donegan, who was the G-3 of the Department. He worked in the G-3 office.

38. General Russell. Colonel, do you remember General Short's going to a dinner at Schofield Barracks on the night of December 6?

Colonel Truman. Yes, sir.

39. General Russell. Did you go with him?

Colonel Truman. No, sir.

40. General Russell. Do you remember about what time he left home.

Colonel Truman. I would say he arrived back about nine-thirty that night, sir. I think he went to Colonel Roosma's that night at Schofield Barracks.

41. General Russell. I was not interested in that end of it.

Do you remember Colonel Bicknell?

Colonel Truman. Yes, sir; very well.

42. General Russell. Were you present when he came out late in the afternoon of December 6 to have a conference with General Short and Colonel Fielder?

Colonel Truman. No, sir; I was not present. I might have been in the headquarters, but I was not present at any conference they had.

43. General Russell. Did you live over at General Short's house?

Colonel Truman. No, sir; I lived next door, at Department Headquarters. I had quarters No. 10.

44. General Russell. General Short came home about nine-thirty that night?

[1453] Colonel Truman. As I remember, he did.

45. General Russell. Who went with him?

Colonel Truman. I believe that Mrs. Short went out there with him.

46. General Russell. That is all.

47. General Grunert. There is nothing else that occurs to you that you think might help the Board?

Colonel Truman. No, sir. The only thing I can say is that I believe there were no strained relations between the Army and Navy at that time. I am certain of that, sir.

48. General Grunert. Thank you very much for coming. We are sorry that you cannot give us more information.

Colonel Truman. I am too.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(The Board took a brief recess, at the conclusion of which the following proceedings took place:)

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TESTIMONY OF SERGEANT LOWELL V. KLATT

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. Colonel West. Sergeant, will you state to the Board your name, grade, organization, and station?
   Sergeant Klatt. First Sergeant Lowell V. Klatt, Battery A, 509th Gun Battalion, Semimobile.

2. General Grunert. Sergeant, the Board is after facts as to what happened prior to and during the Pearl Harbor attack. Now, the reason I asked that you be sent here was that it appeared in the Roberts Commission report that you had been a witness and that you made some statements here on which I want a little more information.

   What was your actual assignment or position, in what organization, and where, during the attack of December 7th?

   Sergeant Klatt. Well, I was Communications Sergeant at the time, sir, in Headquarters Battery, 1st Battalion, 98th Coast Artillery, then stationed at Schofield Barracks.

3. General Grunert. Schofield Barracks?
   Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir.

4. General Grunert. Who was your immediate Commander, and in what regiment did you serve?
   Sergeant Klatt. The regiment I was in was the 98th Coast Artillery, and Colonel—

5. General Grunert. Well, if you have forgotten his name, it doesn’t make much difference.
   Sergeant Klatt. It slips my mind just now, sir.

6. General Grunert. And that organization was an anti-aircraft organization, was it?
   Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir.

7. General Grunert. And what did the organization consist of? Was there a full regiment with a certain number of battalions?
   Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir; it was a regiment of antiaircraft guns, searchlights, and automatic weapons.

8. General Grunert. And they were stationed at Schofield, were they?
   Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir.

9. General Grunert. What did the plans call for that they were to do in case of an attack?
   Sergeant Klatt. Well, we had our field positions set up around Wheeler Field, also at Schofield Barracks there, and in case of attack our job was to go man those field positions.

10. General Grunert. Then, as I understand, Wheeler Field is near Schofield?
   Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir, just about a mile and a half below Schofield Barracks; it is still in the same reservation.

11. General Grunert. And then when your notice came you were to go down in positions already selected in and about Wheeler Field?
   Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir.

12. General Grunert. To ward off any air attacks primarily?
   Sergeant Klatt. Right, sir.

13. General Grunert. Now describe to us a little bit what your equipment was for antiaircraft purposes.
Sergeant Klatt. Well, the gun battalions at the time were 3-inch guns. Shortly after the war started we received 90-millimeter, and we had searchlights and .50-caliber machine guns, .30-caliber machine guns, for antiaircraft defense.

14. General Grunert. Just what did you have charge of?

Sergeant Klatt. I was in charge of the communication section for the 1st Battalion, sir.

15. General Grunert. And in that communication section what equipment was it necessary to move down or near position, or what equipment did you have to move and where did you have to move it to in order to get into action?

Sergeant Klatt. I had communication lines strung to each battery gun position from the Battalion C. P., which was located at Wahiawa, just on the outskirts of Schofield Barracks, in an old C. C. camp.

16. General Grunert. Then you had your communications equipment in, but you had to go from Schofield to that C. P. to start operating?

Sergeant Klatt. That is right, sir.

17. General Frank. May I ask him a question?

General Grunert. Yes.

18. General Frank. How many battalions in this regiment?

Sergeant Klatt. Three, sir.

19. General Frank. What were they?

Sergeant Klatt. Two gun battalions and a searchlight and automatic weapon battalion.

20. General Frank. Two of the large antiaircraft, 3-inch?

Sergeant Klatt. That is right.


Sergeant Klatt. Two 3-inch gun battalions, and then another battalion made up of automatic weapons and searchlights.

22. General Frank. How many batteries in the gun battalions?

Sergeant Klatt. There were six gun batteries.

23. General Frank. Per battalion?

Sergeant Klatt. No; that was three per battalion, and a headquarters battery, each battalion.

24. General Frank. Three gun batteries. And how many guns in a battery?

Sergeant Klatt. Four, sir.

25. General Frank. So that was 24 guns?

Sergeant Klatt. That is right, sir.

26. General Frank. Now let us get down to the other battalion. What was in it?

Sergeant Klatt. That was made up of one battery of searchlights.

27. General Frank. How many searchlights?

Sergeant Klatt. I believe there were 32, sir. And the other three batteries were made up of automatic weapons: that would be .50-caliber machine guns, and at that time we had the 37-millimeter rapid-firing antiaircraft guns.

28. General Frank. How many batteries of machine guns?

Sergeant Klatt. Well, the batteries were made up of four 37-millimeter and four .50-caliber machine guns to each battery.

29. General Frank. And how many batteries?

Sergeant Klatt. Three batteries of those, sir.
30. General Frank. Three batteries of 37-millimeter?
Sergeant Klatt. That is right.
31. General Frank. And three batteries of .50-caliber?
Sergeant Klatt. No, sir. The .50-caliber and 37-millimeter went together in each battery.

[1458] 32. General Frank. Therefore you had how many batteries in that battalion?
Sergeant Klatt. In that battalion there was one searchlight battery and three gun batteries.
33. General Frank. That is four batteries?
Sergeant Klatt. Four batteries altogether; right, sir.
34. General Frank. Plus the headquarters battery?
Sergeant Klatt. Plus the headquarters battery.
35. General Frank. All right. Now, in which battalion were you?
Sergeant Klatt. 1st Battalion, sir.
36. General Frank. What did they have?
Sergeant Klatt. They had the 3-inch guns.
37. General Grunert. Did you have to take any equipment from Schofield to the command post in order to operate?
Sergeant Klatt. No, sir, we did not. Our equipment was all out there at the time.
38. General Frank. In position?
Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir. It was set up in this old C. C. camp.
39. General Grunert. Now, we have this statement of yours before the Roberts Commission to the effect that you said that your switchboard and the battle post telephone were in the supply room, not installed.
Sergeant Klatt. Well, sir, that was a precautionary measure against theft. We had our wires all in, all tagged, ready to set up. It took a matter of maybe three minutes to connect all telephones and switchboards up; three to five [1459] minutes was all; and that is the only reason we didn’t have the telephones and switchboard. In other words, it was a matter of theft, because we didn’t want them stolen, because we did not have equipment guards.
40. General Grunert. Then all the equipment was not actually installed? Some of it was in the supply room?
Sergeant Klatt. That is right.
41. General Grunert. Where was the supply room?
Sergeant Klatt. The supply room was at our battery position in Schofield Barracks.
42. General Grunert. Schofield Barracks. And you had, then, to take the switchboard and certain telephone equipment down to the C. P. to install it and get it operating?
Sergeant Klatt. That is right, sir.
43. General Grunert. Then about how long did that take?
Sergeant Klatt. It didn’t take long. We had our equipment on our trucks and were down there in, oh, I wouldn’t say over twenty minutes at the most, to get to our position.
44. General Grunert. Had you practiced getting that stuff out in a hurry and making hurried connections?
Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir, we had. We had been doing that for weeks previous.
45. General Grunert. That is one reason I wanted to question you. If your switchboard and your battle post telephone equipment was stored some place, it didn’t look as if you were on the alert as far as being prepared to take immediate action was concerned. That was one reason I wanted to ask you these questions.

[1460] Now, then, under Alert No. 1, the so-called sabotage alert, it did not require you to occupy your positions, did it?

Sergeant Klatt. No, sir.

46. General Grunert. Therefore, you didn’t occupy them until after the attack started, and you were then under Alert 3; is that right?

Sergeant Klatt. That is right, sir.

47. General Grunert. We will say the attack took place approximately at 7:55 on Sunday morning. About when were you instructed to go to battle position under Alert 3? About what time?

Sergeant Klatt. My communications officer notified me—well, we slept very close together there. He notified me, oh, I would say about twenty minutes or twenty-five minutes of eight, Sunday morning, to get my stuff together an dhit the field.

48. General Grunert. Twenty-five minutes of eight?

Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir.

49. General Grunert. And that was before actual bombing started?

Sergeant Klatt. I believe it was, sir.

50. General Grunert. Do you know what source of information he had that something was going to happen?

Sergeant Klatt. I do not, sir.

51. General Frank. Who was he?

Sergeant Klatt. Lieutenant Saltsman.

52. General Frank. Saltsman.

53. General Grunert. About when did you actually get in [1461] position to start firing?

Sergeant Klatt. Well, sir, it wasn’t our job to get into position for firing. My job was communications, and I was set up and ready for communications. I had communications to each battery before the batteries were there with their guns in the field themselves.

54. General Grunert. Do you recall at about what time the guns were got in position so that you had communications, all of them, ready for action?

Sergeant Klatt. Well, that exact time, sir, I couldn’t say to now.

55. General Grunert. Was there any actual action after you were all ready?

Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir.

56. General Grunert. Did the battalion actually do any firing?

Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir, they did. We were strafed at approximately eight o’clock at our battery position by some planes that had dumped their bombs on Wheeler Field, and our battery battalion C. P. was in a direct line with the Wheeler Field runway, because they came down the runway along right over our battalion C. P., and a couple of them had strafed us.

57. General Grunert. Did you get in action against those planes?

Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir. The communications officer, Lieutenant
Saltman, and I were both fortunate enough to knock one of them down with B. A. R. fire.

58. General Grunert. B. A. R. fire. How effective was that?

[1463] General Frank. What does that stand for?


Sergeant Klatt. Browning automatic rifle, sir.

60. General Grunert. How effective was this antiaircraft action against low-flying aircraft?

Sergeant Klatt. You mean of our large guns, sir?

61. General Grunert. Of all the equipment you had.

Sergeant Klatt. Most of it was over before they got into position and got ammunition, and so forth, to really do any firing. The firing that the battalion did was done that night on a sabotage alert or attack that happened that night, later in the day, evening.

62. General Grunert. Have you any questions, General Russell?

63. General Russell. Sergeant, this movement into the gun positions and bringing up the ammunition: I believe you state that it was probably that night before they were ready to fire?

Sergeant Klatt. That is right, sir. It was later on, late that afternoon and early evening, before they were ready to really fire, because I know they had difficulty getting ammunition, or something like that.

64. General Russell. Now, the guns were actually out and set up; is that true? You left the guns in position?

Sergeant Klatt. No, sir; the guns were in the barracks.

65. General Russell. They had to be taken out?

Sergeant Klatt. They had to be taken out to the gun positions; yes, sir.

66. General Russell. How were they mounted?

Sergeant Klatt. They were a double bogie wheeled mount, [1463] towed by prime movers.

67. General Russell. Prime movers?

Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir.

68. General Frank. The 3-inch guns were in the barracks?

Sergeant Klatt. They were'nt in the barracks. They were in the gun park area, which was up in the barracks area.

69. General Frank. I mean the barracks area.

Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir.

70. General Russell. Now, do you happen to know where the ammunition was?

Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir. The ammunition was stored at the Schofield ammunition warehouses, which were in lower Schofield, down in the ammunition dumps.

71. General Russell. How far were the guns from the ammunition warehouses?

Sergeant Klatt. You mean after they were set up in the field positions, sir?


73. General Russell. The ammunition warehouse.

Sergeant Klatt. About one mile down, sir.

74. General Russell. And then these guns had to go various distances to get into the different positions?

Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir.
75. General Russell. Now, you said you had a prime mover. What capacity was it? Do you know?

Sergeant Klatt. I believe it was around a 4½- or 5-ton prime mover, sir. I believe that it what we had at that time. They were Corbetts.

[1464] 76. General Russell. The men were all in the barracks when this alert came or when the orders came?

Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir; they were in the barrack area somewheres around, sir.

77. General Russell. And they had to assemble the units and form them and then get the guns and get the ammunition and get into position?

Sergeant Klatt. That is correct, sir.

78. General Russell. Sergeant, was there a night attack, or were you just shooting a little bit?

Sergeant Klatt. I believe it was just a shooting scare, sir.

79. General Russell. Just started shooting at something?

Sergeant Klatt. Somebody got the idea there was something overhead and came over with the A. A. S., and they opened fire with gun batteries.

80. General Russell. Did you have more than one attack up where those gun positions were that day?

Sergeant Klatt. Well, it all happened in the morning. There were about three different attacks that hit Wheeler Field, and then they strafed upper Schofield that morning; probably three different waves of planes, I believe.

81. General Russell. Now, you did not fire in one of these three daylight raids?

Sergeant Klatt. Not with the large guns, sir, no.

82. General Russell. Just this automatic stuff?

Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir.

83. General Russell. It must have been flying rather low for [1465] you to have gotten them with the B. A. R., wasn't it?

Sergeant Klatt. It was, sir. It was maybe about a hundred feet high and not over one hundred and fifty feet away from us.

84. General Russell. How long had you been on duty out there in the Islands?

Sergeant Klatt. Oh, I had arrived over there around July 11, sir, of 1941.

85. General Russell. Had there been any other alerts prior to this alert which began sometime in the latter part of November?

Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir. We had been out in the field positions at that time. We had been moved out into field positions, and we had stayed there several days.

86. General Russell. How many times from the date of your arrival until this one in late November had you been out in the field to stay?

Sergeant Klatt. Well, we had been out on a couple of maneuvers where we had gone out in the field, set up established positions, maintained communications and everything else with the other gun batteries and moved in. They were only of a day or two duration, and then late in November I know we went out and we stayed several
days, because I remember it rained like the devil the whole time we were out.

87. General Russell. So you recall three times you had been out? Sergeant Klatt. Approximately, sir. Yes, sir.

88. General Russell. You do not know whether there was a general alert in the Island or whether it was for the purpose \[1466\] of training that antiaircraft outfit that you were in?

Sergeant Klatt. No, sir; I do not.

89. General Russell. That is all.

90. General Grunert. The ammunition that was in storage at Schofield, was there no ammunition that went directly with the guns to the position?

Sergeant Klatt. No, sir; we had no ammunition, no live ammunition with the guns.

91. General Grunert. So when the guns went to their position did they have to stop and get ammunition, or was ammunition hauled directly to the guns from storage?

Sergeant Klatt. The guns went directly to their field positions, and then the ammunition was hauled from the ammunition dump to them.

92. General Grunert. Then, whatever delay there was in getting guns in position so they could fire was getting ammunition to them, was it?

Sergeant Klatt. I believe that took the longest, sir; yes, getting the ammunition to the guns, because it didn’t take long for the guns to reach their position and it doesn’t take long to set up a gun battery to fire.

93. General Grunert. In your description before the Roberts Commission as to bringing down the plane by B. A. R. fire, it seems here that when you examined the plane brought down, between you and Lieutenant Saltsman you determined that the motor was of an American make:

Sergeant Klatt. It was a Wright engine, sir.

94. General Grunert. Wright engine. And that the parachute \[1467\] was of an American manufacture?

Sergeant Klatt. I believe it was, sir.

95. General Grunert. You didn’t by chance bring down one of our own planes, did you?

Sergeant Klatt. No, sir; it was a Japanese plane.

96. General Grunert. The plane, as far as you could determine had an American motor and an American propeller?

Sergeant Klatt. That is right, sir. It was a Hamilton Standard propeller or a propeller made under American patents in Japan.

97. General Russell. They weren’t Americans in it, were they?

Sergeant Klatt. No, sir; they weren’t.

98. General Russell. How many were in it?

Sergeant Klatt. Two.

99. General Russell. They were both killed in the crash?

Sergeant Klatt. Yes, sir.

100. General Grunert. Any other questions?


102. General Grunert. Colonel, can you think of anything?

103. Colonel Toulmin. No, sir.
104. **General Grunert.** Colonel West?

105. **Colonel West.** No, sir.

106. **Major Clausen.** We offer in evidence a transcript of the telephone conversation that occurred on December 3, 1941, between a citizen in Honolulu, a Dr. Mori, and a person in Tokyo, which was referred to yesterday by Colonel Bicknell of G-2, as the exhibit next in order.

[1468] (Photostatic copy of transcript of telephone conversation of December 3, 1941, between Dr. Mori and Tokyo, was marked Exhibit No. 21 and received in evidence.)

107. **General Grunert.** Now, at this point the Board proceeds to other business.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 11:25 o'clock a. m., the Board proceeded to other business.)

**Afternoon Session**

(The Board, at 4 o'clock p. m., continued the hearing of witnesses.)

**General Grunert.** The Board will come to order.

**Testimony of Admiral Claude C. Bloch, U. S. Navy (Retired); On Active Duty as a Member of the General Board**

(The witness was sworn by the Recorder and advised of his rights under Article of War 24.)

1. **Colonel West.** Admiral, will you please state to the Board your name, rank, organization, and station.

**Admiral Bloch.** My name is Claude C. Bloch; Admiral, U. S. Navy; retired; on active duty as a member of the General Board.

I understand my rights, and do I understand that this evidence can be used in judicial proceedings against me, in the Navy?

2. **Colonel West.** That would be a question for the Navy Department to determine.

**Admiral Bloch.** You told me it was. You just told me it was. I would like to know if that is correct.

3. **Colonel West.** As a general proposition, any voluntary admissions are admissible before courts and boards. Now, I am not prepared to say whether some statutory provision or regulation of the Navy Department might exclude this.

**Admiral Bloch.** All right.

4. **General Grunert.** That is our procedure in the Army. Whether it applies in the Navy or not, I know not.

5. **General Russell.** I think the construction of that is that you cannot take that and introduce it into evidence so that it would become binding, but you can use anything he says in his testimony here as a basis for cross-examining him, to ask him if he did not so testify. In other words, it is not confidential, but it is not evidence to be introduced in the other trial and used, as stated by the Colonel, Admiral Bloch, but it may be used as a basis for impeachment. That is what it amounts to.

6. **General Grunert.** Admiral, the Board is attempting to get at the facts as to what happened, both prior to and leading up to the attack and during the attack at Pearl Harbor, and we hope that be-
cause of your assignment at that time you will be able to throw some light on the subject and give us some facts, and give us probably some leads to other facts.

Now, will you please state to the Board your assignment and generally your duties thereunder during the year 1941, giving the dates.

Admiral Bloch. I went to Pearl Harbor in April 1940. My duty was Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, and also Commandant of the Navy Yard. As Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, I had a dual status under general orders of the Navy Department, in that I was a Commandant of the District, acting under the orders of the Navy Department, and also I was an officer in the Fleet, available for assignment by the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, in task groups, as he saw fit.

7. General Grunert. As Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, what was your official relationship to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, and to the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department?

Admiral Bloch. At that time I was a Rear Admiral in the Navy. The Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet, who was also the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, was an Admiral. He was physically present from the time that he assumed com- [1477] mand, in February 1941, until the date that he was detached, in mid December 1941. In my duties as an officer of the Fleet, he was my immediate superior in command and I was his subordinate.

The Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department was Lt. Gen. Short. He took command of the Hawaiian Department early in February 1941. General Short, as Commander of the Hawaiian Department, and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, were cooperating with the view to attaining the best results in the joint coastal frontier defense.

8. General Frank. Admiral, you stated that, as Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, you were available for assignment by the Admiral of the Fleet; but, as Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, did that situation make the Admiral of the Fleet responsible for the operation of the Fourteenth Naval District?

Admiral Bloch. The Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet commanded the Fleet. I was an officer of the Fleet. In one of my dual statuses, I was an officer of the Fleet, so he was my superior in that respect. All of those assignments as an officer of the Fleet were entirely related to the preparations for offensive and defensive action in time of war; to military matters, purely.

9. General Frank. Who was your next superior with respect to administration of the District?

Admiral Bloch. I was supposed be a decentralized Navy Department for local affairs, acting under the instructions of the Navy Department direct. That work related almost entirely to administrative things like plans, buildings, work of the [1472] navy yard, repairing ships, buying land, building houses, and construction, and things like that.

10. General Grunert. But, in so far as the defense of the naval installations at Pearl Harbor was concerned, you were directly under the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet?
Admiral Bloch. I don’t want to burden you with more details of this complicated set-up.

11. General Grunert. No, we just want to get an understanding of it.

Admiral Bloch. And I have avoided mentioning the Hawaiian naval coastal sea frontier, which is another thing of which I had the command and was supposed to have a force for; but I think it is better to leave that out because I don’t think it has much bearing. What we are concerned with in this matter, as I see it, is my duties as an officer of the fleet, with the Commander-in-Chief present at all times, and I being his subordinate.

Now, I was also the Commandant of the District as related to the routine administrative duties—pay, and all those things; buildings, grounds, and all that, and my subordinates there in the Navy Department; and the Commander-in-Chief had little or no interest in the Department, but he did have an extreme interest in all the things that related to the base—its weapons, its facilities, its storage things, food, its logistics, oil, docks, water, protection; and such services as I could render in the way of mine-sweeping, antisubmarine patrols, and things like that; and I had some small forces for that purpose. I think that’s about as clear as I can put it.

12. General Grunert. Could he have relieved you as Commanding General, or as Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, on his own authority, without reference to the Navy Department?

Admiral Bloch. No. I think he could have done it, but he would have had to have the approval of the Navy.

13. General Grunert. Then he could only use you in your location, there?

Admiral Bloch. That is correct, sir.

14. General Grunert. He could not have suddenly ordered you out with the fleet, and assigned the district to somebody else, could he?

Admiral Bloch. No; he could not.

15. General Grunert. As Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District, do you recall having made a Joint Hawaiian-Coastal Frontier Defense Plan with the Army?

Admiral Bloch. Yes.

16. General Grunert. Do you recall when that plan was made operative, when it was made effective?

Admiral Bloch. It was never made operative. It was effective as a Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan from the date of signature by General Short and myself, and I think that was in the latter part of March 1941, or thereabout—effective as a plan, but it was never made operative, until December 7.

17. General Grunert. By its terms it provided that this plan should become operative upon M Day?

Admiral Bloch. M Day, or, the order of the War and Navy Departments, or the mutual agreement of the local commanders.

18. General Grunert. So, that plan, except as a plan, and except for agreements what to do, prior to its becoming operative, was just a question of agreement between the two of you?
Admiral Bloch. Not exactly, not exactly. The plan was never operative as a plan, because the War and Navy Departments never ordered it to become operative, either in part or in whole. The local commanders never mutually agreed to have it become operative, in part.

19. General Grunert. Could that have been done at any time up to the time hostilities demanded it be done?

Admiral Bloch. I think that is a provision, a part of the plan. It is in the plan; but the plan carried with it further implications in this respect: That plan was prepared in pursuance to the directive of the Rainbow War Plan. That is the reason we made it, because the Rainbow War Plan, which was a joint Army and Navy plan, directed us to make it. And we were duty-bound to have contained therein the provisions which were laid down in joint action by the Army and the Navy, in 1935, which were the over-all policies of the functions and agreements between the Army and the Navy, as to their relative responsibilities of the joint coastal frontier defense, and they had to be a part of that plan.

20. General Grunert. Do you recall that there was a Joint Air Operations Agreement, as of March 21, 1941, entered into between General Martin, the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Air Force, and Admiral Bellinger, of the Navy?

Admiral Bloch. I think that was entered into by General Short and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.

21. General Grunert. What was Admiral Bellinger’s official position at the time?

Admiral Bloch. Admiral Bellinger was an officer of the [1475] fleet. He commanded the patrol. He was with the fleet. He also had some other titles, but he was generally known as Commander of Patrol Wing 2.

22. General Grunert. And he was not a direct subordinate of yours?

Admiral Bloch. Well, no; he was not a direct subordinate. There was a tie-up between us, in this respect, that this joint air defense plan which was signed by General Short and the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District somewheres around the 1st of April—I don’t remember the dates—

23. General Frank. Who was the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District at the time?

Admiral Bloch. It was I. That agreement was first taken up under a directive from the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, and the object was to remove the overlap between the Army and Navy Air Forces, that would always occur where the Army would go this way, and the Navy would go this way; but for each specific function there were some other divers instructions, such as barrage balloons, smoke screens, antiaircraft warning systems, and so forth, and so on, and the harbor patrol boats. As I recall it, they had about five or six committees, and Admiral Bellinger was loaned to me by the Commander-in-Chief to act as my representative in negotiating an agreement about the Air with General Martin.

There was somebody from the fleet loaned to me to help me with the arrangement about the balloon barrages, and somebody from the
fleet was loaned to help me with the arrangement about the smoke screens and the antiaircraft warning. There were a number of committees, with each committee confining itself to a certain part of this agreement, and when it was all drawn up, when all the agreements were agreed upon, it was brought to the Joint Planning Committees and to General Short and myself, and we went over it, and we signed it as an agreement.

24. General Frank. What was your relation to Patrol Wing 2?
Admiral Bloch. My relation to Patrol Wing 2 enters into this situation a little later on, in this respect: We had something they called a “Base Defense Air Force,” and the Base Defense Air Force was commanded by Admiral Bellinger, who was the Commander of Patrol Wing 2, and he brought his patrol planes into this Base Defense Air Force. Now, the Base Defense Air Force wasn’t a firm force. All the aircraft in that force had their own duties, their own missions, their own tasks, and their own jobs to do; but when we sounded an air-raid alarm, they all got together, and they became this thing, and went out for search, attack, or air combat. Do I make myself clear? They were what you might say, in a crude sort of way, a “volunteer fire department.” You sounded an air-raid alarm, and all these planes, coming off these various forces, and each, through command forces, with their own duties, their own tasks, their own missions, they came over to Bellinger’s, and all the fighters went to Martin; and from the air-raid alarm, all of Martin’s bombers came over for search and attack.

25. General Frank. Were the PBYs habitually under the Fourteenth Naval District, or habitually under the fleet?
Admiral Bloch. The PBY’s—the Fourteenth Naval District didn’t have a patrol plane or any other aircraft except possibly one or two utility planes at the air station.

Admiral Bloch. Under Admiral Bellinger, insofar as it related to the part under the Navy’s tactical command, and under General Martin, insofar as the pursuit planes and fighters.

27. General Frank. And in that capacity, who was Bellinger’s next superior?
Admiral Bloch. He didn’t have any superior. I think that the order said that I had supervisory control to coordinate operations for the Army through him. I think that is the way the order read, to coordinate operations with the Army and Navy through the Commander of Patrol Wing 2.

28. General Grunert. Then, as I understand it, under this joint agreement, entered into on behalf of the Navy by you, and on behalf of the Army by General Short, the Air Forces that were primarily land fighters came under the jurisdiction of Short through his Air Force Commander, and what you might call “sea fighters” and patrols, or “over-the-sea,” came under you, using Admiral Bellinger as the Commander of that force?
Admiral Bloch. I would prefer you state they came under Admiral Bellinger.
29. General GRUNERT. But Admiral Bellinger looked to whom directly for instructions or directions or supervision?

Admiral BLOCH. I had supervisory control over him, insofar as related to coordinating his operations with the Army, but his O. P. plan for this force was drawn, and we had drill after drill, along the line that it was required to take, in order that the acts and operations of this Air Force would be automatic and it would not be necessary to take valuable time to give orders in case of emergency.

30. General FRANK. When did this joint defense plan become operative?

Admiral BLOCH. Now, which one are you meaning, sir—which joint plan? The joint air defense, or joint coastal frontier defense?

31. General FRANK. Well, what I am trying to find out is this: Did it require hostile action for this air plan to go into effect?

Admiral BLOCH. I think I can explain that.

32. General FRANK. The next question I want to ask is this: What effect did the joint plan have on operations preparatory to hostile action? Do you see what I am driving at?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes, I see what you are driving at. I think I can probably do it, if I stick to the line of the question. There were two joint agreements. The first is known as the Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan. That was based on the War Plan, and joint action; that was known as JCD-42. That is a Navy designation of it.

The joint air force was an additional joint agreement, signed by General Short and myself, that had to do with the joint use of aircraft, barrage balloons, smoke screens, aircraft warnings, and a lot of other things. That was signed by General Short and myself, I think, even prior to JCD-42. I think that was the first one that we agreed on and signed.

Now, when JCD-42 was signed, we made this air agreement an appendix of JCD-42. It was known as "Appendix 7." Ordinarily it would not be operative, unless the various conditions which I have recited before were effective; but I think that General Short and I had mutually agreed to put in so much of that, into effect, as related to the use of these air forces interchangeably between the Army and the Navy, at once; and I think General Martin, representing General Short, and Admiral Bellinger, representing the Navy, got up their own estimate of the situation, their own OP plan for that.

Is that what you wanted to know?

33. General FRANK. Yes. What I was after was, there was a provision in the plan for these combined operations to become effective when there was fear of an impending attack, rather than having to wait for hostile action to take place?

Admiral BLOCH. There was a provision in the War Plan about that, yes. The War Plan, Rainbow 5, says:

In case of strained relations, M Day can be declared, without hostilities.

Now, they can say "M Day" three weeks before a war, five weeks, or two weeks, and the minute they say "M Day," JCD-42 is in operation; and that may have been what the people expected.

34. General FRANK. That is all.
35. General Grunert. Then there was no actual M Day ever declared?
36. General Grunert. Then how, under the existing cooperative plans, could the necessary reconnaissances and other protective measures be taken, except on your own initiative in behalf of the Army and the Navy?
Admiral Bloch. Well, I don’t know whether the Army had any orders, or not; but I do know, in February 1941, the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet got out a confidential letter, [1480] which he called “2-CL-41,” and that letter was also revised under date of October 14th or 15th, 1941, and I don’t think there were any substantial changes in it; and in that letter, of which some 20 or 30 copies were sent to the Commanding General, he states he proposes to support the Army in their defense of the naval base at Pearl Harbor.
37. General Grunert. Then all of these maneuvers and tests and drills that were held between the combined air forces were merely practice, so that in the event M Day was declared it could be put into force; is that the idea?
Admiral Bloch. No; that particular air-agreement feature was in effect the whole time, from the time the agreement was signed.
38. General Grunert. But, as part of the agreement, were not the Navy’s responsibilities outlined, and the Army’s responsibilities outlined, likewise? Were they not so outlined?
Admiral Bloch. I think “joint action” gives the functions of both the Army and the Navy, not specifically for Hawaii, but for the overall—everything. And I think those same functions were taken out of joint action and put into the joint agreement, JCD-42, specifically for Hawaii.
39. General Grunert. Under this joint Air agreement, was the Army charged with the technical control of Air operations over Hawaii, itself?
Admiral Bloch. Well, I would rather refer to the agreement. I think the document is the best evidence you can get on that, sir.
40. General Grunert. Did the Navy ever check to see whether such control was being fully and satisfactorily exercised by [1481] the Army?
Admiral Bloch. I don’t know; I don’t know. Is that a part of the agreement, General? I am quite “at sea” as to what you want to know.
41. General Grunert. Paragraph 2 of the agreement states, in part, as follows:
Defensive air operation over and in the immediate vicinity of Oahu will be executed under the tactical command of the Army. The naval base-defense officer will determine the navy fighter strength to participate in these missions. With due consideration to the tactical situation existing, the number of fighter aircraft released to Army control will be the maximum practicable. This force will remain available to the Army for repeated patrols or combat, or for the maintenance of the required alert status, until, due to a change in the tactical situation, it is determined by the Navy base-defense officer to revert to Navy control.
Admiral Bloch. Is that in the joint agreement, sir?
42. General Grunert. That is in the joint agreement of the 20th of March 1941. Now, whose business was it, on the part of the Navy,
to check to see whether the Army was prepared to meet their responsibilities under that agreement?

Admiral Bloch. I didn't think Navy undertook any check of the Army for their responsibilities. This was turned over to the tactical control of the Army.

43. General Grunert. Wasn't the Navy concerned about whether or not the Army could fulfill its part of the agreement?

Admiral Bloch. I don't think the Navy lacked confidence in the Army's ability to take the tactical control of the fighters.

44. General Grunert. Under this agreement, I believe that the Navy was charged with what we call "distant patrolling." As far as you know, did the Navy have sufficient means to carry out its responsibility in that respect?

Admiral Bloch. Now, are you referring to this same agreement, or to other agreements?

45. General Grunert. This same agreement.

Admiral Bloch. I don't remember that, in that same agreement. I remember it in the joint coastal frontier agreement.

46. General Grunert. I think probably you are correct that it does have a reference to it in paragraph 1 of the Joint Air Agreement, by saying:

Joint air attacks upon hostile surface vessels will be executed under the tactical command of the Navy. The Department Commander will determine the Army bombardment strength to participate in each mission, and so forth.

Admiral Bloch. I think it might clarify the situation to say that this Joint Air Agreement, and the naval base defense air force, was for the purpose of breaking up an air raid which had happened, was happening, or which was imminent of happening, when the air-raid alarms sounded.

47. General Grunert. What I am trying to get at is this:

In guarding against attack, any preparatory measure to be taken, which in itself really constituted a strained relation, during the period of strained relations, such measure should be taken for the defense of the Navy and the defense of the Army; while the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, under paragraph 18, "NAVY," says:

The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall provide for:

a. An inshore patrol.
b. An offshore patrol.
c. An escort force.
d. An attack force.

—and so forth.

Now, in fact, was this plan operative to the extent that the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District did provide offshore patrol?

Admiral Bloch. Offshore? The only offshore patrol that was provided—and I want to be sure that you have got your term right, General. You mean the second one, "a" to "d", and this one, here?


Admiral Bloch. In order 2CL-41, the Commander-in-Chief stated what the inshore patrol was to consist of, and where the forces were
to come from. I think you will find that in paragraph 3 (a), "Continuous Patrols," "inshore patrol."

This states what the inshore patrol shall do and where the forces shall come from; that is, 3 (B) intermittent patrols. The first is destroyer offshore patrol. That is supplied by the fleet under command of the task force concerned. Then, under intermittent patrols are certain air patrols which are prescribed, and under 3 sweeping for mines. This was under the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District.

49. General Grunert. Did that apply both to surface vessels and aircraft?

Admiral Bloch. Where it says surface vessels, they were surface vessels; where it says aircraft, they were aircraft.

50. General Grunert. Then, according to the instructions under which you were functioning you had no responsibility for distant air reconnaissance?

Admiral Bloch. There was no distant air reconnaissance ordered in that order. That is the only order that I know which was operative.

51. General Grunert. But, actually, was there some distant air reconnaissance being made from time to time or continuously?

Admiral Bloch. I do not know. I do not know whether there was or not. That would not be under me.

52. General Grunert. It was not your responsibility to see whether there was or not?

Admiral Bloch. Not at that time. I was supposed to have under my command 108 P. B. Y.'s for the purpose of performing distant reconnaissance. I had asked time and time again for them, but the Navy had never furnished them. So I had no implements to perform distant reconnaissance in the Fourteenth Naval District force

53. General Grunert. The P. B. Y.'s that were furnished were under whose jurisdiction?

Admiral Bloch. Rear Admiral Bellinger's. They were fleet planes.

54. General Grunert. The P. B. Y.'s are land-based?

Admiral Bloch. No, sir; they are seaplanes.

55. General Grunert. But what I mean is that they are land-based; they are not carrier-based, are they?

Admiral Bloch. No; they are based at an air station.

56. General Grunert. Where were they kept in the Fourteenth Naval District? What was their base there?

Admiral Bloch. We had two air stations, one at Kaneohe and one Ford Island. Some were based on Kaneohe and some on Ford Island.

57. General Grunert. If any reconnaissance was made or supposed to have been made on the morning of December 7th, so far as the Navy was concerned it was under the jurisdiction of Admiral Bellinger?

Admiral Bloch. I think Admiral Bellinger would get his orders from the Commander-in-Chief to conduct it. Although Admiral Bellinger had command of the patrol craft he could not order them on any mission or task that he saw fit, because that directive would come from the high command.
58. General GRUNERT. But the directive did not process through you; it would go direct from high command to Admiral Bellinger? Admiral BLOCH. I think so.
59. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not any such instructions are covered in this document which you just mentioned? Admiral BLOCH. So far as I know, this reconnaissance was not mentioned. The only place that any kind of search is mentioned under my duties is where it says:

The following procedure shall be followed by the task force, and so forth.

Then it provides for air search for enemy ships. That would be this volunteer air force.
60. General GRUNERT. But that was only in the event of an attack? Admiral BLOCH. That is right, sir.
61. General GRUNERT. That was not preliminary? Admiral BLOCH. That is right, sir.
62. General GRUNERT. Then, so far as you know, there were no instructions concerning a probable attack, in case of strained relations, or in anticipation of a probable attack?
Admiral BLOCH. Not so far as I know.
63. General FRANK. Whose responsibility was it to provide that reconnaissance? It must have been somebody's.
Admiral BLOCH. I suggest that you ask the Commander-in-Chief. Has he been before you?
64. General FRANK. No.
Admiral BLOCH. I think he can answer those questions better than I. I am just giving my understanding.
65. General RUSSELL. Now, Admiral, on the joint agreement, or the two joint agreements we have gotten in the record so far: In this joint agreement for air operations, signed between you and General Short, was reconnaissance mentioned at all?
Admiral BLOCH. I do not think it is.
66. General RUSSELL. The other agreement was this coastal defense plan in which missions were outlined and agreements on reconnaissance were reached?

[1487] Admiral BLOCH. That was a major responsibility if the plan became operative.
67. General RUSSELL. But while the plan was effective from early in the spring of 1941, it was never operative until December 7th, 1941?
Admiral BLOCH. That is correct, sir.
68. General RUSSELL. So that respecting missions of the Army and Navy, according to your construction of the agreement, reconnaissance missions were not effective until December 7, 1941?
Admiral BLOCH. Under the circumstances that obtained, that is the way it happened. I will say that I accepted the responsibility in that agreement for distant reconnaissance for the Navy, and I did my utmost to implement my responsibility by demanding patrol planes for that purpose, but I never had any; I never had one.
69. General RUSSELL. Admiral, what do you mean by "I accepted my responsibility" under the joint plan?
Admiral BLOCH. No; I said, when I signed it, I signed that joint agreement as Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. I think that is the way it reads.
70. General Russell. J. C. D. 42 you are talking about now?
Admiral Bloch. Yes. First, it says what the Hawaiian Department accepts as their responsibility, and then what the Navy accepts as its responsibility. As to the Army, it says that the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, shall provide for—and then it went along with 15 or 20 things for him to provide, and then came the Navy:

The Commandant, the Fourteenth Naval District, shall provide for—

[1488] and under Item I, it says:

Distant reconnaissance.

Having accepted that responsibility, the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District—in this agreement which I signed I did my best to implement that distant reconnaissance by patrol planes.

71. General Russell. Admiral, I do not know that we understand each other. We are talking about J. C. D. 42?
Admiral Bloch. I think it is.

72. General Russell. You and General Short signed that?
Admiral Bloch. Yes.

73. General Russell. And it was not to become operative until certain conditions were met?
Admiral Bloch. I will show you that. Have you seen it?

74. General Russell. Yes; I have seen it. That was to become operative when certain conditions were met. In the meantime, between the date of the execution of J. C. D. 42 and the coming of war and the reaching of an agreement, which is the condition precedent making it operative in so far as the respective reconnaissance missions were concerned, both you and General Short accepted the missions and attempted to put them into effect immediately, before the plan became operative? Is that the testimony?

Admiral Bloch. I did not say that, sir. I do not know what anyone else had said.

75. General Russell. What do you say about that now?
Admiral Bloch. I say that General Short and I signed this agreement, J. C. D. 42, in which the Army shall provide for certain things and the Navy shall provide for certain things, and that I, being the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, [1489] did my utmost to get the various craft, implements of all kinds, to meet my obligation, and I never was able to get them all. I never got a single patrol plane, although I had 108 promised.

76. General Russell. When did you think under this agreement as you construe it your obligation for distant reconnaissance became binding?

Admiral Bloch. My obligations for distant reconnaissance would not become binding until that plan was operative.

77. General Russell. I think I understand you.

78. General Frank. To whom did those P. B. Y's that were there belong, if they did not belong to you?

Admiral Bloch. They belonged to the patwings of the United States Fleet, Patwing 1 and Patwing 2, both under the command of Rear Admiral Bellinger; and he was of the echelon of command of the Commander-in-Chief.

79. General Frank. The commander of the fleet afloat had a patrol wing that was under his command that had to be based on land?
Admiral Bloch. Yes, two of them. One and two. They could be based on tenders when they went away. There were a number of tenders present; and if they went out to Samoa or to the Marshalls or some place where there was no place to land, they would have to base on tenders.

80. General Frank. You signed this agreement, the Joint Coastal Defense Plan, with General Short, and you did not have the facilities with which to carry out your part of the agreement. Did you ever tell that to General Short?

Admiral Bloch. I think General Short knew it perfectly well.

81. General Frank. But did you ever tell him that you did not have the equipment with which to do it?

Admiral Bloch. I cannot say that I have never told him and I cannot say that I did tell him.

82. General Frank. A little while ago you stated that you never checked up on the Army to see if they were carrying out the things with which they were charged. If General Short had the same attitude of never checking up to find out whether or not the Navy was carrying out its responsibilities or whether it had the equipment with which to do it, if he never asked and if, on the other hand, you never told him, he did not know, did he?

Admiral Bloch. I think we are at somewhat of a disagreement about that, General. In the first place, the question you asked me was whether I checked up combat efficiency of the fighters that were turned over to the Army for flying overland for the protection of Oahu, and I said I did not. That related entirely to this joint air agreement where the Navy fighters went to the Army for the defense of Oahu. I had complete confidence in the Army's ability to handle those planes in attacks. Every day the Army supplied the Navy with a list of bombers and, vice versa, the Navy supplied the Army with a list of fighters. I am not a flier. I could not tell you whether a fighter was doing a thing in the proper way or not. I did have very definite ideas. I knew how many fighters the Army had and I knew how many bombers the Army had; I knew whether they were modern or obsolete. So far as my knowledge is concerned, it related to numbers and types; but I feel quite certain that General Short had the same information.

83. General Frank. Was there a carefully detailed, worked-out system of operations between the Army and the Navy in this defense situation?

Admiral Bloch. I do not quite understand your question, sir.

84. General Frank. This Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan was signed; and what I am trying to find out is whether this agreement was just a state of mind or whether there existed some place a carefully-detailed, worked-out system of operations that were arrived at by the working people sitting down around a table and determining what to do each with the other.

Admiral Bloch. Of course that question is a question on which I could not, necessarily, have the information you want; but I will say it is my belief that General Martin, General Rudolph and General Davidson, and Admiral Bellinger and his subordinates—I do not remember their names—were very, very close to one another, and I further know that on several occasions a carrier came in from sea. There was a position indication—this was a drill—and in such cases
they would have to search for her and they would find her and they would bomb her, and they had the usual things that you probably remember when you were there. There were some obscurities in communications and operations. Those were all carefully noted, analyzed, and remedied. So I believe that within the limits of our intelligence and ability we tried to make the thing a working scheme. But it had the limitation of being only for an air attack, in the case of a raid or where we knew we had positive information and knew what was coming, presuming we had some information.

85. General GRUNERT. It seems that this joint plan made between you and General Short in certain respects, certainly as far as air search and distant reconnaissance are concerned, should have been made between the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet and General Short, inasmuch as you had nothing with which to implement that part of the agreed-upon plan?

Admiral BLOCH. You are talking about the joint agreement?

86. General GRUNERT. Yes.

Admiral BLOCH. Had that plan become operative, we will say, on the 4th day of December, and the fleet had left there—suppose the fleet had all pulled out and taken everything with them—in our plan Admiral Kimmel had made a provision that two patrol squadrons belonging to the fleet would be left there for me to perform my obligation of distant reconnaissance. Of course you know two squadrons of patrol planes cannot perform a 360-degree reconnaissance a distance of 800 miles. It cannot be done. But that was what they were to leave me when that war plan went into effect. But I do not think he gave me a small force just because he wanted, but because he did not have a larger one. He did not have any more to give me.

87. General GRUNERT. Did General Short understand the conditions, first, the organization, then the responsibility as pertained to the Navy, as you have outlined it to us, and then did he understand that you did not have the means to carry out your responsibility under that joint plan?

Admiral BLOCH. I think General Short had better answer those questions. But I will say that I knew his deficiencies.

88. General GRUNERT. In this cooperative plan, it would appear necessary that both the commanders fully understand the situation in each command so as to be able to cooperate; and unless such things are explained by the commanders thereof it is difficult for the other commander to get an insight into what is being done or what can be done?

Admiral BLOCH. General Short had access to the Commander-in-Chief at all times, and he had conferences many, many times when I was not there; and while I believe that the Commander-in-Chief made a tremendous effort to tell us what was taking place, as to whether he omitted to tell me anything, I know that the Commander-in-Chief and General Short were in close contact all the time.

89. General GRUNERT. That is what is difficult for me to realize, what did and did not take place. Here is the commanding general of the Department and here is the commander-in-chief of the fleet, and here is the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. Just what he should do in relation and in cooperation and coordination with the fleet, as to what he should do certainly with you as Commandant of
the Fourteenth Naval District, do you think was clearly understood by General Short?

Admiral Bloch. I cannot answer for General Short, but I do know, or it is my firm belief, that the cooperation was extremely good between the Commander-in-Chief and General Short. I know it was good between General Short and myself, from my side of it, and I hope he reciprocates the same feeling.

90. General GRUNERT. Does cooperation include a thorough understanding of the capabilities of all those commands?

Admiral Bloch. I felt quite sure that I understood his capabilities, sir, and his deficiencies.

91. General FRANK. I have one question about the lack of patrol planes. Actually, Hawaii was without sufficient air patrol planes to provide adequate reconnaissance?

Admiral Bloch. Yes. I say yes, and I am not an air man and I have not made the computations myself, but I heard someone say, who had made the computation, that to conduct a 360-\(^\circ\) degree reconnaissance for 800 miles, which is necessary for finding aircraft, it would require 170 aircraft and 350 pilots. I believe those are the figures. I might say further that I understand that a number of P. B. Y.'s that we had there were of a new type, and they were deficient in spare parts, and they were having difficulties with certain mechanical features. What, I do not know.

92. General GRUNERT. Did they make such reconnaissances as the available means permitted?

Admiral Bloch. General, you better ask the Commander-in-Chief about that. I had no control over those things.

93. General GRUNERT. As far you know, do you not know whether they did or did not?

Admiral Bloch. I do not know whether they did or did not, sir.

94. General GRUNERT. Do you know on the morning of the 7th of December whether any such planes were in the air on any reconnaissance mission?

Admiral Bloch. I heard planes taking off. I do not know exactly what missions they were on, but there were planes in the air.

95. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether or not many of the P. B. Y.'s were caught on the ground and destroyed?

Admiral Bloch. I understand that some were.

96. General GRUNERT. But you do not know of your own knowledge?

Admiral Bloch. No, sir.

97. General GRUNERT. The P. B. Y.'s were not your planes?

Admiral Bloch. They were not under my command, my responsibility.

98. General GRUNERT. Whose responsibility was it to initiate and coordinate efforts against a hostile attack? Was it the Army's or the Navy's?

Admiral Bloch. I do not quite understand you.

99. General GRUNERT. In case there was a hostile attack, as there was on December 7th, whose responsibility was it to initiate the offensive side of the defensive? In other words, as to aircraft, was it under the Navy, under the Army, or under both?

Admiral Bloch. I cannot answer that question. It is hypothetical, and I do not understand it.
100. General Grunert. In case of a hostile attack, with reference to the plan that we call the Joint Hawaiian Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, which became operative when there was a hostile attack, did the Navy and the Army have separate defenses, or attacks, you might call them? Were they initiated of their own accord, or was the Navy charged with meeting the attack, and then when it came over the Island of Oahu itself, then it became the Army's responsibility to take care of what was in the air? Was there a clear understanding of just how such a defense would be initiated and how it was to be carried out?

Admiral Bloch. I am sorry; I have not the operation order on the Air Force, but it was covered in there. When the air raid alarm sounded there were two primary things to do: First, the aircraft that were going under the Army's control had to go to them, and vice versa, the Army aircraft that came under Navy Control had to come to them. The Navy called it search and attack. They went out and looked for carriers to try to find them and hit them, and the Army concentrated, according to their plans and doctrines, their pursuit and fighter planes to drive off and break up attacks of enemy planes; and I think 

Admiral Bloch. It even went so far as to specify that they were to trail them back to their carriers so they could inform the Navy where the carriers were. Which was first, I do not know.

101. General Grunert. Does not that seem to indicate that had there been one distinct plan under unity of command there might have been better results?

Admiral Bloch. I think so. That is a hypothetical question.

102. General Grunert. Then it appeared to be the Navy's mission to locate and destroy a hostile navy task force?

Admiral Bloch. Yes, sir.

103. General Grunert. And when the attack came, it was the Army's business to conduct the defense?

Admiral Bloch. Yes.

[1497] 104. General Grunert. I believe you told me you were kept informed of the Army's defensive measures; is that correct?

Admiral Bloch. I do not know whether I said that or not. What do you mean by "measures," sir?

105. General Grunert. Well, did you know just how the Army intended to carry out its mission to defend Pearl Harbor by its installations, by its antiaircraft locations, by its interceptor command, including the air warning service, and so forth? Were you generally familiar with that setup?

Admiral Bloch. I was familiar with that. I knew the locations of the guns.

106. General Grunert. Did the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, inform you as to any special measures he proposed to take or had adopted as the result of these so-called warning messages that were received late in November, early in December?

Admiral Bloch. I believe that General Short told me that he was on alert, and I think he said he was on Alert No. 1, and there is a possibility that I may have confused his Alert No. 1 with our Condition No. 1, because our Condition No. 1 is the most rigid, and his Alert No. 1 is the most less rigid.
107. General Grunert. That was quite another subject I had: whether or not you thoroughly understood that his Alert No. 1 was merely against sabotage.

Admiral Bloch. Well, I do not know what I knew at that time. I know now, of course.

108. General Grunert. I believe that you testified before the Roberts Commission.

Admiral Bloch. I think I told the Roberts Commission that [1498] I believed I knew they were on alert but I might have been mixed up in whether it was Alert 1 or Alert 3, because our numbers are different. I think I told them that. I am not sure.

109. General Grunert. As I recall your testimony, it was to the effect that you knew they were on Alert No. 1, but you understood or just thought that that was the same as your Alert No. 1.

Admiral Bloch. Well, something to that effect.

110. General Grunert. And that you really didn't find out that they were on the lowest form of alert, while you were on the highest, until after the attack.

Admiral Bloch. Possibly. That is the idea. There was some confusion in my mind about the thing.

111. General Grunert. Now, did the Fleet Commander keep you informed of the international situation and of the knowledge that he gleaned as to the Japanese Fleet from time to time?

Admiral Bloch. I think the Commander-in-Chief tried to show me all the telegrams and correspondence that he had, but I do not want this Board to believe that the information he got represented the political situation, because it did not.

112. General Grunert. Did you know of the presence of a Japanese task force in the vicinity of Jaluit between November 27th and 30th?

Admiral Bloch. We had received an intelligence report from Washington which referred to the presumed presence of certain types and numbers of ships in the Marshall Islands in the vicinity of Jaluit. This intelligence was the best that I [1499] had or that the Navy Department had, but I believe that its correctness is subject to some question.

113. General Grunert. Do you know whether this information was furnished to General Short?

Admiral Bloch. No, I do not.

114. General Russell. Were carriers indicated as being in that force? Did that message indicate that carriers were in that task force?

Admiral Bloch. My recollection is that the intelligence dispatch stated that there were one or two carriers present there and that the remainder of the carriers, some eight or ten, and the capital ships, were in home waters, meaning Empire waters.

115. General Grunert. Were you kept advised of the movement of this force, and did you have knowledge of its whereabouts after December 1st?

Admiral Bloch. This same intelligence report detailed very heavy movements of men-of-war, including one division of battleships to Indo-China and Thailand; also included large numbers of transports. After December 7th I had no knowledge of where they had gone or what had taken place.
116. General GRUNERT. Would it be out of consideration to figure that a task force would come to the Marshall Islands in order to go down toward Thailand or the Kra Peninsula?

Admiral BLOCH. Well, if I were running a task force, I wouldn't go to the Kra Peninsula via the Marshall Islands.

117. General GRUNERT. Was General Short kept informed of this naval intelligence; do you know?

[1500] Admiral BLOCH. I do not know whether he got it from the Commander-in-Chief or not, sir.

118. General GRUNERT. He did not get it from you?

Admiral BLOCH. So far as you know. I gave him some. I gave General Short some intelligence. On occasions he would come to my office and ask specific questions, and if I had any intelligence on the subject I would give it to him.

119. General GRUNERT. What was the customary procedure in passing out this intelligence? Only on request, or how?

Admiral BLOCH. Well, we had two types of intelligence. One type was handled by the Office of Naval Intelligence, and I believe that there was free interchange between this Intelligence and Military Intelligence, and that everything we got the Army got, and everything the Army got we got. This latter type of intelligence we have been speaking of had a very high secrecy classification, and only necessary people in the naval establishment were told even of its existence.

120. General GRUNERT. Then, normally the command would not be informed of this type of intelligence?

Admiral BLOCH. I think he was informed a great deal, sir. I think he was informed, but it was not sent in the mail or anything like that.

121. General GRUNERT. Well, as to such intelligence, who was the judge as to what would be told to General Short?

Admiral BLOCH. Well, so far as I was concerned, I usually gave intelligence to General Short of this nature in response to inquiries. What the Commander-in-Chief gave him or the Commander-in-Chief's intelligence officer gave him, I cannot [1501] testify; I don't know.

122. General GRUNERT. Then, normally were his sources of information both the Commander-in-Chief, the Commander-in-Chief's intelligence force, and your headquarters and your intelligence officer? Did he have those dual places to get intelligence from, or was whatever he got passed down through you to him?

Admiral BLOCH. No, I do not think it was passed through me to him.

123. General GRUNERT. Then, he had several sources to look to?

Admiral BLOCH. He had sources: I think he got intelligence from the Commander-in-Chief. I cannot say that he did and I cannot say that he didn't, but I believe he got information from the Commander-in-Chief. I gave him intelligence on one or two occasions that I remember, in response to inquiries. There was free and routine setup for interchange of Naval intelligence and M. I. D. intelligence. That was done through the respective intelligence officers.

124. General GRUNERT. But such matters as the issue we have just been discussing were not routine?

Admiral BLOCH. No.

125. General GRUNERT. That was ultrasecret?

Admiral BLOCH. That was not routine.
126. General GRUNERT. And ordinarily that would not be passed out except on special requests or on the initiative of those who had the intelligence, as to whether or not the other party should have it?

Admiral BLOCH. I think that is correct, sir.

[1502] 127. General FRANK. This type of information was picked up by an installation that was a part of the District, wasn’t it? Wasn’t that one of your activities as a Naval District Commander?

Admiral BLOCH. It was known as the District Combat Intelligence.

128. General FRANK. It therefore would come to you first and through your District Combat Intelligence to the C.-in-C. of the Fleet?

Admiral BLOCH. No; the Commander-in-Chief as a rule got it as soon as I got it, maybe sometimes sooner. It was sent to him immediately.

May I say for the understanding of the Board that this same type of intelligence is collected by the Army too and available to the Army. Whether they sent it to General Short or not, I do not know. They had all this same information here in Washington.

129. General GRUNERT. Do you know whether General Short expected better sources of information from the Navy than he had of his own?

Admiral BLOCH. I do not know. There is no reason why he should.

130. General GRUNERT. But with your District Intelligence setup, isn’t it more probable that he should get such information about other naval forces from the Navy rather than from the Army?

Admiral BLOCH. I believe all the same information was possessed here in Washington by the Army Intelligence and was available for distribution by them in the same way that we got ours.

[1503] 131. General GRUNERT. But originally that intelligence came from Naval sources?

Admiral BLOCH. No, sir. I don’t know where it came from.

132. General GRUNERT. Well, do you know what efforts were made by the Navy to secure information of possible Japanese naval activity in the mandated islands?

Admiral BLOCH. I don’t know, but we didn’t have any luck.

133. General GRUNERT. But you did have some information apparently about the Japanese being in home waters. Where did that come from?

Admiral BLOCH. That was one of these speculative intelligence matters.

134. General GRUNERT. Did that come from Washington?

Admiral BLOCH. From Washington.

135. General GRUNERT. Or from your own sources?

Admiral BLOCH. It came from Washington; same source that the “fleet in Jaluit” came from.

136. General GRUNERT: Now, as to cooperation and so-called coordination—two overworked §64 words—did you know whether or not the Army’s air warning service was in operation, and did you know the details thereof?

Admiral BLOCH. I had some information which I thought to be good.

137. General GRUNERT. Did you make inquiries regarding it?

Admiral BLOCH. Yes.
138. General Grunert. Had you received General Short’s standing operational procedure of November 5th about the types of alert and the interceptor scheme of operation?

Admiral Bloch. I don’t know. I don’t think so. I am not sure. I never saw it at that time.

139. General Frank. Had your liaison officer, Lieutenant Burr, over at Hawaiian Department Headquarters, obtained copies of that at your establishment, would they have been delivered?

Admiral Bloch. I believe they would have been delivered to the war plans or operations officer.

140. General Frank. And that need not necessarily have been brought to your attention?

Admiral Bloch. That is correct, sir.

141. General Grunert. Lieutenant Burr is a subordinate of yours is he?

Admiral Bloch. He was then.

142. General Grunert. He was. And then he was the liaison man with the Army for the 14th Naval District, and not for the Fleet itself?

Admiral Bloch. No; he was the 14th Naval District liaison officer.

143. General Grunert. Now, some questions as to these various messages received from October to December. There is one here October 16th. From that date, do you recall what that was?

Admiral Bloch. Well, I think the 16th is about the fall of the Cabinet. That is when the Matsuoka Cabinet fell.

144. General Grunert. The Navy message of October 16th:

(Navy message of October 16, 1941, was read as follows:)

The following is a paraphrase of a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations which I have been directed to pass to you. Quote:

Japanese cabinet resignation creates a grave situation. If a new cabinet is formed it probably will be anti-American and strongly nationalistic. If the Konoye cabinet remains it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the United States. Either way hostilities between Japan and Russia are strongly possible. Since Britain and the U. S. are held responsible by Japan for her present situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack those two powers. View of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan.

Do you recall that message?

Admiral Bloch. I remember the message.

145. General Grunert. That came to you through the Commander-in-Chief, or you were informed through the Commander-in-Chief?

Admiral Bloch. I don’t remember whether it was addressed to me as an information addressee or whether he gave me a copy of it, but I saw it.

146. General Grunert. Do you know whether General Short was informed as to that message?

Admiral Bloch. I think he was. I didn’t but I think the Commander-in-Chief did send it to him.

147. General Grunert. Now, the Navy message of November 24th, which reads as follows:
[1503-C] (Navy message of November 24, 1941, was read as follows:)

There are very doubtful chances of a favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan. This situation coupled with statements of Nippon Government and movements of their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including an attack on the Philippines or Guam is a possibility. The Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch and concurs and requests action.

Inform senior Army officers in respective areas utmost secrecy is necessary in order not to complicate the already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action.

Do you know whether that message was transmitted to General Short or he was informed as to its contents?

Admiral Bloch. I do not think that message was addressed to me, even. I think that was shown to me by the Commander-in-Chief. I believe he showed it to General Short. I don’t know, of course.

148. General Grunert. Now, the Navy message of November 27, which starts out somewhat to the effect that, “This is a war warning.” Do you recall that message?

Admiral Bloch. Yes, I recall it.

149. General Frank. This last message is from CNO to CINCPAC. Admiral Bloch. That is the Commander-in-Chief Pacific.

150. General Grunert. Now let me ask you what that meant to the Navy: “This is a war warning.” Did that mean to you naval people that war is in the immediate offing, or what?

[1504] Admiral Bloch. I never heard it used in that sense before, sir.

151. General Grunert. Had it been used before? Is that a common expression in the Navy, or for certain purposes, or what?

Admiral Bloch. I don’t know. I never heard it before, used in that sense.

152. General Frank. In what sense?

Admiral Bloch. “This is a war warning,” beginning a dispatch. The obvious conclusion is that that is naval phraseology, and it is not naval phraseology insofar as I know.

153. General Frank. Well, if you had never seen it before, what did it mean to you?

Admiral Bloch. Well, this dispatch was received late afternoon 27th of November. Admiral Kimmel telephoned for me. I was not available. My Chief of Staff got it and delivered it to me that night. This was one of many dispatches of the same tenor, and the next morning I believe, the 28th of November, Admiral Kimmel had a—I went over, and he had a number of officers in his office. This dispatch was discussed, what we should do, and so forth, and Admiral Kimmel made his decisions, what he would do and what the decision of the Commander-in-Chief would be in regard to all measures.

154. General Frank. That is Admiral Kimmel?

Admiral Bloch. Admiral Kimmel, the Commander-in-Chief. I had no reason for reaching any independent decision. I accepted Admiral Kimmel’s decision; and furthermore, I had no information other than what he had, or any information that caused me to disagree with his conclusions.

[1505] 155. General Frank. Well, you certainly had some professional reaction, having been in the Navy for 35 years.
Admiral Bloch. Longer than that, sir.

(Message of November 27, 1941, was read as follows:)

156. General Grunert. This particular message of November 27th starts out by saying,

Consider this dispatch a war warning.

and continues:

Negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific have ended. Japan is expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days. An amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsula or possibly Borneo is indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces. You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL 46 only. Guam Samoa and Continental Districts have been directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage. A similar warning is being sent by the War Department. Inform naval district and army authorities. British to be informed by Spenavo.

Do you know whether this message was transmitted or the information therein transmitted to General Short?

Admiral Bloch. The message was not addressed to me. I think in the body of the message it directs the Commander-in-Chief to show it to the Commanding General.

157. General Grunert. Was General Short present at any discussion of this message; do you know?

Admiral Bloch. I believe he was at a subsequent date, not on the 27th.

158. General Grunert. That was on the 27th?

Admiral Bloch. No; it came late in the afternoon.

159. General Grunert. Do you recall the Army message of November 27th?

Admiral Bloch. I have seen it.

160. General Grunert. Which reads as follows:

(Army message of November 27, 1941, was read as follows:)

Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the rarest possibilities that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue. Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment. If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act. This policy should not, repeat not, be construed as restricting you to a course of action that might jeopardize your defense. Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary but these measures should be carried out so as not, repeat not, to alarm civil population or disclose intent. Report measures taken. Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan. Limit dissemination of this highly secret information to minimum essential officers.

1507] I understand there was a conference held on November 27, at which Admiral Kimmel and you, and, I believe, General Martin and Colonel Mollison were present. Do you recall that conference?

Admiral Bloch. I believe there was a conference held on the forenoon of the 27th.

161. General Grunert. Do you know whether at that time this message had been received?

Admiral Bloch. It had not.

162. General Grunert. It had not?

Admiral Bloch. No.
163. General Grunert. Had the message of November 27 been received?
Admiral Bloch. No, it had not.
164. General Grunert. Then why the conference? What was it about?
Admiral Bloch. Oh, something about island bases.
165. General Grunert. Then that was a discussion of the extension?
Admiral Bloch. Something about planes, and soldiers going down and taking the place of the Marines’ guns at Canton.
166. General Frank. That was something about Midway and Wake.
Admiral Bloch. And these conferences were frequently called by the Commander-in-Chief, with an agenda, but it was never confined to that agenda. Before we got through, we had usually talked and “boxed the compass.”
167. General Grunert. Were these two messages of November 27, the Navy message, which starts out “consider this a war warning,” and this Army message, which I have just read to you, ever the subject of a conference on that date, or subsequent thereto, that you know of?
Admiral Bloch. I don’t believe I ever saw the Army message, until the Navy Department repeated it to the Commander-in-Chief; and then I was furnished a copy.
168. General Grunert. That Navy message of the 27th said that the Chief of Staff, or the War Department—something to that effect—“is sending a similar message to the Army”?
Admiral Bloch. That is correct.
169. General Grunert. Evidently, this message of November 27 was intended to be that “similar message”?
Admiral Bloch. Yes, sir.
170. General Grunert. Although differently worded?
Admiral Bloch. Yes, sir. I think we got that on the 28th. We got it repeated by the Chief of Naval Operations to us on the 28th, and I believe that on November 28, a conference was had in the office of Admiral Kimmel, when the Navy dispatch of November 27 was discussed, and he reached his decisions as to what he would do.
171. General Grunert. We have had testimony to the effect that immediately after the conference on November 27, the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, General Short, went back to his headquarters and made a decision on this message which we just read, and decided to go on Alert No. 1 for sabotage.
Admiral Bloch. Well, my recollection is that the Navy dispatch did not arrive at Pearl Harbor, until somewhere around 4 or 4:30 in the afternoon, Honolulu time, and it is also my recollection that the conference was held in the forenoon of the 27th, and stopped about noon, or a little after noon.
172. General Grunert. Then neither one of these messages could have been received at that time?
Admiral Bloch. That is my belief, sir; and I believe the conference was held the next day.
173. General Grunert. Are you pretty well convinced that that conference was held on the morning of the 27th, and that there was no conference held on the afternoon of the 27th?
Admiral Bloch. That’s my belief, sir.
174. General GRUNERT. And what seems to convince you that your memory is correct on that subject?

Admiral BLOCH. Because I had to go to Queen's Hospital, at 3:30 in the afternoon, to visit a patient; and I left the Yard at 3:30, and in my absence, the Navy message arrived. And I didn't know it, until my return from the hospital.

175. General GRUNERT. When did you first know of this November 27 Army message?

Admiral BLOCH. I don't believe that I saw that until the Navy Department repeated it to the Commander-in-Chief.

176. General GRUNERT. Then, as far as you know, there was no discussion of the two messages in conference?

Admiral BLOCH. I wouldn't say that, because I am quite certain that General Short sent Admiral Kimmel a copy of the Army dispatch; but I don't believe he sent me one.

177. General GRUNERT. What I am getting at is your reaction to these two messages in conference, which I understood they discussed in conference. If you do not recall any such conference, I can't get that reaction.

[1510] Admiral BLOCH. I recall a conference on November 28, and I remember that discussions were had about the Navy message, and particularly there was some doubt in the minds of someone present as to what a "defensive deployment" was, because we do not use that term in the Navy. That is not one of the precise terms that we use in the naval tactics. I remember that incident, and I believe that Admiral Kimmel had made his decisions at that conference; in fact, I know he made his decisions at that conference, and decided that he would pursue the same schedules of employment that he had already had in force; which was along the lines of intensive training, material upkeep, and operations. Whether the Army message was discussed by analogy, or in comparison, I have no recollection about that; and I can't supply you any information with regard to that.

178. General GRUNERT. Then you have no recollection of the measures taken by Short, on the Army message being discussed at that November 28th conference?

Admiral BLOCH. On the November 28 message?

179. General GRUNERT. No, the November 28 conference.

Admiral BLOCH. Oh, I believe General Short declared his alert on the 27th, late in the afternoon.

180. General GRUNERT. He did, but that was a matter of discussion with the Navy, later on?

Admiral BLOCH. I don't recall that.

181. General GRUNERT. That is, as to its adequacy, or as to whether or not it covered what you Navy people thought ought to be done?

Admiral BLOCH. He didn't discuss it with me. I have no recollection. I know that I knew the Army had an alert No. 1, and I have said before that I think, as I recall it, there was some confusion in my mind, that I thought maybe it was something else; but I knew it was Alert No. 1.

182. General GRUNERT. Certainly the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and you, as Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, had an interest in the measures taken by the Army to protect Pearl Harbor, and I thought possibly that might have been discussed
in conference, as to whether General Short's actions in taking Alert No. 1, which was just for sabotage, was enough to protect your Navy and the fleet, or what variations of it there might be in Pearl Harbor.

Admiral Bloch. I think that the Commander-in-Chief's reactions on this should be obtained from him, sir.

183. General Grunert. But your reactions?

Admiral Bloch. I have no recollection of any discussion on that.

184. General Grunert. Are you at liberty to tell us about WPL-46, or would that disclose information that might be of value to the enemy?

Admiral Bloch. Well, so far as I remember it, I can tell you. I think it is secret, but I don't think it has any particular bearing on this war, now.

185. General Grunert. In other words, this message of November 27 says:

You will execute a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out the tasks assigned by WPL-46 only.

So it is of interest to the Board to know what "defensive deployments only" you could take.

[1512] Admiral Bloch. Well, the Army, like the Navy, is a service in which they necessarily must use very precise terms, very precise terminology, particularly those relating to tactics and movements, in the Navy. It is very important because, moving ships, if they are not governed with great definiteness, it will do a good deal of damage. So far as I know, the term "defensive deployment" has never been used in any textbooks, tactical books, or tactical instructions and orders that I know of, in the Navy.

WPL-46 is a Joint War Plan. It is not only joint between the Army and the Navy, but it is based on mutual understanding with the Allied Nations; and you must have a copy of it; and while your tasks would be the Army tasks, in our WPL we have the Navy tasks, and they took the Navy Department WPL-46, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet had to break that down, to get the Pacific Fleet separated in their idea. Then, I had to break it down, to get my share in it; and so forth, all the way down.

186. General Frank. This is the first time we have run across that phraseology.

Admiral Bloch. Now, I don't know whether you would call that the same name. The real name is "Rainbow 5." You know it by that name, unquestionably.

187. General Grunert. Well, that answers our question.

188. General Frank. That answers our question. This is the first time we have had that cleared up.

189. General Grunert. There appear to be three more messages about which I would like to ask some questions, all three of them from the Navy to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific [1513] Fleet, and dated December 3, December 4, and December 6.

Admiral Kimmel said, here:

On 3d December we have, "OpNav informs"—this is a paraphrase, you understand, sir.

* * * "—informs CinC Asiatic, CinCPac, Combat 14-16 that highly reliable information has been received that instructions were sent Japanese diplomatic
and consular posts at Hong Kong, Singapore, Batavia, Washington, and London
to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn secret documents."

Do you recall that message?
Admiral Bloch. Yes, sir.
190. General Grunert. Do you know whether that was transmitted to
General Kimmel, or the information given?
Admiral Bloch. I did not transmit it. I do not know whether
Admiral Kimmel did, or not.
191. General Grunert. Do you recall having had a conference on
December 3 with Admiral Kimmel and General Short?
Admiral Bloch. Well, it is pretty difficult to set the days. As I
recall it, we had a conference on the forenoon of the 27th; I think
there was a conference on the forenoon of the 28th—that was on Fri-
day—I think there was a conference in Admiral Kimmel's office, on
December 1. Now, I believe on December 2 and December 3 Admiral
Kimmel went to General Short's office, and I didn't accompany him.
That is the best of my recollection.
192. General Grunert. Now, there is also contained in the report
of the Roberts Commission the following reference:

The Navy Department sent three messages to the Com-
mander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet:
The first, of December 3, stated it was believed certain Japanese consulates
were destroying their codes and burning secret documents.
The second, of December 4, instructed the addressee to destroy confidential
documents and means of confidential communications, retaining only such as
were necessary, the latter to be destroyed in the event of emergency (This
was sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet for information only);
and,
The third, of December 6, directing that in view of the tense situation, the
Naval command on the outlying Pacific Islands might be authorized to destroy
confidential papers, then, or later; that under conditions of greater emergency,
those essential to continued operation should be retained until the last moment.

Do you recall those three messages?
Admiral Bloch. I think I do.
193. General Grunert. Or words to that effect?
Admiral Bloch. Yes; I think I do.
194. General Grunert. You were concerned when it came to the
possible destruction of documents, and so forth?
Admiral Bloch. Not very much, sir.
195. General Grunert. Not as much as the Fleet Commander, I
presume?
Admiral Bloch. Well, I can't speak for him, but I wasn't much
concerned.
196. General Grunert. By that I mean, did you have in your pos-
session certain things that should be destroyed, to keep
them from getting into the possession of an enemy?
Admiral Bloch. I had thousands of them. I was the distributing
agent.
197. General Grunert. But you were not concerned about their
getting into the hands of the enemy?
Admiral Bloch. I had no orders to destroy any of mine.
198. General Grunert. Those were not orders, but they were cau-
tions, in a way?
Admiral Bloch. No, they were applied to a different locality.
199. General Grunert. You understood that did not apply to the Island of Hawaii?

Admiral Bloch. I don’t think so. I think it applied to Guam and some other place—outlying islands.

200. General Grunert. Is Hawaii considered an outlying island?

Admiral Bloch. Oh, no.

201. General Grunert. It is not part of the mainland.

Admiral Bloch. Well, it is a primary fleet base, at any rate.

202. General Frank. It states, here, this was sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet “for information only.”

Admiral Bloch. Which one was that?

203. General Grunert. That referred to the one message, evidently.

204. General Frank. Yes.

Admiral Bloch. The one to Guam?

205. General Frank. “The second, of December 4, 1941, instructed the addressee to destroy confidential documents and means of confidential communication, retaining only such as were necessary, the latter to be destroyed in the event of emergency (This was sent to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet for information only).”

206. General Grunert. That seems to run the gamut of all the messages received that are of record.

Now, did that create any particular alarm in your mind, or what was your reaction to this combination of messages received, and of information received?

Admiral Bloch. Well, our method of disposing of obsolete and compromised codes is to burn them. Many of them expire on certain dates, and they are burned. Moreover, although the dispatch says “categoric and authentic information,” and so forth, I didn’t know what the nature of the codes were, exactly where, or what the circumstances were, and I could make no intelligent deduction.

In Hawaii, located as I was, my horizon expired at the navy yard’s wall. My perspective wasn’t very big. I was submerged in local matters—matters of considerable importance locally. I had supreme confidence in the fact that if the Navy Department got information, knew the sources, and the reliability of the sources, that they would evaluate it and tell us what it meant.

207. General Grunert. Then you didn’t consider these messages sent as doing that which you envisaged?

Admiral Bloch. No, sir. Furthermore, the dispatches to Guam were perfectly natural dispatches to send, because two or three times in these warning dispatches they had mentioned the possibility of Guam and the Philippines. In the dispatch of November 27 that was mentioned, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, was never mentioned. The mere fact that they mentioned Guam and the Philippines, the only United States possessions, and didn’t say anything about any other place, excluded them. Now, Guam had been mentioned several times. We knew it had no fortifications. We knew it was bound to fall. It was the only natural thing, if they had a war, to get rid of the cipher and codes. It didn’t make any impression on me, at all.

208. General Grunert. Now, about the message. Did you consider this a war warning?
Admiral Bloch. That is the one I was talking about—the 27th of November. It says:

Consider this a war warning.

And it went ahead, to say—

They are going to have the war in southeastern China, with possibilities of the Philippines and Guam.

209. General Grunert. And you just considered that as a general notice that—

A war is likely to take place, but not necessarily; and this warns you that a war is likely to hit you in Hawaii?

Admiral Bloch. It didn’t warn us, at all. It was not sent to us specifically. It was sent to four or five people, and it wasn’t sent to “Admiral Kimmel,” it was sent to “Admiral Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific”; it was sent to “Admiral Hart, Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic”; and it was sent to “Admiral King, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic.” And it went to all of them.

210. General Grunert. Well, in the Army we are taught that in case you have no information, you ought to be prepared for the worst; and in an outpost like Hawaii they are always supposed to be awake and prepared for anything—that is why it is an outpost, so that people on the mainland can go to sleep.

Admiral Bloch. Well, mind you, I am not defending anything that took place, there. I am telling you what I recollect about this thing as fully and truthfully as I can, and the people to decide are someone else.

211. General Grunert. The gist of these messages did not create a particular war consciousness on your part?

Admiral Bloch. Not to me.

212. General Frank. Was the attack a complete surprise to you?

Admiral Bloch. Yes, sir.

213. General Grunert. Now, I have a question, here, on the subject of conferences and cooperation. In framing it, it was not intended to hurt anybody’s feelings, but I would like to get the reaction.

Is it a fact that you and General Short mutually, whilst maintaining the utmost in cordial personal relationship, felt such a delicacy as to interest in one another’s affairs that neither of you really got down to the details of your respective responsibilities and inquired into each other’s business, so that there was a lack of true teamwork and cooperation based upon definite factual knowledge of exactly what was happening?

Admiral Bloch. I can’t speak for General Short, of course. I can speak for myself. When I wanted to know anything, I asked him. While I felt that our cooperation was close, and while I thought our personal relations were extremely cordial, we many times had differences of opinion on a thing. I then had no more reason to believe that I was right than he—a difference of opinion.

214. General Grunert. As far as you were concerned, you felt that you had all the information you needed to carry out your responsibilities as to what the Army knew and was doing, is that right?

Admiral Bloch. Well, I don’t know whether I did or not. It is a pretty broad question. I felt that I knew the Army’s capabilities.
For example, I knew that they didn’t have the personnel that the Commanding General wanted. I didn’t believe they had sufficient, either in numbers or types, of antiaircraft guns. I felt that they were deficient in bombers, numbers and types. I didn’t think they had enough pursuit planes, in certain types. I think General Short knew that those were my sentiments, and I think that he tried to get the conditions improved. I don’t think he tried to do it because I asked him about it, and he and I talked about it, but I think he was making an effort to do it.

Now, I want you to understand that Admiral Kimmel had a great deal of contact with General Short, and, after all, Admiral Kimmel was an Admiral, and General Short is a military general, and I was a rear admiral; and while General Short and I would have been the same level of echelon if it hadn’t been there, because I had been the senior man in the Navy, and he had been the senior in the Army. He did have access to Admiral Kimmel, and Admiral Kimmel had access to him freely, and I have no criticism in the world to make of that. I think it is perfectly right and proper that they should; but, frequently about some thing he would come to me; sometimes I would talk to Admiral Kimmel about something before I would take it up with General Short, and I was sure not to get my “wires crossed.” I don’t think there was any reluctance on the part of either of us to talk freely and fully and frankly, if that is what you mean.

215. General GRUNERT. That is partially what I mean, but the gist of the thing, more than anything else, is to know each other’s capabilities and limitations, actually what can be done and what will be done under such capabilities and limitations. In other words, in ordinary language, outside of getting along well together and not having particular fights or anything, did you actually know each other’s business to that extent where it might affect your business?

Admiral BLOCH. Well, I think that I had a very good understanding of his business as General. I couldn’t understand the details of it, but in a general way, I understood his business.

216. General GRUNERT. You would not have had any hesitancy in asking him? You didn’t feel that “well, that’s none of my business, I ought not to butt into his,” if you really thought you ought to know something for your own responsibility?

Admiral BLOCH. Oh, no; I wouldn’t.

217. General GRUNERT. Have you any question?

218. General FRANK. I would like to ask one, about Bellinger. Who was Bellinger’s next superior?

Admiral BLOCH. Bellinger’s next superior was Vice Admiral Brown, Commander of the scouting force. Now, I may be in error, there, because at some time, Bellinger’s entire command was set up in a task force—I think, task force 9—in which case he would come under Admiral Kimmel, direct—that is, for operations. Administratively, he would be under Vice Admiral Brown.

219. General FRANK. In conducting this base defense air force, under whom did he operate?

Admiral BLOCH. He was under my supervisory control, but his directives were contained in that older order, 2CL-41, I think, and he got out his operation order and his plan of operations for that base defense air force, and that was a joint agreement between Bellinger
and Martin, and I approved it, and I passed it, I authenticated it, passed it on to the Commander-in-Chief.

[1522] 220. General Frank. Let us assume that he had violated some of the provisions of that agreement under which he was operating: Who would have taken action against him?

Admiral Bloch. Well, it would not be under me to take disciplinary action; it would be under the Commander-in-Chief.

221. General Frank. But the Admiral in command of the Fourteenth Naval District was the man who was responsible for carrying out the task that Bellinger was charged with carrying out, was he not?

Admiral Bloch. Bellinger had a task, you see; he had the task, and I had a supervisory control over him. Bellinger was an air man. He knew the technicalities of it. He and Martin drew up the joint estimates; he and Martin drew up the joint operations, and I passed it on to the Commander-in-Chief and approved it, and he approved it. The whole thing was approved all the way through.

222. General Frank. Bellinger did not report to you?

Admiral Bloch. Oh, I had certain supervisory duties in connection with him. I was called upon to designate to condition of readiness of the aircraft. That was one of my duties. My duties were specified very clearly in that order.

223. General Frank. In what order?

Admiral Bloch. 2–CL–41. I think you will find it in paragraph G-6.

224. General Grunert. Who would the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet hold responsible in case something went wrong? Would he hold you or Bellinger?

Admiral Bloch. I do not know.

225. General Grunert. That never happened?

Admiral Bloch. If there was some error or omission of mine he would probably have held me. If it was on the part of Bellinger he would probably have held him.

226. General Grunert. You do not think that he would hold you for something that Bellinger did?

Admiral Bloch. No; I do not.

227. General Russell. Admiral, I want to be very clear on this matter of reconnaissance. I believe I understand the situation. I am just going to repeat it for the purpose of confirming what I am thinking about.

The only prescribed reconnaissance to be conducted by naval forces, either from Pearl Harbor or by the fleet based on Pearl Harbor, was described and set forth in this letter 2–CL–41?

Admiral Bloch. I think that is correct, sir.

228. General Russell. That letter was issued as routine in the chain of command in the Navy?

Admiral Bloch. Issued by the Commander-in-Chief; yes, sir.

229. General Russell. It was not based on any agreement with the Army?

Admiral Bloch. No, except the air agreement.

230. General Russell. The air agreement you testified earlier made no reference to missions of the Army and Navy for reconnaissance?
Admiral Bloch. That is right.

231. General Russell. Therefore, the portions of this letter 2–CL–41 which relate to reconnaissance had no application to any agreement with the Army at all?

Admiral Bloch. So far as I know, the word "reconnaissance" is not used in that letter anywhere.

232. General Russell. Patrol?

Admiral Bloch. Patrol, search.

[1524] 233. General Russell. What does an air patrol go out for?

Admiral Bloch. There is a difference between distant reconnaissance and an air patrol, because an air patrol may be restricted or may be extensive.

234. General Grunert. Does the word "search" cover distant reconnaissance or both close and distant?

Admiral Bloch. It might be distant and it might be short; it might be anything.

235. General Russell. Is there anything in the letter 2–CL–41 which provides for obtaining information at a distance from Hawaii—call it distant reconnaissance or distant patrol or what?

Admiral Bloch. I think not. May I look at that just one second?

236. General Russell. Certainly (handing a paper to the witness).

Admiral Bloch. No. So far as I know, the word "reconnaissance" is not used in that order.

237. General Russell. Is there any language used in there relating to patrols that might be analogized to distant reconnaissance?

Admiral Bloch. Yes; in paragraph (B) I think, it says that Patrol Wing 2 shall search assigned operating areas and vicinity prior to entry therein by operating forces in early morning, and that an air patrol shall be established at least two hours prior to the sortie of the first heavy ship, and so forth.

238. General Russell. But the distant patrolling which may be analogized to distant reconnaissance was directed under the provisions of this letter 2–CL–41 for the protection of the fleet, [1525] or elements of the Pacific Fleet, after it had gone away from the base at Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Bloch. I do not quite get that, sir.

239. General Russell. I was just quoting what you referred to a moment ago.

Admiral Bloch. That is done every day; that is something that is done every day.

240. General Russell. These planes went out every morning, then?

Admiral Bloch. Yes, sir. I think three patrol planes went out every morning and searched the operating areas for enemy vessels and submarines. But I would not call that reconnaissance because I think probably 200 miles or 300 miles would cover the whole radius.

241. General Russell. And the purpose of that patrolling was to clear areas in which elements of the fleet were going to operate?

Admiral Bloch. Yes, sir.

242. General Grunert. It had no particular relation, then, to patrolling for the defense of Hawaii?
Admiral Bloch. No; it was for a specific purpose. I might say that if you have a distant reconnaissance, as I understand it, it is something that you send out during a period every day. You start it out as early as you can in the morning and run it out 600 or 700 or 800 miles and turn them around and they would come back and form a pattern. That would be predicated on a mathematical solution of a problem. But if you went that far, or if there were any enemies seen, they could not possibly get in to attack you before you started out the next morning.

[1526] 243. General GRUNERT. That is my conception.

Admiral Bloch. And that is my conception of a distant reconnaissance. That was not done, and I was not the person to do it, because I did not have the tools to do it.

244. General Russell. Where is contained the agreement that the Army's and the Navy's mission is to search for hostile transport or movement of troops and destroy them?

Admiral Bloch. I am not acquainted with that mission. Where is that, sir?

245. General Russell. I understood you to testify in answer to a question by General Grunert that it was the mission of the Navy to discover hostile convoys at a distance from Hawaii and to destroy them.

Admiral Bloch. I do not remember that, sir.

246. General GRUNERT. The question I asked was this: Was it the Navy's mission to locate and destroy hostile naval task forces?

Admiral Bloch. And I said that when the air raid alarm sounds all of the fighters went to the Army and all of the heavy ships went to the Navy, and the Navy went out to search and to attack the naval force, and the Army planes broke up the air attacks that came overland. That was my answer.

247. General Russell. Let us talk cases for a moment. Let us assume that there was a hostile task force in the Marshalls and that task force left the Marshalls for a point at which it could launch airplanes and attack our naval base. When did it become the Navy's duty to search out that task force and destroy it, if ever?

Admiral Bloch. Would we know whether it left the Marshalls?

248. General Russell. Assuming that you did not know that it had left the Marshalls?

Admiral Bloch. Then our knowing the presence or imminence of an attack would depend on the information we got as to when this task force arrived at some given point.

249. General FRANK. Actually, there had not existed a reconnaissance defense of Oahu at any time, had there?

Admiral Bloch. I think we had done it in fleet maneuvers and exercises and found that the number of P. B. Y.'s we had could not do it. They would break down and we would always lose a lot of them. We did not have enough. Of course at this particular time you are discussing now there was a squadron of planes and they did make a reconnaissance on this very same Sunday forenoon. Admiral Halsey had a task force some 200 miles west of Oahu, and I believe that he had a large reconnaissance fleet of his own out searching. Admiral Brown was 400 miles southeast of Midway, and he conducted recon-
naissance with aircraft. So there were reconnaissances in particular localities going out.

250. General Frank. But those two task forces were making reconnaissances which were a part of the operation of those two task forces?

Admiral Bloch. Yes; clearing the waters for themselves; that is right.

251. General Frank. But so far as there having been a reconnaissance for the actual protection of Oahu, such continuous reconnaissance had not been done?

Admiral Bloch. That is correct; and that was a matter subject to the orders of the Commander-in-Chief. I think that might as well be clear. He would be the man to order that, in my opinion.

252. General Russell. Admiral, just one other subject that I [1528] want to ask you about. When witnesses are asked about making reconnaissance with regard to the mandated islands they always say that they had no success at all, that they could not get in there. I am just wondering if, in your experience out in the Pacific, you were ever interested in efforts to get into the mandated islands and find out what was going on there.

Admiral Bloch. General, I would like to get the premises straightened out. You are talking about reconnaissance, and the question was asked me, did we ever get intelligence from them. We may mean the same thing, but they are different words.

253. General Russell. I think we have dealt with premises too much. I can state what I am thinking about without quibbling.

Admiral Bloch. You mean, somebody to go ashore in the mandated islands and get some information?

254. General Russell. That is right.

Admiral Bloch. That information, when it comes to us, is intelligence.

255. General Russell. But that is not what I was asking you about. I was asking you as to efforts which had been made under your supervision to get such information in the mandated islands.

Admiral Bloch. I do not think that I was ever in a position to make an effort to get such information in the mandated islands. I know that an effort was made to get information from the mandates without success.

256. General Russell. Do you know what those efforts were?

Admiral Bloch. I know that the Navy Department asked the Government of Japan to permit certain ships going to the westward and coming to the eastward of Hawaii, to the Philippines, to go in there and anchor, calling attention to the fact that [1529] we permitted them to have tankers and things come to Hawaii and Oahu; but they always refused to permit us to go in there.

257. General Russell. Were those applications made directly by the Navy Department, or did they go through the State Department?

Admiral Bloch. Through the State Department.

258. General Russell. And that was a general application to be permitted to use those ports?

Admiral Bloch. No; I think it was a specific application for specific ships at specific times.

259. General Russell. And those applications were always turned down?
Admiral Bloch. Yes. I think we did get a ship in there around 1929 or thereabouts. I believe one of the cruisers got into one of the ports in there at some time.

260. General Russell. That was about 12 years prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Bloch. Yes.

261. General Russell. Admiral, I have been interested in the line of questioning of General Grunert about the cooperation out there between the Army and Navy, the actual tactical cooperation. Were you out there in 1940?

Admiral Bloch. I arrived there in April, 1940.

262. General Russell. At some time in July the Army forces went on an all-out alert, in 1940?

Admiral Bloch. Yes.

263. General Russell. Do you remember that?

Admiral Bloch. I remember all about it.

264. General Russell. The Navy did not go on an alert at that time?


265. General Russell. It came to pass that the Army would operate on a defensive all-out alert, and that the procedure in the Navy would not be changed at all?

Admiral Bloch. I do not know about that feature, but I will say this, that in the summer of 1940 the Commanding General came to me one day and said he had received instructions from the War Department to go on an all-out alert against a raid from the west or northwest. He said, "This is not a drill; I do not think it is a drill. It is the real thing, because it came from the Chief of Staff, and I want to know what you know about it." I said, "I have never heard of it." He said—and I think you better listen to this, because it is right up the alley you have been inquiring about.

266. General Russell. I am listening.

Admiral Bloch. He said, "I think we ought to have a distant reconnaisance." I said, "I agree with you, but I cannot order it. We will go to see the Senior Officer Present." The Commander-in-Chief was at sea, so we took a car and went to see Vice Admiral Andrews, and I told him what I thought in general terms, and told him about this, and Admiral Andrews gave the order for, I think, a 600-mile reconnaisance. I do not think he had enough aircraft to make it all the way around, but he made it to the north and northwest where the attack was indicated. That was ordered and put into effect by the Senior Officer Present, and the Commander-in-Chief, who was at sea, was informed and he flew in that night. He did not know about it, and he came in. He did not know where he stood. He sent a dispatch to the Navy Department, told them the circumstances and asked them about it, and to the best of my belief and knowledge [1531] they never answered him.

267. General Russell. To make this illustration that we are thinking about a little clearer, on November 27 the Commander-in-Chief had a war warning message. A few hours earlier General Short had received a message of November 27 telling him that anything might be expected. Each was supreme in his own sphere then to place such interpretations as they might see fit and take such action as they saw fit, without respect to the other?
Admiral Bloch. That is what the Roberts Commission said.

268. General Russell. I am asking you if that is what happened. Admiral Bloch. I do not have all the evidence before me that the Roberts Commission had.

269. General Russell. Do you know whether or not the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department took those messages and pursued separate courses without reference to the other?

Admiral Bloch. I do not know. But I will say this: It is very simple to sit here today, two and a half years later, with the facts no longer clear in your mind—and I have only a fair memory, not any too good—and to say what you would have done or what somebody else should have done. But I was out there at the time. I knew Admiral Kimmel very well. I had known him for years, and I saw him very frequently. I do not know of any man who had worked harder or more devotedly. God knows he spent enough time with General Short, and if they did not understand each other I don’t know why.

270. General Russell. The last question I asked was not directed to that point. It was merely to illustrate the fact, if it is a fact, that each was free to act on the information which he received without reference to what the other did.

[1533] 271. General Frank. As had been done in the year previous.

272. General Russell. As had been done in 1940.

Admiral Bloch. And it was done afterwards.

273. General Russell. Then that was the situation?

Admiral Bloch. Well, I find that I know very little about this thing. I only told what I know myself, but I was really quite a small element of the whole big thing.

274. General Frank. To get back to distant reconnaissance again, Admiral: In this Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, paragraph 18, treating of the responsibility of the Navy, it says:

The Commandant, FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT, shall provide for:

(a) An inshore patrol.

(b) An offshore patrol.

And in paragraph it says:

Distant reconnaissance.

You have stated that you could not provide distant reconnaissance because you did not have the planes with which to do it?

Admiral Bloch. I did not have any planes assigned to the local defense forces.

275. General Frank. What happened immediately after December 7?

Admiral Bloch. I believe a search or daily reconnaissance was made. They used everything they had, Army B-17’s, Navy P.B.Y.’s, anything they had; and I think they even used those old B-18’s by putting them in the southeast sector where they only had to go a couple of hundred miles.

276. General Frank. Were there any additional Navy planes furnished from the mainland?

277. General Frank. Do you remember about how many?
Admiral Bloch. No; I do not. That would not come under me. I know some came out, and a lot of B-17's came out almost immediately.

278. General Frank. Did not the Navy give you some P. B. Y.'s from the coast with which to conduct this reconnaissance immediately after December 7th?
Admiral Bloch. Almost immediately after December 7th the principle of unity of command went into effect. I think just a few days afterwards the Navy began to send P. B. Y.'s out, and a great many of them that had been damaged on December 7th were repaired and made serviceable. The Army sent quite a number of B-17's out. I cannot speak authoritatively, because this did not come under me at that time, even though the war was on—I think Admiral Bellinger was told to run these in, and I think he did.

279. General Frank. What I was about to bring out was the fact that there were planes made available right after December 7 which, had they been available prior to December 7, would have made it possible for reconnaissance to have taken place?
Admiral Bloch. That is correct. But the distant reconnaissances that we made after December 7th were made jointly with Army and Navy planes. If they had had those planes prior to December 7th they could have made reconnaissance had they so desired.

280. General Frank. But prior to December 7th there was not a defensive reconnaissance in force?
Admiral Bloch. That is correct, sir.

281. General Grunert. Then, even though that joint plan was [1534] signed by you, when they came to carry it out you had no say about the distant reconnaissance?
Admiral Bloch. That is right, sir. As a matter of fact, I did not have a staff or facilities for doing it. It took a great big staff, a lot of communications and facilities. We had those facilities under Rear Admiral Bellinger, and it would have been stupid to set up another duplicate thing.

282. General Grunert. I have a general question, a question of opinion. Had the staff of the Admiral of the fleet and the staff of the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department sat alongside of each other, as they probably had to do under unity of command, would there have been better results, in your opinion?
Admiral Bloch. Of course they never did sit alongside of each other. They could not get any establishment large enough to take them and have it located in a position——

283. General Grunert (interposing). I really meant the heads.
Admiral Bloch. We got a directive from the War and Navy Departments to establish a joint operating center, I believe it was called, and we used some tunnels in a hill up at Alamarru. I had a tunnel up there and had some officers up there and some communications. They have been in operation now since February, 1942. I do not think they have ever been worth ten cents. I think that the stimulus we needed was to get geared for war; and we got that on December 7th.
284. General Grunert. Have you anything else that you can think of which might contribute any assistance toward getting at facts, anything which you think the Board should know and consider outside of what you have given us already?

[1535] Admiral Bloch. Well, we have discussed numbers of features relating to distant reconnaissance, joint air plans, and telegrams, and whether I knew about the capabilities of the Army and whether they knew about my capabilities. Of course I can’t answer that question, but I don’t know what else you want to know, General Grunert. There may be some other things, but I can’t think of anything else at this time.

285. General Grunert. I did not know but what something stood out in your mind as something special or peculiar or something that probably you thought that an Army Board might think of to go into. I do not mean about naval operations or anything like that, because we want to get information about the facts insofar as the Army is concerned and anything that is connected therewith which will give us light on this subject. That is all.

Admiral Bloch. Well, I think that it is pertinent to say here that all my views—and my views are rather expansive on the number of antiaircraft guns that were required to defend a given place—have been altered greatly. One of our big battleships today probably carries more barrels of antiaircraft guns than they had in all Hawaii on the 7th of December. That may be a slight exaggeration. I think that one of our battleships has 170 barrels. Maybe the Army and Navy together, they had more than 170 barrels together. Two battleships would probably meet the bill.

286. General Grunert. Admiral, it may not be so much what they had; it is what they did with what they did have.

Admiral Bloch. I agree with you there, sir. I agree with you there.

[1536] 287. General Grunert. If there are no other questions—

288. General Frank. From whom did you have to ask for these planes for your force there?

Admiral Bloch. You mean the patrol planes?

289. General Frank. Yes. The Navy Department?

Admiral Bloch. Yes, the Navy Department instituted what they called a 15,000-plane program. I think it was in 1940 when they got the money for the 15,000-plane program. You would probably know that better than I. And in that 15,000-plane program they had so many PBYs, and to the 14th Naval District they allocated I think 108, and to the Fleet I think they allocated 150 or something like that. At that time the Fleet only had 81, I think.

Now, the planes for the 14th Naval District, I was quite persistent in trailing them, pursuing them, and trying to get them, and everybody knew, the Commander-in-Chief knew; all the correspondence went through him, because that was a line of business that I conducted through him, and he supported me. The correspondence went to the Navy Department asking for these planes, and I was told repeatedly they would be given to me but they would not be given to me until sometime that was indefinite in the future.

290. General Frank. That was a question of appropriation?
Admiral Bloch. No, it was not a question of appropriation. It was a question of priorities: The war was in Atlantic; Pacific wasn't in the war. That is the expression of war plan. They say it in the war plan: The war is in the Atlantic; the Pacific is a more or less quasi-defensive until they get around to it.

[1557] 291. General Grunert. Well, Admiral, we appreciate very much your giving us of your time and assistance.

Admiral Bloch. Thank you very much. I hope I have been of some assistance, and I hope I have made myself understood.

292. General Grunert. I think you have.

(The witness was excused, with the usual admonition.)

(Thereupon, at 6:35 p. m., the Board concluded the hearing of witnesses for the day and proceeded to other business.)

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